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EVALUATION OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

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FINAL REPORT

Evaluation of Agricultural Sector Planning Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean

June 1982

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document is the Final Report of a comprehensive study of agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean over the last decade It is based largely on a review of agricultural sector planning activities that have been supported by the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbbean (LAC) of the Agency for International Development (AID). A report of interim findings was reviewed in a seminar in AID/Washington in January, 1982. This document reflects suggestions that were made at that time. It also incorporates additional information that was obtained subsequently.

Objectives

Two main objectives were defined for this study:

- First, to examine, on the basis of previous experience, the factors that are associated with the relative success/failure of agricultural sector planning and to make judgments as to their relative importance; and
- Second, to outline in succinct, usable form, a set of recommendations for the design of agricultural sector planning projects in the future.

These objectives guided the conduct of the entire study, and this document is organized accordingly. The heart of the study appears in Chapters 3-8. The content of these chapters can be summarized under four headings: evaluation design, findings based on review of documentation on agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean, findings based on country visits, and factors to be considered in the design of future agricultural sector planning activities.

Evaluation Design

Agricultural sector planning is a process. It takes place in the context of a national management system and, as an advisory service to decisionmakers, is geared toward the enactment of policies, programs, and projects -- and, ultimately to the achievement of agricultural sector objectives such as increases in production, increases in incomes, and an improvement in the distribution of income.

There are eight key functions of agricultural sector planning: data collection, data processing, data analysis, project identification, project proposals, policy analysis, policy formulation, and evaluation. With the exception of evaluation, these functions correspond closely with what is often referred to as the formulation stage of the planning process.

Since the ultimate objective of planning is presumably to achieve desirable results, it is natural to think of the achievement of agricultural sector objectives as the fundamental criterion for evaluating agricultural sector planning "success." This "results" criterion is indeed an appropriate standard for assessing the effectiveness of the overall agricultural sector management process. It would also be appropriate for agricultural sector planning if planners had control over all parts of the process -- which in fact they do not. As a consequence, this study does not attempt to say whether agricultural sector planning activities have been successful in an ultimate sense. It does, however, have much to say about the usefulness of different kinds of planning activities.

This study identifies four kinds of intermediate impacts that agricultural sector planning activities can have. The four kinds of impacts are capacity-building impacts (that is, impacts on the capacity of planning institutions to plan effectively), interinstitutional impacts (that is, impacts of planning institutions on other public sector institutions), consciousness-raising impacts (that is, impacts on the awareness of decisionmakers about the need for data and analysis as an ingredient to more rational decisionmaking and about questions of equity and the need to target resources to disadvantaged groups), and policy/program impacts (that is, impacts on policy and program decisions). In this study, the usefulness of agricultural sector planning activities is assessed according to the impacts that have resulted from them. Different kinds of activities are expected to have different kinds of impacts and, for this reason, variations of impacts are examined within and among distinct groupings of similar activities.

In examining the different factors associated with useful agricultural sector planning activities, this study adapts the framework that

AID uses in the design of development projects. Specifically, lessons and recommendations from the written record of agricultural sector planning in the region are organized in three categories: technical, institutional, and other.

More detail on the evaluation design for the study can be found in Chapter 3 of this document.

The Written Record

The written record examined in this study consists of two sources: AID documentation on agricultural sector planning activities and the results of a survey of planning units in 23 Latin American and Caribbean countries that was conducted by the Interamerican Institute for Agricultural Cooperation (IICA) in 1978. The findings of the examination of these sources of information appear in Chapters 4 and 7, respectively.

All countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have agricultural sector planning units. In 72 percent of the countries, these units serve as lead coordinating agencies of their agricultural sector planning systems.

Over the last decade, bilateral AID Missions have provided support to agricultural sector planning activities in 16 countries. RDO/Caribbean, ROCAP, and AID/Washington have also supported agricultural sector planning activities. In all, 63 different activities are identified in this study. Of the 63 activities, 40 are formal projects. Appendix A describes each of these activities and is a comprehensive inventory of AID's support of agricultural sector planning in the region.

AID-supported activities are distributed relatively evenly among the Caribbean, Central American, and South American subregions. The countries with the largest number of activities are Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador.

In dollar terms, the aggregate value of the planning components of agricultural sector planning projects supported by AID is $93,632,300. AID's support comes to $49,513,900, or slightly more than half of the total. Of AID's contribution, $29,985,900 (61 percent) comes from grant funding, and $19,528,000 (39 percent) comes from loan funding. Host

country contributions come to $38,106,000, or slightly more than 40 percent of the aggregate amount.

The geographical distribution of the dollar value of agricultural sector planning projects is not as even as the geographical distribution of the number of projects or the number of activities. The total value of projects in Central America comes to $40,749,000, in the Caribbean to $28,310,300, and in South America to $20,594,000. The countries with the largest dollar values of agricultural sector planning activities are Bolivia, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

In socioeconomic terms, the countries with the largest numbers of AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities are those with less than six million people, with GNP per capita less than $1,000, with agriculture making up less than 20 percent of GDP, with less agricultural production per capita in 1977 than in 1961-65, and with more than 55 percent of the labor force engaged in agriculture. With minor variations, the same pattern holds for the distribution of agricultural sector planning projects, the aggregate dollar value of the projects, the proportion of the aggregate dollar value financed by AID, and the proportion of AID's contribution financed with grant funding.

For 22 of the activities supported by AID, an examination was made of available evaluation materials. Summaries of these materials appear in Appendix B. Summary findings on the impacts of these activities are:

- Capacity-building impacts are identified in all 22 cases. This finding indicates that AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities have made an important first step in strengthening the capacity of planning institutions in countries throughout the region.
- Interinstitutional impacts appear in 20 of the 22 cases, that is, in 91 percent of the agricultural sector planning activities evaluated. Most activities were instrumental in bringing about improvements in institutional relations. Nevertheless, interinstitutional impacts vary in intensity from one activity to another.
- Consciousness-raising impacts are identified in nine of the 22 activities. The overwhelming majority of these impacts increased awareness of the need for analytical planning. In only one instance was increased concern for small farmers identified.

- Finally, policy/program impacts are also identified in nine of the 22 activities. Since the sample of evaluations appears to be representative of agricultural sector planning activities in general, this suggests that at least forty percent of AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities have had an impact on agricultural sector policies and programs. It should be stressed, however, that this simple calculation does not account for differences among the policy/program impacts identified. As might be expected, some impacts were more dramatic than others.

The 22 activities can be broken down into three groups of relatively similar activities. The first group consists of nine "data-intensive" activities, the second group of nine "institutional support" activities, and the third group of four "multi-country" activities. The data-intensive activities resulted in a relatively high number of consciousness-raising impacts, but a relatively low number of policy/program impacts. The institutional support activities evidenced the opposite pattern: a relatively high number of policy/program impacts and a relatively low number of consciousness-raising impacts. The multi-country activities had the most difficulty in achieving policy/program or consciousness-raising impacts.

In addition to identifying impacts, the written record on agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean cites a variety of constraints to effective agricultural sector planning and offers a wealth of lessons that are applicable to the design of agricultural sector planning activities in the future. The presentation in the text is in fact only a summary of what is found in available documentation. Nevertheless, the key findings that emerge from AID materials and from the results of IICA's survey are:

- There appears to be a general and pervasive lack of real contact between agricultural sector planning units and decision-makers throughout the region. Institutionally, there appears to be little real demand for analytical planning, that is, a demand that grows out of policy concerns and is formulated in specific terms. Analytical units often have no clear mandate as to what they are supposed to do and, as a consequence, operate in a vacuum. In the final analysis, planning must be "demand- and decision-driven," and planners must target their products to address specific policy and program concerns.

- As a rule, agricultural sector planning units have very limited relationships with other public sector institutions and evidence little interest in cultivating such relationships. For planning to be effective, however, such relationships must be cultivated.
- Agricultural sector planning units are heavily dependent for information on institutions, that are not conventionally regarded as part of the agricultural sector planning system. This suggests that activities to improve the effectiveness of agricultural sector planning cannot afford to be limited to agricultural sector institutions alone.
- Effective planning requires leadership and continuity of technically capable personnel. Most countries have problems in attracting and retaining qualified people. Ideally, a critical mass of strong senior and middle-level staff must be created in agricultural sector planning units.
- As a rule, agricultural sector planning units should concentrate on fast turn-around, highly focused, problem-oriented studies. Long-term data-intensive activities are wont to run into technical difficulties and often cost far more than initially estimated. If and when agricultural sector planning units engage in long-term studies, they should produce real, "live" findings on a periodic basis and engage in short-term analytical work as well.
- Analytical methods need to be kept simple. In technology transfer activities, the absorptive capacity of host-country technicians must be kept clearly in mind. There is a real danger that esoteric techniques may never be used after AID support ceases. As a rule, therefore, keep it simple.
- There is a substantial, unmet need for technical training of agricultural sector planning unit personnel throughout the region. The areas of training of highest priority are training in the preparation and evaluation of policies, programs, projects, and budgets and training in economics and statistics. The mode of in-country training preferred by agricultural sector planning units is in-service training. The preferred mode for training abroad is short-term special courses.
- Capacity-building activities are long-term in nature, often at least five years.
- AID and host-country procurement procedures are often a stumbling block to progress. This is particularly true for timely contracting of technical assistance.

Site Visits

The review of the written record on AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities was supplemented by site visits to different

countries. Short visits were made to Guatemala, Guyana, and Jamaica, and contacts were also made with key figures in agricultural sector planning activities in Colombia and Nicaragua. Findings on these countries appear in Chapter 5. Longer site visits were made to Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras and are summarized in Chapter 6.

The findings of the country visits largely confirm what was found in the review of the written record. Nevertheless, the country visits suggest strongly that lack of demand for planning is more than just one of a set of problems to be addressed; rather, it is the central constraint to effective agricultural sector planning. This finding is the key finding of the study.

Agricultural sector planning can be viewed as a chain of events consisting of the eight functions discussed in Chapter 3. The country visits reveal that substantial progress has been made in data-related activities. The transition from data-related activities to policy analysis and policy formulation, however, has been far from automatic. Although AID-supported activities have had a relatively high degree of success in institutionalizing data collection capacity, in very few instances has the link to data and policy analysis been successfully forged. As a rule, agricultural sector planning has little link with decisionmaking processes. This is a reflection of the weakness of the general planning context in which agricultural sector planning takes place and, specifically, of the failure of decisionmakers to demand policy guidance from the planning process. Often, therefore, agricultural sector planning virtually truncates at the data stage.

The country visits point up a number of other lessons. Among the major lessons that receive less attention in the written record are:

- In some countries, planning, budgeting, and implementation functions are highly fragmented. This fragmentation may also be reinforced by political, economic, and social unrest. In such an environment, it is difficult for even very useful planning activities to be translated into the achievement of agricultural sector objectives.
- The annual budget process is a mechanism in which agricultural sector planning can play a very fruitful role, particularly decentralized agricultural sector planning. This will only be

the case, however, if the functions of key actors, especially the national planning office and the Ministry of Finance, are clearly defined and effectively performed.

- Planning cannot be divorced from politics. Internal and external political support is almost a precondition for the effectiveness of a planning unit. A systematic "public relations campaign" can be critical to the maintenance of political support for agricultural sector planning.

- Many AID project evaluations pay considerable attention to the number of counterpart personnel that host countries assign to planning. This emphasis on quantity may overshadow the question of quality. The key is to have a critical mass of well qualified people and, at least after a certain point, numbers may be relatively unimportant.

Future Design

Since lack of effective demand for planning has been the central constraint to the effectiveness of agricultural sector planning activities in the past, it is suggested that future AID-supported activities be geared explicitly to the generation of demand. The first step in the design of future activities would be the construction of a "demand baseline." Such a baseline would lay out the general context in which agricultural sector planning takes place, how agricultural sector planning plays a role in this context, and what are the problems that are of major concern to decisionmakers.

The intent of the baseline would be to identify the opportunities that have the most likelihood for triggering demand for analytical planning in the future. With this baseline as a guide, options for future AID support would be assessed in terms of their potential contribution to making planning decision-driven.

Since future AID support of agricultural sector planning is seen as emerging from a demand baseline, it is unrealistic to lay out a blueprint of what a "typical" agricultural sector planning activity would look like. Rather, AID's support must be adaptable and flexible. As a rule, less reliance should be placed on large, elaborate projects as the mechanism for funding. On the contrary, a pragmatic approach is recommended in which AID would support a series of discrete, even seemingly disparate, activities over time, all of which would be guided by the

objective of increasing awareness of the importance of data and analysis in decisionmaking. In a loose sense, therefore, AID would support a "program" of agricultural sector planning, a program that would consist of a set of well-defined, carefully selected activities.

Chapter 8 outlines a number of implications of the focus on demand generation for the design of future agricultural sector planning activities. Among the key implications are:

- AID's conventional emphasis on capacity building is generally well placed. Nevertheless, if conflicts emerge between the objectives of institutionalization of capacity and the production of outputs, it is recommended that the balance be tipped toward production. Decisionmakers will only come to "want" planning if they see that planners' outputs are useful. Furthermore, the dynamics of capacity building can be expected to go much more smoothly if decisionmakers are convinced of the need for it.

- Data-related activities have not proven to be an effective lever for triggering analytical work, nor for stimulating demand for analysis. In the future, therefore, it is recommended that AID shift its support priorities toward more directly analytical work. Future AID support of data-related activities should be seen as buttressing the demand process, but not stimulating it.

- It is often through compliance with unappealing, short-term requests that planners can establish their credibility and spark interest in more thought-out analysis. To the extent that AID can provide support in meeting these requests, it may contribute to the ultimate objective of demand generation. Similarly, since projects are often a major concern of decisionmakers, the process of project development may be a useful activity for agricultural sector planning units to engage in -- and for AID to support.

- Institutions are created to perform defined functions, and it is the functions that define how institutions should be organized. Before contemplating changes in organizational arrangements, therefore, the mandate of an agricultural sector planning unit must be clearly defined. A unit's mandate is the ultimate criterion for assessing its organizational adequacy.

PREFACE

This report is the Final Report called for under Work Order No. 6 of Indefinite Quantity Contract, AID/SOD/PDC-C-0389, between the Agency for International Development and Abt Associates Inc. The title of the work order is "Impact Evaluatiion of Agricultural Sector Planning Projects in Latin America and the Caribbean." The work order was designed to assess past experience and, on this basis, to make recommendations for the design of agricultural sector planning activities in the future.

Work commenced in late September, 1981. Between then and now, we have performed the various tasks specified in our scope of work. In brief, these tasks were organized in five phases:

I. Review and Synthesis of Secondary Sources in an Interim Report

II. Review and Revision of the Interim Report

III. Country Visits

IV. Draft of a Final Report

V. Review and Revision of the Final Report and Presentation to LAC/DR/RD.

The Interim Report was reviewed in a seminar in AID/Washington on January 20, 1982. This seminar was extremely helpful in highlighting weaknesses in our initial methodological design for the study. We are indebted to the participants in the seminar for suggesting a number of the improvements that have been incorporated in this Final Report.

In addition to the AID personnel who reviewed this and the earlier report, an external advisory group was formed. The advisory group consisted of five experts in fields that bear on agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean. The members of the advisory group were Juan Antonio Aguirre of the Interamerican Institute for Agricultural Cooperation, Guy Baird of the International Agricultural Development Service, Hunt Howell of the Inter-American Development Bank, William Merrill of Iowa State University, and John Montgomery of Harvard University. We were extremely fortunate in having had these individuals as advisors and we are indebeted to them, as well as to AID personnel, for their constructive comments.

To our knowledge, the breadth of experience encompassed in this study is totally unprecedented in studies of agricultural sector planning and never before tied together in a unified framework. In fact, this experience is so extensive and its documentation so voluminous that it stretches one's capacity to absorb it. Considerable pains have been taken to check on the accuracy of the examples that we cite to illustrate various points. In certain instances, however, the examples may be inaccurate or they may have been overtaken by subsequent events. Nevertheless, errors in illustration should not invalidate the major points that are made.

A number of individuals have contributed to the drafting of different portions of this document. These individuals are:

- James Riordan, Abt Associates
- Kenneth Jameson, University of Notre Dame
- John Tilney, Abt Associates
- Susan Wood, Abt Associates
- Paul Oostenbrug, Abt Associates
- Stephanie Wilson, Abt Associates

Larry Kerpelman reviewed the Interim Report in his capacity as Abt Associates Quality Control Reviewer. In his absence, Robert Jerrett, III, reviewed this Final Report. The formidable task of coordinating the production of this document fell to Joyce Stamps, who was ably assisted by Billie Renos.

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LIST OF KEY ABBREVIATIONS[1]

AID	Agency for International Development
BUCEN	U.S. Bureau of the Census
GO_____	Government of _____
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IICA	Interamerican Institute for Agricultural Cooperation
LAC/DR	Office of Development Resources, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, AID
LAC/DR/RD	Rural Development Division, LAC/DR
LAC/DR/SA	Sector Analysis Division, LAC/DR
PPC/E	Office of Evaluation, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, AID
RDO/C	Regional Development Office for the Caribbean, AID
REE	Research, Education, and Extension
ROCAP	Regional Office for Central America and Panama, AID
S&T	Bureau for Science and Technology, AID
S&T/AGR/EPP	Economic Policy and Planning Division, Office of Agriculture, S&T
S&T/UD	Office of Urban Development, S&T
SIECA	Secretariat for the Economic Integration of Central America
USAID/	AID Mission to Government of
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture

[1] If an entity's designation has changed over the last decade, the current symbol and title are presented.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades, the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) of the Agency for International Development (AID) has provided substantial support to agricultural sector planning throughout the region. Until now, however, only partial attempts have been made to see what impacts all this support has had. In addition, the various lessons that have been learned from this experience have not as yet been pulled together in an integrated fashion that would allow guidelines to be developed for designing agricultural sector planning activities in the future.

Agricultural sector planning is, and is likely to continue to be, a central component of many AID country programs. As a consequence, there is a real need for guidelines for the future that are rooted in lessons learned in the past. This study is a first attempt to develop just such guidelines for future project design. Its intent is to review previous experience, identify the key factors that are associated with useful agricultural sector planning; and, on this basis, develop sound recommendations for future agricultural sector planning activities. Formally, the major objectives of the study are:

- First, to examine, on the basis of previous experience, the factors that are associated with the relative success/failure of agricultural sector planning and to make judgments as to their relative importance; and

- Second, to outline in succinct, usable form a set of recommendations for the design of agricultural sector planning projects in the future.

1.1 Organization of the Study

The remainder of this document is guided by the objectives of the study and is structured as follows. The next chapter, Chapter 2, presents a context and a backdrop for subsequent chapters. It lays out a framework for understanding agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean, discusses the rationale for AID's support of agricultural sector planning, and summarizes how this program has evolved over

time. This background material is essential for understanding the material presented throughout the rest of the study. Nevertheless, readers who have only limited time to read this document or who are already familiar with AID's support of agricultural sector planning in the region may want to skim this chapter and pass directly to the heart of the study beginning with Chapter 3.

Chapter 3 outlines our evaluation design for examining past experiences in agricultural sector planning. It defines operational criteria for assessing the usefulness of agricultural sector planning activities and explains how AID's project analysis framework can be adapted to structure the lessons we learn. Subsequent chapters build directly on this design chapter.

Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 report the findings of our review of agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean. Chapter 4 presents what we have found in our review of the written record of AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities, Chapters 5 and 6 lay out what we have learned from country visits, and Chapter 7 capsulizes the findings of the 1978 survey of agricultural sector planning units conducted by the Interamerican Institute for Agricultural Cooperation (IICA). Each of the chapters concludes with a brief section that summarizes the findings that have been obtained.

Chapter 8 is a future-oriented summary of Chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7. It integrates the major lessons that have been learned and discusses key factors to be considered in the design of future agricultural sector planning activities. Chapter 9 then concludes our textual presentation with a brief summary of possible directions for future study.

This study also contains five appendices. Appendices A and B summarize, activity by activity, the content of the written record on AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities. The format of the forms in these appendices is discussed in Chapter 3 of the text. Appendix C summarizes key lessons that have been learned in planning in sectors other than agriculture. Appendix D lists bibliographical references that we have consulted during the study, and Appendix E concludes with a list of the persons whom we have consulted.

2.0 AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

In this chapter we present a context and a backdrop for the remainder of this report. Section 2.1 discusses some general characteristics of planning, what it is intended to do and what functions it performs. This is followed in Section 2.2 by a brief discussion of the evolution of planning in Latin American and the Caribbean, and, in Section 2.3, by a presentation of a framework for understanding how agricultural sector planning is conducted in the region. In Section 2.4, we shift to a brief presentation of the rationale for AID's interest in and support of agricultural sector planning in Latin American and Caribbean countries. Finally, in Section 2.5 we outline how AID's support of agricultural sector planning has evolved through different stages over the last decade.

Throughout this chapter, we also highlight a number of issues that will be key to our examination of agricultural sector planning in later chapters.

2.1 What Is Planning? The Objectives and The Means

Planning is a commitment to the future. It is a rational series of steps taken to improve conditions and is a process in which most people, to differing degrees, are engaged.

A good definition of planning is given by Benjamin Chinitz in a discussion of economic development planning. "Planning involves a process of measuring and metering local economic performance, articulating a strategy for improving that performance, and pinpointing the investment and related activities by which the strategy can be implemented over time."[1] While the quote speaks to economic development planning, it is applicable to all types of planning. The overall objective of planning is to improve the performance of an economy, a sector of an economy, a private firm, etc., while the means to bring about this improvement are monitoring and analysis of current and projected conditions, identification of problems that hinder performance, assessment of alternative options for solving problems, and, then, clear articulation of a strategy or series of steps (policy changes, legal changes,

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[1] Benjamin Chinitz, "National Policy for Regional Development," Essays in Regional Economics, John Kain and John Meyer (eds.) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971).

investments/projects) to improve performance. Ideally, these activities are ongoing and continuous, since planning is a process, not a static event.

While successful planning articulates strategies and proposes specific activities to carry out these strategies, it is usually not planners who make final decisions on which steps to implement. This is true in both the public and private sectors. A larger system envelops planning, as Exhibit 2.1 indicates. In the public sector, most key decisions are made by politicians and senior government officials, while in the private sector, key decisionmaking falls to company officers. Planners inform decisionmakers but usually do not make decisions themselves. Lyndon Johnson dramatized this division of labor when he instructed his staff of social planners to propose effective social programs, and said he would attend to their passage in Congress.

In general, a developed management process consists of the six stages outlined in Exhibit 2.2. Most often, planners become involved in the first four stages of this process, that is, in performance measuring and monitoring, in problem identification, in strategy formulation, and in the identification of alternative policies, programs, and investments/ projects. Occasionally, however, they also participate in decisionmaking and implementation (stages 5 and 6).

A review of the extensive literature on planning, both domestic and international, suggests that two factors are particularly critical to its success. The first is capacity. A planning unit must have sufficient capacity in the size, training and sophistication of its staff to identify problems and propose feasible and credible solutions to these problems. The second factor, which is an equally important and necessary ingredient for success, is direct access to decisionmakers. To be able to identify and propose solutions to decisionmakers' problems, planners cannot afford to engage in purely academic research or become otherwise isolated from decisionmakers' concerns. Too often planners lose the very credibility they covet by proposing solutions to problems that are politically, administratively, or economically infeasible. Even though planners are usually not decisionmakers themselves, it is nevertheless imperative that they be fully aware of the way in which decisions are made and responsive to the pressing concerns of those in power.

Exhibit 2.1

PLANNING IN THE CONTEXT OF A NATIONAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM[1]



[1]Source: Lizardo de las Casas, "The Continuous Planning - Implementation Process as a Framework for Projects."

Exhibit 2.2

STAGES OF A NATIONAL MANAGEMENT PROCESS



2.2 The Evolution of Planning in Latin America and the Caribbean

National development planning in Latin America and the Caribbean can be said to have started, at least in embryonic form, during the 1940s. During that decade, "the need to enlarge economic infrastructure, particularly transport and power, and to encourage relatively large-scale projects in key industries led to the preparation and implementation of some partial public investment programs."[1] It was during the 1950s, however, that a movement toward comprehensive, economy-wide planning began to gather momentum. Following the success of the Marshall Plan in the reconstruction of Europe after World War II, Latin America and the Caribbean appealed to the United States for a regional aid program of substantial proportions. In making this appeal, it also argued the need for national development planning as a mechanism for stimulating dynamic and balanced growth in the region.

Throughout this period, the leading advocate of comprehensive planning in the region was the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA).[2] As early as 1953, ECLA began to prepare illustrative aggregate and sectoral projections for a series of countries. "These projections were designed to show the most desirable development of the national product and its composition. The projections were criticized as being unrealistic and there is no evidence that they influenced the internal policy of any country for which they were prepared."[3] Nevertheless, as we shall see shortly, the continuing advocacy of ECLA was eventually to bear fruit.

[1] Agency for International Development, "Formulation of National Development Plans in Latin America and U.S. Economic Assistance, by Country and Year," House Appropriations Committee Testimony, Insert, 1967, p. 5264.

[2] The influence of ECLA continues today, and the work of the Latin-american Institute of Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) is respected throughout the hemisphere. ILPES's approach to agricultural sector planning is summarized in Jesús González M., Antonio Pérez G., Francisco León D., José Olivares D., Hernán Calderón L., Danilo Astori S., Sergio Figueroa T., and Terence R. Lee, La Planificación del Sector Agropecuario: Un Enfoque para América Latina (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, S. A., 1977).

[3] Albert Waterston, Development Planning: Lessons of Experience (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 67.

In November, 1954, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American States met at the Hotel Quitandinha, near Petrópolis in Brazil. In preparation for the meeting, Raul Prebisch of ECLA had convened a panel of experts, including such prestigious individuals as Eduardo Frei of Chile and Carlos Lleras Restrepo of Colombia, to define a unified Latin American and Caribbean position for the Council. The Report of the Experts, which circulated in advance of the meeting, recommended both international cooperation and domestic self-help for economic development in the region, and represented the first time that representatives of Latin America and the Caribbean had quantified their ideas about external assistance. Moreover, among the report's four principal recommendations was a proposal to promote national planning to establish development priorities and to allocate private as well as public investments. Although financial support was not immediately forthcoming to implement the report's recommendations the report was nevertheless a milestone in raising consciousness concerning the potential role of planning in the development process.[1]

In the last years of the Eisenhower administration, the United States, largely in reaction to the violence that Vice-President Richard Nixon encountered in his 1958 goodwill tour of the region and to Fidel Castro's stunning overthrow of Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959, displayed greater openness to the use of public funds in support of Latin American and Caribbean development. At the close of the decade, for example, the Eisenhower administration put up the initial capital for the new Inter-American Development Bank and announced U.S. willingness to establish a Social Progress Trust Fund for investment in low-cost housing, public primary education, rural waterworks, health services, and other social projects in the region. Never before had these kinds of projects been eligible for U.S. public loans.

The fundamental change in U.S. policy, however, coincided with the advent of the administration of John F. Kennedy. At the very beginning of his administration, the new President spoke in bold and heady terms of a

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[1] For more on the Quitandinha meeting, see Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis, The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 38-41.

decade of billion-dollar aid for planned economic development and social reform in the hemisphere. In formulating an Alliance for Progress with Latin American and Caribbean countries, the new administration not only postulated rapid economic growth. It also proposed social reform and the strengthening of representative political democracy throughout the region.[1]

In 1961, the American republics signed the Charter of Punta del Este and set the Alliance in motion. The charter was heavily influenced by the earlier Quitandinha Report of the Experts. It:

- Described the Alliance's basic concepts of economic and social development;
- Identified immediate and short-term action measures;
- Defined national planning;
- Stipulated amounts and the form of external assistance;
- Set up an organizational structure, including an expert review mechanism, for national plans; and
- Devoted special titles to economic integration and trade.

In accordance with the charter, participating countries were "to introduce or strengthen systems for the preparation, execution, and periodic revision of national programs for economic and social development consistent with the principles, objectives and requirements contained in this document."[2] If possible, long-term development programs were to be formulated within the subsequent 18 months. The programs were to incorporate self-help activities that would be directed toward: human resource improvement and the widening of opportunities; wider development and more efficient use of natural resources; the strengthening of the agricultural base and progressive extension of the benefits of the land to those who work it; more effective, rational, and equitable mobilization and use of financial resources; promotion of conditions to encourage the flow of foreign investments; and improvement of systems of distribution and sales. Specifically, national development programs were foreseen to consist of the following eight elements:

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[1] An excellent source on the Alliance is Levinson and de Onis, op. cit. Our treatment of the role of planning in the Alliance relies heavily on this source.

[2] Ibid, p. 356.

1. The establishment of mutually consistent targets to be aimed at over the program period in expanding productive capacity in industry, agriculture, mining, transport, power, and communications, and in improving conditions of urban and rural life, including better housing, education, and health.

2. The assignment of priorities and the description of methods to achieve the targets, including specific measures and major projects. Specific development projects should be justified in terms of their relative costs and benefits, including their contribution to social productivity.

3. The measures which will be adopted to direct the operations of the public sector and to encourage private action in support of the development program.

4. The estimated cost, in national and foreign currency, of major projects and of the development program as a whole, year by year over the program period.

5. The internal resources, public and private, estimated to become available for the execution of the program.

6. The direct and indirect effects of the program on the balance of payments, and the external financing, public and private, estimated to be required for the execution of the program.

7. The basic fiscal and monetary policies to be followed in order to permit implementation within a framework of price stability.

8. The machinery of public administration -- including relationships with local governments, decentralized agencies, and nongovernmental organizations, such as labor organizations, cooperatives, business and industrial organizations -- to be used in carrying out the program, adapting it to changing circumstances and evaluating the progress made.[1]

For most Latin American and Caribbean countries, the preparation of national development plans was a tall order, particularly given the 18-month time frame stipulated in the charter. Although one country, Chile, had established a planning organization as early as 1939, most countries had set up a planning organization only during the previous three years or had no established organization at all. As a consequence, institutional and technical capacity for developing plans of the scope contemplated in the charter

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 363-64.

was, as a rule, either fledgling or nonexistent. As Levinson and de Onis have expressed it:

> Essential to the Alliance concept of national development was a belief in the necessity and value of planning. But the framers of the charter did not take into consideration the conditions under which such planning would take place. These technical and political conditions soon emerged as obstacles to implementation of the charter's recommendations. For example, in the early years of the Alliance the Latin American countries lacked the wherewithal to plan. Despite ECLA's yeoman work in educating and influencing a new generation of political and economic leadership, national governments had no planning ministries staffed by technically trained personnel who could formulate operational plans. They had no projects ready for financing by even the most modest standards. Some of the first AID loans under the Alliance financed feasibility studies -- research to determine the optimum structure and to estimate the cost of a development project -- rather than actual projects. Even these preliminary technical studies were hampered by the lack of statistical data on such basic questions as income distribution, employment, agricultural production, and education. From a technical standpoint, the allowance of eighteen months for preparation of development programs was much too short.[1]

Over the longer term, considerable progress was in fact made. By the end of the 1960s, economic planning had become increasingly sophisticated, particularly in Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. Furthermore, young, technically trained people were playing key roles in public sector institutions throughout the hemisphere. In contrast to the intent of the architects of the charter, however, planning fell far short of its billing in having an impact on decisionmaking. In 1961, it was anticipated that development plans would be a guide, if not a precondition, for allocation of development resources, particularly U.S. resources. As years passed, this anticipated linkage appeared to go more and more by the wayside. A 1967 AID memorandum offers a balanced assessment of progress to that date and the extent to which development plans guided AID programs:

> There <u>has</u> been marked progress in development planning -- that is, the national plans have been improved and have thereby served as a vehicle to improve the approach to development. This progress has often been overlooked -- to our discredit, I feel. No one would deny, however, that there

[1] <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 110-11.

> is still a very long way to go. The detailed review of the sections on planning in the country portions of the SPTF [Social Progress Trust Fund] reports that I have just gone through is enough to show anyone how few of these pieces of paper are working guides to actual operations. But, as the value of our own planning and programming documents attests, the value of the papers lies in organizing thoughts and a strategy as much as or more than in plotting every future step in an unpredictable environment. This may seem platitudinous, but has its validity been recognized in practice? Because the first plans seemed "meaningless," is the process worthless?[1]

In retrospect, there appears to have been one basic stumbling block that prevented the development plans called for under the Alliance from being more than "paper plans." This stumbling block has been the major obstacle to effective development planning throughout the world. As Waterston has expressed it, "The available evidence makes it clear that in countries with development plans, lack of adequate government support for the plans is the prime reason why most are never carried out."[2] In Latin America and the Caribbean, this lack of support manifested itself in three ways.

The first way in which planning failed to enjoy support had to do with the fundamental question of commitment. The record of negotiations both before and at Punta del Este suggests rather strongly that many Latin American and Caribbean countries looked at the preparation of development plans as largely the _quid_ that they would pay for the _quo_ of U.S. financial assistance. Although "those who formulated the Alliance had an almost mystical belief in the power of planning to solve Latin America's problems, reform its social structures, and stimulate its economic growth,"[3] this belief does not appear to have been matched by a genuinely internalized "demand" for planning at the operating level in many of the countries concerned. Rather, in many instances planning was seen as more of a demand generated by foreign parties, especially the United States and ECLA.

[1] Michael Niebling, "Insert on National Plans for Mr. Gordon's HAC Testimony of May 18," AID Memorandum, Washington, 1967, p. 1.

[2] Waterston, _op. cit._, p. 367.

[3] Levinson and de Onis, _op. cit._, p. 187.

Second, institutional and administrative support for planning was weak as well. As we have seen, many countries had only limited technical ability to plan. But more than that, the effectiveness of planning units, many of them only newly established, was stymied by:

- resistance from budget offices in Ministries of Finance -- which had been, and often continued to be, the *de facto* planning authorities in most countries;
- outmoded auditing and accounting procedures that had the effect of reducing the financial responsibility of operating personnel and led to delay in carrying out development plans;
- limited operational capacity to implement development plans in the absence of basic administrative changes; and
- low pay and poor personnel practices that reduced the attractiveness of public sector employment.[1]

A third constraint to the use of development plans was the lack of support, in this case more at the international level than at the national level, for a unified set of criteria for evaluating country performance and for using the plans as a guide in the allocation of development resources. The charter of the Alliance had created a "Committee of Nine," whose functions were later subsumed by the Interamerican Committee of the Alliance for Progress (CIAP), to review country development plans and make recommendations as to the programs the Alliance might finance. Neither institution was, however, invested with the right to determine criteria, allocate funds, or establish conditions for lending. On the one hand, this reflected the resistance of the United States to any delegation of authority that would circumscribe its freedom of decision as to how to allocate its funding. But, on the other hand, it also reflected a tension, among both decisionmakers and planners, as to the relative importance the Alliance should attach to conventional economic measures and to broader social reform. The 1960s witnessed an ongoing debate between the "monetarist" and the "structuralist" schools of

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[1] For more on these constraints to planning, see Waterston, *op. cit.*, pp. 254, 266, 282, and 372.

Latin American and Caribbean development.[1] The monetarists, whose standard bearer was the International Monetary Fund, looked at development in terms of stable financial management and saw progress as a function of market growth incentives. This point of view contrasted sharply with that of the structuralists who, with their citadel in ECLA, argued that sustained growth was contingent on structural reform, particularly in land ownership and use. This hemispheric debate naturally affected decisionmaking in the Alliance. After some evolution, the United States developed working standards that, as a practical matter, attached higher priority to monetary stabilization and economic growth than to social reform. Partly as a result of this shift and partly as a result of continuing problems with the technical adequacy of development plans, the U.S. AID program tied its decisionmaking less and less to countries' planning documents and became increasingly pragmatic in funding what were judged to be worthwhile development projects, whether or not they were incorporated in adequate plans.[2]

By the late 1960s, the Alliance had lost much of its vigor and comprehensive national planning had lost much of its appeal. The design and implementation of development projects had now become the focal point of development assistance. In its worst form, this change of emphasis bordered on what many developmentalists refer to as "projectitis," that is, a movement from the extreme of comprehensive planning without implementation to the other extreme of implementation without comprehensive planning. Aware of the dangers of a narrow project approach to development, but disenchanted with the alternative of national development planning, AID therefore searched for an appropriate middle ground between the two extremes. The result of this search was the sector approach to development.

The 1970s were without question the decade of the sector. Although project lending continued, sector loans became a major element of AID and other donor programs. As a rule, sector loans were designed not only to

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[1] The decade was also marked by debate on how comprehensive development planning should be and whether the Soviet model of central planning might be appropriate. This debate was not nearly as burning an issue, however, as the controversy between the monetarists and the structuralists.

[2] This pragmatism was the source of heated debate in Congress. See Agency for International Development, House Appropriations Committee Testimony, May 18, 1967, pp. 5256-64.

address sector problems through direct action programs, but also to strengthen host country capacity to plan sectoral development and to implement effective programs. The principal mechanism that evolved to justify sector loans, that is, to furnish a coherent framework for guiding resource allocation within a sector, was what came to be known generically as sector analysis. Some analyses were also referred to as assessments. Sector analyses and assessments typically attempted to identify the various interrelationships among the components of a sector and to specify the kinds of programs that would best address fundamental constraints to sector development. As the decade progressed, sector analyses and assessments took on a multiplicity of shapes and forms, as did attempts to institutionalize host country capacity to perform these functions.

To a very large extent, recent history of agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean mirrors recent trends in AID support. These trends are discussed at some length in Section 2.5. Before turning to the evolution of this support, however, we first lay out a broad conceptual framework for understanding agricultural sector planning in the region and then discuss the rationale for AID's interest in agricultural sector planning.

2.3 A Framework for Understanding Agricultural Sector Planning in Latin America and the Caribbean

As agricultural sector planning has evolved in Latin America and the Caribbean, its operational manifestations have varied from one country to another. This is true both of the organizational relationships that have been set up to conduct planning and of the range of practical responsibilities that have been assigned to agricultural sector planning units. To be able to draw meaningful comparisons among diverse country experiences, there is need for a unifying conceptual framework that is broad enough to encompass such variations. In this section, we describe in some detail one attempt to develop such a framework. The framework in question has its roots in Latin American and Caribbean experience and has been developed by an institution with a deep interest in agricultural sector planning in the region, namely, the Interamerican Institute for Agricultural Cooperation (IICA).

In Subsection 2.3.1, we first discuss the origins of the work that IICA has performed to date. In Subsection 2.3.2, we turn to an exposition of the planning framework itself. As part of this exposition, we also indicate how the framework relates to the components of the national management system laid out in Exhibit 2.2, and suggest how the framework might be given more flesh for purposes of evaluation -- an issue that is treated in greater depth in Chapter 3.

2.3.1 The PROPLAN Project

IICA's origins trace back to October, 1942, when the American governments created the Interamerican Institute of Agricultural Sciences to promote economic and social development in agriculture throughout the hemisphere. In 1949, the Organization of American States named the Institute its specialized agency for the agricultural sector. During the subsequent two decades, the Institute concentrated its activities on physical and biological research and training. In the 1970s, however, its mandate broadened to encompass the strengthening of national institutional systems for agricultural development and, at the end of the decade, the name of the Institute was formally changed to the Interamerican Institute for Agricultural Cooperation to reflect more adequately its changing focus and operating style.

IICA is an autonomous intergovernmental institution established through a convention ratified by 25 American countries. The relationship of IICA to the Organization of American States is roughly comparable to that of the Food and Agriculture Organization to the United Nations.

IICA is headquartered in San José, Costa Rica, but most in-country activities grow out of initiatives at the local offices in 23 of its member countries. The member countries are grouped into four regions, with regional offices in Uruguay for the Southern Zone, in Guatemala for the Northern Zone, in the Dominican Republic for the Antilles Zone, and in Peru for the Andean Zone. IICA also maintains an office in Washington, D.C., for its representation to the United States and Canada.

IICA has three main goals:

- To increase agricultural production and productivity;
- To increase employment opportunities in the rural sector in proportion to the rate of growth of the rural labor force; and
- To increase the participation of rural people in development by reducing their marginality at a rate that permits a continuous and significant transformation toward a situation providing ample opportunities for all members of the rural community.

To accomplish these goals, IICA has organized its activities in seven "lines of action," or areas of technical cooperation:

I. Analysis of rural development and related information;

II. Education for rural development;

III. Research and transfer of agricultural technology;

IV. Agricultural production, productivity, and marketing;

V. Regional rural development;

VI. Structural change and campesino organizations; and

VII. Formulation and administration of agricultural policy, planning, organizations, and coordination of governmental action to attain rural development.

Under Line VII, IICA's strategy is to:

> aim primarily at the institutionalization in member countries of improved planning and management functions and, on a regional level, the development of a coherent body of methodologies and strategies in the field of rural development for future use by IICA and member countries. In the process IICA aims at fostering and institutionalizing a network of technical cooperative efforts among its member countries.
>
> Specifically, the Institute is concerned with helping member countries to utilize agricultural planning instruments; structure sectoral planning offices; generate and develop planning methodologies adapted to the rural sectors of each country; organize interdisciplinary agricultural planning teams; improve and apply management technologies (coordination, communication, follow-up, control, evaluation, feed-back and correction); and improve organizational and institutional systems and sub-systems functioning in the public agricultural sector. It is also particularly concerned with the design and structuring of adequate organizations and institutions for regional rural development.[1]

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[1] S&T/AGR/EPP, "Activity Paper: Latin American Planning Network," 1977, pp. 37-38.

During the 1970s, IICA came to attach increasing importance to Line VII among its portfolio of activities and assigned increasing proportions of its overall budget to Line VII programs and projects. From 1975 to 1977, for example, the Line VII budget grew by 105 percent, while the budget of the Institute as a whole grew by 36 percent. It was at this time that IICA's increasing commitment to planning and policy analysis came to strike a responsive chord with S&T/AGR/EPP. S&T/AGR/EPP, which at that time was known as the Economics and Sector Planning Division of the Office of Agriculture of the Technical Assistance Bureau, had developed an "Expanded Program of Economic Analysis for Agricultural and Rural Sector Planning" as a mechanism to assist in improving agricultural sector planning capability in the developing world. Recognizing that "the lack of a consistent rural development strategy and inability to formulate and implement coherent policies, programs and projects continues to limit the success of most Latin American countries in their pursuit of equity-oriented development,"[1] S&T/AGR/EPP viewed the growth of IICA's Line VII as a particularly fortuitous occurrence and came to look to IICA as a possible focal point for future AID support of agricultural sector planning in the region.

S&T/AGR/EPP found support of IICA to be attractive on a number of counts. First, S&T/AGR/EPP readily acknowledged that "to move into substantive or quantitative type planning processes and beyond the limited but very practical project type analyses requires commitment, a data base, well trained people and a longer time horizon,"[2] and saw in IICA an institution that was committed philosophically to institutionalization of in-country sectoral planning units over the long term. Second, the growth of Line VII offered concrete evidence that IICA's philosophical commitment was matched by action. Third, Latin American and Caribbean countries not only appeared receptive to IICA as an effective agency of cooperation in development but also seemed to regard it, with good reason, as an indigenous Latin American institution. And, fourth, although IICA's program priorities had shifted dramatically toward agricultural sector planning and policy

[1] Ibid., p.3.

[2] Ibid., p. 5.

analysis in previous years, resource limitations and the need for greater manpower development had prevented IICA from shifting as rapidly as needs arose.

In 1977, AID approved support for a Latin American Planning Network Activity under S&T/AGR/EPP's Expanded Program. Under the activity, AID has provided support directly to IICA and to two U.S. cooperator institutions. The goals of the activity stated in the Activity Paper were to:

1. Improve and build institutional capabilities for agricultural and rural sector planning and policy analysis in Latin American and Caribbean countries through IICA; and
2. Facilitate implementation of agricultural and rural sector planning and policy analysis processes in the appropriate Ministries and planning institutions of the IICA target countries.

The purposes of the activity, in turn, were to:

1. Assess the capacity, constraints, and needed improvements in the Latin American and Caribbean countries in agricultural and rural sector planning and policy analysis, particularly as relating to the rural poor;
2. Identify gaps in training and technical assistance programs in agricultural planning and policy analysis, design specific training activities to improve agricultural planning capacities in IICA and their countries, and facilitate a long-term multiplicative effect of IICA activities in sector planning and policy analysis;
3. Assist in undertaking specific sector planning and policy analysis activities in one or more countries, with special consideration for the needs of the least developed countries, and designing mechanisms for institutionalization and implementation of planning and policy analysis processes for IICA and its target countries; and
4. Provide resources for managing the Latin American and Caribbean agricultural and rural sector planning and policy analysis network in the early stages of development.

[1] In putting together a development project, AID typically makes use of the project design tool known as the "logical framework." The framework lays out the project goals, purposes, outputs, and inputs that are anticipated at the time of project design. The complete logical framework for the Latin American Planning Network activity is presented in Appendix A.

The Latin American Planning Network Activity, which over time has come to be known as the PROPLAN Project, is now in its fifth and final year. As of this writing, progress toward achievement of PROPLAN's purposes appears to be mixed. On the positive side of the ledger, IICA conducted a pioneering survey of planning institutions in 23 Latin American and Caribbean countries in 1978. The data from this survey constitute a rich source of benchmark material for assessing the capacity, constraints, needed improvements, and training and technical assistance gaps of planning units throughout the region. The published findings of the survey are summarized in Chapter 7 of this study. Perhaps more important then the survey itself, however, was the preparatory conceptual work that went into survey design. Before launching the survey, IICA and the cooperator institutions took pains to develop a coherent conceptual framework that would be adaptable to the heterogeneity of ways in which agricultural sector planning is operationalized throughout the hemisphere. It is this framework that is the subject of the following subsection and is what may well be PROPLAN's most lasting contribution to planning in the region.

Although considerable progress has been made in these respects, the negative side of the PROPLAN ledger should, in fairness, also be acknowledged. As we have seen, the project called for the design of specific training activities and the provision of technical assistance in the institutionalization of planning and policy analysis in individual countries. To date, relatively little has been done along these lines. Although a number of country case studies have been performed and a series of seminars have been held, PROPLAN has provided very little formal training in agricultural sector planning,[1] and in-country demand for PROPLAN technical assistance in planning has, at best, been limited. As we might expect, the inability to translate PROPLAN's conceptual work into an ongoing program of practical applications has been a great disappointment and a source of frustration to IICA, the cooperator institutions, and AID.

[1] In fact, most of PROPLAN's training materials have been completed only over the course of this past year.

2.3.2 The PROPLAN Conceptual Framework

PROPLAN's conceptual framework of the agricultural sector planning process is not a static paradigm that was developed in once-and-for-all fashion in preparation for the PROPLAN survey. On the contrary, the framework has been evolving over time. Since 1978, PROPLAN has been giving increasing attention to operational planning and, with support from the Kellogg Foundation, to the identification, design, and management of development projects in the context of a national management system. The bulk of this work has not as yet been formally published,[1] however, and the document that was prepared at the time of the 1978 survey remains the most completely codified version of PROPLAN's conceptual scheme. In what follows, therefore, we shall allude to some of the advances that PROPLAN has made since 1978 but shall focus on PROPLAN Document 1, "Conceptual Framework of the Agricultural Planning Process in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Comprehensive View of the Policy Analysis and Decision-Making Processes in the Agricultural Sector."

For PROPLAN, planning is not an isolated exercise. Rather, the planning system must be viewed in the context of its interrelationships with two other systems, the political-administrative system and the socio-economic system. Exhibit 2.3 illustrates these interrelationships.

The relationships between the political-administrative system and the planning system, between the political-administrative system and the socioeconomic system, and between the planning system and the socioeconomic system all go both ways. The political-administrative system furnishes the planning system with the government's doctrinal position, that is, the ideological-political position that lays out general guidelines and goals expressing the objectives desired for the socioeconomic system. The planning system, in turn, offers the political-administrative system policy alternatives. These policy alternatives can vary in form and can consist of plans, programs, projects, budgets, etc.

[1] We are grateful to Lizardo de las Casas and others of the PROPLAN staff in IICA for sharing their internal draft materials with us.

Exhibit 2.3

INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF THE PLANNING SYSTEM WITH THE POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AND THE SOCIOECONOMIC SYSTEM[1]



[1] Source: IICA, PROPLAN Document 1, p. 7.

Both the political-administrative system and the planning system also interact with the socioeconomic system. The political-administrative system and the planning system each receive quantitative and qualitative information from the socioeconomic system through participative mechanisms or through relationships with pertinent socioeconomic agents or their organizations. For its part, the political-administrative system transmits the decisions it takes to the socioeconomic system in the form of policies, while the planning system lays out the technical bases and implications of these decisions.

Within this overall framework, PROPLAN distinguishes between the planning process and the planning system. For PROPLAN, the planning process is seen as the "integrator" of the policy analysis performed by the planning system and the decisionmaking performed by the political-administrative system. Thus, planning as a process is more than planning as a system; it goes beyond the planning system and cannot be divorced from the political-administrative system.

The planning system is conceived of as the technical element of the planning process. It is

> mainly concerned with ensuring that rational decisions be made by the government of each country on the policies and policy measures to guide their development process. Thus, the main purpose of the planning system is to constantly advise the political-administrative system, proposing policy alternatives and policy measures that are consistent with both the government's doctrinal position and the existing socio-economic situation. The primary task of the agricultural planning system is to generate a policy analysis process that provides comprehensive coherence to its products. Comprehensive coherence . . . [consists of] . . .: i) a formal coherence or internal consistency; and ii) an adequate correlation with the evolution of the political process and the socio-economic process.[1]

[1] Interamerican Institute for Agricultural Cooperation, "Conceptual Framework of the Agricultural Planning Process in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Comprehensive View of the Policy Analysis and Decision-Making Processes in the Agricultural Sector," PROPLAN Document 1, San Jose, Costa Rica, 1978, p. 12.

The role of the planning system, therefore, is to conduct a continuous policy-producing process within a broader planning-implementation process. Although this definition of planning does not appear at first blush to represent a radical departure from what common sense would lead us to understand planning to be, it nevertheless carries with it a number of important implications. Among these implications are:

- If planning is understood as PROPLAN defines it, then, in the final analysis, it is appropriate to look at planning as an advisory service to decisionmakers. At this level of abstraction, planning is equally applicable to political regimes that place considerable reliance on market mechanisms to stimulate development and to political regimes that intervene heavily in the market economy. Planning, therefore, is not a "Plan." As Waterston argued a decade and a half ago:

  > In many countries, the preparation of a development plan appears to be viewed as the final instead of the initial step in the planning process. Just as there is more to the planning process than the preparation of a plan, so the planning process does not depend on the existence of a development plan. There are those who confuse the two. But history shows that it is possible for a country to have a plan without any real attempt at planning, and for another to have planning without the existence of a paper plan.[1]

- PROPLAN's definition of planning obliges us to look at planning as much more than a "technocratic" function. Planning is political in that it is geared explicitly to anticipate the consequences of alternative political decisions.

- The PROPLAN definition of planning "implies that the planning system must be in constant contact with the agents of the socio-economic system and with the decision-making and executor elements of the political-administrative system."[2]

[1] Waterston, op. cit., p. 167.

[2] IICA, PROPLAN Document 2, p. 13.

- For PROPLAN, planning is far more than the generation of specific development projects. At the heart of the planning process is the proposal of alternative policies and policy measures. Hence, while planning may well encompass project development, it is primarily concerned with laying out the consequences of different development strategy, sector policy, and program direction options. All of this is not to downplay the central role that projects play as an instrument of development policy. It is simply to highlight the need, as PROPLAN has argued increasingly in recent years, for rationalization of the initial step of identifying and assigning priority to project ideas. In a world of scarce development resources, project identification and selection can not afford to be performed in an ad hoc manner. Rather, alternative project ideas need to be assessed in terms of their consistency with sector objectives and policies.[1]

Within the overall planning process, PROPLAN distinguishes three different stages.[2] The activities of the first of these stages, the formulation stage, are the most familiar and are generally identified with "planning." The principal objective of this stage's activities is to generate specific strategies, policies, and program directions to stimulate agricultural and rural development.

The second stage, the implementation stage, consists of the actions that are taken to operationalize sector policies. As a rule, these actions are taken outside the sphere of the planning system. Nevertheless,

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[1] For a useful survey of project identification methods, see Dennis A Rondinelli, "Project Identification in Economic Development," Journal of World Trade Law, X (May/June, 1976), 215-51.

[2] As PROPLAN's concern for project identification, design, and management has grown, subsequent documents have broken out more stages. In "La Conducción del Proceso de Planificación-Ejecución de la Política de Desarrollo Agropecuario y Rural: El Papel de la Cooperación Técnica del IICA," published in 1981, PROPLAN distinguishes among the stages of formulation, preparation for implementation, execution, and control/evaluation. In his paper, "The Continuous Planning-Implementation Process As a Framework for Projects," presented in Roseau, Dominica, in 1981, de las Casas breaks out the stages of formulation, preparation for implementation, execution, supervision, and control. These schemes differ from the scheme presented here only by the degree of disaggregation that is accorded the concept of "implementation."

PROPLAN emphasizes that "although planners are not specifically responsible for operative aspects, their role in support of these actions is of critical importance."[1]

The third stage is the control stage. In the PROPLAN framework, control "is seen as a feedback stage of the planning process through which changes generated by the evolution of socioeconomic activities and those produced in the government's doctrinal position are fed back into the planning process."[2] The principal activities of the control stage consist of measuring the results of the evolution of the socioeconomic and political processes, policy evaluation and review, and definition of corrective measures.

Exhibit 2.4 presents the interrelationships among the three stages of the planning process and how they, in turn, are related to political and socioeconomic processes. The exhibit lays out the dynamics of the planning process in linear fashion. As we might expect, there are definite correspondences between the PROPLAN scheme and the circular scheme presented above in Exhibit 2.2. The major differences between the two are that the PROPLAN framework pays explicit attention to the roles of the political-administrative and socioeconomic systems, that the circular framework treats decision-making as a distinct step in the process, and that the circular framework breaks out three separate components of what PROPLAN would include under "formulation."

Although they are not spelled out in Exhibit 2.4, PROPLAN distinguishes five activities in the formulation stage of the planning process. These activities are identification of the government's doctrinal position, definition of an orientation framework (that is, a strategy[3]), analysis

[1] IICA, PROPLAN Document 1, p. 26.

[2] Ibid., pp. 30-31.

[3] "To facilitate the identification of relevant policy alternatives and the choices of those likely to be most effective, requires a frame of reference. This is what a development strategy provides. . . . It is intermediate between an objective and the policies required to achieve it." Governmental Affairs Institute, "Managing Planned Agricultural Development," Washington, 1976, p. VIII-2.

Exhibit 2.4

DYNAMICS OF THE PLANNING PROCESS[1]



[1]Source: IICA, PROPLAN Document 1, p. 10.

and proposal of policy alternatives, and policy definition. While not perfectly isomorphic, there is a close conceptual correspondence between these five activities and the stages of problem identification, strategy formulation, and identification of alternative policies, programs, and investment/projects in Exhibit 2.2. In both cases, the logic of the process can be illustrated with a medical analogy. A patient is sick. Upon examination, the patient's doctor finds symptoms that suggest the nature of the patient's disease. Diagnosis of the patient's disease in turn suggests an overall strategy for cure. Within the context of this strategy, the doctor and patient consider a variety of possible treatments and ultimately decide on an appropriate treatment to apply.

Applicability of the PROPLAN Conceptual Framework to this Study. PROPLAN's conceptual framework is useful for understanding the process of agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean. The framework is comprehensive and is formulated at a level of abstraction that is able to accommodate the variety of ways in which agricultural sector planning is practiced in different countries. The distinction between the planning system and the planning process is an important contribution, as is the emphasis that is attached to the linkages of the planning system with the political-administrative and socioeconomic systems. All this obliges us to look at planning in much more than technical terms. Furthermore, PROPLAN's characterization of the formulation stage of the planning process is consonant with common understanding as to what agricultural sector planning units are expected to do. As we shall see, most of the AID-supported activities that we examine in subsequent chapters of this study have been designed to support data collection, data and policy analysis, and policy formulation, precisely the kinds of activities we would expect to take place in the formulation stage of PROPLAN's scheme.

The PROPLAN framework's level of abstraction is among its most significant strengths: it fits most empirical situations. Ironically, however, it is also somewhat of an Achilles heel: it is not self-administrative. Although the PROPLAN framework is unquestionably valuable as far as it goes, it does not, unfortunately, go far enough for direct, immediate empirical application. The abstractness of the PROPLAN scheme has decided advantages

in that it allows planning to be viewed in a holistic context and is comprehensive enough to encompass a broad spectrum of empirical variation under its theoretical purview. Nevertheless, a by-product of the scheme's abstract terminology is potential confusion as to its empirical content. Moreover, how one would go about applying the PROPLAN framework in a specific situation is not self-evident.

This discussion suggests that the PROPLAN framework is a useful first step in conceptualizing agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean, but that as we evaluate specific empirical applications of planning, we shall need a theoretical skeleton that is fleshed out in more detail. As we develop this skeleton in Chapter 3, we shall build on both the schematic of Exhibit 2.2 and the overall conceptual framework that PROPLAN has developed to date. The principal ways in which the PROPLAN scheme will be expanded include:

- Making explicit the principal functions that are performed in the formulation stage of the planning process. We need to lay out in more detail what agricultural sector planners are typically expected to do.
- Making explicit the principal ways in which the planning system interacts with the political-administrative system. One of the major concerns that prompted AID to sponsor this evaluation is whether its support of institutionalization of planning capacity has been translated into effects in the allocation of development resources, that is, whether planning has been linked to decision-making in such a way that it has had an influence on decisions as to what to fund and what not to fund. The principal interactions that we shall examine, therefore, will be the interactions that take place between planners and decisionmakers in the budget process. Particular attention will be paid to the ways in which long-term, medium-term, and annual operating plans play a role in influencing annual budgets.[1] As Stolper has

[1] PROPLAN has been attaching greater emphasis to annual operational planning in recent years. See, for example, IICA, "Proceso de Planificación Operativa," PROPLAN Working Document 14, San José, Costa Rica, 1980; and IICA, "Proceso de Planificación Operativa Anual: Marco de Referencia para Estudios de Caso," PROPLAN Working Document, San José, Costa Rica, 1980.

argued," a Plan remains unreal until its components have found a budgetary expression and control. . . . Planners of necessity become budgeters; and budgeters, planners."[1] Similarly, as Waterston has put it, "Since annual budgets are the principal means by which governments authorize and control most of their expenditures, most outlays provided for in the public sector portion of a development plan must be incorporated into these budgets if the plan is to be carried out. . . . A government's budget is therefore a key element in converting a development plan into a program for action."[2]

- Making explicit the difference between planning that is geared ultimately to project investments and planning that is geared to make use of other policy instruments. Often planning is identified only with processes that lead to the development of programs and projects, and it is imperative to recognize that agricultural sector development can also be affected to a large extent by macro-economic policy tools such as price subsidies, import controls, definition of land and water rights, etc. The distinction between these two kinds of planning is particularly important since each requires different kinds of analytical expertise -- and, if technical assistance is required, then, as a corollary, different kinds of technical assistance.

2.4 The Rationale for AID Support of Agricultural Sector Planning in Latin America and the Caribbean

President Reagan's recent Caribbean visit and the Administration's proposal for a special economic assistance program are both manifestations of the importance of the development of Latin America and the Caribbean to the present administration. The history of U.S. government support to the region has been a long one, and although the 1970s witnessed a decline in levels of bilateral assistance, particularly in comparison with the levels that were approved for Africa and Asia, there now appears to be renewed interest in improving relations with Latin America and the Caribbean and in increasing U.S. support for development in the region.

[1] Wolfgang F. Stolper, "Some Problems of Adapting the Ideas of Budgeting and Planning to Underdeveloped Countries, "University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1972, p. 1.

[2] Waterston, op. cit., p. 201.

There are a number of reasons that the United States supports Latin American and Caribbean development, but two reasons are predominant. The first reason is that the region needs assistance. A 1979 position paper prepared by AID's Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean points out that "poverty in the Region remains widespread despite unprecedented economic growth, and the basic human needs of many of the Region's people are not being met. The modern growth sectors are not growing fast enough to keep up with rapidly expanding populations and to absorb the rising numbers of unemployed in the traditional sectors."[1] Although many Latin American and Caribbean countries have achieved dramatic increases in national income, the distribution of income within these countries continues to be uneven, and large concentrations of poor, undernourished people still persist.

The second fundamental reason for U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean is one of self-interest. The Latin American and Caribbean region plays a significant role in the U.S. economy. After Western Europe and Japan, the region is the largest market for U.S. products. It purchases $18-19 billion annually of U.S. exports, and some 82 percent of U.S. direct investment in the developing world is located in the region.[2] But self-interest is not just economic. Many Latin American and Caribbean countries are committed to the principles of democracy and free enterprise and have traditionally been strong U.S. allies. It is in the interest of the United States that these close relationships be maintained and nurtured. Furthermore, the United States depends on the support of these countries to address such thorny international problems as illegal immigration and the trafficking of narcotics.

Although U.S. support of Latin American and Caribbean development can be justified on a number of different grounds, the case is not so obvious for support of agricultural sector development and, specifically, for agricultural sector planning.

[1] Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, "A Development Assistance Policy for Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1980s," Draft, 1979, p.1.

[2] See ibid., p. 2.

Throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, development of the agricultural sector is commonly viewed as a key ingredient to the development of the economy as a whole. In most countries in the region, the agricultural sector employs a substantial percentage of the working population and accounts for a significant share of Gross Domestic Product. Although other sectors naturally play important development roles, agriculture is key to meeting the basic needs of a country's population and, in addition, is typically the source of livelihood for one of a country's most disadvantaged groups, namely, small farmers. As a rule, therefore, support of agricultural sector development is consistent with the principal objectives of U.S. development policy, namely, "the promotion of conditions enabling developing countries to achieve self-sustaining growth with equitable distribution of benefits."[1]

AID's 1978 policy paper on agricultural development outlines a strategy for assistance to agriculture in the developing world. The strategy has two emphases:

- To increase countries' capacity to expand and distribute food supplies to alleviate hunger and malnutrition; and
- To increase participation of poor people in the process and benefits of development.[2]

This joint focus on production and equity has been operationalized by the agency in five major functional areas:

- Asset distribution and access;
- Planning and policy analysis;
- Development and diffusion of new technology;
- Rural infrastructure; and
- Marketing and storage, input supply, rural industry, and credit.[3]

[1] U.S. Congress, "Public Law 95-424: International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978," Section 102(b), Washington, 1978.

[2] Agency for International Development, "Agricultural Development Policy Paper," 1978, p. 1.

[3] Ibid., p.22.

The relative importance of each of these five functional areas has varied considerably over time. During the 1975-79 period, for example, the first three areas evidenced a marked pattern of growth. As a percentage of AID's total funding of agricultural and rural development programs, the area of asset distribution and access increased by a factor of nearly seven times, a reflection of AID's growing operational emphasis on supporting improvements in land tenure conditions. In nearly parallel fashion, AID's support for planning and policy analysis rose by a factor of nearly six times over the same period.

The end of the 1970s therefore witnessed an appreciable growth in AID support of agricultural sector planning. There appear to be three predominant reasons for this shift:

- First is growing acceptance of the argument for planning advanced in AID's policy paper, namely, since the agricultural sector is subject "to extreme spatial and temporal, as well as social and ecological variability, . . . sound country analytical capability for both micro and macro socio-economic factors affecting production, equity and ecology -- as well as their interrelationships -- is extremely important."[1]
- A second reason for the increase in AID's support of agricultural sector planning and policy analysis is a reaction to the limited resources that AID has available to support development in the third world. In relation to the magnitude of development problems in Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, the levels of assistance that AID can provide are small indeed. Clearly, most public development financing must come from the countries of the region themselves and, to a much lesser extent, from other donors. As a consequence, it is unrealistic for AID to expect dramatic results from the capital it is in a position to transfer. Rather, priority must be given to assisting Latin American and Caribbean countries in the development of approaches to key development problems that are sound, realistic, and implementable by the countries themselves. In sum, therefore, AID's strategy becomes one of focusing its limited resources at the level of host country planning and policy formulation, and making funding available, generally on a seed basis, to strengthen the capacity of host country institutions to formulate and implement development strategies.

[1] Ibid., p. 31.

- Third, the "New Directions" mandate that AID received from the U.S. Congress in 1973 instructed the agency to target its resources in programs that would benefit the rural poor. Operationally, this proved to be no easy matter, particularly given the paucity of information on these target groups and, thus, limited capability to draw inferences as to the types of programs that would be cost-effective in addressing target group development constraints. The lack of adequate target group data was compounded by poor agricultural sector statistics in general. As a result, many Latin American and Caribbean countries were constrained in their ability to make informed decisions on the relative merits of land reform and colonization programs, technology development and dissemination, rural infrastructure, agricultural sector support services, etc. To alleviate this shortcoming, therefore, AID has attached high priority to the collection and analysis of reliable statistics and has come to see its support of data collection systems as an integral part of its support of agricultural sector planning.

In summary, the United States has reasons both of altruism and of self-interest for supporting development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Agriculture plays a major, and often a dominant, role in the economies of the region. It is both a source of foodstuffs for meeting basic human needs and a source of livelihood for substantial numbers of poor people. Thus, AID has come to consider agricultural sector development as a focal point of its support for achieving its dual development objectives of growth and equity.

Most public agricultural sector investment in the region is made by Latin American and Caribbean countries themselves. The effectiveness of this investment is a function of countries' ability to generate reliable information on which to base investment decisions, to assess the relative merits of alternative policies, programs, and projects, and to translate overall agricultural sector development strategy into specific, actionable measures. Given the limitations of the development resources at its disposal, AID sees itself as playing a catalytic role in strengthening the capacity of a country to perform effective agricultural sector planning and, thus, having a long-run impact in improving decisionmaking for the sector as a whole.

2.5 The Evolution of AID Support for Agricultural Sector Planning in Latin America and the Caribbean

In Section 2.2, we briefly discussed the evolution of planning in Latin America and the Caribbean through the 1960s. By the end of that decade, as we have seen, growing disenchantment with national development planning had been instrumental in bringing about a marked shift in emphasis toward sector planning. During the 1970s, AID became a major actor in affecting the operational course of this shift and, since 1970, has supported a variety of planning activities in different sectors, particularly the agricultural sector, throughout the hemisphere. In this section, we now turn to a discussion of the trends that have characterized AID's support of agricultural sector planning.

Since 1970, there have been four predominant trends of relative emphasis in agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean. These emphases, which are not dramatically clearcut but which have nevertheless occurred in more or less sequential fashion, can conveniently be characterized as follows:

- A trend of large-scale model building;
- A trend of emphasis on basic statistics;
- A trend with a dual focus on problem-solving and management organization; and
- A trend to increase private sector participation in the agricultural sector planning process.

We discuss each of these trends in turn in the following four subsections.[1]

[1] There are a number of different schemes that could be used to describe AID's support of agricultural sector planning since 1970. The scheme presented here borrows heavily from James T. Riordan, "Implications for Education of Recent Experiences in Agricultural Sector Analysis," Beirut, 1979. As a practical matter, this paper is an interpretative history of AID's support of agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean over the last decade. In it, the author presents his opinions on major problems that were encountered in making agricultural sector planning operational and offers suggestions for making agricultural sector planning more effective in the future. In what follows, we do not refrain from presenting these judgments, some of which, at least at the time, were found to be provocative. The advantage in presenting these judgments at this juncture is that it allows a number of critical practical issues to rise explicitly to the surface in advance of our formal examination of Latin America and Caribbean agricultural sector planning experience. In reading this section, however, the reader should bear in mind that these judgments are really more hypotheses to be examined in this study than objective statements of fact.

2.5.1 The Trend of Large-Scale Model Building

The first major trend, which was most in vogue at the beginning of the 1970s, focused on the building of large-scale sector models. The emphasis on modeling emerged largely for two reasons. First, there was a growing appreciation at the time of the lack of quantitative rigor in traditional sector work and the failure of conventional tools, such as project analysis, to account for linkages both within the agricultural sector and between the agricultural sector and other sectors. Large-scale sector models were looked to, therefore, as a means of increasing rigor in selecting among alternative investments and of estimating quantitatively the impacts of different policy, program, and project options on a variety of different policy-relevant variables. The second basic reason for the emerging emphasis on large-scale sector models sprang from a parallel growing dissatisfaction with the project approach to agricultural development on the part of the international donor community -- and a movement toward sector lending as an alternative investment mechanism. In this context the anticipation was that sector models could help provide an analytical backdrop for such lending and, thus, model building came to be viewed as an activity meriting AID and other donor support.

In the end, sector models did not measure up to expectations. Nevertheless, there were positive developments. For example, sector modeling served to attract higher professional talent to planning offices in Ministries of Agriculture (the Dominican Republic is a particular case in point), and the generally increasing quality of sector studies that we have witnessed since 1970 is attributable in part to this trend.[1] On the negative side of the ledger, however, there were a number of problems that, in practice,

[1] These sector studies have assumed a variety of shapes and forms, and what are commonly referred to as "sector assessments" have undergone an evolution of their own, both in content and in style of performance, over the past twelve years. Through much of the early 1970s, AID was wont to distinguish between sector analyses and sector assessments. Sector analysis was seen as the work of modelers; it was quantitative, computerized, and, to many, mysterious. Sector assessments, on the other hand, were "softer"; they relied heavily on the professional judgment of experts and were generally more qualitative in describing the workings of the agricultural sector and its development constraints. In the Bureau for Latin America and the

severely limited the effective use of sector models in planning.[1] The major problems that emerged were as follows:

First, operationalizing a large-scale model takes time. For this reason, personnel engaged in modeling tended to be organized institutionally into separate operating units. Unfortunately, separate institutional identity had an unforeseen side-effect, namely, that modelers tended to be too isolated operationally from the mainstream of Ministry business -- and

Caribbean (then the Bureau for Latin America), this distinction was institutionalized operationally: there was a Sector Analysis Division responsible for sector analysis, and a Rural Development Division responsible for sector assessments. The distinction was somewhat artificial, of course, and over time there was growing pressure for assessments to be more "quantitative" and for analyses to be more "qualitative." In 1977, the Bureau took steps to blur the distinction entirely. It abolished the Sector Analysis Division and vested the Rural Development Division with responsibility for a flexible program of sector assessments that would build on the best of the both worlds of the prior analysis and assessment emphases. Although it developed guidelines for these new assessments, it was understood that depth of coverage could, and would, vary from one application to another. Moreover, although it was recognized that assessments performed by outsiders could have an impact on host country decisionmakers (outside assessments were warmly endorsed by Ministers of Agriculture in Costa Rica and Haiti, for example), preference was given to a process of collaboration in which host country planning units would be deeply involved. The intent of this emphasis on collaboration was both to build Latin American and Caribbean capacity to conduct these kinds of studies in the future and to enhance the probability that the studies would be put to practical use. See LAC/DR/RD, "Bureau for Latin America Agricultural Sector Assessment Guidelines," 1977; and U.S. Department of State, "Agricultural Sector Assessments," Outgoing Telegram, State 071531, 1977.

