

PN-AAL-142

IS 13102

ASSESSMENT OF THE MOROCCAN
"PETIT BIDONVILLE" UPGRADING PROGRAM
AND A PROPOSAL FOR A U.S.A.I.D. ROLE

Prepared for U.S.A.I.D. Morocco

by

Office of Urban Development, DSB

Eric Chetwynd, Jr.
Edward C. Perry

and

Office of Housing, DSB

Richard Zenger, RHUDO, Tunis

Rabat, Morocco

September 24, 1979

CONTENTS

Introduction

Background and Context

The "Petit Bidonville" Program

- Genesis of the Program
- Scope and Timing
- Components of the Program
- Organization of the Project
- Selection Criteria
- Budget

Rational and Content for AID Assistance:

- AID Inputs
- Packaging of AID Inputs

Strategy for PID Development

Issues

- Conceptual
- Technical
- Operational

Introduction

In July 1979, USAID/Morocco received an urgent proposal from the Ministry of Habitat (MHAT) and Regional Planning for assistance with what it called the Petit Bidonville Project--a program for upgrading small bidonvilles in Morocco's small and secondary cities. The mission requested DS/UD and DS/H assistance with evaluation of the proposal and a team, consisting of the authors, visited Morocco during the week of September 16th in response to this request. The following report sets out the team's evaluation of the MHAT and proposes a responsive course of action for the USAID and the Agency.

Background and Context

The Government of Morocco has launched on a new course of social, economic and political development which it refers to as the "new politics". This program is in response to increased domestic and international pressures on the government to pursue a more equitable course in its development. The "new politics" calls for increased attention to the needs of the poor and a decentralization of development, authority and administrative capability. While change in development impact under the new politics has not been dramatic in term of specific results--it is a relatively new program--the change in attitudes and in the direction of certain programs such as shelter programs for the poor, has been commendable.

The so called "small Bidonville" program, the subject of this paper, and the Bidonville upgrading projects of Ben M'Sik and Douar Doum are illustrative of the new approach. Former programs aimed at Bidonvilles and slum communities featured approaches such as constructing fences and walls around Bidonvilles to remove them from public view, demolishing Bidonvilles and trucking the occupants out of town, total displacement of occupants to other sites or into housing at rents the Bidonvilles residents were unable to afford. These programs were failures and are recognized as such by the government. The new direction in shelter centers on a strategy of helping Bidonville residents to secure ownership of the land they occupy to provide incentive for self-help, improving community structure while minimizing displacement of families within the communities, and assisting residents with the upgrading of their homes through providing access to credit and to building materials. Moreover, the Ben M'Sik

and Douar Doum projects have been put on a self-liquidating basis which represents a significant breakthrough in public housing in Morocco. It remains now to urge the Government to pursue this same basically sound approach in public housing programs for middle and upper income groups which still are subsidized unnecessarily.

The Petit Bidonville program is an attempt by the Ministry of Habitat and Regional Development (MHAT) to contribute to Morocco's effort to decentralized development. At the same time it is intended to spread to other regions the new approaches to housing and community upgrading for the Douar Doum and Ben M'Sik programs.

Morocco's overall decentralization policy is intended on the one hand to spread and accelerate development in the regions while on the other to slow the rapid population growth of Rabat and Casablanca. Since migration in Morocco tends to be stepwise—that is rural to urban migrants move to the small and intermediate sized cities in their regions before moving on to Rabat and Casablanca—it is reasoned that through improving living conditions for the poor in the bidonvilles in these outlying cities they will be less inclined to move in to the larger cities (more later about this supposition).

The relationship of the Petit Bidonville program to decentralization policies is interesting but more significant is the Government's recognition of Bidonvilles as a national problem and a social reality. It has been seen that there is a vital community spirit in the Bidonvilles which is destroyed if the Bidonville is demolished or altered drastically and which is a positive

force in community development if it is fostered and harnessed in upgrading programs. This really is at the heart of the Government's bidonville programs, both "grand" and "petit". The next section describes the Petit Bidonville program in detail. 1/

1/ For more specifics on the Bidonville program and on urban growth and development in Morocco, see the Ben M'Sik Project Paper and Richard Zenger's shelter Strategy Paper for Morocco.

