A.I.D. Evaluation Special Study No. 24

Management Education in Modern Tunisia: L'Institut Supérieur De Gestion, Tunis



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MANAGEMENT EDUCATION IN MODERN TUNISIA: L'INSTITUT SUPÉRIEUR DE GESTION, TUNIS

AID EVALUATION SPECIAL STUDY NO. 24

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The views and interpretations expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Agency for International Development.

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FOREWORD

This study is one in a series undertaken by the Center for Development Information and Evaluation, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, to examine Agency for International Development (AID) experience with the implementation of the Private Sector Development Initiative since 1981.

The other related papers are:

AID Program Evaluation Report No. 14, (PN-AAL-049), A Review of the Private Sector Development Initiative, April 1985

AID Evaluation Special Study No. 23, (PN-AAL-047) Private Sector Development in the Thai Seed Industry, Spring 1985

AID Evaluation Special Study No. 25, (PN-AAL-051), Ecuador Industrial Development Finance, Spring 1985

AID Evaluation Special Study No. 26, (PN-AAL-052), Promoting the Manufacture and Use of Small-Scale Agricultural Machinery in Indonesia, Spring 1985

AID Evaluation Special Study No. 29, (PN-AAL-054), Private Development Corporation of the Philippines, Spring 1985

We are indebted to the authors of these papers for their contributions to AID's understanding of the role of the private sector in development, and of the Agency's role in that development.

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SUMMARY

A shortage of managers is a bottleneck to development, and a rapidly growing economy needs an indigenous supply of trained managers. This was the rationale behind the Agency for International Development's (AID) Management Education and Executive Development project (664-51-770-228) in Tunisia.

The core of the project was the founding in 1969 of the first graduate school of business administration in North Africa: l'Institut Supérieur de Gestion (ISG). Since its beginning, the majority of ISG faculty have been Tunisians. The three successive deans have been Tunisians with doctorates from American universities.

ISG is a unit in the country's only university, the University of Tunis, where tuition is free and modest scholarships are commonly available for needy students. A university education is a conduit for social mobility, and most students come from low-income families, at least at ISG.

The Government of Tunisia (GOT) has borne a large majority of the setup and virtually all of the recurrent costs for ISG. AID funded technical assistance by contract faculty (1969-1974) and participant training of prospective faculty (1969-1980) for a total cost of about $1.7 million. Prior AID projects also had supported the attainment of American Ph.D.'s by Tunisians.

A Tunisian university curriculum is designed in successive 2-year blocs or cycles. Diplomas are awarded after completion of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd cycles. These degrees are roughly equivalent to the American A.A., B.A., and M.A. degrees.

At its inception, ISG offered only a 3rd-cycle program that was modeled on the standard curriculum for the master's degree in business administration (M.B.A.) in the United States. AID gave priority to that program as a source of managers. GOT, however, gave priority to expanding and upgrading the teaching of management and economics by drawing on the faculty and graduates of ISG.

The institutional spinoffs of ISG are quite impressive. ISG now has programs for the 1st and 2nd cycles as well as the 3rd cycle. A Faculty of Economics and Management was founded in the city of Sfax, as an offshoot of ISG. The Sfax dean is a former dean of ISG. Former ISG faculty also have been persuaded to become deans and teachers at the established Institute of Advanced Commercial Studies and the new Faculty of Law, Politics, and

Economics. ISG 3rd-cycle graduates are a distinctive cadre of junior faculty in those units of the University of Tunis.

Students accurately see a diploma in management as a ticket to a good job. Despite increases in their numbers, management graduates find ready employment with public and private enterprises. In the judgment of employers--public and private--the expansion and upgrading of the system of management education has been worthwhile. ISG is esteemed by Tunisians.

ISG is the center of excellence in the system as a whole; its senior faculty with doctorates have been "raided" for the benefit of other institutions. This sign of strength is also a weakness because no mechanism as yet exists for the replenishment of doctoral faculty. GOT is aware of the problem, and its scientific mission to this country is exploring the feasibility of the pursuit of doctoral studies by their junior faculty at universities in the United States.

The American model of management education has long been respected by Tunisians. Tunisian officials, nevertheless, were slow to accept the equivalence of the American Ph.D. and the French Doctorat d'Etat. Finally, this problem was resolved through a policy dialogue between the American Ambassador and the Tunisian Prime Minister.

AID had planned that 25-40 students would graduate annually from the 3rd-cycle program at ISG. That goal has never been achieved. ISG now aims for 10-12 graduates annually from its 3rd-cycle program, 150-200 graduates from its 1st-cycle program, and 100 graduates from its 2nd-cycle program. The annual number of all graduates, thus, exceeds the planned target because the undergraduate programs were not planned by AID. A viable institution often develops a life of its own that is at variance with the intentions of its original planners. (The GOT, however, foresaw the undergraduate programs.)

AID's technical assistance may have been withdrawn too soon for best results, since institution building takes a long time. The project, nevertheless, was very successful, with diverse consequences, because it suited its setting: Tunisia was a middle-income country with realistic prospects of rapid economic growth.

PROJECT DATA SHEET

1. Country: Tunisia

2. Project Title: Management Education and Executive Development

3. Project Number: 664-51-770-228

4. Grantee: Government of Tunisia

5. Project Implementation:

   a. Initial Fiscal Year: 1966
   b. Final Fiscal Year: 1981

6. Project Funding:

a.	AID	$1,698,000
b.	Government of Tunisia	$2,663,000
	Total Project Costs	$4,361,000

1. INTRODUCTION

World War II swept back and forth across the French Protectorate of Tunisia. In 1945 a 16-year-old shepherd left his flocks for the capital city of Tunis. He was not able to attend school, but read voraciously in libraries and qualified by examination as a teacher in 1948. For 6 years, he taught in schools on the borders of the Sahara. In 1956, he used his savings for a one-way ticket to England. For 2 years he shoveled coal to support himself and attended night school to perfect his English. At the age of 28, he became a freshman at the University of London and later took his degree with honors at the University of Nottingham. His professors urged him to pursue a doctorate in economics, and he did so at Brown University, completing his Ph.D. in 1965. American doctorates then had no standing in his homeland, however, so he became an economist on the international circuit and did not return immediately to Tunisia. In 1972, finally, he returned as a member of the faculty of the first graduate school of business administration in North Africa, l'Institut Supérieur de Gestion (ISG) of the University of Tunis. ISG had been founded in 1969 with assistance from the Agency for International Development (AID). In 1981 the former shepherd, Dr. Abdesattar Grissa, became its dean.

Dean Grissa's career is a striking example of the national drive for education in modern Tunisia. ISG itself is part of that national commitment; it also was the centerpiece of the Management Education and Executive Development project (664-51-770-228).

The project, as it is called hereafter, was designed to improve the efficiency of enterprises, private and public, by creating a graduate school of business management in Tunisia.[1] The project began in 1966 and ended in 1981, but its period of greatest activity was 1969-1974.

This report is a study of that project and its consequences, with special reference to the private sector. The general finding can be stated briefly: ISG and its graduates have good reputations in the private and public sectors, with the broad impact tending to favor the private sector, but the school's graduates are too few and too recent for their impact to be assessed quantitatively. (Section 3 is a summary of the project's impacts.)

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[1]Revised PROP (July 18, 1974), pp. 3-4. (AID documents and reports are cited by office, author, and title as given on the papers themselves).

1.1 Project Setting

The project was centered in the only university in Tunisia, the University of Tunis. Founded in 1960, the University had more than forty thousand students in 1983.[2] The University's expansion and the concomitant growth in elementary and secondary enrollments reflected substantial expenditures on educational development by the Government of Tunisia (GOT). The educational budget is about one-third of the national budget and about five times the size of the defense budget. Education clearly has been a major priority, which is appropriate for a country with a young and growing population.[3]

The economy grew rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s; real gross national product per capita increased on the average by 4.8 percent per year from 1960 to 1980. Tunisia has become a middle-income country, as defined by current development jargon, with a per capita gross national product of US$1,390 in 1982.

Economic growth led to an increase in the size, number, and complexity of economic organizations. Family enterprises dominate the private sector, whereas public enterprises dominate the national economy. Public enterprises are subsidized in hard times to maintain employment, but they also respond to market forces, particularly since the reversal of policy from collectivism to a market economy in 1969. A vacuum effect, the need for talent at the top, has created social mobility on a large scale.

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[2]The whole was preceded by some of its parts. For example, its school of theology was Zituna University, founded in 1283.

[3]In 1981, for example, 40.6 percent of the population was under 15 years of age. The population was growing at the rate of 2.6 percent per year, but the percentage of adults who were literate nevertheless had increased from 16 percent in 1961 to more than 62 percent. See Harold D. Nelson (ed.), Tunisia, A Country Study, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. xiii, 108; ESDS/DIU/S&T/AID, All data currently available on Tunisia, (04/27/83); and World Bank, World Development Report, 1982 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), Table 1.

