

AID Evaluation Special Study No. 31

Development Management in Africa: The Case of the Land Conservation and Range Development Project in Lesotho



December 1985

Agency for International Development (AID)

Washington, D.C. 20523

PN-AAL-061

DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA:
THE CASE OF THE LAND CONSERVATION AND RANGE
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IN LESOTHO

AID EVALUATION SPECIAL STUDY NO. 31

by

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U.S. Agency for International Development

December 1985

The views and interpretations expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Agency for International Development.

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PREFACE

The limited management capacity of developing country personnel and institutions is a common problem affecting the success of development projects. Although this problem is often identified, there is little understanding of what "capacity to manage" means and what interventions are possible to enhance this capacity. The Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) of the Agency for International Development (AID) has undertaken a series of studies to better understand the nature of these development management problems and to assess the impact of management development interventions that AID and host country project managers have employed.

This series began in September 1984, when all team members attended a workshop on development management organized by CDIE and the AID Africa Bureau and held at Easton, Maryland. Six country studies on agricultural and rural development projects in Africa were carried out between September 1984 and March 1985. A workshop to review the findings of the study teams was held in May 1985 in Washington, D.C. Synthesis reports will summarize and analyze the results of the studies and workshops and relate them to program, policy, design, and implementation requirements. Dr. Irving Rosenthal has been the CDIE coordinator for the series. This study of the Land Conservation and Range Development Project in Lesotho was conducted in February 1985 as part of the African phase of the Special Studies series on development management. Other African project studies were carried out in Kenya, Niger, Liberia, Zaire, and Senegal.

SUMMARY

The Land Conservation and Range Development (LCRD) Project was begun in 1980 to address Lesotho's problems of severe land erosion and low agricultural productivity. Its objectives are to strengthen technical capabilities within the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), to develop plans intended to protect croplands and rangelands from further erosion, and to establish a prototype range management area (RMA) where improved livestock and range management techniques can be systematically applied. A concerted effort is being made within the RMA to introduce a program of rotational grazing, controlled breeding, culling of less desirable animals, disease control, and the marketing of livestock and livestock products. A grazing association (GA) composed of local livestock owners has been established. With the assistance of the resident U.S. technical staff, the GA functions as a self-governing group that enforces the rotational grazing regulations on all livestock owners within the RMA.

Building on earlier training efforts begun in 1973, this project has made an invaluable contribution to strengthening the technical capabilities of the MOA. Livestock farmers of the GA have also benefited from improved livestock and range management practices introduced by the project.

This project suggests the following lessons for consideration.

1. Training should be extended beyond government counterparts to include participants who could play important roles in sustaining project interventions. In view of the critical roles livestock owners and their herdboys play in the RMA, including them in a training program would have provided another means for sustaining project interventions.

2. Rigorous financial management systems may not be important determinants of project success. The LCRD project is meeting planned targets, despite its elementary system of bookkeeping. The USAID Mission has chosen to impose rigorous procedures for managing funds on itself rather than on the project.

3. A project that introduces new techniques of resource management must walk a tightrope. On the one hand, it must co-opt local authority figures; on the other, it must play the role of adversary or "scapegoat" to relieve local organizations of responsibility for unpopular decisions. The LCRD project is attempting to introduce profound changes in the RMA. It must

seek local support for its efforts or run the risk of failure. At the same time, the project imposes highly unpopular decisions on a reluctant GA and deflects blame for those decisions from GA members to members of the U.S. technical team. Thus, the project has had to appear both as friend and enemy to its beneficiary population.

4. A local organization established by a project to control resource allocation must have supportive linkages to preexisting legitimate institutions. The system of authoritative rule by a hierarchy of chiefs continues to be strongly supported by rural Basotho. Establishment of the RMA and its GA could not have taken place without the sanction of the chieftainship. Furthermore, the fact that the local chiefs are all members of the Executive Committee of the GA gives this organization and the RMA a degree of legitimacy that they would not otherwise have.

5. Physical and functional integration of a project into an existing institution can strengthen institutional capacity. The location of the LCRD project within the MOA gave the project both visibility and legitimacy, because it was a part of a well-established ministry with established lines of communication to other sections of the Government. It also allowed for close contact between U.S. technicians and host country staff. U.S. technicians were able to use formal and informal channels for solving implementation problems, while host country staff received on-the-job training and exposure to decision-makers they would not ordinarily meet. The overall effect was an increase in technically trained manpower, more continuous communication, and a strengthened ability to deal with issues of livestock and range management.

6. Different project components, different levels of focus, and different periods of implementation may require different management styles. During earlier years of implementation, some U.S. project technicians located in Maseru held line positions while their counterparts studied in the United States. Upon the counterparts' return, these technicians moved into advisory positions and now function as trainers and advisors to MOA staff. Within the RMA, the management style is far more directive. Rather than acting merely as advisors, U.S. technicians must tell the GA what to do. In both cases, different project elements, implemented at different points in time and at different levels of social and official life, have required different approaches to managing activities.

PROJECT DATA SHEET

1. Country: Lesotho
2. Project Title: Land Conservation and Range Development
3. AID Project No.: 632-0215
4. Life of Project: 1980-1987
5. Project Purpose:
 - a. To strengthen institutional capability within the Ministry of Agriculture
 - b. To arrest degradation of croplands and rangelands

6. Project Funding:

<u>Source</u>	<u>Amount (in US\$1,000s)</u>
a. AID	\$12,000
b. Host Country	4,211
Total	<u>\$16,211</u>

7. Evaluations:

- a. Project Evaluation Summary, 1983
- b. Project Evaluation Summary, 1984

8. Implementing Contractor:

Fredericksen, Kamine, and Associates,
Sacramento, California

9. Currency Equivalent:

- a. US\$1.00 = R (rand) 0.78 (1980)
- b. US\$1.00 = R 1.99 (1985)

In 1979 the Lesotho Government issued the maloti, a national currency at par with the rand and circulating jointly with it.


GLOSSARY

- AID - Agency for International Development
- BCP - Basotho Congress Party
- BNP - Basotho National Party
- CD - Conservation Division
- CPO - Central Planning Officer
- DAO - District Agriculture Officer
- DC - District Coordinator
- DCO - District Conservation Officer
- DDC - District Development Committees
- DEO - District Extension Officer
- EC - Executive Committee
- FS - Field Service
- GA - Grazing Association
- GOL - Government of Lesotho
- LAO - Local Administrative Officer
- LAPIS - Lesotho Agricultural Production and Institutional Support Project
- LCRD - Land Conservation and Range Development Project
- LPMB - Livestock Produce Marketing Board
- M - Maloti--monetary unit used in Lesotho
- MOA - Ministry of Agriculture and Marketing
- MOI - Ministry of Interior
- MOJ - Ministry of Justice
- PC - Principal Chief

GLOSSARY (cont.)

- PMU - Project Management Unit
- PS - Principal Secretary
- R - Rand--monetary unit used in the Republic of South Africa and Lesotho
- RMA - Range Management Area
- RMD - Range Management Division
- RSA - Republic of South Africa
- RTO - Range Technical Officer
- SACUA - Southern African Customs Union Agreement
- TA - Technical Assistance
- TS - Technical Service
- VDC - Village Development Committee
- WC - Ward Chief

Lesotho



502723 9-77 (542158)
Lambert Conformal Projection
Standard parallels 6° and 30°
Scale 1:1,500,000

—+— Railroad
—— Road

1. PROJECT SETTING

A geographical locus totally within the Republic of South Africa (RSA) has been the dominant fact of life throughout Lesotho's history. In the early 19th century, the Basotho¹ occupied lowland areas of the Orange Free State. Forcibly expelled by advancing Boer and British settlers, they withdrew to a mountainous region which became a British protectorate in 1868, then the independent Kingdom of Lesotho in 1966.

About the size of Maryland,² with a population in 1982 of 1.4 million, Lesotho is one of the least developed nations in the world, with a real per capita income in 1980 of about \$190. The country is highly dependent on the RSA for employment and trade. Ninety-five percent of Lesotho's imports come from the Republic of South Africa. Sixty percent of its male labor force is employed in the Republic, remitting to Lesotho an amount that constitutes 40 percent of GNP and is the major source of income for three-quarters of all rural households.

Agricultural production of both crops and livestock has been stagnant since the 1970s, in large part because income from remittances is much higher than income derived from agriculture. In 1978 average annual earnings from crop and livestock farming was 200 rand (R). In that same year, average annual earnings from migrant employment in the RSA was R1,123. Clearly, as long as the Basotho can earn higher incomes from working in the Republic of South Africa, they are unlikely to invest resources in improving agriculture.

This situation may well change, however. Employment opportunities in the Republic have leveled off because of increased internal employment and RSA policies favoring domestic labor and mechanization. As a result, pressures on agriculture to provide a greater portion of Lesotho's national income are likely to grow.

Agriculture still remains the most important sector of the economy. Ninety percent of Lesotho's population live in rural areas and are engaged in some form of subsistence crop or livestock farming. The sector is plagued with problems. Only 13 percent of Lesotho's land is suitable for crops. The soil chemistry makes for easy erosion, a problem that has been compounded by excessive grazing and too many animals.³ Land

¹Collective name of the people of Lesotho.

²30,350 square kilometers.

³Mainly cattle, sheep, and goats.

degradation has in turn led to poor pasturage for livestock, poor animal health, high mortality rates, and low reproduction rates.

These problems are exacerbated by their inseparability from Basotho society and culture and the political crosscurrents arising from competing sources of authority. One source of authority is vested in a modern, two-party parliamentary system, the other in the traditional chieftainship. Although there has been a real decline in their power, the chiefs continue to attract strong allegiance from rural peoples.

Land is collectively owned by all the Basotho. A farming household does not own land, but rather has usufruct rights to an individual plot as long as family members keep it under cultivation.⁴ Once crops are harvested, the plot becomes a communal grazing area.

Livestock play an extremely important role in rural life. Cattle are the source of milk, fuel, and draft power, all of which are consumed by the cattle-owning family or rented out or sold to other farmers. Sheep and goats are the source of wool and mohair, which are sold. Livestock constitute the bride price that Basotho males pay to prospective in-laws and are slaughtered to commemorate significant events, such as marriage, birth, and death.

Until recent times local chiefs were responsible for assigning farm plots to individual (male) farmers and for enforcing rotational grazing between lowland winter pastures and high-altitude summer cattle post areas.

Times have changed, however. Population pressures, increased livestock numbers, growing landlessness, deterioration of cropland and rangeland, and the diminution of agriculture as a source of income have all led to a gradual decline in agricultural productivity. These factors, along with legal decisions handed down through Parliament and Government of Lesotho administration, are effectively undermining the power of local chiefs to allocate land or enforce grazing regulations.

Legally, chiefs can no longer allocate land without consulting village committees. These committees derive their powers not from the chieftainship but from Government central

⁴Average farm size is 2 hectares. Principal crops are maize, sorghum, and wheat.

ministries. The Government is using other legal means to control livestock numbers, restrict communal access to cropland and rangeland, and enforce rotational grazing.

Implementation of these decrees is, of course, another matter. Government efforts to modify cropland and rangeland tenure arrangements have generally met with strong resistance from those who still have interests in maintaining traditional practices.

2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The Land Conservation and Range Development (LCRD) Project was begun in 1980 to address problems of severe land erosion and low agricultural productivity. Its principal objectives are (1) to strengthen technical capabilities within Conservation Division (CD) and Range Management Division (RMD) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Marketing (MOA), (2) to develop plans intended to protect cropland and rangeland from further erosion, and (3) to establish a prototype range management area where improved livestock and range management techniques can be systematically applied.

Strengthening CD and RMD institutional capacity is being accomplished through training of Basotho staff who work at MOA headquarters in Maseru (Lesotho's capital city) and in district agriculture offices. The design and implementation of area conservation plans are the responsibility of U.S. technical staff and Basotho counterparts within the CD. Soil surveys have been conducted and are being used as a basis for the area conservation plans. To assist in the implementation effort, an MOA education and training unit serving both CD and RMD provides training, written materials, and advice to district agriculture staff and village conservation committees directly responsible for implementing the plans. The CD also assists the effort through construction, tree and grass plantings, and terracing. A survey of the physical features of Lesotho's rangeland is now underway under the direction of RMD. One U.S. range management specialist and his counterpart are studying grazing policies and regulations with the intent of making recommendations to the Government of Lesotho for improving range management.