The Petit Bidonville Program

The authors have evaluated the Petit Bidonville Program at all levels, from the Directorate of Habitat in the MHAT through the MHAT Delegation (or regional) offices down to and including some of the Petit Bidonvilles to be in the project. The general conclusion is that the project is sound technically and conceptually, carries with it the risks inherent in any experimental program (it is an innovation not only for Morocco but for the developing world in general), and could be improved considerably through USAID's involvement.

Genesis of the Program. The program was conceived at a meeting last October in the MHAT involving the Ministry's new Office of Regional Development (formerly with the Ministry of Planning but for the last year and one-half located in MHAT) and other offices of the Ministry. The discussion centered on what the Ministry might do to contribute to the Government's decentralization policy and its new concern for poverty programs. It was noted that the Ministry already had a program in rural housing for the poor and that it was engaged with the IBRD and AID in major and highly complex bidonvilles programs in Rabat and Casablanca. The areas not being covered by the MHAT programs were the small and medium sized Bidonvilles in the small and secondary cities in the Provinces. These bidonvilles exist in abundance and are growing rapidly. However, because budget and technical/administrative capacity would be limiting factors in any new initiative, it was decided that the new program should concentrate on the small bidonvilles. These bidonvilles, roughly averaging about 2,000 inhabitants would be easier to manage and less complex technically

than working with the medium sized bidonvilles which, for all practical purposes, are smaller carbon copies (about 10,000 to 20,000 inhabitants) of the larger AID and IBRD assisted bidonvilles of Rabat and Casablanca. MHAT feels that the small bidonvilles are within the scope and competence of the MHAT regional offices and municipality staffs which, while generally are fairly well endowed technically, lack the depth and sophistication of the MHAT and municipality resources in Rabat and Casablanca. The small bidonville program is seen as a way of building on this base of technical capacity. Thus, not only will this approach assist a deserving target group and contribute to implementation of national strategy, it also is seen as a means to develop further Moroccan capacity to deal with the shelter and community development problem of the poor.

Scope and Timing. The program already has been started by MHAT and is accorded high priority by the Minister. He has placed in charge of launching the program architect M. Regragui, a senior MHAT technician with considerable project development experience. Technical manager for the program is M. Ben Omar, engineer, also a senior MHAT professional with considerable experience in technical programs and in working with AID. A part-time sociologist also has been assigned to the program. ↓

Ultimately, the Minister would like to see a small bidonville program in every city of consequence and at least in every city (probably not necessary ^{or} practical in those provinces with scant populations) and a target of 38 small bidonvilles has been set for the present experimental phase of the program. Already, 19 sites have been selected and studies and plans for these are in varying stages of development (see chart No. 1). Since

the Petit Bidonville Program is included in the Moroccan 3-year plan, according to the Government's ground rules physical construction must have commenced on all 38 sites by 1980, the final year of the plan. Moreover, the rules prohibit initiation of studies and plans during the final year of the plan. Thus, before December 31, all sites must be selected and all sites studies and plans must have been started.

This timing problem is the reason MHAT has made its request to the USAID a matter of urgency. The Government lacks the budget resources to carry out the complete program and has asked for AID's assistance. Without this assistance MHAT could not undertake even one-half of the proposed 38 sub-projects. Therefore, the Ministry is loath to select sites and commence studies and plans for the remaining sub-projects unless it has at least some assurance of AID interest in the project. If AID does express at least a tentative interest, site selection and initiation of planning for all of the remaining sub-projects will be undertaken by December 31, 1979 using MHAT resources.

Components of the Program. The basic components of the program are:

- (1) socio-economic studies, technical assessments and physical plans for bidonville improvements;
- (2) land ownership for bidonvilles residents;
- (3) provision of street lighting and community water fountains;
- (4) improvement of roads; and
- (5) provision of building materials (or access to same) for home improvement.

The socio-economic studies cover each bidonville household and include number of occupants, number of children, occupation of household head, total family income, whether owner or renter, and interest in participation in the program. The studies will vary somewhat

in structure depending on the approach of the Délégation.

Plans essentially consist of plot layouts and realignments, as necessary, street and sewer layouts, water pipe and fountain and electric lighting plans and proposals on various options for physical construction. Details on implementation (i.e. a flow chart for tasks, coordination, timing, etc) do not appear to have been developed yet for any projects and no physical work has begun. In addition, there are no optional plans for housing units.