The academic training of economists or managers is not an obvious project for development assistance, but it was appropriate in this setting.[4] A shortage of managers is a bottleneck to development, and a growing economy needs an indigenous supply of trained managers. This was recognized even before the founding of ISG. In previous projects in the early 1960s, AID had funded university studies in the United States. Tunisians who returned with doctorates in economics and management later become the core of the faculty at ISG.

The Tunisian educational system was strongly influenced by the French system, and the French character of the Tunisian educational system was still evident in 1983. Soon after the creation of the French Protectorate in 1881, schools modeled on the French system were established to serve growing French and European communities in the urban centers. In the early 20th century, under political pressure from the Tunisian intelligentsia, the French Government established elementary and secondary schools for Tunisians. Although Arabic was taught in these schools, the program was basically French.[5] Tunisian graduates of the schools filled clerical and semi-skilled positions in the lower echelon of the colonial administration. Very few Tunisians were permitted to attend the French schools for Europeans; even fewer were allowed to pursue university studies in France. French language, education, and cultural attitudes were firmly entrenched when Tunisia became independent in 1956.

The Republic of Tunisia restructured its system of education in its reform of 1958.[6] The new system was to be unified, national, adaptable, and democratic. Arabic is now the language of instruction in all elementary schools; French still is used for science and mathematics in the secondary schools and in most

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[4]A personal memoir explicates both points; see Jean-Claude Koeune, "Teaching Economics in Tunisia: Reflections on a Three-Year Personal Experience and Suggestions for Future Action" (AID/afr/469/Tunisia/Project 237.2, March 1, 1974).

[5]France imposed its civilization through its schools and colonies around the world. For example, all pupils--French and non-French--in the colonies recited in their history classes, "Nos ancêtres les Gaulois" ("our ancestors the Gauls").

[6]Background on the history and reform of education are provided by Nelson, pp. 106-112, and Younès Zoughlami, "Enseignement, Scolarisation et Scolarité en Tunisie" (University of Paris I, unpublished doctorat du 3ème cycle thesis, 1977). Zoughlami's thesis was made available by the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Scientifiques in Tunis.

courses at the University of Tunis. The shift to an Arabic system is not yet complete, and the character of the system is still French.

Despite this French orientation, however, Tunisians and even the French recognized that the United States had a comparative advantage in business education. The U.S. system was accepted by Tunisians, who modeled their business administration master's degree program on the U.S. curriculum. Accordingly, a critical mass of prospective faculty was to be trained in the United States. The obvious next step was to recognize U.S.-conferred degrees, but this proved to be a stumbling block.

1.2 Academic Degrees

The degree-equivalency debate was not a trivial academic problem; degrees affect rank and salary in Tunisia. The basic difficulty lay in establishing the equivalence of the French Doctorat d'Etat and the American Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.). The problem, perhaps, was compounded by linguistic confusion. The French sequence of credentials is the baccalauréat (secondary school diploma), maîtrise (4 years of university study), doctorat du 3ème cycle (2 more years with thesis), and Doctorat d'Etat (additional years with dissertation). American Ph.D. and master's degrees with thesis were terminologically downgraded by one step. No American degree was considered to be the equivalent of the Doctorat d'Etat. (This report uses the word "doctorate" and its variants to denote only the Ph.D. and the Doctorat d'Etat.)

The AID Mission in Tunis raised this problem as early as 1966. The GOT Ministry of Education gave assurances of a satisfactory resolution, but nothing was done officially. American degree holders continued to be seriously disadvantaged: "Years were devoted to the solution of the problem. In the end, the U.S. Ambassador found it necessary to suggest to the Prime Minister that unless there was some action on the promised recognition of U.S. degrees, all U.S. assistance would be phased out."[7] The problem then was resolved by law in 1973. A National Equivalency Commission in the Ministry of Higher Education now handles all such questions.

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[7]University of Minnesota, Building an Economic Analysis Organization in Tunisia (Contract No. AID/afr-469, Final Report, December 1976), p. 31.

Degree equivalency is still a problem elsewhere in Francophone Africa.[8] The Tunisian experience suggests that a policy dialogue is required for its satisfactory resolution. The evaluation team, thus, disagrees with a recent suggestion that "U.S. degree equivalency should be established as a prerequisite to any training programs where the possession of a recognized degree is a normal prerequisite to professional use of the training received. Projects should not be used as levers to trigger changes in a country's degree accreditation system."[9] The ISG project was very successful, as will be described below, but it probably would not have been undertaken if degree equivalency had been a strict prerequisite. The proof of the pudding is in the eating, as the proverb says, and the major argument for degree equivalency on grounds of pure merit was the manifest quality of returning Tunisians with American Ph.D.'s. Dean Grissa was an early example.

The University of Tunis has three types of degree programs: 1st cycle (1er cycle or associate's degree), 2nd cycle (2ème cycle or bachelor's degree), and 3rd cycle (3ème cycle or master's degree). These programs comprise successive, 2-year blocs. A Doctorat d'Etat takes an indefinite number of years. The University is authorized to grant this degree, but does not yet do so in business administration. (Tunisians have a sense of standards and a concern for recurrent costs for advanced degrees.)

ISG began with a 3rd-cycle degree program in 1969. By design, this program was strictly comparable to a master's degree program in business administration, the American M.B.A. AID focused on this program and planned to have 25-30 graduates per year by the end of the 1970s.[10] This goal was later raised to 35-40, but the highest annual number of graduates was 23 in 1972.[11] ISG itself now aims for 10-12 graduates per year from its 3rd-cycle program. This reflects the upgrading and expansion of management education at several levels, in several locations. (In addition, about 30 Tunisians per year receive 3rd-cycle degrees in management in France.)

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[8]See Unclassified Cable #6229, USAID Tunis to USAID Dakar, August 16, 1983.

[9]Project Evaluation Summary (Evaluation Number 82-2, July 1982), p. 2.

[10]PROP (June 23, 1969), p.8.

[11]Revised PROP (July 18, 1974), p. 10.

1.3 The Project

AID contracted for two types of technical assistance from the University of Illinois to support its management education project in Tunisia: (1) placement of Tunisians in doctoral programs in the United States and (2) provision of faculty to participate in the development of ISG. The American professors on contract at ISG never numbered more than three at any given time; they were to be replaced and the faculty was to be expanded by returning Tunisians with American Ph.D.'s.

Tunisian students, by and large, were successful and did return under this project: 7 had completed the doctorate and 5 of those had returned by 1978.[12] Tunisia has not suffered a serious "brain drain." Tunisian returnees, however, often were diverted from ISG by other calls of duty or opportunity in their homeland. ISG, as a consequence, has suffered from a chronic shortage of doctoral faculty, particularly those with American Ph.D.'s.

ISG has been led, since its inception, by Tunisians with American Ph.D.'s. The deans' careers illustrate the multiple demands on doctoral faculty. Dr. Abdellatif Khemakhem (Ph.D., Ohio State University) became the first dean of ISG in 1969. For several years, he was also the Director of the National Institute of Productivity and then the first dean of the Faculté des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion in Sfax. Dr. Mahmoud Triki (Ph.D., Ohio State University) became dean in 1978. In 1981, when Dr. Triki became Director of the Scientific Mission of Tunisia in the United States, Dr. Grissa became the third dean of ISG.

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[12]More were in the pipeline. University of Illinois, Final Report (Contract AFR-550; June 1968-June 1978), p. 5. By 1981, under this project, 21 Tunisians had completed advanced degrees in the United States: 12 Ph.D.'s and 9 M.B.A.'s and M.A.'s. Project Evaluation Summary (Evaluation Number 82-2, July 1982), p. 6. See also Galen Hull, Impact Evaluation of Three Projects in Agricultural Economic Research and Planning, Education Economics, and Management Education in Tunisia (USAID/Tunisia, February 19, 1982). Other AID participant training programs, aside from this project, were also supporting doctoral studies by Tunisians in the United States. The GOT currently offers scholarships to a few outstanding students for advanced study in Europe or the United States.

The University of Illinois had some difficulties with its contract with AID. Personnel frictions were a problem until the appointment of Dr. Peter Holzer, who did an outstanding job in his tenure (1970-1974) as chief of party, before returning to the University of Illinois. He influenced the curriculum designs, seminar programs, library holdings, and research programs. Dr. Holzer still gives occasional lectures and serves on faculty review boards at the University of Tunis.

ISG graduated its first class of 17 from the 3rd-cycle program in 1971. Dean Khemakhem then planned a rapid expansion of that program. USAID/Tunis favored such growth, but it was opposed by the contract team from the University of Illinois. The contract team was prescient: AID cut its existing (and expected) level of support in the 1972-1973 academic year. This cutback continues to be recalled with some bitterness by project personnel, American as well as Tunisian.[13] The evaluation team was reminded repeatedly in interviews that institution building takes a long time and, thus, requires a continuing commitment. Faculty shortages in subsequent years are compelling evidence that the contract team was basically correct in opposing a rapid expansion of the graduate program.