A prototype 34,000-hectare range management area (RMA) has been demarcated and provided with livestock-handling facilities in Sehlabathebe, Qacha's Nek District. It is here that a concerted effort is being made to introduce a program of rotational grazing, controlled breeding, culling of less desirable animals, disease control, and the marketing of livestock and livestock products. A Grazing Association (GA) composed of

local livestock owners from 11 villages in the RMA has been established. With the assistance of the resident U.S. technician, the GA functions as a self-governing group that enforces the rotational grazing regulations on all livestock owners within the RMA.

3. PROJECT IMPACT

3.1 Findings and Analysis

LCRD has built on earlier training efforts that began with the AID-funded Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project in 1973 and the Land and Water Resource Development Project in 1975. These three projects, along with the ongoing AID-supported Farming Systems Research Project, have made an important contribution to strengthening the technical capability of the MOA.

Former AID training participants serve in agriculture positions throughout Lesotho, at MOA headquarters in Maseru, on projects, and in agriculture departments of district government. Many of those trained have moved into management positions. Of 26 past and present MOA Conservation Division professional staff trained in the United States, well over half are in management positions.

One of these individuals had been permitted to spend half his training time studying public administration. He expressed to the study team the belief that he had profited greatly from this inclusion of management coursework in his training program. It had strengthened his decision-making skills and had given him a self-confidence in his management decisions that he had previously lacked. He argued that technical training was not enough and that participants should be exposed to management coursework.

Other informants supported this view, especially because many returned participants move into management positions. These informants argued that management training would introduce participants to a more assertive management style, one that inculcated the habit of exploring alternative avenues for solving problems. Such training might help a future manager learn how to take the initiative, plan, and have confidence in his decisions.

Interviews with returned participants trained under LCRD also suggest the importance of on-the-job training in counterpart positions. While some counterparts cited technical know-

how when asked what they had learned from U.S. technical assistance staff, others cited other factors. One individual noted the initiative exercised by technical assistance staff when faced with a problem. Rather than seeking solutions only through formal channels, the technical assistance team actively sought other avenues for problem solving. Noting the relative ease with which U.S. technicians obtained the sympathetic ear of decision-makers at higher levels, one counterpart believed that his close association with the project permitted a degree of access to influential people he would not normally have. The 12 U.S. technicians who have served on the LCRD project have between them trained 26 counterparts; some of the technicians have had as many as four counterparts. Although an occasional source of frustration to the individual technician who finds himself in an unending routine of training new people, this turnover in counterpart personnel may be to Lesotho's advantage. Like long-term training, on-the-job training is a means of advancement to more desirable positions. If those trained work in Lesotho, they constitute an addition to the country's aggregate wealth in trained manpower.

Livestock farmers of the GA have benefited from the project.⁵ Farmers mentioned the improved pastures and the improved quality of animals through better breeding, culling, and other livestock management practices. The project provided wool-shearing and dip tank facilities, a tractor, and improved seed. Based on farmers' responses, it is apparent that the project has gained farmer support as a result of its quick, successful effort to show visible results and provide real services.

Not all farmers have benefited, however. Use of RMA pastures is restricted to GA members living within the Sehlabathebe area. Livestock owners living outside RMA boundaries have lost access to their traditional grazing areas within the RMA. They believe they have been ill-served by a project that has excluded them from their traditional grazing areas. Although their complaint has been acknowledged at both district and national levels of government, there appears to be no immediate solution to this problem.

In addition, one can argue that more training should have been extended within the RMA as an additional project activity. Members of the Executive Committee of the GA did receive a 1-week course in elementary accounting, which was probably useful for maintaining GA financial records. However, it also

⁵In 1983 there were 291 members whose herds accounted for 86 percent of all livestock in Sehlabathebe. See Appendix D.

might have been worthwhile to have trained all members of the GA and their herdboys, given their heavy involvement in livestock and range management. Such training also could have contributed to making project interventions self-sustaining.

3.2 Conclusion

Building on earlier and concurrent efforts, the LCRD project is making an invaluable contribution to institution building through both long-term and on-the-job training of counterpart staff. At the field level, the project has produced visible results that have won high praise from RMA farmers. Because counterparts often move into managerial positions, a combined program of technical and managerial training might be useful. It is unfortunate that training was not also extended to RMA residents. They and the project would have profited.

4. MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND PROCESS: THE NATIONAL LEVEL

4.1 Findings and Analysis

The LCRD technical assistance team is integrated into the Conservation Division and the Range Management Division, two of the five divisions of the Technical Services Branch of the MOA.⁶ These divisions coordinate with the District Extension Officer and provide technical support to the District Conservation and Range Technical Officers at the district level. Project staff and their counterparts work within the CD and RMD, often in the same or adjacent offices. This proximity fosters close working relationships between the technical assistance team and their counterparts. In addition, the technical assistance team functioned in ministry line positions while their counterparts were away on long-term training. Once counterparts returned, U.S. project technicians moved out of these positions and assumed advisory and training functions.

In addition to maintaining close working relationships with counterparts, the technical assistance team has successfully cultivated both formal and informal channels of communication to key decision-making points within the MOA. Given the

⁶See Figure B-1, Appendix B.

sensitivity of range and livestock management issues, the project's original policy and regulation analyst position, scheduled to be located in the Minister's Office, was not approved. The job title was changed and the position relocated to the RMD. Despite the lowered profile, the U.S. technician filling this position has achieved sufficient credibility to be permitted unofficial involvement in highly sensitive matters relating to land tenure, range, and livestock management. His recommendations for policy and regulatory changes are communicated to higher levels through informal channels. He is, in fact, performing informally those functions he would have performed formally under the original job description.

The technical assistance team leader served as RMD Chief while his counterpart studied in the United States. Having successfully completed his studies, the counterpart has taken over as RMD Chief. The technical assistance team leader is now an advisor to the RMD and oversees LCRD project activities. He also acts as financial manager of project funds. Although it is an inconvenience, this responsibility is not complicated because USAID/Lesotho requires submission of financial statements but retains responsibility for maintaining more sophisticated project accounting records.

Other factors also make the financial management responsibility less onerous. The project design permits some degree of fungibility within budget line items. Thus, although funds cannot be moved from, say, salaries to commodities, the commodity mix can be altered. The project design also provides both a 15-percent inflation factor and a 10-percent contingency fund. These project design provisions, combined with the increased strength of the dollar,⁷ relieved financial management of potential stress.

The increased strength of the dollar also permitted the technical assistance team leader and the USAID Mission to take advantage of the flexibility built into the project budget. The number of degree participant trainees whose training could be funded increased from 16 to 28, and the number of diploma participant trainees went from 6 to 12. To assist the MOA to overcome severe recurrent cost problems, the project is partially funding local costs of vehicles, gasoline, and counterpart salaries.

⁷From US\$1 = R1 when project implementation began in 1980-1981 to US\$1 = R2 at the time of this evaluation in 1985.

4.2 Conclusion

The LCRD project is physically and organizationally integrated into the MOA. Technical assistance staff make effective use of both formal and informal channels of communication. Using informal channels they have conveyed to key decision-makers policy and regulatory recommendations on highly sensitive range management issues. Individual technical assistance staff have moved from direct line positions to assume advisory, facilitative roles. The technical assistance team leader manages project monies, a task that is kept simple. Because of the budget design and strength of the dollar, the project has been able to incur additional expenses on budget line items. This has resulted in a greatly enhanced MOA technical capacity by increasing the number of trained staff.

5. MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND PROCESS: DISTRICT AND VILLAGE LEVELS

5.1 Findings and Analysis

Because land conservation and range management practices must be applied in village settings, LCRD staff work with and communicate through the traditional chieftainship hierarchy. Village chiefs, ward chiefs, principal chiefs, and the King, in ascending order, make up this hierarchy.

At first glance, it appears that traditional and modern sources of authority are distinguishable and, in fact, they do vie for influence over one another in Lesotho's political arena. The reality, however, is more complex. Within the modern state, half the Cabinet members are also chiefs. Both formal and informal linkages tie the chieftainship to the political and administrative machinery of government. The tension between these opposing yet complementary interests permeates administrative dynamics at district and village levels.

The District Coordinator is the senior civil servant in district administration and is responsible for coordination of all the technical line agencies that function at the district level. In addition, the District Coordinator often deals directly with local chiefs. Local chiefs within a district fall under the jurisdiction of the Local Administrative Officer, who is the district representative of the Ministry of Interior. Chiefs receive Government salaries through the Local

Administrative Officer and the Ministry of Interior and are, therefore, subject to some authoritative control by district administration.

Chiefs appear ambivalent toward district government. They are occasionally unwilling to cooperate with technical line ministry staff, whom they see as part of a continuing effort to erode their power. Furthermore, the allegiance that they command from rural peoples has enabled them to effectively resist implementation of public policies. The unexpectedly slow progress of land tenure reform measures introduced under the Land Act of 1979 is one manifestation of local chiefs' effective opposition to changes legally authorized by the modern government.

At the national level, the LCRD project maintains communication with the chieftainship through relatively formal channels extending from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Agriculture. This is in sharp contrast to the ad hoc and more personalized mode of operation of the technical assistance field staff.

Part of the explanation for this difference lies in the physical isolation of the field site. The Sehlabathebe RMA is linked to Maseru headquarters via radio and charter flights. It is also linked by road both to Maseru and to district headquarters in Qacha's Nek. Although these communication links have improved over time, they remain sporadic and difficult.⁸

Thus, technical assistance field staff are loosely tied to MOA project offices, enabling them to respond quickly to site-specific problems without close consultation with Maseru. Technical assistance field staff contact with ministry line offices at the district level is equally infrequent. In part this is due to the RMA's relative isolation. District staff play no immediate role in project operations but are knowledge-

the sensitivity of the issues involved, GA members often cannot act decisively or agree among themselves. The GA is heavily dependent, therefore, on the technical assistance field staff to tell it what to do.

In response, the technical assistance field team has adopted a directive, decisive management style. Field technicians often decide for the GA, thus relieving its members of the responsibility of making unpopular decisions on controversial issues. This also avoids embroiling technical decisions that require swift action in lengthy traditional decision-making procedures and ensures that implementation of project activities goes forward.

Technical assistance field staff also maintain contact with the local traditional court, which has so far sanctioned GA grazing regulations. Local court support has in turn been upheld at higher levels of the Ministry of Justice. This judicial backing has added credibility to grazing and livestock control regulations. So far, the occasional suits brought by farmers against the project for impounding their animals have not succeeded.

5.2 Conclusion

At the local level, traditional sources of authority are strong and can impede implementation. GA reluctance to implement grazing regulations is partially due to their sensitivity. The technical assistance field staff has responded by adopting a directive managerial style, imposing decisions the GA cannot make. Necessary functions are thus performed, but the capacity of the GA to act as a decision-making management unit remains in doubt. Judicial support from local and national courts has added credibility to GA regulations and has played a vital role in protecting the GA in its infancy.

6. ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE AND DECISION-MAKING

6.1 Findings and Analysis

Lesotho's civil service is a relatively new institution that seems unable to effectively defend itself against often opposing traditional interests. From a modern perspective this may be true. Again, however, the reality suggests no clear distinction between modern and traditional aspects of government

administration. When viewed in terms of Basotho culture, it appears that the civil service in certain respects is deeply rooted in traditional practice and values.

In Qacha's Nek District, resources to carry out functions are in very short supply. To overcome this problem, ministry line offices have a standing practice of sharing vehicles. Thus an MOA truck may in fact be used for Rural Development or Health, rather than Agriculture, business. This intermixing of resources has much in common with the traditional mafisa arrangement in village economy, in which farmers share the labor and benefits associated with crop and livestock production.

Another example of the influence of Basotho culture on modern administrative practice is the use of the pitso, or traditional public meeting, as a formal channel of communication. LCRD project personnel use the pitso extensively to convey to farmers technical guidance related to soil conservation and range development.

While the pitso has value for communicating modern ideas in a traditional setting, it also serves to explain the inability to act decisively or resolve administrative matters. Traditionally, male members of a village convene in a pitso to discuss issues of common interest and to make decisions affecting their community. They "talk through" issues, finally reaching consensus or a mutually satisfactory solution. In government, this need for consensus can result in protracted periods of stasis and great reluctance to implement difficult decisions.

