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SYMPOSIUM ON RESEARCH NEEDS REGARDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITIES IN EMERGING COUNTRIES

Conducted for the
Agency for
International Development

ADVANCED STUDY PROGRAM



The Brookings Institution
Washington, D. C.

PREPARED PAPERS

AND

REPORT ON PROCEEDINGS

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PART II

BACKGROUND TO THE SYMPOSIUM

FORDYCE W. LUIKART

The problem on which this symposium focused has been put succinctly by one competent observer: "Anyone who has traveled in underdeveloped countries and talked with those responsible for development programs soon runs into a familiar complaint. Over and over again he is told: 'We know what needs doing; the real problem is how to get it done'." 1/

The United States for nearly two decades and other developed nations for a lesser period have been involved in an historic and unique technical assistance effort. Old Colonial possessions have been released from bondage and given independence, and these societies are struggling with the process of nation building. Technical assistance being rendered is historic because of its scope and cost. And modern assistance programs are unique because they are not devoted solely to historic "law and order" development. Rather, they encompass concern and activity in the whole range of activities relating to the political processes. They provide a favorable setting for the development of institutions and conditions which

1/ Fainsod, Merle, "The Structure of Development Administration." in Development Administration: Concepts and Problems, edited by Irving Swerdlow, (Syracuse University Press, 1963).

will enhance economic growth to satisfy the demands for improvements in material well-being.

Increasing note has been taken by those who have participated in technical assistance programs and by those who have systematically and critically observed these programs that the lack of "know-how" to organize and accomplish objectives is the key to lack of success in developing countries. Whether this need is called "development administration" or just plain public administration is not significant. Whether the "how to get it done" is the single most important element in achieving development goals or whether it is simply critical among many elements in the total political process also is not world shaking in importance. The plain fact of the matter is that competence in public administration is essential somewhere in the stages of the total process of development. And this is important to the success of development programs.

The Agency for International Development over the years has observed the failures and the successes in technical assistance efforts with an awareness that our knowledge about how to develop administrative capability is far short of being complete. Our pragmatic approach to the problem of rendering technical assistance in building administrative competence is perhaps a grand empirical approach. We started on a major assumption that we could transfer our administrative methods and techniques wholesale to other peoples and societies.

If others would listen, learn and apply this knowledge, the job would be accomplished. It is fair to say, however, that this grand experiment has not worked -- certainly not at a level of success that is needed.

In consequence, after trial, error, disappointments, and only moderate successes, the laudable conclusion is that it would be wise to review and evaluate the research base which underlies the technical assistance effort in public administration. Questions such as the following should be probed?

- How adequate is the present research base which underpins efforts to develop administrative capabilities in emerging countries?
- What can be done to improve the research base?
- How best can the effort to improve the research base be guided and stimulated?
- Is research knowledge now available adequately communicated to and applied by those involved in technical assistance efforts?

Seeking a means to develop a research strategy for this problem, the Agency for International Development asked the Brookings Institution to consider the possibility of enlisting the attention and consideration of people with interest in the field, with wide ranging experience in technical assistance work, and with expertness and scholarly interest born of research concerning these problems in an

effort to probe these and related questions. Out of these discussions there developed the plan to conduct a symposium on the subject: "Research Needs Regarding the Development of Administrative Capabilities in Emerging Countries." Brookings agreed to undertake the task.

Going About the Task

As a first step Brookings established an advisory committee to assist in defining the perimeters of the symposium and focus the effort. The committee was composed of eminent scholars and practitioners in the field of development administration, including four persons from AID. [2/] The committee met in early January 1965 and addressed itself to the following matters.

1. General framework of the symposium, including the substantive areas to be given emphasis.
2. Subjects upon which papers should be prepared in advance of the symposium.
3. Persons who should be invited to prepare papers.
4. Persons who should be invited to participate in the symposium.
5. Schedule for the symposium.

2/ Members of the Advisory Committee are listed in Part IV.

The advisory committee recommended that the subject for the symposium be delimited in order to enhance its usefulness. Accordingly, it was urged that the symposium focus quite specifically on problems related to training for public administration in emerging countries. Adequate attention was to be given to "applied science" -- the identification and exploitation of what is already known -- as well as to the possibilities of enlarging the frontiers of theoretical knowledge.

A wide range of topics for papers was suggested and possible authors were identified. The committee also urged that the symposium be scheduled for the fall of 1965 in order to permit adequate time for planning and for preparation of papers.

Symposium Contributors

Seven papers were commissioned by early summer and received in early October. The authors came mainly from the academic world but included among their number a public administrator now working with the United Nations and another from a private nonprofit consultant organization. 3/

3/ The authors' backgrounds are summarized in Part IV. Their papers have been edited and included in Part II of this report.

Joseph LaPalombara's essay on "Alternative Strategies for Developing Administrative Capabilities in Emerging Countries" was prepared specifically to acknowledge that training for public administration is only a part of the story in developing administrative capabilities in emerging countries. This paper reminds us that there are many activities in a society that contribute to meeting this need. He also reminds us that "generalizations about how to improve administrative capacities in the developing areas must be tempered by the variation we find there." Further he suggests that in attacking the problem of administrative capability in any country we need "to provide a profile which will depict its needs, resources, obstacles, and potentialities."

Milton Esman in his paper on "Development Administration As A Profession" makes the case for some of the unique aspects of administration in a developing society and points to areas relating to this subject where there is urgent need for research to underpin technical assistance efforts. More competent governmental performance in these transitional societies depends, in his view, on professionalizing senior administrative personnel. The degree to which the public service can become professionalized depends upon the type of political system, stage of development, and the many

other factors about which little is known today with regard to the rapidly developing new state.

In his paper on "Administrative Reform in the Context of Political Growth" Ralph Braibanti assumes "that transnational inducement of administrative reform does serve to increase the administrative capability of emerging political systems." He concedes that there is a significant ecological relationship between an administrative system and the total social order. But he argues the theme "that transnational inducement of administrative reform as a strategem must proceed as an autonomous action, irrespective of the rate of maturation of the larger political process." This is presented as an expediential strategem, not as a theoretical model. Modernization of administration at a more rapid pace than other elements may encourage favorable diffusion effects in other areas of the political process. Braibanti's paper suggests the possibility of profitable research to shed light on the issue of balanced political and economic growth. But, if this is not considered possible or rewarding, at least there should be research to seek answers as to what aspects of an emerging society can and should be manipulated.

Herman Pope presented a paper on "Underpinning Our Technical Assistance Efforts in Public Administration Through Better Utilization of Our Knowledge and Resources" in which he states

the proposition that the vast technical assistance experience over a score of years "can be made a vast resource for improving administrative capabilities in developing countries through a program designed to assure that relevant information is adequately recorded and reported, thoughtfully analyzed, and made fully accessible at critical points in the design and conduct of assistance activities." His paper suggests strongly that some applied research on this vast experience may help to answer a variety of persistent questions dealing with:

- the role of public administration in the total development program;
- factors bearing upon determination of project duration;
- effective use of universities, consultant, and direct-hire staff;
- value of the broad reconnaissance survey as a base for planning a program of assistance;
- development of relevant and useful guidelines for assigning priorities among assistance projects; and
- alternative approaches to public administration training.

Joseph Starr's paper on "The Logistics and Tactics of Training for Administration in Emerging Countries" identifies a number of areas where more analysis of experience would be valuable in answering problem questions such as: Who should be responsible for training?

Who should be trained in what knowledge and skills? What training resources are needed? What strategy and tactics are the most useful in successfully launching a training program? And what methods are most effective? He deals in particular with the functions of on-the-job training, the role of the supervisor and his special need for instruction in teaching methods. He advocates greater feedback from bureaucracy to teaching staff and the formation of liaison committees to serve as a buffer between the two.

In Henry Reining's paper on "The Role of the Technical Assistance Adviser Overseas" we are reminded that the role of the technical assistance adviser has many variables depending upon local patterns and needs. Proper selection of advisers for each situation will depend upon more careful research and analysis of such factors as:

- the role to be enacted by the adviser in a given situation;
- the setting for technical assistance work; and
- characteristics, motivation, personality, and skills which make for successful and unsuccessful performance.

He urges greater attention to ways and means of evaluating projects, people, and total programs; and the feasibility of introducing some form of rating system based on past technical assistance experience.

The final paper by Fred W. Riggs deals with "Developing Research Capacities in Emerging Countries to Support Training in Administration." He makes the case for the great need for fundamental research on problems of administrative development, and for institutionalizing research capacities in emerging countries to support training in administration. He points to the need for creating this base for research in Western countries to help support indigenous research programs in developing countries. Riggs asserts that such programs and facilities are essential to the development of efficient public administration training in these countries. He points to the prevalence of what he terms "strategic learning," rather than the development of skills for effective administrative performance.

The symposium was conducted November 14 through 17, 1965, in Williamsburg, Virginia. Eighteen persons in addition to the chairman and rapporteur participated. The participants represented a variety of fields of knowledge in the social sciences. Each of them also possessed a depth of interest in problems of technical assistance as demonstrated by research and publication in the field and by active experience in technical assistance work. In addition to the seven authors of papers, two participants came from other

countries (Great Britain and Iran), three from AID, two from Brookings, and the remainder from academic institutions in the United States. 4/

James M. Mitchell, Director of the Advanced Study Program, The Brookings Institution, and Fordyce W. Luikart, Senior Staff Member, shared responsibility for chairing the symposium. Barbara P. Haskins of the Brookings publications staff and Fordyce W. Luikart share the responsibility for preparation of the summary and analysis of the symposium proceedings and the editing of the papers. A major portion of the credit for the summation is due Miss Haskins who worked with great care to identify the highlights of the discussion and to recast the record of it in an orderly and readable form. Paula B. Wildgen was responsible for the many details of conference arrangements which added to the comfort of the participants.

This report contains the edited papers presented at the symposium in the order in which they were presented, together with a summation and distillation of the proceedings of the symposium, as revised and expanded by Brookings staff. The report does not represent the views of the administrative officers or the Board of

4/ The list of participants is found in Part IV.

Trustees of the Brookings Institution. In addition to their responsibility for general administration of the Institution, the function of the Trustees according to the bylaws of the Institution is "to make possible the conduct of scientific research and publication, under the most favorable conditions, and to safeguard the independence of the research staff in the pursuit of their studies."

PART III

PREPARED PAPERS

Alternative Strategies for Developing Administrative Capabilities in Emerging Countries — Joseph LaPalombara

Development Administration As A Profession — Milton J. Esman

Administrative Reform in the Context of Political Growth — Ralph Braibanti

Underpinning Our Technical Assistance Efforts in Public Administration Through Better Utilization of Our Knowledge and Resources — H. G. Pope

The Logistics and Tactics of Training for Administration in Emerging Countries

Appendix: Suggested Topics for Research Related to Training in the Public Service — Joseph R. Starr

The Role of the Technical Assistance Adviser Overseas — Henry Reining, Jr.

Developing Research Capacities in Emerging Countries to Support Training in Administration — Fred W. Riggs

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPING ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITIES IN EMERGING NATIONS

Joseph LaPalombara
Yale University

Wilbur Schramm, in his recent interesting analysis of the international flow of information, comments that the deprived nations of the world are deprived on every dimension, including their access to what takes place outside their limited spatial universes.[1/] It is now customary to think of these so-called developing nations as greatly lacking in the kinds of administrative capabilities that "development" requires. While the evidence for such a broad generalization is mixed,[2/] it certainly seems to be warranted by the dismal reports emanating from technical assistance missions, by dramatic failures in economic plan implementation and by the marked chaos and incipient revolutionary situations that seem to characterize nation-states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

I share the view that in many places there exists marked discrepancy between national needs and administrative capability, but in order to sharpen the focus of my remarks it is necessary to offer a few caveats, definitions, and orienting generalizations.

First, as to caveats, although "models" of transitional societies or of bureaucratic systems may be intellectually appealing to the academic interested in scholastic exercises, I believe that they often are stultifying for those who are concerned with policy and operations. I

1/ Wilbur Schramm, Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries (Stanford University Press, 1964).

2/ All I intend to suggest here is that a) "developing countries" vary enormously in the amount of administrative resources at their disposal, and b) the kinds of administrators and administrative organizations appropriate for a country will surely vary with its needs, its policies, and the ecological factors of the society itself.

fully appreciate the escape-clause which reads that models are not intended to be "real" and must be tested only by their utility in helping us better to understand and therefore to cope with the phenomena of the real world. Nevertheless, as I reflect on the use of such "models" in the social sciences, I am impressed by the frequency with which they confuse the real and the ideal, mask conceptions of "modernity" that are hopelessly culture bound, and imply casual relationships between "development" and administrative organization that are begged rather than empirically demonstrated.[3/]

Second, it seems overwhelmingly apparent that, in terms of almost all of the dimensions we use to characterize administrative organization and behavior, all extant systems are actually "mixed." Yet it is curious that "models" and "typologies," abstract though they must be, rarely if ever reflect the range of such mixtures. It helps me very little to know that "traditional" administrative systems are "fused" and "modern" systems "diffracted." [4/] if I understand that I will never encounter either in the field. Nor is it very edifying to identify

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3/ I have commented at some length on this problem in Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton University Press, 1963), Chaps. 1-2, Cf. "Public Administration and Political Development: A Theoretical Overview" (Michigan State University Institute for Community Development (mimeographed)). A nice discussion of the varying uses of "development" is included in Samuel Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics Vol. XXVI, No. 3 (April 1965), pp. 386-430.

4/ This terminology is that of Fred Riggs. I do not wish to detract in any way from the importance of his theoretical contributions, except to stress that he, like many of us, has not managed to fill that great gap between abstract formulations and empirical realities. See his Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Houghton-Mifflin, 1964), especially Part I.

"traditional" administration with characteristics like ascription-particularism-diffuseness and "modern" systems with achievement-univeralism-specificity if I recognize that all systems contain varying admixtures of such qualities and that no one has yet bothered to demonstrate the relationship of such mixed configurations to concrete patterns of development or change.[5/]

Third, while we are all greatly indebted to Weber's pioneering work in delineating important patterns of administrative organization and behavior, we must not assume that any of these are necessary conditions for "modernity." It may turn out that some of them are sufficient conditions in particular contexts, but this conclusion is one that must be convincingly demonstrated, rather than taken as given.

The use of terms like "development" and "modernity" requires brief attention to definition. In the recent literature of the social sciences, these terms have come to mean a perfectly incredible mixture of economic, political, social, and psychological institutions and

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5/ This terminology is from the important work of Talcott Parsons and has greatly influenced many social scientists, including the present writer. I have tried to appraise the utility for comparative administration of some of Parsons' formulations in my "Public Administration and Political Development," op. cit.

behavior.[6] For many of us in the West, a "developed" or "modern" society is one which is urbanized, highly literate, industrial, socially open, innovating, and democratic. It contains personalities that are "empathetic"[7] and that manifest a relatively high incidence of "need achievement."[8] The "developed" polity is one whose political culture is neither "parochial" nor "subject," but "civic."[9] Economically, it has proceeded through various stages, passed the threshold of "take-off" and "sustained economic growth" and is well on the way to "high mass

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6/ I will not pretend to summarize all of the relevant literature here. The Committee on Comparative Politics has tried to cope with this problem, with mixed results. See Lucian Pye (ed.), Communications and Political Development (Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 14-20; Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development, op cit. pp. 9-14, 35-39; Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 3-7; James S. Coleman (ed.), Education and Political Development (Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 13-32; Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 3-13.

A splendid effort to move from working concepts of political to administrative development is Alfred Diamant's "Bureaucracy in Development Movement Regimes," Comparative Administrative Group Occasional Paper (Indiana University, 1964, mimeographed).

7/ The salience of "empathy" in development was raised by Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe Press, 1958).

8/ The relationship between "need achievement" and economic development is brilliantly laid out by David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (VanNostrand, 1961). For an extensive treatment of the relationship between personality structure and economic development, see Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change (Irwin, 1962).

9/ These concepts, as well as an important suggestion of the way in which ecological factors influence the dynamics of political systems, are contained in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton University Press, 1964).

consumption."[10/] In our search for confirmation of our deep-seated hopes, we have brought to bear on the relationship between affluence and democracy the formidable techniques of multiple correlation and rotated factor analysis, glibly writing off the limitations of "poor data," naively confusing spurious correlation with causation, and therefore evolving what I call the indoor-plumbing theory of political modernity.[11/] We courageously proclaim that the social sciences have advanced far beyond the determinism of Hegel or Marx but write about "modernity" as if history were moving inexorably toward a monotonous reproduction of Anglo-American social, economic, and political configurations. Where empirical evidence seems to challenge this faith we speak about political abberations, imply that there may be a causal relationship

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10/ The "stages" theory of economic growth is attributed to Walt W. Rustow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge University Press, 1960). Cf. the important work suggesting the limitations of Rustow's theories, Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (Yale University Press, 1958).

11/ My quarrel here is with facile assumptions that there exists a causal relationship between economic and political development. In addition, I am concerned with a) the very real problems of the reliability of data concerning quantifiable variables and b) the unsophisticated measures of political development used by writers who enjoy doing correlation and factor analysis. See, Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Doubleday, 1960); Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A Cross-Policy Survey (Cambridge University Press, 1963); Philips Cutright, "National Political Development; Measurement and Analysis," American Sociological Review Vol. XXVIII (April 1963), pp. 253-64. Considerable use and misuse of quantifiable variables to analyze political development has been encouraged by Bruce M. Russett, et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Yale University Press, 1964). But note the careful qualifications on the use of such data spelled out by Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, ibid., Part B, pp. 261-364.

between the number of telephones per 1,000 inhabitants or the flow of foreign mail and totalitarianism, and leap to the conclusion that so-called liberalizing trends in the Soviet Union mean that "they" will soon be more like "us."

Let me make it clear that I deeply share the belief in democratic pluralism as the most desirable kind of polity and that I am greatly concerned with what kinds of policies, organizations, and personalities might help such polities to proliferate.[12/] However, I do not believe that such polities flow automatically from economic affluence; or that theories of political development that confuse the economic and social with the political or that rest on assumptions of unilinearity in development are very useful.

When I refer to political development, therefore, I mean to suggest two kinds of measures or dimensions. The first of these involves a fourfold composite consisting of achievement, secularization,

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12/ I should note that this concern with democratic pluralism has been severely criticized by Christian Bay, who seems to believe that a) most of the recent work in bahavioral and comparative political science has been irresponsible in the sense of dealing with "pseudopolitics" rather than politics; political science should appropriately deal with the needs of man; and b) that a hierarchy of such needs can be derived from psychology. Bay specifically chides me for suggesting that political development might be as important a goal for the developing nations as material well-being, and cites Kwame Nkrumah for the assertion that African political leaders who do not produce full stomachs will be replaced by others. This seems an odd choice, since Nkrumah is strong evidence that Africans may get neither well-being nor pluralistic democracy. See Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature," American Political Science Review, Vol. 59 (March 1965), pp. 39-51.

differentiation and magnitude that I have detailed elsewhere.[13/] The second refers to the capacity of a political system to handle or manage changes in demands that confront it over time. The central role in such development played by public administration will be apparent below.

There are, of course, other kinds of "development" that are of particular interest to economists, sociologists, psychologists, and the like. I assume that changes in the economic, social, and psychological sectors may and probably do affect political change, but I do not consider that these phenomena are absolutely interdependent and much less that what emerges in the political sphere is abjectly dependent on what happens in other sectors of society. Indeed, I assume that political (and there administrative) development is in part a discreet or independent phenomenon which can and often has and does influence change in other sectors.

Finally, let me say something about my general orientation, which is strongly influenced by my association with the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council. That Committee's early endeavors involved great stress on the "input" factors of political systems and their development, but have more recently moved quite self-consciously to the "output" side. This modified emphasis has led several of us to conceptualize political development within a broad context of thrusts toward equality, differentiation, and capacity; to analyze changes in these dimensions within functional

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13/ J. LaPalombara, Bureaucracy and Political Development, op. cit., pp. 39-48.

categories that we need not review here; and particularly to isolate important "crises" moments in national evolution when the capacity of political systems is deeply tested and when response to crises will in turn greatly influence the kind of political changes that occur.

The salient historical crises of central interest to us are those of legitimacy, identity, integration, penetration, participation, and distribution. These are problems that all nation-states must confront and which, depending on when they occur and in what sequence or intensity, will carry certain long-range consequence for subsequent political development. If this is true, it seems to me that the focus on the ways and means of accelerating economic modernity should not be exclusive. Even for those who posit a certain level of economic growth as a precondition for democratic development, it would appear essential to ask whether there are alternative administrative patterns equally (or almost equally) conducive to economic change, and whether some of these alternatives are more likely than others to produce the kinds of polities we would like to see in the world. It is surely too premature to conclude, as have an increasing number of American social scientists, that one-party arrangements, highly centralized and repressive administrative systems and mobilized politics are the only logical solutions open to newer (or older) nations bent on economic change.

This paper, then, will address itself to the problems of increasing administrative capabilities in the developing areas. While I will assume that economic growth (and the related crises of distribution) is

often paramount, I shall also try to take account of other crises and to note how they, too, may impinge on public administrative capabilities and subsequent political institutional evolution. Also, because the range of this topic is potentially so vast, I shall limit my remarks to the following topics: 1) The importance of "profile analysis" as a first step toward public administrative prescription; and 2) patterns of administrative and related action that may accelerate administrative capacity in different situations.

II

It is customary to generalize about developing countries and to attempt to draw extremely broad prescriptions from such generalizations. Thus, we tend to think of all such countries as "transitional" and to endow them with institutional and behavioral similarities that simply will not survive empirical testing.[14/] We note that such societies are simultaneously confronted with a great variety of pressing demands, when in fact the incidence and nature of such crises run a considerable gamut. We speak about a "revolution of rising expectations," obscuring our considerable knowledge that such expectations are almost never a

14/ Thus, Hugh Tinker, in abstracting something called the "Indian Village," warns that his empirical universe consists of 500,000 villages, concerning which some of the ascribed characteristics do not hold universally. See his, "The Village in the Framework of Development," in Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler (eds.), Administration and Economic Development in India (Duke University Press, 1963), pp. 94-133.

groundswell and that, indeed, the real problem in effecting "modernization" is that there often exists such deep-seated resistance to it. When we turn our attention to resistance to change, we generalize about "traditional" societies, assuming that tradition is an impediment to modernization and erroneously concluding that "development" requires tradition's erradication.

Our ability to deal purposefully and successfully with problems of increasing administrative capacities in the developing areas is thus doubly handicapped by stereotypical imagery and assumptions. On the one hand, we are often dealing with a concept of the developing or transitional society that is so abstractly generalized as to amount to a caricature. On the other hand, our thinking in terms of such abstract models easily lends itself to the conclusion that successful development requires the export of our idealized version of administrative organization and behavior in the West. Perhaps the creation of broad generalizations about traditional and transitional societies was an inescapable consequence of the need to break up the parochialism of Western social science, and particularly political science. However, the mushrooming of attention to the non-Western world has clearly demonstrated that: a) these societies and polities are not nearly as exotic or unique as some scholars earlier suggested, and b) there is as much important variation among "developing" nations as one can find in any other category.

This situation would seem to mean that generalizations about how to improve administrative capacities in the developing areas must be

tempered by the variation we find there. It also suggests that prescriptions cannot be based on simple extrapolations from Western experiences in economic, social, and political change. The approach I wish to offer here, therefore, is largely inductive. It is not based on a firm "model" or "typology" of social, political, or administrative systems. It is task-oriented in the sense that it reflects a conception of political development that heavily emphasizes capacity - or, as Eisenstadt puts it, the ability of a political system to produce those new behaviors and organizations that changes in demands over time would seem to require.[15/] The approach also focuses largely on public administration because of my understanding that the test of a political system's developmental capacity will prominently, even if not exclusively, involve administrative organization and behavior.

As an orientation to the problems of changing a system's administrative capability, the following questions should be logically posed:

1. What is the nature of the crises - the demands - confronting a developing nation, and which of these are objectively and subjectively viewed as the most urgent?

2. What patterns of public administrative and related organization and behavior appear to be most well attuned to the solution of these most urgent crises?

15/ S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political System of Empires (London, 1963).

3. To what extent do existing public administrative patterns, the values of the society, the nature of the power structure and other ecological factors facilitate or impede the growth of required administrative and related capacity?

4. How, and to what extent, can such obstacles be overcome, and in what probable period of time?

I should stress that the sequence in which I have posed these questions is not fortuitous. I am not suggesting, for example, that we should begin by exploring in depth all of those structures in society that may impede or facilitate change. Beyond the often abstract quality of such exercises, they are often not obviously useful to policy makers who must devise strategies and tactics that are oriented to specific targets. Nor do I wish to begin by asking what kinds of public administration, writ large, is most consistent with various kinds of development, also writ large. Such approaches, too, quickly take on an abstract quality and lead to idealized typologies and further scholastic hair-splitting. Typologies that relate administrative patterns to developmental potential may eventually emerge, but they will serve us much better when they are based upon more extensive historical and contemporary analysis.

What I am suggesting is that for any country we should be able to provide a profile which will depict its <u>needs</u>, <u>resources</u>, <u>obstacles</u>, and <u>potentiality</u> insofar as these involve or relate to the role of administrations in development. Although this formulation remains very broad and unwieldy, it can provide, I think, a guide to strategy.

Let us now consider some of the kinds of items that we would want to take account of in each category of such a profile.

1. Needs. Here I would be primarily concerned with the sequencing and configuration of the historical crises I noted above. Those of us who reflect on stable polities and modern economies, such as is classicly typified by Great Britain, invariably note that such systems evolved over several centuries. Gradualism in evolution means, of course, that crises did not cluster and that even when certain demands (for example, political participation, distribution of welfare values) became intense, they occurred sometime after other crises such as legitimacy, integration, and penetration had been adequately resolved.

It is clear that the British experience is not only unusual in the West but that it is certain not to be repeated in any of the developing countries. These latter clearly confront much heavier crises loads; demands for political participation, which were relatively late in the development of Western countries, often occur simultaneously with the great needs to create effective bases of legitimacy, integration, and penetration. The drama of many of these newer nation-states is clearly that their political leadership is frequently called upon to permit widespread participation in the political process, and to produce more and new welfare values, before the amount of internal order and cohesion that might permit either of these things has been established.

But it is critical to distinguish among developing countries. The Latin American states in most instances achieved independence over a century ago, and many of them manifest an acceptable level of national

identity, geographic integration, and even psychological integration. In some instances, such as Mexico, effective penetration from the center has been achieved; in others the national government is able to make its presence felt either through the military or by a federal structure, or through arrangements with local notables who exercise faudal control. The overriding needs of these countries are for more meaningful political participation and for the more equitable distribution of welfare values, as well as the production of now unavailable goods and services.

The situation is essentially different in Africa and Asia, although variation of conditions there is also quite worked. In Asia, with few exceptions, geographic integration is not a major crisis, although the matter of national identity is. India is able to hold the subcontinent together, even though the centrifugal pressures from regional, linguistic, and communal groups are very worked. Pakistan succeeds in holding under one national system two major sections physically separated by over a thousand miles and strongly differentiated by ethnic differences. Where, as in Southeast Asia, one might expect integration to be extremely threatened externally because of historical suspicions endemic among the peoples of that area, military power in instances such as Thailand and the achievement of a modus vivendi among most of the nations there has not made geographic integration an overwhelming problem.

On the other hand, Asian countries differ immensely regarding the degree in which national government has succeeded in penetrating the

nonurban areas; the amount of national identification one finds in each country; the stability with which political participation has (or has not) been extended to broader segments of the population. They differ, too, regarding the nature of internal and external threats from anti-system groups, parties, or nations. Indonesia, for example, has an overriding problem of trying to maintain the integrity of the nation against the eroding impact of Indonesian Communists and indigenous Chinese. South Vietnam is mortally threatened by what is unabashedly a North Vietnamese - Chinese attempt to destroy the present system. Malaysia must look to its borders in constant fear that the federation will be subverted by hostile Indonesian neighbors.

To be sure, all of these countries also face the crisis of distribution, but some of them clearly can try to confront it from a basis of greater security and confidence than others. Those whose condemnation of Ngo Diem Diem was of a blanket nature often failed to accord the attention Diem demanded to the fact that neither the participation nor the distribution crisis could be attended to until the country was made secure. Such criticisms, too, often overlook the fact that economic growth alone will not alleviate more basic crises. Indeed, if the history of Marshall Plan programs in Western Europe offers any guide, we can surmise that the centrifugal elements in a nation will actually do what they can to sabotage economic growth programs rather than be mollified by the promise of greater material well-being.

Africa, which has experienced the most dizzying proliferation of nation-states carved out of colonial empires, offers the most extreme examples of crisis loads. With very few exceptions, integration, legitimacy, and identity are major problems. Whereas the flush of nationalism incident to independence can act as national cement, erosion is built into situations where national boundaries have often been drawn with little regard to cultural, linguistic, or historical factors. More than one observer anticipates that the next generation of African politics will provide on a continental scale the kinds of disintegrative relationships that long characterized the Balkans.

The newness of African States, the immense disparity between educated, elite urban minorities and the rural tribal elements, the lack of governmental articulation emanating from the center, the degree in which the nations amount to nothing much more than a handful of political leaders - all of these factors and more dramatize the total range of crises, demands, and needs that confront African political systems. There, too, the demand for greater material well-being must be viewed in a broader context which suggests that meeting such demands will be greatly hampered by other unresolved basic issues.

Thus far, I have been discussing crises or needs from the standpoint of the outside observer. However, it is vitally necessary, in constructing a country profile, to ask what crises and needs are perceived by indigenuous political leaders and their followers, and what kind of priority is ascribed to each of them. If such questions are not carefully posed, strategies regarding technical and economic assistance

are certain to be misguided. Constructing a steel mill or a power dam, for example, may not relate at all (in the eyes of indigenous political leadership) to the resolution of the distribution crisis. Such enterprises - often criticized by technical assistance advisers and lampooned by the press as quixotic - may and often do relate to the crises of legitimacy, identity, and integration. In my own experience, I recall the objections raised to a Vietnamese request for a digital computer. The facts were clear enough. South Vietnam possessed neither the statistical gathering services, nor the planning talent, nor the implementing machinery that would make linear programming a rational enterprise. Yet, one Vietnamese official hammered home the point that the computer was needed for reasons of international prestige and interbureaucratic power. In his scheme of values, these needs superseded the more long-range goal of creating and extending welfare values for the society.

Anyone with any experience at all in technical assistance programs could multiply examples such as this. It seems to me that most of them tend to reflect one overruding fact, namely, that the political and bureaucratic elites in developing countries, even when they have a near monopoly of the available power in their systems, recognize that the scope of that power is in fact very limited and that their nation-states are very fragile edifices indeed. Thus, while the rationality of planned economic growth may require that indigenous and foreign technicians go into the villages and countrysides, insecure elites in

the urban centers may and do veto such programs because they cannot predict the consequences of such intervention for integration, identity, and legitimacy.

It will not do for the outsider to observe that there are many crises, that all of them are in some measure interrelated, and that all of them should be attacked on a broad front. In most instances the human and physical resources for such a massive resolution of crises are frighteningly lacking. In many cases, the current leadership is too deeply involved with the overriding problem of holding the real estate together and maintaining itself in managerial positions to pay much heed to the logic of rational organization and resource allocation for the systematic confrontation of the crises that beset these nations.

Thus, in exploring a country's needs, neither their identification nor the setting of priorities among them can be simply imposed from the outside. This is particularly true when we stop to consider that many of the ends of development are in fact normative; they involve conceptions of the good life that are not automatically to be equated with those associated with the Judaic-Christian tradition. They cannot be extrapolated from the values of a highly industrialized society when, in fact, we know that for a number of Asian countries material well-being may be identified with an agricultural - even if more highly productive - economic base.

2. Resources. A country profile would also include a careful assessment of existing physical, human, and organizational resources

for meeting the configuration of crises and needs that are identified. Ward and Rustow, for example, suggest that each country confronts certain "givens" or problems which are "set or predetermined in such a manner as to be wholly or largely beyond the control of the leaders of the modernizing society." These would include geopolitical problems, problems of timing of external stimuli for change, and problems relating to a society's traditional heritage.[16/] At any point at which the various crises of development we have been discussing confront a society, it has inherited such things as geographic location, cultural heritage, and general readiness to respond to challenge. If the timing of such crises could be managed, much of the developmental problem would be resolved. What motivates our present discussion is that few societies - developed or underdeveloped - are ever in such control over the vagaries of history to be in a position perfectly to respond to stimuli for change.

Thus, alongside a cataloging of perceived needs it is necessary to catalogue resources. Geographic integrative needs logically raise questions about military organization, transportation, and communications facilities; and the availability of police and other civil bureaucratic forces necessary to the maintenance of law and order. The crises of identity and penetration require us to consider such matters as the geographic distribution of governmental and administrative authority, the relationships between central and regional administration, the

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16/ Ward and Rustow, op. cit., p. 465.

actual distribution of power among political, bureaucratic, and non-political elites. Participation crises necessitate some attention to the presence or absence of political parties, the nature of their leadership, the degree of their organizational articulation from the center to the outlying reaches of the nation, the incidence of secondary association and their relationship to political and bureaucratic organizations.

The crises of distribution, tied as it is to economic growth, raises the greatest number and the most perplexing questions about available resources. We must know something about the availability of specialists in society at large and in public administration; about where on a continuum of economic development a society happens to be at a given moment; about the ability of the political system to provide basic conditions for economic growth ranging from law and order, regularized commercial and financial relations, and necessary educational patterns to extractive capacities such as taxation and controlled resource allocation.

We must ask, too, what is the nature of the prevailing values - and particularly of the ideology (ies) - of the society. As Spengler notes, strong and widely held feelings against the extraction of interest in Moslem countries can greatly impede economic growth.[17/] Similarly, ideologies that are sacrally rather than secularly based, or which in

17/ Joseph Spengler, "Theory, Ideology, Non-Economic Values, and Politico-Economic Development," in Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler (eds.), Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic Development (Duke University Press, 1961), p. 36.

any event impede the use of empirical science in problem solving, will greatly damage a system's capacity to resolve most of the crises we have discussed, particularly that of creating new welfare values. On the other hand, an ideology of development, depending on by whom and how widely held, may be the strongest resource a nation has for responding to demands for change.

In providing a resource inventory, it may be necessary to conclude that: a) certain felt needs can never adequately be met and b) satisfying one set of needs may - for an indeterminate time period - be incompatible with satisfying others. It seems reasonably apparent, for example, that the physical resource situation of many countries will not close the gap between the relatively affluent and the relatively deprived. I am struck, for example, by the documented fact that almost two decades of planned economic development in Southern Italy has actually resulted in widening the difference separating South and North.[18/] I am also aware that a combination of extremely limited physical resources, inadequate control of economic growth factors, and population growth rates of explosive proportions will long and absolutely limit the economic development capacity of many nations, unless unprecedented sources of power and/or a world-wide leveling of material well-being comes into existence.

We should also consider that the requirements, say, of geographic integration and national penetration, are incompatible with certain

18/ See Joseph LaPalombara, The Politics of Economic Development in Italy (Syracuse University Press, forthcoming).

responses to the demand for greater political participation or for more equitable distribution of welfare values. When a charismatic leader like Kwame Nkrumah warns that African leaders must either produce greater material well-being for their people or be replaced by those who will, he does not tell the full story. For it is apparent that in Ghana, as in many other developing countries the world over, indigenous leadership may neither produce increased material wealth nor be replaced; rather, in the name of conserving the integrity of fragile nations, they may respond to the crisis of participation by repression (for example, Ghana, Guinea, Vietnam, Sudan, Cuba, Burma) or by mobilization (for example, Egypt, Iran, Mexico, Indonesia). Similarly, what has been denominated "defensive modernization," may involve the deliberate acceptance of only so much innocation as is consistent with the maintenance of integration within a basically traditional framework and power structure. The way in which Latin American elites have responded to modern crises of participation and distribution provides dramatic examples of this phenomenon.[19/]

3. Obstacles. A careful inventory of resources should also expose obstacles to increasing required administrative capacity. A strong

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19/ Robert Scott treats this problem in an enlightening way in his "Latin American Political Parties and Public Policy," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton University Press, 1965). Cf. George Blanksten's section on Latin America in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 455-531.

bureaucracy inherited from colonialism may be of critical importance to a new nation in the resolution of identity, legitimacy, and geographic integration crises. There can be little question that the elite ICS of Indian public administration has served splendidly in this regard. The same might be said for Pakistan, Ceylon, and Malaya.[20/] These law-and-order bureaucrats not only possess the skills to keep disruptive behavior within bounds, but they often serve as important symbols and transmitters of the sense of nationhood. Too, within their spheres of competence as administrative generalists they may provide important assistance in overall policy formulation and in checking the excesses that new and impatient political leadership may engage is in the name of development.

But, as many have noted, law-and-order bureaucracy is often at odds with "development administration." Partly because of their entrenched power positions, partly because of their self-image as guardians, partly because of their suspicion of (if not disdain for) the masses, such administrators do not take easily or kindly to newer administrative missions or to demands for popular participation. Thus, for some purposes, these administrators constitute a strong resource; for other purposes they clearly represent obstacles. Whether one

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20/ See Ralph Braibanti, "Reflections on Bureaucratic Reform in India," in Braibanti and Spengler, Administration...., op. cit., pp. 3-68; R. Braibanti, "The Civil Service of Pakistan: A Theoretical Analysis," in Inayatullah (ed.), Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan (University of Peshawar, n. d.), pp. 189-249; Robert O. Tilman, Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya (Duke University Press, 1964).

wishes to increase or diminish this kind of administrative capacity is not to be established axiomatically.

One will want to gauge, too, the extent to which traditional values, institutions, and behaviors constitute obstacles to the creation of administrative capacity essential for crises resolution. It is far from clear that all of traditional heritage is incompatible with change. Japan and Turkey offer striking examples of the extent to which economic (and, to a lesser degree, political) change can occur within a framework in which tradition plays a prominent role. It is certainly arresting for those of us who associate legal-rational bureaucracy with economic and political modernity to note that traditional patterns of recruitment and authority persisted in Japanese public administration right through the modernization of that country and that, indeed, the bureaucracy's ability to manage certain crises was actually aided by its having incorporated traditional patterns of authority.[21/] Similarly, Apter's studies of Ghana and Uganda clearly alert us to the danger of assuming that economic, social, and political change are consistently impeded by traditional patterns.[22/] Hoselitz,

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21/ This is one of the striking conclusions emerging from Ward and Rustow, op. cit. See in particular, Masamichi Inoki, "The Civil Bureaucracy: Japan," in ibid., pp. 283-300. Inoki stresses that modernization was actually aided in Japan by reason of the bureaucracy having remained patrimonial, ascriptive, particularistic and paternalistic.

22/ See David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda (Princeton University Press, 1961). Cf. his article, "The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda," World Politics Vol. 13 (October 1960), pp. 45-68.

in an effort to provide a theoretical basis for assessing the implications of inherited patterns for subsequent economic change distinguishes "traditional" from "traditionalistic" societies, placing great stress on the question whether traditional values are consciously or unconsciously held, formalized or non-formalized, normative or non-normative, and a matter of habit, usage, or ideology.[23/] Schemes such as his give us at least a rough standard for assessing whether tradition can or cannot be instrumental for the management of the changes in demand which historical crises entail. Approaching the problem from this vantage point should minimize hasty conclusions and expressions of despair regarding the suitability of existing administrative patterns for developmental tasks.[24/]

There are, of course, other obstacles to look for. One critical one was suggested above when I spoke of the perceptions of elites and the relative salience they ascribe to various problems. Where the dominant elite and the indigenous bureaucrats are indistinguishable,

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23/ Bert F. Hoselitz, "Tradition and Economic Growth," in Braibanti and Spengler, Tradition..., op. cit., pp. 83-113.

24/ For examples of discouraged reaction to indigenous administrative systems see Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton University Press, 1957), especially Chap. 8. Berger understands that Egypt represents a complex "dual" society for which Weberian concepts of bureaucracy are inappropriate as analytical or prescriptive tools. On the other hand, this understanding is lacking in W. Hardy Wickwar, The Modernization of Administration in the Near East (Beirut, 1963), whose recommendations come right out of the standard text book in American public administration, or a United Nations bulletin. See pp. 189-95.

their values perceptions and ideologies are absolutely controlling, at least in the short run. The only opportunity for increasing administrative capacity in such situations will be limited to those tasks which they consider salient and to patterns of task resolution that will not openly and seriously challenge their status.

Where the power structure is more pluralistic and the indigenous bureaucrats constitute only one element within it, it may be possible to overcome their resistances to change by appealing to political and/or military or nongovernmental elites. But, as many ill-fated attempts at bureaucratic reforms in the so-called developed countries will attest, efforts to increase administrative capacity that directly threaten the entrenched bureaucracy encounter formidable opposition, have extremely tough sledding, and usually go over a political or implementive precipice.

Finally, one will have to reckon with the extent to which ideology constitutes an impediment to improved capacity. Clearly, if ideology is defined in its most pejorative sense, it is considered essentially incompatible with the kind of rationality that such things as economic development presumably require.[25/] On the other hand, I believe one

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25/ This is essentially what Spengler does in his "Theory, Ideology, Non-Economic Values, and Politico-Economic Change," op. cit., pp. 28-41. This is not the place to open a debate on ideology or the ends-means rationality used by economists in analyzing growth, except to note that Spengler, himself, is fully aware of it and attempts to come to grips with a portion of the problem in the cited section.

should be extremely wary about the dynamic potential of the so-called "ideology of development," attributed to many of the leaders of developing countries. Presumably, such strong, normative commitments to economic or political change offer strong reason to suppose that obstacles or resistances to change will be overcome. Yet, such ideologies themselves constitute obstacles to the successful resolution of several crises. For example, a genuine commitment to economic and social change at all cost may quickly lead to decisions to ride roughshod over traditional institutions, thus creating conditions that severely aggravate problems of integration and legitimacy. Or, where such ideologies contain rigid formulations about the overpowering role in economic development of the public as opposed to the private sector, they may actually serve to inhibit, certainly further to complicate, the resolution of the distribution crises. Perhaps such statements are nothing but window dressing and, as one Nigerian minister put it to me not long ago, "African Socialism is really capitalism but we don't dare say so to our people." My point is that a strong commitment to change is alone not enough to assure that the approach to the ends and means dilemma will be rational. In addition, the facts seem to suggest that so-called ideologies of development are often not much more than symbolic output, designed to obscure much more immediate power-centered intentions on the part of established political and bureaucratic elites. Whether such symbolic commitments can in fact be translated into policies that lead to the creation of

the kind of administrative and related arrangements that amount to increased crisis-management capacity is an empirical question, the answer for which cannot be begged on an a priori basis.

4. Potentiality. Our country profiles would include finally, some estimate regarding a nation's potentiality for producing the kind of public administrative capacity that various crises or demand configurations require. As a rule, such potentiality involves a complex calculus of comparing resources to obstacles and providing some sort of strategy for maximizing effectiveness within the limitations set by these parameters. We ought to be able to say about Nation X that commitment to a certain set of developmental goals will require certain bureaucratic capability, the creation of which is facilitated by certain identifiable resources and impeded by certain identifiable obstacles. Economists who have dealt with the problem of economic growth have often tended to focus exclusively on economic variables, either ignoring the state or treating it in a somewhat wooden, stereotyped or, in any case, nondynamic manner. Indeed, as I will suggest below, one great problem in attempting to analyze the matter of increasing administrative capability is that few scholars or policy makers have taken adequately into account the central - in many cases overwhelming - importance of administration in all varieties of programs of development.

The calculus I am suggesting should lead to orienting, even if crude, estimates about the potentiality in any country of producing certain kinds of administrative capacity. It ill behooves any policy

maker, for example, to insist on national economic planning if it is apparent that the requisite skills of planning are in extremely short supply, the educational system will not keep up with the matter of supplying the kinds of administrative and technical personnel that plan execution requires, and that, even if the first two conditions could be met, neither the nature of administrative organization nor the structure of indigenous work and other social patterns will be consonant with plan fulfillment. Furthermore, even where it is possible to outline the ways in which certain obstacles might be overcome, it is vital that one include in such prescriptions some estimate of the time needed before such solutions reach a state of viability.

What, then, can we say about alternative strategies that might lead to increased administrative capacity? What follows represents only the bare bones of alternative strategies. The foregoing discussion clearly indicates that specific and greatly articulated strategies must be based on degrees of profile analysis of each situation that are uncommon in most attacks on this problem. Some of the following generalization hold for many, perhaps all, developing countries; others will clearly be restricted to the profile circumstances I describe.

Let us consider first a number of highly generalized strategies.

1. Political Support. I believe the evidence is strongly persuasive that very little can occur by way of increasing or improving administrative capacity unless those in favor of such changes secure the overt, continuous, and single-minded support of central political leadership. Where the upper reaches of the indigenous bureaucracy

and central political leadership are indistinguishable, this proposition amounts to a truism. Such situations represent both the greatest obstacle and the greatest opportunity for administrative transformation. For if the leading bureaucrats, who also wield political power, are favorably disposed toward change, they can move quickly and resolutely to effect change; if they are not, change is unlikely.

We can point to a number of examples of the importance of top-level bureaucratic commitment to reform in situations where the leading bureaucrats were very close to power and where they managed, in fact, to direct change. The civil service of Brandenburg-Prussia, during the century following the advent of Frederick William (The Great Elector), represents the prototype of such a bureaucracy in relatively modern times, although some writers would choose ancient China, up to the Sung period, as the matrix.[26/] A more recent example would be the Japanese bureaucracy following the Meiji Restoration and, possibly, the Indian Bureaucracy since independence.

Morstein Marx, Braibanti, and others have referred to such bureaucrats as "guardians." They are men with a deep sense of the continuity of the state, a strong commitment to the "public interest," a high degree of professional identification and pride, a marked intellectual predisposition, and generally enjoying quite high status in their societies. Either largely through their own collegial effort,

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26/ See Fritz Morstein Marx, The Administrative State (The University of Chicago, 1957), pp. 54-60.

as in the case of post-Takugawa Japan, or through strong central political leadership, as in the two-century history of Bradenburg-Prussia after 1640, such bureaucrats were major instruments for attuning administrative organization and practice to the demands of development.

Where upper-level bureaucrats are not also the central political leaders of the society, it is doubtful (although not impossible) that they will develop the attributes of guardians. In any case, effecting administrative change in such situations absolutely requires that such a goal be accorded high priority by the political leadership. Inevitably, the entrenched administrative system will resist major changes; where the management of such a program is accorded law priority or is entrusted to relatively weak political leadership, it is bound to fall. How much pressure the political side will have to apply is, of course, problematical. Fainsod notes that, for all of his efforts at bureaucratic reform, Peter the Great left the corrupt, inefficient, self-seeking Russian bureaucracy pretty much as he found it.[27/] Following World War II, Italian efforts to expand administrative capacities to meet the growing demands for distribution, and economic development of the South, have been clamorous failures, owing in large measure to the fact that this goal has never been made the object of dedicated attention by the top political elite.[28/] Programs for administrative reform in such varied

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27/ Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case," in Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development, op. cit., pp. 233-67.

28/ J. LaPalombara, The Politics of Economic Planning in Italy, op. cit.

places as Vietnam, Egypt, and Brazil clearly indicate how difficult the increase of capacity will be when the political leadership will not or cannot bring its full pressure to bear on this problem.

It surely will not suffice to say about a particular country that its political leaders are dedicated to development or motivated by a "mobilization ideology." Presumably this is true of Nasser and his followers, General Branco and his Brazilian entourage, the Christian Democratic - Socialist coalition that now leads Italy, Touré and his devoted lieutenants in Guinea, etc. In each of these instances one must ask whether the political leaders clearly recognize the relationship between administration and development and whether they have the determination and the capacity to bring about needed administrative change. Wherever possible, that capacity is best exemplified by a partnership between political and bureaucratic elites in the interest of facilitating development. The Prussian, Japanese - even the Turkish - cases are striking examples of this. But where existing structures of administration are too rigid, these same examples, as well as that of the Soviet Union, would suggest that extreme measures for dealing with feudal enclaves and practices in the bureaucracy might have to be used.