The intent is to disrupt existing plot formation and structures only as absolutely necessary to permit street paving and installation of water and sewer systems and plans should reflect this fundamental rule. Needless to say, some sites are impossible to reach with services and are physically dangerous. In such instances alternative locations must be found. For example one Petit Bidonville in Fes was located in a gravel pit in which residents are killed each year from falling debris. Plans have been proposed to move their residents to a nearby site.

Fund Ownership is considered the key to the bidonville upgrading program. It is assumed that people will be willing to improve their homes and assist in community self-help activities such as sewer and road construction if they have a secure stake in the community and a property whose appreciation will redound to them. This is a principal that derives from experience in many different developing countries and appears to be valid also for Morocco.

It is in this respect that the project takes an interesting dimension. Because the Government lacks the financial resources for land acquisition on a wide scale, the pilot program will be limited to those Petits Bidonvilles on Government land. The government will offer residents the opportunity to purchase their land on 15 year terms (with no or minimal downpayments?) which is good for Morocco where land normally is acquired with about ^{50%} down-_A payment and 6-10 year terms. Interest rates to be charged are uncertain at this point, but probably will vary throughout the program.

As land holders, the bidonville residents will be subject to a 12% state (national) tax and a 6% tax to the municipality. This tax will be imputed on the shadow rent of the property to be set before community improvement. Hence, at least the initial tax burden should be relatively light.

This approach is interesting in that the Government will benefit also from the Petit Bidonville program through land purchase by residents and taxes. Thus, land once fallow for the government will become productive and, assuming the project is successful, many thousands of families will have been helped to a better life. Of course, the poor and their property always are an easy mark for wealthy land speculators and there is no guarantee that individual participants in this program will not be exploited. These possibilities should be taken into account in the further design and implementation of the project.

Street lighting and water fountains will be installed by the local participating municipalities with materials furnished or funded by the MHAT. Lighting will be placed on the main streets and water fountains will be placed at convenient points. These improvements will not be charged directly to bidonville occupants although, as noted, they will pay national and local taxes on their own properties. Residents who wish to have electricity or water hookups to their homes will have to pay for them.

Street paving will be done with materials provided by the MHAT and bidonville labor mobilized by the Ministry of Youth and by Promotion Nationale. At this point in the program's development these are the only additional government agencies that MHAT has drawn into the program although there is scope for broader cross ministerial involvement. (see issues)

Building materials for housing upgrading are to be furnished by MHAT. The project plans to date are least specific about how these are to be provided, the various options, etc. Since upgrading of housing is the last stage of the process there still is ample time to work on this if it is not a serious deficiency. Nonetheless, it should be addressed as soon as possible.

Organization of the Project. Most of the site specific planning and operations will be done at the local level by the staffs of the Délégations and the municipalities involved. MHAT Délégués, usually professional architects or planners, have small professional and para-professional staffs capable of doing all but the highly specialized study, planning and engineering design tasks required in the program. For example, the Délégué of Tetouan,

is himself a very impressive professional architect and administrator and has a staff of 3 architects, 2 engineers (including one Peace Corps Volunteer) and 4 draftsmen. The municipalities also have professional engineers who will assist with the installation of water and streetlights. In addition, MHAT has new Regional Offices corresponding to the 7 economic regions into which the country is divided. These offices (ERAC) have been instructed to lend their assistance to the Petit Bidonville program but, as yet, it is not clear what the relevant capabilities of these offices are or how they will contribute to the projects in their respective regions.

At the national level, the program has been lodged in the MHAT Technical Operation Office. A special "Cellule" has been established there to administer and coordinate the project. Its staff was described earlier in this section. There is no particular reason to assume that this unit will have difficulty coordinating with the other ministries involved although this aspect of the regional organization was not explored nor has it been addressed in any of the project documents.

Selection Criteria. Selection criteria has been established which are consistent with the basic principles of the program. These are:

1. The land on which the bidonville is located must belong to the government, for reasons already stated.
2. The bidonvilles must be close to urban centers so that its residents will have access to services (see issues).
3. The site must propose no insurmountable technical problems--that is, it must be feasible to improve conditions in the bidonville.

4. The bidonvilles should be small to medium in size, roughly between 2,000 and 5,000 inhabitants.

These are reasonable criteria but they could be expanded to include consideration of regional migration patterns and relative poverty levels (see issues).