6.2 Conclusion

Cultural practices exert influence on civil service administration. The traditional practice of deciding through consensus is a time-consuming process that has carried over into government and helps explain why decision-making is often difficult.

7. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

7.1 Findings and Analysis

From an implementation standpoint, the LCRD project is clearly successful. It is on schedule in most respects; it has exceeded original training targets; and it has established an

RMA complete with facilities, a functioning GA, and a system of controlled grazing. The project has also established effective organizational linkages using both formal and informal mechanisms. However, continuation of these activities after the project ends in 1987 is in doubt. Some activities will carry over into the new AID-funded Lesotho Agricultural Production and Institutional Support Project. However, there are no plans to continue surveillance over the RMA.

Together, the RMA and its GA constitute a new decision-making unit inserted into rural society. Although the local chieftainship structure is incorporated into the GA, the project represents externally imposed decision criteria for exercising systematic control over resources in ways not previously done. The project becomes a kind of adversary, forcing unpopular but necessary decisions that GA leaders, by virtue of their identity with village society, find impossible to impose.

At present, there is no institution that can play this adversarial role after the technical assistance team is withdrawn. District offices are too weak to take over. They are also likely to respond in perfectly rational fashion by diverting project assets to other uses. Some form of semi-autonomous presence in the RMA, with clear national Government backing, will be necessary to sustain field operations.

A unique set of favorable circumstances makes Sehlabathebe an ideal project site. It coincides with a political unit under the authority of the local Ward Chief, with recognized dip tank areas where farmers have traditionally brought animals for treatment, and with river watersheds possessing lowland and high-altitude pastures. A self-contained, isolated region of Lesotho, it is bordered by high mountains, a national park, and the RSA. Animal trespassing is most likely from the south and west, thus simplifying police functions. These factors will help sustain grazing regulation enforcement. Because this combination of factors is unlikely to exist elsewhere in Lesotho, the RMA prototype may not be easily replicable.

7.2 Conclusion

The RMA and GA are unlikely to continue without leadership from an external source that can shoulder the blame for unpopular decisions. The unique conjunction of favorable circumstances that helps sustain the RMA makes it a poor choice for replication.

8. LESSONS LEARNED

1. Interactions between technical assistance staff and host country people through formal and informal channels and at different hierarchical levels can be instructive to project counterparts. Such interactions can also serve the purpose of institution-building. Counterparts were clearly impressed with the creative energy U.S. technicians expended on the search for alternative solutions. The use of informal channels directed at different points in the Government bureaucracy not only achieved desired results, but brought host country project staff into contact with salient decision-makers, whom they would otherwise not get to know. The overall effect was to raise the status of the counterparts and to assist internal communication within the MOA and between the MOA and other sections of the Government.

2. Where returned participants are frequently promoted into administrative or management positions, additional training that combines technical and managerial training is desirable. The Government of Lesotho attaches considerable professional legitimacy to Basotho who return from abroad with advanced technical degrees. Within the CD and RMD, those trained under AID projects moved quickly into managerial positions, despite the fact that their degrees were (in most instances) in agricultural or animal sciences. Informants argued that in view of this professional mobility, a training program that includes coursework in management makes better sense than one that focuses exclusively on technical subjects.

3. Training should be extended beyond government counterparts to include participants who could play important roles in sustaining project interventions. In the LCRD project, livestock owners are part of the beneficiary population. Their cooperation is critical to successful implementation and the continued application of reforms in livestock management. The herdboys also play an important role; they are responsible for grazing and caring for animals in cattle post areas of the RMA during the summer grazing season. In view of the critical roles both owners and herdboys play, including them in a training program would have provided another means for sustaining project interventions.

4. When surplus funds are available, management decisions to provide additional training for host country staff and avoid recurrent cost generation can promote long-run development capacity. By increasing the numbers trained from 16 to 28 degree participants and 6 to 12 diploma participants, the project contributed to improving technical skill levels and institutional capability within the MOA without adding to the recurrent cost burden of the Government of Lesotho.

5. Project design should allow for budget flexibility. A degree of fungibility within line items of the project budget released funds for local recurrent costs and increased training beyond levels originally planned for. This in turn has eased the severe shortage of skilled manpower and recurrent cost problems within the MOA.

6. Rigorous financial management systems may not be important determinants of project success. The LCRD project is clearly meeting planned targets, despite its elementary, informal system of bookkeeping. This is not to say that financial management is loose. In this instance, the USAID Mission has chosen to impose rigorous procedures for managing funds on itself rather than on the project.

7. A project that introduces new techniques of resource management must walk a tightrope. On the one hand, it must co-opt local authority figures; on the other, it must play the role of adversary or "scapegoat" to relieve local organizations of responsibility for unpopular decisions. The LCRD project is attempting to introduce profound changes in the RMA. It must constantly seek local support for its efforts or run the risk of failure. At the same time, the project imposes highly unpopular decisions on a reluctant GA and deflects blame for those decisions from GA members to members of the U.S. technical team. Thus, the project has had to appear both as friend and enemy to its beneficiary population.

8. Field-level independence allows quick, flexible responses within the local milieu in which project activities are carried out. The remoteness of the RMA from Maseru forced project staff in the area to act independently of its main office in MOA headquarters. RMA technicians were thus able to respond quickly and flexibly to sudden or unexpected situations that required immediate attention.

9. Project efforts to introduce new techniques of resource management must be supported by relevant institutions with both policy and regulatory responsibilities at national and local levels. Because of the profound character of the changes introduced in the RMA, they could not have been implemented without Government support. There is general recognition that unchecked grazing and land erosion must be brought under control. The Government of Lesotho, through a variety of legislative, regulatory, and policy actions enacted at national and local levels, is forcing gradual but far-reaching changes in the way rural people manage their land and livestock. Opponents of GA regulations, for example, have so far been rebuffed in their efforts to legally press their cases in local courts.

10. A local organization established by a project to control resource allocation must have supportive linkages to preexisting legitimate institutions. The system of authoritative rule by a hierarchy of chiefs continues to be strongly supported by rural Basotho. Establishment of the RMA and its GA could not have taken place without the sanction of the Sehlabathebe Ward Chief and his subordinate local chiefs. Furthermore, the fact that the local chiefs are all members of the Executive Committee of the GA gives this organization and the RMA a degree of legitimacy they would not otherwise have.

11. Physical and functional integration of a project into an existing institution can strengthen institutional capacity. The location of the LCRD project within the CD and RMD of the MOA gave the project both visibility and legitimacy because it was part of a well-established ministry with established lines of communication to other sections of the central Government. It also allowed for close contact between U.S. technicians and host country staff. U.S. technicians were thus able to exploit a variety of avenues for solving implementation problems, while host country staff received on-the-job training and exposure to decision-makers they would not ordinarily meet. The overall effect was an increase in technically trained manpower, more continuous communication, and a strengthened ability to deal with issues of livestock and range management.

12. Effective use of informal communication channels may be an important key to successful project performance. In instances when project staff have been unable to achieve results through formal channels, they have used informal channels with some success. The role of policy advisor, for example, was officially rejected by the Government of Lesotho, yet is being effectively performed by one of the U.S. technicians, principally through informal linkages to much higher level officials.

13. Different project components, different levels of focus, and different periods of implementation may require different management styles. During earlier years of implementation, some project technicians located in Maseru held line positions while their counterparts studied in the United States. Upon the counterparts' return, these technicians moved into advisory positions and now function as trainers and advisors to MOA staff. Within the RMA, the management style is far more directive. Rather than acting merely as advisors, U.S. technicians must tell the GA what to do. In both cases, different project elements, implemented at different points in time and at different levels of social and official life, have required different approaches to managing activities.

14. During early phases of implementation, the delivery of quick, obvious results may be important for local credibility but is not indicative of long-run sustainability. U.S. techni-

cians in the RMA were able to construct facilities and provide services early in project implementation. These have clearly made a far greater and more favorable impression on local livestock farmers than the creation of the GA or the imposition of grazing regulations. On the other hand, the GA and its regulations will have the greater long-run effect on controlling erosion and animal overpopulation. Providing quick, tangible short-run benefits has won friends for LCRD but will not sustain the social, behavioral, and institutional changes necessary to achieve project objectives.

15. Circumstances favorable to a project's success may also argue against its replicability. The location of the RMA was a deliberate choice based on a unique combination of favorable political, ecological, and functional factors. Because this combination of factors is unlikely to exist elsewhere in Lesotho, LCRD may be only partially replicable in other parts of the country.

APPENDIX A

CONTEXT

1. BRIEF BACKGROUND

Territorial wars with the Boers in the mid-1860s forced the Basotho to place their country under British rule. These wars and subsequent events resulted in loss of land by the Basotho. Today, Lesotho is completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa (RSA) and is confined to a tiny 30,355 square kilometers of highland, 75 percent of which lies on and around the Maluti and Drakensberg mountains. The country has three ecological zones: the lowlands, the foothills, and the mountains. Because of rocky outcrops, steep slopes, and heavy erosion, only 13 percent, or 341,000 hectares, of the country is classified as arable land.

The lowlands are warmest, with temperatures varying from a maximum of around 32°C in summer to a minimum of below -2°C in winter. The mountains are coolest, with a maximum of 29°C and a minimum of -16.9°C. Rainfall is variable and averages 700 millimeters a year over most of the country. Most of the rain falls between October and April. The south is relatively dry. From time to time, extended droughts have caused crop failures and some loss of livestock. Averaged over a long period, droughts have occurred about one year in five. Even in years with good rains, it is critical for agricultural production that enough rain fall during the short, 3-week period of field preparation. Most rain falls in the growing season, but heavy downpours and hail storms are common, causing damage to soil and crops.

2. THE PEOPLE

The Basotho nation was formed in the early 19th century when King Moshoeshoe the Great attracted various Southern African people that were scattered both by the powerful Shaka, king of the Zulu, and by smaller nations who were fleeing the Zulu raids. Out of these "refugees" Moshoeshoe moulded his nation. Today the Basotho speak one language, Sesotho, and have one culture, although a few Basotho of Nquni origin, mainly on the southern and southeastern border, still speak their own language and have their own culture. The total de jure population of Lesotho is estimated at 1.4 million people. The de facto population is estimated at 1.2 million because about 200,000 people are permanently out of the country, employed in the mines, industry, and agriculture of the neighboring Republic of South Africa.

3. MACRO ECONOMIC SETTING

Lesotho's gross national product (GNP) per capita for 1981/1982 was 455.00 maloti (M) or US\$214.62 (see Table A-1), or well below the cutoff for "very poor countries" as determined by the World Bank. However, despite large annual variations, Lesotho experienced a substantial average rate of growth in real income in the 1970s. GNP in constant prices grew at a higher rate, averaging 13 percent between 1970/1971 and 1978/1979, a reflection of increases in real wages of migrant mine workers and the upsurge in economic activity in the mid- and late 1970s (see Table A-2). These rates must have dropped substantially in recent years because of the South African and world economic recession and severe crop losses caused by the protracted drought since 1981/1982. Agriculture's contribution to this drop in growth, however, will be cushioned by the fact that the sector's relative contribution to GNP is much smaller than that of migrant mine workers and has been dropping over the years relative to the contributions by other sectors.

Estimates from the Bureau of Statistics show that of all resources available in the country in 1981/1982, gross domestic product (GDP) accounted for 40.6 percent. The rest came from imports of goods and services. Since the mid-1970s, domestic production has tended to account for a declining share of total resources. What is conspicuous in Lesotho is that the country consumes more than it produces domestically. According to 1981/1982 estimates, private consumption alone was 66 percent higher than GDP at market prices, and this divergence appears to be continuing to increase. An examination of the structure of the economy that encourages this trend is presented below.

Table A-1 shows changes in the structure of the Lesotho economy. Whereas primary activities accounted for 35 percent of the GDP at market prices in 1976/1977, their relative share in 1981/1982 had fallen to 23.8 percent. At the same time, the relative share of the tertiary sector had increased substantially, while that of secondary activities had moved only slightly from 11.1 percent to 14.3 percent of GDP, largely due to the building and construction sector. Even if the output of the manufacturing sector had increased in real terms since 1978, its impact on the national economy would still be insignificant. The impact of development, particularly the growth of public service and improvement in salaries of migrant miners, as well as the relative increase in the share of the tertiary activities in the GDP, all operate together to promote an extreme form of consumerism.