Spengler rightly tells us that those interested in technical assistance and development programs often pay insufficient attention to elites, that economic development involves changing the "content of men's minds," and that it is critical that this problem be attacked at the apex of the power hierarchy in society.[29/] Braibanti, in listing

29/ J. Spengler, Tradition ..., op. cit., pp. 5-6.

the several factors that account for what he interprets as India's sophisticated approach to modernization, lays great stress on the fact that that country's central political leadership, its top-level bureaucratic officials, and the general public were associated with administrative reform.[30/] Montgomery, in one of the most perceptive statements I have seen on this problem, stresses that the political dimension is too often neglected in foreign aid programs geared to modernization goals. His is an almost exhaustive roll call of the kinds of international and domestic political factors that can impede or play havoc with economic modernization programs. He makes it quite clear that the rationality of improving material well-being or of introducing greater efficiency into public administration in developing countries is neither self-evident to indigenous political elites nor likely to be accepted by them - even if self-evident - if such programs elicit their hostility rather than their support.[31/]

If this central generalization appears obvious, the means of acting on it are not. Beyond conceding that political elite support for increased administrative capacity is desirable, perhaps essential, one can rightly ask how this might be secured. Although specific answers to such a query are inevitably dependent on the profiles I have mentioned, it seems to me that some broad operational rules can be suggested.

30/ R. Braibanti, "Reflections on Bureaucratic Reform in India," op. cit., pp. 12-15.

31/ John Montgomery, "Political Dimensions of Foreign Aid," in Braibanti and Spengler, Tradition.III, op. cit., pp. 224-75.

a. Unless those who propose administrative reform or increased capacity are committed to the overthrow of the existing political regime, it is necessary to demonstrate how proposed changes will either enhance existing power or at least not greatly diminish it. Proposals, for example, that would greatly diminish the role of administrative generalists are not likely to be accepted if the existing power elite depends on such generalists for the maintenance of internal order and security, or if their threatened displacement might lead to counter-elite activities that are unpredictable. Proposals for tax reforms or for streamlined auditing procedures are likely to fall on deaf ears if the existing elite itself depends on regressive taxation or widespread evasion for its central support, or if corrupt procedures that streamlined auditing would uncover and abolish would remove an important source of financing for the dominant political party.

b. Any proposal for improving administrative capacity that threatens the existing power structure must include persuasive analyses regarding how such losses in power base can be quickly replaced. If, in the name of development, political leadership is asked to assault privilege, the physical and/or psychological means of controlling disintegrative responses from those who are threatened must be specified. Prussian bureaucratic reformers, confronted with the hostility of a feudal aristocracy, had to recruit new administrators among burglars and military troops among peasants in order to make reforms stick. The group of samurai who became Meiji's reformers after 1868 discovered that only physical force, ruthlessly used, would provide any chance

at all of inaugurating the programs of development to which they were dedicated. Beyond changing the content of the minds of existing elites, one must assess how politically secure they may be and how they might manage threats to such security once reform programs are launched.

c. Insofar as increases in administrative capacity can be improved within the context of existing practices and structures, these should clearly be accorded the top priority. For example, one might be able to recruit traditional authority figures to important developmental roles in public health or agriculture, without insisting that the administration of such programs follow the prescriptive norms of legal-rationalism, or in any major way threaten status positions or power relationships in rural areas. Or, to cite another example, tradition-oriented bureaucrats, particularly at top levels, might be recruited to major roles in development, even if to do so would sacrifice efficiency or prolong patterns of corruption or particularism that seem inconsistent with a modern society. It seems highly improbable, for example, that Japan's reformers would have been as successful had they refused to incorporate and coopt their opponents, or if they had attempted really to exorcise ascriptive and particularistic considerations from the national bureaucracy.[32/]

d. It may very well be that the appeal to existing political leadership may have to focus not on strengthening public administration

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32/ See Inoki, op. cit.. Cf. R. P. Dore, "Education: Japan," in Ward and Rustow, op. cit., pp. 176-204.

but, rather, on the ways and means of extending and streamlining one or more political parties and associated organizations. As I shall point out below, this may represent both a persuasive strategy for improving administrative capacity outside the existing administrative framework, as well as laying the groundwork for potential pluralistic democratic development.

2. Education. It seems fairly obvious that strongly modifying prevalent public administrative institutions and practices is a matter of long-range education. As Dore notes in his discussion of Japan, education is an essential long-run strategy for improving not only central administration but particularly administrative capacity at the local level. Thus, those who associate Japan's modernization exclusively with the policies of the Meiji restoration's reformers ignore what an important contribution to their evolution was provided by educational patterns of the Takugawa period. Not only did the Meiji reformers inherit an extraordinarily literate male population; they were able to incorporate as well a strong tradition of guardian bureaucracy whose roots lay in the kind of educational training that dated back several centuries.[33/]

Similarly, when we turn to the Turkish example of relatively successful and rapid improvement of capacity to meet the requirements of modernization, the importance of education is striking. Frye notes that for some time Turkish society consisted of three tiers,

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33/ R. P. Dore, op. cit., pp. 176-82. In the same volume, see the important discussion by John W. Hall, "The Nature of Traditional Society: Japan." pp. 14-41.

the uneducated, the traditionally-oriented educated, and the Westernized-educated. Turkey, he argues, did not really begin to modernize until the educational system tipped the balance in favor of Western values.[34/] To be sure, Turkey itself is far from having resolved the problem of improving administrative capacity, but it is significant that what progress has been registered there can clearly be identified with educational reforms and with the commitment to bureaucratic change expressed by a number of perceptive political leaders who formed the Republic early in this century.

The irony of associating education with increased bureaucratic capacity lies in our understanding that educational institutions often become not merely the repositories of knowledge but also among the most tenacious of society's institutional resistances to change. When Lenin surmised that the kind of administrators required by the Soviet Union would not appear for a generation - and then only through a radically revamped educational system - he reflected not only the revolutionary determination of the Bolsheviks but also his knowledge of how deeply rooted were the then prevailing patterns of Russian education.

Thus, when we speak of an educational strategy for improving bureaucratic capacity, we must consider short- and long-run periods as well as specific educational instruments that might be efficacious in each of these periods.

34/ F. Frye, "Education: Turkey," in *ibid.*, p. 204.

In the long-run, one will want to modify, indeed, what Spengler calls the content of men's minds. Another way of putting this is to say that the socialization experiences of citizens - among which education enjoys a paramount place - should result in a self-sustaining commitment to adaptive change. Few societies, developed or developing, have achieved this kind of educational pattern; all societies periodically confront a serious lag between the need for increased human capacity and the ability of educational structures to contribute to need or crisis management.

It seems to me that considerable experience now shows that direct assaults on firmly established university systems will produce meager short-run results. We can, of course, point to examples where striking successes have been registered in fields like medicine, engineering, and other areas of considerable importance to economic development, and wherever this kind of upgrading or improvement can be introduced into existing or emerging higher educational systems, it should be rigorously pursued.

However, the campaigns to introduce public administration, as a specific and separate discipline, into university curricula have not been nearly as successful, and in several instances can only be described as fiascoes. Several reasons for this failure are well known. They include the hostility of entrenches faculties of law whose members take a dim and hostile view of the "gimmickry" of administrative science; the identification of public administration as incompatible with liberal and humane higher education, the residual effect in

many excolonial areas of high-status colonial administrators who were broadly rather than narrowly trained; and, of course, the imperviousness to such changes in university curricula manifested by ministries of education that are either too weak to carry through such reforms or too dominated by high-level bureaucrats for whom the new science of administration is anathema.

But there are additional factors that should be cited here. First, it is clear that public administration is not really an accepted discipline in many of the highly developed countries with which developing countries have had experience and/or identity. As Morstein Marx notes, there is far from agreement among Western nations as to the kind of training appropriate for university graduates headed for the public service. He says:

> The Germans, with their concern for holding public administration to legally defined authority have favored the study of law, with social science trimmings, especially from political science, economics, and history. The British have favored a program suitable to a gentleman with a taste for scholarship. British study is therefore intended to be an intellectual venture rather than a practical preparation, with considerable leeway granted for high attainment in any chosen field of knowledge. The French, in the main, have relied on a rather formal type of general education comparatively rigid in its organization and lacking a resourceful approach to contemporary problems.35/

Morstein Marx notes that the English have actually challenged whether public administration is a field amenable to academic training, and he suggests that perhaps "all we can hope for is good minds."36/ Those

35/ Morstein Marx, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
36/ Ibid., p. 48.

of us who have noted the response of academic elites to proposals for public administration curricula in Saigan or Bologna, Karachi or Lagos, Sao Paulo or Cairo appreciate how widespread the British attitude actually is. Whether or not one agrees with Morstein Marx or the British, it is fair to say that experiences in developing countries have more than ever raised serious questions about what to teach, when, how, and to whom, if the goal is better administrative capacity. Indeed, the thrust of much of what Ralph Braibanti had had to say on this subject amounts to a warning that, while administrative specialists are necessary, much more important for the bureaucracy of a developing nation would be a spirit of humane compassion, a commitment to intellectuality and predisposition to empiricism.[37/]

The views of American and foreign academics who are dubious about university curricula in the science of administration are strongly supported by some striking facts. Clearly, for example, the developed industrial countries managed to reach such stages without worrying too much about specific and specialized university-level training for public administrators. Just as clearly, I would add, our probes into the histories of Western development reveal that much administrative capacity evolved notwithstanding wholesale deviations from the kinds of legal-rational shibboleths that have become the stock in trade of far too many public administration advisors. If one peruses, for example,

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37/ R. Braibanti, "Reflections on Bureaucratic Reform in India," op. cit. See, also, his "The Philosophical Foundations of Bureaucratic Change," in Inayatullah, op. cit., pp. 79-89.

what now amount to the United Nation's codified prescriptions of what kind of public administration a developing country requires, both the futility of such prescriptions operationally - and their potential for rampant formalism - are obvious to anyone who has ever worked in or thought seriously about administrative organization and behavior.

The long-range goals of education, then, at all levels, should point to changing the content of men's minds. The critical elements to inculcate are a sense of empirical and pragmatic approaches to developmental problems. Some of this will surely emerge as secondary schools and universities become concerned with manual training and the physical and natural sciences. More of it may be a consequence of what is certain to be a relatively slow evolution of the social sciences in these countries. In places like Africa, where universities will be created de novo in many places, opportunities for moving in such empirical problem-centered directions are very good, and should be encouraged. In Latin American and Asian countries where existing universities are already tied to European rather than American university traditions, the evolution will be much more complicated and time-consuming. Once again, how much attention one will pay to this sector must depend on the kinds of balance between resources and obstacles that a profile analysis would show.

What of alternative educational devices for increasing the administrative capacity we are after? The proliferation of institutes and centers of public administration, often with the assistance of the United States or the United Nations, is one reflection of the lack of

confidence in the university as an efficacious method for meeting the problem. Such institutes usually constitute one segment of what may be a broader program of assistance in the field of public administration. Such assistance may include field administration demonstration projects, counterpart relationships between technical advisors and host-country bureaucrats, the creation of new or improved staff functions such as personnel systems, job classifications, organization and management units, model in-service training programs, budget and accounting divisions, and so on. All of these activities are part of an educational-operational campaign aimed at upgrading indigenous administrative capacity. Although one can point to a number of such programs that have been markedly successful, reports from the field indicate that the implantation of Western procedures and structures often suffers from what Riggs calls formalism[38/] and, in any event, does not seem to bring about the kind of improved administrative capacities that developing countries presumably need.

It is not my intention to review the pros and cons of such public administrative programs or to arrive at estimates of their success or failure in various settings. A number of competent writers have dealt with such problems, suggesting that the evidence is mixed and that there are at the moment no sure-fire methods for deciding what will work and

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38/ F. W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries, op. cit., pp. 15-19.

what will not.[39/] Most of us agree that a central problem - beyond the transplantation of structure and techniques - is the proliferation of "development administrators." Few of us can draw on the kind of systematically gathered data that would tell us what kinds of such administrators are needed and how they might flourish in given national settings. I assume that country profiles would help to set the parameters of intervention and therefore to set some realistic expectations regarding what results might be forthcoming from institutes of public administration, demonstration projects, top-level administrative reforms or reorganization, the counterpart formula, expert assignments to village development academies, and so on through the full roll-call of techniques that have evolved over the last two decades. A task-centered and country-centered approach should help us to resolve in each case serious dilemmas growing out of the many contradictions in formulas and strategies that the literature on this subject now reveals.

There are, however, three general recommendations that seem to me to be absolutely critical to any effort to attack the problem within an educational framework.

39/ See John Montgomery, op cit.; Edward W. Weidner, The World Role of Universities (New York, 1962); Bruce L. Smith, Indonesian-American Cooperation in Higher Education (Michigan State University Press, 1960); Walter Adams and John A. Garraty, Is the World Our Campus? (Michigan State University Press, 1960); Harry J. Friedman, "Elements of Development Administration," in Inayatullah, op. cit., pp. 1-13. Of particular interest and importance here is a critical, analytical paper by David S. Brown, "Concepts and Strategies of Public Administration Technical Assistance," Comparative Administration Group Occasional Paper (Bloomington, Indiana, 1963, mimeographed).

a) First, it is essential that one avoid writing off traditional institutions and administrative structures as unqualifiedly incompatible with the demands of development. Even if there is a "science" of modern organization and management, it is abundantly clear that great variation will exist regarding each nation's ability to incorporate that science into its own system of values and behavior. How much of Weber, or of Western administrative practice, can be successfully grafted on to other cultures is not a matter for a priori determination but for empirical experimentation. It may very well be that industrialization carries with it certain requirements of discipline and rationality, but one should begin by asking what alternative approaches or functional equivalents might serve such purposes. As I reflect on the industrialization of the West, I am struck by the great varieties of social patterns that have accompanied the transformation of rural societies. France and Italy, for example, became major industrial powers in a context of economic organization shot through with particularism, ascription, diffuse roles, and the kinds of inefficiencies that Taylorism has been unable to overcome even to the present time. We know about Eastern European societies that considerable transformation has occurred without, indeed in open deviation from, administrative canons associated with legal-rationalism.[40/] To cite just one singular example, since we in the West have not yet resolved the dilemma of

40/ See Carl Beck, "Bureaucracy and Political Development in Eastern Europe," in LaPalombara, Bureaucracy and Political Development, op. cit., pp. 268-300.

generalists versus specialists in public administration, it would seem quite presumptuous to prescribe in a blanket way for developing countries in this regard.

b) Second, since many of the developing countries are certainly anything but understaffed in public administration, educational efforts should concentrate on how modifications of existing patterns might improve capacity. Indigenous and foreign observers wax eloquent about the waste involved in excessive administrative centralization, the needless involvement of high-level bureaucrats in the details of program execution, the unwillingness of status-conscious top-level bureaucrats to delegate responsibility and the equal reluctance of lower level managers to accept greater responsibility. Educational programs, of whatever specific format, should take such situations carefully into account and should explore the extent to which indigenous values and other ecological factors will permit a more productive use of the existing manpower pool. I do not mean to be sanguine on this score; several studies and considerable experience demonstrate that this procedure is fraught with great complexities. Yet it seems to me that decisions to go around existing administrative structures by creating new "development-centered" administrative units is not always a sound strategy. Indeed, one can point to a number of European and Latin American countries where such ad hoc practices are of such ancient vintage that both the fiscal system and national administration constitute a fantastic maze of complex arrangements that drain existing financial

and human capability without producing even minimally acceptable results. The public corporation or ministry for village development, or variations on these structures, is no sure road to greater administrative productivity.

c) Third, the educational strategy should self-consciously explore how a system's administrative capacity might be augmented outside the formal sphere of public administration. Single-minded concentration on the latter sector, despite our understanding of the prominent role that the public sector will play in developing countries, may lead to what Siffin rightly calls the fatuous assumption that administration is the only instrument for realizing social objectives.[41/] I shall say something more about this below.

d) Finally, the educational strategy desperately requires that everyone - political elites, technical advisors, development specialists, teachers, and trainers - understand that administration is neither something that can be separated from development programs, or a set of skills that one simply or automatically adds to the development calculus as needed. This notion is unhappily widespread in many societies. Technical assistance programs that (almost as an afterthought) allocate very tiny percentages of total program allocations to problems of public administration reveal the assumption that the substance of a program can be separated from its administrative aspects.

41/ W. J. Siffin, "Relations Between Political and Administrative Development: Some Questions and Propositions," Paper delivered at the September 1963 meeting of the American Political Science Association, p. 5.

As David Brown pointedly notes, the domination of U. S. assistance agencies by professional economists has greatly reduced the attention paid to public administration.[42/] I might add that this is scarcely surprising when we reflect that, with few and recent exceptions, economists have either ignored the role of the state in development or treated it as a troublesome irritant.

No broad-gauged educational strategy to improve administrative capacity in the developing areas is likely to be successful unless administration is seen for what it always is and must be - an integral part of all public policy making and execution, no matter how technical or esoteric, involving a set of skills in human organization and behavior without which policy implementation is, at best, haphazard and, at worst, a chaotic and clamorous failure. In short, the functional specialists or technocrats cannot press a button and input administration as needed; administration is at the heart of their activity and should therefore be built into their educational experiences. This is particularly true of any society where the public sector will presumably monopolize activities that in other societies were widely shared by a variety of institutions and that in many cases evolved as a matter of chance.

I do not pretend to know how best to integrate administrative concerns into the educational experiences of all those on whom the

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42/ D. S. Brown, op. cit., p. 16.

management of crises and demands will depend. I do believe that such a step is essential and that achieving it requires changing the content of men's minds not merely in the developing countries but also in those countries and institutions from which technical assistance in development will presumably continue to emanate.

III

So much for generalized strategies. What can we say about more specific strategies that might be attuned to certain kinds of needs-resources-obstacles-potentiality profiles?

1. Where the overriding need or crisis of a developing country is integration, identity, and penetration, major attention should be paid to providing for the capacity necessary to handle these problems. Operationally, this would mean, in the short run, major efforts to reinforce military and police facilities, administrative control techniques that may have been inherited from colonial experiences, and so on. Blanket condemnations of the military as undesirable instruments for nation-building may be ideologically appealing but they ignore the brute fact that many of the developing countries are barely able to survive centrifugal pressures from within and disintegrative pressures from without. In such situations it makes very limited sense to move toward producing "development administrators" on a crash basis. For one thing, such talent cannot be effectively used unless and until the new nation's borders are secure and the probability that the central government can extract minimum level of obedience from its subjects is

reasonably high. For another thing, premature emphasis on development administrators tends to create a threat to the traditional bureaucracy, therefore introducing elements or feelings of unrest and insecurity at exactly the time when such pressures should be minimized. If I may return to previous examples, Brandenburg - Prussia, Meiji Japan, post-revolutionary Turkey, post-unification Italy all required as a precondition to later national development, the physical power to assure control at the center. The long effort of Paris to make France a nation in more than merely a symbolic sense encompassed several centuries of military and bureaucratic strategems directed at refractory regions and feudal personages. For places like the Congo or Indonesia, Sudan or South Vietnam, Algeria or the countries of French West Africa, the clear and present need is for a network of civil and military bureaucratic organization that will provide a reasonable amount of integration.

Where, as in Burma or Pakistan, political party interaction or conflict between bureaucrats and politicians threaten the very integrity of extremely fragile new nations, decisions by indigenous military leaders to take over in the name of nationhood are surely not surprising, even if unfortunate from a democratic standpoint. Where, as in many of the new nations of Africa, present boundaries represent historical accidents rather than logical outcomes of centripetal social, economic, religious, ethnic, or ideological forces, mechanisms for assuring and increasing integration should be the first order of business.

A second recommendation, therefore is that greater attention be paid to the opportunity and desirability of strengthening rather than

weakening whatever bureaucratic apparatus a developing country may have inherited. In many places in Africa and Asia, such bureaucratic structures are highly sophisticated, even if they are not adequately geared to the management of crises such as distribution and participation. Thus, Braibanti points out that very vital roles in meeting integration problems were played by the elite bureaucratic corps of India and Pakistan. Indeed, insofar as we can agree with Braibanti about India's superior performance on this score, it seems to be owing to the fact that the Moslems who led Pakistan were much less prominently represented than Hindus in the old ICS.[43/] In like fashion, Kingsley notes that the kind of law-and-order central bureaucracies inherited by many African states have been vital to integration and that, indeed, many problems of national integration were considerably aggravated where African nations moved too precipitously to replace European administrators with Africans of much less training and experience.[44/]

Obviously, aggrandizing military organization in the interest of assuring national integration implies certain hazards for future political development. One can point to Latin America for evidence that, long after integration problems had been essentially resolved, military organization and _coudillos_ became instruments for impeding resolute management of participation and distribution crises, thus creating new kinds of instabilities. However, such situations can

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43/ R. Braibanti, "The Civil Service of Pakistan," _op. cit._

44/ J. Donald Kingsley, "Bureaucracy and Political Development with Particular Reference to Nigeria," in J. LaPalombara, _Bureaucracy and Political Development_, _op. cit._, pp. 301-17.

possibly be offset by a) diverting military organization to economic development tasks and b) self-consciously going outside the political-military sphere in search of developmental capacity.

2. Where developing nations are hard pressed to respond to demands for new and more equitably distributed goods and services, the military can be an important means of providing such capacity. The arguments in favor of the military organizations as nation builders and modernizers have been widely discussed and need no detailed reiteration here. Those who are optimistic note that the military can be an important instrument for increasing literacy, mixing the ethnic and religious elements of the nation, easing the transition from rural to urban social patterns, providing a pool of trained technicians and managers for civilian needs, instilling a sense of national loyalty and identity, and providing for the construction of the infrastructure - roads, railroads, waterways, sanitation facilities, communications systems - that industrial development requires. Moreover, it may be that the military constitute an important matrix for the creation of that empirical attitude toward problem solving which is so vital to all kinds of crises management. As Braibanti says:

> Of all the sectors of the public bureaucracy the military by virtue of its mission, can be expected to discard more quickly both the intuitive disposition of the masses and related literary-generalist tradition of the civil bureaucracy. Although it is preoccupied with the requirements of order and stability, its concern for precision in situation analysis disposes it favorably toward empiricism.45/

45/ R. Braibanti, Tradition....., op. cit., p. 174.

To be sure, there is far from agreement on the efficacy or desirability of using military organization in economic development. Advocates of economic as opposed to military aid often cite the drain on limited economic resources implicit in the maintenance of military establishments. Such views, it seems to me, must rest on the assumptions that the military will perform no useful role in economic growth and/or that it will inhibit the growth of organizations that might accomplish these tasks more efficiently. Experience in many countries now indicates, however, that the military can be effectively involved in a very wide range of economic growth related enterprises.[46/] However, it is also true, as Pye warns, that in order to perform adequately in this sense, the military itself must become relatively modern structures, well organized and effectively led, rather than the rag-tag caricatures of armies that one often finds in the newer nations of Africa and Asia and the older nations of Latin America.[47/]

U. S. support for "civic action" programs engaged in by military units in many developing countries today rests in part on the conviction that efficient armies are essential for dealing with threats of insurgency, in part on the hope that they will in fact become major nation-

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46/ On this theme see the interesting overview by Jess P. Unger, "The Military Role in Nation Building and Economic Development," Comparative Administration Group Occasional Paper (Bloomington, Indiana, 1963, mimeographed).

47/ See Lucian Pye, "Military Training and Political and Economic Development," in Don C. Piper and Taylor Cole (eds.), Post-Primary Education and Political and Economic Development (Duke University Press, 1964), pp. 75-94. Cf. John L. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton University Press, 1962).

building instruments. If the Janowitz theory that the relationship between civil and military organization becomes more and more interdependent as technology increases is valid,[48/] considerable logic and realism may support this hope. Reports from such scattered places as Vietnam, Indonesia, and Latin America indicate, however, that the transformation of the military's role will require greater attention to the training of military leadership in nonmilitary administrative roles. Among other things, it will be essential to provide for roads, communications systems and other elements of infrastructure whose timing and location are not predicated on exclusively military considerations. It will also be necessary to promote not merely increased administrative scope for the military but a strengthening of "guardian" bureaucratic structures such that some control over military development decisions can be exercised within the broader framework of administration. It goes without saying that generalists are more likely to be able and willing to do this than administrative specialists who are apt to develop functional affinities for and identification with their counterparts on the military side. In any event, in assessing the potentiality of a particular military organization for adding to economic development administrative capacity, one will surely want to ascertain: a) the extent to which military leaders are in fact dedicated to nation-building; b) the cohesiveness of important

48/ Morris Janowitz, "Changing Patterns of Organizational Authority: The Military Establishment," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 3 (1959), pp. 473-93.

military leaders behind such programs; and c) the degree in which countervailing internal forces either exist or may be created. This last consideration leads to my last recommendation regarding profiles and strategies.

3. I have noted above that administrative capacity is nowhere the exclusive property of the public sector. All of the crises of development require some degree of collaboration between political, bureaucratic, and military elites, on the one hand, and the people they expect to direct or lead, on the other. Wilbert Moore, in an excellent discussion of the social requisites of economic development, identifies first- and second-order requisites in the organizational sphere. Second-order requisites are said to include trade union and other occupational groups and new voluntary associations. Moore notes that either such structures or their functional equivalents must come into existence if economic development is to proceed.[49/]

Moore's emphasis on structural alternatives clearly means that this formulation is not rigidly or normatively tied to a conception of pluralistic democracy, although I suspect that functional equivalents for voluntary associations would probably be difficult to specify for nondemocratic societies. For our purposes, the point to be stressed is that the kind of administrative capacity that economic development seems to require leads us to ask where and how in developing countries such assistance may be forthcoming.

49/ Wilbert Moore, "The Social Framework of Economic Development," in Braibanti and Spengler, Tradition...., op. cit., pp. 71-77.

There are three obvious sectors worthy of considerable attention in this regard, namely, business, labor, and political parties. Our interest in them should involve at least these two dimensions: a) the extent to which sectors can be used instrumentally for the implementation of national policy, and b) the extent to which such sectors can be viewed as training sectors and manpower tools from which public administrative talent can be drawn.

a. Business. The antipathy of many developing area governments to free or capitalistic enterprise is well known. Whether because of religious strictures against interest or profit making, or political elite commitments to "socialism," it is widely assumed in many Asian and African countries that the economy will be planned and that much enterprise will be publicly owned. In many of these same countries, antagonism against the private sector is easily and greatly abetted by the fact that such entrepreneurial activity as these nations possessed was often monopolized by ethnic minorities. The Chinese in Southeast Asia, Indians in East African countries would be good examples. Partly because economic enterprise was not greatly developed, partly because commerce and industry were controlled by colonial powers or by indigenous ethnic minorities, few nationalist or independence movements were spearheaded by business leaders. Even where, as in India, some businessmen helped to finance the anticolonial campaign, the influence of the business community at independence was not strong enough to stem, or even to moderate, demands for socialism, centralized

planning, and extensive regulation of economic enterprise emanating from students, intellectuals, labor leaders, and political leaders.

In the developing countries of Latin America, of course, the situation is markedly different. Almost all of these countries recognize "free" enterprise, although the extent of government ownership of large industrial sectors is often obscured. In these countries, large landowners and major business or industrial figures constitute integral parts of the elite oligarchies that have played the game of political musical chairs in a somewhat isolated arena in which only coopted counter-elites could participate. Such elites have succeeded in limiting or nullifying demands for additional political participation, creating in a number of instances tension levels of explosive proportions.

Whether and how the business sector can be used to increase administrative capacity, then, is a matter to be settled by careful profile analysis. In a country like India, which has the strongest business community of any of the newer nations of Asia or Africa, it is clear that the business community has been an important factor since independence, but that its potential contribution to economic development is greatly hampered by the hostility of bureaucrats and other groups toward the private sector, as well as by such a complex maze of legislation and bureaucratic regulation affecting the business community that only a form of widespread corruption permits it to survive at all in many

instances. Myron Weiner, who provides an illuminating discussion of this problem notes both the stultifying and the dynamic implication for development of certain patterns of business organization and behavior in that country.50/

Although this is not the place to settle the debate over public as opposed to the private sector in the resolution of several national developmental crises, it seems to me essential to bring to bear on this subject the considerable theoretical and empirical experience we now have in the field of national economic planning. Spengler, for example, has written incisively about the merits of a "mixed" system, suggesting both that the public sector should provide the basic conditions for economic change and that the kinds of additional skills, organization, and controls that subsequent growth requires are unlikely to emerge in any public bureaucracy.51/ Peter Wiles, in what I consider the most exciting and persuasive short comparative analysis of the relative merits of varying approaches to planning, carefully delineates the enormous price of inefficiency, confusion, inflated bureaucratic cost, and restriction of other normative societal goals that centralized planning implies. While his is certainly not a brief for a free market,

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50/ Myron Weiner, The Politics of Scarcity (The University of Chicago Press, 1962), Chap. 5.

51/ See, for example, J. Spengler, "Bureaucracy and Economic Development," in LaPalombara, Bureaucracy and Political Development, op. cit., pp. 199-232; J. J. Spengler, "Public Bureaucracy, Resource Structure, and Economic Development: A Note," Kyklos, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1958), pp. 459-89.

it is indeed an eloquent statement of the value of a pluralistic approach to problem solving.52/

It is reasonably clear that expanding the contribution to bureaucratic capacity that the private economic sector can make will be greatly limited by particular national circumstances. Little of this can occur in Communist countries. More of it is possible, I believe, in African countries where the situation is still relatively fluid, and in some Latin American countries where there is evidence that portions of the business community are dedicated to economic growth. The initiative for such a program, I contend, must come from political leadership and the upper reaches of the bureaucracy. In some cases, as in Pakistan, where the political elite combines military and bureaucratic modernizers, it may be possible to explore with diligence and foresight exactly how the business community can expand crisis-management capability. I should imagine that such explorations would be considerably facilitated by the needed cooperation which planned economic development in a mixed economy requires, and by the certainty that in few countries will the private sector be permitted the kind of swashbuckling freedom of action that was true of some Western countries.

A number of specific tactics might be suggested in this regard:

a) Strong representation of the business community on national planning bodies.

52/ Peter Wiles, "Economic Activation, Economic Planning and the Social Order." Paper prepared for the Comparative Administrative Group Research Seminar. Minnowbrook Conference Center, 1964 (mimeographed).

b) The use of business organizations (such as chambers of commerce) for the administration of certain plan-oriented local activities.

c) Joint training programs in business and public administration.

d) Business representation on ministerial consultative committees.

e) Exchange "internship" programs for middle management personnel in the public bureaucracy and in indigenous industrial enterprises.

f) Government encouragement (through tax, credit, import-export, and related policies promoting the rapid expansion of aggressive industries, regardless of how rational such expansion may appear from the standpoint of a national economic plan).

g) Government facilitation of joint business enterprises involving indigenous and foreign capital, without losing ultimate control over the limits imposed on foreign exploitation of local opportunities and resources.

h) Use of industrial manpower training devices as a means of recruiting needed specialized, technical administrative talent for the public bureaucracy.

Ralph Braibanti, in commenting on Spengler's suggestion that the public bureaucracy concentrate on "polity" functions, leaving entrepreneurial skills to the private sector, distinguishes two subtypes of entrepreneurial skills, namely, the "intellectual empirical" and the "personalized entrepreneurial." He thinks it entirely appropriate that bureaucrats should develop an empirical, problem-solving orientation. But he objects to the "personalized-entrepreneurial" values, which

emphasize "risk, courage, shrewd business sense, and desire for profit, wealth, power, or prestige deriving from successful commerce."[53/] He notes that in countries like Pakistan, the latter attributes are possessed by bazaar merchants whose acquisitive impulses are antisocial and, in more developed countries, by capitalists who are philistines and unconcerned with the public interest.[54/]

Without commenting on the philistine character of entrepreneurs, I think we can agree that Braibanti poses the central dilemma that faces the developing nation that seeks to minimize the private sector. That dilemma is that the problem of economic growth and, therefore, the crises of distribution in such countries cannot be adequately resolved unless and until the bureaucracy produces "personalized entrepreneurial" types. It may well be that one will want to keep such types out of the bureaucracy for normative reasons. But they will have to appear somewhere, for I believe that the list of attributes that Braibanti assigns to the "personalized entrepreneurial" personality pretty much exhausts the human motivations that lead to economic development and change. There are few examples in history, I believe, in which the willingness to take risk of various kinds (if not pathologically determined) was wholly divorced from motivations of profit, wealth, power, and prestige. Nationalism, or the national interest, is probably an insufficient substitute for such drives, where the end in view is the economic development of the nation.

53/ R. Braibanti, "The Civil Service of Pakistan," op. cit., p. 230.
54/ Ibid.

b. Labor. Just as the business community and its related associations, can augment public administrative capacity, so can the broad field of organized labor. Unlike businessmen, however, many Asian and African labor leaders were quite prominent in the movements toward national independence. Guinea's Seku Toure emerged from one of the country's labor federations; Tom Mboya began his active political career as head of the Kenya Labor Federation; Asoka Mehta, a leader of India's Praja Socialist Party, was a former labor leader.

The intimate relationship between trade unions and independence movements in several countries has led to a number of interesting consequences. In many cases, it is clear that the labor movement was viewed by many of its intellectual and middle-class leaders not as an end in itself but as a stepping-stone to political office and power. Although such instrumental use of labor organizations is certainly not restricted to the developing countries,[55/] it can and often does deprive the unions of important leadership and leave them at the mercy of political parties. Second, the close association between nationalism and trade union development often has meant that post-independence governments have had to pay much greater attention to the ideological

55/ The use of trade unions for political purposes is deeply rooted in this history of Europe. See D. L. Horowitz, The Italian Labor Movement (Cambridge University Press, 1963); J. LaPalombara, The Italian Labor Movement: Problems and Prospects (Cornell University Press, 1957); Lewis Lorwin, The International Labor Movement (Harper, 1953); W. Galenson (ed.), Comparative Labor Movements (Prentice-Hall, 1952); Henry Ehrmann, French Labor from Popular Front to Liberation (Cornell University Press, 1947).

shibboleths of labor leaders than to the appeals of the business community. Indeed, much of the official antagonism toward the private sector noted above can be traced to the influence over national policy exercised by trade union leaders turned politician. Along with the intellectuals, these latter will often appear among the most rigidly doctrinaire of the elites of a developing nation. Whereas the egalitarian dimension of their ideologies may make much sense in highly stratified and polarized societies, their pet, and often terribly obscure, formulas for bringing "socialism" into existence surely to not encourage an optimal approach to crisis management.

Thus, a third consequence of the prominent role of trade unions in the independence drive is that post-independent political and bureaucratic leaders have sought to exercise tight controls over them. This is as true of a relatively pluralistic system like India as it is of a highly unitary and monistic country like Ghana or Guinea. In India, the Congress Party reacted to Communist domination of the labor movement by creating its own federation. The four major labor federations of that country are all highly associated with political parties; all of them are subjected to extremely limiting controls by the government. Strikes are discouraged; collective bargaining is impeded; unions are mobilized behind economic development programs; they, like other associations, are under constant threat of restrictive legislation that can range in its impact from the preventive detention of union leadership

to the abolition of the unions.[56/] The Indian pattern, like the Mexican is relatively subtle; it gives the impression that the unions are in fact separate entities and that they serve as centers of countervailing power. In countries like Ghana, Egypt, or Guinea, the patterns are not nearly as subtle; there the unions either serve as instruments of mobilization or they are subjected to extreme harassment. In Ghana, the TUC is frankly described as "the wage earner's wing of the Convention People's Party";[57/] in Guinea, Toure warns that "we all believe in trade unionism," but we have all understood that trade union action alone is not enough. We must use it as a political as well as an economic weapon..... You will note that I put the political aim first, and that we are seeking to achieve it through the trade unions.[58/] In Liberia, the role of the trade union is expected to be even more inert, for no interference with national policy or plans will be brooked there.

It is obvious that the range of situations regarding trade unions extends from one extreme where they may be outlawed to another where they enjoy complete freedom of organization and action. The extremes

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56/ M. Weiner, op. cit., Chap. IV.

57/ Bruce Millen, The Political Role of Labor in Developing Countries (Brookings Institution, 1963). This volume, a Brookings Institution study, is an excellent short summary of the vicissitudes of labor movements and leaders in Asia and Africa. Millen writes from the sympathetic and comparative standpoint of an American trade unionist who, as part of the U. S. Labor Attache Program, has held assignments in Europe and Asia. Cf. Walter Galenson (ed.), Labor in Developing Countries (U. of Calif., 1962).

58/ Bruce Millen, op. cit., p. 87.

need not concern us here. The developing countries in which unions are likely to play any role at all in increasing administrative capacity fall somewhere in between. Where, as in Ghana, Guinea, Tanganyika, Mexico, and Egypt, unions are either represented directly or spoken for in one-party power structures, one might argue that they serve as important links between national political and bureaucratic leadership and the unions' mass followers.[59/] It is conceivable that such arrangements permit the trade unions to serve as important vehicles for improving public administrative capacity to meet economic development demands. It is also possible to add that, where the developing nations confront major crises of integration or internal insurgency, extending greater freedoms to the trade unions would create great risks of disintegration. African and Asian leaders with whom I have discussed this problem insist that greater freedom of association and of economic (or bread-and-butter) action can only occur when the basic problems of nation-building have been resolved.

I am willing to concede that intelligent and enlightened political and bureaucratic leadership might use the trade unions as an effective means for mobilizing national effort behind programs of economic development. Some persuasive evidence for this assertion can, perhaps, be gleaned from the Mexican experience since the Revolution and from the Soviet and East European experiences. It is obviously too early to

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59/ This is the burden of Millen's argument in *ibid.*, pp. 91-92. This viewpoint is echoed by others who do not see any serious threat to free trade unionism in one-party patterns.

draw conclusions from African and Asian states where the unions are nothing more than the abject instrumentalities of one-party oligarchs and the bureaucratic elite who serve them.

I am, however, more than a little skeptical about whether the rigidly controlled, mobilization pattern is the best way of maximizing the contribution that union can make to augmenting administrative capacity. The theory of democratic centralism rings not so clearly for those who reflect on its workings in the U.S.S.R. following the "domestication" of the trade unions in 1929. Similarly, I believe that European experience will clearly show that in places like Italy, France, and Great Britain, the trade unions made their greatest contribution to crises management (that is, participation and distribution crises) when the unions were not so rigidly tied to political parties or abjectly dependent on the bureaucracy.[60/]

Short of permitting the kind of pluralistic freedom that would make the unions an independent center of power, developing country strategies should involve the self-conscious encouragement of auxiliary administrative capacity in the trade unions. The union is a critically important training ground for many skills that are desperately needed

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60/ I would suggest that European evidence for this can be found by examining the postwar history of the relationship of the German Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund to the C. C. U. and S. P. D.; that of the Italian Confederation of Workers Unions (C.I.S.L.) to Italy's Christian Democrats and that of the Italian General Confederation of Labor (C.G.I.L.) to the Italian Communist party; that of France's C.G.T. to the French Communist party and that of the C.G.T. - F.O. to the French socialist party.

by a developing nation. In the throes of the struggle for independence, the skills developed may be paramilitary, or in any case, of the mobilizing variety identified with social movements. Beyond this, and following independence, the unions can inculcate the spirit of bargaining, the skills of organization management, and the techniques of program implementation. As instruments for easing the transition from traditional to modern economic patterns, they can also serve as vital training mechanisms for the kinds of middle- and lower-level administrative skills that can be exploited in the public bureaucracy, particularly at the level where administrator meets citizen in a campaign to change the latter's behavior. Above all, they may serve both to aggregate raw, strident demands before they reach the centers of decision, and to alert bureaucrats regarding the limits within which their implementive regulations and actions must be articulated.

Many of the above recommendations regarding the businesss sector hold for labor as well. Representation in policy-making bodies -- on planning commissions and ministerial advisory councils -- is crucial; formal participation in programs of village development, adult education, and similar activities is central to the idea that administration is essentially not the exclusive function of formal governmental bodies.

c. Political Parties. The development of nation states suggests that the political party -- as an instrument of free mass participation, or mobilization, or control and repression -- is ubiquitously needed. The emergence of the party is generally associated with the thrust for

equality, with the norm that large numbers of people must participate, meaningfully or otherwise, in the political process.[61/] How well political parties or party systems relate to the solution of the crises we have been discussing will, of course, depend in considerable measure on profile conditions. The situation of most developing nations, particularly those in Africa, indicates that political elites lean strongly toward the single-party formula.[62/] In its idealized form, the single, dominant party becomes a large brokerage in which the interests of varying groups are articulated, conflict mediated, and the energies of the whole society mobilized behind the twin goals of nation-building and economic development. Many of the same rationales utilized by dominant party leaders to justify severe limits on and controls of voluntary organization apply to the defense of one-party arrangements.

The question of primary interest to us here is the potential use of the party or parties to improve administrative capacity. Where the parties are well articulated, extending from the center to the

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61/ With Myron Weiner I have discussed at some length both the conditions giving rise to the emergence of parties and the subsequent impact of parties and party systems on development and crises management. See J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton University Press, 1965), introductory and concluding chapters.

62/ For ample documentation of this, see James C. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (U. of Calif., 1964); G. M. Carter (ed.), African One-Party States (Cornell University Press, 1962).

far reaches of the country's regional and local subdivisions, it can be a vital instrument of government and politics. Where the party is strongly identified with the nation-building mission, it can be a powerful vehicle for resolving the integration and identity crises. But even where its commitment to a given line of development is not as strong as, say, bureaucratic economic planners might like, the party can be a highly effective mechanism for involving local elites and masses in the policy making and policy-execution processes. Like the voluntary associations pertaining to major occupational or other groups, the political party can bring into existence a sector of coherent attention to the crises of development. Beyond this, they can operate as vital communications links between the bureaucratic center and the point at which bureaucratic behavior directly affects citizens. They can also provide some check on excessive or ill-advised bureaucratic behavior, thus increasing the rationality of the relationship between ends and means.

I take the position that the optimal contribution of the political party to crises management requires the achievement of a balance between parties and bureaucracy. Lack of balance can of course exist on either side, and augmenting capacity would require paying attention to the weak side, so to speak. Thus in some colonial areas, nationalist parties sometimes developed as parallel governments, assuming at the local level certain administrative functions such as welfare, police, and education. Unless the weaknesses of the formal governmental apparatus is remedied, the party, following independence, will continue

in the performance of administrative function. This arrangement, as the Guinea experience attests, may be unavoidable for some time. But the blurred distinction between party and bureaucracy may mean, on the one hand, that the bureaucracy becomes extremely politicized or, on the other hand, that the political party becomes "governmentalized."[63/]

Finding the proper balance between party and bureaucracy is immensely complex. Where the bureaucracy is overpowering, as in some Asian excolonial areas, or where the political parties are extremely weak and not really plugged into the power grid, as in many Latin American countries, the bureaucracy can operate pretty much as it chooses, thus running the risk of intensifying centrifugal tendencies. Where the party is the all-encompassing matrix in the political system, it loses the benefits of meaningful communications and of countervailing demands and power that a more pluralistic system should produce. In places like Thailand and Vietnam, one finds the pattern (and consequences) of extreme bureaucratic, as opposed to party, power. Ghana, Guinea, Egypt are examples of the single party colonizing and bending the bureaucracy to its will. Neither pattern, I believe, is ideally suited to efficient management of the range of demands or crises that these nations confront.

63/ For an analysis of the tendency of the party and its auxiliaries to become indistinguishable from the government and bureaucracy, see Immanuel Wallerstein, "Political Parties in Post-Independence Africa: Recruitment and Participation," in LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit.

In this section, I have been arguing that optimal administrative capacity is likely to be associated with a pluralistic rather than a monistic arrangement. This view is based in part on the assumption that centralized political and bureaucratic authority, no matter how seemingly open to rational procedures and critical self-appraisal it may be, eventually suffers the eroding consequences of: a) its immunity or isolation from honest and open reporting and criticism, and b) its tendency to overburden a single sector, the public bureaucracy, with the tasks of nation-building and economic development.

Braibanti is undoubtedly correct in observing that: "In the early stages of political development, there is little inclination of a bureaucratic agency to identify itself substantively with the clientele it serves."64/ However, we can also agree with Norton Long, who notes:

> A structure of interests friendly or hostile, vague and general or compact and well defined, encloses each significant center of administrative discretion. This structure is an important determinant of the scope of possible action. As a source of power and authority it is a completion of the formal hierarchy.65/

My point is that attempts to obscure this reality, which is implicit in centralized, monistic, noncompetitive systems, lead to enormous loss of bureaucratic capacity. Centers of interest as "competitors of the formal hierarchy" can condition the exercise of authority in a rational

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64/ Ralph Braibanti, "The relevance of Political Science to the Study of Underdeveloped Areas," in Braibanti and Spengler, Tradition..... op. cit., pp. 172-73.

65/ Norton Long, "Power and Administration," Public Administration Review, Vol. 9 (Autumn, 1949), pp. 257-58.

way only if there is reasonable freedom and ability for open maneuver. The suppression of this kind of competitive milieu does not remove the existence of major differences over policy, or of conflicting interest; it simply forces these into channels which I believe have pathological implications for system management.

Masihuzzaman, in an eloquent and perceptive brief for more pluralism in Pakistan, notes the many ways in which such development is impeded by that country's bureaucracy. In harmony with Braibanti's observation, he notes that bureaucrats are disdainful of the masses, deprecate their potentiality for initiative, prefer to rely on fear and force as instruments of control, and go to great pains to harass pluralistic development, or to control it rigidly when it does evolve. He would try to correct this by restricting the strong tendency of bureaucrats to hold key positions in voluntary associations, limiting the ability of the police to intimidate such organizations, and liberalizing the restrictive regulations governing the emergence of such groups.66/ Weiner details the range of legislative and bureaucratic regulations that hem in and greatly frustrate entrepreneurial activity in India's private sector.67/ Bureaucratic harassment of Chinese entrepreneurs in Thailand, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian countries has been noted by many writers. Antagonism toward Asians and Europeans who dominate

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66/ Masihuzzaman, "Administrative Obstacles to Voluntary Organization in Pakistan," in Inayatullah, op. cit., pp. 57-78.
67/ M. Weiner, op. cit., especially footnote at p. 100.

economic enterprise is noted by Apter.[68/] The appeals to "socialism" as justification for attacks on the private economic sector by the dominant parties and bureaucracies in many African countries are now well documented.

It may be, as some suggest, that the one-party patterns are not inconsistent with a working and effective pluralism. Wallerstein, for example, traces the important role of voluntary associations in the economic and political development of Africa and expresses the hope that economic development itself will erode the rigid controls over such associations and lead again "in the direction of multiplicity, specificity and autonomy."[69/] John Friedman, in stressing the greater viability for development of "Transitional - Modern-Reconciliation" systems, clearly finds much more political tolerance of opposition and proliferation of voluntary associations than I do in such countries as Mexico, Turkey, Brazil, Columbia, and Argentina.[70/]

Milton Esman, in a most interesting and thought-provoking essay on the relationship between political systems and development, devises a typology of systems based on where they fall on scales of intensity regarding such things as ideology, priority accorded social reform, political and social mobilization, acceptance of social and political

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68/ D. E. Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda, op. cit., p. 56.

69/ See Immanuel Wallerstein, "Voluntary Associations," in Coleman and Robert, op. cit.

70/ See John Friedman, "The Social Context of National Planning Decisions: A Comparative Approach," Comparative Administration Group Occasional Paper (Bloomington, Indiana, n.d.), pp. 15 ff.

pluralism, religious and ethnic integration,, government control of social and economic policy, and commitment to the future.[71/] Dimensions such as these, as well as others, should certainly be included in country-profile analyses, for they should, indeed, help us to gauge a system's potentiality for growth in adminis[illegible] and related capacity. However, I would urge that attempting to slot countries into neat typological categories is likely to be misleading, because premature, in that we are still relying largely on impressions and fragmentary data.[72/]

Easman's paper illustrates this last point quite clearly. After having characterized highly generalized patterns for each of his system types, he concludes that the "dominant mass party" political system is superior (from a nation-building and economic development standpoint) to systems that are conservative oligarchies, reform military, competitive-interest, or communist-totalitarian. He [illegible] tells us that, "Using the criteria of purposeful leadership, [illegible] developmentally relevant doctrine, capacity to create and effectively to deploy a variety of action and communications instruments, the foregoing analysis clearly points to the superiority of the dominant mass party type."[73/]

71/ Milton J. Esman, "The Politics of Development Administration," Comparative Administration Group Occasional Paper (Bloomington, Indiana, 1963), pp. 65 ff.

72/ Esman's typology follows well established previous patterns such as Gabriel Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Almond and Coleman, op. cit., pp. 3-64; Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States (Humanities Press, 1962).

73/ Ibid., p. 98. Emphasis added.