Budget. The project budget is somewhat difficult to comprehend at this point because of the contributions coming from different sources and the difficulty in interpreting budget categories. It does seem apparent that the budget covers three kinds of expenditures—technical studies, materials and labor. A substantial contribution of the labor budget is to come from the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Youth and Sports and the Ministry of Equipment and National Development. This is about DH 30 million and is in addition to the DH 67 million budget shown in the DHAT proposal to AID. Crudely put, then, the budget is:

Studies	DH 3,000,000
Labor	DH 50,000,000
Materials	DH 44,000,000
Total	<u>DH 97,000,000</u>

Of this total, the MHAT has asked USAID for DH 40 million, most of which is for construction materials for lighting, water supply, sewers, roads and home improvements. Approximately one third of the water and electricity materials are importables such as pipes, valves, transformers, wires and switches. Similarly, about one third of the road building

material is asphalt which also is imported, as clinkers. Altogether, roughly DH 100 million is represented by importables, all of which could come from the U.S., if necessary.

The MEAT contribution to the overall project budget is DH 27.0 million of which DH 13.5 is in the 1979 budget and DH 13.5 is programmed for the 1980 budget, the last year of the three year plan. The Ministry already has expended DH 9.0 million of the '79 budget, primarily for materials purchase contracts and studies (see issues).

Rationale and Content for AID Assistance

There are a number of good reasons why USAID should respond positively to the MHAT request for assistance. These are:

- (1) AID is in a position to make improvements in the project which will make it a better policy instrument, or more productive learning experience, a less risky pilot project and possibly a self financing long term program;
- (2) the project addressees directly the basic needs of AID's target groups of the poor majority and in a manner that is new and creative in the development field;
- (3) it will provide some answers to important questions on rural to urban migration and decentralization policy implementation;
- (4) it provides an opportunity to continue the dialogue towards improved shelter strategies in Morocco which were begun with the Ben M'Sik project;
- and (5) the project basically is conceptually and technically sound.

Most of these reasons are self-evident, but the first one requires some

further discussion. First, some of the shortcomings of the project as it presently is planned have been highlighted in the project description and are discussed further in the issues section that follows. In addition, the project presents an unusual opportunity to do policy oriented research and evaluation since it is designed by the government as a specific policy instrument for decentralized development and will be implemented in so many different sites under varying sets of circumstances. The presence of control groups in the small bidonvilles which are located on private lands and therefore will not be a part of the program now is another built-in research asset. These matters all can be addressed through addition to the project of a well thought out technical assistance component, perhaps through Type "B" IIPUP grant involving both DS/H and DS/UD.

AID Inputs. Specifically, it is recommended that AID do the following:

1. Make a DL or HG loan to the MHAT for the DH 40 million which has been requested of AID for construction materials.
2. Condition that input an MHAT acceptance of a technical assistance package, i.e. an IIPUP grant, that will help the project to:
 - (a) develop further selection criteria that more closely tie the project to the migration policy objectives of the project (see issues);
 - (b) insure the socio-economic problems of the bidonville residents are identified specifically and addressed through the project—perhaps through involvement of other ministries; (see issues)
 - (c) build in technical assistance to the poor, e.g. for help in home improvement techniques, employment access, etc.

- (d) incorporate a systematic program of research and evaluation to fully mine the potential of the project to provide policy instruction and insights into some basic developmental questions effecting programming for the very poor.

3. Condition the AID input further on the agreement of MHAT at least to experiment with a mechanism to use the government revenues generated through the program (sales and taxes) to establish a revolving fund for future bidonville upgrading activities. This could put bidonville upgrading on a self-financing basis, or at the very least, make a significant contribution to future programs. The government does, after all, consider the present program experimental.

Packaging of AID Inputs. Obviously there are several options open to the Mission for packaging assistance to the project. First, the level per se may be negotiable and certainly more budget detail is necessary before the full DH 40 million request is accepted. Secondly, the assistance can be in the form of a Development Loan, HG or a combination thereof.

A development loan will have to be at least partially waived. As noted earlier, about DH 10 million could be earmarked for items importable from the United States and, reportedly, there would be no problem in matching these items with local systems and provision of maintenance. If a loan is to include U.S. imports, however, a professional engineering assessment of this assumption should be made prior to PID development. Another potential problem with U.S. procurement is the time it would take for delivery and the difficulty of allocation within the 38 sites of the project. This too would have to be evaluated before a final decision is made.