There has been, however, a significant increase in investment in Lesotho. Gross capital formation in 1981/1982 totaled M128.8 million, a 176-percent increase over the 1976/1977

Table A-1. Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost
and Market Prices
(in millions of maloti)

Sector	1976/1977	1977/1978	1978/1979	1979/1980	1980/1981	1981/1982
Agriculture	49.7	54.5	63.0	66.5	62.1	67.1
Crops	24.4	26.7	24.7	24.7	21.9	23.6
Fruit	2.5	2.7	2.9	3.5	4.6	3.5
Livestock	22.7	25.2	35.4	38.3	35.6	40.0
Mining & Quarrying	0.5	1.2	11.0	18.6	20.7	16.0
Manufacturing	6.2	7.1	8.0	11.9	14.7	17.9
Handicrafts	4.3	5.1	5.8	8.7	11.0	13.5
Electricity & Water	0.5	1.6	2.1	2.0	1.8	1.7
Building & Construction	9.7	22.2	19.7	21.1	28.3	31.8
Wholesale & Retail	17.1	19.1	21.1	20.5	23.9	27.9
Catering	5.5	7.5	8.6	7.8	9.6	10.8
Transport & Communications	3.5	4.3	4.9	3.5	3.8	4.6
Finance & Business	15.9	18.7	22.6	23.5	26.4	36.0
Social Services Government	8.6	9.8	13.2	18.7	31.0	31.6
Services	10.5	12.2	19.0	23.2	43.8	48.5
Community & Personnel	1.0	1.5	2.0	2.8	2.8	3.5
Indirect Tax (net)	14.7	26.6	45.3	48.9	55.6	58.6
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GDP (market prices)	143.3	186.4	240.6	267.1	321.7	348.5
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Net Factor Income	125.8	144.9	156.1	184.9	217.5	287.7
GNP (market prices)	269.1	331.4	396.7	452.0	539.2	636.1
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Table A-1. Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost
and Market Prices (cont.)
(in millions of maloti)

Sector	1976/1977	1977/1978	1978/1979	1979/1980	1980/1981	1981/1982
Population (million)	1.216	1.244	1.272	1.301	1.365	1.397
GDP per Capita	118	150	196	205	236	249
GNP per Capita	221	266	319	348	395	455

Notes: 1. Figures have been rounded, so they do not necessarily add to total.
2. For 1979/1980, imputed bank service charges have been subtracted.

Source: Bureau of Statistics, Maseru.

figure. There has, however, been a shift from private investment to Government investment. In 1981/1982, Government investment accounted for 60 percent of gross fixed capital formation, whereas in 1976/1977 it was 55 percent. This shift largely reflects an increase in foreign capital assistance.

Table A-2. GDP and GNP in Constant (1970/1971) Prices
(in millions of maloti)

Year	Gross National Product at Market Prices	Net Factor Income from Abroad	Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices
1970/1971	74.8	22.3	52.5
1971/1972	71.9	24.3	47.6
1972/1973	84.5	27.8	56.7
1973/1974	107.4	35.9	71.5
1974/1975	119.3	43.5	75.8
1975/1976	134.0	64.4	69.6
1976/1977	153.3	72.2	81.1
1977/1978	170.5	75.1	95.4
1978/1979	186.8	72.6	114.2

Source: Bureau of Statistics, Maseru.

4. DEPENDENCE ON THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Lesotho economy is characterized by its overwhelming dependence on the RSA. The 1976 population census showed that 60.4 percent (129,582) of persons aged 10 years and over employed for wages were employed in South Africa. It is clear from statistics that migrant labor earnings explain the vast difference between GDP and GNP and influence the level of investment, consumption, imports, and Government of Lesotho revenues and expenditures. The recruitment of Basotho for

South African mines was formalized in an agreement in 1973, and 1981/1982 remittances stood at 40.9 percent of the GNP. Recruitment has leveled off and may indeed drop as a result of economic and sociopolitical issues in South Africa.

The Southern African Customs Union Agreement (SACUA), of which Lesotho is a member, was formalized in an agreement in 1910, and its revision in 1969 introduced some improvements. In 1979/1980, Customs Union revenues accounted for 84 percent of total revenue. The integration of the Lesotho economy into the RSA economy is also reinforced by the Rand Monetary Agreement of 1974 that formalized the circulation of the rand currency as the legal tender in Lesotho, South Africa, and Swaziland and made way for a free transfer of funds within the monetary area. Although both SACUA and the Rand Monetary Agreement incorporate compensation elements, what is unique is the degree of inequality of the members involved and the overwhelmingly dominant position of South Africa. The free product flow provided by SACUA and the free flow of capital funds within the framework of the Rand Monetary Agreement have both worked to undermine productive capacity within Lesotho. Together with rising migrant earnings, these factors have increased the country's propensity to import South African goods, a factor responsible for the widening trade deficit.

5. THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

It is estimated that over 90 percent of Lesotho's population is in rural areas, where they survive partly on what they produce and partly from off-farm incomes such as migrant earnings. Because of land shortage and a rapid population increase, the average land holdings are only 2.0 acres per household. About 16 percent of the households are landless.

Several factors have led to the poor performance of the agricultural sector: overgrazing, uncontrolled breeding, poor crop and animal husbandry, soil erosion, communal ownership of land, and poor livestock marketing facilities. These factors, together with climatological factors, make agriculture very risky and relatively less profitable than some other activities. It is estimated that agriculture contributes only 17 percent of the average rural household's income, while nonfarm activities contribute 12 percent and migrant remittances 71 percent. The unattractiveness of agriculture and the migration of able-bodied men to South Africa have had unfortunate results for agriculture. The figures in Table A-3 reveal the decline in this sector.

Table A-3. Lesotho Agriculture Sector,
Selected Years, 1950 to 1976

Indicator	1950	1960	1970	1976
Gross Crop Production (000s MT)	322	248	290	133
Mine Labor Supply (000s)	34	51	87	120
Area Planted (000s acres)	738	797	856	556
Gross Yield/Acre (200-lb bags)	4.8	3.4	2.4	2.6

Source: Bureau of Statistics, Maseru.

6. GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND APPROACHES IN THE LIVESTOCK SUBSECTOR

The first and second Five-Year Development Plans were mainly exploratory. They emphasized research with a view to collecting more data and finding appropriate solutions to the economic and general developmental problems that faced Lesotho. The approach to agriculture in general and to the livestock subsector in particular reflected this attitude. Three major area-based projects--the Khomokhoana Project in the north, the Thaba Bosiu Project in the central region, and the Senqu River Project in the south--each included livestock and some range management components. Based on the findings of these projects, the Thaba Tseka Project, the Mphaki Project, and the Land Conservation and Range Development Projects were designed. All these projects are attempting to improve livestock productivity through technical, organizational, and management improvements that will not unduly disturb the land tenure and culture of Lesotho.

Government has also introduced legislation and regulations to improve the use and management of the land. The latest and most significant addition to these changes was the 1979 Land Act. It has taken the Government a long time to develop the capacity to implement the Act because of opposition from groups that feel threatened by its provisions. Prominent among these are chiefs, whose prerogative over land management, their basic power base, has been abrogated by the Land Act.

To improve livestock and produce marketing, two Government corporations were established. The Livestock Marketing Corporation functioned for a short time and collapsed, largely because of financial and management inefficiencies. The Produce Marketing Corporation also collapsed because of bad pricing

policies, undue political interference, and management inefficiencies. The construction of an abattoir, planned since the early 1970s, has finally been completed in the past 2 years and should be operational by the end of 1985. There is a feedlot not far from the abattoir that has been operational for about 1 1/2 years. Smaller feedlots are planned for the southern, northern, and eastern parts of Lesotho to link up with the Maseru feedlot. Should these plans succeed, they will bring livestock marketing facilities closer to the farmer.

There is no doubt that some returns have been realized from Government efforts in the agricultural sector. The MOA is a much more effective institution than it was in 1970. There are more qualified Basotho with some experience in senior positions. Reports produced over the years have contributed significantly to the understanding of the complex problems facing the nation in its efforts to promote agricultural development and the farmer.

7. LIVESTOCK AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN LESOTHO SOCIETY

The latest estimates from the Lesotho Department of Statistics show that as of August 1983 there were 529,173 cattle, 1,280,975 sheep, and 856,900 goats in Lesotho. Over the years, no clear trends are discernible in these numbers (see Table A-4).

Table A-4. Estimated Number of Cattle, Sheep, and Goats
1973/1974-1981/1982

Year	Cattle	Sheep	Goats
1973/1974	465,500	1,556,900	961,900
1974/1975	512,400	1,577,400	886,400
1975/1976	502,400	1,519,700	834,600
1976/1977	484,500	1,128,000	617,500
1977/1978	526,181	942,833	582,499
1978/1979	560,322	973,996	613,314
1979/1980	593,929	1,043,561	784,346
1980/1981	589,976	1,168,404	766,535
1981/1982	562,372	1,337,443	930,413

Source: Dr. Moteane, D. Bostwick, and F.E. Ronsholt, "Meat Marketing Arrangements and Live Animal Supply for the National Abattoir," November 1984.

The Lesotho Agriculture Analysis Report No. 10 points out that imports of livestock were at their highest in 1977, reflecting the increase in migrant labor earnings in the mid-1970s. Exports dwindled during the same period. These developments should have combined to raise livestock numbers dramatically in Lesotho. This has not occurred. Two reasons are given for this phenomenon: (a) meat consumption must have risen with increased incomes, leading to increased slaughtering, particularly of small stock; (b) the new animals introduced into the harsh climate and overgrazed Lesotho range without any feed supplements must have died in great numbers.

Available statistics show that in 1980, 49.3 percent of households in Lesotho had livestock and over 48 percent had both livestock and land (see Table A-5). Stock holdings per household tend to be small, averaging between 5 and 10 units. There are, however, some large herds, particularly among the important chiefs and prominent citizens. The percentage of households with livestock increases progressively from the lowland to the mountain regions, reflecting differences in availability of arable land and rangeland. There are, however, relatively high numbers of cattle in the lowlands and a high percentage of households owning cattle (44.7 percent), reflecting the significance of cattle in a crop area afflicted by drought.

Table A-5. Land and Livestock Holdings by Households

Livestock Holding	Land Holding		Total	Percent
	With Land	W/O Land		
With Livestock	118,960	2,770	121,730	49.3
W/O Livestock	87,040	38,030	125,070	50.7
Total	206,000	40,800	246,800	
Percent	83.5	16.5	100.0	100.0

Source: "Towards the Year 2000: Strategies for Lesotho Agriculture," Lesotho Agricultural Sector Analysis Research Report No. 10, 1982.

Ranges are not fenced in Lesotho, and therefore herding is an important aspect of the livestock industry. With the spread of schooling, however, herdboys are becoming difficult to find. To accommodate both schooling and herding, some

livestock owners have consolidated their herds and let their herdboys alternate days in looking after the animals and going to school.

Cattle are normally wintered in the foothills and lowlands and migrate to the cattle posts in the mountains after the plowing and planting season. This practice is intended to allow grass to recuperate, thus ensuring reasonable grazing in winter. To reinforce the preservation of grazing for winter, chiefs may, under the Laws of Lerotholi, declare certain areas unavailable for grazing during late spring to the beginning of winter (maboella). With population increases leading to an increase in settlements in the mountains, winter grazing areas are diminishing. The mountain households are also becoming increasingly resentful of the influx of lowland cattle on what they consider their grazing areas.

Problems with mountain cattle posts and the unavailability of herdboys have led some households to keep their cattle in the lowlands throughout the year. Pressure on limited grazing areas in the lowlands and the desire by the herdboys and their families to keep their animals in reasonable condition have led to increasing incidents of grazing on the reserved areas (leboella). Furthermore, the communal grazing system does not provide an incentive for one household to conserve grazing land. The household may have a small herd and therefore not benefit from conservation as much as those with large herds.