[1] To one degree or other, the problems we are about to discuss affected virtually all attempts at agricultural sector modeling in Latin America and the Caribbean over the last decade. The one dramatic exception appears to be the CHAC model in Mexico. Particularly noteworthy in this experience was the Mexican government's commitment to support CHAC over the long term, especially after initial support from the World Bank had declined. Although there were some ups and downs, CHAC benefited decidedly from being able to attract, and retain, well-qualified technical personnel. Moreover, given its location in the Office of the Presidency, the model was put to operational use in the formulation of sector policy. For more on the use of CHAC, see Roger D. Norton and M.L. Solís (eds.), The Book of CHAC: Programming Studies for Mexican Agriculture (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming).

thus not enough in contact with specific problems needing to be addressed. This was the case in Colombia, for instance. In addition, although modeling was generally recognized as a long-term activity, the failure of models to produce meaningful policy-relevant results in the relatively near term tended to lower the credibility of the activity in the eyes of Ministry decisionmakers -- and thus further exacerbate the built-in institutional isolation.[1]

A second problem had to do with the state of the art of sector modeling at the time. Since much modeling work was intellectually pioneering, a heavy premium was placed on methodological development at the expense of policy-relevant results. The professional literature is replete with sector model methodology but there is relatively little spelling out implications for policy in specific terms.[2] In a sense, this is the proper function of the literature and, thus, to level this kind of criticism is somewhat unfair. As a matter of relative emphasis at the working level, however, a lack of an adequate focus on policy issues was indeed a genuine problem.

A third problem grew, ironically enough, out of one of modeling's strong selling points. An argument frequently advanced in favor of modeling was that models could be structured in such a way as to capture interrelationships among broad sets of variables and address a multiplicity of policy and program issues. In practice, models tended to encompass considerably less than had been "sold" beforehand. More serious, however, were two other consequences. First, since models had been advertised as able to address a

[1] In the professional literature on agricultural sector models, relatively little attention has been paid to the practical implications of institutional concerns. Significant exceptions that prove the rule include Max R. Langham, "On System Models for Agricultural Sector Analysis and Research Priorities for Developing Countries," Staff Paper No. 83, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, 1978; and Harold E. Klein and Terry L. Roe, "Agriculture Sector Analysis Model Design: The Influence of Administrative Infrastructure Characteristics," TIMS Studies in the Management Sciences, XVII (1981), 273-308.

[2] The technical literature on sector models and sector analysis is indeed voluminous. A relatively comprehensive and up-to-date compilation of important contributions appears in Roger D. Norton and Gerhard W. Schiefer, "Agricultural Sector Programming Models: A Review, "European Regional Agricultural Economics, VII (1980), pp. 256-65.

broad range of issues, there was a tendency to look at "the model" as a self-contained exercise and downplay the signficance of previous work not feeding directly into the model itself. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the all-embracing character of models tended in practice to serve as a pretext for modelers not to come to grips with specific policy-relevant problems.

A fourth problem is the question of the opportunity cost of resources devoted to a modeling activity. It is almost axiomatic that the construction of a large-scale model makes heavy resource demands. A fundamental question to be asked, therefore, is whether resources devoted to large models could be more effectively employed in less ambitious, less sophisticated, more short-term work. The jury may be out forever on this issue, but if and when modeling is considered in the future, a healthy and honest skepticism on this question is imperative.

The intent of this catalog of problems is not to disparage modeling. The technical power of models is not a matter of controversy, nor is their potential usefulness for planning. It is no easy matter, however, to make large-scale models operational in a developing country context in such a way that they are genuinely useful for planning and decisionmaking. The main lesson suggested by experience with model building in Latin America and the Caribbean is that the proper starting and ending point for planning is not the analytical tools to be used but, rather, the specific decisionable problems that planners must address and to which the tools must be tailored.

2.5.2 The Trend Toward Basic Statistics

The second trend in AID-supported agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean during the 1970s was an emphasis on basic statistics. In one sense, this trend grew out of the previous one. It is somewhat paradoxical, in fact, that the emphasis on basic statistics can be looked at as emerging from both the substantial data demands of large-scale models as well as a disillusionment with and reaction against model building itself. It seems, however, that two additional factors were at least as instrumental in bringing about this gradual shift. The first of these factors was a growing realization that to tackle the interlocking problems confronting the agricultural sector, conventional qualitative judgements do

not suffice: "hard" data are required. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the increasing recognition of the need to spread the benefits of economic growth and to target resources specifically to disadvantaged populations made it imperative that solid data be available to come to a firmer understanding of the socioeconomic characteristics of potential target groups.

Regardless of exactly how this trend emerged, the evolution was generally a positive one. As in the case of large-scale model building, however, the emphasis on basic statistics was not without accompanying problems.

A first problem was a tendency not to focus data collection specifically enough on defined planning problems. Although broad-gauged, multipurpose surveys are very attractive conceptually, and although there are indeed economies of scale associated with data collection, surveys can become so unwieldy that they stretch institutional capacity to manage them. (Experience in El Salvador in the late 1970s may be an example of such overextension.) At least after a certain point, the total costs of a survey, from inception through fieldwork to the processing of statistical output, are clearly exponential, not linear. What is required, therefore, is survey management that is disciplined enough to restrict survey content from what is "interesting" to what is "essential." This is not to say that there is no place for broad, baseline information or for data geared to the identification rather than the resolution of priority problems. The point is simply that the appetite for data on the part of potential users must be focused within reasonable limits.

A second problem was the temptation to apply highly sophisticated statistical methods when they were not called for or when the benefit of their application was outweighed by difficulties in conducting subsequent analysis. To take an example, most mathematical statisticians trained in the United States or elsewhere in the developed world are schooled to maximize the statistical reliability of point estimates while minimizing the number of observations required. Frequently this leads to heavily stratified sample designs. In the context of agricultural sector planning, the precision of any one individual estimate may be of considerably less importance than the overall <u>pattern</u> of results that emerge from survey data -- for instance, the relationship between farm size and income per hectare.

Furthermore, the more complex the sample design, generally the more difficult is the job of the analyst in working with the data later.

A third problem associated with the emphasis on basic statistics sprang from the time and resource intensity inherent in launching a survey. The nuts and bolts of conducting a quality survey cannot be downplayed. The real danger is that sample design and field work tasks can so swamp a survey activity that two parties, whose early participation is crucial, get left out in the cold. The first of these parties are data processors. All too often, the attitude of survey designers is, "Let's get on with getting the data first. We'll worry about how to process the information later." When such an attitude is present, it is imperative that it be attacked head on, first, because of the efficiencies and cost savings that can be introduced through integration of a data processing design at the inception of the process and, second, because failure to do so inevitably leads to underestimation of data processing resources and, consequently, to severe delays in providing useful output in timely fashion.[1] The second major party whose early participation is essential are the users of the anticipated data. If survey statistics are to be useful to planning and decisionmaking, planners and decisionmakers must have a say in defining the content of the data to be collected. Moreover, their input needs to be far more than nominal. For ultimate effectiveness, planners must foresee how they will use the data in specific terms and have an early and clear understanding of what they can expect. In the beginning and at the end, collection of data for agricultural sector planning is an exercise that must be consciously and directly responsive to decisionmakers' needs.

Although this brief catalog of problems focuses on some of the major difficulties that were encountered in the movement to a greater emphasis on collection of survey statistics, the positive nature of the strides that were made should not be ignored. As a rule, it is fair to say that Latin American and Caribbean planners' knowledge of the socioeconomic characteristics of target populations, as well as the factors constraining their development, has never been better. There is still considerably more to be done, of course, but achievements to date reflect substantial progress.

[1] Riordan argues that this latter point is critical. "Half the battle in establishing the credibility of a planning unit is the timeliness with which it delivers results." Riordan, op.cit., p.16.

2.5.3 The Trend Toward Problem Solving and Management Organization

The emphases on model building and basic statistics were technical in nature, that is, attention focused on the properties of the models to be constructed and the operational steps that were required to collect statistical information. In both cases, problems emerged that limited the extent to which resultant technical work was put to practical use. These problems were not disparate or unrelated. In fact, practically all the problems in the previous two subsections can be reduced to two basic tendencies:

- First, a tendency for analytical and statistical activities not to be sufficiently problem-focused; and
- Second, a tendency for technical work not to be sufficiently integrated organizationally into the public sector management process.

By the late 1970s, the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean began to question the analytical and statistical work that it had supported earlier in the decade. It concluded that its accomplishments had not matched anticipations. Although it did not wish to abandon its support of agricultural sector planning, it was nevertheless skeptical about the advisability of continuing with its earlier approaches. It therefore searched for mechanisms to build into the design of agricultural sector planning activities that would offer greater assurance that the Bureau's support of planning would be translated into identifiable impacts on agricultural sector decisionmaking.[1]

The Bureau did not come up with any hard and fast guidelines as the result of its search. Since 1978, however, proposals for support of agricultural sector planning have been subject to considerable scrutiny. Specifically, the Bureau has examined the design of these activities in light of the two tendencies we have just discussed.

On the one hand, the Bureau has taken pains to try to assure that the technical work it supports is geared to address clearly defined policy problems. Some would argue that it still has not gone far enough, but at

[1] It also decided to sponsor an evaluation of Latin American and Caribbean experience in agricultural sector planning. Thus, this study.

least there is explicit pressure to tie technical approaches to policy concerns. The 1978 Integrated Area Development Studies Program in Guatemala is an instance of how the appropriateness of alternative approaches to data collection is a function of the framework in which investment decisions will be made. At the time of project design, the Government of Guatemala was contemplating use of an area development approach to public sector investments. To support movement in this direction, the project first launched a comprehensive cross-sectoral data collection activity at the municipality level.

On the other hand, the Bureau has also been going to increasing lengths to assess agricultural sector planning proposals with respect to the extent to which, and the ways in which, planning is linked to decisionmaking in management organization terms.[1] The premise of this concern is that planning can only be effective if it fits in organizationally in such a way that it can make an operational difference. An example from Guyana illustrates how a change in administrative arrangements can alter operational responsibilities. Until the late 1970s, the Resource Development and Planning Division in the Guyanese Ministry of Agriculture was layered in as a technical line division and, in practice, exerted limited influence in the planning and budgeting process. During the design of the 1980 Agricultural Sector Planning Project in Guyana, this inadequacy surfaced to the attention of both the Government of Guyana and AID. Both agreed that a change was in order and the Government raised the status of the division to that of a department. As a consequence of the change, the Planning Department reported directly to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry and was expected to play an active role in the allocation of the agricultural sector budget.

The trend of problem solving and management organization has been ongoing for the past three years. Unfortunately, the track record of this trend is not complete enough to offer an assessment of its progress and its problems. Nevertheless, it appears to be a logical reaction to the principal problems that affected earlier trends.

[1] This emphasis on institutional concerns was recently reinforced by recommendations of the U.S. Congress for AID to focus on long-term institutionalization of planning capacity. See U.S. Department of State, "Implementation of FY 1982 Legislation," Outgoing Telegram, State 277771, 1981.

2.5.4 The Trend Toward Increased Private Sector Participation

The fourth, and last trend, of post-1970 agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean is, at least from AID's perspective, still in embryonic form. In reaction to the priority that the Reagan administration has accorded to the participation of the private sector in the development process, AID has been investigating mechanisms in which public and private resources could be deployed in harmony to address development problems. In the case of agricultural sector planning, however, there have as yet been no major initiatives along these lines.

In this subsection, we shall not look at what has transpired thus far. Rather, we shall first suggest one specific way in which the private sector might participate more in the agricultural sector planning process and, then, lay out a scheme to organize thinking as to the minimum set of responsibilities that fall appropriately under the purview of the public sector.[1]

A Suggestion for Increased Private Sector Participation. Subsection 2.5.1 catalogued some of the problems that have accompanied attempts to institutionalize large-scale models in the public sector. Since model building requires continuity of senior technical personnel, and since civil service salaries are low in most countries, experience to date suggests that modeling activities might well be contracted out to private sector institutions that would be in a position to pay competitive salaries and retain key staff. In principle, the same argument would apply to any work that might require specialized analytical skills. Under such an arrangement, public sector planners would take on the role of specifying the policy questions that the work of contractors should address, and thus, increase the likelihood that analytical results would be responsive to decisionmakers' needs.

[1] As recent work by PROPLAN has stressed, the translation of planning into effective action is generally a function of the degree to which those who are likely to be affected by policy measures (the private sector, as a rule) participate in the formulation of policy. This is true regardless of how the purview of planning is defined. In what follows, therefore, we take this proposition for granted and focus attention on areas of responsibility that have frequently been assumed by the public sector and might be beneficially transferred to the private sector.

Such arrangements are not without precedent. In the United States, for example, the public sector routinely relies on the work of forecasting and research firms to furnish the grist for the mill of the articulation of policy. In Latin America and the Caribbean, as well, it is not uncommon for private sector institutions to perform policy-related work for agricultural sector planning. Three obvious examples of such institutions are the Catholic University of Chile, INVEST (Inversiones y Estudios Económicos, S. de R.L.) in Honduras, and CPES (Centro Paraguayo de Estudios Sociólogos) in Paraguay.

A Scheme for Organizing Thinking on the Responsibilities of the Public Sector. A recent article by Theodore Schultz, the Nobel-prize agricultural economist from the University of Chicago, addresses the topic of the relationship of government to the economic organization of agriculture.[1] Although Schultz's predisposition is to limit government involvement in the agricultural sector, he nevertheless identifies seven areas of responsibility in which a stable, well-managed government would have a comparative advantage over the private sector. The areas are:

1. Collection and reporting of agricultural statistics. Reliable information assists producers and consumers in making economically prudent decisions. Both stand to gain from the development and dissemination of good statistics.

2. Establishment of Standards of Measurement and the Enforcement of Such Standards in Trade. Trade will be encouraged when producers and consumers have confidence in the information at their disposal. An important characteristic of information concerns the nature of products to be traded and measures of their quantity.

3. Definition of the Property Rights of Buyers and Sellers. It is the responsibility of the public sector to spell out the rules that govern land ownership and access to water.

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[1] See Theodore Schultz, "Knowledge is Power in Agriculture," Challenge (September/October, 1981), 4-13.

4. Reduction of the Occurrence and Spread of Animal Diseases and Pests, and Health Inspection of Foods. These functions are largely the province of veterinarians and plant pathologists, but they also depend on the ability of government to monitor production in process and to organize and use information.

5. Maintenance of Price Stability and Avoidance of Inflation and Deflation. Agricultural development is not independent of overall economic policy. Adequate performance of this function requires reliable production data and an ability to estimate domestic demand and monitor international markets.

6. Reduction of Inequality in the Distribution of Personal Income. Again, reliable information is essential, as is a capability to assess the likely impact of policy alternatives on income distribution.

7. Formation of Agricultural Research Institutions and Dissemination of Results. It is difficult for the developer of an agricultural innovation to reap the benefits. Similarly, it is difficult for consumers to pay directly for the research that generates an innovation. Thus, government must play a role.

For Schultz, these seven areas make up a minimum set of responsibilities that fall properly in the domain of the public sector. Beyond them, there is considerable latitude for private sector involvement. As we might expect, management of the agricultural sector in Latin American and Caribbean countries reveals wide variation within this broad range.

Although Schultz's seven areas speak to the proper role of "government," they are nevertheless suggestive of a minimum set of functions that would correspond to agricultural sector planning. The fifth and sixth of Schultz's areas are commonly identified as planning functions, and to perhaps a lesser extent, his first and seventh areas as well. It is noteworthy that Schultz does not see direct government involvement as essential in what is probably the most common instrument of policy to which agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean generally leads, namely, development projects. This suggests that the identification, design, and implementation of development projects is an area of responsibility in which increased private sector participation could be encouraged. It also speaks

to the relative priorities of agricultural sector planning itself: although planners must have the capacity to assess the impacts of major policy measures, including projects, the process of designing projects, an area in which planning has not infrequently played a significant role, is not the area of responsibility to which the highest priority attention of planning should be paid.

In laying out a minimum set of responsibilities for government in agriculture, Schultz opens up more opportunities for private sector participation in the agricultural development process. Even under this restrictive scheme, however, there is still plenty for agricultural sector planning to do. As an advisory service to decisionmakers, planning is applicable both in current-day Chile, which has moved dramatically to restrict government involvement in agriculture, and in Guyana, where government intervention is substantial.

3.0 EVALUATION DESIGN

As discussed in Chapter 1, the major objectives of this study are twofold:

- First, to examine, on the basis of previous experience, the factors that are associated with the relative success/failure of agricultural sector planning and to make judgments as to their relative importance; and

- Second, to outline in succinct, usable form a set of recommendations for the design of agricultural sector planning projects in the future.

In the literature on evaluation methods, a number of dichotomies are commonly used to distinguish between different approaches to evaluation. Among the principal dichotomies used are: summative versus formative, impact versus process, and confirmatory versus exploratory.[1] These dichotomies are not perfectly isomorphic. Nevertheless, common elements exist among summative, impact, and confirmatory evaluations, on the one hand, and among formative, process, and exploratory evaluations, on the other hand. The approach to meeting the first objective of this study will contain many elements of summative, impact, and confirmatory evaluations, whereas the approach to meeting the second objective will address many issues that are commonly the focus of formative, process, and exploratory evaluations.

The first objective is largely retrospective in character. The intent is to review previous experiences in agricultural sector planning and reach a determination whether these experiences were successful or unsuccessful. The basic question is whether agricultural sector planning achieved, or failed to achieve, the objectives for which it is intended -- or, in other words, "Did agricultural sector planning 'work'?" In the context of evaluation methods, therefore, the major thrust of the first objective of this study is a <u>summative</u> one, that is, to measure, <u>ex-post</u>, progress toward objectives, to identify the <u>impacts</u> that agricultural sector planning activities have had, and to <u>confirm</u>, or fail to confirm, hypothesized linkages between objectives and the means chosen to achieve these objectives.

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[1] See, for example, Agency for International Development, "Design and Evaluation of AID-Assisted Projects," 1980; T.D. Cook and D.T. Campbell, <u>Quasi-Experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings</u> (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1979); and Abt Associates Inc., "Program Evaluation Plan Report: Rural Satellite Program: Evaluation Management Contract," Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1981.

A major stumbling block to addressing the first objective is the establishment of appropriate criteria for evaluating "success." This is no easy matter, either conceptually or empirically. Since the ultimate objective of planning is presumably to achieve desirable results, it is natural to think of the achievement of increases in production, increases in incomes, improvement in the distribution of income, etc., as the fundamental criterion for evaluating agricultural sector planning performance. This "results" criterion is indeed an appropriate standard for assessing the effectiveness of the overall agricultural sector management process. It would also be appropriate if planners had control over all the steps that are required to bring ultimate outcomes about. As a rule, however, planners do not make final decisions on policies to be adopted, are not directly responsible for the implementation of policy, and, like everybody else, do not have control over exogeneous events. As a consequence, a failure of agricultural sector planning to result in the achievement of desired objectives may not be the fault of planners at all, but may be attributable to shortcomings or unanticipated events farther along the line. Conversely, the achievement of desired objectives does not necessarily mean that planners were effective; the positive outcomes could have been the accomplishment of decisionmakers and implementers who were able to compensate for planners' drawbacks.

In light of these complications, this study will <u>not</u> attempt to say whether agricultural sector planning activities have been <u>successful</u> in an ultimate sense. It <u>will</u>, however, have much to say about the <u>usefulness</u> of different kinds of planning activities. In the following section, we identify four kinds of intermediate impacts that agricultural sector planning activities can have. The four kinds of impacts are <u>capacity-building impacts</u> (that is, impacts on the capacity of planning institutions to plan effectively) <u>interinstitutional impacts</u> (that is, impacts of planning institutions on other public sector institutions), <u>consciousness-raising impacts</u> (that is, impacts on the awareness of decisionmakers about the need for data and analysis as an ingredient to more rational decisionmaking and about questions of equity and the need to target resources to disadvantaged groups), and <u>policy/program impacts</u> (that is, impacts on policy and program decisions). In this study, the usefulness of agricultural sector planning activities will be assessed according to the impacts that have resulted from them. We fully

expect that different kinds of activities will have had different kinds of impacts and, for this reason, shall focus on variations of impacts within and among distinct groupings of similar activities.

Although we are not in a position to speak to the ultimate "success" of agricultural sector planning activities, we shall nevertheless identify the factors that are associated with the different patterns of impacts that they have had. Conceptually and operationally, this exercise feeds directly into the second, objective of the study, that is, the development of a set of recommendations for designing agricultural sector planning projects in the future. To a large extent, the factors that are associated with useful activities in the past can be taken as the basic building blocks for developing recommendations for the future. Moreover, they are a good check to assure that whatever recommendations we make are grounded in the "school of hard knocks" of experience.

Identification of the key factors associated with useful agricultural sector planning requires a focus on issues that are commonly the subject of a formative evaluation, that is, an evaluation in which explicit attention is paid to process as well as to results and in which the predominant intent is to explore, discover, and learn. Although it is natural to have preconceptions as to what is important and unimportant, unanticipated findings must nevertheless be allowed to surface and, in reviewing the evidence, a conscious attempt must be made to keep an open mind.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into two sections. The next section, Section 3.1, specifies an operational framework for assessing the usefulness of agricultural sector planning activities. Section 3.2 then presents the organizational scheme that we shall use to structure our heuristic findings.

3.1 A Framework for Assessing the Usefulness of Agricultural Sector Planning Activities

In this section, we specify an operational framework for assessing the usefulness of agricultural sector planning activities. We first describe in some detail the functions of planning, and their relationship to public sector management. This is followed by a presentation of the criteria that we shall use to assess the usefulness of agricultural sector planning

activities, by a listing of key hypotheses concerning the impacts that we would expect to result from different kinds of planning activities, and, finally, by a discussion of the ways in which our assessment criteria will be applied to different groupings.

3.1.1 The Agricultural Sector Planning Process and Its Relationship To Agricultural Sector Management

In the previous chapter, we presented a general discussion of the role of planning in the context of a national management system. We now examine the functions of agricultural sector planning, and how they relate to public sector management, in more detail.

A convenient scheme for understanding the functions of agricultural sector planning is presented in Exhibit 3.1. The scheme is far from perfect (no scheme is), but it does have a number of decided advantages. First, it delineates in relatively specific terms what agricultural sector planning units are typically expected to do. In this sense, it is a distinct improvement over Exhibits 2.2 and 2.4. Second, although the scheme is organized in linear fashion, the presence of the evaluation feedback loop makes it clear that planning is in fact an ongoing process. Third, relationships between planning and decisionmmaking are made explicit. And, fourth, as we shall discuss further below, the exhibit distinguishes clearly between project and non-project planning.

Exhibit 3.1 is divided into four parts by three sets of broken lines. The first part illustrates that agricultural sector planning is just one component of national planning, that planning takes place in primary sectors other than agriculture, and in secondary and tertiary sectors as well. The second and third parts of the exhibit reflect the different responsibilities of planning and decisionmaking, respectively. And the fourth part presents the ultimate objectives toward which the agricultural sector management process is directed.

The distinction between the provinces of planning and decisionmaking is naturally an important one. As we have seen, planners are rarely responsible for final decisions on the enactment of policies and programs. In many cases, in fact, the influence of planners on these decisions may be somewhat marginal. In the real world, pressure groups are often key sources of

Exhibit 3.1

THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING PROCESS
AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO AGRICULTURAL SECTOR MANAGEMENT



influence in getting a course of action adopted. This is not to play down the real influence that planning can, and often does, have. It is simply an acknowledgement of the need to take a real-world perspective and to recognize operationally that planning does not take place in a vacuum. Even in cases where planning has played an obviously positive role in affecting policies and programs (the work of UNASEC in Nicaragua is a pertinent example -- see Chapter 5), other actors and factors exert influence as well.

All countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have agricultural sector planning units. In most countries, these units serve as lead coordinating agencies of their agricultural sector planning systems. This role is reflected in the "Agricultural Sector Planning Unit" box in Exhibit 3.1.

The exhibit defines eight key functions of agricultural sector planning: data collection, data processing, data analysis, project identification, project proposals, policy analysis, policy formulation, and evaluation. There is a close correspondence between these functions and the two planning frameworks discussed in Chapter 2. With the exception of evaluation, the functions parallel the second, third, and fourth stages in Exhibit 2.2 and flesh out the activities in the formulation stage of the PROPLAN framework. Since Exhibit 3.1 is more specific in delineating the functions of planning, however, it, rather than either of the other two frameworks, will be relied on heavily throughout the rest of this study.

The first three planning functions -- data collection, processing, and analysis -- are seen as preconditions for effective performance of the remaining five functions. Planning, as an advisory service to decision-makers, requires reliable, up-to-date information for analytical use. At first blush, the specification of data collection, data processing, and data analysis as three separate functions may appear to attach undue importance to data-related activities. Given the inadequacy of data in many Latin American and Caribbean countries, however, the strengthening of data collection, processing, and analysis capacity has been a major focus of AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities. Furthermore, making the transitions from collection to processing and from processing to analysis is,

in practice, far from automatic.[1]

As Exhibit 3.1 illustrates, data are used in three distinct and interrelated sets of activities. They are inputs to project development activities, to the broader process of policy analysis and formulation, and to evaluation activities. The interrelationships among the three sets of activities are important. The arrow to the left of the "Policy Formulation" box points up the fact that project development is not independent of policy context. Similarly, the evaluation feedback loop illustrates that policies, programs, and projects should be guided by the pros and cons of prior experience.

The third part of the exhibit lays out the key functions that fall under the province of decisionmaking. These functions consist of project funding and project implementation, on the one hand, and macro-policy implementation, on the other hand. As a rule, planners can be expected to exert some degree of influence in shaping these activities, particularly if the recommendations they offer meet what are commonly decisionmakers' key tests: political acceptability and budgetary feasibility. Rarely, however, are planners directly involved in carrying these activities out.

The final part of Exhibit 3.1 presents the ultimate objectives of agricultural sector planning, that is, the final outcomes that are anticipated to result from the chain of events that have preceded them. Although agricultural sector objectives vary somewhat from one country to another, they commonly include increases in production, increases in incomes, and improvement in the distribution of income. For this reason, these objectives are listed explicitly in the exhibit.

[1]The appearance of the three data-related functions directly below the "Agricultural Sector Planning Unit" box is not intended to imply that all of these functions should necessarily be performed by planning units themselves. As we shall see, in fact, a good case can be made that a planning unit's assumption of data collection and processing functions distracts attention away from analytical work. Nevertheless, the three functions are critical ingredients of the planning process and, as a consequence, planning units must at least contribute to deliberations on what data should be collected and the ways in which they should be processed.

3.1.2 Criteria for Assessing the Usefulness of Agricultural Sector Planning Activities

In general, we can distinguish four kinds of impacts, short of the achievement of ultimate objectives, that agricultural sector planning activities might be expected to have. These impacts are:

- Capacity-Building Impacts
- Consciousness-Raising Impacts
- Interinstitutional Impacts
- Policy/Program Impacts

In this study, the usefulness of agricultural sector planning activities will be assessed according to the extent to which these impacts have resulted from the activities in question. Each kind of impact is discussed in detail in what follows.

Our first evaluation criterion is one that has been a major objective of AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities, namely, capacity building. If we examine the logical frameworks that have been drawn up for AID-supported agricultural sector planning projects, what we commonly find are references to the development of institutional capacity for planning. Conceptually, this institution-building objective is distinct from the production of outputs. The operative concept here is not so much the outputs but, rather, the creation of the capability to produce quality outputs on a continuing basis.

Although capacity building has been a primary objective of AID's support of agricultural sector planning, the building of capacity does not, in and of itself, guarantee that planning will make an operational difference, that is, that it will "work." As a result, capacity building is not a *prima facie* indicator of "success," but it is nevertheless a basic precondition for effective planning. Effective planning cannot occur if an infrastructure of technical skills is not in place. Thus, capacity building is not only useful; it is essential.

By consciousness raising, we mean the heightening of awareness among decisionmakers about the need for the policies and programs that planners recommend and, more basically, increased recognition of the need for data and analysis as an ingredient to more rational decisionmaking. Indeed, a number of observers of AID's support of agricultural sector planning in

Latin America and the Caribbean would claim that one of its main accomplishments has been increased "technification" of decisionmaking. It is argued that decisionmakers are now more aware of the need to base policies and programs on empirical evidence and analysis and demand more information and analysis before making decisions. If this is true, it can certainly be said that AID-supported planning activities have been useful, even if we are not in a position to point to specific policies and programs that have resulted from this raising of consciousness.

Among the different ways in which decisionmakers' awareness can be heightened, there is one that merits special attention in this study. Over much of the last decade, AID's development resources have been directed in large part to improve the welfare of the rural poor, especially small farmers, in developing countries. The intent has been not only to affect the direct beneficiaries of the programs for which it has provided assistance, but also to lead to changes in the consciousness of host country governments about questions of equity and the need to target resources to disadvantaged groups. In Latin America and the Caribbean, AID's support of agricultural sector planning has been an ingredient, and often a major ingredient, for achieving this objective of "concientización," and this kind of consciousness raising, in spirit if not in explicit letter, is incorporated in the documentation of virtually all AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities in the region. Thus, it is of more than passing interest to learn whether AID's support has had this desired effect.[1]

The third kind of impact that agricultural sector planning can have consists of <u>interinstitutional</u> impacts, that is, impacts of agricultural sector planning units on other public sector institutions. Agricultural sector planning is not an isolated exercise. In practice, agricultural sector planning units are expected to interact with other public sector

[1] In the final analysis, the proof of the pudding of "concientización" consists in shifts of host country resource allocations toward disadvantaged groups. For this reason, we debated examining changes in the budgets of Latin American and Caribbean countries over the past decade but concluded that it would be virtually impossible to link budget changes to agricultural sector planning activities.

institutions (and with institutions outside the public sector) in both an active and reactive capacity.[1] To the extent that they perform this function well, planning units can be said to be doing their job and, thus, can be said to be useful.

Identification of positive interactions with other institutions is easier to discuss in theory than to apply in practice. A certain amount of caution is called for in assessing interinstitutional impacts operationally. To be able to say that positive interinstitutional relationships exist, we need to know more than that routine meetings were held between agricultural sector planning units and other institutions or that materials were exchanged between them. We need to know that the interaction made a difference, that is, that agricultural sector planning actually performed a recognizable and important service.

The fourth kind of impact that we shall examine is the impact of agricultural sector planning on the adoption of policies and programs. If planners exert an identifiable influence on program and policy decisions, then, almost tautologically, it can be said that their work is considered to be useful. Even if we are unable to say that this influence has been translated into increases in production, increases in incomes, or an improvement in the distribution of income, policy/program impacts still come considerably closer to these ultimate objectives than the three other kinds of impacts we have just discussed. As a consequence, achievement of policy/program impacts is a key criterion for assessing planning performance.

Our assessment of the usefulness of AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities will be conducted by examining the different kinds of impacts that they have had. If a given activity evidences all four kinds of impacts, we can conclude that it has been a very useful activity. Each activity that we examine should not be expected to evidence all four kinds of impacts, however. AID-supported activities have varied widely in their scope and objectives, and it would be unrealistic to expect activities with narrowly defined objectives to accomplish more than they set out to do.

[1] Planners are not just initiators. As PROPLAN stresses, relationships between planners and decisionmakers are not, nor should they be expected to be, unidirectional.

On the other hand, if we find a recurring pattern of narrowly defined objectives and limited impact, it may suggest that AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities have been too limited in scope and may have missed the planning "forest" for specific activity "trees."

In this connection, it is important to recognize explicitly that the four kinds of impacts are not independent of each other. On the contrary, they are linked together in a logical progression leading to the achievement of agricultural sector objectives. This chain of impacts is illustrated in Exhibit 3.2.

The logic of Exhibit 3.2 can be described simply as follows. As a first step, contributions are made to the capacity of agricultural sector planning institutions to conduct data-related activities, to analyze and formulate policy alternatives, and to identify and develop projects. This increase in capacity leads to increased awareness on the part of decisionmakers about the need for different kinds of policies and programs, and the need for empirical evidence and analysis on which to base them. As a consequence of the strengthening of agricultural sector planning capacity, other institutions are also inclined to make greater use of the outputs of agricultural sector planners and to pay more attention to their recommendations. The increased awareness of decisionmakers and other institutions then leads to the adoption of policies and programs that, in turn, are translated into increases in production, increases in incomes, improvement in income distribution, and other outcomes.

The chain of events laid out in Exhibit 3.1 presents the different <u>things</u> that planners, decisionmakers, and implementers <u>do</u>, whereas the chain of impacts in Exhibit 3.2 presents the <u>impacts</u> that we would expect to <u>result</u> from these activities. Thus, the two schemes are closely related, as we discuss further in the next subsection.

3.1.3 Hypotheses Concerning Impacts to Be Expected from Agricultural Sector Planning Activities

This subsection presents a number of key hypotheses concerning agricultural sector planning. Many of the hypotheses go into specifics concerning the linkages that would be expected to exist between the chain of events in Exhibit 3.1 and the chain of impacts in Exhibit 3.2. Given the

Exhibit 3.2

CHAIN OF IMPACTS EXPECTED FROM THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING PROCESS



limitations of the data to be examined, it will be difficult to test the hypotheses in a strict sense. Subsequent chapters, however, will touch upon all the issues that the hypotheses raise. In any case, the hypotheses are a useful way to structure thinking about the impacts that would be expected to result from AID-supported agricultural sector activities, and it is with this intent that they are presented here.

The central hypothesis of this study is:

> The greater the extent to which agricultural sector planning is demand-driven, the more likely that planning capacity will be institutionalized and that planning will be directly responsive to decisionmakers' needs.

As we have seen, lack of commitment was a basic constraint to the effectiveness of national development planning under the Alliance for Progress. It is natural to expect that the same would be true in cases of ineffective agricultural sector planning. If this hypothesis can be substantiated, then what we have termed consciousness-raising impacts assume even greater importance. For this reason, particular attention will be paid to this kind of impact in subsequent chapters and, as we shall see, the issue of effective demand for planning will be a major focus in the presentation of the findings of our country visits.

Other key hypotheses are the following:

- The capacity of an agricultural sector planning unit is directly related to the salary levels that decisionmakers are willing and able to pay.

- The less developed the overall capacity of an agricultural sector planning unit, the more likely that data-related functions will receive higher operational priority than analytical functions.

- The broader the scope of data-related activities performed by an agricultural sector planning unit, the less attention that will be paid to analytical activities.

- The broader the scope of project development activities performed by an agricultural sector planning unit, the less attention that will be paid to policy analysis and policy formulation.

- The more sophisticated the analytical techniques that it is attempted to transfer to host-country planners, the less likely that a broad range of planning skills will be applied and institutionalized.

- The development of decisionmakers' awareness of the need for data and analysis is a slow process. Therefore, countries in which decisionmakers already recognize the need for data and analysis are more likely to benefit from AID-supported capacity-building activities.

- If planners' work is not guided by the needs of decision-makers, it is less likely that it will be put to practical use.

- The greater the institutional linkage between agricultural sector planning units and the public sector institutions that are responsible for budget decisions, the more likely that planners will identify policies, programs, and projects that will be funded and implemented.

- The broader the relationships between agricultural sector planning units and other public sector institutions, the more likely that planners' work will be put to operational use.

- The greater the contact between planners and implementers, the more likely that planners' recommendations will be realistic, feasible, and used.

Subsequent chapters address the issues raised by these hypotheses in some detail. This is particularly true of our examination of groupings of relatively similar activities, which is discussed further in the next subsection.

3.1.4 Grouping Agricultural Sector Planning Activities

Over the last decade, AID has supported a diverse array of agricultural sector planning activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. Among the activities that have received AID support are data collection activities, sector and subsector studies, regional planning, institution building, and project activities. In subsequent chapters of this study, we shall look at the individual impacts that many of these activities have had and shall also present summary statistics on the impacts of a broad sample of these activities. Between these two extremes, however, we shall also look at the impacts of different groupings of agricultural sector planning activities.

The intent of this study is to go beyond the idiosyncracies of specific agricultural sector planning activities and, ultimately, to identify the factors that it will be important to take into consideration in designing agricultural sector planning activities in the future. On the one hand, therefore, the study must do more than go back and review previous agricultural sector planning experiences one by one in isolation from each other.

On the other hand, a simple lumping together of previous experiences would run the risk of mixing "apples and oranges" and, thus, render comparisons problematic. As a result, what is required is an intermediate level of analysis, that is, analysis that focuses on the characteristics and impacts of groupings of activities that are relatively similar in nature.

In this study, we shall look at groupings of activities that are similar in two ways: first, by substantive scope; and second, by country of implementation.

In the next chapter, Chapter 4, we first examine the written record of AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities. In conducting this examination, we disaggregate planning activities into subsets that are relatively similar in substantive scope, and then go into some detail in examining the impacts of the activities in each of these subsets. Specifically, we examine data-intensive activities separately from activities that have been broader in their institutionalization objectives. A priori, we would expect the impacts of the two subsets of activities to vary -- for example, institutional support activities would be expected to evidence more policy/program impacts than data-intensive activities, at least within the time frame within which these activities have run their course.

In Chapters 5 and 6, we report the findings of our site visits to individual countries. In these chapters, we shall focus less on specific activities than on the combined impact of the various agricultural sector planning activities that AID has supported in each country.

3.1.5 Summary

Planners play a major role in the agricultural sector management process, but are by no means the only actors. The principal responsiblities of planners consist of data-related activities, policy analysis and formulation, project development, and evaluation. In most countries, planners are not the parties responsible for funding and implementing decisions. These responsibilities fall under the province of decisionmakers.

Ideally, the ultimate criterion for evaluating the success or failure of an agricultural sector planning process would be whether that process resulted in the achievement of sector objectives, for example, increases in production, increases in incomes, and improvement in the distribution of

income. Since planners are not directly responsible for all parts of the agricultural sector management process, however, it would be inappropriate (as well as difficult technically) to apply this criterion as the sole standard for judging the effectiveness of AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities. In this study, therefore, we shall focus on the broader issue of the usefulness of planning activities. Usefulness will be assessed according to four criteria: capacity building, consciousness raising, interinstitutional impacts, and impacts on the adoption of policies and programs. In applying these criteria, we shall disaggregate planning activities into groupings of relatively similar activities for detailed examination.

The central hypothesis to be examined in this study is that planning is most effective when it is demand-driven. For this reason, particular attention will be paid to the consciousness-raising impacts of AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities.

3.2 Use of AID's Project Analysis Framework as a Conceptual Framework for Evaluation

The bulk of the discussion in the previous section of this chapter has focused on the summative, impact, and confirmatory elements of this evaluation. Particular attention has been paid to what we mean by success and usefulness in the context of agricultural sector planning and the problems involved in attributing causality. The usefulness criteria defined in Section 3.1 provide a convenient framework for organizing these kinds of findings. In what follows, we present a framework for organizing our formative, process, and exploratory findings.

There are a number of ways in which these findings could be categorized. In our judgment, however, the most appropriate scheme is the framework that AID uses in the design of development projects. As an AID project is developed, four different types of project analysis must be performed:

- Technical Analysis. A project must be technically sound on two counts. First, the project and its technological implications must be appropriate for the specific time and place for which the project is proposed. Second, the project must be reasonably priced and designed.

- Financial Analysis. A project must be financially viable. Among the major financial issues that must typically be addressed are whether there are sufficient financial resources to implement the project, whether cash flows are suitably timed, whether the ability to meet recurring costs is reasonably well assured, and, in the case of a revenue-producing project, whether the project evidences an adequate financial rate of return.

- Economic Analysis. A project must be economically feasible. A typical economic analysis must provide the economic rationale for the selected project design over alternative designs. In general, one of two different approaches is used. For revenue-producing projects and projects whose outputs can be translated realistically into monetary equivalents, cost-benefit techniques are applied. Cost-effectiveness analysis, on the other hand, is normally used for projects that are not revenue-producing but whose outputs can nevertheless be meaningfully quantified. In either case, an examination must be made of the possible divergence between the social and private returns resulting from the project.

- Social Analysis. A project must be socially sound. A typical social soundness analysis must address three distinct but related issues: the compatibility of the project with the sociocultural environment in which it is to be introduced; the likelihood that the new practices or institutions introduced among the initial project target population will be diffused among other groups; and the social impact on distribution of benefits and burdens among different groups, both within the initial project population and beyond.

In addition to these project analyses, each AID project must be shown to be institutionally viable. The major elements of such an institutional analysis, which is normally embedded in discussion of implementation arrangements, are:

- The identification of the key organizations that are to implement the project, the role of each organization, and the interrelationships among them; analysis of the management capability of implementing organizations, including an examination of proposed coordination mechanisms and administrative arangements to reach and involve target populations; and specification of the operational responsibilities of each implementing organization and examination of the appropriateness of the relationships among these responsibilities.

These five kinds of analysis -- technical, financial, economic, social, and institutional -- are couched here in terms of their applicability for pre-project justification and approval. The overall framework that these

analyses provide is not only applicable before a project begins; it is also a useful tool for structuring the evaluation of the project during and after its implementation. In the context of this study, this framework also offers the decided advantage of highlighting the two kinds of concerns that are commonly raised in discussions of planning, namely, technical and institutional concerns.

As we examine the different factors associated with the usefulness of agricultural sector planning activities, we shall group our findings in three general categories: technical, institutional, and other. The grouping of financial, economic, and social findings in a residual category is guided by the following considerations. Most financial findings can be expected to be somewhat platitudinous, for example, "Sufficient financial resources must be available if agricultural sector planning is to be successful." The one major exception concerns the degree of influence that planners have over budgetary allocations -- but this is really more of an institutional issue than a financial issue. Economic findings can be expected to be sparse. Most agricultural sector planning project papers shy away from trying to estimate the economic benefits of planning and retreat to qualitative cost-effectiveness arguments -- and ex post treatment is generally less rigorous still. Finally, social analysis, in the context of agricultural sector planning, can conveniently be covered under the rubric of institutional analysis.

In the next chapter, Chapter 4, we present the findings obtained from examining written documentation on AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities in Latin America and the Caribbean over the past decade. This is followed in Chapters 5 and 6 by a presentation of the findings of our country visits, and in Chapter 7 by a presentation of a summary of the findings of the PROPLAN survey. As an introduction to these chapters, we now conclude this chapter with a brief explanation of how our adaptation of AID's project analysis framework, together with our operationally defined usefulness criteria, will be used to organize each of these bodies of findings.

3.2.1 Organization of Findings Obtained from Examination of Agricultural Sector Planning Activity Documentation

The building blocks for the findings presented in Chapter 4 are contained in Appendices A and B. Appendix A contains two sets of forms, "Project Summaries" and "Activity Descriptions." Appendix B contains one set of forms entitled, "Evaluation Summaries."

Project Summaries. The Project Summaries capsulize key information about activities that have components dealing with planning in Latin America and the Caribbean and for which AID approved separate project funding. Virtually all the information that appears in these forms is taken from Project Papers or similar documentation and is therefore ex-ante information. The information in question includes the following:

- The country in which the activity was to be carried out. Since most AID-supported agricultural sector planning projects are Mission-funded, the name of the country indicates the source of AID project funds. In the case of subregional projects supported by Caribbean Regional funds or funds from the Regional Office for Central America and Panama, either "Caribbean Regional" or "ROCAP" appears as the country in question. In cases where AID/Washington is the source of funding for a project in a specific country, the name of the AID/Washington office appears, followed by the name of the country in question in parentheses. In cases where AID/Washington funds a project that is not specific to any country, the name of the AID/Washington office appears alone.

- The title and code number assigned to the project by AID, plus the year in which AID funding was approved.

- The level of funding, in dollars, of the project as a whole and of the planning components of the project. In each case, funding is broken down among the AID grant contribution, the AID loan contribution, the host country contribution, and the contribution of other parties.

- The counterpart planning institutions to be involved in the project.

- The source of technical assistance contemplated for the planning components of the project.

- The logical framework for the project as a whole.

Activity Descriptions. The agricultural sector planning activities that AID has supported over the past decade have not been limited to projects. There have been a number of other activities that AID has funded but that have not passed through the formal AID project approval process. In many cases such activities were financed with Program Development and Support funds. The principal examples of such non-projectized activities are agricultural sector assessments and baseline studies of agricultural research, education, and extension (REE).

Although many of these non-projectized activities have made a direct and positive contribution to agricultural sector planning, formal documentation of levels of funding, counterpart planning institutions, sources of technical assistance, and activity objectives is generally not readily available. As a rule, therefore, it is impossible to complete the equivalent of Project Summaries in these cases. On the other hand, there is generally some documentation, usually the products resulting from the activities, that outlines the objectives of the activities and describes the way in which they were, or were anticipated to be, carried out.

Appendix A contains Activity Descriptions for both agricultural sector planning projects and non-projectized agricultural sector planning activities. In each case, the descriptions consist of one-page textual summaries, taken, usually verbatim, from pertinent documentation. In the case of projects, the intent of the Activity Descriptions is to shed more light on project content. In the case of non-projectized activities, the Activity Descriptions provide a mechanism for addressing these activities in this study, even if in less structured fashion than projects.

Evaluation Summaries. The Evaluation Summaries in Appendix B capsulize the conclusions of evaluations that have been made of agricultural sector planning activities. As a rule, AID does not formally evaluate non-projectized activites and, thus, the Evaluation Summaries presented in this study are limited largely to project evaluations.

The format of the Evaluation Summaries does not correspond to the format that AID recommends for the evaluation of development projects but, rather, is guided by the objectives of this study.[1] The Evaluation Summaries contain the following information:

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[1] For the format that AID recommends, see AID, "Design and Evaluation of AID-Assisted Projects."

- The country in which the agricultural sector planning activity was carried out. In cases of subregional or AID/Washington-funded projects, the same conventions that are used in the Project Summaries are used here. In addition, there are two cross-country evaluations of agricultural sector planning activities that do not correspond to any one of the activities included in the Project Summaries or Activity Descriptions. In these cases, the name of the sponsoring office appears as the "country" in question.

- For projects, the title and code number assigned to the project by AID, plus the year in which AID funding was approved; for non-projectized activities, the title of the activity and the year(s) of performance.

- The evaluation document that was consulted and the year in which the evaluation was performed. If more than one document was consulted, all such documents are listed.

- The type(s) of evaluation(s) performed. Three types of evaluations are distinguished: regularly scheduled (but not final) project evaluations, special-purpose evaluations, and final project evaluations.[1]

- The impacts of agricultural sector planning identified in the evaluation(s). Four types of impacts are distinguished: policy/program impacts, consciousness-raising impacts, interinstitutional impacts, and institutional capacity impacts.

- Constraints to achieving objectives identified in the evaluation(s).

- Lessons learned and recommendations made in the evaluation(s). The categories used to group these findings are: technical, institutional, and other. Since the intent of this study is to go beyond the idiosyncracies of previous experience, lessons and recommendations are cast in generalized form whenever possible.

In Chapter 4, the findings contained in the Project Summaries, the Activity Descriptions, and the Evaluation Summaries are pulled together and analyzed. The first part of the chapter is descriptive and summarizes AID's support of agricultural sector planning activities in the region over the last decade. The second part analyzes our evaluation findings. Impact findings are grouped according to the usefulness criteria defined in Section 3.1, and factors associated with useful agricultural sector planning are organized according to our adaptation of AID's project analysis framework discussed above.

[1] To date, AID has conducted no impact evaluations of specific agricultural sector planning projects.

Without anticipating the conclusions of the next chapter, there is one further major conceptual issue associated with the content of the Evaluation Summaries that merits particular attention at this juncture. This has to do with the identification of planning impacts and, specifically, again, with attribution of causality.

As we have seen, Evaluation Summaries report the policy/program impacts, the consciousness-raising impacts, the interinstitutional impacts, and the capacity-building impacts that are identified in agricultural sector planning activity evaluations. If any one of these different types of impacts appears, then it is safe to conclude that an activity, according to our definition, has been useful in some way. The difficulty, however, is that if no one of these different types of impacts appears, we can not conclude that the activity has not been useful.

There are two basic reasons that this is so. First, many of the evaluations we have consulted are interim evaluations and, obviously, lack of evidence of positive impacts in midstream does not necessarily mean that there will be no such impacts once an activity has run its course.[1] Second, what appears in an evaluation document is very much a function of how the evaluation is performed. Among the factors that can lead to the omission of positive impacts are the framework established for the evaluation, time available, and the predispositions of the evaluators themselves. In some evaluations, for example, evaluators focus so much on problems that the benefits of a project wind up being ignored. Similarly, so much attention may be paid to inputs and outputs that virtually no consideration is given to the achievement of purposes and goals.[2]

To highlight this very real problem, let us consider a particular case in point. In November 1981, that is, during the course of this study,

[1] A similar argument could be made for final evaluations, that is, that identifiable impacts may appear only some time after an agricultural sector planning project's formal life.

[2] On the other side of the coin, project managers, in practice, often wind up evaluating their own projects. In such cases, there is a natural temptation to be defensive and to blow minor positive impacts out of proportion. It is interesting to note, in fact, that some of the most glowing evaluations we reviewed were evaluations of projects that are not widely regarded as success stories.

Abt Associates participated in a special evaluation of the Rural Development Planning Project in Bolivia. During the evaluation, the evaluation team identified examples of policy/program impacts, consciousness-raising impacts, and interinstitutional impacts and intended to include them in their report. If we look at the report, however, we find no evidence of any of these types of impacts. An ambitious scope of work, limited time, and the existence of real problems that had to be grappled with acted, in combination, to constrain what now appears in the written record.[1]

3.2.2 Organization of Findings Obtained from Country Visits

In Chapters 5 and 6, we present the findings of our country visits. Chapter 5 reports the findings of brief visits to Guatemala, Guyana, and Jamaica, and Chapter 6 reports findings on three countries, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras, in which we were able to look at agricultural sector planning in some depth. In both chapters, our findings are cast in a framework in which agricultural sector planning is viewed explicitly as a process. Specifically, the chain of events in Exhibit 3.1 is used as an organizational paradigm. Within this paradigm, the impacts of planning are discussed and lessons articulated.

3.2.3 Organization of the Findings of the PROPLAN Survey

In Chapter 7, the conceptual framework for organizing the findings of the PROPLAN survey is identical to the framework used by IICA in its survey report. At the end of the chapter, the findings are summarized in two categories: technical and institutional.

[1] For the record, the impacts in question were: (1) application of the Logical Framework has led to the rejection of project ideas as inappropriate; (2) Departmental Development Corporations have shown growing concern for agriculture and the small farmer; and (3) the Logical Framework is being introduced in other Bolivian institutions.

4.0 A REVIEW OF AID-SUPPORTED AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: THE WRITTEN RECORD

This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 4.1 presents a descriptive overview of the various agricultural sector planning activities that AID has supported in Latin America and the Caribbean over the last decade. Section 4.2 lays out what we have found in our review of evaluations of many of these activities. And, finally, in Section 4.3 a summary is presented of the major lessons learned from our review.

4.1 A Descriptive Overview of AID-Supported Agricultural Sector Planning Activities

Subject to questions of definition, which we shall discuss shortly, Exhibit 4.1 presents what we believe to be a comprehensive list of the different agricultural sector planning activities that AID has supported in Latin America and the Caribbean since 1970. A number of different criteria were applied to reach a determination as to which activities should be included in, and excluded from, this list. The activities that appear in the list include:

- Activities that fall under the general rubric of what IICA describes as the formulation stage of the agricultural sector planning process. More specifically, an activity is included if it is concerned with agricultural sector information systems, agricultural sector policy analysis, agricultural sector policy formulation, or linkages of agricultural sector planning units with decisionmakers or other public sector institutions.

- Agricultural sector assessments. If more than one agricultural sector assessment was conducted over the last decade, however, only the most recent assessment is included.

- Planning activities in which the principal counterpart institution is a Ministry of Planning or other central government institution, but only if some components of the activities are concerned with agriculture or rural development, broadly defined.

- Regional planning activities, but only if some components of the activities are concerned with agriculture or rural development, broadly defined.

- Title XII baseline studies of [illegible]ltural research, education, and extension.

Exhibit 4.1

SELECTED AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES
SUPPORTED BY AID SINCE 1970
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

	DOCUMENTATION PRESENTED IN THIS STUDY		
ACTIVITY	Project Summary	Activity Description	Evaluation Summary
Bolivia			
Basic Foods Production and Marketing (511-0451)	X	X	X
Agriculture Sector Loan (511-0455)	X	X	X
Agricultural Sector II (511-0465)	X	X	
Rural Development Planning (511-0471)	X	X	X
Farm Policy Study (511-0485)	X	X	X
Departmental Development Corporations (511-0511)	X	X	
Agricultural Sector Assessment		X	
Southern Valleys Assessment		X	
Chile			
Agricultural Production Credit (513-0294)	X	X	X
Agricultural Sector Assessment		X	
Colombia			
Colombian Agricultural Sector Analysis		X	X
Costa Rica			
National Development Information System (515-0139)	X	X	
Agricultural Sector Assessment		X	

Exhibit 4.1 (continued)
Page 2

ACTIVITY	DOCUMENTATION PRESENTED IN THIS STUDY		
	Project Summary	Activity Description	Evaluation Summary
Dominican Republic			
Agricultural Sector Loan II (517-0116)	X	X	
Agricultural Sector Analysis Phase II (517-0117)	X	X	X
National Employment Policy (517-0121)	X	X	X
Agricultural Sector Analysis (598-0554)	X	X	X
Comprehensive Resource Inventory and Evaluation System (931-0236)	X	X	X
Agricultural Sector Assessment		X	
Ecuador			
REE Baseline Study		X	
El Salvador			
Development Planning (519-0166)	X	X	
Multi-Purpose Household Survey (519-0176)	X	X	
Reform and Policy Planning (519-0260)	X	X	
Rural Poor Survey (931-0236)		X	
Progress Indicators for the Rural Poor (931-0236)	X	X	X
Agricultural Sector Assessment		X	

ACTIVITY	DOCUMENTATION PRESENTED IN THIS STUDY		
	Project Summary	Activity Description	Evaluation Summary
Guatemala			
Small Farmer Development (520-0233)	X	X	X
Integrated Area Development Studies (520-0249)	X	X	X
Farm Policy Analysis		X	
Guyana			
Agriculture Sector Planning (504-0077)	X	X	
Agricultural Sector Assessment		X	
REE Baseline Study		X	
Haiti			
Agricultural Development Support II (521-0092)	X	X	
Agricultural Sector Assessment		X	
Honduras			
Agriculture Sector Program (522-0100)	X	X	X
Agriculture Sector II Program (522-0150)	X	X	X
Agricultural Sector Assessment		X	
Jamaica			
National Planning (532-0039)	X	X	X
Agricultural Planning (532-0061)	X	X	
Agricultural Sector Assessment		X	
REE Baseline Study		X	

Exhibit 4.1 (continued)
Page 4

ACTIVITY	DOCUMENTATION PRESENTED IN THIS STUDY		
	Project Summary	Activity Description	Evaluation Summary
Nicaragua			
Agricultural Planning and Statistical Services (524-0105)	X	X	
Rural Development Sector Loan (524-0118)	X	X	
Agricultural Sector Assessment			
Panama			
Agricultural Sector Assessment			
Paraguay			
Agricultural Planning and Statistics (526-0104)	X	X	X
Agricultural Sector Assessment		X	
Small Farmer Survey		X	
Peru			
Integrated Regional Development (527-0178)	X	X	
Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education (527-0192)	X	X	
ONERN -- Land Use Inventory Environmental Planning (527-0202)	X	X	
Iowa - Peru Program		X	X
REE Baseline Study		X	

ACTIVITY	DOCUMENTATION PRESENTED IN THIS STUDY		
	Project Summary	Activity Description	Evaluation Summary
Caribbean Regional			
Caribbean Institutional Development (538-0016)	X	X	X
Caribbean Agricultural Planning (538-0033)	X	X	
Project Development Assistance (538-0042)	X	X	
Agricultural Development Survey		X	
ROCAP			
SIECA Institutional Assistance (596-0040)	X	X	X
Agricultural Research and Information Systems (596-0048)	X	X	X
Agricultural Secretariat (596-0094)	X	X	
LAC Regional			
Agricultural Sector Analysis Support (598-0554)	X	X	
S&T/AGR/EPP			
Latin American Planning Network (931-0236)	X	X	X
A Framework for Appropriate Agricultural Planning in LDCs		X	

On the other hand, among the activities excluded from the list

- Subsector planning activities, that is, activities concerned with, but limited to, natural resource management planning, agricultural research planning, etc. Although subsector planning is obviously important (and considerable AID support has been given to such activities), the scope of this study is restricted to planning at the sectoral level.

- Relatively small agricultural sector planning activities, financed principally with Program Development and Support funds.

Available documentation on the activities in Exhibit 4.1 is relatively complete. With one exception, the Rural Poor Survey Project in El Salvador, we have been able to locate adequate documentation to complete a Project Summary for each project on the list. In only two cases, the Nicaragua and Panama agricultural sector assessments, have we been unable to complete Activity Descriptions. Availability of project evaluations is more spotty but, in many cases, projects are not far enough along to have had even interim evaluations. On the other hand, the 22 different activities for which we have been able to locate evaluation materials represent a good spread of agricultural sector planning activity, both geographically and substantively. Although the sample is obviously not one that resulted from random selection, it is still sufficiently representative in our judgment to draw meaningful inferences about agricultural sector planning, especially the factors that appear to be associated with its usefulness. Moreover, the sample is complemented by the availability of two cross-country evaluations. These evaluations do not correspond to specific activities on our list but are the basis for two additional Evaluation Summaries.[1,2]

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[1] The cross-country evaluations in question are a 1972 evaluation of 12 agricultural sector studies and a 1974 evaluation of agricultural sector programs in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. See the last two Evaluation Summaries in Appendix B for more details.

[2] Location of all this documentation turned out to be a considerably more time-consuming task than we anticipated. The assistance of David Jesse of LAC/DR/RD was key to our being able to compile as much as we have. His assistance is much appreciated and gratefully acknowledged.

As a prelude to summarizing the content of our Project Summaries, Activity Descriptions, and Evaluation Summaries, Exhibit 4.2 presents a set of basic indicators for Latin American and Caribbean countries. The countries appear in two groups. The first group consists of countries in which AID supported agricultural sector planning activities over the last decade, and the second group consists of countries in which this was not the case. The indicators in Exhibit 4.2 are used in subsequent exhibits in this chapter as an organizational device to see whether our results fall into identifiable patterns by type of country.

As Exhibit 4.3 indicates, AID has provided support for 63 different agricultural sector planning activities in the region since 1970.[1] Three of these activities were not specific to any one country or subregion, while the remainder are distributed relatively evenly among the Caribbean, Central American, and South American subregions. The countries with the largest number of activities are Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador, with eight, six, and six activities, respectively. AID Missions have provided the lion's share of the Agency's financial support. AID/Washington has funded only seven, or 11 percent, of the activities.

Of the 63 activities, 40 are formal projects. Again, the distribution of projects is relatively even across the different subregions, and the countries with the largest number of activities are also the countries with the largest number of projects.

In dollar terms the aggregate value of the planning components of agricultural sector planning projects supported by AID is $93,632,300.[2] AID's support comes to $49,513,900, or slightly more than half of the total.[3]

[1] Strictly speaking, these are activities for which AID has at least approved support. Some projects are still in their infancy and two projects, the Departmental Development Corporations Project in Bolivia and the National Development Information System Project in Costa Rica, although approved some time ago, have, for different reasons, not gone forward.

[2] Although we were unable to complete a Project Summary for the Rural Poor Survey Project in El Salvador, this figure includes the dollar value ($133,000) anticipated for this project.

[3] To put AID's support of agricultural sector planning in perspective, AID's development programs in Latin America and the Caribbean totaled over $2 billion over the past decade.

Exhibit 4.2

BASIC INDICATORS FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

COUNTRY	INDICATORS				
	Population, 1977 (millions of people)[1]	Gross National Product Per Capita, 1977 (U.S. $)	Agriculture As Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 1977[1]	Index of Agricultural Production Per Capita, 1977 (1961-65 = 100)[2]	Percentage of Labor Force in Agriculture 1970[3]
Bolivia	5.2	630	17	100	56
Chile	10.6	1160	10	107	24
Colombia	24.6	720	26	101	38
Costa Rica	2.1	1240	21	123	42
Dominican Republic	5.0	840	20	95	61
Ecuador	7.3	790	20	93	51
El Salvador	4.2	550	30	90	56
Guatemala	6.4	790	28[4]	123	61
Guyana	0.8[5]	520[6]	23[7]	77	29[8]
Haiti	4.7	230	45[9]	80	74
Honduras	3.3	410	32	92	67
Jamaica	2.1	1150	9	66	30
Nicaragua	2.4	830	23	106	51
Panama	1.8	1220	23[10]	101	42
Paraguay	2.8	730	35	125	53
Peru	16.4	840	16	67	45
Argentina	26.0	1730	13	113	16
Brazil	116.1	1360	12	116	46
Mexico	63.3	1120	10	94	45
Trinidad & Tobago	1.1	2380	3	71	19
Uruguay	2.9	1430	12	87	15
Venezuela	13.5	2660	6	114	26

[1] Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1979.

[2] Source: USDA, "Indexes of Agricultural Production for the Western Hemisphere, 1970 Through 1979."

[3] Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1978.

[4] 1975. Source: Inter-American Development Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Agency for International Development, "General Report on the Agricultural and Rural Development of Guatemala."

[5] 1978. Source: Agency for International Development, "Congressional Presentation: Fiscal Year 1980."

[6] Source: USAID/Guyana, "Country Development Strategy Statement: FY 1981."

[7] Source: Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., "The Income and Production of Guyana Rural Farm Households."

[8] Source: Kenneth P. Jameson and Frank J. Bonello, "A Macroeconomic Assessment of the Economy of Guyana."

[9] 1976. Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1978.

[10] 1960. Source: Agency for International Development, "Congressional Presentation: Fiscal Year 1980."

Exhibit 4.3

NUMBER OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES AND FUNDING OF PLANNING COMPONENTS OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING PROJECTS, BY COUNTRY AND AID FUNDING SOURCE

COUNTRY	NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES	NUMBER OF PROJECTS	FUNDING OF PROJECTS[1]				
			Total	Grant	Loan	Country	Other
Caribbean							
Dominican Republic	6	5	5,797.6	2,169.9	1,450	1,990.3	187.4
Guyana	3	1	7,160.7	1,898	1,000	4,262.7	0
Haiti	2	1	1,408	765	0	643	0
Jamaica	4	2	5,972	2,703	0	3,189	80
Caribbean Regional	4	3	7,972	5,275	0	1,463	1,234
SUBTOTAL	19	12	28,311.3	12,810.9	2,450	11,548	1,501.4
Central America							
Costa Rica	2	1	7,500	250	3,250	4,000	0
El Salvador[2]	6	5	3,448	1,958	0	1,179	310
Guatemala	3	2	4,667	1,323	1,295	2,049	0
Honduras	3	2	9,562	728	4,642	4,092	100
Nicaragua[3]	3	2	8,839	815	2,000	6,024	0
Panama[3]	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
ROCAP	3	3	6,733	3,221	0	2,065	1,447
SUBTOTAL	21	15	40,749	8,295	11,187	19,409	1,857
South America							
Bolivia	8	6	10,888	4,913	1,935	3,790	250
Chile	2	1	2,650	0	1,800	850	0
Colombia	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ecuador	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paraguay	3	1	593	341	0	252	0
Peru	5	3	6,463	2,050	2,156	2,257	0
SUBTOTAL	20	11	20,594	7,304	5,891	7,149	250
Region-Wide							
LAC Regional	1	1	704	704	0	0	0
S&T/AGR/EPP	2	1	3,275	872	0	0	2,403
SUBTOTAL	3	2	3,979	1,576	0	0	2,403
TOTAL	63	40	93,632.3	29,985.9	19,528	38,106	6,011.4
FUNDING SOURCE							
Missions	56	34	87,253.7	26,341	19,528	37,962.7	3,421
AID/W	7	6	6,378.6	3,644.9	0	143.3	2,590.4

[1] In U.S. $ (000).

[2] Includes Rural Poor Survey Project

[3] Includes Agricultural Sector Assessment Activity

Of AID's contribution, $29,985,900 (61 percent) comes from grant funding and $19,528,000 (39 percent) comes from loan funding. Host country contributions come to $38,106,000, or slightly more than 40 percent of the aggregate amount. The remaining $6,011,400 comes from other sources.

The geographical distribution of the dollar value of agricultural sector planning activities is not as even as the geographical distribution of the number of projects or the number of activities. The total value of activities in Central America comes to $40,749,000, in the Caribbean to $28,270,500, and in South America to $20,594,000. The countries with the largest dollar values of agricultural sector planning activities are Bolivia ($10,888,000), Honduras ($9,562,000), and Nicaragua ($8,839,000).

Exhibit 4.4 presents the same information as Exhibit 4.3, but grouped according to country indicator categories. Since the intent of the exhibit is to relate our findings to the characteristics of different countries, the exhibit does not include information on Caribbean Regional activities, ROCAP activities, or region-wide activities.[1] In socioeconomic terms, the countries with the largest numbers of AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities are those with less than six million people, with GNP per capita less than $1,000, with agriculture making up less than 20 percent of GDP, with less agricultural production per capita in 1977 than in 1961-65, and with more than 55 percent of the labor force engaged in agriculture. With minor variations, the same pattern holds for the distribution of agricultural sector planning projects, the aggregate dollar value of the projects, the proportion of the aggregate dollar value financed by AID, and the proportion of AID's contribution financed with grant funding. At least in terms of cross-country comparisons, therefore, it appears that AID's support of agricultural sector planning in the region has been consistent with its mandate to target resources to the rural poor.

In the 39 projects for which we have completed Project Summaries, Ministries of Agriculture participate as counterpart planning institutions 30 times; Ministries of Planning, eight times; and other central government institutions, 23 times. (See Exhibit 4.5.) Thus, a number of projects have more than one counterpart planning institution. Given the way in which we

[1]The same is true for Exhibits 4.6, 4.8, 4.10, and 4.12.

Exhibit 4.4

NUMBER OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES AND FUNDING OF PLANNING COMPONENTS OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING PROJECTS, BY COUNTRY INDICATORS

INDICATOR	NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES[2]	NUMBER OF PROJECTS[3]	FUNDING OF PROJECTS[1]				
			Total	Grant	Loan	Country	Other
Population, 1977							
Less than 3 Million	16	7	30,064.7	6,007.0	6,250.0	17,727.7	80.0
3 - 6 Million	25	19	31,103.6	10,533.9	8,027.0	11,694.3	847.4
More than 6 Million	12	6	13,780.0	3,373.0	5,251.0	5,156.0	0
GNP Per Capita, 1977							
Less than $700	22	15	32,466.7	10,262.0	7,577.0	13,966.7	660.0
$700 - $1,000	22	13	26,359.6	6,698.9	6,901.0	12,572.3	187.4
More than $1,000	9	4	16,122.0	2,953.0	5,050.0	8,039.0	80.0
Agriculture/GDP, 1977							
Less than 21%	26	17	31,770.6	11,835.9	7,341.0	12,076.3	517.4
21 - 27%	10	4	23,499.7	3,963.0	6,250.0	14,286.7	0
More than 27%	17	11	19,678.0	5,115.0	5,937.0	8,215.0	410.0
Index of Agricultural Production Per Capita, 1977							
Less than 100	30	19	39,811.3	12,271.9	9,248.0	17,613.0	677.4
100 - 120	15	9	22,377.0	5,728.0	5,735.0	10,664.0	250.0
More than 120	8	4	12,760.0	1,914.0	4,545.0	6,301.0	0
Labor Force in Agriculture, 1977							
Less than 41%	10	4	15,782.7	4,601.0	2,800.0	8,301.7	80.0
41 - 55%	15	7	23,395.0	3,456.0	7,406.0	12,533.0	0
More than 55%	28	21	35,770.6	11,856.9	9,322.0	13,743.3	847.4
TOTAL	53	32	74,948.3	19,913.9	19,528.0	34,578.0	927.4

[1] In U.S. $(000).

[2] Includes Agricultural Sector Assessment Activities in Nicaragua and Panama

[3] Includes Rural Poor Survey Project in El Salvador

Exhibit 4.5

FREQUENCY WITH WHICH DIFFERENT TYPES OF COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTIONS PARTICIPATE IN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING PROJECTS, BY COUNTRY AND AID FUNDING SOURCE

COUNTRY	INSTITUTIONS				
	Ministry of Agriculture	Ministry of Planning	Other Central Government Institutions	Decentralized Institutions	Regional Institutions
Caribbean					
Dominican Republic	4	1	1	0	0
Guyana	1	0	1	0	0
Haiti	1	0	0	0	0
Jamaica	2	0	5	0	0
Caribbean Regional	0	0	7	0	2
SUBTOTAL	8	1	14	0	2
Central America					
Costa Rica	1	1	1	0	0
El Salvador	1	4	1	0	0
Guatemala	2	0	1	0	0
Honduras	2	0	3	0	0
Nicaragua	2	0	2	0	0
Panama	0	0	0	0	0
ROCAP	7	0	0	0	2
SUBTOTAL	15	5	8	0	2
South America					
Bolivia	4	2	0	14	0
Chile	1	0	0	0	0
Colombia	0	0	0	0	0
Ecuador	0	0	0	0	0
Paraguay	1	0	0	0	0
Peru	1	0	1	2	0
SUBTOTAL	7	2	1	16	0
Region-Wide					
LAC Regional	0	0	0	0	0
S&T/AGR/EPP	0	0	0	0	1
SUBTOTAL	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	30	8	23	16	5
FUNDING SOURCE					
Missions	27	7	22	16	4
AID/W	3	1	1	0	1

have defined agricultural sector planning activities for purposes of this study, this distribution is largely as we might have expected. A somewhat surprising finding, however, is the small number of projects in which decentralized institutions participate. Such projects appear only in Bolivia and Peru.

Exhibit 4.6 presents our findings on counterpart planning institutions by country indicator categories. The exhibit contains no dramatic surprises. The distributions of the frequencies of counterpart planning institutions largely mirror the distributions of the frequencies of agricultural sector planning projects in Exhibit 4.4.

The Project Summaries in Appendix A report the different sources of planning technical assistance that were anticipated for agricultural sector planning projects at the time of project design. Although it would be preferable to know the sources that were actually tapped during project implementation, gathering this information would have required resources beyond those at our disposal. Despite this shortcoming, it is still of interest to examine the different sources of technical assistance associated with agricultural sector planning, and the data that we have been able to gather are summarized in Exhibit 4.7. We find that private sector sources and USDA are the predominant sources of technical assistance anticipated. BUCEN, other U.S. government institutions, land grant institutions, and regional institutions were also anticipated to provide technical assistance in a goodly number of cases.

Exhibit 4.8 presents anticipated sources of technical assistance by country indicator categories but, as in the case of Exhibit 4.6, the patterns that emerge appear to be a function of the project frequencies in Exhibit 4.4.