A fully waived development loan (which Jerry Zarr indicates should not present a serious problem in the context of this project) or a HG for the full amount would be the best alternatives if this is feasible for the Bureau. This would permit full flexibility for materials procurement within the project. Procurement normally would be through local markets. A U.S. import component is feasible but is a contrivance.

The technical assistance and research and evaluation package probably should be in the form of an IIPUP Type "B" grant in the neighborhood of \$400,000. This should be adequate to bring a full time urbanist to the project for up to one year to get the TA and research underway and would leave adequate funds for maximum use of local technical expertise, of which there is a good supply in the universities and in the private sector. Type "B" IIPUPs are managed jointly by DS/H and DS/UD and would assure the Mission the full backstopping of these two offices.

Strategy for PID Development

Both RHUDO/Tunis and DS/UD have indicated a willingness to assist the Mission with development of a PID and backstopping for it in AID/W. This should be done within the next few months since timing of the assistance is important. It is recommended also that the USAID engage the services of one of the urban and Regional Development or Shelter IQC contractors to help carry out some of the pre-PID studies such as a complete budget and timing review, design of the technical assistance package and an engineering assessment (if U.S. imports are involved). DS/UD and/or DS/H can assist the Mission with recruitment, as necessary.

Issues

During the course of the review of this proposed small bidonville project several issues were raised concerning the conceptual, technical and operational or implementation aspects of the project.

Conceptual Issues. One of the major reasons given for concentrating on small bidonvilles is to stem the flow of migrants from the more rural interior to the larger cities, especially Rabat and Casablanca. It is argued that small bidonvilles are located in small and medium-sized urban centers and that by locating projects at this size level the stepwise migration that characterize Morocco will be attacked and the population stabilized. However, a review of migration literature will indicate that there is little certainty concerning the outcome of such a policy. In fact, it is conceivable that the proposed approach could increase migration to the larger cities. Before launching a project based to a large extent on this rationale, it is advisable to obtain answers to at least the following questions:

- Have past shantytown upgrading and/or sites and services projects been evaluated in terms of their effect on rural-to-urban migration in Morocco? in other parts of the developing world?

of shelter and other programs on migration. In fact, this project would be ideal not only for evaluating the effect of shantytown upgrading on migration but the overall effectiveness, as well. Given the fact that there will be many different sub-projects, there will be many different situations addressed and approaches employed.

Technical Issues. In examining the proposed project a number of questions were raised concerning the technical aspects of the project. These include the following:

- 1) Affordability of project costs by bidonville households;
- 2) Lack of emphasis on provision of social services;
- 3) Absence of an employment-generation component;
- 4) Lack of emphasis on the socio-economic aspects of project studies;
- 5) Lack of direct participation in decision making by the bidonville residents;
- 6) Criteria for site selection do not take into consideration predominant migration streams; and
- 7) Needless demolition of shelter stock.

Affordability . Concerning the cost of the project to the bidonville residents, the authors have some questions about its affordability. In the project's present form, each bidonville household would approximately pay 25% of its monthly income over a 10-15 year period. While this percentage may not create hardships for the more wealthy inhabitants the poorest segment of the bidonville population might be overburdened. Moreover, housing expenditures will vary from one bidonville to another.

For example, Ben M'Sik shelter expenses are minimal, representing between 3 and 8 % of income on the average, while in the bidonvilles of Douar Doum, Douar Maadié and Douar Hajja, households spend about 25% of their income on housing. It is suggested that as a component of the project research be carried out in project bidonvilles on income levels and housing expenditures so that the cost of housing under the project may be set accordingly.

Selection. Present plans call for the selection of bidonvilles that are near serviced areas. It is assumed that this will assure access of inhabitants to essential services. However, the proximity of a service to a bidonville does not necessarily ensure access to that service by bidonville residents. There may often be a need for additional facilities in the bidonville proper such as schools and health clinics.

Employment Generation. A further shortcoming of the proposed project is the absence of an employment generation component. If employment is found to be a serious problem in a particular bidonville, there can be little assurance that the bidonville residents will remain, improve their homes or even participate in the program. Hence, where social surveys suggest this problem, consideration should be given to employment related programs including at least the promotion of the development of small scale enterprises and placement services.

