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**Implementation  
Issues in  
Integrated Rural  
Development:  
A Review of 21  
USAID Projects**

**IRD Research Note No. 2**

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## PREFACE

The reader should be aware that this research is intended as an interim document. As outlined in the Introduction, it is intended as a partial data base for a series of essays to be written later. It is being published now in the belief that it will be of interest to researchers working on similar issues. It should also be pointed out that the issues discussed in this report are characteristic of many types of development projects and programs and are not confined to integrated rural development projects. Thus, the material presented should be of interest to a broad range of rural development researchers and practitioners.

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## INTRODUCTION

Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) and Research Triangle Institute (RTI) signed a four-year contract in September 1978 with the Office of Rural Development and Development Administration, United States Agency for International Development, to assist donor agencies and host governments in the design and implementation of integrated rural development (IRD) projects and programs. This project, the Organization and Administration of Integrated Rural Development (AID Project #936-5300), has two simultaneous objectives. First, it provides short term technical assistance to aid project managers in the organization and administration of IRD projects. Secondly, it aims at documenting and analyzing the most serious problems that occur during IRD implementation, and identifying alternative organizational mechanisms and management practices to help alleviate those problems. The present report is one facet of a research strategy aimed at addressing this second objective.

## SECTION I

## THE RESEARCH STRATEGY

Lists of implementation problems common to IRD projects were generated and extensively discussed by DAI and RTI team members in late 1980. In the end, nine critical implementation problems were selected for study.<sup>1</sup> These were:

Effecting Integration: To be successful, an IRD project requires coordination of the activities of several independent agencies or groups. Yet, actually obtaining this coordination is often very difficult. Consequently, how an organization fits into the government's bureaucratic structure, the kinds of linkages between agencies that are required, and the methods used to facilitate coordination within a given institutional framework, are factors which assume increased importance.

Political, Economic, and Environmental Constraints: The success of IRD projects is sometimes adversely affected by constraints which are seemingly beyond the control of the project itself to resolve. Research is needed on the causes of these external constraints and remedial actions that could be undertaken to overcome them or minimize their impact.

Participation and Decentralization: While it is generally felt that greater participation and decentralization would promote development, it is not clear how to best implement these concepts in an IRD project setting. Research is necessary to determine what kinds of participation have been encouraged by IRD projects and the mechanisms introduced to promote it. Similarly, with respect to decentralization, it is necessary to determine how it has occurred in IRD projects and what methods have been, or could be, used to measure the extent of decentralization efforts.

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<sup>1</sup> Elliott R. Morss and David D. Gow, Integrated Rural Development: Nine Critical Implementation Problems, Research Note No. 1, Development Alternatives, Inc., February 1981.

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Information Systems: Historically, formal information systems, while provided for in almost all IRD project designs, are rarely implemented, and if implemented, are not effectively used. Research is needed into the reasons for this unsatisfactory performance. Further, it is necessary to investigate alternative "informal" systems that can provide the information needed in a cost-effective manner.

Timing: Inaccurate timing estimates (usually overly optimistic) lead to serious implementation problems. Research is necessary into the causes and effects of implementation delays, as well as into how project-related activities should be phased so as to make them most effective.

Differing Agendas: The major actors in project identification, design, implementation, and evaluation are likely to have differing purposes or agendas which may not place the highest priority on achieving project goals. It is important to determine how incentive systems might be used to modify the behavior of these actors and make it more conducive to project success.

Managing Technical Assistance: Generous amounts of technical assistance (TA), both short and long-term, are usually built into donor-funded IRD projects. Yet, the process of managing and structuring assistance to such complex projects is an often ignored issue. The questions that need to be addressed include the appropriate mix of long-term versus short-term TA, the changing TA needs of projects to be met as the project life-cycle unfolds, and the appropriate strategy for providing technical assistance to large multisectoral projects (i.e., the personal contract, academic, bodyshop, or management team strategy).

Counterpart Shortages: Quite often shortages occur in the complement of host country personnel assigned during IRD project implementation to work with short and long-term expatriate technical assistance teams. As a result, projects must proceed more slowly than originally planned and the expatriate teams may take on far more implementation responsibilities than projected, at the expense of their capacity-building roles. However, assuring a full complement of host counterparts may mean diverting skilled manpower from other jobs where they are also desperately needed.

Sustaining Project Benefits: Often the intended benefits of a rural development project are not sustained (if ever attained) after external resource flows stop. Research into the most important constraints to sustainability is needed, along with an identification of the elements that contribute to project sustainability.

Several approaches are being used to examine these critical issues: These include:

- A review of the development literature, a review of project documentation on USAID and World Bank IRD projects, and information drawn from DAI's own implementation experiences;
- Workshops, surveys, and interviews of former IRD project managers aimed at obtaining specific examples of the problems that have been encountered in implementing IRD projects, along with what steps were taken to alleviate them; and
- The collection of concrete information on these problems during technical assistance missions by DAI and RTI team members to IRD projects in the field.

These data will serve as the basis for essays on the nine critical implementation problems that have been identified above.

In the present report, implementation documents for 21 USAID integrated rural development projects were reviewed and the insights, lessons, and experience of these projects, vis-à-vis the nine issues, were extracted. The report is divided into two sections. In the first, the 21 projects are briefly described. The objective of the second section is to provide background material for DAI's internal use in the preparation of the forthcoming set of essays on the nine critical issues.

## CHOOSING THE SAMPLE

USAID funded projects from around the world are included in this review. However, since the term "integrated rural development" has been used very loosely in recent years (calling a project "integrated" seems to smooth over the bumps in the funding approval process) a working definition of IRD was developed to limit the sample size to relevant projects. The criteria used in determining whether a project was "integrated rural development" for our purposes were:

- The project involved more than one component (e.g., agriculture, road construction, health, etc.) and required some degree of coordination (either explicitly called for in the design of the project or implied through, for example, giving the responsibility for implementation to a single entity);
- It was geographically bounded, i.e., concentrated resources in a specific area or group of areas within the country; and
- It was focused on meeting the needs of people in predominantly rural areas.

Forty-four projects more or less met the above criteria. Of these, eight which were still in the planning or early implementation stage were eliminated, since it could not be expected that much concrete data would be available from them. Of the remaining 36 projects, the 21 with the most adequate documentation were selected for inclusion in the sample. Table 1 lists these 21 projects and presents some basic information on them.<sup>2</sup> The relevant project design documents, progress reports, evaluations and related data were then reviewed and the information relevant to the nine critical issues was extracted and catalogued.

Of the 21 projects selected, 8 have been visited by Development Alternatives, Inc. technical assistance teams under the Organization and Implementation of IRD contract. Table 2 presents a list of these projects as well as some data on the technical assistance missions to them. Three of the 21 projects employ long-term technical assistance teams provided by DAI.

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<sup>2</sup> Annex A1 lists the 44 AID sponsored projects considered in this review. Annexes A2, A3, A4 list IRD projects sponsored by the World Bank and other donors, and projects which are either proposed or just getting underway.

Table 1. AID-Financed Integrated Rural Development Projects Reviewed in this Study

Country	Project name and AID project number	Implementation dates	Organizational Placement	Components	Donor Funding (million \$)	Host Country Contribution (million \$)	Location
Bolivia	Subtropical Lands Development Project (511-0346 & 511-0514)	1975-82	Lead-line agency	Ag. extension, research & input supply, road construction, potable water, health, colonization	9.7	5.1	Chane-Piray, San Julian areas
Colombia	Community Based Integrated Rural Development (514-0210)	1976-80	PMU	Ag. extension/farmer training, credit, road construction and improvement, health, nutrition, education and school construction, community development	1.0	1.1	Sibundoy, Guadalupe, Sumapaz
Haiti	Gros Morne Rural Development (521-0081)	1977-80	PMU	credit, health, community development	0.13	n.a.	Gros Morne
Haiti	HACHO (Haitian American Community Help Organization (521-0061)	1972-79	PMU	Ag. extension & research, road construction, health, nutrition, education, community development	6.6	0.9	Northwest Province
Indonesia	Community Based Integrated Rural Development (497-0240)	1976-80	PMU	Ag. extension, credit, bridge construction, potable water, sanitation, electrification, health, nutrition, education, cooperative development, rural industry	2.0	n.a.	Tangse and Lam Teuba, Aceh Province
Indonesia	Luwu Area Development and Transmigration Project (497-0038)	1976-83	Lead-line agency	Ag. extension, road construction, irrigation system construction, colonization, health	15.0	45.0	District of Luwu, island of Sulawesi
Indonesia	Provincial Area Development Program (497-0264)	1978-82	Subnational government agency	Ag. extension, research & input supply, credit, rural industry promotion	6.0	4.3	Provinces of Aceh and Central Java
Jamaica	Second Integrated Rural Development Project (532-0046)	1977-82	PMU	Ag. extension & research, road construction and improvement, soil conservation/reforestation, potable water, electrification, cooperative development	15.0	11.2	Pindars Rivers & Two Meetings Watersheds
Kenya	Vihiga/Hamisi Special Rural Development Program (615-0147)	1970-78	National IRD agency	Ag. extension & research, credit, livestock and range management, road construction and improvement, education, rural industry, socioeconomic research	1.8	0.25	Vihiga & Hamisi Administrative Divisions

(continued)

Table 1. (continued)

Country	Project name and AID project number	Implementation dates	Organizational placement	Components	Donor Funding (million \$)	Host Country Contribution (million \$)	Location
Lesotho	Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project (632-0031)	1973-78	PMU	Ag. extension, research & input supply, credit, livestock & range management, marketing, road construction and improvement, soil and water conservation/reforestation, socioeconomic research	8.4	1.4	Maseru
Liberia	Upper Lofa County Agricultural Development Project (669-0022)	1976-81	PMU	Ag. extension, research & input supply, credit, road construction and improvement, cooperative development	11.0	7.0	Northern part of Lofa County
Mali	Operation Mils-Mopti (688-0202)	1976-83	Subnational government agency	Ag. extension, research & input supply, marketing, road construction and improvement, potable water, rural industry	21.5	4.3	Mopti District
Mauritania	Integrated Rural Development (Guidimaka) (602-0201)	1977-83	PMU	Ag. extension & research, livestock and range management, soil and water conservation/reforestation, cooperative development	6.0	1.7	Guidimaka Region
Nicaragua	INVIERNO (524-0118)	1976-	National IRD agency	Ag. extension, credit, marketing, community development	12.0	18.0	Central Interior & Central Pacific Regions
Philippines	Bicol Integrated Rural Development Program (492-0303/0260/0275/0310/0289)	1974-85	Lead-line agency	Ag. extension, research & input supply, credit, land reform, road construction & improvement, electrification, health, nutrition	29.6	58.6	Bicol Region, Southeastern Luzon
Sudan	Abyei Rural Development Project (650-0025)	1979-81	PMU	Ag. extension & research, potable water, health, communications, cooperative development	1.3	1.8	Abyei District, South Kordofan Province
Tanzania	Arusha Planning and Village Development Project (621-0143)	1978-82	Subnational government agency	Ag. extension & research, credit, road construction & improvement, potable water, rural industry, regional planning	5.5	16.0	Arusha Region
Tunisia	Siliana Rural Development (664-0307)	1977-81	Subnational government agency	Livestock and range management, road construction & improvement, potable water, health, community development	1.6	n.a.	Makthar & Rohia Delegations, Siliana Province

(continued)

Table 1. (continued)

Country	Project name and AID project number	Implementation dates	Organizational	Components	Donor Funding (million \$)	Host Country Contribution (million \$)	Location
Upper Volta	Eastern ORD Integrated Rural Development (686-0201)	1975-80	Subnational government agency	Ag. extension & research, credit, marketing, road construction & improvement, socioeconomic research	4.8	1.0	Eastern Region of Upper Volta
Yemen Arab Republic	Community Based Integrated Rural Development (279-0031)	1978-81	PMU	Ag. extension & research, road construction & improvement, potable water, health, nutrition, community development	1.5	0.3	Mahweit
Zaire	North Shaba Maize Production Project (660-0016)	1977-81	PMU	Ag. extension, research & input supply, marketing, road construction & improvement, cooperative development, rural industry, socioeconomic research	13.4	9.6	North Shaba Region


Table 2. DAI Technical Assistance to IRD Projects in the Sample

Country	Project name	Dates of missions	Man-months of assistance	Type of assistance provided
Indonesia	Community Based Integrated Rural Development	9/10/79-9/16/79	0.5	Analysis of CBIRD approach; evaluation
		5/12/80-5/27/80 <sup>a</sup>	1.5	
Indonesia	Provincial Area Development Program <sup>b</sup>	8/29/80-9/28/80	6.0	Reconnaissance; organizational capacity building
		1/19/81-2/6/81	1.5	
Jamaica	Second Integrated Rural Development Project	5/11/80-5/31/80	2.3	Management workshops
		3/ 2/81-3/20/81	2.3	
Liberia	Upper Lofa County Agricultural Development Project	3/17/80-3/29/80	2.8	Management workshops; logistics and transportation TA
		8/10/79-8/28/79	2.0	
Philippines	Bicol Integrated Rural Development Project	4/17/79-4/26/79	0.5	Reconnaissance; management workshops
		10/1/79-10/13/79	1.5	
		6/11/71-7/8/81	2.0	
Sudan	Abyei Rural Development	1/8/81-2/7/81	4.0	Evaluation
Tanzania	Arusha Planning and Village Development Project <sup>b</sup>	periodic	n.a.	Sector analysis, regional planning assistance
Zaire	North Shaba Maize Production Project <sup>b</sup>	periodic	n.a.	Agricultural analysis, management workshops, evaluation

<sup>a</sup> Technical assistance provided by Research Triangle, Inc., the subcontractor in the Organization and Administration of IRD contract, and involved a principal member of the IRD research team.

<sup>b</sup> DAI implementation projects.

Figure 1. Geographic Dispersion of IRD Projects in the Sample



It should be kept in mind that this report is not meant to be an evaluation of the projects in the sample. Rather, it aims at reviewing the implementation experiences of these projects in order to clarify the nature and importance of the nine issues discussed above. Hopefully, the insights gained from the review will provide a solid base from which to continue the state-of-the-art research on IRD implementation issues. This report focuses, by definition, on the problems that these projects have faced and their attempts to overcome them. Thus, it may provide a more negative view of these projects than is really justified. The reader should not attempt to judge any project in this sample by the problems discussed in this report, if for no other reason than the inclusion of these projects in the discussion of any given issue is as much a function of the availability of data as the relative seriousness of that problem for the project.

Further, the use of USAID documentation as a basis for this review may tend to emphasize the role of USAID and the technical assistance that it provides to a project, and may not do justice to the importance and role of other donors or the host country itself in implementation. It should be kept in mind that in many of these projects the USAID contribution was only a part of a much larger effort. Because of this bias in the focus of the documentation, figures cited in the text, such as "host country funding contribution" may be underestimated (for example, they may refer to program costs and not to government budgetary support for staff, or they may refer merely to government investment in only the components covered in the USAID loan or grant).

#### GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE

The IRD projects in the sample are varied. In terms of geographic dispersion, the sample contains 3 projects from Latin America, 3 from the Caribbean, 4 from Asia, 4 from East Africa, 5 from West and Central Africa, and 1 each from North Africa and the Middle East. In terms of organizational placement, 3 of the projects use the lead-line agency approach, 11 employ project management units (PMUs), 5 are attached to subnational government agencies and 2 are implemented by national integrated rural development agencies.

In terms of total funding, the smallest project is the Gros Morne Rural Development Project in Haiti (around \$250,000) and the largest is the Bicol Integrated Rural Development Program in the Philippines (\$88.2 million). Total project costs for 7 of the projects amount to less than \$5 million. Four of the projects cost between \$5 and 10 million; 3 between \$10 and 20 million, 4 cost between \$20 and 30 million, and 3 projects had total costs in excess of \$30 million.

Similarly, with respect to donor contributions, 7 of the projects receive less than \$3 million in assistance from USAID and other donors. Seven of the projects receive from \$3 to 10 million in foreign assistance. Five receive from \$11 million to \$15 million, and two receive in excess of \$20 million. Five of the projects in the sample are implemented by private voluntary organizations (PVOs), usually under an operational program grant from USAID. These PVO projects are among the smallest in the sample.

Information on the availability of counterpart contribution was available for 18 projects. Of these, the host country contribution amounted to an average of 50.3 percent of total costs in the largest nine projects (over \$12 million in total costs), but only 27.3 percent of project costs in the smaller projects (under \$12 million).

The number of beneficiaries reached by a rural development project is highly subjective and definitions of who is a beneficiary vary from project to project. However, for those projects where reasonably sound figures exist estimated costs/beneficiary show a wide variation:

		<u>costs/beneficiary</u>
Jamaica	Second IRD Project	\$6550
Mauritania	IRD Project (Guidimaka)	500
Yemen	Community Based IRD (Mahweit)	300
Kenya	Vihiga Rural Development	200
Indonesia	Luwu Area Development	200
Lesotho	Thaba Bosiu Rural Development	161
Indonesia	Community Based IRD	130
Philippines	Bicol IRD	74
Haiti	HACHO	50
Haiti	Gros Morne Rural Development	42
Colombia	IRD (Sibundoy, Guadelupe, Sumapaz)	26
Tunisia	Siliana IRD	26

## THE PROJECTS

What follows is a brief description of each of the projects included in the sample.

Bolivia--Sub-Tropical Lands Development Project: The Sub-Tropical Lands Development Project in the area of San Julian and Chane-Piray, Department of Santa Cruz, is a major colonization project financed by USAID (\$9.7 million) and the Government of Bolivia (\$5.1 million). It began in 1975 and will continue until 1982. Its objective is to bring into production the underutilized lands in the Bolivian "Oriente," increasing the productivity and incomes of the approximately 11,000 campesino families that will eventually be located in the area. The Instituto Nacional de Colonización, a semi-autonomous agency within the Ministry of Campesino Affairs, Agriculture and Livestock, is the implementing agency. Nine other public and private organizations have been participating in the implementation of the project. The project involves the construction of all weather and access roads in the area, the provision of production and social services to the settlers (including the construction of agricultural service centers, potable water and health facilities) and an orientation program for settlers aimed at minimizing the shock of moving from the Bolivian "antiplano" and other mountainous areas to the lowlands in the interior.

Colombia--Community Based Integrated Rural Development (CBIRD): The CBIRD Project in Colombia is one of about a dozen such projects operated by Save the Children Federation around the world. In Colombia, the CBIRD approach was employed in three geographically and socioeconomically distinct regions. These were: Sibundoy, Department of Putumayo, a community made up of two culturally distinct Indian groups operating within a subsistence economy; Guadalupe, Department of Huila, a "mini-fundista" agricultural area in a mountainous region of the country; and Sumapaz, Department of Cundinamarca, an isolated community in the mountains near Bogotá. The project received an Operational Program Grant from USAID in 1976 for \$300,000 matched by \$700,000 from SCF and another \$1.1 million in host country contributions. The project has worked closely with, and coordinated the service delivery of, a number of Colombian line agencies. Activities have included projects in agriculture, health, nutrition, the formation of credit unions,

school construction, and the improvement of the network of roads and trails in the areas. Midway through the life of the project it was decided to reallocate funds from Sumapaz to the other two areas. This was in response to the low grass roots support and lack of participation by the beneficiaries in Sumapaz. On the other hand, the level of participation and enthusiasm in the two other project areas has been very high. The USAID support for the projects ended in 1980, when the mission phased out of Colombia.

Haiti--Gros Morne Rural Development: The Gros Morne Development Project in northern Haiti was begun in 1977 and was scheduled to terminate in 1980. It was financed through an Operational Program Grant to Catholic Relief Services (\$104,000), a contribution by the CRS itself (\$50,000), and funds from German government and private sources (\$80,000). The funding was initiated in response to a proposal by Gros Morne hospital staff. Activities in the areas of agricultural production, sanitation, health care, and nutrition were planned. A Rural Development Center was established which would, in conjunction with the staff of the hospital, work with and through already existing community councils in the project area. By early 1980 some 1300 families were involved in these community groups.

Haiti--Haitian American Community Help Organization (HACHO): HACHO operates in the very poor, drought-prone northwest region of Haiti. Created in 1966 under the auspices of CARE, the project was an ad hoc response to the need for disaster relief and medical services. Gradually, the focus of HACHO changed from a concentration on providing health services to include road construction, education, and agriculture. HACHO has also served an umbrella role for other relief and development efforts. In its activities, HACHO seeks to work through local community councils to foster community participation and support. In 1973, USAID funding was obtained in the form of an Operational Program Grant to CARE, conditional on the gradual withdrawal of the USAID subsidy, to be replaced by full government funding by 1980. USAID's assistance to HACHO did end in that year. GOH funding levels, however, have not kept pace with the demand for program funds. Nevertheless, CARE and several other international donors have remained involved in the program.

Indonesia--Community Based Integrated Rural Development: The CBIRD Project in Indonesia is a Save the Children Federation project. It is based in Tangse, a subdistrict of the Special Territory of Aceh, Indonesia's westernmost province. Tangse

is made up of 27 villages with around 14,000 inhabitants. In early 1979, the project was expanded to include Lam Teuba, a settlement of eight villages in Seulimeum subdistrict. The project, funded under an operational program grant from USAID, began in 1976 and focused on three types of interventions: income generating activities (e.g., agriculture and the formation of credit unions), infrastructure development (water supply, electrification, sanitation, etc.), and human resource development (child care and nutrition, education, and primary health care). Aside from the SCF Director, the project staff is entirely Indonesian. Much of the effort within the project has gone to establishing grass roots support through the use of village community development groups.

Indonesia--Luwu Area and Transmigration Development Program: The Luwu Program is a \$60 million resettlement project with a heavy investment in upgrading a major road network in the district and rehabilitating and extending two large irrigation systems. The project is located in the District of Luwu, on the island of Sulawesi. The Ministry of Manpower, Transmigration, and Cooperatives is the administering agency, and coordinates its activities with the Ministries of Agriculture Public Works, and Trade. The first phase of the project began in 1976 and is scheduled to run until 1983. A follow-on project is planned.

Indonesia--Provincial Area Development Program: The Provincial Area Development Program is one of three projects in the sample being implemented with technical assistance provided by Development Alternatives, Inc. It is financed by USAID (\$6 million) and the Government of Indonesia (\$4.3 million). The goal of the program, which runs from 1978 to 1982, is to assist the provincial planning boards, local rural development organizations, and other agencies operating in the provinces of Aceh and Central Java in the identification and planning of rural development projects. These projects will then be carried out by the government's line agencies with the Directorate of Regional Development, a division of the Ministry of Home Affairs, providing central government managerial support. The areas of attention include agricultural production and support, rural industry promotion, and credit extension. The main focus of the project, however, is on capacity building at the provincial level.

Jamaica--Second Integrated Rural Development Project: The Second IRD Project is located in two non-contiguous watersheds in the central highlands of Jamaica, the Pindars River and

Two Meetings Watersheds. In the project area, 4,000 small, hillside farmers cultivate farms averaging 2.9 acres each, with slopes as great as 30 degrees. As a result, the project's watershed areas have become severely eroded and crop yields are very low. Further, the provision of credit, agricultural extension, marketing, and agricultural inputs services is inadequate. The project, jointly financed by USAID and the Government of Jamaica, involves a combined US \$26 million in loans, grants, technical assistance, and host country investment. Approximately half of this expenditure, however, is earmarked for erosion control activities, including terracing, reforestation, waterway and check dam construction, and river embankment protection.