There is one further item in the Project Summaries that is not summarized in tabular form in this chapter, namely, the logical frameworks of the 39 projects. Although AID's logical framework is a convenient paradigm for structuring a project and examining how its goals, purposes, outputs, and inputs relate to each other, it does not lend itself to uniform coding and comparable reporting as readily as the rest of the descriptive information we have just discussed. To assure comparability, a structured content analysis would be required, which is beyond the scope of the current study.

Exhibit 4.6

FREQUENCY WITH WHICH DIFFERENT TYPES OF COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTIONS PARTICIPATE IN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING PROJECTS, BY COUNTRY INDICATORS

INDICATOR	INSTITUTIONS				
	Ministry of Agriculture	Ministry of Planning	Other Central Government Institutions	Decentralized Institutions	Regional Institutions
Population, 1977					
Less than 3 Million	7	1	9	0	0
3 - 6 Million	12	7	5	14	0
More than 6 Million	4	0	2	2	0
GNP Per Capita, 1977					
Less than $700	9	6	5	14	0
$700 - $1,000	10	1	5	2	0
More than $1,000	4	1	6	0	0
Agriculture/GDP, 1977					
Less than 21%	12	3	7	16	0
21 - 27%	4	1	4	0	0
More than 27%	7	4	5	0	0
Index of Agricultural Production Per Capita, 1977					
Less than 100	12	5	12	2	0
100 - 120	7	2	2	14	0
More than 120	4	1	2	0	0
Labor Force in Agriculture, 1977					
Less than 41%	4	0	6	0	0
41 - 55%	5	1	4	2	0
More than 55%	14	7	6	14	0
TOTAL	23	8	16	16	0

Exhibit 4.7

NUMBER OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING PROJECTS WITH DIFFERENT SOURCES OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, BY COUNTRY AND AID FUNDING SOURCE

COUNTRY	SOURCES								
	USDA	BUCEN	Other USG	Land Grant Institutions	Other U.S. Universities	Private Sector Institutions	Personal Services Contractors	Private Sector, Source not Specified	Regional Insti-tutions
Caribbean									
Dominican Republic	3	3	3	0	1	0	2	1	0
Guyana	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Haiti	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Jamaica	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
Caribbean Regional	1	0	0	1	0	2	1	0	0
SUBTOTAL	7	4	3	2	1	3	3	3	0
Central America									
Costa Rica	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
El Salvador	0	1	0	0	0	3	1	1	2
Guatemala	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0
Honduras	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0
Nicaragua	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
Panama	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ROCAP	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	1
SUBTOTAL	6	2	4	2	1	7	4	5	4
South America									
Bolivia	2	1	1	1	0	2	1	3	0
Chile	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
Colombia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ecuador	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Paraguay	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Peru	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0
SUBTOTAL	3	2	2	2	0	3	3	6	1
Region-Wide									
LAC Regional	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
S&T/AGR/EPP	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
SUBTOTAL	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	17	9	9	7	2	13	10	14	6
FUNDING SOURCE									
Missions	14	7	8	7	2	13	9	13	4
AID/W	3	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	2

Exhibit 4.8

NUMBER OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING PROJECTS WITH DIFFERENT SOURCES OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, BY COUNTRY INDICATORS

INDICATOR	SOURCES								
	USDA	BUCEN	Other USG	Land Grant Institutions	Other U.S. Universities	Private Sector Institutions	Personal Services Contractors	Private Sector, Source not Specified	Regional Institutions
Population, 1977									
Less than 3 Million	5	2	2	0	1	3	3	3	2
3 - 6 Million	8	5	5	2	1	5	4	7	2
More than 6 Million	1	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	0
GNP Per Capita, 1977									
Less than $700	6	3	2	2	0	6	2	6	2
$700 - $1,000	6	3	5	2	2	2	5	4	2
More than $1,000	2	2	2	0	0	2	2	2	0
Agriculture/GDP, 1977									
Less than 21%	6	5	5	2	1	3	4	8	0
21 - 27%	3	2	2	0	1	3	2	0	1
More than 27%	5	1	2	2	0	4	3	4	3
Index of Agricultural Production Per Capita, 1977									
Less than 100	8	5	4	2	1	4	3	8	2
100 - 120	3	2	3	1	1	4	3	3	1
More than 120	3	1	2	1	0	2	3	1	1
Labor Force in Agriculture, 1977									
Less than 41%	2	2	1	0	0	2	1	2	0
41 - 55%	3	1	2	1	1	2	3	3	2
More than 55%	9	5	6	3	1	6	5	7	2
TOTAL	14	8	9	4	2	10	9	12	4

In the future, we would recommend that such a content analysis be performed, not so much to construct descriptive tables but, rather, as a prelude to a multivariate statistical analysis that would formally examine the relationships among the different characteristics and the different outcomes of agricultural sector planning projects. At one point, consideration had been given to the possibility of performing such an analysis as a component of this study, but the idea was discarded on the reasonable grounds that professional judgment and interpretative analysis alone would suffice. We have no quarrel with the contention that professional judgment and interpretative analysis are the key ingredients to a study such as this. Nevertheless, we would still recommend strongly that the possibility of a multivariate statistical analysis be considered as a means, sometime in the future, for AID to gain a higher degree of confidence as to what works in what circumstances, and what does not. Such an analysis need not be complex. Its intent would be simply to serve as a heuristic device for complementing professional judgment and for providing suggestive, organized grist for the interpretative analysis mill. Moreover, the raw materials for such an analysis are now, with this document, organized and at hand. What we have found in the conduct of this study is that the volume of sources stretches absorptive capacity and tempts an analyst to return to preconceptions. Considerably more credence could be attached to an analyst's conclusions if his or her judgment were at least challenged by the hypotheses that a statistical exercise of the kind described here might suggest. In light of the causality attribution problems we have discussed above, such a strategy would be particularly appropriate in the case at hand.

4.2 Findings Obtained from Review of Evaluations of Agricultural Sector Planning Activities

This section consists of five subsections. Subsection 4.2.1 looks at the distribution of the evaluations examined in this study and the frequency of identification of agricultural sector planning impacts by country, AID funding source, and country indicator categories. The subsequent three subsections then turn to the content of the Evaluation Summaries in Appendix B. In Subsections 4.2.2, 4.2.3 and 4.2.4, we examine impacts identified,

constraints, and lessons learned, respectively, for all of the activities in question. Then, in Subsection 4.2.5 the activities are divided into three separate groups, and we examine similarities and differences among the groups in terms of impacts, constraints, and lessons and recommendations.

4.2.1 A Brief Description of the Evaluations of Agricultural Sector Planning Activities Reviewed in This Study

Exhibit 4.9 presents the distribution, by country and AID funding source, of the evaluations we have examined. As discussed in Section 4.1, we have located evaluation materials on 22 of the agricultural sector planning activities listed in Exhibit 4.1. In addition we have consulted two cross-country evaluations. These cross-country evaluations are not included in our summary statistics but offer a wealth of lessons and recommendations that are referred to in the text.

The 22 activities that have been examined are country- or subregion-specific activities, and 18 of the 22 are Mission-funded. The geographical distribution of the country- and subregion-specific activities is almost perfectly even, with virtually identical numbers in the Caribbean, Central American, and South American subregions.

Aside from the cross-country evaluations, 33 different evaluation documents have been consulted. This reflects the fact that some activities have been evaluated more than once. Of the 33 evaluations, 19 were regularly scheduled evaluations, six were special evaluations, and, unfortunately, only eight were final evaluations.

Exhibit 4.10 presents the distribution of the 18 activities that are specific to individual countries, as well as the distribution of the evaluations of these activities, by country indicator categories. The distributions again mirror the distributions in Exhibit 4.4. In this case, this is of no small analytical interest. Exhibit 4.10 suggests that our sample of evaluations is consistent with the distribution of agricultural sector planning activities at large.

In Exhibits 4.11 and 4.12, we find the frequency distributions of the agricultural sector planning activities in which different types of impacts are identified. The types of impacts in question are, again, policy/program

Exhibit 4.9

NUMBER OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF EVALUATIONS OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES, BY COUNTRY AND AID FUNDING SOURCE

COUNTRY	NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES	EVALUATIONS		
		Regular	Special	Final
Caribbean				
Dominican Republic	4	4	2	1
Guyana	0	0	0	0
Haiti	0	0	0	0
Jamaica	1	1	0	1
Caribbean Regional	1	1	0	0
SUBTOTAL	6	6	2	2
Central America				
Costa Rica	0	0	0	0
El Salvador	1	1	0	0
Guatemala	2	1	3	0
Honduras	2	1	0	1
Nicaragua	0	0	0	0
Panama	0	0	0	0
ROCAP	2	1	0	1
SUBTOTAL	7	4	3	2
South America				
Bolivia	4	5	1	1
Chile	1	2	0	0
Colombia	1	0	0	1
Ecuador	0	0	0	0
Paraguay	1	1	0	1
Peru	1	0	0	1
SUBTOTAL	8	8	1	4
Region-Wide				
S&T/AGR/EPP	1	1	0	0
TOTAL	22	19	6	8
FUNDING SOURCE				
Missions	18	15	4	7
AID/W	4	4	2	1

Exhibit 4.10

NUMBER OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF EVALUATIONS OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES, BY COUNTRY INDICATORS

INDICATOR	NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES	EVALUATIONS		
		Regular	Special	Final
Population, 1977				
Less than 3 Million	2	2	0	2
3 - 6 Million	11	11	3	3
More than 6 Million	5	3	3	2
GNP Per Capita, 1977				
Less than $700	7	7	1	2
$700 - $1,000	9	6	5	4
More than $1,000	2	3	0	1
Agriculture/GDP, 1977				
Less than 21%	11	12	3	4
20 - 27%	1	0	0	1
More than 27%	6	4	3	2
Index of Agricultural Production Per Capita, 1977				
Less than 100	9	7	2	4
100 - 120	6	7	1	2
More than 120	3	2	3	1
Labor Force in Agriculture, 1977				
Less than 41%	3	3	0	2
41 - 55%	2	1	0	2
More than 55%	13	12	6	3
TOTAL	18	16	6	7

Exhibit 4.11

NUMBER OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN WHICH DIFFERENT TYPES OF IMPACTS ARE IDENTIFIED IN ACTIVITY EVALUATIONS, BY COUNTRY AND AID FUNDING SOURCE

COUNTRY	IMPACTS			
	Policy/Program	Consciousness-Raising	Institutional: Interinstitutional	Institutional: Capacity
Caribbean				
Dominican Republic	3	4	4	4
Guyana	0	0	0	0
Haiti	0	0	0	0
Jamaica	1	0	1	1
Caribbean Regional	0	0	1	1
SUBTOTAL	4	5	6	6
Central America				
Costa Rica	0	0	0	0
El Salvador	0	1	1	1
Guatemala	1	0	2	2
Honduras	0	0	2	2
Nicaragua	0	0	0	0
Panama	0	0	0	0
ROCAP	1	0	2	2
SUBTOTAL	2	2	7	7
South America				
Bolivia	1	0	2	4
Chile	0	1	1	1
Colombia	0	0	1	1
Ecuador	0	0	0	0
Paraguay	1	1	1	1
Peru	1	0	1	1
SUBTOTAL	3	2	6	8
Region-Wide				
S&T/AGR/EPP	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	9	9	20	22
FUNDING SOURCE				
Missions	8	6	16	18
AID/W	1	3	4	4

Exhibit 4.12

NUMBER OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN WHICH DIFFERENT TYPES OF IMPACTS ARE IDENTIFIED IN ACTIVITY EVALUATIONS, BY COUNTRY INDICATORS

INDICATOR	IMPACTS			
			Institutional	
	Policy/Program	Consciousness-Raising	Interinstitutional	Capacity
Population, 1977				
Less than 3 Million	2	2	2	2
3 - 6 Million	4	5	9	11
More than 6 Million	2	1	5	5
GNP Per Capita, 1977				
Less than $700	1	1	5	7
$700 - $1,000	6	5	9	9
More than $1,000	1	2	2	2
Agriculture/GDP, 1977				
Less than 21%	6	6	9	11
21 - 27%	0	0	1	1
More than 27%	2	2	6	6
Index of Agricultural Production Per Capita, 1977				
Less than 100	5	6	9	9
100 - 120	1	1	4	6
More than 120	2	1	3	3
Labor Force in Agriculture, 1977				
Less than 41%	1	2	3	3
41 - 55%	2	1	2	2
More than 55%	5	5	11	13
TOTAL	8	8	16	18

impacts, consciousness-raising impacts, interinstitutional impacts, and institutional capacity impacts.[1]

In the evaluations of nine of the 22 activities, policy/program impacts are identified. If we are prepared to accept the sample of evaluations as representative of agricultural sector planning activities in general, this suggests that at least forty percent of AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities had an impact on agricultural sector policies and programs. It should be stressed, however, that this simple calculation does not account for differences among the policy/program impacts identified. As might be expected, some impacts were more dramatic than others. As a consequence, it is important to temper this conclusion with an examination of the nature of these impacts, which is the focus of the next subsection of this chapter.

Of the 22 activities that have been evaluated, consciousness-raising impacts are identified nine times or in 41 percent of the cases. The overwhelming majority of these impacts increased awareness of the need for analytical planning. Only one instance of the second type of consciousness raising, namely, concern for small farmers, was identified.

In 20 of the 22 cases, that is, in 91 percent of the agricultural sector planning activities evaluated, interinstitutional impacts appear. Most activities were able to achieve improvements in institutional relations. Like policy/program impacts, interinstitutional impacts vary in intensity from one activity to another. Hence, the same caveat noted about policy/program impacts is likewise in order here.

Finally, institutional capacity impacts are identified in all 22 cases. This finding indicates that AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities have made an important first step in building the capacity of planning institutions in countries throughout the region.

[1]To minimize the danger of beauty being a function of the eyes of the beholder, a first draft of each Evaluation Summary was prepared independently by two Abt Associates staff, then discussed and integrated by the staff in question, and, finally, reviewed for consistency by the project director. As a consequence, we believe that the meaning of "impact" is as comparable across Evaluation Summaries as can reasonably be expected.

4.2.2 Impacts Identified in the Evaluations

In this and the next two subsections, we examine the impacts, constraints, and lessons and recommendations that emerge from the activities that have been evaluated. The 22 activities include 18 country-specific activities and four multi-country activities. There is considerable diversity among the 22, but it is useful to present the findings for all 22 initially. We shall then divide the 22 into three separate groups and examine differences and similarities among groups.

Policy/Program Impacts. Our examination of the evaluations reveals that in nine of the 22 activities some policy and program impacts were identified. This means that in 41 percent of the cases, activities resulted in the adoption of new policies or in the funding of new programs or projects. Policy and program impacts are our strongest measure of usefulness because they indicate that something concrete and tangible has happened as a result of agricultural sector planning activities. These impacts are also the most likely to result in increases in production, increases in incomes, a more even distribution of income, etc. While it is impressive that 41 percent of the activities are identified as having had these kinds of impacts, this can also be turned around to say that in 59 percent of the cases, no policy or program impacts were identified.

It is important to review the policy and program impacts of the activities we have examined because they indicate how planning was effectively tied into decisionmaking and may provide useful insights on how to structure agricultural sector planning activities in the future.

Of the nine activities in which policy/program impacts are identified, three are in the Dominican Republic (Phases I and II of the Agricultural Sector Analysis Project and the National Employment Project). Excluding the Dominican Republic, only six of the remaining 19 activities have policy or program impacts identified.

Of the countries whose evaluations we examined, the Dominican Republic appears to be the only country in which agricultural sector planning activities led to major strategy development and implementation. The agricultural sector planning unit in the Dominican Republic directed most of the technical work behind the $950 million 1980-82 Dominican Agricultural Plan

and was also actively involved in the development of the $72 million Dominican Post-Hurricane Reconstruction Plan, which included a $40 million IDB loan and a $15 million AID loan. In addition, the unit's technical work was instrumental in leading the Minister of Agriculture to endorse a labor absorption policy for Dominican agriculture. This was one instance in which AID-supported activities were influential in agricultural sector policymaking and program development.[1]

In Peru, Iowa Mission staff produced a series of studies and policy memoranda that influenced policy, legal, and programmatic changes. For example, the Iowa Mission's suggestion that production cooperatives be allowed to become owners of agrarian reform lands was incorporated into the 1964 Agrarian Reform Law. This law also created a special fund for industrial investments, an idea based largely on a previous Iowa Mission study.

In other countries, AID-supported activities resulted in the development of specific projects. In Jamaica the PDRT assisted in the development of 68 projects through training or consultation, thus exceeding the project objective of assisting in the development of 56 projects over the life of the project. In Paraguay, the Technical Cabinet of the Ministry of Agriculture prepared detailed project proposals, many of which were funded through a Japanese government grant.

While this review of the policy and program impacts identified in agricultural sector planning activity evaluations certainly cannot be considered an exhaustive summary of these activities' impacts,[2] it at least

[1] It is interesting to speculate on the extent to which this may be attributable to the training that large number of Dominican agricultural sector personnel received in the 1960s under the Texas A&M program and to the substantial number of positions that were created under the IDB-supported Integrated Agricultural Development Project (PIDAGRO).

[2] In addition to the 22 activities that we reviewed, we also examined two cross-country evaluations. The first evaluation, "Intercountry Evaluation of Agricultural Sector Programs" (1974), reveals that the Colombian agricultural sector analysis confirmed existing agricultural program strategy, while studies in Costa Rica and Guatemala directly influenced programs adopted. The second evaluation, "Agriculture Sector Studies: An Evaluation of AID's Recent Experience" (1972), reviews twelve of the very early (pre-1972) agriculture sector studies. The authors find that only two of the twelve analyses examined were unanimously considered useful -- an exercise in Turkey as a prelude to a wheat program and a Guatemalan exercise as a prelude to AID's 1970 sector loan.

suggests some tentative conclusions. In most countries, agricultural sector planning activities do not appear to have led to rapid changes in policies or programs. This may be a function of the need to create capacity first but, on the other hand, many activities do not appear to have been tied in directly to the decisionmaking process. Particularly given the political instability in a number of countries, it may not be feasible for agricultural sector planning units to conduct long-term studies. Rather, fast turn-around, highly focused, problem-oriented studies may be of greater practical value.

It should also be stressed that even though no policy or program impacts were identified in 13 of the 22 activities, this does not necessarily mean that no such impacts occurred. Many of the evaluations we have examined are not final evaluations, so they report only the status of activities in mid-stream. Furthermore, even final evaluations are often performed before policy or program impacts can realistically be expected. Evaluations may also have missed policy or program impacts because of time pressure or a failure to give sufficient attention to the achievement of purposes and goals. Finally, many of the agricultural sector planning activities we have examined have focused much more explicitly on capacity building than on influencing policies or programs. In such cases, therefore, short-run policy and program impacts are not necessarily appropriate indicators of usefulness.

Consciousness-Raising Impacts. Consciousness-raising impacts can be the precursors of future policy and program impacts. By consciousness-raising impacts, we mean changes in decisionmakers' thinking about the need for analytical planning and also about equity questions, especially problems of small farmers, that result from the influence of agricultural sector planning. New policies or programs may not result from these changes in thinking in the short run, but decisionmakers can at least be expected to bring a different perspective to their jobs and this, in turn, will eventually change the way things are done.

Consciousness-raising impacts are difficult to identify because of their intangible nature. They are not something that normally appears explicitly as part of the formal written record. In addition, consciousness raising is not a specific topic to be addressed in AID project evaluations.

Of the 22 activities that we reviewed, consciousness-raising impacts were identified nine times, or in 41 percent of the cases. The overwhelming majority of these impacts increased awareness of the need for analytical planning. This has often been referred to as the "technification" of agricultural sector planning. On the other hand, only one instance of the second variety of consciousness raising, namely concern for small farmers, was identified.[1] Thus, these activities appear to have had a much greater impact on decisionmakers' recognition of the need for analysis than for a redistribution of income within the agricultural sector.

In a number of countries, the data bases that were prepared and the analyses that were conducted under AID-supported activities impressed government decisionmakers. In most of these instances, decisionmakers appropriated additional funds for further development or refinement of the data bases and analyses. For instance, in Chile a large agricultural information system was set up as part of the Agricultural Production Credit Project. The information system could provide data to farmers and processors on markets, prices, input costs, and trade opportunities, and could also be used to estimate the effects of agricultural policies. The Ministries of Agriculture and Finance were so impressed with the results of the data analysis and information system that they have improved the data base and associated software, and continued to upgrade the personnel in the unit.

The same kind of impact resulted from the Comprehensive Resource Inventory and Evaluation System (CRIES) activity in the Dominican Republic. The government's commitment to this enterprise is reflected in the assignment of "departmental" status to SIEDRA (the unit responsible for CRIES) in the Subsecretariat of Agriculture, even though its small size would not normally warrant such status. The commitment by host governments to continue and build upon activities after AID funds have ceased reflects a new awareness by decisionmakers about the importance of these activities.

[1] In one of the cross-country evaluations another instance of consciousness raising on equity concerns was identified. The "Intercountry Evaluation of Agricultural Sector Programs" reveals that the sector approach has made possible dialogue concerning sector problems and their consideration in a "holistic" context. As applied, it has directed attention at "a frequently neglected subsector," the small farmer, and resulted in increasing concern for this target group.

We only identified one instance in which consciousness was raised about the needs of small farmers. In Paraguay the Technical Cabinet, which received funding under the Agricultural Planning and Statistics Project, showed a greater disposition to addressing small farmer needs during and after the project than before. Staff in the Technical Cabinet also influenced other agencies to focus on AID's target groups.

Institutional Impacts -- Relationships With Other Institutions. Many of the projects that AID has supported are intended to build up the capacity of agricultural sector planning institutions and to improve their planning processes. One key ingredient in improving the planning process is to forge closer relationships among the various government agencies concerned with agricultural policies, programs, and projects in order to create a more coordinated and informed basis for decisionmaking.

In our review of the 22 agricultural sector planning activities, we have found that most of the activities (20 out of 22) have had an impact on interinstitutional relationships. The predominant effect appears to have been that counterpart planning institutions have provided other institutions with data, analytical findings, or new methodological approaches. Counterpart planning institutions have also had some impact in conveying policy and program recommendations to other agencies. On the other hand, they have rarely had any impact on coordination, particularly the coordination of the overall programming and budgeting process for the agricultural sector. This type of coordination is identified in only two of the activities. To a certain extent, this should not be surprising, since AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities have frequently focused more on information generation and agricultural sector studies and analyses than on the improvement of the planning process institutionally.

Examples of the use of data and analyses produced under AID-supported activities are widespread. In nearly half of the activities, the data produced by counterpart institutions have been used by Ministers, other agencies, or in several instances, farmers. In Bolivia, for instance, the Ministry of Planning used socioeconomic farm survey data generated by the Ministry of Agriculture to create different regional planning zones. In El Salvador, Ministers have received social indicators generated under the

Social Progress Indicators Project. In Chile information has been provided to farmers and processors on markets, prices, input costs, and trade opportunities. It is apparent that through activities such as these, AID has helped stimulate a considerable amount of information sharing among institutions, particularly within countries. Regional institutions, on the other hand, have had less success in disseminating their data and analytical findings to Ministries and other agencies in specific countries.

Agricultural sector planning activities supported by AID have also led to a considerable amount of technology transfer both among institutions within countries and between regional and in-country institutions. This type of technology transfer is cited in the evaluations of seven of the 22 activities. One project, the Program for Agricultural Information for the Central American Isthmus (PIADIC), has been credited with disseminating area frame sampling throughout the Central American subregion. PIADIC has sponsored training in this and other techniques for national planners. In Honduras, the Agricultural Policy Commission was able to promote adoption of a common language and common methodologies for use by various institutions concerned with the agricultural sector.

One interesting way in which some activities have had an impact on other institutions is by serving as a training ground -- or, some would say, a "hiring hall" -- for staff who move on to more senior government positions. A major objective of the Iowa-Peru Program was to train Peruvians in agricultural economics and policy analysis. Many of the Peruvians trained under this project later took responsible positions in the Peruvian government. In the Dominican Republic and other countries, agricultural sector planning personnel moved on to assume key decisionmaking positions.

As a rule, the agricultural sector planning activities that we have examined have not had a major impact in developing new planning processes or in creating a coordinated institutional framework for agricultural planning. The principal exception is in Paraguay, where the Technical Cabinet gained responsibility for preparing the budget for the Ministry of Agriculture in consultation with the Ministry of Finance. The Technical Cabinet also became actively involved in developing program recommendations as well as in coordinating all economic studies in the agricultural sector. In sum, this

unit has become central to both the policy formulation process and the budgeting process. This kind of institution building is rare among the activities whose evaluations we have reviewed. AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities have generally emphasized data gathering and analysis more than the structuring or restructuring of planning and budgeting systems.

Capacity Building Impacts. The other type of institutional impact of interest is capacity building. As we have seen, development of the capability to perform rational and systematic planning has been an objective of many AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities.

Our review of evaluations of agricultural sector planning activities reveals that institutional capacity has been strengthened in the following areas:

- Data collection, processing, and dissemination (including surveys);
- Project selection, design, and management systems;
- Policy analysis and evaluation (including computerized modeling and sector analysis); and
- Preparation of plans.

In addition, a number of evaluations report that activities have increased the professionalism of planning staff or have received expanded financial support by host country governments.

Institutional capacity building is the most commonly cited impact of agricultural sector planning activities -- all 22 activities we examined appear to have resulted in some improvement in host country analytical planning capability. Several of the activities evidence improvements in all four areas. This is not surprising in that many of the activities were designed explicitly with these ends in mind.

The area in which planning capability has been strengthened most frequently is in data collecton, processing and analysis. For instance, in Bolivia, the Marketing Office within the Ministry of Agriculture established a system that assured the continuous collection, tabulation, and publication of quarterly reports on prices and markets. Many countries also improved their capacity to conduct field surveys, process data, and analyze results.

Moreover, in many cases, this survey capability was geared to address the needs of small farmers.

Planning capacity in the other three areas -- project selection, design, and management systems; policy analysis; and preparation of plans -- has also improved in a number of countries. Three countries have established formal project design systems. Jamaica, for example, requires that project profiles be prepared for new project ideas and that these profiles be reviewed by a central committee. In at least five other countries, governments' ability to analyze and evaluate policies and to prepare plans has been strengthened. For instance, agricultural sector institutions in Honduras are identified as now being better equipped to deal with planning, management, and evaluation responsibilities.

In several countries, agricultural sector planning activities have resulted in expanded capabilities across all four areas. Perhaps the best example is the Agricultural Sector Analysis Project in the Dominican Republic. At least to a certain extent, the project has been instrumental in strengthening in-country institutional capability to carry out, on a sustained basis, sectoral data gathering and processing, and analysis of program, policy, and project alternatives.

While AID support may lead to improved capacity to plan in the short run, there is always the danger that improvements will not be sustained once AID funding ceases. A very important indicator of capacity building for the long term, as well as of a host country's perceptions of AID-supported activities, is host-country financial commitment, particularly after AID support terminates. Evaluations of eight agricultural sector planning activities stress that host countries have decided either to expand the activities with their own funds or, at a minimum, to continue the activities beyond the formal AID project life. A number of these governments have also assigned increased responsibility to the units that have been the principal counterpart institutions of AID support. This has been the case, for example, in the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Paraguay.

4.2.3 Constraints to Achieving Objectives

There are many factors that can impede planning activities from achieving their objectives and resulting in identifiable impacts. Before we turn to a discussion of the lessons that have been learned from the 22 planning activities, it is important to understand the constraints these activities have met in achieving their objectives. An analysis of constraints can shed light on what to avoid in other activities and what steps might be taken to design and implement better planning projects in the future.

The constraint that was cited most frequently (in evaluations of nine of the 22 activities) was lack of well qualified staff. While a basic objective of AID has been to build up the capacity of planning institutions in the region, a number of activities still suffered from having poorly trained staff with little experience. In Guatemala, for instance, the agricultural sector planning unit (USPA) has been in the process of formation during much of the Small Farmer Development Project. Training of staff has been limited, and anticipated scholarships have not been granted. Many of the USPA staff were assigned tasks for which their training did not suit them. The situation was the same in a number of other AID-supported planning activities. It is interesting to note that six of the nine projects that evidenced a lack of well qualified staff are identified as having failed to achieve any policy/program impacts. Reasons cited for lack of qualified staff include poor pay levels (usually attributable to civil service requirements) and promotion of capable senior staff to higher levels of government.

High turnover of staff was cited in about 25 percent of the activities (five of the 22 activities). This was a particularly serious problem because the turnover usually took place among senior staff who moved to higher levels of government. Once activities lost their leadership, especially technical or substantive leadership, they often failed to regain a sustained sense of direction.

Another commonly mentioned constraint was lack of host country support. This was cited in seven of the 22 activities, or in 32 percent of the cases. In a number of instances, host countries did not provide anticipated counterpart funding for planning activities. In Bolivia, for instance,

the critical financial situation of the country affected the hiring of an adequate number of counterpart technicians in the Agriculture Sector Loan Project and in the Basic Foods Production and Marketing Project. Many of the activities that lacked qualified staff also had not received adequate and anticipated host-country financial support.

In a number of other instances, decisionmakers have not provided other types of support. In Honduras, for example, the Agricultural Sector Planning Committee has shown little authority because it has not had higher level support. Lack of higher level support has meant that there has been little coordination among agencies involved in the planning process. Fiscal difficulties, lack of interest in planning, institutional inertia, and turf fighting have accounted for lack of support by host country governments.

A related problem in a number of activities (five of the 22) was inefficient up-front planning and financing of large research enterprises. Model building and the creation of new data bases from primary survey data are both ambitious activities that inevitably take longer and require more resources than anticipated. Furthermore, these activities often fail to produce intermediate products. As a consequence, AID and host countries are often reluctant to provide substantial additional funding if nothing tangible has been forthcoming in mid-stream.

AID contracting difficulties were a constraint in five of the 22 activities. What usually happened was that a key technical advisor was delayed in getting to post because of contracting problems. Lack of initial technical guidance and leadership often meant that an activity started poorly and, in some cases, never recovered.

Other constraints that were cited in three or four activities included: lack of a clear assignment or work plan; technical problems with questionnaire design and sampling; computer difficulties; and lack of essential data. Changes in government were also mentioned in three activities.

4.2.4 Lessons Learned and Recommendations Made in Evaluations

The evaluations we have reviewed have generated a long list of lessons and recommendations. While a number of the lessons and recommendations are highly situation-specific, others appear in many evaluations and

have potentially broad applicability for the future. It is the latter set of lessons and recommendations that we focus on here. As discussed above, these lessons and recommendations are grouped into three major categories: technical, institutional, and other.

Technical Lessons and Recommendations. An overarching concern highlighted in many of the evaluations is that analytical work must be related to specific policy concerns and programmatic problems. Long-term studies, while obviously useful in many cases, should not be allowed to consume most of a planning unit's time and resources. Policy issues need to be addressed in a highly specific manner, and products must be prepared with policymakers rather than technicians, especially economists, in mind.

Analytical methodologies need to be kept simple. As a rule, sophisticated linear programming techniques, for instance, should not be emphasized at the expense of simpler, possibly more directly relevant approaches. This is particularly true in the case of technology transfer activities. In such instances, the absorptive capacity of host country technicians must be kept clearly in mind. There is a real danger that esoteric techniques may never be used after AID support ceases. As a rule, therefore, keep it simple.

In a similar vein, analytical reports need to be written in straightforward fashion and pains must be taken to avoid elaborate statistical equations and technical jargon. Reports filled with esoteric-sounding properties often confuse readers and lead decisionmakers to miss the point.

Many of the activities we examined were medium- to long-range in duration. In such activities, regular interim reports, with intermediate results, need to be prepared and circulated widely if policymakers are to be kept interested and enthusiastic. Such reports can enhance visibility and credibility and add to the activities' momentum.

Many activities that we examined focused on the collection, processing, and analysis of large quantities of data. With the magnitude of some of the data sets in question, errors are highly likely to occur. If errors are not found and corrected before data are presented in statistical reports, the whole credibility of a statistical activity can be brought into question. As a consequence, explicit attention needs to be paid to data review and

evaluation. Whenever possible, data should be carefully assessed through consistency tests, error analysis, sensitivity analysis, tracking tests, or, at a minimum, review by knowledgeable professionals. For survey data, secondary sources of data should be checked to assess accuracy and reliability.

Given the quantities of data to be processed in many activities, computers were frequently used. In many cases, however, it appears that insufficient forethought and planning has gone into their use. In computer-intensive activities, substantial up-front planning is generally required to guarantee an appropriate mix of hardware, software, and in-country support services.

Another major lesson of our review is the value of training. The evaluation of the Iowa-Peru Program concludes that the training component of the program, which included training both outside and inside Peru, was probably the component that was most effective in having a long-term effect. Furthermore, in comparison with other components of the program, the cost of training was relatively small. One of the major constraints to an activity achieving its objectives was lack of well qualified staff. This reinforces the need for more training throughout the region. Evaluations of activities with in-country training and technical assistance components again stress the need for simplicity and clarity. They recommend that in-country training and technical assistance focus on: project development, administration, implementation, and evaluation; information and statistics; budget preparation and evaluation; policy analysis and formulation; and planning systems.

Institutional Lessons and Recommendations. In this subsection, we examine lessons and recommendations of an institutional nature. In this discussion, we shall be concerned with such questions as how to set up agricultural sector planning organizationally and administratively, how to integrate planning within a government's overall management system, and how to promote effectiveness over the long term. It is important to preface this discussion with the caveat that no one of these questions can be answered definitively and once and for all. Institutional arrangements always need to be tailored to specific situations -- a country's governmental structure, its politics, its level of development, the technical capability of its public

sector, etc. Nevertheless, the lessons and recommendations found in the evaluations provide important insights that can help guide the design of agricultural sector planning activities in the future.

One of the key concerns in the agricultural sector planning activity evaluations is how to link planning with decisionmaking, that is, how to integrate planning operationally within a country's national management system. The principal conclusion appears to be that planning activities must address issues that are of importance to decisionmakers and provide timely policy and program recommendations related to these issues. Agricultural sector planning activities need to be more clearly "demand- and decision-driven" if they are to be effective and taken seriously. This emphasis does not necessarily preclude long-term studies or modeling. If agricultural sector planning units are to pursue such activities, however, it is imperative that they produce real, "live" findings on a periodic basis and, more importantly, that they engage in short term analytical work as well. In sum, planning activities must be responsive to felt needs and demands.

One way that AID can help promote such responsiveness is to assure that host country decisionmakers and technicians are intimately involved in the design of the activities it supports. This can also lay the groundwork for smooth implementation of these activities.

If large-scale modeling is judged to be of importance, consideration should be given to setting up a separate analytical unit or to contracting the work out. Experience suggests that model builders are often not particularly adept at identifying priority issues to be addressed. As a result, it may be preferable for modelers to report organizationally to personnel who are more closely tied to the decisionmaking process, and that these latter personnel be the party responsible for defining analytical questions and integrating and presenting analytical results. Furthermore, since model building requires continuity of key senior staff, and since civil service salaries are low in most countries, it may be advisable for model building to take place in a quasi-public agency that can pay competitive salaries -- or, alternatively, that the work be contracted out of the public sector entirely.

Staff turnover was a problem that plagued a number of the activities we examined. Although such turnover creates problems of continuity in many cases and is frequently a source of delay in the implementation of specific

activities, it is not without its side-benefits in certain instances. In some of the activities we reviewed, turnover was attributable to the promotion of planning personnel to more senior government positions. In such cases, the personnel in question presumably brought their analytical skills with them to their new jobs and were in a stronger position to integrate planning with decisionmaking. All of this is not to say that this kind of turnover should be encouraged, particularly since it is often the personnel with strong leadership qualities that are the likely candidates for promotion. On the other hand, this kind of movement should not necessarily be discouraged. Rather, the moral of the story is that there should exist a critical mass of strong senior and middle-level staff to prevent staff turnover from causing an agricultural sector planning unit irreparable damage.

A number of activities included training of host country personnel in the United States. The evaluations suggest that this type of training must be designed with care to minimize the danger that trainees will not return home after training. The evaluation of the Iowa-Peru Program reveals that most of the Peruvians who came to the United States to study for advanced degrees returned to take important jobs in the Peruvian public or private sector. Two factors that are identified as having contributed to this outcome are, first, encouragement to students to do their thesis work in Peru on current policy issues and, second, encouragement to students to spend vacations in Peru working on policy papers and in government programs. Other activities do not appear to have been as successful in attracting staff to return. In these cases, the evaluations recommend that strict agreements be negotiated to oblige staff to work for a stipulated period of time in a mutually agreed-upon capacity upon their return from training.

A problem that occurred in a number of countries had to do with the role of coordinating committees. As a rule, the objective of these committees was to bring together staff from various public sector institutions to address major development problems. Although these committees often made constructive recommendations, they rarely had any influence over operational matters. As a result, committee recommendations usually failed to result in tangible changes and this, in turn, caused frustration among committee members. All this suggests the need to think through the structure and role of coordinating committees before steps are taken to create them.

Our review of the evaluations suggests that AID's logical framework, appropriately adapted, can serve as a useful project design and monitoring tool. The experience in the Bolivian Rural Development Planning Project is particularly instructive in this regard.

A major tension in many agricultural sector planning activities had to do with the temptation to bring in outsiders to assist in the timely generation of tangible products and the desire not to interfere with the pace of the development of indigenous host country capacity. There do not appear to be any hard and fast rules to resolve this production-internalization tension. Nevertheless, the internalization strategy laid out in the CRIES Project in the Dominican Republic contains a number of useful guidelines. The strategy was for technical assistance staff to: 1) assume the initial leadership role and then phase out as host country leadership is developed; 2) develop and maintain interest without creating unrealistic expectations; 3) work through counterparts to influence other country personnel; 4) keep support demands consistent with output; 5) develop a reliable data base before analysis; 6) adjust all inventory and analytical techniques to the technical competence of in-country staff and product users; 7) maintain long-term project direction, but search for short-term, high-impact activities to maintain the interest and support of administrators.

Many evaluations point out that capacity-building activities are long-term in nature and may take a minimum of five years before an active, professional, self-sufficient agricultural sector planning unit has been established within the host country government. The implication is that AID should be cognizant of such a time horizon in the planning and programming of its technical assistance projects, particularly large data gathering and research activities.

Finally, many agricultural sector planning activities appear to have been delayed and adversely affected by AID contracting problems. For instance, key resident advisors would often arrive in country six months to a year late because of complications in the procurement process. These contractual difficulties often hampered the execution of critical activities and frequently strained relations between AID and the host country.

Other Lessons and Recommendations. Most of the lessons and recommendations in the evaluations are either technical or institutional in nature, but there are a few lessons and recommendations that do not fit easily under either of these categories.

A number of evaluations stress the fact that agricultural sector planning projects often require considerable amounts of both AID and host country financial support. This is particularly true of projects that include large farm surveys as components. On the other hand, the development of efficient data collection systems can wind up saving money in the long run. For example, the evaluation of the PIADIC Project suggests that the introduction of the area sampling system in Costa Rica has reduced the government's total annual survey costs by over $3 million.

In a world of limited resources, hard decisions must be made as to the priorities to be assigned to different agricultural sector planning activities. The evaluation of the Social Progress Indicators Project in El Salvador, for example, emphasizes that the success that the project has had does not necessarily imply that it should be replicated elsewhere. The social indicators system developed in El Salvador is based on survey research, which is a complicated, rigorous, and expensive process. In other countries, where survey capability is less advanced, development of a social indicators system may simply absorb too many resources at the expense of other necessary, but less ambitious studies.

A final general lesson from the evaluations is that several projects have succeeded in attracting expatriates back to their home countries as resident advisors. This strategy appears to have worked well and should perhaps be considered more in agricultural sector planning projects in the future.

4.2.5 Examination of Groups

The previous discussion examined the impacts, constraints and lessons learned from all 22 activities for which we assembled evaluation materials. This has been a valuable exercise because it has looked at the complete set of activities and drawn conclusions from all the documentation at our disposal.

It should be stressed, however, that there has been considerable diversity in the activities that AID has supported, and we would expect differences in impacts, constraints, and lessons/recommendations among them. For example, we would expect a project identification activity to have very different impacts from a multi-country research activity conducted by a regional organization.

In order to examine these differences, we have divided the 22 activities into three groups of relatively homogeneous activities. The first of these groups (Group A) consists of activities that have generated or depended heavily on data. The second group (Group B) of activities has focused more on providing broad institutional support for planning. The activities in Group B are more diverse than those in Group A. The third group (Group C) consists of multi-country activities conducted by regional organizations. There have been four such activities, and they have included attempts to set up regional institutions, conduct regional research, and analyze and improve planning as a network.

The activities that have been included in each of these groups are shown in Exhibit 4.13. Group A and Group B each contain nine activities, while there are four multi-country activities in Group C. We shall now examine similarities and differences among impacts, constraints, and lessons learned in the various groups.

Impacts

Many differences among the three groups of activities can be seen in Exhibit 4.14 in which impacts, constraints, and lessons/ recommendations are summarized for each of the groups. The reader is also referred to Exhibits 4.15, 4.16, and 4.17 in which the impacts, constraints, and lessons/recommendations of each activity in each group are presented.

Group B, the institutional support activities, had the highest frequency of policy and program impacts. Fifty-six percent of the activities (five of nine) resulted in policy/program impacts, as compared with 33 percent of the activities in Group A (the data-intensive activities) and 25 percent (one of four) in Group C. The difference is actually more dramatic than these summary statistics suggest. The three activities in Group A that had policy and program impacts were all in the Dominican Republic and were

Exhibit 4.13

COMPOSITION OF THREE GROUPS
OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES

Group A - Data-Intensive Activities

	Country	Activity
1.	Bolivia	Farm Policy Study
2.	Chile	Agricultural Production Credit
3.	Colombia	Colombian Agricultural Sector Analysis
4.	Dominican Republic	Agricultural Sector Analysis - Phase I
5.	Dominican Republic	Agricultural Sector Analysis - Phase II
6.	Dominican Republic	National Employment Policy
7.	Dominican Republic	Comprehensive Resource Inventory and Evaluation System
8.	El Salvador	Progress Indicators for the Rural Poor
9.	Guatemala	Integrated Area Development Studies

Group B - Institutional Support Activities

	Country	Activity
1.	Bolivia	Basic Foods Production and Marketing
2.	Bolivia	Agriculture Sector Loan
3.	Bolivia	Rural Development Planning
4.	Guatemala	Small Farmer Development
5.	Honduras	Agricultural Sector Program I
6.	Honduras	Agricultural Sector Program II
7.	Jamaica	National Planning
8.	Paraguay	Agricultural Planning and Statistics
9.	Peru	Iowa - Peru Program

Group C - Multi-Country Activities

	Funding Source	Activity
1.	Caribbean Regional	Caribbean Institutional Development
2.	ROCAP	SIECA Institutional Assistance
3.	ROCAP	Agricultural Research and Information Systems
4.	S&T/AGR/EPP	Latin American Planning Network

Exhibit 4.14
COMPARISON OF IMPACTS, CONSTRAINTS, AND LESSONS/
RECOMMENDATIONS IN THREE GROUPS OF ACTIVITIES

IMPACTS, CONSTRAINTS, AND LESSONS/RECOMMENDATIONS	GROUP A DATA-INTENSIVE ACTIVITIES Number (N=9)	Percent	GROUP B INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES Number (N=9)	Percent	GROUP C MULTI-COUNTRY ACTIVITIES Number (N=4)	Percent	TOTALS Number (N=22)	Percent
IMPACTS								
1. Policy/program	3	33%	5	56%	1	25%	9	41%
2. Consciousness raising	6	67	2	22	1	25	9	41
3. Interinstitutional	9	100	7	77	4	100	20	91
4. Capacity building	9	100	9	100	4	100	22	00
CONSTRAINTS								
1. Lack of well qualified staff	2	22	5	56	2	50	9	41
2. High turnover of staff, particularly senior staff	2	22	1	11	2	50	5	23
3. Changes in government	1	11	2	22	-	--	3	17
4. Computer difficulties	1	11	1	11	1	25	3	17
5. Lack of data	1	11	2	22	-	--	3	17
6. Technical problems, e.g., in questionnaire design or sampling	4	44	-	--	-	--	4	18
7. Lack of clear assignments or work plans	1	11	2	22	1	25	4	18
8. Insufficient planning and financing for large research enterprise	4	44	1	11	-	--	5	23
9. Lack of host country support -- financial or other	-	--	6	67	1	25	7	32
10. AID project manager was spread too thin or left	2	22	-	--	-	--	2	9
11. AID contracting difficulties	3	33	2	22	-	--	5	23
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS MADE								
Technical								
1. Analytical work must be related to policy concerns	2	22	1	11	2	50	5	23
2. Publicize results, even preliminary results, regularly	2	22	-	--	-	--	2	9
3. Keep analytical methods simple	3	33	-	--	1	25	4	18
4. Make reports readable	2	22	-	--	-	--	2	9
5. Check data	3	33	-	--	-	--	3	14
6. Substantial up-front planning for computers is required	2	22	-	--	-	--	2	9
Institutional								
1. Planning must be demand- and decision-driven	2	22	4	44	2	50	8	36
2. Have a critical mass of strong senior and mid-level staff	2	22	3	33	-	--	5	23
3. Think in terms of long time horizon to develop capacity	2	22	2	22	1	25	5	23
4. AID or host country contracting difficulties can throw off activities	3	33	1	11	-	--	4	18
5. Agencies' or institutions' roles must be clearly defined	2	22	2	22	2	50	6	27
6. Pay scale must be appropriate for qualifications	1	11	2	22	-	--	3	14

Exhibit 4.15
IMPACTS, CONSTRAINTS, AND LESSONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
IN DATA-INTENSIVE ACTIVITIES (GROUP A)

IMPACTS, CONSTRAINTS, AND LESSONS/RECOMMENDATIONS	ACTIVITY									
	Bolivia Farm Policy Study	Chile Agricultural Prod. Credit	Colombia Agric. Sector Analysis	Dominican Republic ASA I	Dominican Republic ASA II	Dominican Republic Natl. Employment	Dominican Republic CHIES	El Salvador Progress Ind.	Guatemala IADS	TOTALS
IMPACTS										
1. Policy/program				X	X	X				3
2. Consciousness raising		X		X	X	X	X	X		6
3. Interinstitutional	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	9
4. Capacity-building	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	9
CONSTRAINTS										
1. Lack of well qualified staff							X		X	2
2. High turnover of staff, particularly senior staff				X	X					2
3. Changes in government	X									1
4. Computer difficulties			X							1
5. Lack of data							X			1
6. Technical problems, e.g., in questionnaire design or sampling	X		X	X				X		4
7. Lack of clear assignments or work plans							X			1
8. Insufficient planning and financing for large research enterprise			X		X		X		X	4
9. Lack of host country support -- financial or other										-
10. AID project manager was spread too thin or left	X			X						2
11. AID contracting difficulties	X	X			X					3
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS MADE										
Technical										
1. Analytical work must be related to policy concerns						X	X			2
2. Publicize results, even preliminary results, regularly			X	X						2
3. Keep analytical methods simple				X	X			X		3
4. Make reports readable				X				X		2
5. Check data				X			X	X		3
6. Substantial up-front planning for computers is required			X		X					2
Institutional										
1. Planning must be demand- and decision-driven			X		X					2
2. Have a critical mass of strong senior and mid-level staff			X	X						2
3. Think in terms of long time horizon to develop capacity				X			X			2
4. AID or host-country contracting difficulties can deter progress	X				X	X				3
5. Institutions' roles must be clearly defined						X			X	2
6. Pay scale must match qualifications					X					1

Exhibit 4.16
IMPACTS, CONSTRAINTS, AND LESSONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
IN INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES (GROUP B)

IMPACTS, CONSTRAINTS, AND LESSONS/RECOMMENDATIONS	ACTIVITY									
	Bolivia Foods Prod. & Marketing	Bolivia Agricul. Sector Loan	Bolivia Rural Development Plng.	Guatemala Small Farmer Development	Honduras Agricul. I Program	Honduras Agricul. II Program	Jamaica National Planning	Paraguay Agricul. Plan. & Stat.	Peru Iowa Program	TOTALS
IMPACTS										
1. Policy/program			X	X			X	X	X	5
2. Consciousness raising							X	X		2
3. Interinstitutional			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	7
4. Capacity-building	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	9
CONSTRAINTS										
1. Lack of well qualified staff	X	X		X		X	X			5
2. High turnover of staff, particularly senior staff						X				1
3. Changes in government		X	X							2
4. Computer difficulties		X								1
5. Lack of data		X						X		2
6. Technical problems, e.g., in questionnaire design or sampling										-
7. Lack of clear assignments or work plans			X			X				2
8. Insufficient planning and financing for large research enterprise								X		1
9. Lack of host country support -- financial or other	X	X	X	X		X	X			6
10. AID project manager was spread too thin or left										-
11. AID contracting difficulties						X	X			2
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS MADE										
Technical										
1. Analytical work must be related to policy concerns			X							1
2. Publicize results, even preliminary results, regularly										-
3. Keep analytical methods simple										-
4. Make reports readable										-
5. Check data										-
6. Substantial up-front planning for computers is required										-
Institutional										
1. Planning must be demand- and decision-driven	X		X	X		X				4
2. Have a critical mass of strong senior and mid-level staff	X					X	X			3
3. Think in terms of long time horizon to develop capacity							X		X	2
4. AID or host-country contracting difficulties can deter progress						X				1
5. Institutions' roles must be clearly defined			X	X						2
6. Pay scale must match qualifications				X			X			2

Exhibit 4.17
IMPACTS, CONSTRAINTS AND LESSONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
IN MULTI-COUNTRY ACTIVITIES (GROUP C)

IMPACTS, CONSTRAINTS, AND LESSONS/RECOMMENDATIONS	ACTIVITY				
	Caribbean Regional Institutional Development	ROCAP SIECA Institutional Assistance	ROCAP PIADIC	S&T LA Plan Network	TOTALS
IMPACTS					
1. Policy/program		X			1
2. Consciousness raising			X		1
3. Interinstitutional	X	X	X	X	4
4. Capacity-building	X	X	X	X	4
CONSTRAINTS					
1. Lack of well qualified staff	X	X			2
2. High turnover of staff, particularly senior staff		X		X	2
3. Changes in government					-
4. Computer difficulties		X			1
5. Lack of data					-
6. Technical problems, e.g., in questionnaire design or sampling					-
7. Lack of clear assignments or work plans				X	1
8. Insufficient planning and financing for large research enterprise					-
9. Lack of host country support -- financial or other		X			1
10. AID project manager was spread too thin or left					-
11. AID contracting difficulties					-
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS					
Technical					
1. Analytical work must be related to policy concerns		X	X		2
2. Publicize results, even preliminary results, regularly					-
3. Keep analytical methods simple				X	1
4. Make reports readable					-
5. Check data					-
6. Substantial up-front planning for computers is required					-
Institutional					
1. Planning must be demand- and decision-driven		X		X	2
2. Have a critical mass of strong senior and mid-level staff					-
3. Think in terms of long time horizon to develop capacity	X				1
4. AID or host-country contracting difficulties can deter progress					-
5. Institutions' roles must be clearly defined	X	X			2
6. Pay scale must match qualifications					-

mainly related to post-hurricane recovery there. No other Group A activities in any of the other countries had any such impacts. On the other hand, the five activities in Group B that had policy and program impacts were each in a different country. It is not surprising that institutional support activities had more policy and program impacts than activities in the other two groups. One element of institutional support was to provide technical and financial assistance for developing programs and projects. Therefore, we would expect some of these activities to have had policy and program impacts in the short run, but it is still significant that over 50 percent of the Group B activities actually achieved them.

Consciousness-raising impacts, on the other hand, occurred more frequently in Group A activities (67 percent) than in Group B (22 percent) or Group C (25 percent). This also is not surprising since most of the consciousness-raising was related to data and analysis. Group A activities focused on data collection and analysis, and in two thirds of the cases their analytical products were apparently instrumental in convincing decisionmakers of the importance of their work. It is a little surprising that the multi-country activities (Group C) were not identified as having had more impact on consciousness raising. The analytical work conducted under these activities apparently has not been recognized by decisionmakers.

The differences among the groups in interinstitutional impacts and capacity-building impacts are minimal. This is because these impacts are common to nearly all of the activities. These impacts, therefore, will not be discussed further here.

Constraints

The major constraints among all 22 activities were the lack of well qualified staff and lack of host country support. As can be seen in Exhibit 4.14, the Group B activities, the institutional support activities, evidenced these constraints more often than the other two groups. Lack of well qualified staff showed up in 55 percent of the Group B activities, as compared with 50 percent of the Group C activities and only 22 percent of the Group A activities. Apparently, it was more difficult to attract qualified staff in institutional support activities (Group B) than in data-intensive activities.

The Group B activities also suffered much more heavily from lack of host country support than either of the other groups of activities. Indeed, most of the Group B activities that failed to evidence any policy and program impacts lacked well qualified staff and lacked host country support. These seemed to be the main sources of problems for institutional support activities.

The constraints that appear most frequently in the data collection and analysis activities (Group A) are not unexpected. Four of the nine activities suffered from technical problems, such as with sampling or questionnaire design, and four of the nine also evidenced insufficient planning and financing. Many of these activities were, after all, large, complex, data-gathering activities leading to ambitious analyses. Thus, this finding is not all that surprising.

Exhibit 4.14 reveals that multi-country activities (Group C) had personnel problems. Two of the four activities lacked qualified staff, and two of the four also evidenced high turnover among their staffs, particularly senior staff. These activities may also have suffered from lack of coordination. Multi-country activities had great difficulty in involving counterparts in their work. Regional organizations also had trouble disseminating their products. These reasons probably account for the fact that only one of the four activities evidenced any policy/program impacts.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations Made

Most of the technical lessons and recommendations are concentrated in the Group A activities. Within this group of activities, no technical lesson or recommendation is dominant. Rather, each lesson or recommendation -- such as keeping analytical methods simple, checking data, and publicizing findings regularly -- is applicable to two or three of the Group A activities. This suggests that all of these technical considerations should be kept in mind in designing future data-intensive activities.

The dominant institutinal lesson/recommendation is that planning must be demand- and decision-driven. In other words, activities must respond to the felt needs of decisionmakers. This is particularly true for institutional support activities.

Another major institutional lesson/recommendation was that institutions' roles must be clearly defined. This was particularly the case in the multi-country activities.

Most of the other institutional lessons and recommendations were related more to the country-specific activities than to the four multi-country activities. These included the need for a critical mass of strong senior and mid-level staff, the need for a long time horizon to develop capacity, the need for AID to make its contracting procedures more agile, and the need for more appropriate salary levels to attract qualified personnel.

Conclusions for Each Group

Group A activities, the data-intensive activities, evidenced policy and program impacts, but they were more successful in raising consciousness. In two-thirds of the cases they appear to have been instrumental in convincing decisionmakers of the need for empirically based analysis upon which to base decisions. Our examination of constraints reveals that this type of activity is wont to run into a number of technical difficulties and often costs far more to complete than originally anticipated. If AID or a host country does not think it can provide continuity of funding, then it should think seriously about not launching heavily data-intensive planning activities.

Group B activities, the institutional support activities, appear to have been the most adept in achieving policy and program impacts, at least in the short run. Five of the nine activities resulted in these impacts. Three key factors were identified as contributing to the usefulness of these activities. They must have well qualified staff; they must have strong host-country support; and they must respond to problems. Ultimately, these factors are practically tantamount to impact achievement.

Group C activities, the multi-country activities, had the most difficulty in achieving either policy/program or consciousness-raising impacts. They did, however, succeed in having interinstitutional and capacity-building impacts, even though these were common to almost all activities. The multi-country activities suffered from lack of coordination and an apparent inability to capture the attention of in-country counterparts.

4.3 Summary of Major Findings

The major findings of our examination of the written record on AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities can be organized in the following five categories: AID Support; Impacts Identified; Constraints; Lessons Learned; and Groups of Activities. It is difficult to summarize this

chapter, particularly the "Lessons Learned," because most of the text is already a summary of the impacts identified and the lessons learned in the evaluations. It is important to bear in mind, therefore, that the text contains a number of other important findings that, for the sake of brevity, are not included here.

4.3.1 AID Support

- AID has provided support for 63 different agricultural sector planning activities in the region since 1970.

- In dollar terms the aggregate value of the planning components of agricultural sector planning projects supported by AID is $93,632,300. AID's support comes to $49,513,900, or slightly more than half of the total.

- In terms of cross-country comparisons, it appears that AID's support of agricultural sector planning in the region has been consistent with its mandate to target resources to the rural poor.

4.3.2 Impacts Identified

- Impacts on policies and programs are identified in the evaluation of nine of the 22 activities that have been examined. This suggests that at least forty percent of AID-supported agricultural planning activities have produced useful, tangible results in host countries.

- On the other hand, almost 60 percent of the activities do not appear to have led to rapid changes in policies or programs or have been tied into the decisionmaking process. There appears to be a need for more fast turn-around, highly focused, problem-oriented work.

- In the 22 activities that have been evaluated, consciousness-raising impacts were identified nine times, or in 41 percent of the cases. The overwhelming majority of these impacts raised awareness of the need for empirically based analysis. Only one instance of the other variety of consciousness raising (concern for small farmers) was identified.

- Through its support of agricultural sector planning activities, AID has helped stimulate a considerable amount of information sharing among institutions and also a considerable amount of technology transfer both among institutions within countries and between regional and in-country institutions.

- As a rule, agricultural sector planning activities have not had a major impact in developing new planning processes or in creating a coordinated institutional framework for agricultural planning.

- Institutional capacity building is the most commonly cited impact of agricultural sector planning activities -- all 22 activities examined appear to have strengthened analytical planning capability in some respect.

4.3.3 Constraints

- The most frequently cited constraint was lack of well qualified staff. While a basic objective of AID has been to build up the capacity of planning institutions in the region, a number of the countries still lack capable staff.

- Lack of host country support was cited as a constraint in seven of the 22 activities. In some cases, countries did not provide anticipated counterpart funding, and in other cases, decisionmakers did not back the planning enterprise actively.

- Insufficient up-front planning and inadequate financing often hampered ambitious analytical activities.

- Other key constraints included AID contracting problems high turnover of staff; technical difficulties; and lack of clear assignments and work plans.

4.3.4 Lessons Learned

- Policy issues need to be addressed in a highly specific manner, and products must be prepared with policymakers, rather than technicians, in mind.

- Analytical methodologies need to be kept simple.

- Quality control of data is extremely important in computer-intensive activities.

- Agricultural sector planning units involved in long term studies should produce real, "live" findings on a periodic basis and, more importantly, engage in short-term analytical work as well.

- A critical mass of strong senior and middle-level staff must be created in agricultural planning units to prevent staff turnover from deterring progress.

- AID's logical framework, appropriately adapted, can serve as a useful project design and monitoring tool.

- Capacity-building activities are long-term in nature (often at least five years), and AID should be cognizant of such a time horizon in the planning and programming of its technical assistance projects.

4.3.5 Groups of Activities

- The 22 activities that have been examined can be divided into three relatively homogeneous groups. The first group (Group A) consists of nine data-intensive activities; the second group (Group B) consists of nine institutional support activities; the third group (Group C) consists of four multi-country activities.

- The Group A activities resulted in a high number of consciousness-raising impacts. In six of the nine cases, these activities were instrumental in raising awareness of the need for empirically based planning. This type of activity, however, is wont to run into a number of technical difficulties and often costs far more than initially estimated.

- The Group B activities were the most successful in achieving policy/program impacts, at least in the short run. Five of the nine Group B activities resulted in these impacts. Three factors contribute to the capability of these activities to achieve policy and program impacts. The activities must have well qualified staff; they must receive strong host-country support; and they must respond to problems confronting decisionmakers.

- The Group C activities had the most difficulty in achieving either policy/program or consciousness-raising impacts. Multi-country activities suffered from a lack of coordination and an inability to interest in-country counterparts.

5.0 A REVIEW OF AID-SUPPORTED AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FINDINGS SUGGESTED BY BRIEF COUNTRY VISITS AND PERSONAL CONSULTATION

In conducting this study, we have not only benefited from the opportunity to review a broad array of written documentation on agricultural sector planning activities. We have also been fortunate in being able to complement this review with on-site visits to a number of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. These visits have broadened the perspective that we have been able to bring to bear on specific planning activities, and have suggested a number of additional insights about the overall institutional context in which agricultural sector planning takes place.

In Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, we report the findings of brief visits to three countries, Guatemala, Guyana, and Jamaica. Since the visits were short, our findings are based only on limited evidence and are more impressionistic than we would otherwise prefer. The findings emerge fairly clearly, however, and, in their main lines, are largely corroborated by the findings of the visits to the three countries, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras, in which we were able to take a more detailed look at agricultural sector planning.

Sections 5.4 and 5.5 are not based on country visits but are nevertheless included here for the lessons that they suggest for the future. In Section 5.4, we present some reflections of a former head of the Agricultural Sector Analysis Group in the Colombian Ministry of Agriculture. The reflections assess the long-term impact of AID's support of this group in the early and mid-1970s. They are instructive both because of the period of time that has elapsed since the termination of AID support and as the views of a former host-country "insider" who, to this day, remains convinced of the potential value of empirical analysis for more rational agricultural sector decision-making.

Section 5.5 recounts an instructive process of institutional change, the evolution of UNASEC and DIPSA in Nicaragua. Our presentation relies heavily on interviews with IICA's former agricultural sector planning advisor in Managua. Nicaragua's experience in agricultural sector planning institution building is instructive in a number of respects, and is a fascinating story that is merely summarized here.

Section 5.6 concludes this chapter with a summary of the major lessons that are suggested by these collective experiences. It also serves as a preamble of key issues to be addressed in Chapter 6 in our presentation of the findings of our visits to the three countries in which we have been able to examine agricultural sector planning in greater depth.

5.1 Country Visit Findings: Guatemala

The presentation in this and the following two subsections is guided by the chain-of-events framework laid out in Exhibit 3.1. Exhibit 5.1 repeats this framework, but also indicates the major agricultural sector planning functions that AID has supported in the three countries whose visits we report in this chapter. This exhibit is a summary point of reference, therefore, for much of the discussion that follows.

The three major activities in which AID has supported agricultural sector planning in Guatemala are the 1975 Farm Policy Analysis, the 1975 Small Farmer Development Project, and the 1978 Integrated Area Development Studies Project. Because of the brevity of our visit, and because it was conducted in conjunction with an evaluation of the Integrated Area Development Studies Project (IADS), our conclusions concerning the first two of these activities are based more on impression and review of available documentation than on direct contacts with participants in these activities.

In Guatemala, the locus of national planning is the National Economic Planning Council (CNPE). As in other countries, CNPE is responsible for articulating development policy in national plans. The translation of these plans into action, however, is far from automatic. In the annual budget process, for example, CNPE plays a largely reactive role. Line ministries enjoy virtual autonomy in the development and proposal of projects for financing, and although CNPE and the Ministry of Finance have the power to delete activities and budget items that are not a national priority, they have little formal power to influence what projects are developed in the first place. Moreover, once line ministries receive their annual budget allocations, CNPE has little control over how these funds are spent. It admittedly has some power of moral suasion (and the capability to exercise this moral suasion can be expected to increase as a result of IADS), but

Exhibit 5.1

AID SUPPORT OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING PROCESS
IN GUATEMALA, GUYANA, AND JAMAICA



	Guatemala	Guyana	Jamaica
Agricultural Sector Planning Unit	X	X	X
Data Collection	X	X	X
Data Processing	X	X	X
Data Analysis	X		
Evaluation			X
Project Identification	X		X
Policy Analysis			X
Project Proposals	X		X

there is no formal institutional recourse available to CNPE to demand changes of course should they be required. None of this is to say that CNPE should assume project development and implementation responsibilities. But it is important to recognize that planning in Guatemala takes place in an overall institutional context in which planning, budgeting, and implementation responsibilities are far from integrated -- which in turn has implications as to the effectiveness that planning can be expected to enjoy.

In the agricultural sector, responsibility for planning lies in the Agricultural Sector Planning Unit (USPA) in Guatemala's Ministry of Agriculture. The unit is a relatively recent creation and was an outgrowth of the reorganization of the public agricultural sector that took place in the early 1970s. As of 1975,

> the sector planning unit has not provided the staff support required to assist the Minister of Agriculture in effectively carrying out his policy-making and sector coordination role. The weakness of the sector planning unit to date is attributable to lack of financial and high-level support. Sector planning activities have been assumed through default by the agricultural divisions of the National Economic Planning Council and programming and budget preparation are done independently by each agency with little direction and/or coordination and only cursory review at the ministerial level. As a result, the activities of the various agencies of the public sector are not integrated, tending to move in their own directions and their own pace.[1]

As a response to the ineffectiveness of the sector planning unit to date, the 1975 Small Farmer Development Project recognized the need to strengthen the unit's institutional capacity and earmarked funds explicitly for this purpose. (This support is reflected by the "X" alongside the "Agricultural Sector Planning Unit" box in Exhibit 5.1.) The project called for an expansion of the office to perform four functions: to gather, process, and analyze data for policy formulation; to program and budget resources in accordance with established priorities; to assist the Minister in coordinating all sector programs; and to evaluate sector activities in a systematic fashion to provide guidance for future planning and programming.

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[1] USAID/Guatemala, "Project Paper: Small Farmer Development," 1975, p. 50.

In the Project Paper, it was anticipated that the expanded unit would consist of five divisions: multi-year planning; programming, budgeting, and project development; statistics and information; evaluation; and training coordination. In fact, the organization of USPA has evolved considerably over time. Indeed, questions of organization appear to have preoccupied USPA throughout its entire existence. The impression one gathers in reading available documentation on the project -- an impression that our brief country visit did not enable us to confirm or disconfirm -- is that the Ministry never translated the broad objectives that had been set for USPA into a clear operational mandate of exactly what it expected USPA to do. As a consequence, no sense of long-term direction appears to have emerged, and, aside from responding to short-term requests, USPA has largely found itself in the position of defining its own scope of work. Although USPA has had plenty of work to do (the 1980 evaluation of the project suggested that it was stretched too thin), medium- and long-term work priorities appear to have been set more by USPA's own changing perceptions as to what is important than as a response to articulated demand. As a practical matter, therefore, USPA continually had to revise its work plans, and continually had to rethink its organizational structure as a means of executing the work plans.

Complicating the matter further is the way in which USPA has gone about defining its work plans:

> One of the major difficulties with the work plans stems from the USPA strategy of proceeding to establish a complete planning, programming and budgeting system on a comprehensive rather than a selective basis. USPA is attempting to develop a complete system applicable to the entire SPA [Public Agricultural Sector] simultaneously, rather than, for example, concentrating initial efforts on those sector areas and analytical tasks that have the greatest payoff in terms of development plans, goals and objectives for improving the condition of small farmers. A comprehensive rather than selective strategy runs the risk of bogging down system development efforts in peripheral areas while failing to quickly exploit the full potentials of the system in those areas of highest priority for decision-making by the Minister of Agriculture.

> Another major difficulty with the work plans is the relative priority that appears to be assigned to establishing the formal paperwork procedures and initiating the monitoring and coordination of day-to-day SPA agency activities compared with generating useful and timely decision-relevant analyses of agricultural development problems, opportunities, policies and program initiatives.[1]

Lack of clear long-term direction has been a serious impediment to USPA's effectiveness. Despite this shortcoming, however, Guatemalan agricultural sector planning has made marked progress since the early 1970s. Although much of this progress has been characterized by a series of fits and starts, it has been progress nevertheless. Particularly by dint of continuity of emphasis on programming and budgeting activities, USPA has managed to become a key actor in the annual budget process. The methods that it devised for assigning priorities to development projects have been used to guide budget allocation decisions, and the unit has participated directly in the design of a variety of projects itself. In sum, therefore, USPA's influence on the project development process has come to be substantial. (See the "Xs" alongside the "Project Identification" and "Project Proposals" boxes in Exhibit 5.1.)

Progress in other agricultural sector planning activities has been considerably more modest. In data collection, USPA has put most of its eggs in the basket of developing an area sample frame. As in a number of other Latin American and Caribbean countries, the process of area sample frame development has turned out to be a much longer enterprise than originally anticipated. As of 1980, a pilot test had been carried out in one region, interviewers had been trained, and data processing procedures had been set up. The work was a full two years behind schedule, however, and a national system was far away from being operational.

In relative terms, policy analysis and evaluation have suffered from the importance that USPA has attached to programming and budgeting, on the one hand, and to the area sample frame, on the other. At least as of

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[1] William A. Carlson, "Report on a Review of the Technical Assistance Needs of the Agriculture Sector Planning Unit of the Guatemalan Ministry of Agriculture," Guatemala, 1979, pp. 8-9.

1980, USPA had not yet established a system for evaluating sector programs and projects, and we are unaware of any analytical work by USPA that has addressed broad questions of sector strategy and has had an impact on the formulation of overall sector policy.[1,2] Thus, while USPA has made strides in the project development process, there is still much that remains to be done in the policy development process.

The other major agricultural sector planning activity that AID has supported in Guatemala is the 1978 Integrated Area Development Studies Project (IADS). In contrast to the Small Farmer Development Project, the objectives of IADS were more methodological in nature. As stipulated in the Project Paper, the purpose of the project was "the development and adoption by the GOG and non-Government agencies of a systematic planning methodology for determining priorities and allocating resources to provide the infrastructure and services required to achieve the . . . goal."

The project design called for IADS to be administered jointly by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Municipal Development Institute (INFOM). Within the Ministry, both USPA and the Studies and Projects Unit were to participate. In addition, a project Steering Committee was to be formed. The committee was to consist of representatives of public sector institutions that were expected to benefit from the project, and was to be chaired by CNPE.

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[1] In interpreting this finding, the reader is again cautioned to bear the brevity of our site visit in mind.

[2] Some excellent analytical work has been performed on the Guatemalan agricultural sector, but much of it by foreigners. Two significant examples are William C. Merrill, "The Long-Run Prospects for Increasing Income Levels in Guatemala's Highlands," Guatemala, 1974; and Gary Smith, "Poverty Indicators for Guatemala," USDA Memorandum, Washington, 1976. The Guatemala Farm Policy Analysis, which was conducted by LAC/DR/SA prior to the Small Farmer Development Project, provoked considerable controversy in AID/Washington at the time, but, again, we are unaware of any significant programmatic impact that it had in Guatemala itself. See Samuel R. Daines, Hunt Howell, et al., "Guatemala Farm Policy Analysis: The Impact of Small-Farm Credit on Income, Employment and Food Production," LAC/DR/SA Analytical Working Document No. 10, Washington, 1975; William C. Merrill, "Guatemala IRR on Small Farmer Development," AID Memorandum, Washington, 1975; and Samuel R. Daines, "Comments on William Merrill's February 3, 1975 Memo, Guatemala IRR and Small-Farmer Development," AID Memorandum, Washington, 1975.