The School of Commerce and Business Administration of the University of Illinois, in cooperation with Tunisians, was building a graduate school of business administration. AID and the University of Illinois disagreed, from time to time, about how to do that job. Exchanges were testy on occasion: "Mission staff insisted on including development outputs . . . deemed significant by them, but not by the contractor. . . ."[14] AID, however, ultimately recognized that an outstanding job was done by the contracting university.

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[13]The cutbacks culminated in the withdrawal of the contract team in 1974. The evaluation team cannot discern the exact rationale for these cutbacks in the mid-seventies. The following rationales have been mentioned, but the files are obscure and memories have blurred with the passage of time: (1) An over-reaction to the Statement of New Directions of Basic Human Needs in the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended in 1973? (2) A side-effect of the first plans to phase out American aid? (3) A negative response to host insistence on the expansion and upgrading of management education at several levels, in several locations?

[14]University of Illinois, "Contractor's Report of Progress and Plan of Work" (Contract AID/afr-550; August 1, 1973-January 31, 1974), p. 11.

The University of Illinois withdrew its contract team when funding was terminated (contrary to its recommendation) in 1974. The remaining project funds were used largely for the completion of doctoral studies by Tunisians already in the United States.

The seminar program for business executives and the research programs of faculty members have languished since the departure of the contract team. La Revue africaine du management, for example, was founded in 1971 but foundered in 1981. Nevertheless, much was accomplished. The institutional spinoffs were particularly noteworthy.

2. OUTCOMES, 1983

2.1 Project Spinoffs

Tunisian academics foresee the development of three universities in their country, at Tunis (capital and largest city), Sfax (business center and second largest city), and Sousse/Monastir (coastal cities between Tunis and Sfax). The University of Tunis is a holding company from this perspective, pending the establishment of faculties and institutes in sufficient numbers at the other locations.[15]

The university system is growing rapidly, with emphasis on professional programs rather than liberal arts; management education is given a high priority.

Four schools offer management programs: ISG, the Faculté des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion in Sfax, the Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Politiques et Economiques in Tunis, and the Institut des Hautes Etudes Commerciales in Carthage, a suburb of Tunis. A business school is expected to be established in Monastir. Management studies also are offered at the Tunisian Military Academy.

ISG is the only school that offers programs at three levels. A 1st-cycle program began in 1971, a 2nd-cycle program in 1973. The 2nd-cycle program now produces about 100 graduates per year. (Appendix B gives the numbers of graduates by year.)

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[15]A note on terms: A faculté is equivalent to a department, and an institut is equivalent to a school. Both restrict admissions to qualified students, but an institut, unlike a faculté, is also empowered to restrict admission of qualified students.

The Faculté des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion at Sfax was founded in 1975 as an offshoot of ISG. From 1975 to 1978, the two schools had the same dean. A 1st-cycle program began in 1975. A 2nd-cycle program started in 1976. A 3rd-cycle program is planned to turn out graduates prepared for careers in teaching and research.[16] The 2nd-cycle program now produces about 50 graduates per year; on the average, when they graduate, they receive about three offers of employment, according to a private businessman in Sfax.

The Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Politiques et Economiques and the Institut des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) also established programs in management at the undergraduate level in the 1970s.[17] Both schools were advised by the contract team from the University of Illinois. Both also hired faculty from ISG. These 2nd-cycle programs now produce about 80 graduates per year (30 and 50, respectively).

This expansion of management education has had two notable consequences:

1. The other schools not only have hired ISG 3rd-cycle graduates as junior faculty, but also have "raided" senior faculty from ISG. As a result, the senior faculty with doctoral degrees has been spread thinly over four schools, leaving each with a predominantly junior faculty. ISG remains the center of excellence in the system, but a critical mass has been dispersed countrywide as a result of Government policy. GOT and ISG are aware of this problem.

2. The 2nd-cycle graduates are well trained for employment in public or private enterprises. The system as a whole now produces about 230 such graduates per year. This production eases the managerial need for 3rd-cycle graduates from ISG. Accordingly, the 3rd-cycle graduates can be (and are) diverted into careers in teaching or research. An annual output of 230 2nd-cycle graduates and 10 3rd-cycle graduates, rather than zero 2nd-cycle

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[16]Ministry of Higher Education, Faculté des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, Sfax (April 1983), pp. 7, 19.

[17]HEC is the oldest business school in Tunisia, founded during World War II. The French dean retired in 1973. His successor was an ISG faculty member with an American Ph.D. Ross M. Trump, "Report on a Visit to Tunisia for the Study of the Institut Supérieur de Gestion" (AID, 1976), p. 42.

graduates and 40 3rd-cycle graduates, is probably better for Tunisia. But this mix was not planned by AID.

2.2 Students

ISG students, two-fifths of whom are women, are the bright graduates of the mathematics and science track in the secondary schools. Four-fifths attend with the help of modest government scholarships, for most university students are from low-income families.[18] No tuition is charged by the University of Tunis.

ISG graduates between 1971 and 1982 totaled 1,939: 1,274 1st-cycle graduates, 486 2nd-cycle graduates, and 179 3rd-cycle graduates. (Appendix B gives details by year.)

In interviews, students reveal some uncertainty about their aspirations and professional goals. A few speak of their dreams of further study in France or the United States. For many, the educational process is rather confusing. They are ill at ease with the balance between the theoretical and pragmatic and with the range of challenges in the use of their knowledge. They must choose between using simple techniques to produce more for the local markets or adapting sophisticated techniques to serve the new international markets of Tunisia. They are taught by faculty members who themselves are still working to integrate the business cultures of Tunisia, France, and the United States.

ISG requires an internship between academic years. The internship links academic study with experiential norms, permits students to show what they have learned and what they can do, and allows employers to appraise prospective employees. Most managers are positive about their interns, but some are negative, particularly in small family firms. The internships are also a source of student doubts about the value of their education. Many are job oriented and clamor for more pragmatic training, but some are academically oriented and prefer a more theoretical preparation for a teaching career.

The dropout rate increases from cycle to cycle; it is about 10 percent in the 1st cycle and more than 50 percent in the 3rd cycle. However, these dropouts are valued in Tunisia. Employers seek to hire them, and they take jobs rather than continue

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[18]The numbers are drawn from interviews. Jean-Claude Koeune had his teaching assistants canvass his students in the introductory economics course at the Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Politiques et Economiques. Two-thirds of them came from low-income families.

studies because they need the money. Dropouts are replaced in part by transfers from elsewhere in the University of Tunis or Francophone Africa. ISG has a special year of preparatory studies for graduate students who did not take a management degree in the 2nd cycle.

The magnitude of the flow of students is as follows: In fall 1975, the 1st-cycle program had an entering class of 149 freshmen; augmented by transfer students, this group produced 121 graduates in spring 1977. In fall 1977, the 2nd-cycle program had an entering class of 83 from the 1st-cycle program; augmented by 22 transfer students, this group produced 76 graduates in spring 1979. In fall 1979, the 3rd-cycle program had an entering class of 10 from the 2nd-cycle program (including 2 from previous years); augmented by 17 transfer students, this group produced 10 graduates in spring 1981. In summer 1983, those 3rd-cycle graduates had dispersed as follows: three were junior faculty members, one was studying abroad, and the status of six was "unknown." The numbers of graduates by level of program and field of specialization for the last 2 years are given in Table 1.

Table 1. ISG Graduates by Level of Program and Field of Specialization, 1980/1981 and 1981/1982

Program/Field of Study	1980/1981	1981/1982	Totals
1st-Cycle Programs			
Accounting	31	31	62
Information Systems	34	35	69
Management	88	99	187
Subtotal	153	165	318
2nd-Cycle Programs			
Accounting	43	37	80
Information Systems	19	23	42
Marketing	16	23	39
Personnel Management	12	8	20
Finance	23	20	43
Subtotal	113	111	224
3rd-Cycle Program			
Professionals	10	5	15
Total Graduates	276	281	557

The cost of educating these students is hard to measure. In 1983, it cost about 1,550 Tunisian Dinars (TD; US$1=TD0.7 in September 1983) annually to maintain a student in the University of Tunis. The average cost at ISG is TD1,080. This lower cost is explained principally by the relatively low salaries of its predominantly junior faculty. The following breakdown includes both direct and indirect operational costs per student for an academic year:

Salaries of Faculty	TD400
Supporting Staff and Expenses	TD170
Central Administration Overhead	TD100
Scholarship (financial aid)	TD260
Dormitory and Cafeteria Subsidies	TD150
	TD1,080

The ratio of operational costs per student to gross national product per capita is slightly higher in Tunisia than in the United States. In Tunisia, this ratio is about 2,210/1,420 = 1.56 for the University and 1,540/1,420 = 1.08 for ISG. In America, the ratio is about 12,500/11,500 = 1.09 for a private eastern university and 14,500/11,500 = 1.26 for a private midwestern college.

The 1st-cycle graduates have sufficient skills to become accounting clerks, computer operators, or management assistants. Some take jobs with business or the Government, but most continue for 2 more years of specialized studies.

The 2nd-cycle graduates are sought after and are eminently employable. Most take jobs with business or the Government, and very few continue for 2 additional years of professional studies.