Kenya--Vihiga/Hamisi Special Rural Development Program: The Vihiga Project was one of six experimental efforts initiated by the Government of Kenya to test various ideas and approaches to rural development in that country. The Vihiga SRDP was initiated in 1970 with the assistance of USAID. The project area includes two divisions (Vihiga and Hamisi) in Kagamega District, Western Province. The project, originally designed to end in 1976, was extended to 1978. It was managed as an inter-ministerial government operation, with each ministry carrying out its own activities. Funding and coordination were handled by the Ministry of Finance and Planning. The project involved the provision of credit, extension services, agricultural research, labor intensive road construction, vocational education, and promotion of rural industries.

Lesotho--Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project: USAID and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development jointly financed two of the projects in the sample. The first was the Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project, located near Maseru in Lesotho. The project began in 1973 and is scheduled to end in 1981. Financed by \$2.8 million from USAID, \$5.6 million from the World Bank, and \$1.4 million in host country counterpart funds, this project focused on soil conservation as a means of increasing the agricultural productivity of the approximately 12,000 farmers in the project area. The project was implemented by a semi-autonomous project management unit (PMU) which, in turn, was responsible to the Thaba Bosiu Authority, a supervisory body composed of senior line ministry officials. Aside from soil and water conservation activities, the project involved increasing agricultural extension efforts, credit, farmer training, and agricultural research, as well as including livestock development, range management, and road construction components. Though USAID withdrew from the project at the end of the first phase, the World Bank has continued to fund it.

Liberia--Upper Lofa County Agricultural Development Project:

The second joint USAID/World Bank project in the sample is the Upper Lofa County Project in Liberia. USAID and the World Bank contributed \$5 million and \$6 million respectively, with the Government of Liberia putting in another \$7 million. The objective was to improve the agricultural production and productivity of some 8,000 farm families in the project area. The project involved the improvement of upland and swamp rice cultivation practices and the development of cocoa and coffee farms. Aside from agricultural extension and research, components in the project included road and well construction and the provision of farm inputs and credit. A project management unit was established and given the responsibility of creating marketing cooperatives which would take over the PMU's functions at the end of the project.

Mali--Operation Mils Mopti: Operation Mils Mopti, a semi-autonomous regional agency within the Ministry of Rural Development, is the implementing agency for this project, which aims at increasing the production of rainfed food crops in the region around Mopti, in the eastern portion of Mali. Between 1976 and 1980 USAID contributed almost \$8.9 million to the project, matched by \$1.5 million in host country counterpart funds. An extension of the project until 1983 will involve the investment of another \$12.7 million by USAID and \$2.8 million by the Government of Mali. The project involves road improvement, agricultural research and extension, provision of agricultural inputs, marketing assistance, well construction, and a program to improve blacksmith services in the area.

Mauritania--Integrated Rural Development: The IRD Project in Mauritania is located in the Guidimaka Region, around Selibaby, in southern Mauritania. The project, which runs from 1977 till 1983, is being implemented by a project management unit staffed by expatriates and host country nationals, under the auspices of the Ministry of Rural Development. The activities, which are carried out in cooperation with other line ministries, include increasing cereals production, livestock and range management, animal traction, and reforestation. The project originally planned to concentrate on agricultural research and demonstration efforts, with the commencement of extension activities awaiting a separate, follow-on project. After the first year's experience, extension activities were begun when it was found that proven and adaptable improved agricultural technology was already available and in great demand by the beneficiaries. USAID is investing almost \$6.0 million in the project, while the Government of Mauritania is contributing another \$1.67 million.

Nicaragua--INVIERNO: INVIERNO, which stands for Instituto de Bienestar Campesino, (Institute for Small Farmer Welfare) was created by the government of Nicaragua as a semi-autonomous institution in 1975. Its main focus is the provision of supervised credit, using a rather sophisticated technology, including the use of computers for processing credit applications. Improving the availability of other rural services, e.g., extension input supply, marketing, etc., is also an objective. Though initially implemented in only two of the eight regions in the country, it was to spread to the other regions as experience was gained in the implementation of the project.

Philippines--Bicol Integrated Rural Development Program: A massive integrated rural development effort, the Bicol Project is financed with \$29.6 million in USAID loans and grants, combined with \$58.6 million in host government contributions. The project area, in southeastern Luzon, is divided into several "integrated development areas" (IADs), including the Libmanan/Cabuso IAD Project, the Bula IAD Project, and the Rinconada (Buhi-Lalo) IAD Project. The Bicol River Basin Development Program also involves separate USAID loans for secondary and feeder road construction and an integrated health, nutrition, and population component. Supervision and coordination responsibilities of the overall program lie with the Bicol River Basin Coordinating Committee, a national level committee. The responsibility for project implementation within the integrated development areas, however, is the responsibility of various line agencies. Much of the investment in the Bicol IRD Project is in basic infrastructure development, road construction, rural electrification, and especially irrigation system construction. Production services (agricultural extension, research, input supply, credit, and land reform) and social services (health, nutrition, etc.) are also financed under the project. The project was begun in 1974 and will continue until 1985.

Sudan--Abyei Rural Development Project: Located in the very remote Abyei District, Southern Kordofan Province, Sudan, the Abyei Rural Development Project involves the provision of agricultural extension and research services, well construction, health services, and the establishment of cooperative farms. Started in 1979, the project is financed by \$1.3 million in USAID funds matched by \$1.05 million in counterpart project funds and \$365,000 per year in annual government budgetary obligations. The project, which will end in 1981, is being implemented by a project management unit with national level support.

Tanzania--Arusha Planning and Village Development Project: Implemented with technical assistance provided by Development Alternatives, Inc., the Arusha Planning and Village Development Project aims at conducting regional planning and rural development in three districts (around 120 villages) in the Arusha Region in Northwest Tanzania. The project, which runs from 1978 to 1982, is financed by \$5.5 million from USAID and \$16.0 million in government funds. The implementing entities are the Office of the Regional Development Director and the government of each of the three districts. Specifically, the project involves agricultural research and extension, provision of credit, construction of access roads and wells, appropriate technology development, and institution building at the regional, district and village levels.

Tunisia-Siliana Rural Development: The Siliana Rural Development Project is located in the delegations of Makthar and Rohia in Siliana Province, north central Tunisia. It is funded by USAID through both a direct loan of \$975,000 and an Operational Program Grant to Save the Children for \$617,000 to carry out a CBIRD-type project. The existing provincial government was to provide project supervision and delegation-level line agencies were to implement the core components of the project. Over thirty sub-projects were involved (seventeen of them under the SCF community development component) including range management, road construction, provision of potable water, health, and agriculture and livestock programs. The Siliana Province Rural Development Project began in 1977 and ended in December of 1980. Subsequently a major IRD project, the Central Tunisia Integrated Rural Development Project, was initiated in an area near Siliana.

Upper Volta--Eastern ORD Integrated Rural Development: The Eastern Region is the poorest of the eleven states that comprise Upper Volta. In 1975, USAID obligated \$4.8 million for an integrated rural development project aimed at improving extension and agricultural research services to the region, credit availability, marketing and infrastructure, and conducting socioeconomic research. The Government of Upper Volta was to contribute an additional \$1.5 million. The Organisme Regional de Developpement (ORD) a semi-autonomous regional development organizational implemented the project, with technical assistance provided by Michigan State University. The project ran until 1980, and USAID is currently considering implementing a second phase.

Yemen Arab Republic--Community Based Integrated Rural Development: The CBIRD approach was also attempted in Yemen, where it was employed in a project based in Mahweit Province. Financed by an Operational Program Grant from USAID, the project began in 1978 and was to continue until December of 1980. Working through a local development association, the project carried out activities such as agricultural research and poultry production, road, well, and building construction, and the provision of health and nutrition services. The conflict-ridden setting and the complicated political events which resulted, led to an early termination of the project and the departure of the expatriate staff in April of 1980, four days short of a deadline imposed by local community leaders.

Zaire--North Shaba Maize Production Project: The North Shaba Maize Production Project is being implemented with technical assistance from Development Alternatives, Inc. Begun in 1977, the project will have involved an investment of \$13.4 million by USAID and \$9.6 million by the Government of Zaire by its completion in late 1981. The project attempts to address all the major constraints to increased maize production in the North Shaba Region in eastern Zaire. The activities have included agricultural research and extension, input supply, marketing, the development of intermediate technology for crop production and processing, and the construction of rural roads. The project is being implemented by a project management unit comprised of host country and expatriate personnel.

## SECTION II

## INTRODUCTION

This section is a compilation of information extracted from the project documentation files of the twenty-one USAID-financed integrated rural development projects contained in the sample. This information is to be used as background material for the preparation of a forthcoming set of essays on the nine critical implementation issues. The information is presented in a concise, disaggregated form so as to maximize its utility to the IRD team of analysts, while minimizing the amount of time spent in writing up the report. The items within each section are presented in alphabetical order by country. Because this is intended to be an interim document, some of the source work is extracted verbatim. Citations are, of course, given for all published material used. When citations are not given, it is because the information has been obtained through interviews with DAI staff members familiar with the project.

The references in the bibliography are listed by project, with each project receiving a letter code, "A" through "U." Within each project grouping the references are numbered. The citations in the text refer to this project code and reference number, followed by the page numbers within the reference from which the material was obtained.

Table 3 provides a breakdown of the information collected by project and by issue. Each of the chapters that follow will have a brief introduction describing the issue as presented in IRD Research Note #1.<sup>1</sup> The composition of the material in each chapter inevitably reflects the idiosyncracies of the documentation reviewed. For the most part, the material presented is heavy on problem manifestation, and contains relatively little on means of alleviating the problem. This latter aspect will have to be addressed more thoroughly through the alternative approaches planned as part of the IRD research strategy.

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<sup>1</sup> Morss and Gow, op. cit.

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Table 3. Project Experience by Critical Implementation Issue

		Effecting Integration	Political, Economic, and Environmental Constraints	Participation and Decentralization	Information Systems	Timing	Differing Agendas	Managing Technical Assistance	Counterpart Shortages	Sustaining Project Benefits
Bolivia	Sub-Tropical Lands Development	X				X		X		X
Colombia	Community Base <sup>3</sup> IRD			X						
Haiti	Gros Morne Rural Development			X		X	X			
Haiti	HACHO									X
Indonesia	Community Based IRD	X		X						X
Indonesia	Luwu Area Dev. and Transmigration	X				X				
Indonesia	Provincial Area Development			X	X		X			X
Jamaica	Second IRD Project	X		X	X	X		X	X	X
Kenya	Vihiga/Hamisi Special Rural Dev.			X			X	X		
Lesotho	Thaba Bosiu Rural Development		X				X			
Liberia	Upper Lofa County Agricultural Dev.	X	X							X
Mali	Operation Mills-Mopti		X							
Mauritania	Guidimaka IRD Project			X		X				
Nicaragua	INVIERNO	X	X	X	X		X			
Philippines	Bicol IRD Program	X		X	X	X	X			
Sudan	Abyei Rural Development Project	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Tanzania	Arusha Planning and Village Dev.			X		X		X	X	X
Tunisia	Siliana Rural Development							X	X	
Upper Volta	Eastern ORD Integrated Rural Dev.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Yemen Arab Republic	Mahweit CBIRD Project	X		X					X	
Zaire	North Shaba Maize Production		X					X	X	

## EFFECTING INTEGRATION

Few will disagree with the proposition that development calls for various activities that should be coordinated. However, it has proven extremely difficult to move from this proposition to coordinated planning and implementation activities. Setting the background for the problem of effecting integration is the placement of the IRD project within the existing government structure. Four placement strategies have been identified:

- Use of a lead-line agency with cooperative agreement between it and other sectoral agencies (e.g., Bolivia's Sub-Tropical Lands Development Project);
- Working at a program level through a sub-national government unit such as a region or province (e.g., Upper Volta's Eastern ORD Project);
- Operating through an integrated development agency which is a permanent organization deriving its authority from a president's office (e.g., Nicaragua's INVIERNO Project); and
- Establishing an autonomous but temporary project management unit (PMU) to deliver integrated services within a specified but limited geographic area (e.g., Liberia's Lofa County Agricultural Development Project).

This organizational placement is important because it defines the subsequent pattern of organizational linkages, i.e., activities carried out during implementation which require coordination of two or more agencies. Each placement strategy will, to a greater or lesser extent, involve inter-organizational conflicts and problems of coordination among the various actors involved in project implementation. Therefore, it is necessary to look at what can be or has been done to address these conflicts. This involves the use of formal and informal mechanisms (involving joint decision making, information sharing, and resource sharing) to encourage coordination and reduce conflict among the various participants in the project's implementation.

## PROBLEM MANIFESTATIONS

Sub-Tropical Lands Development Project, Bolivia

- The administrative system in Bolivia is set up to serve a "control" function, i.e., it is organized to guard against potential abuses of the public trust, particularly in the area of financial management. To fulfill this function, the system has the following characteristics:
  - A high level of centralization.
  - An extraordinary number of officials who must sign off on expenditures.
  - An absence of flexibility in budget execution.

However, these characteristics, while serving the control function, may not be conducive to the management of "development" oriented activities. Consequently, development program managers continually are at odds with administrative structures and requirements that were designed to achieve different objectives.

Most of the administrative problems and/or bottlenecks experienced in the Sub-Tropical Lands Development Project implemented by the National Colonization Institute (INC) in San Julian and Chane-Pirai involved this "control" versus "development" conflict. (A5, p. 1-2).

- The project paper for the Sub-Tropical Lands Development Project envisioned the participation of eight government entities and two private organizations. In order to achieve the cooperation among these various groups:
  - Inter-ministerial agreements or contracts were signed between the primary implementing agency, the INC, and other participants, detailing each party's responsibilities, funding arrangements, and a work schedule.
  - The existing Operations Committee of the INC was reorganized to serve as a coordinating mechanism. The committee was chaired by the Sub-Secretary for Agriculture in the Ministry for Campesino Affairs, Agriculture, and Livestock (MAGOG) and included the directors of various ministries and division heads.
  - Within the INC a Project Coordinator was to be given the responsibility of managing, coordinating and reporting on the various activities associated with the project. This office would also have project evaluation responsibilities. He would also be the logical counterpart for the USAID project supervisor. (A1, p. 70-74).

- The high level of inter-agency cooperation contemplated in the project paper failed to materialize, in part because a natural tendency exists for agencies to avoid cooperative arrangements that are dominated by others (in this case the INC). The attitude of the INC Director was that coordination among agencies in Bolivia never works and that promotion of the involvement of other agencies would result only in confusion. The INC discouraged project activities by other agencies (e.g., the National Community Development Service and the Center for Social and Economic Development-DESEC). The INC Director felt that the highly complicated proposal for cooperation contained in the project paper was unrealistic. (A5, p. 3-4).
  
- The inter-agency project Operations Committee, which was to coordinate all of the inputs under the leadership of a sub-secretary of the ministry, met with some regularity during the initial implementation of the project but subsequently became dormant.
  
- There was a high degree of cooperation between the INC and the United Church Committee (CIU), a private group contracted to supervise the settlement and orientation program at San Julian. This positive relationship was facilitated by the CIU's independent base, its long colonization experience, and the popularity and respect accorded to the CIU's field representative. (A5, p. 5).
  
- Within the INC itself, a project coordinator was to be the liaison between the INC's headquarters office and other GOB agencies in the field. He was to be named by the President of the Republic and occupy the same hierarchical status as the department heads, but reporting directly to the INC director. However, the President appointed someone who was unacceptable to the INC director, who consequently froze the coordinator out of all discussions and policy making at the headquarters' level. The coordinator was not invited to attend project discussions with AID personnel, nor was he given any support in his dealings with department heads. The situation continued until the coordinator was replaced by someone more acceptable to all of the parties involved. (A5, p. 6-7).

- Subsequently, in order to improve the effectiveness of the new coordinator and allow him greater control over project funding, he was promoted to the post of administrative head of the INC, while still retaining the position of project coordinator. However, though this promotion placed the coordinator in a more influential position, his new responsibilities severely limited the amount of time he could devote to the project as coordinator. (A5, p. 7-8).

#### Community Based Integrated Rural Development (Tangse), Indonesia

- When Save the Children began the CBIRD project in Tangse, Indonesia, relatively formal briefings of villagers by government officials and SCF staff were held. It later became clear that these meetings had failed to impart a great deal of understanding to these people. Subsequently, informal relationships have played a key role in co-opting the community leaders whose support is necessary for projects. Informal leaders have especially been cultivated. Similarly, SCF has both formal and informal relationships with government in Jakarta. However, these linkages, except for legitimizing SCF's presence in Indonesia, are relatively unimportant. A growing network of informal linkages, however, is of increasing importance to the success of the program. This has involved:
  - Increasing staff interchange between SCF and government agencies at each level.
  - Increasing coordination and application of government services in support of the CBIRD program (increasing staff assigned to the project area, for example).
  - Support by government officials to CBIRD proposals.

Informal ties have been a significant element in the CBIRD project's success. The more formal links to government administrative structure envisioned in the project design would not have been possible without the initial creation of these informal relationships. (G3, p. 20-24).

#### Luwu Area Development and Transmigration Project, Indonesia

- While the Luwu Project was supposed to be integrated, most of the component agencies behaved as if it were a sectoral or functional project. Consequently, their performance delays lead to delays in other sub-projects. For example, for the transmigration program to be

efficient, the plans for irrigation needed to be finalized before the families were moved into the area. This would have allowed villages to be located in conformity to irrigation plans. Similarly, land clearance should have been timed to prepare the area as irrigation construction proceeded. As it was, land that would not be irrigated until near the end of the project was being cleared of trees. (E7, p. 7).

- Coordination was identified as the most difficult institutional objective to achieve in the Luwu Project.
  - The sectoral agencies seldom brought the project headquarters into their budgetary planning and allocation processes.
  - One key subproject manager was not even stationed in the project site (he was also chief of a ministerial division for the entire province and located in the provincial capital).
  - Within the sectoral agencies the delegation of authority to the field was weak and varied. Some subprojects did most of the key decision making on site. In others nearly all of the important decisions were concentrated in the provincial capital, or even in Jakarta itself, over 1500 miles away. The decentralized subprojects, however, were making greater progress than the ones with more centralized decision making. (E9, p. 9-10).
- Since the subproject managers in the Luwu Project each answered directly to their own line agencies, the Project Luwu Area Coordinator had to rely on indirect methods to establish a coordinated effort among the components, including:
  - Training. The project conducted management training for the personnel of the headquarters and the various subprojects. This allowed the headquarters to ensure that the idea of a coordinated multi-sectoral effort was not lost.
  - Monthly coordination meetings. These meetings provided a forum for the discussion of technical problems and coordination.
  - Monthly treasurer's reports.
  - Subprojects' progress reports. (E5, p. 20-21).

Second Integrated Rural Development Project, Jamaica

- A major problem in the Second IRDP in Jamaica has been that management resources within the project were spread too thinly. In the project there have been only three persons with primary line management roles, the project director and two assistants. All other senior staff are in technical component or staff roles. It is difficult to expect that three persons could meet the management needs of a project as large as the IRDP (\$26 million). As a result:
  - Many management roles are not fulfilled.
  - There is a tendency for technical and advisory personnel to accept by default management functions which are not part of their job. Consequently, lines of management and accountability are confused.
  - The flow of information essential for effective planning and management is diffused.
- This led to several problems:
  - At lower levels agricultural extension officers were the focus of conflicting demands. Role conflicts and ambiguity resulted in disorganization and reduced capacity for service delivery. It resulted, for example, in field level officers not having enough authority to perform the management functions expected of them.
  - Routine activities preoccupied the time of key staff. For example, the director spent a lot of time with visitors, handling logistics, procurement, information dissemination, and fulfilling representational responsibilities.
- Suggested solutions to these problems include:
  - Providing subwatershed team leaders with the authority needed to fulfill their management function, including greater control over subwatershed personnel, and the responsibility for coordinating overall subwatershed activities. They also need management training. Finally given the importance of the team leader's management role, the individuals in that position should be rewarded and evaluated based on their management performance, as well as their technical work.
  - Management responsibilities for discrete tasks or activities should be externalized where ever possible.
  - Routine activities should be handled by an individual such as a "deputy director" in order to relieve key policy makers such as the project director of these burdens. (H3, p. 33-34; H2, p. I2-I3).

Upper Lofa County Agricultural Development Project, Liberia

- Lofa County RDP was set up as a PMU in order to avoid many of the difficulties entailed in using regular government channels. For example, government procedures for paying its employees are so archaic that many man days of work are lost each month as government employees stop working in the field in order to wait for the paymaster, who comes irregularly and requires the presence of the employee in order to authorize the payment. If an employee misses the paymaster, he must go through several days worth of bureaucracy in the capital in order to get his pay. As a result, when the paymaster is due, extension agents and other staff do not leave their office. Using a PMU allowed the project to avoid this type of problem. The employees are paid directly by the project, rather than the government.
- Use of PMU format permitted the IBRD to top-off salaries of Liberian professionals (something USAID is forbidden to do) in order to obtain and keep qualified people. The difficulty is that this creates a class of people that do nothing but go from one internationally financed project to another.
- Since the establishment of the Lofa Project the GOL has created similar projects in Bong County (USAID and IBRD) and Nimba County (assisted by the West German Government). However, the GOL is moving away from the PMU mechanism. There is now more local and central government pressure to use existing structures to coordinate and manage these projects. Planned IRD projects will not use the PMU strategy.

INVIERNO, Nicaragua

- INVIERNO has not provided the various services for which it is responsible with equal vigor. Credit has been given the first priority, while most of the other services have been organized around the credit operations. This was not planned, rather it reflects INVIERNO's response to the institutional constraints and political situation in which the program developed. Credit has also been the activity which has most significantly influenced the institution's image with the Government and the public. However, this leads to the danger that only borrowers and not other non-borrowing farmers will benefit from the program. (N6, p. 22).

- In part, this bias also reflects the difficulty that INVIERNO has had in coordinating operations with other public agencies. In marketing, for example, INVIERNO had a contract with the Nicaraguan Institute for External and Internal Marketing (INCEI) for the marketing of basic grains. The farmers, however, chose not to sell their crops to INCEI. Rather, they dealt with private intermediaries. This limited INVIERNO's involvement in marketing to the dissemination of information on crop prices and other peripheral activities. (N6, p. 22).

### Bicol Integrated Rural Development Program, Philippines

- The Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP) has a program level focus, embodied in a planning and monitoring unit with its own line item in the national budget. It draws its authority from a cabinet level coordinating committee and the president's office (the national integrated development agency approach). However, the Integrated Area Development Projects (IADP) within the program are implemented by lead-line agencies with cooperating personnel assigned to the implementer from other ministries (the lead line agency approach).
- A cabinet level committee, the Cabinet Coordinating Committee for Integrated Development, was created to serve as a policy making body for the integrated rural development programs in the country (Bicol, Mindoro, and Cagayan). Individual ministers were assigned responsibilities for specific programs. This cabinet level support protected the budgetary requests of these IRD programs from attacks by the line agencies, and legitimized the philosophy of IRD.
- In 1976, by presidential decree, the Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP) was formed. It contains five parts:
  - The Bicol River Basin Program Office (BRBPO) provides planning and support services. With a staff of 100, it is headed by a director who is responsible directly to the Management Committee of the Cabinet Coordinating Committee. The BRBPO is financed by a line item appropriation from the central government and a grant from USAID. It maintains a small liaison staff in Manila, but most of its facilities are located in the Bicol Region.