*how not discuss
in the "B"?*

Socio-Economic Studies. A fourth weakness in the project as presently proposed concerns the lack of emphasis on socio-economic studies. Engineering and physical planning studies are emphasized but socio-economic surveys appear rather superficial and give little attention to the identification of social and economic problems. Socio-economic analyses are especially important to determine where employment generation programs are required and to effectively integrate the services of other ministries into the project. For example, the Ministère de la Santé Publique (MSP) must know the specific needs of the target population in order to plan an appropriate program.

Participation. There is little formal provision to encourage dialogue between the bidonville residents and the GOM. At the minimum, questions should be put to the inhabitants in order to find out whether the improvements to be implemented under the project are important ones for the population and whether most residents would stay in the bidonville and make improvements on their dwelling units. Understanding of the project's objectives and related actions are of the utmost importance if the project is to be a success. This approach already is applied in Ben M'Sik and could be adopted in the small bidonville program.

Unrelatedness. A sixth shortcoming is the unrelatedness of policy development and project site selection. While stemming migration is used to justify a policy of upgrading small and medium size bidonvilles, there is no mention made of migration streams in site selection.

Shelter Stock. Finally, the authors feel that some shelter stock could be saved by relaxing certain planning requirements. A case in point is the decision to have paved roads in the upgraded bidonvilles of between 6 and 8 meters. These roads could be much narrower and still permit access to emergency and other vehicles. Why not take the position that narrow roads will not be widened^N if this will require demolition of shelter stock?

Operational Issues.

Important questions are raised concerning the GOM's ability to implement the proposed project. This is for these reasons. First, with three ministries, the different municipalities and, presumably, the Banque Centrale Populaire (BCP), the project is set in a complex institutional background. Second, experience with multi-sectoral urban development projects is limited in Morocco. Third, it is not at all certain that the ministries involved, especially the Ministère de la Jeunesse et des Sports (MJS) and the Ministère de l'Équipement et de la Promotion Nationale (MEPEN), have the technical expertise and adequate staff to fill their roles in project implementation. If the capacity is lacking in these ministries, this may result in delays in implementation, poor workmanship and additional expenses. The Ministère de l'Habitat et de l'Aménagement du Territoire (MHAT) appears to have the technical staff to carry out the project. However, as the coordinating agency for projects such as this, their experience is minimal. More thought needs to be given to this question of coordination. One possibility is a

steering committee at the provincial level formed to coordinate activities. This approach is being tested in the Rabat Urban Development Project. Under the present arrangement, doubts are raised as to whether MHAT's administrative capacity is adequate given the heavy demand for coordination and supervision.

Budget. The budget presented in the project proposal contains inconsistencies which never were fully resolved. Some of this difficulty results from questions of interpretation and some is due to lack of consistent detail. For example, MHAT indicated that the cost of materials and labor for the project is DH 400 thousand per ha. This multiplied by the 200 ha total for the project yields DH 80.0 million—which does not equate with any of the other budget totals given. Similarly, the proposal mentions materials for housing and roads, yet the proposal's budget does not seem to incorporate these items. These questions and other budget details will have to be worked out at the PID stage.

CHARTStatus of Operations on Upgrading of Medium-Sized Bidonvilles

(Cell - Medium-Size Bidonvilles - 14 Sept 1979)

Delegation	Location	SURVEY STATUS		Estimated Date	Correspondence
		Documents Completed	Documents to be prepared		
TETUAN	Larache (Hay Jadid) (Upgrading)	- Location Plan - Socio-Economic Survey - Upgrading plan - Sanitation Survey - C.P.S. (Sanitation)	- Materials supply contract (Sanitation) WORK TO BEGIN 1st WEEK OF NOVEMBER - Roads Survey - Materials Supply Contract (Roads) WORK TO BEGIN LATE DECEMBER 1979	Late Oct.	
BENI-MELLAL	Kasba Tadla (Relocation)	- Location Plan - Social-Economic Survey - Sanitation and Roads Survey - C.P.S.	- Materials Supply Contract WORK TO BEGIN AS SOON AS CONTRACT IS APPROVED	Late Oct 79	
	Fqih Ben Salah (Relocation is difficult. Up- grading is possible, but land is privately owned)	- Location Plan - Social-Economic Survey	- File on Expropriation - Upgrading Plan - Sanitation and Roads Survey	1980	
SETTAT	Benslimane (Relocation)	- Social-Economic Survey - Relocation Plan (to be reviewed following observations by Housing Directorate)	- Final Relocation Plan - Sanitation and Roads Survey - File on Call for Bids		