Livestock plays an important role in the socioeconomic life of a Basotho. Not only is livestock an investment, but it is also a symbol of the economic status of the household. Cattle ensure and increase one's access to the scarce land resource. Ownership of fields continues only as long as fields are regularly cultivated. Cattle owners are permitted to cultivate their fields, thus ensuring that they never lose title to them. Non-livestock owners have to wait until livestock owners are through with their fields before their lands can be plowed and planted. By that time, it is often too late and their crop fails. This discourages some households, which then allow their land to lie fallow. Livestock owners can also increase their access to land through the share-cropping arrangement--a form of land rental. Finally, an individual benefits from communal grazing in direct proportion to the number of livestock owned. If one has no animals, one is effectively transferring to those that have animals one's rights to communal grazing at no price.

Livestock introduces some stability in the community through institutions that distribute benefits of ownership. Mafisa, a long-term loan of livestock, is one such institution. The loan of the animals includes the benefits of their produce,

for example, milk, meat, and draft power. The owner benefits from free herding and the return of all animals and their offspring. Should an animal die, the owner is informed. He may, as is customary, decide that the borrower may consume the meat and send the skin to him. According to the Thaba Tseka and Thaba Bosiu Projects' findings, about 20 percent of livestock-owning households manage stock on loan, while 25 percent of non-livestock-owning households manage stock on loan.

In a traditional Basotho marriage, the groom or his family pays the bride's family 20 cattle, 10 sheep, and 1 horse. The custom is silent on the quality of the animals transferred. The practice may have contributed in no small measure not only to the overstocking of livestock in Lesotho but also to the inferior quality of stock that abounds in the country.

At most traditional ceremonies in Lesotho, blood must be shed. A ceremony in which no animal is slaughtered will not generally be well attended, and the villagers will look down on the household or consider it "strange." Livestock is slaughtered at funerals, marriages, in accepting a new bride by the groom's family (koae), in welcoming a new baby (pitiki), in thanking or pacifying one's ancestors (ho hlabela balimo or ho felehetsa), and in similar ceremonies. Data from the Thaba Tseka Project indicate that 52 percent of cattle were slaughtered at funerals and 26 percent at weddings. At these ceremonies meat, beer, and other food are distributed free to family, friends, and villagers, providing, in a sense, a redistribution by the household to others.


These factors partly explain the overstocking that exists in Lesotho. Table A-6 shows overstocking rates in the country and by districts.

8. LAND TENURE

Traditionally, land in Lesotho belongs to the nation and is entrusted to the King who allocates user rights over the land to households through chiefs and headmen. At the village level, a household is allocated a piece of land for its household and, perhaps, for growing vegetables for the family. The household is also allocated cropland, which is theirs as long as it is kept in use. According to the Laws of Lerotholi (1938 version), a family should be allocated enough land to meet its subsistence needs. Where not enough unallocated land is available and there are deserving requests, families with holdings larger than needed to meet subsistence requirements may be dispossessed of part of their land for allocation to the needy families. Similar allocations do not extend to grazing land.

Table A-6. Livestock Carrying Capacity by District in Lesotho, 1981/1982

District	Carrying Capacity		Current Stocking Rate		
	Estimated Hectares of Rangeland	Average Hectares of Rangeland/AU ^a	AU	Average Hectares Rangeland	Percent Over-stocking
P/Butha	170 940	23 100	7 4	51 408	3.3



All grazing land is communal, and each household in a given area has an equal right to graze its animals on this land. Furthermore, cropland, once the crop has been harvested, also reverts to communal use. Removal of crop residue and stovers is frowned on and may result in the household's livestock being barred from grazing on other households' fields.

In urban and surrounding areas, land may be held under a title deed or leasehold. Until recently, financial institutions were reluctant to extend loans for title deed land because they believed it was not secure enough.

The tenure system in Lesotho has prevented the accumulation of large tracts of land by a few, as well as absentee foreign landlordism. About 206,000 rural households, or 83.5 percent, hold land. Contrary to general belief, however, land is not equitably distributed. Twenty percent of the smallest rural households hold only 5.3 percent of total arable area, while 20 percent of the largest hold 37.5 percent.

A system of sharecropping (lihalefote) exists that permits those who have tillage power, seed, labor, or the cash to hire these services to use more land than is allocated to them. Traditionally, such persons share a portion or all of the crop with the "owner" of the land. Recently, however, arrangements for hiring fields at an agreed price have developed. Although this system tends to undermine the equity principle built into the Laws of Lerotholi, it does allow destitute rural landholders to generate some income from their land. In addition, because the land is in use, these landholders will not lose title to their land as they would if they allowed it to lie fallow for over 2 years.

When the first Five-Year Development Plan was published in 1970, it recognized that the tenure system posed constraints to agriculture and general economic development in Lesotho. It was believed, however, that any changes made should not destroy the fundamental aspect of the system, that is, ensuring that the land remains collectively vested in the Basotho. Various projects were introduced to test concepts that could promote development without changing this principle. The Land Act of 1979 is the boldest step taken by the Government to improve the tenure system and make it more development oriented. The Act "provides for increased security of tenure, makes legitimate inheritance possible and through its leasing provision provides a mechanism whereby the efficiency of land use can be substantially increased."¹

¹See Sebastian Poulter, Legal Dualism in Lesotho, Morija, 1981.

9. MIGRATION

About 50 percent of Lesotho's male labor force works in the Republic of South Africa. It is estimated that 14 days' labor in the mines produces as much income as 1 year of Lesotho farm labor. A significant proportion of the migrant income available for saving is traditionally invested in livestock. This practice, together with other factors, contributes to serious overstocking of livestock.

The future of migration is uncertain. The South African Government would prefer to see its own blacks in the positions occupied by foreign laborers. With the high population growth among rural South African blacks and the recession in the country, black unemployment is rising. The mining industry, which has historically been dominated by migrant labor, is also becoming increasingly attractive to South African blacks because of the improvement in pay and benefits. The mining companies would also like to have a stable labor force not subject to political interference. In 1975, after the disastrous fight that killed over 70 Malawian migrants at Francistown in Botswana, President Banda halted all migration to the Republic. This was at a time when the gold price was high and the gold mining industry was expanding old mines and opening new ones and was hungry for labor. Realizing its vulnerability, the mining sector in South Africa decided to explore methods for reducing its dependence on visiting labor.

There are also factions in Lesotho who believe that the long-term costs of migration outstrip the short-term benefits and that efforts should be made to reduce and finally stop it. But having no sufficiently attractive alternatives to offer, these forces cannot be successful in the short and medium term. Despite its problems and uncertainties, migration will continue at the rate determined by the mining companies and the South African Government. As long as there are no attractive alternatives, the Basotho will continue to migrate.

The migration of able-bodied men from the rural areas of Lesotho leaves women, old men, and children to attend to the arduous agricultural tasks. Plowing, planting, cultivating, and attending to livestock are traditionally male functions, but the women and children left in the villages have found themselves increasingly doing these tasks. However, they cannot perform these tasks as efficiently as the men can, which contributes in no small measure to the low yields and productivity in the agricultural sector.

Even when the man is away from home, he still retains his position as the formal head of the family. All major decisions, including what to plant in the fields, which animals to cull, and what and when to sell or slaughter, are his decision. The wife, therefore, has to send to her husband the advice she receives from agricultural officers regarding planting, culling, and selling unproductive or excess livestock before making a decision. The result is that decisions on important and even urgent issues are delayed. This cumbersome procedure also is likely to lead to poor decision-making because the wife may relay messages from the officers incorrectly or with insufficient details.

The migrants, when they are home between contracts, probably consult and accept suggestions from their herdboys on issues affecting their stock. Livestock has traditionally been a man's business. Basotho culture and traditions do not even allow women near the animal exposure, especially when animals are around. Unfortunately, the herdboys do not receive serious and continuous training from the livestock officials. As a result, herdboys tend to point out to their masters the negative side of changes proposed or implemented by livestock officials and thus do not facilitate necessary changes and improvements.

10. REGIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Southern Africa is marked not only by gross inequalities in development but also by pervasive differences in social systems. South Africa's racist policies prevent regional cooperation at the political level. This, in turn, prevents an optimal allocation of resources in the region and threatens the stability of cooperation in the economic sphere. Because of political instability, Lesotho had to divert M17 million of its development funds in the past 2 years to repair economic infrastructure (including some industries) that had been damaged by sabotage. Because it is totally surrounded by South Africa, Lesotho has to walk a political tightrope. It has to support change in South Africa's racial policies to maintain credibility abroad. At the same time, realities at home do not allow it to do this openly. It is, however, generally hoped that recent developments between South Africa and the smaller countries in the subregion will pave the way for broader and more meaningful cooperation and therefore more rational allocation of the region's resources.

11. LOCAL POLITICS

At independence in 1966, Lesotho assumed a British system of government. Of the two politically strong parties, the Basotho National Party (BNP) and the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), the BNP won the elections and formed the Government. The BNP was strongly supported by the Catholic Church and antileftist elements in the country. Headed by a chief and with most of the senior cabinet members also chiefs, the party was seen as strongly pro-chieftainship and pro-establishment. The ruling party accepted close economic ties with the RSA and advocated dialogue with Pretoria.

During the first postindependence elections in January 1970, violence erupted and election results were nullified. The BNP once more took over power and the constitution was suspended. After continual clashes between BNP and BCP supporters, political activity was banned. Toward the end of the 1970s, reconciliation attempts were made by the two parties. Imprisoned opposition political leaders were pardoned and freed. Those that had fled the country were invited back. An interim National Assembly was established and a national Government with some opposition party leaders occupying Cabinet positions was established. These efforts brought an element of stability and hope to Lesotho. Elections were promised. But when these did not materialize, the outside wing of the BCP organized the Lesotho Liberation Army, which engaged in subversive acts confined mainly to the rural areas. Recently, the Interim Assembly has been disbanded, and arrangements are being made for new elections.

At the district level, political organization is unclear. Since the political developments of the early 1970s, BNP representation at the district level has tended to coincide with the central Government representation. For instance, the positions of District Development Secretaries (which have since been abolished) were held by politicians who had been assistant ministers in the Cabinet immediately following independence. Until recently, the major Government representatives at the district level did not have any post-high school education or, indeed, much administrative experience. Their appointments appeared to be based more on political patronage than on administrative capability and experience.

Wallis and Van de Geer identify three levels of political organization below the district level in Lesotho: the Constituency Committee, the Polling Station Area Committee, and

the Village Party Committee.² They further indicate that village committees appear to have been the more active of these organizations, probably because the activities of the other two committees are dependent on elections being held. In some villages, the Village Party Committee has become the Village Development Committee (VDC). Because water projects are delivered to the villages through the VDCs, it is not surprising to find that village water supply management committees are dominated by BNP supporters.

Decision-making in the Lesotho administration is highly centralized, despite recent efforts to decentralize. The villagers and their organizations serve only an advisory role in the decision-making process. They are, however, expected to participate actively in project implementation in their districts and villages. It is, therefore, doubtful whether projects at the village level have been affected either positively or negatively by the political affiliation of the villagers.

Moshoeshe the Great relied on the chieftainship institution to manage the country. The chiefs had decision-making, administrative, and judicial powers. The distribution of land was entirely their prerogative. Chiefs consulted closely with the people through a system of public gatherings (the pitso) and advisory councils. The introduction of colonial administration after Moshoeshe placed himself and his people under British rule led to the development of a system of dual authority. The structure of the present day central Government derives from the colonial administration. Over time, various reforms have been introduced that gradually transferred the chiefs' powers to the central administration. The more prominent of these are the 1938 reforms, the National Treasury Act, the 1968 Chieftainship Act, and the 1979 Land Act.

These moves have not sought to abolish the chieftainship, but they have removed almost all the major administrative, judicial, and land allocation powers from the institution. The chieftainship institution is, however, still strong and influential at the village level.

There is no independent local administration in Lesotho. The central Government appoints its personnel to run local affairs and promote development at the district and village levels. The district is headed by a District Coordinator who reports to a Principal Secretary in the Cabinet Office; under

²Roeland Van de Geer and Malcolm Wallis, Government and Development in Rural Lesotho (Rome: National University of Lesotho, 1982).

the latter are various technicians representing ministries and departments of Government. Although these technicians are formally responsible to their relevant head in Maseru, they are supposed to be administratively responsible to the District Coordinator. There is also a Local Administration Officer who is responsible for chieftainship affairs and other local administrative affairs.