- The Bicol River Basin Development Board (BRBDB) is made up of the Program Director, two provincial governors, and the regional directors (or their equivalents) of fourteen line agencies. The Board meets monthly.
  - Project Office plans and coordinates individual projects. It contains officials from the line agencies, with a representative of the line agency that received the bulk of the project funds heading the office. Rivalries between line agencies have involved the designation of which one would be appointed the lead agency for individual projects. Moreover, some of the weaker line agencies have felt that their interests have been ignored by the lead agencies.
  - Integrated Rural Development Teams contain local political administrators, representatives of the line agencies, and local notables. It is responsible for information sharing, monitoring project implementation, and sub-area coordination. (Ø18, p. 6-9).
- Disadvantages of using a Project Management Unit divorced from the line ministries:
    - Because of the temporary nature of the project, a great deal of time is spent by employees not only learning the job initially, but subsequently looking for another job.
    - Because of the high salaries paid by the PMU, service delivery outside the project area (or by other organizations) may decline as the most qualified personnel leave to join the project.
    - It is difficult to institutionalize the project within line agency operations because it has obtained an "elite" status, and because its autonomy has protected it from normal budgetary procedures and organizational realities. (Ø13, p. 3-4).
  - Alternative: focus on a limited geographic area but work through line agencies rather than around them. This involves the simultaneous funding of multiple line agency "projects" all focusing on the same locality. A District Development Committee is formed, including provincial department heads and government officials.
    - Advantages: smoothes the institutionalization process and avoids the weaknesses of the PMU approach.
    - Disadvantages: because of lack of coordinated authority, output levels are lower; separate funding makes independent (and sometimes conflicting) activity easier. (Ø13, p. 4).

- The Bicol's Integrated Area Development Projects (IADs) have generally the following characteristics:
  - Autonomy in hiring and firing personnel and in financial management.
  - Control over all project-related activities in the area covered.
  - Directly employ personnel involved in the project-related activities within that area, thus many ongoing line agency efforts are handed over to the project.
  - Project salaries are set higher than comparable line agency salaries to attract competent personnel and compensate for the temporary nature of project employment.
  - A ministerial level steering committee and a project-level coordinating committee are formed to strengthen communications with external organizations.

This approach decentralizes authority to the project area and concentrates that authority within the area. (Ø13 p. 2-3).

- Rather than create an autonomous PMU, the Bicol model brings together existing agencies under the leadership of a lead agency. It works through line agencies, rather than around them. However, since project-level authority is the responsibility of a lead agency and inter-agency personnel are not on the payroll, the higher output level may be limited to the focus of the lead implementing agency, rather than the full range of IAD activities. (Ø13, p. 7).
- The use of a lead agency for an integrated area development program can lead to insufficient emphasis on activities that are peripheral to that agency's interest. For example, when, due to an economy move, funds were cut for the National Irrigation Administration, the administering agency for the Libmanan/Cabusao IADP, the institutional/agricultural activities were more adversely affected than the infrastructure components.

#### Abyei Rural Development Project, Sudan

- The organizational arrangement proposed for the Abyei Project represented a new approach to rural development that did not fall within the normal range of responsibility of existing ministries and government bodies.

(P6, p. 20). Though the Ministry of Agriculture was officially responsible for the day-to-day operation of the project, much of the Sudanese authority for project planning, policy making, and evaluation, was designed to be carried out by a National Coordinating Committee. This committee, however, never really exercised the authority it received with respect to the project.

Three principal organizational structures were envisioned for the Abyei Project:

- A National Coordinating Committee, comprised of high level representatives from several ministries (Agriculture, Planning, Foreign Affairs) and the Provincial Commissioner. Yet Abyei was a very small project and, as a result, the amount of attention it received from such a high level was very limited. This Committee of Ministers was convened in May 1978. This meeting was instrumental in legitimizing the project, securing the release of funds, and allocating staff for its execution. However, that was its only meeting. This National Coordinating Committee was to be supplemented by a Technical Committee, incorporating representatives of USAID, the U.S. university implementing the project, and GOS agency representatives. However, this committee has met only infrequently, and has not, in fact, reviewed the status and progress of the project. Its duties have been carried out as needed by the Director General of Planning in the Ministry of Agriculture. (P3, p. K1-2).
- A Provincial Coordinating Committee was to be established by the Provincial Commissioner and include those assistant commissioners and other agencies who were most concerned with providing personnel and resources to the Abyei Project. Unfortunately, the distance and physical isolation of the project from the provincial governmental system was a major barrier to communication. The Provincial Coordinating Committee was established to coordinate all agricultural projects in the province, not just Abyei. Indeed, it viewed Abyei as a relatively minor project in light of its small size relative to other projects in the province and because its financial support was from external, rather than provincial, sources.

Given that the project was viewed as a "national" as opposed to a "provincial" project by provincial authorities, there were few incentives to a generate high level of support by them. Indeed, there were important disincentives to provincial support (e.g., high political risk, credit for project success would not accrue to provincial officials, the experimental approach employed in the project was perceived to entail a high risk, etc.). Further, the top-heaviness of the project stifled initiatives and objections from lower-level administrative officials.

- An Abyei Peoples' Development Organization (APDO) consisting of a board of directors, managerial staff, and technical staff was to provide a mechanism for soliciting local popular opinion concerning developmental needs and priorities and help to mobilize community resources in support of project activities. The ADPO never got off the ground, in part because the magnitude of the task of building local participation was underestimated at the time. (P6, p. 20-23).

#### Eastern ORD Integrated Rural Development Project, Upper Volta

- There are eleven ORDs (Organismes Regional de Developpement) in Upper Volta. They cover the entire country, and correspond to the boundaries of the eleven states that make up the country. The line agencies exist in theory in Upper Volta, but the ORDs have autonomy. They are also supposed to be self-sufficient and, indeed, profit making. Attaching the IRD project to the Eastern ORD was done to avoid the regimentation and corruption that affects the line ministries. Moreover, the ORD had more of a business orientation.
- The Eastern ORD had a monthly meeting, known as the Sector Chief's meeting which had several functions, including:
  - Reviewing the progress of the project (i.e., information sharing).
  - Scheduling activities to economize on the management of the workforce and equipment.
  - Airing problems.

This meeting was chaired by the Director of the Eastern ORD and involved the 8 sector chiefs (state government representatives), the 6 bureau chiefs (crop production, economic studies, etc.), personnel from the international donors, and representatives of the other

governmental agencies working in the area (road construction, health, etc.). Lower level personnel would come if asked, but if someone did not have a reason for being there he was asked to leave. It was essentially an upper echelon meeting. The beneficiaries did not attend. The Eastern ORD director did not care for surprises, but encouraged debates on the problems. Then he would make the decision.

The Sector Chief's meeting was not really effective in solving the critical problems of the IRD project (e.g., the unmanageability of the survey being conducted, the inability of the chief-of-party to extract himself from administration and work on the marketing component which was also his responsibility, or the problem of financing recurrent costs). These problems were just too sensitive and complex and did not involve everyone who attend the Sector Chief's meeting. Rather, these problems were discussed in small meetings.

- Until recently, the Eastern ORD's administration was very centralized. Everything went through the project director. Consequently, one bureau did not know what the others were doing. Lower echelon people never worked with their equals in other bureaus. They called in their superior who, in turn, called in their own superiors. This centralized decision making has been changing. Now, less and less trivia is being brought up at the Sector Chief's meetings. Instead, these matters are being resolved by lower level people. Moreover, the Eastern ORD director is refusing to get involved in a lot of the mundane matters, and participation in decision making is increasing.

Community Based Integrated Rural Development (Mahweit),  
Yemen Arab Republic

- The absence of any kind of formal agreement between Save the Children's Mahweit Project and one or more of the government agencies working in the area contributed to the project's subsequent problems. Since the project did not share its work plans and budget with the relevant agencies, government officials were not sufficiently informed of the project and its activities. Closer ties with government agencies would have been beneficial in the public relations sense (and provided the project with a defender when it subsequently needed it) and could have improved the performance of individual sectoral activities.

- Further, involving local government agencies in the planning, budgeting and implementation of project activities would have benefited Mahweit Town in the long run as well. Since government services in the area are in their formative stage, activities such as those undertaken by the project could have shaped and developed the eventual delivery of those services. (T2, p. 28, 37).

## POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS

For many integrated rural development projects, external factors place serious constraints on the possibility of achieving project objectives. There are three basic categories of constraints:

- Political constraints. The objectives of a rural development project may be at odds with the prevailing political considerations. Generally, governments must balance a large number of priorities, of which assisting the rural poor is but one. A low priority for rural development may lead to low administrative support for, and coordination of, project activities;
- Economic constraints. Sometimes governments must address economic problems (balance of payments deficits, unemployment, high rates of inflation, etc.) in ways which adversely affect the implementation of their rural development projects. For example, domestic price ceilings imposed to improve exports may lower the incentives for farmers to adopt agricultural innovations, or restrictive monetary policies may limit the access of small farmers to credit; and
- Environmental Constraints (both physical and socio-cultural). Factors such as polarization within the community, past unfavorable experiences with certain agencies, or the physical environment itself (including the ecology or the area and its location) may be important constraints which are beyond the ability of the project to address. Further, some IRD activities (i.e., land clearing) may involve environmental tradeoffs.

Sometimes these constraints can be addressed by project designer or implementers. Sometimes they cannot. In any case, diverting project resources to respond to or address the constraints will involve costs which may or may not have been taken into account in the project design. The objective of the IRD research effort with respect to this issue will be to determine what constraints present clear and evident barriers to project success and what strategies have been developed to deal with them. Further, how effective have these efforts been?

## PROBLEM MANIFESTATIONS - ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS

Operation Mils Mopti, Mali

- The Government of Mali's attempts to achieve self-sufficiency in basic food grains and agricultural inputs, has had an adverse impact of Operation Mils Mopti, an integrated rural development project aimed primarily at increasing millet and sorghum production. In order to maintain low domestic food prices, the government has set the official prices of these grains at only about 60-70 percent of production costs. A parallel market arose in response to the low official grain price, which was responsible for substantial illegal exports to neighboring Sahelian countries, where the official prices were up to 100 percent higher than in Mali. However, it was chiefly the larger farmers which were able to take advantage of the parallel price. The smaller farmers tended to sell most of their surplus to the government because of production quotas imposed on the population. (L1 p. 3, 12).
- In an attempt to maintain the country's grain production levels, the government of Mali has discouraged the production of peanuts by farmers in the project area by not providing a market outlet (most of the peanuts are processed into oil and the government owns the only mill). The government feels that, if the ban on peanut production were lifted, the switch from grains to the more remunerative peanuts would doom the government's program for achieving food self-sufficiency. Yet, these policies have had an adverse effect on the project's performance and on the feasibility of its achieving its welfare objectives. (L1, p. 3).
- In Operation Mils Mopti, an attempt to increase agricultural production through the promotion of plowing was constrained by the government's refusal to permit the importation of a light plow. SCAER, the government agency with monopoly control over agricultural inputs, was charged with distributing only plows made within the country (by another government entity). Only a heavy plow was available domestically, however, and this was poorly adapted to the soils of a large portion of the project area. Moreover, it had to be pulled by oxen, rather than by less expensive donkeys. Though light plows had been at one time available and in great demand, the government prohibited the procurement by Operation Mils Mopti of plows from sources other than SCAER. As a result, the number of plows distributed by the project was insufficient to have a noticeable impact on production. (L1, p. 3).

Abyei Rural Development Project, Sudan

- In the Sudan, the deteriorating balance of payments position has led that government, with the encouragement of international donors, to concentrate Sudanese manpower and financial resources on the export-oriented "modern agricultural sector." This has consequently led to a decrease in the resources available to small farmer-oriented integrated rural development projects such as the USAID-financed Abyei Rural Development Project. That project has already experienced staffing problems and funding delays, and the situation is expected to get worse. (P3, p. 5).

North Shaba Maize Production Project, Zaire

- The North Shaba Rural Development Project in Zaire has been seriously affected by the deteriorating macroeconomic situation in that country. This economic decline has resulted in increased budgetary and balance of payment deficits and a very rapid rate of inflation. One consequence has been a decline of 50 percent in the volume of imports between 1974 and 1978. Consequently, critical shortages in fuel and cement have resulted in an inability to achieve the project's construction targets, while extension activities have been hampered by a lack of fuel for transportation. The marketing component, in turn, has been adversely affected by the difficulty traders have had in obtaining trucks, spare parts, fuel, and sacks.
- The Government of Zaire's difficulties in financing its recurrent and investment budgets have also been a major problem for the Shaba Project. Expenditures have been cut back, with the agriculture sector receiving a relatively low priority. In recent years, agriculture has accounted for 2 percent of the recurrent budget and 7 percent of the investment budget. Of these amounts, only a small proportion has been allocated to small farmer production activities. During periods of retrenchment, moreover, cuts tend to occur in the government's contribution to externally supported projects. Funding cuts late in 1979, for example, led to layoffs of two-thirds of the Shaba project workforce (over 600 people). Most of them came from the infrastructure subsystem, which ground to a halt. The lack of funds meant that project staff had greatly reduced means of transport and, even if they had the means, they would

not have been reimbursed for travel expenses. As a result, they were not able to maintain contact with the farmers. With salaries being paid late, morale declined noticeably and, even though the situation improved subsequently, the threat of retrenchment has continued. (U3, p. 15-30).

#### PROBLEM MANIFESTATIONS - POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS

##### Upper Lofa County Agricultural Development Project, Liberia

- In the Upper Lofa County Rural Development Project, the road construction program fell far behind schedule as a result of the diversion of equipment and personnel to the capital to help complete projects associated with the 1979 Organization of African Unity Heads of State Conference. (K3, p. 9). In response, the project had to use its own equipment for road and bridge construction, even though that equipment had been originally intended to carry out only maintenance responsibilities. (K3, p. 8).

##### INVIERNO, Nicaragua

- In the INVIERNO Program in Nicaragua, land tenure was a serious external constraint. The unresolved question of the ownership and distribution of land was critical, in that as many as 85 percent of the project's beneficiaries in one region and half of those in the second region rented land. Thus, increased land rent, higher land sale prices, and the eviction of tenants and sharecroppers from the more profitable farms were concerns. (N6, p. 88-89). In order to attack the land reform issue, USAID required that the Nicaraguan government undertake interim measures to protect the small farmer-tenant until final landlord-tenant regulations could be enacted. (NI, annex 3, p. 5).

##### Abyei Rural Development Project, Sudan

- The potential for conflict among client groups is another external constraint which must sometimes be dealt with in integrated rural development projects. The initiation of the Abyei Rural Development Project in the Sudan, for example, took place one year after violent clashes between two ethnic groups, the Messirya Humr, Arabic-speaking pastoralists, and the less politically advantaged Ngok Dinka, a settled Nilotic tribe. Though the level of

violence declined between 1977 and mid-1978, it has been recently increasing with the southward advancement of the Messirya groups in search of pasturage and water. The conflict is aggravated by strong political differences dividing the two groups on the subject of Abyei's future political status, specifically the transfer of Ngok Dinka territory from the administrative control of the northern province of South Kordofan to the Southern Region of the country. This conflict has put several major constraints on the project:

- Staff mobility and commitment to extension activities have been restricted. The staff were Ngok Dinka. There were no Messirya on the project staff, though it did include other Arabic speakers (including the project director). The Ngok Dinka staff have been generally unwilling to travel in areas where the Messirya were present.
- The disruption of settlement patterns has made access to the project's beneficiaries more difficult. Reaching the Messirya has been complicated by their nomadic lifestyle.
- There are risks of increasing the potential for conflict in the delivery of services, such as water and storage facilities, at sites where both groups claim "traditional" rights. (P3, p. 4-6).

Eastern ORD Integrated Rural Development Project, Upper Volta

- Sometimes project management will be forced to divert project resources to cover unplanned costs resulting from constraints over which it has no control, occasionally with disastrous results. High level political problems in Upper Volta, for example, led to the inability of that government to supply the funding required as their contribution to the financing of the Eastern ORD Integrated Rural Development Project. Consequently, the management of the project used money that had been set aside for a revolving credit fund to cover the project's recurrent costs, especially salaries. Initially, it was intended as a loan from one account to another until the government came through with its obligation. The subsequent failure of the government funds to arrive, however, seriously threatened any chances of the project's having a sustainable credit program. (S1, p. 3-5).

PROBLEM MANIFESTATIONS - ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS

Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project, Lesotho

- In Lesotho, the Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project has been faced with an absence of economic incentives for farmers to increase agricultural production beyond subsistence. Many of these farmers work in South African mines, where it is possible to earn as much in a few days as can be earned from farming in an entire year. Thus, farmers carry out the minimal amount of farming necessary to maintain control of the land. (J2, p. 15-18).

Abyei Rural Development Project, Sudan

- The physical isolation of some IRD projects serves as a further important constraint. The Abyei Rural Development Project is remote by even Sudanese standards. The region is virtually inaccessible during the rainy season, lasting from mid-May to mid-November, and even during the dry season transportation by air is erratic and that by land takes days. A recent USAID evaluation of that project pointed out the importance of this geographic isolation, noting that, "Delays or failure in project outputs can be attributed to delay in the delivery of health supplies, construction materials, tools and hardware, agricultural implements and staff with technical expertise." (P3, annex I-10).

ALLEVIATING THE PROBLEM

Operation Mils Mopti, Mali

- As a condition for the disbursement of funds for the final two years of Operation Mils Mopti, USAID required that the Government of Mali, through a private contractor, conduct a study of peanut production and marketing in the Mopti region, with a view towards determining (1) what effect, if any, increased peanut production would have on farmers' net revenue, soil fertility, and millet production, and (2) whether the marketing of peanuts

would increase Operation Mils Mopti's financial viability. Further, if the study recommended that Operation Mils Mopti should market peanuts, the government was to give Operation Mils Mopti the authority to do so prior to the disbursement of funds for the second project year. Finally, while concluding that the grain pricing policy of Mali was beyond the scope of the project to solve, a "condition present" to the continued funding of Operation Mils Mopti required that the government not increase the grain quota for the region. This ensured that the small farmer would not have had to sell more of his output at the official price than previously. This allowed him to sell any increased production on the "illegal" parallel market, thus providing the farmer in the project with greater incentive to produce a surplus. (L2, p. 105).

#### North Shaba Maize Production Project, Zaire

• Experience from North Shaba indicates that addressing at least some types of external constraints can be advantageous to project management. The effectiveness of tools such as "conditions precedent" to the distribution of funds for a project will depend upon the type of constraint. Some external constraints will be beyond even the ability of the government itself to correct. Other constraints will be within its power to affect. Given the external constraints faced by the North Shaba Project, an amendment to the project's budget included several conditions precedent to deal with them. One called for the creation of a high level "project liaison committee" to review the project's budget and ensure that the funds are disbursed in a timely manner. A second authorized the use of counterpart fund advances to cover project operating costs when regularly scheduled budget releases are delayed. Finally, two conditions were included to thwart the attempts of a powerful politician in the region to create a sanctioned marketing monopoly in the project area. Though the project staff had to make a special effort to inform the relevant government policy makers of the existence of these conditions in the amendment, the Government of Zaire has acted surprisingly fast in fulfilling them, once they were known. (U1).

## PARTICIPATION AND DECENTRALIZATION

It is generally agreed that the intended beneficiaries of IRD projects should play an active role in project decision making and should make resource commitments to the project. Similarly, it has been recommended that government control over resources be devolved to lower levels of government. However, it is often unclear as to how these participation and decentralization concepts should be implemented in an IRD setting. While political constraints to increased participation and decentralization exist, there are other major impediments which also must be considered, including:

- The absence of knowledge about how to actually implement participation and decentralization initiatives and how to bring about the behavior changes necessary to make them work;
- Beneficiaries may simply not want to participate in IRD project activities for social, economic, political, or historical reasons; and
- Time and resource constraints may inhibit increased participation and decentralization. Since it takes more time to plan and implement projects with beneficiary and lower level government participation, there may be a tradeoff between output level achievement and participation/decentralization objectives.

The objective of the IRD research on participation and decentralization is to come up with operational guidelines on how to implement the participation and decentralization concepts. This involves examining questions such as:

- What kinds of participation have IRD projects encouraged (e.g., involvement in decision making, resource commitment, accountability, etc.);
- What methods have been used to promote participation and decentralization; and
- What is the relationship between participation and decentralization (e.g., should they proceed together or be phased in some way).

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Judging from what has been gathered from this review of project documentation, decentralization has only recently become a popular project objective. Only two of the projects in the sample have addressed the issue directly, Tanzania's Arusha Planning and Village Development Project and Indonesia's Provincial Area Development Program.

## PROBLEM MANIFESTATIONS - PARTICIPATION

### Community Based Integrated Rural Development, Colombia

- In the Community Based Integrated Rural Development Project implemented by Save the Children in Colombia, three sites were chosen:
  - Sibundoy, Department of Putumayo. Inhabited by two culturally distinct indigenous groups, the Kamsas and the Ingas, who are generally subsistence farmers.
  - Guadalupe, Department of Huila. A minifundista area which, though containing fertile land, suitable for both agriculture and livestock, lacks the farm-to-market roads necessary to make it profitable.
  - Sumapaz, Department of Cundinamarca. Because of its high altitude, the area is relatively barren and cold, with only eleven potentially viable "veredas" (hamlets) containing about 350 families. It is very isolated. The access road is so bad that, though it is only 40 miles from Bogota, it takes approximately three hours to get there. Also, for historical reasons, the people are very wary of outsiders. (B4, p. 7-12).
- Beneficiary participation was high in Sibundoy and Guadalupe. It was nonexistent in Sumapaz. As a result, midway through the project, the Sumapaz project was terminated and its resources redirected to the two more successful projects.
- The factors inhibiting beneficiary participation in the Sumapaz project included:
  - Low population mass (only 1,900 individuals in the project area).
  - Low population density (3.3/km<sup>2</sup>).
  - Proximity to Bogotá. There were greater linkages between each "vereda" and Bogotá, than between the "veredas" themselves within the project area.
  - Difficult inter-vereda communication.

- The timidity and distrust of outsiders resulting from the violent history of the area. During "La Violencia" from 1948 to 1960, Sumapaz was used by revolutionaries as a staging area for assaults on Bogotá. As a consequence, the people suffered many hardships.
- The lack of government attention. To date there has been a minimum of public services extended to the Sumapaz area.
- Unlike the other two areas, Sumapaz did not have a central market town. (B1, p. 4; B4, p. 11-12).

#### Gros Morne Rural Development, Haiti

- Early experience in the Gros Morne Project demonstrated that direct motivation and education through existing community councils was a practical impossibility, because:
  - Many of those councils were controlled by powerful local interests intent on maintaining the status quo.
  - The previous experience of these community councils with development groups (specifically a massive food-for-work project undertaken as part of a drought relief effort in the area) had conditioned them to wait for relief, rather than exercise local initiative to solve their problems.

As a result, the project turned its attention away from the community councils and concentrated on re-grouping peasants into small, viable, independent, self-supporting groups. (C1, p. 4).

#### Community Based Integrated Rural Development (Tangse), Indonesia

- Factors which typically constrain effective participation that were present in Tangse (the project area):
  - Administrative patterns were relatively centralized and there was a tradition of top-down planning and decision making.
  - Local power alignment revolved around elite groups, particularly religious leaders, the military, and the rich.
  - Poor farmers had dependency relationships with patrons which did not encourage openness to change. (F4, p. 30).