A careful reading of Esman will show, however, that the relationship he suggests is "clear" only if one accepts his generalized ascription of motivational, organizational, and behavioral attributes to each system type, and only if it does not bother to ask for a complete listing of concrete systems that fall into each category. For example, how important idealogy may be in dormant mass party systems, how antagonistic such a system may be toward traditionalism, how well articulated the dominant party may be at the grass roots, how much dirigisme exists in fact as well as doctrine, how much elbow room is accorded voluntary associations, and how expansive may be their public bureaucracies are critical empirical questions relating to profile, and surely cannot be begged by a lumping together of systems on the basis of vague criteria of judging or scoring intensity. Another example of the weakness in such a typology and its accompanying generalizations can be seen in the Communist-totalitarian category, which regularly appears in our analyses. Frankly, I find it extremely difficult to view in the same context (except on some dimensions that may or may be relevant to crisis management) countries like East Germany and North Vietnam, Czechoslavakia and North Korea, Poland and China, Cuba and Albania. It seems clear enough that these countries differ substantially among themselves even on some of the dimensions suggested by Esman.

Esman, himself, is evidently uneasy about his brief for the one-party systems. Speaking of their susceptibility to failure in development plans, he cites the cases of Burma's AFPFL and the loss of reform

momentum in India. He concedes too that such regimes can slide into tyranny:

> "Such regimes -- Ghana is a case in point -- may lapse into terror, stamping out human dignity and decencies and using negative symbols of domestic or foreign enemies as scapegoats to sustain mass mobilization. Yet in view of the potential for such abuse, it is remarkable how few of the mass mobilizing regimes have resorted to repressive measures and how relatively strong their humanistic commitment remains.74/

I have three reactions to this sort of observation. First, depending on how much terror, repression, or attacks on dignity one's psyche or value system can take, the number of countries included in a "backsliding" category can range considerably. One man's humanistic commitment may well be another's enslavement. Second, I believe that social scientists who conclude that one-party systems are the only types that will speed along the era of milk and honey should also confront the issue of value versus fact. I believe it abundantly clear that many of the extant one-party systems have taken on a striking number of the trappings associated with fascist dictatorships. These would include extreme nationalism, a carefully planned set of symbols designed to glorify entrenched leadership, the use of bureaucratic and police methods to harass opposition and limit voluntary association in the name of the nation's "sacred mission," and the subservience of all internal policy decisions to the will of the dominant party and its

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74/ Ibid., p. 92.

instrumentalities.[75] That such polities may not exactly fit the Communist totalitarian model makes them not the less objectionable from a normative viewpoint. Many who read these words will surely recall that Americans greeted many Fascist dictatorships of the 1920's and 1930's as necessary instruments for the economic development of European and Latin American countries. In almost all instances, these regimes failed in the mission of rapid economic change and, indeed, managed to plunge the world into war and chaos. Short of a blind commitment to social engineering, I believe the social scientist should carefully ponder the implications of his findings, both for personal and national policy and behavior.

Third, it seems to me that the kinds of conclusions offered by Esman, as well as those suggested by himself in this paper, should be made the objects of much more intensive research than we have had thus far. We are very long on theory and still poverty stricken as far as research findings are concerned, particularly research findings oriented to the kinds of questions I have raised in this paper. It may be that Esman is right, and that only highly mobilized one-party systems can maximize short- and long-term economic growth. Or it may be, as Braibanti suggests, "The demands of economic development can be met only by an oligarchic bureaucracy, whose effectiveness as a viable

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75/ See, for example, Dante Germino's discussion of the evolution of the Italian Fascist party and compare this to many discussions of the development of one-party states in Africa and Asia. Dante Germino, The Italian Fascist Party in Power (University of Minnesota Press, 1959).

administrative system is limited by the necessity of fulfilling the prescription of dispersed power implicit in popular sovereignty . . . Economic development must be achieved in the matrix of constructing an equilibrium of bureaucratic power and popular control."[76/] It may be that Spengler and others are right about the vital role to be played by a relatively free public economic sector in achieving rapid growth; or that what we need to inculcate in political elites and the population at large is more of what McClelland calls need achievement. It may be that the Africans, in the one-party context, have perfected democratic centralism or found what Moore suggests must be functional equivalents for voluntary associations.

I do not have anything very reassuring to say about which strategic approach or which typology of political systems is most relevant to the general problem of increasing administrative capacity in the developing countries. My surmise is that situations will differ considerably from place to place. My assumption is that crisis management, of the several varieties described in this paper, will probably be most effective in contexts which do not depart too far from a political-bureaucratic-social pluralistic arrangement. My belief is that we will be better able to judge such assumptions or generalizations only after we have done considerably more research along the lines of the country profile analyses I have described above. Specific research designs that might emanate from such a task-oriented approach can be produced readily enough, but that is the subject of another essay.

76/ R. Braibanti, "Political Science . . ., op. cit., p. 143.

DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION AS A PROFESSION

by

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The Role of Government in Development

Though they are influenced by different models of growth, the leaders of all the emerging countries have assigned to government a critical role in their development strategies. Their own confidence in the efficacy of government to strengthen their political systems, manage their economic growth, and provide improved social services has been enhanced by the availability of foreign aid which provides advice and material resources primarily through public channels.

Public administration is the main expression of modern governmental action. Through administrative instrumentalities the preponderance of governmental policy is formulated and operational programs are designed and carried out. This is especially the case in the emerging countries where legislatures tend to be weak, organized interest groups have little standing, and the public sector commands the services of a large percentage of the educated personnal

It has been the experience of the emerging countries that the burdens which their administrative systems have been asked to shoulder have increased more rapidly than their capabilities. The new and expanded programs which governments have undertaken in response to independence, enhanced developmental ambitions, and the availability of funds and advisors from abroad have over-taxed their inherited administrative resources which had been designed or had evolved to provide a limited range of services at

a more leisurely pace. Thus the capacity of emerging countries to implement developmental plans and programs has fallen behind their ability to plan. In many countries the principal bottleneck to growth is not what economists have traditionally regarded as the scarce factor of production -- access to capital -- but their inability to put available capital to productive uses. In large measure this is an expression of administrative incapacity both in the public and in the private sectors. The familiar symptoms of administrative inadequacy appear in the slow pace of communication, decision making, and action, rigid adherence to procedural rituals and routines, difficulty in achieving coordination among related services, the prevalence of corrupt practices, and similar evidences of low moral, limited capacity, and a nondevelopmental orientation among officials in the administrative services of most of the developing countries.

Nevertheless, few leaders of the developing countries or their foreign advisors have been prepared to reduce or retard their developmental plans or programs to accommodate these administrative limitations. Instead they have searched for methods to bypass or overcome these deficiencies. The measures they have improvised or which have been prescribed by scholars and by international institutions fall into three categories: those which would relieve the burden on the administrative system, those which would increase pressures on the bureaucracy to improve performance, and those which would build additional capabilities into the system. These expedients have been widely used and suggest the utility of research to determine the conditions under which each of them is likely to prove effective. None of these approaches is exclusive and indeed they are frequently applied simultaneously or in various combinations.

Expedients Employed To Improve Administrative Performance

1. Relieving the burden on the administrative system.

A. Withdrawing activities from government and commiting them to the private sector or to the market mechanism. Measures to terminate foreign exchange controls, supply allocations, industrial licensing or price fixing, the elimination of various forms of state marketing, the divestiture and sale of industrial holdings to private investors fall into this category. While one purpose of these measures is to break administrative bottlenecks, they may also be motivated by an ideological commitment to market mechanisms or the interests of private investors.

B. Decentralizing activities to local authorities in order both to lighten the load on national administration and to stimulate participation in governmental affairs by local and presumably less bureaucratic interests. While this prescription relies heavily on Anglo-Saxon confidence in local government, its most dramatic application has been in the Yugoslav experiment with communes and with workers councils. Current experiments in many countries with regional authorities are a version of this procedure, though frequently they involve little actual local participation.

C. The creation of autonomous agencies. This classical device to liberate developmental activities from traditional budgetary, personnel, procurement, and expenditure controls has been widely used in the hope of achieving greater operational flexibility and performance orientation than would otherwise be possible. It is prescribed by some international lending agencies in the hope that it may eliminate "politics" from the administration of special purpose programs and permit these agencies to control their own

financial resources thus improving the prospect that their affairs will be managed on a "business" basis.

2. Increasing pressures on bureaucracy to improve performance is more the prescription of a group of scholars than a widespread practice by politicians or administrators. According to this theory, bureaucrats are likely to perform more responsively and more efficiently when they are pressed and controlled by nonbureaucratic forces such as political parties, legislatures, and organized interest groups. Since bureaucracy is said to be a conservative and self-serving institution, the proper strategy is to limit its autonomy and make it increasingly accountable to other forces. If necessary, program activities which depend upon strengthening the bureaucracy should be retarded while legislatures, interest groups, and political parties are deliberately fostered by public policy. This prescription is consistent with the public administration theory which separates "policy making" which is political from "administration" which is or should be an instrumentality of legitimate political authority. Some of the implications of this theory will be analyzed later in this article.

3. Building additional capabilities into the administrative system.

A. Reorganizing the administrative structure to achieve more logical combinations of activities, improve program coordination, and facilitate the placement in key positions of more developmentally minded officials is a short-run method of achieving improved administrative performance without fundamental changes in methods, attitudes, or personal capabilities. To some American advisors, strengthening the administrative power of the Chief

Executive and equipping him with adequate staff services -- following the logic of the Brownlow Committee Report -- has had a continuing appeal.

B. Introducing modern administrative technologies, particularly those related to the merit system, performance budgeting, central procurement, performance reporting, cost accounting, methods improvement, information processing, and more recently, central planning have been prominent both in the United States and in the United Nations technical assistance programs. Rationalizing the administrative processes, especially those which are common to all the public services has been regarded as a key to improved performance. Rationalization has generally been equated with the application of modern managerial technologies.

C. Professionalizing the public services by rigorous training, career incentives, and the inculcation of developmental and public service attitudes, especially among senior officials has been and remains a main thrust of efforts to improve the performance of public bureaucracies. While the results of the considerable resources which have been invested in this approach have to date been rather spotty, they began from a rather low base in most developing countries.[1/] Because I feel that with all its pitfalls this is still the most promising avenue to long term administrative improvement, I shall devote this paper to an exploration of some of the problems inherent in the professionalization of the bureaucracies of the

1/ See Edward Weidner, Technical Assistance in Public Administration Overseas (Chicago University Press, 1964), for an analysis and evaluation of some of these efforts.

developing countries and some of the opportunities this provides for applied research.

Elements of Professionalism in Public Administration

The essential elements of professionalism in public administration are: 1) expertise, the possession, by an identifiable and specially educated group, of substantive knowledge of the problems of public policy relating to major areas of government such as national security, economic development and social welfare and of the methods and practices by which policy is translated into operational programs through complex organization in the environment of government; 2) continuity, the availability to government on a career basis and subject to good behavior and effective performance of the services of cadres of persons possessing the specialized training and capabilities indicated above, thus enhancing the possibility of institutional learning and sustained programmatic commitment; and 3) an ethos of public service which transcends the short term perspectives of particular group interests and internalizes a code of behavior which includes commitment to public values, respect for equity and the rule of law, and concern for the rational relationship of ends to means. For development administrators a commitment to program performance and to entrepreneurial behavior are in behalf of developmental goals necessary additions to the established code. An ethos is shared by members of the profession and tends to reenforce behavior consistent with the code.

The benefits of professionalism flow only when these three elements are simultaneously present. In many contemporary bureaucracies,

continuity or protection in office combined with a very modest level of relevant expertise and the absence of a public service ethos results in careerism, administrative formalism, and the reenforcement of hierarchical authority rather than effective programmatic performance. Professionalism, implies a status and role for qualified administrators which has not been sufficiently recognized in administrative theory. It implies that professional administrators cannot be the mere instruments of others who are anointed with legitimate or other forms of political power. Despite a long and respected contrary tradition in political and legal theory, administrators as professionals must be regarded as legitimate sharers in public authority, wielders of power, and participants in the policy process. Their responsibility for initiating policy measures and for designing and carrying out public programs is a logical consequence of their specialized training and expertise in public affairs, for authority in modern organization derives from functional competence as well as from formal position. This implies that professional administrators, though interacting with interested groups, political spokesmen, and judicial authority and subject to overriding political direction, will have wide latitude in their policy initiatives and in the direction of administrative operations.

With the increasing complexity and the more active role of government this is the role which professional administrators in many fields of public policy are in fact achieving and indeed have achieved in many countries. This emerging status is in defiance of legal and political theory which in this realm as in others tends to lag behind practice. The preoccupation of nineteenth century legal theory and of liberal doctrine

with limiting the powers of government and controlling the actions of public officials no longer fits the exigencies of modern government. It must be supplanted by more sophisticated theory which emphasizes the action priorities or the service or developmental state and consequently leaves appropriate scope for the initiative and discretion of professional administrators whose competence and commitment entitle them to a recognized role -- though by no means a monopoly -- in the shaping of policy and the deployment of public power.

In most developing countries the more important problem is not how to control the bureaucracy, but how to equip and motivate it to exercise the initiatives on which program performance depends. Especially in countries where so large a proportion of the educated manpower is committed to the public services and where agencies of government are a major engine of economic growth and social development, the classical definition of administrators as executors of the will of others cannot survive as an effective guide to action. Thus a redefinition of the political role of the professional administrator and his relationship to other participants in the exercise of public power provides an important opportunity for creative thought and for research.

This concept of professionalization is troublesome to a number of students of development administration. These writers are concerned with the alleged tendency of bureaucracies to expand the scope of their powers and their activities and to behave as a self-serving interest group resistent to innovation, contemptuous of their clienteles, unconcerned with efficiency, unless they are both prodded and controlled by political

leadership or by other nonbureaucratic interest groups.[2/] These writers fear that enhanced capabilities in professionalized bureaucracy will not only weaken public control over the bureaucracy but will also inhibit or reduce the scope for participation in governmental decision making by nonbureaucratic individuals and interests. Strengthening the professional capacity and role of administrative personnel would thus impede the process of political development which is identified in large measure with enhanced participation by nonbureaucratic groups in public affairs.

The prescription for resolving this dilemma thus denigrates bureaucracy in the interest of "participation" by other groups in public affairs. Policy efforts should be directed at invigorating the political process and activating interest groups while retarding the growth of bureaucratic power even at the temporary price of postponing economic growth and deferring social services. Debauching the burearcracy by patronage appointments and even by the institutionalization of corrupt practices are condoned as devices for fostering nonbureaucratic activity and therefore political development. The consequence of such measures, in terms of any of the values associated with development could be illuminated by empirical research, particularly in societies where bureaucracy has been tightly controlled and has not been permitted to professionalize. My hunch is that this remedy may be far more pernicious than the disease and that political development need not be at the cost

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2/ Fred Riggs has frequently propounded this thesis. See his essay "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View" in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development, (Princeton University Press, 1963).

of administrative development. For administrative development is necessary for economic and social as well as the political development in virtually all emerging countries. In our judgment, professionalism deals with this problem by enhancing the administrator's capacity for performance and simultaneously internalizing his responsibility to a code of public values.

Problems in Professionalization

There are a number of problems in the professionalization of the administrative role.

The first is dual professionalism. Virtually every recognized profession is prominently represented in the public services, including engineers, accountants, economists, doctors, agronomists, and geologists. While many of these practitioners as they advance in their careers assume major administrative functions they nevertheless continue to identify themselves primarily with their initial professional fields. In many countries they are not considered as legitimate administrators. Frequently their appreciation of public policy is circumscribed by programmatic and even technical perspectives derived from their academic training and early professional experience. Though competent in the practice of their own professions they are frequently unsophisticated on questions of policy, including those that touch on problems within their basic professional interest. Often they are unskilled in managing organizational machinery and in designing and carrying out action programs in their own sectors. Many of them are encumbered by administrative lore gathered at random from their own experience and even worse from primitive axioms or principles gleaned in their original academic training.

In all administrative systems including those in which a generalist core of elite administrators is supposed to be "on top," much of the burden of high level administration inevitably falls on special purpose administrators trained in other professions. Frequently they are untrained in administration and they are discouraged from exercising any creative initiative. Often there are severe tensions between them and the administrative generalists with whom they must interact. No effective system of administrative professionalization can disregard the role of these other professionals. How to achieve effective complementarity among the two groups and to develop an administrative professionalization that includes them both deserves careful thought and study.

The second problem is the variety of bureaucratic types and the plurality of bureaucratic experience. The study of development administration has not yet yielded detailed models of the several types of bureaucracy which can be identified by simple observation in the emerging countries. For this reason much of the academic writing in development administration has been far too general either for analytica or applied purposes. Three fundamentally different types which immediately come to mind are the spoils systems found in many Latin-American countries; the semi-professionalized services, dominated by a corps of generalists, found in the post-colonial regimes in Asia and Africa; and the Soviet style bureaucracies which cover the entire range of economic activity. These bureaucracies differ in the functions they perform, the institutions by which they are governed, the incentives and status they are accorded, their relations with political leadership and clientele groups, their sources and criteria of recruitment, their

opportunities for career development, and the degree of action autonomy which they are accorded.

The major problems they face also differ. In the spoils bureaucracies, the major task still is to legitimatize the very concept of professionalism, a result which has been achieved in the United States only in this generation. In the semi-professionalized services, the task is to upgrade competence, increase programmatic orientation, and legitimatize the role of sectoral administrators. Within these broad types of bureaucracies, there are important differences based on the type of political regime within which the bureaucracy operates, the stage of development of the country, and the program activities performed by functional groups.

This functional or programmatic breakdown -- education, health, finance, industrial promotion, public works -- suggests that for some purposes bureaucracy may be regarded as a plural phenomenon even within the same country. The strategy and the style of professionalization may thus have to vary within a single country according to the organization and status of each professional field, its political sensitivity, and the preferences of the clienteles with whom they share power. Another functional break down that may affect professional roles is the distinction between regulatory, promotional, guidance, operational, and system maintenance activities of government.

One of the most urgent research tasks facing students of development administration is the more precise description and classification of bureaucracies of developing countries according to variables that

are significant to their structure and performance. Any prescriptions to improve their capabilities for performance or to professionalize their activities must take into account the special features of the bureaucracy concerned which may result from historical inheritance, stage of development, the regime type within which they operate, and their functional fields. An even more basic question is whether the professional roles of the development administrator, their job content, and consequently the preparation required to fill these roles, are sufficiently similar to warrant generalization about development administration as a profession. Our working hypothesis is that these are generic roles, but that their expression varies with the specific situations in which administrators function in the developing countries. These similarities and differences should be clarified by detailed and disciplined research of the administrative structure and behavior in individual developing countries.

A third problem, unique to the public administration profession, is the heavy involvement of public administrators with issues of policy and the execution of programs which touch powerful and sensitive interests. It is their entanglement with politics, their ability to deploy public power, that distinguishes them from other professional groups and complicates the process of professionalization itself. In the opinion of some scholars it undermines the possibility and even the desirability of administrative professionalization. The expansive and controversial scope of the subject matter in which they deal weakens their claims as possessors of a discrete body of specialized knowledge

or esoteric techniques in the use of which laymen are unqualified or even morally unjustified in interfering. To protect themselves from this vulnerability, some public administrators, including many in the United States, have retreated to managerial technology so that as technocrats in performance budgeting, supply management, operations research, or electronic data processing, they might claim the same autonomy and respect that is accorded to other established professions. In limiting themselves to these specialized techniques, however, they shed the role of administrators with its conscious involvement in policy forming and program development.

This illustrates the dilemma of the administrative professional. He functions in the realm of politics and competing interests, yet asks protection from the consequences of his political role. Can the classical doctrine of political neutrality, designed to protect the professional status of the civil servant in a society where public goals are widely shared, be evoked in a regime which is struggling to consolidate its power and implement radical programs of change in the face of bitter opposition? Such regimes tend to demand commitment rather than neutrality from the civil service. Under what circumstances can political commitment be compatible with or disruptive to professionalization? While working under the formal authority of politically responsible ministers, administrators attempt to manipulate, to accommodate, and where prudent to yield to political forces which circumscribe their freedom of action. Since administrators are involved in political roles, is professionalism impossible, unnecessary, or undesirable in public administration? Or might it mean

that the tasks of this profession are unique in their subtlety and complexity, far more exacting than others in their social and intellectual demands, and require therefore a special combination of training and of operational skills? It probably means that the style and expression of professional administration must vary with the demands and the opportunities provided by different political systems.

The fourth problem in administrative professionalization is how to protect the common man from the superior wisdom of a meritocracy without undermining the performance of major operational programs. The self discipline of the professionally trained and committed officer can help significantly to avoid arbitrary or oppressive behavior but it is seldom sufficient to instill compassion for the less educated or appreciation of the innumerable ethnic, regional, economic, and other interests that might inhibit or complicate "rational" policy formulation or program execution. A bureaucracy can be humanized by measures of patronage which destroy its professional quality. Professionals can be kept on their mettle by the countervailing forces of a) interest associations expressing their demands on government directly or through political intermediaries, even in cases where government itself must activate these interest associations and b) political organizations and legislatures which both goad the meritocracy to improved performance and constrain their activities in the interest of groups they represent.[3/] Yet a critical balance must be maintained between

3/ Discuss some of the problems inherent in this relationship in "The Politics of Development Administration," a CAG Occasional Paper.

autonomy and accountability, so that administrators may be accorded sufficient scope for the exercise of their professional discretion.

The fifth problem is how to maintain the developmental perspective of a core of professional administrators. How to sustain the flexibility that will permit them to respond quickly to change and even to crisis. Any corporate group over time tends to develop a vested commitment to its established body of knowledge and operational practices and guards its status even at the price of more effective social performance. There a number of resources now available to counteract this tendency, more perhaps than at any previous period in history. The first is the rapid explosion of physical and social technologies which shows no signs of abating and imposes a continuing challenge even to insensitive practitioners to keep abreast of changes. The second is the opportunity for continuing education which despite its investment costs is slowly becoming available for government officials in many countries. The third is the expanding network of international communication and contact which touches the information channels of numerous professional men through bilateral and multilateral personal exchanges and technical assistance activities, through the flow of documents and even through internationalization of professional associations. The fourth influence is the previously mentioned organized interest associations and the political demands on public bureaucracy for responsive action. There also are opportunities for building incentives into administrative systems which reward entrepreneurial behavior and performance consistent with developmental objectives. Opening the administrative services to competitive lateral entry may -- unless the practice is abused -- keep the professionals on their toes.

It appears that resources will be available in the foreseeable future to prevent the stagnation of the type of professional administrators visualized in this article and indeed to provide continual stimulation of their self improvement.

The sixth and perhaps most subtle problem is whether there are a group of cultural prerequisites, in the absence of which efforts at administrative professionalization degenerate into a struggle to maintain special status and to discharge rituals rather than provide a creative service to society. Take the concept of time as one example. Is rational (professional) administration possible in a society which does not place a high value on time and which is incapable of orienting current action to the achievement of future states or of deferring present for future benefits? Is development administration possible in a society which sees large organization primarily as a vehicle for expressing the personal needs of its members, rather than for the disciplined achievement of social purposes? If formal administrative expectations are contrary to the functional goals and behavior patterns of a society, how does this affect the possibility for professionalized development administration, even granted that administrative ideas and institutions can themselves be agents of change in society. Clearly this is a field for additional research not merely to identify cultural prerequisites to modern administration, but more importantly the means by which administrative institutions and initiative can foster the conditions for the social acceptance of modern technologies and their underlying values.

The conclusion of many students of administration and of knowledgeable practitioners who have reflected on these dilemmas is that there is no

feasible alternative to administrative professionalization in modern government. The management of complex development plans and programs cannot be committed to amateurs, to political commisars, or to specialists in other professions, though such groups must continue to participate in policy forming and program execution. As a result much of the effort to strengthen public administration in the emerging countries has centered on the creation or the improvement of professional capabilities. The methods have been to establish career services based on merit principles, to strengthen managerial technologies, and to improve the education and training of administrative personnel. The latter is undoubtedly the most fundamental approach, the one to which United States universities can make the most substantial contribution. The record, however, is less than convincing and the uneven performance to date may be based on a misconception of the scope, content, and requirements of administrative professionalism in the public services of the emerging countries. In the next section we shall explore some of these requirements.

The Functions of the Development Administrator

For what roles must development administrators be trained? This definition and emphasis may vary with stages in the officers career development, the functional fields in which they operate, the requirements and the opportunities afforded by different political systems. One way of defining the generalized roles in which they are likely to be cast and the responsibilities they are likely to carry is outlined below.

1. Policy Shaping. Processing the advice of specialists and of interest representatives, relating them to the national priorities which

they themselves have helped to forge, adjusting technical rationality to political feasibility, mitigating the short term considerations of politicians with the longer term perspectives of the professional functionary - these are some of the policy making roles of the professionalized public administrator. A substantive interest and capacity to appreciate and to analyse the larger issues of public policy is indispensable to the fulfillment of this professional role. Unfortunately this concern with policy is the very role which has been most neglected in efforts through technical assistance to professionalized public administration in developing countries. Much of this failure can be attributed to the preoccupation of United States academic public administrators with managerial techniques and with its complete dependence on the single discipline of political science to the neglect of other social disciplines, particularly economics.

2. Program Implementation. The administrator's principal action role is the transformation of policy into programs and the effectuation of program operations. This calls for skills and attitudes which are oriented to performance in a world of scarce resources, time deadlines, great uncertainty, and conflict of interest.[4/] Program execution involves the reduction of generalized objectives to specific time phased targets, the deployment, guidance and control of limited manpower, finance, and physical resources, activation and interaction with organized clienteles, manipulation of the machinery of government, and mitigation of the conflicts of

4/ Bertram Gross, in The Managing of Organizations (New York, 1964), deals with many of the elements which are relevant to program performance.

interest that inevitably arise in any complex activity. This role, the management of program operations, has been neglected in technical assistance efforts to professionalize administration, perhaps because of a misplaced emphasis on the staff services which have been so prominent in American public administration training.

3. Management of Auxiliary Services. These are the activities which facilitate and control -- and in most cases in the emerging countries, tightly control -- the flow of essential resources, such as manpower, finance, supplies and information, through the programmatic agencies. In fact the Treasury controls are traditionally associated with the image of administration and with the procedural red tape which places the program administrator in chronic conflict with the auxiliary services. The functions of the auxiliary agencies are to enforce common priorities and to maintain common standards throughout a diversified service, but as these activities have become institutionalized over the decades, their effect has been to concentrate on the formal enforcement of regulations in perverse disregard for program performance.

The effect of a more professionalized service is to shift the emphasis in these essential services away from mere controls and toward the facilitation of program operations. This trend is abetted by the development planners who have recently joined the company of auxiliary services and whose influence is generally weighted on the side of program performance. Nevertheless there are built-in tensions in relationships between the auxiliary services and the program agencies which can be managed but never fully resolved. The more professionally trained the personnel,

however, the more likely they are to focus on programmatic goals rather than on formal procedures and controls.

4. Institution Building. In emerging countries entirely new activities associated with new values and unfamiliar technologies must be introduced and assimilated in a short time often in an environment which is hostile or ill prepared for the particular innovation. One of the main functions of development administrators is to facilitate -- and in some cases to direct -- the building of new institutions or the reconstituting of established institutions which permit modern innovations to survive and to take root. Most of these changes, whether they be national planning, birth control, cooperative marketing, or central procurement, must be deliberately induced by political and administrative leadership and embodied in organizations which foster and protect them. Many efforts to introduce innovation have been aborted or destroyed because their initiators looked upon these activities merely as the installation of a new technology or a new operating program rather than the establishment of a viable institution.

The Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building has begun with the working hypothesis that institution building in the context of modernization is a generic process, that successful strategies of institution building can be identified by disciplined research, and that operational guidelines for effectively managing these processes can be derived from the analysis and evaluation of experience. Building institutions implies the creation of organizational capabilities for performance which had previously not existed. The creation of new institutions implies an investment at the cost of alternative short run

uses of scarce personal and financial resources. The job of the development administrator in connection with institution building is a) to make judgments concerning the priority and utility of alternative investments in new institutions, b) facilitate and maintain their access to authority and to operational resources, c) build an effective and durable structure, and d) establish linkages in its environment which permit it to survive, to pursue its innovative programs, and to impress its values on other institutions with which it interacts.

The burden of institution building falls both on administrators who are directing major functional programs and on those who are directly in control of the new or reconstituted organization. Institution building capabilities, however, differ from the problem solving skills which are the hallmark of the effective program administrator. The institution builder must be prepared to look upon his role in an institutional perspective, to sacrifice immediate advantages and programmatic opportunities and even to make painful compromises in order to insure the longer term viability of the institution itself. A more precise appreciation of the institution building role of the development administrator is an important objective of the current Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building.[5/]

These four roles -- policy shaping, program implementation, management of auxiliary services, and institution building -- cannot be equally

5/ For a more technical statement of this research approach see the Program's "Guilding Concepts" (mimeo), available at the Headquarters of the Program, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh.

shared by all administrators. These roles are not entirely interchangeable and many able administrators are not equally qualified to perform in all of them. It is likely that different political systems and different program functions provide differential opportunities for the practice of these roles and that officers are likely to perform them in different combinations at successive stages of their careers. It would be useful to those responsible for the training and the assignment of administrators to know more precisely the tasks and the responsibilities of particular positions or classes of administrative positions, an area of research which should not be beyond the competence of specialists in job analysis and evaluation. At the present stage of knowledge this is an important research priority.

Who Should be Trained as Professional Administrators

Professional training in administration must be directed at three groups: administrative generalists, program specialists, and middle management. Training should be available prior to entrance on a professional career and at various stages of career development.

1. Administrative Generalists - These officers are either specifically identified as members of an elite corps of administrative generalists or they begin their careers as practitioners of the auxiliary technologies with the opportunity for mobility that can move them into administrative posts in one or several program activities. Most efforts to professionalize public administration have hitherto been directed at the administrative generalists. In some administrative cultures it has been supposed

that only this group "does administration" and that they can readily move from one program field to another because administration is generic to all government activities. The consequences of this over-commitment to mobility have often been superficiality, careerism, ill-informed decision making, conflict with program specialists, and emphasis on hierarchical position rather than program performance -- evils which can be corrected only by more extended assignments in single functions or in related program activities. In many developing countries the administrative generalists who regard themselves as professionals clearly do not so qualify under our definition because they lack the necessary substantive knowledge.

The appropriate time for initial exposure of administrative generalists to professional training is prior to their entry into the service. This is appropriate because knowledge of the fundamentals of public policy and administrative operations represent their initial capabilities in the same manner that knowledge of engineering theory and practice or medical theory and practice qualify the engineer or the public health man for entry into the public services. Where possible this training should be geared to the postgraduate level but this may be impossible for many years in a number of the developing countries where there are acute shortages of trained personnel and where public administration, like engineering and accounting must consequently remain undergraduate subjects. Where possible, this pre-entry training should be facilitated by a guided internship extending over several months. Experiences with such internship, including the French National School of Administration, should be examined critically to determine optimum organization, content, and duration.

Professional training in all fields of modern knowledge is a continuing process. At mid-career, therefore, opportunities should be provided for experienced and promising officers to withdraw from operations, to reflect on major policy issues, to become conversant with new thinking in the administrative sciences, and to gain access to new management technologies. The problems involved in coordinating large and complex operating programs is a special challenge to higher level administrators to which mid-career training should be addressed. If this experience is to be useful both for cognitive learning and to permit the officer to gain deeper insights into his personal adjustment to an administrative role, it must extend over a period of four to six months, even if programs are specially designed for this purpose. The few ongoing experiments in mid-career training as well as in senior staff conference programs might well be critically examined to determine what ambiance, subject matter and teaching methods produce the most effective results in this obviously expensive form of training.

2. Program Specialists - In all administrative systems, as we have previously observed, much of the administrative function is carried on by persons who are not formally designated as "administrators." As they rise in their careers a diminishing portion of their time is spent in the practice of their professions for which their education has prepared them and an increasing proportion is consumed by administrative activities for which they have had no formal training. They learn administration from experience which more often than not is outmoded and routine practice.

The need to train program specialists in development administration has been increasingly recognized but there are few countries which have been prepared to make this investment or to provide suitable facilities in universities or in governmental training centers. The critical time for this training is at the point when a successful educator, engineer, doctor, economist, or agriculturist, is about to be tapped for an important administrative post within his service. The various schemes of service or career ladders could identify such posts, establish special selection procedures, and provide administrative training at the post-graduate level as prerequisite for assignment. Such training extending for a minimum of six months could perhaps be combined with advanced refresher training in the officer's basic professional field, but only if such training concentrates on questions of public policy and administrative operations within the subject matter field of the officer's basic interest, rather than on technical problems.

3. Middle Management - Though most of the academic interest in administrative training focuses on the professionally trained and "higher level" manpower, much of the operations -- though little of the policy shaping -- is in the hands of intermediate and supervisory level personnel. In this large category are the office managers and the executive officers who operate the major managerial technologies, direct the more routine activities in headquarters offices, and head up small field establishments which deliver services to the public. Though the training required for middle-management personnel should not focus on public policy it should deal thoroughly with program operations and the

efficient use of governmental machinery. The needs for competent middle-management personnel are massive and their preparation must be far more sophisticated than the clerical training programs which have been established in many countries.

What Should Be Taught

Academic training for professional development administrators should be directly responsive to the roles they are likely to occupy. Their curricula therefore should incorporate the following groups of subjects. These can be presented in any variety of combinations so long as the major areas are competently covered. They include:

1. The substantive problems of development and of directed social change in an interdisciplinary perspective. This involves an exposure to the applied social sciences particularly to development economics, the sociology of change and political institutions and behavior, for these sciences can afford the perspectives essential to creative and responsible participation in the policy process. These concepts and insights should be related to the broad policy problems which are likely to arise in the design of developmental programs. These substantive areas include: a) the various strategies and major policy choices available for development; b) the analytical methods appropriate to make informed choices in the main sectors of agriculture, industry, public works, education, and social welfare; c) the systems of inter-dependency among sectors; d) the mobilization and allocation of material and human resources; e) relations with other nations and with international agencies.

This training will not qualify the student as a specialist in agricultural marketing, central banking, manpower analysis, transportation economics, nor in the research methods associated with these specialized fields of policy. It will prepare him for intelligent judgments on the policy choices available to senior administrators in a development context and the major analytical methods by which alternative choices can be evaluated. It will also help to develop the intellectual self-confidence which facilitates innovative thinking and entrepreneurial behavior in large organization.

2. The processes of guiding and controlling action in complex organization in the environment of government. Public administrators must achieve their policy objectives through the management of large and complex organizations in an environment of conflicting economic, regional, social, ethnic and bureaucratic interests and subject to the network of legal and political accountability that constrains administrative discretion. Administrative skill must go beyond sound and even consistent policy judgments; it extends to judgments of feasibility, based upon an informed appreciation of the action capabilities of governmental machinery which may frequently force modification in otherwise sound policy measures. It involves the ability to manipulate this machinery and to increase its operational capabilities by institution building and other means. An appreciation of the elements of human motivation and the techniques of tapping them through the gentle arts of persuasion is necessary equipment of the trained administrator.

The recent burst of knowledge in organizational theory and administrative science has enriched the more established branches of applied administration derived from political and legal theory and from the doctrine and practice of scientific management. As a result of the application of behavioral sciences to public affairs there is a substantial body of knowledge relevant to the achievement of action in the arena of government. This is rapidly being expanded by the current interest in comparative administration which is adding an important cross-cultural dimension to this new field of knowledge.

An adequate curriculum must also deal explicitly with the ethos or code of behavior which is an essential ingredient of professionalism. One possibility is that these values and practices should infuse the entire curriculum, but unless this is carefully planned, they may easily be overlooked in the instructors preoccupation with substantive problems and operational technology. Special courses on the social role of the administrator, focusing on their leadership and change agent responsibilities in developing countries and working both at the cognitive and emotional levels of learning may be useful, but unless they are conducted with sensitivity and sophistication they may quickly degenerate into banality. The danger is that this element in professional training may be disregarded because it presents difficult conceptual and pedagogical problems.

3. Managerial techniques. This area of knowledge has been deprecated in recent writings as a reaction to excessive emphasis at an earlier period in the development of American public administration and the tendency

to apply familiar technologies uncritically to societies which were unprepared in their value systems, behavior patterns and institutions to accept them. Yet these techniques -- budgeting, personnel management, procurement and supply, reporting and information control systems, and most recently development planning -- are essential equipment of the professional administrator, instruments to activate, guide, and control program operations. Though these technologies are not ends in themselves, they are among the tools of administrative practice and any properly trained administrator should be acquainted with them and know how to use them. They must, however, be adapted to the environment in which they will function. While sensitive to cultural distortion to serve traditional values, these technologies may themselves be instruments for producing cultural change.

It should be clear from this exposition that we associate qualification for professional administration with familiarity and competence in a body of substantive knowledge, analytical methods, and operational practices, - modern social science applied to problems of development in the environment of government. This view of professionalization is thus incompatible with the elegant aristrocratic notion that a gentleman endowed with good character and educated in any field, however remote from the problems of government, is by virtue of that education fitted for a career in administrative service. It rejects equally the notion that a good professional -- engineer, doctor, agronomist, accountant -- is likely to learn development administration from experience.

The experiments in developing teaching programs for administrative professionalization have been strongest in the management technologies, in the legal and political controls on administrative discretion, and more recently on the sociology of bureaucracy. Following the tradition of American teaching in public administration they have been weakest on the substantive problems of policy shaping and on the processes of program administration. Even in the area of management technologies they have been slow to incorporate such new and powerful techniques as development planning and manpower analysis or to deal with such problem areas as public enterprise management which have been a minor significance to U. S. administrators but are of major concern to development administrators in emerging countries.

The extension of the American interest to emerging countries with the comparative insights this process permits provides an opportunity for American public administrators to redefine their field in the light of new interests and new experience. In the area of policy formulation, development administration must clearly transcend the single discipline of political science. Notwithstanding all the difficulties that arise in sustaining an inter-disciplinary discourse or launching a teaching program that fractures the conventional organization of knowledge, this is a subject that warrants creative thinking and research. One first step might be to evaluate the few experiments that have already been launched in integrating this subject matter for instructional purposes such as the economic and social development program at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh and

the combined government and economics program at the Littauer School at Harvard. This appraisal should attempt to relate teaching programs to the actual and evolving tasks of senior development administrators, for which we have already recommended a research effort.

Development administration teaching must incorporate instruction in the newer technologies, particularly development planning, information processing, and operations research with their far-reaching effects on the entire scope of governmental activities; on institution building with its attention to creating and sustaining increased capabilities for performance; and on the problems of program operations by which government organizes and delivers its substantive services.

As a field of study, public administration has several options. It can emphasize methodology, including such fascinating and sophisticated technologies as decision making and operations research to the neglect of social purpose. It may focus on refined policy choices and social preferences, unrelated to instruments of action. Or it can attempt to synthesize the two. If it chooses the latter course -- and this is the logical concomitant of an interest in development resulting from overseas experience and in professionalism which unites policy with practice -- it may evolve into a major integrating discipline in public affairs. One point of departure for this synthesis is such major problem areas as agrarian reform, river basin development, and public finance.

Where Shall Professional Administration Be Taught?

The achievement of professionalism in any field depends not only on the existence of a recognized body of applied knowledge and an ethos of practice but also on the status ascribed to it, and on its capacity to grow and adapt to new needs.

Professional status is usually associated with university education. Achieving this status has been a difficult problem for public administration. Of the more than 150 schools and institutes of public administration -- most of them in the emerging countries -- which under the leadership of Donald C. Stone have associated in a working party of The International Institute of Administrative Sciences, barely a third have a university affiliation and several of these are small programs in law faculties.

There are several reasons for this situation. One of them is the conservatism of the universities which, following European traditions, have been reluctant to recognize public administration as a legitimate field of knowledge worthy of university study. In countries following French precedents, administrative training is considered a normal function of government. The alienation of universities from the daily business of the community, the distrust and tensions which continue to separate the academic community from government in many countries, and the desire of government to control curriculum content have militated against the establishment of departments or schools of public administration with university affiliation.

The results have not been entirely fortunate. With all their acknowledged deficiencies, the universities remain the recognized intellectual

centers in most of the developing countries and substantial resources are being invested in their improvement and modernization. To separate a professional training institution from the university community tends to isolate it from the main stream of indigenous intellectual development and bias its curriculum in a conservative direction. It complicates the problem of attracting and holding first class instructors and researchers whose status is likely to depend on their identification with a university. When university faculty members are coopted to teach at nonaffiliated institutions, they often engage in intellectual slumming, in a conscious downgrading at their levels of teaching. To sustain a sophisticated pre-entry or mid-career program of professional education in administration will increasingly require the infrastructure and the environment of a university.

While a number of the institutes of administration were set up originally to avoid the conservatism of the universities, the utility of this relationship is now being reappraised in many countries. The atmosphere is becoming more favorable in many universities as European traditions recede and as their leadership looks increasingly for opportunities to meet indigenous needs. Thus there is a gradual trend among schools of administration to affiliate with universities. To cite some important examples: in the Far East, the Philippine Institute of Public Administration has recently become the Graduate School of Public Administration at the University of the Philippines; the Faculty of Economics at the University of Indonesia is establishing a department of administration; the University of Malaysia has recently created a new Faculty of

Economics and Administration, including a division of public administration. The Middle-East Technical University in Ankara has a Faculty of Administrative Sciences which includes both business and public administration. In Africa the Institute of Public Administration in Zaria, Northern Nigeria, has been incorporated into the new Ahmadu Bello University. In Central America, the U.N. sponsored Higher School of Public Administration (ESAPAC) in San Jose, Costa Rica, originally unrelated to the Central American University structure, is now attempting to facilitate the undergraduate teaching of public administration in the six national universities and to establish itself as the regional graduate level center. This pattern may be useful to schools of administration which desire university relationships but prefer to relate to several institutions rather than one. The new Institute of Development Administration in Bangkok will operate under this principle.

It is also likely that the research activities which are indispensible to the growth of professional knowledge, the adaptation of professional practice to evolving needs, and fruitful contact with professional thought and practice in other countries can better flourish in a university environment than in governmentally controled centers or even in independent centers without university affiliations. While it is difficult to generalize, I believe the intellectual stimulation of university environment in most countries outweighs the danger that the research may become unduly abstruse and remote from problems of action.

The trend is not uniform, however, because of the resistance of universities, the opposition of governments, and the reluctance of already established institutes to impair their autonomous status and privileges

by incorporating into a university. In some countries the public personnel systems still provide little incentive for students to invest in the study of administration as a professional subject or for universities to activate such programs. Yet the future seems clear. The day of the administrative amateur is fast receding.[6/] The complexities of modern government compounded by the growing commitment in the emerging countries to rapid development through economic and social planning affords no real alternative to administrative professionalization and to professional education in public administration. The question now is what form of professionalization will take and how best it can be institutionalized.

The process of professionalization could be facilitated by a more solid information base. This base could be provided by disciplined research which on an individual country basis, would focus on such undramatic subjects as 1) the description and analysis of specific functions performed by the various categories of personnel engaged in professional administrative roles; 2) the cognitive knowledge, behavioral skills, and ethical values associated with effective performance of these functions; 3) the elements of teaching and training programs designed to inculcate and develop these capabilities and sensitivities; and 4) the institutional arrangements in governments that can foster and reenforce these capabilities. This fourth topic could identify some of the political problems in professionalization and the strategies that might be available to achieve incremental progress in that direction.

6/ Robert Presthus, "Decline of the Generalist Myth," Public Administration Review, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1964), pp. 211-16.

While much data have been gathered on bureaucracy in general and on the structural and performance features of many national administrative systems, little of this information is organized in a form that make it useful for analysis, especially of the first three groups of problems listed above. The immediate research task requires both additional data gathering -- preferably ordered by a common research format to facilitate comparative analysis -- and the adaptation of data already available.[7/] This task would require little innovation in research methodology, but rather a greater willingness among academic public administrators to do detailed and disciplined research on a subject that should be dear to their hearts.

SUMMARY

Our basic argument, then, is that (1) progress toward nation building and improved conditions of life in the transitional societies depends in large measure on more effective governmental performance; (2) this requires more competent public administration which in turn depends on professionalizing senior administrative personnel; (3) the modes and opportunities for professionalization vary with the demands of the political system, stages of development, specific program functions, and other factors which are not well understood at the present state of knowledge; (4) administrative professionalism in all cases embodies expertise, continuity and an ethos oriented to public service and development values;

7/ An interesting proposal for the more disciplined collection and analysis of administrative data is found in Blanche Davis Blank, "A Proposal for a Statistical Approach to Comparative Administration: The Measurement of National Bureaucracies," CAG Occasional Paper, July 1965.

(5) this combination of values implies policy shaping, program implementing, and institution building roles; (6) administrative professionals share in public power and their professional effectiveness depends on the legitimization of that role; (7) administrative professionalism comprehends both generalists and program specialists; (8) it involves the mastery of a growing and complex body of interdisciplinary knowledge of the science of development, administrative behavior in the environment of government, and managerial technology; (9) this evolving body of knowledge and practices forms the substance of professional education; (10) the preferred locus for such training at the pre-entry and mid-career levels is in university related institutions; (11) the current information base on the structure and performance requirements of transitional bureaucracies which is essential to improved professional education for development administration is rather generalized and imprecise; (12) it should be enhanced by applied research on an individual country basis which would gain in usefulness and in comparability if it were ordered by a common conceptual framework for investigation.

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL GROWTH

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Large-scale efforts at transnational inducement of administrative reform in developing states have provoked some analysis of the utility of these efforts in terms of enhanced administrative capability. Certainly, the magnitude of this reform effort has been impressive. Elsewhere it has been reported[1] that the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, the United States Agency for International Development, and the Ford Foundation spent throughout the world in the decade 1951-62 at least a quarter of a billion dollars in administrative reform, supported some seventy-five training institutions, and trained at least seven thousand persons in public administration. These figures are minimal and if local currency expenditures and foreign and local currency costs of related activities such as community development, welfare, agricultural, and educational administration were included, the expenditure might approach half a billion dollars. Neither the substantive content of administrative reform nor the validity of alternative strategies for inducing it by means of technical assistance has been seriously questioned. In the twelve years from 1953 through 1965, the testimony recorded before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations of the House of Representatives is printed

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1. Ralph Braibanti, "Transnational Inducement of Administrative Reform: A Survey of Scope and Critique of Issues," in John D. Montgomery and William D. Siffin (eds.), Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change, (McGraw-Hill, 1966).

in 30,000 pages yet only in eleven places is there mention of public administration in more than a few lines.[2] Even in those instances, the questioning relates to fiscal details of contracts rather than to basic assumptions of the activity.

Although elsewhere many of the assumptions underlying the strategy of administrative reform have been questioned,[3] in this paper it shall be assumed that transnational inducement of administrative reform does serve to increase the administrative capability of emerging political systems. It is granted that there is a large margin of error and a corresponding unproductive use of resources in such inducement. But such unproductivity is probably no greater than that found in other foreign aid activities which, not amenable to rational manipulation, can be characterized as functioning in the dark mystery of a complex process only partially comprehended. I shall, therefore, in this paper seek to examine certain issues of strategy within the context of these assumptions. The issues have been selected largely because they have appeared as controversial aspects of foreign aid either in the literature on theoretical political development or in ruminations discernible in the establishment of the U.S. Agency for International Development. These issues relate in general to the sectors of a recipient political system and to the levels within the bureaucracy to which externally induced reform efforts should be directed.

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2. The latest of these published hearings is House of Representatives, 89th Cong. 1st session, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, "Foreign Assistance and related agencies appropriations for 1966" (Washington, D. C. 1965). In these hearings (pp. 1318-19) there occurs the only statement in the entire 30,000 pages of testimony which even summarizes public administration objectives. See ibid., pp. 1139, 1318-9, 1485, and 1495 for mention of public administration.