To promote popular participation, District Development Committees (DDC) and VDCs have been established. The DDCs are chaired by the District Coordinator, and the VDCs by elected members. The chieftainship is represented in the DDC by the principal or ward chief and in the VDC by chiefs, headmen, or their appointees. Above these local administrative organizations are several special structures promoted by various district departments to facilitate delivery of Government services or development projects. There are, for instance, village garden committees, cooperative movements promoted by Rural Development Officers, farmers' associations, range management associations, and the like which are promoted by agricultural officers.

The chieftainship institution is expected to function in cooperation with Government officials and the various committees and associations to bring development and services to the people. There are indications that this does not always happen. This is understandable in the context of the measures taken by the central Government to strip the chieftainship institution of its power and influence. Furthermore, most chiefs are themselves farmers, and some decisions and measures that the Government seeks to implement at the village level are not perceived as directly beneficial to individual farmers, at least in the short term. As a result, these measures frequently meet with farmers' resistance.

Another significant factor in village politics is the church. Eighty percent of the nation is said to belong to one or another of the Christian churches, with the Catholic Church the dominant one. The King and the Prime Minister are Catholics. The educational system is dominated by the churches, and most churches have also been involved in the delivery of health services, including building, equipping, and running hospitals. Thus, the church influences local opinion not only through the pulpit but also through the educational and the health systems. Thus, acceptance of change at the village level is facilitated when the change is supported, or at least not opposed, by the religious movements.

APPENDIX B

ORGANIZATIONAL LINKAGES IN THE LAND CONSERVATION AND RANGE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

The Land Conservation and Range Development (LCRD) project is a two-tiered project. It provides assistance at the national level to the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), especially to two of its divisions. This project builds on the work of two previous AID-supported efforts (Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project, 632-0031, 1973-1979; and Land and Water Resources Development Project, 632-0084, 1975-1982) that emphasized soil and water conservation. The institutional linkages established, as well as the work within MOA, provided the foundation for the LCRD's continued work on conservation and is the basis for its extension into range management. The second tier of assistance is at the local field level within 1 of the 10 districts of Lesotho. Here, the LCRD project has established a demonstration area for range management, using the lessons learned in earlier attempts (e.g., Thaba Tseka). This two-tiered approach has meant that the project has had to develop two distinct kinds of organizational linkages.

1. NATIONAL-LEVEL LINKAGES

The LCRD technical assistance team is integrated into the Conservation Division (CD) and the Range Management Division (RMD) of the MOA. They are two of five divisions of the Technical Services branch of the Ministry (Figure B-1). Project staff are at a middle level in the national setting of MOA. These divisions coordinate with the Field Services branch, especially the District Extension Officer. In addition, they support district level staff (e.g., the District Conservation Officer and the Range Technical Officer), as do other divisions of technical services. Project staff and host counterparts of CD and RMD are located in the same office building, providing easy and continuous contact. The project is providing technical assistance to three of the four sections of the CD and the RMD (Figure B-2).

The budget is also integrated. For example, during a gasoline shortage near the end of the Lesotho fiscal year, the project was able to cover some of the cost because it had surplus funds (see Appendix D). The CD is the older of the two divisions. The RMD began in 1979, nearly coincident with initial project implementation, and has had much higher levels of project budget support. About 40 percent of the LCRD budget goes to CD and 60 percent to RMD, although at least one position (information specialist) serves both divisions. It is

Figure B-1. Ministry of Agriculture Organization Chart





Figure B-2. Land Conservation and Range Development Project



anticipated that the Government of Lesotho will gradually assume more and more of the budget costs over the life of the project so that by the end of the project the financial contribution by the project to each division will be zero.

The close linkage between project staff and MOA divisions is illustrated by the role played by the LCRD technical assistance team during host country counterpart training. The team functioned in line ministry positions during counterpart absences, and then took on an advisory/training role when the counterparts returned. The clearest example of this is with the Senior Range Management Specialist/Team Coordinator, who functioned in a line capacity for approximately 20 months (Figure B-3). When in line positions or in an advisory role, the LCRD staff functions mostly through formal channels.


With at least one position, however, the informal link has been more important, especially because this position has provided policy input. The function of this position has been to initiate policy changes and to develop regulations for effective range management. Because such changes are complex and politically sensitive, informal networks proved more productive. The LCRD project and its two predecessors have created another informal link through participants who were trained under these projects but are now located in other divisions of MOA (e.g., Livestock, Crops) or elsewhere in government (see Appendix E). In the long run, this cadre of trained personnel, situated in technical and managerial positions, may constitute the most important contribution of the LCRD project to a strengthening of the development management capacity of the Government of Lesotho.

Because land conservation and range management practices must be applied in local village settings, LCRD staff must work and communicate with the traditional system of authority--the chiefs (see Appendix E). At the national level, this occurs through the formal hierarchy of Government (from the MOA to the Ministry of Interior) when the communication is to chiefs as a group, such as distributing policy changes or new grazing regulations. But when the communication is with a specific chief about particular conditions in his area, informal channels are often used.

2. FIELD-LEVEL LINKAGES

Field-level assistance by the LCRD project is linked to the national level via radio and charter flights between Sehlabathebe and Maseru, and by road, either to Qacha's Nek or directly to Maseru. Although these links have improved over time, their use is still sporadic and difficult (see Appendix F).

Figure B-3. Sehlabathebe Range Management Unit



The project functions very much as an independent project management unit at the field level. It has independent (or virtually so) resources and makes many decisions (both small and large) without close consultation with the national headquarters. In addition, the geographic isolation of the field-level location reinforces the sense of independence, perhaps even alienation (see Appendix F). This loose coordination permits flexibility in the activities of the field-level staff and allows them to respond to local conditions based on their judgment.

Contact between LCRD field staff and district line agencies is minimal. In part, this is due to distance (both in area and time) and to lack of a radio link. More importantly, the low level of coordination is attributable to the lack of involvement by the district line agencies in the field operation, leaving the LCRD field staff to take direction from the national-level technical assistance teams and the RMD. While this may not be important during implementation, it does not bode well for sustainability after the project period.

The Grazing Association (GA), composed of members from the 11 villages of the RMA, is a creation of the project. It had approximately 250 members in 1984 and is governed by an Executive Committee of 30 members, which itself has seven officers. Each of the village chiefs is a member of the Executive Committee, and thus the LCRD field staff have close links to local institutions, including the Ward Chief, whose area of control is coincident with the RMA boundaries and the villages of the GAs.

The most common focus of coordination is the daily management of the RMA and enforcement of its regulations. The officers of the GA, the Ward Chief, and LCRD field staff interact almost daily, mostly through informal mechanisms. Formal links occur during the monthly meetings of the GA and the occasional pitsos held in villages. The 11 range riders, who patrol the RMA grazing areas, provide an ongoing mechanism for organizational linkage.

The Principal Chief, whose territory is coincident with the Qacha's Nek District, was instrumental in establishing the legitimacy of the RMA and GA but today plays no major role in the field operation. He has appointed the Ward Chief as his surrogate, and thus the field staff have little ongoing contact with the Principal Chief.

Another institution with which the project maintains contact is the local traditional court. It provides a second layer of sanction for the regulations of the GA. Its role will be greater if more trespass and impoundment situations occur.

The backing by the local court is supported at high levels in the Ministry of Justice, and this backing is a key element in the ability of the GA and project to command local respect. People know project decisions are unlikely to be overturned in the courts.

Besides the RMD, the other national institution with which the LCRD field staff interacts is the Livestock Produce Marketing Board. It has responsibility for marketing the products from the RMA--wool, mohair, mutton, and cattle. However, the only products that systematically link the Board with the GA are wool and mohair; mutton and cattle marketing are left to the LCRD staff and the GA.

3. LINKAGES FOR SUSTAINABILITY

The LCRD project has developed effective organizational linkages, through formal and informal mechanisms. Furthermore, the project has achieved this despite the tension that exists between the project and necessary policy/regulations on the one hand, and the GA and livestock owners on the other. The former's goals are long term, within a modern context, and apply to the common good. For the latter, goals tend to be short term, within a traditional context, and focus on an individual's immediate needs. The project emphasis on quick performance and the activation of linkages to support this, however, is often at the expense of establishing the linkages needed to sustain the activity beyond the life of the project; for this to occur, the project must emphasize the process, build the institutional capacity of local organizations, and teach decision-making.

APPENDIX C

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES

The Land Conservation and Range Development (LCRD) Project is designed to influence decision-making related to livestock. Achieving this will require the promotion of organizational and administrative processes that support new practices.

This appendix explores existing processes as they interact with project needs and objectives.

1. ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE AND DECISION-MAKING

The rejection of the British constitution for Basutoland in 1970 may have symbolized more than just political tenacity on the part of local leaders. It may also have represented a lack of acceptance of British administrative culture, including the civil service traditions of political neutrality and noblesse oblige.

Instead of these imported perspectives, the administrative culture of the Lesotho civil service seems to have borrowed and adapted aspects of traditional culture. Numerous observers have remarked on the fact that the civil service tradition is young and uncertain. This appears to be true in relation to the codes of conduct, role models, and preferred career paths firmly etched into the administrative machinery of the invited colonial power. However, when viewed in terms of traditional Basotho culture, a more definite and deeply rooted set of values and practices emerges.

For example, chiefs take for granted preferential treatment, privileges, and prerogatives in relation to "public" resources. The civil service hierarchy assumes similar rights in the management of resources. Office heads keep the privilege of resource control to themselves.

At the same time, decision-making often follows a traditional pattern. Group consensus building, rather than individual decisiveness, is sought on controversial issues. This often means that reaching decisions is a time-consuming process.

Field practices also show similarities with some aspects of traditional society. For example, the major formal communication channel between villagers and bureaucrats is the pitso, or public meeting. Other cultural practices also creep into administrative operations. For instance, line ministries

have very few resources at their offices in the district headquarters of Qacha's Nek. Vehicles are in especially short supply. To compensate for this, an informal practice of sharing them occurs. Thus a Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) truck may be carrying Rural Development, Health, and local administration staff rather than Agriculture staff. It is impossible to tell a vehicle's mission by identifying its ministry of origin. All ministries gain from the practice, however, because sharing their resources gives them access to those of others in times of need. Such practices have much in common with the traditional livestock sharing practice of mafisa.

Thus the administrative processes of the modern state in Lesotho are a partial reflection of practices rooted in the traditional culture. At the same time, a separate system of administration also exists.

2. DUAL SYSTEMS

Two major and largely distinct hierarchies are characteristic of Lesotho. One is the chieftainship and the other is the modern state.

The position of chief is an inherited one at each level. Village chiefs, ward chiefs, principal chiefs, and the King, in ascending order, make up the hierarchy of chiefs. A set number of chiefs is allowed within the nation. Twenty-four are principal chiefs. Each chief receives a Government salary. The chieftainship system is under the Ministry of Interior, and the local administrative officer is in charge of chieftainship-related issues in each district.

At the same time, the apex of the chieftainship hierarchy is the King. Moreover, about half of the members of the cabinet are chiefs and thus are from families recognized as nobility. Both formal and informal links, then, tie the hierarchy of chiefs and the modern political/administrative staff together. But tension between them permeates administrative dynamics in field settings.

This tension often manifests itself in the unwillingness of the chiefs to cooperate with technical line ministry staff--people who are seen as intruders in their domains of authority. Chiefs are sensitive to the erosion of their powers by the imposition of technical criteria for decision-making. This is especially true as it relates to the allocation and use of land--a major foundation of chiefly power.

Further chipping away of the power of the chieftainship has occurred through a committee system imposed by the modern state. Land allocation committees, village development committees, and district development committees have been formed. The membership of these committees is appointed rather than elected, and one study suggests that they function more as penetration mechanisms (weak ones) than as channels for mobilizing rural populations for development.¹

Although the trend has been to curtail the concentration of power in the chiefs, chiefly resistance to public policy can immobilize group decision-making in the modern arena. The chiefs are a force that must be taken into account.

3. DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION

The District Coordinator (DC) oversees district administration. The DC is the senior civil servant in the district and reports directly to the Principal Secretary (PS) in the Office of the Cabinet. The job of the DC is to coordinate the efforts of technical line agency staff in the district.

The DC often takes a more direct role in dealing with the chiefs. The chiefs are responsible to, and receive their paychecks from, the Local Administrative Officer (LAO), who is the district head of the Ministry of Interior. However, the chiefs listen to the DC more than to the district line agency heads. If an issue cannot be resolved with the chiefs by the DC and LAO, it is forwarded, by the DC, to the Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Interior. Thus the DC is an important link between the traditional and modern systems.