Provincial Area Development Program, Indonesia

- Two basic goals of the PDP program are to reach the rural poor and increase participation in planning. Officials in both Aceh and Central Java have reported two obstacles to their efforts:
  - There are no clear guidelines from the central government as to the criteria for identifying the "poor" in the community.
  - They do not as yet possess an adequate methodology for including the beneficiaries in the planning process.
- One difficulty is in recognizing and screening the desires, needs, and potentials of the villagers, especially the poor. What is usually characterized as poor in rural communities is not a homogeneous group. Assisting them uniformly may not be fair. Yet, setting up different criteria for inclusion in project benefits may also not appear fair to the villagers. Similarly, some of the poor will be relatively easy to help. Others will be very difficult to help. Should development efforts be concentrated on the relatively easy to help? If these efforts are directed to those that have the least potential, are PDP funds being used efficiently. (F6, p. 39-40).

Second Integrated Rural Development Project, Jamaica

- Meaningful participation by the farmers in the Second IRDP in Jamaica remains below expectations, despite the creation of local organizations, the cultivation of organizational leaders, and the flow of resources to these organizations. Part of the problem may be historical, i.e., the farmers' experience with similar organizations in the past. There is a tradition in Jamaica of centralized control of resource flows to farmers. The most important local organizations, e.g., the Jamaican Agricultural Societies, rely on the Ministry of Agriculture for subsidies and policy guidelines. In turn, local government is dependent upon the national government for 95 percent of its revenues and most of its policy initiatives. The IRDP follows this pattern in maintaining considerable control over the Development Committees that it formed to promote participation in the project.

Moreover, the IRDP provides almost all of the resources available to the development committees. There is no tradition of community development based on self-help and widespread participation. Leadership roles in the JAS depend more on political links to higher levels than broad local support. These problems are reinforced by the project's basic approach, i.e., large up-front resource commitments and direct subsidies to farmers.

- Direct participation by the farmer is not linked to Development Committee involvement but, rather, is arranged on an individual farmer basis. Preparation of the farm plan provides the farmer with access to project resources and expertise. But his participation is subsidized to make the involvement highly attractive (i.e., the IRDP provided an initial soil treatment subsidy of 75 percent to cooperating farmers). Efforts to reduce this subsidy have met with resistance by farmers, since they are now accustomed to receiving it.
- IRDP emphasizes large up-front resource transfers relying on imported technology and technical assistance. Also, the project is locked into a set of quantitative output targets such as acres of land to be terraced. This focus on short term measurable targets is intrinsically anti-participatory. Attention to these targets precludes strategies aimed at meaningful long-term farmer involvement. (H2, p. 16-18).

#### Vihiga/Hamisi Special Rural Development Program, Kenya

- Beneficiary participation in the Vihiga project was conspicuous by its absence, despite a general agreement by the project staff, donors, and government officials that it was crucial to the success of the project.
  - The project was weak in even simple information dissemination. For example, Maize credit recipients never had the aims and conditions of that program explained to them.
  - There was no effective dialogue between the Government of Kenya (GOK) staff or donor staff and local leaders concerning desirable project goals, elements, methods of implementation, local needs, etc.

- Both GOK staff and donor team members were sensitive to the need for more local participation, but incapable of generating it. The training, institutional environment, and previous experience of the GOK officers were not conducive to this. Donor personnel, because they were outsiders, were even less suited to promoting beneficiary involvement. Though there was never a conscious attempt to exclude beneficiaries from involvement, one naturally tends to avoid doing things that one is not good at. There was a general lack of knowledge about the practical mechanisms and procedures for promoting genuine local initiative and participation.
- GOK and donor staff generally arrived at decisions about what would be good for farmers and then told the farmers, instructing them to cooperate. The GOK staff usually felt that they knew what would benefit the farmers. The staff also faced important time constraints and deadlines and consequently had no time to consult the farmers.
- The lack of farmer involvement meant that the people of Vihiga did not regard the project as theirs. Nor did they feel any enthusiasm about participating actively. The construction and promotion of cattle dips and provision of maize credit were two project elements which had disappointing results as a consequence.
- Farmers, and perhaps local politicians, were not invited to participate and contribute their ideas. Rather, it was expected that the ordinary machinery of government would automatically stimulate this participation.
- The project began almost exclusively with the expansion of GOK services (staff, housing, vehicles, etc.) with only a trickle of money going to the farmers.
- The presence of the expatriate staff presented a "foreign" image that did not attract people or encourage them to participate.
- The project was short on incentives and long on exhortation to follow government instructions, with rigidly conceived objectives and ground rules.
- Vihiga's large area and population and numerous and conflict ridden constituencies and ethnic groups complicated the task of fostering a sense of homogeneity and common interest among the participants. (I6, p. 13-15).

Before initiating any self-help project that requires contributions from the beneficiaries, one should take into account the number of other self-help projects in the area that require funds from the local people. With the low income levels characterizing many IRD target groups, it doesn't require many of these self-help projects before a farmer can't afford to give. In the Vihiga Project this might have been the case with the construction of cattle dips. All of the communities which constructed dips had problems in raising their 50 percent of the construction money and in getting the users to pay the dipping charge. (I5, p. 8-14).

#### Integrated Rural Development (Guidimaka), Mauritania

- No provision was made in the Guidimaka Project design for obtaining the labor needed to carry out various tasks (well digging, water catchment construction, land preparation, fencing, etc.) on the project's agronomic and range management demonstration sites. It was thought that the local villagers would do these tasks. However, while farmers can be expected to supply free labor for activities which directly affect them, it may be unrealistic to assume that they will work for nothing on demonstration sites and other activities where the benefits are less direct. As a result, the project had to hire as many as 100 day laborers at a time on a part-time basis to meet work deadlines. (M2, p. 12).

#### INVIERNO, Nicaragua

- Evidence suggests that when a project is highly complex, it is less likely that project staff will encourage intended beneficiaries to become actively involved in project implementation. This may have been the case in the INVIERNO Project, where a rather complex and sophisticated technology (which included the use of computers to process credit applications) was used. In that project the participation by beneficiaries was limited almost exclusively to taking advantage of the services offered, e.g., the provision of agricultural credit, inputs, and technological packages. (N7, p. 11-12).

Abyei Rural Development Project, Sudan

- With respect to the formation of community organizations, the project was not successful. This occurred for several reasons:
  - The project design made no provision for sustained technical assistance to the local organizations component of the project. No project staff time was specifically programmed for this activity, nor were any funds budgeted for training, equipment, or office facilities in support of the local organization (known as the Abyei People's Development Organization-ADPO).
  - While the ADPO was envisioned to have a policy making role, no assessment was made of the decision making functions and capabilities at the council level.
  - Strong emphasis was placed on the Assistant Commissioner in Abyei (at that time an energetic Ngok Dinka strongly committed to the area's development), but this position was subsequently downgraded and the incumbent given far less authority within both the administrative hierarchy and the community.
  - The magnitude of the task in building an effective local development organization was underestimated in the design stage. (P3, p. H5-6).

Community Based Integrated Rural Development (Mahweit), Yemen Arab Republic

- While successful in a number of other settings, Save the Children's Community Based Integrated Rural Development (CBIRD) approach encountered serious problems in Mahweit, Yemen. In part this was because the CBIRD approach assumes that the target community has certain characteristics:
  - A degree of social homogeneity.
  - A sense of cohesiveness formed around a number of commonly agreed upon objectives.
  - An egalitarian ideology oriented toward the community good, which works through civic "democratic" institutions.

Mahweit Town was in some respects the antithesis of the above model. Mahweit was a large community with the following characteristics:

- Highly differentiated in terms of social groups (origins, occupations, tribal affiliations, political ascription and the use of religion as a determinant for political action).
- Lack of modern, secular, civic institutions which crosscut parochial loyalties.
- Weak presence of central government authority.
- Major net deficits in basic infrastructure (e.g., water, roads, sewage, educational facilities, health services).
- Distortions in the local economy due to national inflation, and workers' remittances from abroad yielding high levels of liquid personal assets.
- Isolation.

This conflict between the basic premise of the CBIRD philosophy and the realities of Mahweit led to a number of problems, including:

- The difficulty of mobilizing "representative" participation of a factionalized community.
- Heightened expectations on the part of the community which could not be fulfilled with the resources available. (T2, p. 35-36).

#### ALLEVIATING THE PROBLEM - PARTICIPATION

##### Community Based Integrated Rural Development, Colombia

In Sibundoy a high degree of community participation resulted in project costs below those expected. The project was also very successful at mobilizing host country government agency sources and channeling them into the project area. Increasing coordination between these government agencies and local community groups has resulted in a greater responsiveness on the part of these agencies to the needs of the communities.

There has been a great deal of beneficiary contribution of labor and materials in both Sibundoy and Guadalupe. A high percentage of the families in both communities are participating in the projects. In Sibundoy, for example, 350 Kamza families have contributed the equivalent of \$41,318 during the first half of the project (labor calculated on a local daily wage of less than two dollars per day). During the first half of the project the beneficiaries constructed 4.4 km of roads (1600 mandays of labor), three elementary schools (1700 mandays of labor), and aqueducts in 3 veredas and the town center (10,000 mandays of labor). Guadalupe

where the population is much larger, contributed the equivalent of \$53,895 in labor and materials for school and aqueduct construction. Similarly, Colombian government agencies contributed almost \$240,000 in cash, materials and services to the two areas during the first half of the project, far exceeding that made from donor funds. (B1, p. 2-20).

- The success of the Sibundoy and Guadalupe Projects in fostering participation has been attributed to:
  - Direct involvement of local community members in the identification of needs and the formulation of project plans.
  - The use of indigenous personnel as on-site project managers and promoters (because of their first-hand knowledge of the culture and problems of the region, and because of their credibility and acceptance by the target population). (B1, p. 21).

Community Based Integrated Rural Development (Tangse), Indonesia

- Factors which facilitated participation in Tangse:
  - Relative homogeneity and cohesion of the community.
  - A tradition of cooperative community effort.
- Management factors which promoted increasing participation in the CBIRD Project:
  - Control of the distribution of project resources by the Save the Children Federation. The SCF ultimately decided which activities to fund. Those which clearly benefit large numbers of the village poor were readily funded, for example.
  - Development of local community development committees.
  - Training of villagers active in the SCF-funded projects (with respect to both certain technical skills and management). The improvement of management capabilities over time has allowed the less-educated villagers to effectively participate in project related decision making. This development has been facilitated by deliberate project simplicity.
  - Open management, i.e., the increased accountability of those responsible for the allocation and utilization of project resources.
  - The willingness of local officials to accept organizational arrangements that give the poor a voice.
  - The project rewarded effective participation more than effective projects. (G3, p. 30-32).

• Open management has had its greatest impact at the village level, and its introduction was a major innovation for an Indonesian village. It means essentially that all expenditures, income, receipts, and accounts are routinely published, posted, and made available to everyone. Committee meetings are open and anyone can come and express their views. A major result of this openness has been the willingness of the community to isolate and even remove corrupt leaders, something which had never been done before and represents a significant departure from tradition. Thus, in addition to skill development, access to information becomes a means by which the poor assume a greater share of power in the community. (G3, p. 18-19).

• Generally, income producing and infrastructure development activities were readily identified and endorsed by the villagers, and had a high degree of participation. Projects like peanut cultivation and road improvement are felt to hold relatively immediate prospects for increased income. Human resource development projects begin later, require more direction and encouragement from sources outside the community, and often take longer to yield "visible" results. However, as the community begins to understand that continued development will require management, community organization, and specific technical skills (in addition to funds and materials), an increasing amount of time and attention is given to these human resource development projects. A comparison of the project focus in Tangse (with three years of experience with CBIRD) and Lam Teuba (with only a single year's experience with CBIRD) demonstrates this trend. In Lam Teuba the bulk of the projects aim at increasing income, e.g., cash crop production, credit unions, and poultry cross-breeding. The villagers of Tangse, on the other hand, identified human resource development projects such as community administration and technical training as a central concern. (G3, p. 41-42).

• In the CBIRD Project in Indonesia, the critical importance of Islam in the life of the villagers was recognized early, along with the role of the ulama in the local society. In the past, development projects such as the construction and maintenance of roads, irrigation canals, and schools have been closely linked to the Islamic faith and are dependent upon the active participation of the ulama. This was taken into account in the recruitment of the CBIRD staff. For example, the project's director of training is a widely respected ulama and many of the staff have degrees from a local religious university. (G2, p. 19).

- In the CBIRD approach, Save the Children, as a matter of principle, prefers to work through organizations that existed in the community prior to the CBIRD intervention. In Tangse, as in most Indonesian communities, there were local development committees known as Lembaga Sosial Desa (LSD). These committees were an advisory group to the village chief and consisted of a mix of traditional leadership elements. The SCF Indonesia staff, however, felt that the LSD's in Tangse were controlled by elite elements and neither represented nor possessed much credibility with broad elements of the community. Nor did they perform any active or significant development function. A decision was made, therefore, to create Community Development Committees as a vehicle for promoting beneficiary participation in the project. The CDCs were to be a separate entity, though there was common membership. (G3, p. 33).
- Two community groups form the basis for participation in the CBIRD Project in Indonesia. At the village level Village Community Development Committees (VCDC) are elected by the local villagers. Several members from each VCDC are proposed by the committee as a whole to serve of the Community Development Committee (CDC). Members of these committees serve without compensation. The aim of these committees is to bring the villagers together to discuss problems and suggest appropriate project activities.
- The officers of the CDC, however, although elected by villagers, are usually GOI officials. This may or may not be an expression of the villagers' resigned acceptance to the existing political and social order.
- The VCDCs are, at the present time, still weak. In reality, they do not function as deliberative bodies, as planned, but serve only as a link in the project approval mechanism. It may be that the VCDC is too small to play an important role in the development process. While villagers identify with their local village in terms of residence and tradition, they tend to regard Tangse, the market center, as the focus for economic affairs and social services. Thus, the VCDC may be an unnecessary unit. Moreover, the success of the project in areas where VCDCs do not exist may support this contention. Further, villagers do not identify with the VCDC but with the projects that directly affect them (e.g., the construction of an irrigation canal, or agricultural project). (G2, p. 30-36).

Provincial Area Development Program, Indonesia

- In the PDP, two different Kabupaten (districts) were involved in motorized fishing subprojects. In both cases boats, motors, and nets were supplied through the project. The two subprojects were identical except for one fact--in one Kabupaten the villagers received two nets and in the other they received three. That difference is important because during about three months of the year there is little fish to be caught except for one large fish preferred by restaurants in Surabaya. The two nets are used for fish and shrimp, but only the third type of net is useful for catching this large fish. Further examination revealed that in the case where three nets were provided the villagers were consulted about the content of the subproject during design. In the other case the villagers were not consulted --once the nets were approved the villagers were simply informed and told how to use them. The subproject with the third net was in the area of a District Commissioner who displayed a participatory management style, whereas the subproject without the third net was in the area of a much more authoritarian manager. It was evident that the agency personnel in the latter area were much less interested in villager participation. This seems to support the proposition that, if there is a low level of participation on the part of managers within their own organization, then the level of involvement of client/target groups in development programs administered by those managers is likely to be low, since managers tend to adopt a self image consistent with the organizational environment in which they function. (F2, p. 1-2).

Bicol Integrated Rural Development Program, Philippines

- Early in the implementation of the Bicol Project, several issues with respect to beneficiary participation were raised. These included the following:
  - The technical specifications for infrastructure (e.g., irrigation systems, flood control, etc.) were essentially "blueprints" put together by contractors and staff with a minimum of consultation with the local population. Though in light of the complexities of the various systems, this may be justifiable, farmer input into the system designs could possibly have uncovered unique constraints to project implementation (such as "right-of-way" conflicts).

- Mechanisms were needed to specifically involve farmers in the process of project development. Several mechanisms were possible: regular farmer meetings, informal discussions or interviews with farmers, the collection and reporting of data by farmers (e.g., farm records systems), etc.
- Once a new technological package is selected, or a strategy chosen, the behavioral changes required of farmers for project success need to be identified in the project design process. For each activity, there is a need to know exactly what is being asked of the farmer. For example, the adoption of a new technological package may require a commitment of family labor at times when other critical production activities are underway, an increased dependence on outside sources for the timely provision of credit and agricultural supplies, or a cash commitment greater than the possible return from the market. Similarly, farmer group formation may require cooperation among individuals who have traditionally argued over land rights or other matters. By identifying the behavioral changes required, it would help the project staff determine if they were reasonable, what training and incentives would be needed to insure that the changes take place, and allow the project to monitor the changes during implementation to see if modifications to the project design are needed. (Ø19, p. 7-10).

#### Abyei Rural Development Project, Sudan

- In Abyei there was no clear distinction between research activities and implementation efforts. Low levels of local participation in the project's strategy led to differing perceptions as to priorities. Areas considered by the project staff as long term research and testing, such as water well testing, were perceived by the beneficiaries as components requiring immediate action. Moreover, since there was little interaction with the beneficiaries in establishing research objectives, inconclusive research was more often than not perceived as an implementation failure. (P6, p. 5).
- Individuals respected for their local knowledge could simultaneously contribute to the project and act as its spokesmen, rather than viewing it from the outside. Missed opportunities for the use of local knowledge in the Abyei project were identified by an evaluation team which reviewed that project's progress:

- Group farm leaders and members were not fully exposed to the agronomic trials conducted by the project staff, and were not directly involved in the selection of the production packages that were to be tested on the group farms.
- Traditional Dinka specialists with a reputation for identifying water sources at shallow depths were not sought out for the input that they might have given to the Abyei Project's water program.
- Insufficient use was made of local knowledge on stock movements and diseases in developing a design for an animal health program. (P3, p. H6-7).

### Arusha Planning and Village Development Project, Tanzania

- To what degree and with respect to which functions should village-level participation be increased? Which functions are better performed at the village level and which are best left to the district level?
  - Problem Identification: This is best left to the population affected by the problem, i.e., the villagers.
  - Identification of the Causes of the Problem: This might involve the identification of causal factors outside the experience and/or knowledge of the villagers. However, this should not be assumed, and the function is therefore best performed through a dialogue between the villagers and officials from higher levels.
  - Response/Design of Project Solution: This will ordinarily be beyond the initial capacity of the villagers. Therefore, this function is ordinarily best performed by technically skilled people at the subdistrict, district, or regional levels. It should, however, be performed at the lowest possible practicable level.
  - Project Commitment: Sometimes, when villagers become aware of the tradeoffs that must be made to achieve project objectives, they decide that the achievement of that objective is no longer desirable. Unfortunately, planners sometimes think that, since the project as they designed it will achieve the desired result, that the villagers will continue to support its implementation. Thus, they do not present the project design itself to the villagers for their final approval. This sometimes leads to unexpected failures during implementation. Therefore, this function should be performed through a substantive

dialogue between villagers and higher officials prior to the final approval of the proposed project and the obligation of funding.

- Project Implementation: Projects should be designed to be primarily implemented by the villagers themselves, even when, from a short-term financial or cost/benefit view, that is not the most efficient method. Assistance from higher levels should be limited to those technical inputs that are both necessary and impossible to obtain from among the villagers themselves. (O3, p. B10-12).

#### Eastern ORD Integrated Rural Development Project, Upper Volta

- All services of the ORD flow to farmers through village groups. These groups have been substantially strengthened by the project. There are approximately 500 of these groups. They are not considered cooperatives (nor even pre-cooperatives). Becoming a cooperative entails a substantial legal process. The stronger village groups are only now moving into the pre-cooperative status.
  - The groups are used for the provision of medium-term credit and to facilitate the work of the over-extended extension agents by aggregating people who will meet and be exposed to demonstrations in one place.
  - They are the "moral guarantors" of their members who receive credit.
  - They set aside communal fields on which new or known cash crops are grown using recommended cultivation practices, the production of which is marketed through the ORD and the profits shared among the members.
  - Strong village groups (about 30 of them) were given loans for group projects such as cereal banks. A loan was given at harvest time to buy grain when prices were low. It was subsequently sold when the prices were high, with the margin staying in the village group to finance group projects. Success in a collective field project helped qualify a group for the "strong village group" status, and thus eligibility for cereal loans.
- In the Eastern ORD project there were "village group study days" in which the leaders of the village groups got together in each of the 23 subregions of the ORD to complain about problems and make suggestions. There is some indication that the extension agents were very responsive to beneficiary accountability. The creation

of an automated billing system allowed the project to send bills to all of its delinquent farmers once a year. This was announced and each of the extension agents was asked to gather his people together so that these bills could be distributed. This resulted in a significant return to "embezzled" funds, i.e., payments that had been made to the extension agent, but that he had never reported. The extension agents were more afraid of the beneficiaries finding out that they had pocketed the money, than of their bosses finding out. The extension agents were reprimanded, but it was realized that they had never been given so much responsibility before and that the money was a great temptation.

#### PROBLEM MANIFESTATION - DECENTRALIZATION

##### Provincial Area Development Program, Indonesia

- Factors which constrain progress toward devolution of planning responsibility within the PDP include:
  - The USAID focus on capacity building objectives at the provincial and district levels, rather than village and sub-district levels.
  - A general emphasis on successful sub-project implementation, which results in a reluctance to involve lower level officials and organizations with capabilities that are perceived as limited.
  - Uncertainty as to how to implement decentralized activities, including planning, especially within existing structures. (F7, p. 15).
- In order to do the PDP's project planning, a team comprised of provincial, district and sub-district personnel visits target villages for discussions with village chiefs and assembled groups of farmers.
  - The attempt to foster open discussions and elicit local expressions of needs, however, is limited by the imposing entourage and its being a single visit.

This information is passed up to the district and provincial levels, where the actual planning is done.

- Except for their role in interpreting local needs and aspirations, the village and sub-district officials have no role in the actual planning of projects, or in their subsequent implementation.

Implementation is handled by PDP staff (village motivators, district and sub-district coordinators, and technical advisers) augmented by government staff from the line agencies.

- Village heads have no control over any PDP resources.

Recommended changes to this strategy to facilitate decentralization, one of the stated objectives of the project, include:

- Joint planning in which village and sub-district officials work with district planners in preparing project documents;
- Determination of what planning and administrative tasks could be effectively performed at lower levels and what kind of training would be needed to support a further devolution of responsibility. (F7, p. A18-19).

Further decentralization in the PDP will place strains on existing organizational capabilities. Requirements for coordination will be increased and communication needs multiplied. Persons with very limited managerial skills will be drawn into the process of decision making. The roles of staff and local leaders will become more ambiguous, with a lack of clarity about specific responsibilities, and the possibility that local elites might capture the project benefits will increase. (F7, p. A19).

## INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Most IRD projects provide for formal information systems. These are often, however, not implemented or if implemented, not effectively used. Examples abound, for example, of cases where:

- An expensive contractor is hired to design a system that is never implemented;
- Project managers assign their information/monitoring/evaluation staffs to other activities; and
- Large data collection efforts are undertaken, but the data collected is never analyzed.

The data collected using formal information systems remains unused in many IRD projects for a number of reasons:

- Information is power and may be seen as a threat to project management. This is especially true of donor requests for information;
- Information gathered for donors or other actors outside of the project itself may be seen as irrelevant and gathered in a careless manner, packaged, and forwarded to the interested party, without ever being examined for its value in the redesign or ongoing improvement of the project;
- The project management may not be able to anticipate information needs;
- Consultants brought in to design information systems may design elaborate systems with lengthy documentation as a means of justifying their contribution and satisfying explicit contract requirements; and
- Some project managers derive great enjoyment from crisis management and thus do not feel the need for additional information simply in order to anticipate crises.

One objective of the IRD research on information systems is to further document the reasons for the non-use of formal information systems. Another objective is the examination of possible cost-effective informative systems. This includes an understanding of how management decisions are made in projects, what informal information channels exist, and what formal or informal channels are most effective in fulfilling specific information needs.