Delegation	Location	Documents Completed	Documents to be Prepared	Estimated Date	Correspondence
EL JADIDA	El Jadida Relocation (El Maghzen)	- Social/Economic Survey - Relocation Plan - Sanitation/Roads Survey - C.P.S. - Materials Supply Contract	- Contract Signature WORK TO BE STARTED AS SOON AS CONTRACT IS SIGNED		
CASABLANCA	Casablanca Relocation (Fenara)	- Oulfa Development - Social/Economic Survey - Parcelling Survey	- Sanitation Survey (B.E.C.I.T. is responsible for it)	Late September 1979	
WORK TO BE STARTED AS SOON AS CONTRACT IS SIGNED					
TANGIER	Azilah (upgrading) Privately-owned land	- Location Plan - Social/Economic Survey	- Upgrading Survey - Expropriation (U.P.) - Sanitation and Roads Survey - Call for Bids		
FES	Fes Istiqual Relocation	- Survey on Tarik Development (Relocation of Istiqual Slum People) - Social/Economic Survey	- Sanitation/Roads Survey - Preparation of Call for Bids		
----- P ^b of Land Price -----					
	Fes (Doukkarat) Relocation and upgrading	- Social/Economic Survey - Location Plan	- Survey on Relocation of a portion of Doukkarat Slum Population - Upgrading Survey - Sanitation/Roads Survey - Call for Bids		

SURVEYS ARE TO BE COMPLETED IN A MONTH AND A HALF

Delegation	Location	Documents Completed	Documents to be Prepared	Estimated Date	Correspondence
MARRAKECH	El Kelaa (El Mers) Upgrading	- Location Plan	- Call for Bids for Preparation		
		- Sanitation and Roads Preliminary Survey	of a dimensioned layout plan	Late Sept 79	
		- Social/Economic Survey	- Operational Survey on Upgrading	Nov 79	
WORK TO BEGIN AS SOON AS CONTRACT IS SIGNED					
Tamlalt	Upgrading	- Location Plan	- Call for Bids for Preparation		
		- Preliminary Sanitation/ Roads Survey	of dimensioned layout plan	Late Sept 79	
		- Social/Economic Survey	- Operational Survey on Upgrading	Nov 79	
WORK TO BEGIN AS SOON AS CONTRACT IS SIGNED					
Marrakech (Koudiat) Upgrading		- Location Plan			
		- Preliminary Sanitation/ Roads Survey	same		
		- Social Economic Survey			
Marrakech (SIDI M'Barek) Upgrading		- Location Plan	- Promo-Conseil is the lowest bidder		
		- Upgrading Survey			
		- Social Economic Survey	4,960.00 DH	31 Aug 1979	
		- Call for Bids "Douar Sidi M'Barek sanitation, and completion of Douar Mapping Survey	- Call for Bids on Materials Supply - opening of bids	14 Sept 1979	
WORK TO BEGIN AS SOON AS CONTRACTS ARE SIGNED					
TAZA	Taza (El Koucha) Upgrading	- Location Plan	- Topographical Survey	14 Sept 1979	
		- Social/Economic Survey	(Township's Purchase Order)		
		- Upgrading Draft	- Detailed Upgrading Survey		
				Late October	

Delegation	Location	Documents Completed	Documents to be Prepared	Estimated Date	Correspondence
TAZA	Taza (Relocation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Location Plan - Social/Economic Survey - Parcelling Plan (560 lots) - Contract on Sanitation Survey (M.H.A.T.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Call for Bids for Materials Supply 		
WORK TO BEGIN AS SOON AS CONTRACT IS SIGNED					
KENITRA	Souk El Arba (Upgrading)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Location Plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social Economic and Land-Ownership Survey - Topographical Mapping - Upgrading Survey - Sanitation/Roads Survey 		
KHOURIBGA	Khouribga (Karacha) Relocation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Location Plan - Return of Maps - Social/Economic Survey 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Relocation (parcelling) Survey - Sanitation/Roads Survey (Private B.E.) 		
	Oued-Zem	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Location Plan - Return of Maps - Social/Economic Survey 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Relocation Survey (parcelling) - Sanitation/Roads Survey (private B.E.) 		