The 3rd-cycle graduates today tend to become scholars. Perhaps 90 percent of the junior faculty in management education are graduates of ISG.

Most students at ISG end their educations with 2nd-cycle degrees. Career ladders are still uncluttered for those graduates. A 3rd-cycle degree is not required for a successful career, although it tends to speed promotions. The average differential in starting salaries is about 30 percent between 2nd- and 3rd-cycle graduates. Deans believe that the differential has increased over time. (See Section 3.1 for more detail.) But that difference is not consistent; the variance is large. The 2nd-cycle graduates know this and, by and large, have had no difficulty finding jobs, despite an unemployment rate of between 15 and 25 percent for the national labor force. (Employers commonly are said to be somewhat reluctant to hire married women, because fringe benefits are substantial for married mothers and because family responsibilities may compete for company time.)

The 3rd-cycle graduates are doing well as judged by many standards. By 1982, the 3rd-cycle program had produced a total of 178 graduates. They were distributed as follows: 3 in top management, 46 in middle management, 8 in lower management, 42 on teaching faculties, 21 abroad, and 58 status "unknown."[19] The 57 in management were distributed as follows: 12 in private business, 41 in public enterprises, and 4 in public administration. (See Appendix C for the details by year.) These graduates are well entrenched in management positions or in teaching careers. Those that are abroad are foreign students, for the most part, who have returned to their own countries in Francophone Africa.

ISG graduates from all programs have a good reputation and are in demand with prospective employers. A leading foreign bank, for example, has employed three graduates in past years; all three were highly regarded, but went on to "bigger and better jobs." The bank recently sought someone with qualifications comparable to a new graduate from the 3rd-cycle at ISG. Despite private follow-up to public advertisements, the bank was unable to recruit such a person. (Tunisian employees are reluctant to accept promotion if it entails moving abroad, according to the manager of this bank.)

A Tunisian businessman in the private sector made the following summary assessment of management graduates: "We hire management graduates for various tasks to be performed with competence and versatility. We believe that the graduates' strength is the ability to analyze complex situations . . . and to identify long-term problems and opportunities. We cannot begin to evaluate the contributions or . . . potential of such graduates in less than 5 years."

2.3 Faculty

ISG has the best faculty of business administration in Francophone Africa, but that faculty is also the greatest weakness of ISG. The senior faculty with doctorates are in short supply. The junior faculty without doctorates have little experience, limited qualifications, and too many tasks. (Senior faculty and faculty with doctorates are almost identical at the present stage of institutional development. This study uses the terms virtually interchangeably.)

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[19]These figures do not include President Habib Bourguiba, who was offered and accepted the first degree awarded by ISG in 1971, a 3rd-cycle degree with honors. This gave an aura of leadership to the degree and to ISG.

The student/faculty ratio is quite adequate: about 1,000 students and 104 faculty members. The regular faculty comprises 57 members, 14 with doctorates. The part-time or temporary faculty comprises 47 members, 9 with doctorates. The ratio of doctoral faculty to total faculty is low for a business school: 23/104 = .22.

The doctoral faculty taught only 13 percent of the total credit hours in spring 1983. Senior faculty are scarce in the fields of finance, marketing, and quantitative methods, as well as management and production. There are none in the fields of accounting and management information systems.

The teaching load--one or two courses per semester--is not heavy, but the comparative shortage of senior faculty is accentuated by the allocation of teaching responsibilities. The senior faculty have fewer and smaller classes than the junior faculty.

Credit hours (the number of students times the number of credits for a class) are a common measure of teaching loads. The credit hours by specialized field and by faculty qualifications are given in Table 2 for spring 1983.

Table 2. Credit Hours Taught at ISG, by Field and by Faculty Qualification, Spring 1983

Specialized Field	Doctorate Faculty	Other Faculty	Total Credit Hours
Accounting	0	2,796	2,796
Economics	728	1,200	1,928
Finance	288	752	1,040
Law	362	876	1,238
Management	414	2,116	2,530
Systems	0	2,610	2,610
Methods	282	3,455	3,747
Marketing	84	705	789
Total Credit Hours	2,158	14,520	16,678

The quality of teaching is difficult to assess. Students often complain that it is "too theoretical." Professor David Miller of Columbia University reports that he also heard of "professors who have no syllabus, who come to class without

notes, who speak 'off the top of their head' [and] who never explain or discuss any of the theory which underlies their course."[20] The situation is aggravated by the diversity of teaching and by the paucity of textbooks on the economy of Tunisia. Faculty sometimes must teach outside their specialized fields, and students often must read textbooks and journals from France and the United States. Lecture notes are indispensable, given the shortage of teaching materials.

ISG uses the new technology of microcomputers and language laboratories for instructional purposes. English is required of its students, and the use of computers is spreading in its curricula. The equipment is adequate to excellent and is updated from time to time. IBM personal computers have been installed recently through AID assistance.

Faculty functions transcend classroom performance, of course, and include advising students, performing research, and undertaking other services (including consulting). The case approach to management education was advocated by the contract team from the University of Illinois. Faculty members, accordingly, wrote case studies for instructional purposes. There has been a decline in the writing of case studies by faculty, but the gap has been filled--at least in part--by undergraduate and graduate theses on the economy and business life of Tunisia. Selected theses are used by some instructors as assigned reading. ISG thus creates some of its own textual materials.

The extent of consulting is difficult to estimate. Moonlighting by faculty is said to be common, but the evaluation team was unable to determine exactly what constituted "consulting." Senior faculty, however, apparently consult with some frequency. For example, the Institut de Financement du Développement, an international facility for training leaders of member banks, draws some of its lecturers from the senior faculty. (The director of that institute took his doctorate under the aegis of this project at the University of California.)

The university system is not designed to reward research, although instruction and research are the official duties of regular faculty. The budgetary constraints are similar to those of government bureaus: Teaching classes is routine and rewarded, but the conduct of research is not routine and is not rewarded. The dean is not empowered to modify the system of rewards since

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[20]David W. Miller, "Report on AID Sponsored Mission to l'Institut Supérieur de Gestion, Tunisia: From January 15, 1977 through February 8, 1977, Inclusive," pp. 5-6.

his authority is severely limited. The GOT Ministry of Higher Education sets salaries by rank and seniority for the whole system without regard for institut, faculté, or individual merit.

The GOT severely constrains the University of Tunis and ISG. Changes in the curricula are made by law. Faculty may not be paid for special activities, and any fees for activities such as executive seminars go to the Treasury. Faculty must pay for their own research assistants. ISG graduates and some executives are interested in special seminars, but the frequency of such activities is low because of funding restrictions and faculty shortages. (The short supply of senior faculty also has prevented the establishment of a part-time evening graduate program.)

Faculty salaries are low, and consequently the retention of faculty is a problem for ISG. Former senior faculty now are found in executive positions throughout Tunisia, but some continue as part-time faculty, supplementing the inexperienced corps of ISG junior faculty.

The junior faculty have few opportunities to advance within the University of Tunis. Most have advanced as far as possible, since a doctorate is required for promotion. Without it, the junior faculty are doomed to careers of relatively low status. The opportunities for doctoral study are very limited and are prohibitively expensive for married students because the doctorate is not granted in Tunisia.

The Tunisians are aware of the shortage of doctorates. The need is obvious and urgent. A promising approach is a proposed program that would send junior faculty for 2 years of course work in the United States, followed by dissertation research in Tunisia. This program could serve a large number of junior faculty in a short time and could inject a critical mass of doctoral faculty into management education. The junior faculty, by and large, are ready to embark on doctoral studies since most have a 3rd-cycle degree or M.B.A.

2.4 Stakeholders

Four constituencies have major stakes in management education: governments, students, faculty, and employers. Despite agreement on some points, each stakeholder has a distinct perspective.

The GOT sees management as both a problem and an opportunity for national development. Creative management is considered a pressing need, an outlook that is shared by the World Bank and

AID.[21] Both GOT and AID have committed resources to management education as an "act of faith." The results to date are promising, but the consensus of opinion among officials is that it is too early to tell what the impact will be in the long run.

Students view management education as a passport to good jobs, and as a result, there is a plethora of applicants for admission. However, students continue to complain that courses are too theoretical and not geared to particular jobs. The evaluation team concurs that advanced courses tend to be too theoretical, too unrelated to the local context. The team has little sympathy, however, for the students' claim that courses are not geared to particular types of existing jobs; 3rd-cycle programs, in particular, should prepare managers who can adapt to a changing milieu. The students' view of this matter is characteristic but short-term.

Faculty members see management education as an appealing career. Nevertheless, they worry about being stretched too thin and complain about the paucity of rewards for research and consulting. The evaluation team concurs that the critical mass of faculty with doctoral degrees has been diluted by the expansion of programs in business education. ISG needs an infusion of new faculty with doctoral degrees to recoup its losses to other institutions. The team also concurs that the system is not structured to reward research. Salaries, for example, are set system-wide by the GOT. The junior faculty need senior faculty for role models, especially in the consulting arena, but the team realizes that consulting is new in Tunisia.