## PROBLEM MANIFESTATIONS

### Second Integrated Rural Development Project, Jamaica

Little systematic use has been made of market information for guiding the overall project strategy in the second IRDP. In particular, information available about market conditions for farm products has had little influence on decisions about extension strategy, and has not been passed on to area farmers for their own decision making. However, project staff have not given a more central role to marketing information in shaping their project strategy because they feel it would require changes in the project paper and thus were beyond their influence.

The emphasis in the project paper on quantitative measures of project outputs, combined with the technical background of most of the project's staff, has led to an emphasis in the Jamaica IRDP on collecting information on individual component performance, rather than on the overall impact of the project on the beneficiaries. For instance, considerable information is available about numbers of acres treated for soil conservation, amounts of planting materials distributed, number of farmers visited by extension agents, etc. But it is not known how (and if) these activities are improving production levels or families' incomes. Acres treated are not necessarily acres maintained or productively planted. Increased crop production is not necessarily a benefit if markets fail to materialize and credit payments are in default. Information on project impact, for example, might have alerted the project earlier to the need for less emphasis on soil conservation and more on effective extension. (H2, p. 19-20).

Abyei Rural Development Project, Sudan

- The design of an information system depends ultimately on the overall objective of the project. If this perspective is lost, moreover, the adequacy of the entire information system may be lost. In the Abyei Project, for example, the ultimate objective of the "research and experimental mode was to produce a design for a major development undertaking in the area." The importance of designing the information collection to meet this objective, however, was not adequately taken into account, with unfortunate results. For example:
  - One glaring weakness of the research effort was the virtual absence of data relating costs to outputs. The budgets prepared for yearly operations were broken out by line-items, with amounts allocated for salaries, commodities, travel and so forth. The absence of a "program budget" meant that the costs associated with a single intervention (such as the introduction of a low cost technology to make bricks, for example) could not be calculated. As a consequence, activities or approaches could not be compared to obtain the most efficient alternative.
  - The research output of the project was generally more descriptive than prescriptive. Emphasis was given to the extraction of lessons learned, with less emphasis on the meaning and interpretation of these lessons. Further, experimental design was rather casual, with loose control over inputs, lack of rigor and control of variables influencing the experiments (particularly delivery of material support for activities), etc. As a result, much of the research was not replicable. Many of the research outputs had not been finished at the time of the final evaluation of the project, thus raising the issue of timeliness. Further, some data were irretrievably lost with short-term staff departures, or research data were not relevant to the project due to the differing agendas of researchers. (P3, p. J8).

- One major problem of the Abyei Project was that the design called for much greater output levels than could possibly be achieved given the resources available. Each newly arrived expatriate team member, reviewed what was "programmed" in the project's formal documents and compared it with what could reasonably be accomplished, in his/her professional opinion, in the Abyei setting. In almost all cases the team member rejected as unachievable much of the rhetorically stated purposes and outputs, and selected a work program more consistent with available resources and skill levels. These "inception reports," completed within the first few months of arrival, should have been used to establish a more realistic work plan and a set of criteria with which to evaluate achievements. Unfortunately, this was not done and the project continued to be saddled with unrealistic goals. (P3, p. J6-7).

#### ALLEVIATING THE PROBLEM

##### Provincial Area Development Program, Indonesia

- A communication system designed to produce baseline information for the planning of various rural development projects, should include the following steps:
  - Abolishing the communications barrier by creating the impression on the villagers that the project staff have come primarily to listen, not to give instructions or to preach.
  - Use of guided discussions, i.e., the talk should be directed toward the collection of the needed information.
  - Acceptance of the discussion topics raised by the villagers. This is to assure them that their voices are really listened to and that the discussions are not being carried out merely for the sake of formality.
  - Selecting and collecting the results of the discussions. This involves separating out the relevant information and that perceived as irrelevant in order to observe patterns and linkages between the two. This should provide the field officers with a picture of the perceptions and the way of thinking of the community.

- Presentation of the results of the discussions to the people. This will assure the villagers that the discussions have not been a waste of time. Secondly, it will demonstrate to them the value of such discussions in identifying their problems and possible solutions. (F6, p. 41-42).

### Second Integrated Rural Development Project, Jamaica

- In the Second IRDP too much reliance was being placed on informal information systems for the day to day management of the project, and not enough use was being made of formal information channels. Misinformation was becoming very expensive to the project. Not enough information was available on where or when meetings were to be held, or who was supposed to attend, etc. As a result, people would arrive too early for meetings, or meetings would be postponed and some of the participants left uninformed. Likewise, there was a lack of coordination with respect to transportation needs. People would spend an inordinate amount of time looking for rides, or several people would go to the same place in separate cars. Extension agents often had to miss meetings with farmer groups and, in general, staff time was not effectively used. In addition, information that one unit or level thought was disseminated, often had not been, with predictable problems.
- The conditions for a reliable informal information system include:
  - Reliable physical communication facilities (e.g., telephones, inter-office mail).
  - Clear differentiation of purely technical information from management decision making information.
  - Clear understanding of management roles and technical or staff roles.
  - Widespread knowledge of the responsibilities and authorities vested in different staff members or units.

Most of these conditions did not exist in the IRDP and thus the heavy reliance on informal information systems was not effective. (H5, p. 20-21).

- An example of the effective use of an informal information system to gather technical information is illustrated by the forestry component. The forestry needed to obtain information from the soil conservation farm plans on the slopes of the hillsides, in order to determine how many trees would have to be planted on the slopes (i.e., how much acreage was involved). Unfortunately, he could not wait until the formal reports were done. Instead, he contacted the field officers who filled out the reports and asked them what the figures were (i.e., used informal channels). This allowed him about a two month lead time for his own planning. (H2, p. 21)

### INVIERNO, Nicaragua

- INVIERNO has made extensive use of electronic data processing for its operations and management, including:
  - Handling traditional administrative activities such as cash flow analysis, payroll, budgets, etc.
  - Computerized analysis of the results of demonstration plots.
  - Processing of a large number of individual small loans at a relatively low cost.

The use of the computer has led to problems, however. For example, though the computer decreases the administrative burden at the local offices, it increases the problems of communication between both the field staff and the central office, and between INVIERNO's personnel and the project's beneficiaries. Insufficient understanding on the part of the field staff of the computerized procedures or of the outputs generated has been a problem. Similarly, outputs have not always been in a form that is readily understood or usable by the field staff in their daily activities.

Bicol Integrated Rural Development Program, Philippines

- The Bicol Project began with the creation of a very comprehensive effort that was used to develop 25 and 10 year development plans for the program area. The resulting data base included:
  - Data for describing conditions in the program area, including agricultural and other economic activities, development potentials, problems and resources.
  - Data for planning regional development strategies and establishing priorities, necessary inputs and anticipated outputs, in particular the information needed for developing region-wide road, water, health and education systems.
  - Data for specific project design and implementation.
  - Data for program justification to government agencies and the foreign donor community.
  - Data for evaluating the long-term effects of the development effort.

Despite this mass of data generated, however, the information needed for specific project development was lacking.

- DAI made several recommendations designed to speed up and increase the usefulness of the planning exercise in the Integrated Area Development (IAD) projects. These included:
  - Avoiding the creation of a comprehensive data base for each IAD. Instead, the critical questions that will affect project design and implementation should be identified.
  - After determining the critical questions, the data requirements for answering these questions, data sources, and collection techniques can be identified. DAI pointed out that in past planning efforts, the Bicol Project had relied heavily on traditional survey methods which were costly and time consuming. However, in many cases informal interviews with farmers, farmer groups, merchants and representatives of other public and private agencies would result in more operationally useful answers than the traditional methods. Some types of information will need to be collected during systematic data collection methods, but not all.

- The use of Bicol project and line agency staff members in the collection and analysis of the data needed to be increased. It is important that those persons doing the data collection and analysis be the same ones responsible for eventual project design and implementation. This will give the implementers first hand knowledge of the development problems and potentials in their area. Moreover, the use of interdisciplinary teams will provide a common basis for future coordination.
- Farmer groups needed to become more involved in the planning of the Bicol project. (Ø19, p. 3-5).
- One initial problem faced by the Bicol program was the inability to create the irrigators' association necessary to assure the utilization of the irrigation network being constructed. Irrigators' associations are necessary to obtain both proper water management and an equitable distribution of the resource. A lack of focus, i.e., trying to create associations everywhere at once, was identified as the main reason for the lack of success. Consequently, a pilot scheme was undertaken to create a single irrigators' association in one section of the project, encompassing approximately 10 percent of the project's total area. It was hoped that, once this first irrigators' association was operational, an expansion to other areas would be possible. The pilot project was called HELPS (Handong Area Extension in the L/C TAD Pilot Scheme). A management information system was created in order to monitor the implementation of the pilot scheme. It had three components:
  - A map of the target area. It is not enough, for example, to know how many farmers have been trained. It is also necessary to know where the farmers being trained are coming from. Similarly, if you are providing extension services, knowledge of the geographic dispersion of the beneficiaries is required. This would assure, for example, that all of your resources are not being concentrated on a select few who happen to live near the research station, or near paved roads, or near the extension agent's home. Thus, a map provides a focus which can immediately identify concentrations, weaknesses, gaps, etc., and can thus help to adjust priorities over time.
  - A Target Achievement Report. This links planned accomplishments on the map to actual achievements in the field. It is sent each time a planned output is completed by the responsible extension agent to the area supervisor, who passes it up the line to the division chief.

- Request for Action Form is used to notify appropriate persons of a need, problem, etc. The person most directly concerned and capable of doing something about the problem is the one notified. This should keep communication as simple as possible and focus on actions which might be taken to improve a situation. One difficulty has been the access to blank forms. Since the Request for Action Forms focus on problems, the extension agents, who are responsible for reproducing and distributing the blank forms have been relatively slow in doing so. (Ø13, annex B).

Ideally, an information system will perform the following functions:

- Monitor the inputs or flow of resources and the outputs of the program.
- Test the assumptions on which the success of the program and of individual projects is based (e.g., whether specific national or regional policies facilitate the achievement of project activities).
- Determine whether the behavioral changes necessary for successfully implementing project activities are taking place and the reasons for adoption or non-adoption.
- Identify the initial effects of the development effort, both positive and negative.
- Evaluate the effectiveness of different development activities.
- Evaluate the overall impact of the development effort on the quality of life of the people. (Ø19, p. 14).

#### Abyei Rural Development Project, Sudan

- In the Abyei Project a "counterpart" system of monitoring was practiced where the Sudanese codirector and team reported monthly to the Ministry of Agriculture about activities, difficulties, and problems confronted in project implementation. If specific action was required, the codirector wrote a separate letter detailing the nature of the problem and the support required. The monthly reports followed a standard format and formal feedback was not expected. The Technical Advisory Board, consisting of central agency representatives which was initially expected to review such reports, stopped meeting early in the project's life. No regular system for continuing review of the Abyei Development Project's status was

established. Though the effectiveness of this reporting system was questionable, it was important to note that the counterpart team was taking part in the generation of project information. This was preferable to having the expatriate team report on both their activities and those of the host country team. A preferred method, however, would be for the two teams to work together to generate a single, jointly written, information product.

- Impressions of how the Abyei project was viewed by the local community were gleaned from local staff feedback. This informal information system worked well given the size of the community. However, there were inherent weaknesses as a consequence of the multiple roles and interests of the staff. (P3, p. J2-3).

Eastern ORD Integrated Rural Development Project, Upper Volta

- The importance of short, policy oriented surveys, as opposed to large, comprehensive, long-term surveys is illustrated in the Eastern ORD project. The implementing university designed and undertook, as part of this project, a large (up to 90 page) farm survey. The designers tried to provide all things to all people. The questionnaire had many sections: a credit file, a crop production file, an animal traction file, a small industries survey, etc., and the sections were filled out at different times. The result was unmanageable. Information was eventually pulled off in little pieces, but the bulk of it will probably never be used. The survey was sold in the name of all the latest innovations in survey design, computer processing, etc. Though it provided data suitable to the needs of PhD. candidates working on their dissertations, the information system did not satisfy the policy making needs of the Eastern ORD management.
- An alternative technique, illustrated by a short study undertaken by the project staff to answer specific questions on small farmer credit was also used. This study took only one month to complete. It was argued by the designers that setting such a time limit forces people to think about what they really want and need. You start with the end product, i.e., design the tables for analysis, and then work backwards. Once you have

the method for analysis worked out, determine how to get the information vitally necessary (how should each question be phrased, etc.). This avoids a lot of the "wouldn't it be nice to know" questions. Further, if someone doesn't articulate a problem, i.e., if it makes no difference in terms of policy, then you shouldn't undertake to study it.

## TIMING

The adverse effects of timing issues on integrated rural development project implementation fall into three categories:

- The excessive time lag between project identification and start-up means:
  - Enthusiasm for the project diminishes and the potential beneficiaries become skeptical and impatient.
  - Donor and host country personnel involved in the planning of the project leave.
  - Expatriates lined up to provide long-term technical assistance take other assignments.
  - The political, economic, and environmental conditions affecting the project change.
- Timing estimates made during the project design usually underestimate the amount of time needed for various implementation activities. For example:
  - It takes longer to get expatriate and host country personnel in place and for them to develop good working relationships than anticipated.
  - Unprogrammed delays occur in the delivery of supplies from outside the project.
  - The project team is rarely around long enough to ensure benefit sustainability.
- Inappropriate time phasing of activities. Including:
  - Logical sequencing of activities and the setting of priorities.
  - The timing of project activities in a manner that is consistent with local production cycles and other constraints.
  - Changes in technical assistance requirements over time.
  - Time phasing of evaluation activities.

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## PROBLEM MANIFESTATIONS

Subtropical Lands Development Project, Bolivia

- The Project Loan Agreement was signed in September 1974, but the fieldwork didn't really begin until 1977. At that time, changes in key personnel in the various agencies, the arrival in country of the equipment, and improved communication between the various actors contributed to the visible progress of the project. The major impediments to more rapid implementation were:
  - Lack of adequate pre-project communication between USAID and the main implementing agency (the Instituto Nacional de Colonización) and within the INC itself.
  - Slow procurement procedures and delayed arrival of the equipment.
  - Excessive centralization of decision making by high level personnel of the implementing agency.
  - Lack of adequate technical staff within the INC, especially in aspects related to engineering and machinery management.
  - Problems with the assistance provided to the INC in the procurement of tractors to be obtained as US excess property.
  - Lack of aerial photography to deal with the land property claims of people that had settled in the area before the project was begun.
  - Excessive delays in awarding contracts for road construction.

Improvement of 80km of existing road and construction of 100km of new road were scheduled to start in September 1975. The road improvement did not start until August 1977 and the new construction did not begin until November of that year:

- The first delay in the road construction component was due to a decision by the implementing agency, the Instituto Nacional de Colonización, to take responsibility for the road design and topographic work. Decision was made to save money. The equipment needed for the work was purchased "off the shelf" using loan funds. However, procurement was slow because of the implementing agency's unfamiliarity with AID procedures. The INC's design work proved to be deficient when completed and was therefore contracted to a private firm.

- Lack of aerial photography proved to be a problem. One exploratory trail hit private property and had to be relocated at considerable cost and lost time. Aerial photography was not, however, contemplated in the project design.
- With the design work finished, bids were issued, but all of the proposals were rejected because the bid prices were considerably higher than the official ones. A second call for bids also exceeded by 10 percent the official bid prices and was therefore declared null and void. Finally direct invitations were made to eight companies, five of which responded. A private firm was selected from these five, yet USAID delayed its approval of the contract for several months because the documentation supplied for USAID review did not prove the firm's possession of the machinery necessary, nor its capacity to carry out the work. These problems were not ironed out and the contract signed until November 1977, 26 months later than programmed in the project design. By November, however, the rainy season had begun and the amount of work that could be done was severely restricted. Had the firm been able to start work in September, the necessary road culverts could have been finished and access to the project area during the rainy season assured.
- The cost of the road contracts turned out to be \$2.9 million higher than planned. (A2, p. 6-7).

The construction of 800km. of access trails in the project area was delayed by problems with the procurement and operation of five "excess property" tractors. The procurement of these tractors was an important source of discord between USAID and the Bolivian implementing agency.

- The tractors arrived in country a year after the signing of the loan agreement (even then they were the first project machinery to arrive in country).
- The excess property tractors were ordered by USAID without the approval of the implementing agency, the National Colonization Institute. Of the five tractors, an average of two have been working normally, each with about half the output of new tractors. The tractors were to have been reconditioned to normal use standards and, though the engine and tract systems were rebuilt, the transmission and blade lifting mechanisms were not. Because the tractors were built in the late 1940s and early 1950s, spare parts are difficult to find in Bolivia.

- A Bolivian Caterpillar dealer inspected the tractors and concluded that four of the five tractors could yield acceptable service, assuming the availability of spare parts and good maintenance and servicing, the fifth tractor would have to be cannibalized for spare parts. (A2, p. 8-9).

#### Gros Morne Rural Development, Haiti

- This project had two components, the formation of "groupements" (community groups) and the creation of "health clubs" to promote preventative health care. Although these two components were supposed to work hand in hand, there was little coordination. As a result, a number of the health clubs, formed in communities where the groupements were absent or weak, had failed. It was concluded that preventative health care was a difficult activity to undertake, and is tied to a change in beliefs and attitudes on the part of the beneficiaries. Thus, it was concluded that the health clubs should only be formed after the groupements, to benefit from the motivation and attitudinal changes that result from participation in the groupement. (C1, p. 33-34).

#### Luwu Area Development and Transmigration Project, Indonesia

- This project has met with numerous implementation problems. For example, 176km. of road were to be upgraded by late 1978. By September 1979 nothing had been done and a new completion date was set for 1983. Similarly, only 28 percent of the irrigation system construction/rehabilitation had been contracted by September 1979, with as little as 65 percent of the work on these contracts actually completed. (E1, p. 7).
- The road construction contracts were directed towards local contractors and this has been a reason for the delay in project implementation. The use of local contractors was justified on the grounds that it would not only provide for the construction of the road but would educate local contractors in road construction. Of the two construction contractors selected, only one had any experience in road construction. This lack of experience was exacerbated by the project's remote location. Heavy equipment had to be moved from one island to another, into an area where roads were barely passable under optimum conditions. (E1, p. 8-9).

- There is a shortage of qualified irrigation system construction contractors in the area. This is attributed in part to the existence of a nearby Dutch supported irrigation project. The Dutch project has absorbed several construction contractors who would have otherwise been available for the USAID-financed project. (E1, p. 14).

### Second Integrated Rural Development Project, Jamaica

- The designers of the Second IRDP in Jamaica realized the importance of the timely collection and transmission of the data required for decision making. Therefore, they acquired the services of a consultant with considerable experience in information system design. Several months following project approval, he arrived to work with the project staff on the design of the information system for the project. Several factors, however, combined to negate the usefulness of this preliminary information system design:

- Neither the host country project staff nor the advisory team had been constituted.
- Real implementation did not begin until almost a year later, and thus the system had no internal constituency to support its use.
- Actual project implementation proved more complex than the design was capable of dealing with.

The conclusion is that significant design efforts must involve the project staff, and must be undertaken both prior to project start-up and at regular intervals during implementation. As the data requirements, external conditions, and key actors change, changes must be made in the system design or implementation. (H3, p. 26).

- Vehicles required for farm plan development and extension did not arrive until 13 months after project approval and 6 months after the arrival of the expatriate advisory team. This seriously limited the effectiveness of the implementation team, since farms could not be visited to establish farm plans (for terracing). Without farm plans most other activities had to be rescheduled. Effective implementation, in the view of the project staff, only began when the vehicles arrived. Because of this delay, one of the first strategic decisions facing the project was whether to begin lobbying for a project extension.

- One reason for the delay was the discontinuity of personnel within USAID mission responsible for the project. However, such discontinuity is common and should be taken into account in project design. (H3, p. 10, 26).

#### Integrated Rural Development (Guidimaka), Mauritania

- Evaluation of the project concluded that, while it faced serious logistical and administrative problems, more could have been done had priorities been properly set and a little imagination used to circumvent the problems. For example, it was not absolutely necessary that the demonstration plots be enclosed in barbed wire before the land was prepared for the crops. Faced with delays in obtaining the barbed wire, the project should have either built "traditional" fences, or hired labor to guard the fields. (M1, p. 24-25).
- One of the major weaknesses of the Guidimaka project was the inclusion of too many sub-tasks. The project attempted to do too much with too few resources (both manpower and financial). Much of the project implementation delay was attributed to the inability of the project management to set priorities with respect to the activities included in the original mandate. Moreover, the situation was exacerbated by the addition of new sub-projects, tasks which were not included in the original project paper. As a result, the staff in the field was overwhelmed with many activities and confusion as to which way the project should go. (M1, p. 18-20).

#### Bicol Integrated Rural Development Program, Philippines

- If a development project is to proceed in phases, there must be a set of logical reasons why one stage would precede the next and there must be some objective criteria for distinguishing among stages. For example, a farmer organization cannot manage an irrigation system until both the organization and the system are complete. Since, in most cases, the initiative for building both comes from the government, the initial phases will be characterized by a dominant role for government agencies. That role must gradually change to fit emerging needs. One identifiable transition in focus will occur when the physical infrastructure is completed and work shifts from construction to

operation. Another identifiable shift will be from a subsidized water fee to that required for operating and maintaining an independent system. Finally, consideration should be given to both functional and area phasing. (Ø16, p. 21-25).

#### Abyei Rural Development Project, Sudan

- Project designers must carefully weigh the timing and sequencing of components in an IRD project. To do everything simultaneously will be difficult, even if all of the concerned host government agencies appear to be ready to start. In Abyei, not even this condition was met, and thus a phased approach should have been attempted. However, the "action-research" framework used by the project deliberately offered little structure or phasing of the activities. Priorities were to be established after the identification of critical areas (based on needs, potentials, and external constraints). However, no priorities were established and virtually all of the activities were given equal importance. This led to a scattergun approach and consequently little measurable impact. (P6, p. 33, 41-42).

#### Arusha Planning and Village Development Project, Tanzania

- Project activities in the Arusha Project seem to be running ahead of the planning process, in the sense that there might not be much money left to fund initiatives resulting from the planning process. The project has \$4 million for roads, \$1 million for potable water, and \$4 million for everything else. It is quite conceivable that final decisions will have been made on how to spend the entire \$9 million before the first phase of the regional planning exercise is completed. For example, though the transportation plan has not yet been completed, work on upgrading of major roads will probably use up the \$4 million available for that component.

Eastern ORD Integrated Rural Development Project, Upper Volta

- There was an 18 month delay in fielding the expatriate team. This meant, for example, that the Eastern ORD started giving out credit loans to farmers even though the expatriate credit advisor hadn't arrived. The loans were given quickly and carelessly. Not only were the expatriate's experience and skills necessary, but he was needed to monitor the program's progress.
- Applied research activities were behind schedule because of delay in fielding the expatriate team. Further, a budgetary crisis in the UNDP prevented that organization from providing key technical experts and funds for the construction of project headquarters. It was estimated that two years of data collection had been lost because of the 18 month delay in fielding the team. (S1, p. 5-6).
- Construction of the ORD complex was originally scheduled to be completed in December 1976. It was later re-scheduled to mid-1977, but the construction continued until June 1978. Construction of housing for the expatriate team was far behind schedule. Delays were due to a lack of construction capacity in Upper Volta and the extreme difficulty of obtaining construction materials and equipment in a timely manner. (On the other hand, vehicles, equipment and commodities to support the ORD activities were delivered more or less on schedule). (S1, p. 5).