During implementation, quite another organizational picture emerged. CNPE's role was expanded to take over the overall direction of the project, while, at the same time, the Ministry and INFOM retained operational responsibility for the studies and activities that were to be performed. As things turned out, the Ministry of Agriculture became the junior partner of the enterprise. Curiously, USPA dropped out of the picture almost altogether, and the only agricultural sector institution that played an active role was the Directorate of Natural Resources.

The reasons for USPA's failure to participate in the project are not entirely clear. One explanation that has been offered is that USPA saw the planning methodology that was to be developed by IADS as a rival to its area frame sampling work. To be sure, IADS's use of the municipio as its unit of analysis differs from the land use stratification of the area frame, but area frame sampling is really a statistical methodology, not a planning methodology. A more likely explanation may therefore be that USPA anticipated that the main use of IADS would be in guiding infrastructure investments, an area of emphasis that did not fall in the mainstream of Ministry concerns.

In any event, the project went forward. An ambitious municipio-level survey has been conducted, a massive data base has been compiled, the data have been processed, and a series of analyses have been performed. As an outgrowth of these activities, a systematic planning methodology can also be said to have been developed. The nuts and bolts of applying the methodology have not been worked out in each and every detail. In broad terms, however, we can say that the methodology consists of comparing agricultural potential and supporting infrastructure throughout the target region of over 200 municipios and, on the basis of the relative hierarchy of each area in the region, drawing inferences as to where and what types of future investments should be made. There is also a recognition that existing access patterns and perceived needs at the local level should be considered in the priority-setting process.

All of this is not to say that there have been no problems in project implementation. With the advantage of three and a half years of hindsight,

we can say that the project would have benefited from clearer, more limited objectives, from a different organizational approach, from early resolution of computer problems, and from a more experienced and accessible source of technical assistance. Despite these drawbacks (and partly because of them -- in that the GOG was forced to rely heavily on its own resources), IADS is now internalized in the hands of experienced and well qualified people in both CNPE and INFOM. The project is not regarded as an "AID activity," but, rather, as part of the institutions' planning processes.

IADS has effectively passed through the dynamics of the data-related activities in our chain-of-events framework. At the time of our site visit, the outputs of the project had just reached the stage of being used in more applied analytical work. INFOM had begun to use the IADS planning methodology in setting priorities for infrastructure investments and, in this way, IADS was having an identifiable impact on the project development process. At the same time, CNPE had begun to apply the IADS data to formulate an overall regional development strategy for the country. Since this work was just in its initial stages, we have not placed an "X" alongside the "Policy Analysis" box in Exhibit 5.1, but are relatively sanguine about the likelihood of this work bearing fruit.

To summarize, our assessment of AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities in Guatemala is, on the whole, a positive one. Both projects that AID has supported have had implementation problems, and both have taken more time than anticipated to bring about results. Nevertheless, results have come about, and the projects appear to have been useful in a number of ways.

An appeal for caution is in order, however. The discussion in this section has concentrated on activities that fall under the province of planning. As we move farther down the chain, we enter a broader institutional context that has been marked historically by a fragmentation of planning, budgeting, and implementation. This fragmentation is only reinforced by the political, economic, and social unrest in Guatemala today. Thus, despite the usefulness of the work that has been performed under the Small Farmer Development and Integrated Area Development Studies Projects,

we can not offer a rosy prognosis that all this work will necessarily be translated into increases in production, increases in incomes, improvement in the distribution of income, etc.

5.2 Country Visit Findings: Guyana

There have been two AID-supported activities in Guyana that relate directly to agricultural sector planning. The first is an agricultural sector assessment that was completed in 1980, and the second is the Agriculture Sector Planning Project that commenced the same year.[1] Our site visit focused on an examination of the latter.

In reporting our findings, we again follow the overall scheme laid out in Exhibit 3.1 and refer the reader to the column for Guyana in Exhibit 5.1.

The context for planning in Guyana was established at the time of independence when a "National Plan for Independence" was prepared with assistance from Sir Arthur Lewis. There have been a number of plan documents since, with the most recent entitled, "National Development Plan, 1978-1982." As is quite common, the plans have consisted mainly of data compilations and project summaries, and are largely extrapolations of the way things are.

The Guyanese economy is dominated by the public sector, which accounts for approximately 70 percent of national employment. Given its history of national development plans, one would think that Guyana would be fertile soil for planning. It was only in 1978, however, that a State Planning Commission was established, and to date its activities have focused primarily on financial concerns, assuring that budgetary items add up ex ante and are consolidated ex post. The explanation for this apparent contradiction seems to be a high degree of concentration in decisionmaking and a concomitant unwillingness to allow decisions to emerge from a planning framework. If real planning takes place, there must be some tie-in with policy development -- and this appears to be the principal bottleneck in Guyana's national management process.

[1] A baseline study of agricultural research, education, and extension was completed in 1981, but was immediately discounted by the Mission, largely for its failure to recommend specific proposals for action. The study has apparently met a negative reception in the GOG as well.

Excluding bauxite, Guyana's primary sector has four key components: foodstuffs, livestock, rice and sugar. Of these four components, the Ministry of Agriculture exerts influence only over foodstuffs. The Livestock Development Corporation sets livestock policy, the Guyana Rice Board dominates the rice sector, and GUYSUCO controls the sugar sector. As a consequence, the Ministry's agricultural sector planning affects only a small proportion of agricultural sector activity, and it is unlikely that its influence will expand considerably in the foreseeable future. Rice and sugar are, of course, Guyana's major food exports, but rice also plays a central role in the domestic market as a basic staple and as a major source of income for small farmers. It is also of interest that AID lending has focused on the rice sector in recent years. All this would seem to argue for inclusion of the rice sector under the purview of agricultural sector planning. For reasons of state, however, this change has not been made and is unlikely to be made in the future, much to the detriment of the potential of agricultural sector planning.

The major vehicle that AID has used to support the strengthening of agricultural sector planning capacity in Guyana's Ministry of Agriculture is the Agriculture Sector Planning Project. As a precursor to this project, AID first financed the bulk of a comprehensive sector assessment activity. Beginning in late 1977, the assessment relied heavily on outside expertise, but included a training component as well. Initial work included the compilation of an extensive bibliography of references on the agricultural sector of the country and a summary of existing information on income distribution, especially in rural areas. The main component of the assessment was a National Farm Household Survey that was designed to provide benchmark data on the household characteristics, production decisions, and incomes of Guyanese small farmers. The survey was a major data collection activity, and involved considerable data processing. The culmination of the survey was a comprehensive study that was completed in early 1980.

The Agricultural Sector Planning Project is in many respects a direct outgrowth of the earlier assessment work. The transition from the one activity to the other was relatively smooth and marked with a sense of purpose and continuity. (As an example of continuity, the statistical

advisor to the assessment continues in that capacity under the planning project). Moreover, the work that was performed prior to the initiation of the planning project precipitated two important institutional changes that have carried over into the project itself. First, the Resource Development and Planning Division of the Ministry of Agriculture was elevated to the status of a "Planning Department." As a consequence, the planning unit now reports directly to the Ministry's Permanent Secretary and is expected to play a much more active role in sector decisionmaking. Second, the GOG approved an increase in crop reporters and transferred them to the institution that, at least on paper, would appear to be the logical home for their services, namely, the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Development. Thus, the formal institutional infrastructure for agricultural sector planning appears to have improved. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the current heads of the Planning Department and the Statistics Bureau do not enjoy the same degree of personal influence and prestige that previous incumbents had, and although the two institutions have worked together in relative harmony in the past, there is no denying an underlying rivalry between them that could affect collaboration in the future.

To complicate matters further, there does not yet appear to have been much contact between these two institutions and the State Planning Commission. Furthermore, a new institution has been established on whose services both the Planning Department and the Statistics Bureau now depend. This is the National Data Management Authority, which was created to house and operate the computer to be purchased under the Agriculture Sector Planning Project. The authority was set up outside ordinary government channels to allow it to attract and retain high-caliber technicians and, thus, is an additional independent institution with which the Planning Department must interact. Although the new computer is not operational yet, the anticipation is that it will ultimately be used to process a goodly proportion of Statistics Bureau data, only part of which will be directly relevant to agricultural sector planning.

Returning explicitly to the chain of events presented in Exhibits 3.1 and 5.1, we now focus our attention on specific steps that have been taken to strengthen Guyanese capacity to conduct data-related activities, specifically, data collection, data processing, and data analysis. Although preparation for the National Farm Household Survey included enumerator training, and although the survey experience itself was in fact a form of on-the-job training, most AID support of Guyanese data collection capacity is foreseen as being provided under the Agriculture Sector Planning Project. Operationally, the project is still in its initial stages and there is not that much to report at this time. Nevertheless, there is evidence of some up-front slippage. For example, the project calls for increases in both crop reporting and data processing personnel, but these increases do not appear to have occurred to date. A second activity that is behind schedule is the development of a reliable sampling frame for the collection of agricultural sector statistics throughout this decade. Problems with earlier sampling methods had led project designers to make provision for an add-on form to the 1980 Population Census questionnaire that would identify farmers in the national population. These forms were indeed added and filled out, but processing has been delayed by coding problems. Once this work is completed, however, the revised sampling frame will represent a definite improvement.

Data processing has been a major preoccupation of the Agriculture Sector Planning Project. The data from the National Farm Household Survey were stored in Guyana, but table development and processing were carried out in Washington by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Guyanese technicians participated in the whole process, however, so that they would be in a position to perform additional data processing on their return to Guyana. Indeed, a set of tables was designed for this purpose, but none of the tables have as yet been processed.

In response to difficulties that had been encountered in earlier data processing activities, particularly the processing of Labour Force Survey data, the designers of the planning project decided to adopt explicit measures to improve data processing capacity in country. A major component of the project was thus the acquisition of an IBM 370 computer, and its

establishment in the National Data Management Authority. ($1 million of AID's total project contribution of $2.9 million was allocated for this purpose.) The computer was not operational at the time of our site visit, which implied more than a year's slippage beyond the installation date originally programmed, but most equipment was in country and initiation of operations depended only upon the installation of a power line. Once the computer becomes operational, however, it is questionnable whether there will be immediate demand for its use in agricultural sector planning. The head of the Planning Department did not have a backlog of jobs ready for processing, and seemed to have little in mind for use of the computer. Thus, the computer is likely to be underutilized, as are other computers in Guyana, and will probably be used mainly to process the data that are generated routinely by the Statistics Bureau and to meet the needs of other users in the country. As a result, it is hard to visualize exactly how the computer will relate to specific agricultural sector planning functions. It should be noted, however, that the arrival of the project's long-term analysis advisor may create new demands for data analysis, but that would be a major change, though not an inconceivable one. Such dependence on outside technical assistance is itself a commentary, however, on the extent to which the need for data analysis is currently institutionalized.

The planning project has not as yet had any visible impact in stimulating data analysis. The Statistics Bureau routinely publishes a "Statistical Digest" and a series of topical reports, but this process was initiated before the project began and there is no evidence that the project has affected the process to date. Indeed, in the activities in which the fruits of previous work would have been easiest to harvest, the National Farm Household Survey and the Labour Force Survey, the Bureau has yet to publish any results. In the case of the Planning Department, routine surveys continue to be carried out and "A Brief Overview of Agriculture" report, which is a compilation of data from various sources, continues to be produced yearly. But, again, little has changed since the initiation of the project.

As our chain of events illustrates, data can be used in policy analysis and formulation, in the development of projects, and in evaluation activities. In the case of Guyana, however, the agricultural sector planning process virtually truncates at the data stage. Our site visit uncovered no evidence of the use of data in analysis of policy alternatives, and the only evidence we found of the use of agricultural sector planning data in the development of projects was the use of the National Farm Household Survey data by international donors, particularly the Inter-American Development Bank. Furthermore, the Ministry does not appear to have a system set up for evaluating policies, programs, and projects. Thus, planning as a dynamic process largely ends at the stage of data collection and processing. Some positive strides have been made in the strengthening of technical capacity, but at least as things stand now, it does not feed into an ongoing process that is directed toward the provision of policy guidance for agricultural sector development.

Guyana's experience with agricultural sector planning largely mirrors its experience with national development planning. In neither case is planning recognized as a process that is expected to play a role in the formulation of policy. AID's support may ultimately be instrumental in raising consciousness in the GOG as to the potential usefulness of planning in rational decisionmaking. But this will be a long-term process, and there is at present little reason to believe that AID's support of agricultural sector planning will be translated into increases in production and incomes in the short to medium term.

5.3 Country Visit Findings: Jamaica

There are four AID-supported activities that have had some relation to the process of agricultural sector planning in Jamaica. These activities are in turn related to each other in a variety of ways. Before going into the specifics of these activities, however, they must first be placed in the broader context of national planning in Jamaica.

Jamaica has engaged in some form of economic planning over the entire post-war period. The earliest plan was the "Ten Year Development Plan, 1946-1957," and the most recent was the "Five Year Development Plan,

1978-1982." For the most part, these documents pulled together possible projects in one place, organized them by sector, and attempted to furnish an overall context for development. They also served as a mechanism for compiling existing data and for making extrapolations to the future. Most importantly, however, Jamaica has evidenced an openness to the usefulness of planning throughout its independence period, an openness that has not varied significantly with different political parties in power. This has provided a continuity of legitimacy to the entire enterprise and an environment in which agricultural sector planning can exert real influence.

One of the greatest ironies to emerge from our country visits is the sharp contrast betwen Guyana and Jamaica in their attitudes toward planning. At first blush, Guyana would appear to offer a welcome home for planning but, as we have seen, this is not the case. Jamaica, on the other hand, unabashedly portrays itself as a "market-oriented" government, and yet it offers a remarkedly favorable context in which planning can take place. The reason for the difference appears to be Jamaica's awareness that radical changes in policy can not be brought about unless there is some sense of the impacts that the changes will have so that, in practice, ideology can be tempered with political and economic reality. Thus, at this point in time we find Jamaica going back to earlier planning activities to provide a basis for current policy decisions, for example, the "zoning" of agricultural production that was a focus of planning in 1971.

Jamaica thus offers an environment in which we could presumably expect a planning structure to thrive, develop its competence, and then expand its influence to other government institutions, and outside of government as well. Interestingly, it is the private sector that might be most capable of taking advantage of such expertise, much as in the United States.

As is the case in most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Jamaica's Ministry of Agriculture is the locus of most planning for the agricultural sector. As is also the case in other countries, however, the Ministry's influence does not extend to all agricultural activity. The country's major agricultural exports, sugar, bananas, and coffee, do not fall under the purview of the Ministry and, thus, the potential exists for inconsistency in the formulation of agricultural sector policy.

As a practical matter, the major concern of the Ministry is the small farm subsector, a concern that was highlighted in the AID-supported agricultural sector assessment. The assessment, which relied heavily on outside technical assistance and was completed in 1978, focused explicitly on the constraints and opportunities of small farmers. In a separate volume, it also investigated options for an integrated rural development program in Western Portland and Eastern St. Mary.

The organizational structure of agricultural sector planning within the Ministry has evolved over time. Although many of its findings did not deal directly with planning, the 1979 baseline study of agricultural research, education, and extension was instrumental in this evolution. The study made two important suggestions: first, that a pay incentive be offered to planning personnel as a means of reducing turnover; and, second, that the Ministry's planning apparatus be consolidated to include responsibility for data-related activities. Both suggestions were well received and the changes implemented. As the Agricultural Planning Project got off the ground in late 1979, therefore, a number of institutional issues had already been addressed beforehand.

The two long-term planning activities that AID has supported are the 1976 National Planning Project and the 1979 Agricultural Planning Project. Each has dealt with a different segment of the planning process and, thus, we shall treat them separately. Nevertheless, there have been a number of ways in which the two projects could have, and should have, mutually reinforced each other, but, to the detriment of both, this apparently has not occurred.

The National Planning Project was essentially a project development activity. It concentrated on the training of personnel to identify projects and the establishment of a system that could screen out infeasible projects and usher viable ones through the decisionmaking and project funding process. Long-term technical assistance, which was provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, was essential to the training component of the project. Most training took place in country and was termed "action training" because of its focus on learning by doing. A number of Ministry of Agriculture personnel received training, mainly personnel at the regional level. It is difficult

to say to what extent this training has carried over to the development of agricultural sector projects. One contact mentioned that projects were indeed being developed in the Ministry's regional offices, and at least one of the trainees is still employed by the Ministry in Kingston.

The other component of the project was the establishment of a project screening committee, which is now called PAMCO, the Project Analysis and Management Company. It continues to serve as a major gateway to funding and is thus an important institution in the planning framework.

There are two ways in which closer institutional linkages might have been forged to the benefit of both the National Planning Project and the Ministry of Agriculture. First, the four years of training experience under the National Planning Project do not appear to have been drawn upon in the design of the Agricultural Planning Project. The National Planning Project had a marked impact on the training division of the Ministry of Finance, but there appears to have been little cross-fertilization and mutual learning between this unit and the training division of the Ministry of Agriculture. Second, the steps that the Ministry of Agriculture has taken to upgrade agricultural sector data do not evidence any direct tie-in with the project development process. In both these ways, therefore, potential reinforcement between the two projects has remained embryonic.

Most components of the Agricultural Planning Project fall under the purview of the Director of Planning, Programs, and Budgets in Jamaica's Ministry of Agriculture. As noted above, the responsibilities of this unit include data-related activities, and data collection and processing are clearly the project's major areas of emphasis. Indeed, of the $1.9 million AID contribution to the project, only $134,000 is earmarked for other activities, "analyses and evaluation." The concentration is not really as extreme as these gross figures would suggest, but there is little doubt that the development of an agricultural sector information system is the core of the project. It is also the component of the project that has progressed the farthest.

As a point of departure, the Agricultural Planning Project has focused attention on the basis of any information system, namely, the data collection process. The first step involved assessing and, if necessary, upgrading the Ministry's sample frame. As it turns out, no major changes have been required, but modifications will be made to improve the frame's reliability on a periodic basis in the future. The frame therefore appears to be adequate for most applications, though special-purpose surveys will naturally demand adjustments.

Despite the adequacy of the sample frame, data reliability has often been low. In some cases, in fact, error rates have run as high as 50 percent. This problem has its roots in the field and has been dealt with in a number of ways under the project. The project called for the GOJ to increase its number of enumerators, and this commitment appears to have been honored. The project also contemplated that enumerators would be outfitted with trail bikes to extend survey coverage. Although country-of-origin questions delayed procurement, the trail bikes have indeed been delivered to the enumerators under a rather complex purchase-and-use agreement that is designed to provide incentives for upkeep and maintenance. Availability of replacement parts has emerged as a major problem, however, and questions have been raised as to the adequacy of service skills. As a consequence, over half of the 65 trail bikes were estimated to be inoperable at the time of our site visit.

A further step that has been taken to improve data reliability has been to upgrade regional supervisory personnel to the status of Chief Data Collection Officers and to provide them with four-wheel drive vehicles. The role of these officers is to supervise the enumerators and, in cases of poor performance, to step in and ensure that data are collected properly. Again, these positions have in fact been filled, and both the officers and their vehicles are functioning.

A final measure that has been taken is training of field personnel. Several short courses have been designed that cover survey techniques, the characteristics of agriculture, and the nature of agricultural information systems. The most important have been the "crop production survey" course

and the "introduction to agriculture" course. This training is seen as a major component of the project, and the project's technical assistance coordinator is a training specialist.

To summarize, the project has made considerable progress in strengthening the Ministry's data collection capacity. The data collection component of the project was well conceptualized, potential sources of problems have generally been addressed, and a coordinated program has been developed to increase data reliability. The brevity of our site visit did not allow us to assess the quality of the data that have been collected, but it is probably safe to conclude that project activities have brought about some improvement. This presumption is buttressed by the good reputation that the unit currently enjoys and the Ministry's recent commissioning of the unit to conduct a special Agribusiness Survey. Nevertheless, the repair and maintenance of the enumerators' trail bikes is a major problem that calls for resolution.

The Agricultural Planning Project envisioned a combination of training, technical assistance, and commodity support to assist in the upgrading of the Ministry's data processing capacity. To date, there have not been any dramatic operational changes, and, thus, it is still somewhat premature to forecast how this component of the project will work out. Some training and technical assistance has been provided, but not to the extent contemplated in the Project Paper. Staffing of data processing positions has also fallen short of anticipated levels.

The principal reason for our inability to assess the usefulness of the data processing component of the planning project is the delay that has occurred in making the project-financed System 34 IBM computer operational. Its installation had been anticipated well over a year ago, but it still was not functioning at the time of our site visit. The principal problem is the lack of an interface between it and the mainframe computer, an IBM 370, in the Ministry of Finance. Until it arrives, no communication is possible. Complicating the matter further is the decision of the Ministry of Agriculture to purchase the computer rather than to lease it. Once installation is completed, therefore, the maintenance of the system will devolve completely upon the Ministry.

Like the Ministry of Agriculture in Guyana, the Ministry of Agriculture in Jamaica routinely publishes a number of topical reports. These reports include a quarterly crop production survey, an annual pig census, surveys of agricultural machinery and buildings, crop production forecasts, inland fisheries production and price statistics, and evaluations of Ministry projects. In the past, some of the surveys have been tabulated by hand, but most have been processed on a minicomputer in the Ministry's data processing section. The system is somewhat primitive but has nevertheless been adequate to the task. The anticipation is that this system will continue to be used to process modest surveys in the future. Thus, use of the System 34 is likely to be concentrated in the processing of elaborate surveys and in analytical tasks. As we shall see below, however, computer capacity does not appear to be a major constraint to such activities as yet, and it is likely that this situation may continue for some time.

As noted earlier, there appears to be little linkage between the Ministry's data-related activities and the process of project development. In the area of evaluation, however, significant strides have been made. A project evaluation and monitoring system has been developed. The system will make use of the System 34 once it becomes operational. Data collection forms have been developed and provided to project managers. With periodic reporting, the system will facilitate the monitoring of projects and their subsequent evaluation. There is far from complete compliance with data reporting requirements as yet, but if this changes, the system will be a useful addition to the planning process.

In addition to developing this new system, the Ministry played an important role in the evaluation of the Integrated Rural Development Project, both in the collection of information and in its use in the evaluation itself. The Ministry appears to be almost evangelical about its mandate to "evaluate and monitor," and this is indeed a very positive development.

But perhaps the most important use to which agricultural sector planning data can be put is their application in policy analysis. In this case, our visit to the planning section of the Ministry revealed little evidence of progress. There are a number of possible explanations for this

finding. First, the long-term advisor to the planning section left the project shortly after his arrival. Second, our contact with the section was minimal: its head was on retreat; the staff member who had earlier received stateside training had just returned after a three-month vacation; and two recent hires were reluctant to be interviewed without the authorization of the section head. Third, we were unable to gain access to a report on the section's activities. Thus, there may be a substantial amount of progress that has not surfaced, but we are doubtful.

The principal policy analysis strategy that the section has adopted is what we can term the "big study" approach. As suggested in the Project Paper, the section has decided to embark on a relatively ambitious demand study of agricultural products. The objective of the study is to increase understanding of the consumption impacts of various food import and subsidy programs. At the moment, the implementation of the study appears to be waiting upon the arrival of a new long-term advisor. In the meantime, no agenda has apparently been set up for other analytical work, and our contacts with other sections of the Ministry failed to indicate that the planning section has articulated demands for additional information for its work. All this suggests that the section may want to rethink its "big study" approach, and concentrate on a limited number of important policy questions that can be addressed in a less ambitious analytical fashion.

As we might expect, our site visit also failed to evidence much project impact on policy formulation. As we have seen, the focal point of the project is the Ministry's Director of Planning, Programs, and Budget, and the coordinator of the technical assistance team reports directly to him. The Director, in turn, reports directly to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry. Organizationally, therefore, the Agricultural Planning Project fits squarely in the flow of formulation of policy. Moreover, informal evidence suggests strongly that the Director of Planning, Programs, and Budget and the head of the planning section both play a central role in formulating policy. Nevertheless, we were unable to uncover any evidence of project influence on the policy formulation process. This may be a shortcoming of our site visit, but that is what we found. A review of the

Ministry's survey activities failed to reveal that any of this work was a direct response to policy concerns. Rather, the surveys were designed to furnish information for the Ministry's ongoing statistical programs. This is important work, to be sure, but it is not policy formulation.

There is one additional concern that emerged from our site visit that does not correspond explicitly to the boxes in our chain-of-events framework. This has to do with institutional linkages outside the Ministry of Agriculture. In one sense, the Agricultural Planning Project is fortunate in having few problems of interministerial coordination. The project's only formal linkage is with the Ministry of Finance to gain access to the computer of the Central Data Processing Unit. On the other hand, this isolation encourages a tendency to be too ingrown. We have already mentioned the apparent lack of contact of the Ministry's training unit with other training institutions. In addition, there would appear to be benefits from closer relationships with the private sector. Farmers need information, and there is a natural unity of interests that could be cultivated. One specific way in which this might be done would be to use the Ministry's Agribusiness Survey to solicit information on data and analysis needs. As far as we know, nothing like this has ever been attempted.

In summary, the Agricultural Planning Project has evidenced a number of significant accomplishments. It is also beset with a number of weaknesses. In contrast to other countries that we visited, however, Jamaica creates the decided impression of having launched a process with a definite sense of direction. Although there is considerably more to be accomplished, there is evidence of strengthened planning capacity and an expectation that this capacity has an important role to play in the development of the country's agricultural sector.

5.4 Host-Country Assessment of the Impact of AID Support Over the Long Term: Colombia

In 1970, as AID was placing increasing reliance on sector loans as a vehicle for its lending, the Latin American Bureau established a Sector Analysis and Strategy Staff to work on the refinement of analytical techniques and procedures to guide its resource allocation decisions in agriculture

and other sectors.[1] One of the staff's early activities was to use input-output and linear programming methods to model the Colombian agricultural sector. This activity, which came to be referred to as the Colombian Agricultural Sector Analysis, was computer-intensive and ambitious in scope. By 1972, a complete model had been constructed with Colombian data in Washington, and although not all methodological kinks had as yet been worked out, the approach was nevertheless judged to be far enough along to recommend for institutionalization in country.

The second phase of the Colombian Agricultural Sector Analysis began in November, 1972, in Colombia, when the Ministry of Agriculture established an Agricultural Sector Analysis Group (GASA) within its Agricultural Sector Planning Office, and contracted the first GASA personnel with AID loan funds.[2] Since the major drawback of the Washington-based model had been the inadequate data underlying it, the design of the second phase of the activity made provision for the collection of primary data on rural production and consumption patterns and contemplated extensive use of data on sectors other than agriculture. A massive rural survey was therefore conducted and arrangements were made to tap other data sources. As the activity moved beyond its initial stages, capacity to process such quantitites of information emerged as the major bottleneck to progress. By the time that AID terminated its support in 1977, GASA had produced only one report on rural production and consumption and had processed relatively little of the data on other sectors.

A summary of AID's final evaluation of the Colombian Agricultural Sector Analysis appears in Appendix B and need not be repeated here. Since five years have now transpired since the termination of AID support, however, it is of interest to know to what extent the activity has had an impact over the long term. Although we were unable to visit Colombia in person,[3] we have

[1] See the Agricultural Sector Analysis Support Project Summary and Activity Description in Appendix A.

[2] See the Colombian Agricultural Sector Analysis Activity Description in Appendix A.

[3] Originally it was anticipated that our country visits would include travel to both Chile and Colombia, but this did not turn out to be possible.

been fortunate in receiving comments on developments in recent years from a former head of GASA, and his reflections on the whole experience are summarized in what follows.

With the announcement of the termination of AID development assistance to Colombia in 1975, the AID Mission to Colombia lost whatever leverage it had had to promote the Colombian Agricultural Sector Analysis. Although its pipeline of assistance to the activity continued until 1977, its influence waned notably. The Colombian Ministry of Agriculture continued to provide a modicum of support for the work of GASA until the end of the decade but, as time went on, the agricultural sector analysis came to be looked at more and more as an unnecessary burden. As a result, the work on large-scale models was ultimately abandoned.

Despite AID's attempts to promote GASA as an integral part of the Ministry, Ministry decisionmakers never really adopted GASA as their own. Rather, the activity was viewed as a peripheral adjunct to day-to-day Ministry operations or, to put it simply, as an "AID activity." As long as AID's development assistance to Colombia continued, the Ministry was reluctant to voice strong objections to the activity, but it remained skeptical nonetheless. The tenure of high Ministry officials is typically only one or two years and, thus, the time horizon that guides their work is often very short. Although the benefits of a medium- to long-term analysis activity could be accepted in principle, the failure of the activity to yield recognizable short-term payoffs gradually led them to conclude that GASA's modeling work was largely irrelevant.

Although the work on the construction of input-output and linear programming models finally ground to a halt, the activity still has evidenced a number of significant benefits. By the end of the decade, GASA had produced a set of important studies, including a study of land use and an overview of agriculture in Colombia, that were based, for the first time, on nationally representative farm-level survey information. Futhermore, while the Ministry's Agricultural Sector Planning Office is now organized in much the same fashion as before the analysis activity began, four former GASA employees now hold management positions within the office. This upward movement is a reflection

of two related phenomena: first, the relatively high technical caliber of the personnel that GASA had been able to attract, and, second, a recognition by Ministry decisionmakers of the opportunity cost of continuing to permit these personnel to work outside the mainstream of Ministry business. Over the long term, therefore, the Colombian Agricultural Sector Analysis served as a training ground and ultimately as a "hiring hall" to fill middle-management planning positions. Moreover, the individuals who have been promoted routinely make use of GASA work in their current jobs, particularly the statistical base that GASA created.

In retrospect, therefore, the Colombian Agricultural Sector Analysis was an experience with both its pluses and its minuses. On the whole, however, the activity fell considerably short of AID's anticipations. It is therefore of interest to learn why this is so -- or, to take more of a perspective toward the future, to suggest what different steps it would be appropriate to take if the opportunity existed to start all over again today. According to the former head of GASA, the principal constraints to the achievement of the activity's objectives, together with the lessons they suggest, were the following:

- First, the Colombian Agricultural Sector Analysis was both pretentious and overly ambitious in contemplating construction of an input-output table with 625 rows and columns. Construction of a model of this size, which was largely AID's brainchild, was simply beyond the capacity of GASA to implement. (Many would argue that it would have outstripped capacity in many developed countries as well.) There is no doubt that input-output analysis can be a powerful analytical tool for structuring thinking on the consistency of alternative policy options, but it does suffer from one major practical disadvantage, namely, that relatively little analytical power can be harnessed until the model is completely built. As a rule, GASA personnel were well trained but lacked hands-on experience in anything approaching the magnitude of the endeavor that was contemplated. As a consequence, considerable time and effort were expended in producing relatively little that was of direct policy use. In retrospect, it would clearly have been preferable not to embark on the construction of one enormous model but, rather, to build a small, usable model well and, then, expand

its size and analytical power over time. To put it colloquially, you cannot write 100 pages until you have written ten, and you cannot write ten pages until you have written one. Adoption of a staged work plan also has the benefit of furnishing checkpoints where progress can be evaluated and mid-course corrections made -- or if results fall far short of expectations, an appropriate moment to abandon the activity entirely and still have something to show for it.

- Second, the progress of the Colombian analysis was plagued throughout by a failure to evaluate data sources carefully at the time of its design. Although existing data sources were reviewed at the initiation of the activity, the review was relatively cursory and, as a result, failed to anticipate the myriad of practical problems that would follow in its wake. If the review had been performed carefully, the inappropriateness of the 625 x 625 input-output model would have been virtually inescapable. Instead, day-to-day GASA business was "eaten up" with data-related problems and enormously more time was spent in statistical "watchmaking" than in the construction of the models and their application to planning.

- Third, the data processing implications of the proposed work, like the inadequacy of existing data sources, were grossly underestimated. As things turned out, data processing problems were not only a consequence of the magnitude of the Colombian analysis; they were also exacerbated by institutional frictions between the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Statistics Department. With the benefit of hindsight, considerably more progress might have been made if data processing activities had been handled by a private firm with more of a client orientation than the Ministry's sister institution.

- Fourth, with few exceptions, the technical assistance that was provided to the Colombian Agricultural Sector Analysis focused less on the transfer of technical skills than on the overall conceptualization of the activity or, alternatively, the actual performance of specific tasks. In an activity like this, there is less of a need for high-powered "experts" than for the services of practitioners who are willing to work "elbow to elbow" with host-country personnel on a daily basis.

- Fifth, as alluded to above, the Colombian Ministry of Agriculture tolerated the work of GASA; it did not embrace it with any deep-rooted conviction.[1] Again, it would have been preferable if a staged plan for work had been adopted whose proposed outputs could have been adjusted periodically to address changing policy concerns within the Ministry.

5.5 A Case Study of the Process of Institutional Change: UNASEC and DIPSA in Nicaragua

The concluding years of the regime of Nicaraguan President Anastasic Somoza were noteworthy not only for the political developments and the turbulence that led to his overthrow. Although it received nowhere near the same degree of international attention, the early and mid-1970s were also marked by a remarkable evolution in Nicaragua's agricultural sector planning capacity. Given the turmoil that characterized Nicaragua during this period a replication of the entirety of this evolution in other countries would not only appear to be highly unlikely; it would also be highly undesirable. Nevertheless, the dynamics of this evolution are instructive in a number of respects and suggest a number of lessons that may have applicability elsewhe

USAID/Nicaragua's documentation of its 1974 Agricultural Planning and Statistical Services Grant and its 1975 Rural Development Sector Loan describes the early evolution of Nicaragua's agricultural sector planning capacity in summary terms. Because of this, it fails to do justice to the intricacies of the dynamics that made the evolution "work." In conducting this study, we have been fortunate in having the opportunity to interview th IICA advisor who was present in Managua throughout most of this evolutionary process. The history that follows is based largely on these interviews. Errors of interpretation are our responsibility, however, not his.

An initial stimulus for upgrading Nicaragua's agricultural sector planning capacity came from AID. In late 1971, AID decided that

[1] In fairness to AID, it should be noted that the Minister of Agriculture who negotiated the original project agreement with AID was indeed genuinely enthused about the agricultural sector analysis, but he left office shortly after the activity got off the ground.

> no further significant U.S. assistance would be granted to the Nicaraguan agricultural sector until a sector analysis had been performed to identify constraints to equitable development and to establish priority areas of investment for development purposes. This decision was conveyed to the highest levels of the Nicaraguan government in January 1972. Following a series of consultations between representatives of the GON and of AID, a decision was reached by the GON to proceed with the proposed sector analysis.[1]

The unit that was set up to conduct the agricultural sector analysis, which later came to be referred to as the Nicaraguan Agricultural Sector Assessment, was not set up as a permanent institution. Rather, it was established as a temporary independent unit whose staff was drawn from key agricultural sector institutions. The unit, which was called UNASEC, was headed by the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, but enjoyed broad support throughout the Nicaraguan public sector. In retrospect, this breadth of support, which was an outgrowth of the mid-1972 negotiations between the GON and AID, was critical to the effectiveness of the unit. In the early 1970s, the GON counted the Ministry of Agriculture among its weakest institutions. At the other extreme, the Nicaraguan Central Bank was one of the most powerful institutions, if not the most powerful institution, in the country. Thus, when the Central Bank, along with other GON institutions, threw its prestige squarely behind the enterprise, the activity immediately came to be recognized as one meriting attention and respect.

In and of itself, the support of other institutions was not enough; UNASEC also needed to attract high-caliber people. The Ministry did not have the capacity to conduct the assessment by itself and, thus, was forced to look elsewhere for personnel. The Ministry recognized that the participation of other agricultural sector institutions would be key to ultimate acceptance of the study's findings and, as a consequence, limited its search for people to sector institutions. In what was interpreted as a gracious act of humility, the Deputy Minister appealed to all other sector institutions to lend their full cooperation. Specifically, he asked each institution to collaborate by assigning one person to UNASEC on a loan basis. The Deputy

[1] USAID/Nicaragua, "Noncapital Project Paper: Agricultural Planning and Statistical Services," 1973, p. 2.

Minister solicited a list of the institution's most capable people from whom he might choose. In asking for this list, he appealed to the institution's self-interest by emphasizing the importance that the assessment was likely to have in guiding the allocation of resources for future agricultural sector programs. AID also chimed in at this point by hinting at the possibility of a follow-on loan that would abide by UNASEC's recommendations.

The Deputy Minister's appeals were successful in inducing agricultural sector institutions to nominate their best people. Before the final selection of UNASEC personnel was made, however, a committee of representatives of key public sector institutions met to define the specifics of what the assessment was to do. Thus, selection of personnel was guided not only by the caliber of the people who had been nominated but also by a clear sense of the work that lay ahead.

The original UNASEC staff consisted of 11 professionals, three of whom had Ph.D. degrees. The other eight had Master's degrees. Each was paid by his or her own institution, and AID agreed to top off salaries as an additional incentive.

UNASEC's first activity was a one-month retreat in which each person's plan of work was defined in specific terms. The work plans laid out what was to be accomplished, how it was to be done, how much time it would take, and how much money it would cost. For at least two days each week, the entire staff met as a group. These meetings forced each staff member to see the forest of the assessment as well as his or her own trees. They also surfaced interrelationships among different pieces of work.

Throughout this one-month period, UNASEC staff were prohibited from contacting their home institutions. The only exceptions to this rule were instances in which it was crystally clear that outside assistance was required. The reason for this prohibition was not to isolate UNASEC from the rest of the sector. Rather, it was to assure that each person on the staff had a clear understanding of what everybody was to do and what it was going to be used for -- so that the entire staff would be competent to answer inquiries from outsiders later on. As a practical matter, the one-month retreat also had a significant side-benefit: it introduced an <u>esprit de corps</u> among a group of very diverse individuals that was to carry over well into the future.

As UNASEC emerged from its retreat, communcations with other institutions went, if anything, to the other extreme. The creators of UNASEC had insisted early on that the unit was not to be divorced from the rest of the sector. Indeed, UNASEC personnel were not only instructed not to hide anything from their home institutions; they were also encouraged to communicate with their institutions on what they were doing. To structure operational requests, however, each institution was asked to name a liaison person for contacts with UNASEC. In the conduct of official business, therefore, there was one channel in and one channel out.

Throughout this entire period, AID played a behind-the-scenes role. Relative to its moral support, its financial support was small. As a percentage of the cost of the entire enterprise, AID's financial contribution is estimated to have come to only about 20 percent. This low-keyed posture was an outgrowth of a conscious strategy decision on AID's part. From both the GON's and AID's perspective, the assessment was to be a Nicaraguan enterprise, and both parties recognized that AID visibility would foster an image of the assessement as an AID creation. On the other hand, AID did not stand by as an aloof spectator. At one point, for example, there was some concern that political support might be waning and the U.S. Ambassador interceded to ask President Somoza to make a public statement expressing his support. On a more routine basis as well, AID was receptive to UNASEC's requests to fund outside technical assistance. As the assessment progressed, an atmosphere of trust was created in which AID came to recognize that whenever UNASEC made such a request, it had good reasons for doing so. Furthermore, AID was flexible in its responsiveness and funded technical assistance from non-U.S. sources when that was necessary -- which in turn diffused the visibility of U.S. support.

In making its requests for technical assistance, UNASEC went to great lengths to draft detailed scopes of work. As a result, outside consultants had a clear idea of what was expected of them. Moreover, consultants were cautioned not to leave behind work that their counterparts would not be able to internalize and defend. The guiding philosophy was that UNASEC would ultimately be the party responsible for making and defending policy recommendations -- not outsiders, whether long-term or short-term.

From conception to presentation, the assessment took a year and a half. Throughout the course of the study, UNASEC had taken continuous pains, both formally and informally, to apprise a broad spectrum of public sector institutions of developments and progress. This "public relations campaign" paid off in two ways: first, the assessment did not suffer from discontinuities in political support; and, second, it raised expectations at levels of government that could act on the recommendations that were made. (Indeed, one of the major findings of the assessment was that the majority of policy decisions that affect the agricultural sector are made outside the agricultural sector.) Upon presentation of the assessment, the GON formed a committee to meet weekly to review its conclusions and to decide on appropriate courses of action. The composition of this committee is an indication of the support that the enterprise had been able to muster. It consisted of the President of the Republic, the Minister of Agriculture, the President of the Central Bank, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Economy, Industry and Commerce, and the Director of the National Planning Office.

Although the assessment was not accepted in its totality, it was still very well received, and most of its major recommendations were in fact adopted. UNASEC affected the future of Nicaragua's agricultural sector in a number of significant ways. Among the outgrowths of UNASEC's work were:

- The assessment itself, which, although somewhat uneven in quality, furnished an adequate basis for the design of future agricultural sector programs;
- A new Agricultural Sector Law that established a National Agricultural Council and firmly established the Ministry of Agriculture as the institution responsible for the direction of public sector activity in agriculture;
- The transformation of UNASEC to DIPSA, a permanent sector planning department in the Ministry of Agriculture;
- Development of an innovative integrated rural development program that was known as INVIERNO during the Somoza regime and continues in modified form as PROCAMPO under the Sandinista government;
- Creation of a National Agricultural Technology Institute with responsibility for agricultural research, education, and extension; and

- The compilation of the most comprehensive agricultural sector data base in the history of the country, a data base that is still used today.

Before turning to the transition from UNASEC as an ad hoc group to DIPSA as a permanent planning department, it may be useful to summarize the principal factors that appear to have accounted for the remarkable impact that UNASEC's work had. In the opinion of IICA's advisor, the principal factors were:

- Nicaragua was in turmoil and UNASEC was recommending rational solutions to agricultural sector problems.
- Shortly after the assessment was completed, there was a change in Ministers of Agriculture. Rather then discounting the work performed under his predecessor, the new Minister endorsed the assessment in its totality, urged personnel to remain in their positions, and provided continuity of direction and leadership over the 1974-78 period.
- The quality of the work that had been performed was of high caliber.
- The systematic "public relations campaign" was critical to the maintenance of political support.
- AID was always there in an unobtrusive way.

In light of the positive tenor of the discussion to this point, one might suppose that the transition from UNASEC to DIPSA would have been a smooth, harmonious process. In fact, this was far from the case. Again, the dynamics of the evolution are instructive -- in this instance, of the institutional frictions that can accompany success.

As we have just seen, 1974 witnessed a change in Ministers of Agriculture. In retrospect, this change was probably a blessing, but a number of other key personnel changes occurred at the same time as well. The most significant was the departure of the Deputy Minister of Agriculture who had headed UNASEC from its inception. This was particularly unfortunate in light of the disruption that necessarily accompanied the shift of the Ministry's operating style away from an implementation mode and toward a planning and budgeting mode. For many Ministry personnel, this shift was not a welcome one, and there was indeed resentment of the power that the assessment staff

had been able to obtain. With the benefit of hindsight, it is somewhat ironic that UNASEC had spent so much energy courting support outside the Ministry -- while taking its own backyard almost for granted. But opposition to DISPA was not limited to the confines of the Ministry of Agriculture. Other public sector institutions, especially the Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Commerce, also resented the influence, including access to the President of the Republic, that UNASEC had managed to achieve.

Suddenly, therefore, DIPSA found itself fighting for survival. Fortunately, the new Minister turned out to be a key ally, and was able to resist outside pressure and hold down internal opposition. AID also re-entered the scene at this point and hinted at a withdrawal of its support for the INVIERNO program unless DIPSA were permitted to function as anticipated. The impact that AID's intercession had is not completely clear, but it is not inconceivable that it tipped the scale in DIPSA's behalf.

As things have turned out, DIPSA survived the storm and continues, albeit in modified form, to the current day. The original staff of DIPSA consisted of eight of the 11 professionals who had worked in UNASEC. (The other three professionals took positions with the Central Bank, INVIERNO, and the National Agricultural Technology Institute.) Over the following three years, the department expanded markedly, and two assistants were trained for each of the original professionals. Although DIPSA does not appear to have had the dramatic impact that UNASEC had had (UNASEC was a tough act to follow), the 1974-78 period witnessed a marked growth in the prestige of the Ministry of Agriculture, and there is no question that DIPSA contributed substantially to that growth.

Organizationally, DIPSA's activities were concentrated in three areas:

- "Firefighting". From the beginning it was recognized that the satisfaction of "short-fuse" demands is part and parcel of the planning process, and a unit of five people was set up expressly for this purpose. If a request were too big for this group to handle, however, a special task force would be set up.
- Studies. Under the rubric of studies, DIPSA:

  -engaged in medium-and long-term forecasting activities;

-collaborated with other agricultural sector institutions, and with international donors, in the design and evaluation of development projects; and

-participated in the annual budget process, that is, in deliberations on the size of the agricultural sector budget and how it would be allocated among sector institutions.

- Information Center. The data bank that had been set up by UNASEC was maintained by DIPSA on a continuing basis. For the first time, there were now reliable agricultural sector statistics to work with and, for all practical purposes, DIPSA became the agricultural sector statistics branch of Nicaragua's Central Statistics Office. Also, since information is power, the Ministry's proprietorship over this information served to buttress its leadership role in the agricultural sector.

In addition, DIPSA acted as the GON's permanent liaison with international donors on agricultural sector matters. In this capacity, it was a focal point for international financing and technical assistance.

Although this recount of the evolution of agricultural sector planning capacity in Nicaragua may be biased somewhat by the perspective of one who participated in the process, most observers of Nicaragua would concur that the evolution was indeed impressive. We conclude, therefore, with a summary of major lessons to be learned from this experience, again, in the opinion of IICA's former agricultural sector planning advisor to Nicaragua. The lessons are:

- Planning can not be divorced from politics. Internal and external political support was a precondition of UNASEC's and DIPSA's effectiveness.

- Planning can not be theoretical.

- Planning must be flexible.

- A planning unit must be organized in such a way that it can perform a broad array of tasks.

- The best planner may not be a person with a planning background but, rather, a good technician in his or her own field.

5.6 Summary

The findings of our brief country visits are very similar to the findings of our examination of the written record on AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. This is to be expected, since many of the same activities are examined in each case. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that this chapter confirms many of the findings reported in Chapter 4.

The experiences examined in this chapter suggest that AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities have had positive impacts, but, again, the impacts are primarily capacity-building and interinstitutional in nature. With the exception of the Nicaraguan experience, agricultural sector planning has not made an effective transition to policy formulation. Even in Jamaica, where planning appears to have a strong sense of direction and momentum, there is little evidence of project impact on policy formulation.

A number of reasons can be cited for this finding. In Colombia and Jamaica, heavy emphasis either was or is being placed on large-scale studies with limited short-term payoff. In other countries, particularly Guyana and, to a lesser extent, Guatemala, there appears to be a high degree of concentration in decision-making, and an unwillingness to allow decisions to emerge from a planning framework. Thus, agricultural sector planning plays a relatively minor role, and has focused on data-related activities.

These findings reinforce a major conclusion of Chapter 4, namely, that planning must be demand- and decision-driven. Agricultural sector planning often takes place outside a policy formulation and decision-making framework and, because of this, lacks a clear sense of direction. This suggests that AID focus on mechanisms to stimulate demand for planning, for example, by encouraging fast turn-around studies that are directly responsive to decisionmakers' concerns.

Experience in Nicaragua highlights the need for host-country support and direction. The success of UNASEC was largely a function of its clear mandate and the broad support that it enjoyed throughout the Nicaraguan public sector. Moreover, the Ministry of Agriculture was able to attract high-caliber personnel to the enterprise. Chapter 4 suggests that lack of host-country support and lack of well qualified staff are key constraints

to effective agricultural sector planning. These were not constraints in Nicaragua, and planning flourished. Even when opposition arose to the conersion of UNASEC to DIPSA, continuity of high-level support was instrumental in weathering the storm and bringing about an effective transition.

An interesting finding of the country visits is that the environment for planning is more favorable in Jamaica whose government has a strong "free enterprise" ideology, than in Guyana, where the public sector controls nearly 70 percent of the economy. The reason for this apparent contradiction appears to be Jamaica's awareness that radical changes in policy can not be brought about unless there is some sense of the impacts that changes will have, so that, in practice, ideology can be tempered with political and economic reality.

There a number of other important findings and lessons that emerge from this chapter. Briefly, they are:

- In some countries, planning, budgeting, and implementation functions may be highly fragmented. This fragmentation may also be reinforced by political, economic, and social unrest. In such an environment, it is difficult for even very useful planning activities to be translated into increases in incomes and production and an improvement in the distribution of income.

- Planning cannot be divorced from politics. Internal and external political support is almost a precondition for the effectiveness of a planning unit.

- A systematic "public relations" campaign can be critical to the maintenance of political support for agricultural sector planning.

- Planning cannot be theoretical and needs to be flexible.

- A strategy for setting up a complete planning, programming, and budgeting system on a comprehensive rather than a selective basis may be a mistake. A comprehensive rather than a selective system runs the risk of bogging down system development in peripheral areas while failing to exploit the full potentials of the system in areas of highest priority for decision-makers.

- Policy analysis and evaluation have often been ignored because of the substantial time and resources that have been devoted to data collection and processing.

- Experience suggests that countries may want to rethink the "big study" approach to agricultural sector planning and concentrate on a limited number of important policy questions that can be addressed in a less ambitious analytical fashion.

- Experience in Colombia suggests that it would clearly have been preferable not to have embarked on the construction of one enormous model but, rather, to have built a small usable model well and, then, expanded its size and analytical power over time.

- Data sources and data processing facilities must be evaluated very carefully at the design stage of a project, lest the project bog down in mid-stream.

- In many activities, there is less of a need for high-powered "experts" than for the services of practitioners who are willing to work "elbow to elbow" with host-country personnel on a daily basis.

- The Jamaica experience suggests that pay incentives can be effective in reducing turnover of high-caliber planning staff.

6.0 A REVIEW OF AID-SUPPORTED AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: A COMPARISON OF EXPERIENCES IN BOLIVIA, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, AND HONDURAS

This chapter presents the findings of visits to three countries in which we were able to look at the agricultural sector planning process in some depth. The three countries are Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras.

The three countries differ markedly in a number of respects and, thus, a comparison of their experiences in agricultural sector planning is of no small interest. Exhibit 6.1 lays out ten indicators for the three countries. Six of the indicators are quantitative, and four are qualitative. The qualitative indicators are based largely on professional judgment and, as a consequence, it is not inconceivable that others might assign different ratings in some instances. Nevertheless, the exhibit is a useful device for reflecting the ocntrasting environments in which agricultural sector planning has taken place.

Examination of Exhibit 6.1 suggests that AID support of agricultural sector planning can be expected to have had more of an impact in the Dominican Republic than in Bolivia and Honduras. The Dominican Republic has the highest per capita income of the three countries, has enjoyed a period of political stability, and has had a broader base of well trained planning personnel. Its institutional linkages are relatively developed and the stature of its agricultural sector planning unit has been greater than in the other two countries. Although AID support of Dominican agricultural sector planning has been less than in Bolivia and Honduras, the environment for planning has been different, in a positive sense, in a number of respects.

Although AID-supported activities in Bolivia and Honduras can be expected to have evidenced less impact than in the Dominican Republic, the two countries differ in several ways. Honduras has the smallest population of the three countries, has the lowest per capita income, and has the greatest economic dependence on agriculture. Bolivia, on the other hand, has received the most AID support, has been the least politically stable, and has had the smallest base of well-trained planning personnel.

Exhibit 6.1

INDICATORS FOR BOLIVIA,
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, AND HONDURAS

INDICATORS	COUNTRIES		
	Bolivia	Dominican Republic	Honduras
Population, 1977 (millions of people)[1]	5.2	5.0	3.3
Gross National Product Per Capita, 1977 (U.S. $)[1]	630	840	410
Agriculture as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 1977[1]	17	20	32
Index of Agricultural Production Per Capita, 1977 (1961-65 = 100)[1]	100	95	92
Percentage of Labor Force in Agriculture, 1970[1]	56	61	67
AID Project Assistance, 1970s (U.S. $(000))[2]	6,848	3,619.9	5,370
Political Stability	Low	High	Medium
Base of Trained Personnel	Low	High	Medium
Linkages Among Institutions	Low	Medium	Low
Stature of Agricultural Sector Planning Unit	Low	Medium	Low

[1] Source: Exhibit 4.2.

[2] Source: Exhibit 4.3.

As in Chapter 5, the chain-of-events framework is used to organize the findings of our country visits. Exhibit 6.2 is a summary of these findings and is discussed in the following sections.

6.1 Country Visit Findings: Bolivia

Initial AID support of agricultural sector planning in Bolivia was an outgrowth of a long-term technical assistance contract with Utah State University. In 1965, the Mission contracted with the university to assist the Government of Bolivia in improving sheep production and marketing in the Altiplano and in developing a wheat program in the country's high valleys. In 1970, the responsibilities of the agricultural economist on the technical assistance team were altered to include support for the agricultural sector planning unit in the Ministry of Campesino Affairs and Agriculture (MACA). Initial planning work included compilation of information on the physical characteristics of Bolivian agriculture, crop studies, and, in 1972, the conduct of a national household survey of agricultural production and consumption in rural areas and of consumption in urban areas. Since then, AID support of Bolivian agricultural sector planning has grown and assumed a number of shapes and forms.

During the 1970s, eight distinct AID-supported activities were initiated that have some relationship to agricultural sector planning. These activities will not be treated individually here, but will be organized in two groups. The first group consists of activities with central government institutions, mostly the planning and statistics units of MACA. Included in this group are: a 1974 agricultural sector assessment; the 1974 Agriculture Sector Loan Project; its companion grant, the 1975 Basic Foods Production and Marketing Project; a 1977 assessment of the southern valley region of the country; the 1977 Agricultural Sector II Project; and the 1978 Farm Policy Study Project. The second group consists of two activities with Bolivia's Departmental Development Corporations (DDCs): the 1978 Rural Development Planning Project and the 1979 Departmental Development Corporations Project.

As in other countries, agricultural sector planning in Bolivia is influenced heavily by the national planning context in which it takes place. National development planning was initiated following the 1952

Exhibit 6.2

AID SUPPORT OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING PROCESS
IN BOLIVIA, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, AND HONDURAS



	Bolivia	Dominican Republic	Honduras
Agricultural Sector Planning Unit	X	X	X
Data Collection	X	X	X
Data Processing	X	X	X
Data Analysis		X	X
Project Identification	X	X	X
Policy Analysis		X	
Project Proposals	X	X	

revolution and has been conducted ever since. The stabilization of government under President Hugo Banzer in the early 1970s marked a turning point in the evolution of national development planning. During the Banzer regime, formal planning institutions were established that continue to today. The President of the Republic and the National Economic Planning Council (CONEPLAN) are jointly responsible for defining overall development objectives and national development policy. In carrying out this responsibility, CONEPLAN relies heavily on the Ministry of Planning and Coordination (MPC) as its technical arm, and it is MPC that is responsible for coordinating planning both at the sectoral and at the regional level. In most circumstances, one would expect agricultural sector planning to be able to function relatively effectively in such an institutional environment. Indeed, in stable times this would likely be the case. Since recent Bolivian history has been marked by a succession of coups, however, the country has failed to enjoy the continuity required for a coherent planning enterprise. Thus, while Bolivia's national planning context does not discourage agricultural sector planning, its political climate has certainly not encouraged it.

The small farm and food crop subsectors are much more coextensive with the agricultural sector in Bolivia than in other countries. To a significant extent, this is attributable to the land reform that accompanied the 1952 revolution. MACA's influence over the sector is quite limited, however. For example, responsibility for pricing of agricultural commodities lies with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, not with MACA. Furthermore, the fiscal situation of the central government is such that agricultural sector development is heavily dependent on external funding for new initiatives. Little lattitude exists for use of domestic resources.

Three AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities have been oriented toward increasing knowledge of the characteristics of small farmers: the 1974 agricultural sector assessment, the 1977 southern valleys assessment, and the Farm Policy Study Project. The first of these activities relied heavily on secondary sources and was performed largely by outsiders. The last two activities have been conducted in close collaboration with MACA, but primarily with MACA's statistics unit, not with its planning unit. Despite opportunities for involvement, the planning unit

has evidenced little interest in this work. The same appears to be true of the planning work performed under the Basic Foods Production and Marketing Project. The products of these various activities have often received a warm reception outside the Ministry, but there has been little planning unit involvement in the activities themselves and little use of the products that have resulted.

The limited involvement of the planning unit is attributable to a number of factors. First, the unit has been understaffed and, as a consequence, has been fully occupied with annual operational planning and "firefighting" assignments. Second, the technical caliber of the planning unit has been limited. Third, there has been substantial turnover of personnel. Planning unit salaries have not been such as to attract and retain experienced people. When the unit has been able to attract talented personnel, they have generally been lured away by more remunerative and challenging positions elsewhere. Fourth, the planning unit has not enjoyed dynamic leadership and its stature within the Ministry has been low. As a result, the unit has had limited budgetary resources at its disposal. Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, the scopes of work of AID-supported analytical activities have been specified largely by outsiders. Thus, when overtures for involvement have been made to the planning unit, the work to be performed has often already been defined. This has reduced the incentive for the unit to identify with the proposed analytical work and to make it its own. It is of interest to note, however, that the planning unit has recently evidenced interest in conducting a sector assessment with AID assisstance. To our knowledge, this is the first time that the initiative for such work has come from the planning unit itself.

Both of the agricultural sector loan projects have had among their objectives the "improvement of agricultural sector management." The first loan, together with its companion grant, focused on the upgrading of the professional capacity of agricultural sector institutions through training programs, both in and out of the country. In the second loan, objectives were broadened to include management organization. A substantial technical assistance component was incorporated in the project to assist in the design and implementation of new administrative systems, program budgeting, for example. Bolivia's political instablility in recent years has not

furnished an auspicious environment for this undertaking, however, and strained relations between the GOB and the United States have resulted in delays in project implementation.

The main focus of central government activities has been the data-related functions of planning, especially data collection. With the exception of the agricultural sector assesment and the Basic Foods Production and Marketing Project, all central government activities have included data collection components. Both sector loan projects, for example, have supported the development of an area sample frame. In contrast, as we shall see, to the relative success of a similar undertaking in the Dominican Republic, area frame development in Bolivia has cost significantly more and taken considerably more time than initially envisioned. To a large extent, this has been a function of Bolivia's rugged topography and shortages of technical personnel and materials. Substantial progress has been made, but the frame is far from completed. Furthermore, suspension of official relations between the United States and Bolivia resulted in suspension of AID support for the enterprise and, at least as of the time of our site visit, work had ground virtually to a halt. On the other hand, the capacity of MACA's statistics unit to continue the development work has definitely been strengthened.

The Southern Valleys Assessment was based on a sample survey of 750 farm households in the Departments of Chuquisaca, Potosí, and Tarija. MACA's statistics unit conducted the survey, assisted by regional personnel. Substantial outside technical assistance was also provided. Although there were some minor problems, the survey was conducted rapidly and efficiently. The data collection capacity of MACA's statistics unit was strengthened considerably by this activity but, again, there was little planning unit involvement in defining the content of the survey or in analyzing survey data.

The 1978 Farm Policy Study Project built on the base established by the Southern Valleys Assessment. Its objective was to fill existing data gaps and result in the preparation of an updated agricultural sector assessment. Initial project design called for seven data collection and analysis activities: a national socioeconomic farm survey, analysis of southern valley data, an analysis of credit, a national crop and livestock

survey, a traditional practices study, a rural household study, and a data integration and analysis activity. The record of project implementation has been mixed. The rural household study was underbudgeted to begin with and has been eliminated from the project. The national crop and livestock survey was conducted, but technical difficulties rendered the data highly suspect and no analysis has been performed. On the other hand, the national socioeconomic farm survey, the analysis of southern valley data, the analysis of credit, and the traditional practices study have all gone forward, and have either been completed or are nearing completion. Moreover, the outputs of these activities, particularly the traditional practices study, appear to have much to say about small farmer development problems and opportunities. Again, however, the lion's share of the analytical work that has taken place has been performed by outsiders. Although the technical capacity of MACA's statistics unit has been strengthened further as a result of the project, the planning unit has hardly participated at all. This could change, however, if the proposed sector assessment activity goes forward.

A major obstacle to the progress of the Farm Policy Study has been the bottleneck of data processing. During most of the project, there had been no source of data processing that could be counted on and, as a consequence, schedules for production of outputs have slipped substantially. Nevertheless, a workable, though not ideal, arrangement now appears to have been set up with the National Statistics Institute and MACA's survey data are currently being processed there.

Given the limited involvement of MACA's planning unit in data analysis, it is not surprising that it plays little role in policy analysis and policy formulation. Although the planning unit participates actively in the preparation of annual operating plans, its role is limited largely to packaging the programs and projects that are proposed by various sector institutions and passing them along to MPC. Virtually no strategy work is performed. Nor does it appear to be demanded by decisionmakers within the Ministry.

We turn now from central government activities to activities with Bolivia's DDCs. There are two such activities, the Rural Development Planning Grant and the Departmental Development Corporations Loan. The two

projects are closely related. The planning grant was designed to strengthen the capacity of the DDCs in regional planning, while the follow-on loan was seen as a mechanism for funding projects developed by the DDCs. The planning grant has been in operation since 1978, but loan expenditures have been suspended as a consequence of strained US-GOB relations. As a practical matter, therefore, the discussion that follows focuses largely on the Rural Development Planning Project.

The responsibilities of the DDCs for regional planning mirror those of the sectoral ministries for sectoral planning, except that the DDCs are responsible for coordination of planning, across sectors, within their regions. Within the framework of guidelines established by MPC, the DDCs are charged by law with the responsibility of identifying regional problems that demand attention, establishing regional development strategies, translating these strategies into potential development responses, and recommending policies, programs, and projects to be implemented. DDC recommendations are reviewed for technical adequacy by MPC, and if central government financing is required, final responsibility for funding decisions rests with the Ministry of Finance.

In the early and mid-1970s, DDC planning had been limited largely to "diagnósticos," that is, descriptions of the characteristics of their regions. In 1978, the Law of the Corporations formally vested the DDCs with the responsibilities just described. Shortly thereafter, the Rural Development Planning Project was initiated to strengthen the capacity of the DDCs to exercise these responsibilities.

The purpose of the planning project is to improve the technical consistency and coordination of the planning system in order to increase the effectiveness of rural development programs. To accomplish this purpose, project designers contemplated three interrelated sets of activities: the development of technically sound methodologies for project identification, preparation, and analysis; use of these methods by the DDCs in the preparation of annual operating plans; and development by MPC of overall guidelines for the planning process. The intent of the project was to assist in the institution[illegible]ation of a mechanism through which the DDCs could make demands on the c[illegible] government planning structure -- which in turn would facilitate ratio[illegible] allocation of development resources among

the country's nine departments. In light of central government instability and the relative stability of personnel and development direction in the DDCs, it was believed that decentralization would be required to give continuity to the development planning process. This belief appears to be substantiated by subsequent events, but has not as yet been translated into smoothly functioning action.

During the implementation of the planning project, considerably more emphasis has been attached to the process of methodology development than was envisioned at the time of project design. This has been especially true in the case of the development of project identification methodologies. With the notable exception of the spatial planning methodology that has been introduced in Potosi, little progress has been made in the application of project identification methods, and impacts on DDC planning capacity have been minimal. In contrast, DDC capacity to design and manage development projects has grown markedly as a result of the project. As a specific instance, a variant of AID's logical framework has been institutionalized in a number of the DDCs, and there is evidence that it has been used to modify, and, in some cases, eliminate, infeasible project ideas. Furthermore, attempts have been initiated to broaden the conceptualization of the logical framework to encompass the design and justification of programs.

The key bottleneck to effective regional development planning has been the failure of MPC to perform the third set of activities contemplated in the design of the planning project, that is, to define and enforce "rules of the game" for the overall planning process. At the current time, regional development planning, as practiced, is largely an annual budget exercise. Technical review of strategies, programs, and projects is minimal and ad hoc. From our observations, the process is heavily weighted toward subjective decisionmaking based on perceptions of the geo-political importance of different DDCs.

The annual budget process is initiated by the Ministry of Finance when it sets tentative budget limits for each public sector institution. This financial guidance is not supplemented by technical guidance from MPC. Given their budget limits, the DDCs prepare annual operating plans. As a rule, the plans consist of little more than packages of programs and projects that they propose for the following year. No formal statement of regional development strategy is required.

As we have seen, the DDCs are responsible not only for recommending policies, programs, and projects that they intend to implement but also for coordinating the planning of sectoral institutions within their departments. In practice, this is no easy matter. In the case of the agricultural sector, for example, MACA has a regional office in each department that reports directly to MACA headquarters in La Paz. In addition, there are seven distinct decentralized public agricultural sector institutions, each with its own independent planning unit and over which the DDCs have no formal control. Thus, while the DDCs have the responsibility for coordinating departmental planning, they have little authority to do so. As a practical matter, coordination is a function of the good will of parties involved. In some departments, the various actors take pains to be sure that their collective proposals of programs and projects form an integrated whole. In other departments, annual operating plans are prepared in almost total isolation from each other.

Once prepared, annual operating plans are submitted to MPC for technical review. As a rule, the review is limited to an examination of inconsistencies and duplication. Very few cuts are made at this stage. Upon completion of its review, MPC passes the plans on to the Ministry of Finance. It is here that final, hard decisions are made. In recent years, Ministry of Finance cuts have often been substantial, largely because of its initial overestimation of the budget resources that it expected to be available. From the point of view of the DDCs, the cuts are frequently seen as capricious and indiscriminate. As a consequence, an atmosphere of resentment and distrust is created, which is only exacerbated by the frequent failure of the Ministry of Finance to distribute agreed-upon funding allocations promptly at the beginning of the operating year.

In the case of new projects, the review and approval process does not end here. Once feasibility studies are conducted, detailed project proposals are passed to a National Project Committee and then to CONEPLAN and the Office of the Presidency for final approval. This review and approval process routinely takes six months to a year and is not guided explicitly by a unifying strategy framework. Throughout the entire process, therefore, the DDCs operate largely in the dark. The technical "rules of the game" are not clearly articulated and the functional responsibilities

of the various actors are not tightly defined. In contrast to the institutionalized processes that govern interactions between AID/Washington and its field Missions in the development of programs and projects, for example, MPC and the DDCs do not as yet share a common understanding for strategy, program, and project development. Increasing use of the logical framework is an important step in this direction, but it is still a first and fragile step. The technical and institutional dimensions of the broader regional planning context in which project development takes place still remain to be articulated in clear terms. This articulation must come from the top, from MPC.

Despite its shortcomings, decentralized agricultural sector planning in Bolivia appears to have more of a dynamic to it than national agricultural sector planning. As we have seen, planning in MACA is constrained by the political instability that has beset Bolivia in recent years, by the limited influence that the Ministry can exercise over the agricultural sector, by serious personnel problems, and, most importantly, by the absence of a demand for planning to contribute to the formulation of sector policy. As a consequence, MACA's planning activities have been limited largely to data collection and the packaging of annual operating plans. In the DDCs, on the other hand, projects are being developed and, ultimately, funded and implemented. There is as yet no formalized system for linking and integrating these projects as instruments for coherent execution of regional development strategy. But, in contrast to national agricultural sector planning, there is more active awareness that this is indeed a serious constraint and more of a sense of measures that could be taken to alleviate it.

6.2 Country Visit Findings: Dominican Republic

We are fortunate in having been able to visit the Dominican Republic in the course of this study. The history of AID's support of Dominican agricultural sector development has been a long and active one, and support of agricultural sector planning has been a key element in USAID/Dominican Republic's development assistance programs. As a consequence, the Dominican experience gives us a long-term perspective on the dynamics of agricultural sector planning and is instructive in a number of

important respects. As in the case of our other country visits, our presentation is organized in accordance with the chain-of-events framework discussed in Chapter 3.

There has been continuity of AID support to Dominican agriculture since the mid-1960s. Early activities included a long-term training program in which substantial numbers of Dominicans received training at Texas A&M University. This program is widely acclaimed as having been instrumental in bringing about a dramatic increase in Dominican human capital. Many trainees now hold key positions of responsibility in both the public and private sectors. Among the early planning-related activities were two sector studies that were carried out in 1966 and 1969 by short-term consultants. In essence, these studies furnished an overview of the agricultural sector and identified institutional bottlenecks to the implementation of agricultural sector policy. Partial assessments were later performed by the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. A 1974 assessment by AID laid the basis for its first agricultural sector loan to the Dominican Republic. The loan included a credit component, supported measures to alleviate marketing constraints, and was oriented toward a mix of domestic and export crops; there was no planning component per se. In 1976, a "Statistical Analysis of the Agriculture Sector" was performed. Then, in the 1976 Agricultural Sector Loan II Project, agricultural sector planning emerged as a specific concern. It is at this point, therefore, that we pick up the historical process.

In the Dominican Republic, national development planning falls under the purview of the National Planning Office (ONAPLAN). The office is located in the Technical Office of the Presidency and organizationally, therefore, squarely in the flow of decisionmaking. As is the case in other mixed economies, Dominican national planning emphasizes fiscal control. ONAPLAN sees its role as one of standardizing information and forcing consistency upon the programs of public sector institutions. It also acts as a central clearinghouse and as a monitoring agency for international donor programs. The office's key documents are a three-year rolling plan and the annual budget. Both of these documents focus on financial consistency. ONAPLAN has sectoral planning units that work closely with the sectoral planning entities in the Dominican line ministries, but, again,

the focus of concern is financial. Although ONAPLAN attempts to bring a regional perspective to sectoral programs, it offers little overall policy guidance to line ministries. Thus, the environment of national planning in the Dominican Republic is supportive of sectoral planning, but it does not explicitly lay out a role for planning in the policy formulation process. We shall see that this is mirrored in the planning process of the Secretariat of State for Agriculture (SEA).

The locus of agricultural sector planning in the Dominican Republic is the Subsecretariat for Planning in SEA (SEAPLAN). As in other countries, SEA has considerably more influence on the food crop sector than on plantation, industrial, or export crops. There are a number of semi-autonomous institutions in the public agricultural sector, and they are not integrated into any coherent planning framework. Among these institutions are the water resources institute (INDRHI), the agrarian reform institute (Instituto Agrario), the agricultural bank (Banco Agrícola), the price stabilization institute (INESPRE), the cooperative credit institute (INDECOOP), and the export agency (CEDOPEX). In addition, the sugar operations of the government function independently, and private sugar operations have little relationship with SEA. To be sure, some planning goes on in the sector's semiautonomous institutions, and fiscal coordination is imposed by ONAPLAN. But again, we find that agricultural sector planning at the Ministry-of-Agriculture level is confined to the small farmer and food crop sectors.