Employers, public and private, are pleased with the graduates of the system. Large enterprises are the main employers. The banking sector seems most interested in management graduates, and the agricultural sector seems least prepared to hire them. (Family enterprises are only beginning to emerge as complex organizations in Tunisia.) This pattern is reminiscent of past practices in the United States. ISG graduates have a good reputation, but employers stress that graduates are too few and too recent to have had a measurable impact on the general economy.

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[21]World Bank, Tunisia, Review of the VIth Development Plan (1982-86); Volume I, The Main Report, World Bank Report No. 4137-TUN (Washington, D. C., March 16, 1983), pp. v, ix, *passim*.

3. IMPACTS

AID's operational goals were the launching of a graduate school of business administration in Tunisia and the training of prospective faculty at the doctoral level in the United States. These goals were achieved with conspicuous success: ISG has become part of the "establishment," and there has been no "brain drain."[22]

AID's ultimate goals were the academic training of future managers who would "increase the productivity and profits in both public and private enterprises." These goals were apparently achieved: ISG's annual output of future managers now exceeds the planned targets.[23] These graduates are said to be evenly distributed between the public and private sectors, and they are highly regarded by employers in public and private enterprises.[24]

3.1 Careers

The starting salary of recent graduates is commonly used as an indicator of the economic value of management education. The

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[22]AID did not plan the dispersal within the country of the returning American Ph.D.'s. But that dispersal was unavoidable with the expansion of the system.

[23]Future managers are produced largely by the undergraduate programs (2nd cycle) rather than the graduate program (3rd cycle). AID did not plan an undergraduate program, but several were foreseen by the GOT.

[24]Based on interviews; data on employment are unavailable. The evaluation team could not directly measure the putative effect of management graduates on the productivity and profitability of public and private enterprises. The requisite data were not available. Tunisian academics, in fact, complained that the absence of such data is a handicap in their own research. But the problem transcends the data shortage: "There is as yet no evidence of quantitative explanatory power of the human capital model to match the promise indicated by the qualitative and comparative analyses." Jacob Mincer, Schooling, Experience, and Earnings (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research and Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 43 (emphasis added). Mincer's remark refers to the United States. Measurement of the effects is nonexistent in other countries, not just Tunisia.

relative salaries of management graduates and other graduates are particularly revealing. Because such data are not collected on a systematic basis in Tunisia, the data in Table 3 are based on informed estimates by various deans.

Table 3. Estimated Salaries of Management and Letters Graduates in Tunisia

Degrees	Monthly Salary	Typical Employment
1st Cycle, Management	TD200	Public/Private Enterprise
2nd Cycle, Letters	TD220	Secondary Teaching
2nd Cycle, Management	TD300	Public/Private Enterprise
3rd Cycle, Letters	TD350	University Teaching
3rd Cycle, Management	TD350	University Teaching
3rd Cycle, Management	TD450	Public/Private Enterprise

These estimates of starting salaries are rough approximations, but significant nonetheless. A number of conclusions can be drawn from them. (1) For management graduates in enterprise employment, the salary premium for 3rd-cycle graduates compared to 2nd-cycle graduates is about 50 percent ((450-300)/300). This differential is comparable to the premium for graduates from the very best of the graduate schools of business administration in the United States. (2) The salary premium for management graduates compared to letters graduates is roughly 30 percent (((450-350)/350 + (300-220)/220)/2). This differential is also comparable to that in the United States. (3) The salary premium for a 2nd-cycle degree in letters compared to a 1st-cycle degree in management is only about 10 percent ((220-200)/200). This differential is lower than in the United States. (4) A competitive market for management graduates is indicated by the similarity of starting salaries in public and private enterprises. Nominal salaries are said to be somewhat higher in the private sector, but fringe benefits are reputed to be somewhat better in the public sector. (5) Enterprise employers, public and private, not only profess a high regard for management graduates but also pay them a high salary. The information from interviews is reflected in the marketplace.

ISG has adapted its programs to its resources and the demands of the economy. The market demand for management specialists and the chronic shortage of senior faculty are reflected in the emphasis on undergraduate programs that are large by comparison with graduate programs and that can be taught by junior faculty without doctoral degrees.[25] Program changes at the undergraduate level also suggest that the school is responsive to demand shifts for various skills. For example, computer specialists have emerged in recent years and financial technicians have given way to banking specialists. This training of undergraduates in response to the market is demanding, but it is vital for the growth of the economy in the future. In the judgment of the evaluation team, this is a wise approach.

ISG hosts conferences and executive seminars, and its faculty do research and consulting, but its primary function is to train students for future employment in public and private enterprise.

ISG's impact is primarily through its former students, who are very bright and well trained. The graduates themselves are very young; few are older than 35.[26] Their careers are very promising in both public and private sectors. Their salaries are relatively high and their promotions are relatively rapid.[27] Some occupy the types of positions to be expected of young high-flyers: chef de cabinet for a minister, executive assistant to a general manager, division director in the railway system, executive director of a binational chamber of commerce, vice president of a small company, and so forth. Broadly speaking, everyone expects all public and private enterprises, aside from small family firms, to be run by management graduates in the long run.

Senior executives aged 45 to 65 occupy the top management positions in the public and private sectors.[28] Both sectors

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[25]For some specialists, such as accountants, an undergraduate education is considered to be quite adequate in the United States. American graduate education in accounting tends to concentrate on the training of future accounting faculty. The parallel with Tunisia is evident.

[26]ISG graduated its first class in 1971. Tunisians typically graduate from secondary school at the age of 19.

[27]This was affirmed in interviews by employers, deans, faculty, graduates, and other observers. Students also stated that they expect rapid promotions.

[28]None is a graduate of ISG, since it was not founded until 1969.

respond to market forces. There is little difference in their management styles, but there is a distinct difference in management generations. The younger generation, the next generation of top managers in both sectors, seem "more business oriented."[29] Whether middle managers in their mid-thirties will retain that outlook in their mid-forties and mid-fifties is an open question, but trends suggest that the business orientation will persist and infuse the next generation of top managers in both public and private enterprise.

3.2 Trends

ISG is a symbol of national trends in Tunisia. President Bourguiba's acceptance of its first degree was a public signal that the symbolic role of the school as an indicator of national trends was supported at the highest level. Broadly speaking, the salient trends are favorable to individual enterprise.

ISG is a symbol of modern management. The American character of the school is its most striking feature. The actual transfer of business practices and teaching methods is rather limited, but the symbolic significance is very great.[30] ISG's establishment and growth are a signal to society in general and business in particular that modern management practices modeled on the American system are valued by the GOT.

ISG is a symbol of market forces. The school's founding coincided with the reversal of GOT policies from collectivism to a market economy. The timing actually was strictly coincidental. ISG's founding reflected a 3-year planning process; the policy reversal reflected a fast-breaking political crisis. Yet the confluence of events is significant. The ruling party is still a socialist party, the Government continues to dominate the national economy, but the sustained growth of a system of management education is a signal that the Government is serious about market forces and the private sector.

ISG is a symbol of upward mobility--of careers open to talented individuals. The social mobility of its students is quite

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[29]The quotation is from an interview with an American banker doing business in Tunisia. The general points were made in several interviews.

[30]The French cultural attaché is reported to have expressed concern about ISG's recent acquisition of American computers, supplied by AID.

striking. Most come from poor families but go on to good jobs with bright prospects. Women constitute an astonishing percentage of its student body (about 40 percent). President Bourguiba's commitment to women's emancipation is longstanding and well known, but it has been opposed by some traditional institutions. ISG gives effect to his policy.

In short, ISG is both a symbol of change and an agent of change. The symbiosis between the school and its milieu is profound, so the strands of causality are difficult to disentangle, but its impact is already significant and steadily increasing in the judgment of the evaluation team. The broad impact has been good for the private sector.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

4.1 Conclusions

The basic conclusion is very simple: This project was quite successful, although its evolution diverged from the original plans.

AID spent $1,698,000 on this project, the approximate cost of two endowed chairs at a college or university in the United States. This assistance called into being not only a graduate school of business administration but also an entire system of management education in Tunisia. AID served as a catalyst; most setup costs and virtually all recurrent costs were borne by the GOT.

The project is an excellent example of the transfer of appropriate technology. Tunisia is a middle-income country with a rapidly growing economy. The United States offered a comparative advantage in management education, and management education was a felt need in Tunisia.

The project also is an excellent example of institution building. ISG was a stimulus and standard for a reform and expansion of the entire system of management education in contemporary Tunisia. ISG is the center of excellence in a system, not an isolated outpost. AID did not plan this flourishing growth, but it is a sign of the project's success.

AID's cutback of technical assistance was too soon and too large for best results. Five years is not long in the life of a graduate school of business administration.

ISG itself has not yet achieved equilibrium, because no mechanism is in place for the renewal of senior faculty. The

evaluation team supports the current efforts to upgrade the qualifications of management faculty throughout Tunisia.

AID's original purpose was to establish a graduate school of business administration. That is straightforward. The ultimate purpose was "to increase productivity and profits in both public and private enterprises." That is not measurable. Tunisian academics complain that they cannot get information about productivity and profitability, for pure research purposes, even from personal friends who are enterprise managers.