## DIFFERING AGENDAS

The individual or institutions participating in an integrated rural development project at each stage of the project cycle (project identification, design, implementation, and evaluation) are likely to have different purposes and agendas. These differing agendas may not, either singly or collectively, place the highest priority on achieving project goals. Organizations put primary emphasis on increasing their size, power, and control, and their internal incentive systems are formulated in accordance with these motivations. Individuals, similarly, have agendas that reflect their professional and personal goals. For example:

- Donor agencies receive pressure for quick results from their political sponsors (who generally have a time horizon that corresponds to their term in office). As a result, the projects that receive funding often have overly optimistic designs which cannot serve as a realistic basis for implementation;
- USAID missions are often more concerned with developing new projects than with implementing those that have already been approved;
- For professional and personal reasons host country professionals will be oriented to obtaining a position in the capital city, rather than working in an isolated rural area for a long period of time. Similarly, expatriate staff generally view three years as the maximum time they should spend in a single project;
- Technical assistance specialists may spend time on their own pet projects, such as collecting data for dissertations, research reports, etc., at the expense of fulfilling their implementation responsibilities; and
- Certain individuals or institutions may not be in agreement with the strategy or focus of the project. For example, they may not agree with the selection of the target group, or with the mix of activities being undertaken.

Aside from documenting the existence of differing agendas and their effect of project implementation, an investigation of the use of incentive systems to modify that behavior in a positive fashion would be useful.

## PROBLEM MANIFESTATIONS

Provincial Area Development Program, Indonesia

- For a project design to be implemented as planned, the behavior of the individuals within the organization must be reliable. Thus, the incentives for the people to act in a certain way must be stronger than pressures supporting other behavior patterns. Many different factors can influence performance incentives. For example, inadequate salary levels (which make two or three jobs necessary) can introduce conflicting loyalties, lower organizational commitment and decrease the time spent on the job. In other situations, management procedures can actually provide disincentives for performance. For example, in Aceh, responsibility for a vehicle is often given to one person. This identifies the person accountable for the vehicle's condition and thus simplifies management. However, when this assignment is combined with certain financial management procedures, it rewards people for non-performance and it can penalize them for behaving as desired. That is, when the responsible staff member receives, in cash, a standard monthly allotment to cover the cost of gasoline and routine maintenance, there is an incentive not to make frequent visits to isolated rural areas because this increases gasoline costs and raises the probability of minor repairs and other maintenance. Since anything over the allotment must come from the civil servant's own pocket, such a performance can be an effective deterrent to delivering services to rural areas, monitoring field activities, or incorporating villagers into project decision making. Increasing administrative capability for poverty-focused rural development thus requires the replacement of disincentive systems with rewards for undertaking bottom-up, integrated action to assist poor villagers to improve their welfare. Moreover, a necessary step in improving capability is targeting general types of staff behavior and examining existing incentive systems which either support or discourage such behavior. Supportive incentives might then be reinforced or expanded, whereas disincentives might be discarded or suppressed. (F4, p. 20-21).

Vihiga/Hamisi Special Rural Development Program, Kenya

- Government of Kenya objectives with respect to the Special Rural Development Program (of which Vihiga was one aspect) changed during the life of the project. However, USAID failed to reassess its own position with respect to the project in the light of the government's change in priorities. (I3).
- As initially designed, the SRDP program was to expand by creating similar development programs in other regions of the country, based on the experience gained from the first projects. Shortly after the inauguration of the program this plan was abandoned by the GOK when it was realized that the government was injecting a large amount of its resources into a relatively small portion of the rural area, and that there was little possibility of replicating the experiment elsewhere. As a result of this realization, persons at high levels who originally were opposed to the project gained more influence and the thrust of rural development implementation was shifted to a higher level. The attitude towards the SRDP projects was to let them run their due course while trying to learn as much as possible from them. The shift in policy was partially responsible for the lack of critical staff and resources that was later faced by the project. (I10, p. 5-6).

Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project, Lesotho

- In order to attract good quality Basotho, the Thaba Bosiu Project paid one pay grade higher than the Ministries. Thus, it took some of the good people from the Ministry of Agriculture. This left, however, that ministry even more under-staffed than before the initiation of the project. (J2, p. 47).

Bicol Integrated Rural Development Program, Philippines

- In examining a project one must ask "are there incentives for cooperation between the actors in the project?" In the Bicol all donor funds flowed to one agency. "Incentive allowances" for cooperating agency personnel were disbursed as counterpart funds by the project. Thus, one organization became a provider of money to the personnel of other organizations. However, the provider had no natural organizational incentive to distribute those funds. Consequently, one of the most eligible line items for budget cutting in times of retrenchment was the incentive allowance, since those who benefited from it had no organizational base within the project. This arrangement did

not support the morale of those cooperating agency personnel who were attached to the project since they were placed in a position of being beggars vis-a-vis the project. Yet, is it realistic in a time of budgetary retrenchment to expect administrators to channel their funds and personnel into an integrated project which primarily benefits another agency, and a better funded agency at that?

#### Abyei Rural Development Project, Sudan

- Within any IRD project there will be a number of actors, each of whom has his own differing agenda. These agendas may not, either singly or in combination, place the highest priority on achieving the project's goals. With respect to the Abyei Project there were a number of actors:
- USAID/Khartoum was divided into two groups, neutrals and antagonists to the project, depending, in part, on individual attitudes to other actors involved in the project. Originally, the Abyei Development Project was appealing to USAID/Khartoum because:
  - The mission in Sudan was newly established and the project promised national visibility and an opportunity for rapid start-up.
  - The low budget avoided delays in the USAID/Washington approval process. At the time, projects funded for less than \$500,000 were authorized for mission approval.

However, because of the high visibility, the project received greater attention than its size and funding level would normally have warranted. The politicized setting meant that the project was causing USAID/Khartoum and USAID/Washington more trouble than it was worth, and more attention was being given to it than to projects that were much larger in scale.

- The Abyei Project was implemented by a U.S. university-based development institute whose traditional role was one of providing high level advisory services to developing country governments. Abyei was the first attempt by this institute to become involved in field level rural development implementation. There were differing views within the institute, however, on whether this was its appropriate role. The Project Coordinator's view was that such grass roots development was the more relevant approach. Other members of the institute staff saw the Abyei project as merely a single project, on the

periphery of the institute's activities. The result was an ambivalence which contributed to the lack of support to the project by the institute. The institute did not undertake similar projects elsewhere, nor did it make a long-term investment to develop in-house capabilities in logistics or personnel recruitment.

- The team fielded by the institute were relatively inexperienced, and their attitudes to the project depended on their personal perceptions and relationships with the Project Coordinator (who operated from the headquarters of the institute in the U.S.). One adverse effect of their deference to the Project Coordinator and the institute was that it limited their own initiatives. They expected to receive guidance and, because the decision making authority was so far away, it was never received.
- The Sudanese political patron of the project, one of the most significant leaders of the project's principal beneficiary group, the Ngok Dinka, pushed the project through. However, he envisioned a much greater effort than was ultimately created, and consequently used his influence to try to have more attention focused on the project than its funding level justified. The project became politicized, and this became a divisive rather than a unifying factor in conditioning the response of factions and interest groups among the beneficiaries.
- The Sudanese field team was composed almost exclusively of Ngok Dinka, and it was the interests of that ethnic group which they were promoting. Moreover, though the project's strategy focused on "action-research," the Sudanese staff were more concerned with the action, than with the research.
- The beneficiaries were divided into two groups, the Ngok Dinka, a Nilotic tribe, and the more politically advantaged Messirya Humr, Arabic-speaking pastoralists. The conflict between the two groups has become increasingly violent, as the nomadic Messirya move south in search of pasture and water. The Dinka saw the project as a means of redressing the existing economic and social imbalance. The Messirya viewed the project as primarily benefiting the Dinka. Though the project was primarily designed

to address the needs of the poorest and most disadvantaged elements in the population (the majority of whom were Dinka), it was also supposed to benefit the entire rural population of the Abyei area, including the Messirya. The result of this conflict between ethnic groups is that staff mobility and commitment to extension activities have been restricted, with the Dinka staff being generally unwilling to travel to areas controlled by the Messirya, and the opposition of the Messirya and its supporters to the project.

The provincial authorities viewed the project as a "national" rather than a "provincial" agricultural project, especially given its high level of political sponsorship, political visibility, and "special" status. The organizational features that were developed for the project fell outside the normal administrative channels. For example, the technical staff assigned to the project were seconded from central ministries, and project funds were provided directly to the project without disbursement through the provincial government. (This occurred after some initial difficulty in gaining the release of funds for the project from the provincial level). Moreover, from the perspective of the provincial authorities, the integrated rural development approach of the project is little understood. The local administrative norm is one of functionally discrete activities, such as mechanized farming, with little integration of social service delivery. Finally, the distance and physical isolation of the project from the provincial government has been a major barrier to communication, and consequently to both understanding and support for the project. The provincial government, since it was controlled by the dominant Arabic-speaking ethnic groups, was more concerned with the obvious lack of benefits going to the Messirya, than was the project staff, and this was also a source of contention. In sum, the Abyei Project was launched in a manner that effectively bypassed the provincial administration. Efforts to correct this situation later did not succeed because no incentives existed to attract provincial support. Credit for project success would not accrue to the provincial government, and the officials there perceived a high risk of failure in the project.

For the national level policy makers the Abyei project had a symbolic role in support of a national policy of solidarity and unification between the northern and southern parts of the country. However, it could not reasonably be expected that such a small project would receive the continued attention of very high level

government officials (in this case a ministerial level committee). Once the project was launched, funds released, staff assigned, etc., the amount of support available from the national level inevitably declined. National level economic constraints, especially the worsening balance of payments situation have diminished the importance of rural development projects such as Abyei. Instead, more attention is being given to increasing the production of cash crops. As a result, Sudanese manpower and financial resources are being concentrated in the "modern" agricultural sector, leaving the Abyei Project with staffing problems and funding delays.

- Within the Ministry of Agriculture this conflict is more pronounced. The mechanization advocates within the Ministry saw the export crop mix (which generally requires mechanization) as the solution to Sudan's agricultural problems. For them, the reason that Abyei is poor is that it does not have any mechanization. On the other hand, traditional agricultural advocates within the Ministry argue that there are some places in Sudan, including Abyei, where mechanization is not feasible for environmental, cultural, or economic reasons. This ambivalence has affected the funding levels, commitment, and political support available to the project from the Ministry. (P3).

#### Eastern ORD Integrated Rural Development Project, Upper Volta

- A good deal of the technical assistance provided under the university contractor to the Eastern ORD project consisted of PhD candidates who were also collecting information for their dissertations. The conflict of objectives (project needs vs. dissertation needs) was illustrated by the large socio-economic survey undertaken by the contractor. The survey was long and very complex, and it was difficult to perform timely analysis so as to benefit short and medium-term project decision making. Rather, the survey served the needs of the graduate students and the university by providing a data base that could be tapped for future research on campus.

When USAID contracted with a university to implement the Eastern ORD project, they expected to obtain a staff of university professors. Instead, the university "bodyshopped" it. In some cases they got experienced people who had had no affiliation with the university. In other cases, they got people without the experience but having relevant education. This led to some resentment on the part of USAID and the host country. It was felt that the university:

- Was more interested in obtaining a budget source that could be used to support an international center on the university campus, with plush offices and modern buildings for the professors.
- Was more interested in obtaining a source of survey data to build up a data bank for the use of the university and its graduate students.
- Was using the Eastern ORD to "finish off" graduate students.
- Was using the Eastern ORD for "academic patronage," creating jobs for people that were "around" the campus (including not only students and professors, but also professional associates). It was sometimes felt that the availability of a candidate to do a study was more important in the initiation of the work than the existence of a felt need for the product by the project staff.

#### ALLEVIATING THE PROBLEM - INCENTIVES

##### Gros Morne Rural Development Project, Haiti

Gros Morne staff are permitted and expected to play a role in the direction of the project. No major operational decisions are taken without prior staff discussion. The agricultural agents, in particular, are recognized as being in the best position to judge the project's progress and problems. Weekly staff meetings have been established expressly for this purpose. This system has made for a dedicated and responsible staff. Secondly, since these staff members are in the field on a regular basis, they command more and better information on the project's impact than anyone else involved. The success and flexibility of the project is ultimately based on the availability of this feedback from the staff. (C1, p. 37-38).

Provincial Area Development Program, Indonesia

- High level government officials saw the PDP program as a grand experiment that might either succeed or fail. The bottom up emphasis in planning and targeting benefits to the rural poor were seen as novel and experimental components in the project. However, as one moved down the government hierarchy, perceptions as to the experimental nature of PDP as compared with other government programs became less clear. At some lower levels, PDP was not viewed as experimental at all, but rather as a source of new funds with which to expand existing programs.
- Experimentation will be relatively more expensive due to the need to provide comparative information on the benefits and costs of alternative approaches, as well as the higher level of risk involved. Therefore, experimentation will not occur to a significant extent in the PDP programs unless incentives for it are created. At the present time the opposite is the case. The Regional Development Directorate insists on detailed blueprints on how monies are to be spent, and USAID, by withholding decisions on whether to reimburse for sub-project activities until after they are implemented, discourages risk-taking/experimentation in PDP activities. (F5, p. 33-37).

Vihiga/Hamisi Special Rural Development Program, Kenya

- The Vihiga project did not have a flexible system of promotion geared to performance in the field. There were rigid educational qualifications for jobs at every level and the only way to rise within the system was to return to school and obtain the needed certificate or degree. Even then, only a very small proportion of the available positions in agricultural educational institutions went to the upgrading of outstanding field personnel. There was no way that an employee could qualify for a higher position by his experience of performance on the job. Consequently, there was little encouragement for anyone to do more than a minimum amount of work. (I10, p. 10-11).

INVIERNO, Nicaragua

- The INVIERNO experience demonstrates that the use of high salary levels to attract qualified national professions can result in high quality performance. The argument was thus made that, instead of governments contracting loan-funded expatriates to assist in implementation, a competitive salary structure combined with an appropriate personnel system can attract the quality national staff that will be more culturally attuned to the needs of the area and possibly less expensive as well. (N3, p. 164-165).
- INVIERNO's personnel system combines a competitive salary scale, a liberal benefit package, and an effective system for the selection and promotion of the personnel from within the organization (including six month employee performance evaluations). The attractive pay has helped bring persons to INVIERNO with substantial academic training and prior work experience. In turn, these people have tended to stay at INVIERNO due to the professional stimulation provided by the institution. (N6, p. 41).

Bicol Integrated Rural Development Program, Philippines

- The Program Office of the Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP) provided several services to the regional offices of the line agencies which encouraged their cooperation:
  - The Program Office facilitated communication between agencies. Information obtained at the Program Office and at development program meetings improved the chances of individual line agencies and government organizations succeeding at their own projects. For example, a governor could learn which roads were being built by national agencies and then coordinate smaller provincial projects with them.
  - Credit for successful projects could be claimed by more than one agency, as well as by political bodies within the region. Since each entity would provide a part of the input, each could claim responsibility for the successful project. Similarly, the burden of failures could be diffused, or shouldered by the Program Office, which in turn could attribute it to "inadequate coordination."

- Line agencies could justify their funding requests under the "integrated planning" rubric, and thus stood a chance of increasing their budget, claiming that a project had to be undertaken in order to complement another agency's project.
- In preparing budget requests, the technicians in the regional offices of the line agencies could obtain the assistance of the regional planners in the BRBDP Program Office. The planning function provided by the Program Office was a free good for the line agencies, which would otherwise have had to rely on their national offices for this service. However, while the national offices were far removed from the rural reality, the Program Office provided a local staff of competent social and economic planners, more in tune with the needs and constraints of the area.

• The BRBDP, however, had to assure the line agencies that it would not become a major rival for funds. Increased staff size and budget would be viewed as a threat to the resource base of the line agencies. Especially, a shift in BRBDP focus from planning to project implementation would have been viewed with concern by the line agencies. Thus, over the long run, an integrative agency such as the BRBDP can only act as a coordinating and planning body. Its ability to coordinate may be strengthened if it must sign off on line agency plans, but actual project implementation must be left to those line agencies. Otherwise, they will not cooperate. (Ø18, p. 10-14).

## MANAGING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Generous amounts of short and long-term technical assistance are usually built into donor-funded integrated rural development projects. The process of managing and structuring such assistance when a multidisciplinary team is involved is a complex and often ignored issue. As a result, inappropriate technical assistance is frequently given to IRD projects, and that technical assistance that is provided is often not used effectively. The key operational problem is how to most effectively structure and manage this technical assistance. There are four basic strategies for providing technical assistance:

- The individual (personal contract) strategy, whereby the funding agency makes contracts with specific individuals;
- The academic strategy, where the contract is made with a university which may, or may not, use its own staff in the field;
- The "bodyshop" strategy, where a private company puts together a team of individuals who may be complete strangers to one another and dispatches them to the field, but subsequently provides only the basic logistical and administrative support necessary and does not get involved in project implementation; and
- The "management team" strategy, where the team is headed by a staff professional and the home office, besides providing logistical and administrative support, becomes actively involved in field team management and project implementation.

Each of these strategies has certain advantages or disadvantages with respect to the others, and the appropriateness of an individual approach may depend a great deal on the nature and complexity of the project, and the type of position to be filled.

Among the issues to be addressed in the IRD research on managing technical assistance are:

- The substitutability of short-term technical assistance for long-term TA, and the most appropriate mix of generalists and specialists on long-term implementation teams;

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- The functions of short-term technical assistance, and their interactions with both the long-term TA team and their counterparts; and
- The changing needs with respect to technical assistance through the life of the project.

### PROBLEM MANIFESTATIONS

#### Subtropical Lands Development Project, Bolivia

- The Project Paper for the Subtropical Lands Development Project called for technical assistance to the Instituto Nacional de Colonización (INC) in the form of a resident adviser. However, despite protracted negotiations with several candidates, the position was never filled. The high salary relative to GOB standards, the fact that the position was to be financed by loan rather than grant funds, and the cumbersome contracting procedures of both AID and the host government, combined to undermine the effort. Similarly, the lack of a master mechanic led to problems of machine maintenance and an inability to keep several pieces of heavy equipment assigned to the project operational. Though at least one outstanding candidate was identified, his U.S. \$1000 per month salary requirement was higher than that of the Director of the Instituto Nacional de Colonización, and thus rendered him unacceptable. (A5, p. 8. 13).

#### Second Integrated Rural Development Project, Jamaica

- It is costing roughly U.S. \$100,000 per person-year for long-term technical assistance to the Second IRDP in Jamaica, and U.S. \$9,000 per person-month for short-term technical assistance. However, there was a substantial underestimation in the Project Paper of the unit costs of U.S. based technicians. The Project Paper allowed for U.S. \$60,000 for long-term TA and U.S. \$4,500 for short-term TA. Partially as a result of this, the technical assistance provided to the project was substantially less than that planned (13 person-years instead of 25). (H3, p. 9).

- The inability of USAID to place a Project Officer in the mission in Kingston (due to personnel ceilings) meant that many of the administrative duties entailed in supervising the Second IRDP became the responsibility of the Rural Development Officer. However, since that person had a full slate of other duties, he was unable to devote the amount of attention required to the project. Consequently, the responsibility for many of these administrative matters was passed to the technical assistance team leader. While this relieved the burden on the USAID staff, it prevented the team leader from fulfilling his technical duties, either as the soil conservation or extension adviser, as anticipated in the Project Paper. (H3, p. 8-9).

Vihiga/Hamisi Special Rural Development Program, Kenya

- The USAID technical assistance to the Vihiga Project in Kenya suffered from a lack of administrative guidance and organization. No continuing advisory staff were at the project site during the first year of implementation. Rather, there was only a series of short-term contract technicians who passed through the project area with little opportunity to gain a meaningful understanding of the project's progress and objectives, or to develop a working relationship with the government personnel assigned to the project. Attempts to recruit qualified full-time technicians who were familiar with the project were unsuccessful, primarily because the typical USAID contract provided no assurance of continued employment or participation in civil service retirement benefits. (I10, p. 69-70).
- After a year of unsuccessful attempts at staffing the Vihiga Project with individuals under personal services contracts, USAID decided to award a contract to an American university. The university selected, however, had no prior experience in development. Presumably the intention was to assist it in developing a capacity to handle such contracts. However, the university had a great deal of difficulty in recruiting the needed personnel. USAID assisted in locating a chief-of-party and marketing adviser, and hired two other technicians through another contractor. The university, in the end, provided only the extension adviser. The inability of the university to handle the administration of the project (including paying salaries and making reimbursements within a reasonable amount of time) aggravated the situation, adding to the burden of the chief-of-party and distracting from his primary duty of monitoring the project's progress. (I10, p. 71)

- An evaluation of the technical assistance provided to the Vihiga project made the following observations:
  - Donor personnel helped to alert government personnel to the value of pilot testing and pointed out the value of more general planning and programming techniques. A major contribution of the field team was their development of a simple empirical survey and data analysis system. Also, because they are scarce skills in Kenya, farm management and market analysis and labor-intensive road construction were useful contributions by the technical assistance team.
  - The substantial and costly input of temporary donor consultants had, on the other hand, relatively little impact. Their advice was sound, but the time constraints and their limited knowledge of the area undermined their efforts. They were not around long enough to translate their recommendations into feasible projects. The recommendations of several advisers on marketing, for example, only took root because a resident expert was there to do the essential adaptation and follow-up in the field. (I6, p. 16-17).

#### Abyei Rural Development Project, Sudan

- The use of a university-based development institute as implementor implied that a link to faculty research network was established that could be enlisted to assist the implementation of the Abyei Project. In reality, the faculty research network was not realized and short-term assistance was recruited either externally to the university or from among students. Further, the grantee was inexperienced in recruitment and procurement, and chose whoever was available and willing to go, with a limited review of the existing resource pool. The temporary (non-affiliated) staff sent to the project was a handicap to field management in terms of both turnover and their lack of previous experience with the home office. Moreover, the grantee was hesitant to give discretion to temporary field staff. Since the grantee was seriously constrained by the resources available for staff salaries, the personnel recruited frequently had limited technical experience. The reward system for staff was ambiguous and may have tended to reward research at the expense of action. Finally, a personnel recruitment capability was never built up by the grantee since it never saw itself as a long term implementing organization. (P6, p. 40-41).

- The long-term technicians recruited by the grantee were well motivated but inexperienced in IRD project implementation. Most had specific training and interests (e.g., animal traction, agricultural machinery, nursing) that prepared them for only a part of their broad responsibilities. Though institutional backstopping and short-term assistance can partially compensate for such limitations in long term staff skills, the timing, quality, and relevance of the short-term technical assistance provided has not been sufficient. Guidance to the field team was personally supportive but non-specific in terms of assessing plans and performance. (P3, p. 6-7).
  
- In the Abyei Project, the distance separating the home office of the implementing institute and the field team adversely affected the quality of that project's management. The development strategy applied at Abyei was at times viewed differently by the field team and the project coordinators in the home office. This distance and lack of communication exacerbated the varying interpretations of what was important, the order or priority of certain actions, and what was expected as the project developed. The inaccessibility meant that the field team received little guidance or control from the headquarters in the U.S. However, in the project the home office assumed responsibility for definition and coordination of basic project strategy. Though total abdication of responsibility by the home office to the field is not a satisfactory approach, the model employed in the Abyei project was equally unsatisfactory. Too many key operational decisions were made away from the field, while some critical policy decisions were never dealt with or were resolved in an ad hoc fashion. Clear lines of decision making need to be established between a home office and its field team, particularly when the home office assumes the responsibility for defining and coordinating the project strategy. (P6, p. 23, 32).
  