In what follows, we shall focus on three AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities, the 1975 Agricultural Sector Analysis, the 1976 Agricultural Sector Loan II Project, and the 1976 Comprehensive Resource Inventory and Evaluation System (CRIES). Because the anticipated course of the Agricultural Sector Analysis Phase II Project was so disrupted by Hurricanes David and Frederick, we shall not treat this activity separately except to note one curious and dramatic finding. Hurricanes are of course tragic events. In the Dominican Republic, however, the hurricanes in question appear to have had a decidedly salutary impact in stimulating the responsiveness of agricultural sector planning to specific sector problems. After the hurricanes, the GODR was desperate for solid information and analysis that would permit it to develop a rational and responsive recon-

struction program. The sector analysis enterprise, which up to that point had functioned in relative isolation from pressing policy concerns, was suddenly the target of appeals for program guidance. As things turned out, the data that had been collected in the first phase of the project were a goldmine for structuring the design of the reconstruction program, and the sector analysis section of SEAPLAN came to play a key role in the $72 million Dominican Post-Hurricane Agricultural Reconstruction Plan, to which the Inter-American Development Bank contributed with a $40 million loan, and AID with a $15 million loan. The hurricanes postponed indefinitely the national farm survey that was to have been conducted under the project, but they also served to direct resources to an undertaking of national importance. Although subsequent sector analysis work can probably not be said to have had comparable impact, the sector analysis enterprise has not retreated to the sidelines. There is no way to turn the clock back, nor does it appear that anyone would want to do so.

SEAPLAN is the outgrowth of a long institutional evolution that began in 1965 with the establishment of a production, marketing, and economic studies section. By the time Agricultural Sector Loan II got off the ground, SEAPLAN had taken on much of its present form, although a number of institutional adjustments have taken place since then, the creation of an Evaluation Directorate, for example.

There were a number of other steps that were taken prior to 1976 that would be building blocks for later activities. A sampling frame had been developed, and a start had been made in strengthening SEA's data collection capacity. In addition, a data processing unit had been set up. But data collection and processing activities had not as yet gathered any sustained momentum. This was to come with the advent of Agricultural Sector Loan II.

The planning components of the loan were designed to affect virtually all functions of the agricultural sector planning process. Much of the funding for planning was targeted to direct support for SEAPLAN. For data collection activities, additional survey personnel were to be hired, training was to be provided, and vehicles were to be procured. For data processing activities, data processing staff was to be increased, training was to take place, technical assistance was to be provided, and

provision was made for the purchase of computer time. The institution of a periodic "Farm Production Survey" report series was a direct outgrowth of this support. For data analysis activities, technical assistance and training were to be furnished to a new Sector Analysis Section of SEAPLAN. At least in the initial stages of the design of the loan, it was not as yet clear exactly what kind of analysis was to be carried out, but this would later be defined in the Agricultural Sector Analysis activity. For policy analysis activities, a "Resource Grant Fund" was to be established to finance consultants to conduct analysis on issues defined by SEAPLAN. In examining the tracks left by the loan, we had difficulty in ascertaining how the fund was used and whether it had any impact, but conceptually it is a very innovative approach for attracting and using outside talent.

The initial momentum of the loan was reinforced by the (first phase of the) Agricultural Sector Analysis, which, as a practical matter, coincided in large measure with the Agricultural Sector Loan II Project. Much of the impetus for the analysis activity -- and its funding -- came from AID/Washington. By this time, considerable support capacity had been built up under LAC/DR/SA's Agricultural Sector Analysis Support Project, and, from the perspective of the division, SEAPLAN appeared ripe for the kind of support it was prepared to offer. The Agricultural Sector Analysis was designed to lead to the construction of a sector linear programming model, and the bulk of the initial tasks to be performed during the analysis activity were a function of the model's requirements. The model itself represented a quantum leap in sophistication over existing SEAPLAN capacity, but the activity was staged in such a manner that useful intermediate outputs could be produced along the way.[1] The accomplishments of the sector analysis were many: it carried out an extensive farm survey and added to SEA's data collection capacity; it attracted a number of very capable Dominican technicians; it created a rich data base that could be used to shed light on important agricultural sector issues; and it gave a clear identity to the sector analysis section. But there were a number of significant problems as well: to meet projected deadlines, U.S. technicians

[1]This was a conscious reaction to the Colombian Agricultural Sector Analysis experience. See Section 5.4.

assumed key implementation roles; data processing was so complex that eventually it was carried out almost entirely in the United States; the generation of methodological and statistical documents was given higher operational priority than the production of analysis reports; the model proved to be difficult and costly to work with and, as a consequence, was not applied beyond a couple of initial studies. Furthermore, the final opportunity to test the feasibility of SEAPLAN making a quantum leap in sophistication was lost when the course of the Agricultural Sector Analysis Phase II Project was altered dramatically by the hurricanes. In sum, therefore, the first phase of the sector analysis made impressive strides in data-related activities, but, aside from one important study on rural employment policy, made little headway into the process of policy analysis.

Over the course of its life, the Agricultural Sector Analysis was also beset with political and personnel problems. At one point, a number of key SEAPLAN decisionmakers resigned for political reasons and the future of the sector analysis section was for a time in doubt. Personnel turnover was a problem as well. This process fed on itself and some left, as one told us, "because the work there was no longer interesting or stimulating." The departure of personnel also had positive ramifications, however, as we shall see below.

The third major AID-supported activity was the Comprehensive Resource Inventory and Evaluation System, which was designed to complement and build on sector analysis work. The primary objective of CRIES was to use remote sensing to put together an inventory of natural resources in the country for use in comprehensive natural resource planning. In many ways the CRIES experience mirrored the sector analysis experience. It was targeted toward the construction of a model, and it marshalled technical assistance, training, and, to a lesser degree, commodities to facilitate the process. In a number of ways, it represented a substantial jump in technical sophistication. It was affected by political problems that led to its transfer from SEAPLAN to the Subsecretariat for Natural Resources. Data collection did not encounter insurmountable obstacles. Capability was developed to use LANDSAT images, and they were linked with data on cropping characteristics that had been collected by SEA's regional planning units (Unidades de Planificación Regional, or URPs). CRIES was not, however,

able to link its information with the data that had been collected in the sector analysis farm survey. CRIES has produced a number of descriptive documents, and has a whole series in the wings waiting for funding. But, again, the movement from description to policy analysis has been difficult. At one point, a model was developed and run to shed light on cane rust problems, but there has been little direct feed-in to policy. As in Jamaica, the government is developing a "zonification" scheme for agriculture, and the CRIES data base could be put to good use in this enterprise. In the area of project development, the major outgrowth of CRIES has been the design of an AID-assisted project to address natural resource problems, especially soil erosion.

Because of its parallels with other countries, one other segment of the Dominican Republic's agricultural sector planning process merits attention. This is regional agricultural sector planning. SEA has eight regional offices throughout the country, and within each office is a regional planning unit. These URPs are in turn linked to SEAPLAN and many of them are staffed with personnel who participated in the sector analysis farm survey. Their tasks are twofold. The first is to develop projects in their regions. In this respect, they have parallels with Bolivia and Jamaica, but it is difficult to say how effective they have been. The second task is to monitor and collect information on cropping intentions and crop production. To this end, each region is broken down into small contiguous areas where information is obtained from knowledgeable on-site representatives. This information does not appear to be used for statistical purposes. But, as an early warning apparatus and a mechanism for farmer-Secretariat communication, the URPs seem to function quite effectively.

During our site visit we gathered a great deal of additional information on the dynamics of the agricultural sector planning process in the Dominican Republic, and there are a variety of interesting aspects of the Dominican experience that we have not touched upon in this discussion. Enough has been said, however, to set the stage for an overall assessment of agricultural sector planning in the Dominican Republic at present.

The agricultural sector planning activities that AID has supported in the Dominican Republic have had a number of notable achievements, achievements that, at least in the medium to long run, can be

expected to have a positive impact on the achievement of agricultural sector objectives. Certainly the most notable achievement is the strengthening of data collection capacity that has taken place. Large numbers of young Dominicans have been trained in data collection procedures and all available evidence suggests that surveys are conducted effectively and efficiently. In addition, the sample frame is refined on an ongoing basis to maintain or upgrade data reliability. Future budgetary support is not guaranteed, but there is no reason to believe that the survival of the survey section is in any jeopardy. The survey section enjoys a good reputation -- by all accounts, for good reason. While we were in the Dominican Republic, the survey section was involved in a bean survey with AID and the University of Kentucky, and the professionals from Kentucky had high praise for their work.

Another major achievement has been the development of human capital. A good number of participants in the Agricultural Sector Analysis now hold responsible positions in different parts of the government: within SEA itself, in the price stabilization institute, in the national electric utility, in the census bureau, and elsewhere. In speaking with them, we found that they considered their participation in the sector analysis to be a major formative influence on their careers. They had left for better pay or for what they regarded as more interesting jobs, but the effect was still there. As a rule, it is unrealistic to expect that capable, well trained people will stay forever in one position; upward movement is to be expected -- and prepared for.

The information generated by the sector anaysis activity has also been used. We have already noted its use in the design of the hurricane reconstruction program. The medium-term agricultural sector plan also relied heavily on the sector analysis data -- indeed, it was put together largely by sector analysis section graduates. The Inter-American Development Bank has used the data in project papers and evaluations and there is evidence that IICA has referred to them in its own work. On the other hand, the Evaluation Directorate expressed an interest in using sector analysis data as a baseline for one of its evaluations, but for reasons we were unable to determine, the Directorate was apparently unable to secure access.

A major achievement in itself was the sustaining of a coherent, multi-faceted program of capacity building over an extended period of time. The activities we have discussed were not independent undertakings. On the contrary, they were conceptually and operationally intertwined. Perhaps the most significant testimonial to the combined effectiveness of these activities is the continuity of high-level support that SEAPLAN has received and continues to receive. Indeed, the leadership of SEAPLAN is now important enough to be considered a plum in the allocation of political positions. At the regional level as well, SEA's regional planning units exist, have legitimacy, and monitor, "on the ground," the performance of the sector.

With all this said, however, the process of agricultural sector planning in the Dominican Republic does have its shortcomings. The central shortcoming is the inability of the process to make an effective transition from data collection, data processing, and data analysis to policy analysis and policy formulation.[1] The basic reason for this shortcoming appears to be a lack of effective demand for data and analysis as an ingredient to policymaking. Although some tentative steps have been taken in the area of policy analysis, we are unaware of any instance in which this work has been demand- rather than supply-driven. As a number of the Dominicans we met emphasized to us, the political process in the Dominican Republic does not generally call for empirical analysis as a key element in policy formulation. For example, the recent electoral campaign was waged largely on grounds other than differences in the policies advocated by the candidates. Furthermore, key positions in the new government are likely to be allocated more on party or personal considerations than on policy stance or analytical competence. In many ways, therefore, this shortcoming of the agricultural

[1]Although prior evaluations of the sector analysis activity point with pride to the sector analysis section's study on rural employment policy, it is very much the notable exception that proves the rule. Similarly, much is made of the contribution of the sector analysis to the hurricane reconstruction program. In essence, however, this was project development work, it was not policy analysis. It led to a very large and very significant project, to be sure, but a project nevertheless.

sector planning process is not so much a function of what planners have or have not done as a reflection of the broader political context in which planning takes place.[1]

There are also a number of shortcomings of a less sweeping nature. Relatively little of the analytical breadth of the Agricultural Sector Analysis has been internalized in country, and the modeling work hardly at all. To a large extent, the same appears to be true for CRIES. In both cases, institutionalization has been constrained by the sophistication of the skills to be transferred and the degree to which U.S. technicians took on direct implementation responsibilities. In the case of the sector analysis, little output has been disseminated in simple, abbreviated form; thus, use has been restricted to a relatively narrow band of users. In the case of CRIES, the format of presentation -- maps -- is less of a problem, and CRIES staff have been more conscious of the need to market their product.

In recent years, dissemination of the survey section's work has been a problem as well. Farm production surveys continue to be conducted on a periodic basis, but no data have been processed since 1979, and no plans currently exist to resume processing. The "Farm Production Survey" report series has therefore ground to a halt -- interestingly, with apparently little complaint.

Finally, all these shortcomings are mirrored to one degree or another in SEAPLAN's current organizational structure. At the time of our site visit, most SEAPLAN personnel were engaged either in programming and budgeting, on the one hand, or in operational planning, on the other. A "sectoral policy" section still existed, but it was mainly a liaison unit for SEAPLAN's dealings with ONAPLAN. The section appeared to have little contact with or influence on the Subsecretary. This could change, of course, if the new administration were to make demands for analysis of strategy and policy alternatives, but historical precedent suggests this is unlikely.

[1]The other side of the coin is the opportunity that this context offers for a politician who wishes to change the nature of the debate -- a change in which the products of planners would presumably be not only useful, but demanded as well.

To sum up briefly, agricultural sector planning in the Dominican Republic has made impressive, even dramatic strides. Dominican capacity has improved substantially over the past six years, particularly in data collection, data processing, and data analysis. The transition from data-related activities to policy analysis and policy formulation has been difficult, however. The transition is a function of demand for such work, a demand that has yet to emerge.

6.3 Country Visit Findings: Honduras

AID's support of agricultural sector planning in Honduras has been directed toward virtually the same objectives as its support of agricultural sector planning in other Latin American and Caribbean countries. As elsewhere, its support in Honduras has been geared toward the strengthening of host-country capacity to plan effectively to improve the welfare of rural poor people. In contrast to experience in other countries, however, practically all of AID's support in Honduras has been furnished through the mechanism of sector lending. Of the three AID-supported Honduran activities identified in Chapter 4, two are agricultural sector loan projects. The exception, the Agricultural Sector Assessment, was conducted primarily to underpin and justify the second loan.

The planning components of the sector loans have been designed to alleviate institutional constraints to effective agricultural sector planning. Collectively, the accomplishments of these components have fallen far short of initial expectations. In both instances, meaningful institutional change has been extremely slow in coming. The institutional context in which agricultural sector planning takes place in Honduras is peculiar in a number of respects and has been a major obstacle to agricultural sector planning making an operational difference in agricultural sector development.

Because of the peculiar nature of AID's support and because of the peculiar institutional environment for agricultural sector planning in Honduras, this section will not follow the chain-of-events framework as closely as in the presentation of the findings of our visits to other countries. Rather, this section will discuss AID's two agricultural sector loans, summarize the key institutional constraints to effective agricultural

sector planning in Honduras, illustrate how institutional arrangements are played out in annual operational planning, and, finally, conclude with an overall summary. Nevertheless, as we have seen, AID's support of agricultural sector planning in Honduras is summarized in the chain-of-events framework in Exhibit 6.2.

The Agricultural Sector Loans. The two agricultural sector loans are known officially as the Agriculture Sector Program and the Agriculture Sector II Program. In both cases the word "program" is of importance. The designers of the two loans saw the two projects as more than just individual "projects." Rather, the loans were viewed as multi-facted sets of activities that would be coordinated and could be expected to be mutually supportive in achieving agricultural sector objectives.

The first agricultural sector loan had a six-year life. It began in 1974 and terminated in 1980. The planning component of the loan was designed to improve "sector coordination, management, planning, and evaluation." Two institutional changes were contemplated. First, an institutional mechanism was to be established to facilitate development and coordination of sectoral development plans. Specifically, an Agricultural Sector Coordinating Committee was to be set up to coordinate the planning and programming of all sector institutions. Second, the capacity of the Sectoral Planning Division (DPS) of the Secretariat of Natural Resources (SRN) was to be strengthened so that it could play a major role in the agricultural sector planning process. Four departments in DPS were to receive support: the Statistics Department, the Sector Analysis Department, the Project Development Department, and the Evaluation Department.

In 1975, the anticipated coordinating committee was formed. Officially, it was known as the Committee for Interinstitutional Coordination for the Execution of Development Plans in the Agricultural Sector, or COCO. The committee consisted of representatives of SRN, the National Agrarian (Reform) Institute (INA), the National Agricultural Sector Bank (BANADESA), the Honduran Forestry Development Corporation (COHDEFOR), and the Honduran Coffee Institute (IHCAFE), and was chaired by the Technical Secretariat of the Superior Council for Economic Planning (ST/CONSUPLANE). COCO's execution of sector coodination was hampered by the agreement that all its decisions would need to be unanimous. More importantly, however,

COCO was, by definition, a coordinating committee; it was vested with little formal authority over the actions of sector institutions. It did succeed in promoting dialogue among institutions but lacked the political support required to translate this dialogue into effective coordination.

In 1977, the Commission on Agricultural Policy (CPA) was created by the President of the Republic to advise him on agricultural sector development issues, principally on matters concerning agrarian reform. Its membership consists of SRN, INA, ST/CONSUPLANE, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (MHCP), and the Ministry of Economy. CPA is chaired by the President of the Republic or, in his absence, by ST/CONSUPLANE.

In early 1978, a Technical Secretariat (ST/CPA) was added to CPA to lend the Commission technical support and, in effect, to assume the responsibility for coordination of the planning activities of agricultural sector institutions. Two months later, COCO was formally disbanded and its responsibilities formally transferred to ST/CPA. At the same time, a Planning Committee of the Public Agricultural Sector (COPLAN) was created as a support unit for ST/CPA. Its membership includes representatives of ST/CPA, the Agricultural Planning Division (DPA) of ST/CONSUPLANE, DPS, INA, BANADESA, IHCAFE, the Cooperative Development Directorate (DIFICOOP), the Honduran Banana Corporation (COHBANA), and the Honduran Agricultural Marketing Institute (IHMA).

The final step in the evolution of COCO took place in 1980. At that time, ST/CPA was formally disbanded and its functions transferred to DPA. At least as of the time of our site visit, however, there was little evidence that DPA had been able to coordinate agricultural sector planning more effectively than COCO or ST/CPA.

The second institutional change contemplated in the design of the planning component of the first agricultural sector loan was that the capacity of DPS would be strengthened to participate actively in the process of agricultural sector planning coordination. Like COCO, DPS appears to have had little impact on coordination. Nevertheless, the technical capacity of DPS did grow as a consequence of AID support. The Statistics Department conducted a number of surveys and published summary data resulting from them. It did not, however, succeed in eliminating duplication of data collection throughout the sector. Building on AID

support of linear programming work in the early 1970s, the Sector Analysis Department conducted a number of high-quality studies, many of which were used for project development purposes. Because of personnel turnover, however, the Department has lost much of its dynamism and, at the time of our site visit, much work was on hold. The Project Development and Evaluation Departments were not as successful in having as visible an impact as the Statistics and Sector Analysis Departments. The Project Development Department conducted a number of crop pre-feasibility studies, but only one resulted in a specific project. In retrospect, it appears that the Department lacked clear guidance and direction and, as a consequence, operated in a vacuum. To a lesser extent, the same appears to have been the case for the Evaluation Department. Although a number of evaluations were conducted, they were not of high technical quality. Moreover, many of the evaluations assessed the performance of agricultural sector institutions in terms of the proposals that they made in their annual operating plans, not in terms of the activities that they actually received funding to implement. Eventually, the Evaluation Department was disbanded in 1979.

The second agricultural sector loan began in 1979 and continues in operation today. It builds upon the foundation laid by the first loan and was underpinned by a comprehensive agricultural sector assessment that was conducted in close collaboration with GOH institutions and personnel. The loan includes an "institutional development system" component, which in turn is made up of a set of activities for strengthening the planning system, a set of activities for development of an information system, and a set of activities for creating a marketing research and analysis system.

The inputs to the planning and information subcomponents of the loan include technical assistance, training, personnel, travel, per diem, vehicles, computer and other equipment, materials, and funding of recurrent costs. These inputs are seen as instruments to achieve such outputs as increases in planning staffs, the production of sectoral and regional plans, integration of planning and budgeting processes, formal establishment of an information system, completion of an area sampling frame, implementation of surveys, the establishment of a data bank, and the creation of a national agricultural sector documentation system. In turn, these outputs are seen as leading to the achievement of the subpurpose "to

establish an effective sector-wide system for policy analysis, planning, budgeting, coordination, operations follow-up, and evaluation at central and regional levels." The focus of the loan's planning and information activities is therefore the creation or strengthening of institutional systems. The difficulty is that both the Project Paper and the Project Agreement are far too ambiguous to function as an implementation plan. The design of the loan fails to identify what the planning and information systems are to produce in other than general terms. Furthermore, the design does not spell out exactly how the development of the two systems is to be brought about nor does it define the specific responsibilities of different parties involved.

At the present time, there are very few accomplishments that can be pointed to. Some initial steps have been taken in both subcomponents and noticeable progress has been made in the development of the documentation system. In the main, however, the two subcomponents are largely on hold pending a clear definition of operational roles and responsibilities.

At the time of our site visit, an audit of the loan had just been completed and a large-scale evaluation of two years of loan implementation was in progress. Two concerns were dominant: first, that the GOH had failed to assume support for any new planning personnel under the loan; and, second, that after two years of project implementation, leadership and coordination functions had still not been defined. The first of these phenomena is a manifestation of the low operational priority that the GOH has attached to the planning subcomponent of the project. Nevertheless, the concern with numbers may be somewhat misplaced. The current and a past director of DPS both expressed a preference to us for a much <u>smaller</u> planning unit, but a unit that would be staffed with high-caliber personnel. These interviews suggest that AID should be less concerned with the numbers of additional planning personnel to be brought on board with GOH counterpart funds than with incentives to attract and retain a limited number of well-qualified people. As things stand now, DPS cannot offer salaries on a par with DPA and other sector institutions -- and perhaps this is the key personnel issue that needs to be addressed.

The second concern has been, and continues to be, the key obstacle to effective agricultural sector planning in Honduras. Shortly after the

initiation of the loan, two studies were financed to make recommendations on how agricultural sector planning in Honduras should be organized and coordinated. The first was conducted by SRN with technical assistance from IICA. It recommended a strong coordinative role for DPS. The second study was conducted by COPLAN with assistance from the Latinamerican Institute of Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) and argued that the lion's share of responsibility for coordination of agricultural sector planning activities should lie with DPA in ST/CONSUPLANE. The two studies thus adopted polar positions and since neither was acceptable politically, a standstill was created. Although ST/CPA endorsed the SRN proposal, neither was approved by CPA. In an attempt to break the logjam, COPLAN drafted a compromise proposal in March, 1981. The compromise recommended a division of responsibility in which DPS would take the lead in coordinating annual operational planning and that DPA would assume the lead responsibility for medium- and long-term planning. At least as of the time of our site visit, no organizational scheme had as yet been adopted. For some coordination of planning to occur, however, some decision must be taken.

Although the story is not so involved, a parallel conclusion can be drawn from the attempt to develop the Honduran National Agricultural Information System. The Project Paper acknowledged that "ideally, as a first step, a law would be passed to establish the legal identity, responsibilities and jurisdiction of the Honduran National Information System (SNIAH), and its relationships with the major agricultural institutions who are contributors to and users of information stored in or generated by SNIAH."[1] Enactment of such a law, however, was not seen as a prerequisite for implementation of the information subcomponent of the loan. With the benefit of hindsight, this was probably a mistake. As in the case of the planning subcomponent, the information subcomponent cries out for clear direction and authoritative assignment of operational responsibilities.

The Key Institutional Constraints to Effective Agricultural Sector Planning. The preceding discussion has alluded to a number of institutional problems that have beset AID support of Honduran agricultural sector planning. In what follows, we offer an underlying explanation of these

[1] USAID/Honduras, "Project Paper: Agriculture Section II Program," 1979, p. 21.

problems. We also elaborate briefly on the complications that are introduced by the variety of institutions that participate in agricultural sector planning in Honduras.

In the final analysis, agricultural sector planning in Honduras has been the victim of an ongoing struggle for power between ST/CONSUPLANE and SRN. This struggle has manifested it self not only in the recent battle over how agricultural sector planning should be organized in the future. It has also played itself out over much of the last decade in the creation of a succession of different coordinating mechanisms. Indeed, as one views the evolution of events, one is forced to the conclusion that the changes have been a means to sidestep the basic question of where control over agricultural sector planning should lie. Furthermore, the lack of political will at the highest levels of government to resolve the issue one way or the other suggests a lack of demand for planning. Although agricultural sector planning may be of interest to decisionmakers, there is not enough interest to prompt the hard decisions that would be required to make it effective.

Complicating the execution of agricultural sector planning in Honduras is the sheer number of actors that participate in it. This only fragments the process still further. In addition to SRN, there are six decentralized agricultural sector institutions involved. These institutions are INA, BANADESA, IHCAFE, DIFICOOP, COHBANA, AND IHMA. With the notable exception of SRN's sign-off authority on agricultural sector funding disbursements, the decentralized institutions operate in virtual independence of SRN. Each has its own planning unit and, in many cases, has enjoyed more continuity of personnel and program direction than the central ministry.

In addition to the decentralized institutions, there are seven Regional Agricultural Committees (CARs). The CARs are responsible for coordination of agricultural sector planning at the regional level in much the same way that CPA is responsible for coordination at the national level. The CARs are chaired by the regional agricultural directors of SRN and consist of the regional representatives of INA, CPA, BANADESA, and, where applicable, IHCAFE, DIFICOOP, COHBANA, and IHMA. The CARs were vested with their coordination responsibilties at the same time that COPLAN was established in 1978. On the whole, the creation of the CARs has been

an important first step in regionalization of agricultural sector planning in Honduras. With the exception of the CAR in San Pedro Sula, however, CARs have suffered from a very limited base of well-qualified personnel. More importantly, while the CARs have responsibility for regional coordination, they have virtually no authority to exercise it. Like coordinating institutions at the national level, they are in a position to promote dialogue and collaboration but they cannot demand it.

Finally, the actor that currently exercises the most control over agricultural sector planning is not ST/CONSUPLANE, SRN, or any of the institutions we have jsut discussed; it is the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, MHCP. This is particularly so in the annual budget process.

Institutional Relationships in Annual Operational Planning. Annual operational planning is a key process in which agricultural sector planners can exert an influence on allocations of development resources. It is useful to examine this process in some detial. In Honduras, the process is also illustrative of a number of the institutional problems discussed above. The process of annual operational planning in Honduras is summarized in the upper part of Exhibit 6.3.

In Honduras, annual agricultural sector operational planning begins with technical guidance from CONSUPLANE to public agricultural sector institutions. CONSUPLANE's technical guidance is not accompanied by financial guidance from MHCP. Thus, institutions learn what is expected of them technically but have no formal indication of the levels of budget resources that are likely to be available to them. This contrasts sharply with practice in Bolivia, where financial but no technical guidance is initially forthcoming. (See Section 6.1.) Upon their receipt of technical guidance, SRN and decentralized agricultural sector institutions prepare budget proposals. These proposals are submitted directly to CONSUPLANE for technical review. No sector institution attempts to integrate and reconcile inconsistencies among the proposals beforehand. Upon completion of its technical review, CONSUPLANE passes the proposals on to MHCP. MHCP then negotiates final budget levels separately with each institution. In practice, sizable cuts are made in the levels proposed. The earlier practice of reducing the level of funding of each proposed program and project has been replaced in recent years by cuts of entire programs and

Exhibit 6.3

ANNUAL OPERATIONAL PLANNING IN HONDURAS





projects. This represents a distinct improvement. Nevertheless, the cuts that are made often appear to have little relation to CONSUPLANE's technical guidance. Moreover, since institutions are given no prior formal indication of what their funding levels are likely to be, the perception is often, as in Bolivia, that MHCP's cuts are capricious and indiscriminate.

The lower half of Exhibit 6.3 illustrates ways in which this process could be improved. Possible improvements include:

- Provision of financial as well as technical guidance at the initiation of the process, including reconciliation of possible inconsistencies;[1]

- Designation of a sectoral bargaining agent (COPLAN or DPS, for example) to integrate the institutions' proposals before they are submitted for review and to negotiate final funding levels for the entire sector; and

- Joint technical and financiual review and negotiation by CONSUPLANE and MHCP.

Summary. AID's support of agricultural sector planning in Honduras is of interest both because of its heavy reliance on sector lending and because of the institutional environment in which Honduran agricultural sector planning takes place. As in other countries, AID's support appears to have had an impact in strengthening capacity to perform data-related activities. There has been very limited impact on the project development process or on the process of policy analysis and policy formulation, however.

Institutionally, Honduran agricultural sector planning takes place in an environment of a struggle for power between the national planning office (ST/CONSUPLANE) and the agricultural sector ministry (SRN). Over the past decade, agricultural sector planning has been uncoordinated and fragmented among a large number of institutions. As a practical matter, the most powerful actor in the process is the Ministry of Finance (MHCP). A clear definition of the operational roles and responsibilities of all parties is essential if agricultural sector planning in Honduras is to be

[1] MHCP has been reluctant to provide early financial guidance for fear that this would reduce its power to make cuts later.

effective. This, in turn, is likely to be contingent on a demand for planning at the highest levels of government that has not been the case in the past.

6.4 Summary

In light of the findings reported in Chapters 4 and 5, the findings of this chapter do not come as a surprise. In the main, they corroborate the conclusions of our examination of AID documentation and of our visits to other countries. Most significantly, they reinforce the conclusion that demand is critical to effective execution of agricultural sector planning. As we expected, progress has been more marked in the Dominican Republic than in either Bolivia or Honduras. Even in the Dominican case, however, demand is still embryonic and the transition from data-related activities to policy analysis and planning formulation has not been automatic.

The overall context in which agricultural sector planning takes place is a critical determinant of planning effectiveness. In all three countries, the Ministry of Agriculture has only limited influence over the sector. In Bolivia, lack of political stability has deprived central government agricultural sector planning of continuity of direction. In such an environment, decentralized planning may hold more promise. In Honduras, failure to define the operational roles and responsibilities of all parties has been the major deterrent to effective coordination. In the absence of such definition, agricultural sector planning can be anticipated to continue to be fragmented.

The Bolivian and Honduran experiences in annual operational planning underline the importance of clear role definition. In each case, the national planning office and the Ministry of Finance are key actors.

In both Bolivia and Honduras, progress has been affected by personnel problems. Both cases, particularly the Honduran case, suggest that quality is more of a deterrent than quantity. The key is to have a critical mass of well qualified people and, at least after a certain point, numbers may be relatively unimportant.

Finally, experience in Honduras suggests the need for development of detailed implementation plans during project design. Both sector loans in Honduras, especially the second loan, have suffered from ambiguity of definition.

7.0 A REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: A SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS OF THE PROPLAN SURVEY

As part of the PROPLAN project, the Interamerican Institute for Agricultural Cooperation conducted a survey of planning units in 23 Latin American and Caribbean countries in 1978. The survey had its conceptual basis in the framework discussed in Subsection 2.3.2 and was an empirical application of some of the concepts contained therein.

The objectives of the survey can be summarized as:

- The identification of the units making up the agricultural planning systems at national, sectoral, and institutional levels of the agricultural sector in 23 Latin American and Caribbean countries;

- The definition, analysis, and appraisal of the different activities and relationships developed by the units of the agricultural planning system within each interviewed country's policy analysis process; and

- The clarification of the operative mechanism and the participation of the agricultural planning units in the policy analysis and decisionmaking processes concerning policies and policy measures.[1]

The survey consisted in the administration of two slightly different questionnaires to agents of agricultural planning systems in the 23 countries. The first questionnaire was administered to planning units charged with conceptualizing and designing policy alternatives and policy measures, that is, national and sectoral planning units. The second was applied to units involved in policy implementation. These units are referred to by IICA as institutional planning units. Six different types of institutional planning units were identified: agricultural research, agricultural extension, marketing, agrarian reform and settlement, credit, and agricultural services.

Since the primary concern of the survey was to determine the capability and degree of participation of planning units in the policy analysis

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[1] See Interamerican Institute for Agricultural Cooperation, "Analysis of the Operation of the Sectoral Planning Units Within the Latin American and Caribbean Agricultural Planning Process: Their Participation in the Agricultural Sector's Policy Analysis and Decision-Making Processes," PROPLAN Document 2, San José, Costa Rica, 1979, p. 1. The bulk of this chapter is taken from this source.

process, the questionnaires asked for two different types of information: first, basic descriptive information; and, second, the opinions of the planners interviewed. The solicitation of opinions was intended for evaluative purposes. Hence, findings on the adequacy or inadequacy of planning units are based on the opinions of planners in the units themselves.

The scope of the PROPLAN survey is unprecedented, as is the wealth of relatively up-to-date information that has been collected. As of this writing, only a small portion of this information has been processed, tabulated, and published. Moreoever, the analysis of this information has been relatively cursory. This is unfortunate, particularly since further "mining" of the PROPLAN data could shed considerably more light on constraints to effective planning and pinpoint areas of special concern for the design of future agricultural sector planning activities. We would recommend, therefore, that serious consideration be given to specifying the PROPLAN survey content with the most future programmatic relevance and to processing and analyzing this select body of information.[1]

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a synopsis of the survey findings that have been published to date. These findings appear in PROPLAN Document 2, "Analysis of the Operation of the Sectoral Planning Units Within the Latin American and Caribbean Agricultural Planning Process: Their Participation in the Agricultural Sector's Policy Analysis and Decision-Making Processes." The document contains 41 summary tables, based almost exclusively on data collected on sectoral planning units. The focus on sectoral planning units was chosen "in order to determine the characteristics and opinions concerning the unit which ideally should lead the planning system in its role of technical assistance to decision-making on policies and policy measures."[2] The tables, and accompanying descriptive text are grouped in six categories:

- General Characteristics of Agricultural Planning Systems;
- Nature of the Relationships Between Sectoral Planning Units and the Agricultural Political-Administrative Systems;

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[1] A good start has already been made in designing formats for analyzing this information. See Hylke Van de Wetering, "Output Formats for the General Survey Questionnaire," Ames, Iowa, 1978.

[2] IICA, PROPLAN Document 2, p. 8.

- Importance of Elements of the Socioeconomic System for Sectoral Planning Units;
- Nature of Relationships Between Sectoral Planning Units and the Agricultural Planning System;
- Structure and Evaluation of Resources Used by Sectoral Planning Units; and
- Elements of a Strategy for Influence of Sectoral Planning Units on the Decisionmaking Process.

7.1 General Characteristics of Agricultural Planning Systems

All countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have agricultural sector planning units. In 72 percent of the countries, these units serve as lead coordinating agencies of their agricultural planning systems. National planning units are in all cases relevant to the policy analysis process. On the other hand, in 60 percent of the countries, relatively little importance is attached to decentralized planning units. Hence, the role played by the Departmental Development Corporations in Bolivia, as fledgling as it is in some respects, is relatively uncommon.

The leadership characteristics given highest priority by agricultural sector planning unit respondents are, in order of frequency of reporting: political support (11), technical capability (10), negotiating capability (5), and administrative capability (3). The importance of the first characteristic is clearly corroborated by our site visits and the second, as we have seen, has been a major focus of most AID-supported projects.

Virtually all sectoral planning units participate in annual programs, projects, budgets, special studies, evaluation reports, and occasional reports. On the other hand, only 50 percent are involved in long-term or medium-term plans, though practically all are interested in being so involved.

7.2 Nature of the Relationships Between Sectoral Planning Units and the Agricultural Political-Administrative System

As part of the PROPLAN survey, sector planning units were asked to identify the agricultural policy objectives that define the orientation of public sector activities. In order of frequency of reporting, highest priority objectives are to increase production and productivity (15), to upgrade income levels (12), to increase employment opportunities (9), to

improve standards of living of the rural population (7), and to improve foreign trade conditions (7). Operationally, however, two predominant objectives guide planning units' performance, namely, the objectives of increasing production and productivity and of directing the sectoral planning process. Of the tangible products of sectoral planning units, the ones considered most important are projects, budgets, annual programs, and special studies. Long-term plans and medium-term plans are notable for their perceived relative unimportance but this may simply be a reflection of the low participation of sectoral planning units in these activities.

Exhibit 7.1 presents the degree of interaction of sectoral planning units with elements of the agricultural political-administrative system. Despite the relatively small number of units that provided information on this issue, PROPLAN's findings are suggestive of a general and pervasive lack of real contact between sectoral planning units and decisionmakers.

7.3 Importance of Elements of the Socioeconomic System for Sectoral Planning Units

The PROPLAN survey examined two aspects of the relationships between sectoral planning units and the socioeconomic system: first, the socioeconomic agents that the respondents consider to be of priority for generating policy alternatives; and, second, the sectoral planning units' understanding of the reaction of these socioeconomic agents to the policy alternatives produced.

The principal socioeconomic agents that sectoral planning unit respondents consider to be of priority are, in order of frequency of reporting: small farmers (20); consumers (14); agricultural workers (11); professionals in agriculture or related fields (10); large-scale farmers (9); and input producers (8). Operationally, however, there are two predominant agents toward which the products of the units are directed: small farmers and medium-size farmers. Generally, therefore, agricultural sector planning units are primarily producer-oriented, which is consistent with the priority objective, across most countries, of increasing production and productivity. Despite this producer focus, sectoral planning units generally have very little interaction with producer organizations and, furthermore, do not appear to have an interest in increased interaction. This appears to be an

Exhibit 7.1

ACTUAL AND DESIRED LEVELS OF INTERACTION
OF SECTORAL PLANNING UNITS WITH ELEMENTS OF THE
AGRICULTURAL POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM[1]

ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM	RELATIONS WITH UNITS[2] Actual	Desired
President's Office	1	4
Legislature	-	1
Minister/Vice-Ministers		
Agricultural	5	9
Others	1	5
Directors General/Directors		
Agricultural	3	8
Others	2	5
Others	-	-
Units Providing Information	11	

[1]Source: IICA, PROPLAN Document 2, p. 37.

[2]Number of times the units assigned a first priority relationship.

example of the definite impression gathered from our site visits that sectoral planning units evidence too little concern for external relations.

The other side of the coin is the reaction of socioeconomic agents to the products of agricultural sector planning units. According to the perceptions of the sectoral planning units themselves, the two socioeconomic groups that appear to consider the units' products most useful are professionals in agriculture or related fields and large-scale farmers. On first blush, this suggests a sharp dichotomy between stated objectives and actual practice, but it may simply be a reflection, first, of the type of work that sectoral planning units perform and, second, of the more effective organization of large farmers to take advantage of the units' products.

7.4 Nature of Relationships Between Sectoral Planning Units and the Agricultural Planning System

An agricultural sector planning unit is only one of several planning units in an agricultural planning system. National planning units and six different types of institutional planning units can also play important roles.

As part of the PROPLAN survey, planning units were asked to identify the other units in the system from which they require technical support and from which they in fact receive such support. As an average across all countries and all units, sectoral planning units receive technical support from less than 40 percent of the units from which they indicated they require such support. The reciprocal relationship is not considerably better: less than 60 percent of other planning units indicated that they receive the technical support they require from sectoral planning units. It is natural for institutions to complain that they fail to receive required support from others and, thus, these findings may be skewed somewhat by simple interinstitutional rivalry. Nevertheless, the low percentages reported suggest rather strongly that there are serious deficiencies in interinstitutional coordination in agricultural sector planning in the region.

Non-sectoral planning units were also asked about their awareness of the products of sectoral planning units and to appraise them in terms of use, quality, and timely availability. Here, too, as Exhibit 7.2 illustrates, the findings of the survey are unfavorable. Besides a low level of awareness of sectoral planning units' products, there is a generally inadequate appraisal

Exhibit 7.2

AWARENESS AND APPRAISAL OF THE PRODUCTS OF SECTORAL PLANNING UNITS BY OTHER PLANNING SYSTEM UNITS[1]
(In Number of Planning Units)

PRODUCTS	SECTORAL PLANNING UNIT	NATIONAL PLANNING UNIT				AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PLANNING UNIT				AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION PLANNING UNIT			
	Produced	Awareness	Use	Quality	Avail-ability	Awareness	Use	Quality	Avail-ability	Awareness	Use	Quality	Avail-ability
Long-Term Plans	15	10	6	3	4	7	4	2	3	5	1	2	2
Medium-Term Plans	12	7	3	2	3	8	4	2	1	8	3	3	1
Annual Programs	20	16	10	6	6	10	6	5	4	9	5	7	3
Projects	20	14	5	7	3	8	3	3	-	7	3	3	3
Budgets	21	15	4	3	5	9	4	4	-	10	5	4	5
Special Studies	21	14	7	7	4	8	3	3	1	5	3	1	1
Evaluation Reports	21	13	5	6	3	8	3	3	2	7	3	3	1
Occasional Reports	21	11	3	5	6	5	2	2	1	7	2	-	-
Total Number of Planning Units With Information	22	20				12				14			

PRODUCTS	MARKETING PLANNING UNIT				AGRARIAN REFORM AND SETTLEMENT PLANNING UNIT				CREDIT PLANNING UNIT			
	Awareness	Use	Quality	Avail-ability	Awareness	Use	Quality	Avail-ability	Awareness	Use	Quality	Avail-ability
Long-Term Plans	2	2	2	2	4	1	1	2	5	3	3	1
Medium-Term Plans	5	5	2	3	6	2	2	2	4	2	3	-
Annual Programs	9	6	6	5	8	3	4	4	8	5	7	3
Projects	7	3	5	3	9	3	3	3	2	-	-	-
Budgets	8	4	4	5	8	3	4	4	4	1	1	1
Special Studies	9	5	6	6	8	1	2	4	4	1	1	1
Evaluation Reports	6	5	4	2	8	1	2	3	7	-	2	-
Occasional Reports	7	4	5	1	6	1	3	3	2	-	-	1
Total Number of Planning Units With Information	11				14				13			

[1]Source: IICA, PROPLAN Document 2, p. 51.

of their use, quality, and timely availability. Subject to the same caveat noted in the previous paragraph, this suggests that problems of interinstitutional coordination are exacerbated by technical shortcomings in the sectoral planning units and a lack of timely production and dissemination of their work.

With the exception of long-term and medium-term plans, there is a relatively acceptable proportion of knowledge on the part of sectoral planning units about the products of non-sectoral planning units. Thus, a low level of awareness of other units' products does not go both ways.

The principal types of external information that is used by sectoral planning units are economic statistics, reports and studies of the agricultural sector, and surveys and censuses. The sources of the bulk of this information are statistics institutions, central banks, and other national institutions that do not specialize in generating, organizing, or administering information. As a consequence, agricultural sector planning units are heavily dependent on institutions that are not conventionally regarded as part of the agricultural sector planning system. This suggests that activities to improve the effectiveness of agricultural sector planning cannot afford to be limited to agricultural sector institutions alone.

7.5 Structure and Evaluation of Resources Used by Sectoral Planning Units

The PROPLAN survey requested information on four different types of resources of sectoral planning units: financial and physical resources, human resources, technical procedures, and external resources.

Financial and Physical Resources. Only 30 percent of the sectoral planning unit respondents that provided information believed that their budgetary resources were insufficient. Nevertheless, their evaluation of the availability of physical resources is another matter. In order of frequency of reporting, deficiencies were noted in data processing equipment (11), library materials (10), office furniture and equipment (9), vehicles (8), space (7), and reproduction and printing equipment (6).

Human Resources. Exhibit 7.3 presents the distribution of technical personnel in sectoral planning units by country and field of specialization. Excluding Argentina and Colombia, there were a total of 1,250 technical personnel in sectoral planning units in the region in 1978, or an average of

Exhibit 7.3

TECHNICAL PERSONNEL OF SECTORAL PLANNING UNITS BY COUNTRY AND FIELD OF SPECIALIZATION
(In Number of Persons)[1]

COUNTRY	FIELD OF SPECIALIZATION											
	Business Adminis-tration	Public Adminis-tration	Agronomy	Archi-tecture	Political Science	Computer Science	Economics	Statistics	Civil Engineering	Sociology	Others	Total
Argentina[2]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Barbados	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	6
Bolivia	-	-	6	-	-	-	10	-	-	1	-	17
Brazil	85	-	48	1	-	25	105	21	4	13	71	373
Colombia[2]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Costa Rica	6	1	25	-	-	-	3	1	-	2	1	39
Chile	-	10	49	2	3	4	8	4	-	1	4	85
Ecuador	5	1	49	1	4	-	19	3	3	7	17	109
Guatemala	-	-	5	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	7
Guyana	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	1	-	-	5	11
Haiti	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11
Honduras	6	2	13	-	-	17	35	1	3	1	2	80
Jamaica	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	1	-	21
Mexico	-	-	60	-	-	6	30	10	30	5	5	146
Nicaragua	9	-	10	-	-	5	17	2	2	3	21	69
Panama	-	1	11	-	-	1	20	1	-	-	-	34
Paraguay	-	-	9	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
Peru	1	-	48	4	-	-	20	-	15	3	1	92
Dominican Republic	1	1	21	-	-	-	22	2	-	2	-	49
El Salvador	10	-	5	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	31
Trinidad & Tobago	-	-	4	-	-	-	5	3	-	-	-	12
Uruguay	-	1	12	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	3	18
Venezuela	2	-	6	-	2	-	18	2	-	-	-	30
TOTAL	125	17	392	8	10	58	363	51	57	39	130	1,250

[1] Source: IICA, PROPLAN Document 2, p.68.

[2] Without data.

almost 60 technical personnel per country. If Brazil and Mexico are excluded, the average drops substantially to 38. Of the total, 30 percent had agronomy as their field of specialization, 29 percent had economics as their field of specialization, and ten percent had business administration as their field of specialization. Slightly less than one percent of the total had doctoral degrees and approximately nine percent had master's degrees.

When asked about priorities for training, virtually all sectoral planning unit respondents attached high priority to training in the preparation and evaluation of policies, projects, programs, and budgets. General economics and statistics were considered the most important of the conventional academic disciplines.

The sectoral planning unit respondents that provided information assigned almost equal importance to in-country training and training abroad. The preferred mode for in-country training is in-service training. Lesser importance is attached to seminars and, least of all, to external advisory services. The preferred mode for training abroad is short-term special courses. Master's training is given lesser importance and doctoral training, least of all.

As of 1978, only 20 percent of informing sectoral planning units offered any type of training or courses and then, mostly only occasionally. Thus, despite the upward bias that was undoubtedly imparted to PROPLAN's findings on training needs as a result of the "wish-list" nature of requesting this information, there is clearly a real perceived need for training of agricultural planners in the region, a need that is both substantial and unsatisfied.

Technical Procedures. The PROPLAN survey requested sectoral planning units to indicate the technical procedures that they use to identify, organize, and establish priorities, to select among alternative means of implementing objectives, and to design, propose, implement and control policies coherently within the framework of objectives currently in force. As of 1978, only about 50 percent of informing units made use of formal programming procedures and only 40 percent of budgeting techniques or economic analysis. In most cases, therefore, technical procedures are not well established, which may help explain the poor technical appraisals that sectoral planning units received from non-sectoral planning units. Furthermore, these shortcomings correspond closely to the areas of training that

virtually all sectoral planning units identify as important. As a result, the findings on technical procedures lend more objective credence to the contention that the units have substantial, unmet training needs.

External Resources. In 1978, the principal international institutions that were identified as providing technical assistance to agricultural sector planning units in Latin America and the Caribbean were, in order of frequency of reporting, IICA (15), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (11), AID (8), and the Inter-American Development Bank (6). In addition to technical assistance, international institutions also provided financial assistance, training, and, in one country, coordination of external assistance. In the main, however, technical assistance was, and continues to be, the predominant form of assistance provided.

The published PROPLAN findings identify the different international institutions that provided technical assistance in each country. Unfortunately, they do not include information that would permit comparisons of levels and types of technical assistance across countries and across international institutions.

7.6 Elements of a Strategy for Influence of Sectoral Planning Units on the Decisionmaking Process

Agricultural sector planning units were asked to rank order elements of a strategy for influencing the decisionmaking process. In order of frequency of reporting as either a first or second priority, the key elements of such a strategy, as viewed by sectoral planning units throughout the region, are:

- Improved coordination with executor centers of the political-administrative system (7);
- Strengthening of the agricultural planning system (5);
- Expansion of technical capability (5);
- Increased support from the political-administrative system (4);
- Increased participation of groups from the socioeconomic system in planning (4); and
- Awareness of the socioeconomic situation (4).

As stated, these elements of a strategy for making sectoral planning units more effective are abstract and somewhat platitudinous. In the following section, therefore, we attempt to put some flesh on this strategy by outlining what we believe to be the key programmatic findings of the PROPLAN survey.

7.7 Summary of Major Findings

The major findings of the PROPLAN survey, as we anticipated in our overall evaluation design, group themselves naturally into technical findings and institutional findings.

7.7.1 Technical Findings

The major technical findings of the PROPLAN survey are:

- Only about half of the agricultural sector planning units in Latin American and Caribbean countries participate in long-term or medium-term plans. Moreover, long-term and medium-term plans are not perceived of as much importance as projects, budgets, annual programs, and special studies.

- Other planning units in the agricultural sector planning system typically consider the use, quality, and timely availability of the products of the sectoral planning unit to be inadequate.

- As a rule, sectoral planning units do not have well-established technical procedures for programming, budgeting, and economic analysis.

- There is a substantial, unmet need for technical training of agricultural sector planning unit personnel throughout the region.

- The areas of training of highest priority are training in the preparation and evaluation of policies, programs, projects, and budgets and training in economics and statistics.

- The preferred mode for in-country training is in-service training.

- The preferred mode for training abroad is short-term special courses.

7.7.2 Institutional Findings

The major institutional findings of the PROPLAN survey are:

- There appears to be a general and pervasive lack of real contact between agricultural sector planning units and decisionmakers.

- There are serious deficiencies in interinstitutional coordination in agricultural sector planning in the region.

- The highest priority objective of most sectoral planning units is to increase production and productivity.

- Operationally, small- and medium-size farmers are the predominant socioeconomic groups toward which the products of sectoral planning units are directed. On the other hand, the two socioeconomic groups that appear to consider the units' products most useful are professionals in agriculture or related fields and large-scale farmers.

- Although sectoral planning units are primarily producer-oriented, they generally have very little interaction with producer organizations.

- Agricultural sector planning units are heavily dependent for information on institutions that are not conventionally regarded as part of the agricultural sector planning system. This suggests that activities to improve the effectiveness of agricultural sector planning cannot afford to be limited to agricultural sector institutions alone.

- In most countries in the region, relatively little importance is attached to decentralized planning units.

- More than half of the sectoral planning units in the region report deficiencies in physical resources.

8.0 FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE DESIGN OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN THE FUTURE

As the previous chapters of this study attest, AID's support of agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean over the last decade appears to have been instrumental in bringing about a number of significant achievements. In most countries that we have examined, capacity has grown markedly, particularly the capacity to perform the data-related functions of planning. Furthermore, most agricultural sector planning units have had some degree of positive influence on the work of other public sector institutions, a number of AID-supported activities appear to have stimulated increased recognition of the need for data and analysis in rational decisionmaking, and, in a number of instances, there is evidence that agricultural sector planning has had an impact on the adoption of policies, programs, and projects.

The overall record is not cause for elation, however. In comparison with the objectives that had been defined at the outset of AID-supported activities, very few have come close to measuring up fully to expectations. The previous chapters are not only a testimonial to agricultural sector planning's accomplishments; they are also a telling documentary that there is still a long way to go.

In this chapter, we attempt to summarize the implications of past experience for future work. We believe that the overall lines of a strategy for the design of future agricultural sector planning activities are quite clear, and that the conclusions we draw are well substantiated by what we have already seen. Nevertheless, the strategy that is presented is by no means a blueprint that can be applied mechanistically in any given case. In fact, it is argued that future design work should be guided less by a blueprint approach and more by a fuller up-front understanding of the overall context in which agriculural sector planning takes place. As a result, the design of agricultural sector planning activities is likely to be more demanding in the future than has frequently been the case in the past.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section, Section 8.1, briefly summarizes the key lessons that emerge from Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. The subsequent three sections then develop a

strategy for the design of future agricultural sector planning activities. Section 8.2 discusses the central role that demand plays in effective agricultural sector planning. Section 8.3 lays out the general lines of a strategy for future design. It argues that the generation of demand for planning should be the focus of future AID support. Finally, Section 8.4 outlines the tactics of the strategy. It recommends that future design work should begin with the construction of what is called a "demand baseline." It also discusses a number of different implications of the focus on demand generation for the design of future agricultural sector planning activities.

8.1 Summary of Key Lessons from the Written Record and from Country Visits

Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this study offer a wealth of lessons that bear on the design of future AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities. In this section, we summarize the key lessons that emerge from our examination of the written record of AID-supported activities, from our country visits, and from the PROPLAN survey. At this point, these lessons are merely catalogued. In the remainder of this chapter, the lessons are tied into a strategy for future design work.

The key lessons that emerge from the written record and from country visits are:

- There appears to be a general and pervasive lack of real contact between agricultural sector planning units and decisionmakers throughout the region. Institutionally, there appears to be little real demand for analytical planning, that is, a demand that grows out of policy concerns and is formulated in specific terms. Analytical units often have no clear mandate as to what they are supposed to do and, as a consequence, operate in a vacuum. In the final analysis, planning must be "demand- and decision-driven," and planners must target their products to address specific policy and program concerns.

- As a rule, agricultural sector planning units have very limited relationships with other public sector institutions and evidence little interest in cultivating such relationships. For planning to be effective, however, such relationships must be cultivated.

- In some countries, planning, budgeting, and implementation functions are highly fragmented. This fragmentation may also be reinforced by political, economic, and social unrest. In such an environment, it is difficult for even very useful planning activities to be translated into the achievement of agricultural sector objectives.

- The annual budget process is a mechanism in which agricultural sector planning can play a very fruitful role, particularly decentralized agricultural sector planning. This will only be the case, however, if the functions of key actors, especially the national planning office and the Ministry of Finance, are clearly defined and effectively performed.

- Planning cannot be divorced from politics. Internal and external political support is almost a precondition for the effectiveness of a planning unit. A systematic "public relations campaign" can be critical to the maintenance of political support for agricultural sector planning.

- Agricultural sector planning units are heavily dependent for information on institutions that are not conventionally regarded as part of the agricultural sector planning system. This suggests that activities to improve the effectiveness of agricultural sector planning cannot afford to be limited to agricultural sector institutions alone.

- Effective planning requires leadership and continuity of technically capable personnel. Most countries have problems in attracting and retaining qualified people. Ideally, a critical mass of strong senior and middle-level staff must be created in agricultural sector planning units.

- As a rule, agricultural sector planning units should concentrate on fast turn-around, highly focused, problem-oriented studies. Long-term data-intensive activities are wont to run into technical difficulties and often cost far more than initially estimated. If and when agricultural sector planning units engage in long-term studies, they should produce real, "live" findings on a periodic basis and engage in short-term analytical work as well.

- Analytical methods need to be kept simple. In technology transfer activities, the absorptive capacity of host-country technicians must be kept clearly in mind. There is a real danger that esoteric techniques may never be used after AID support ceases. As a rule, therefore, keep it simple.

- There is a substantial, unmet need for technical training of agricultural sector planning unit personnel throughout the region. The areas of training of highest priority are training in the preparation and evaluation of policies, programs, projects, and budgets and training in economics and statistics. The mode of in-country training preferred by agricultural sector planning units is in-service training. The preferred mode for training abroad is short-term special courses.

- Many AID project evaluations pay considerable attention to the number of counterpart personnel that host countries assign to planning. This emphasis on quantity may overshadow the question of quality. The key is to have a critical mass of well-qualified people and, at least after a certain point, numbers may be relatively unimportant.

- Capacity-building activities are long-term in nature, often at least five years.

- AID and host-country procurement procedures are often a stumbling block to progress. This is particularly true for timely contracting of technical assistance.

8.2 The Central Importance of Demand for Planning

During the course of this study, a number of significant constraints to the effectiveness of agricultural sector planning have been highlighted:

- Lack of contact between planners and decisionmakers.
- Lack of a clear mandate for planning units.
- Lack of qualified personnel.
- Relatively little contact between agricultural sector planning units and other public sector institutions.
- Personnel turnover.
- Low pay and poor working conditions.
- Assignment of higher operational priority to data-related activities than to analytical activities.

Many of the evaluations we have examined recognize interrelationships among these constraints and suggest measures to alleviate a number of them simultaneously. Often, however, the constraints are treated as more of a catalog of separate problems to be addressed than as a "seamless web" that may have its roots in something more basic.

The fundamental impediment to the effectiveness of agricultural sector planning is the lack of effective demand for planning. Virtually all the evidence examined in this study, particularly the findings of our country visits, leads us to the inescapability of this conclusion. If agricultural sector planning is to be useful in any sort of dynamic sense, it must be wanted. If decisionmakers really valued planning, we could presumably expect to find meaningful contact between planners and decisionmakers, a clear sense of direction for planners' work, extensive relationships of planning units with other institutions, incentives to attract and retain qualified personnel, and the production of analytical output that would be targeted to policy concerns.

The conclusion that demand is central to agricultural planning is deceptive in its simplicity. In fact, it has far-reaching implications for future design work. The most obvious implication is that future AID-supported agricultural sector planning activities should be oriented toward the overall objective of creating new or strengthening nascent demmand. As a guiding philosophy, this represents a sharp shift in emphasis from the past. In virtually all the projects we have examined, the creation of demand has not, in fact, been an explicit focus of attention. On the contrary, project designers have largely assumed that planning is a good thing, and therefore "wanted." Specifically, most AID-assisted projects have been geared to the building of planning capacity; except in the most general of terms, however, they have not answered the basic question, "Capacity for what?"

8.3 A Strategy for Future Design

In what follows, it is assumed that planning is a good thing, but it is not assumed that it is necessarily wanted in any effective sense. There are some who would argue that neither assumption should be made, but there is enough empirical evidence to suggest that planning, when effectively conducted, is useful to decisionmakers, and therefore "good." There are others who would contend that both assumptions should be made, that planning, as an advisory service to decisionmakers, is like "motherhood and apple pie," and therefore desired by all. At this level of abstraction, this contention may

very well be true, but experience in Latin America and the Caribbean is rife with instances in which commitment to planning in theory and commitment to planning in practice have been two very different things.

In laying out an overall strategy for the design of future agricultural sector planning activities, two cases can be distinguished: first, the case where substantial demand for planning already exists; and, second, the more typical case in which demand for planning is weak. This distinction admittedly dichotomizes what is in fact a continuum, but is a useful organizational device for highlighting the fundamentally different roles that AID (or other donors) should play at either end of the continuum.

At the extreme of the first case, there is no role for AID to play at all. If effective demand already exists, then, by definition, a host country will have taken measures to attract high-caliber personnel to the planning enterprise, defined the responsibilities of the enterprise in clear terms, and demanded advice for use in decisionmaking. The planning system will be functioning smoothly and there will be no need for outside assistance. Short of this extreme, however, there is a definite role for AID to play. Substantial demand may already exist in a country, but gaps may exist that it is not in a position to fill. As a rule, the gaps would reflect shortages of technical skills and AID's role would consist of furnishing technical assistance and training to build host country capacity in these skills. In this case, the host country already has a relatively effective planning enterprise that is being encouraged to assume more of a role in the policy formulation process. The host country articulates its needs in specific terms, and AID's role is completely reactive. From our examination of experience in Latin America and the Caribbean over the past decade, it is clear that this case is rare. The one example that comes closest to this scenario is the example of UNASEC in Nicaragua -- which, interestingly enough, is an instance in which AID was instrumental in stimulating an effective demand for planning in the first place.

The second case, the case in which demand for planning is weak, is clearly the typical case. In this case, there may be a nominal commitment to planning, and even a commitment that has been translated into some action --

the development of data collection and data processing capacity, for example. But it is not a commitment that has any clear policy drive to it. As in the first case, a host country may make specific requests for outside assistance, but the justification for the requests will be fundamentally different. In the second case, the requests will typically be justified only in broad-brush terms ("We need an advisor to assist our planning unit") or reflect more of an interest in technological sophistication (computer capacity, for example) than in the uses to which the technology will be put.

In the past, this second case has commonly been diagnosed by AID as simply a more complex variant of the first, and AID's response, as in the first case, has been to target resources to strengthen host-country planning capacity. This is not necessarily an inappropriate response. Lack of capacity has indeed been a severe constraint to the effectiveness of agricultural sector planning, and AID assistance, as we have seen, has been instrumental in alleviating it. But, as we have also seen, capacity alone is not enough. Ultimately, capacity must respond to decisionmakers' concerns and a dynamic must be set in motion that will result in a self-sustaining role for planning in policy formulation. In the past, many AID-supported activities have not succeeded in doing this. The challenge, then, is to identify opportunities in which AID support can be expected to trigger movement down the chain of events in the agricultural sector planning process. Most of these opportunities can be expected to involve the creation of capacity, but capacity that, in turn, can be expected to lead to increases in host country commitment to planning.

In its simplest form, then, the role of AID assistance is to increase the <u>supply</u> of those planning functions that, over time, will induce increases in host-country planning <u>demand</u>. In other words, what we have termed "consciousness raising," or "awareness," becomes key.

We should have no illusions that creation of demand is easy. A "push" strategy is always more difficult than a "pull" strategy:

> The supply side of the knowledge-for-action problem is inviting. It isn't hard to build R&D units for industrial development, to create economic analysis apparatus, to produce technical agricultural knowledge, and to underpin urban management or health programs with formal analysis capabilities. Generating demand for these facilities is something else. It can be

> like trying to push a mattress through a keyhole with a piece of cooked spaghetti. The knowledge-push approach can produce formalistic "institutions" to suck up resources while growing quietly stale and relatively useless.[1]

Nor should we have any illusions that creation of demand will be a short-term process. We realize that it is conventional for outsiders to take AID to task for expecting its assistance to yield impacts in a short time frame. We have no desire simply to add to the catalog of studies that make this point. Nevertheless, the time horizon we are talking about here is long for a fundamentally different reason than in other studies. As a rule, other studies argue for acknowledgement of a long time horizon because of the length of time that it takes to build institutions and to train critical masses of people. In this case, we are adding an additional objective explicitly on top of all this: bringing about a change in awareness. As we have seen, consciousness raising is no easy task, and it does not flow automatically from institutional or technical capacity.

Given these notes of caution, AID may be tempted to abandon its support of agricultural sector planning. But this, too, would be a mistake. The history of AID support of agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean has its accomplishments as well as its drawbacks. As we have seen, these accomplishments point up a number of significant lessons that can make AID more sanguine about the impact it can expect from its support of agricultural sector planning in the future.

8.4 The Tactics of the Strategy

In this section, we turn to the key considerations that we believe should enter the process of designing future agricultural sector planning activities. These considerations make up what we can call the "tactics" of the strategy.

[1] Program of Advanced Studies in Institution Building and Technical Assistance Methodology, "Knowledge and Action: Research and Development," PASITAM Newsletter: The Design Process in Development, No. 19, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, 1978.

To be able to identify the opportunities that will trigger more demand for planning in the future, the overall context in which planning and decisionmaking currently take place must first be thoroughly understood. At first blush, this task may appear relatively straightforward, but it is in fact the most difficult component of the entire design process. It is particularly difficult when, as is frequently the case, the responsibility for constructing this "baseline" falls largely to outsiders who are brought in on a short-term basis to flesh out the details of a project in project paper form. In many cases, project designers come with definite preconceptions as to what the major elements of the project should be. As a practical matter, therefore, the design process is often marked by a search for evidence that will buttress the validity of preconceptions rather than by a search to identify the key elements that currently drive the planning and decisionmaking enterprise. This is really a matter of degree, of course, but the tendency is still there. Meetings between a Minister of Agriculture and a project design team, for example, are often a forum in which the Minister reacts to the team's ideas, rather than vice-versa. And when a team does make a conscious attempt to use these meetings to learn what makes the Ministry "tick," it often feels frustrated by an inability to elicit more than generalities, at one extreme ("Our objectives are to increase production, increase incomes, and improve the distribution of income"), or, at the other extreme, to get much beyond what it considers to be picayune details ("We're having trouble in getting everyone to sign off on the release of the rice project equipment from customs").

The moral of the story, therefore, is that a baseline of concerns and problems can generally not be put together from a series of brief meetings with decisionmakers. Nor, as a rule, can it be based solely on sector plans, organization charts, etc. The construction of the baseline takes time and often requires piecing together a variety of details to see the whole picture. Frequent contacts with agricultural sector planning units can be key to this process, but the guiding philosophy of the contacts should be different from what has often been the case in the past. Rather than viewing these contacts as a mechanism for identifying things that planners would like to do, rely on them more as a means of finding out what decisionmakers

would like them to do. Planners' frustrations can frequently be instructive as to the ways in which they have not been responsive to decisionmakers' concerns in the past and can suggest appropriate changes for the future.

In more specific terms, the elements of this "baseline" would typically consist of the following:

Elements Concerning the Ministry of Agricultures

- In what kinds of activities do Ministry of Agriculture decision-makers spend the bulk of their time?
- What kinds of policy and program concerns consume most of their time?
- What are the origins of the problems that concern them?
- How much of the agricultural sector does the Ministry of Agriculture have influence over?
- What other public sector institutions have influence?
- What are the key interest groups in the agricultural sector?
- What is the nature of the relationships that exist among the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Planning Office, and the Ministry of Finance?
- What institutional mechanisms come into play in decisions on what to fund and what not to fund?

Elements Concerning the Agricultural Sector Planning Unit

- In what specific activities is the agricultural sector planning unit involved?
- What are the relative priorities of these different activities?
- Who defines what the agricultural sector planning unit does?
- How many people work in the agricultural sector planning unit?
- What are their qualifications?
- What role does the agricultural sector planning unit play in the preparation of plans and the development of projects?
- How extensive are the contacts of the agricultural sector planning unit with other institutions, in both the public and private sectors?

The objective of these questions is to provide a basis for making informed judgments as to the kinds of activities that can be expected to be instrumental in contributing to increases in demand for planning. The

underlying premise is not that planners should tell decisionmakers what they want to hear. Rather, it is simply that the point of departure for designing future agricultural sector planning activities must be things as they are, not things as one might like them to be.

In practice, a demand baseline may not have to be as comprehensive as this list of questions might suggest. A full baseline would indeed be indispensable if a large-scale planning activity were contemplated in the future. But experience over the last decade suggests rather strongly that elaborate planning schemes, be they technical or institutional, should not be the cornerstone of future AID support of agricultural sector planning. On the contrary, we would argue that AID should be pragmatic and selective in the activities it supports in the future.

This is not to say that AID should necessarily rule out all support of large-scale planning enterprises. Indeed, our examination of data-intensive activities in Chapter 4 suggests that elaborate statistical and analytical activities can be instrumental in raising awareness of the need for empirically based analysis in decisionmaking. It is important to note, however, that four of the six activities in which such impacts were identified were activities that were conducted in the Dominican Republic. Although the Dominican experience is impressive in a number of respects, our Dominican site visit suggests that demand is embryonic even in this case. Thus, before adopting "big-study" tactics in the future, one must first ask whether other approaches might be more cost-effective in achieving the objective of setting a dynamic of demand in motion.

The basic principle is that options for future support must be assessed in terms of their potential contribution to making planning demand-driven. If a given option does not satisfy this test, then, we would argue, the option is low priority for AID agricultural sector planning support. As a working rule of thumb, the plan of attack would be to shed light on problems that decisionmakers consider to be important now -- and planners' tools would be defined by these problems, not vice-versa. Furthermore, if there is a conflict between the objectives of "production" and "institutionalization," we would argue that the balance must be tipped toward production. Decisionmakers will only come to "want" planning if they see that planners' outputs

are useful. The day of judgment should not be put off to set this process in motion. Again, the point is not to downplay the importance of capacity building, but a simple recognition that the dynamics of capacity building can be expected to go much more smoothly if decisionmakers are convinced of the need for it.

As we have seen, demand generation can be expected to be a long-term process. In certain countries, particularly countries characterized by political instability, this process may take longer than AID is realistically prepared to make a commitment for. If the long-term prognosis is not all that sanguine, therefore, AID should not feel compelled to make a concerted attempt to assist in the demand-generation process. It may, however, want to plant seeds that could lead to a take-off of the process at a later date. One possibility would be to assist in the expansion of the human resource base through training programs. The PROPLAN survey identifies training as a key constraint to effective agricultural sector planning, and both the Dominican and Peruvian experiences suggest that training can have a long-term payoff. A second possibility would be for AID to stress to host-country decisionmakers the importance that it attaches to sector studies as a prelude to sector loans. This could be fruitful even if there were only minimal participation of agricultural sector planning units in these studies.

If AID is prepared to make a long-term commitment to the generation of planning demand in a host country, this does not necessarily mean, as we have seen, that heavy reliance should be placed on large, elaborate projects as the mechanism for funding. Large projects can lock both the host country and AID in too tightly to take advantage of emerging opportunities to trigger the demand process. We are more inclined toward a pragmatic approach in which AID would support a series of discrete, even seemingly disparate, activities over time, all of which would be guided by the objective of increasing awareness of the importance of data and analysis in decision-making. In a loose sense, therefore, AID would support a "program" of agricultural sector planning. Although loosely structured, the program would not be amorphous. On the contrary, it would consist of well defined -- repeat, well defined -- activities, each of which would be seen as contributing to a broader objective.

Implementation of this approach would demand considerable flexibility on AID's part, but the Program Development and Support (PD&S) funding mechanism is a possible model that could conceivably be adapted and applied to the support of agricultural sector planning in the region. Under the PD&S mechanism, the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean allocates funds to its Missions on an as-needed basis to meet program and project development and support needs. The mechanism has built-in flexibility to adjust to changing needs over the course of a fiscal year. Typically, Missions receive an initial allocation at the beginning of the year and can request additional funds as specific needs arise. Funds can also be transferred from Missions that initially overestimated their needs to Missions that initially underestimated them. In parallel fashion, an agricultural sector planning "PD&S" project could be set up. Under such a project, Missions would receive variable funding allocations to support agricultural sector planning activities that were foreseen as having the potential to stimulate demand for planning. AID/Washington would be responsible for the distribution of funding among Missions but once funds were distributed, responsibility for implementation would lie with the Missions. To facilitate quick response to emerging opportunities, a spectrum of institutions and individuals could be pre-qualified (through the competitive process) as potential sources of planning assistance for up to, say, two years.

We now discuss a number of issues that can emerge in the agricultural sector planning design process. In discussing these issues, particular attention will be paid to the ramifications that the objective of demand generation has for operational design choices.

Data-Related Activities. Availability of adequate data is commonly regarded as a precondition for effective agricultural sector planning. Over the last decade, AID-supported activities have attached considerable importance to the data enterprise and, indeed, appear to have had marked success in strengthening data collection, data processing, and, in some cases, data analysis capacity in Latin America and Caribbean countries. As we have seen, however, the transition from these activities to policy analysis activities has been far from automatic. In the future, therefore, we would recommend that AID shift its support priorities toward more directly analytical work.

Considerable progress has been made in the collection and processing of agricultural sector data, and considerably more progress could be made in the future. In most countries, however, only a fraction of existing data appears to be used in policy analysis and policy formulation. On the whole, therefore, data-related activities have not proven to be an effective lever for triggering analytical work, nor for stimulating demand for such work.

We do not recommend that AID rule out all support for data-related activities in the future. By no means. But the guiding criterion should not be whether a given activity can provide useful information; it should be whether the information is effectively demanded by decisionmakers and planners. In other words, future AID support of data-related activities should be seen as buttressing the demand process, but not stimulating it.

Two final points concerning data-related activities. First, in many Latin American and Caribbean countries, planners are wont to complain that the data at their disposal are flawed, and therefore unusable. In many instances, this contention can be a pretext for planners to sidestep their responsibility to perform analytical work. No data are ever perfect and, as a rule, much more can be done with what is at one's disposal than is generally the case. Consequently, inadequacy of existing data is not, in and of itself, a sufficient rationale for launching major new data collection initiatives.