The project contributed to upward social mobility in the expanding economy, with its concomitant demand for managerial talent. ISG students tend to come from poor families and many are women, but its graduates have no difficulty in getting good jobs. The project, thus, helped students to help themselves.

The direction of change in education in Tunisia is toward increased "Arabization." This shift will create a demand for new texts, if only for new translations. Management education will become accessible to many students who are not fully literate in French.

ISG, with its low costs and high quality, should be considered as a possible center for third country training in Francophone Africa. Bilateral agreements are required for such training, however, since the administrative discretion of ISG is limited by the GOT.

The University of Tunis is also constrained like a governmental bureau. Deans of ISG, as a consequence, have limited discretion to encourage research or sponsor seminars. AID assistance in the future, if any, should attempt to augment the influence and discretion of the dean rather than reform the system as a whole. The system is not susceptible to change in the short run.

4.2 Lessons Learned

The lessons to be learned from this project are commonplace but consequential:

1. The probability of success is increased if a project is objectively appropriate and subjectively desired by the host country.

2. The building of an institution takes a long time.

3. The renewal of cadres is indispensable in the long run.

4. The competing demands for trained personnel tend to disperse that scarce resource.

5. A viable institution adapts to its environment and often diverges from the original plans.

6. The spinoffs from a project may be more significant than the project itself.

Perhaps the time scale for institution building and the competing demands for trained personnel are the most significant elements for project planning. These realities are enduring constraints.

APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGY

This evaluation report is based on personal interviews and documentary research by the authors in 1983.

The French dimension was explored in interviews with businessmen and academicians in France. Americans, who were interviewed in Tunisia as well as in the United States, included the following: (1) AID Mission staff, (2) American Embassy staff, (3) project personnel in Illinois and Washington, (4) desk officers from the State Department and AID, and (5) bankers.

The majority of the interviews were conducted in Tunisia in August/September 1983.

Tunisians, who were interviewed in French or English, included the following: (1) deans, faculty, staff, graduates, and students of ISG; (2) dean, faculty, and staff at Sfax; (3) AID-sponsored students who had returned to Tunisia; (4) private businessmen in Tunis and Sfax; (5) Government officials in education and economic development; (6) professional staff of chambers of commerce and national associations; and (7) bankers. Significantly, these categories are not mutually exclusive.

Most interviewees were recommended by AID or ISG. The team took pains, however, to arrange some interviews on its own. Common themes arose in diverse interviews with remarkable consistency. No attempt was made to interview a random sample, because the team's time was too short to interview a random sample of sufficient size to be statistically defensible for drawing conclusions.

AID files were indispensable. ISG files were made available by Dean Grissa. Mr. Mohamed El Louadi (3rd-cycle student, ISG) assisted in compiling statistics.

APPENDIX B

NUMBER OF ISG GRADUATES BY PROGRAM LEVEL AND BY FIELD OF STUDY, 1971-1982

Level/Field of Study	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	Total
1st-Cycle Diplomas													
Techniciens Supérieurs en Gestion													
Informatique de Gestion	--	--	10	15	9	11	26	74	54	20	34	35	288
Finance	--	--	8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	8
Gestion du Personnel	--	--	8	10	17	10	26	24	31	7	--	--	133
Comptabilité	--	--	15	16	31	5	48	42	50	35	31	31	304
Marketing	--	--	16	12	18	17	21	25	26	31	--	--	166
Fiscalité	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	27	22	--	--	--	49
Institution, Financieres	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	34	33	--	--	--	67
Finance	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	66	--	--	66
Production	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6	--	--	6
Assistants en Gestion	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	88	99	187
1st-Cycle Totals	--	--	57	53	75	43	121	226	216	165	153	165	1,274
2nd-Cycle Diplomas													
Gestion du Personnel	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	18	8	8	12	8	54
Marketing	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	18	18	18	16	23	93
Comptabilite	--	--	--	--	--	--	10	33	33	38	43	37	194
Finance	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	15	17	28	23	20	103
Informatique de Gestion	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	19	23	42
2nd-Cycle Totals	--	--	--	--	--	--	10	84	76	92	113	111	486
3rd-Cycle Diplomas	17	23	15	18	21	19	10	16	9	16	10	5	179
Grand Total	17	23	72	71	96	62	141	326	301	273	276	281	1,939

APPENDIX C

PLACEMENT OF 3RD-CYCLE ISG GRADUATES, 1971-1982

Position	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Top Management	1	1	1	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--
Middle Management	9	9	7	5	6	5	1	1	--	2	--	1
Lower Management	--	--	--	--	4	2	--	1	1	--	--	--
Faculty	2	2	4	5	4	2	4	9	2	5	3	--
Abroad	--	10	3	4	1	1	--	1	--	--	1	--
Unknown	5	1	0	4	6	8	5	4	6	9	6	4
Total	17	23	15	18	21	19	10	16	9	16	10	5
Management[a]												
Private Enterprise	1	2	3	--	--	5	--	1	--	--	--	--
Public Enterprise	6	8	5	4	10	3	1	1	1	1	--	1
In Government	3	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	--

[a]This is a reaggregation by private and public sector of the three management categories above.

APPENDIX D

ISG GRADUATES, SPRING 1983

Subject	Instructor	Assistant Professor	Associate Professor & Professor	Totals	American M.B.A.	American Ph.D.	3rd-Cycle Degree	Doctorat d'Etat	Other	Total
Accounting	6/5			6/5	1/0		5/5			6/5
Economics	4/0		5/2	9/2	1/0	3/0	3/0	2/2		9/2
Finance	3/6		1/3	4/9		1/2	3/6	0/1		4/9
Law	3/3		2/1	5/4			3/2	2/2		5/4
Management and Production	11/4		3/1	14/5		1/0	11/3	2/1	0/1	14/5
Marketing	2/4	0/1	1/0	3/5		1/0	2/4		0/1	3/5
MIS and Computers	6/12	3/1		9/13			6/12		3/1	9/13
Quantitative Methods	5/3		2/1	7/4		1/0	5/3	1/1		7/4
Total	40/37	3/2	14/8	57/47	2/0	7/2	38/35	7/7	3/3	57/47

Note: Slash separates permanent/temporary or part-time faculty.

APPENDIX E

L'INSTITUT SUPÉRIEUR DE GESTION: AN ASSESSMENT

by Gundar J. King

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purposes of the Assessment

This assessment of the Institut Supérieur de Gestion (ISG) in Tunis uses American standards for professional business schools. These standards, developed and adopted by the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB), the sole accreditation body for business schools in the United States, govern over 200 accredited members in the United States and Canada. Many of its standards, especially those dealing with curricula, are widely observed by other business schools.

The main purpose of this assessment is to use critical elements of these standards to show strengths and weaknesses of ISG in the light of American experience in building business schools of high quality. The second purpose is to draw general conclusions about the school and its operation in the Tunisian setting.

The standards, policies, and evaluation practices of the AACSB are used as benchmarks. Weight is given primarily to the philosophy and conceptual principles used by Dean Eugene Clark and other authors of the comprehensive revision of the AACSB standards in the 1960s, rather than to specific numerical measures currently in force.

The synopses of the standards and their use are provided as points of departure in the evaluation of ISG, as the American standards are not designed for export. It is strongly suggested that these standards, in their totality, are not suitable for direct transfer to the Tunisian environment. (Currently, only a few Canadian schools--those most similar in practices and settings to institutions located in the United States--meet these standards effectively and to the benefit of the communities served.) It is noted here with express caution that the ISG is not conforming to and should not be seeking to comply strictly with American standards for accreditation for purposes other than general policy guidance.

1.2 American Standards

The accreditation standards and policies of the AACSB support the Association's aim to improve the quality of education for business in the United States. To this end there are preconditions to accreditation, and standards related to the quality of institutional objectives and administration, students, faculty and professional staff, curricula, financial resources, facilities, library, and innovation. Among these preconditions are the following:

1. The business school to be evaluated is well established and has programs with a track record.

2. The business school is primarily concerned with business education on a professional level. It has suitable objectives and has authority over business programs.

3. The school operates within a college or university framework (partly to work closely with other units offering courses other than business).

4. Students are selected with care. They should be able to meet the program requirements, and they should be of a quality equal to those in the university as a whole.

5. Faculty are primarily full-time, regular faculty engaged in teaching and research. Faculty may be supplemented, in a minor capacity, with external lecturers.

6. Faculty have high qualifications for subject matter taught. The undergraduate programs offered are supported by some faculty with doctorates in all major fields of business study. The holders of doctorates constitute at least 50 percent of the teaching staff and form a critical mass, enabling them to give guidance and leadership to junior faculty in teaching and research.

7. Graduate level courses are taught almost exclusively (75 percent) by doctorally qualified faculty with strong research records.

8. There is adequate support staff for the faculty, including research assistants and secretaries.

9. Undergraduate programs do not include professional business courses in the lower division (first 2 years) of college curricula. Professional courses are reserved primarily for the upper-division level of work (last 2 of 4 years). The first 2 years of college are devoted

to general preparation, primarily in the liberal arts, to support subsequent professional studies.