3. R. Braibanti "Transnational Inducement...," op. cit.

Administrative Reform and Political Growth

The question of what sector or sectors of the political system should receive the manipulative attention of external reform efforts can be analyzed only when the relationship between administrative reform and political growth is established. For some time, technical assistance efforts in public administration have been attacked on the ground that administration cannot be effectively reformed without stimulating politicization of the total social order. This was recognized by two other Brookings Institution conferences in 1960 and 1961 which concluded that "assistance in the reasoned development of democratic political structures" was an "implied objective" of administrative reform and that the United States should bring to bear its "limited influence.... to encourage the kind of political development which will apply power to humane ends."[4]

There is no question that the administrative system has an ecological relationship with the total social order, that it is influenced by it, and that often it cannot contribute to balanced political development unless its increased capability is articulated to the political growth process in some manner. Moreover, I would go so far as to suggest that in the long run, an administrative apparatus must be sustained by doctrinal or ideological supports derived from the social order. Having conceded this crucial relationship which elsewhere I ha somewhat warmly advocated, I shall pursue a somewhat different argument here, namely, that it is beyond the capability of an aid-giving nation to directly and deliberately accelerate politicization and that administrative reform must proceed

4. Robinson, Mary E., Education for Social Change (Brookings Institution, 1961) p. 12. The two conferences referred to were the AID-sponsored conference on establishing institutes of public and business administration abroad, October 31 and November 1 and 2, 1960, and the Brookings Study Group on Political Development in the Emerging Countries held in the spring of 1961.

irrespective of the maturation of the political process. This is a different point of view than that advanced by several other student of political growth, hence it is appropriate to start by summarizing the position taken by such students. Fred W. Riggs, for example, warns that improved administrative technology can be used and wasted in intra-bureaucratic politics and can have little or no effect on administrative implementation of state polity. The improved technology can be utilized for proper ends only when the bureaucracy is adequately "directed" towards policy ends and this "direction" is achieved only by a mature political process capable of exerting its will on the bureaucracy.[5] Lucien W. Pye expresses a similar point of view suggesting that strenghtening administration may aggravate the imbalance between administration and politics and hence lead to a "greater need of the leaders to exploit politically the administrative services" to bolster their own weakening political posture.[6] S. N. Eisenstadt, describing the extensive involvement of bureaucracies

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5. Fred W. Riggs, "Relearning an Old Lesson: The Political Context of Development Administration," Public Administration Review, Vol. 25 (1965), pp. 70-79. This point of view is also taken in his article, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," Joseph LaPalombara, (ed.) Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton University Press, 1963) pp. 120-68. There it is succinctly stated: "premature or too rapid expansion of the bureaucracy when the political system lags behind tends to inhibit the development of effective politics. A corollary thesis holds that separate political institutions have a better chance to grow if bureaucratic institutions are relatively weak" (p. 126). See also Riggs' "Economic Development and Local Administration," The Philippine Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 3 (1959), pp. 86-145.

6. Lucien W. Pye, "The Political Content of National Development" in Irving Swerdlow, (ed.) Development Administration: Concepts and Problems (Syracuse University Press, 1963) pp. 25-45. On p. 33 Pye states: "Our analysis suggests, however, that public administration cannot be greatly improved without a parallel strengthening of the representative political processes. In fact, excessive concentration on strengthening the administrative services may be self-defeating because it may lead only to a greater imbalance between the administrative and the political and hence to a greater need of the leaders to exploit politically the administrative services."

in the political processes of their societies, suggests that to the extent that bureaucracy itself becomes an aggregating mechanism of group interests and fulfills legislative, executive, and political party functions, the "development of autonomous and differentiated political activities, organizations, and orientations" would thereby be impeded.[7]

The implications of this point of view are a serious challenge to the validity of a strategem of administrative reform which ignores simultaneous development of other political institutions in a more or less balanced or symmetrical pattern of politicization of the total social order. It casts doubt on the wisdom of aggravating asymmetry by strengthening one sector (that is, administration) and thereby retarding the growth of other sectors. While it is not explicitly stated, the assumption is that the growth of other sectors should be stimulated in some way by external foreign assistance to achieve a greater measure of symmetrical or balanced growth. Such balance can be brought about by (a), contrived inaction or deceleration of administrative reform until such time as other sectors are deemed to be mature enough to

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7. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Problems of Emerging Bureaucracies in Developing Areas and New States," in Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore (eds.), Industrialization and Society (The Hague, 1963) pp. 159-175, especially 163-164 and 171-173. See also S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (Glencoe Press, 1963), in which both the analysis and evidential corroboration make it less than clear that bureaucratic development negatively affects political growth. Eisenstadt notes (279 ff) that "the tendency toward the bureaucracy's political and social autonomy" occurred in "Sassanid Persia, ...in the decadent stages of the Chinese dynasties...during the final period of the Byzantine Empire...during the aristocratic reaction in eighteenth-century France...and somewhat less extreme manifestations occurred at the close of the Hapsburg era; during the decline of the Spanish-American Empire ...and in the later stages of the Abbaside Caliphate." He attributes this phenomenon to several factors among which he lists six, i.e., Parkinsonian expansion, nepotistic recruitment, deteriorating effectiveness, personalization of office, excessive formalization, and deteriorating coordination.

"match" the administrative sector; (b), contrived stimulation of the other sectors until they are in "balance" with administration; or by (c), a blend of (a) and (b) wherein simultaneous stimulation and either inaction or contrived depression are manipulated in a calculated manner. By other sectors in the total social order I mean those institutions which have some capability of articulating and aggregating group interests in the creation and implementation of state polity. Typically, they would be political parties, trade unions, professional associations, ecclesiastical or religious entities, communications media, legislative bodies, voluntary associations, private commerce, educational entities, community development movements, and other comparable groups.

It is the theme of this paper that transnational inducement of administrative reform as a stratagem must proceed as an autonomous action, irrespective of the rate of maturation of the larger political process. It should be made clear that this autonomy is suggested merely as an expediential stratagem not as theoretical ideal. On the contrary, construction of a theoretical ideal would lead me to advocate the opposite, namely, the contrived manipulation of as many sectors as possible in the hope of achieving balanced development in which administration is finely articulated to the other elements of political growth. Further, I do not wish to leave the impression that the characterization of administrative reform as an "autonomous" action implies absolute autonomy. The autonomy is relative, varying spatially and temporally; perhaps "quasi-autonomy" would be a more accurate expression. Indeed, much of my subsequent argument is based on the belief that administrative reform is not as autonomous as we may think, that it does have a permeative effect in other sectors of the social order, and that it may serve as a generant in the growth

of those sectors. Hence, I would suggest that it is not inevitable that exclusive concern for administrative development result in aggravated unbalanced political growth.

The first argument in behalf of exclusive concern for administrative reform rests on the belief that manipulation of the larger social order embracing the sectors listed above is no longer politically feasible and is becoming less feasible, as the bona fides of United States operations abroad are more and more questioned. The stimulation of the political process or the deliberate strengthening of counter elites implies internal interference with domestic politics which cannot be consistent with post colonial sensitivities regarding sovereignty. The complexities of political life, moreover, cannot be adequately understood by foreign entities. This is particularly true in evaluations made of the viability of various regimes based on such dubious and ethnocentric criteria as "representativeness," "popularity," and "modernizing capability." This was amply demonstrated in Vietnam during the Diem regime and its successor governments. Some manipulation of political forces can be achieved through covert activities within the ambit of the intelligence function, but I regard this as an immoral aberration unworthy of the relationship of dignity and respect which should characterize the diplomatic intercourse of two sovereign states, however disparate in economic and political development they may be. Quite apart from the issue of international morality, continued covert manipulation of this kind is bound to be ultimately exposed. Such exposition will come as a consequence of the amateurish and naive quality of such American operations and of the shrewdness and centuries-old experience in intrigue of Asian and Middle Eastern

societies which are made the subject of such activity.[8]

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8. Most developing states are acutely sensitive to alleged or imagined interference by the United States in their internal affairs. The instances mentioned below in the case of Pakistan merely suggest the reality and importance of this sensitivity as a fact of political life. A similar catalog can undoubtedly be made for any other Latin American, Asian, or African state in which there is a significant American foreign assistance operation.

In 1963 it was alleged that the United States Ambassador to Pakistan mentioned that East Pakistan needed special attention in its economic development. This was immediately criticized as undue interference in the nation's internal problems, although it was praised in East Pakistan as a legitimate American concern that American aid be equitibly utilized. See National Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, June 13, 1963, p. 431.

Peace Corps volunteers, of whom there were some 146 in Pakistan in 1963, have not been above suspicion particularly when, out of natural youthful curiosity, they visited and "discussed politics" with leading figures, such as Maulana Bhasani, Maulana Maudoodi, or Mahmud Ali Qasuri, whose announced political views were not the same as those of the government. The allegation that Peace Corps volunteers "have been working as American spies..." made by Mahbubul Huq in the National Assembly in March, 1963, (National Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, March 29, 1963, p. 949) has been shared by most Pakistani.

Sensitivity towards Islam and the activities of Christian missionaries is a constant source of irritation. In 1963, the National Assembly discussed the allegation that the United States Ambassador to India had named his cat after the Holy Prophet. (National Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, April 9, 1963, pp. 2014-16.) Speeches against Christian missionaries, said to be an "internal danger in the garb of humanitarian services" are frequently made in the legislatures. See, as examples, National Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, June 30, 1962, pp. 840-62; July 13, 1962, pp. 1447-49. On one occasion the government of Pakistan protested against display of a figure of the Holy Prophet in a wax museum in Florida. Subsequently, a member of the National Assembly stated that an apology from the United States had been received and the figure had been removed. (National Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, March 12, 1963, p. 240.) Later, an article in the Newsweek issue of February 25, 1963 characterizing the month-old fast of Ramayan as being detrimental to economic development was strongly protested. (Ibid., pp. 240-41.) Rumors have periodically circulated in high government circles that the United States was supporting various political causes, for example that American support was given to Ayub Khan when martial law was declared in 1958. The allegations of support are so numerous and so varied that they tend to cancel each other. In 1964, for example, the Minister of Information of the West Pakistan provincial government alleged that the United States was supporting the opposition against President Ayub. This led the Pakistan Times to ask "whether Pakistan has now become the latest playground of America's

A second argument can be succinctly stated. The demands of a sovereign polity on the public administrative apparatus appear to increase at a far faster pace than does the capability of politics. Indeed, the demands were accelerated phenomenally by the mere facts of independence and acceptance of external technical and fiscal assistance. Thus, as Huntington rightly asserts, "increased communication may....generate demands for more 'modernity' than can be delivered....(and) may also stimulate a reaction against modernity and activate traditional forces."[9] An expanding capability for converting political demands into administrative action is, after all, a fundamental state function. The technological complexities of this function are such that only a modernized administrative apparatus can cope effectively with such demands. The profound impact of foreign technical assistance on unbalanced or asymmetrical political growth

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Footnote 8 (cont.) 'Invisible Government' - the CIA." (See Pakistan Times, December 31, 1964, p. 1.) The same issue also includes the text of the official statement issued by the United States Embassy denying American support of the opposition to Ayub. The reference in the Pakistan Times' account of the Information Minister's speech is to the book by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, Invisible Government (Random House, 1964), purportedly widely distributed among key Pakistani government officials. Revelation of the CIA Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba and distribution of the Wise and Ross book did much to engender distrust of all American activities and link them with intelligence functions.

9. Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, Vol. 17 (1965), 386-430, especially p. 415.

has not been widely appreciated.[10] The acceptance of foreign aid requires the concentration of the highest bureaucratic, negotiating, and technological skills at the point of impact, usually in the planning, economic, or external affairs apparatus. This generates increased capability within the bureaucratic structure often perhaps at the expense of the political process. It appears also that massive foreign technical assistance may change the balance in the distribution of powers within the political system, compelling greater centralization and assumption by the central government of powers otherwise traditionally regarded as local.[11] While the symmetry of political

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10. There is some evidence to suggest that conversion of externally-induced demands by the political system is gaining recognition as a significant input. See, for example, Harold D. Lasswell, "The Policy Sciences of Development," World Politics, Vol. 17 (1965), 286-310. "It is not unusual," says Lasswell, "in the study of development to give insufficient emphasis to external power relations....It is clear that political modernization is not to be achieved by progressive withdrawal from world politics" (p. 292). Lasswell does not refer to foreign aid as an aspect of world politics in this analysis. But, certainly, it cannot be excluded. In some instances (e.g. India, Pakistan, Vietnam, Korea) it is the fulcrum in which external power politics is balanced or unbalanced; in any case, it is likely to be a factor in world politics, of varying relevance, to be sure, but a factor to be reckoned with nevertheless.

11. It would be difficult to find a better documented illustration of this than the organization of government in Pakistan under the 1962 Constitution. The new structure is premised on the need for maximum delegation of administration or operational aspects of government to the two provinces. A doctrine of implied "residuary" powers assumes that such subjects as health and welfare, and education are provincial subjects. The implementation of such constitutional polity, however, reveals that the central government felt it necessary to maintain ministries dealing with education, health, food and agriculture, labor, social welfare, railways, industries, fuel and power. One reason advanced was "to deal with international aspects of even such matters as fall wholly within the Provincial sphere." See Ralph Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan (Duke University Press, forthcoming 1966); his article, "The Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan" in Braibanti and Associates, Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition (Duke University Press, forthcoming 1966); and "Pakistan: Constitutional Issues in 1964," Asian Survey, Vol. 5 (1965), pp. 63-74.

growth may (but not necessarily will) be aggravated, this effect appears to be impossible to control. The conversion of internally derived and externally induced demands requires rapid improvement in bureaucratic capability. To deliberately slow down this improvement to allow other sectors of political development to catch up is to run the risk of unproductive use of external aid or its consequent termination. A more significant and likely consequence would be a progressively deteriorating administrative capability in the face of escalating conversion demands.

The third argument for "quasi-autonomous" administrative development requires more extended analysis. It is based on certain assumptions regarding unbalanced or asymmetrical political institutional development and on certain relationships between political growth and administrative improvement.

It is assumed that institutions in emerging states have developed in an uneven way. Their development can be measured in these terms: (a) the assimilation of norms of modernity; (b) the capacity of the institution to formulate norms and to relate positively such formulation to its institutional objectives and its structure; (c) the capacity to maintain internal efficiency and viability; (d) the efficiency of the institution as a source for diffusing its norms among other institutions; (e) the capacity of the institution to receive, assimilate, and integrate competing norms with its own norms; and (f) a cosmopolitan view of the relation of selfish to group interests. When we view the development of such institutions as public civil bureaucracy, public military bureaucracy, nonpublic commerce, education, ecclesiastical

entities, medicine, judiciary and practice of law, voluntarism, the political process, and interest groups, an extremely uneven attainment of these characteristics is evident.

When the growth of these institutions is viewed in terms of the indices listed above, it is evident that their development is highly differential, unbalanced, or asymmetrical. The asymmetry occurs not only in the relation of one institution to another but in relations of subinstitutions within an institution. Thus, for example, within the public bureaucracy we find differing rates of development of the higher bureaucracy and the lower bureaucracy. This phenomenon may be called intra-institutional as distinct from inter-institutional differential. There is also a characteristic which we may call substantive differential. That is, various characteristics of development advance at differential rates in the subsectors as well as the sectors. As a consequence we find a complex pattern of differential rates, some changing rapidly, others slowly. For example, the officer subsector of the military bureaucracy may be permeated with modern norms at a much faster rate than the enlisted subsector or than other major sectors, yet may be behind other subsectors or sectors in assimilating and integrating competing norms. Such asymmetry appears to have characterized the development of most states although the asymmetry may have been less differential in some. It is clear, for example, in the United States that, for a variety of reasons, private commerce developed faster than did public bureaucracy, and the political process faster than the administrative process. In India, Pakistan, and

Ceylon, public bureaucracy developed faster than the political process or private commerce. In Malaya, largely because of the economic consequences of rubber and tin, these differentials appear not to have been as acute.

Asymmetrical development is probably inevitable; even in rigidly planned societies perfect control seems impossible to achieve. Be that as it may, asymmetrical development poses serious problems not the least of which is the uneven burden assumed by some sectors or subsectors which, by design or by default, compensate for the slower development of companion sectors. But the problem most crucially related to administrative reform is that of intersectoral permeability of technology and norms. The bureaucracy should be the medium for absorbing superior technological and normative competences from other sectors. They should manifest sufficient flexibility to extend an intake apparatus to whatever sectors are productive, at any given time, of superior, though not necessarily surplus, competences. It is clear, for example, that managerial technology in India and Pakistan is developing at a much greater pace in private commerce than in public bureaucracy. It is conceivable that technological output of engineering, agricultural, and economic institutions may soon be superior to those of the orthodox university structure. Many of these differentials are caused or accelerated by foreign technical assistance. Whatever the cause, the differentials exist. The problem is to structure the intake media to accommodate to the differential outputs. I should point out in passing that this is

important not only to bring into the public bureaucracy talent from other sectors but also to bring into such sectors as the political process, bureaucratic talent which might articulate better with the needs of politics than with the new dynamism of administrative development. The crucial need in developing states is the opening of means of intake so that newly emerged talent may have mobility. Even so, this must be done with care lest some institutions monopolize such emerging talent.

There is still another facet to the problem of intake. Above, I have elaborated on a means of capturing the output in talent from faster developing sectors. Of equal importance is the problem of maintaining within the bureaucratic structure a highly dynamic medium for the diffusion of new technology. Unless there is inter-institutional permeability and hence diffusion of technology, we may very well witness an atrophy of viability of various institutions caused by the autonarcotic effect of living exclusively on fading standards of the past. Of course, the opposite has its dangers; the intake of a new technology is so fast and so dynamic that not atrophy but other disorders may be the consequence. Closely related to diffusion of technology is inculcation of an ideology capable of continuous generation of viability. Intrastructural training, properly conceived and implemented, and supported by institutions, is, in my view, the best medium for diffusion of norms and technology. In the absence of such training or in the presence of imperfect training, inter-institutional permeability is essential. The suggestions which I intend to be derived from the foregoing analysis of inter- and intra-institutional permeability is simply that, the diffusion of norms and technology does occur if the interstices are kept open. Such diffusion may affect the political process even though the immediate origins of such norms

and technology may be in an administrative system much more highly developed than other parts of the social order.

A fourth argument suggesting the unreality of manipulating the political process to balance administrative development is deeply rooted in conceptions of political development. Political modernity embraces four qualities: (1) The establishment of an institutional apparatus which has the potential for conversion of valid expressions of popular will into actions fairly predictable and consistent with the fundamental polity of the state. This potential may not always equal present capability; indeed, the gap between potential and capability is one means of determining the effectiveness of this aspect of modernity. (2) The expansion of popular participation in the political process and the enrichment of the quality of such participation in terms of popular comprehension of issues, acceptance of personal responsibility, and commitment to orderly pursuit of change. Judged in the context of established constitutional systems, it is easy to overlook the significance of this qualitative dimension. (3) The capability of maintaining national integration through orderly and just accommodation of cultural, religious, and similar divisive forces. (4) The capacity to blend elements of the popular will in markedly disparate stages of development into an aggregate and to make that aggregated will effective and subject ultimately, though not necessarily immediately, to neutrally imposed canons of equity and justice. Thus the rationality of bureaucracy, which Weber so well described as becoming cumulatively more rational with experience, must be blended with the comprehension of norms of justice manifest by

the judiciary, with sacerdotal norms of religious institutions and with the popular will into an aggregated pattern.

It is apparent that these four attributes of political modernization are achieved at an unequal or asymmetrical pace in most emerging states. Much emphasis is given the first half of the second attribute, that is, the quantitative dimension of popular participation in and control of the political process.[12] This emphasis is understandable especially because determinations of qualitative participation have been used in the past as justification for colonial rule or, in sovereign systems, for nonparticipative authoritarianism. It is also the consequence of Western liberal zeal applied to emerging societies whose pattern of development is far less symmetrical than that experienced by most Western nations. The emphasis given this quantitative aspect of participation or "popularity" neglects some very important characteristics of most developing societies. The first of these, and the most important, is the bifurcated nature of the social order. Politicization proceeds on the basis of Western ideological and constitutional norms divorced, sometimes even in language, from the mainstream of the social order. Thus the ideological cohesion of the

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12. Samuel P. Huntington, surveying the variety of definitions of political development, concludes that the characteristic most frequently emphasized is increased participation in the political process and that "if there is a political revolution going on throughout the world, it is what might be called the participation explosion." "Political Development..... op. cit., p. 388. Harold D. Lasswell agrees with "those who urge... that the preferred model requires...commitment to wide participation in power as a long-run goal." (Italics in the original.) "The Policy Sciences of Development," op. cit., p. 290.

social order is badly disturbed and even minimal popular comprehension of polity may not exist. Most developing states have faced this problem in one way or another by seeking to unite the bifurcated strata of the social order through mediational institutions such as rural development, direct or indirect elections, or ideblogical indoctrination. Nevertheless, such bifurcation affects the nature of popular participation and renders it a less effective vehicle for the attainment of a just society than is commonly supposed. In assessing this participative element it is also common to overlook the relationship of the masses to the manipulators of lawlessness, and thus wrongly to assess mass agitational behavior as a valid expression of popular will. Nor can earlier experiences in the political development of the United States emerging from colonial rule, however intriguing in terms of comparable experience, be of much help in terms of contextual equivalence. The extent of understanding of issues, and the relationship between leaders and the led was qualitatively different in the uprisings preceding the American Revolution than it is in many comparable behaviors in developing states. To transfer the same criteria of validity from the one to the other is to reflect a curious ethnocentrism and misconception of the nature of developing political systems. While systems and perhaps even the process of political growth may be the same, the qualitative fibre of the context both affects and creates conditons of dissimilarity vitiating relevance of other experience. In short, the extent and quality of popular knowledge and responsibility and the low state of civic culture prevailing in most new stages suggest an interpretation of "participation" somewhat at variance

from that commonly held. It is an implicit comprehension of this reality or at least a vital political response to the problems created by it that has led state after state to evolve distinctive transitional systems, whether tutelary democracies, basic democracies, indirect elections, military rule, suspension of popular liberties, or even moratoria on the political process, in an effort to seek a means accommodating in some form of unity these otherwise sharply separated conditions of the social order.

The bureaucratic systems of developing states must be viewed in the context of such issues of political modernization. The quality of the civic culture which participation in power now thrusts to the forefront of the political system, requires the administrative apparatus to assume a greater burden of leadership and responsibility than would be the case in an advanced system. The assumption of this burden and the improbability of rapid increase in public mass capability to reduce it makes it economical to improve the quality of decision-making, thus enlarging the component of rationality.

The foregoing analyses of unbalanced political growth and the administrative burden consequent upon the quality of civic culture now bring us to the theme of this paper. The stark realities of developing societies suggest the urgency of rapid administrative development which, if conditions of permeability are created, may result in diffusion of norms and technology into the larger political order, thereby enhancing the possibility of achieving more balanced political growth. While rapid

administrative modernization is likely to be accomplished at the expense of improving other characteristics of political growth, the overall effect is likely to have many more dimensions than that. For example, the modernization of administration may set in motion forces which activate modernizing irritants in the political realm. Thus, the establishment of courses in administration and politics in universities tends to break the monopoly of a bureaucratic elite on administrative learning by diffusing into the body politic what were formerly secrets of the trade. The establishment of departments of administration or training institutes may result in diffusing norms to other segments of education thus increasing the capability of educational institutions and enhancing its potential as a countervailing force in the society. The extent to which these irritants may operate effectively depends, of course, on the existence and viability of at least embryonic political institutions. This infusion may not be effective for some time, but if other changes occur in the social order inducing, even gradually, politicization, such dissemination of ideas and skills may become influential. Moreover, almost all aspects of administrative modernization carry certain implicit ideological assumptions, however much effort is made to separate such assumptions from technique. Though the skills may be record-keeping, efficiency, work analysis, or financial controls, they are premised on such concepts as accountability to the public, equality of opportunity within the bureaucracy, or intra-bureaucratic participation in decision-making. To be sure, the technical skills can be separated from the ideological tissue and used for purposes

antithetical to the underlying concepts. This has often occurred. But little is known about this process of transfer and it is possible that, unless politicization is completely suppressed, even sedated politicization will react with latent ideological premises of administrative modernization in a manner enhancing the diffusion of both. Another possible advantage extracted when the pace of administrative modernization exceeds that of other growth components is the effectiveness of the bureaucracy as a social matrix for the diffusion of ideology and technology. The hierarchical and disciplined nature of the structure coupled with respect shown and inclination to emulate super-elites within it are powerful forces by which ideology and technology can, to some extent, be controlled whether by indigenization or adaptation of another kind. This is particularly so in the bureaucracies of former British imperial systems in which a small super-elite of former Indian Civil Service officers are in a powerful position to influence the larger bureaucratic apparatus. This possibility is enhanced further when formal training institutions exist for the molding of new ideologies infused into the system.

Even if these advantages do not result, partial suppression of the political process is not, per se, a disadvantage. By one means or another, most developing states have, in fact, depressed the vigor of politicization to allow a bureaucracy to convert demands with minimum political harassment. This appears to be necessary and even desirable. The difficulty in reconciling this with certain preconceptions of political development lies in denial of the validity of the qualitative dimension of

public participation or in ignoring it as a factor of relevance. Once its validity and relevance are accepted, the acceleration of administrative modernization with its possible concomitant of deceleration of other aspects of politicization is not unacceptable either conceptually or as a political stratagem. On the other hand, this argument cannot be carried too far. The asymmetrical evolution of the four characteristics of political development cannot long maintain such imbalance without the risk of tyranny and eventual collapse. Eventually some force must contain bureaucratic discretion. It may be the tempering effect of an ideology of humaneness, compassion, and stewardship to the public. This is the least likely and the least effective since men are no more seraphim now than they were the angels of which Madison spoke. The application of law by the judiciary may also be a temporary restraint, but in the long run, the risk is great, for the burden on the judiciary may cause internal imbalance in the administration of justice and it may be difficult to prevent a steadily expanding encroachment of the judiciary in the administrative realm. Inevitably the judiciary will more and more substitute its judgment for administrative expertness, and in so doing will stretch its own competence. The consequence may be a diminution in respect for the judiciary and a loss in its status in the social order. In the final analysis, the rise of countervailing elites and a vigorous political process seem to be the most promising restraints on administrative behavior. There must be a synaptic network connecting the bureaucratic system with the total social order. In a political context

premised on popular sovereignty, a bureaucracy which remains autonomous, generating its own norms of behavior, is not likely long to endure.

The position of bureaucracies in new states inheriting the British imperial tradition appears to have certain distinctive advantages in the context of political modernization described above. In that context, bureaucracy exercising broad discretion, has the transitional function of carrying on in a social order whose qualitative aspects have outpaced the quantitative aspects of the political growth process. It must, therefore, accommodate to political demands while yet infusing the polity with a quality of rationality far greater than the aggregated public will. All bureaucratic systems face this task of accommodation, but in some emerging states the hiatus is widened by an unusually well-trained bureaucracy and an unusually low state of civic culture. From what sources can the bureaucracy derive the ideology and the rationality necessary to infuse the national polity with a sense of higher purpose? It cannot derive such sustenance entirely from the public will, or the legislature, or even from its indigenous cultural tradition, to the same degree possible in most Western systems. This is so not only because of the quality of civil culture but also because the political and bureaucratic norms are not diffused in and shared by the whole social order. Its ideological motivations can come from three sources: (1) A reconstructed indigenous tradition in which strands of thought equivalent to the assumptions underlying Western constitutional systems have been identified, elucidated, and woven into a cohesive doctrine. This essentially is the concept behind Pyidawtha

in Burma, Panchayati Raj in India, and Basic Democracies in Pakistan. But such doctrine usually must be infused by contrived means into the bureaucratic ideology; rarely does a bureaucracy with external orientation absorb such ideology osmotically. This accounts for bureaucratic resistance to all community development movements and for the perennial political efforts to involve the bureaucracy in them in the hope that the ideology will be contagious. (2) The wellsprings of British doctrine as embodied in the ICS tradition. But unless such doctrine is refurbished constantly, it fades as the physical presence of its agents vanishes. The autonarcotic effect of living exclusively on fading standards of the past is not likely to be a sufficient generative impulse for an action both philosophically based and articulated to the dynamics of the times. Atrophy is likely to be the consequence. (3) The creation of a dynamic institutional medium for the diffusion of an ideology and technology of administration. This can be augmented by bringing into the bureaucracy older recruits from other sectors of society who carry with them the modernizing ferment of those sectors. It can best be accomplished by vigorous training programs in which new doctrine is diffused and indigenized. In many states, principal reliance is placed on the British tradition. But, in time, this will fade and be overwhelmed by indigenous ideology.

Conclusion

The foregoing suggests a strategy which proceeds to increase administrative capability rapidly. This should be done irrespective of politicization but not without concern for the effects of aggravated imbalance. The program of administrative reform should be as broad as possible spreading into as many interstices of the social order as is possible. Mere management consultancy service is inadequate for while it may strengthen bureaucratic competence, it is not likely to lead to diffusion. If a short formula is needed, it might be: vigorous quasi-autonomous administrative reform contextually diffused. Research, training, and publication activities are especially important generants of diffusion. Where feasible, within the bounds of discretion, attention should be given to strengthening institutions which might ultimately restrain bureaucratic excess. The quality of legislative oversight through a vigorous and responsible committee apparatus can sometimes be improved without minimal tampering with the political party process. Similarly, judicial scrutiny of bureaucratic behavior is amenable to capability enhancement by external aid. Rural development can perhaps be manipulated to some extent although excessive concern for this institution may be uneconomic. Rural development is predicated on the notion of diffusion of norms and increased participation in power from the periphery of the social order inward to the core. It has been less successful than anticipated probably because the qualitative aspect of power-sharing has not kept pace with the "participation

explosion" and partly because the complexity of decision making demands ever more complex coordination of larger units of government. The centripetal movement of governmental power appears inevitable and is at odds with the centrifugal thrust of rural development. But that theme requires another paper.[13] A strategem of administrative reform eclectically focused (or, perhaps more properly, unfocused) may very well result in diffusion of norms and technology adequate to produce a balance in political growth not attainable under other doctrines and strategies.

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13. The theme which implies that decentralized administration under certain conditions may be as conducive to "democracy" as allegedly autonomous local governments appears to be a significant pattern of government for emerging states. See Paul H. Appleby, "Some Thoughts on Decentralized Democracy," The Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 8 (1962), pp. 443-55; James W. Fesler, "Approaches to the Understanding of Decentralization," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 27 (1965), pp. 536-67.

UNDERPINNING OUR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE EFFORTS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THROUGH BETTER UTILIZATION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE AND RESOURCES

H. G. Pope

The experience of AID and its predecessor agencies has extended over a score of years, dozens of countries, and thousands of man-years of technical assistance in public administration and allied fields. In a number of countries such assistance has been continuous for a decade or more. The proposition of this paper is a simple one: this body of experience can be made a vast resource for improving administrative capabilities in developing countries through a program designed to assure that relevant information is adequately recorded and reported, thoughtfully analyzed, and made fully accessible at critical points in the design and conduct of assistance activities.

Basic Premises

It may be worthwhile to state at the outset the premises that underlie the basic proposition of this paper. Some of these premises may be no more than definitions and others no more than an acceptance of reality.

For the purposes of this discussion, public administration is defined as the operation of the apparatus of government. It is recognized that in practice a more limited concept of public administration often prevails, reinforced by organizational patterns and certain rigidities of staffing practices. In this more limited concept, public administration is preoccupied with the governmental activities related to staff, supporting, and auxiliary services--budgeting, accounting, treasury management, personnel policy and practices, procurement and supply, and sometimes tax administration--and organization and methods work. In some places it has been treated organizationally as a sister

science of business administration. This limiting concept of public administration operates to the disadvantage of the total assistance program in a number of ways. A program to underpin technical assistance in public administration should be based on the more general and more correct definition.

The need for an effective public administration is evident in all countries without regard to their place on the scale of development. However, as a fact to be acknowledged, if not necessarily applauded, technical assistance in public administration overseas today is aimed primarily at development. Admittedly, the defining of "development" is an elusive business, but the term apparently comprises exploiting resources, increasing wealth, raising standards of living, and, perhaps less accurately, industrializing and urbanizing a country. The contribution that technical assistance in all its varied forms can make through accelerating the pace of improvement has long been well established both at home and abroad. However, a support base to be sound must recognize that the kind of technical assistance that should be provided in public administration should differ with the kind of public administration that is needed at a given time and place.

In a politically stable country well along on the road to development, the desirable changes in public administration would seem to be to develop refinements in administrative practices, to adapt organization and methods to new or changing governmental programs, to correct numerous and sometimes gross inadequacies in services, and further to broaden the base of public participation in the fruits of development. In the less developed countries, the role of technical assistance in public administration is more the building de novo upon the foundations of a society that has assigned lesser values to material things and whose component parts have been characterized by relative autonomy, with minimum assistance from formal government.

Although the public administration requirements of countries only beginning the journey to development are more modest, they are quite as difficult to satisfy as are those of more developed countries. There are fewer preoccupations with great concentrations, complexes, institutions, or enterprises of more developed nations because, by and large, these may not yet exist. Instead, in those countries that are just embarking on development programs, there are the equally difficult tasks of organizing and motivating and supporting human resources in such a way that they may exploit the natural resources available to them and distribute the benefits of this exploitation broadly.

And, while development needs are now cited and widely accepted as the principal justification for technical assistance in public administration, it is to be hoped that this assistance may also aid and abet democratic practices, so that growing populations and complexities will not smother individual roles and choices and so that these emerging aided countries will be able to fit into a world community of nations.

Any discussion of underpinning technical assistance, either at home or overseas, almost inevitably raises the question of the transferability of experience from one situation to another. While there are those who question it, this particular group might be expected to contend that there is, at least for practical purposes, a discipline of public administration and that it comprises a body of information and perhaps even some principles that, whatever their ultimate theoretical validity, presently have usefulness when applied to the improvement of governmental operations. If this is true, it is not necessary, for purposes of early practical contribution to development, to invent the inclined plane or even the wheel of public administration all over again in each new country.

Obviously, efforts to make literal transfers of American administrative systems abroad would be as silly and as futile as efforts to saddle the machinery of New York on a town in New England, or a township in Indiana, or a borough in Alaska, or an Indian reservation in New Mexico. Obviously, too, when features of the public administration systems of more developed countries are exported, it should be with an awareness that they are founded in the particular value systems and other circumstances of the exporting country. Also, however, there should be an awareness that what is sought in development in the less advanced countries are many of the values, and particularly the material value, of more developed countries. Stripped of differences that are more superficial than basic, there presently are limitations on the number of ways of organizing and managing governmental operations effectively, just as there currently are limitations on the number of ways in which minerals can be exploited, land made more productive, educational and medical institutions brought into being, external and internal security accomplished, transportation and communications systems developed, diplomatic relations effected, and the host of other things done that governments do.

The importance to technical assistance of competence, imagination, improvisation, and adaptation is in no way diminished through acceptance of the notion that there is such a thing as public administration and that some of its experience is transferable or, at least, adaptable. The transfer or adaptation of experience may be between more developed countries or from them to less developed countries or, similarly, among the latter, particularly where they have considerable in common. Denial of this concept would carry with it denial of the practicality of underpinning assistance efforts in action situations.

Any effort to underpin public administration technical assistance abroad must recognize that its most conspicuous element, however measured, is the adviser. More important, this is the critical element in accomplishment, for it is the perceptions and actions of individual public administration advisers, be they chiefs of divisions, lonely advisers, or members of a direct hire or contract team, that will largely determine the content of a program and whatever useful effect it may produce.

Improving the quality of personnel in overseas public administration assistance is obviously a matter of profound concern. This concern, however, should be dressed with realism. People who should know better are at times prone to distort the personnel problem through exhortations on behalf of qualifications that exist in so few people that only those who are exceptionally privileged may have met a handful of them in a lifetime. A dependence on paragons is unrealistic, and, even if they existed in the numbers desired, there would be dubious advantage in employing them in remote and strange environments that automatically preclude the full exploitation of their potential for contribution to human affairs. A technical assistance program, whether at home or abroad, must work with what there is and not what one might wish existed, while at the same time constantly striving for practicable improvements in the quality of its people.

There are sound, attainable standards for overseas technical assistance advisers, in addition to the requirements that they and their dependents be physically and mentally healthy. It is reasonable to expect that an adviser in public administration should be somewhat more than ordinarily dedicated, intelligent, industrious, competent, and self-sacrificing in balancing personal advantage against professional obligation to his own and the host country.

It is reasonable to expect that he should have had from 15 to 20 years of formal schooling and have evidenced some intellectual curiosity and activity beyond this. It is reasonable to expect that he should have had something approaching a decade of relevant, varied, and progressively responsible experience in supplementation of his academic background. Obviously, the selection process operative in three decades of education and experience in itself takes care of much of the problem of evaluation. Beyond this, as an overseasman, he should have considerably better than average traits of personality, curiosity, understanding, and empathy in relation to a variety of kinds of people in a variety of kinds of circumstances, together with the competence and self-discipline necessary to generate usable work products and an inclination to work cooperatively with other people in an institutional setting.

It is not a downgrading of the importance of intellectual capacity to note that some of these qualities can be tested as well in employment situations characterized by direct involvement with all kinds of people, modest-scale improvisation, and even rough-and-tumble, as in more sophisticated environments characterized by the best this country has to offer in formal arrangements, qualified personnel, supporting facilities and services, and protection from the grubbier distractions and influences that still exist both in this country and in less developed nations.

With exceptions too rare to be significant, only mortals can be sent on missions of assistance in public administration. It is possible, however, to enhance the effectiveness of these mere mortals through institutional support.

Such institutional support or underpinning of the public administration adviser must take cognizance not only of his limitations but also of his special

role. Applied research is the foundation of his work; publication of his work findings for at least limited distribution is essential to making them useful and actionable; and training is likely to be a necessary auxiliary to the accomplishment of the purposes of his work. Yet his role is more than the sum of these with their attendant responsibilities of integrity, diligence, sound workmanship, and results. He carries the added obligation to share with the responsible public officials in actual, specific, and sometimes critical situations the responsibility for making changes in governmental arrangements that, hopefully, will expedite the accomplishment of desirable political, economic, and social goals. Only by accepting this additional burden will he achieve the purpose of technical assistance, namely, to get the greatest use out of the limited available public administration resources for early applied practical results.

It is possible to achieve immediate practicality and also to contribute to the further development of public administration. Certainly, technical assistance provides clinical opportunities for strengthening the foundations of such science as may underlie public administration, for the development of knowledge, the construction of theory, the instruction of students, or simply for the sake of knowledge itself. However, responsible technical assistance and intellectual excursions should be kept clearly separate, particularly when they are performed by the same person or institution. The program suggested in this paper is directed primarily to the accomplishment of the adviser's specific obligation to the governments of his own and the host country, voluntarily assumed with at least an implied representation that it will be fulfilled, and only secondarily to matters of more general obligation and personal curiosity.

The AID Experience

Suggestions for an applied research and information program may be interpreted to imply criticism of the AID technical assistance program. It may be appropriate, therefore, to offer the personal observation that AID in this field has probably done the best job of anybody who is in the business on a significant scale and that this has not been a small accomplishment in the troubled and demanding environment of foreign assistance.

It should be noted, too, that the view of problems implied by the proposed program derives primarily from an undoubtedly subjective and certainly summary review of the experience of Public Administration Service during some two decades of work overseas and a longer period at home. In addition, of course, these judgments have been influenced by, or may even have originated with, other people who have written or talked knowledgeably and persuasively on this subject and who are too numerous to identify but who may be assured of appreciation as they recognize their work in this paper. Consequently, the perceptions of problems and the suggestions of remedies offered here are not novel, and the present formulation of them seeks essentially to tie together into an orderly outline what many people think ought to be done--and what some have tried to do in some measure.

AID has conducted, directly or by contract, dozens--perhaps even scores--of each of many different kinds of undertakings. These have had different origins, reflected different approaches, been conducted under different circumstances of host country environment, methodology, and level of support, and they have produced results of varying degrees of utility. The agency has planned and financed for hundreds if not thousands of persons training opportunities in the United States or third countries as well as

many training institutions in a variety of locations. It has utilized Peace Corpsmen and third country nationals as members of advisory teams and in quasi-operational posts in several countries, and it is in the incipient stages of securing experience with the use of Americans as operational executives.

A review of this vast experience of AID may be expected to illuminate a variety of what must be persistent questions, both in Washington and in its overseas extensions. Among such questions are the following:

1. What should be the role of public administration in the total program? What should be expected of its representation in the planning and operating processes of the individual Mission? How, under the diverse conditions found in three or four score different countries, may this activity best be integrated with the other activities that together comprise the total assistance program?
2. What factors bear upon the determination of project duration, of staff size and of the optimum mix as among advisers, training of various kinds, publications, and material support?
3. What are the most effective uses of universities, management consultants, and direct hire advisers, and what are the most appropriate blends of these media of technical assistance under varying circumstances?
4. What, if any, circumstances suggest the desirability of a broad reconnaissance survey as a base for planning a program of assistance in improving administrative performance?

5. What are relevant and useful guidelines for assigning priorities among projects of different kinds? What supplementation of national level with local projects should be maintained? Under what circumstances and to what extent is Mission initiative in promoting public administration projects to be encouraged? What is the significance, for project success or failure, of its timing in relation to the political environment of the host country?

6. What circumstances favor or oppose alternative approaches to training? What are the conditions that are likely to affect the optimum use of American operational personnel, both at the executive level and at that of Peace Corpsmen, as extenders of host government personnel resources?

Answers to questions such as these would, of course, simplify the tas of underpinning the technical assistance program at its points of application. To the extent that answers can be developed, they are most likely to be derived from the AID experience.

Institutional Support for the Individual Adviser

Some of the characteristics of the public administration adviser and his role have already been described. Before attempting to suggest some of the features of institutional support for him that appear to be inadequate, it should be mentioned that certain kinds of institutional support seem more generally satisfactory: those concerned with the clearance of staff, transportation of persons and impedimenta, provision of housing, supply, education, and health services, and the administration of compensation, allowances, and the like. In some instances all, and in all instances some, of these things must be done to make technical assistance possible.

Getting the man there and providing for his well-being--much like the current popular impression of Project Apollo--still remains a compelling administrative burden, one that overshadows equally important administrative concerns with substantive matters. These latter embrace institutional preoccupation with the substance, practicality, support, progress, and results of work, concerns that often are attended to less conspicuously and less systematically.

Essentially, these graver needs can be summed up as the institutional support of an adviser that, as a minimum, should include providing an understanding of the general context of his work--the purpose of the mission and what has been accomplished so far and what is expected now and hoped for later--and adequate reference materials regarding both relevant subject and geographical areas. Also, there is much to be said for initial association with some experienced advisers on the scene who can facilitate and accelerate his settling into the professional job, introductions to officials and others concerned with the work, assistance in overcoming language and other communications obstacles, and the like. Essential, of course, is the resource represented by general direction, review, and conferences with others knowledgeable in the work to assure performance at reasonable standards and compatibility with other elements in the total program. It is through institutional devices such as these that men who might be considered less than extraordinary can make as much of a contribution as the host country can absorb, and, in addition, help to provide the continuity that is essential in any realistic technical assistance program, whether at home or abroad.

Admittedly, the provision of adequate institutional support of technical work is not easy. It is necessary for effectiveness, however, and, on the scale of American overseas technical assistance in the public administration

in typical host countries, it is entirely practical of attainment. It is not a new problem, in that it has a background of two decades of relevant experience overseas and twice that long at home. It is not a large problem, since it relates not to thousands but only to some hundreds of advisers, most of whom are wholly competent to ease the solution of the problem through effective cooperation. It requires no grand scale development of new resources, for the resources already available can make a great difference if they are employed at the point of application of technical assistance.

That point is to be found where the adviser works. The place, the duration, the dimensions, the field of action, the sponsoring agency of the host country, and similar related elements usually have been determined by persons and circumstances largely beyond the control of the adviser, and usually before he arrives. This leaves him in somewhat the same position that the infantry adviser held in Viet Nam. Primarily, he has a defined job to do, and, secondarily, he can do some philosophizing and intellectualizing about the attending and surrounding circumstances. The extent to which he does the latter with profit to his country, the host country, and himself depends pretty much on his personal qualities. On the other hand, the extent to which he does his primary job effectively can be heavily influenced by the kind of institutional support he gets.

The general observations offered above should now be given a more specific content in terms of the end products toward which the assembly, review, and arranging of recorded experience should be directed. These products are of two broad classes: (a) those providing general background for the adviser in his new environment; and (b) those providing background information bearing directly on the adviser's assignment and affording potential support of a practical nature in his performance of the task at hand.

General Background

General background materials are of three principal types. First, there should be readily available in the Mission a judiciously selected collection of published works on the host country, its history, geography, resources, institutions, and people.

Second, a concise description of both the nation's and the Mission's total program should be at hand. This should encompass the principal features of the current development program, where it has been and where it is intended that it should go, together with explanation of the goals selected and the means by which their attainment is being sought. To the extent that, formally or otherwise, there is some sharing of the burden of external assistance among United States, third country, and international economic and technical assistance agencies, their roles should be identified and defined. Apart from the utility of such documentation for the practitioner in public administration, its development should have further usefulness in affording the Mission a perspective of its entire program and in helping to break down the compartmentalization that too often exists among and even within the several program elements.

Finally, there must be recognition that the public administration adviser is concerned with governmental institutions, how they have evolved, what they are, what they do, and how the different pieces of the structure relate to one another. In many countries, the records and reports of past AID projects constitute a principal resource for developing such a host government handbook. Other resources are the various internal reports prepared in connection with program planning by the Mission itself. Where these sources are inadequate for the job, their gaps often could be reduced through appropriate reporting by Mission specialists in the various functional fields--agriculture, health, housing, and others.

The inclusion of evaluatory observations in a compendium on governmental organization and operations entails the risks that the document may fall into the wrong hands and be a source of embarrassment to the Mission or that it may prejudice the user. While such documentation should avoid appraisals of personalities, it should include some identification of institutional characteristics that may influence the project or work assignment. Each new adviser, for example, should not have to discover for himself that one of the conditions limiting the effectiveness of scarce professional and administrative talent is the scant availability of particular kinds of support.

Project Background and Support

To give full effect to the adviser's motivation, professional abilities, familiarity with the general scene, language skills, and personal adaptability in pursuing the objectives of his assignment, there are still further needs. The adviser should first be enabled to learn the origins of the project he is expected to advance. This need is not satisfied by access to the project's formal documentation of project agreement, project implementation order, and contract. It calls for information on the problems that gave rise to the project, their relationships to major programs of the current government of the host country, the source and nature of the initiative for the undertaking, the degree of understanding that has been achieved, and what both the host country and the Mission desire and expect by way of accomplishment. The adviser also should have an opportunity to learn what there is to be learned about the institutional rivalries within the host government that may affect the progress or outcome of the project; and the principal personalities with which he will have to deal should be identified. He should know about other assistance projects related to his own, who is conducting them, how far along they are, and the kinds of problems and levels of acceptance they have encountered.

There are common institutional traditions and similar institutions in groups of countries in several of the major regions of overseas assistance operations. A number of the Latin American nations, for example, have constitutionally independent offices of financial control that combine responsibilities in pre- and post-auditing, accounting, and financial reporting. In several of these nations at a given time, AID may find itself providing assistance with financial management projects directed toward strengthening concepts of executive financial responsibility and improving the content and timeliness of financial information for purposes of planning and management. It is to be expected that these projects will be at different stages of progress. Documentation and reporting procedures should be designed so that public administration advisers working on similar projects in different nations may benefit from their common experience and so that those who started later may make use of pertinent products of the work of those who are farther along with systems design and installation.

In many places, the public administration adviser will be expected to advance on a path along which earlier advisers have started. The project in program budgeting may have been preceded by a review of financial administration; the one in tax administration has sometimes been anticipated in part by studies of the nation's revenue structure; a program of assistance in administration of the educational system may find that earlier efforts to build schools, improve curriculum, or expand vocational training contain useful elements for a foundation on which the current project may build. The adviser needs to know about these things.

The public administration adviser must work with and through employees of the host government. It is important, therefore, that the beneficiaries of U. S. or other training assistance be identified for him and that he receive

information on the type and recency of such training. He can also profit from the observations of any predecessors about personnel resources and training needs.

Technical assistance projects in public administration often encounter an almost exciting eagerness among employees of the affected agencies to expand their competence in the areas of project work. This circumstance lends added emphasis to a duty imposed by the fundamental project objectives of improving local capabilities, that of making publications available that can help to satisfy the need and interest of the individual agency employee. Institutional foresight and action can help the adviser to meet these needs much more quickly and effectively than his isolated efforts will permit. The obvious requirements on AID and its Missions here are for current information on training resources in being within the host country, for the maintenance in current and usable form in each active Mission of a catalog of available training materials, and for the maintenance of regional or worldwide arrangements whereby such materials may be obtained easily and quickly.

Steps Toward a Research and Information Program

Some of the questions for which answers should be sought in information that is in the custody of AID, if it is anywhere, and some of the end products that are obtainable from that information, have been suggested. It seems appropriate also to discuss some of the steps that should be taken toward providing a foundation for needed institutional support. This discussion will offer considerably less than a research program, in that it is related to less than an exhaustive catalog of questions for which answers are required and not at all to the methodology of research or the agencies for performing it. Moreover, it is presented in ignorance of current efforts to find answers to what

may be a considerably broader formulation of pertinent questions than the one offered in this paper.

The discussion deals with something different from a research program, in that it envisions capturing and recording a body of experience in AID before that experience has become impossibly dispersed. It envisions recording, reporting, and other administrative practices which, if required by current policy, have not made their results apparent generally in AID's country offices.