Second, there is enough evidence to suggest that an agricultural sector planning unit's assumption of direct responsibility for data-related activities can distract attention away from analytical work. It is important for agricultural sector planners to have a say in what data are collected but, on balance, it is probably preferable that the statistical and analytical functions of agricultural sector planning be assigned to distinct institutional units. As Waterston commented on national planning in 1965, "Experience shows, also, that where the statistical and planning functions have been combined in a single agency, either the statistical or planning function has been neglected."[1]

[1] Waterston, op cit., p. 430.

Policy Analysis Activities. Policy analysis, if targeted on policy issues of interest to decisionmakers, has the potential of being of direct use to decisionmakers and, as a consequence, of stimulating additional demand for such work as an ingredient to policy formulation. We would recommend, therefore, that policy analysis be the central activity in AID's future support of agricultural sector planning.

By policy analysis, we mean analysis of the advisability of different policy alternatives. This can take on a multiplicity of shapes and forms. To maximize the impact of its assistance on the demand-generation process, we would suggest that AID focus its support on analysis of specific issues that are of direct concern in current deliberations on agricultural sector policy or that have strong potential for suggesting new development opportunities. Studies of broad scope should also be encouraged, but breadth of scope should not be used as an excuse for failing to address pressing sector problems. In either case, an up-front understanding of what decision-makers perceive the key problems of the sector to be is essential -- which reinforces the importance of a thorough "demand baseline" as discussed above.

Past experience suggests a number of lessons as to how policy analysis can be instrumental in stimulating self-sustained demand for planning. The major lessons appear to be:

- It must be focused on real, live problems.
- Any one policy analysis activity should be relatively short-term, that is, it should not take longer than a year.
- Even in short-term activities, the work of policy analysts may need to be "sold" on a continuing basis to maintain political support.
- Analytical tools are a function of identified problems, not vice-versa. As a rule, keep it simple.
- Analysts must present their conclusions plainly, concisely, and without technical jargon.
- If a tradeoff must be made between "production" and "institutionalization," go with production. This is not to say that policy analysis studies should not be viewed as a capacity-building mechanism or that broad participation by agricultural sector institutions should be discouraged (Nicaragua is a case in which broad participation had a long-term payoff); but it is an attempt to place emphasis where emphasis is due -- that is, on production.

Project Development Activities. Since projects are often a major concern of decisionmakers, the process of project development may be a useful activity for agricultural sector planning units. An overemphasis on projects can of course lead to a proliferation of development activities with no unifying policy framework, but an involvement of agricultural sector planners in the identification and design of projects may still be an appropriate entry point for stimulating awareness of the need for analytical planning. Furthermore, project development activities can be structured in such a way that initial project ideas are screened for their consonance with sector policy before a major investment in developing the ideas is made. In different ways, this appears to be evolving in Bolivia, Colombia, and Jamaica.

As we have seen in Chapter 6, there also appears to be a movement among Bolivia's Departmental Development Corporations toward use of a variant of AID's logical framework in the design and justification of programs. Although it is still early to tell, it is conceivable that programs, rather than projects, could emerge as the central focus of strategy review in the annual budget process.

"Firefighting" Activities. A common complaint of planners is that decisionmakers burden them with quick turn-around, "firefighting" work. Whether they like it or not, meeting firefighting demands is an essential component of planners' jobs. Moreover, since this kind of work allows little margin for error, it requires capable personnel to perform it.

Effective performance of firefighting work can have a positive long-term payoff. Indeed, it is often through compliance with unappealing, short-term requests that planners can establish their credibility -- and spark interest in more thought-out, analytical work. To the extent that AID can provide support in meeting these requests, therefore, it may contribute to the ultimate objective of demand generation.

Institutional Arrangements. There are a host of institutional lessons that have been learned in the course of this study. In what follows, we make no attempt to review all these lessons but raise four general institutional considerations that bear directly on agricultural sector planning project design.

The first consideration is how a planning unit should be organized. In this connection perhaps more than in any other, there appears to be a temptation to look for the "ideal" organizational pattern that can be applied under all circumstances in all countries. Fortunately or unfortunately, there is no one ideal pattern, and it would be a mistake to pretend otherwise. As the Governmental Affairs Institute argues in a somewhat broader context:

> Although it should be obvious, it is often hard to get people to understand that there is no universal organizational and institutional blueprint which can be used to deal with these [agricultural sector] problems. The search for universal solutions goes on despite the mounting evidence that such solutions almost never have been productive. Nor are they likely to be.[1]

The limited applicability of any one organizational scheme springs from the different things that different agricultural sector planning units do. Ultimately, institutions are created to perform defined functions, and it is the functions that in turn define how the institutions should be organized. In the case of agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean, there are wide differences in responsibilities among agricultural sector planning units and, as we might expect, wide differences in organizational structure as well. Although these units may not all be organized adequately, heterogeneity, rather than uniformity, is to be expected.

In designing agricultural sector planning activities in the future, it may be useful to draw on organizational schemes that appear to have functioned effectively elsewhere (in Nicaragua, for example), but organizational changes should not be made simply for the sake of change. In the final analysis, care must be taken not to beg the fundamental question, "Organization for what?" This question <u>must</u> be answered, for it is the mandate of an agricultural sector planning unit that is the ultimate criterion for assessing organizational adequacy. As Waterston has argued for national planning:

[1] Governmental Affairs Institute, <u>op. cit</u>., p. XII-4.

> There is a need for every country which seeks to plan well to define as precisely as possible who is to do what and how, i.e., by what criteria or standards it is to be done. Few countries bother to do this. Consequently, there is often a lack of clarity about the division of responsibility between planning and operating bodies and an even greater uncertainty about the manner in which planning functions are to be performed.[1]

This citation also speaks to the second institutional consideration we wish to raise. Effective agricultural sector planning requires clear guidance from, and a clear definition of the roles of, national planning offices and Ministries of Finance. Experience in Bolivia and Honduras is particularly illustrative on this score. Again, agricultural sector planning takes place in a national management process. As a consequence, the strengths and weaknesses of this overall process must be taken into account in reaching judgments as to the kinds of agricultural sector planning activities that are and are not likely to be useful.

The third institutional consideration has to do with personnel. Agricultural sector planning activities in Latin America and the Caribbean have been beset with a variety of personnel problems -- insufficient staff, poor qualifications, low pay, high turnover, poor working conditions, etc. We shall not discuss these problems in any detail here except to make one simple, but fundamental, observation. Many of the AID project evaluations that we examined paid considerable attention to the number of counterpart personnel that host countries assigned to planning. This emphasis on quantity often overshadowed the question of quality. From our visits to different countries, we are convinced that quality is the much more important issue. The key is to have a critical mass of well qualified people and, at least after a certain point, numbers may be relatively unimportant.

The fourth institutional consideration concerns the place of technical assistance. The evidence we have examined suggests strongly that long-term technical assistance can be an effective ingredient in the transfer of planning skills. This is particularly the case when an advisor is product-oriented and adopts an "elbow-to-elbow" working style. Lest there be any

[1] Waterston, op. cit., p. 429.

misunderstanding, therefore, our recommendation that AID support focus on a series of relatively short-term activities is not intended to preclude long-term technical assistance. It can be argued, in fact, that such assistance could act as the operational glue to bind discrete activities together in a coherent program.

The Role of AID in Implementation. Previous discussion has focused on factors for AID to consider in the design of future agricultural sector planning activities. Among the factors to be considered is AID's role in implementation. Past experience suggests two important lessons in this regard. First, AID project managers can not expect to play active substantive roles. There are too many instances in which AID project managers anticipated heavy involvement in project activities but, despite their good intentions, were forced to retreat to largely administrative roles because of other work priorities. A second lesson is that AID contracting procedures somehow have to be made more agile. As we have seen, progress of a number of agricultural sector planning activities was deterred by AID procurement problems. One suggestion for improvement would be to set up a scheme in which institutions and individuals could be pre-qualified as potential sources of quick-response planning assistance. This scheme could be operationalized under a mechanism like the agricultural sector planning "PD&S" project discussed above.

Private Sector Participation. This study has made reference to the possibility of the private sector playing more of a role in the agricultural sector planning process. For example, it has been suggested that work requiring specialized skills (such as modeling) be contracted out to private sector institutions and that increased private sector participation could be encouraged in the design of development projects. The private sector can also be viewed as a potential demander of planning services, much as in the United States. In this connection, designers of future agricultural sector planning activities may want to think of encouraging private as well as public sector demand for planning. Specifically, they may want to identify private sector groups -- small farmer organizations, for example -- that would stand to benefit from the products of planning and to structure agricultural sector planning activities to respond to these clients' needs. Identification of these needs could be folded explicitly into the "demand baseline" discussed above.

9.0 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY

This chapter outlines possible directions for future study. Section 9.1 offers a recommendation for AID at large, while Section 9.2 presents four possible directions for future study concerning agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean.

9.1 Review of Experiences in Other Regions and Other Sectors

This study has been limited to experience in Latin American and Caribbean countries. Although this experience has suggested a number of important lessons for the design of future agricultural sector planning activities, these lessons may not be applicable in their entirety to other regions of the world and, indeed, there are likely to be other important lessions to be learned elsewhere. As a consequence, we would recommend that AID consider sponsoring a review of agricultural sector planning experiences in other regions.

In a similar view, AID may also want to take stock of experiences in planning in other sectors. Although there are commonalities in planning across sectors, there are also differences. Given the importance of education, health, and nutrition sector planning in AID development programs, a review of the effectiveness of previous AID support may be in order.

9.2 Directions for Future Study Concerning Agricultural Sector Planning in Latin America and the Caribbean

This subsection presents four possible directions for future study related to agricultural sector planning in Latin America and the Caribbean. The directions are listed in order of priority.

9.2.1 Analysis of the PROPLAN Survey Data

As discussed in previous chapters, the Interamerican Institute for Agricultural Cooperation conducted a survey of planning units in 23 Latin American and Caribbean countries in 1978. The objectives of the survey were: 1) to identify the units making up the agricultural sector planning systems in Latin American and Caribbean countries; 2) to define and analyze the different activities and relationships of these units; 3) to clarify the role of these units in policy analysis and decisionmaking processes.

The scope of the PROPLAN survey is unprecedented in studies of planning, as is the wealth of relatively up-to-date information collected. As of this writing, only a small portion of this information has been processed, tabulated, and published. Moreover, the analysis of this information has been relatively cursory. This is unfortunate, particularly since further "mining" of the PROPLAN data could shed considerably more light on constraints to effective planning and pinpoint areas of special concern for the design of future agricultural sector planning activities. We would recommend, therefore, that serious consideration be given to specifying the PROPLAN survey content with the most future programmatic relevance and to processing and analyzing this select body of information.

9.2.2 Statistical Analysis of Project Documentation

An important extension of this study would be to perform a statistical analysis of the data in Appendices A and B. Although we have looked at these data in some detail, analysis of linkages among project characteristics, country characteristics, planning unit characteristics, and impacts could be more formal and rigorous.

We would recommend that a content analysis of this information be performed and, then, a multivariate statistical analysis. We believe such an exercise would permit AID to gain a higher degree of confidence as to what works in what circumstances, and what does not. Such an analysis need not be complex. Its intent would be simply to serve as a heuristic device for complementing professional judgement and for providing suggestive, organized grist for the interpretative analysis mill. The raw materials for such an analysis are now, with this document, structured and at hand.

9.2.3 Site Visits to Additional Countries

Another useful activity would be to compare agricultural sector planning in the countries we have studied with planning in Latin American and Caribbean countries that have not received support from AID in recent years, such as Mexico and Brazil. Such a comparative analysis would broaden the perspective that could be brought to planning and perhaps suggest useful lessons. Furthermore, Mexico is known to have an excellent regional planning system, and it might have applicability elsewhere.

9.2.4 Linkage Analysis

A final possibility for additional study would be to probe further into the linkages that exist among planners, decisionmakers, implementers, beneficiaries, and international donors. Such a study would examine what kinds of relationships have been forged most strongly, how they came about, and how they have been retained. This would require extensive analysis, as well as site visits. The aim would be to find out how these linkages work so as to draw inferences as to how they might be improved in the future.

APPENDIX A

PROJECT SUMMARIES AND ACTIVITY DESCRIPTIONS

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Bolivia	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Basic Foods Production and Marketing (511-0451), 1975	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	14,972,000	1,455,000
GRANT	5,642,000	548,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	9,330,000	907,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Consortium for International Development

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS 1) Increase per capita income and standard of living of rural people. 2) Increase production and increase factor productivity of basic food crops and livestock produced in the small-farm sub-sector of the intermountain valleys of Central Bolivia and the developing agricultural areas of the lowlands of Eastern Bolivia.

PURPOSES 1) Develop improved small farmer technologies. 2) Extend improved technologies and more modern production practices to small farm operators. 3) Develop the capability of MACAG's offices of Economics and Statistics, Marketing, and Planning to generate basic data, analyze problems, formulate, and implement coordinated policies and programs for the sector.

OUTPUTS 1) Research studies, thesis projects, new courses, training. 2) Short courses, extension bulletins, training. 3) Training, development of policies and procedures, re-organization.

INPUTS Long-term advisors, short-term technicians, training, equipment.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Bolivia
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Basic Foods Production and Marketing (511-0451), 1975

The Basic Foods Production and Marketing Project was established as a companion grant to the Mission's Agriculture Sector I Loan (511-T-053). The basic purpose of the grant was to provide technical assistance to develop improved technologies and to extend them to the small farm sector in the intermountain valleys of central Bolivia and the eastern agricultural lands. These actitvities are directed towards complementing the ones being financed under the loan -- a project designed to strengthen research and extension services, finance small farm credit, and provide improved access to inputs and markets.

A host country contract for the provision of long-term technical assistance was signed by MACA and CID in 1975 providing services for 7 years until June 1982. Utilizing a team of 11 advisors, the following general scope of work was agreed upon:

- Provide assistance in the research activities at the San Simón (Cochabamba) and Gabriel René Moreno (Santa Cruz) Universities;
- Provide assistance with research activities at experimental stations in Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Potosí;
- Provide assistance to IBTA to integrate research results with the extension system; and
- Provide limited teaching services at San Simón and Gabriel René Moreno (later expanded to include guidance for graduate students' field work and thesis preparation).

The 11-person technical assistance team included an agricultural economist in planning in La Paz.

*Source: Project Evaluation Summary 81-8.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Bolivia	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agriculture Sector Loan (511-0455), 1974	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	14,850,000	1,400,000
GRANT	0	0
LOAN	9,200,000	600,000
COUNTRY	5,650,000	800,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Campesino Affairs and Agriculture (MACAG)

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

USDA, Contractors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Reduce Bolivia's food gap by meeting projected growth in basic food requirements through domestic production.

PURPOSES Achieve significant increases in basic food production by small farmers, to: a) strengthen and institutionalize the commercial credit system for small farmers, and b) increase credit made available by the domestic banking system for the production of foodstuffs.

OUTPUTS 1) Loan applications approved. 2) Recuperations (new loans). 3) Staffing of Central Bank with economic statisticians. 4) Field offices of Central Bank established. 5) Special fund for economic development. 6) Coordination meetings. 7) Marketing studies. 8) Measurement of progress.

INPUTS Production credit, processing/marketing credit, capital goods imports, general credit, marketing study; equipment and materials, vehicles, salaries and operating expenses, participant training, technical assistance.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY Bolivia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Agriculture Sector Loan (511-0455), 1974

The Project contemplates the strengthening of agricultural research, extension, and the use of modern factors of production through the development, expansion and decentralization of essential public services in the high valleys and newly developing Eastern lowlands of Bolivia. Projects funds will be utilized to (i) improve agricultural sector management, (ii) enhance technological development, (iii) make available credit resources, and (iv) accelerate agriculture education and training.

Activities to be implemented under the first of these components include the development and establishment of a new and more complete series of agricultural production and marketing statistics, and the expansion and improvement of the MACAG's sector analysis and planning capacity.

The Project will establish an agricultural production and marketing data center which will improve and expand upon the activities currently carried out by the Ministry's Division of Economic and Marketing Studies. The center would also assume part of the marketing data collection activities currently being carried out by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. By employing improved linkages with the MACAG regional and field offices, the center would improve the quality of MACAG data and the timeliness of their release, expand crop coverage, initiate crop production forecasts in the major commodities and expand the currently limited analysis of crop production costs. Concurrently, timely marketing situation and pricing surveys, covering both product and input markets, would be conducted on a periodic basis and the appropriate data disseminated in timely fashion to local producers and marketing elements. While the activity of this data center would essentially be national in scope, initial priority would be assigned to the needs of the basic commodities and target groups addressed by the other project components.

Parallel to the activities noted above, this Project will assist in the expansion and improvement of the MACAG's sector analysis and planning capacity. The strengthened unit would undertake: (i) short- and long-term planning exercises, (ii) project analysis and evaluation, (iii) greater policy analysis, (iv) coordination of external donor assistance, and (v) special duties.

*Source: Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Bolivia	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agricultural Sector II (511-0465), 1977	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	19,530,000	2,500,000
GRANT	2,200,000	1,000,000
LOAN	11,300,000	1,035,000
COUNTRY	6,030,000	465,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Agriculture and Campesino Affairs (MACA)

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

USDA, Contractors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Increase the per capita income and improve the standard of living of Bolivia's rural people, especially small farmers in the southern and central intermountain valleys, and developing eastern lowland valleys.

PURPOSES 1) Increase availability of inputs (land, seeds) to small farmers; provide farmers with credit for inputs. 2) Develop sector's human resources and management capability.

OUTPUTS 1) Seed production and storage. 2) Credit. 3) Human resource development. 4) Sector management and coordination.

INPUTS AID: technical assistance, training, equipment and vehicles, loan capital, seed rotating fund, construction. GOB: training, loan capital, seed rotating fund, data processing, administration. CODETAR: construction, administration.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY Bolivia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Agricultural Sector II (511-0465), 1977

During its five-year disbursement period, the Project will seek to increase the availability to the small farmer of needed inputs, particularly land, and improved seed, and to provide him with the production and investment credit necessary for the purchase of such inputs. This objective will be sought through (1) increasing the production capacity of certified seed, (2) supporting a small farmer production and investment credit program and (3) carrying out a small farmer land clearing credit program. The Project is also aimed at developing the agricultural sector's human resources and improving its management and coordination.

By the end of the Project, 3 new and 3 upgraded seed processing and storage facilities will have been completed. The small farmer credit program will be providing about 5,000 farmers with production and investment credit and will have provided approximately 2,200 farmers with credit to clear a total of 10,000 hectares of land. In addition, the quality of professional education in agriculture at two universities will have been improved and sector management and coordination will have progressed.

Small farmers in the target area, the southern intermountain valleys of Chuquisaca, Potosí and Tarija Departments, will benefit directly from project seed processing and storage, production and investment credit and land credit activities. They will benefit indirectly from project human resources development and sector management and coordination activities.

*Source: Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Bolivia	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Rural Development Planning (511-0471), 1978	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	3,600,000	3,600,000
GRANT	2,250,000	2,250,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	1,100,000	1,100,000
OTHER (S&T/UD)	250,000	250,000

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Planning and Coordination,
Departmental Development Corporations

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Institutional Contractors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Improve the standard of living of the rural poor and improve the Bolivian departmental and national planning system.

PURPOSES Improve the technical consistency and coordination of the planning system in order to increase the effectiveness of rural development programs, including integration of rural and urban development.

OUTPUTS Improved project preparation and evaluation, improved sectoral operational plans, more emphasis of urban development programs on agriculture and compesino needs, on-the-job training, short courses, seminars, long-term training, training materials and guidelines.

INPUTS AID: technical assistance, long-term training; workshops and studies; training materials, equipment and vehicles. MPC: counterpart personnel, conferences, studies, operating expenses, materials, and in-country travel and per diem. DDC: counterpart personnel, studies, operating expenses and equipment.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Bolivia
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Rural Development Planning (511-0471), 1978

The purpose of the proposed project is to improve the technical consistency and rural focus of the Bolivian development planning system. The project is designed to make systematic improvements in planning and project preparation and implementation at the departmental and national levels, emphasizing activities which directly affect the rural sector. An improved planning capability should result in improved coordination among on-going and planned projects funded by the GOB and departmental committees as well as by external donors. More efficient use of GOB development resources should thus result, and the quality and quantity of projects directed to the rural sector should improve.

Within the national planning system, the project focuses on the Ministry of Planning and Coordination (MPC) and the departmental development corporations (DDCs) in the five departments of Pando, Beni, Tarija, Potosí and Chuquisaca, in order to increase the scope and effectiveness of rural development programs, including those addressing rural-urban development linkages, in these areas. Although the project will focus on the national and departmental levels of the planning system, coordination with the sectoral level of the system (i.e., the sectoral ministries) will be an important element of the project.

The cost of the project over the three year implementation period will be $3,600,000. AID will provide $2,500,000 in grant funds for 21 work years of long-term and 3 work years of short-term technical assistance in various aspects of planning and on-the-job training to the participating development corporations and the MPC. AID funds will also finance in-country training courses, workshops, materials, office equipment and vehicles. The GOB will contribute $1,100,000 for salaries of counterpart personnel, operating expenses, short-term training courses, materials, studies, and in-country travel and per diem. The GOB contribution accounts for 30.5 percent of total project cost, thus satisfying the requirements of Section 110(a) of the FAA.

*Source: Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Bolivia	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Farm Policy Study (511-0485), 1978	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	1,583,000	1,583,000
GRANT	1,115,000	1,115,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	468,000	468,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Campesino Affairs and Agriculture (MACA)

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

AID, BUCEN, Personal Services and Institutional Contractors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Increase the per capita income and standard of living of Bolivia's rural people and improve sectoral planning capacity through the collection and analysis of reliable rural base level information.

PURPOSES Obtain reliable information on socio-economic characteristics of rural farm and non-farm households and utilize this information to better formulate strategies and policies.

OUTPUTS 1) Socio-economic farm survey. 2) Analysis of Southern Valley survey data. 3) Credit analysis. 4) National crop and livestock technology survey. 5) Traditional practices study. 6) Rural household study. 7) Data integration.

INPUTS AID: long- and short-term technical assistance, local personnel for data gathering, equipment, materials, data processing services, administrative support. GOB: local personnel, equipment, administrative support.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY Bolivia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Farm Policy Study (511-0485), 1978

The Farm Policy Study is intended to improve the Government of Bolivia's (GOB) sectoral planning capacity through the collection and analysis of reliable rural base-level information. The project purpose is two-fold: (a) to obtain reliable information on the socioeconomic characteristics of rural farm and non-farm households; and (b) to utilize this information to better formulate strategies and policies which will contribute to the achievement of the project goal and improve GOB and USAID/Bolivia programs in the rural sector. The Grantee will be the GOB; the executing agency will be the Ministry of Campesino Affairs and Agriculture (MACA). Two of the proposed project activities, the Traditional Practices Study and the Rural Household Study, will be carried out under MACA's supervision by the National Community Development Service (SNDC), a decentralized MACA agency.

The project will finance the following data gathering and analysis activities: (a) National Socioeconomic Farm Survey, (b) Analysis of Southern Valley Survey Data, (c) Credit Analysis, (d) National Crop and Livestock Technology Survey, (e) Traditional Practices Study, (f) Rural Household Study, and (g) Data Integration. The project is an outgrowth of an AID/W initiative dating back to December, 1974, to develop a Sector Analysis, and it will build upon the recently completed Southern Valleys survey which was undertaken at the Mission's request in order to identify more specifically the target group for the Agriculture Sector II Project.

The various data gathering and analysis activities over the three-year implementation period will require a total financing of $1,583,000. A.I.D. will contribute $1.115 million in grant funds for long- and short-term technical assistance, data gathering costs, a small amount of equipment and materials, and data processing services and other administrative support. Through MACA, the GOB will contribute $468,000 for project personnel, administrative support and some equipment, exceeding the 25 percent counterpart contribution requirement of the FAA.

*Source: Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Bolivia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Departmental Development Corporations, (511-0511), 1979

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	13,500,000	350,000
GRANT	0	0
LOAN	10,000,000	300,000
COUNTRY	3,500,000	50,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Planning and Coordination
Departmental Development Corporations

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Short-Term Contractors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS: Improve the standard of living and quality of life of the rural poor in Bolivia.

PURPOSES: Enhance the outreach capability of the DDCs to plan, identify, and implement subprojects that will be of direct benefit to the target group.

OUTPUTS: 1) Subprojects financed. 2) Promoters/extensionists added to DDC staff. 3) Increased contacts with campesino groups. 4) DDC workshops to share experiences in establishing outreach mechanisms. 5) Expanded financial resource base for the DDCs.

INPUTS: AID: short-term technical assistance and subproject fund.
GOB: counterpart for subproject fund.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Bolivia
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Departmental Development Corporations (511-0511), 1979

The proposed Project has been designed in response to the strategy set out in the Mission's DAP and CDSS to work more closely with the DDCs as alternative sources for channeling development resources to the rural poor in Bolivia. By providing financial resources to the DDCs for the objective of strengthening their outreach capability to implement subprojects, the Project complements the technical assistance being provided to the corporations under the Rural Development Planning Project. Together, the two projects will assist in improving the planning and project design and implementation capabilities of the DDCs.

All nine of the development corporations in Bolivia will participate in the Project. In light of the limited funds available for the Project, consideration was given to restricting the number of corporations participating in order to maximize the impact of those resources. This idea has been rejected because the primary objective of the Project is institution building (i.e., improved outreach capability for the identification and implementation of subprojects designed to impact upon the target group) within the framework of the strategy and eligibility criteria which have been established. Both the Mission and the GOB believe that all the DDCs must be involved if this objective is to be achieved.

Project funds will be used as follows:

- $300,000 from the Selected Development Activities (SDA) account will finance 36 work/months of short-term technical assistance specifically directed at improving the DDCs' outreach capability. The following areas will be investigated: identification of outreach problems, development of solutions to the problems, and implementation of permanent outreach mechanisms once the DDCs have had an opportunity to test the proposed solutions; special evaluations of subprojects and instituting an evaluation mechanism for the DDCs to assure appropriate feedback of experiences from implementing subprojects into the planning process; a study to identify potential alternative sources of revenues that would help expand the financial resource base of the DDCs; and development of guidance regarding examination of environmental concerns during the design of subprojects.

- $9.7 million from Agriculture, Rural Development, and Nutrition (FN) account and Selected Development Activities (SDA) account will finance costs directly associated with subproject implementation; funds will not be used to finance activities such as feasibility studies. Emphasis for subproject investment will be on those activities which generate income or employment opportunities for the target group, particularly in the agriculture sector. Specific activities will include: improved crop production and development, livestock development, water resources/water control, land improvement, reforestation, storage facilities, small-scale agroindustries and marketing facilities. Subprojects outside the agriculture sector such as potable water systems and small-scale rural electrification will also be eligible.

*Source: Project Paper.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Bolivia
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	Agricultural Development in Bolivia: A Sector Assessment, 1974

The purpose of this assessment of the agricultural sector in Bolivia is to provide guidance for planning USAID technical and capital assistance programs in support of Bolivia's efforts to improve the standard of living of its rural population. Factors related to the overall development of the Bolivian economy are taken into consideration, but the focus is constantly on agriculture. The Assessment is an effort to describe the performance of the agricultural sector over recent years, and to identify and analyze the problems and constraints which have restricted its more dynamic development.

A companion review also has been undertaken within the Planning Section of the Ministry of Rural Affairs and Agriculture to assess the problems of the sector from the Ministry's viewpoint, to identify priority areas for the GOB's development emphasis, and to give guidance to the foreign donor community. The descriptive part of that review has been completed. However, the Ministry has not yet developed fully a detailed strategy in support of its goals. The tentative GOB strategies and priorities upon which this assessment is predicated have been derived mainly from conversations with key personnel of the Ministry -- including the Minister. It is expected that the GOB will develop a more complete analysis and formalize its sector development strategy and priorities by early 1975.

The first six chapters of the Assessment draw heavily in terms of empirical content, organizational structure and analysis on a manuscript, "The Status of Bolivian Agriculture," prepared by Drs. Morris Whitaker and E. Boyd Wennergren, of the staff of the Economics Department of Utah State University. Both authors have extensive experience in Bolivia as part of the USAID-financed Utah State University Contract Team. Their manuscript is scheduled to be published by Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, in late 1974 as one of the Praeger Series of Special Studies in International Economics and Development. However, modifications of that analysis and the conclusions and judgements presented, as well as the proposed development assistance program which is outlined in the final chapter of the Assessment represent the views of the USAID Mission. They do not necessarily reflect the views of Drs. Whitaker and Wennergren.

*Source: Agricultural Sector Assessment.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Bolivia
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	An Assessment of the Southern Valley Region of Bolivia, 1977.

Throughout the course of the development of USAID/Bolivia's Agricultural Sector Loan II, the intermountain valleys of Bolivia's southern Departments (Chuquisaca, Potosí and Tarija) were proposed as the principal geographic focus for the project. In both the Project Identification Document (PID) and the Project Review Paper (PRP), specific mention was made of the intent to extend Agricultural Sector Loan I program activities, which were directed to the valleys of central Bolivia, to small farmers in the southern region. Information available at the time of the preparation of the PRP indicated that the small farm population in the southern Departments is among the poorest in Bolivia -- and thus that the selection of this geographic focus would be fully consonant with AID's mandate to benefit the rural poor. It was readily acknowledged, however, that if the proposed loan were to effectively address the needs of the poorest in this region, both additional refinement of target group identification as well as analysis of the appropriateness of alternative program activities would be required.

In an effort to meet these requirements, the Ministry of Rural Affairs and Agriculture (MACA) and USAID/Bolivia agreed in late 1976 to collaborate in collecting primary data for the purpose of studying farm households in the target region. Given the necessity of producing results which would be timely for the design of the sector loan, a number of constraints were placed on the data collection effort. Nevertheless, a scientifically selected sample was designed and strict quality control procedures were adhered to insofar as the tight time schedule and available resources permitted. Actual preparatory work commenced in late January, 1977, and field work was performed from mid-April through early May. This was followed by data coding, editing and processing in late May and early June. During all these activities, substantial technical assistance was provided to MACA and the Mission by AID/Washington and the U.S. Bureau of the Census (BUCEN).

*Source: Assessment Report.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Chile	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agricultural Production Credit (513-0294), 1976	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	26,850,000	2,650,000
GRANT	0	0
LOAN	14,000,000	1,800,000
COUNTRY	12,850,000	850,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Agriculture

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

AID, BUCEN, Personal Services and Institutional Contractors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS 1) Improve incomes, farm productivity, and employment opportunities of Chilean small farm families. 2) Achieve greater agricultural production.

PURPOSES Increase volume of production credit available to Chilean small farmers and improve its utilization.

OUTPUTS 1) Permanent INDAP small farmer credit fund. 2) INDAP integrated rural development planning capability. 3) Commercial bank small farmer credit system. 4) Mechanism for the formulation and evaluation of credit projects, programs, policies and the small farmer credit environment (PPIS).

INPUTS INDAP subloans, banking system subloans, technical assistance to INDAP, PPIS (DP equipment, software, supplies, service contract, training and technical assistance, survey and personnel costs).

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Chile
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agricultural Production Credit (513-0294), 1976

The Project has two components: Agricultural Production Credit, including related technical assistance to the principal lending institution; and an agricultural Policy Planning and Information System (PPIS).

Credit (including related T.A.): The purpose of this component of the Project is to increase the volume of agricultural production credit available to Chilean small farmers and to improve its utilization. This component totals $12,500,000 of A.I.D. Loan funds, of which $7,500,000 are to be relent through the Institute for Agricultural Development (INDAP), an autonomous entity of the Ministry of Agriculture, $500,000 are to be used to upgrade INDAP's institutional capacity, and $4,500,000 are to be relent through the banking system in an effort to establish a private sector source of financing for small farmer production credit needs.

Policy Planning and Information System: The PPIS component is to provide an ongoing mechanism for the formulation and evaluation of projects, programs, and policies aimed at improving the welfare of the Chilean rural poor. It is specifically designed to provide guidance on the impact of agricultural credit, both that provided under this Loan, and the broader agricultural credit environment. The PPIS component totals $1,500,000 of A.I.D. Loan funds (including evaluation costs) and will finance technical assistance surveys, data processing, and equipment and supplies. The PPIS involves three different types of information gathering, processing, and analyzing efforts. The first and most important of these is survey based analytical information about agricultural production units, marketing and processing establishments, and consuming households. The second is agricultural census information which provides the PPIS with baseline information on land tenure and the product structure and geographic distribution of agriculture. The third is a variety of information about the agricultural sector from the public institutions serving the sector.

At the end of the three and one-half year disbursement period of the Project, the Ministry of Agriculture Development Planning Office (ODEPA) will have the basic analytical tools and modernized information handling process necessary for improving the allocation of public sector credit and other resources for rural development and to provide a basis for selected policy making. (The Project will not include complex sector modeling activities.)

*Source: Project Paper.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Chile
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	Chile Agricultural Sector Overview: 1964-1974, 1976

The objective of this study is to review the development of the agricultural sector in the period 1964-74, so as to identify its behaviour and contribution to the general growth of the country. In this context, this study is only a first stage of an agricultural sector assessment focused towards a more in-depth study of factors of growth and future perspectives of agriculture.

This study was proposed by the Agency for International Development (AID) to the Programa de Postgrado en Economía Agraria (PPEA) of the Universidad Católica de Chile. According to the contract, the University assumed the responsibility of performing the study, while AID provided the necessary financial support.

The work has been structured in nine chapters. In the first, the importance of the agricultural sector in the Chilean economy and the objectives posed for the sector by present economic policies are briefly reviewed. In the following three chapters, resource availability, production and use of inputs for the period 1964-74 are examined. Chapter 5 contains a detailed analysis of product and input prices. Chapter 6 deals with the land tenancy situation during the period. An attempt is made in this chapter to identify the structure of production for the various farm types. The fishing and forestry sectors are analyzed in chapter 7; and in chapter 8, the behaviour of foreign trade is examined. Finally, chapter 9 includes a summary of all previous chapters, and an analysis of the implications of the present economic policies for the future development of agriculture. Some priority research areas are also identified.

*Source: Agricultural Sector Assessment.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Colombia
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	Colombian Agricultural Sector Analysis, (Phase I: 1970; Phase II: 1972)

This was one of the earliest and most ambitious projects of the Sector Analysis Support Program. In 1970 the project was initiated to build an input-output model of the Colombian economy focusing on agriculture. This model was then to be used with linear programming techniques to study the nature of programs which would focus on such key development issues as improved employment, increased gross national product, improved nutrition status, etc. It was believed that such a tool was a fundamental need for the identification of AID strategies in support of the agricultural sector.

A version of the model was in fact constructed using available data and considerable linear programming work has been accomplished with this version. During the construction of the model, however, the inadequacy and inconsistency of the available data was amply demonstrated. It was therefore decided to construct a second model, but to collect new data appropriate to this purpose. Consequently a 22,000 farm survey, national in scope, was designed and carried out. It has now been four years since the decision was made to construct the second model, and while much of the data has been organized and processed in the requisite form, the final coefficients are not yet in place.

To date approximately $1,000,000 has been spent on the project. The major product will be in our view, the publication of the national farm survey data. For the first time Colombia will have good data on farming practices from a national survey. No such data has ever been available in Colombia before.

Analytic results from the work indicated that capital availability at the farm and market level were more important constraints to agricultural development than were land availability and technology. These findings were consistent with AID's support for credit programs in Colombia, and were in fact contributory to the development of a credit loan.

Colombia Ministry of Agriculture employees have been working on this analysis since 1972, and are continuing to seek support for analysis. They have successfully analyzed data from the national household survey and other sources, and have constructed several sub-models of the developing input-output model.

*Source: LAC/DR/SA, "Background Information on the Sector Analysis Support Project," 1977.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Costa Rica

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: National Development Information System (515-0139), 1979

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	7,500,000	7,500,000
GRANT	250,000	250,000
LOAN	3,250,000	3,250,000
COUNTRY	4,000,000	4,000,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Office of Information of the Presidency, National Economic Planning Office, Agricultural Sector Planning Office

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

AID, USDA, BUCEN, Personal Services and Institutional Contractors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS: 1) Permanent socio-economic improvement of Costa Rica's poorest groups through increased access to and more productive use of the means of production and through popular participation. 2) Improved public sector policy making and better planning and management of GOCR development programs.

PURPOSES: Improved information base for development policy making and for planning and management of priority development programs and projects.

OUTPUTS: 1) Development data bank. 2) National area sampling frame and survey capability. 3) Development documentation centers.

INPUTS: Personnel; surveys; rent and utilities; vehicle and equipment maintenance; design and installation; technical assistance; training and seminars; vehicles, equipment and supplies; computer hardware, software, and time.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Costa Rica
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	National Development Information System (515-0139), 1979

The Goal of the proposed Project is the permanent socio-economic improvement of Costa Rica's poorest groups through increased access to and more productive use of the means of production. This improvement for Costa Rica's poorest groups will be brought about by improved public sector policy-making and better planning and management of GOCR development programs (Project Sub-Goal). The Project's Purpose is to provide improved information about priority development problems and programs.

The Project will finance, during its five-year life from authorization, the creation of a National Development Information System (SNID) for Costa Rica. SNID will have the following components:

a. A Development Data Bank, which will consist of geographically coded data sets, consistent with user needs, organized into modules covering: (1) agriculture and natural resources; (2) health and nutrition; (3) industry and employment; (4) community infrastructure and population characteristic information not covered in other modules; (5) information on specific project and program inputs and results. The data bank would be supported by a network of computer terminals located in OFIPLAN, OIP, DGEC and three sectoral/ministry planning offices. These terminals will be connected to the MH computer's Project-funded central processing unit (CPU).

b. An Area Sampling Frame and Survey, whose purpose will be to generate more statistically representative data on the rural sector. Under this component a continuing survey mechanism will be created. This component will fund the construction of an area sampling frame and ten national and special surveys which will generate new and needed data on agricultue, land use, and the rural dweller. SNID's computer network will be used to process survey data and to feed data into the Data Bank.

c. Two Development Documentation Centers, the purpose of which will be to make more available to users information which is in the form of the printed word. One documentation center, located in OFIPLAN, will collect GOCR or GOCR-funded planning documents and assessments, feasibility studies, and survey documentation. The other, located in OPSA, will collect more detailed information on Costa Rican agriculture and rural life. Documents in both centers will be abstracted, indexed, and a key word access system for them will be developed in order to facilitate user research. Reproduction facilities will be funded for them so that SNID users will be able to copy relevant information. The index, abstract, and key word system of both centers will be accessible to all users of the SNID computer network.

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*Source: Project Paper.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Costa Rica
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	An Assessment of the Agricultural Sector in Costa Rica, 1977

The Agricultural Sector Assessment was prepared by USAID/Costa Rica for purposes of meeting program analytic requirements and as a program and strategy document useful to the GOCR, especially the Office of Agricultural Sector Planning of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock.

The Assessment contains four Sections. Section I presents an overview of the Costa Rican economy and a macro-economic analysis of the Agricultural Sector. Section II contains a description of the target group, including resource endowment, income, market orientation, production and socio-economic characteristics of the small farmers as well as characteristics of the non-farm rural poor. Section III contains a description and analysis of the overall Sector and major subsectors. An overview of the land and climate, land tenure, infrastructure and public and private institutions is presented. The production and market situation for various groupings of commodity systems is described and analyzed. Within this group of sectorial and subsectorial characteristics, the major production, marketing, and policy constraints are identified and a discussion is presented on alternative actions to resolve constraints. Section IV deals with specific suggestions for programs and policies to resolve constraints. Implications are that these limiting factors to development represent areas where AID could best place its assistance emphasis, in consort with GOCR resources and perhaps other donor assistance. A strategy for AID assistance in the Agricultural Sector is suggested, stressing rational natural resource utilization, employment, resolution of marketing problems, agro-industry, sectoral planning, crop diversification, land settlement and export promotion.

*Source: Agricultural Sector Assessment.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Dominican Republic

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agriculture Sector Loan II (517-0116), 1976

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	30,000,000	2,900,000
GRANT	0	0
LOAN	15,000,000	1,450,000
COUNTRY	15,000,000	1,450,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Secretariat of Agriculture

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Personal Services Contractors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS: 1) Improve the economic standards of the rural poor. 2) Increase the level of agricultural productivity with particular regard to the needs of the small farmer.

PURPOSES: Expand the range of public activities undertaken in the agricultural sector, with emphasis on those providing services to the small farmer.

OUTPUTS: (Planning Components Only.) 1) Technical Subsecretariat for Agricultural Sector Planning personnel trained. 2) Expansion in national agricultural data bank storage capacity. 3) Establishment of National Documentation Center. 4) Reading rooms established. 5) Agricultural Research Council established and coordinated. 6) Curricula, facilities, and staff at agricultural schools of participating universities. 7) Expanded Farm Survey System underway.

INPUTS: Personnel, equipment and supplies, vehicles, vehicle operation and maintenance, in-country travel and per diem, training, technical assistance -- short-term and long-term, project operations, construction/remodeling, credit.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Dominican Republic
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agriculture Sector Loan II (517-0116), 1976

The Borrower will be the Government of the Dominican Republic (GODR). The Executing Agency will be the Secretariat of State for Agriculture (SEA). The individual entity within SEA charged with overall coordination responsibility will be the Department of Coordination of Foreign Programs and Resources (Sub-Secretariat of Agriculture Sector Planning), which will allocate funds to all other SEA Departments charged with technical implementation responsibilities, as well as to other Dominican Government agencies, such as the Agricultural Bank (AgBank) and Caminos Vecinales, which will participate in the Loan Program.

The overall program goal is to improve the economic standards of the rural poor in the Dominican Republic. The sub-goal is to increase the level of agricultural productivity, with particular regard to the needs of the small farmer. The overall project purpose is to expand the range of public activities undertaken in the agricultural sector, with emphasis on those providing services to the small farmer. Within this overall purpose there are specific purposes for each of the three elements:

Regarding the Planning element, the purpose of that aspect of the Loan Program is to "strengthen the agricultural sector planning, coordination and evaluation capability of the Secretariat of State for Agriculture (SEA), and to involve other professional agriculturalists in the agricultural development process and, in this respect, to increase the supply of agricultural technicians."

The second element of the Loan Program seeks "to establish an integrated small farm production support system to provide improved technological, production, educational and marketing resources and services."

The third element of the Loan Program, rural development, envisions a joint effort "to establish a viable and comprehensive rural development effort within SEA."

*Source: Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Dominican Republic

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Sector Analysis Phase II (517-0117), 1979

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	500,000	500,000
GRANT	300,000	300,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	200,000	200,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Secretariat of Agriculture

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

USDA, BUCEN

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS: Formulation of improved agricultural sector objectives, policies, and resource allocation for increasing agricultural production and small farmer income.

PURPOSES: Establish the capability within SEA to carry out agriculture sector analysis activities on a continuing basis.

OUTPUTS: ANSE group, with technical assistance, produces: a) planning information summarizing farm management, rural development and agriculture sector problems, issues, and alternative policies and programs; b) sector model in form that can be used for policy analyses when called upon; and c) a final edited data tape of 1979 farm survey, correlated with other farm management information.

INPUTS: GODR staff, technical assistance, training, commodities.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Dominican Republic
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agricultural Sector Analysis Phase II (517-0117), 1979

The Project is the last phase of a two-phase, grant funded program of AID assistance for sector analysis activities in the Dominican Republic (DR). The first phase project, funded by AID/W, introduced sector analysis methods to the Secretariat of Agriculture (SEA), and began to build up SEA's capability to carry out sector analysis activities. The second phase project was incorporated in the original program design. The purpose of the Agriculture Sector Analysis, Phase II Project (ANSE II is the Spanish acronym) is to establish the capability within SEA to identify farm problems and agricultural sector policy issues, to collect and process relevant information, to formulate policy alternatives and analyze their associated impacts, and to produce documented information which summarizes the results of analyses and presents relevant planning information to policy makers. ANSE II will emphasize the internalization of sector analysis capabilities within SEA through support of SEA's own follow-on sector analysis efforts. The Project is expected to establish SEA's capability to manage and carry out sector analysis activities without further major outside assistance.

The Project will provide assistance in the following three areas:

1. Analyses of existing data using a wide variety of intermediate level analytical methods, including in-country application of computer analytical software packages.
2. The agricultural sector model developed during phase one will be used for limited additional policy related analyses. The model's design and capabilities will be documented in order to enable further use of the model as desired.
3. Assistance on the 1979 farm survey in the areas of survey design, data editing and processing.

*Source: Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Dominican Republic	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	National Employment Policy (517-0121), 1978	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	691,000	691,000
GRANT	494,000	494,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	197,000	197,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

National Statistics Office, National Planning Office

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

BUCEN, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Universities, Personal Services Contractor

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS 1) Reduce existing high levels of unemployment and underemployment. 2) Integrate manpower and employment policies into the nation's development activities.

PURPOSES Establish within the GODR's Technical Secretariat of the Presidency's Offices of Statistics and Planning the capability to collect and analyze data and to formulate policies and strategies designed to reduce existing levels of unemployment and underemployment.

OUTPUTS 1) Review of existing employment literature. 2) Review of existing Dominican data and studies. 3) Review of GODR employment policies. 4) Design of household and establishment surveys and questionnaires and annual collection of data. 5) Participant training. 6) Formulation of employment policy and strategies.

INPUTS AID: Technical assistance, participant training, salary support, equipment, supplies. GODR: Professional and secretarial salaries, office space, office equipment, in-country travel, in-service training, computer time and programming.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Dominican Republic
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	National Employment Policy (517-0121), 1978

The purpose of this project is to establish within the GODR the capacity to collect and analyze data relating to the levels of employment, unemployment and underemployment and to formulate overall public policy and specific strategies designed to reduce the high levels of unemployment and underemployment that have become a characteristic feature of the nation's recent economic history. The objective will be achieved through a joint effort between the USAID and the Technical Secretariat of the Presidency's Offices of Statistics (ONE) and Planning (ONAPLAN). Before the end of the project, ONE will have designed and implemented a continuing nationwide household survey that will permit accurate estimates of the rates of unemployment and underemployment. In addition, ONE will also have redesigned and updated its establishment survey in order to compile and annually publish data in timely fashion on a wide variety of employment-related economic indicators including the size and location of the labor force, the number of hours worked, and rates of turnover and absenteeism. ONAPLAN, on the other hand, will train, equip, and augment its recently created employment unit so that by the end of the project it will have acquired the ongoing capability to analyze and interpret the data collected by ONE and will also have formulated a public policy and made specific recommendations with the objective of maximizing employment.

*Source: Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: LAC Regional (Dominican Republic)

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Sector Analysis (598-0554), 1975

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	437,445	437,445
GRANT	294,117	294,117
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	143,328	143,328
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Secretariat of Agriculture

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

AID, USDA, BUCEN, Consultants

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS: Use by the GODR, AID, and other donors of the analytical techniques developed as part of this project to: a) set objectives and strategies for the agricultural sector that are feasible and consistent, and b) allocate resources and utilize policy instruments in a manner consistent with achievement of these objectives and strategies.

PURPOSES: 1) Provide a profile of small and large farmers. 2) Compare income, production, and employment absorption performance of different farm groups and identify correlations between performance and factors which might be influenced by program and policy decisions. 3) Illuminate issues relating to farm management and farming systems. 4) Make available tools for determining resource allocation patterns and policies appropriate for achieving pre-established objectives. 5) Strengthen GODR medium- and long-run agricultural planning capacity.

OUTPUTS: 1) A final edited data set. 2) A document evaluating differences in patterns of farm operations, income and production levels, employment absorption, efficiency and opportunities, and attempting to associate them with agricultural factors. 3) Document(s) describing the various "representative" farm linear programming models constructed. 4) Document(s) describing the sector-wide model constructed.

INPUTS: Economists, programmers, statisticians, survey logistics, printing, keypunching.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY LAC Regional (Dominican Republic)

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Agricultural Sector Analysis (598-0554), 1975

Goal:

Use by the GODR, AID and other donors of the analytical techniques developed as part of this project to set objectives and strategies for the agricultural sector that are feasible and consistent, and to allocate resources and utilize policy instruments in a manner consistent with acheivement of these objectives and strategies.

Purposes:

1. Provide a profile of small and large farmers suitable for use in later phases of the analysis, for designing assistance activities, and for other kinds of policy analysis (Activity #1).
2. Compare income, production and employment absorption performance of farm groups of different sizes and in different regions of the country, and identify correlations between good and bad performance and factors that might be influenced by program and policy decisions (Activity #2).
3. Illuminate issues relating to farm management and farming systems (Activity #3). Examples would include farmer response to new varieties, technologies, price and interest rate changes, programs which reduce resource constraints, etc.
4. Make available tools for determining resource allocation patterns and policies appropriate for achieving pre-established objectives such as income levels and distribution, production and employment levels (consistent at the sector level) and for quantifying the trade-offs between objectives (Activity #4).
5. Strenghthen GODR medium and long-run agricultural planning capacity (all activities).

*Source: Activity Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: S&T/AGR/EPP (Dominican Republic)

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Comprehensive Resource Inventory and Evaluation System (931-0236), 1976

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	1,269,200	1,269,200
GRANT	1,081,800	1,081,800
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	0	0
OTHER (USDA, NASA)	187,400	187,400

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Secretariat of Agriculture

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

USDA, NASA

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS: 1) Assist developing countries to identify and analyze the consequences of alternative policies, programs, and prospects for agricultural and rural development in terms of their own multiple economic and social goals. 2) Improve the information and analytical basis for making decisions on agricultural and rural development strategies, policies, and investments. 3) Expand the number and enhance the capability of developing country planning personnel to construct and use such an information base and analytic system.

PURPOSES: 1) Select and apply techniques for collecting, classifying, collating, and documenting data on a country's land and water resources, land use, inputs and expected outputs, production costs, technology options, and institutional constraints. 2) Establish a system, using existing data management techniques and analytical processes, for evaluating these data. 3) Demonstrate the analytical capabilities of this system and test the reliability and usefulness of the results. 4) Develop procedures for linking the resource data and analytical system into a sector analysis. 5) Internalize the techniques developed as part of the project.

OUTPUTS: 1) A data management and analytical system capable of evaluating the resource/production potential of a developing country. 2) A data bank, including information on land and water resources, production levels and costs, technology options and institutional restraints, for each of the two test countries. 3) Selected analyses of resource constraints, production potentials, resource development programs, etc. for the two test countries. 4) In-country capability to construct and use this system in the two test countries.

INPUTS: Leadership staff, consultants, secretarial and clerical staff, field staff, support activities.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	S&T/AGR/EPP (Dominican Republic)
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Comprehensive Resource Inventory and Evaluation System (931-0236), 1976

Reliable estimates of the economic supply options of the resource base and, conversely, estimates of resource production adjustment and production response, would materially strengthen agricultural sector planning systems and expand the scope of questions that can be addressed by sector analysis techniques.

This Activity proposes to adapt existing methodology and techniques developed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) in the U.S. to the problem of assembling, classifying and systematically analyzing information to estimate agricultural supply options and resource potentials that reflect the quantity and quality of available resources, their relationships, economic determinants and institutional impediments. Further, the activity will be coordinated with, and linked to, an on-going sector analysis project in the Dominican Republic (DR) (and a planned sector analysis activity in a second Latin American country) to provide improved estimates of sector response and on-farm impacts of alternative policies and programs.

The resource inventory will be based upon Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS) imagery and tapes which are merged with soil and environmental information to divide resources into homogeneous units that are similar with respect to soil, slope, erosion, climate, water resources, type of farming, productivity, problems, and development potentials. For each of these unique resource units, production function data will be estimated for existing and potential crop options under reasonable alternative levels of technology.

The work will begin in the Dominican Republic and be extended to a second country over a 4 year period. The System will be internalized by developing the capability of country planning personnel to maintain, refine and utilize the system on a continuing basis. Seminars for improving procedures and acquainting other countries with the process are also planned.

*Source: Activity Paper.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Dominican Republic
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	Economic Growth, Equity and Agricultural Development in the Dominican Republic, 1979

The salient fact of the existential situation is the under-utilization of land and labor resources in the agricultural sector. While precise measurement of their undesirability awaits further development of the CRIES/SIEDRA project and information on the landless rural poor, there is little doubt that it is considerable. That is why the need to provide access by more people to more land (either in small farms or through group farms) has been identified as the most important constraint on the sector. Assuming the access problem is resolved, then priority next must go to complementary programs to provide the technology, water, other inputs, and technical assistance required for increased output and employment of small farmers.

Effective demand will rise if the production structure transfers the benefits of the increased production back to the population at large. But export markets are also required once production rises past the absorption capacity of the domestic market.

In spite of large public sector expenditures since the mid-1960s, and in spite of numerous programs that are individually highly successful, the measurable impact of the high rate of economic growth during 1965-77 on the rural poor has been negligible. Their productivity remains low. Underemployment remains high. There are still thousands of farm families trapped in a struggle for subsistence for which they are inadequately prepared in terms of resources and capabilities. There are still thousands of individuals dependent upon the earnings of landless, unskilled laborers. Rising output, increased employment, greater productivity of human and natural resources, and a more widespread enjoyment of improved standards of living, are the stated objectives of the government. Public expenditures on improvements in infrastructure, public services, and inputs are certainly necessary in observing a higher standard of rural living, but they are by no means sufficient. It is necessary to fundamentally reassess rural development as it has been sought in the Dominican Republic to date. It is time to reconsider the basic resource constraints and supporting economic and social services that limit the participation of the majority of rural population in the growth process.

*Source: Agricultural Sector Assessment.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Ecuador
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	Baseline Study of Agricultural Research, Education, and Extension in Ecuador, 1979

The study of the Research, Education, and Extension systems describes the present situation, identifies the limiting factors, and makes recommendations to improve the type, quality, and quantity of services necessary for the rural and agricultural development and growth of Ecuador.

The specific objectives of the study are:

a. To measure the capacity of the research institutions to develop packages of technology which can be put into practice in Ecuador, especially by the small- and medium-sized farmers; to measure these institutions' capacity to prepare and disseminate technical, economic, and social information.

b. To obtain quantitative and qualitative estimates of the capacity of the Ecuadorian educational institutions' professional and technical personnel to work in the research, education, and extension services, and in rural development, as well as to determine the best levels of specialization and training for professionals and technicians for the fulfillment of their functions.

c. To determine the administrative and distribution capacity of the extension services to disseminate technical, economic, social, and other information to farmers, especially small and medium-sized ones, in a useful and timely way.

d. To determine the physical, economic, and human requirements that the research-education-extension systems require for the fulfillment of the agricultural and rural development goals which may be established.

e. To design strategies to coordinate and integrate planning, implementation, and administration of the research-education-extension systems.

*Source: Baseline Study.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: El Salvador

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Development Planning (519-0166), 1975

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	730,000	730,000
GRANT	300,000	300,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	120,000	120,000
OTHER (IDB, Peace Corps)	310,000	310,000

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(s)

National Economic Planning Council

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Personal Services or Institutional Contractors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS: Bring about better allocation of resources to improve the quality of life of Salvadorans.

PURPOSES: Strengthen the ability of CONAPLAN to analyze socio-economic problems, with an emphasis on agriculture, education, health and population, in order to contribute effectively to the formulation and coordination of appropriate development policies and programs.

OUTPUTS: 1) Modification of plan to adjust to dynamics of development. 2) Special analyses in various areas of development. 3) Economists trained. 4) Statisticians trained. 5) Cost/benefit analysts trained. 6) Personnel trained in special areas of development. 7) Preparation of time-phased implementation plan.

INPUTS: Technical advisory services, participant training, counterparts.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY El Salvador

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Development Planning (519-0166), 1975

While there has been recent improvement in the performance of the National Economic Planning Council (CONAPLAN), the planning mechanism still remains somewhat weak. Part of this weakness is structural, but even more serious is the shortage of trained, professional manpower.

The purpose of this project is to strengthen CONAPLAN's ability to analyze El Salvador's basic socio-economic problems and recommend policies and projects that will contribute to attainment of development goals. Specifically, assistance will be provided to improve CONAPLAN's capacity to (1) analyze and formulate policies at a macro-economic level (i.e., those fiscal, monetary, and trade policies required to reach production/consumption targets and levels of investment and savings) and (b) analyze and judge sectoral plans and programs with an emphasis on health, education, and agriculture (i.e., analyze sectoral constraints, determine consistency with overall planning targets, determine adequacy of plans/programs addressing these constraints, and determine inter-sectoral resource allocation and coordination). Of major concern will be such AID-supported acitivities in rural development as informal education and population and nutrition (including new proposals in these areas) with the ultimate goal being that of increasing employment and improving the level of income of the low-income groups. This project complements other AID-supported on-going technical assistance activities within the planning division of the Ministries of Education, Agriculture, and Health.

The project is also directed at upgrading planning personnel at the professional level by providing appropriate CONAPLAN personnel with the necessary level of training, and by providing short-term technical advisors in subject matter areas of particular weakness and concerns.

*Source: Noncapital Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: El Salvador

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Multi-Purpose Household Survey (519-0176), 1977

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	1,245,000	1,245,000
GRANT	380,000	380,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	864,000	864,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Planning

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

BUCEN

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS: Establishment of a national system which meets the country's and USAID's needs for statistical data relative to social and economic development.

PURPOSES: Establishment of a continuing national, multi-purpose household sample survey providing data for planning and evaluation of development policies and programs in education, health, and agriculture, especially among the rural and urban poor.

OUTPUTS: 1) Organization of operational unit to carry out surveys. 2) Design of multi-purpose sample of households. 3) Six periodic household surveys and five supplemental surveys. 4) Personnel trained.

INPUTS: AID: survey technical advisors, participant training.
GOES: personnel; office space, furnishings, equipment; vehicles, maintenance, operation; services.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	El Salvador
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Multi-Purpose Household Survey (519-0176), 1977

The purpose of the proposed project is the establishment and institutionalization of a new statistical organization capable of operating and maintaining a periodic multipurpose household sample survey which will produce data for the planning and evaluation of development policies and programs. In addition to yielding a wide variety of data of known quality which will provide measures of change and indications of trends, the ready availability of such a statistical tool will also make possible in-depth socio-economic surveys and studies of the urban and rural poor majority. During the three-year duration of the project six surveys will be conducted with supplemental inquiries relating to priority subjects in education, health, family planning, agriculture and other areas of interest to be added to the basic vehicle after the first year.

In the absence of a sample survey capability, a number of Ministries such as Education, Health and Agriculture have begun to develop their own statistics organizations but they are limited in what they can carry forward owing to the absence of a household survey of the type proposed. For example, the Ministry of Education can study the characteristics of enrolled students, to whom they have ready access through the school system. The Ministry cannot, however, study the important question(s) of why children drop out or why they never enroll in the first place. The only way to locate such children is in a household survey and the Ministry of Education does not have the financial or manpower resoures to mount such a survey. The same is true of the other Ministries.

*Source: Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: El Salvador

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Reform and Policy Planning (519-0260), 1980

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	1,800,000	780,000
GRANT	1,350,000	585,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	450,000	195,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Planning

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

SIECA, Consultants, and Institutional Contractors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS: Improve the economic and social well-being of the poor in El Salvador.

PURPOSES: Provide the GOES with the assistance it requires to plan and begin basic and development reforms.

OUTPUTS: 1) Establish new Legal and Social Assistance Units. 2) Create Juvenile Vocational Centers. 3) Upgrade technical capacity of MinPlan with respect to economic planning. 4) Perform social and economic research that will contribute to the improvement of economic planning process.

INPUTS: Technical assistance, training, commodities.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY El Salvador

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Reform and Policy Planning (519-0260), 1980

The Project is structured in two basic components as summarized below:

1. Component One: Legal and Social Assistance. Comprises assistance for the initiation and pilot testing of several experimental activities in the human rights and resource sectors. Such activities will be coordinated by the Ministry of Planning (MinPlan) and implemented by the Protector General of the Poor, the Ministry of Justice, and related agencies. The assistance will advance legal reforms for the protection of basic human rights as well as extend new opportunities to the under-priviledged on a pilot basis. An estimated $630,000 in grant funding is allocated to Component One.

2. Component Two: Economic Policy and Planning Support. Provides support for a variety of priority planning activities. It will be implemented by the MinPlan in cooperation with several operating agencies for the government such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Interior, etc. Activities are anticipated to include formulation of the government's new, reform-oriented development activities, agriculture sector support and planning for employment generation, environmental improvement and municipal development. These activities are expected to result in requests for financing at the end of the Project. An estimated $585,000 in grant funding is allocated to Component Two.

Through the Agriculture Sector Planning activity, support will be provided to the Office of Sectoral Planning (OSPA) of the Ministry of Agriculture (MAG) in conducting a study related to sector planning and the agrarian reform process, with assistance from MinPlan. It is planned that a linear programming model will be applied to the agriculture sector, similar to the model developed by the ECID Center of SIECA. This model will be adapted for El Salvador at the MAG where technical personnel will be trained in its applications and analytical use. In addition to the study and model adaptation, project planning, design and evaluation assistance will be provided to OSPA.

*Source: Project Paper.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY S&T/AGR/EPP (El Salvador)

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR El Salvador Rural Poor Survey (931-0236), 1978

The Development Assistance Executive Committee (DAEC) review of the Agricultural Sector Assessment in El Salvador commended the assessment's relatively complete analysis of the rural poor, but noted gaps in available data which prohibited in-depth analysis of the landless poor and of the "landed" poor's off-farm employment patterns -- for both men and women. Given the numerical importance of these groups in El Salvador, the Latin American Bureau of AID recommended that a survey be conducted in 1978 which would identify development constraints and point to possible intervention strategies for the rural poor.

The proposed survey would consist of approximately 1,400 rural households selected on a nationwide random probability basis. This sample size is also adequate for regional subanalyses. The collected data would be used to construct profiles of the various categories of rural poor. The implications being that the rural poor are a heterogeneous group with many subcategories which require varied programs and strategies depending upon their characteristics. The socio-economic characteristics proposed for inclusion in constructing profiles are: (a) income, (b) employment data -- on-farm, off-farm and cottage industry, (c) morbidity, (d) health factors, (e) women's occupational roles, (f) credit use of the households, (g) social participation, (h) communication behavior, and (i) attitudes of the poor toward intervention strategies. Characteristics (a) through (f) are important in assessing the current situation of the various rural groups and for determining what is missing from a development standpoint. The rural poor's social participation and communication behavior are necessary for understanding ways of reaching these target groups with new programs. Lastly, the poor's own evaluation of their situation and their proposed solutions are invaluable in program construction.

*Source: Cooperative Agreement.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: S&T/AGR/EPP (El Salvador)

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Progress Indicators for the Rural Poor (931-0236), 1977

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	560,000	560,000
GRANT	560,000	560,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	0	0
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Agriculture, Institute for Agrarian Reform

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

SIECA and U.S. Institution

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS: Improved quality of life of the rural poor in El Salvador and other Central American countries.

PURPOSES: 1) Improve the ability of agricultural planning units in El Salvador to define rural development problems and policies affecting the rural poor. 2) Assist in and facilitate the replication of similar indicators systems in other Central American countries.

OUTPUTS: 1) Identification of a set of social-economic progress indicators sensitive to changes in rural development programs and policies. 2) Development of baseline data for the selected progress indicators. 3) Area frame sampling and household sureys being used to collect social-economic data on the rural poor in an integrated system.

INPUTS: Technical assistance, secretarial and data analysis support, travel and support funds, GOES country collaborators.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	S&T/AGR/EPP (El Salvador)
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Progress Indicators for the Rural Poor (931-0236), 1977

A "snapshot" of the rural man at one point in time can be useful for designing programs and policies to improve his welfare. It is necessary, however, to have a series of "snapshots" in order to determine if such programs and policies are in fact changing the quality of life in rural areas.

The AID progress indicators project is intended to identify the composition of the "snapshots" and to promote the institutionalization of a data collection system which will provide such "snapshots" periodically. As the system in GOES proves its feasibility, it can be replicated in other CA republics. The involvement of a SIECA technician in the project is intended to promote and ease its replicability.

The construction of such a system involves several steps:

1. A determination of the dimensions such as health and nutrition, education, etc. that the indicators will focus on.
2. Developing a preliminary list of indicators which experts in the development field acknowledge as important and which have some theoretical and empirical justification.
3. Assessing the availability of data to construct the desired indicators and determine additional data that is needed.
4. Use of household sample surveys and area frame sampling to generate more timely data and supplement the existing data.
5. Use of correlation analysis and other techniques to assist in the selection of the best indicators.
6. Institutionalization of a data collection and analysis system.
7. Preliminary statistical analysis of program impacts and changes in indicator values.
8. Continued analysis and selection of more appropriate indicators as warranted by user needs and inclusion of more complex linkage mechanisms into the system.

*Source: Activity Paper.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	El Salvador
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	Agriculture Sector Assessment: El Salvador, 1977

The primary data source for the farm level analysis was the 1971 Agricultural Census of El Salvador. The following types of data were provided by the census: a) land availability and distribution; b) land use and productivity patterns; c) yield patterns; d) technological indicators (fertilizer use, mechanization, irrigation); e) credit access and use; f) land tenure patterns; g) crop and product composition of output; h) subsistence patterns.

The census, however, did not contain farm level, crop by crop input-output data. The Ministry of Agriculture had physical input-output data for all crops and livestock enterprises based on a survey using the area sample frame. These data were collected in 1976 and reflect the 1975 crop year. To obtain value figures from these data, 1976 prices were applied.

The agroindustrial portion of the assessment is based on data contained in the 1971 industrial census. The census was taken on two different questionnaires depending on the scale of the plant. Those industrial establishments which had less than five workers are considered small scale. The industries which are selected as being agroindustries for purposes of the assessment are: on-farm processing of poultry, forest industry, fishing, food industries, coffee and miscellaneous industries, drinks, tobacco, textiles (spinning, weaving, finishing), textiles (clothing products), leather (except shoes and clothing), leather shoes, wood industries (except furniture), wood furniture.

The portions of the assessment which deal with the small farm and agroindustrial subsectors are summaries of a more detailed work. These more detailed analyses are contained in documents entitled: "An Analysis of Small Farms and Rural Poverty in El Salvador," and "Agroindustrial Profile: An Assessment of the Potential of Agroindustry to Contribute to the Income and Employment of the Rural Poor" which form Annex I and Annex II respectively.

The principal conclusion drawn from this assessment is that continued reliance on basic grains alone offers almost no hope for increasing the incomes of those living on small farms to levels considered acceptable under the A.I.D mandate. Farms of less that two hectares constitute 71 percent of all farms in the country and are mostly engaged in the production of basic grains. This group makes up more than half of the rural poor target group. This situation exists, in part, because of government incentives in the form of price supports, credit, research and technical assistance for basic grains production and a lack of these incentives for other higher value labor intensive crops. Other related factors are outlined below. Programs must be designed to increase land productivity because of its scarcity and to increase labor intensivity because of its abundance.

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*Source: Agricultural Sector Assessment.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Guatemala	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Small Farmer Development (520-0233), 1975	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	28,024,000	3,792,000
GRANT	1,875,000	825,000
LOAN	13,000,000	1,295,000
COUNTRY	10,649,000	1,672,000
OTHER (USG)	2,500,000	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Agriculture

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

USDA, Personal Services and Institutional Contractors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Improve the quality of life and increase the incomes of rural Guatemalans.

PURPOSES 1) Increase the productive capacity of small farmer land resources. 2) Open new lands for settlement by small farmer and landless poor. 3) Expand the farm-to-market transportation infrastructure. 4) Strengthen the capacity of public agricultural sector organizations to carry out planning, programming, and delivery of improved services and techical assistance to small farmers.

OUTPUTS 1) Mini-irrigation and soil conservation teams, Regional Project Office staff, loan fund, DIGESA social payment. 2) Access, social infrastructure, cooperative organized and functioning. 3) Roads construction. 4) Expanded Sector Planning and Coordination Office, integrated sector-wide training program.

INPUTS Technical assistance; cooperative infrastructure and services; cadester and land use studies; equipment, materials, supplies, and services; engineering; labor; vehicles; loan fund; funds for social payments; transportation and per diem.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY Guatemala

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Small Farmer Development (520-0233), 1975

Given the magnitude of the problem -- 87% of all farms in the highlands are less than seven hectares, and of these more than half are of 1.5 hectares or less; 60% of all rural families have a per capita income of $80 or less; the average wage for farm laborers is 80 cents per day; average size of farms in the highlands is dropping rapidly (50% over last 20 years); there are 200,000 landless laborers -- it is evident that there is no single solution to correcting what could well appear to be a hopeless cause. However, we believe there are measures available to the GOG which can alleviate such impacted conditions. Specifically, the Government can provide attractive alternatives to those willing to resettle away from the highlands; it can increase the productivity of those that remain through improved technology and improvements in their land resource base; and it can improve access to inputs, markets and other government services such as health and education. Finally, the government can modify its approach to public works to maximize their employment impact.

The project focuses on relieving the land constraint and improving the productive base in the most densely populated areas of the country. The pilot colonization activity will provide the GOG with an alternative, lower cost approach to settlement of the large tracts of vacant lands in the country. It is expected also to solidify the positions of member-owned cooperatives as vehicles for development in rural areas. Other initiatives are designed to assist the government in developing new programs for upgrading land resources through improved conservation practices and irrigation, as well as through improving access. These programs are designed to have a heavy employment generation impact as well. Finally, the project also provides assistance for upgrading public agriculture sector planning and human resource capabilities as a means for increasing the effectiveness of sector institutions in devising and implementing outreach programs.

*Source: Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Guatemala
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Integrated Area Development Studies (520-0249), 1978

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	875,000	875,000
GRANT	498,000	498,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	377,000	377,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Agriculture and National Institute for Municipal Development

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

AID and U.S. Land Grant Institutions

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Increase small farmer income and improve well-being in rural areas.

PURPOSES The development and adoption by the GOG and non-Government agencies of a systematic planning methodology for determining priorities and allocating resources to provide the infrastructure and services required to achieve the above goal.

OUTPUTS 1) Definition of rural/urban hierarchy and inventory of infrastructure and services. 2) Inventory of natural resources and determination of economic potential of each level of the rural/urban hierarchy. 3) Classification and mapping of information. 4) Initial screening of investment possibilities.

INPUTS Technical assistance, local staffing, commodities, office space, secretarial service, computer time, vehicle rental, operation and maintenance.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Guatemala
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Integrated Area Development Studies (520-0249), 1978

The sectoral goal which this project addresses is to improve the quality of life and increase of incomes of Guatemalans in rural areas. In addressing this goal, the Mission has focused its efforts on an area consisting of 206 municipalities which were defined as economically marginal or submarginal based upon a series of indicators of social and economic well-being. Many localities within the target area still lack access to the most basic infrastructure and public services to stimulate their development. Most are lacking in farm-to-market roads, accessible input and product markets, irrigation, energy for irrigation, and other agricultural production-related infrastructures. The coverage of services such as credit, extension, health posts and education is equally limited.

This project proposes to assist the GOG to evolve and implement a systematic methodology for (1) determining the type of infrastructure and services most required in each municipality, and (2) establishing priorities among communities for such investments.

The proposed project consists of the following steps:

(a) Conduct a study of the nature and spatial distribution of the existing infrastructure and services in each of 157 municipalities, and analyze their hierarchical inter-relationships.