The key technical ministry for the LCRD project is the Ministry of Agriculture, acting through its district office in Qacha's Nek. The head of the MOA in the district is the District Agriculture Officer (DAO). Five administrative staff and two vehicles are under the control of the DAO. Additionally, there are five substantive technical officers who obtain administrative support from the DAO but get technical direction from Ministry offices in Maseru. Those offices are Crops, Livestock, Range Management, Conservation, and Extension. The DAO is also responsible for the District Farmers Training Center.

¹Roeland Van De Geer and Malcolm Wallis, Government and Development in Rural Lesotho (Rome: National University of Lesotho, 1982).

A warrant from the Principal Secretary of the MOA now funds all sections at the district level. Previously, each section received its warrant from the corresponding section in Maseru (e.g., the district conservation officer received funding from the project-supported conservation office in Maseru). Thus travel, wages, and miscellaneous expenses are paid from the warrants at the district level. All salary checks are issued in Maseru, however. A vehicle is dispatched each month to collect the salary checks, a 16-hour journey one way.

All district offices are located in a small compound. The close proximity facilitates informal interactions, which (given the severe isolation, resource constraints, and the distance and difficulty of travel throughout the district) are crucial for getting anything done.

4. THE PROJECT

The LCRD project is designed to introduce new decision-making processes and criteria into the range management area (RMA). The approach it takes to this process is a function of its interaction with the district administration, the existence of the two systems, and the administrative culture.

At the field level, the project takes an informal leadership role in decision-making within the Grazing Association (GA). Because livestock deployment in the different range areas is sensitive to delay, project staff force swift decisions and attempt to avoid the lengthy traditional decision process. This active role interjects technical criteria as primary ones and establishes the GA as the authority on range management decisions --an area previously controlled by the principal chief. Some observers see this as a key element in field success to date.

Thus at the two levels of the project, two different strategies have been followed to influence decision-making processes: a forceful leadership role at the field level and a subtle, augmentative role at the national level. At both levels, however, acute sensitivity to hidden agendas and informal interactions has guided project activity.

5. SUSTAINABILITY

The LCRD project has been justifiably praised for its accomplishment of short-term implementation targets. But the real key to its success will be the inheritance it leaves behind after outside resources have been exhausted. This is especially true in relation to its impact on decision-making processes.

The project and its satellite, the GA, constitute a new decision-making unit in the rural institutional landscape. Although the local chieftainship structure has been incorporated into the GA, the project represents imposed decision criteria. The intent is to control resource use in ways not previously done. The relationship between the project and its beneficiaries, then, is partly adversarial.

How will this relationship be sustained after project funds are depleted and technical assistance is withdrawn? District offices are obviously too weak to take over project activities, and a siphoning off of project vehicles would be a rational response to inheriting project assets. Thus, some form of semiautonomous presence in the field area will be necessary after project termination.

What about the link to policy analysis? How will this be maintained? Establishment at the national level of the regulations to be enforced at the local level is crucial for introducing new decision criteria. A scapegoat role must be developed to help chiefs and local leaders enforce unpopular decisions. Who can fill that role?

The project is planned to operate for 7 years. But even in the United States, where conditions are less harsh, turnover of resource control to beneficiary groups takes at minimum 20 years. Even then, an outside adversary role often must be performed, and extensive, continued, multilevel training is required.

Local observers suggest that two prerequisites exist for sustainability: a transition plan and a series of buffer projects in the areas adjacent to LCRD to take pressure off the area. From the discussion above, several other factors can be added to this list. Sustained impact on decision-making

APPENDIX D

HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT IN THE LAND CONSERVATION AND RANGE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT: A DISCUSSION OF ROLES AND IMPACT

This appendix focuses on the human dimension of the Land Conservation and Range Development (LCRD) project--the distinctive roles that individuals play and the perceived effects that project interventions have had on those who benefited from them.

Although the original Project Paper identified farmers as the beneficiary population, it is premature to expect much impact on that group at this time. The project will not end until 1987, and impact is often not visible until years after interventions have ended.

1. RETURNED PARTICIPANT TRAINEES AND INSTITUTION BUILDING

Returned participant trainees constitute the one group on whom impact has clearly been substantial. In this case, however, LCRD has actually built on earlier training efforts that began in 1973 with the Thaba Bosiu Rural Development project and the Land and Water Resource Development project that began in 1975. These three projects, along with the ongoing Farming Systems Research project, have made an invaluable contribution to strengthening the technical capability of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA).

Former AID training participants serve in agriculture positions throughout Lesotho, at headquarters (MOA in Maseru), on projects, and in agriculture departments of district government. Many of those who received BS and MS degrees have moved into management positions. For example, of 26 past and present MOA Conservation Division professional staff trained in the United States, well over half are in management positions.¹

Discussions at both headquarters and district levels indicate that long-term U.S. training is an important vehicle for professional mobility. Specific instances abound.

In an interview with the study team, the District Coordinator in Qacha's Nek district revealed that he had begun his career as an agriculture extension agent. He went on to teach

¹An additional 24 Conservation Division professional staff were trained to the diploma level under AID projects.

in various farmer training institutes, eventually reaching the position of principal. He then studied at Washington State University at Pullman as a participant trainee under the Farming Systems Research Project. Upon his return to Lesotho with a BS and an MS in extension, he became Deputy Director, then Director, of the Extension Division at MOA headquarters in Maseru. As District Coordinator he is currently filling the highest government position at the district level.

The study team was able to interview 6 of the 12 returned participants trained under LCRD. All those interviewed considered their training worthwhile for the expertise they had acquired.²

In addition, they appear to have acquired on-the-job training from the LCRD U.S. technical team as well. While some counterparts cited technical know-how when asked what they had learned from the U.S. technicians, others cited other factors. In one instance, the counterpart noted the initiative exercised by U.S. technicians when faced with a problem. Rather than seeking solutions only through formal channels, the U.S. team actively sought out other avenues for problem solving. Noting the relative ease with which U.S. technicians obtained the sympathetic ear of decision-makers at higher levels, one counterpart believed that his close association with LCRD permitted a degree of access that he would not normally have.

Two of the 12 returned participants received some management training either during or prior to filling their current management positions. One of the two had originally been scheduled for technical training only, but had been permitted to spend half his training time studying public administration. He expressed a belief that he profited greatly from the coursework: it had strengthened his decision-making skills and gave him a self-confidence in his management decisions that he had previously lacked. He expressed the opinion that technical training was not enough and that participants should have some exposure to management coursework.

Other informants tended to support this view, especially because so many of the returned participants move into management positions. These informants argued that management training would introduce students to a more assertive management style, one that inculcated the necessity of exploring alterna-

²Twenty-eight LCRD participants are being (or have been) trained mainly in range management, soil science, public administration, forestry, agricultural engineering, land-use planning, and veterinary medicine.

tive avenues for solving problems. Such training might help a future manager learn how to take the initiative, plan ahead, and have confidence in his decisions.

Other informants suggested that the project had emphasized technical training to the detriment of other equally important areas of knowledge. The MOA staff, generally, are professionals knowledgeable about agriculture. They perceive their function as one of providing technical solutions to technical problems. There appears to be a sense of frustration among MOA staff professionals over the pervasive influence that political considerations exercise over what are sound technical decisions. Outside observers argue that MOA staff do not always appreciate the need for accommodating the political, social, and cultural realities surrounding technical problems. One U.S. technician drew a parallel between the trained host country technical experts and the trained U.S. technical expert working in a foreign context. Both may bring a wealth of specialized expertise to a problem but have little appreciation for the complex social environment in which the expertise must be applied. In both cases, the experts could profit from exposure to coursework intended to raise their sensitivity to, and comprehension of, environmental factors that influence technical problems.

Members of the study team were nevertheless impressed with MOA staff, both at headquarters and at the district level. Those interviewed appeared to be well trained, capable, and dedicated professionals. Lacking adequate support services, vehicles, equipment, and gasoline, district staff, particularly, appear to do the best job they can under difficult circumstances. The district agriculture officer in Qacha's Nek estimated that Agriculture Department staff spend over half their time working in the district, including Sehlabathebe, where the LCRD range management area (RMA) is located. Thus, while not directly involved in project activities, he and the head extension officer were well acquainted with the LCRD RMA and the Grazing Association (GA).

The Government of Lesotho recently granted a substantial wage increase to its employees that in effect raises Government pay to levels found in the private sector. Although the study team was not able to pursue this issue in detail, it does appear that Government employees depend on their civil service salary as their sole or principal means of livelihood. This suggests that the Government provides adequate compensation to its civil servants, thus encouraging better on-the-job performance.

2. THE ROLE OF THE U.S. TECHNICAL STAFF

The U.S. technical team, for its part, has been careful to maintain close working relationships with technical counterpart staff, officials at higher levels within the MOA, and traditional sources of authority (the chieftainship). Within Government, U.S. project staff have successfully cultivated both formal and informal channels of communication. This cultivation has brought credibility to the U.S. technical team and provided it access to important decision-making points within the MOA.

In one instance, the range policy and regulations analyst position scheduled to be located in the Minister's office was not approved because of the sensitivity of range and livestock management issues. The job title was changed and the position was relocated to the RMD. Despite the lowered profile, the U.S. technician filling this position has achieved sufficient acceptance within the MOA to be permitted involvement in highly sensitive matters relating to land tenure, range, and livestock management. He is, in fact, performing informally those functions he would have performed formally under the original job description.

In the Sehlabathebe RMA, the same philosophy obtains. A resident U.S. technician serves as an advisor to the GA and its Executive Committee. He is present at all Executive Committee meetings (held about twice a month) and participates in all general meetings held for area residents. He and other LCRD staff spend considerable time and effort communicating with individual area chiefs as well.³

In discussing with U.S. technicians their role in the project, it becomes apparent that transferring their knowledge to others is perceived as an important aspect of their functions. It is equally apparent that transferring knowledge occupies a good deal of their time. In addition to the short courses and guidance they regularly provide to district officers, village committees, and farmers, they also train MOA counterparts. The 12 U.S. technicians who have served on the LCRD project have among them provided on-the-job training for 26 counterparts. Some of the technicians have had as many as four counterparts. Although this task is an occasional source

³The importance that LCRD attaches to the chieftainship is indicated by the choice of Sehlabathebe as the RMA. Although a number of factors were considered in the selection, the endorsement and support of the area's principal chief was critical.

of frustration to the individual technician who finds himself in an unending routine of training new people, this turnover in counterpart personnel may in the end be to Lesotho's advantage. Like long-term training, on-the-job training provides a means for moving on to more desirable positions. If those who are trained continue to work in Lesotho, they constitute an addition to the country's aggregate wealth in trained manpower.

3. RMA LIVESTOCK FARMERS

Unfortunately, very little data are available on the 3,500 residents of the RMA. The U.S. team social scientist is now conducting a research survey on local social and economic organization, cultural attitudes, household income sources, and incentives for participating in a range and livestock management program. Some preliminary data are available. Family income is derived from a wide variety of sources, the most important of which is wage remittances from mining jobs in the Republic of South Africa (RSA).⁴

Of the 291 members of the GA, no more than 30-40 percent own livestock, and most of that ownership is concentrated among relatively few farmers.⁵ Average herd sizes are small by African standards: 10 head for cattle, 109 head for sheep, and 24 head for goats. Ten percent of GA members own 37 percent of all cattle owned by the membership, 10 percent of members own 78 percent of the sheep, and 10 percent of members own 63 percent of the goats. Evidence from other parts of Lesotho also suggests that it is likely that the biggest cattle owners are also the biggest sheep and goat owners.

Livestock owners with whom the study team spoke said that they had benefited from the project. It had brought better pasturage and had improved the quality of their animals through better breeding, culling, and other livestock management practices. The project had also provided wool shearing and dip tank facilities, a tractor, and technical expertise.

⁴Other sources of family income include rental of cattle and sale of livestock, milk, wool, mohair, vegetables, and crops. The exact percentage of family income derived from wage remittances is not yet known. Nationally, the figure is 71 percent.

⁵There were 291 members in 1983, the first year of the GA's operation. Membership accounts for about 86 percent of resident livestock in the RMA.