It is suggested, first, that AID undertake an inventory of completed projects. For projects in public administration--whether surveys, installations, or training endeavors focusing on personnel resources for administration--this inventory should extend to such elements as:

1. The origin of the project, including the problems which gave rise to it, the host country officials sponsoring it, the nature and source of the initiative for the project, and its purposes and objectives.
2. The relationship of the undertaking to other assistance activities.
3. The agency by which the work was performed--direct hire, contract, or otherwise--and the backgrounds of the adviser or advisers who performed the work.
4. The non-personal service elements used in performance or support of the project, including training outside the host country, publications, materials and equipment support, and the like.
5. Project participation and support by the host country, including the degree of interest and assistance maintained by the responsible officials concerned, the numbers and

and kinds of host country employees assigned and the extent and level of their participation, the kinds and amounts of materials and facilities supplied, and financial contributions toward the expenses associated with AID-supplied personnel.

6. Costs, meaningfully classified, summarized, and interpreted.
7. Work products--survey reports, manuals, and training materials, such as curriculum outlines, course plans, and texts.
8. Results accomplished, as changes in organization and practices, improvements in the productive ability of the agency or agencies involved, and numbers of persons receiving various types of training benefit; and an evaluation of results against initial project goals.
9. The problems in the project area calling for subsequent action, ranging from further projects to intermittent followup by Mission personnel.

For completed projects not identified as public administration undertakings, but within or directly affecting the programs of governmental agencies, the inventory should cover much the same ground as for public administration projects, with modifications appropriate to the nature of each project. It should also be so planned as to summarize findings relevant to future Mission program planning and performance under a broader concept of public administration than that which typically prevails.

It would appear reasonable, moreover, to compile for each completed project of whatever type a report on the inventory and to incorporate work

products into a control collection of these and other reference materials that would be kept readily available to the people who can use them.

The development of similar compilations should be initiated and carried as far as practical for active projects and those under current consideration. This information should be supplemented by a catalog of the projects of non-United States public agencies and of all private agencies rendering technical or financial assistance in the country, together with an explanation of agreements or tacit understandings affecting the division of work areas between such instrumentalities and AID.

Action toward improving institutional support for training activities in recipient countries is needed at the Washington level and at that of the individual Missions. This should include an expansion of activities on a central or regional basis or, if now adequately performed at such levels, an extension of the availability of their results to the individual Missions. Such activities encompass:

1. The evaluation of published materials on recipient countries for their background value to Mission personnel, and the maintenance in each Mission of a selected collection of pertinent materials of this kind.
2. The systematic compilation of what is already known about training needs for expanding administrative capabilities in individual countries and among groups of nations characterized by geographic proximity and common institutional traditions.
3. The identification and evaluation of English and other common language (Spanish, French) materials for their value in meeting these training needs, and the identification of significant gaps that justify the commissioning

of new publications or of translations. This process should be broad enough in concept to encompass materials that lie outside a conventional definition of public administration, so as to include, for example, Spanish language training materials in touch-typing, shorthand, elementary bookkeeping, general accounting and auditing, and so on. The great mass of materials developed for training in basic skills in the United States armed forces may be a neglected resource.

To the extent that training within the host country or overseas is well designed and executed, the recipients should constitute a principal resource for future public administration assistance programs as well as for the country's own development efforts. To advance the productivity of current and future programs, a systematic effort should be made to maintain a roster of training recipients--who they are, what agency they came from, what agency they returned to, and where, in position and agency, they are at any given time. This roster would seem to be basic as well to any attempt at evaluating important aspects of the efficacy of prior outlays for training purposes.

In Conclusion

To be of fullest value, the measures outlined above must, of course, be kept current. The justification for doing so is the assumption that foreign assistance is a continuing program of the United States. Given this assumption, it is only reasonable to suggest that recording and reporting systems should be designed and maintained to meet the needs of an on-going program.

The results of the steps proposed, however mundane and circumscribed they may appear, would contribute significantly to the content of the program

of technical assistance in public administration and to the effectiveness and productivity of its advisers, if applied to the work situations as they exist in the field and if used in the search for answers to persistent questions of program policy. The cost of taking these steps and making their results available to Missions and their public administration advisers would be very small in relation to the cost of providing advisers. They must be taken through institutional arrangements, since the individual cannot take them by himself.

The only obvious alternative to institutional introspection and institutional technical support is to limit the program to those very few who are so gifted that they can sit on one end of a log with a nation on the other end and engage in dialogue that achieves the intended purposes of public administration assistance.

THE LOGISTICS AND TACTICS OF TRAINING FOR ADMINISTRATION IN EMERGING COUNTRIES

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Scope of the Campaign of Training

Broad programs of action, whether under private or public sponsorship, seem to invite the use of military terminology. Efforts to finance charitable undertakings require their ward or neighborhood captains. Political parties conduct periodically their campaigns, and a government wages a "war on poverty" or launches an attack against illiteracy. The common elements in all these undertakings are their broad purposes, the necessity of joining a large number of persons in a common activity, and the employment of extensive resources of funds and materials. Each such great undertaking requires its strategy or general plan, thorough organization of logistical support by marshaling resources of personnel, and a judicious selection of tactics for the accomplishment of the desired purposes.

Training in the public service has come to be a broad-guaged activity of this kind. Beginning only about a quarter of a century ago as a small-scale and intermittent effort to improve the quality of public personnel, training has come to be in many countries a concerted and continuous activity having well-defined goals. In many of the countries which are preoccupied with modernization there is an added element of urgency, which makes the training campaign a full-scale assault upon incompetence and inefficiency in the public service.

In a good many countries, including some newly independent and non-industrialized ones, training is conceived as a comprehensive program which is intended to touch all levels and practically all groups within the public service. In these countries the scale of the undertaking is so great as to present difficult problems of organization and supply. On the other extreme are a few countries, including especially those which are just beginning their efforts toward modernization, in which there are as yet few training institutions, professional staff, or other means or resources for training. These countries are, for practical purposes, in the earliest stage of initiating training programs. Their problems or organizing a suitable campaign and finding the necessary resources of personnel and materials are even greater than those of countries which have ongoing programs.

The Function of Command in Training in the Public Service

A factor in the success of a great undertaking involving the common efforts of a large number of persons and the employment of great resources of funds and materials is the element of command. Someone, or a relatively small group of officers, must be in charge of the entire operation, enjoying the right to direct the work of all persons engaged in the undertaking and to dispose of the resources allotted to it. With respect to training in the public service, the function of command is presumably furnished by the highest executive officers of the country concerned, namely, the chief executive and his principal assistants, known as ministers or heads of departments.

Thus, a comprehensive program of training would be under the direction of the same officers who direct a "war on poverty," a campaign against illiteracy, or any other great economic or social program. This principle is often expressed by saying that training is a function of management.

If the principle that training is a function of management be interpreted as placing the responsibility for training in the highest echelon of the political executive, it can only be said that this interpretation has received little recognition in law or practice of either advanced or developing countries. In the United States, when the first general law on training in the civil service was enacted in 1958, the responsibility for providing training was vested, not in the President, but in the Civil Service Commission and the principal departments of government. The British plan of organization places the principal responsibility for providing training in the Establishments Division of the Treasury, while the separate ministries are made responsible for providing a large part of the training needed by their own personnel.

These patterns have been followed in a large number of other countries. No country is known to vest the responsibility for training directly in the chief executive or prime minister. In some countries the central personnel agency is a part of the Office of the Chief Executive, and in this case the organizational arrangement for training may bring this activity into a position quite close to the chief executive. It is also true that some schools and institutes of public administration, like those of France and Ethiopia, are attached to the Prime Minister's Office, thus bringing them into close

association with the highest echelon of command. Many observers consider that the affiliation of a school or an institute with the Chief Executive's or Prime Minister's Office is an advantageous arrangement.

The location of ultimate responsibility is one thing. The location of direct operational responsibility is another, and perhaps more important and practical, aspect of training in the public service. In countries which make a serious and sustained effort in training, the operational responsibility is vested in a training staff. The principal officers of the training staff bear titles such as "Director of Training" or "Training Officer," or they are members of the staff of a training institution. For convenience, all these specialists may be referred to as training officers. In a good many countries their number and professional competence are growing rapidly.

In practice, training officers, where they exist, come to have broad responsibilities in the field of training. It is they who formulate plans for training and propose budgets to provide the necessary resources of personnel, funds and equipment. The training officers prepare courses and programs of instruction, and they preside as teachers or instructors in formal training classes. In brief, the training officers organize and direct training operations. To a very considerable extent, they discharge the responsibilities of management in the field of training.

Some observers, interested in the more or less legal aspects of this matter, have suggested that the authority of training officers is the result of administrative delegation from above. Even though the delegation may be formalized in directives, it is probably correct to say that management does

not escape its responsibility for training by creating a special staff to take charge of operations. The entire managerial element of the administration, from the highest political and administrative executives down to and including the first-line supervisors, necessarily continues to participate directly in training. It is the supervisors who provide the informal kind of training, generally known as on-the-job training. Every officer in a managerial position has the responsibility for getting the work of the organization of which he is the head accomplished efficiently. Under modern conditions, this requires the training and development of his subordinates. Even though a special staff has been established to take charge of the formal aspects of training, the manager cannot escape the responsibility for guiding his subordinates in their day-by-day tasks, explaining how to perform such tasks, and demonstrating correct methods and procedures. In times past, subordinate and junior employees were often given indifferent guidance during their apprenticeship. Such practices are, however, entirely inconsistent with modern concepts of management in the public business.

Higher placed managers also participate directly in training offered in institutions and classes. Lower and middle managers often appear as students in formal training courses. Senior officers often serve as instructors, for it has been demonstrated over and over that the direct participation of senior officers is necessary in order to make training practical and to insure that the content of training is directly related to the conditions and practices prevailing in the country concerned. Highly placed executives often participate in the opening and closing sessions of training courses, and in other ways they allow their presence to contribute to the prestige of training activities.

Over and above all evidences of direct participation in training, the warm endorsement and support of management is a necessary factor in the success of all training. The consent of management is necessary before any training can be undertaken. Otherwise, no employees could be released from duty in order to take training, nor would it be possible to continue the salaries and to reimburse the expenses of employees who are in training. Moreover, the results of training depend in large measure upon the support of management. Broadly speaking, the "graduates" of training courses can be given work assignments related to the training received only by the good offices of persons in managerial positions. The same is true of the granting of increases in salary or promotions which may be related to the training received.

The relation of management to training is therefore, in principle, close and direct. It is important to note, however, that in some countries and perhaps to some degree in all countries, there is a tendency to divorce management from training. Insofar as a specialized training staff is created, many officers in managerial positions may begin to look to it to relieve them of their responsibilities in relation to training. A busy executive, harrassed by many demands on his time, may begin to look upon the training staff as carrying on an operation in a place apart. The department head or other chief officer may begin to give the Director of Training a free hand in deciding what courses to offer, how and when to offer them, and even to choose the employees to take the training.

It may be said that the training staff often falls into this plan with pleasure. Training officers sometimes desire to reach out and expand their own authority. They may begin to think of the training institution as their own preserve, in which they enjoy a kind of academic isolation or freedom. There are even instances when training officers teach new methods and procedures of administration which have not received the approval of management. The motives may be of the highest order, and the intention may be to introduce needed reforms in public administration; but there is a real danger of the usurpation of the functions of management.

The semi-independent position of many training institutions is further evidence of the separation between management and training. The organizers of many schools and institutes of public administration have been interested in obtaining for them an autonomy of status with reference to all other branches of the government. The directors and staffs of these institutions have frequently defended their rights to plan curricula and to determine the content of all courses offered by them. There is, in fact, quite general agreement that these training institutions can function effectively only when they enjoy a rather high degree of independence within the administrative structure which the institution serves. While it is often thought that the desired degree of independence is more easily gained and preserved if the institution has an independent charter or if it is affiliated with an academic institution such as a university, the claim for autonomy is made also on behalf of official training institutions which are affiliated directly to the Office of the Chief Executive or Prime Minister or to a ministry of general responsibilities, such as the Ministry of Finance.

The separation between management and training may be seen in its extreme form in the operations of schools or institutes of public administration affiliated with universities which in their own right are autonomous institutions, as in the case in many Latin American countries. In this situation, we have the spectacle of university professors offering courses which are intended to prepare young persons for entry into the civil service, while such professors are under no obligation to consult with ministers or other officers in managerial positions concerning the content or character of the instruction. In fact, the staff of the training institution may be discouraged by legal provisions and firmly fixed traditions from seeking any such consultation. The result may be that an entire curriculum is formulated by an academic staff, while management has never been asked whether it is the kind of instruction desired, or likely to be honored by giving the graduates favorable consideration for entry and advancement in the civil service. The penalty may be difficulty in the placement of graduates, as has been experienced by not a few schools and institutes of public administration. This kind of situation, in which management and training staff tend to go their separate ways, may widen the breach between the autonomous university and the community which it should serve. It may cast training in a purely academic mold and make it unresponsive to the practical demands of everyday administration.

The remedy may be sought in various devices designed to preserve the general responsibility of management for training and to the training staff its proper place in the campaign for the improvement of the public service. Insofar as training is dealt with by law, it would seem to be

desirable to find in the law a reassertion of the principle that the Chief Executive or Prime Minister has an inalienable responsibility for training. Whenever a part of the responsibility for providing training is assigned to a nonpolitical agency like a Civil Service Commission or to an autonomous training institution such as a school or an institute of public administration, the law or directive should provide for the continuous consultation of such independent agencies with the principal officers of the executive branch of government. The creation of a board of directors for the training institution or an advisory committee on in-service training, and the construction of such boards or committees as broadly representative agencies, is one of the best methods to insure coordination of the training program. It is time to reconsider the methods whereby training can be made a cooperative effort among all the interests and agencies which desire to see training contribute directly to the improvement of day-by-day administration.

Human Resources for Training

It is difficult to formulate a definition of training, but it is evidently an interaction among human beings. On the one side is the small minority of civil servants who participate in training as trainers or instructors; on the other side is the mass of civil servants who are in the position of learners. They are often referred to as "trainees" or "participants." The former term is a harsh-sounding neologism, coined on the model of paired terms like "payer--payee." Obviously, the so-called trainee is not in the position of a payee, receiving something ready made in his hand which is capable of being used by the recipient as currency or a tool. The person being trained is not merely a passive receiver. He has to work for all that he gets as a value to

to be taken away from the training course.

The term "participant" is also misleading. The attempt to apply this term to the persons being trained passes over the obvious fact that the instructor also participates in the training. When the training is conducted mainly by the lecture method, which is so often the case, the instructor's participation is rather one-sided. It consists largely of give but little of take. When group methods of instruction are used, however, the instructor finds that he is a participant in the training in every sense of the word. A well-conducted training course should result in about as much improvement of the instructor as of the members of the class.

For convenience in this paper, the two elements of the human resources for training will be referred to simply as instructors and students. The instructors are pictured as transmitting knowledge and demonstrating, or otherwise developing, skills which are useful in the work of civil servants. The students or persons being trained are pictured as absorbing the knowledge transmitted and making it a part of their own fund of knowledge, while at the same time practicing or otherwise becoming proficient in the skills which are touched upon in the particular training course. Training is a mutual process requiring the joining of energies and efforts between those conducting the training and those being trained. Merely to expound theories and principles is not enough; for unless something is learned, there is no training at all.

Considering first the instructors as resources for training, it is to be observed that they divide into two subclasses according to whether the training being conducted is informal or formal in character. Informal training is

understood to be that which is conducted as a part of the ordinary work situation. It is commonly known as on-the-job training. Formal training is understood to be the organized kind of training which ordinarily requires that the students shall be taken out of the work situation, assembled in a classroom or other convenient location, and instructed by a series of lectures or other formal means. The relative effectiveness or value of these two kinds of training is not in issue. In a large organization such as the civil service of an independent country, both informal and formal methods of training should be extensively used. Under prevailing conditions it would be difficult to imagine a situation which would point to the exclusive use of either informal or formal methods of training. They have to be used together, and each is a supplement to the other.

Informal or on-the-job training is ordinarily the exclusive preserve of the supervisory staff. Each officer holding a managerial position is theoretically the instructor of all persons who work under his immediate supervision. It is common knowledge that many officers forget this important part of the supervisory function, or they allot to the training of subordinates a small part of the working time. The avoidance of the obligation of training is perhaps commonest in the higher echelons of command, while the lowest level of supervisors, the first-line supervisors, find that they cannot get the work assigned to their sections accomplished unless they give a part of the working time to training. At all events, the chief burden of on-the-job training seems to fall, in practice, upon the first-line supervisors, who are thus easily recognizable as key personnel in any comprehensive program of training.

The principal problem which presents itself is the competence of persons in managerial positions to serve as instructors. The general impression is, especially with reference to the so-called underdeveloped countries, that supervisory talent is exceedingly scarce, and that many persons holding supervisory positions are poorly equipped to pass on their knowledge and skills to the persons under their supervision. It is therefore of considerable importance to ask whether officers serving in managerial positions can be developed as effective instructors of their subordinates.

It is now generally recognized, it can be said all over the world, that supervision can be taught. That which can be taught includes the role of the supervisor as the instructor of his subordinates. This was first demonstrated on the grand scale in the Training Within Industry program in the United States during the Second World War. One of the short courses included in the trilogy of TWI was devoted specifically to the development of the foreman as the instructor of the members of his team or section. The success of TWI was readily measured in terms of the vast increase in production in the war industries of the United States. Since that time, the basic concepts of TWI, including the development of the foreman as the instructor of his subordinates, have been extended to many other lands and adapted to use in the civil service. It became the basis of the concept of "training the trainers," an approach which has been followed often in programs of technical assistance, especially when the development of a large corps of personnel is required.

Referring to persons in middle and higher managerial positions, the role of the instructor is obviously more complicated and difficult. In countries where the role is being played imperfectly, the remedy would seem to be to offer some training of middle management personnel, designed specifically to

improve the functioning of individuals as instructors. A sound approach is to require all middle managers to take a course in supervision at an early point in the career and to make sure that such course includes material looking to greater effectiveness as an on-the-job instructor. As for officers placed fairly high in the managerial hierarchy, it seems worthwhile to provide training as instructors only when they are drawn into more or less continuous participation in formal training. Senior officers and experts in staff specialties may be asked to give occasional lectures in training institutions, although they may have no special preparation for this role. If, however, such officers are called upon to take charge of formal training courses, or to make frequent appearances as lecturers or discussion leaders, they should have an opportunity to prepare themselves by attending a short course for instructors.

All managerial personnel should be instructed in the relations between informal and formal training. Supervisors of all grades should be informed as to the matters which they are expected to teach. They should be taught to recognize the point at which on-the-job training ceases to be effective, and where the need for more formal training begins. With this kind of information, supervisory personnel can serve more effectively in informing the professional training staff on the kinds of training needed and desired in the organization. Supervisors would also be more competent in picking out individuals among those under their supervision who are to be nominated as students in training courses, or as candidates for scholarships or other financial support for study in an outside institution or abroad.

It remains to speak of the relations between supervisors in their role as instructors with the permanent or professional training staff. There have

been some suggestions that training officers should have some kind of a supervisory role over on-the-job training, or that they should be authorized to make inspections from time to time of on-the-job training and the competence of supervisors to conduct it. The desirability of such a role for training officers, to say the least, is open to question. A training office or institution is not placed in the chain of command. It would be better to avoid the difficulties which might arise if a training officer attempted to interpose himself between the head of the agency and a supervisor somewhere down the scale. The permanent training staff may assist in raising the standards of on-the-job training by providing advice, circulating information, and preparing bibliographies for the guidance of supervisors in their own self-improvement.

Turning to the teaching staff for formal training, the first thing to be noted is the serious shortage of such personnel in the countries which are embarked upon programs of modernization. There seems to be little realization of the size of the staff required for a comprehensive program of training. A small country may name a part-time training officer, or a single officer who is expected to divide his time between the administrative duties attendant upon training and the teaching of courses, in the belief that one overburdened officer can operate a program of training. It should be obvious that a single instructor can at best offer only a few courses from time to time for only a small fraction of the civil service. With only a small training staff, it is useless to pretend that training needs are being met in a systematic way, for a small staff can offer only the courses which fall within the limits of its own knowledge. A broad training program, designed to meet the many needs which exist in a

modern civil service, requires a fairly large staff of instructors possessing a variety of talents.

The preparation of instructors for service in training institutions is one of the most serious problems related to training in the public service. When training first became a generally accepted part of personnel management in the years just following the Second World War, many instructors were recruited from academic institutions, while many other training officers were persons of little or no pertinent experience. This is still the case in many of the newly independent and nonindustrialized countries, for there are few persons who have the kind of preparation and experience which points directly to service on the staff of training institutions. Many countries give a relatively low rank and salary to training officers, and opportunities for advancement are often unfavorable. In some countries, service as a training officer is looked upon as a temporary assignment, and the only opportunity for advancement in grade or salary may be transfer away from training. All of these considerations, together with a lack of opportunities to obtain professional training, point to a generally unsatisfactory situation for training officers. It is imperative that serious consideration be given to methods of improving the lot of persons assigned to these responsible functions.

A few schools and institutes of public administration have conducted short courses for the preparation of instructors having duties connected with in-service training. These courses are so few in number and the number of students accepted in each is so small that the training officers of many relatively small and poor countries have, for practical purposes, no opportunity to

obtain training in their professional specialty. Schools and institutes of public administration have in more than a few instances had difficulties in providing for the perpetuation of their own teaching staff, especially to replace the foreign experts who played an important role in the early formative years of many of these institutions. Even though opportunities were offered for graduate study abroad, the recruitment of persons able and willing to undertake long and intensive study proved in some instances to be impossible. In other cases, persons upon completing their graduate studies abroad were unwilling to continue as members of the staff of a training institution, and sought other employment offering more favorable salaries and working conditions.

The kind of preparation deemed suitable for members of the teaching staff of schools and institutes of public administration is a graduate degree in public administration. As for instructors in in-service training, it is taken for granted that they should be well grounded in the matter which they are expected to teach. This grounding in subject matter may be obtained by university study or long experience in administrative work in the civil service, or preferably by a combination of these two means. It is probably useless to think that a sufficient grounding in subject matter can be given in a short training course, unless the subject matter is of relatively small proportions and not higher in difficulty than a subprofessional level. In addition to a good grounding in the knowledge to be transmitted, an instructor needs to be trained in modern methodology. Sufficient instruction and practice in methodology can probably be provided in an intensive course of a few weeks' duration.

Having considered some of the problems of staffing a training program, attention may be directed to the other category of human resources, that is,

the persons to be trained. Numerous questions can be raised concerning the capacity of the mass of civil servants for training in many of the new and nonindustrialized countries. It is a commonplace to say that many of these countries have an incomplete and defective educational system, which means that they have an adult population whose receptiveness to training in complicated tasks is not high. It is not uncommon to find that a rather large part of the civil service is made up of illiterates or persons who are barely literate, and these appear sometimes in elective positions, particularly in local government councils. Attempts to train poorly educated persons by verbal means are not likely to bring good results.

Thus, a good many persons having responsibilities for training find themselves faced with the necessity of working with potential students whose obsorptive powers are known to be low. This, in practice, has shifted emphasis to the selection of persons for training, and numerous experiments have been tried and proposals put forward. A good many schools and institutes of public administration have prescribed that persons wishing to enter upon training shall have completed the secondary school; but, finding that few candidates possessing these qualifications come forward, these training institutions have been forced to suspend the entrace requirements and accept students of much lesser preparation. In many African countries, students who complete the secondary school have reached a level of education so far above the usual attainment that they have no trouble in obtaining financial support for the continuance of their education at universities either at home or abroad. Upon the completion of university work, they expect and often receive appointments in the civil service at a high level. In some African countries, the highest

positions in the civil service were quickly filled by the appointment of relatively inexperienced persons drawn from the small group of nationals who had received higher education. The result was, as has been pointed out by many observers, something of a vacuum in the middle ranks of the civil service. In this situation, some observers believe that the highest priority in training belongs to the middle level of managerial, technical, and subprofessional personnel.

One method of winnowing the candidates for training is to resort to examinations. This might not be a bad procedure, if the makers of the entrance examinations were well grounded in, and capable of using, the best of the modern techniques in constructing examinations. The fact is that examinations in training institutions of the less economically developed countries tend to be of a traditional type, calling for highly subjective judgments of candidates' ability. In the Latin American region, entrance examinations for schools of public administration affiliated with the universities tend to be poorly constructed examinations of the essay type, being essentially achievement tests based upon the curricula of the lower schools. Although there have been some efforts to introduce the use of short-answer questions, the examinations in use give little basis for other than arbitrary decisions in the cases of students applying for admission. In recent years, there has been some experimentation looking toward the development of entrance examinations modeled upon the College Board and other similar examinations in general use in the United States. The objective in these experiments is, not to introduce mere translations of the examinations in use in the United States, but to produce adaptations actually suited to the cultural setting.

In the French-speaking countries of Africa, extensive use of examinations is made at the time of selecting students for entry into the schools of administration and also at the end of each year of training, in order to determine which students shall be allowed to continue in training and the nature of the appointments which they shall receive upon finishing. These examinations seem to be based in large measure upon the classical studies which form such a large part of the usual curriculum. The theory of this system seems to be that, in a situation where a sufficient number of graduates of the secondary schools do not appear, severe examinations can be used to select those who probably would have succeeded in a secondary education and that subsequent examinations can be used to reinforce and correct these decisions. The general result is the selection of a comparatively small number of able young people and the concentration of efforts in training upon the persons who are destined to occupy a few highest placed positions in the administration.

The problems of human resources for training may be observed, perhaps in their extreme form, in the local government service in African countries. Some of the newly independent countries have taken scarcely the first step in instituting training in the local government service, largely because of the serious problems presented by the lack of human and material resources. An outstanding problem is the magnitude of the task of training. While the number of employees of each local government unit is usually not high, the great number of local authorities means that the total of persons to be trained reaches a high figure. By common consent, the councilors also need to be

trained in the role which local government can play in the program of modernization. The great number of elected councilors further expands the task of training. Since local authorities usually have to stand at the end of the queue and wait until the personnel needs of the national civil service, commerce, and industry are satisfied, it is a matter of common observation that the local government service contains a large amount of poor material for training.

The lack of human resources extends to the planning and teaching staff. A training course in local government, sponsored by the Economic Commission for Africa at Addis Ababa in May-June, 1965, revealed that in all English-speaking Africa there are only a handful of training officers in local government and only a few instructors specialized in local government in the staffs of training institutions.

The personnel problems of the local authorities in Africa are obviously of such dimensions that they cannot be solved solely by training. For this reason, the public administration staff of the United Nations Secretariat has under consideration all aspects of the personnel problems of local authorities, in the hope of furnishing sound advice to African governments on all the possible solutions. Matters under consideration include the ways and means of improving the status, salaries, and working conditions in the local government service, as well as the advantages of amalgamating the personnel of all local authorities into a single local government service for the whole country, or of parts of the local government service with the national civil service, as means of equalizing salaries and career possibilities. In the belief that personnel problems often reflect defects in structure and methods of work,

these aspects of local government in Africa are also under study.

Intellectual Resources

There is an aspect of training in the public service lying midway between the human and the material resources, which may be referred to as the intellectual resources. These consist of the textbooks, training manuals, research monographs, and other written and published materials of great variety, which are necessary in training. We may find here also a military analogy. The armed forces of many countries have channeled a great deal of money, talent, and effort into the production of instructional materials and books of reference. Training has a much longer history in the military forces than in the civil service. There has been much more time for the production of instructional materials for use in training in the military forces than is the case in the civil service. Even so, the quantity and quality of such material depends to a great degree upon the prevailing beliefs concerning their value. It is evident that the value and necessity of instructional materials gained acceptance long ago in the military forces, but there is little evidence of a similar philosophy prevailing in the civil service.

The lack of instructional materials is a matter of frequent comment by persons who have responsibility in training in the public service, particularly by public administration experts engaged in technical assistance programs. Some manuals and other instructional materials have been produced in almost all projects of training. It is a matter for regret that there has been such incomplete exchange of information among projects as to result in great ignorance of the existence of such materials. More frequent exchanges of materials

produced in different countries would probably have resulted, some years ago, in a marked improvement in the intellectual resources for training.

The kind of instructional material most needed is good texts on various phases of public administration. The requirement is not for over-simplified texts which fail to hold the interest and challenge the intelligence of the persons being trained. The most useful writings are those which give a description of the experience of advanced countries, presented in terms which are understandable to persons who have little or no knowledge of modern public administration. Textbooks must also be expressed in terms related to the conditions in which public employees live and work in countries embarked upon programs of modernization. It is also well to bear in mind that, as conditions stand, public administration has to be taught in many countries without any case materials. A need of special importance is well-constructed exercises which place the person being trained in a simulated but real situation in which he must solve problems and apply much that he has learned about administrative affairs. There has been little experimentation in the construction of workbooks or exercise books, which would take the civil servant through a series of incidents or situations in which he would have to act in much the same manner as he would if he were in charge of an office or a section.

The production of good instructional materials becomes possible only when a considerable amount of research has been done on public administration in the country in which the training is being offered. Unless the facts of importance in public administration have been brought to light, it is quite impossible to relate theories and principles to the situation prevailing in the

country concerned. These considerations dictate a marriage between research and training, and require that the staff having responsibility for training shall be large enough to allow for the investment of time and energy in research. Some question may arise as to where the research should be performed, but the multipurpose school or institute of public administration seems to be the ideal custodian of this responsibility. Doubt may be expressed of the wisdom of vesting the responsibility for research in the typical training center, which is occupied primarily with the in-service training of personnel of clerical grades, or in the staff college which has the special function of putting the capstone on the training of candidates for the highest administrative positions. A country preoccupied with modernization should probably decide upon one training institution to be developed as a research center, and the school or institute of public administration seems to be best suited to this purpose.

Material Resources

Broadly speaking, the material resources necessary in training divide into two large classes of things. First, there is the building or series of rooms in which the training is to be conducted, together with the fixed equipment suitable for the purpose. Secondly, there is the movable equipment, consisting of office and classroom furniture, office machines, and materials and devices of great variety known to be useful in the conduct of training.

Many training institutions have had to begin their work in makeshift and inadequate premises. Good work has been done in many countries in locations which were poorly situated and indifferently furnished. Some training institutions have had the good fortune to be able to move into a renovated locale

or a specially designed and constructed building. Much might be said about the design and layout of lecture rooms, seminar rooms, language laboratories, and other features of the ideal physical surroundings for a training institution. Suffice it to say that experimentation in these matters is still in progress, and that it would be desirable to collect a great deal of data which might be made the basis of sound advice to governments concerned in establishing new training institutions.

It is difficult to generalize about the equipment needed by training institutions. A minimum list of equipment for a small training institution would include classroom and office furniture, projection equipment, machines for reproducing papers, a calculator, dictating machines, typewriters, storage cabinets, and drafting table, and easels for displaying charts and posters, together with supplies and instruments for producing visual materials. This list may be expanded by the addition of tape recorders, public address systems, language laboratory equipment and other teaching machines, and many other kinds of equipment, depending upon the kinds of training to be offered and the methods to be used.

Many thousands of dollars can be spent in equipping a training institution. Public administration experts who serve in an advisory capacity in the early stage of development of such institutions have a great responsibility in considering the utility of various kinds of equipment and in suggesting the purchase of equipment whose cost is in some reasonable relation to the financial resources of the country concerned. Persons in charge of training institutions

must constantly be on guard to avoid proposing the purchase of costly equipment which requires the use of sophisticated methods of training which the staff is not yet equipped to put into practice.

Underlying all matters of material resources is the problem of the availability of funds. It is probably correct to say that the training program is a rare one, if its costs have been carefully calculated in terms of man-years or man-months of training provided. Such calculations would probably contain some surprises by revealing unexpectedly high costs of training. Few reliable data are available on the legitimate and reasonable costs of training, nor is there any norm or sure guide as to the percentage of the national budget which should, in given conditions, be allotted to training. Some training institutions which received aid from foreign spurces in the early stage of development have an operating budget which may well tax the resources of the country concerned when such aid is withdrawn. There is general agreement that a government cannot afford to forego the training of its employees, so the problem becomes one of keeping the costs of training within reasonable bounds.

Some kinds of training are obviously more costly than others. It takes only an elementary calculation to show that the use of funds to provide long-term academic study abroad soon reaches a point of diminishing returns, and that the money may be better used to develop a training institution within the national borders. Few countries can afford to provide at home all the different kinds of education and training in the many specialties required in a modern civil service, so that small and relatively poor countries may

be expected to allot a large fraction of the training budget for years to come to subsidizing study abroad.

Relation between Tactics and Resources

In a military operation the commander is limited in his choice of tactics by the nature of the resources which he has at his disposal in the form of personnel, armament, and supplies. In a campaign of training in the public service, the persons in charge are, in like manner, bound to search for a logical relation between the tactics and the resources at hand. In this paper the resources related to training have been classified as human resources, intellectual resources, and equipment. The relation between tactics and resources of each of these classes requires some consideration. The practicability of using some methods cuts across the whole range of resources. For example, it is impossible to use programmed instruction, unless instructors skilled in the techniques have been hired, the intellectual resources in the form of programs are at hand, and the necessary teaching machines purchased and installed.

A recent study of the methodology of formal training identified no less than nineteen distinct methods of instruction in common use in training courses for civil servants. These methods may be classified, in part, according to their suitability for large classes of twenty to forty persons or smaller groups of less than fifteen persons. The many different kinds of methods may also be broadly classified into the more or less traditional methods of education and newer methods developed specifically in relation to training. On the whole, there is a widespread desire to decrease the use of traditional methods

of education and to encourage the wider use of newer methods of training, which, in many cases, are directed to the training of employees assembled in relatively small groups. The traditional methods are still in general use, while many of the newer methods remain unused because of unfamiliarity or the absence of the materials and equipment required in their use.

A recent exercise required the reconsideration of the methods of training with particular reference to their use in training the personnel of African local governments. To suggest that a great variety of methods should be used in the training of such personnel seemed to have possibilities of causing great confusion. Since there is a dearth of qualified instructors, as well as of training aids and material, it seemed better to suggest concentration upon the use of about half a dozen methods of training, rather than to experiment with a large number of different methods. For these reasons, persons responsible for training in African local governments were advised to continue the use of traditional educational methods, modified by the frequent use of discussion and working groups.

Because of the poor preparation of the instructional staff in many nonindustrialized countries and the low capacity for absorbing training, as observed in many parts of the civil service, the choice of tactics may be limited to a segment of the known methodology. There appear to be two points of view in this matter. On the one hand, it may be said that training activities should, in the conditions usually prevailing in nonindustrialized countries, be conducted according to a few familiar methods, such as lectures, classroom meetings, and seminars. On the other hand, the view may be

expressed that it is better to make a clean break with traditional and academic methods and to introduce new and sophisticated methods of instruction, such as programmed instruction, teaching machines, and closed-circuit television.

A sound attitude for the near future would seem to be a mean between the two extremes just stated. The persons in charge of training programs, when they are working with less pliable human material, are advised to limit their tactics to a judicious selection among the many known methods of instruction. Persons interested in strengthening training institutions, such as those established as part of technical assistance programs, are advised to make sure that national training officers understand the few methods chosen for emphasis and that they are skilled in their use. In this way the training staff may be equipped with a battery of methods well suited to the capabilities and preparation of the personnel generally encountered in the public service of nonindustrialized countries.

The intellectual resources of training have been defined to include textbooks and other published materials, as well as audio-visual materials. The absence of suitable textbooks or manuals to place in the hands of the persons being trained practically dictates the more or less exclusive use of lectures. By the same token, the absence of suitable motion-picture films, charts, posters, and other audio-visual materials means that these methods of instruction cannot be used. The obvious remedy is to improve the intellectual resources for training by preparing written and audio-visual materials. With a good supply of such resources, the persons in charge of the training have a

much freer choice of tactics. They can introduce methods of group instruction, as well as practical exercises which are designed to simulate actual working conditions in government offices.

The material resources of training consist large of appropriate equipment, such as mimeographing machines or projection equipment. In the absence of suitable equipment, the persons in charge of the training must select methods which require only the simplest equipment or none at all. The remedy in this matter is obvious and consists in supplying the training institution with a good selection of machines, equipment, and materials as necessary for use in training.

The Tactics of On-the-job Training

A tactical problem of importance and difficulty is to decide how much of the training is to be given on the job and how much as formal training in organized classes. It is probably correct to say that in any smoothly functioning organization the greater part of in-service training should be provided by the regular supervisors as a normal accompaniment of guiding their subordinates in their daily work. Where the tasks of public employees are relatively simple or manipulative in nature, the knowledge and skills involved can best be transmitted by on-the-job training. It is clear, however, that on-the-job training cannot satisfy all the demands under modern conditions. It is more practicable and economical to offer a part of the training in organized classes.

In early reports relating to training in the American public service, sweeping claims were made for the success of formal training in relatively simple matters. One early report mentioned the training of workmen who

were engaged in planting trees as part of a program of reforestation and claimed that such training resulted in economies. Training of secretarial personnel in the avoidance of errors in letters was also mentioned. A report of recent date from a Latin American country mentions the formal training of charwomen, messengers, and telegram deliverers. It would appear that, in all these cases, the formal training in organized classes, if needed at all, should have been provided for the foremen or other first-line supervisors who, in turn, could have given sufficient training to the rank and file.

Another consideration of value in determining when formal training may be superior to training on the job is to ask whether the time spent in training may be shortened by offering a prepared course. The learning of various occupations by apprenticeship is something which has been known for a long time. Generally speaking, the apprenticeship was begun at an early age, and the attainment of journeyman status came only in the early adult years. The state can seldom undertake the responsibility for such long periods of training. Modern methods of training have, to a large extent, replaced the traditional apprenticeship, and various trades and employments can now be taught in a shorter time than formerly.

On-the-job training consists largely of brief, oral instructions, followed by demonstrations. The results of training are subject to immediate review by the use of performance tests. The follow-up in this kind of training is provided by the continued supervision of employees at their work, the control of output, and frequent criticisms of work performed. Thus, the methodology of on-the-job training offers no great difficulty. To insure that persons

responsible for directing the work of others are able to function successfully as trainers, it is imperative that all supervisory training include methodology.

The Strategy of the Training Campaign

Strategy is understood to be the broad design of an organized effort. Strategy involves planning, deploying resources, and timing the different phases of operations.

Persons responsible for training programs must recognize the importance of planning their activities in advance.. This involves the collection of data on the composition of the civil service, the needs for training, and the capacity and capabilities of existing training institutions. It involves also the procurement of resources before the campaign is initiated. In many instances, training has been undertaken without sufficient preparation, which results in a great deal of improvisation. Poorly prepared training is almost certain to have unsatisfactory results. Good strategy calls for marshaling human and material resources, preparing textbooks and training manuals, procuring training aids, and furnishing suitable premises in which to conduct the training.

In a good many countries, officers responsible for training find that they must carry on their work in spite of a good deal of opposition or indifference. They are faced at the outset with the necessity of convincing the government, the high-ranking civil servants, and the mass of public employees of the importance of training. The consent of management is essential, for without it training officers cannot assemble the resources or obtain the locale necessary for the conduct of training. The consent of civil servants,

who are the potential students in training classes, is also essential, for nothing can be accomplished by trying to instruct an unwilling audience. The prospective students have to face a period of hard work and intellectual concentration, which may require the reviving of habits from long-past school days. Unless civil servants are willing, indeed anxious, to participate in training, there can be no improvement on their part.

Care should be taken to initiate new training activities at a time propitious for success. Thus, it would be well to avoid a season in which many public officers are absent on vacation, or a season of unfavorable weather in relation to the place and equipment being used. Once launched, training activities can be carried on almost continuously. This, however, requires good planning for using instructors and keeping dormitories and classrooms filled to capacity. In an ongoing program, the persons in charge should be on the alert to avoid errors in timing, such as offering a course on budget management at a time when budget officers are fully occupied in the annual budget exercise. Training officers have a responsibility to make training accord with the usual demands of public employment.

Finally, it may be said that the strategy of the training campaign depends, to some extent, upon the attitude of the general public. Large elements of the public have, from time to time, shown great interest in training activities in the military forces and in some civil forces, such as fire and police departments. Quite probably, the public would show a similar interest in training activities for office employees or administrators, if attention were given to the public relations of the training program. There are many ways

in which public interest could be attracted, such as by giving publicity in the press and other media for incidents occurring in training courses. The patronage of training by ministers and other prominent persons may offer the occasion for obtaining publicity. So-called graduation exercises, in which civil servants receive certificates upon the successful completion of training courses, are another occasion offering possibilities for publicity. The persons immediately in charge of training do not need to be public relations men; but they should be persons who can write good and interesting reports about training activities, and who can recognize the features offering possibilities for attracting public interest.

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APPENDIX

SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR RESEARCH RELATED TO TRAINING IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE *

1. The Curriculum in Public Administration

It is obvious that opinions have not yet crystallized on the desirable content of the curriculum of public administration. There has been a great deal of experimentation in schools and institutes of public administration in many countries. This experience has continued well over a decade, but we do not yet have anything which can be identified as a standard or basic curriculum in public administration. It is true that curricula developed in different parts of the world show a great deal of similarity, and the content is indicated by the titles of courses seems to embrace a common area which is more or less the core of instruction in public administration.

All this experience needs to be reconsidered with particular reference to the less technologically advanced countries. We need to arrive at generally accepted notions of the basic material which should be included in all curricula and at the same time to formulate

* Submitted by Mr. Starr after the symposium.

guides for specialization and application to local conditions as necessary in different countries. Intensive research along these lines would be of great value in the operations of many schools and institutes of public administration.

2. Job Description of the Administrator

There have been some efforts to formulate a comprehensive statement of the duties and functions of an administrator in the public service. Such formulations have been inadequate, as is evidenced by efforts in a few developing countries to make new surveys and state the duties of the administrator in the country concerned. The connection between the description of the position of administrator and the design of the curriculum in public administration is obvious. A good curriculum should prepare, so far as is possible, a prospective administrator to perform satisfactorily in the job for which he is destined. Designing the curriculum depends in large measure upon the prevailing concept of the nature of the administrator's job. Research is needed to arrive at a better understanding of the nature and limitations of the managerial function in public administration, particularly in developing countries.

3. Costs of Training

We know little in a precise way about the cost of training in terms of man-hours or man-years of training, or of results in comparison with the aims of training. Research in this matter would lead into the detailed consideration of the financial aspects of staffing training programs and institutions, selecting and purchasing equipment, designing premises to be used for training, preparing training manuals and other instructional materials, and many other similar matters. Well-conducted research in this area might be expected to give us better guides in choosing approaches in training and selecting methods related logically to the expected results. While the opinion that training is a necessity is now generally accepted, and for that reason a government cannot expect to escape some expenditures for training, yet many problems concerning the wise expenditure of funds have not been fully considered.

4. Lessons of Training in Private Industry

In the developing countries, there has been, on the whole, little contact among persons engaged, respectively, in training in private industry and the public service. It is quite likely that experience in the two realms is transferable in many particulars and productive

of exchanges and transfusion. This is particularly important because of the wide area of the economy included in the public sector in many countries. It appears that training in private industry has been, on the whole, more experimental than in the public service. Research to determine the transferability of this experience into the public service is desirable.

5. Aid to Students for Pre-entry Preparation

A great deal of money has been expended in subsidizing students for obtaining education believed to be important in preparing them for entry into the civil service. Financial aid is provided from many sources, and it is provided to support students both in national institutions and abroad. A thorough reconsideration and intensive study of this widespread activity might be expected to result in better guides for the selection of students to be aided, better assignment of students who have completed their training, and better administration of other aspects of this important phase of personnel administration.

6. The Architectural Design of Training Institutions

Many training institutions, such as schools and institutes of public administration and national training centres for clerical and secretarial employees, are operating in inadequate and makeshift

quarters. Other training institutions have obtained commodious and well-appointed premises, which are either old buildings extensively remodeled or new buildings especially designed and constructed for use as training institutions. There appears to have been little trading of information and experience in the designing of such buildings, especially when there is a need to adjust to particular problems such as those offered by tropical weather conditions. Research along these lines might be expected to result in the formulation of useful guides in adapting the physical appointments to the intended uses, as well as in saving considerable sums of money by advice on how to avoid bad designs.

7. Methods of Teaching Problem-Solving and Decision-Making

While there is general agreement that problem-solving and decision-making are the most important skills, or clusters of skills, to be acquired by the prospective administrator, there is still a great deal of skepticism about the methods of teaching such skills, particularly in the developing countries. Research upon this topic would consist largely of collecting the experience of many countries under different conditions in teaching these skills. A reconsideration of such experience could well result in a narrowing of the approach

in this branch of training and the production of better instructional materials, such as case studies and practical exercises for use in training courses.

8. The Staff College Idea

The type of training institution known as the school or institute of public administration has become very popular in the last ten or fifteen years and has spread widely throughout the globe. The training institution of the type of the staff college, however, has been established in only comparatively few countries, most of which are found in the Anglo-Saxon world. Research might well be undertaken to determine, as best as is possible, why the idea of the civil staff college has not been more popular, especially in the developing countries. Intensive study might be addressed to the question of whether the civil staff college is a necessary and desirable part of the structure of training. If the best judgment is in the affirmative, technical assistance programs might well be redesigned to promote the more general establishment of staff colleges.

9. Relations between Organization and Methods and Training

Organization and methods (O and M) and the training structure occupy substantially the same position with reference to management

in the public service. Both are staff services having the general mission of assisting management in the realization of greater efficiency and better performance in administrative work. Obviously, the staffs concerned, respectively, with O and M and training should work in close collaboration. It is generally agreed that O and M should furnish much of the basic data from which good training manuals and other instructional materials can be produced. Beyond this, the nature and modes of relations between these two important staff agencies have not been clearly defined. Research to clarify the common interests and improve the collaboration between these two staff agencies is indicated.

10. Norms and Standards in Personnel Requirements

In various professions, as represented by teachers, engineers, doctors of medicine, nurses, and social workers, research has brought out some norms and standards of value in judging how many professionals are needed in proportion to a given population and in differing work situations. Little research has been performed, so far as is known, for the purpose of formulating guides in judging the numbers of managers of different grades required in the public service. The same appears to be true in many other occupations needed in a modern public service, such as accountant, tax collector,

policeman, or secretary. Intensive research along these lines might result in better guides in estimating manpower requirements in the public service and, consequently, in planning comprehensive training programs to meet the requirements.

11. Assessing the Results of Training

While many efforts have been made to evaluate training courses and programs, the fact is that the methods used allow for little more than the forming of subjective judgments of the results of training. An intensive study of the subject should result in the statement of some standards against which a training program or course could be judged as well planned and organized or the contrary. Research is needed to forge, rather than to sharpen, tools of measurement for use in assessing the results of training.

12. Instructional Materials

Everyone connected remotely or intimately with training in the public service says that better instructional materials are necessary. There is, so far as is known, no organized effort to correct this unsatisfactory situation. A study is needed to establish what kinds of instructional materials are most useful in training courses in developing countries and to explore the ways and means for procuring

and producing better materials. This kind of research should be supplemented eventually in practically every country of the world with programs of research in the public administration of the respective countries, for the purpose of producing the data and monographs from which, in turn, good teaching materials might be prepared. An intensive study of this subject might be expected to produce also workable suggestions for dividing among the many agencies concerned with technical assistance the responsibility for producing the kinds of instructional materials which each agency is best equipped to undertake.

13. Adaptation of Tests for the Selection of Persons for Training

The examinations used for the selection of students for entry into training institutions are generally of the nature of achievement tests based upon the candidates' accomplishments in the general educational system. Little use had been made, particularly in developing countries, of aptitude and diagnostic tests. The line for improving the selection of civil servants for training lies along the way of adapting modern tests for use in widely different cultural situations. This is a matter which goes far beyond the mere translation of standard tests and requires a great deal of research looking towards the adaptation of tests for use in particular countries or regions.

14. The Place of Training

Speaking generally, civil servants may be trained at home or abroad. If the decision is made in favor of training within the national borders, the assumption is that the country concerned is well equipped to offer the training. The so-called advanced countries seldom entertain the idea that their civil servants might be better trained in a foreign environment, but careful consideration might reveal some advantages in favor of foreign study under certain conditions. The so-called underdeveloped countries are encouraged through the technical assistance programs to send many of their civil servants abroad for training. The wisdom and desirability of this practice and its continuance in the second decade of major technical assistance activity has, apparently, never been considered in depth and impartially. Training abroad divides into the cases of sending civil servants for training to (a) a country of substantially higher technological advancement; (b) a country of about the same degree of technological advancement, where they are assembled with civil servants from other countries exhibiting about the same degree of development (known commonly as regional training); and, (c) a country exhibiting a high degree of technological advancement, where they

are mingled for training with civil servants of many other countries. Thus, we can perceive differing roles for training institutions operating on a national, regional, or substantially worldwide scale. The problems of dividing up the great task of training, and deciding in any given situation what is the best locus of training, appear to offer an interesting, and possibly fruitful, subject for research.