- The management and monitoring demands posed by the "experimental" nature of the Abyei Project were poorly suited to the Operating Program Grant (OPG) framework under which the contract was awarded to the university-based development institute which implemented it. The OPG is designed to minimize USAID's management role, while allowing a PVO, contractor, or university to carry out known activities in which it has a proven track record. The Abyei Project, however, was a high-risk project and the contractor had almost no prior implementation experience relevant to the situation. As difficulties arose, the OPG framework did not provide accountability to the degree that USAID desired or expected. (P6, p. 32).

Arusha Planning and Village Development Project, Tanzania

- An evaluation of a previous USAID project undertaken in the Arusha region identified difficulties inherent in the provision of technical assistance to development projects which had to be considered in the design and implementation of the Arusha Planning Project. These problems included:
  - The expatriate staff and their counterparts tended to apply different standards when judging the performance of expatriate technical assistance. The Tanzanians tended to stress the ability to communicate (language facility indicates both commitment and effectiveness) and interaction with local organizations and individuals, whereas the expatriates stressed technical competence.
  - The Tanzanians wanted a voice in the choice and evaluation of the expatriate personnel (especially for decisions on contract renewal); Tanzania government officials were often not familiar with expatriate job descriptions.
  - Reasons for personnel decisions by the expatriate team were often not communicated to the Tanzanian project staff, and the decisions were subsequently misinterpreted.
  - Report sharing between the local and expatriate staff was minimal.
  - There was a need for a chief of party with planning/management/administration expertise, and not just technical skills. Technicians seldom have either the skill or the personal inclination to involve themselves in the procedural matters required to manage a team. The only advantage of having a technician as team leader is his ability to counteract resistance to priorities on technical grounds. But in a multidisciplinary team this advantage is limited to only a minor portion of the activity. (Q2, p. 8-9, 15-16).

Siliana Rural Development Project, Tunisia

- The health project designed as part of the Siliana IRD Project involved the construction of a hospital and the placement of a three person medical team to train paramedical personnel to address, at least partially, the problem of a lack of doctors in the project area. The project was never implemented. The technical assistance team never showed up because contracting for the team ran into procedural snags in Washington. An American consultant did, however, make several trips to Tunisia to confer with the Tunisians about architectural designs. Since there were already several understaffed dispensaries in the project area, and training was obviously the critical need, the concern about construction and not training was misplaced, to say the least. The lack of follow through in providing the medical team, made the technical assistance given to hospital construction quite irrelevant. (R4, p. 57).

Eastern ORD Integrated Rural Development Project, Upper Volta

- When AID chose a major university to carry out the Eastern ORD project, they were expecting to get a staff of experienced professors. However, the university recruited some of the staff from outside the university, and gave the other positions to recent graduates. The absence of experienced university staff on the project implementation team led to some resentment on the part of USAID and the Eastern ORD. The use of graduate students for short term technical assistance fostered the belief on the part of the donor and host country that the university was more interested in "finishing off" graduate students, including getting them access to the data they needed to do PhD dissertations, than in implementing rural development. As a result, both AID and the Eastern ORD decided not to continue with a university for the second phase of the project.
- Research was supposed to be a major component of the Eastern ORD project, if not the main objective. But the expatriate staff, with the exception of the agricultural production economist, all ended up taking on operational positions in the ORD structure. Though this has the advantage of more closely involving the team in the work of the ORD and thus increasing their short-term impact on programs, it interfered with their research responsibilities. This was especially true of the

marketing economist, who functioned as the expatriate team leader and as head of the Economic Analysis and Planning Bureau and as a result had no time to do marketing research. The marketing constraints faced by farmers in the project area (which turned out to be critical) were not, as a result, resolved. (S9, p. 6).

- An audit report on the Eastern ORD project noted that the average cost of a U.S. adviser is currently about U.S.\$137,000 per year. Thus, it concluded, using expatriates to fill local staff positions is not the best possible use of scarce project resources. A project is justified only to the extent that it trains counterparts to take it over upon completion. (S1, p. 3).

#### North Shaba Maize Production Project, Zaire

- Within the team management strategy, three types of short-term technical assistance can be distinguished:
  - Potential candidates for long-term positions on the implementation team who spend four to six weeks with the project. This serves as a useful testing mechanism for personnel, though it does not generate a usable product for the field team. Experience with the North Shaba Project has shown that this mechanism should not be used unless the successful long-term placement of the individual is substantially greater than 50 percent.
  - Specific problem-oriented technical assistance on issues affecting one or more of the project's subsystems. It was felt in the North Shaba Project that this type of technical assistance had not been utilized to its fullest potential, nor as early in the implementation process as it should have been. Another problem was a resistance to and distrust of outside "experts" on the part of host country nationals and some expatriate staff members. Short-term technical assistance specialists are very expensive. An individual consultant's salary and expenses can easily exceed \$10,000 per month. Such an expense is justifiable only if the long-term technicians can translate the results into a program that the staff can implement.
  - Visits by home office representatives to assist with project management. This has been useful in crisis management, strengthening field/home office dialogue, sustaining team morale, and providing an overview of the project's implementation. This technical assistance has not been able to substitute for the lack of permanent field personnel for specific subsystem deficiencies. (U3, p. 61-63).

- In the North Shaba Project, it was originally envisioned that the U.S. chief-of-party would provide technical backstopping to a Project Monitoring and Evaluation Subsystem. This subsystem was intended to provide an ongoing monitoring and evaluation function internally within the project, and would have served to coordinate the activities and direction of the various subsystems. However, this was not the case because of the excessive time and effort required in administration and management within the project management unit. Occasional short-term assistance proved inadequate in keeping this subsystem on track and providing the necessary analytical backstopping to produce useful reporting. (U1, p. 7).

## COUNTERPART SHORTAGES

IRD projects almost never have a full complement of host counterparts to work with short and long-term expatriate teams. The result of these shortcomings is that a project must proceed more slowly than originally planned, or that the expatriate team takes on more implementation responsibilities than expected. In any case, the critical capacity building and technology transfer functions of the technical assistance are lost, greatly reducing the chances that the project will be sustainable when donor assistance is withdrawn.

The main reasons for the problem are that many developing nations do not have the trained manpower to fill project positions, or may not have the recurrent budget funds to pay their salaries and provide the necessary supporting services. Often, filling the project slots has meant the withdrawal of skilled manpower from other jobs where they are also desperately needed.

The first research priority is to document the counterpart shortage problem. Following that, research will be done on methods of overcoming counterpart shortages through, for example, long-term or on-the-job training, or by increasing the use of paraprofessionals.

## PROBLEM MANIFESTATIONS

Second Integrated Rural Development Project, Jamaica

- The original Project Director was the Senior Conservation Officer for the Ministry of Agriculture. The IRDP constituted only a part of his responsibility and the MOA would not relieve him of his other tasks nor permit his full-time transfer to the project site. Eventually, he had to be replaced by a full-time IRDP Project Director, one with management, rather than technical, skills. (H3, p. 11).

Arusha Planning and Village Development Project, Tanzania

- An evaluation of a previous USAID project undertaken in the Arusha area identified difficulties inherent in the expatriate-counterpart relationships which had to be considered in the design and implementation of the

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AP/VDP. These problems were traceable to the nature of the expatriate-counterpart relationship itself, rather than to the personalities of the people involved. The problems identified included:

- A tendency on the part of the expatriates to treat the Tanzanian staff more as trainees than as professionals. The underlying rationale of the expatriate presence is the transference of skills from "the more equipped to the less equipped." Moreover, the counterpart interaction tends to be modeled on the craftsman-apprentice relationship. However, the counterpart staff desired to be treated more as professionals than as trainees. The problem could be partially overcome by screening during recruitment and sensitizing expatriate staff to the needs of the counterparts.
- The criteria and choice of participants for training in the United States was often unknown to field staff when selection was made in Dar es Salaam. Moreover, participants in this training sometimes switched majors or were not trained for project-related work. It was therefore recommended that participant training be programmed as an integral part of project activities. Moreover, a prior on-site experience by participants, their selection by field staff, and the creation of complementary on-the-job, on-site workshops is desirable in an effective training strategy. (Q2, p. 9, 26-29).

#### Siliana Rural Development Project, Tunisia

- Management of the Siliana Project was to take advantage of existing government territorial and administrative structures. However, not a single extra cadre was added to any Tunisian service for the implementation of the project. In fact, many of these services were operating below their assigned strength during the course of the project. (R4, p. 9).
- In order to avoid having expatriates collecting data for social research in Siliana Province, a dozen Tunisian social scientists, administrators, and USAID members were formed into a Social Science Research Committee and entrusted with the responsibility for designing the appropriate instruments of data collection, analyzing the results, and disseminating them. However, these Tunisian committee members were already overburdened with other responsibilities and, as a result, the Social Science Research Committee held only one meeting. (R4, p. 12).

Eastern ORD Integrated Rural Development Project, Upper Volta

- The lack of counterparts was a serious problem for the members of the Eastern ORD expatriate team. Each team member was to receive a counterpart. Some got them in the first six months. Others didn't get them until the last six months of their three year tour.
- The audit report of the Eastern ORD project noted that the average cost of a U.S. adviser is currently about \$137,000 per year. Thus, using expatriates to fill local staff positions is not the best possible use of scarce project resources. The project was justified only to the extent that it trained Voltaics to take over the project upon completion. (S1, p. 3).

Community Based Integrated Rural Development (Mahweit), Yemen Arab Republic

- One of the main reasons for the failure of the Save the Children Project in Mahweit was the inability of the project to recruit and train at least one senior Yemeni counterpart for either the Director or the Program Manager position. Consequently, a predominantly expatriate character developed around the project. It became "the American project." This left it open to criticism by groups within the community that were not sympathetic to its objectives or activities.
  - Without senior Yemeni staff (or central government counterparts) problems related to communication, cultural/political sensitivity, and official contacts became more serious. (T2, p. 6).
  - The infrastructure component, for example, while it targetted upon important needs, displayed lack of judgment with respect to what commitments to avoid and thus became seconded to political pressures. Further, the infrastructure component developed in an ad hoc manner, divorced from real or potential central government planning and resource commitment. (T2, p. 13).
  - The project was supposed to last 10 years and the expatriate staff were not supposed to be phased out and replaced by Yemenis till the end of the fifth year. Two senior level Yemeni "counterparts" had been identified, but were sent to study at universities in the U.S. (T3, p. 2)

- One question raised in the final evaluation concerned the requirement by Save the Children that these senior counterparts be bilingual. USAID's evaluation felt that this requirement was unnecessary. SCF felt that the requirement was needed since these people would take over for the expatriate staff in everything, including dealing with USAID and the SCF home office in the future. (T3, p. 12).

#### North Shaba Maize Production Project, Zaire

- The turnover of staff assignments in the project has been recognized as a potential constraint to project implementation. Just as expatriate staff tend to regard three years as a maximum period for assignment in the project area, Zairois staff with long term career interests in the Department of Agriculture share a similar perspective, for some of the same reasons (isolation, absence of urban amenities, lack of contact with professional colleagues outside the project, etc.) (U3, p. 31).
- The complement of staff provided to the project by the Department of Agriculture has been young and inexperienced. This meant that a considerable amount of the initial project time had to be spent in training the new staff and exposing them (sometimes for the first time) to the rural development environment. Further, the concepts and development strategy expressed in the Project Paper were unfamiliar to the new staff, and contrasted sharply with DOA activities in other projects. (U3, p. 32).
- Assignments in the capital remain the surest way to protect and advance one's career in the DOA. Being posted in a remote project, such as Project North Shaba can be seen as a setback, especially given the political unrest in the area, which further reduces the desirability of an assignment there. (U3, p. 33).
- The expatriate staff of the North Shaba Project has apparently given insufficient attention to the training function inherent in their assignments. The Zairois staff feel that they have received little specific, structured, on-the-job training. Further, some believe they have lost the chance for overseas training while having been left to fend for themselves, rather than receiving intensive, high quality technical assistance. However, this training role is the only real justification for sustaining a large expatriate team in the project. (U3, p. 55-56).

## ALLEVIATING THE PROBLEM

Arusha Planning and Village Development Project, Tanzania

- Training of host country nationals should focus as directly as possible on the specific characteristics of the setting and the needs of the project and the personnel in it. Prepackaged training that originates from outside, or is derived from other project experiences, may be only marginally relevant to the special training needs of the project. Several suggestions have been made in order to improve training.
  - Training should be based on the explicitly identified needs of the trainees themselves. Thus, the actual design of the training programs should follow discussion between those responsible for the project design and those receiving the training.
  - Throughout the training sessions, the material used should be subject to revision by the trainees themselves, based on their perceptions of the relevance of such materials to their actual job requirements.
  - Materials and exercises used should be based almost exclusively on the actual materials used by the trainees in the performance of their actual assignments on the job.
  - Any training program should be designed in such a manner that it can be replicated by the host country nationals on future occasions. Foreign trainers cannot be relied upon indefinitely and the training needs will be required forever in order to maintain the skills, given personnel turnover. (Q3, p. B14-15).

Eastern ORD Integrated Rural Development Project, Upper Volta

- The recommendation made by one expatriate adviser to the Eastern ORD project is to bring counterparts up from the ranks. Recruit counterparts from among the local extension personnel and recruit from your extension personnel from among the farmers themselves. A person with a PhD is not usually happy working with international donors or on a position with the government in the capital. There is a tradeoff between motivation and qualifications. The host country counterpart in the credit components of the Eastern ORD Project had only an 8th grade education. But he performed well in his job and, since he was proud of his newfound skills (managing a computerized credit system), he will be more likely to remain content filling his role in the project.

- There are difficulties with bringing up counterparts from below. Sometimes expatriate PhDs expect PhD counterparts and are unsatisfied with anything less. Also, if a job description requires a great deal of interaction with higher level government officials, a lesser educated counterpart may not command the respect needed. However, for a job that is action- or field-oriented (something that is just a matter of learning a new skill) pulling counterparts up from the lower ranks could be more appropriate.

Community Based Integrated Rural Development (Mahweit),  
Yemen Arab Republic

- The Nutrition Center developed a training program for approximately 10 female trainees to serve as assistants to the expatriate staff. This training program, however, placed inordinate strain on running the center. Lack of expatriate staff time, clients demands on services, and inexperience of the staff in running such a program lessened its overall quality. Insufficient attention was given to long term objectives of the training program (e.g., how these trainees could eventually replace the expatriate staff, given their minimal formal skills; who would eventually pay their salaries; how high their salaries should be, etc.). To ensure, for example, that these assistants would eventually be absorbed into the local Ministry of Health (MOH) structure in the hospital, the training model developed in the Mahweit project should have been approved by the Institute for Health and Manpower which certified health personnel.
- The Mahweit project also sponsored a Children's Referral Room (CRR) in the Mahweit Hospital in which they attempted to train a young Yemeni male salaried by the MOH as a nursing assistant, giving him practical, hands-on experience. However, the CRR eventually placed extra demands on his time, over and above that justified by his low MOH salary. The project, however, was reluctant to top-off or take over entirely his salary, thus causing some friction. The lack of a policy with regard to compensating Yemeni counterpart staff plagued the project throughout its existence. (T2, p. 16-17).
- The training component in the project, aimed at teaching community education and organization skills to promote community based-IRD, experienced several problems:
  - The curriculum and plan of execution were designed without adequate attention to the actual educational level of the trainees and their backgrounds.

- There was no standardized process for selecting trainees (i.e., no uniformity in experience, educational levels, interests, attitudes, etc.). (T2, p. 23).
- In any case, the population from which the project could draw trainees was very limited. Their selection was based primarily on a commitment to the rural development of Mahweit through a community development approach. (T3, p. 11).
- Climate of ambiguity led to inaccurate expectations on the part of the trainees and project staff with respect to requirements and duties, compensation, etc.
- Rotation of assignments of field coordinator trainees meant that they sometimes did not have enough time to get sufficient practical experience in any given technical area. Some trainees who developed an interest in a specific sectoral activity would have preferred to pursue it more thoroughly. Similarly, some male trainees viewed involvement in the social sector (elementary nutrition, preventative health, breast feeding, etc.) as a waste of time at best and an embarrassment at worst. (T2, p. 24).

Problem of who was to take responsibility for Yemeni trainees once trained and in place was not resolved. (T2, p. 29).

## SUSTAINING PROJECT BENEFITS

The ultimate measure of IRD project success is whether the project benefits are sustained (if ever attained) when outside assistance stops. Yet, until recently, the sustainability of projects has not been an expressed concern of the project documentation. Reasons for the non-sustainability of projects include:

- Sustainability is not a consideration in project design;
- Promised host country resources are not forthcoming, either because the resource level required is unreasonable or because the government chooses not to provide them;
- The proposed technologies are not appropriate;
- The local population does not make the necessary behavior changes; and
- The project staff do not devote adequate attention to the sustainability issue, in part, because of time pressures to deliver goods and services.

It is important to determine what elements are critical for rural development benefits to become self-sustaining. Considerations might include:

- An identification of what benefits "ought" to be sustained;
- An evaluation of the resource requirements necessary to ensure sustainability, both during and after the foreign assistance is withdrawn, and the commitment by the project's beneficiaries to the behavior changes required by the project;
- A determination of the degree and type of political support required; and
- An identification of the local level organizational arrangements that are necessary to sustain the flow of benefits.

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## PROBLEM MANIFESTATIONS

Subtropical Lands Development Project, Bolivia

- Within the Subtropical Lands Development Project, the orientation program, directed by a private organization, the United Church Committee (CIU), remained apart from the regular on-site administrative structure of the project. The terms of the relationship were defined in a contract between the CIU and the Instituto Nacional de Colonizacion (INC). Because of their institutional independence, the CIU could insist that the terms of the contract be honored. For example, many of the specialists in the orientation program were Bolivian employees of the INC who had been seconded to the CIU for the orientation program. Occasionally, one of their supervisors would insist on revising their work schedule, adversely affecting the orientation program. The CIU had the authority to insist that priority be given to the needs of the orientation program, and could appeal to La Paz, if necessary. However, with the eventual takeover of the orientation program by the INC and the completion of the CIU contract, the terms of this relationship were expected to change. There would be no contract defining the relationship between the orientation program and the rest of the INC, and no regular Bolivian employee would enjoy the direct access to La Paz available to the CIU. The sustainability of the project is therefore called into question. Though competent Bolivian professionals can be found to replace the CIU team members, it is doubtful that they would be able to accomplish as much without an equal amount of institutional independence. More likely, they would find themselves fixed in traditional bureaucratic roles without the leverage needed to ensure success. (A5, p. 11-12, 21).

HACHO (Haitian American Community Help Organization), Haiti

- HACHO is currently in a state of crisis with respect to its future, due to (1) withdrawal of USAID funding; and (2) the delay in establishing government policy regarding the disposition of HACHO and resulting funding problems. HACHO is officially in limbo. The reasons for this are:

- HACHO was originally set up as an ad hoc response to drought conditions with a focus on emergency health services and provision of relief. It only broadened its focus to include a variety of public services.
- No adequate provision was made for the agency to be transformed from a private agency with foreign donors and local government support, to an autonomous government agency coordinating services in the region. The government's policy has been to treat HACHO as a device for assuring foreign donations, rather than to try to transform HACHO into a regional development agency.
- No linkages were developed with any government departments. As a result, there is no GOH commitment to the idea of HACHO as a regional coordinator of either governmental services or non-governmental programs.
- The HACHO staff regarded it as an "American" agency and, as a result, they were demoralized by the cutoff of funds.
- The ambiguity of HACHO's status is heightened by the current presence of PIRNO (Programme Integre de Rehabilitation du Nord-Ouest). PIRNO was established with UNICEF funds and its services overlap and duplicate those of HACHO. The two projects resemble one another (though they have little rapport). PIRNO concentrates its projects on agriculture, health, and education, and is attached to the Ministry of Agriculture. PIRNO, however, uses a more top-down approach. HACHO is committed to working in collaboration with community councils and seeks to respond to initiatives from the councils. PIRNO, on the other hand, provides the program without even the appearance of council initiative. (D4, p. 15-25).

#### Provincial Area Development Program, Indonesia

- The PDP approach has resulted in some impressive early performance. However, it is not as good from an institution-building viewpoint. It is unlikely to strengthen district level capability to make and implement plans, since PDP activities are run by a coordinator who is not a government employee and is not under government supervision.

- Similarly, at the village level, the activities of the PDP are managed by a motivator who is independent of village administrative structure. The motivator mechanism is important, given the social-cultural setting, but in the long run will not have the impact needed unless linkages to village institutions are created. (F3, p. A-12).
- One aspect affecting the institutionalization of a project and its sustainability is "absorptive capacity." If the area cannot absorb new resources, they will simply be wasted. One dimension of absorptive capacity is the ability to spend money quickly. If a provincial budget is increased tenfold, but the money just sits in the treasury account, it will not contribute to solving the problems being addressed. There are three ways to deal with limited absorptive capacity. The first is to accept the present situation as a constraint and not overtax present capacity. Ways of adjusting to limited spending capacity include keeping added resources to a low percentage of present expenditures, or making the new expenditures routine fixed costs (such as salaries) rather than non-routine variable costs (such as funding multiple sporadic sub-project activities), or providing only one-time disbursement (such as the initial capitalization for a cooperative revolving credit fund). The second way to deal with low capacity is to raise it--to employ more treasurers, paymasters, bookkeepers, auditors, etc., and to develop less cumbersome procedures for turning money into rural development activities. Training both new and existing personnel in the streamlined procedures is also an aspect of capacity building. (F3, p. 7-8).
- Some methods of emphasizing equity may tend to make management difficult, results low, and sustainability impossible. For example, sometimes the proof that the rural poor are being reached is related to the difficulty of access to the project site (the new machismo). The more kilometers of bumpy trails, the more fords of flooding rivers, the more hours in small boats, the more mountains scaled or the more days of walking, the better the project and the more status accorded to the expatriate providing technical assistance. In some cases, this may be good because it does lower the willingness of national elites to divert project benefits. Moreover, it requires decentralized decision making and builds local (very local!) autonomy. On the other hand, as part of a larger effort, this approach can make management almost impossible. Technologies, political dynamics, geography, existing infrastructure and human resource bases can all be expected to affect the importance and results of such projects. (F2, p. 4-5).

Upper Lofa County Agricultural Development Project, Liberia

- The sustainability of the project was adversely affected by the political structure which was exploitive, set up for penetration and control, not for development. Development mechanisms were controlled by the wealthy (e.g., cooperatives). The government never provided much in the way of services.
- There existed political constraints to the creation of sustainable cooperatives:
  - The cooperatives were controlled by the wealthy and powerful and not fully trusted by the farmers.
  - The middlemen (Lebanese and Mandingo) were naturally resistant to the coops. They had leverage in that they were moneylenders as well and could stop providing banking services to the people, a function the coops were not able to do.
  - The Liberian Produce Marketing Corporation (50 percent government owned and 50 percent privately owned) was a relatively strong elite-run agency, which would have been hurt by a buildup of cooperatives. Since the personnel of LMPC were to be seconded to the Lofa County Project (eventually losing their affiliation with the LMPC) it was not in that agency's interest to strengthen the coops.
- The PMU was supposed to build up coops and then dissolve, leaving the coops in control. The coops do not appear to be self-sustaining. In fact, the PMU has assumed the responsibilities envisioned for the cooperatives (e.g., recruiting farmers into the project, supervising the distribution of farm inputs, transporting the harvest, maintaining up-to-date records of farmer loans and repayments, etc.) The cooperatives are weak because:
  - The funds generated from operations are insufficient to cover expenses.
  - The cooperatives are distrustful of having the PMU too involved in their affairs and fear the project is attempting to usurp their powers.
  - The management's focus has been on developing its own capabilities. From the inception of the project the PMU concentrated its efforts on developing its own ability to provide services to farmers, rather than strengthening the cooperatives. (K1, p. 3-5).