(b) Conduct a study of the quality and spatial distribution of the natural resources, and their current and potential economic use of each of the same municipalities.

(c) Classify and map the information forthcoming from the above studies in such a way that the analyst can determine the suitability of an investment according to:

  i. The economic potential of the natural resource base at each investment site.

  ii. The need for specific types of public infrastructure and services in each site.

  iii. The suitability of locating an investment at each site given the spatial relationship of that site to the surrounding localities.

(d) Initial screening of investment possibilities, applying appropriate economic and social criteria, to establish priority investment programs and determine the most indicated sites for such investments.

*Source: Project Paper.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	LAC Regional (Guatemala)
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	Guatemala Farm Policy Analysis: The Impact of Small-Farm Credit on Income, Employment and Food Production, 1975

Guatemala, like many developing countries, has a large and growing rural population and a limited arable land base. Farmers live in conditions of extreme poverty, suffer high unemployment rates and have low food production levels. Over the last decade a variety of programs including credit, research, and extension have been undertaken to improve the rural situation. This study is an attempt to evaluate the impact of these programs on the three most important objectives for the Guatemalan agricultural sector. These are:

- Increasing food production
- Increasing small farmer net incomes (the "equity" objective)
- Increasing rural employment.

The analysis is based on data gathered by the Government of Guatemala from 1600 farms in 1974. Half of the sampled farms had been receiving institutional production credit (BANDESA) and technical assistance. The other half were selected as a control group of farms with similar size, endowment, and locational characteristics, but without institutional credit.

*Source: Analysis Report.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Guyana	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agriculture Sector Planning (504-0077), 1980	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	7,160,700	7,160,700
GRANT	1,898,000	1,898,000
LOAN	1,000,000	1,000,000
COUNTRY	4,262,700	4,262,700
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Economic Development

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

BUCEN, USDA or Private Consulting Firm

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Improve the standard of living of the rural population of Guyana.

PURPOSES 1) Institutionalize the capacity of the GOG for sustained and effective agricultural sector planning so as to develop policies, programs, projects, and budgets designed to increase productivity and farmer income. 2) Institutionalize the capacity of the GOG to establish and maintain a broad set of policy-relevant baseline data to facilitate the design, implementation, and evaluation of programs and projects.

OUTPUTS 1) 1982-83 Agricultural Sector Plan. 2) Acre and production estimates of major crops. 3) Agricultural sector budget. 4) Other special studies. 5) Personnel training -- in-country. 6) Personnel training -- off-shore. 7) Functioning computer center.

INPUTS AID: technical assistance, participant training, and computer hardware and related equipment. GOG: personnel, operating expenses, and facilities.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY Guyana

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Agriculture Sector Planning (504-0077), 1980

The Borrower/Grantee will be the Government of Guyana. The implementation of the project will be undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) through the Planning Department (PD), and by the Ministry of Economic Development (MED) through both the Statistics Bureau (SB), and the National Data Management Authority (NDMA).

During the five-year implementation period, the Project will seek to improve the GOG's agriculture sector planning capacity through strengthening of the three implementing entities. This strengthening will be brought about through the provision of technical assistance of long- and short-term advisors and participant training financed by the Grant and through establishment of a computer center.

The computer center, financed by the Loan, will be managed by the NDMA. This center will further enhance agriculture sector planning by strengthening SB's ability to process and tabulate sectoral statistics and PD's ability to analyze those statistics.

*Source: Project Paper.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Guyana
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	The Income and Production of Guyana Rural Farm Households, 1980

This report is part of a broader effort by USAID and the Government of Guyana to improve the information available on the agricultural sector in the country. The report is based primarily on the new information available from the 1979 Survey of Rural Farm Households conducted by the Government of Guyana with financial and logistical assistance sponsored by USAID.

The purpose of the survey was to obtain reliable national and regional estimates of the following:

- Incomes of rural farm households with an identification and detailed profile of the low-income target groups;
- Acreage and production of crops and livestock;
- Use and potential of various agricultural programs.

Chapter 1 provides a summary of the major findings of this report and their implications for program and policy development.

Chapter 2 of this report discusses the setting of agriculture in the Guyana national economy, both its domestic and international sectors. It also considers the Guyana goals for economic and agricultural development as well as the U.S. goals for its foreign assistance program.

Chapter 3, on the income of rural farm households, presents a comparative analysis of the target and non-target groups in terms of total income, household characteristics related to income, off-farm and farm sources of income, and the receipts and expenditures which determine the farm portion of net income.

Chapter 4 presents the total capital used in terms of land, livestock and machinery by target and non-target households. Aspects of land use for different size farms are analyzed.

Chapter 5 focuses on the productivity and efficiency of farm production of the target and non-target households, as measured not only by yields, but also by net economic returns. The problems of obtaining needed supplies, services, and credit are also considered.

*Source: Agricultural Sector Assessment.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Guyana
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	Baseline Study of Agricultural Research, Education, and Extension in Guyana, 1981

This Baseline Study of the Agricultural Research, Education and Extension (REE) System in the Cooperative Republic of Guyana has been conducted at the specific request of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) in anticipation of a major restructuring of the country's agricultural services. Recognizing the importance of research, education and extension to the overall development of agriculture in Guyana, the Government of Guyana is seeking ways to improve the current REE system. Financial support for the study was provided by USAID which contracted with the South-East Consortium for International Development (SECID), a consortium of U.S. universities, to provide the technical assistance for the study. In turn, SECID contracted with Tuskegee Institute, a member university in Alabama to serve as the lead American institution. The SECID/Tuskegee Team was composed of ten members from Tuskegee Institute, two from Auburn University and one from the University of Maryland. SECID staff provided management and editorial services for the project.

The study was collaborative in nature; that is to say, the study was conducted by the SECID/Tuskegee Team in conjunction with personnel from the Guyanese Ministries of Agriculture and Education. This approach was considered essential in producing a well-designed system tailored to existing conditions in Guyana. Although several members of the team had previous experience in Guyana, the Guyanese agriculturalists possessed an in-depth understanding of their REE system and were able to share this with the American team. On the other hand, the SECID/Tuskegee Institute team members, lacking the vested interests which come with working within the system, were able to analyze the Guyanese REE system objectively. This afforded a "fresh" look at the system and made for recommendations unencumbered with preconceptions. Furthermore, the SECID/Tuskegee team was able to bring its prior experience with another REE system to bear on the analysis of the Guyanese system. Therefore, the collaborative approach provided the means for combining the in-depth knowledge of the Guyanese team with the objectivity and analytical skills of the SECID/Tuskegee team. Hopefully, the result can serve as the basis for relevant change in the Guyanese REE system.

*Source: Baseline Study.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Haiti

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Development Support II (521-0092), 1978

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	6,373,000	1,408,000
GRANT	4,047,000	765,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	2,326,000	643,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural Development (DARNDR)

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

USDA or U.S. Land Grant Institution

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS: Improve the standard of living of the Haitian rural poor.

PURPOSES: Establish in DARNDR the institutional ability to conduct agricultural research and agricultural statistics surveys of adequate volume and reliability to sustain the Haitian small farmer agricultural/rural development program.

OUTPUTS: 1) Technology packages: farming systems, maize, sorghum, beans, vegetables, coffee, sugar cane, forestry. 2) Research facilities. 3) Trained personnel. 4) Transportation facilities. 5) Sampling frame. 6) Reorganization plan for SERA. 7) Research programs organized, with coordinators. 8) Research Advisory Councils. 9) Social systems descriptions for watersheds. 10) Cost of production and analysis for technological packages. 11) Baseline and series surveys.

INPUTS: AID: technical assistance, participant training, commodities, aerial photo services, and construction. GOH: personnel, cooperative services, commodities, POL and vehicle maintenance, building and equipment (in-kind), training (in-service).

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Haiti
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agricultural Development Support II (521-0092), 1978

The purpose of this four-year project is to develop the institutional capability of the Haitian Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (DARNDR) to conduct and coordinate a national program of agricultural research and statistics to support the country's agricultural development program. Current agricultural research and statistical activity in Haiti is highly fragmented, does not respond to the complex array of economic and ecological forces that affect small-scale agriculture and is of insufficient volume to have a favorable impact upon farm income and productivity. Therefore, a principal objective of the project will be to provide small farmers with readily adaptable technological recommendations or "packages" for small farm crops. These packages, agronomic and/or managerial in nature, will concentrate on those crops and agricultural practices that will most directly assist the small farmer to increase his income and productivity.

During the project's first year, a comprehensive review will be conducted of the current state of Haitian agricultural research and technical information outreach. This review will lead to the introduction, testing and evaluation of provisional packages that will be further refined at the experiment stations. Also, a national research plan will be developed and regularly updated that will identify priority research to be undertaken and resources required for implementation. Finally, the upgrading of DARNDR's statistical service will permit reliable crop forecasts and the formulation of valuable time series data on agricultural production, farmgate prices and consumption.

*Source: Project Paper.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Haiti
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	Agricultural Development in Haiti: An Assessment of Sector Problems, Policies, and Prospects Under Conditions of Severe Soil Erosion, 1978.

This sector assessment is the product of research carried out intermittently between June 1977 and May 1978. The format for this study follows closely the Agricultural Sector Assessment Guidelines prepared by AID's Bureau for Latin America, though some modifications have been made. No primary data collection was deemed appropriate at this time. The study incorporates material on land tenure, income, and employment prepared by the author in draft form in August 1977 and revised in March 1978. It also draws on a variety of other published and unpublished studies listed at the end of this document. USAID/Haiti staff and consultants who have contributed material for incorporation into the sector assessment include Harold Bauman, Pierre Brisson, Lloyd Clyburn, Joseph Conrad, Jacques Defay, Leslie Delatour, William Garvey, Jean Lafontant, Linda Morse, James Purcell, Terry Roe, William Sugrue, Elias Tamari, and perhaps others whose names inadvertently have been omitted.

There is no formal "Summary and Conclusions" section to this document, but readers whose time is limited are referred to Chapter 7.B for a summary discussion of the constraints to agricultural development identified in Chapters 4-6. Table 7.1 lists these constraints and assigns them a tentative ranking according to their degree of importance (1=major; 2=moderate; 3=minor). Our proposed strategy and program is presented in Chapter 7.H. Given the constraints facing agricultural development in Haiti, and the serious absorptive capacity of institutions in the agricultural sector, this writer recommends that AID efforts in the next few years concentrate on consolidation and improvement of existing programs, and on institution building, including a variety of short- and long-term training programs, both in-country and abroad (with emphasis on the former). This does not preclude the initiation of large-scale projects, but these should be relatively few in number.

Specific projects and programs are recommended in the following areas:

a. Erosion Control and Erosion Control/Irrigation Packages

b. Institution Building
   1) Base-level Organizations
   2) Ministry of Agriculture (DARNDR)
   3) Credit
   4) Research

c. Coffee Production and Marketing

d. Rural Road Construction

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*Agricultural Sector Assessment

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Honduras	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agriculture Sector Program (522-0100), 1974	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	20,707,000	1,341,000
GRANT	0	0
LOAN	12,000,000	821,000
COUNTRY	8,707,000	520,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Natural Resources, Office of Sector Planning

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

USDA, Private Contractors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Improve the well-being of the rural poor of Honduras.

PURPOSES 1) Support the effective expansion of Honduran institutional outreach to embrace increasing numbers of peasants and small farmers. 2) Support the Honduran agrarian reform effort.

OUTPUTS 1) Small farmer credit mechanisms: model asentamiento activity and cooperatives and associations. 2) Sector coordination, management, planning, and evaluation. 3) Agriculture services: extension service support, vehicle maintenance, and improved seed system. 4) Agricultural education. 5) Asentamiento access roads.

INPUTS Credit, personnel, technical assistance, revolving seed fund, equipment and parts, academic training, demonstration materials, vehicle purchase, construction.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY Honduras

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Agriculture Sector Program (522-0100), 1974

The overall Goal of the Sector Program is to improve the well-being of the rural poor of Honduras. The specific purposes of the Loan are (a) to support the effective expansion of Honduran institutional outreach to embrace increasing numbers of peasants and small farmers, and (b) to support the Honduran agrarian reform effort.

A multi-faceted program whose activities are mutually supportive and whose unifying principles are the above Purposes, will be financed under the Loan, with grant assistance to be provided in selected areas. An AID-GOH financed model "asentamiento" (settlement) activity will serve as an evolving prototype from which lessons may be learned even as the broader asentamiento program (the cutting edge of the agrarian reform) unfolds. A cooperative activity sets the groundwork for the private institutional structure to absorb the new farmer organizations being created through the agrarian reform effort. A management, planning and evaluation activity will help institutionalize capacity to enable the GOH to plan, organize and manage the sector effort. An asentamiento access road activity tied into the model asentiamiento activity will provide better access for existing asentamientos and provide access for new asentamientos within clusters selected for the model activity. Agriculture services (including extension service support, an improved-seed system activity and vehicle maintenance) will provide necessary support to the expanding outreach of the Ministry of Agriculture. Finally, an agriculture education activity will address the needs of the sector for trained manpower.

*Source: Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Honduras	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agriculture Sector II Program (522-0150), 1979	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	49,011,000	8,221,000
GRANT	4,000,000	728,000
LOAN	21,000,000	3,821,000
COUNTRY	24,011,000	3,672,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Natural Resources, National Development Bank, National Agrarian (Reform) Institute, General Office of Statistics and Census

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

USDA, NASA, Contractors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS 1) Increase incomes of the rural poor in Honduras. 2) Increase the capacity of the Agricultural Sector to absorb and use efficiently domestic and foreign resources (human, financial, natural, and technological) so that they can be brought to bear more effectively on the problems of the rural poor.

PURPOSES Establish efficient and cost-effective institutional structures and delivery systems to serve the needs of small farmers.

OUTPUTS 1) Human resources system. 2) Institutional development system. 3) System for delivery of services and related inputs.

INPUTS Professional personnel, technical assistance, support personnel, travel, per diem, vehicles, training, computer and related equipment, supplies and services.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY Honduras

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Agriculture Sector II Program (522-0150), 1979

The ultimate objective of this Program is to increase the incomes of the rural poor in Honduras. The Program's sub-goal is to increase the capacity of the agriculture sector to absorb and efficiently use domestic and foreign resources (human, financial, natural, and technological) so that they can be more effectively brought to bear on the problems of the rural poor.

The Program seeks to establish efficient and cost-effective institutional structures and delivery systems to serve the needs of small farmers. Attainment of the Program's purpose will be indicated by the following conditions at the conclusion of the Program's execution: (i) There is an increased number and improved quality of trained professionals working in the sector. More specifically, there is a decreased reliance on foreign experts, especially at CURLA (Centro Universitario Regional del Litoral Atlántico); the percentage of Honduran faculty at CURLA with at least Master's Degrees or better increases from 16% in 1978 to at least 33%; at least 235 officials working in public agricultural institutions have benefitted from post-graduate training programs and at least 45% of public agriculture employees have received in-service training. (ii) There are permanent systems to determine agricultural training requirements, both in-country and overseas, for public sector employees. (iii) There is an in-country capability to train all B.A./B.S.-level technicians required in the agriculture sector. (iv) There will be improved mechanisms through which agricultural services can be delivered to reform sector and non-reform sector farmers (i.e., small traditional farmers). The Extension Service alone will be reaching at least 80% of all reform sector farmers and 25% of all non-reform sector farmers, based on 1978 levels. (v) A system exists by which local or zonal infrastructure needs (e.g., access roads, storage structures, irrigation systems) are identified and projects implemented. (vi) The National Development Bank (BNF) has a strong regional program, and is lending to substantially more target farmers than in 1977. It also has an improved financial position and reduced default rates. (vii) There is improved regional and national coordination among Extension, Research, the National Agrarian Institute (INA), the BNF, and other sector institutions. (viii) There will be increased participation (regional and beneficiary) in the planning and execution of agricultural development programs. (ix) Individual institutions in the sector will have strengthened analytical and planning units. (x) There is an effective sector-wide system for policy analysis, planning, budgeting and evaluation. (xi) The percentage of actual budget expenditures vs. planned expenditures for all sector institutions will increase from 70% in 1978 to 85% by 1983. (xii) Agricultural data and information will be more reliable and accessible to public sector institutions and farmers.

*Source: Project Paper.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Honduras
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	Agriculture Sector Assessment for Honduras, 1978

This sector assessment was conceived, and its methodology designed, to achieve three discrete but related ends: (1) for use as the Government of Honduras believes appropriate in the formulation of the agricultural sector portion of its five year National Development Plan 1979-1983; (2) as the analytical basis for a second AID sector loan in support of the Honduran program; and (3) for use by the Government of Honduras in providing guidance to agriculture sector agencies in the planning and execution of their operations.

With the above purposes in mind a draft scope of work along the lines of that attached to the June 1977 PID was discussed with representatives of the Ministry of Natural Resources and the National Planning Council in order to ensure that the interests of all participants in the process could adequately be met. This resulted in some expansion of the draft scope of work prepared by USAID, e.g., provision was made for studies of certain aspects of national parks development and wildlife protection. It was also decided to go into greater depth in the macro-economic study.

This final scope of work, thus agreed upon, provided for undertaking studies, surveys and/or organizing data in 24 discrete subject matter categories. (See Annex H for a detailed listing.) All but one item, i.e., the planned for study on agrarian reform, were carried to completion. Four of the topics were dealt with in house by USAID staff, one topic (water resources) was covered by a USAID financed study commissioned earlier, and one study (agricultural research) was produced under an arrangement between GOH and the International Agricultural Development Service (IADS). The remaining studies were contracted with consulting firms or individuals. Twenty-one of the studies are to be published in Spanish in a two-volume printed edition and given wide distribution as a basic reference work. It is made clear in the Introduction to the publication that the content of each individual study represents the point of view of the author -- who was given complete freedom to come to his individual conclusions -- and not necessarily that of either the Government of Honduras or AID. The twenty-second item (a collection of 1974 Agricultural Census data disaggregated on a regional basis) will be printed or reproduced and distributed separately in a smaller number of copies. The final item, a study on Price Policies, is considered not to be in final form and will not be included in the printed edition.

*Source: Agricultural Sector Assessment.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Jamaica	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	National Planning (532-0039), 1976	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	630,000	630,000
GRANT	375,000	375,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	175,000	175,000
OTHER (IDB)	80,000	80,000

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministries of Finance, Agriculture, Education, Public Service, Health and Environmental Control, National Water Authority

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

USDA, U.S. Contractors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Increase the utilization of available development resources.

PURPOSES Establish a GOJ capability in project design and management that will: a) increase the number of Jamaican development projects available for financing by foreign and domestic sources, and b) improve project implementation and reduce project completion time.

OUTPUTS 1) Jamaican Project Development Resource Team (PDRT) with training and experience. 2) Work groups in government ministries trained in project preparation and implementation. 3) A Jamaican training manual for project preparation and execution.

INPUTS AID: technical assistance and commodities. GOJ: staff and logistical support. IDB: technical assistance.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY Jamaica

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR National Planning (532-0039), 1976

The project will be implemented by the Investment Planning and Projects Division (IPPD) of the Ministry of Finance in coordination with the Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Public Service, Health and Environmental Control, National Water Authority and possibly one or two others. These latter entities will provide the appropriate sector specialists to form Project Development Working Teams within each ministry. The composition of these Working Teams will be determined by the nature of the subsector activity which will be projectized. The IPPD will form a Project Development Resource Team (PRDT) from its own members to train and consult with the various Ministry Work Groups. External assistance to this PDRT is designed to impart the skills and methods to make them a self-sustaining nucleus in meeting GOJ needs.

Purpose: The purpose of the project is to: Establish a GOJ capability in project design and management that will:

a) increase the number of Jamaican development projects available for financing by foreign and domestic sources; and

b) improve the project implementation process and consequently reduce projects' completion time.

End of Project Status: A Jamaican capability to fully design projects will exist as well as an experienced consultative team, the Project Development Resource Team. More than 40 projects will have been designed in the period 1977-1980 (33 during years 1977-79). It is expected that the PDRT/Working Teams will design and develop approximately ten projects per year. Additionally, the project expenditure rate will have been increased by 40% during 1977-1980 over the base period 1973-1976.

*Source: Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Jamaica	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agricultural Planning (532-0061), 1979	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	5,342,000	5,342,000
GRANT	2,328,000	2,328,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	3,014,000	3,014,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Agriculture

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

U.S. Contractors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Provide increased MOA technical planning, administrative, and logistical support for the Jamaican rural/agricultural sector effort to improve production and incomes at all sector levels, especially the small farmer.

PURPOSES Increase the institutional capability of the MOA to: a) collect organize and analyze relevant data; b) upgrade its level of personnel, both quantitatively and qualitatively; c) improve its administration and management; d) identify and satisfy its ongoing training requirements; and e) utilize these factors effectively to meet the stated project goal.

OUTPUTS 1) Increased mobility for data collection and management officers. 2) Improved data processing capability. 3) Upgraded data collection processing, and management staff. 4) Upgraded MOA training facilities. 5) Improved MOA training management capability. 6) Development of data and policy analysis capability. 7) Improved capability in project evaluation.

INPUTS Technical assistance, training, and commodities (computer hardware and software, vehicles, equipment, and spare parts).

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY Jamaica

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Agricultural Planning (532-0061), 1979

One of the primary objectives of USAID/Jamaica is to help the GOJ analyze and respond to the problems of the small farmer. This agricultural planning project provides training, technical assistance, and commodities to address deficiencies in:

a. data collection and management;

b. data policy analysis;

c. project evaluation; and

d. training administration.

The improved capacity to produce and manage accurate and relevant data for policy analysis and project planning purposes will:

a. provide the MOA with a cadre of skilled professionals capable of projectizing the agriculture sector portion of the Five-Year Plan so as to benefit the small-farm sub-sector;

b. support MOA endeavors to decentralize project planning to the regional level;

c. facilitate utilization of techniques transferred under the USAID/GOJ National Planning Project; and

d. be coordinated with the German Volunteer Service attempt to introduce a system of small-farm accounting records.

The GOJ has determined that increasing the capacity of the MOA in training, planning, implementation, and evaluation is necessary if further efforts to develop the agricultural sector are to be successful. A start was made with the April 1977 establishment of the Training Division and the Data Bank and Evaluation Division. The capabilities of these units are limited by the lack of a sufficient number of well-trained personnel and the lack of equipment for efficient servicing of various client needs. This reduces the availability and timeliness of cropping, livestock, marketing, and extension information. The Agricultural Planning Project is designed to correct these problems. The MOA recognizes these problems as major current bottlenecks to increased agricultural production for domestic consumption and for export. This recognition has been demonstrated by the MOA through (a) recent reorganizations designed to deal with these problems; (b) analysis and policy statements in the November 1973 GOJ Green Paper on the Agriculture Sector; and (c) the GOJ Five-Year Development Plan (1978 - 1982). This recognition facilitates GOJ assignment of the necessary material, human, and financial resources, as outlined in this project paper, for accomplishment of the project sub-goals and purposes.

*Source: Project Paper.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Jamaica
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	The Small Farmer in Jamaican Agriculture: An Assessment of Constraints and Opportunities, 1978

Our main concern in this assessment of the agricultural sector is the small farmer: the conditions under which he is operating, the role he is playing -- and might play -- in the continuing transition from a traditional to a more modern agriculture, and his present and future welfare. The small farmer is viewed, however, against the background of the agricultural sector as a whole. In switching the spotlight from one to the other, matters implicit in this relationship have been brought to the surface for review and examination. One result of this process has been the confirmation (to some) and the discovery (to others) that the rhetoric on behalf of the small farmer, for the past couple of decades, has been greater than the value received. What the small farmer has obtained is a small, and in certain instances a declining, share of the technical and financial assistance intended for this sector. It should be added -- to the disadvantage and detriment of both.

Although successive Governments have shown a continuing interest in the welfare of the small farmer in the postwar period, it cannot be said that a consensus ever emerged with respect to his potential to contribute to his own welfare and to the Nation's goals in this sector. The present study is an effort to bring together the relevant data on this subject, to update 'old' data where possible, to identify the key constraints to the improvement of his condition, and to offer some suggestions for their neutralization. It is hoped that the study will serve as a basis for action in specific areas.

The assessment is divided into two parts. Part I (Volume I) is an island-wide view of the small farmer. It deals with the characteristics of the small farmer and the conditions under which he is operating. It examines the constraints which press upon him at various levels: economic, social, administrative, and cultural.

Part II (Volume II) deals with the small farmer in the Portland Region (West Portland and Eastern St. Mary parishes). The project area consists essentially of the constituency of Western Portland plus that portion of the constituency of Eastern Portland that includes Port Antonio, and the part of Eastern St. Mary parish contained within the Portland Region (defined by the Town and Country Planning Department).

*Source: Agricultural Sector Assessment.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Jamaica
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	Baseline Study of Agricultural Research, Education, and Extension in Jamaica, 1979

This baseline study of the research, education, and extension system of Jamaica was conducted at the request of the Government of Jamaica, and carried out through a contract signed June 4, 1979, between the University of Kentucky and the United States Agency for International Development. The study team attended an orientation and training session in Washington, D.C. June 11-13, 1979, and four members of the team departed immediately for Jamaica. A fifth member joined the team in Jamaica one week later. The team departed Jamaica on August 3, 1979, after preparing the initial draft report and leaving materials for review by USAID and officials of the Government of Jamaica. Two team members returned to Jamaica December 4-8 to discuss a final draft report.

The objective of the study was to obtain, analyze, and document information relevant to the present capacity and capability of Jamaican agricultural research, education, and extension (REE) institutions to provide the kind, quality, and quantity of services necessary for agricultural growth and development.

The team was directed to prepare a report, to the extent feasible, in accordance with the Baseline Study Methodology. Preliminary discussions during the Washington conference June 11-13 indicated that the methodology might not be totally applicable due to lack of information in some categories. The team was advised that the methodology could be modified somewhat as required to meet the objective above.

A sincere and serious attempt was made to adhere as closely as possible to the Baseline Methodology developed by and provided to the team by BIFAD. Although the methodology provides a logical and objective framework for evaluating a country's research, education, and extension system, many of the data required to fully implement this approach are simply not available in a developing country. Some portions of the methodology would be extremely difficult to fulfill even with the information processing and retrieval systems available in the most economically advanced nations. Thus, implementation of the methodology required a substantial amount of judgement on the part of individual team members and their counterparts at all stages of the study, and entailed the making of a number of assumptions whose validity may be subject to challenge.

*Source: Baseline Study.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Nicaragua	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agricultural Planning and Statistical Services (524-0105), 1974	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	2,839,000	2,839,000
GRANT	815,000	815,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	2,024,000	2,024,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Agriculture, Institute of Statistics and Census

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

AID, USDA, University Contractor

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Assist the GON to plan, organize, and implement long-term development activities.

PURPOSES 1) Establish a unit to collect agricultural statistics required for rural development planning. 2) Develop an analytical, planning and evaluation unit for the rural sector.

OUTPUTS 1) Better primary current agricultural data. 2) Crop and livestock estimates. 3) Special statistical studies. 4) Renewable natural resources program. 5) Evaluation of rural income distribution. 6) Evaluation of rural employment. 7) Plans for farm management. 8) Evaluation of crop production.

INPUTS Technical advisory services, participant training, commodities.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Nicaragua
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agricultural Planning and Statistical Services (524-0105), 1974

Since 1970, international donor and lending institutions have placed increasing emphasis upon the performance of sector studies or sector analysis to determine development constraints and to assist in the establishment of host country development priorities as a pre-condition for the granting of development loans or grants. The creation and development of the proposed analysis planning and evaluation unit, which would work with reliable statistical data generated by the agricultural statistical unit, would provide a continuing analytical and planning capability within the GON.

This unit will address such problems as rural income distribution, rural employment, development and conservation of renewable natural resources, farm management, agricultural production, agricultural marketing and manpower development. It will develop plans for projects or programs to alleviate or overcome problems identified in each area studied.

This project provides for 1) the creation of an agricultural statistics unit to become a part of the Institute of Statistics and Census that is scheduled to be given autonomous status in January 1974, and 2) transformation of the agricultural sector analysis work group into an analysis, planning and evaluation unit that will function in the Ministry of Agriculture. This unit will do the economic research planning and evaluation for the entire agricultural sector. Consideration is also being given to strengthening this unit, beginning in 1975, to enable it to become the implementation unit of the GON to manage international lending in the sector. Ideally, all central and autonomous agencies would be subordinate to it, insofar as allocation of public funds for agriculture are concerned.

Close coordination between the two units will be maintained and joint decisions will be reached on precisely what data will be collected annually. Furthermore, the methodology employed will be mutually agreed upon. These provisions assure that there will be a close working relationship between the two project activities.

One final issue to be addressed is whether or not the importance of timely agricultural statistics justifies the establishment of a separate and independent data processing unit, or whether the needs of the sector can be met by relying on facilities in general use by all government agencies, or through contracting for processing outside of Nicaragua. The GON has one computer physically located in the Ministry of Finance that all agencies rely upon for data processing. At present, earthquake related efforts are given priority, and it has been impossible to rely upon this facility for agricultural data. The Central Bank has only one computer programmer, who cannot stay current on demands for his services. The 1971 agricultural census was processed through an arrangement with the University of Missouri. USAID foresees the need to supply at least temporary financial assistance to contract processing of data, until this issue is resolved by the GON and appropriate investments made.

*Source: Noncapital Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Nicaragua	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Rural Development Sector Loan (524-0118), 1975	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	36,600,000	6,000,000
GRANT	0	0
LOAN	14,000,000	2,000,000
COUNTRY	22,600,000	4,000,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Ministry of Agriculture,
Institute for Campesino Development

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

IICA, Personal Services and
Institutional Contractors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Improve the standard of living and quality of life of the rural poor of Nicaragua.

PURPOSES 1) Support the GON's plan for establishing the Nicaraguan Agricultural Public Sector under the overall planning direction of a restructured Ministry of Agriculture. 2) Assist the GON develop and operate its new Institute for Campesino Development (INVIERNO) and thus provide an operational instrument for reaching increasing numbers of rural poor.

OUTPUTS 1) Convert Ministry of Agriculture into a planning, program, budgeting, and evaluation unit for the Agriculture Public Sector by developing a Department of Sector Planning, a Regionalization Program, and a National Training Center. 2) Create Institute for Campesino Development. 3) Develop Institute's rural service and delivery system. 4) Develop rural communities and market towns.

INPUTS Advisory services, commodity assistance, construction of office facilities, staffing and operating costs, rural regional planning assistance, in-country training courses, international training, organization and institution-building assistance, adaptive research and development of small farmer technological packages, agricultural credit program, land resource adjustment program, input supply and marketing, cooperative development.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY Nicaragua

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Rural Development Sector Loan (524-0118), 1975

The first component of the A.I.D. assisted sector program will support GON plans to convert its Ministry of Agriculture into the planning, program budgeting and evaluation unit for the Agriculture Public Sector thus assuring that an institutional mechanism exists for carrying out the policy objectives of the GON's 1975-80 Rural Development Program. The A.I.D. loan will therefore support the GON plan of formally creating the Nicaraguan Agriculture Public Sector under the policy, planning and program budgeting guidance of a restructured and revitalized Ministry of Agriculture.

A.I.D. loan funds of approximately $2.0 million will be combined with GON counterpart funds totaling approximately $4.0 million for developing in the Ministry of Agriculture a Department of Sector Planning, a Regionalization Program and a National Training Center. These new units will provide the MOA with the necessary instruments to plan, coordinate and upgrade sector activities and implement expanded programs that can better serve the needs of the rural poor of Nicaragua.

The Department of Sector Planning will institutionalize the Nicaraguan Agricultural Sector Assessment that was developed in the period 1972-74 and will provide a permanent sector planning, program budgeting, project development and evaluation capability for the agriculture public sector. The Regionalization Program will establish a regional planning and coordinating mechanism to improve field implementation of sector activities. And the National Training Center will provide a vehicle for upgrading the technical and managerial personnel that are operating sector institutions.

The second component of the A.I.D. supported sector program will assist the GON develop and operate its new Institute for Campesino Development (INVIERNO). This institution is specifically designed to increase the operational capacity of the Nicaraguan public sector to reach the rural poor who previously have had limited or no access to development resources and services required to increase their productivity and improve their well-being. Thus, the development of a capacity to plan and coordinate overall sector policies aimed at improving the standard of living of the rural population, as described in component one, is to be matched by a new specialized agency (INVIERNO) that will increase the operational capacity of the sector to design and carry out expanded programs for the rural poor thereby overcoming the institutional constraints that had adversely affected such programs in the past.

*Source: Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Paraguay	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agricultural Planning and Statistics (526-0104), 1975	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	593,000	593,000
GRANT	341,000	341,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	252,000	252,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(s)

Ministry of Agriculture

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Long-Term Consultant, Personal Services Contractor, USDA, IICA

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Improved agricultural sector policies and plans which are based on appropriate economic studies and utilize reliable statistics.

PURPOSES Establishment of a capability within the MAG to develop realistic analyses and rational plans for the agricultural sector.

OUTPUTS 1) Small farmer sub-sector assessment. 2) MAG budgets. 3) Economic policy, planning, and evaluative studies. 4) Annual sample surveys. 5) Annual forecast surveys.

INPUTS U.S. technicians -- long-term and short-term; participant training; commodities, operational travel, computer rental, surveys; personnel.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Paraguay
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agricultural Planning and Statistics (526-0104), 1975

A Technical Unit (Gabinete Técnico) was established on January 6, 1975, under the office of the Minister of Agriculture to take over the highest level planning and policy functions within the Ministry of Agriculture (MAG). We believe that this decision places the planning function at a useful operation level in the MAG. The creation of the Technical Unit at this time is consistent with the decision made jointly between MAG and the Mission to develop a competence in planning and policy. Four young technicians were selected for graduate training in agricultural economics (planning and economic analysis) at the Masters level in the U.S.A. under the Agricultural Institutional Development Project FY 1970-1974. Three of these have now returned and two have been incorporated into the Technical Unit with the third assigned part time.

The present project provides funding for a long-term consultant to advise the Technical Unit and for a portion of the costs of the small farmer sub-sector assessment which is being prepared jointly by the Mission and the Technical Unit.

Statistical activities in the MAG were originally conducted by a small poorly staffed division (9 personnel) under the Marketing Department and the main activities were limited to poorly conducted agricultural censuses. With the assistance of a USDA statistics advisor, the first annual national sample survey was undertaken in 1970 with production estimates for 9 crops plus livestock inventory. The survey presently provides production estimates for 19 crops and for livestock inventory and forecasting of planted acreage for 4 crops. Annual crop forecasting surveys were initiated in 1971 for 5 crops. At present, this covers 6 crops.

USAID's assistance, through the Agricultural Institutional Development Project and P.L. 480 funds, concentrated in training key personnel (7 short-term plus 1 M.S. trained in the U.S., and 6 short-term trained in third countries), necessary office equipment, transportation facilities were provided to the MAG to improve its statistical capabilities. Furthermore, the statistical office was upgraded to Department level. It has a current staff of 19 permanent employees plus 7 part time employees.

The Mission feels that only limited USDA/PASA technical advice and commodities are now necessary to maintain and advance the present statistical work. No more than 6 man months of TDY personnel per year is expected to be required during the life of the project.

*Source: Noncapital Project Paper.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Paraguay
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	Small Farmer Sub-Sector Assessment and Constraints Analysis, 1976

The purpose of this document is to provide under one cover a general assessment of the agricultural sector of Paraguay and, at the same time, rather detailed information about small farmers. (For reasons described more fully in the development of the paper, small farmers are those with farms of less than 20 hectares. More than 85 percent of all farmers in Paraguay are of this size.) This emphasis, we believe, is particularly timely, given the priority assigned in recent years to improving the wellbeing of this sizable segment of the disadvantaged population by national and international institutions. A deliberate effort is therefore made to treat in some detail a subject which is both timely and, as a rule, neglected in agricultural assessments.

Section A provides an overview of certain key characteristics of the Paraguayan agricultural sector which are supported by more detailed data and analysis in later sections. Section B is a description of the environmental setting in which the agricultural sector functions. Section C is an analysis of production and of present knowledge about marketing these commodities. Section D focuses upon production from the point of view of the production unit, providing an analysis of the economics of small farm operations and comparisons of economic behavior by farm size. The current institutional setting and services provided by these institutions are set forth in Section E. Finally, Section F provides tentative conclusions about the agricultural sector which have been drawn from existing information; an exploration of various possibilities for its development; and a few recommendations for future directions in rural development.

*Source: Agricultural Sector Assessment.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Paraguay
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	Algunas Características de los Pequeños Agricultores en la Región Oriental del Paraguay, 1979

This report contains the results obtained from the Small Farmer Survey, Eastern Region, Paraguay, Agricultural Year 1975-76. This survey was sponsored and financed by the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) in Paraguay, under a contract with New Mexico State University, and the participation of the Paraguayan Center of Sociological Studies (CPES), the Faculty of Agricultural Engineering (FIA), and the Technical Cabinet of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (GT/MAG).

The phase of critiquing and editing of data, as well as obtaining the first results, was carried out in Asunción, but because of a lack of computer equipment capacity to expand the results, it was necessary to transfer the data to the A.I.D. Computer Center in Washington where the results presented here were obtained.

Although more than two years have transpired since conducting the survey (August-September, 1976), it is thought that the results, as well as the initial interpretation presented in this report, are useful as indicators of the situation of the Small Farmer in the Eastern Region of Paraguay. At the same time, it is intended to serve as a model for the type of information that can be obtained through sample surveys and to contribute to the more complete understanding of the socio-economic situation in the rural sector.

The Small Farmer Survey had as its fundamental objectives the following:

1. Understand the social, technical and economic characteristics of farms with less than 51 hectares in the Eastern Region of Paraguay. As part of this objective, the intent was especially to understand the technical and economic situation of livestock on these farms;
2. Resurvey farmers who had been interviewed in the survey conducted by AID and CPES in the year 1972-73, in six districts of the Eastern Region.

As a result, two sets of data are available, one for the Eastern Region as a whole and another for the six districts covered by the sample of cooperatives.

The purpose of this report is to present a description of the socio-economic characteristics of the farms of small producers, on the basis of the information obtained for the Eastern Region, without going into technical characteristics of the agricultural sector or information on livestock.

*Source: Survey Report.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Peru	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Integrated Regional Development (527-0178), 1979	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	22,550,000	4,550,000
GRANT	1,050,000	1,050,000
LOAN	15,000,000	2,000,000
COUNTRY	6,500,000	1,500,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Departmental Development Committees of Junín and Cajamarca

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

U.S. Contractors

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Further the socio-economic development of priority sierra and high selva regions of Peru with emphasis on increasing employment and income opportunities for the poor population in key market towns and surrounding rural areas.

PURPOSES Strengthen a decentralized regional planning capability and establish a mechanism for financing and executing priority sub-projects in selected market towns and rural areas of the Peruvian sierra and high selva.

OUTPUTS 1) Regional organizations fully staffed and operating. 2) Regional development plans completed. 3) Revenue-generating, market town infrastructure sub-projects financed. 4) Rural public works completed. 5) Person months of technical assistance provided.

INPUTS AID Development Loan: market town fund, rural public works, regional administration, and grant for technical assistance. GOP: rural public works and regional administration.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY Peru

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Integrated Regional Development (527-0178), 1979

The goal of the Project is to further the socio-economic development of priority sierra and high jungle regions of Peru, with emphasis on increasing employment and income opportunities for the poor population in key market towns and surrounding rural areas.

The purpose of the Project is to strengthen a decentralized regional planning capability and establish a mechanism for financing and executing priority sub-projects in selected market town and rural areas of the sierra departments of Junín and Cajamarca. The overall socio-economic development of these regions, including increased incomes and employment opportunities for the target groups, is dependent on the orderly and integrated development of both market town centers and their rural hinterlands. The GOP is striving to foster this process through the establishment of decentralized development agencies capable of planning for regional development, relating regional plans to national priorities, and coordinating and executing priority investments. The Project is designed as a pilot effort in this important decentralization process, and it is anticipated that the GOP will utilize the model developed in efforts to install an increased planning and executing capacity in other areas.

The development of Peruvian sierra and high jungle regions requires the spatial coordination of investments. The Project's strategy will be: (i) to seek areas where production potential exists and provide productive rural infrastructure; (ii) to develop the transport network which links rural areas to local service centers and market towns; and (iii) to develop the infrastructure and service base of selected local towns with clusters of investments in electricity, water, sewerage, markets, transportation terminals, etc. The recently created departmental development committees represent an opportunity to coordinate investments in local infrastructure and to bring about planned development of market towns, rural growth centers, and their surrounding hinterlands. The strengthening of the planning and project selection capabilities of the committees is a critical element in promoting integrated regional development. AID's support to the committees will be designed to overcome their present weaknesses, transforming them into effective regional development entities. The Project and its geographic focus are highly consistent with USAID's emerging regional development strategy in Peru, as most recently articulated in the CDSS.

Activities to be undertaken through the Project include three components: (i) institution building; (ii) Market Town Development Fund; and (iii) Rural Public Works.

*Source: Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Peru	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education (527-0192), 1980	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	15,000,000	266,000
GRANT	2,000,000	0
LOAN	9,000,000	156,000
COUNTRY	4,000,000	110,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

National REE Management Unit

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

U.S. Land Grant Institution

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Further the socioeconomic development of the Peruvian small farmers in order to increase the production and income of the rural population of Peru.

PURPOSES Create an Agricultural, Research, Extension, and Education System that will enable the institutions involved in agricultural research, extension, and education to: a) increase agricultural production by structuring the basis for enhancing and reinforcing the human resources required for agricultural research, extension, and education; and b) provide for a continual flow of agricultural technology that meets the needs of the small- and medium-size farmers, as well as those of the associative enterprises.

OUTPUTS 1) National REE Management Unit. 2) National Production Programs (NPPs). 3) Regional service laboratories. 4) Regional research centers. 5) National research support unit. 6) Education program. 7) Demonstration sites. 8) Farmers with improved production technologies. 9) Trained personnel.

INPUTS Technical assistance, training, library and research support, publications, research facilities, facility improvements, extension implementation support, research implementation support, equipment, vehicles, vehicle operation and maintenance, salary incentives, salaries.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY Peru

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education (527-0192), 1980

The goal of the Project is to further the socio-economic development of the Peruvian small farmers so as to increase the production and income of the rural population of Peru.

The purpose of the Project is to create an Agricultural, Research, Extension and Education System (REE) that will enable the institutions involved in agricultural research, extension and education to:

a. Increase agricultural production by structuring the basis for enhancing and reinforcing the human resources required for agricultural research, extension and education.

b. Provide for a continual flow of varying levels of agricultural technology which meet the needs of the small- and medium-size farmers, as well as those of the associative enterprises.

The overall socio-economic development of the small farmer of Peru is dependent upon the adoption of improved agricultural technology and practices. A Research, Extension and Education System is essential to accomplish the transfer to the small farmer of these improved agricultural practices. Within the last year, the GOP has shown interest in improving the existing REE System and has recently completed a joint GOP-Title XII Baseline Study of Agricultural Research, Extension and Education. This study of the status of existing REE institutions indicates that there is little technical talent left in these institutions. The economy of the nation is such that it will be difficult for it to budget increased resources for the rebuilding process in the short-term, no matter how urgently required. Thus, careful strategies must be developed which will, in a reasonable period of time, provide technological information to the producer resulting in farm production increases.

Initially under this Project the focus will be on the production of crops which are GOP political priorities, are widely grown by target farmers, and which are currently being imported to cover existing deficits. These crops, which will show production increases in relatively short periods of time, include rice, potatoes, corn, grain legumes and small grains. In the longer term, a follow-on project could cover additional products which require longer periods to show production increases. In this second phase livestock, range improvement and pasture management would be added to the extension packages, as would such other areas of interest as youth clubs, home extension, etc. The proposed Project is, therefore, the first phase of a broader program. These initial activities will provide the institutional and programmatic basis for additional activities which the GOP, A.I.D. and other donors would consider funding in the future.

*Source: Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Peru	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	ONERN -- Land Use Inventory and Environmental Planning (527-0202), 1980	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	1,647,000	1,647,000
GRANT	1,000,000	1,000,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	647,000	647,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

National Office of Evaluation of Natural Resources (ONERN)

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

U.S. Experts

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Improve the economic and social well-being of the Peruvian population by increasing the availability of natural resources and enhanced environmental planning.

PURPOSES 1) Assist ONERN in the identification of natural resources and determination of land use capabilities in the high jungle and sierra areas. 2) Upgrade ONERN's capability for environmental assessments, protection plans, and policies on natural resources conservation.

OUTPUTS 1) ONERN's capabilities will be enhanced to provide information effectively to Peruvian user agencies in the fields of natural resource inventory, information storage and processing applications of new technology to resource analysis and environmental assessment and planning. 2) Soil, water, land use, vegetation, and similar natural resources surveys. 3) Environmental assessments, environmental protection plans, and the preparation of general policies on natural resources conservation.

INPUTS Technical assistance, training, hardware, materials and supplies.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY Peru

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR ONERN -- Land Use Inventory and Environmental Planning (527-0202), 1980

The National Office of Evaluation of Natural Resources (ONERN) is charged with the responsibilities relating to inventory and evaluation of natural resources, as well as assessment of the state of the environment and recommendations for its protection. The proposed project will greatly strengthen ONERN's basic capabilities to carry out timely and accurate resource information of use to planners and managers in the fields of resource inventory, environmental assessment and environmental protection. The project will provide ONERN with the capability to carry out nationwide resource inventories using advanced remote sensing technology and to store and manipulate, for environmental purposes, resource data in a thematic/geographic information system (GIS). The project consists of an integrated blend of technical assistance, training, hardware purchases, and acquisition of materials and supplies. Project duration is three years. Total estimated cost is $1,647,000 of which USAID will provide $1,000,000 and the Government of Peru will provide $647,000, a counterpart contribution amounting to 39% of the total estimated cost.

The project consists of three phases, each consisting of several tasks. Phase I will introduce the concepts of digital processing of Landsat data, thematic mapping, and manual geo-based information systems. In order to build a truly operational capability, sets of thematic map overlays will be prepared for 6 test sites. Each test site will be defined as that area bounded by six 30' x 30' quadrangle sheets. Mapping scale will be 1:100,000 to conform with Peruvian mapping standards. Approximately 10 theme maps, including a Landsat derived land cover map, will be prepared for each quadrangle.

Phase II will consist of establishment of a computer-assisted Geographic Information System (GIS). Into this GIS will be placed all of the mapped data of Phase I plus extensive other data available from ONERN and various other mapping agencies. The GIS will be designed not only to store and retrieve data, but to manipulate efficiently the various themes contained therein and produce customized map products at any scale.

Phase III is an environmental demonstration and training phase. A national profile of environmental conditions, hazards, laws, and programs will be produced. Training courses, in environmntal assessment methodologies, will be presented, from the technical point of view, to environmental scientists, and from the managerial point of view, to environmental program administrators. In addition, a series of nine environmental demonstrations and training programs will be conducted. These will demonstrate potential applications of the data and systems of Phases I and II.

*Source: Project Paper.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Peru
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	Iowa-Peru Program (ICAC 2226: 1961-62; AID/la 49: 1962-68; AID/la 592: 1969-74; AID/la 1069: 1974-80)

The genesis of the Iowa-Peru Program occurred in 1961, when the U.S. Ambassador to Peru (James Loeb) requested the U.S. Department of State to provide technical assistance to Peru on the economic and legal aspects of land reform problems.

Contract #1 Objectives. Under the Contract, "The Contractor agrees to use its best efforts to render technical advice and assistance to the cooperating country for the purpose of analyzing the economic and legal aspects of land reform problems. . . ." As further specified in Appendix B of the Contract, "The Contractor is to assist the Cooperating Government by analyzing existing conditions leading to the development of solutions of land reform problems which will permit progress toward economic growth and social improvement in the Cooperating Country."

Contract #2 Objectives. According to the contract, "The overall objective of the work under this contract is to plan and develop an agrarian reform and credit program, nation-wide in scope, but with special emphasis in Southern Peru, for the purpose of assisting the agricultural sector to develop and to contribute to the national economy through achieving significant increases in agricultural production and improving the standard of living of the rural population in general, and of the Indian communities in particular as means toward economic and social development of the nation." As the work developed under the contract, technical assistance was extended beyond the Institute of Agrarian Reform and Colonization (IRAC) to the newly formed National Planning Institute (INP) in order to integrate the agricultural sector with other sectors at the national level.

Contract #3 Objectives. According to Contract AID/la-592, the broad objective of this contract was to assist the Government of Peru in the formation, as an institutionalized element in the planning process, of an improved and expanded capability to execute economic planning research and to attempt to insure the prompt incorporation of the results of such research into the Government's planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation process.

Contract #4 Objectives. According to the Contract, objectives of requested technical assistance were: "To assist the Ministry of Agriculture (MDA) in analyzing key problems in the agricultural sector and improving its medium and long range planning system. Emphasis will be placed on improving methodology, conducting a series of studies on agricultural problems, and assisting Peru (GOP) in implementing programs resulting from the analysis and studies."

*Source: Final Report.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Peru
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	Baseline Study of the Peruvian Agricultural Research, Education and Extension System, 1979

As a developing nation, Peru has been faced with rising food imports of basic food commodities to meet the demands of its young and growing population and to counteract the effects of malnutrition which compromise the future of the country.

The "Baseline Study of the Agricultural Research, Education and Extension System" has been instrumental in identifying the above problem and in determining that proper utilization is not being made of the national resources so as to achieve a higher production of food commodities through available scientific and technological knowledge.

Agricultural Research, Education and Extension are not operating as a coordinated activity and this is the reason for recommending that a Research, Education and Extension System be established to concentrate the few resources available to meet the farmers' needs as well as to increase food production. Likewise the start of a scientific-technological approach is advisable in the Agrarian Sector to contribute to the solution of the food requirements which mankind will face in the future.

This study has been executed under Agreement No. 527-0166 signed by the Government of Peru and the Agency for International Development of the United States Government. Qualified Peruvian specialists have given their collaboration in the different fields involved and adequate advisorship has been provided by a group of experts of the North Carolina State University Mission who are fully acquainted with the problems of agriculture in Peru.

The information contained herein refers to the situation existing in Peru with regard to Agriculture and Food; Physical-Biological Research; Socio-Economic Research; Agro-Industrial Research; Agrarian Education and Training; Technical and Financial Cooperation; and Administration, Organization and Structure of the REE System. The contents also include the identification of problems in every area studied as well as relevant recommendations and several annexes.

*Source: Baseline Study.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	Caribbean Regional	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Caribbean Institutional Development (538-0016), 1978	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	3,941,000	2,369,000
GRANT	1,837,000	1,235,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	268,000	100,000
OTHER (U.K., Canada)	1,836,000	1,234,000

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Personal Services Contractors, Firms

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Improve the income and welfare of the lower income groups of the English-speaking Caribbean.

PURPOSES Institutionalize the capabilities of the CDB to provide technical assistance to the English-speaking Caribbean and the regions servicing them.

OUTPUTS 1) Technical assistance fund formally established. 2) Operating procedures developed. 3) Operational criteria established. 4) CDB publicity campaign in LDCs.

INPUTS General: technical advisors/staff, training, and institutional development. Project Implementation: agriculture, industry, and infrastructure. Bank development: staff experts, government project officers. Project preparation: feasibility studies. Fund administration: staff and other.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Caribbean Regional
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Caribbean Institutional Development (538-0016), 1978

The purpose of the Project is to institutionalize the capability of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) to provide technical assistance to the English-speaking Caribbean countries and the regional institutions serving them. As a result of an academically oriented school system and widespread emigration, the English-speaking Caribbean is suffering manpower shortages of higher and middle level technical and administrative personnel. The World Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank have highlighted this shortage as a major constraint on the effective use of the relatively large volume of development assistance currently flowing to the region. This Project provides the technical assistance and training necessary to overcome the shortage of technical and administrative skills in the region.

The Project calls for the establishment of a permanent, multilateral Technical Assistance Fund with necessary staff support, operating criteria and procedures. The Fund would finance advisory services, training, and studies for national institutions in the CDB's borrowing member states and for regional institutions. Priority will be given to the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) by requiring that at least 70% of the Fund's resources finance technical assistance to the LDCs. The Fund would enable the Bank to expand its technical assistance services beyond project preparation to meet general, non-project requirements. Technical assistance would be provided for four general purposes (general development, project preparation, project implementation and CDB development) in the productive sectors in which the CDB now lends, in public and fiscal administration, and in basic needs areas such as health, education and shelter.

The total requirement for the multilateral Technical Assistance Fund is $3,941,000 over a four-year period. AID will contribute $1,837,000. CIDA and the U.K. will contribute approximately $1.0 million each. The CDB will provide $268,000.

*Source: Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Caribbean Regional

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Caribbean Agricultural Planning (538-0033), 1979

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	5,303,000	5,303,000
GRANT	3,940,000	3,940,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	1,363,000	1,363,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

East Caribbean Common Market Secretariat

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

USDA or U.S. Land Grant Institutions

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS: Develop agricultural sector policies at both the country and regional levels, that will be more effective in: a) increasing production for domestic consumption and export; b) raising small farmer's incomes; c) providing employment; and d) achieving regional economic integration.

PURPOSES: Institutionalize within the ECCM and its member states and in Barbados the techniques and staff capabilities needed for effective agricultural planning, defined broadly to include: a) the collection and analysis of reliable data; b) policy formulation; c) preparation of planning documents; d) project preparation; and e) evaluation of projects, programs, and policies.

OUTPUTS: 1) Immediate outputs: more capable staffs. 2) Ultimate outputs: plans, policies, programs and projects at both national and regional levels that enable the States to progress more rapidly toward achieving the sector goals defined above.

INPUTS: Personnel: five extra advisors in planning and statistics; seven counterparts on the ECCM staff; 50 professionals and technicians at the country level; and 94 work months of short-term consultants' services. Training: workshops, short courses, and observational training. Program support: equipment, travel funds, consumable supplies. Evaluations: 16 work months of consultants' services.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Caribbean Regional
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Caribbean Agricultural Planning (538-0033), 1979

The absence of adequate agricultural planning capabilities in the Eastern Caribbean States is responsible, in part, for many of the inefficiencies in the deployment of existing agricultural services and the often serious inconsistencies in national agricultural policies. Weak national agricultural planning capabilities are also an important impediment to coordination and cooperation in undertaking Regional Agricultural Development Programs. Finally, the lack of strong national agricultural planning capabilities in the region presents a major constraint to securing needed external development assistance from the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), other development finance institutions and bilateral donors.

The goal of the project is to develop at the regional and national level agricultural sector policies and programs. The project purpose is to strengthen agricultural planning activities regionally at the ECCM and nationally in eight Eastern Caribbean States. In achieving the project purpose, the project will significantly improve the States' abilities to assume greater initiative, responsibility and control in planning and implementing rural development projects, particularly those benefiting small farmers. Improved agricultural planning capability at the individual national level will, in turn, supply the essential foundation for participation in the process of planning regional development programs. Finally, it will increase the capacity of the participating governments to effectively absorb external capital and technical assistance. The project strategy is thus rooted in the belief that the States must become more active participants in regional institutions and less dependent on donor agencies. To do this, the States need assistance in order to assume greater responsibility for analyzing their agricultural problems, formulating policies and programs, and designing action projects. The provision of this assistance is what this project proposes to address.

*Source: Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: Caribbean Regional

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Project Development Assistance (538-0042), 1981

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	4,558,000	100,000
GRANT	4,558,000	100,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	0	0
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Governments of Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Vincent, Montserrat, and Barbados

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

U.S. Commercial Firm

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS: Improved socio-economic conditions of the lower income groups of the Eastern Caribbean LDCs and Barbados.

PURPOSES: Assist the governments and private sector of the Eastern Caribbean to identify, design, and implement development projects which promote productive employment.

OUTPUTS: 1) Completion of studies in selected development sectors. 2) Completion of policy studies. 3) Identification, design, funding, and implementation of an increased number of development projects in areas of highest government priority.

INPUTS: Long-term contract personnel, short-term technical assistance, investor search assistance, training/evaluation, contingencies, inflation.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Caribbean Regional
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Project Development Assistance (538-0042), 1981

The countries of the Eastern Caribbean face a critical need to stimulate growth and employment in all of the productive sectors to reverse the serious economic decline of recent years. Yet these same countries are presently unable to plan and design the type and quality of development projects which can be acted upon by donors and financial institutions. Although substantial financial resources do exist, civil servants and private entrepreneurs often do not possess the skills and experience to perform the analyses and justifications required to secure this critical funding and get urgently needed development activities underway.

The goal of the Project is to increase the employment, income and well-being of the lower income groups of the Eastern Caribbean. The Project purpose is to assist the governments and private sector of this region to identify, design and implement development projects which promote productive employment. Project funds will provide for a team of Project Development Advisors who will reside in these countries over 3 years to assist in the planning, design and execution of specific projects in the public and private sector. They will advise on the conditions and procedures of donors and institutions, aid in the acquisition of technical inputs for project design and implementation and facilitate the growth and acceleration of development activities in general. Short-term technical assistance will also be provided for project appraisals, feasibility studies, a limited number of sector or policy studies and for exchanges of technical personnel between participating countries. Finally, where projects are identified which lend themselves to possible joint ventures or outside investor support, the Project will assist in the search for and linkage with appropriate U.S. investment sources.

*Source: Project Paper.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	Caribbean Regional
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	Agricultural Development in the Eastern Caribbean: A Survey, 1977

The central purpose of the Agricultural Survey was to gain a better understanding of the status and potential of the agricultural sector in each country in the Eastern Caribbean region through on-site consultation with key Government officials. In this context, the Team sought to:

1. Identify the problems and priority needs of the agricultural sector in each country as determined by local officials.
2. Evaluate the adequacy of both local and external resources for meeting agricultural sector needs in each country.
3. Evaluate current USAID assistance strategy vis-a-vis the agricultural needs of each country and the activities of other development assistance institutions.
4. Determine the need and requirements for agricultural sector assessments and/or studies necessary to identify specific projects appropriate for AID assistance in the region.

The four members of the Survey Team visited the region from October 16 to November 23, 1977. They met with a broad range of public officials including Ministers, Chief Agricultural Officers, and staff members of institutions concerned with research, extension, credit, marketing, land titling, and fisheries. The Team also visited small- and medium-size farms and talked to farmers and hucksters (intermediaries). The Team's recommendations were put in final form in Washington, D.C. from January 30 to February 10, 1978.

*Source: Survey Report

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: ROCAP

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: SIECA Institutional Assistance (596-0040), 1977

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	1,863,000	1,863,000
GRANT	980,000	980,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	352,000	352,000
OTHER (Other Donors)	531,000	531,000

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(s)

Secretariat for the Economic Integration of Central America (SIECA)

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Brookings Institution, National Bureau of Economic Research, Iowa State University, Other U.S. Institutions, Experts

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS: 1) Achieve higher rates of economic and social development in Central America with increased opportunities for participation by the poor majority in the benefits emanating from regional development. 2) Support Central American efforts to build an integrated economic and social community in Central America.

PURPOSES: To improve within SIECA the analysis capability that provides decisionmakers in the region with policy options on matters affecting the economic and social integration of Central America and to undertake specific policy-related studies with emphasis on employment and the agricultural sector.

OUTPUTS: 1) Economics and agricultural studies. 2) Special research carrying out economic and agricultural research on a broad range of integration and development issues. 3) Create network for the dissemination of study results and methodology employed.

INPUTS: Regional research training assistance, regional research operations.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	ROCAP
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	SIECA Institutional Assistance (596-0040), 1977

The proposal presented here continues a technical assistance project to enable the Secretariat for the Economic Integration of Central America (SIECA) to expand its technical analysis capability to provide decision-makers in the region with policy options on matters affecting the economic and social community and to study several key integration issues with emphasis on the agricultural sector.

SIECA has identified study areas which will be investigated by its Special Research Unit (herinafter Unit). The continuing task of the Unit will be the execution of research on a broad range of integration issues and drawing from this research concrete policy options for the decision-makers in the region. By identifying obstacles to greater integration and providing policy options to remove them, the project activities will support Central American efforts to build an integrated economic and social community in Central America. This will be particularly true of the agricultural sector.

SIECA, through the Unit, will be the agent to implement the project. SIECA has served as coordinator and contractor of pertinent integration research for over 14 years. Most recently SIECA has carried out analyses of priority issues identified by the High Level Committee during the preparation of the proposed Treaty for the Central American Economic and Social Community (Tratado Marco). For the past three years, the Unit has formed the nucleus for such research.

AID financing required for the activity will be $980,000 over three years. The Unit, advised as necessary by experts, will study social and economic integration problems and develop policy alternatives for the participating governments. Linkages SIECA has established with national government institutions will provide the means for obtaining country-specific data to apply to regional models and to refine methodology appropriate for use by the region as a whole and by the individual countries.

*Source: Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	ROCAP	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agricultural Research and Information Systems (596-0048), 1975	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	2,128,000	2,128,000
GRANT	1,391,000	1,391,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	737,000	737,000
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

IICA

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

USDA, Consultants

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Create an environment, or conditions, in which the rural poor will have increased opportunities for, and sustained participation in, the expanding benefits emanating from development through optimizing output and income from the land they work.

PURPOSES 1) Upgrade the quality of research and orient it to the needs of small farmers. 2) Create a region-wide system for more effective information management.

OUTPUTS 1) Regional steering committee. 2) Manuals and guides. 3) Researcher training. 4) Development of five technological packages. 5) Data banks and information system. 6) Technician training. 7) Design of market news and crop forecasting system. 8) Information exchange.

INPUTS Advisors, short courses, seminars, workshops; staff; travel, per diem, equipment, supplies, services.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	ROCAP
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agricultural Research and Information Systems (596-0048), 1975

The purpose of this project is to create and make operative a Central American system for agricultural research and information management. It establishes the mechanism for regional cooperation and coordination in setting standards, methodologies, and processes for research and information management and for support by the regional system of national programs through technical assistance. Multidisciplinary research and appropriate information management techniques will be emphasized, technicians trained and CA linkages strengthened or established if non-existent.

The project is aimed at providing regional and national planners, researchers and information managers with the technical and technological data, in compatible and comparable form, that is needed for planning and developing programs for the small farmer segment of the rural poor. It will provide the norms for upgrading research and information management capability in Central America.

The project will lead to the creation of a regional ag data bank available to and coordinated with facilities in the five countries. It will orient research to meet the income and production needs of the small farmer through the development of technological packages (techpacs) tailored to the needs of small farmers for expanded food production in the major production zones of Central America. It will create a region-wide system for timely and effective crop-forecasting and market news.

Inter-American Institute for Agricultural Cooperation (IICA) will be the implementing agent for this project. IICA will work with a Regional Steering Committee and directly support the regional ag development program of the CA Ministers of Agriculture and their Director of Ag Research under the October 1974 Agreement of San José. The financial assistance provided under this project will provide full-time US specialists for helping IICA plan and carry out the component project activities as well as provide training and technical assistance required for regional and national institutions.

*Source: Noncapital Project Paper, Revision No. 1.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	ROCAP	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agricultural Secretariat (596-0094), 1981	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	2,742,000	2,742,000
GRANT	850,000	850,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	976,000	976,000
OTHER (IICA)	916,000	916,000

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

National Agricultural Planning Units of Central America, Panama, and the Dominican Republic

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

IICA

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS Promote regional efforts to increase agricultural production, intra-regional trade and exports, and stimulate rural development, particularly rural employment and improved living standards.

PURPOSES Assist the newly created Regional Agricultural Secretariat to become a permanent and effective body able to identify, analyze, and recommend solutions to agricultural problems common to some or all of the Central American countries, Panama, and the Dominican Republic.

OUTPUTS 1) Agricultural Secretariat established and functioning. 2) Regional information system functioning. 3) Reciprocal technical cooperation unit functioning. 4) Special fund established.

INPUTS Personnel studies and reports, data management, equipment and computer services, travel and per diem, office equipment, technical assistance, supplies.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY ROCAP

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Agricultural Secretariat (596-0094), 1981

The Inter-American Institute for Agricultural Cooperation (IICA) will be the Grantee and will have overall responsibility for project implementation.

Within the Agricultural Secretariat, there will be a policy making body -- the Regional Council for Agricultural Cooperation (RCAC) -- comprised of the Ministers of Agriculture from each country; an advisory group -- the Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC) -- which will include the directors of the National Agricultural Planning Units (NAPUs) of each country; and the technical staff -- the Technical Secretariat (TS) -- which will be directed by IICA personnel and rely on NAPU personnel in each country for support.

Project activities will focus on the TS and its two staff units which will be responsible for the technical and administrative work of the Agricultural Secretariat. The Research and Analysis Unit will undertake and/or contract studies which will provide the basis for making policy recommendations to the RCAC. In addition, it will respond to requests for technical information by providing data available in the regional information systems at IICA. The primary project support to the Unit will be to establish a Special Fund ($350,000) for financing the studies. The project will also provide funds ($150,000) for data management, analysis and output requirements.

The Regional Technical Cooperation Unit will serve essentially as a clearing house to receive requests for technical assistance and to match them with available expertise from within the region. The Unit will be responsible for the logistical management of this exchange mechanism. Project funds ($150,000) will help cover the cost of travel and per diem of experts during the first years of operation of this mechanism, and will also finance a limited amount of outside technical assistance when expertise is not available from CAP public sector institutions ($70,000 has been budgeted for this purpose).

The Agricultural Secretariat will be permanently located at the IICA headquarters in San José, Costa Rica, where it will utilize available staff resources as well as the available computerized information systems which have been partially developed through other AID-supported projects.

*Source: Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY: LAC Regional

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR: Agricultural Sector Analysis Support (598-0554), 1971

LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	704,000	704,000
GRANT	704,000	704,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	0	0
OTHER	0	0

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

Not specified.

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Latin American Centers of Excellence in Social Science Research and Statistics, USDA, BUCEN

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS

PURPOSES

Not specified.

OUTPUTS

INPUTS

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	LAC Regional
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Agricultural Sector Analysis Support (598-0554), 1971

Increasing concern with the functioning of their entire agricultural and educational systems on the part of Latin American countries has led to the growing importance of the sector loan as a vehicle for AID lending. As a result, new demands of a conceptual nature have been placed on the Latin American countries and on AID. The kinds of analysis typically used to aid decision-making for program loans are not adequate for sector programs, and for this reason efforts have been made to create a new analytical framework for decision-making regarding sector loans.

The Latin American Bureau is attempting to use an approach to agricultural development which is in accordance with the mature relationship between the U.S. and Latin America and is aiming at assisting these countries in improving their analytical and decision-making processes from the national level to the farm level. The sectoral approach utilizes an analytical framework which allows the entire agricultural sector to be viewed at once so that large numbers of variables such as social, economic, technical, administrative, political, and attitudinal elements and their interactions can receive appropriate attention.

The Latin American Bureau established in 1970 a Sector Analysis and Strategy Staff, to focus its energies and abilities on the refinement of the sector analysis methodology and the application of sector analysis in agriculture and education. The implementation of these applications will bring new techniques and procedures to bear on problems, and will provide the necessary feedback mechanism for continuous refinement of the analytical framework and the decision-making process, thereby seeking to increase the effectivity and productivity of USG assistance in Latin America. In addition, this approach will aid in the rationalization of information needs and will therefore simplify the process of deciding what data are needed from which to obtain that information.

The targets to which this Agricultural Sector Support Project addresses itself are central to the problems of resource allocation in agriculture, and to AID involvement in Latin American lending in this area. They are:

(1) The development and refinement of the sector analysis and strategy methodology, with the assistance of selected Latin American institutions;

(2) The publication of country reports containing data for agricultural sector analysis and strategy, and for evaluation of progress;

(3) Experimentation with specific agricultural technologies designed to adjust production processes to the economic, natural, and human resource endowments of individual countries, with particular attention to labor-surplus economies.

*Source: Noncapital Project Paper.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COUNTRY	S&T/AGR/EPP	
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Latin American Planning Network (931-0236), 1977	
LEVEL OF FUNDING	ENTIRE PROJECT	PLANNING COMPONENTS
TOTAL	3,275,000	3,275,000
GRANT	872,000	872,000
LOAN	0	0
COUNTRY	0	0
OTHER (IICA)	2,403,000	2,403,000

COUNTERPART PLANNING INSTITUTION(S)

IICA

SOURCE OF PLANNING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

U.S. Land Grant Institutions

PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOALS 1) Improve and build institutional capabilities for agricultural and rural sector planning and policy analysis in Latin American and Caribbean countries through IICA. 2) Facilitate implementation of agricultural and rural sector planning and policy analysis processes in the appropriate ministries and planning institutions of the IICA target countries.

PURPOSES 1) Assess the capacity, constraints and needed improvements in agricultural planning and policy analysis. 2) Identify gaps in training and technical assistance programs, design specific training activities, and obtain a long-term multiplicative effect of IICA activities in sector planning and policy analysis. 3) Assist in: a) undertaking specific sector planning and policy analysis activities in one or more countries; and b) designing mechanisms for institutionalization and implementation of planning and policy analysis processes in other IICA target countries. 4) Manage the Latin American and Caribbean agricultural and rural sector planning and policy analysis network.

OUTPUTS 1) A documented analysis of agricultural and rural sector planning and policy analysis capabilities. 2) Assessment of the needs for increasing capacities. 3) A series of workshops, seminars, and training courses. 4) A series of training materials. 5) A methodology for sector planning and policy analysis activities for applications and implementation in one or more countries. 6) Results of sector planning and analysis activities available. 7) Recommendations for implementation and institutionalization of sector planning and analysis. 8) An integrated planning and policy analysis network.

INPUTS Data collection and analysis, workshops, seminar, training course, country analysis and implementation, network management and coordination.

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	S&T/AGR/EPP
PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR	Latin American Planning Network (931-0236), 1977

The Technical Assistance Bureau is proposing a five year project to establish a Latin American Agricultural and Rural Sector Planning and Policy Analysis Network under the Expanded Program of Economic Analysis. TAB cost of the activity is estimated to be $872,000 over a five year period. The project will be funded initially for three years at $697,000 with funding for the fourth and fifth years contingent on the outcome of a comprehensive evaluation at the end of the second year of activity.

The activity goal is to improve and expand institutional capabilities for agricultural and rural sector planning and policy analysis in Latin America through the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences (IICA) which operates in twenty three countries. Important elements of the activity include assessment of needs in planning and policy work; training seminars and courses; development of training materials; selection and testing of planning and policy methodologies appropriate to target countries; and specific planning assistance to some of the least developed countries.

Resources of the TAB Expanded Program will be made available directly to IICA and through Cooperative Agreements with U.S. institutions for providing inputs to the networking activity. These cooperators will work with IICA in providing the manpower and other inputs necessary to achieve project purposes. In addition, representatives of TAB/AGR and LA/DR will take an active role in the administrative management of the activity and will contribute professional inputs to coordination, management and evaluation of the networking system.