10. Undergraduate and graduate programs include about 1 year of general business studies. These studies, known as "common body of knowledge" subjects, take a comprehensive sweep of business functions and traditional analytical methods for business.

11. Master's programs, especially those leading to the M.B.A. degree, require some broadening subjects, in addition to common-body-of-knowledge subjects, that are not highly specialized.

12. The financial resources match the school's program objectives. Faculty members teaching undergraduate courses do not have teaching loads in excess of 12 hours per week, and graduate faculty have reduced loads.

13. Facilities of the school are adequate for program purposes and on par with those available to other professional schools in the institution.

14. Library resources are adequate for program purposes and are used effectively by faculty and students.

15. The school is committed to innovation in teaching, taking advantage of new technologies and other available improvements.

2. INSTITUTIONAL ROLES IN THE TUNISIAN ENVIRONMENT

2.1 The Institution

ISG, founded at the conclusion of the Tunisian experimentation with collective forms of economic organization in 1969, is a remarkably successful business school. It is the product of a strong Tunisian demand for professional management leadership and expertise, and an unusually heavy Tunisian investment in higher education for business skills. It is the beneficiary of careful help and support received from the AID Mission and leading American business schools. Today, this school of American orientation with French as the instructional language, plays an increasingly important role in Tunisia and other Francophone countries in Africa. Well-connected with Tunisian business enterprises, the Ministry of Higher Education, and other Government agencies, it is firmly established as a respected unit of the University of Tunis.

Following the graduation of the class of 1982, ISG had almost 2,000 alumni, including 1,274 graduates of the 2-year technical (1st-cycle) program, 486 of the 4-year undergraduate (2nd-cycle) program, and 179 of the graduate (3rd-cycle) programs.[1]

2.2 The Institutional Environment

The emergence of a business school with a clear, although limited, commitment to American business concepts and teaching methodology in Francophone Africa is, in itself, a major achievement. In this sense, ISG competes directly with the pervasive French cultural, educational, and commercial presence in most Tunisian institutions. Here is a recent explanation of the French influence:[2]

> France's staying power in Africa has been called one of the political and economic wonders of the post-imperial era . . . . The French have managed the extraordinary feat of hauling down their flag and then not only staying on but even increasing their presence.
>
> . . . The French work closely with African rulers whom they themselves have trained. Thus their financial support, their commercial presence, and even their military presence are generally seen by Africans as serving African national interest.
>
> . . . The cream go to Paris for education, and then come back and work with the French.

In this setting, several factors favor ISG.

1. The pragmatic philosophy of the Tunisian Government and the governing political party. They maintain a pronounced preference for American effectiveness and efficiency in business matters. From the Tunisian point of view, it is also useful to dilute the French influence in the educational and economic spheres of Tunisian life.

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[1]The figures for the class are calculated after the second round of comprehensive examinations, conducted in September for those students who did not pass them in June.

[2]Don Cook, "French are Staying the Course in Africa," International Herald Tribune, August 24, 1983, p. 5.

2. Centralized planning in Tunisia is becoming more complex. For this reason, private and public enterprises require more sophisticated management to perform well in this new world of comprehensive government intervention and control.

3. Rapid industrialization of the Tunisian economy, combined with the introduction of high technology in industry and government, has accelerated the demand for modern business skills at all levels on a large scale. It is no longer feasible to rely on American and French institutions abroad to meet these needs.

4. The institutional location of the school within the University of Tunis system, despite original difficulties of business faculty integration with other units and program development in this larger organization, gives the school very good access to both business and government hierarchies.

5. The AID Mission programs are especially useful in the development of faculty resources through scholar exchanges and graduate work of Tunisian faculty in the United States. This contribution is essential to the rapid introduction of American management in the Tunisian business culture, and aids the school in meeting totally unexpected demands.

6. The original concept of ISG as a small, select graduate school for the preparation of Tunisian administrators and business leaders is fortunate in retrospect. This limited role is fundamental to the the educational philosophy of a high quality ISG and to the excellent relationships it has with thoroughly modern, high quality university business schools in the United States and, to a lesser degree, in France.

2.3 Tunisian Schools for Managers

The educational activities and the number of institutions for the preparation of managers and administrators in Tunisia are expanding rapidly. In addition to a small private school for vocational business training, the public business schools include traditional and new institutions of the University of Tunis. The major schools are described below.

1. The Faculty of Law and Economics in Tunis is a large unit (3,000 students). It is a well established, traditional, and highly influential source of administrators with a legal and public affairs orientation. Generously

staffed with senior faculty, it attracts those future leaders who are not especially drawn to private sector enterprises.

2. The undergraduate Institute for Advanced Commercial Studies in Carthage is the oldest of Tunisian business schools. Its traditional orientation focuses on the skills and knowledge needed for administrators to comply with financial and accounting procedures and reporting requirements established by the Government. Recently upgraded and expanded (600 students), it is evolving in orientation as a very French school.

3. The Tunis ISG is, at this point, the only school turning out graduates on all three levels, technical (A.A., 1st cycle), undergraduate (B.A., 2nd cycle), and graduate (M.B.A., 3rd cycle). Located in the capital city, it is the leading school (1,000 students) of business. It is, directly and indirectly, the main source of business faculty in Tunisia.

4. The new Faculty of Economics and Management in Sfax (1,000 students) is a business school with an American orientation. Currently offering technical-level and specialized undergraduate education in business and economics, the school is located in the private sector business center of Tunisia and is a junior rival of the ISG. It plans to offer graduate programs in the fall semester of 1984.

5. It is expected that a vocational-level business school will be established soon in Monastir to relieve enrollment pressures on the two major business schools and help the geographical decentralization of higher education in Tunisia.

The relative importance of the business schools discussed above is supported by recent trends in enrollments, diplomas granted, and faculty resources used.

Colleges and universities outside Tunisia continue to be important in Tunisian business education. A considerable number of Tunisian business students go abroad for undergraduate and graduate studies. Even more important, universities abroad are the major source of guest faculty and of doctoral studies for Tunisian business faculty. Although there is a strong preference for full or partial doctoral studies in the United States, there is a renewed interest in French doctorates. The reasons for the latter include recent improvements in French university business

schools,[3] the relatively low cost of sending students to France, and the uncertainties about American support for doctoral studies.

2.4 Institutional Roles

ISG plays several important roles as an educational and research organization. Among the most significant are the following:

1. It prepares future top managers for the Tunisian and other developing economies in Francophone Africa; this is the main function of the graduate professional program (M.B.A., 3rd cycle).

2. It provides graduate-level specialized professional training for students who plan to become chartered accountants in Tunisia.

3. It is the principal undergraduate school granting business specialist diplomas (B.B.A., 2nd cycle).

4. It is the major source of entry-level business technicians and management assistants (A.A.), especially in the applied computer technology field.

5. It is the focal institution for channeling faculty for training abroad and development in rotating career assignments at ISG and other Tunisian business schools.

6. It serves as a model institution for new Tunisian business schools.

7. It disseminates information on modern business concepts and techniques through business conferences and short courses.

8. It is the main center of emerging scholarly research and academic consultation resources for the Tunisian business community.

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[3]Recently, the French schools of business, especially the Grandes Ecoles, have become Americanized to a large degree. The French now compare their best schools directly with leading American schools. For related articles and assessments, see Le Monde de L'Education, July-August 1983 issues.

3. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

3.1 Institutional Objectives and Administration

3.1.1 Strengths

1. ISG is growing into a comprehensive business school to serve a full range of Tunisian needs. In this sense, it resembles a school in a major state university in the United States.

2. Authorized to start a doctoral program, ISG is about to offer it in cooperation with several American business schools. The joint project approach preserves current faculty resources from further dilution and draws on important American resources.

3. Without undue influence from external pressures, the school selectively responds to major needs of the Tunisian society and economy.

4. ISG is a fully recognized professional school of the University of Tunis. The experienced dean has adequate authority to limit enrollment at a time when indiscriminate expansion could endanger irreparably the quality of the school.

3.1.2 Weaknesses

1. The school is at risk to be dominated by the very large technical education element (the 1st cycle, 2-year program students and faculty), which is not predominantly academic and professional in outlook.

2. The dean functions, to a large degree, as an administrator for the Ministry of Higher Education and is subject to civil service and other leveling procedures in budgetary and personnel matters.

3. Relationships with other units of the University of Tunis are limited. The ISG's campus is separated physically from the main campus.

4. The Tunisian system of business education is built on the 3-cycle model of French universities. The hierarchy of three distinct programs includes a technical (1st cycle, first 2 years, A.A.), a specialist (2nd cycle, second 2 years, B.A.), and graduate professional (3rd cycle, third 2 years, M.B.A.) level. This approach injects a vocational tenor early in the student's

progress, and it limits the broad, general preparation for professional careers.

5. Compared to the American system of a 2-cycle model (undergraduate and graduate programs overlap for about a year during the second and third 2-year blocks of study), the system tends to favor specialization more than the American system.