The Role of the Technical Assistance Adviser Overseas

by Henry Reining, Jr., Dean
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THE ROLE

When one speaks of role, one speaks of the performance: that is, how a man does his job rather than of the job itself. The perception and view of the job determines the role; the actor will play his part, do his job as he interprets its requirements and the expectations of his employers, his professional peers, and his clients as to performance -- all rolled into one bundle of sometimes conflicting values and overladen with his own personal philosophy, ambitions, and concerns.[1/]

Storm and Finkle have for the last two years been engaged in what has to date been the most exhaustive study of the role of the technical assistance adviser overseas.[2/] It is possible by utilizing their findings to go beyond the kind of experience-based speculation which has had to be the substitute for tested facts up until now, at least in some respects.

The Ideal Role

Storm and Finkle asked those who had served overseas whether their role there corresponded actually to what they thought it ought to have

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1/ See Lynton K. Caldwell "The Role of the Technical Expert," Vol. 323 (May 1959), pp. 91-99).

2/ A preliminary partial report appeared in mimeographed form in September 1965, entitled American Professionals in Technical Assistance by William Bruce Storm and Jason L. Finkle (School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, Los Angeles). The writer of this paper is deeply indebted to this research.

been ideally.[3/] The answers could be divided roughly into two groups: 1) the doers and 2) the stimulators. The doers believed that ideally they should teach, demonstrate, answer questions, do things; in short, the doers believed that ideally they should use their professional (that is, subject-matter) skills helpfully, rather than their professorial skills. The stimulator, on the other hand seemed to feel almost the opposite. Ideally, he felt he should not do things, answer questions, teach classes. He believed his ideal role to be professorial: to stimulate his counterpart and host country agency to new ways of looking at problems, new ways of thinking about the subjects of concern. This type of respondent argued that the professor overseas should be critic, catalyst, and consultant: help identify problems, develop ideas, formulate programs and in such, and additional, ways, build indigenous skills which would continue to develop after he departed. He believed that while even ideally, his role had some operational overtones as he assisted with planning, training, curriculum, program-building, and so forth, that he should first and foremost focus on helping indigenous counterparts develop skills whereby they might themselves be able to formulate acceptable and useful answers.

Along somewhat the same lines, Storm and Finkle found they could categorize their respondents as activists and passives. The activists

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3/ They interviewed 342 overseasmen: 182 professors from professional schools who had been out on University-AID contracts, and 160 AID-direct-hire professionals. The report being cited covers only the academics, evenly divided into four professional groups: agriculture, education, engineering, and social scientists. Their tasks overseas had been largely institution-building, i.e., setting up schools and training institutes.

expressed their ideals in terms of vigorous intervention. The passives felt they should wait to be asked. It was then possible to subcategorize as follows: active and passive doers and active and passive stimulators.

But such categorization did not hold true in all respects. In terms of specifics, Storm and Finkle's respondents agreed almost completely that ideally the professional academic overseas should 1) impart information and 2) act as an adviser. Except for these two points, there was relatively little concensus.

Slightly more than a fourth of the respondents thought the academic man overseas should serve a performance role: 43 percent saw the ideal role in such terms as "change agent," "catalyst," "stimulator." Furthermore, this preference for the "stimulator" role as the ideal one was common to all four professional groups queried (agriculturalists, educators, engineers, social scientists).

However, in the actual doing, this ideal interpretation of role as "stimulator" had been set aside because the doing was more immediate and visable and the stimulating slower and less conspicuous - and more difficult. In other words, the respondents cheerfully admitted as to specifics that they performed "more than their ideal conception of role permitted" and then in general responded that they saw relatively little difference between the ideal and actual roles. This actual performance turned out to be a major disappointment to those respondents who named themselves as stimulator or catalyst types. "Fewer found themselves actually serving in a self-determined, flexible, and accommodating manner,

more in an externally - determined role than they had expected and wished for themselves."[4/]

The Anticipated Role

Storm and Finkle not only checked on ideal conceptions of role but also on expectations as to role. Did the respondents have a clear set of prior expectations? Two-thirds said they had. Did the respondents find a difference between their expected role and the role they actually played? Half said they did; in fact, 18 percent went so far as to say that their talents had been misused overseas.

Moreover, Storm and Finkle found another difference: whereas respondents were well agreed as to the "ideal" role of the technical assistance adviser, regardless of profession, in the probing of the discrepancy between actual and expected roles, differences between the professions were discovered. Education and social science respondents said they experienced the discrepancy more often than engineering and agriculture. Could this be because of basic differences between the professions? One could regard education and social science as being heavily communication-oriented and engineering and agriculture as primarily performance-oriented. Thus the latter two groups would naturally find overseas work similar to what they did at home.

As will be brought out below such differences among the professions are worth further exploration. Further research would probably produce valuable insights.

4/ Storm and Finkle, op. cit., p. 115.

The Role Perception of Others

On the premise that anyone's job performance will depend on what his fellows about him expect of him, Storm and Finkle queried the academic professionals as to how 1) their team mates, 2) their party chiefs, 3) their counterparts, 4) the AID Mission, and 5) the host government sympathized with their conception of their role. The responses revealed that they felt their colleagues were most sympathetic, the host government least. One-half of them expressed feeling that the AID Mission disagreed with their ideal interpretation of their role; only 38 percent said the AID Mission agreed. Half felt their party chief agreed but 31 percent were unwilling to answer this. The responses were evenly divided as to the counterpart's attitude but only a minority felt that their counterpart, counterpart agency, and host government accepted their own conception of their role.

Obviously, there is fertile ground for further tilling within this context. It would appear that role conceptions varying directly from the individual's as concentric circles spread out: the innermost agrees most, the outermost least. It appears clear that there is real role conflict in the overseas situation. Some possible reasons for it are to be inferred from what has already been stated; others are implicit in the organizational environment within which technical assistance is done, as will be brought out below.

The Actual Role Overseas

Storm and Finkle had a number of specific items to which they asked the academic professionals to respond in terms of the actual overseas role. Nearly 90 percent of the responses agreed that communicating ideas had been more important in their work than performing specific tasks. Two-thirds agreed that they spent more time in negotiations, bringing people together, than in professional tasks. In fact, two-thirds agreed that the ability to get along with people was more important than technical competence (but not the social scientists). Sixty percent felt that generalists operated better overseas in technical assistance work than the highly specialized (but not the engineers).

Along somewhat the same line, the group as a whole agreed that high professional standards were possible but 33 percent disagreed, with the social scientists and the educators being least in agreement. The engineers, on the other hand, agreed the most that high level professional work was possible in overseas technical assistance.

Here is a line for further investigation that relates directly to selection and training, namely that the less specialized, more broadly based professional is preferable to more specialized. Why? And why the disagreement among the professions on this point?

Storm and Finkle expressed disappointment with their research results, or it would be more accurate to say, with their respondents. The respondents said that they had not suffered from "role shock" or if so, only slightly. Storm and Finkle deduced that there was substantial

"role shock," that there was real stress produced by the difference between the ideal and the actual, and between the expected and the actual.

> There is little evidence in our findings that respondents had assumed a substantially different professional role overseas. Not more than 25% indicated they were doing a significantly different kind of a job overseas.[5]

Wasn't it "role shock" which drove the respondents back upon the familiar? Storm and Finkle are inclined to think so.

> We were dismayed by the narrow, performance-oriented interpretation of role offered by many respondents (though by no means all) and we have wondered whether this may indicate a degree of such shock. Conceivably the alternatives and role challenges overseas were so overwhelming participants retreated into familiar repetition of the more product-oriented elements of their domestic role. Possibly the pressure of the Mission for a product reduced individual willingness to employ more heuristic behavior overseas. These are speculations; however we do not know the answer.[6]

THE STAGE: THE SETTING OF OVERSEAS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

The foreignness of overseas work has been much written about. How much of the problem of the Technical Assistance Adviser (T.A.A.) is due to the alien nature of the setting within which he does his job? Storm and Finkle found few responses, astonishingly enough, which indicated the respondents had suffered from culture shock, assuming this term to refer broadly to emotional problems associated with adaptation to the foreign situation. Furthermore, the respondents all testified their wives and family had been happy overseas. To this dilemma the researchers remark

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5/ Ibid., p. 119.
6/ Ibid., p. 133.

wryly: "We assume this was a matter so painful, so personal and so threatening that they did not respond accurately."[7] They go on to summon as evidence to support their contrary conclusion, the many, many complaints their respondents made as to local conditions:

- delay in planning by host country agencies
- cumbersome, time consuming decision making
- inability of host country personnel to think straight
- low motivation toward achievement
- pessimism, dilletantism, and elitism; and even
- low ethical and moral standards

Culture shock and the cross-cultural dimensions of overseas work have been much commented on and written about[8] -- so much so that Mark Twain's quip on weather comes to mind. "Everybody talks about the weather but nobody does anything about it." What can be done about culture shock? That is a good research question.

Storm and Finkle thought they found that prior knowledge was a good antidote, whether it was in the form gained from prior technical assistance experience as such, prior foreign experience, or even scholarship upon problems and aspects of the particular country involved.

Pre-departure and post-arrival orientation has often been recommended -- much more often recommended than practiced, especially, post-arrival training.[9] Has anyone ever tried the clinical approach, in a

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7/ Ibid., p. 134.

8/ Perhaps the most extended treatment of the cross-cultural aspect of technical assistance is Francis C. Byrnes, Americans in Technical Assistance: A Study of Attitudes and Responses to their Role Abroad, (New York, Praeger, 1965).

9/ See the general remarks to this effect in the Gardner report AID and the Universities (1964), p. 36. Also the recommendations of the special Task Force on Training and Orientation chaired for AID by James M. Mitchell, A Ten Point Training Program ... (Washington, D.C: AID, 1961).

formal way? It might be an interesting experiment to assign a psychiatric social worker or counselor to every other American family as they arrive in a number of posts around the world, to attempt to assuage the rigors of culture shock.[10/] The unattended families could be the "control group." In the process we might find out more about the phenomenon of culture shock itself and who is most affected as well as the proper treatment.

Training problems will be referred to again in this paper. Orientation should help but it has distinct limits as a technique too, has it not? Can much really be done for a person by way of orientation until he has had some experience overseas or in the country of concern, i.e., until he has some sense of his own to which he can relate what he learns? Pre-departure orientation has distinct limitations both as to role and culture introduction. We need to learn more about the limits.

10/ Lest this discussion be interpreted as a criticism of AID, it should be pointed out that AID has tried to do a job as to orientation. Here are some of their current publications relevant to the subject: Orientation Handbook: Development Cooperation, (AID, March 1964 and January 1965), 113 p. American Women's Club of Geneva (Switzerland), At Sea Abroad: Learn to Live and Live to Learn in a Foreign Country (Geneva: AWC, 1965) 36 p. John M. Fenley, ed., The Role and Problems of Wives of American Technicians Overseas in Rural Development (Orientation Activities Branch, Employee Development Division, Office of Personnel Administration, AID, April 1962). Edith Lord, Cultural Facts and Fancies (Evaluation Division; Research, Evaluation and Planning Assistance Staff, AID, 1964), 61 p. Arthur F. Raper, Some Points for Consideration of Technicians Working with Villagers (Orientation Activities Branch, Employee Development Division, Office of Personnel Administration, AID, 1964), 12 p.

Organizational Complexity

The organization complex into which the T.A.A. enters in overseas work is complex indeed and may well be a major part of his role or culture shock. It has already been referred to in connection with role interpretation by other than the T.A.A. himself. For the average professional, accustomed to a single employer and as easily identifiable clientele, the welter of organizations he enters overseas may often be overwhelming. The academic professional is especially susceptible because of the near autonomy he enjoys in his work in his university at home and the permissive atmosphere which prevails there.

First, there is the "team," that is, his fellow professionals. This peer group offers a few problems, so does the party chief if he is also a fellow professional. The host country counterpart also may not be threatening because he also shares peership and profession. But as was seen above, the U.S. Mission is a different matter, and so is the host country government.

Storm and Finkle suggest that it is the authority and bureaucracy he encounters which upsets the professional overseas, as well as the cross-cultural barriers. The T.A.A. may even feel that his professional integrity is in jeopardy because the "goal activities" he is associated with overseas are not in professional hands; they are too much in the hands of U.S. Mission bureaucrats. Seventy-two percent of the respondents were critical of the AID Mission; only 18 percent were praiseful. And this praise was not in terms of program but in terms of logistical and administrative

support. The respondents felt the AID Mission exercised too much program guidance and control, disagreed as to program goals, and had too many people of inferior quality on its staff to justify such control and disagreement.

Seventy-seven percent of the respondents felt that the political and administrative system of the host country was a barrier to progress because of its red tape, bureaucracy, overcentralization, and cumbersome decision making. Authoritarianism and lack of civil rights were also mentioned frequently. Nevertheless, when asked to rank the two governments -- the AID Mission and the host country -- the respondents answered that the U.S. Mission caused more trouble than the host government. In other words, role shock is worse than culture shock?

Storm and Finkle, in a neat summary, mention that the organizational environments of overseas work is complex indeed, merely quantitatively considered.[11/] For completeness, the U.S. Embassy or consulate needs to be added to the list, plus perhaps other U.S. programs: Food for Peace, Peace Corps, U.S. Foundation programs, U.S. voluntary groups, U.S. business enterprises, and similar agencies and endeavors of other nations also, not to mention the UN and other world organizations. But qualitative considerations need to be added to paint a fuller picture, such as:

- official U.S. policy
- a hostile or grudging Congress

11/ Storm and Finkle, op. cit., p. 19.

- subtleties in dealing with sensitive emerging nations
- complexities of headquarters-field relations
- mingling of contract and direct-hire personnel.

Role shock is a fact indeed, especially for the academic overseas: the academician's general purpose in life is to preserve, disseminate, and advance knowledge; scholarship is central to his customary role. Now there is from time to time, conflict about hierarchical relationships in all universities, but the situation is comparatively simple and certainly well known by all concerned. Shift the academic overseas. His role is uncertain, often not clearly defined and sometimes in conflict, and it is often not simple but made up of a number of new activities (the teacher-scholar becomes trainer, coach and adviser, negotiator and cheerleader, all in one) and even his purpose in being overseas may be questioned as uncertainties develop about the fundamental nature of technical assistance and its performance in a particular situation. And the T.A.A. is expected to play his role "bureaucratically," to fit into the going organization regardless of his experience or inexperience in bureaucracy at home. Indeed he is expected to be an informal ambassador of U.S. goodwill and foreign policy.

It may be worthy of mention that the American T.A.A. is expected to have a host country counterpart even though he does not work with a similar aide at home. (Question: Does the U.S. academic develop a bad habit in this regard due to his close work with graduate students, especially doctoral candidates? Is this why U.S. advisers are at times criticized by their counterparts or top-lofty and superior?) Similarly,

the U.S. adviser is exposed to an immediate sanction overseas -- namely, recipient response -- to which he is not accustomed at home. Are these not all real and substantial changes which deserve careful research so that findings may be fed back into selection and training efforts, into job and country assignments, and into standards for the evaluation of performance?

Organization Theory and Role Shock:

Traditional organization theory was not designed to accommodate professional personnel at all, let alone large numbers of them. Yet modern organizations are forced to hire more professionals and to rely on them more and more heavily. The "power field" in organization has been restructed. Management is having to develop new ways to achieve compliance. Accommodation of knowledge in the organization imposes a structural and managerial dilemma: administrative authority versus professional authority. This is especially true of the "true professional" who feels responsible only to his own conscience, his colleague peers, and the courts.12/

12/ For samples of the so-called "new" organization theory see: Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Prentice Hall, 1964) especially on the autonomous professional, p. 76; Chris Argyris, Integrating the Individual and the Organization (John Wiley, 1964); William Kornhauser, Scientists in Industry: Conflict and Accommodation (Berkeley, University of California, 1962); and for academia, John D. Millett, The Academic Community: An Essay on Organization (McGraw-Hill, 1962); and John J. Carson, Governance of Colleges and Universities (McGraw-Hill, 1960).

In these terms the central question for the professional overseas is the degree to which his own work group and team, his counterpart organization, and the U.S. Mission -- or at least that division which relates to him -- are in fact professional organizations. Stated the other way around, do AID and AID Missions need to rethink their organization, administration, supervision, and liaison practices in keeping with the new organization theory and, theory aside, in response to the demands of the professionals? It need hardly be stated that this denomination of "professional" includes the direct-hire as well as the academic professional who serves through the instrumentality of an AID-University Contract.

It might be argued that it would be easier to write selection standards so as to secure professionals with a high tolerance for administrative procedures and restraints. In other words, if the ability to find one's way in a forest of governmental organizations overseas is essential to survival, then insist all professionals have that ability prior to selection. But this would be a contradiction and at best only a very short run expedient. It would be a contradiction because the best professionals are the "true professionals." The research undertaken by Storm and Finkle showed that the anti-management group (that is, those respondents most critical of AID) were higher as to their own standards of performance and were higher in academic rank than the "pro-management" group, and "were more often tenure members of their respective university facilities."[13/] (Incidentally, they were also more seriously interested

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13/ Op. cit., p. 196.

in public affairs, less religious in the formal sense, more strongly indentified in terms of political parties, and more often liberal than conservative.)

Any specific suggestions? No, not really. A good deal of research will have to go into the effort. Professor Bernard Barber has made some interesting suggestions.14/ He calls for three types of accommodative mechanisms to reduce the strain between professional roles and organizational needs:

1. Differentiated role structures
2. Differentiated authority structures
3. Differentiated reward structures

Point one calls for segregated substructures within the organization wherein the professional has a buffer against "the outside world" and as wide discretion as possible within, especially with reference to "goal activities" i.e., choice of what he will do. (Note: is not the University contract arrangement such a substructure?) Point two calls for differentiation within the hierarchy by setting up "professionals" as the administrative authority over professional groups as substructures. (The Chief of Party of a University Contract? The Chief of the AID Mission Education Division who is himself a respected "pro" in the field and who is given a free hand by the Mission Director? Or maybe even a detached Institute of Education?) Point three means that both pay and recognition will be specially designed to fit the professionals' value system. (Here overseas work seems to be especially handicapped;

14/ Bernard Barber, "Some Problems in the Sociology: Of the Professions," in a recent issue of Daedalus.

especially since so many professionals have returned from overseas work and found it not to have been professionally rewarded; indeed to have been a loss rather than a gain in regard to promotion, professional recognition, professional research, and writing.)

It takes but the spelling out of the above three suggestions to underscore the depth of the need for probing research and innovative change of organization and administration in overseas work. Storm and Finkle suggest that the professional societies might be asked to take a hand in such probing and innovation.[15/]

THE ACTOR: WHO PLAYS THE ROLE?

The principal of our overseas drama has already been pretty well identified by the foregoing discussion. It may be fruitful to pursue further the character of the actors who play the role of technical assistance adviser overseas. Due to the heavy reliance on Storm and Finkle's research much of our discussion thus far has been in terms of the academic professional. Some mention has been made of the direct-hire professional who is employed on AID rolls.

To this category probably need be added only two more employer types, namely the foundations and the consulting organizations. If we ignore the administrators (university contract chief of party; AID division heads; foundation and consulting firms resident representatives), and omit the professionals of the United Nations, other world organizations, and other private groups as not directly related to AID efforts,

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15/ Op. cit., p. 198.

we can arbitrarily say this is our list of examples: AID direct-hire, University-contract, foundations, consulting firms.[16/]

Question: do we know all we need to know about the differences created by the nature of the employer of each? What are these differences, if any? What are the implications for job qualifications? Selection? Training? Assignment? Standard of performance? Evaluation of performance?

What about other differences determined by the profession or discipline? Nature of activity to which assigned and the strategy and tactics required? Length of service? Age? Phase or stage of project?

Overseas Type

But let us come back to a prior question before we go on with these categories. Question: is there such a thing as an overseas professional type regardless of the nature of the employer? Are the professionals who go overseas different from those who stay at home? Storm and Finkle raised this question in several forms. By using the Brookings study as a frame of reference, they were able to establish that the academic professionals of their study -- the overseas type -- were different in some respects from those the Brookings researchers studied in relation to the Federal service.[17/] The overseasmen put a good deal more stress on

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16/ The Herter Committee Report gave a broader treatment of overseas personnel including USIA and the Foreign Service of the Department of State. See Committee on Foreign Affairs, Personnel for the New Diplomacy, 1962.

17/ Franklin P. Kilpatrick, Milton C. Cummings, Jr., and M. Kent Jennings, The Image of the Federal Service (Brookings Institution, 1964).

challenge, the opportunity for achievement and self development than the stay-at-homes, and less stress on financial reward, work worthwhile socially, or the moral value of work. Negatively, the overseas social scientists excoriated routine, poor working conditions, and poor management more often than did those in the Brookings group. Even allowing for the actual difference between at-home and abroad, Storm and Finkle felt the differences of attitude great enough to be significant.18/ They describe the overseasmen as follows: -

> They expect their work to be enjoyable and do not want to "walk away from it" at night. Their work is important to them in and of itself. They do not place heavy emphasis on making money. They care about respect from family and friends and they want recognition for what they do. While they are social and willing to make friends, this value is not pressing for most of them. They want their work to be challenging but it is not terribly important for them to have the chance to "get to the t p." They are not very concerned about whether they are ahead of the next person. They believe in the Protestant Ethic, that hard work is rewarding in itself and is good for people. They are not especially committed to altruistic social values but are more likely to see their work in terms of their own interests and development. They want freedom and feel strongly about conditions which restrict their opportunity to make their own choices.

Storm and Finkle go on to point out that there were a number of items on which there was marked difference between their own respondents and Brooking's college and university teachers. Their own respondents were:

- less concerned with freedom to carry out their own ideas without interference,
- less interested in supervising others,

18/ Op. cit., pp. 82-83.

- less interested in work worthwhile to society,
- less interested in recognition for their own work,
- less concerned about having work which allowed them to develop their own special abilities
- less likely to believe success depended upon influence,
- less likely to see work as a "service to God," and
- a bit more willing to risk friendships in order to get ahead but less likely to agree that it is important to do a better job than the next person.

Among these differences may be indicators which, with further research, might be valuable to future recruitment and selection. Some of the above items no doubt relate to these persons' original decisions to go overseas, and to the nature of their own reactions to the overseas experience; hence, the value of these items. Allowance must be made, however, for the fact that these measurements were taken after their overseas experiences: that is, their occupational values may have been shaped, at least in part, by the experience overseas. Finally, it is University-contract professionals who were measured; how many, if any, of the above items apply to AID professionals remains to be determined. It is interesting to speculate that many of AID's one-tour professionals (we called them "term-specialists" above), would probably share the concerns and values of the academic professionals characterized above. The career-professionals probably would not: they would likely have become more institutionally or bureaucratically oriented, more inward-looking, and less "professional," less peer-oriented, and perhaps may have lost some of the excitement and adventure of technical assistance.

Where in this kind of speculation does the private foundation overseas professional fit? Is he to be equated with the University-contract or academic professional? There are grounds for making that equation since many of the hiring and work circumstances are the same, including the use of University-contract groups. There are differences in the work setting since the foundation is private rather than government, but if we are talking about public administration assistance, this difference will be minimized since the foundation T.A.A. must also work with both the U.S. Mission and the host country government.

Where in this kind of speculation does the consulting firm professional fit? Probably not as an academic professional. Is the consultant type not more apt to be overseas on a specific mission, such as a position classification survey, than on a more general mission, such as the setting up of an institution for education or training purposes? More on this point later.

There is need to put an end to this kind of speculation and to put into its place firmer facts based on research. Research on the academic professional overseas is exemplified by the Storm and Finkle endeavor. Their research needs to be refined in a number of directions as they themselves suggest. There need to be added longitudinal studies of the academic professional, before - during - after experience analyses, to countercheck the post-experience, personal recall Storm and Finkle had to rely on. And the self-recall of the respondents needs to be buttressed by the testimony of colleagues, and supervisors, as well as counterparts

and host country government contracts, not to mention the AID professionals who have personal experience with the professional being analyzed.

It might be revealing to run the same kind of studies on foundation-employed professionals.

The same types of studies -- a) post-experience, personal recall; b) longitudinal surveillance of individuals and groups, prior to induction, shortly following induction, mid-term, and after return home; and c) cross checks from colleagues, supervisors and counterparts -- need to be made of AID professionals, especially the term-specialists. The career professionals will require some adaptation of these techniques. (Incidentally, the career AID-sman offers an opportunity to compare long-term overseas experience with shorter run and especially one tour experience.) More on this below.

It should also be added that AID has documentation in the form of field memoranda, personnel files, terminal and other reports, efficiency ratings, and annual panel evaluations which may well constitute valuable research resources and which could serve both original and cross-check research purposes.

Difference by Employer

Storm and Finkle devote Chapter III of their study to "A.I.D. Personnel in Technical Assistance." They have a comparable set of data obtained from 160 AID-smen, drawn from the same professions as the academics: agriculture, education, engineering, and social science. The two researchers propose to give this data the same treatment as they have

given that of the academics. They express awareness of greater difficulty to do so because the AID population is more varied, less homogenous and thus less identifiable in terms of common training, socialization, experience, and career orientation. Also, there is, comparatively, a dearth of published data available about the training, professional backgrounds, experience, and career perspectives of AID professionals. Therefore, it will be more difficult to generalize about them than about academics.[19/]

So far as this writer knows, no one has as yet proposed a study of consultant firm professionals. As suggested above, much the same sort of studies need to be made of them as of AID professionals. No doubt they too divide at least into two groups: the careerists or permanent staff of the firm and the term, or project, specialists hired for a tour or a specific survey or installation.

Comparative studies of these several groups of professionals -- academics, bureaucrats, consultants -- need to be made too. Until such comparisons can be drawn with systematic accuracy, we cannot have really firm answers to such questions as the appropriate purpose for the university contract as a device, the best utilization of the consulting firm, or when to use direct hire. And then maybe we can answer for once and for all time whether there is actually an overseas type; or if there is no such type. And if not, what is the distinctive core of requirements common to all?

19/ For other studies see Francis C. Byrnes, op. cit. (footnote above), and Clarence E. Thurber, The Problem of Training Americans for Service Abroad in US Government Technical Cooperation Program (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1961).

Difference by Profession

We have already quoted Storm and Finkle to the effect that the chief differences they detected among their respondents were based upon profession: that the most significant criterion of reactions to overseas experiences was professional values; that the four professions differed each from the others. For example, Storm and Finkle found on a question as basic as the role of the professional school in preparing persons for jobs in technical assistance or similar activities abroad that there was great difference in response. While 60 percent of the respondents said that there ought to be research programs and curriculum innovations introduced in their graduate school to serve the overseas purpose, the four professional groups were well divided. The engineers and the social scientists were the extremes: only 38 percent of the former agreed, and over 70 percent of the latter. The engineers, as previously noted, believed that the best technical adviser in their field was the one with the most technical competence. Many engineers argued that they were not much affected by the cross-cultural aspect of their experience abroad. Forty-three percent of the agriculture respondents agreed curriculum innovations would be useful in their field but the changes they recommended were more often technical than behavioral in nature.[20/]

Education and social science respondents, especially the latter, were most likely to recognize needs for specifically behavioral and

20/ Op. cit., pp. 192-3.

comparative (that is, cross-national and world-regional) materials. The social scientists alone were inclined toward theoretical model building and research activities. Only the social scientists indicated in their comments any degree of sophisticated sensitivity to the arguments favoring the elevation of technical assistance itself to the status of a professional field (that is, as a separate field) apart from other professions, although inevitably interrelated at time and place of application.

(Question: What do these differences in view and in values among the professions signify as to selection of persons for overseas duty and their prior professional education, their training and orientation, not to mention job assignment, country team composition and support staffing? Would not close analysis be extremely helpful in these respects, as applied to AID's own professionals and other professionals doing work as T.A.A.'s for foundations and consulting firms?)

Is it possible some are so hyper-professional as to guarantee failure? Could we not learn to avoid such "hypers" with further study? Or, if we have to have them for technical reasons, learn how to create an artificial atmosphere around them, *à la* the Hollywood movie company on location? Or the U.S. army camp? Or the British cantonment? This suggestion is not entirely facetious; recall for this point the discussion earlier in this paper about the *organization complex* and see below the discussion of the *ecological system*.

Difference by Nature of Job Activity in which Involved

Here we get into an almost endless discussion because the specific tasks and actions the T.A.A. gets involved in overseas are so many and various. Reference has already been made to Storm and Finkle's speculation that may be the reason the four professions studied differed one from the other, especially the agriculturists and engineers from the educationists and the social scientists, was because they worked in significantly different ways which could be characterized as demonstration or performance for the former and communications for the latter.

What other kinds of distinctive activity can be identified in overseas rank? Edward W. Weidner broke the role of the T.A.A., especially the academic, into four categories: administrative, teaching, consulting, and researching.[21/]

David S. Brown called his categories "the tactics of public administration assistance overseas":

i. Persuading and selling
ii. The advisory role
iii. Demonstration projects
iv. Training and assisting others
v. Engaging in operations
vi. The use of third parties
vii. The use of leverage.[22/]

The point is that we need to know a good deal more about how the T.A.A. performs his job overseas and the kinds of skills and specific understandings he needs to perform his job successfully. There is great need for research

21/ The World Role of Universities (McGraw Hill, 1952), p. 226.
22/ Concepts and Strategies of Public Administration Technical Assistance 1945-1963, Comparative Administration Group Occasional Paper, (Indiana University, April 1964, mimeographed).

here. For example, how often does the teacher overseas need to be an effective coach and trainer as well? What kind of training should he have then to do that job actively?

Reference has already been had to the difference in demands made on a T.A.A. by a very general job assignment and by a specific one: the institution-building kind versus the wage and salary survey or accounting installation, for example. In the latter cases, it might be argued little orientation and training is necessary because of the highly specific nature of the job and the well-known character of the activities connected with it. Is this true? Can we prove it?

Consider the institution-building assignment, to set up a new school of public administration, for example. How many of the technical assistance professors assigned to it will be able to construct the courses and to set up the curriculum, as well as teach the field he is expert in? Will he know enough about university organization and administration to advise his counterparts wisely as to the structure and procedures of the new school so it will survive and succeed in its own cultural milieu? Will he be enough of a coach and trainer to work effectively with his counterpart and to guide the development of the school's professorial staff? Will he be enough of an academic strategist and tactician to know when and how to get indigenous teaching materials prepared, a research program started, and to eschew an enormous translation program? Will he know how to set up a library, have the librarian educated and trained, and the library actually utilized?

Will he be enough of a pedagogue to get the lecture method reformed, an instructional technology or audiovisual laboratory set up?

All this illustration should serve to point up is: 1) that we need to study much more deeply and closely than we have the actual different job activities and requirements of the T.A.A. overseas; and 2) respond to those study findings in more discriminative selection and training.[23/]

Difference by "length of service"

It was pointed out above that T.A.A.'s who had had previous exposure to the country where they worked, previous experience overseas, or previous technical assistance experience found the subsequent adjustments overseas easier to make and were more satisfied with their achievement abroad. Sounds like a truism, does it not? But how true is it? Can we prove it? Why is it true? And is it not possible that closer study of these cases of long term service, multiple exposures, etc., might reveal some clues of adjustment which might be generally of value.

The remark was made above that maybe the careerists, the long-experience professionals, lose something of their zeal for overseas work. How true is this possible hypothesis? If true, how serious is the loss? How may it be counteracted?

23/ There is nothing original in this suggestion. See the recommendations of the Task Force on Training and Orientation for AID: Training for A.I.D. A Ten Point Training Program (U.S. Agency for International Development, October 1961), pp. 22 and 23.

How valid is the career concept for overseas work? The hypothesis that people with tenure overseas become so increasingly more valuable that special effort should be expended to create a career for them -- this hypothesis is generally accepted. Several national study groups have made such a recommendation including the latest, the Herter Committee (see footnote 16). But can we prove it. Also, careers for whom? Only the T.A.A. administrators? Should T.A.A.'s themselves -- the professionals in health, education, engineering, public safety -- be permitted to become career persons with tenure so-to-speak? Or is a succession of one-termers better; are they more apt to be up-to-date in terms of their professional knowledge?

A very interesting report was prepared some years ago by the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry. They divided overseas men into three groups: 1) the career officer, 2) the technical assistance expert, and 3) the civilian working for a voluntary agency.[24/] They urged separate treatment and research on each of these groups, and on each of the following types of assignments:

- career vs one-term assignments
- general vs specific mission
- headquarters vs field work
- indirect vs direct contact with local population, and
- indirect vs direct recognition for work performed.

The report mentions the following factors as very important: a deep interest in and dedication to one's work, the quality of the individual's

24/ Committee on International Relations, Working Abroad: A Discussion of Attitudes and Adaptation in New Situations, Report No. 41 (New York, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, December 1958).

response to the challenge of the new and the unknown (compounded of curiosity, willingness to learn and to understand, patience, flexibility, and adaptability), and social imagination (the ability to see oneself in proper perspective and to see the other person in his own cultural and personal situation). These are provocative, preliminary findings, especially so considering the group from which they come. Further research should be conducted along these lines, especially to test the common attributes the psychiatrists feel are necessary to overseas work as well as the differences created by length of service and the nature of the assignment. Some years ago, Milton Mandell started a very interesting research approach at the U.S. Civil Service Commission to try to identify, by pencil and paper test, the persons who would do well overseas. That effort became turned around but still produced useful results in the form of an instrument which identifies candidates who should not be sent overseas. The same kind of effort needs to be resuscitated, but on more specific traits, both positive and negative, which are critical to overseas work, especially technical assistance at the technical level.[25/]

25/ See U.S. Civil Service Commission, Research Project on Selection Methods for Overseas Employees (Washington, D. C., Examining and Placement Division, August 1953) and A Statistical Study of a Clinical Technique Use in the Selection of Overseas Employees (Washington, D.C.: Supplement, USCSC Standards Division, December 1955). See also Milton Mandell's articles, "Selecting Americans for Overseas Assignments" Personnel Administration, XXI, no. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1958, pp. 25-30, and, with Sally A. Greenberg, "Selecting Americans for Overseas Employment" Personnel, Vol. 30, no. 5 (March 1954), pp. 357-66.

"Talking through an Interpreter"

While we are dealing with so-called common factors, let us add another one: namely, the remote control or playing second fiddle aspect of overseas service. Literally, this relates to the language barrier. But figuratively it describes a generic problem of overseasmanship. One professional put it this way: "I got sick and tired of telling the jokes and having the interpreter get the laughs!" This aspect applies even in cross-cultural situations wherein the professional is able to deal directly in the language of the country (English, for example) without an interpreter. He still has a counterpart. He still runs into unfamiliar language uses and strange cultural differences. He still has to give the credit to someone else. He is still helping -- not building, but helping to build someone else's institution, not his own. It would be interesting to study this phenomonon and to run down the traits which enable one professional to be happy with, or at least tolerant of, this indirect control aspect of his experience but which bothers others. What produces this kind of derivative satisfaction?

Difference by Age

Referring to the "length of service" consideration, or rather to a factor which is closely related: the age of the professional T.A.A. Adams and Garraty in their book use as the archtype of bad actor in technical assistance the brash, abrasive young man from the States who knows it all and, by God, is going to see to it that the heathen makes

proper progress whether he likes it or not, indeed may even threaten his counterpart agency with withdrawal of AID if they do not go ahead as he, the young T.A.A., recommends.[26/]

Is age that much of a criterion? Should the younger man be barred from work as a T.A.A.? Storm and Finkle had the age factor in mind when they did their study. They divided their respondents into three age groups: under 45, 45-55, and 55 and over. They were thus able to run the responses to all items, comparing those of the youngest group to the two older groups.[27/] (Incidentally, the age groups were not equally divided as to profession: the older group included more persons from agriculture and engineering while the youngest third was heavy with education and the social sciences.) It was found that age had no significant effect on the respondent's occupational values except for the item, challenge in the job. The 45-plus groups proved over twice as likely to mention challenge -- the desire to have obstacles to overcome -- as the under-45 group. The youngest respondents were strongest in agreeing that getting recognition for work done was important to them, and agreed least of the three age groups that one should have ego-orientation to one's own work, but further agreed least that one should do things out of a sense of duty or obligation to the job. The younger respondents likewise agreed least that "work is a good builder of character."

26/ W. Adams and J. A. Garraty, Is the World our Campus? (Michigan State University, 1960), Chapter 5.

27/ Op. cit., p. 63.

Storm and Finkle found that the youngest third of the respondents were the least enthusiastic about their overseas experience as a whole and the most critical of it. At the same time the youngest third expressed the greatest appreciation for their relations with counterparts and host government personnel. They were the most pleased, of the three age groups, with their personnel relations overseas. It would appear therefore that the case against the younger T.A.A. is not clear; it is by no means proved. More study will be needed; it may well be that professional background and personal characteristics are more important than age.

Speaking of age brings up another related factor, namely, level of competence. Is there such a thing as being over qualified? (Question: Is a senior academic professional, full of honors and prestige, and on top of all the latest developments in his profession, the best man to send overseas as a T.A.A.?) Seniority, honors, and prestige are most acceptable, especially to the beneficiaries in the host country. But what about the superlative level of expertise? Is it possible that the professional who heretofore has spent his time working on problems at the most advanced levels of his speciality will not be able to shift from high into low gear, from speciality to fundamentals, from knowledge-generation to know - dissemination, as his basic concern? Storm and Finkle found enough evidence, not to reach conclusions but at least to raise the hypothesis, that the distinguished senior is not necessarily the best man to send overseas as a T.A.A. He is 1) too well qualified, 2) too specialized, and 3) too set in his ways, especially in professional terms.

It would be an interesting pursuit to pair older, well-established T.A.A.'s with younger men, eliminating by the pairing all factors but age and level of competence or specialization. One of the applications of the findings of such an investigation might relate to job assignment. Maybe the older, prestigious man does not belong in the field as a T.A.A., but should be assigned at Mission headquarters to play a representational role, or to act as research adviser.

Difference by Phase of Project

One more consideration involves age but in this case, age or stage of project. If there is such a factor as age in the life of a project or institution, involving perhaps succeeding levels of maturity, should it be considered in the selection, orientation and training, and job assignment of the T.A.A.'s involved?

Iran's High Council on Administration was many years in developing. It is apparently a mature, powerful institution now playing a leading part in national development. At one stage (1957) it was doubtful that it would ever become fully established, that is, that a stable inner core of government would really develop in the form of a secretariat consisting of a career undersecretary from each ministry, plus an administrative staff. Did it take a different kind of a T.A.A. in the beginnings of the High Council when all kinds of precedents were being shattered and "it cannot be done" was in the air, than now when it has been done and the latest nuances of performance budgeting are the items of concern?

What kinds of qualities are paramount to success of a T.A.A. who "breaks the sod" on a given project? What kinds of qualities are essential

to the T.A.A.'s success who is assisting a project after it is a going concern? Little is known about such "subtleties": do we not need to find out? In what stage of a project is the innovative, creative type of T.A.A. most useful? At what stage should he be avoided? Many such questions need to be asked, and answered.

Difference of the Public Administration Type

We have raised the question of technical assistance advisers overseas as a generic type. Is there such a thing, or at least a core of requirements common to all T.A.A.'s? Let us now face the question whether there are imperatives, distinct characteristics, which are peculiar to public administration as a field of work overseas. The same question can be raised in turn for each field of professional work overseas. Certainly there is a lot of room for research here.

Generally the role of the T.A.A. is distinguished from other overseas men by his primary concern for development: the need to induce change for the better, toward economic and social improvement.

Is not the role of the P.A./T.A.A. even more pronounced in this respect? That is to say, does he not operate more closely to the cutting edge of development than any other group of T.A.A.'s? Is he not more directly concerned with developments qua development, more generally and also more immediately? The agriculturalists work to improve food production, the engineers to provide public works, the educationist to develop schools. Their development responsibilities are more specific and perhaps more easily measurable in quantitative terms. The P.A. man

is responsible for the whole government apparatus of development, including individual sector approaches such as personnel, finance, methods. Is this a distinction without a difference? Or is this a difference so significant that it should be reflected in standards for selection, training, assignment, and job evaluation?

Out of the same context arises the question, is the P.A./T.A.A. distinguished by his need to be a generalist, with an overall responsibility, rather than a specialist in a given function such as agriculture, health, or education? If so, what happens when a professional whose whole career has been spent on tax matters is assigned as P.A. adviser to a Mission in a given country?

Generally all T.A.A.'s work in and with the host country government: is not the T.A.A. in public administration distinguished by the intimacy with which he works within the host country government agencies, as well as the universality of his contacts with the government agencies? For example, is he not more apt to deal with the President's or the Prime Minister's office than any other T.A.A.'s? If true, what does this imply? All T.A.A.'s are told, sooner or later, that they are "unofficial ambassadors" of the United States in their contact with host country officials. What, in these terms is the P.A. adviser with his breadth, intimacy, and high level of government contacts? Ambassador Extraordinaire?

As late as 1959, the writer of this paper had a most interesting debate with the Chief of Mission of an important Middle Eastern country (not Iran). The Chief of Mission insisted that he could not

admit a P.A. adviser to his staff because that adviser's efforts would mean meddling in the internal affairs of that country, indeed in its own government -- something verboten in the conduct of foreign affairs. This writer spent the better part of a pleasant afternoon trying to convince that Chief of Mission that public administration assistance did not work that way. But the Chief of Mission had a point, did he not?

Mention has been made of the problem of the effect of working through an interpreter. In similar fashion, is not the P.A. adviser to be distinguished by the way he has to work at least one step removed from direct production, be that food, bridges, or schools, when he labors to help set up better personnel and finance systems, devices for administrative communication and coordination, etc? The measurement of his efforts are thus far less susceptible to quantitative treatment, as suggested above.

There is little point to drawing this discussion out further. Attention is called to the need to explore more deeply and closely the distinctive aspects, if any, of the field of overseas work denominated "Public Administration." It would appear that if any field of overseas work were to be picked as an area for selection - training - assignment experimentation and follow-up, for research purposes, that public administration might well best serve that purpose.

Much more could be said about the needs of understanding better the actor, as well as his role and stage, but let us now pass on to the critic and the function of evaluation of performance.

THE CRITIC: EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

This writer reviewed, prior to drafting this paper, the AID manual orders for its annual evaluation panels and the precepts issued for their guidance in doing the evaluations.[28/] AID is to be commended for responding so promptly and so well to the recommendations of the several task forces which had recommended increased attention to performance evaluation and selection - out procedures:[29/] Page A-6 of the manual orders states: "(4) Evaluation Panels should consider the conditions under which service has been performed, giving attention to factors of isolation, emergency, hardship and staff adequacy." And on the previous page on "(4) Interpreting efficiency reports, Panel members should be alert to evidence of bias, either unduly laudatory or critical, on the part of the rating officer. Comments of the reviewing officer and of Field Review Panel should prove helpful in this respect."

One is reluctant to appear derogatory of what is manifestly, comparatively, an advanced system of performance evaluation.[30/] But in a paper on research needs, one feels compelled to raise questions as these arise.

28/ U.S. Agency for International Development, Manual Order No. 424.1, effective March 16, 1964, and Attachments A. and B.; USAID Order No. 476.4, effective Dec. 30, 1963, "Selection out," and Attachment.

29/ See for example the Herter Committee recommendations (footnote no. 16). The 1964 revision of the AID Manual quite specifically implements the Committee's recommendation that more rigorous evaluation commence at the Class 3 level. See p. 105 of the report.

30/ A check with UN Public Administration Division revealed that there is no systematic evaluation of their T.A.A.'s at all as a formal or organized process.

Balancing Factors: The Ecological System

What balancing factors ought to be considered in evaluating the performance of a T.A.A.? Would it be possible with research to get ratings, not just descriptions but ratings, not only on the individual but on his assignment (or misassignment), the organization complex in which he worked, both United States and host country, the political and social environment, and any specific institutional context within which he was placed? There are, to be sure, Completion of Assignment Reports -- by the individual being rated however -- which may describe some of these factors. Other facts may be described in other reports available to the Evaluation Panel, to be found in the file of the employee. This plea is for something a good deal more structured and systematic.

Storm and Finkle, for example, were very much impressed by the "eco-system" as a construct or model which might have much usefulness in an effort to evaluate the overseas situation.[31/] In fact, they used that approach to guide their own study. Could not the "eco-system" of overseas technical assistance be factored out so as to produce an agreed-upon frame of reference with quantitative values attached for

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31/ Op. cit., p. 1
"Eco-system" means an ecological system conceived as made up of a) population, b) organization, c) environment and d) technology, all as reciprocally related parts of the system; indeed, the notion of a high degree of interrelatedness is fundamental to the concept. Otis D. Duncan and Leo F. Schnore, "Cultural, Behavioral and Ecological Perspectives in the Study of Social Organization," The American Journal of Sociology, LXV, no. 2, September 1959.

rating purposes? Perhaps not, but it would be a magnificent research effort, and should in the doing produce many items of valuable insights into the setting and the role of technical assistance.

But more specifically, what about the man's assignment or misassignment? Should an ex-tax adviser be struck out because, without further education or training and with only brief orientation, he was assigned as P.A. adviser to a mission in a country he had never been in before? Would it be possible to work out an actual rating of assignment in terms of appropriateness? Pages A-4 and A-5 cited above allude to this kind of need, but in a fragmentary way.

There has already been enough discussion earlier in this paper about the factor of the organizational complex, both United States and host country, in which a T.A.A. is placed overseas. Could such a complex be structured, factored, and quantified? Given all the model-building expertise of the United States, why not?[32/] It is perfectly clear that a T.A.A. must have an environment which makes his work possible: logistical support, staff support, supervision or at least information, or else he should not be judged a failure.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of overseas technical assistance work is the extent to which its effectiveness is susceptible to the receptiveness of the host country, agency, or institution. This receptiveness, or lack of it, may well be largely or even completely

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32/ See for example the mathematical model of the land use of a whole city, Ira M. Robinson - Harry B. Wolfe - Robert L. Barringer "A Simulation Model for Renewal Programming," Journal of American Institute of Planners, Vol. XXXI, no. 2, May 1965, pp. 126-134.

outside of the control of the T.A.A. and therefore should temper any evaluation of his efforts. Negative or non-response may flow from misconstrued needs, poorly conceived objectives, fragmentation of responsibility among a number of institutions and agencies, non-commitment on the part of the host country because that country may have accepted the technical assistance in order to get something else, probably economic assistance. A study of this one factor alone would be worthwhile, that is, of non-receptiveness. It probably would be even more worthwhile if cast in a frame of reference such as the eco-system model suggested above.

WHO WILL DO THE RESEARCH?

Does research on technical assistance work flow out of overseas experience as a natural byproduct of the experience? In other words, to what extent can the participants themselves be relied upon to do significant writing and professional reporting on their experience? Not very much, with but one exception, Storm and Finkle found. They asked their respondents this question of the four professional groups. Only one, the social scientists reported they had done such research and writing. And the count was gratifyingly high, 60 percent. But again, the other three professions said they had done little or none at all.

Does this not mean the research will have to be done, not by the T.A.A.'s themselves, but by persons qualified to carry it out? It would be well worthwhile discussing who those persons are and what

professional competencies and research capacities could and should be enlisted. The sociologists who study occupations, organizations, and so on have already been cited. The social, clinical, and tests--and--measurements psychologists, and the psychiatrists have been mentioned. (The economists seem to be off on other inquiries which are relevant to national development but not central to development administration.) The historians and political scientists have been evident in their interest in description, capture--and--record, and comparative studies. The social and cultural anthropologists have made a substantial contribution to the literature of technical assistance overseas especially with reference to the cross-cultural dimension. Last but far from least, the academic fraternity in public administration has done much research and writing. It is not surprising that a number of the principal works on the subject have been prepared by them. Specifically, it is to be hoped that the kind of studies instigated by Irwin Sanders of the Ford Foundation at Penn State, University of Massachusetts, M.I.T., and USC might be continued and expanded.[33/]

33/ See Irwin T. Sanders, "Interprofessional Training Goals for Technical Assistance Personnel Abroad," Report of an Interprofessional Conference on Training of Personnel for Overseas Service (Ithaca, N.Y., Council of Social Work Education, 1959); George M. Guthrie and Richard E. Spencer American Professions and Overseas Technical Assistance (Pennsylvania State University, 1965), 114 pp.; Edwin D. Driver and C. Wendell King, Report on a Retrieval Study of the Professional Person Overseas, (University of Massachusetts, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, July 1964) mimeographed, 51 pp. plus 35 tables; Storm and Finkle, op. cit., (USC-1965). The M.I.T. report has not as yet reached the hands of the writer of this paper.