*Source: Activity Paper

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION*

COUNTRY	S&T/AGR/EPP
ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR	A Framework for Appropriate Agricultural Planning in LDCs, 1980

It is the hypothesis behind this proposal that effective analytical planning for agricultural policy in LDCs requires a framework that includes:

a) a modified analytical approach which shares much of the conceptual framework of Agricultural Sector Models (ASM), but is more appropriate to the institutional situation and resource constraints found in LDCs;

b) much greater consideration of the role of the planning environment in the planning process, including the interaction among institutions, analytic approach and data and other resource constraints; and

c) clearer specification of the relationship between problems to be addressed by agricultural policy and the analytic planning process.

If such an hypothesis were accepted and such a framework were developed it could be utilized to provide, for each general type of planning environment and problem situation, a discussion of the issues involved in selecting and carrying out an appropriate planning program. This discussion would include:

a) issues of problem definition;

b) issues on type and methods for analytical studies; and

c) issues of effective interaction with decision makers.

Experiences in these areas would be reviewed, and suggestions made where appropriate.

Past experience can be a valuable guide in planning future improvements. Therefore, it would seem that an investigation of the problems and successes of past analytical planning projects for policy analysis should help in the development of the improved framework and its application in LDCs.

The proposed research is part of an effort to develop such an approach, using the experience of past analytical planning efforts, especially ASM, as a tool.

*Source: Research Proposal.

APPENDIX B

EVALUATION SUMMARIES

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY Bolivia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Basic Foods Production and Marketing (511-0451), 1975

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

USAID/Bolivia, "Project Evaluation Summary 77-10," 1978

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular X Special_____ Final_____

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

None identified

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

None identified

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

None identified

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- Output of MACA's Planning Office has been of remarkably good quality and quantity.

EVALUATION SUMMARY (continued)

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- Administrative support services have been lacking. For example, customs clearances for individual technicians' property has caused loss of time.
- In MACA's Planning Office, staffing is not yet sufficient in terms of numbers to fulfill all functions. The office is staffed with one M.S. level technician and the 1978 budget has not made resources available to expand this staff by four additional M.S. level employees.
- Training is inadequate. Of 51 personnel projected to be trained in fields of planning, marketing, economics, and statistics, only 22 have been trained.
- MACA's Marketing Office is staffed by one M.S. agronomist.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

None noted.

Institutional

- The impact of MACA's Planning Office on national agricultural policy questions has been essentially nil. Appropriate changes at the executive level of MACA are required before the Planning Office can have an effect on national agricultural policy.
- In future technical assistance, expatriate scientists should be carefullly screened to select individuals prepared to work in a "practical environment" rather than an academic one.

Other

None noted.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY Bolivia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Agriculture Sector Loan (511-0455), 1975

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

USAID/Bolivia, "Project Evaluation Summary 78-4," 1978
USAID/Bolivia, "Project Evaluation Summary 81-9," 1981

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular X Special ____ Final X

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

None identified.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

None identified.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

None identified.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- MACA's Marketing Office has established a system for assuring the continuous collection, tabulation, and publication of quarterly reports on prices and marketing.

EVALUATION SUMMARY (continued)

PRINCIPAL CONSTRA . ɔ TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- The sector management purpose was not successfully achieved due to high GOB personnel turnover and the GOB critical financial situation affecting the hiring of an adequate level of counterpart technicians.
- MACA's Economics and Statistics Offices did not have any M.S. trained professionals. The only M.S. professional who worked in 1979-1980 was forced out due to personnel changes following the July 1980 coup.
- Reports on price policy have been of limited use because of ineffective government price controls.
- Three M.S. trained Bolivians had to leave MACA's Planning Office since they were not able to develop acceptable working relationships with the National Director of Planning.
- A principal delay in the development of the area frame sample was the inability to obtain complete aerial photography from the Bolivian Air Force.
- Several operational problems occurred with the General Edit System, which was to be used to edit the data collected by the area frame.
- It was decided at the time of programmatic changes following the July 1980 change of government in Bolivia to discontinue all USAID support of the area frame.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

None noted.

Institutional

None noted.

Other

None noted.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY Bolivia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Rural Development Planning (511-0471), 1979

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

Marina M. de Achata, Willy Santa María, Kevin Kelly, and Jaime Vizcarra Cuellar, "Planificación para el Desarrollo Rural: Primera Evaluación Conjunta de Progreso, M.P.C. y USAID/B," 1981. Thomas McKee and James Riordan, "Review of Bolivia's Rural Development Planning Grant," 1981.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular X Special X Final ____

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

- 107 projects were improved by use of the Logical Framework.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

None identified.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- Personnel in other GOB institutions have been trained in the use of the Logical Framework.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- The greatest capacity-building impact has been the introduction of the Project Management System, including the Logical Framework. The Logical Framework has introduced a common development language into the dialogue between the MPC and the DDCs.
- The spatial diagnosis in Potosí has established the basis for identification and selection of projects.
- CODETAR has expressed interest in extending sector analysis to all of Tarija.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- Lack of high-level contact between USAID/Bolivia and the GOB has had a negative impact on the project. Suspension of relations beteen the U.S. and Bolivia led to the contractor keeping a low profile at MPC.
- In two years there were four governments and five Ministers. Changes in project personnel have not been significant, however, although DDC personnel training had to be repeated.
- Too much emphasis was given to methodology development.
- Some DDCs did not see the operational utility of the project identification and selection methodologies.
- Methodology advisors were treated as if on "special assignment."
- Lack of clear definition of responsibilities between the DDCs and sectoral ministries has occasionally created a situation of uncertainty and little coordination.
- The GOB has not provided the anticipated level of counterpart personnel. This has been a function of the difficult economic situation that has confronted the GOB in recent years.
- Provision of financial and logistical inputs by MPC and CODETAR has not always been timely.
- The sector analysis in Tarija was dependent on data processing in Cochabamba.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

- Project identification and selection methodologies can be applied directly to programs without extensive methodological experimentation.
- Problems define the tools to be used, not vice-versa.

Institutional

- The focus of a project like this should be operational. Making the planning system operational must not be viewed as only one of several project elements. The planning system must become more clearly demand- and decision-driven if lasting operational improvements are to be obtained.
- In a context like Bolivia's the "rules of the game" of decentralized planning need to be established clearly at the top. Functional responsibilities and clear criteria/standards need to be defined.

Institutional (continued)

- Until responsibilities of DDCs and sectoral ministries are clearly defined, intergovernmental disputes have the potential to debilitate the work to be performed by the DDCs.
- Research scopes of work should be approved by the institutions in which advisors will be working, and the advisors should be integrated into the staff.
- Articulation of development strategy should be distinct from the annual budget process.

Other

None noted

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY Bolivia

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Farm Policy Study (511-0485), 1978

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

USAID/Bolivia, "Project Evaluation Summary 79-5," 1979
USAID/Bolivia, "Project Evaluation Summary 80-2," 1980

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular___X___ Special_____ Final_____

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

None identified.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

None identified.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- Socio-Economic Farm Survey data have been used by the Ministry of Planning to develop regional planning zones.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- There has been significant improvement in the ability of MACA's statistics division to conduct field surveys and gather data.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- Seven changes of Ministers of Agriculture delayed progress.
- There was a 20-month delay in contracting the resident economic analyst.
- There were difficulties contracting data entry, programming, and tabulation services.
- Although this type of project is very time-intensive for project management, the USAID project manager was also assigned to numerous other sector management activities.
- There has been no increase in the number of personnel in the MACA Planning Office.
- There were shortcomings in questionnaire design for the Technology Survey.
- The project's first publication was delayed by other pressing demands on the time of the author (an AID employee).
- One of the biggest deterrents to the execution of the Rural Household Study was the identification of an appropriate Bolivian agency to take charge.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

- The personnel and production management difficulties of a large and complex project must be appreciated before the project is begun so that realistic time tables can be established.

Institutional

- Early contracting and arrival of key resident analyst personnel is essential to maintain the schedule.
- This type of project is very time-intensive for AID management.
- Workload and conflicting demands make it unwise to rely on AID direct-hire employees for drafting of major analytical documents.

Other

None noted.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY Chile

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Agricultural Production Credit (513-0294), 1976

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

USAID/Chile, "Project Evaluation Summary," 1978
USAID/Chile, "Project Evaluation Summary 513-79-2," 1979

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular X Special_____ Final_____

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

None identified.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

- The Ministries of Agriculture and Finance were so impressed with the results of the data analysis and information system that they have improved the data base, software, and continued to upgrade personnel.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- The PPIS is providing information to farmers and processors on markets, prices, input costs, and trade opportunities.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- The GOC has decided to utilize the PPIS as a core for an integrated system of agricultural statistics.
- The PPIS was being used to determine effects of agricultural policies, something they could not do empirically before the information system was set up.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- Institutional inertia in INE has delayed processing of census data.
- Bureaucratic red tape imposed by AID and the GOC led to delays in procurement and staffing.
- At the beginning, lack of definition of ODEPA's role in the planning of agricultural development led to difficulties in defining the scope of the PPIS.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

- Lack of census data creates serious difficulties in designing reliable samples for survey work.
- A data bank approach having information from many sources is preferable to annual massive applications of a single farm survey instrument.
- A PPIS can be more useful than perhaps commonly thought.

Institutional

None noted.

Other

- The approach of using a host country professional as a resident advisor may be applicable in other situations where there are opportunities to reverse the brain drain by returning expatriates to work in their own countries under AID projects.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY Colombia

ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR Colombian Agricultural Sector Analysis, 1972

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

USAID/Colombia, "Project Evaluation Summary," 1977

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular_____ Special_____ Final___X___

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

None identified.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

None identified.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- The data on rural production, income and consumption patterns are in substantial demand by ICA, FEDESARROLLO, CIAT, etc.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- Recent support has come almost completely from Ministry financing. The Ministry is committed to seeing the project through to the input/output analyses.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- Sample sizes were unnecessarily large.
- The major bottleneck has been the editing and processing of the data to be of direct use analytically.
- There was occasionally a conflict between institutionalization and production of outputs. The failure to produce outputs in timely fashion was often justified on the grounds that GASA was in the process of being established and one should not demand too much too soon. On the other hand, the continued lack of outputs to point to made it increasingly difficult to argue for continued USAID and GOC support for the group.
- The lack of a Logical Framework lessened the impetus for USAID evaluations at regular intervals and for measuring progress against pre-established criteria.
- The fact that the project was overwhelmingly an AID/W initiative resulted in Mission support being less active than it might otherwise have been.
- Project design severely underestimated the administrative and logistical problems of managing a large-scale modeling effort within the GOC.
- The unpolished and uncoordinated nature of documentation from the prior Colombian Agricultural Sector Analysis (which was methodologically oriented and performed in AID/W) created confusion among Colombian readers.
- Wide distribution of materials from the predecessor analysis created the impression that the project was primarily an AID project. This resulted in GASA's extreme reluctance to call on AID resources.
- USDA's General Edit System failed to edit the agricultural production and rural consumption data.
- GASA staff has fluctuated over the course of the project.
- The job of processing household sector data has gone through four changes of DANE personnel.
- GASA personnel have generally been of high quality but relatively inexperienced for an effort of this magnitude. A manifestation of this was an overall lack of confidence to push through to "dirtying one's hands" with actual data until methodological issues were clearly and definitively resolved.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

- If a methodology of this sort is to be applied elsewhere, it must be explicitly recognized from the beginning that such an effort is necessarily middle- to long-term.
- The production of intermediate outputs enhances the credibility of a planning unit for a longer term effort.
- In a project like this, sustained outside assistance in data processing can be very valuable.
- General edit systems may not be appropriate for questionnaires like the one used in Colombia.
- Sample sizes need to be clearly thought out beforehand.

Institutional

- Before embarking on a project of this kind, one must seriously address whether expertise of this kind needs to be institutionalized within the public sector at all and if it does, whether the proper site would be a National Planning Office rather than a Ministry of Agriculture.
- Clear direction and demands for outputs by a sector planning unit would help facilitate progress of a modeling unit.
- Intermediate outputs, although less sophisticated and more limited in scope than sector models, are likely to be more intelligible and useful to policymakers in the short run.
- AID's standard programming procedures are useful for monitoring progress and identifying problems.
- Potential conflicts between the goals of institutionalization and production of outputs need to be reconciled.
- Too much AID/W involvement can dampen Mission interest and support and too much AID involvement can dampen host country interest and support.
- Large-scale modeling is attendant with administration and logistical problems.
- Large-scale modeling requires stability of personnel.

Other

None noted.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY Dominican Republic

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Agricultural Sector Analysis Phase II (517-0117), 1979

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

USAID/Dominican Republic, "Project Evaluation Summary," 1980

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular X Special_____ Final_____

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

- ANSE II staff directed the technical work behind the $950 million 1980-82 Dominican Agricultural Plan.
- ANSE II staff was active in the $72 million Dominican Post-Hurricane Agricultural Reconstruction Plan, including a $40 million IDB loan and a $15 million AID loan.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

- Due to the demonstration effect of project-related activities, many GODR agencies are strengthening their analytical and computer based capabilities, generating in the process a growing demand for scarce professional know-how.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- Project data processing personnel were promoted to direct the computerized processing of the Dominican 1980 Population and Agricultural Censuses in the National Statistical Office.
- Project-trained personnel have moved to key decisionmaking positions in other GODR institutions.
- The project initiated a project for improved area frame management and encouraged the Central Bank to seek technical support for its first National Household Income and Consumption Survey, an activity now being supported by DS/N.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- The project's distinctive characteristic is the establishment of an in-country institutional capability to carry out, on a sustained basis, sectoral data gathering and processing, analysis of policy and program alternatives, studies leading to improved resource allocation to remove rural development constraints, and the design of projects based on preparation of detailed implementation plans for new projects.
- Project direct analytical counterparts have increased from three to over 12 technicians.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- The destruction caused by hurricanes David and Frederick delayed the farm survey to beyond the project's time horizon.
- The principal stumbling block has been fast personnel turnover.
- Changes in relative salary structures within the agricultural sector led to a massive exodus of the better qualified and trained technicians, aggravating an already delicate personnel problem.
- Contractual procedures delayed arrival of a key advisor.
- Training of computer center personnel in techniques for survey data editing, archiving, and accessing was incomplete.
- The linear programming model was vastly underfinanced.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

- A project like this must be consonant with technical counterpart absorptive capacity. As a rule, keep it simple.
- In any computer-intensive project, designers must carefully assess not only hardware but also software and in-country support services.
- Technical transfer projects must stay away from the temptation to transplant esoteric techniques that will never be applied in everyday operations. A good extension procedure is to initiate the technological transfer by marginally improving the methodologies and techniques already being applied.

Institutional

- Although movement of project personnel to key decisionmaking positions in other government institutions strains a planning unit's flexibility and readjustment capability, the ultimate effect of these changes may be to enhance project impact on public sector technical staff.
- Publication of project findings under existing institutional auspices, rather than as project publications, can provide an institutional environment for effective technological transfer.

Institutional (continued)

- A project like this must be responsive to felt needs and demands.
- Counterpart funding, though adequate, may be erratic and unpredictable. Improved procedures for accountability and synchronization of resource flows are needed.
- Rigorous assessment of salary structures is critical to effective implementation.
- Establishment of a nucleus of workshops and on-the-job training processes has proven to be an effective mix.
- Projects of this nature must not be rigorously specified from the beginning. A set of guidelines complemented by a list of generic outputs should suffice to provide the required overall project structure as well as its indispensable flexibility.
- Support in economic analysis, computer applications, and statistical procedures must be complemented by training programs on management principles for those who supervise technical staff.
- Local universities may be better counterpart organizations for projects like this. Alternatively, joint projects may be preferable where both government agencies and universities share project resources and benefits.
- To avoid the pernicious effect of technical assistance personnel turnover, programs such as this one should rely on U.S. Universities, preferably under a Title XII arrangement, to supply continuous, long-term technical support.

Other

None noted.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY Dominican Republic

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR National Employment Policy (517-0121), 1978

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

USAID/Dominican Republic, "Project Evaluation Summary," 1980

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular X Special_____ Final_____

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

- Among the activities emerging from the project are a Micro Industry OPG and a Small Industry Loan.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

- The GODR is enthusiastic about project outputs and has decided to fund continued project activities.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- ONAPLAN has provided data to the National Office of Tourism.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- ONAPLAN has acquired capability to interject employment/manpower considerations into development projects.

EVALUATION SUMMARY (continued)

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- Project started slowly because of contracting problems.
- Hurricane David caused havoc and created an atypical condition in which to administer surveys.
- Lack of highly trained employment/manpower analysts in the Dominican Republic was a factor in slowing things down.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

None noted.

Institutional

- Contracting problems can cause delays and slow project progress.
- Important to success is the close coordination among those government organizations involved in the data gathering, statistical analysis, identification of needs, training of people, and, ultimately, the placement of people in the right jobs. A key factor is the creation of a unit with responsibility for manpower development and coordination of activities.

Other

None noted.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY LAC Regional (Dominican Republic)

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Agricultural Sector Analysis (598-0554), 1975

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

USAID/Dominican Republic, "Project Evaluation Summary 79-1," 1979. Sandra K. Rowland, "An Evaluation of the Agriculture Sector Analysis Project in the Dominican Republic," 1978. Felipe Manteiga, "The Sector Analysis Project: An Institutional Overview," n.d.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular_____ Special___X___ Final___X___

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

- Project research moved the Minister of Agriculture to endorse a labor absorption policy for Dominican agriculture.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

- The GODR has set more systematic planning as a high priority and the political, organizational, and technical environment for it is much improved.
- The Planning Department's increased data processing and analytical capacities have been used by SEA to improve its current operations and to rationalize the planning process.
- The outward and upward movement of personnel had a negative impact on project continuity but was a net plus for the Subsecretariat in terms of its professionalization.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- Personnel from the project have been placed in key decision-making positions and apply sector analysis experience to their new jobs.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- There has been generally increased professionalism within SEA's planning units. This is particularly true for data processing and analysis capability.
- Because of prodding by the project, it is now possible for SEA to offer more competitive salaries to well trained Dominican advisors.

EVALUATION SUMMARY (continued)

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- There was an unforeseen rapid turnover of project personnel.
- The project suffered from a lack of organizational stability within AID. LAC/DR/SA and USDA were unable to play anticipated roles and USAID/DR was unable to pick up the slack because of personnel turnover.
- SEAPLAN's operations were drastically reduced during the 1977-78 period of election preparation and change of government.
- Elaborate farm-level cross-sectional data are available and some descriptive documents published, but policy issues and implications for program development are spotty.
- The project's impact has been lessened by the limited dissemination of project results.
- In an effort to identify and recruit well trained people for its own staff, the project occasionally fulfilled a "talent search" function for the SEA. In a number of cases the project could not retain the identified professionals because the SEA used them for other high priority needs that required analytical skills.
- The three institutions that were supposed to direct the project did not meet their responsibilities. Therefore, the personalities involved became the directing and driving force behind the project.
- The survey tape was too esoteric for those with no in-depth programming knowledge and unfamiliar at handling large data bases, thus limiting its use.
- A paucity of explanatory notes limits the use of the project's voluminous statistical output.
- Work priorities reflected too much emphasis on analytical backup and too little on final economic analysis.
- A major problem with the farm survey was the undercount of the sample.
- The elaborate nature of every stage of data processing was a function of the elaborate requests of the economists.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

- Statistical tables should not be overabundant or too complex for easy interpretation.
- It is risky to emphasize sophisticated linear programming techniques at the expense of simpler, perhaps more appropriate types of analysis.
- Greater emphasis on farm level economic analysis would be useful in understanding the small farmer problem and in formulating agricultural policy to assist the small farmer.

Technical (continued)

- It is important to develop alternative sources of information to use to crosscheck, support, and interpret survey data.
- Esoteric-sounding properties expounded by project staff have deterred overall comprehension.
- Tapes should not be esoteric and should be well documented.
- Statistical publications should include a generous number of explanatory and definitional footnotes.
- Proceeding from farm to sector models may be less efficient than proceeding from sector to farm models.
- Complex samples and the use of weights scare many users.
- Provision should be made for programmed intermediate products to increase a project's visibility and credibility.
- Questionnaire content should be reduced to what is most important.

Institutional

- A full-time resident can shield a project from organizational shocks.
- The outward and upward movement of personnel from a project can have a negative impact on project continuity but be a net plus for a Ministry of Agriculture in terms of its professionalization.
- Continuity of project leadership is very important.
- More time should be spent by a project design team in assessing proposed counterparts' absorptive capacity and tailoring the project to their needs and capabilities.
- There is a trade-off between fully realizing a set of limited objectives and only partially realizing a set of more lofty objectives.
- If internalization of new techniques is an objective, then host country national staff must be substantially involved in all phases of the work.
- Some thought should be given to the appropriateness of medium- and long-range sector planning programs within AID and the feasibility of supporting large-scale analytical efforts. Given the typical need of Mission and regional AID personnel for more short-term products, these activities might better be handled through institutions with longer time horizons.

Other

None noted.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY S&T/AGR/EPP (Dominican Republic)

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Comprehensive Resource Inventory and Evaluation System (931-0236), 1976

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

Trevor G. Arscott, Ernest E. Hardy, Gerald W. Olson, and John F. Timmons, "Review Report of the Comprehensive Resource Inventory and Evaluation System (CRIES)," 1978. Trevor G. Arscott, Daniel Bromley, and Hylke Van de Wetering, "Review Report of the CRIES/SIEDRA Project in the Dominican Republic," 1979.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular___X___ Special_____ Final_____

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

None identified.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

- The GODR's continued commitment to the project is reflected by the assignment of "departmental" status to SIEDRA in the Subsecretariat even though its small size would not normally warrant this procedure.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- There is direct communication between SIEDRA and GODR policy-makers.
- There are strong functional linkages between agencies that must provide SIEDRA with inputs and agencies that use SIEDRA's outputs.
- SIEDRA has many communication channels with agencies outside the SEA that determine basic sector policies and international technical assistance.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- CRIES management has successfully internalized its concepts, methodologies, and objectives via the SIEDRA project.
- SIEDRA has been incorporated in the regular annual programming-budgeting cycle.
- SIEDRA has able and committed leadership and a capable multidisciplinary staff.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- Data on the country's land and water resources, land use, production inputs, expected outputs, production costs, technology options, and institutional constraints are neither complete nor authoritative.
- SIEDRA's multidisciplinary team is relatively weak in terms of economic and system analytical capability.
- In-country capability to construct, refine, and utilize the system as an integrated component of sector planning activities is not feasible for the following reasons:
  - -Sector planning is not the institutional responsibility of SIEDRA.
  - -SEAPLAN has de-emphasized its institutional responsibility in the area of comprehensive quantitative sector planning.
  - -The strength of SIEDRA is not in planning, it is not in modelling, nor is it in agricultural economics. SIEDRA's comparative advantage is in the meaningful inventorying of natural resources, problem-related evaluation of these resources, and in the development of an information system of general usefulness to the several agencies of the Secretariat of Agriculture.
- The output goals for the CRIES/SIEDRA project have been too closely linked to the ANSE/SEAPLAN sector analysis effort. Accomplishments of CRIES/SIEDRA must be seen as separable from the adverse circumstances that have beset the sector analysis project.
- Administrative problems stem from a fragile and uncertain commitment by USDA and AID on staffing, funding, and horizon of the project.
- Ambiguities appear to exist within the major thrust of CRIES between the role of and emphasis on the analytical model and the information system.
- There is a continuing need to get the data used.
- SIEDRA's resources are underutilized because of the lack of an annual work plan.
- The lack of credibility of the agricultural sector linear programming model can be hypothesized to be attributable, in part, to its lack of a time dimension, which is the "name of the game" in analyzing development problems.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

- CRIES-developed concepts, methodologies, and objectives are sufficiently simple that a group of host-country nationals with limited professional specialization can adopt and apply them to local problems related to resource use and management.
- The numerous country studies made over the past two decades pertaining to analytical models and information systems used in agricultural sector analysis should be reviewed.

Technical (continued)

- Linkages between agriculture and other sectors should be identified and examined.
- All data should be carefully evaluated through consistency tests, error analysis, sensitivity analysis, tracking tests and further review by knowledgeable scientists.
- To serve as an analytical aid to agricultural planning, economics and systems analysis capability is required.
- The RPU concept appears valid in trying to obtain working units of sufficiently homogeneous areas.
- Available remote sensing techniques should be reexamined for use as an integral part of data acquisition.

Institutional

- Great attention should be paid to the choice of country project leaders if the CRIES success in the Dominican Republic is to be repeated in other countries.
- Wherever possible CRIES projects should search for a tie-in with ongoing AID technical assistance or lending activities.
- CRIES country projects will typically need three to five years to achieve a reasonable set of output goals.
- Permanent resident advisory assistance is critical. The choice of resident advisor is more important yet. TDY assistance should be concentrated in the first year of the project with intermittent TDY assistance the following three to four years.
- The internalization strategy followed by CRIES in the Dominican Republic should be used as a model for subsequent efforts, that is: 1) assume the initial leadership role and then phase out as host country leadership is developed; 2) develop and maintain interest and support without creating unrealistic expectations; 3) work through counterparts to influence other host country personnel; 4) keep support demands consistent with output; 5) develop reliable data before analysis; 6) adjust all inventory and analytical techniques to the technical competence of SIEDRA staff and product users; 7) maintain long-term project direction toward comprehensive, multi-level land use analysis, but search for short-term, high-impact activities to maintain the interest and support of administrators.
- The administrative problems of CRIES are more serious than the technical problems.
- The organizational foundation for CRIES must be supported by a commitment from top eschelons of USDA, AID, and any other federal departments involved in the work, to fully recognize CRIES as a continuing unit of administration with an important mission to perform in discharging U.S. responsibilities to developing countries.

Institutional (continued)

- Serious consideration should be given to integration of AID-assisted sectoral analysis work in the Dominican Republic with the CRIES efforts.
- The concept of internalization raises the question of whether or not the model and information system should be developed indigenously within the host country with full participation by counterparts from the beginning. Related to this problem is the matter of training sufficient numbers of talented and interested counterparts.
- Serious thought should be given to a gradual movement into other countries based upon adequate appraisal of experiences within the Dominican Republic.
- Continuing consulting assistance should be maintained as needed in the future.
- Decisionmakers do not find models credible that omit data they know are important, that omit logic they know is important, or that are not understandable to them and tend to support recommendations that the decisionmakers know from experience are unworkable in practical situations.

Other

None noted.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY S&T/AGR/EPP (El Salvador)

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Progress Indicators for the Rural Poor (931-0236), 1977

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

Gordon Appleby, George Gardner, Floyd O'Quinn, and Hope Sukim, "Social Progress Indicators, El Salvador: Project Evaluation," 1981

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular X Special_____ Final_____

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

None identified.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

- The Social Progress Indicators Project has met rapid acceptance in El Salvador. It was developed quickly and provided timely results.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- Manageable and very basic sets of indicator variables have been presented to each minister.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- The capacity to develop social progress indicators projects has been created.
- GOES support has been large and constant. The GOES has provided personnel and facilities whenever necessary.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- Failure to test questionnaires appropriately has been a continuing source of difficulty. Some key concepts are operationally unclear.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

- Indicators are designed to monitor socio-economic conditions, not to predict future conditions or goals.
- Standard questionnaires need to be improved before results can be used productively in monitoring change.
- The complementary relationship between quantitative and qualitative information is particularly critical in developing countries.
- There is a trade-off between timely production of results and technical quality.
- The set of basic indicator domains and variables developed in El Salvador should apply to most countries.
- Results need to be verified against independent reports.
- Indicators are useful when simple. Construction of composite indicators is of low priority. The construction of a single numerical index for each domain is problematic.
- Technical consultation is more important before defining variables than after.
- Simple statistical procedures should be used.

Institutional

- Clear, well-organized presentations to government officials are just as critical for project success as technical advances.
- A project like the one in El Salvador is contingent on an institutionalized, structured household survey data collection program.
- A technical review team needs to be appointed to review the accuracy of the data and their interpretation before any documents are circulated.
- Reams of computer output need to be reduced to a select set of pertinent tables.

Other

- The success of the project in El Salvador does not mean that similar social indicator systems should be institutionalized in other developing countries. There is the question of whether social indicator systems based on survey research, which is a complicated, rigorous, and expensive process, absorbs too many resources at the expense of other necessary, local studies. To this question there is no easy answer. The choice between approaches is not either-or. It is a choice of which methods for what ends, in the context of limited resources.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY Guatemala

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Small Farmer Development (520-0233), 1976

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

William A. Carlson, "Report On A Review of the Technical Assistance Needs of the Agricultural Sector Planning Unit of the Guatemalan Ministry of Agriculture," 1979. Ministry of Agriculture/Guatemala, "Tercera Evaluación del Programa 'Desarrollo del Pequeño Agricultor' (Préstamo AID 520-T-026): Período Abril 1979 - Diciembre 1979," 1980.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular X Special X Final ____

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

- Through its work on priority setting, USPA has influenced allocation of the annual operating budget of the public agricultural sector and the four-year National Agricultural Development Plan.
- USPA collaborated in the preparation of projects of other institutions, both national and international.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

None identified.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- USPA assisted in coordinating programming and budgeting for the public agricultural sector.
- A commission was set up in USPA to develop a master plan for integral agricultural development of the Northern Transversal Strip.
- USPA coordinated the Small Farmer Development project.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- GOG has made a commitment to provide the financial resources and leadership to upgrade USPA.
- Guatemalan technicians currently involved in the installation of the performance and budget status information system are trained and experienced.
- Personnel have been trained and procedures established for use of the area sample frame.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- A major difficulty with the work plans stems from the USPA strategy of proceeding to establish a complete planning, programming, and budgeting system on a comprehensive rather than a selective basis.
- Another major difficulty with the work plans is the relative priority that appears to be assigned to establishing the formal paperwork procedures and initiating the monitoring and coordination of day-to-day public agricultural sector agency activities compared with generating useful and timely decision-relevant analyses of agricultural development problems, opportunities, policies, and program initiatives.
- The work plan of the Economic Analysis group does not sufficiently stress the timely generation of policy-relevant analytical studies. This situation seems to be the result of 1) the relatively low priority accorded this group for manpower allocations, 2) the application of much of available staff to long-term tasks, and 3) the need to provide short-run technical assistance to the Consultores.
- USPA was not able to complete all the technical work it had proposed because of short-term demands that had not been anticipated in the work plans. Examples of long-term work that has suffered are evaluation and area sample frame development.
- The responsibilities of each area of USPA are not well defined and there is not much coordination among areas. There is little delegation of responsibility, which has led to delays.
- Medium- and long-term goals and objectives are not well defined.
- USPA has the image among other sector institutions of being more of a fiscal agency that wants to impose its technical opinion than of a coordinating agency with a participatory style. Relationships are poor with executing agencies because of poor communication and coordination.
- USPA personnel have been assigned tasks for which their training did not suit them. Accommodations are crowded and personnel are distributed among three different sites. Provision of office materials has been deficient.
- USPA is still in the process of formation and lacks experience. Training has been limited and anticipated scholarships have not been granted.
- Increases in administrative functions have outstripped the capacity of existing personnel.
- There has been wide divergence of views among advisors about relative priorities, and incompatability of personalities and temperaments.
- There has been a lack of sustained coherent strategy by USAID/G for deploying technical assistance.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES (continued)

- There is no assurance the Ministry of Finance will make available to USPA the type of budget and financial information contemplated by the design of the performance and budget status information system.
- The concept of the Consultoría as an organizational device for economizing professional technical manpower by combining several analytical roles is vitiated by attempting to create another set of general-purpose analysts in the Programming and Budgeting group.
- There have been deficiencies in the capabilities and experience of the advisory group in relation to their assigned roles.
- There was a non-supportive political and bureaucratic environment faced by USPA during much of its early history.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

- Introducing the computer at an early stage -- before performance and budget status information has been thoroughly tested on a manual basis -- introduces the added technical problems peculiar to any new computer operation. The same is true of the compilation of survey results.

Institutional

- There is no one "ideal" organizational pattern for sector planning, programming, and budgeting functions that would be equally suitable for all countries during all phases of development.
- A comprehensive rather than selective work plan strategy runs the risk of bogging down system development efforts in peripheral areas while failing to exploit quickly the full potentials of the system in those areas of highest priority for decisionmaking.
- A lack of clarity in defining the tasks of different groups can become a major source of confusion, delay, and stress in the overall performance of a planning unit.
- High priority needs to be given to professional manpower for economic analysis.
- The need for developing better data sources and undertaking long-term economic research should not be neglected, but emphasis must be given to generating a flow of policy-oriented special analytical studies.
- In a context like USPA's, on-the-job training is of higher priority than long-term training.
- Training should focus initially on developing basic skills in asking the right questions and defining issues and problems in a useful manner.

Institutional (continued)

- Contractual arrangements for policy-relevant analysis can usefully supplement staff efforts, but only where qualified contract capability exists and is prepared to be responsive to a planning unit's needs.
- More important than Ph.D. degrees is that staff have good analytical minds, a strong quantitative sense, some training in the rigorous use of a variety of analytical tools, and a strong motivation to be useful to policymakers.
- To coordinate effectively, USPA has to adopt more of a participatory style with other public agricultural sector institutions.
- Better use can be made of international technical assistance by clearly defining priorities in their scopes of work.
- Salary scales need to be in accordance with the experience and qualifications of personnel.

Other

None noted.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY Guatemala

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Integrated Area Development Studies (520-0249), 1978

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

U.S. Department of State, "Integrated Area Development Studies, Project No. 520-0249," 1981. Thomas McKee and James Riordan, "Evaluation of the Guatemala Integrated Area Development Studies Project," 1982.

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular_____ Special___X___ Final_____

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

None identified.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

None identified.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- There is evidence of interest in the regional offices of the National Economic Planning Council (CNPE) to use the IADS data in developing regional plans

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- IADS is not viewed as an isolated, "AID-financed" activity. Rather, IADS has met a real GOG need and is now part and parcel of CNPE's planning process. The project has definitely been instrumental in the development of a systematic planning methodology, and CNPE and INFOM are beginning to put it into practice.
- Despite delays, some of which were unavoidable, the project has collected, collated, and computerized a large body of extremely useful data. Products generated under the project have generally been quite well done. CNPE and INFOM staff working with the IADS data are experienced and well qualified.
- Funds have been diverted from other activities to support project activities.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- The political climate and related security problems contributed to costly delays in data collection in the field.
- No formal institutional mechanism currently exists to tie planning and programming tightly together. CNPE and the Ministry of Finance play a largely reactive role in the annual budget process.
- Use of IADS to develop and implement infrastructure and service projects is constrained by lack of managerial capacity to develop and implement projects in the target region.
- Vesting responsibility for project direction and coordination in CNPE fostered competition between CNPE and INFOM and led to institutional frictions.
- Failure to create the steering committee anticipated in the Project Paper has probably contributed to the limited use of IADS data by other GOG institutions.
- USPA's interest in using the IADS planning methodology to set agricultural sector investment priorities does not appear to be great.
- The "planning methodology" called for by the project meant different things to different parties. For some, a data base was expected to be the final product. For others, an integrated regional development plan, including identification of fundable projects, was anticipated.
- The absence of a data processing institution that attached high priority to IADS work was a major constraint to progress.
- A first attempt to validate and upgrade soil data failed due to poor performance by a local contractor.
- Insufficient funding was provided for the access study to be able to generate information on each municipio. This meant that sampling procedures had to be redesigned. Success of this study was further constrained by insufficient technical assistance, poor communications, a long and cumbersome questionnaire, respondent reluctance to answer questions, and failure to computerize the data.
- The participation study was constrained by lack of clear direction, the unclear role of foreign advisors, and departure of the advisors from Guatemala before completing their report.
- USAID/Guatemala suffered from discontinuity of management, with three project managers in three years.
- The absence of earlier evaluations lessened the impetus to address problems head on.
- Considerable time was requir[illegible] obtain a qualified institution with the requisite combination of [illegible]ical and language skills. As a result, the university contractor wa[illegible]ght into the project late.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES (continued)

- The contractor was hampered by the gradual increase in the level of civil violence in Guatemala and by univesity demands. The contractor was not always able to provide on-call, Spanish-speaking, experienced technical assistance.
- Transfer of data processing to the contractor's headquarters in the United States led to the contractor shifting from an advisory to an implementation role, duplication of work, reduction in communications with attendant misunderstandings, and GOG concern over loss of control of the data.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

- The overall IADS planning framework for setting priorities among alternative investments appears to be sound.
- Instead of relying on research station findings to estimate agricultural potential, the IADS approach of looking at what the "best" farmers are actually doing appears to be eminently reasonable and realistic.
- In retrospect, the project may have been too ambitious, particularly with respect to the number of variables it took into consideration. The project could have benefited from a clearer, more limited statement of its objectives.
- Given the experimental nature of a project like this and the need to ascertain the availability and quality of secondary data, the implementation period and financing requirements are difficult to establish.
- In practice, regional science and, as a corollary, regional planning are more of an art than a science. This is not to say that planning should not be formal or systematic, but it is a recognition that planning requires judgment and that it has its qualitative as well as its quantitative dimensions.

Institutional

- "Learning by doing" is ultimately the only way in which institutionalization of planning capacity actually takes place.
- There is a temptation to expect what is basically a technical tool for program and project developers to have too great an impact on political decisionmakers.
- Suitable data processing arrangements need to be worked out early as a precondition of institutionalization.

Institutional (continued)

- Performing computer processing out of country can make training of counterparts difficult, contribute to a lack of communication, and change the role of the technical assistance institution from advising to actual performance of work.
- In the future, more planning needs to be done in the field and mechanisms need to be set up institutionally to assure that this planning is taken seriously centrally.
- Particularly in the implementation of integrated regional development programs, clear authority must be established at the local level to coordinate the contributions of different sectoral agencies.

Other

None noted.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY Honduras

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Agriculture Sector Program (522-0100), 1974

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

USAID/Honduras, "Project Evaluation Summary 522-81-15," 1981

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular_____ Special_____ Final___X___

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

None identified.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

None identified.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- The Agricultural Policy Commission was able to promote adoption of a common language and common methodologies by the various institutions working in the agricultural sector.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- Agricultural sector institutions are better equipped to deal with planning, management, and evaluation responsibilities.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- The crucial problem was interinstitutional coordination. The creation of the Office of Sector Planning did not resolve the problem because it was not given control of the planning units in the major sector institutions.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

None noted.

Institutional

- A host country government program will normally not move any faster than technicians or power brokers wish it to. AID must therefore tailor its projects better to coincide with host country government interests and efforts. This means that host country technicians should have been more intimately involved in project design. If you cannot resolve issues at the design stage it is unlikely you will be able to resolve them at the implementation stage.
- Coordinating committees cannot be expected to achieve effective coordination unless they have some control over the people who will actually be involved with implementation.
- If a project requires coordination and it becomes apparent that the project is suffering from a lack of cooperation on the part of one or more institutions, AID should be prepared to redesign or close out the activity. Any other course of action is interpreted by host country government officials as AID's acceptance or approval of the status quo of lack of cooperation.
- Statements of goals and programs of activities should not be more ambitious than a host country is willing or able to implement.

Other

None noted.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY Honduras

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Agriculture Sector II Program (522-0150), 1979

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

Secretariat of Natural Resources/Honduras, "Evaluación de Progreso Año 1980: Segundo Programa Sectorial Agrícola," 1981

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular X Special_____ Final_____

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

None identified.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

None identified.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- Agricultural Policy Commission has provided technical assistance to other sector institutions.
- The Planning Department of the National Agrarian Institute established mechanisms to coordinate budgeting with programming and evaluation.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- An increased number of regional planners has led to an improvement in regional planning.

EVALUATION SUMMARY (continued)

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- The roles and responsibilities of sector institutions in agricultural planning have not been defined.
- The Agricultural Sector Planning Committee has shown little authority, possibly because of lack of higher level support.
- The functions of the National Agricultural Information System have not been defined. As a result there has been a lack of leadership and deficient interinstitutional coordination and communication.
- Changes in policymakers have led to critical delays in project implementation.
- Administrative problems, particularly with GOH procurement procedures and AID procedures and regulations, have delayed project implementation.
- Progress has been delayed by lack of GOH counterpart funds.
- Progress has been delayed by insufficient numbers of qualified personnel.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

None noted.

Institutional

- The strengthening and coordination of agricultural planning and the National Agricultural Information System can not take place in the absence of a high level definition of the roles and responsibilities of sector institutions.
- Effective agricultural sector planning is contingent on stability at the policymaker level.
- Effective agricultural sector planning is contingent on agile administrative procedures, especially for procurement.
- Effective agricultural sector planning is contingent on adequate numbers of qualified personnel.

Other

- Effective agricultural sector planning is contingent on adequate financing.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY Jamaica

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR National Planning (532-0039), 1977

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

USAID/Jamaica, "Project Evaluation Summary 79-2," 1979
USAID/Jamaica, "Project Evaluation Summary 81-1," 1981

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular X Special ____ Final X

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

- The PDRT has assisted in the development of 68 projects through training or consultation, thus exceeding one project objective to assist with 56 projects over the life of the project.
- Through the use of feasibility studies, interministerial review, and thorough technical analysis, the system has had some impact on improving the quality of GOJ projects.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

- There is a growing demand for PDRT's services in project planning.
- The requirement to develop project profiles for new project ideas and for these profiles to be reviewed by a Project Pre-Selection Committee has become part of the GOJ system.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- PDRT has acted as a resource for the Administrative Staff College, the Finance and Accounts College of Training, the Community Enterprise Organization, and school administrators.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- PDRT's mandate has been broadened to include implementation. Steps have been taken to establish a project cycle, provide organization and staffing for projects, and improve project support services.

EVALUATION SUMMARY (continued)

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- At the beginning, a major problem was the failure to ensure institutionalization of the PDRT or its equivalent. The principal difficulty was the inability of PDRT to attract and hold well qualified people at the salary levels assigned by the Jamaican civil service.
- A means for systematically reviewing priorities of the PDRT did not exist and was needed.
- The failure to establish a steering committee meant that PDRT had to market its own resources.
- Provision of long-term advisors was hampered by contracting delays and the unanticipated departure of one advisor.
- Early USAID project managers were reluctant to supply AID inputs without a fully staffed PDRT.
- GOJ provision of office supplies and furniture was not readily forthcoming.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

None noted.

Institutional

- In an institution-building project of this type, the long lead time necessary to develop a project review system, to assemble the necessary technical assistance and local team, to get the system and team accepted by host government organizations, and to consolidate achievements and "produce" the intended projects should be kept in mind. It is probably not realistic to expect results in less than three or four years. A core of one or two technical assistance advisors should be committed to the project for the full four years.
- A basic core of host country personnel should be in place as early as possible during the project. Staffing of the entire division to house the project should be reviewed and not just the staff of the unit that will comprise the project.
- Commitment to the project on the part of a counterpart unit will not be enough to insure project success. It will be necessary to "sell" the project throughout the bureaucracy.
- As counterpart personnel gain high visibility through the project, they will attract alternative job offers that may be difficult to resist.
- An inability to attract and hold well qualified people because of low civil service salary levels may be resolved through the creation of a semi-autonomous agency able to offer a more attractive employment package.

EVALUATION SUMMARY (continued)

Institutional (continued)

- Marketing is not an efficient use of the time and resources of a unit like the PDRT.

Other

None noted.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY Paraguay

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Agricultural Planning and Statistics (526-0104), 1975

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

USAID/Paraguay, "Project Appraisal Report 77-3," 1977
USAID/Paraguay, "Project Evaluation Summary 78/8," 1978

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular X Special ____ Final X

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

- The Technical Cabinet prepared detailed project proposals for a Japanese Government grant. Most of the proposed projects were implemented.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

- The importance of the Technical Cabinet is becoming increasingly recognized by the Minister of Agriculture and the heads of other decentralized agencies within the agricultural sector. The Technical Cabinet is viewed as an office playing an increasing leadership role in the planning and coordination of all sector programs.
- The Technical Cabinet has shown a greater predisposition to addressing the small farmer than ever before. They have also influenced other agencies to focus on AID's target groups.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- The Technical Cabinet gained responsibility for preparing the budget for the MAG in consultation with the Technical Secretariat and the Ministry of Finance.
- The Technical Cabinet has been actively involved in developing program recommendations and project proposals and coordinates all economic studies in the agricultural and private sectors.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- The Technical Cabinet has demonstrated its competence by preparing rational plans for the agricultural sector and is playing an increasing role in coordinating all progress and plans in the sector.
- The Technical Cabinet changed from a two-person part-time operation to a unit placed at the highest level of the MAG and employing six full-time professionals.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- The statistical unit was not able to publish their formal surveys or forecasts because of lack of resources. Poor initial planning meant that this problem was identified too late in the process.
- Lack of timely data hurt agricultural planning and policymaking.
- Staff trained in U.S. under the project did not always return to work for MAG.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

- Timely data are necessary for effective agricultural planning and policymaking.

Institutional

- Up-front budget planning is required for effective surveys.
- Before training in the U.S., agreements should be made that trainees will return to country.

Other

- Adequate funding of planning unit is required.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY Peru

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Iowa-Peru Program (ICAC 2226: 1961-62; AID/la 49: 1962-68; AID/la 592: 1969-1974; AID/la 1069: 1974-1980)

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

John F. Timmons, "Agrarian Reform, Agricultural Planning, and Economic Development in Peru," 1981

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular_____ Special_____ Final___X___

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

Examples:

- One suggestion that was adopted in the 1964 Agrarian Reform Law was that production cooperatives be allowed to become owners of agrarian reform lands.
- The 1964 Agrarian Reform Law created a special fund for industrial investments. This idea was based largely on a previous Iowa Mission study.
- The Agrarian Reform Structural Change Model was used in agrarian reform legislation.
- The official Public Investment Program for 1964 and 1965 incorporated parts of an Iowa Mission study.
- Analyses of the economic potential of different areas of Peru served as guidelines for development of program plans for agrarian reform.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

None identified.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- Technical assistance was provided to many GOP institutions.
- Numerous research projects and studies were carried out on problems of national and regional concern and results have been published inside and outside Peru. Numerous policy memoranda were also prepared.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- Most of the Peruvians trained in the United States returned to Peru and many have held responsible positions in the Government.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- Technical assistance occasionally was adversely affected by exogenous political events.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

- In retrospect, the training program, embracing training components outside as well as inside Peru, was probably the most effective and lasting part of the program even though its cost in funds were relatively small.
- In most cases, students pursuing advanced degrees outside the country should perform their thesis research within their native countries.
- Cross-disciplinary approaches should be encouraged.
- Programs should allow foreign students, while attending the U.S. university, to keep in close touch with their native country's developments.

Institutional

- The success of a foreign program depends heavily on its staffing by the university, which in turn depends upon full and enthusiastic support by staff and administration. In many respects, foreign service demands a higher quality staff then required by domestic assignments.
- Technical assistance programs, to be successful, must be planned and programmed for five to ten years or even longer in most cases, depending on need.
- A serious problem with planning horizons and continuity of work is the changing directions of country programs frequently accompanying the change of USAID Country Directors on other AID personnel in country. USAID should fully support and not interfere with the University's performance program unless the University's activities are clearly inconsistent with contractual provision or are not in accord with proper rapport of U.S. citizens in another country.

Other

None noted.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY Caribbean Regional

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Caribbean Institutional Development (538-0016), 1978

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

RDO/Caribbean, "Project Evaluation Summary 538-81-03," 1981

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular X Special_____ Final_____

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

None identified.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

None identified.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- Government Development Project Officer positions have been filled in Antigua, Dominica, and Grenada.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- Administrative and operating procedures have been set up.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- Administrative and operating procedures have proven to be time consuming and cumbersome in actual practice.
- Efforts to promote the Fund's resources have been minimal.
- Limited staff manpower, as well as recent growth in other CDB technical assistance funds, has delayed project implementation.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

None noted.

Institutional

- There is a need to establish a sound operational, management, and structural framework that could maximize the probability of achieving project objectives.
- A substantial time period is required to establish a viable unit within an established institution that is capable of effectively administering a program.
- A more sound approach would have been to allocate funds directly from the project for the staffing needed to establish an effective unit.

Other

None noted.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY ROCAP

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR SIECA Institutional Assistance (596-0040), 1972

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

ROCAP, "Project Evaluation Summary 80-1," 1980

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular_____ Special_____ Final___X___

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

- Price comparison studies examined the effects of inflation on relative prices and purchasing power parties. The data have been useful in designing a proposed new common external tariff for the region.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

None identified.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- Central banks and national planning offices have made some use of ECID's work.
- Guatemala's Agriculture Planning Unit has expressed interest in using ECID's results.
- ECID's modeling work has earned it a good reputation among government and academic economists.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- Technically, ECID's work has been of good to excellent quality.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- There appears to have been a lack of skills or experience on the part of ECID's technical staff in transferring their technology to policymakers.
- Research design was more costly and time-consuming to implement than had been anticipated and computer facilities were not adequate to the task.
- ECID's activities were too heavily weighted toward basic research.
- Personnel changes and other events in El Salvador and Nicaragua, together with the limited participation of Honduras in regional integration activities, have limited ECID's impact in these countries.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

- The research mix needs to be less heavily weighted toward basic research. Policy issues need to be addressed in less of a general way and with policymakers rather than economists in mind.
- Research on specific countries is an appropriate role for an institution like ECID.
- Serious doubts can be raised about the long-run productivity of large-scale modeling but there is still a case for continuing some of the agricultural modeling work.
- Modeling demands adequate financial resources and computer capacity.

Institutional

- For economies-of-scale reasons, ECID should not only conduct research on integration issues but should also serve as a common services organization providing specialized expertise to national government institutions unable to support required staffs. ECID's services should include applied research in project preparation and evaluation for individual countries.
- Policymakers need to be brought into the process.
- Institutions with less personnel turnover make greater use of the results of research.
- ECID needs to have established contacts with national governments.
- ECID should be tied more closely to SIECA.
- Funding for ECID should be flexible so it can respond to requests from national governments for policy analysis rather than rigid project-specific requirements.
- Future AID support should be conditioned upon a significant increase in Central American governments' support.

Other

- Work like ECID's is important because policy changes at the regional or national level can have just as great an effect on the poor (if not more so) than direct action programs.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY ROCAP

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Agricultural Research and Information Systems (596-0048), 1975

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

ROCAP, "Project Evaluation Report 78-4," 1978

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular X Special_____ Final_____

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

None identified.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

- The PIADIC project has awakened a demand for such elevated levels of technical assistance and training that the project can in no way satisfy them.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- The area frame sampling technique has been accepted throughout the region as the basis for crop forecasting systems and initial training has taken place.
- PIADIC has been successful in encouraging national planners to move more rapidly to the development of national information plans and implementable information projects.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- IICA has done an excellent job in organizing the system of committees, work groups, and task forces that will form the nervous system of PIADIC.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- The establishment of a system of committees, work groups, and task forces at both the national and regional levels took quite a bit longer than was originally estimated in the project formulation.
- National planners criticized PIADIC staff for coming to them initially with a completely determined approach to the development of agricultural information systems, without involving national planners sufficiently.
- National planners criticized PIADIC staff for being somewhat high-handed, at least initially, in dealing with national planners.
- The biggest drawback to effective use of the PIADIC staff for increased training is the inability of a small technical staff to respond to the broad training needs occasioned by agricultural information system development.
- The actual degree of linkage with CIDIA is unclear.
- None of the PIADIC manuals and guides deals with the problem of disseminating information to the small farm, nor does any of the technical staff seem to have training or experience in this kind of activity.
- A commonly heard complaint from national planners was that PIADIC technical assistance personnel are not available often enough, and that when they do appear it is usually for only a day or two. The feeling is that not only is this pattern of delivery of assistance not efficient, but in some cases actually counterproductive.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

- The concept that underlies the techpac is an interesting one but the viability must still be proven.
- It would be a definite error to concentrate on the development of information systems hardware and data banks at the regional level before the development of even the most rudimentary standardization has taken place at the national level.
- Information on commodity producer prices in various markets is not considered important by many producers. These producers, limited in their alternatives to one market in many cases, are much more concerned about availability of transportation and other related questions. This raises questions about the utility of a standardized mass media news service.
- The establishment of a good crop forecasting system takes a number of years to work out.
- Without adequate conceptualization, precise information needs cannot be specified. And no information sytem can be designed and constructed without exactitude and painful attention to detail at the level of specification of data requirements.

Technical (continued)

- There is one project component that can be extended to the regional level without waiting for the development of national information systems: the adoption and use of a method for coding research information.

Institutional

- Information is viewed as a matter of national sovereignty in most countries and for this reason decisions concerning the determination of information system design characteristics and the regional and international exchange of information require considerable time to be worked out.
- PIADIC staff views concerning what a regional agricultural information system is, and how one goes about developing it, have undergone radical transformation since the beginning of the project.
- A series of short, formal technical training programs can help whet the appetites of national planners and technicians for more detailed and substantive information and training.
- Methods for developing techpacs cannot proceed without very close collaboration with ROCAP's soils fertility and multiple cropping systems projects.
- Simultaneous attention to PIADIC's variety of different lines of activity is too ambitious.
- It is through national information systems that the project purpose is ultimately to be fulfilled. This does not imply that there should be no regional focus. To the contrary, if national systems are developed completely independently of one another, they are not likely to share enough commonality of definition and concept to permit regional information systems to be developed in a meaningful way.

Other

- The establishment of an area sampling system in Costa Rica has been estimated so productive of resources that it will save the government over $3 million annually in total survey costs.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY S&T/AGR/EPP

PROJECT TITLE/NUMBER/YEAR Latin American Planning Network (931-0236), 1977

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

Boyd Wennergren, Virginia Perelli, and William Goodwin, "Team Evaluation Report: The Latin American and Caribbean Agricultural Planning and Policy Analysis Project (LACPLAN)," 1979

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular___X___ Special_____ Final_____

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

None identified.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

None identified.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

- There appears to be a strong initial acceptance by participating nations of the role to be played by IICA.
- In-depth institutional study resulted in the subsequent drafting of a new law for agricultural planning in Costa Rica.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- There has been some internalization of project impacts within IICA as the capability and interest of IICA personnel have increased.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- The presence of three participating groups with essentially the same contract objectives has resulted in coordination deficiencies. Some of this problem has arisen due to the geographical separation of the three groups.
- A basic assumption of the project was that the nature and structure of Policy Analysis and Planning are well known and that general agreement on methodological and philosophical issues could be readily reached by all parties concerned with the project. The opposite was the case and an inordinate amount of contract time and resources were required to reconcile the differences.
- Scopes of work were deliberately vague and imprecise so as to enable both the contractor and the two cooperators the desired flexibility that is essential in a project such as this. The lack of specificity in the scopes of work could have been compensated for by concise and precise plans of work but unfortunately, this was not the case.
- Even though IICA was charged with the responsibility for the final products of the project, ISU was to have had a greater input into their accomplishment than IICA.
- It was assumed that the three parties would have pooled their financial resources, in a budget sense, so that each activity would have been costed out on the basis of [illegible] party's allocation of its own resources to each specific activity. This was never done. As a consequence, funding was fragmented and IICA assumed greater financial responsibility than it should have done, which has caused serious funding problems within the IICA contract budget.
- S&T/AGR/EPP and LAC/DR/RD experienced a lack of continuity in persons responsible for project management.
- There is no evidence of insistence on AID's part for detailed plans of work and budget guidelines.
- The project seems to have stagnated for lack of strong leadership. The universities did not provide the strong technical direction intended by the original agreement and there is still a lack of a clear role definition and relative project responsibilities among the three groups.
- The problem of lack of leadership has been aggravated by the failure of the universities to respond in a timely manner when collaborative assistance was requested.
- The original scope of the general survey was expanded to essentially an in-depth series of surveys. Resulting documents are more descriptive than analytical and indicate that a tremendous amount of more detailed information could yield valuable results. An estimated 80 percent of the total information remains to be analyzed.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

- The design and production of the training materials plus the conduct of related workshops, seminars, etc., are considered crucial to the success of the project.
- More basic approaches focused on the following subjects may be needed for the training courses: project development, administration, implementation, and evaluation; information and statistics; budget preparation and evaluation; policy analysis and formulation; and planning systems.

Institutional

- Reliance on a diagnostic phase to ascertain the felt needs and deficiencies within participating nations as a basis for establishing training needs and subsequent technical assistance activities is sound.
- A network activity will only be realized by evidence and recognition of quality responses to member countries' needs.
- There is a need to centralize contract responsibilities in one participant whereby role definitions and program planning can be accomplished and responsibility assessed. IICA should assume a strong leadership role and the universities should act as technical advisors to IICA.
- A consolidated budget needs to be developed by the three parties in concert, so that each party fully understands, on a before-the-fact basis, its project responsibilities, functions, and budgetary inputs.

Other

None noted.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY: LAC Regional

ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR: Intercountry Evaluation of Agriculture Sector Programs, 1974

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

Edmond Hutchinson, Charles Montrie, James Hawes, and Fred Mann, "Intercountry Evaluation of Agriculture Sector Programs: Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Vol. 1: Summary Report," 1974

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular_____ Special___X___ Final_____

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

- The Colombia analysis has affected programs insofar as its results have suggested that the program and strategy already adopted are not inconsistent with the implications of the analysis.
- The Costa Rican and Guatemalan studies influenced the program adopted.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

- Adoption of the sector approach has made possible dialogue concerning sector problems and their consideration in a "holistic" context. As applied it has directed attention at a frequently neglected subsector, the small farmer, and resulted in increasing concern for the welfare of that group.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship with Other Institutions

None identified.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

- While many problems remain, major improvements have been achieved in the capacity of public agencies to plan, implement, coordinate, and manage their work and in their ability to bring advice and credit to small farmers.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- Host country government participation in sector studies has been limited.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

- Sector analysis is an essential requirement of a sector approach and should be made a condition for the provision of assistance on a sector basis.
- The Colombia analysis should be further refined, disaggregated, and tested before a similar effort is undertaken elsewhere.
- The key to the analytical process is the building of a strong and effective analytical base from a continuing series of partial analyses that are constantly providing greater insights into the solution of problems and pointing the way toward selection of suitable policies and programs for development of the sector.

Institutional

- There is a need to establish in each program an institutionalized process of analysis, investigation, and evaluation.
- There is a need to provide AID staff in the numbers and with the range of skills necessary to meet technical, managerial, and analytical and evaluation requirements.
- There is need to relate, in a fully adequate and satisfactory manner, essential sector assessments and analyses to the initial loan making process or the results of continuing analysis and program evaluation to the process of strategy revision, course corrections, and program changes, and the making of new loans.
- A sector analysis process should be established, funded, and staffed in an organization appropriately located in the governmental structure and provision should be made for required staff training.
- An institution much more concerned with programming and coordination of program implementation than with analysis is likely not to be a suitable home for a continuing analysis process.

Other

None noted.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

COUNTRY PCC/E

ACTIVITY TITLE/YEAR Agricultural Sector Studies: An Evaluation of AID's Recent Experience, 1972

EVALUATION DOCUMENT(S)/YEAR

E.B. Rice and E. Glaeser, "Agricultural Sector Studies: An Evaluation of AID's Recent Experience," 1972

TYPE OF EVALUATION(S)

Regular _____ Special ___X___ Final _____

IMPACTS IDENTIFIED

POLICY/PROGRAM IMPACTS

- Two of the twelve analyses examined were unanimously described as successes -- the Turkey exercise as a prelude to the wheat program and the Guatemala exercise as a prelude to the 1970 sector loan.

CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IMPACTS

None identified.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS

Relationship With Other Institutions

None identified.

Capacity of Planning Institution(s)

None identified.

EVALUATION SUMMARY (continued)

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS TO ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

- Missions were remiss in the provision of terms of reference to analysis teams. A problem of acceptability appeared when a team's recommendations cut deeper or shallower than a Mission intended a team to cut.
- Low absorptive capacity in the Missions and AID/W to critically review and use a study undermines utilization.
- Short visits undermine utilization.
- A large percentage of the officers who make decisions about AID's rural development activities view the model building professions with suspicion or hostility.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Technical

- Examination of twelve studies suggests that the quality of a report does not depend on (1) the clarity with which the purposes were originally stated, (2) the length of time taken, (3) the staffing, or (4) the degree of host government involvement.
- Brief exposure to the new modeling techniques suggests that they will offer an improved basis for decisionmaking and the work on computerized modeling should be expanded.
- The state of the art of computerized modeling needs to be substantially improved and codified before it realizes its promise as a decision tool. The work on computerized modeling must be recognized as experimental.
- It is important to determine the degree of quantification and disaggregation necessary to provide a basis for decisionmaking.
- Some LDCs may not have the data base to support computerized modeling.
- Computerized models are of dubious economy if conducted with a view to improve only AID's programs. Some Mission decisions may not require the level of detail offered by computerized analysis.
- Short-term sector analyses on the average can be done in probably not more than ten percent of the time required for computerized model studies and cost only a fraction as much.

Institutional

- Mission personnel should be involved in analysis in order to provide local background and a basis for follow through.
- Host government involvement in study design and execution appears to be always desirable, more to encourage utilization than to assure high quality work.

Institutional (continued)

- Other factors have a greater influence on utilization than does the quality of the analysis. The factors that appear to help assure utilization are (1) determined and purposeful Mission management of a study, (2) fairly broad Mission involvement in the study, (3) articulation and agreement on purpose and guidelines before the study begins, and (4) host government involvement.
- A mechanism for coordinating action and sharing lessons must be devised.
- The Agency should strengthen its competence to perform less elegant sector analyses.
- S&T/AGR should take a prominent role in improving the methodology of the traditional approach as well as the computerized approach.
- Whatever the methodology, the emphasis should shift from simple discrete studies to a continuing process of analysis.
- The promoters of computerized models must try to document their case.
- Several other public relations jobs are called for.
- The campaign to promote the new guidelines on "sector analysis" should be practical.
- An increasing cause for concern is the divorce of agricultural sector analysis from agricultural sector policies, resource allocation, and administration.
- There is a need for a discriminating approach to sector programming according to each country's level of sophistication.

Other

- The Agency may be fooling itself about its competence to do or recognize good scientific work in the new field of sector analysis in the time usually allowed for it, while at the same time profiting from an unfamiliar perspective on old problems.

APPENDIX C

LESSONS FROM PLANNING IN OTHER SECTORS

LESSONS FROM PLANNING IN OTHER SECTORS

As Chapter 2 of this study suggests, there are a number of commonalities among different types of planning. As a result, lessons learned outside the agricultural sector may have applicability to agricultural sector planning. With this in mind, we have reviewed a selected sample of materials on education, health, and nutrition sector planning to see what the key issues have been in these sectors, and whether these issues, and associated lessons, might carry over to agricultural sector planning. In this appendix, we present a brief summary of this review.

Education and Health Sector Planning

Virtually all the education and health sector planning materials that we reviewed look at planning as part of a rationalized system for identifying and designing needed projects, for putting projects into place, and for assessing the impacts of projects on the target populations that they are intended to affect. As in the case of agriculture, therefore, the process of planning can not be divorced from the broader process of sector management. Within this broader context, however, the literature on education and health sector planning argues for a clear operational distinction between the responsibilities of planners and the responsibilities of decisionmakers. Specifically, the functions of planning are seen to consist of ongoing evaluation of sector performance, definition of alternative objectives for decisionmakers to choose among, analysis of alternative courses of action for achieving selected objectives, development of strategies for implementing programs that decisionmakers have chosen, and evaluation of the implementation of these programs.[1]

The practice of education and health sector planning, like the practice of agricultural sector planning, has not always corresponded to theoretical expectations, particularly in its responsiveness to decisionmakers' needs and the realism of its recommendations from an implementation perspective. Among the major problems that have limited the effectiveness of education and health sector planning are the following:

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[1] See Robert C. Bradbury, "Planning for Health: Policymaking and the Planning Process," Fort Washington, Pennsylvania, 1976; and USAID/Honduras, "Assessment of the Public Health Sector in Honduras," 1980.

- Lack of adequate information. In the materials that we reviewed, the constraint to effective planning that is cited most frequently is the absence of reliable information on the nature and magnitude of current sector problems. Availability of good, up-to-date information is seen as essential to a rationalized system of planning and project implementation.

- Methods of Presenting Information. Information needs to be presented in such a way that it can be put to practical use. For example, summary tables are a useful device for comparing the relative merits of alternative project ideas that are competing for scarce resources. Such tables would articulate key objectives, budgetary requirements, anticipated outcomes, and achievements and problems that have been identified in similar projects in the past.

- Failure to Identify a Range of Program Alternatives. Decisionmakers are frequently constrained by limitations of choice. It is incumbent on planners to identify a range of program alternatives for consideration, to subject these alternatives to critical scrutiny, and to test their viability in practice.[1]

- Failure to Anticipate Implementation Problems. The implementation of a project does not always mirror the design of the project. Often this is a reflection of the failure of the design to address implementation constraints. Projects are subject to institutional, social, and political dynamics that must be taken into consideration beforehand.

- Failure of Outsiders to Collaborate with Host-Country Personnel. AID-supported activities must be collaborative. When outside consultants work independently of host-country personnel, a lower long-term payoff can be anticipated.

- Assessment of Tradeoffs Among Alternative Sector Strategies. Decisionmaking is a function of assessing tradeoffs among alternatives. Often these tradeoffs have their roots in philosophical differences of opinion as to the appropriateness

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[1] See Barclay M. Hudson, "The Sector Approach to Education: Some Promises Still to Keep," Washington, 1974.

of broad strategy options. To be responsive to decisionmakers' needs, planners cannot skirt such tradeoffs as efficiency vs. effectiveness, national vs. local needs, long-term vs. short-term objectives, the temporary "fix" vs. structural reform, self-reliance vs. dependence, growth vs. equity, and spiritual values vs. materialistic progress.

As in the case of agricultural sector planning, the appropriateness of sector modeling has sparked considerable controversy in the education and health sectors. On the one hand, for example, the AID/Harvard Planning Education for Development Project concludes that quantitative models and systems analysis have been effective planning tools.[1] It argues that comprehensive models can shed light not only on sector policy and program issues but on general social issues as well. Nevertheless, the study acknowledges that model findings must be presented in such a way as to meet the needs of decisionmakers. The study argues that planning has the greatest impact when planners enjoy the confidence of decisionmakers, accept the validity of pluralistic politics, and develop strategies that would benefit target populations.

Despite this endorsement of the usefulness of comprehensive models, most education and health sector planning practitioners would recommend a "go-slow" policy on modeling. Before embarking on the construction of large sector models, considerable headway can be made with relatively simple analytical techniques. For example, the preparation of cost-effectiveness studies of specific program options can not only be useful, but can also be a means for planners to gain the confidence of decisionmakers for more sophisticated work.

Besides pragmatic reasons for a "go-slow" policy, there are also a number of technical concerns that have been raised about model building. Among these concerns are:

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[1] See Russell G. Davis, Planning Education for Development. Volume I. Issues and Problems in the Planning of Education in Developing Countries (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Printing Office, 1980).

- The advisability of assigning dollar values to outcomes. One study recommends that other valuation methods be used whenever possible. Specifically, it argues that straightforward associations of expenditures with outcomes are preferable to the use of shadow pricing.[1]
- The detail and sophistication of models that may obscure as much as they reveal.
- The use of excessively crude variables that result in spurious statistical associations.
- The use of unreliable and outdated data.
- The use of situation-specific data for extrapolation purposes.

Nutrition Sector Planning

Nutrition sector planning shares many of the objectives of agricultural sector planning and often has a predominantly rural focus as well. For this reason, it is given separate treatment here.

In what follows, we present some lessons that have been culled from nutrition planning activities during the 1970s. In doing so, we rely heavily on two sources: a review of nutrition sector planning in the 1970s by James Pines[2] and materials from a project that Abt Associates is conducting for S&T/N to develop a nutrition program evaluation methodology that can be readily applied in developing countries.

Nutrition planners have sometimes been naive in their analysis of the causes of nutrition problems and in their prescription of interventions to address them. The causes of malnutrition are varied, and they include some factors that are politically realistic to address and others for which this is not the case. Malnutrition is often described as being attributable to poverty or ignorance. Planning activities that have focused on these factors (in contrast to the design of implementable programs) have frequently weakened the case for nutrition planning. For instance, prescriptions that "income must be redistributed" frighten away governments

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[1] See B. Abel-Smith, "Health Priorities in Developing Countries: The Economist's Contribution," International Journal of Health Services, II (No. 1, 1972), 5-12.

[2] See James M. Pines, "National Nutrition Planning: The Lessons of Experiences," Washington, n.d.

that are mildly receptive to price and other policies that could achieve the same objectives.

Developing countries are generally more concerned with plans for "productive" investments than with plans for nutrition programs. Given that nutrition planning must often assume low priority, it is incumbent upon nutrition planners to find ways of improving the nutritional status of the populace through programs that are operated by other institutions. Such progarms may be designed to meet related objectives. In the agricultural sector, for instance, many programs have the potential to improve nutritional status. This can be done in two ways: by encouraging other programs to adopt a nutritional focus (that is, by dealing with nutritional objectives as well as with agricultural ones), and by focusing the programs on populations that are known to be at risk nutritionally.

For nutrition planning to be effective, nutrition planners must act as advocates for the consideration of nutritional objectives in the formulation of programs and interventions in other sectors. If nutrition planners restrict themselves solely to "nutrition" interventions, they are likely to see much less progress in the improvement of a country's nutritional status.

What is needed is not special pilot projects or studies, but improved coordination of existing programs and resources. Broadening the contribution of nutrition planning to agricultural and health programs is one way to increase potential benefits for target populations. This approach requires only the modification of existing institutional arrangements rather than the introduction of new initiatives and institutions.

Effective nutrition sector planning requires information on the nutritional status of at-risk populations, existing nutrition programs, and the relationship of these programs to the programs of other government institutions. National nutrition planning must start with an examination of how institutions collect information and what they do with it. Frequently this information is simply unavailable or inaccessible for planning purposes. The experience of Abt Associates in the Philippines suggests that information collection can become an end in itself, that is, it ceases

to be a tool for improving nutritional status. In the Philippines, nutrition program staff were required to collect large quantities of data, little of which could be used in the planning process. Often the information that was of the greatest interest from the perspective of (multisectoral) planning was available only at the municipal level. Provincial, regional, and national nutrition planning would have benefited considerably if even a minimum of these data had been passed to higher levels -- and if these data, supplemented with information from other sources, had been used to assess program responses and provide useful feedback for day-to-day operations. Instead, special surveys and data abstraction activities were required just to develop a profile of current nutrition conditions and to inventory nutrition programs for addressing them.[1]

As a rule, it is infeasible to collect information on all aspects of nutrition problems, and hard choices must first be made as to what most needs to be known. These choices are not independent of the broader policy context in which nutrition programs take place. Rather, the choices are a function of political decisions as to the advisability of different kinds of program activities in supporting nutritional improvements.

[1]Failure to put nutrition data to effective use is not peculiar to the Philippines. Costa Rica has perhaps the most sophisticated nutrition information system in the world, yet it still does not monitor changes in nutrition status effectively, nor respond to these changes in adequate fashion. See ibid.

APPENDIX D

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APPENDIX E

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