Based on these responses, it would seem that the perceived benefits are proportionately greater for those who own livestock. It is unclear what benefits the 60-70 percent of GA members who own no livestock can derive from the project, other than the right to use the tractor.

The principal functions of the GA are to enforce rotational grazing procedures and to impound animals grazing in unauthorized areas. Unfortunately, enforcement is not easy.

Some members of the GA who own livestock do not adhere strictly to GA grazing regulations. There are several possible explanations for this. Some families (especially those in which male members are working in the RSA) do not have herdboys to oversee their animals in the higher altitude, remote cattle post areas set aside for summer grazing. Others may not own cattle posts (shelters for herdboys and small stock) and may not be able to negotiate access for their animals to another livestock owner's cattle post area. Still others, by virtue of their stature in the community, may demand exemption from RMA grazing regulations. The apparent lack of clear advantage of GA membership to those who do not own livestock and the inability (or unwillingness) to cooperate with GA regulations raise some real doubts concerning the sustainability of the RMA and the GA following project completion.

Use of RMA pastures is restricted to GA members living within the 11 villages that fall inside the Sehlabathebe RMA. Some livestock owners have therefore lost access to their traditional grazing areas within the RMA because they live outside its boundaries. They have continued to use RMA pastures in violation of regulations and have threatened range riders for impounding their cattle. These farmers feel strongly that they have been ill-served by a project that has excluded them from their traditional grazing areas. Their complaint has been acknowledged at both district and national levels of government. There does not appear to be an immediate solution to this problem. District staff believe that the project should compromise, either by extending the RMA boundary to include excluded livestock or by permitting some grazing inside the RMA by outsiders.

Based on past reports on livestock farming in Lesotho and study team observations, one could argue that more training should have been extended as an additional benefit to RMA residents. Members of the Executive Committee of the Grazing Association did receive a 1-week course in elementary accounting, which was probably useful for maintaining GA financial records. It might also have been worthwhile, however, to have trained all members of the GA and their herdboys.

The herdboys play a particularly important role in livestock management, for they are responsible for grazing animals in cattle post areas of the RMA during the summer grazing season. Each herdboy decides where he will graze a livestock owner's animals in the cattle post area. He keeps track of all animals, protects the small stock from predators, takes animals to dip tanks, and treats them for internal parasites.

Given their heavy involvement in range matters, herdboys and livestock owners would have benefited from practical training in livestock and range management. More important, such training could have contributed to sustaining project interventions.

APPENDIX E

RESOURCE INPUT MANAGEMENT

The project was able to exceed some of its intermediate targets relating to participant training and commodity procurement. This is not attributable to sophisticated financial control mechanisms but rather to decisions made during implementation and design and to a contextual situation: low inflation and the strength of the dollar during the 1981-1985 implementation period.

This appendix highlights key dimensions of resource input management in view of the performance of the project and outlines some lessons emerging from the experience.

1. DESIGN

The project design provided for financial flexibility in two ways. First, by using normal Government of Lesotho channels for the local contribution, total flexibility was allowed between budget subheadings. Thus, although funds could not be moved from, say, salaries to commodities, the mix of the commodities purchased could be changed. Second, the design provided for buffer funds. Both the foreign exchange and local contribution portions of the budget included a 15-percent inflation factor. Moreover, a 10-percent contingency fund was established for the foreign exchange component. These provisions were intended to protect the project from economic trends that could threaten financial support.

Table E-1 outlines the sources and uses of funds as set out in the Project Paper.

2. IMPLEMENTATION

At the beginning of project implementation (1981), one dollar would buy one maloti; by the time of this assessment in March 1985, one dollar would buy more than two maloti. The increased value of the dollar, combined with the contingency and inflationary buffer funds, relieved project management of much potential financial stress. In fact, it increased the flexibility that the financial planners had tried to build into the project design.

Table E-1. LCRD Source and Use of Funds
(in thousands of dollars)

Use	AID		Lesotho		Total	
	FX	LC	FX	LC	FX	LC
TA, Staff, Consultants	3,430.0	84.0	-	937.6	3,430.0	1,021.6
Training	1,712.0	20.0	-	619.1	1,712.0	639.1
Construction	-	875.0	-	159.0	-	1,034.0
Commodities	968.5	154.0	109.1	470.7	1,077.6	624.7
Budget Support	-	902.0	-	295.0	-	1,197.0
Evaluation	160.0	-	-	-	160.0	-
Inflation	1,982.0	625.9	70.5	1,550.0	2,052.5	2,175.9
Contingency	<u>824.7</u>	<u>261.9</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>824.7</u>	<u>261.9</u>
Total	9,077.2	2,922.8	179.6	4,031.4	9,256.8	6,954.2

Note: FX = foreign exchange
LC = local currency
TA = technical assistance.

Source: AID Project Paper, "Lesotho Land Conservation and Range Development Project" (632-0215).

With little financial pressure, management decisions were easier to make. A common way of dealing with local currency excess or increased buying power of foreign exchange (the project had obtained a procurement waiver allowing non-U.S. sources) is to build buildings or buy commodities, which passes recurrent cost burdens onto the local government. Instead, however, much of the extra resource base the project now enjoyed was invested in human resources development and critical consumables such as fuel.

The very circumstances that strengthened the foreign exchange component combined with other factors, such as a slowdown in regional economic performance, to put stress on the Lesotho contribution. Gasoline allotments especially suffered. However, the project was able to compensate for that reduction.

Although personnel were merged with local staff in the conservation and range management sections at the national level, the technical assistance team leader and USAID maintained control over project-specific commodity, technical assistance, and participant training funds. No attempt was made to strengthen local financial management capacity.

At the field level, an attempt was made to enhance local financial management skills by giving one 1-week training session in simple bookkeeping skills to three officers (the planning was for five but only three attended) of the Grazing Association (GA). No followup training was provided. Additionally, the project picked up some of the GA's financial management burden by collecting fines for impounded livestock and issuing receipts for payments. Even more significantly, the project subsidized the deficit of the GA's operations. This was justified as support to an "infant institution" that would require some time before it was able to become self-supporting.

Interim evaluations noted neither a high nor a low quality of resource input management. "Adequate" sums up the situation. In fact, this sums up the experience at all levels--obligations did not force cash flow crises. Although financial accounting and reporting was an onerous burden on the technical assistance team leader, the reports were acceptable, local processes did not pose major barriers, and the GA carried on with project support even though its financial situation and its ability to assess that situation remained less than exemplary.

3. SUSTAINABILITY

Although immediate project performance in the area of resource management supports the achievement of immediate objectives, some questions remain about postproject viability

in both the range management section and the field. Both the section and the GA are highly dependent on project financial and managerial support.

Project activities at the field site require financial backing from the national Government. Postproject viability is unlikely without this backing, but the capacity of the Government to pick up this responsibility is uncertain.

The "infant institution" argument also strikes a vital chord. Changing behavior patterns and building local capacities to manage new resources and processes is a long-term effort. If the project ends completely in 1987, as planned, it may be ending just as it has begun to create some of the preconditions for success. This would be very unfortunate.

APPENDIX F

SPATIAL FACTORS IN THE LAND CONSERVATION AND RANGE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

The Land Conservation and Range Development (LCRD) project involves two levels of assistance to the Government of Lesotho. First is the technical assistance given at the national level to the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) in the Conservation and the Range Management Divisions. Second, and more important in the context of this appendix, is the local, field-level assistance provided by LCRD in the creation of the range management area (RMA). It is at this level of assistance that two sets of spatial factors become evident: (1) geographical elements in establishing the RMA and (2) other spatial considerations that affect the management of the RMA, whether jointly by LCRD and MOA now or by the MOA alone after the project ends.

1. REGIONAL FACTORS

The choice of Sehlabathebe for the demonstration RMA was not accidental. Three regional factors were important in the selection. First was that the proposed Sehlabathebe area had ecological features that met the needs of the RMA in terms of different grazing types/categories. These ecological features are two watersheds that possess both valley (or relatively lowland) grazing areas as well as high, mountainous ones (cattle post areas). A combination of divides, mountain ridges, and national boundaries make this an ecological unit with sufficiently varied resources for an effective RMA.

A second regional factor was the correspondence of two dip tank areas with the two watersheds. The country is divided into numerous (over 70) dip tank areas that function as land management units and become focal points for surrounding villages during the dipping season (January to April). Dipping of animals occurs twice during this period. Farmers and herders bring their animals to the dip tanks for treatment at the same time throughout the country. The two dip tanks in the proposed Sehlabathebe RMA were Sehlabathebe and Liqooa. With the creation of the RMA, the LCRD project built a third dip tank at project headquarters. However, the critical element in the formation of the RMA was the match between the watersheds and the areas served by the two dip tanks.

The third regional factor concerns a local authority unit. Traditionally, the lowest political level is the village, headed by a village chief or headman. Village chiefs come under the authority of ward chiefs, who are under

principal chiefs, of whom there are currently 24. The principal chiefs, in turn, give their allegiance to the King. The proposed RMA contained 11 villages, all of which fall under the authority of one ward chief.

The Sehlabathebe RMA is, therefore, the result of a fortuitous and unique correspondence of three regional factors or units. As Allen Dobb indicates, this combination of ecological variety, functional unit, and ward chief area is unlikely to be found elsewhere and thus has negative implications for replicability.¹ On the other hand, it bodes well for the sustainability of the RMA.

2. ISOLATION FACTORS

The second set of spatial factors present at the field level of the LCRD project concerns its isolation. This is evident in at least four ways. The Sehlabathebe RMA is located in Qacha's Nek District, 1 of 10 in the country. It is a lightly populated district, on the southeast border of the country, and one of three mountain districts. More than 70 percent of the population of Lesotho live on about 20 percent of the area (the lowlands); the remainder are scattered thinly over the 80 percent of the country that is mountainous.² At best, Qacha's Nek has but a small portion of that population.

The RMA itself is northeast of Qacha's Nek, along the border with the Republic of South Africa and Sehlabathebe National Park. The terrain is mountainous and the location isolated even from the rest of the district. The RMA is not very accessible.

Communication problems emphasize this element. No reliable telephone system exists, even at district headquarters, and there is none between Qacha's Nek and the RMA. To overcome this lack of a regular communication channel, the LCRD project attempted to develop a radio link with the MOA in Maseru. During the first few months of the project activity, however, not even this existed. Now, radio communication is possible, if favorable atmospheric and weather conditions exist, if timing

¹Allen J. Dobb, "The Organization of Range Use in Lesotho Southern Africa: Evaluation of Attempted Modifications and Case Study" (M.S. Thesis, Washington State University, Department of Forestry and Range Management, 1984), p. 8.7.

²Colin Murray, Families Divided: The Impact of Migrant Labour in Lesotho (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-3.

for the call is coordinated, and if power for communication (especially at the RMA) is available. Neither end of the communication link is staffed continuously, and, as the study team observed, even when it is (and other conditions are apparently favorable), communication does not always succeed.

Transportation difficulties also reinforce the RMA's isolation. The RMA is connected by a fair-weather, four-wheel drive road to the district headquarters at Qacha's Nek, which is 100 kilometers away, a 3-hour trip under favorable conditions. The road through Qacha's Nek to Maseru is 525 kilometers (or 14 hours), and is a very indirect route, albeit the only realistic one for moving material from LCRD national headquarters (at Maseru) to the field site. The roads are extremely rough and destructive to vehicles. There is an airstrip at Ha Paulusi, one of the 11 villages in the RMA, but it can handle only small planes. With chartered planes (because no regular service flies to the airstrip), Maseru is approximately 50 minutes away. Lesotho Air maintains more or less regular daily service to Maseru from Qacha's Nek, but that is 3 hours away from the RMA.

In summary, then, regional factors made this a good demonstration unit for an RMA. The coincident boundaries of three preexisting regional units meant that the Sehlabathebe RMA was a unique, self-contained area. It was protected on the east by the National Park, on the northeast by the boundary with the Republic of South Africa, and on the north and northwest by high mountains. Trespassing would come mainly from the west, southwest, or south. That this combination of factors occurred in a remote, isolated location along the eastern mountainous border has meant that activities occur here without regular and full communication with the national-level LCRD project. This was especially true early in the project, but remains so to some extent even today. The local LCRD personnel take actions and make management decisions without full consultation with national project headquarters.

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