A lot of constructive imagination, both as to research topics and research methodology will have to be applied to meet the problems and to provide the findings mentioned in this paper, and the many others not covered herein. Obviously, the most pressing demand will be for the social scientist researcher who has both professional and research competencies, and in addition is interested in, concerned about, and preferably has had personal experience with, overseas technical assistance in public administration.

DEVELOPING RESEARCH CAPACITIES IN EMERGING COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT TRAINING IN ADMINISTRATION

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Introduction: Training Without Research

An inconspicuous paradox may be found in the widespread establishment of training programs in the emerging countries unaccompanied by institutionalized research. At the Congress of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS) held during July 1965 in Paris more than twenty-five documents, under the heading "Education for Development Administration," were presented to the working group of schools and institutes of public administration.

Even Papua and New Guinea, which Robert S. Parker described as a "Fully Undeveloped Country," in November 1963 established an Administrative College which took over the training functions previously exercised by the Public Service Institute.[1/] Papua-New Guinea is a country of about two and a half million persons, almost all indigenous, which acquired its first university graduate in 1964, and has only a dozen university students, now enrolled as undergraduates in Australia.[2/] This is a country, also, which lacks an economic development ministry, a development or central bank, institutions taken for granted in the IIAS questionnaire to which Parker was responding. It does plan to open a university, however, which will enroll its first students in 1966.

1/ Bibliographic references are given at the end of this paper.
2/ No account is taken here of the graduates among the non-indigenuous population, comprising some 30,000 persons, largely Australians.

It would be tedious to review the situation in all the countries of Asia and Africa which have but recently won their independence. However, one can say, with little risk, that in almost all of them some schemes for pre-entry and in-service training of public servants have been launched within the last decade.

A country like Thailand, which is not a "new state" but has a long and proud history of independence, has nevertheless only recently discovered the importance of training. With the help of an In-Service Training Division in the Institute of Public Administration at Thammasat University (established in 1955), some 54 training programs were conducted from 1957 to 1964. These included 134 different courses, attended by more than 10,000 registrants.[3/]

The inconspicuous paradox lies in the fact that very little investment has been made in these countries in the systematic analysis of these training programs, in research on how the needs of each country might best be met by training, in studies of administrative and developmental processes which might be strengthened by training programs, or in systematic evaluations of the actual impact of the programs launched upon the country. Nor is there any evidence that this situation, this contrast between the vigor of training efforts and lack of related research, is regarded as strange or inappropriate. The idea that the relevant and suitable pattern of training in emerging countries might be quite different from that in Western countries has provoked comment

3/ For details see the document by Amara Raksasataya in the IIAS collection.

and stimulated consultations prior to launching a scheme, but it has rarely led to systematic and sustained research.

There are, no doubt, exceptions. Yet even a country like Brazil, one of the first (with help from the United Nations in 1952) to launch a major School of Public Administration, has only recently begun to sense this major gap in its program. The School's director, Mrs. Beatriz M. de Souza Wahrlich, writing for the IIAS Congress, reports the integration into the School of a Center for Administrative Research in April 1964. Among this Center's activities is a scheme to support research related to teaching. Sixteen projects are listed as having been started in 1964, of which three seem to have some relation to training. One concerns opportunities for scholarships abroad in public administration, a second the receptivity of the state public service for candidates trained in administration, and a third relates to fundamental characteristics of administrative leadership. Another part of the Center's program is concerned with the preparation of fifteen textbooks which "will fill a long-standing void in the literature on public administration" in Brazil (p. 7). One of the monographs commissioned deals with "The Education of Administrators and Training for the Public Service in Brazil."

This development in Brazil, however, appears exceptional rather than typical. And it must be remembered that Brazil is a large country which has also, in some regions at least, become highly developed. There are now, for example, eleven schools of public administration in

Brazil, largely based in the universities, although the Brazilian School of Public Administration, which pioneered this field, did so under the aegis of the Getulio Vargas Foundation.

Ambivalent Attitudes Toward Research

A characteristic expression of the fundamental ambivalence which has made it difficult for those responsible for the conduct of training programs to give adequate support to relevant research is contained in the IIAS document by S. S. Richardson, director of the Institute of Administration in Northern Nigeria. "Professional training," he writes, "must not become a plaything of academics or an activity secondary to research. . . . Output must not be held up in deference to the pleadings of the philosophers for more time for thought" (p. 5). Yet Richardson is acutely aware of the need to make training relevant to the problems of the country for he writes, in the same paragraph, that: "Training programmes must produce and feed back must be carefully studied."

What, indeed, is the study of "feed back" but research? The training given, says Richardson, should "fully reflect changing conditions." But how are these conditions to become known save through research? Perhaps one difficulty here lies in divergent conceptions of the meaning of the term "research." If it is perceived as a "plaything of academics" and the leisurely ratiocination of philosophers, then one can understand that a man of action would regard this kind of activity as a threat to the efficient conduct of training programs. But research

can also, at the opposite extreme, be thought of as little more than the collection of relevant information, what Richardson sees as the useful fruit of "frank interchanges between the agency and the training institution."

A third view of research may be regarded as intermediate between these two, or perhaps better as a combination of both. Neither the purely logical methods of the philosopher nor the purely empirical outlook of the pragmatist are enough. Scientific research involves the combination of systematic theorizing with factual data. Only such a framework can provide, I believe, the verified knowledge of cause-effect relationships and the predictive capabilities which will enable planners, whether of training programs or of economic development schemes, to formulate and implement projects capable of achieving their own goals.

We must at least consider the possibility that present training programs will, in fact, lead to results just the opposite of those intended. However unpleasant such a possibility may seem, we must be willing to contemplate it if we are to raise the fundamental questions to which answers are needed. If, after considering this disagreeable hypothesis, we can prove it wrong, can show that existing training practices are indeed well designed to secure our basic objective, we shall then be able to proceed with far more confidence in the rightness of our approach than we have had hitherto. Instead of feeling somehow, intuitively or in our bones, that we are going forward in the right way, we shall be able not only to reassure ourselves that we have acted

properly, but we shall be able to prepare a convincing case for those who allocate resources, thereby assuring more generous and sustained support for these programs.

Interestingly enough, Richardson himself, in his discussion of some of the perplexities affecting his own Institute's programs, raises some sharp questions which require, not just intuitive answers or a "frank interchange of views," but systematic analysis. Consider, for example, the following statement:

> . . . if a training scheme is being devised for improving professional standards in local government service and appointments to the service are made under a locally controlled spoils system, the correct approach is to train the people who are in the jobs rather than people for the jobs and the technique employed by the training officer will be very different from what would be adopted in training for employment in a merit system. Where a person qualified by training to do a particular job fails to obtain a post in the system against a person who is unqualified but in receipt of patronage, then he perforce seeks employment elsewhere and to that extent, at least, his training has been wrongly directed and wasted. The social consequences of misdirection of this kind must be costed to include the frustrations and bitterness engendered in the disappointed trainee. (Obstacles to the Development of Administrative Training Programmes," p. 3.)

The Implicit Assumptions Behind Training Programs

The questions raised by this statement strike at the core of the assumptions implicit in most training programs. As designed in the United States, England, and other Western countries, training for the public service is conceived of as a way of imparting skills, knowledge, and values required by career officials for the impartial administration of programs whose basic objectives have been set by political and

legislative institutions outside the boundaries of the state bureaucracy itself. However much public officials may shape the details of policy execution, or even put before the political leadership information about the probable consequences and feasibility of alternative policies, it is not considered to be a normal part of administrative training to provide officials with normative criteria for use in shaping and legitimizing public policies.

It is also assumed that the officials trained will enter a career service where the competencies gained through their training will be utilized over a considerable period of time, and that the training imparted will also be relevant to the work performed, enhancing the capability of the trainees to perform this work, and thereby improving their prospects for recognition and promotion.

What happens if these assumptions do not hold? Can one merely reshape the content of training, or must the whole concept of training itself be reassessed? Consider first the question of a career service based on merit principles. Clearly from Richardson's statement he is thinking of a system in which many officials are appointed on the basis of favoritism and where promotions may not be made for merit, nor can a career service be assumed. One can scarcely assume that such a state of affairs is unique to Northern Nigeria. Indeed, on a comparative basis, one may well believe that conditions in Nigeria approximate the model of a career and merit system more closely than they do in many other parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Let us ask what role training on the Western model can play in a society where the government services are organized on the basis of favoritism in appointments and promotions, with rapid turnover of offices. Without in any way suggesting that such a condition prevails in all or even most of the emerging countries, we should nevertheless agree, I think, that it may prevail in some. If so, what kind of training system, if any, would be appropriate for such countries? We might conclude that any formal training scheme would have limited utility. It might even be harmful. Those who worked hard to strengthen their competence might not be employed in positions corresponding to their abilities, and would consequently become disaffected. If they did not turn their energies to the service of revolutionary groups, they would certainly discredit among their friends the notion that training was a useful activity.

Meanwhile those who did secure appointments as a result of the influence of friends in power would be unlikely to devote themselves strenuously to training programs because they would know that their own good fortune depended on the support of powerful allies and patrons more than job performance. As beneficiaries of a patronage system, they would realize that their welfare depended on their ability to please their supporters more than serving the public interest. If they were to enter training programs, it would be with the goal of cultivating the favor of their patrons rather than to provide better public service.

Latent Functions of Training

If we find that training programs are encouraged by those in power in governments permeated by patronage and favoritism, then we may ask why this should be the case despite the disutilities just pointed out. Perhaps they fulfill some unexpected latent functions.

One plausible explanation could be that it has become fashionable in our times to provide training programs. Why is it that the trend to set up such programs has swept around the world only within the last decade? Did those countries which are generally considered to be the most developed have training programs in earlier decades? We shall find, I believe, that the higher career services in these countries have been recruited, for the most part, from men with academic or professional education in some field such as law, medicine, engineering, and the humanities, not with specific training for public administration. Competence for specific organizational work and management has been acquired subsequently through experience and "on-the-job-training." Such training, however, has rarely if ever been a matter of design. Rather, it has been the informal fruit of working with others whose examples and ideas gradually influenced one's own conduct in office.

Strangely enough, the country which most notably provided formal training for all new recruits to the public service was the Ottoman Empire. In its classic period, enslaved boys were inducted into the imperial household and provided with a rigorous schooling designed to make them reliable instruments of the royal will. However excellent

the Ottoman services might have appeared to unbiased European contemporaries who could compare them objectively with the corrupt, spoils-ridden bureaucracies of their own countries, it was not the Turkish empire but the relatively more chaotic European governments which laid the foundations for modern development and established the conditions requisite to the industrial revolution. A somewhat parallel situation might be found in imperial China where the examination system for recruitment to a career-based bureaucracy made it necessary for candidates to secure, through private means, a costly education based on the ethical and administrative doctrines of Confucianism. But the Chinese and the Ottoman systems of public service training both tended to block modernization and both had to be destroyed completely before the foundations of modern governance could be laid in contemporary Turkey and China.

It is interesting to note that even in the United States, contemporary stronghold of public service training, the idea was introduced only in the twentieth century. Starting modestly at the Institute of Public Administration in New York, it was later transferred to the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. It was not until the New Deal period in the 1930's that the idea became popular and spread to other universities. Even so, specific education in public administration remains, until the present day, primarily a means of preparing men for the "staff" services, rather than for work in the main "line" agencies. Technical, professional, and legal education still constitute the primary avenues for entry to the civil services.

As to in-service training, this has now become quite popular in the United States, and many programs of executive or career development have mushroomed, both in government and in industry. In view of the extensive industrialization and expansion of public services which had already taken place, however, it is as reasonable to assume that training appeared because of, and after, development as to think that it facilitated development in the first place. It can be argued that only affluence makes it economical to spare officials from their normal duties to engage in training programs. Alternatively, it can be supposed that only after the tasks of administration have become extremely complex and/or specialized in a modern, developed country does it become worthwhile to devote resources to training for tasks which, previously, had been mastered by anyone of reasonable intelligence who really wanted to perform them.

The Emulation Effect and Foreign Aid

On the hypothesis that the rapid spread of training programs reflects a current fashion rather than a necessity of development, one might still ask what mechanism transmits this fad, what leads to emulation in this field? One answer, surely, is the very existence of organization such as the International Institute of Administrative Sciences. Through questionnaires sent to every country responsible officials are led to ask themselves whether they are up-to-date, whether they will be ashamed at international meetings because they are deficient in so presumably important a matter as training.

The nature of this pressure becomes evident on reading Robert Parker's reply to the IIAS questionnaire. He observes that the schedule asks about facilities for training personnel in "central planning, programming, budgetary and other central policy offices; economic development ministries, development banks, central banks, etc." Parker, not being an "indigenous inhabitant" of New Guinea, and therefore perhaps more willing to expose realities than national respondents might be elsewhere, comments that "New Guinea is still at the stage where none of these functions is really performed in the Territory itself . . . It would seem therefore that the Symposium might consider the structure and functions of planning and policy-making institutions that are desirable in Territories like New Guinea, as a necessary basis for discussing the most appropriate training and educational programmes to staff them efficiently" (p. 1).

For most respondents, however, moved as they naturally are by a desire to make the best possible impression at international meetings, and eager as they are to travel to one of the glamorous capitals of the world, the unavoidable response is to present whatever training programs have already been established in the best possible light, and insofar as these programs seem deficient by comparison with those of other countries, to exert themselves to set up programs which will make a favorable impression abroad.

One need not think, however, that it is only the emulation effect which spurs the international dissemination of training programs.

More concrete incentives can be found in the resources and policies of the United Nations, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), the Ford Foundation, the Colombo Plan, and other major sources of technical assistance and foreign aid. By requesting support for such an agency, the participating country not only obtains help in catching up with other countries, but also such tangible benefits as funds for travel abroad and for creating new institutes and schools which, in turn, can provide positions for job-hungry candidates unable otherwise to satisfy their ambitions.

Moreover, there is always the hope, spread by the optimistic views of foreign advisers, that training programs will really help poor countries pass through the "doorway to the Twentieth Century," becoming thereby richer and more powerful. . . How this is to happen may not be too clear, but if affluent countries have training programs, then no doubt poor countries can speed their own progress by having them also.

To put the matter so baldly is, no doubt, to caricature the actual situation. A serious and plausible argument can be made to the effect that modernization depends on efficient public services, and that such services will become available only if well qualified persons staff them. Insofar as training programs can equip candidates and public officials to perform their duties more effectively, training is a strategic means to speed the processes of development.

The Relevance of Training to Development

The fatal flaw in this argument may well be that inefficiency in the public services of poor countries is due much more to lack of an adequate incentive system than to the scarcity of trained manpower. If the men who do become highly qualified fail to secure appropriate positions, and those who receive appointments feel that they have little to gain by administrative training, then the resources invested in training are likely to make little impact on the situation. They may, indeed, be wasted.

Such is likely to be the case not just because of favoritism in appointments but, even more importantly, because of weakness in a country's political institutions. Consider for a moment the extreme case where legislative bodies are mere rubber stamp mechanisms to legitimize the decisions of autocratic rules, and political parties have been built as a means to secure popular support for the clique or junta which runs the government. Under such conditions the men who become government officials are likely to find themselves involved in tense intra-bureaucratic struggles whose outcome will not only shape their own careers but deeply affect the future of the government and the composition of the ruling elite.

If such is to be the role played by government officials, then training in administrative skills, in the techniques of management and the rational utilization of scarce means to achieve prescribed goals is likely to be irrelevant. The official will have much greater

need for political sagacity, for diplomatic skills, for cunning in bureaucratic in-fighting, for making alliances and undermining enemies. Such are scarcely the attainments cultivated in schools of public administration and in-service training programs. Whatever gains may be made by officials and candidates for public employment who pass through these programs, it seems unlikely that they will derive much direct benefit through enhanced administrative competence if governmental power is allocated by the means visualized above. If so, then what values can be secured by such training programs?

This, of course, is not to suggest that training is everywhere irrelevant or wasteful in the emerging countries. In some of them, indeed, such as India, the Philippines, Brazil, Turkey -- to name but a few instances quite at random -- the level of development already achieved may be such as to render the government capable of making efficient use of more highly trained manpower. If so, however, the discernible correlation between training and development may well show that development makes good training programs possible rather than the opposite hypothesis that training speeds development.

Ulterior Motives and Training

The reader may well object, at this point, that if training can be as irrelevant to the needs of a developing country as is suggested by the foregoing argument, then surely so many countries would not have embraced the idea with such enthusiasm. The international emulation effect and the lure of foreign aid are surely not sufficient

to explain the rapid spread of training programs. Are there, indeed, any other reasons, more organic to the requirements of the emerging countries, which might help to explain their enthusiasm for training schemes?

Sociologists have demonstrated that social structures may have latent or hidden as well as manifest or open functions. The latter are freely explained in terms of the simple, the approved motives of the participants; the former correspond to the ulterior, the concealed motives. Psychologists have also demonstrated that individuals acting for reasons of which they are ashamed often try to justify their actions to others by invoking respectable reasons, i.e., by "rationalizing." Could it be that the formal objectives ascribed to training programs are rationalizations, and the more operative reasons for their popularity can be ascribed to ulterior motives? If so, what could these motives possibly be?

Again, field research is needed to give a definitive answer to such a question. But guesses can be made in the form of hypotheses subject to refutation or validation by research. Such hypotheses can be formulated if we ask what practical advantages might accrue to trainees apart from those formally attributable to training. In other words, how could someone gain from taking a training program even though he did not thereby acquire any skills or knowledge which would enable him to do a better job as a public official? If the exclusive, or even the primary functions served by training programs had to do with strengthening the performance capabilities of trainees, then there would be few by-products of this activity to look for -- they

would not be significant factors in explaining the spread of training activities. But where ulterior motives are powerful, the latent functions of the activity must be examined carefully.

One of these latent functions of training has already been mentioned, the attainment of prestige on the international stage. Those governments which support training improve their image in the eyes of foreign critics. Moreover, insofar as trips abroad as students, participants and delegates to international meetings accrue to those involved, a second latent function of training programs becomes apparent.

There may well be other latent functions and ulterior motives that reinforce these. I suggest, for example, that the pattern of recruitment and promotion of officials in many of the emerging countries is not primarily a matter of favoritism in the sense of purely individual and accidental connections and influence, nor does it depend essentially on achievement and merit. There are, after all, other modes of recruitment and promotion. I have in mind a procedure that may be called "strategic learning."4/

Communalism and Public Office

In order to appreciate the full impact of strategic learning, we must first say something about the related phenomenon of communalism. Many of the emerging countries are characterized by a sharp

4/ For definition and discussion see my book, Administration in Developing Countries (Houghton Mifflin, 1964), pp. 149-56.

differentiation of "communities" (in the Indian sense) from each other. The grounds for identification of a person with a community may be racial, religious, linguistic, or cultural, or any combination of these traits. Even highly industrialized countries, such as the United States, suffer from substantial communalism, based in this instance primarily on racial criteria. In a country like Malaya, all the grounds of identification are combined in the prevalent differentiation of Malay, Chinese, and Indian communities.

Following Richardson's philosophy, one should offer training essentially to those who are in, or likely to be in, the public service, not wasting resources on the education of persons not likely to be able to secure official posts. But let us suppose that in a poly-communal society, governmental positions, especially those in the higher echelons, are monopolized by members of one community and that those who belong to other communities are systematically discriminated against in such employments. This, of course, was precisely the situation under colonial rule whenever all the key bureaucratic posts were monopolized by expatriates coming from the "mother country." It was precisely the revolt of subjugated majorities against the monopolization of positions, wealth, and prestige by a ruling caste which laid the basis for the independence movements in these countries. The origin of the Congress Party as a movement to open civil service positions to Indians is a classical example.

But it should not be thought that the dangers arising from communal domination of public office arise only under Western

imperialism. The resistance of the Chinese in Malaya to alleged discriminations by a dominant Malay community in Kuala Lumpur lay behind the recent secession of Singapore.

One might, of course, argue that the question of improving administrative efficiency can be divorced from problems of social justice and political revolution. If so, one might help the ruling Africander and English communities in South Africa to strengthen governmental efficiency without concerning himself about broader issues involving interracial relationships. Thus one might seek to separate administration from politics in a sense never contemplated by Woodrow Wilson.[5/]

Can a solution along such lines work even at the administrative level? Consider one of the most basic functions of government, the maintenance of law and order. If the monopolization of power by a dominant community gives rise to feelings of hostility and alienation on the part of subject communities, then the task of maintaining the peace becomes increasingly arduous. The prevalence of social order is only in part a function of efficient police and judicial services; it is perhaps even more a function of the sense of integration, of identification of the population with the state and society. Most governmental programs, especially in any modern society, require substantial cooperation between the public and government officials if they are to be successful and not impossibly costly. Hence

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5/ For a discussion of Wilson's views in this context see my essay, "Relearning an Old Lesson: The Political Context of Development Administration" in Public Administration Review, Vol. 25 (March 1965), pp. 70-79.

administration in an emerging country can become effective and efficient only to the extent that it succeeds in winning relatively active support from the administered populations.

Insofar as this proposition can be accepted, it becomes evident that a training policy which selects candidates for instruction only from among those persons who are already in government, or likely to secure appointments, is unlikely to succeed, even by strictly administrative criteria, if power is monopolized by a dominant community at the expense of large subject communities.

That training programs may, in fact, be so used has been a lesson of history. After all, one of the early instances of a significant training program for a large-scale career bureaucracy was that of the Indian Civil Service which, early in the nineteenth century, put its new recruits through several years of pre-entry training at Haileybury College. When the responsibilities of the East India Company were subsequently transferred to the government of England, the training function was shifted to the leading universities, essentially of Oxford and Cambridge. Not only was recruitment for the Civil Service limited to Englishmen, but it became increasingly a prerogative of upper-class Englishmen. To suggest, therefore, that training ought to be given especially to those in power represents, in a paradoxical new form, an old tradition.

The Role of "Strategic Learning"

At this point a critical reader may protest that, if training is as irrelevant as has been suggested above, then the monopolization of training facilities by a dominant community should have no significant impact on the course of events. It is here that one must bring into the picture the role of "strategic learning."

Government by a dominant community differs from traditional regimes in that the recruitment of elites does not take place by simple ascription. Inheritance of office is the clearest example of simple ascription. But under communal rule, the dominant community is much larger than the elite. Thus means must be found to select from among the numerous members of this community those who will be elevated to elite positions.

It is difficult to find a principle of selection to fit this situation. Pure favoritism is not as effective a mode of recruitment as one may think. A hereditary ruler may institutionalize favoritism, but only because the recruitment of the ruler himself is governed by purely ascriptive criteria. Even then, appointed officials try to make their posts hereditary, thereby weakening the effective power of the ruler. If there is disagreement about the succession to the top position, then rival factions contend for office, civil strife ensues, and violence becomes the salient means of resolving disputes.

Another form of favoritism involves the designation of office-holders by a victorious party. Such a "spoils system" can work only because ultimate power rests with the voters who decide between contending parties.

But in most of the emerging countries we are dealing with situations where effective power has not been transferred to the electorate and to a system of contending political parties. Indeed, the maintenance of communal rule is basically incompatible with an electoral system that recognizes the right of general or universal suffrage, although it may persist temporarily if the suffrage can be granted exclusively to the dominant community. But when the electoral principle is once legitimized, subject communities begin to demand equality at the polls, and the supremacy of the dominant community is thereby undermined.

An alternative mode of seeking to preserve the special privileges of a dominant community involves the use of schooling as a substitute for the electoral principle. The right to rule is claimed for the educated rather than the elected. In this context, administrative training is only one sector of the general system of schooling. Political rights and access to public office is limited to those who secure these privileges by obtaining some certificate, diploma or degree as the culmination of a formal program of instruction. By limiting opportunities for such schooling to its own members, a dominant community can maintain its privileges and power. By combining an achievement-oriented technique -- education -- with an ascriptive criterion -- birth -- communalism can be perpetuated.

When the essential, though latent, goal of a school system is to select candidates for elite positions, then the central interest of students shifts from the content of what is taught to the attainment

of the prized certificates which open doors to future power, prestige and, wealth. Such a school system may appear on the surface to offer substantive education but its more important, and latent, function is to provide strategic learning.

The principle of strategic learning is closely correlated with the principle of bureaucratic rank. This principle, which is best exemplified in military and police services around the world, was also highly developed in Czarist Russia where the root chin in the term chinovnik or official simply meant "rank." As is well known, in the rank system, a whole set of associates rights and status symbols are attributed to each rank. Regardless of the actual work performed, a captain or a major is considered entitled to his appropriate salary, deference, and insignia.

Interestingly enough, entry to the officer ranks of all contemporary regular military services has been based on pre-entry training programs. Military cadet schools have spread from Europe to virtually every country of the world, and in each case probably antedate training programs for civil services. The expansion of training programs often carries with it an effort to institutionalize a cadet-type system. The key principle in a rank-oriented bureaucracy is that admission is based on certification, not achievement, and promotion follows from seniority more than from expertise, especially during peacetime. I do not wish to deny that what is taught in an academy is relevant to the assignments subsequently given military officers, but the point is that graduation from a cadet school and the academic record made there, counts very heavily in subsequent appointments.

Insofar, then, as certification -- the acquisition of a degree -- carries greater weight than the competencies acquired through training in a career service, the students in a training school tend to become more concerned with the degree than with course content. Such, I believe, is the situation which prevails in many of the emerging countries.

The Origins of Strategic Learning

Why should this be so? We need not assume that dominant communities have deliberately designed a system to assure their own supremacy, though once established we can understand why they would perpetuate it.

Let us consider, first, the relation between content of instruction and the tasks assigned to graduates. In large part it is not merely the content of in-service training programs but also of regular schools and universities in the non-Western world which is patterned after the offerings of cognate institutions in the West. The reasons why this is so are numerous and well known, so they need not be recited here.

But what are the consequences? Graduates entering the public service find themselves equipped with a costly but largely irrelevant body of knowledge and skills. Knowing that such knowledge is obtained by their opposite numbers in the most developed countries they may imagine -- and certainly it is easy to convince the average citizen of this supposition -- that Western learning is indeed relevant to the

problems they will face in their quest for modernity. But even if they discover, after bitter experience, that it is irrelevant, they will scarcely admit this fact to the general public nor consent to the appointment and promotion of rivals who lack it.

Moreover, in most bureaucracies one discerns the formation of social identifications, especially among the elites. To join the higher ranks is also to join a social club. Membership is based less on technical competence than on ability to speak the same language, to share common symbols and values. In such a club the ability to recite Homer in the original Greek may count for more than accounting skills or managerial talents.

In other words, where strategic learning prevails, one goes to school, not primarily to acquire new knowledge and skills relevant to future needs, but rather to acquire not only a degree, but also an armory of ritualistic phrases and sentiments which can be used, like talismans, to gain admission to the inner sancta of the public bureaucracy. Insofar as a training program can add to this impedimenta, especially where the acquisition of a certificate automatically assures promotion or admission to a select cadre, it is understandable that such training programs should become very popular.

Significantly, some of the questions raised by Richardson in his IIAS document point to the prevalence of strategic learning. He writes as follows:

> Throughout the former colonial territories Governments and the Directors of training establishments frequently agree on qualifications for a particular post which are re-statements

> of the qualifications required in the metropolitan countries and often are no longer relevant to the local situation. There are curious psychological difficulties in obtaining recognition by Governments, the private sector and, indeed, the students themselves of a curriculum and qualifications tailor made for ascertained local needs. Whilst everybody will pay lip service to the principle of substituting local for overseas qualifications, in practice the graduate with internationally recognized overseas qualifications which are often completely irrelevant to his task will nevertheless enjoy a status advantage over his locally trained colleague (p. 4).

What Richardson sees as a regrettable fact or a sign of irrationality should rather be seen, I believe, as a natural consequence of strategic learning and the rank system. When admission to the public service and prestige positions is limited to graduates who can speak correctly and who hold degrees from the "right" places, why should those in power agree to changes certain to undermine their own privileges. Why, also, should students accept alternative curricula that are unlikely to entitle them to the rewards for which alone they are willing to undergo the tedious, because so meaningless, business of going to school? And if such are the ulterior motives which dictate support of training schemes, why should they be openly admitted, and why should not lip service be given to the new doctrines which confer international respectability, and assure external financial assistance?

If the opportunity to secure a costly education is largely limited to those whose families already hold positions of power and influence -- and belong to the dominant community -- then we can readily see how strategic learning and communalism will reinforce each other, and how the attainment of high rank in the public service will assure the employment of prestigious affluence in the social class system. The

superior educational attainments of a dominant community can be used not only to maintain but also to justify its monoplies and special privileges.

The Dangers of Research

That the situation and relationships outlined above do, in fact, exist in some countries can scarcely be denied. How widespread this condition may be can well be a subject for debate -- and for research. Insofar as such a condition does exist, it would appear to be unwise to reinforce it by supporting the establishment of training programs which accentuate strategic learning and communalism without promoting development. If the contention of a social scientist that careful research ought to precede and accompany the creation of training programs is treated as an academic delaying tactic, then we can perhaps imagine that those who oppose research do so because they fear that it would uncover embarrassing facts.

We may well have come across an explanation for the curiously inconspicuous paradox noted at the beginning of this paper. The widespread lack of relevant research should be as much a cause for surprise as the rapid spread of training programs. Why, with the rising international interest in research and with the foreign financial support that has become increasingly available, have not more research programs been set up in close association with the new training efforts?

The answer may lie in the same considerations, the same ulterior motives, that appear to have motivated the rapid acceptance of training. For just as training, based on Western models, can be used to deepen the influence of strategic learning and to strengthen the grip of dominant communities over governments, so research might be used to expose these relationships and to provide ammunition for the critics of government, for those who seek either to infiltrate or to overthrow the established regime.

Yet even this resistance to research in the emerging countries might perhaps have been overcome if the agencies of external aid had themselves been eager enough promote research. The lure of outside funds might have been sufficient to bring research programs into existence. But the fact is that external agencies, especially the governments and inter-governmental agencies, have not given the same kind of substantial support to research that they have to direct operation, whether as foreign aid or technical assistance.

Characteristically the Brazilian School of Public Administration, although established with help from the United Nations in 1952, did not launch a major research program until it set up its Center for Administrative Research in 1964, when it received a grant from the Ford Foundation enabling it to finance a new program of studies of Brazilian administrative behavior. It is true that AID gave some research support to the School in 1963 according to Mrs. Wahrlich's account, but this was characteristically for the translation of

foreign, notably American, writings on public administration rather than for the preparation of new studies concerning the realities of Brazilian administration.

Why should these agencies have been so reluctant to sponsor research? No doubt one reason was the notion, especially popular in Congress and other appropriating bodies, that technical assistance involves essentially the transfer of existing "know-how" to countries which lack the knowledge to bring about their own development. This comforting idea suggests that the knowledge and skills required for development already exist, and that the cost entailed is only the relatively modest expense of transmitting the required information to the right persons. Training programs are, manifestly, appropriate mechanisms for the transfer of knowledge.

Research programs, by contrast, can be justified only on the assumption that we do not yet know the answers to our problems, and that further study is required before the appropriate solutions can be found. But no assurance can be given in advance that research will, in fact, discover simple cures, nor can anyone know how long it may take to find answers or what the overall costs might be. To promote research is therefore to admit ignorance and to open the door for unlimited future demands for funds.

Even the Ford Foundation, which has proved most generous in its financing of research, set up an internal organizational cleavage which mitigated against vigorous support for research overseas on administrative behavior and problems. One major unit, concerned with overseas development, tended to stress technical assistance and action programs

at the expense of research. Another division, devoted specifically to research and training, was limited in its scope to the support of Americans studying foreign areas and their problems. Thus effective research support was not, until recently, meshed with overseas technical assistance, and few incentives were provided for American scholars to collaborate effectively with indigenous scholars in the emerging countries in programs that might provide sound intellectual foundations for developmental efforts.

Research and the Profession

One suspects that the reasons for the weakness of research support from overseas for the new institutes and schools of public administration may also have stemmed from some fears of the exponents of public administration which parallel the fears of indigenous officials overseas. The pretensions of American specialists in public administration to have an expertise which is relevant abroad are necessarily based on the belief that answers have already been found to problems which are virtually universal in character. To admit that basic research is needed, therefore, is to admit the possibility that this body of knowledge and skill may be more or less irrelevant abroad. Such an admission might eliminate public administration specialists from technical assistance programs. Nor would the training of foreign participants in established schools and institutes of public administration continue to be justifiable if much of our established "wisdom" in this field could be shown to be irrelevant in the emerging countries.

Should such an exposure occur, those seeking foreign aid and advice might well turn to anthropologists, economists, or sociologists rather than to specialists in public administration. Or the administrative experts would have to "re-tool" in a wide range of subjects and techniques they had hitherto slighted. Both of these alternatives would be costly. Nor can such motivations be admitted for they also rest on ulterior motives, on some of the latent rather than the manifest functions of technical assistance programs in public administration.

The profession, in other words, has its own peculiar reasons for resisting fundamental research on problems of administrative development. It could, of course, support more superficial research efforts to accumulate data compatible with the established model of administrative performance. It is quite safe to prepare organization charts, to collect data on available training programs and fellowships, to describe course offerings, to investigate the history of governmental programs, and to prescribe reforms which ought to be undertaken in the light of a growing catalog of administrative malpractices.

But such investigations can scarcely be called fundamental research. They do not produce a meaningful body of knowledge about the causes and consequences of patterns of administrative behavior found in the emerging countries. While failing to produce such results, however, they do secure a different kind of latent pay-off. They provide useful data for the conduct of educational and training programs established on the Western model. They appear to validate the sincerity of foreign advisers in their support of research. By avoiding

dangerous issues, they make it possible for the administrative profession to maintain the convenient fiction that existing bodies of knowledge and doctrine are still essentially relevant to the problems of administrative development abroad.

Conclusion

The problem of institutionalizing research capacities in emerging countries to support training in administration is, then, only in part the problem of generating a support basis for such research in the participant countries. Even more, it is the problem of creating a base for such research in the Western countries, especially in the United States. Until such a base can be created in American universities and research centers, and until the American government and private foundations can be induced to provide the financial support which these institutions cannot furnish from their own regular resources, it seems unlikely that any basic research on training abroad will be carried out.

I believe it would be possible, however, to create a plan of action in the United States that could help to create the required research capacity overseas. It would entail a concerted effort by a number of American scholars and institutions, in close cooperation with selected colleagues overseas who have already shown their interest in and capacity to carry out such research. Some such research has already been carried on, both here and abroad, by American and foreign scholars. But it remains pitifully inadequate in the face of the great and growing need. In large part is still must face the suspicion,

if not the opposition, of established professional and institutional interests in the field, and the reluctance of aid giving agencies to provide adequate financial backing. Hopefully, the conference at the Brookings Institution, for which this paper was prepared, will serve a great creative purpose by opening a door, even though a small door, to permit a growing awareness of the need for fundamental research of the kind proposed here, and to shape an entering wedge to invite cooperation and solicit support for such an endeavor.

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PART III

SUMMARY OF THE

SYMPOSIUM DISCUSSIONS

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Focussing in the main on questions raised in the prepared papers, discussants identified, accepted, or rejected the need for further research on specific and general administrative problems and training needs. Topics have been summarized under five broad headings: The Administrative Function in Emerging Nations; The Professional Public Administrator in the Development Process; Special Training Needs of Administrators in Emerging Nations; Goals of Technical Assistance; and The Role of the Foreign Adviser. Each section is followed by a brief listing of the research problems uncovered during the course of the discussion.

The report concludes with a summation of the major issues on which, in the view of the chairman and rapporteur, there was general agreement as to the need for further research. Priorities have not been established among these issues. Participants keyed their remarks and suggestions to those aspects of developing administrative capabilities most pertinent to the functions of an aid-giving agency. No attempt was made to reach a concensus on any particular research need, but persistent emphasis on certain subjects (such as the

development of country profiles and the systematic compilation of existing technical assistance data) left no doubt as to the priorities in the minds of some participants.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION IN EMERGING NATIONS

Can public administration be defined generically or must analysis be confined to finding out how the system actually works in each specific administrative situation?

Every country can be said to be unique in its administrative structure and in its ability to accept new ideas, synthesize them, and assimilate them in their new form within the framework of longstanding indigenous institutions or tribal organization. In fact, every institution can be regarded in this sense as unique. Comparative study has therefore been difficult. The problem has been further compounded because administrative solutions in different parts of the world (and even within the same region) have been arrived at through research based on differing concepts, differing standards and technology.

Attempts have been made, of course, to arrive at appropriate definitions of the various administrative functions common to a variety of political systems. But the pattern of development in new nations is constantly changing and is continuously subjected to ideological and political pressures unknown in the years when western nations grew to maturity. A further concerted effort is perhaps in order today to establish a broad frame of reference on the role of public administration that will provide a common base for research and inquiry for administrators in all parts of the world.

A general operational framework for public administration applicable to all types of situations would be too broad to have much practical value, but classification of certain general administrative functions by region and closer definition by subgroups of countries at different stages of development is possible and has merit. There will be a tremendous range of variation within the subgroups but appropriate typologies could be worked out on which to base the delineation and sequencing of reform measures. Refinement within the broad categories established at regional or subgroup level would lead to country-by-country analyses of administrative needs and possible avenues of change.

What Form Should These Country Profiles Take?

Joseph LaPalombara in his symposium paper suggested that analyses should determine for each country receiving aid what are:

a. The Administrative Needs. What particular crises in administrative development does the country face?

b. The Existing Resources. How is the administration structured to meet these demands?

c. The Obstacles to Development. What factors impede the ability of the present system to meet these needs?

d. The Potential Administrative Capacity. How can administrative capacity be increased (with or without outside aid) to cope with the series of crises an emerging nation is facing or will inevitably have to face in the future? Is it possible to work out a practical plan for the timing of the various phases of development?

Two types of theory are implicit in the development of these country profiles: empirical and policy related. They require different types of abilities and different research techniques. The one is easier for the foreign aid specialist to undertake; the other impinges on policy decisions to be made by the indigenous political leadership.

Understanding the system and its ability (or lack of ability) to meet the demands made upon it involve empirical studies of existing facilities. The determination of needs and potential requires policy decisions on the relative importance of certain social goals. What, for example, is the ultimate goal -- what is "good" public administration? Are efficiency and democratic principles important, or do the ends appear to justify the means and the goals at short term term differ from those at long term? Is a law-and-order bureaucracy run by the Darkness at Noon type of administrator -- a brutal and ruthlessly efficient Ivanov or Gletkin -- justified in the interests of obtaining a viable government because, it is argued,

without a viable government, no further development and administrative reform are possible?

What Are The Crises Facing An Emerging Nation?

Every new nation has certain immediate and urgent demands made upon it. The government is not a viable government until it can control its people through a well-integrated security network that will enforce its legislation. Regardless of the general level of education, the clamor for popular participation in the political process has to be satisfied to some degree. The interests of the minority groups, particularly the larger minority groups, have to be protected, if the threat of civil war is to be avoided. As the people participate in the political process, they will demand more and more of their leadership in areas of educational reform, economic growth, welfare institutions, and the like. How should these needs be sequenced and who is going to decide on the priorities?

What Is the Nature of the System?

It is no good continuing to justify crash programs to train personnel, educate the electorate, institute land reform and measures to encourage economic growth by saying that there is "no time" for preliminary planning; that, to ensure stability and for other laudable

reasons, new governments have to plunge precipitously into five-year plans and ten-year plans for national development with little or no analysis of long-term effects or major objectives. A government may claim that it has no time to sequence administrative needs, assess their importance, and evaluate the ability of the system to meet them -- let alone to meet the subsidiary demands caused by the ricochet effect of reform in one part of the system on the other parts.

Before instituting reform in any area, it is necessary to understand the nature of the political system. What type is it? Is there any administrative machinery to speak of, or is there a transitional form of government, perhaps in charge of the military? Are there checks and balances within the system itself to restrict the power of the administrative machine? If not, short of tampering with the political process, how and where should such checks be instituted? How do you encourage the formation of professional societies, the growth of political parties, the development of the grassroots politician, and the political education of the electorate?

A basic profile of the system is considered a prerequisite for long-term planning; it can be developed for many countries by using available data from indigenous government sources, foreign aid reports, military manuals, and the United Nations archives. These

empirical studies will lay the groundwork for the later identification of needs and the ability of the systems and their parts to adapt and develop broader capacities to meet the changing pressures of a maturing nation.

What Are Some Obstacles to Development?

Obstacles to development in a given context take on shape and form when the nature of the specific system under review is understood. But there are two major deterrents to growth characteristic of the systems of many countries emerging from the colonial period. These relate to their background: to the conflict of values and to the increased popular involvement in politics.

These fledgling nations bring with them into their new statehood an administrative network of varying quality but developed by professionals of the old school. Whether imperialist ties are severed completely or not, part of the bureaucratic framework remains. And it is an organization developed to meet not so much the needs of the former dependency as those of the colonial power controlling it. The standards and values on which the system of control is based are often at variance with the culture on which they have been superimposed. This conflict may be tolerated during colonial rule because so many other alien factors are present. But the transfer of power to indigenous

leaders brings this schism between the norms under which they live and the norms under which they work into sharp relief. Religious, ethnic, and cultural standards -- in fact, the total social order -- are often in direct opposition to the standards set by the superimposed administrative structure. Is there any understanding of the effects of these contrasting value systems, or does an ambivalent attitude toward both prevail?

Another common factor in most emerging nations is the participation explosion. Emphasis on the quantitative dimension of popular involvement in the political process is understandable for two reasons: first, because the colonial system emphasized quality, the rule of the few with little or no popular influence at the upper levels of government; second, because the West finds it hard to envisage any system where political growth is not synonymous with instant democratization. Underlying this enormous expansion of participation in, if not control of, the political process remains the rift between the old ways and the new. Stages of development that took decades in Europe and the United States are now encompassed by a few short years, if not months, in the new nations of the twentieth century. State after state has evolved some form of transitional system to "guide" their peoples into this changing pattern of existence, to adapt to changing value and organizational systems, and to give them time to learn

something of their responsibilities as full participants in the political process. The means resorted to are varied although they generally involve some form of charismatic leadership. Ostensibly, they are all efforts to seek a means to accommodate in some form of unity these sharply separated conditions of the social order.

How Can Administrative Capacity Be Increased?

One country has a higher literacy rate than another country, or a higher standard of living and per capita income. It is possible to compare educational levels and even stages of economic development (based on accepted formulas set up by international organizations), but how today is it possible to compare levels of administrative development and potential administrative capabilities? How do you assess the administrative capacity of an institution, of a bureaucratic system, or of a nation, both in the public and private sectors? And how do you relate that capacity to development in another country? Agreement on appropriate definition and the building of theoretical models will help to establish patterns of performance in certain administrative situations and to set up comparative standards.

But attempts to standardize and pidgeonhole classes of administrative situations have perhaps accentuated the tendency in the West to isolate public administration and to regard it as a more-or-less

separate and independent input into the political system. The middle-management concept of the bureaucrat has prevailed -- someone who "gets things done" but is in no way involved in policy decisions as to why they are done. This view has been perpetuated by many directors in other sectors of the system who regard themselves as jurists, doctors, academicians, economists, and the like with an unacknowledged administrative function managing a large organization. The administrator is spelled with a capital A and is someone apart in the civil service. In effect, public administration in emerging countries, no less than in emergent ones, is not separable from development in other areas.

A theoretical ideal in the view of some is balanced development in all sectors of society to prevent centralization of power in any one sector, notably in the bureaucracy. The ideal is obviously unattainable, particularly with the accelerated and unbalanced growth characteristic of new nations. Nonetheless, if balance is the ultimate goal, certain policies can be adopted that encourage greater symmetry of development than others. Administrative reform can be decelerated, for example, whilst measures in other areas such as education and welfare are pushed forward.

The dangers of aggravating existing asymmetry and centralization of power in the bureaucracy have been uppermost in the minds of

many administrative reformers. Is it possible that such dangers have been overestimated? The seepage of new ideas and new technology into other sectors in the political system may deter exaggerated imbalance in political growth. This "spillover" effect is hard to assess, however.

Would the adoption of the deliberate strategy (advocated by Ralph Braibanti in his symposium paper) to undertake administrative reform without regard to reform in other areas be so dangerous a proposition? Such induced reform should not be undertaken irrespective of the country's background and stage of development. The prescription would have to be suited to the situation a little better than it has been in the past. Through basic profiling, circumstances would have to be identified indicating when there is a need for differential strategies.

The converse strategy -- putting the brakes on the bureaucracy in the interest of more balanced political development -- would probably only be applicable in the minority of emerging countries. There are many parts of the world where lack of administrative reform has retarded development in any form. In a number of countries there is already considerable competition at work in the system, with the bureaucracy competing with other pressure groups. In the Philippines, it is necessary to increase administrative capacity rather

than to put a damper on it. In certain Latin American countries with a history of government instability, the civil services need professionalization, not weakening. New countries like the Congo need their whole political system reinforced, including the bureaucracy. Single-party states, such as those under Communist domination or those like Egypt under mass mobilization, have the bureaucracy fairly well under control. The philosophy of the ruling elite may not be favorable to the West but at least they have organized their own system of checks and balances over the bureaucratic machine.

Advice to put a brake on administrative reform, then, is largely applicable to those countries where the bureaucracy (whether civilian or military) dominates politics. Even these countries may be on the move, however, and the best strategy may be to help the bureaucratic elite to develop rather than to put the brake on its operation. In fact, it is doubtful whether there is <u>any</u> country where it ought to be a deliberate policy to downgrade the bureaucracy. However, there are many states where it might be advisable to build up the nonbureaucratic elements of the social system, both as a source of recruitment for the public service and as a curb on bureaucratic power. This is not an easy proposition. If it is decided to help the private sector, how does the reformer go about it? Again, the old question: does the plan, to be successful, have to be accepted by the indigenous

leadership? It is doubtful if any outside expert's suggestions would be entertained unless they are also supported by the local experts.

Long-term reform depends on the education and training of a new generation of administrators and a general public conscious of its own administrative responsibilities at the local and national levels, in the public and private sectors. In the meantime, the political process is dependent on existing administrative networks and possible short-term modifications that would not upset the total system. What sort of modifications would be countenanced? Practical measures to expand present capacities might include steps to withdraw certain activities from the public sector altogether, thus lightening the burden on officials; decentralization, delegating greater authority to the local bodies; and the creation of autonomous agencies to solve specific administrative problems. These and other alternatives need careful investigation and preliminary appraisal.

Independence has brought a shortage of skills rather than a shortage of manpower in many countries. Much can be done to streamline institutional organization, introduce new techniques, and upgrade the skills of current personnel by on-the-job or in-service training programs.

But the long-term goal is an enlightened public: to improve general education standards, to incorporate administrative skill

learning into school programs, and to change the attitude toward public administration. Training in public administration should be handled as universally and as continuously as possible. There should be a nationwide approach at secondary school level. Everyone should understand enough about administration to facilitate its functioning.

Research Problems

- Appropriate definition of administrative functions to make comparative evaluations possible
- Standards for "good" public administration: which are universal, which specific?
- Typological classification of bureaucracies
- Measurement of institutional administrative capacity
- Development of country profiles
- Determination of administrative potential
- Operational strategies for administrative reform

MISSING PAGE

NO. 16

THE PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Is the public administrator a professional or is he merely someone in an occupation requiring a rather complex variety of organizatio and management skills?

Public administrators have been typed over time as law-and-order bureaucrats, Philosopher Kings in Plato's image, glorified clerks, specialists-turned-administrators, program specialists, and generalists. Each type has responded to the needs of their respec tive political systems as these needs have been interpreted and sequenced by the leadership of the day: by the metropole, perhaps, or the military, the bureaucracy, the legislature, the political party leadership, or the electorate.

In recent years, the development administrator has emerged. According to Milton Esman in his symposium paper, this type of administrator interprets his role somewhat differently from some of his predecessors. He regards himself as a member of an established profession with expertise, career continuity, and a sense of public duty as its guiding precepts. In his function as adviser, his concepts are western in orientation, and he is concerned with administrative development. But in emerging nations not all systems develop along similar lines. It may be that different types of

administrators (and public administration advisers) are needed for different systems and for different levels within each system.

These nation-by-nation variations render an effective common approach to the analysis of administrative function and performance extremely difficult. However, the development of theoretical models could lead to the classification of types of administrative situations likely to arise in a given context which would indicate possible operational strategies -- the personnel-technological-procedural combinations most likely to produce the best coordinated administrative structure.