6. The dean has very limited options for building a reward system in direct support of specific program objectives.

3.2 Students

3.2.1 Strengths

1. Students are admitted selectively. Even for the technical level, students come from the strong mathematics-sciences track and represent the most qualified element of the extended high school graduates. Graduate students are screened, beyond high minimum academic qualifications, in personal interviews. This permits admission of students who have both academic ability as well as a perceived leadership potential. All students have a high proficiency level in Arabic and French and are well qualified to use English as a secondary language for reading and research.

2. Students are provided with liberal scholarships on a large scale. Equitable participation of students from all social classes in higher education is evident.

3. The balance of men and women students is similar to that in the United States. Almost half of business students are women.

3.2.2 Weaknesses

1. By American standards, the Tunisian students appear to be more docile than Americans and tend to participate passively in the education process. On the other hand, the Tunisian student has, at least at ISG, a very pragmatic value system.

2. The students are economically dependent on the school. This limits contributions to evaluations of teaching and may have a chilling effect on the articulation of potential student grievances.

3. The financial ease of entrance to school also leads to limited commitment. Students easily leave studies when good opportunities for work permit them to enter the labor force before graduation. This pattern is further reinforced by students' desire early in life to contribute to family income.

4. Compared to American students, the Tunisian students are not as independent and entrepreneurial. American students are also more long-term-goal oriented and more likely to value graduate work.

3.3 Faculty and Staff

3.3.1 Strengths

1. The ISG faculty is the best business faculty in Francophone Africa. It includes a significant element of faculty members educated in the United States and in France. In terms of cultural perspectives and approaches to knowledge, it is well diversified.

2. The best faculty members rank with the best anywhere. Indeed, faculty in this category have records of teaching at the most prominent American and French business schools.

3. The faculty likes Tunisia and is sympathetic to Tunisian problems. (The loss of faculty to other countries is minimal.)

4. The faculty is supplemented with experienced, pragmatic and well-qualified part-time lecturers. At this stage of faculty development, this is an important asset.

5. The more pragmatic and experienced faculty maintain close contact with industry, both for increased income and professional maturing.

3.3.2 Weaknesses

1. The faculty is very junior in terms of qualifications and experience. At the same time, it faces a very heavy task in the need to adapt scholarly knowledge and insights to pragmatic needs of both students and the Tunisian economy.

2. The senior faculty with terminal degrees has been seriously diluted by detached service, opportunities in industry, and dispersement to other Tunisian business schools.

3. There is no critical mass of Ph.D. faculty in business fields, except in finance. The strong presence of doctorally qualified faculty in economics, law, management (represented by social scientists), and statistics is commendable. On the whole, however, the senior faculty is dominated by representatives from disciplines other than business. This makes it very difficult to develop a holistic approach to business problems and to make the curricula more pragmatic. In this sense, ISG delivers in the most limited fashion on the promise of American pragmatism.

4. The junior faculty need effective teaching and research role models and exposures to effective teaching.

5. Support staff is inexperienced to support faculty research well, if at all.

6. The present lack of doctoral study opportunities is a dead end for faculty development. Junior faculty without doctorates cannot be promoted and are not likely to make long-term professional commitments to teaching and research. In this sense, the lack of a doctoral program represents a serious bottleneck in faculty growth and development.

3.4 Curricula

3.4.1 Strengths

1. The undergraduate and graduate curricula fully correspond to established American patterns in terms of subject matter covered. It is broad by French standards and gives the professional and advanced-study graduates a strong base for future growth.

2. The analytical elements of the curricula, especially the use of sophisticated theoretical concepts, is very strong. It is noted that this is a strength not easily acquired in many business programs.

3. The study of research materials in both English and French gives students an unusually fine base for comparative understanding of emerging concepts.

3.4.2 Weaknesses

1. The teaching appears to be lacking in a good choice of methodological models and examples. Pragmatic applications seem

particularly lacking and appear to be reserved primarily for the student thesis work.

2. The curricula are not well related to opportunities for additional course work in other units of the University of Tunis beyond the business disciplines.

3. The graduate work is slanted primarily for the preparation of future faculty. This limits the appeal of the graduate programs to more entrepreneurial students.

4. Although the teaching approaches may not be, in many instances, less pragmatic than in the United States, Tunisian industry does not currently provide the massive additional on-the-job training so common in the United States. The French internship experience (stage) becomes very important and critical in the Tunisian case, both for orienting the student to the business environment and for translating business concepts into successful practical applications.

5. The lecture model is still prevalent in the teaching at ISG. Other methods are not optimally used.

3.5 Financial Resources

3.5.1 Strengths

1. The budgeted resources available to support the school's operations are generally adequate and fair by University of Tunis standards.

2. The faculty positions provided for by the Ministry of Higher Education are ample to serve the school's academic objectives.

3.5.2 Weaknesses

1. The salaries are low by any standards and have not kept up with inflation in recent years.

2. There are no market-oriented salary differentials. The faculty salaries, somewhat on par with skilled-worker incomes, may already limit faculty recruitment. More important, the salaries may not be adequate to hold the best and the most qualified faculty members at a time when they have become internationally mobile.

3. The budget is designed for regular academic operations. Funding for research assistance, seminars, and conferences is very low.

4. Use of nonbudgeted external income is not encouraged by the Ministry of Higher Education. For example, there is no alumni- or industry-supported dean's fund for minor essential supplements for faculty travel or research assistance.

3.6 Facilities and Equipment

3.6.1 Strengths

1. The school is now located on the campus of a former teachers college in the Bardo section of Tunis. The physical facilities are now clearly adequate and indicative of the public support for the school.

2. Modern equipment is available to support most academic functions.

3. The school has a fine computer center, including Apple II and IBM PC computers provided by AID.

3.6.2 Weaknesses

1. No word processing equipment is currently available to assist faculty in the revision of lecture notes and research activities.

2. There is a general paucity of visual aid equipment.

3.7 Library

3.7.1 Strengths

1. The library's collection of books and periodicals is substantial. It is international in substance.

2. The library is heavily used, especially by students in the thesis stage. The reserve-materials section is updated regularly. An important function of the library is the circulation of textbooks, which are not usually purchased by business students in Tunisia.

3.7.2 Weaknesses

1. At this point, the library has no significant visual materials resources.

2. The library's collection may not be adequate to support the research stage of the future doctoral program.

3.8 Innovation

3.8.1 Strengths

1. The whole school represents a very major innovation by Tunisian (and French) standards.

2. The multicultural emphasis of the school, especially on the graduate level, assures students an early preparation for business careers to help Tunisia participate more effectively in international trade.

3.8.2 Weaknesses

1. The teaching methodology, especially that of case use and other pragmatic applications, is underdeveloped. The teaching and learning processes in the school are still much more French than American.

2. The use of the English language is primarily limited to reading and research. In this sense, the students and faculty do not have a good feel for the way Americans interact with each other on a personal level and in making executive decisions.

4. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

4.1 General Observations

1. ISG, very successful in its present form, is also a victim of its own success. Under pressure from various quarters, the school tries to respond positively to diverse needs:

-- The growing Tunisian economy is increasing the demand for 2nd-cycle specialists, pushing the volume of operations in the school well beyond the original capacity.

-- It is engaged in the enormous task of integrating American, French, and Tunisian business cultures.

-- It is in the process of undertaking a major faculty development task, with the help of a proposed doctoral program.

-- It is in the process of upgrading predominantly junior and inexperienced faculty.

-- It is taking in stride, whenever possible, recent major developments in education for business; for example, it is pioneering the use of business computers in Tunisia.

2. The school, especially its faculty, is overloaded and diluted. In terms of the AACSB standards, this is a most serious and damaging deficiency. It is aggravated by limited resources for faculty and curriculum development and research, and by an administrative system that gives the dean of the school very little elbow room and a most limited direct authority.

4.2 Conclusions

1. It is unlikely that the educational system and the administrative processes used by the University of Tunis and the Ministry of Higher Education will change in the near future. This suggests that the school would benefit immensely from any assistance program that would increase the dean's informal authority and resources. Obviously, they should be used to build on strengths and to minimize the weak elements of the school.

2. The needs of the school all revolve around the faculty. Any improvement here is likely to affect the quality of Tunisian education for business at ISG and other Tunisian business schools significantly.

3. The tasks of improvement are currently beyond the domestic capabilities of the school and the other agencies of the Tunisian Government. External help is likely to be sought and used. Even more than did the original support of ISG, support of the current phase of faculty development will have profound and lasting effects on this and all other Tunisian business schools.

APPENDIX F

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Liliane Willens, who received her B.S., M.A., and Ph.D. in French literature from Boston University, is an International Cooperation Specialist in the East African Office at the Agency for International Development. She taught French language, literature, and civilization at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Boston College, and trained student teachers at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. In Washington, D.C. she also taught Francophone area studies and French language to Peace Corps volunteers and Foreign Service Officers at the Foreign Service Institute. Her publications include studies of Franco-American relations and French colonial history.