His Changing Role

Yesterday's professional administrator in the British colonial tradition was a "Greats" man, educated in the humanities at Eton and Oxford with a sense of public service equivalent to Plato's Philosopher King. Under the British system, he was a professional but not a development administrator and never intended to be. His function was good government and the maintenance of law and order. Development he left to others -- to the traders and merchants if there were any. He was a member of the ruling classes and, with his passport of accepted certification, he developed a caste system, some form of which has carried over to the indigenous bureaucracies.

The professional administrator today, on the other hand (if he is western-trained or a foreign adviser from a western aid-giving country), tends to see himself as an innovator and reformer. He has taken over many of the functions performed by merchants and traders in the past, "opening up" territories to new ideas and ways of doing things, and consciously adapting to his new social role as a change agent. Essentially the instrument of others, the modern-day professional administrator is performance-oriented, a career man, and a servant of the people. The complexity of his tasks and the concentration of talents inevitably leads to the development type of administrator who is a sharer in public power; and this power role becomes one of his legitimate functions.

The Pros and Cons of Professionalization

One of the major obstacles to the professionalization of the public service is seen to be the divided loyalty of the many individuals who man program agencies and who have specialized training and experience in agriculture, economics, medicine, and the like. In many societies such known program people may not be called administrators; and the style is that, unless a man is called an "administrator," he cannot be one regardless of the administrative functions he performs. There is no systematic exposure

to administrative theory for these lawyers-engineers-scientists-turned-administrators. They tend to set higher priorities on actual program problems than on ways and means to implement policy decisions.

The generalists pose another stumbling block in the way of professionalization. They may have dual professions in that many of their number have law degrees but, because they are not identified with any occupation other than public administration, they tend to inherit the characteristics of the old-time public service, becoming virtually a self-perpetuating meritocracy. Although such a trend does not run counter to professional status for the administrator, it is contrary to the western concept of the bureaucrat as the people's servant, not their master. Professionalization of public administration can therefore lead to the creation of a super group, such as occurred in India. Twenty years in the railroad department apparently qualifies a man for the finance department because he is an "Administrator." Others see professionalization in a somewhat narrower context -- in terms of a specific area like personnel or budgeting. To them specialization is a necessary corollary to the professionalization of the service.

Another difficulty to the building of a profession is the contradiction seen by many people implicit in the words "administrator"

and "professional." They contend that a sharp distinction has to be made between the two. Any attempt to strengthen the professional aspects of an administrator's orientation strengthens anarchic tendencies in the system. The "professional" tends to be an autonomous operator and the "administrator" is an organization man who stresses the importance of disciplined adherence to the goals of the establishment. He considers there is a conflict of norms if administration is not seen in terms of hierarchy and control.

The level of power sharing is a significant factor. In some systems (as in Britain) a senior civil servant shares power, for example, with his politically elected minister. If the permanent civil servant gained the monopoly of power in the system, this would be an important factor of governmental organization and would affect professionalization of the service.

Again, if the professional administrator considers his social role and his responsibility to the people, how responsive should he be to outside pressures? Over-responsive and under-responsive attitudes can be equally dangerous in certain situations. How can the professional preserve his sense of balance in weighing his policy role against his role as a public servant?

Some countries still need the ruthlessly efficient Ivanov type of bureaucrat to maximize mobilization of resources. There is no

room for the professional at this stage of development in that particular type of system. Until administrative content is defined, it may be inadvisable to professionalize in certain situations. But the goal should always be the development of professional concepts, goals, and ideals for the public servant, and the establishment of professional societies to set standards for all administrators, including those who owe their appointments to nepotism and not to merit.

Research Problems

- The functions of administrators:
  - under different types of system,
  - in different types of institutions,
  - at different stages of development, and
  - at different levels from senior administrators to paraprofessional staff.
- Ratio of senior administrators to back-up personnel and paraprofessionals in each institution, in each system
- Ratio of generalists to specialists -- roles of staff, auxiliary, and program agencies in systems at different stages of growth; their respective personnel needs
- Orders of staff priorities in each type of administrative situation

- The elements of a professionalized bureaucracy

- Consequences of professionalization; the pros and cons under systems at different stages of development.

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SPECIAL TRAINING NEEDS OF ADMINISTRATORS IN EMERGING NATIONS

Where, what, when, and how to teach public administration remain unsolved problems in many emerging nations. If public administrators set more store on being able to wear the appropriate old college tie from a western university, they are less likely to be concerned about the relevance of their training. Courses in public administration tend to focus on subjects catering to the needs of a developed rather than a developing nation.

Training consciously adapted to the needs of a specific country requires a considerable supporting research program which, as Fred Riggs points out in his symposium paper, is often lacking at the present time. Where public administration has established itself as a discipline in western universities, the body of theory and techniques evolved has played, and is playing, a dominant role in the development of the political systems of emerging nations. Views may differ as to the effect of this phenomenon, but it is undoubtedly true that the western-trained official appears more generally acceptable in the new state than his fellow administrator trained in a regional or domestic institution. The type of certificate still appears more important to the vast majority of the new bureaucrats than the content of the course.

WHERE TO TEACH

Should public administration be taught in a university, autonomous institution, staff college, or government department? Should training take place in the former metropole or aid-giving nation, in the new state, or in a third country? Location of training is still a key factor in preparing for a career in public administration. Questions of relevance and excellence tend to play second fiddle to accepted practices.

Educational Setting

For prestige reasons the older universities are still extremely attractive to the public administration recruit and a most acceptable credential for employment. But their ability to offer training appropriate to the functions of individual administrators is open to doubt. One main reason for this is the hostility of entrenched faculties, particularly of law, who consider there is too much "gimmickry" attached to administrative science. The situation varies from country to country. Antipathy to public administration appears to be the rule rather than the exception in European universities; the same can be said for their sister institutions, established on similar lines in the former colonies. But some of the newly

founded universities, notably in Africa, may not encounter the same difficulties; they have incorporated public administration into their program offerings and, with time and adequate research, may be able to develop curricula to meet the needs of their own administrative systems.

The reeducation of the faculties of the older universities is gradually taking place, particularly in Latin America. This is an important step because any broad-based research program for country profiles, review of the administrative function, and appropriate training needs requires the interdisciplinary approach and the star intellectual material attracted to the long-established universities.

The United Nations and aid-giving nations tend to favor the autonomous institution over the university. Setting up a new establishment appears to create less difficulty than meshing a public administration program into the existing university framework.

Some see disadvantages in this practice, however. An autonomous institute, especially if it has been organized as part of a technical assistance program, usually has government backing. As such, it is generally wedded to tradition -- to providing the government with the type of recruit it will accept.

One compromise considered appropriate for emerging nations is an autonomous institution loosely affiliated with the most important university in the area. An alternative would be affiliation with a parent university in the aid-giving country or with U. N. (or other international) institutes elsewhere in the world.

A suggestion to solve the conflicts inevitably arising in a teaching program dependent on political support was put forward by Joseph R. Starr in his symposium paper. He considered that a coordinating committee with decision-making powers would perform a useful service by acting as a buffer between teachers and employers (the respective government departments), and as a meeting-ground for the exchange of ideas on course content as administrative demands for personnel change.

If there is not a firmly entrenched civil service like the ICS in India, emerging nations face another difficulty as a result of their concentrated efforts to develop administrative networks overnight -- shortage of backup personnel for their senior officials. No branch head, responsible for developing the overall administrative policy for his area can implement his program without adequate supporting mid-management people, secretaries, clerks, analysts, accountants, and the like. Has training at these different levels been synchronized? Where is it to take place?

Geographic Location

Choice of geographic location for training largely depends on questions of prestige and relevance already discussed. Western universities will still continue to train a number of the top-flight bureaucrats. There are strategic, political, and expense factors to be considered as well as prestige. Some aid-giving agencies believe a good background in American (or European) political theory and public administration techniques lays the foundation for a solidly democratic bureaucratic system in the emerging nation for which the civil servants are being trained. Others, wishing to avoid the charge of perpetuating their own image abroad, may perhaps prefer to pay for training in a third country with advanced university facilities (probably in Western Europe).

The immediate advantage for aid-giving agencies in training in their national institutions is that tried and tested courses are already available. They may not be geared to the needs of the newly formed bureaucracies but, nonetheless, certain administrative experience, principles, and methods are common to all well-run administrations. Undertaking the preliminary research, planning, and the actual establishment of an institute or new university department in an emerging nation is a formidable financial undertaking that cannot be organized too precipitously.

Would a careful country-by-country review of geographic locations for training at different levels reveal unexpected advantages in coordinating certain courses on a regional rather than a national level? It is undoubtedly true that, until indigenous universities have established both their reputations and their ability to offer good pedagogic programs, foreign universities will have to continue to provide the bulk of the training for senior administrators in the new nations.

WHAT TO TEACH

Course Content for Preentry Training

How important is research in training programs? Some hold the view that an institution geared entirely to the practical aspects of training lends itself to rigidity of concept and ideas. Its graduates look backward and sideways instead of forward and there is a tendency to overlook the fact that a training institution is producing tomorrow's senior officials, not today's. Others consider that the immediate need for trained administrators is so urgent that any research into new programs, methods, and materials must take second place. Too much emphasis on innovation and change would radically upset a new country's relatively fragile administrative framework.

If relevance, then, is the key word in developing training programs, what subjects are relevant? Course content needs to be carefully defined in relation to the functions performed by administrators on the job. Curricula should fully reflect changing conditions. There should be feedback from government agencies to the teaching institutions -- a frank exchange of views on present and future needs. Substantive problems of development, the processes of guiding and controlling action in a complex government organization, and managerial techniques ought perhaps to assume greater significance.

A substantial body of knowledge has emerged over the years and concepts have been developed in the area of training, but there are many obstacles to reducing this material to a workable curriculum. It is generally held by those in the profession that curricula in emerging countries provided under technical assistance programs do not reflect these training concepts, particularly when programs have been transported wholesale from abroad with little or no modification. Some consider that even U. N. institutes recently established in Africa have overly sophisticated curricula, quite inappropriate to the African context. There may be, for example, no statistics courses available and yet basic knowledge in this area is essential. Teachers have not been able to contribute much to the programs because their own training has been too erudite and not oriented to

the African scene. The result is that an African student at one of these institutes may learn far more about administration in the highly industrialized and advanced economies of Europe and America than he will about conditions in his own country.

Despite charges of inapplicability and undue sophistication, however, from the point of view of the teachers in emerging nations, which is the lesser of two evils: importing foreign (western) public administration theory "lock, stock, and barrel" or a slowed-down training program? Some believe that the gains of wholesale importation by far outweigh the disadvantage of certain aspects of the training being alien to the indigenous culture. As Indians from different parts of the subcontinent have to communicate in English, so public administrators from different parts of the world use western concepts and terminology to exchange ideas and come to joint solutions of their problems. Careful investigation and preliminary research -- possibly using the case study approach -- are, of course, desirable before the adoption of foreign training practices and techniques, but urgency dictates a more immediate solution to administrative crises in many instances.

Another question may arise in this connection: How much of his own political ideas can an instructor share with his students in, say, a one-party state? An American-trained university professor

may be able to relate little of his own training to his classes at home. Imported political science and administrative theory is probably particularly subject to close government scrutiny.

The location of research into training programs and methods has also been a serious issue. Granted that a respectable output of reasonably well-trained administrators is the first training objective in a new country, would the organization of an effective research unit within the training institution itself impede the latter's primary function? The most formidable objections relate to the expense and time factors: recruitment of enough additional members of the teaching staff with knowledge of research methods and time available to cooperate on joint projects with other universities or institutions. Among priorities in training, is the development of a research program the wisest use of scarce resources?

Another factor in communication involves the variety of subjects in other disciplines bearing on public administration. Should an interdisciplinary approach be adopted or should various visiting professors give guest lectures on invitation and the program be entirely planned and organized by a public administration faculty? A number of teachers have baulked at any concerted effort to develop curricula because of likely interfaculty disagreement or even dissension. Who is going to decide what subjects should be

covered and how? Should the course include political science, anthropology, social sciences, psychology, social psychology, economics? In the university environment, especially, there is danger that the public administration program will be in no one's bailiwick and that there will be little understanding among professors in the various disciplines on their own terms of reference. There is an overlapping of course content in some instances. In others, key subjects are not covered at all.

Who is going to make decisions on the number of other questions to which research is still seeking answers? For instance, how broad should be the coverage of the public administration program? How much does a senior official responsible for program and decision-making at the top level have to know about activities in the village? If it is conceded that policy interpretation is one of an administrator's most important legitimate functions, why do so few training programs in public administration provide officials with normative criteria for shaping and legitimatizing public policies -- why do they not teach them how to assess the feasibility and probable consequences of alternative courses of action? What degree of specialization should be reached at undergraduate level? Should all generalists undergo similar basic training and should specialization occur later in an individual's career? What provisions are made for training specialists in administrative skills?

Practical experience of some sort is essential but how workable is the proposal that the undergraduate program be divided into three parts: theory at the university, practice in a government department, and theory again in the university? On-the-job training poses problems. It is dependent on government cooperation and support. Support is the key word, for the political leadership may concede the necessity for practical experience but be unwilling or unable to provide for it. One criticism -- that there is very little communication between training in the classroom and later practice -- would be obviated by this cooperative program.

WHEN AND HOW TO TEACH

Methods and Materials

Training has to be selective. Both on-the-job and institutional instruction have their place in preentry and inservice training courses for public administration. The extent to which, and the way in which, each are used vary considerably with the country's level of development and the facilities available. Cost is a deciding factor -- not only as to broad approach (on-the-job, institutional, or a combination of both), but also as to specific methods and materials used -- and the ability to test and adopt new ideas and techniques.

Preentry Training

Much information is already available in the United States and elsewhere on teaching methods but public administration raises special problems in emerging nations because of the variety of systems involved and because of close ties with the power structure. Tried and newly tested methods need careful evaluation in light of local political, social, and cultural conditions -- the ecology of public administration. A systematic compilation of current teaching practices on a country-by-country basis and the development of a methodology on how best to teach and train in different circumstances (ecological studies) would bring to light major gaps in knowledge. For example, how can U. S. methods be applied abroad and where are they now being used? They are often effective, sometimes useless. The majority are relatively easy to test but this is seldom done.

Just as there is an overlapping in course content, so there is in the texts provided. This was bound to happen when so many foreign-language books had to be used because of a dearth of original material. It is difficult for an instructor to select appropriate texts unless he has an adequate grasp of the language in which they are written. The ideal answer would be to develop manuals within the country catering entirely to the public administration needs of that

area. This type of project has been started on some countries already, notably in Brazil, but it is a slow and expensive process and can only be conducted with adequate funds and research facilities. Relevant research is not possible without relevant data. Much of the relevant data is inaccessible because of the somewhat primitive methods of dealing with government documents in many new states.

A temporary solution to provide better texts for those countries which have not yet developed their own material would be the compilation of some two hundred manuals covering all the basic topics usually taught in a public administration course. This could be preceded by a bibliographical review of texts already available in English, French, or Spanish, from which appropriate excerpts could be made, supplemented by original material where necessary. This type of research would be better conducted in an American university or in another developed country. The manuals could be translated by teachers in the countries where they were to be used.

These manuals would form the nucleus of a public administration course, supplemented perhaps by current excerpts from periodicals, also to be provided by a central body. The United Nations has already commenced screening and translating professional journals; the chief problem lies in obtaining qualified readers on whose discretion the selection of material depends.

Inservice Training

Improving existing capacity involves systematic attention to improving the skills of those already employed, regardless of their method of appointment. The immediate objective is greater efficiency, the larger goal is to change the perspective of old-time employees so that they see themselves in a new relationship to the public -- as change agents in an expanding economy.

Continuing education. Education cannot stand still after graduation or a brief refresher course. Although an ambitious goal in an emerging economy with so many demands being made on skilled personnel, some governments set a fairly high priority on providing continuing education programs for their employees. These could be provided either on the basis of evening classes (perhaps similar to the adult education programs organized by English local authorities where a wide range of courses are offered, from learning new skills to studying the arts), or in two- or three-week seminars similar to those organized by the Brookings Advanced Study Program to provide senior civil servants with a broad and critical overview of government activities.

The clinical approach has been tried by the government in Iran and a top management group in England. They have provided a

a consultant service for those with special administrative problems at mid-management level. These clinics have on occasion been manned by qualified retired senior administrators from both business and government. In the United States, two experimental projects were organized using the group therapy approach: one in the Philippines, conducted by the Harvard Business School; and one in Ecuador, conducted by the Agency for International Development.

Adult educators have been advocating continuing education for all groups in society for sometime; and many public administrators believe that the general public should start learning something about public administration at the secondary school level and that all age groups should participate in programs dealing with government structure and operation. It is believed that an aware public will make the administrator's job -- and the government recruitment problem -- a great deal easier.

Continuing education courses could be conducted at a public administration institute, university, staff college (for special seminars), or more appropriately, if available, in a special information center whose main purpose would be the gathering and dissemination of materials on public administration; but which would also serve as a professional meeting-place.

Refresher courses and on-the-job training. Concentrated skilled instruction cannot be replaced by a more-or-less, well-organized program of on-the-job training, undertaken by men of practical experience but with little or no knowledge of teaching. Both the formal and informal approach have their place at all levels of training: for the undergraduate, the raw recruit, and the old-time employee.

Probably if it were an either/or situation (which it should never be if possible), the experienced administrator would opt for appointees trained in an institution. Besides the fact that practising and imparting skills are two very different functions not always present in the person of the supervisor, on-the-job training can raise many additional issues. A special assignment given to a junior trainee might be handled fairly easily but a large-scale inservice program would mean setting aside enough staff to teach and enough staff to replace those who are being taught. It is always in those government departments where training is most urgently needed that the civil servants are the most hard-pressed. What senior official in the bureaucracy of any East African country, for example, could spare the time to train? He does not want useless hands around. Let them be ready to handle a job adequately on appointment after they have been trained elsewhere. In general, in fact, African conditions are not at present conducive to on-the-job training.

Supervisory talent is, in any case, particularly scarce in underdeveloped countries. Most men at this level are poorly equipped to pass on their knowledge and skills to others. Can this be improved? A precedent of training foremen as instructors was tried in the United States in the Training Within Industry Program during World War II. The French system of internship has not been attempted to any extent elsewhere.

Selection of Teaching Personnel

Shortage of teachers for all levels of education and in all subject areas is characteristic of emerging nations today; and public administration is no exception. With the mushrooming of newly built institutions, new university departments and department sections, the staffing problem is probably more acute in administration than in other disciplines. Teaching is notoriously underpaid and the good students, especially in management training, are soon snapped up by government or private industry.

Although public administration has many recruiting sources in the bureaucracy and business world not open to other disciplines, selection of retired businessmen, former government officials, foreign advisers, and foreign-trained personnel who have played a variety of administrative roles raises special problems. The

administrative function and administrative procedures in a developing economy are constantly changing. The retired practitioner tends to see nothing wrong in teaching the old ways and finds it hard to learn the new. The foreign-trained is teaching an unreal science unless he has come to grips with the conflict in values between the formal organization theory he has learned in the classroom and the psychological and social cross-pressures of his society. Training should help students to adjust to change but only if the teachers themselves recognize and understand what is at stake.

What measures can be taken to improve both the quality of teaching and recruitment sources? There is no doubt that foreign advisers should exploit all possible avenues to find the right people to train as potential heirs. This issue revolves around training the trainers: selecting trainees who can take over later; looking for administrative talent in business, labor, and political circles; using judiciously, perhaps on a consultant basis, the retiree, the former adviser, the business administrator. If the mid-level management concepts hold sway, public administration as a teaching career will never appeal to the sophisticates. And until the sophisticates, the critics, and the theorists take a hand, rigidity will rule and the new ideas and new techniques will remain alien to the country's culture and traditions.

Just as in other areas of teaching, status, salary, and accreditation remain key issues in public administration. Any country-by-country appraisal of existing and potential administrative capacity will include a careful study of ways and means to improve the lot of teachers today and to upgrade the quality of teaching tomorrow.

Trainees and Their Selection

The first order of business of a newly established training institution is generally to see that employees already in the civil service do their jobs more efficiently. Such an institution cannot function without political support and the government naturally has a hand in the choice of trainees. If the leadership is not solidly behind the training program and merely pays lip-service to the idea, the wrong people are likely to be trained.

A good administrator who would benefit from training can often not be spared, and the government tends to get rid of the undesirables, the supernumary and the troublemaker who are later shunted off to positions where they cannot make use of their new skills. In other instances, even with firm government backing, the wrong people are likely to be trained if the granting of a certificate

is regarded as a badge for promotion and training is used as a way to pay off political debts.

Training, of course, should not be limited to the government-selected employees, but how, in this interim period, do you assess the potential of students from the private sector with a miscellany of qualifications? Selection techniques need to be carefully evaluated. For example, recent sociometric findings have shown that there is a high overlapping of ability and general intelligence -- that the essay type of examination is likely to be quite as good a prediction of success as intelligence testing. If selection is governed by interview, what is the level of communication between interviewer and interviewee?

In answer to the sequencing of needs in an administrative system, the first urgent demand may be for mid-level employees with a knowledge of accounting or for literate junior employees. Illiterates are not uncommon in the public services of emerging nations. Is there any procedure for interviewing illiterates at their level of articulation and communication which will make it easier for the interviewer to gauge potential success in a training course?

Short-term goals may be at variance with long-terms goals in the teacher training program and the training program itself. Rushing in to meet the obvious need may not be the answer. Or it

may be the answer if, within the framework of the country profiles, administrative planners are aware of the nature of the compromise they may be making and have knowingly weighed the pros and cons of alternative courses of action.

Research Problems

- Training priorities at institutional, national, regional levels
- Synchronization of personnel needs at senior, mid-management, and paraprofessional levels
- Possibilities of coordinating training needs on a regional rather than a national basis
- Educational setting and geographic location of training programs
- Course content for different types of administrators
- Feasibility of interdisciplinary approach
- Training methods and materials
- Division of responsibility for training program: pedagogues, bureaucrats, political leadership
- Systematic compilation of teaching methods and materials in common use
- Controlled experimentation on all imported teaching methods, aids, materials
- Role of research in training program

- Possible sources of teaching personnel, measures to upgrade caliber and to retain experienced staff

- Trainees: Who is chosen and how are they selected?

- The need for cost-benefit ratios in evaluating training programs.

GOALS OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

What role does the United States play in helping new nations to establish or reorganize their administrative systems? In the last fifty years, America's own position has changed radically in the area of public administration. Half a century ago, in Woodrow Wilson's time, the United States was borrowing administrative skills from abroad. Along with theory and techniques were imported European political concepts at variance with American ideas. Administrative principles and theory catering to the closely knit and centrally controlled political structures of France and Germany were shaped and moulded to the American model.

In those days, Americans were the learners. Today, they are the teachers, the aid-givers. They are exporting their own standards and values along with administrative theories.

How many foreign advisers realize that, however abstruse their field, they can never take with them a value-free technology? Every know-how package carries with it understood assumptions on the "best" way to do things and certain social goals -- goals that may be considered a threat to the elite of the countries receiving aid. It is these countries today, like the United States in the past, that have to decide which alien concepts to accept, adapt, or reject as incompatible with their own social orders.

There are those receiving aid who argue that, even with what they consider to be "superfluous cultural baggage," American theory provides the common language for intercommunication among administrators in all parts of the world. They believe that it is only with the acceptance of common principles and concepts that research in administration can advance in emerging countries. There are others who consider that it is, and should be, beyond the province of the aid-giver to deliberately influence the policy decisions of a sovereign state, and that large-scale precipitous change would do just that. The middle-of-the-road course of consciously adapting American science to the individual needs of an underdeveloped country in a sequenced research program is probably the ideal choice; but how long, some among those giving and receiving aid ask, can a new government wait before setting up or reforming its administrative structure?

Being an integral part of the total political system, public administration is not separable from other areas of development, and the public administration adviser (even if he is a specialist in accounting or office management) invariably has to make some politically sensitive decisions. Is he aware of the possible effects of these decisions on the standing, perhaps the security, of the ruling elite? If, for example, an adviser working in the rural areas

of a one-party state assembles villagers together to talk over the building of a new school or sewage system -- if he shows them how to organize themselves more efficiently into small committees -- is he aware of the possible repercussions on the social system of this simple act?

Can theories be developed on the process of change in each administrative situation, just as they have been developed in economics? What happens, for example, if American expertise is used to reorganize the bureaucracy and no concurrent political and social reforms are contemplated? The side effects of such a reorganization cannot be foreseen with any accuracy, but probable reactions, "spillover" to other parts of the social order, possible conflicts and patterns of development could be worked out in relation to experience gained in similar administrative situations elsewhere and in relation to the country profile analyses.

The modern tendency to dissociate administration from politics is fallacious from the point of view of the aid giver. Any form of foreign aid, but particularly in the area of public administration, needs strong political backing. Reforms endangering its position are not likely to be entertained by the ruling elite. The foreign adviser may have to accede to an alien set of values -- to a system, for example, that countenances bribery and other forms

of corruption which may occur in his own country but are at least considered to be "wrong."

Aid programs to any country are predicated to U. S. acceptance of the regime in power. It is never possible to look at a public administration problem solely from the point of view of the administrative criteria involved. From the American point of view, what is U. S. foreign aid strategy in this region and how does public administration fit into the total aid program? From the aid-receiving country's point of view, are there any other national programs which should be coordinated with administrative reform proposals? Very few countries receiving aid have national plans, even fewer have a public administration component. Nonetheless, bureaucratic reform has to be keyed to fit in with existing national programs if possible and the functions to be performed by the aid giver and the indigenous leadership should be clearly defined.

Project Planning

"Emerging countries are tired of being studied;" when they see an urgent need -- perhaps for more trained administrators -- they want that need met as soon as possible. Once the U. S. mission has reviewed and approved the setting up of an institute of public

administration to train personnel, it also wants to move ahead. What has to be done in the nature of pre-project planning?

First of all, it has to be decided that the building of this institute will (a) serve overall U. S. goals in terms of strategy and security, and (b) among alternative possibilities, be of most practical benefit to the aid-receiving country. How are such decisions arrived at? Who decides whether old-time employees or raw recruits should be trained? Injecting more youthful trained personnel into the system may be the easiest answer to problems of increasing administrative capacity, but is it the right answer? Some of the alternatives suggested, such as increasing inservice training opportunities, radical overhaul of the administrative apparatus at all levels, revised personnel recruitment procedures, and decentralization of functions, might provide the most immediate and suitable remedies to urgent administrative problems, but they might mean encroaching on the vested interests of the bureaucracy. A foreign consultant deliberately helping to manipulate the administrative machinery is perilously near infringement of state rights, even with tacit government acquiescence. Neither is he likely to meet with the ready proof of success preferred by Congress. The payoff of a new public administration institution in terms of graduates placed is tangible; and long-run evaluations of the effectiveness of training programs offered may never take place.

The Agency for International Development prepares a number of reports on foreign aid strategy, covering much of the information required for the country profiles. Data on the origin, history, and purpose of projects are currently available; so are comprehensive reviews of U. S. long-range plans and project proposals for all countries receiving aid. But a complicated network of review and appraisal procedures is a necessary corollary for any specific aid proposal, both in the United States and in the host country. Often, by the time the project is approved, time is short for its completion; any "unnecessary" preliminaries, such as special anthropological and sociological surveys, appraisals of appropriate research methods and techniques are accomplished in cursory fashion or shortcircuited altogether. Is it practicable to review pre-project procedures for the countries receiving aid and to build into the project plan certain formulas for preevaluation as to achievability (a difficult undertaking) and the possible impact of the project on other sectors of the economy? How are projects actually selected? Given the administrative component present in all areas of foreign aid, is a professional public administrator involved in the planning stages of projects for the total assistance effort? Can a theory of project stages be worked out which would include time sequencing, types of personnel needed at different stages, and processes of feasible evaluation?

Herman Pope in his symposium paper addresses a number of pertinent questions to AID on project planning.

Research Problems

- Development of research design for foreign aid; a three-part strategy plan -- general, long-term, by major project
- Possible role of public administration in all aid projects
- Profiles for AID use to assess project priorities
- Inventory and categorization of completed AID projects
- Importance -- and feasibility -- of conducting preliminary surveys: what type?
- Factors determining project length, personnel and training needed
- Possible cultural and ideological conflicts likely to arise from accepting foreign technical assistance, especially in public administration

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Is there such a person as an overseas type? Is a lecturer in public administration on a university campus or a senior official in an engineering firm a different sort of person at home from his colleague who accepts a two- or three-year assignment abroad? There are probably personal traits that make the foreign adviser a recognizable type but they are not usually related to selection.

How Are Personnel Chosen?

The tendency in recent years to reduce direct-hire personnel in aid-giving agencies has led to a proliferation of contracts with private firms and institutions; the number is likely to increase in the area of public administration. Contractors are varied -- universities, private foundations, commercial firms, nonprofit organizations, even a state government. Have these various employers tended to hire different types of personnel? What are the criteria for selection? What sort of long-term career opportunities do they offer, and does job security or lack of it affect performance? Whether it is more efficient to contract out certain types of projects is one matter; the various factors governing choice of personnel performing similar functions but in different institutions is another.

More information is needed on both. Little is known about the differences -- and whether the employer does make a difference at all.

Contracting experience is another important factor accounting for variations in recruitment practices. An organization like the Public Administration Service is geared to handle the advisory function abroad. It knows what to expect and is used to the complex administrative situations involved in foreign contracts. But, on their own admission, some universities tend to be relative neophytes in this area. They often have no knowledge of the special requirements overseas and tend to follow similar recruitment procedures for personnel hired on special foreign assignments as they do for their own faculty. Personnel techniques which have become relatively sophisticated in selecting individuals for an agency like the Peace Corps are irrelevant to the university's domestic needs and are therefore not used for choosing overseas staff. According to some critics, academic institutions have been somewhat irresponsible in their direct hiring procedures; they have often picked up the rejects from other universities, those who have already proved failures overseas but who are conveniently available. In fact, as one faculty member stated, the probability of a university making personnel mistakes is going to increase

geometrically with the proliferation of contracts and the number of people employed per contract. Should universities build up their personnel complement so that faculty can be spared for overseas assignments? Some Midwest universities have found a part answer by forming a consortium to manage international activities. Others plan projects in joint faculty groups. Nevertheless, the total university management picture should be reviewed in respect to their overall capacities to handle contract work.

The expansion of contracts in recent years has also added considerably to the workload of the direct-hire employee of an aid-giving agency. The technical assistant abroad finds himself an entrepreneur, responsible for managing a series of contracts, all implemented by outside experts with varying backgrounds in advisory work.

For both direct-hire and contract personnel, perhaps different types of people are needed at different stages of the project. Is it possible to find people who perform effectively three totally different functions considered essential for the successful outcome of any project? First comes the pre-project planning by people who act as the pathfinders and who have to take a broad view of the total strategy in relation to the country profiles. Second is the implementation by the commando type of individual who is responsible

for interpreting and developing the project once it has been approved. Third is the management of the project by the occupation troops who have to see that everything runs smoothly according to the ground rules laid down by the commandos. Every function has to be performed by a very different type of individual, both in skill and temperament. What are the differences? What would be the most important considerations in each instance? Better guides are needed for the selection of both contract and direct-hire personnel. The roles of both have radically changed.

The answers to the above questions may relate to the interpretation of project objectives, outline of jobs to be performed and type of personnel required at each stage, channels of command, and finally experience and qualifications considered essential for effective performance of the sequential functions described above. Only when agreement is reached on these points by all involved in the project planning is it advisable to look for candidates.

There are other variables, of course. The time factor is one. Project completion date moves nearer at an alarming pace while negotiations are still in process -- before recruitment for the key positions has even started. The most suitable prospects are often unavailable and the pickings of the labor market are somewhat slim. Another variable is the political climate abroad;

regimes tend to change frequently in emerging nations. A project may be agreed to by one group of political leaders and completed under another.

Familiarity with government routine and procedure helps some contractors bypass the pitfalls found in any form of government contracting. In the case of public administration, deliberate ambivalence in wording, different interpretations, difficulties of definition, uncertainty about actual conditions in the field -- and therefore unwillingness on either side to be tied down to too many specifics -- all create problems. It is difficult, sometimes, if not unwise, to clarify ultimate objectives. Does an aid-giving country spell out, for instance, that its chief aim may be democratization, development of a more active party system (and of an opposition to the ruling clique), or expanded popular participation in the political process? Does the aid-receiving country admit that its aims may be related to prestige or internal security (preserving government control in the hands of the current leadership)? Nonetheless, some feel that there are certain ambiguities in contracts that merely confuse.

Factors of age, experience, whether the individuals on contract or direct-hire have their jobs at stake, also have relevance to hiring. It is sometimes easier to decide what type should <u>not</u> be hired for

overseas service rather than the type that should. Maybe the brash young man is a little difficult for another country to accept but, although the prestige of his distinguished senior reflects to everybody's credit, will the older man do any better on the job? Maybe he is too set in his ways and there is no channel of communication between him and the younger and very necessary commando. Henry Reining devotes considerable attention to all questions regarding choice of personnel in his symposium paper.

How valid is the career concept for overseas service -- are the long-term employees more valuable than the one-termers? The natural assumption is that people with tenure overseas become increasingly valuable and should therefore be given some measure of job security; but this has not been empirically validated. There are those on the other side of the fence who consider that individuals become "stale" if left in one area too long, that they should be rotated to keep them from "going native." Not only are they often rotated within one region but also from one part of the world to another. Does this decrease their efficiency or are versatile and adaptable specialists more effective?

This raises the question of the degree to which experience in one situation is transferable to another situation, especially in the area of public administration. What are the respective roles

of the generalists and specialists in the foreign advisory field? Certain administrative skills and expertise are needed in any type of administrative framework but, in the same vein as the railroad administrator moving to internal revenue, can a budget specialist familiar with Pakistani administration do an effective job in the Congo?

Orientation and Performance

Once the adviser is selected, what is done to prepare him for his job abroad? What needs to be done? The adviser is the key person in the technical assistance program in public administration but no one can be a perfectionist in recruitment. What institutional arrangements are made for briefing and are they different for direct-hire and contract employees? Further empirical evidence is needed on the value of special training for those on first assignment.

If predeparture orientation is considered important, its content and form should be given careful thought. Should, for instance, the new recruit be given a relatively simple preliminary project in the country where he will later be assigned and, on completion, should he then be brought back for orientation? Or, if primary emphasis is given to post-arrival training, who would be responsible

-- the missions (perhaps working with the advisers' counterparts in the host governments), the contractor, or the aid-giving agency?

Conflicting interests. What about possible role and culture conflict? More case studies are needed on the adaptation of the adviser and his family to a totally new environment. Should this be an interdisciplinary project organized by the universities? What would be the part played by the professional societies? Both have a responsibility for the welfare and performance of their own people.

Role shock is particularly acute for the more independent professionals who have never been exposed to organization and management problems. This is especially true of the academic. Does the itinerant academic on contract to an aid-giving agency from a university realize that he will probably not be able to act as a professor overseas? He is not on assignment to do research but to advise, whatever form that advice may take. Is he prepared to have his academic freedom abridged? Is he prepared to respect protocol and to cope with the complexity of his new organizational setting?

In relation to the effect and possible consequences of culture shock, would case studies relating the experience and reactions of late tour advisers with these on their first assignment be helpful?

Would there be any advantage in having psychiatric workers accompany a selected group of advisers abroad to help them and their families to adjust to their new surroundings, and to evaluate the part played by the existing American community abroad in influencing the newcomers' attitudes?

It may be that aid-giving countries and their missions abroad need to rethink their organization, administration theory, supervision and liaison practices in response to the needs of this relatively new type of employee -- the professional on contract -- and in response to the changing roles of their direct-hire personnel. They may need to rethink their organization patterns in terms of the aid-receiving countries also. Many types of aid programs operate in a single country, each making its own demands on the host government as a condition of aid. There are twenty such aid agencies operating in Uganda, for example. Each has special requirements as to reporting procedures, line of command, type of personnel to be employed as counterparts for the advisers, and a host of other special stipulations which impose a false technology on the aid-receiving country and serve no useful purpose. The imposition of sophisticated technology to match up with external requirements rather than with those of the country in need is a form of technological arrogance of which aid-receiving agencies in both Europe and the United States

are guilty. It also imposes a considerable extra administrative burden on the advisers and their counterparts.

Institutional support. No matter what type of individual is chosen or what form of preliminary experience and training is considered necessary, once the adviser is in the field, what type of institutional support does he get from his own people and the country mission? First and foremost needs to be established his chain of command. The complicated interrelationships of the public administration adviser blur the lines of responsibility in many instances. These are not so clearcut for the employee on contract as they are for direct-hire personnel, although in both cases demarkation of responsibilities is often purposely defined in somewhat vague terms to permit flexibility of action. But too much leeway may give rise to conflict, especially if the role of the adviser is differently interpreted by the adviser himself and various associates in his own and his host countries. To whom is the adviser responsible and for what? What are his obligations to his faculty committee or contract supervisor, to the mission, to the aid-giving agency, to the host government? Where is it advisable for him to work: in a government department of the host state, in the mission, in an indigenous university? What is the role of his counterpart in the government? The success of an adviser's mission often

depends upon the cooperation -- or lack of it -- of his counterpart and the type of relationship established.

In one sense, improving administrative capacity is the same everywhere: the adviser needs the best aids available, and the consistent and continuous support of his people back home. The contractor's obligation to backstop his man in the field is not an easy task. The adviser needs thorough knowledge of his predecessor's activities. Since he has to work with the host government, he should know the people identified with U. S. and other aid and training programs. "The targets of recording, reporting, and making available a well of information are the key factors."

Evaluation. Can evaluative criteria be built into a project at the pre-planning stage? There are such a number of unknown variables involved, particularly in the area of public administration, that many doubt the feasibility of assessing the success or failure of a project after completion, let alone before it has commenced. How, for example, do you evaluate a program intended to initiate senior foreign administrators into the workings of the U. S. federal administrative machinery? Do you gauge success by the numbers who volunteer, their expressed reactions on completion, or (what would be extremely difficult but which is the most likely purpose) the degree to which they appear to have assimilated the American

way of doing things? Do you evaluate a public administration institute by the number of pupils or successful graduates, the caliber of teaching, the course content and its applicability to on-the-job experience, or its innovative research program.-- follow-up study on graduate performance and the degree to which it is influenced by training is a very long undertaking.

Other scholars maintain, however, that no matter how difficult, evaluations of some sort are in order. It is necessary to "plan, gauge, and time for evaluation." They urge a review of current reporting procedures, especially in the aid-giving agencies; greater use of university research resources in data evaluation; assessment of the influence of training and orientation on the outcome of an assignment; and the development of some form of rating system for personnel and project combined, taking ecological factors into account. Some projects, it is argued, may fail for the right reasons.

Time appears an important element. A quick study of the relevance and quality of returning foreign experts' reports is more helpful before these people have dispersed. This is regarded as a university function because, although the validity of such subjective reporting may be in doubt, it should be possible for the university to develop standards for interviewing and common criteria on which to base comparative evaluations. Also, "However important

documentation may be, equally important is the accumulation of experience and close contact with people working on projects."

Thousands of man years of technical assistance in public administration have already been reported upon. Can this vast reservoir of experience be exploited to greater advantage? How can the advisers, the majority of whom already know their limitations, make the best use of existing talents and past experience?

Research Problems

- Preproject planning in relation to personnel needs
- Selection of advisory staff. Do choice and methods vary with:
  - type of employer
  - stage of project
  - type of assignment, at home or abroad?
- Special problems facing functional specialists abroad: role conflict, channels of command, culture shock
- Type of orientation, if any -- predeparture, post-arrival
- Institutional responsibilities for backstopping personnel in the field
- Institutional arrangements for briefing and debriefing direct-hire and contract personnel
- Evaluation techniques; rating of personnel and project; data collecting.

ROUND-UP OF RESEARCH TARGETS

The Administrative Function

1. Appropriate definition of functions common to all administrative systems. Standards for "good" public administration. Which are universal, which specific?

2. Classification of types of bureaucracies. For each type:

   (a) Define administrative content. (See 4, below.)

   (b) Respective functions of existing government agencies

   (c) Anticipated stages of administrative growth

   (d) Effect of administrative reform on the development process

   (e) Consequences of developing bureaucratic control devices

   (f) Possible avenues for administrative reform to improve administrative capability.

3. The typological classification of countries receiving aid.

4. The measurement of institutional capacity. For each bureaucratic type:

   (a) What types of institutional organization are there likely to be?

   (b) What administrative functions is each institution likely to perform?

(c) How do the administrative functions performed in one institution relate to, or affect, other institutions in the system?

(d) Is there any basis of comparison with the functions performed in other types of systems at similar stages of development?

5. Country Profiles. Having established common frames of reference, how can be determined for each country:

(a) The nature of the system:

- What are the national goals of the society
- What role is the public sector expected to play
- What patterns of public administration will be most likely to achieve these goals?

(b) The sequencing of administrative needs

(c) Existing administrative resources to meet these needs

(d) Obstacles that impair ability to meet these needs

(e) Potential administrative capacity.

6. In determining administrative capability, some likely studies are:

(a) How new ideas can be adapted and assimilated by institution, by country. How alien ideas are absorbed and changed in their new setting.

(b) Identification of possible interrelationships between institutions and possible interactions among institutions in one political system. What are the probable effects of administrative reform on other parts of the social order?

(c) The types of conflict likely to arise in a new nation between the existing social order and the administrative organization. How will this affect administrative reform and its interaction on the total system?

(d) Operational strategies in specific situations on the personnel-technological-procedural combinations most likely to produce the best coordinated administrative structure.

(e) The role of professional societies. What purposes do they serve: backstopping research projects, control of the bureaucracy, developing standards, training, upgrading the professional status of their members?

(f) The private sector as a recruitment source, as a means of controlling the bureaucracy, as a source of administrative know-how and techniques.

7. Definition of long-term and short-term goals of reform in different types of systems. Role of education.

8. The advantages of the clinical approach in developing the base criteria and data for country profiles. Commence by taking one particular area in one country (say, education or public health), defining its administrative content, institutional capacity, and the other elements of the country profile. Step-by-step enlargement of the area under review and subsequent comparison with experience in another country.

Training

1. Broad review of training needs for the different types of administrators under different systems at different stages of development.

2. Appraisal of existing training facilities on a country-by-country basis; their ability to meet training needs.

3. The educational setting for training in public administration. How does this differ with stage of development, level of administrator?

4. The geographic location of training for different types of administrative personnel. How feasible is it to set up a coordinated regional training framework in response to needs defined in the country profiles for different types and different levels of administrators?

5. Possible role of coordinating committees whose members would be chosen from the ranks of the civil service, political leadership, training staff, and on-the-job supervisors.

6. Studies on course content, training methods, and materials. Such factors to be considered as: feasible short-term and long-term

* See Appendix to Joseph R. Starr's paper (Part II) for amplification of many points mentioned under this head.

solutions to training needs; relevance of course material to practical administrative duties; potentials for training in the private sector; the interdisciplinary approach; the appropriate mix of training methods and materials; institutional versus on-the-job training; training the trainers; selection of trainees; appropriate use of consultants, seminars, research through training, refresher courses; adequacy of methods and materials in use; controlled experimentation on imported teaching methods and materials; and screening procedures for foreign periodicals, where should this be conducted?

7. Prior to the preparation of domestic manuals, the compilation of texts to cover administration topics considered essential in any public administration course.

8. Cost-benefit analyses of training costs. Costs of incorporating research into training programs; is it the wisest use of scarce resources?

Foreign Aid

1. In cooperation with outside professional group, development of profiles in AID to assess priorities for projects in countries receiving aid.

2. Three-part operational strategy; general, long-term, by major project.

3. Inventory and categorization of all completed AID projects in all areas, with special emphasis on evaluating the public administration experience.

4. Survey of contract procedures and requirements.

5. Training and orientation for the functional specialist on short-term assignment abroad. Possibility of using the case study approach.

6. Review of methods of selection, terms of employment, and conditions of service for direct-hire and contract personnel.

7. Longitudinal studies on culture shock, particularly with regard to the influence of the American community abroad on the public administration adviser and his family.

8. Review of organizational structure to meet changing needs of contract and direct-hire personnel, and governments of countries receiving aid. Special emphasis on measures to alleviate role shock.

9. Methods for simultaneous evaluation of project, ecology, and personnel. Feasibility of rating systems. Relate to more precise definition of reporting requirements. Use of mission staff appraisals. The career concept and effect on performance. Methods for institutional debriefing. Possible use of university to (a) elicit

as much current data as possible on country for research use and (b) bring returning adviser up to date on current research in the field.

10. What cultural values and ideological ideas is the United States exporting with the administrative know-how and theory? Is it compatible with U. S. policy to export such norms and, if so, why?

Terminology

Do researchers at present undertaking comparative administration studies agree on the meaning of terms used in public administration? Do these terms relate to developing as well as developed political systems?

Data Collection

1. Prior to the establishment of a coding system to be set up by experts, a committee of scholars and practising administrators to decide upon content, retrievability, audience, time span, and other relevant factors.

2. Wider circulation of data already gathered but not available to researchers; the formation of a committee to review classified sources to see if material not strategically important can be declassified and circulated to the universities.

3. Systematic investigation of possible data sources not at present fully utilized -- sources where data that may have been gathered for some specialized purpose such as the preparation of military manuals during the war. Are there other sources within the United Nations and its specialized agencies, in the various government archives, the State Department, etc., that could provide information to serve as the base data for the preliminary country profiles?

4. Methods to improve communication on ongoing research projects to avoid duplication of data gathering.

5. Possibility of developing a ten-year plan for information retrieval and to disseminate information; the establishment of a central documentation center with a worldwide network.

6. Feasibility of setting up national and/or regional documentation centers for dissemination of information, to act as liaison centers, and to offer resource facilities to U. S. and indigenous researchers.

7. Feasibility of initiating projects solely for the purpose of gathering data. Some of the objectives of such projects could be:

(a) Facilitating the process of professionalization by finding out (i) the categories of personnel engaged in professional administrative roles and the functions they perform, (ii) what type of person with what innate and acquired abilities is required to perform these functions, (iii) what type of training is provided for them, and (iv) how was it organized?

(b) Toning down the level of indigenous research. Much can be done to facilitate research with relatively little expense and no advanced technology in the field of data collection. For example, in Pakistan, despite the large number of research projects, no one has indicated the obvious need to compile and classify government documents.

(c) Providing the man-in-the-field with the background he needs: evaluation of relevant published materials, training priorities, existing training facilities, addresses of potential consultants, management consultant firms, former trainee participants, and the like.

(d) Determining types of institutes already offering training in public administration, their course content, and function.

Using First-Hand Experience As A Data Source

1. Development of interviewing techniques to provide a consistent source of information for returning foreign advisers, participants in U. S. training programs, and trainees at aid-sponsored public administration institutions. Weeding the wheat from the chaff would be a university function.

2. Review of reporting procedures in aid-giving agencies to see if they can be brought more into line with academic research requirements.

3. Assess practicability and possible results of setting up internship programs:

(a) To give university faculty an opportunity to learn more of government documentation and reporting procedures.

(b) To inform teaching and research personnel from abroad on U. S. university research programs, procedures, and data needs.

4. Region-by-region surveys of systems of government documentation, priorities to be established on step-by-step introduction of more advanced techniques in data collection, processing, and dissemination.

5. Possibility of conducting such surveys by the interchange on a regional basis of government personnel, the organization of regional seminars, and cooperation on joint data collection projects. Special emphasis on the adequacy of existing government data for research.

Special Research Problems

1. Who should conduct what type of research where:

(a) Data collection and classification

(b) Applied research

(c) Basic research?

Respective roles of: universities in developed nations, and developing nations, the professional associations, government departments, and political leadership.

2. More preparation for research:

(a) Pre-research reconnaissance surveys -- investigate decisions being made by country missions, check research gaps in relation to country's needs. Feasibility of using indigenous personnel for aspects of this pre-research survey.

(b) Development of research design at the pre-project planning stage. The design should include definition of problem areas, hypotheses, research methods (and the reason for their use), and some assessment of achievability and possible obstacles.

(c) Programs for training through research. Practicability of seminar approach with senior officials working out reform measures for their respective departments.

3. Obstacles to research in certain areas due to:

- lack of market
- lack of communication
- lack of incentive.

How are these difficulties to be overcome?

4. Methodology of research for emerging nations at different levels of development. Use of country profiles to determine need priorities. Case studies on the applicability of specific western research methods in a given region.

5. Feasibility of joint university projects on regional basis to handle foreign contracts and hire personnel for overseas assignments.

6. Plan of action in U. S. to create and make use of research capacity overseas.

7. Case study approach to single project (like Aswan Dam) looked at from all points of view. How can public administration ride piggyback on agricultural, economic, and other projects?

8. Staging of experimental programs with action and research teams working together on a single project, the latter's sole function being to observe, evaluate, and report.

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