Second Integrated Rural Development Project, Jamaica

- There exists a tradition in Jamaica of centralized control of resource flows to farmers. Those small farmer organizations that exist depend upon the

Ministry of Agriculture for subsidies and policy guidelines. The local government gets 95 percent of its revenues from central government and most of its policy initiatives as well.

- The IRDP follows this pattern. It exercises a considerable degree of control over the Development Committee and gives them almost all their resources. Thus inadequate attention has been given to the mobilization of local resources or concepts of self-help in general. Further, the Development Committees have been more interested in increasing external assistance. Local leader depend upon political links to higher levels and not on broad local constituency. (H5, p. 16-17).
- The demands upon staff time to achieve quantitative targets, combined with a relatively thin management structure, have hindered attempts by IRDP staff to adequately plan for improving prospects of sustainability. (H2, p. 32).
- The project design document stated the objective of the project was to develop a replicable model of integrated rural development, something that could be applied to the other watersheds in Jamaica. But the total IRDP project budget was \$26 million. Divided by the 4,000 farmers that are in the project area that is \$6,500 each. To replicate this for the estimated 150,000 hillside farmers in Jamaica would cost \$900 million. (H2, p. 25-26).
- The project paper, thus, failed to address the question of sustainability. The ratio of staff to farmers is 1 to 35 in the IRDP, but only 1 extension agent for every 1,000 farmers in the rest of the country. No thought has been given to making the transition from being a resource intensive project to one dependent solely on normal government inputs and local organizational capacity, e.g., what will future staffing levels be, what components can be sustained, etc. Local participation in the IRDP was an afterthought. Further, the rigid quantitative targets are a constraint. Farmers are paid subsidies to make their initial involvement attractive. But there is a tendency to overlook the maintenance of conservation works, since these activities are not subsidized by the IRDP. Cost-sharing would lower monetary incentives, make it more difficult to achieve acreage targets. (H2, p. 17-18, 24-26, 30).

- Planning for sustainability requires clarity regarding what goals are attainable and worth being sustained after project implementation. In the Jamaica IRDP, the goals and emphasis changed several times over the life of the project. The focus was primarily upon soil conservation, with a subsequent focus on local organizations, and finally a realization of the need for an extension-marketing strategy. No common strategy, was developed in which to set these multiple objectives. (H2, p. 29).
- The project is managed by a PMU within Ministry of Agriculture, which is unlikely to continue after the project ends. There are no plans for institutionalization within the national government structure. The organizational structure developed by the project will probably vanish as a result. There is no assurance that the staff trained by the project will stay in the area. Further, the project boundaries (watersheds) do not conform to "parish" boundaries. This undermines the continuation of support by local governments. (H2, p. 31).

#### Abyei Rural Development Project, Sudan

- Lack of water was a major problem in the Abyei area, and a suggestion by the Abyei project staff of a well construction program was warmly greeted by the inhabitants of the area. The project staff, however, saw the principal objective of this particular activity as that of testing a new drilling technology, rather than as actually providing additional water sources (or the means to produce them) to the beneficiaries. The nature of the technical assistance provided was geared to achieving this latter objective. The beneficiaries, on the other hand, saw the provision of more water as the primary objective of the program, with the experimental objective occupying a decidedly secondary role. Without precise information on the costs of alternative drilling strategies, a relatively small mechanical drill and hand-operated drill rig were brought to Abyei under the direction of an experienced expatriate driller on a very short-term contract to the project. Holes were dug, but the results were disappointing and no producing well was constructed. However, even if a successful well had been dug, there was no provision for follow-up, i.e., the translation of this new technological knowledge into a concrete and sustainable scheme for constructing more wells in the area. There was no plan, for example, to obtain additional well drilling equipment.

Further, there was no provision for training host country nationals in the use of any new technology developed. Though local workers were hired to assist the expatriate driller in the construction of the wells, the short time available prevented any meaningful technological transfer to them. (P6, p. 12).

#### Arusha Planning and Village Development Project, Tanzania

- A larger allocation of the government budget is going to "development expenditures" rather than "operation and maintenance outlays" than efficiency would warrant. Dispensaries are being built when there aren't enough supplies and attendants now. Land rovers abound but there is a shortage of spare parts and fuel.
- The recurrent expenditure's share of the budget is also falling. Government wage and salary payments will therefore increase its share of recurrent expenditures (since the government will not dismiss its workers) and thus, operating and maintenance expenditures will become an even smaller share in budget.
- Foreign donors prefer financing new projects to underwriting operating and maintenance costs. (Q3, p. 4-6).

#### ALLEVIATING THE PROBLEM

#### Provincial Area Development Program, Indonesia

- Local resource commitment is necessary to develop the perception of ownership of the benefits by beneficiaries. This commitment may or may not be financial. The severe poverty of the farmers in the PDP project precluded a financial commitment. The project, however, has not given adequate consideration to alternative ways of developing this ownership, which is important if local participation is to outlast external resource flows.
- Example: The PDP has subsidized the cost of the construction of food storage buildings. Warehouses will buy production at a fair price and resell at a modest markup to cover the costs of warehouse staff and routine maintenance. But this cost does not include an allowance for amortizing the construction cost. The warehouse may give a better deal to the farmers but they will not be sustainable. After PDP, the existing warehouses will depreciate and no new ones will be built for lack of funds.

- The project must look for ways to recycle the benefits from externally funded project activities and develop the capability of rural people to invest their own betterment and be less dependent upon others. (F7, p. A16-17).
- The political support for PDP is strong at higher levels (provincial leadership), but diminishes as one moves down the administrative chain through district, subdistrict, and village levels. The understanding of and commitment to capacity-building objectives weakens while, at the same time, dependence on special PDP-supported personnel increases.
- Below the district level few institution building activities are built into PDP. Institutional arrangements center on the district and subdistrict coordinators, a system which parallels the formal administrative chain and is unlikely to survive the cut-off of funds. These coordinators, in fact, would probably become district-level staff when the project ends. Thus, the subdistrict would lose just about its only coordinating resource.
- At the village level, little attempt is being made to work with or through existing local organizations. Primarily this is because they are seen as weak and peripheral to the project focus of PDP. (F7, p A15-16).
- If staff are judged by how well projects are executed (i.e., whether they reach their quantitative targets) there will be little motivation to achieve capacity building objectives set by higher level government officials. If in the planning and implementation of PDP activities, an emphasis is given to capacity building, while, in evaluation and reimbursement, the emphasis is on project success, many PDP programs may be assessed unjustly. For example, a project in Desa Kandang was to construct a public dockyard to provide training to poor fishermen for building boats. The first boat produced, however, was built by a single hired laborer, and thus the project did not meet the stated goal of proving training to poor fishermen. From a capacity building perspective, this project had not yet been a success. (F7, p. A21-22).
- You must be selective in identifying administrative target groups.
  - Dispersion of target areas for sub-project activity means that staff must travel long distances and expend a lot of time visiting and monitoring sub-project activities. This means more time spent on the road and less in contact with the staff at a particular sub-project and cuts down on capacity building possibilities. It is really not clear what beneficial tradeoffs result.

- The need to concentrate effort on key sectors within the government for capacity building interventions. However, should efforts be concentrated on district and subdistrict levels, or on one or two sectoral agencies within these levels? Will this weaken interagency coordination? (F7, p. 15-17).

Community Based Integrated Rural Development (Tangse), Indonesia

- Resources from many sources (foreign donors from several countries, provincial Indonesian government, local participants) are available to CBIRD, but the project has depended upon SCF as a direct or indirect source. The government is not yet prepared to assume all the costs of continuing SCF Indonesia, but it can be expected that their role will increase if the project is continued with external support in coming years. Increased government funding will probably consist of resources already available for development activity, but rechanneled by existing agencies into the CBIRD program. CBIRD has not placed great demands upon the network of government development services (e.g., agricultural extension, credit, marketing, etc.)? Rather, CBIRD has been mobilizing existing, but inactive service structures. Some expansion of CBIRD is still possible without straining the resources network. Further, certain production projects can produce spin off profits that can be used to generate new activities. Consequently, resource availability is not likely to be a problem for CBIRD (G3, p. 37-39).
- With respect to a change in the beneficiaries' attitudes and behavior, the impact to date in CBIRD is striking. In some cases, the commitment to new ways of decision making and action already appears to have a permanence that is not dependent upon motivational or resource inputs by SCF. (G3, p. 39).
- CBIRD is linked informally to local systems and higher level government agencies, but the linkages are dependent upon SCF staff and resources. Maintaining CBIRD in the long run can be done by:
  - The establishment of a permanent internally funded coordinating field staff (Indonesianized SCF Field Office), i.e., geographic expansion of the program and project management structure. This would duplicate many government functions and thus be costly and politically unacceptable.

- Absorption of the CBIRD methodology into existing government systems. This is the preferred solution and will require CBIRD to cultivate and involve present and potential leaders in the support of CBIRD, as well as promote staff interchange and on-the-job training of promising young government personnel with the SCF. (G3, p. 35-37).
- The focus is on both the grass roots level (e.g., developing project management skills at the village committee and working group levels) and on personnel of the government line agencies. (G3, p. 37).

#### Upper Lofa County Agricultural Development Project, Liberia

- Almost all of the senior staff of the project were from Lofa County and had a high degree of identification with the project. In fact, Liberianization proceeded rapidly and the expatriates were replaced by Liberians one year ahead of schedule.

#### Arusha Planning and Village Development Project, Tanzania

- A decision to build capacity within host country institutions and personnel is not sufficient to achieve the integration necessary to ensure that project activities will become self-sustaining when foreign assistance is withdrawn. How do you carry it out in operational terms?
- Needs for insuring sustainability in Arusha:
  - Insure Tanzanians are fully involved in the regional planning exercise (right individuals and the right institutions).
  - Insure that project initiatives are not too expensive to be carried on when external sources are cut.
  - Insure Tanzanians are fully involve in the project's village level development activities.
  - Link the project activities to annual budget cycles and the five-year development planning exercise of the government.
  - Integrate the finance and administrative activities of project to corresponding structures in the regional and lower level governments. (Q3, p. 18-20).

## SUMMARY

The previous sections discussed the implementation experiences of a number of integrated rural development projects that have been financed by A.I.D. Nine critical implementation issues were the focus of this research. A brief synopsis of observations made with respect to each issue is presented below.

Effecting Integration

No organizational placement strategy is going to be perfect. Conflicts and inadequate coordination will be the rule, rather than the exception. Thus, the IRD research that we are conducting should focus on the coordination problems that exist and the mechanisms, both formal and informal, used to deal with them. Such mechanisms could involve interagency task forces or coordinating committees, cost sharing, joint training, informal lending of resources (personnel, transport, etc.), and having participant agency offices in the same building. The level and form of these mechanisms must be matched to the size and scope of the project, with, for example, small scale, PMU-type projects relying more on informal mechanisms while large scale projects would tend to need more formal linkages.

A root cause of the limited amount of coordination in integrated rural development projects is that administrative systems in developing countries tend to serve a "control function," i.e., to guard against potential abuses (especially financial irregularities) within a project. Consequently, there is often a large number of officials who have to sign off on expenditures and little flexibility in budget execution. This often conflicts with the flexible management approach needed for implementing IRD projects.

Political, Economic, and Environmental Constraints

Examples of the political, economic, and environmental constraints to project implementation included the adverse effects of a deteriorating balance of payments position, land tenure, conflict between client groups, and the physical isolation of projects. One method of alleviating this problem is the use of "conditions precedent to the release of funds." However, this will be effective only in cases where the host country government, in fact, can respond to the demands built into a loan. In some countries, the resources

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exist, but are just not being effectively employed. In other countries, however, such as Tanzania, the macroeconomic situation is such that the resources simply do not exist. Thus, demands by projects to provide more gasoline, manpower, or financial assistance simply cannot be met. Thus, the use of "conditions precedent" does not constitute a solution except where the overall macroeconomic situation in the country is not the constraint. An alternative means of alleviating the problem might be to build in a "planning research component" into a project that allows for the documentation of how existing external constraints interfere with project implementation. The effectiveness of this or similar strategies has yet to be examined. A third method of alleviating the problem would be to avoid placing projects in situations or sites (such as Abyei) where external factors (such as isolation) will be a determinant of project success or failure.

### Participation and Decentralization

A number of factors were seen as deterrents to participation in the IRD projects reviewed. These included social conflicts and lack of common interests among the beneficiaries (Kenya, Sudan, Yemen), distrust of outsiders (Colombia), control of local organizations by elites (Haiti) pre-existing dependency relationships (Haiti, Jamaica, Indonesia), and low population density and lack of community identity (Colombia). With respect to decentralization, a major limitation was seen to be the strain on existing organizational capabilities and managerial resources (Indonesia). Lack of knowledge about the practical mechanisms and procedures for promoting genuine local initiative and participation was seen to be a constraint in Kenya. Similarly, in Indonesia, uncertainty as to how to implement decentralized activities, especially within existing structures, was seen to be a constraint.

A highly participatory or decentralized strategy is usually more time consuming than a less participatory or more centralized one, since it takes time to train the beneficiaries and lower level officials, to meet with them and solicit their views, and to receive their input or feedback. When a project is locked into a set of quantitative targets (hectares of land to be improved, amount of credit to be extended, etc.) it is more difficult to do it in a participatory manner. Similarly, an emphasis on successful sub-project implementation (in terms of performance evaluation of staff) was seen in the PDP Program in Indonesia to be a constraint to decentralized planning. Staff members were reluctant to involve lower level officials and organizations with capabilities that were seen as limited.

Methods to promote local organizations, beneficiary participation, and decentralization must be built into the design of a project and resources (technical assistance, funds for training, office space, etc.) must be directed at promoting it. Moreover, the behavioral changes required by beneficiaries for project success must be identified, in order to determine if these expected changes are reasonable, and what training and incentives are necessary to ensure that they take place.

Finally, a number of factors were identified which facilitated participation, including homogeneity and cohesion within the community, a tradition of cooperative community effort, and the use of "open management," i.e., accountability (though posting of budgets, income, expenditures, etc.) of those responsible for the allocation and utilization of project resources. Management styles in which officials encouraged subordinates to participate in an organization's decision making were seen to be conducive to increased participation by project beneficiaries. Factors which facilitated decentralization included joint planning in which village and subdistrict officials worked with district planners in preparing project documents, and the determination of exactly which planning and administrative tasks would be needed to support a further devolution of responsibility.

### Information Systems

Based on the information gleaned from the IRDP project experience reviewed, several points can be made with respect to information systems. First, the design of an information system depends ultimately on the overall objective of the project. If this perspective is lost, the adequacy of the entire information system may suffer. Further, information on overall project impact is as important for evaluating project success as that for measuring the achievement of individual component targets. In one IRD project, for example, the emphasis was on collecting information on individual component performance (number of acres terraced, etc.), rather than on overall project impact on the beneficiaries (in terms of income improvements). Information on project impact, however, might have alerted the project staff to changes necessary in the focus of the project.

Large, comprehensive, long-term surveys are often difficult to manage and the information obtained is usually not timely enough to be of use for project design, implementation, or evaluation purposes. Rather, short, policy-oriented surveys are preferable. Generally, if a question makes no difference

in terms of policy, resources should not be spent answering it. Moreover, surveys should be time-bounded in order to force policy makers to decide what they really want and need, and to ensure that the information is collected efficiently. In the Eastern ORD, short surveys were shown to provide the management information needed for project decision making, while a comprehensive socioeconomic survey did not.

Within a project's organizational structure a balance must be struck between the use of formal vs. informal communication channels. In the Second IRDP in Jamaica, for instance, too much emphasis was placed on informal channels of communication for the day-to-day management of the project, and not enough use was being made of more reliable, formal channels. As a result, lack of information and misinformation (missed meetings, etc.) were becoming an expensive drain on project resources. Informal information channels required reliable physical communication facilities (telephones, inter-office mail, etc.); and a clear understanding of both management and staff roles and responsibilities. These requirements were absent from the project.

### Timing

The information collected on the implementation experience of the 21 IRD projects pointed to several causes of implementation delays. These included:

- A lack of pre-project communication between the various actors involved in project design and contract negotiation;
- Centralized decision making authority in the various agencies involved in planning the project and a discontinuity of personnel within the donor and host country agencies;
- Slow procurement procedures resulting in delayed arrival of equipment and delays in fielding expatriate personnel;
- Lack of adequate planning capability and technical expertise on the part of host country agencies and local contractors; and
- Slow construction of project offices, expatriate team housing, etc. due to the difficulties of obtaining construction materials, equipment, and construction expertise in project areas.

Similarly, several points can be made with respect to the phasing or sequencing of activities in IRD projects. The concern in several projects has been an attempt to do everything simultaneously, entailing a failure to set priorities and the inclusion of more activities than the budget of the project could adequately support. The sequencing of activities must be planned out and, if development is to proceed in phases, there must be objective criteria for determining when one stage ends and another begins. Moreover, the sequencing of the phases must have some logical order.

### Differing Agendas

Whenever you have more than one individual or organization involved in implementing a project, you will have conflicting motivations, approaches, and even disagreements as to objectives. For example, organizations will each want to control, to the extent possible, the flow of funds and resources entailed in a project. Since in a bureaucracy managers will generally try to maximize their long term budget and staff, organizations must compete with one another for the scarce resources available. Similarly, individual perspectives will vary depending upon their origin, disciplinary orientation, career goals, experience, and personality traits. In the extreme case, one interested party's solution will be another's problem. The information gathered from the implementation documents identified several examples of such conflicting agendas. Alleviating the problem requires the provision of incentives to individuals and organizations to support the "agenda" of the project, rather than conflicting individual objectives. One objective of the research being conducted through this project should be to identify and examine the various incentive mechanisms.

### Managing Technical Assistance

There are four basic approaches to providing technical assistance to integrated rural development projects. These are:

- The personnel contract strategy;
- The academic strategy;
- The "bodyshop" strategy; and
- The "management team" strategy.

Though the information presented in the text is not sufficient to permit us to evaluate the effectiveness of these alternatives in the context of implementing IRD projects, it does point out some of the problems common to each approach. The effectiveness of the alternative strategies will depend upon the nature and complexity of the task to be performed. Detailing the strengths and weaknesses of each approach within various contexts should be an object of our research.

The cost of long-term expatriate technical assistance runs to over \$100,000/person/year. Given this high cost, using expatriates to fill local staff positions is probably not the best possible use of scarce project resources. One possible alternative is the use of less expensive, but less experienced, younger individuals for long term assignments, especially in remote areas. Experience has shown, however, that the use of less experienced personnel is effective only if they receive guidance from highly experienced, short-term consultants on a continual basis. The high cost of expatriate technical assistance implies a need for greater attention to training counterparts to take over the project as soon as possible.

#### Counterpart Shortages

Just as expatriates view three years as the maximum period for assignment to a development project in a rural setting, so do host country nationals, and for similar reasons, e.g., absence of urban amenities, isolation, lack of contact with the professional mainstream, and adverse effects on career advancement. Two related methods have been identified for resolving the resulting problem of counterpart shortages (i.e., inability to obtain host country personnel to work with expatriates on a project). These are:

- Widening the pool from which counterparts are selected; and
- Increased training within a project itself.

Since it is sometimes very difficult to get host country nationals with adequate education and training to serve in remote areas, considerations should be given to enlisting less qualified personnel, i.e., bringing up counterparts from below. For example, counterparts for expatriates can be selected from among the local extension personnel, while extension agents can be recruited from along the farmers themselves. Such individuals are more likely to remain in the project area and continue performing their jobs after outside funding ends, and thus will contribute to the sustainability of the project. Moreover, for tasks that are field oriented and a matter of simply learning a new skill, counterparts chosen from below are often as effective, if not more so, than more educated candidates.

## Sustainability

The sustainability of a project, i.e., whether project benefits continue after the outside assistance stops, is a major measure of project success. Ensuring a project's sustainability, however, entails several considerations. First, unless thought is given to the institutionalization of project activities, the organizational structures developed during implementation will vanish when the project ends. A determination is necessary as to what can and should be sustained in a project, and then provision must be made for local government or private support to continue these activities once outside funding ends. Often, this will entail the creation of linkages with a particular government entity or other organization. Further, provision must be made for the financing of the recurrent costs of projects. Currently, donors prefer to finance new projects, rather than underwrite operating and maintenance costs. As a result, less money is going to cover these costs than efficiency would warrant.

Secondly, capacity must be built into local organizations, through both formal and on-the-job training (including opportunities to "learn by doing") of both local staff and beneficiaries. However, this can be difficult, since often staff are judged in terms of whether or not they reach specific output targets. Thus there is little motivation to achieve the capacity building objectives necessary to ensure project sustainability.

Finally, local resource commitment is necessary in order for the beneficiaries to develop a sense of ownership of the benefits, and thus a stake in seeing project activities continue. Therefore, attention must be given to the mobilization of local resources and concepts of self-help in general. The centralized control of resource flows creates a dependency upon outside funding sources which will undercut attempts to sustain project benefits.

## ANNEX A

Table A-1. Aid Funded Integrated Rural Development Projects

Country	Project name/ project number	Duration	Funding <sup>a</sup> (million \$)	Comments <sup>b</sup>
Bolivia	Sub-Tropical Lands Development Project (San Julian/Chane Pirai) 511-0346 & 511-0514	1975-82	9.7	Phase II beginning 1979
Colombia	Integrated Rural Development (OPG) (Sibundoy, Guadalupe, & Sumapaz) 514-0210	1976-80	0.3	SCF/CDF
Colombia	San Gil Integrated Rural Development Project (OPG)	1974-77	1.1	CRS
Costa Rica	Integral Rural Development (OPG) 515-0129 & 515-0158	1976-	0.2 <sup>c</sup>	AI TEC, Phase II began in 1980
Dominican Rep.	Loma de Cabrera Integrated Development Project	1976-79	0.2	SCF/CDF
Haiti	Gros Morne Rural Development	1977-80	0.2	CRS
Haiti	Rural Community Development (HACHO) 521-0061	1972-79	5.1	
Honduras	Pespire Valley IRD Project 522-0128	1976-80	0.2	SCF/CDF
Jamaica	Second Integrated Rural Development Project 532-0046	1977-82	13.0	
Nicaragua	INVIERNO 524-0118	1975-80	14.0	Renamed PROCAMPO in 1980, continued without AID funding
Peru	Subtropical Lands Development Project (Huallaga/Bajo Mayo areas) 527-0163	1979-84	19.0	

(continued)

Table A-1. (continued)

Cameroon	North Cameroon Pilot Community Development Project (Dadjamka) 631-0010	1977-80	0.1	SCF/CDF
Ghana	District Planning and Rural Development 641-0073	1977-85		
Kenya	Vihiga Rural Development Project 615-0147	1971-78	1.7	
Lesotho	Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project 632-0031	1973-80	4.0	Joint project with World Bank
Liberia	Upper Bong County IRD Project 669-0139	1978-82	11.0	Joint project with World Bank
Liberia	Upper Lofa County Rural Development Project 669-0142	1975-81	6.0	Joint project with World Bank, AID is discontinuing assistance to project
Mali	Operation Mils-Mopti 688-0202	1972-83	12.7	Now in second stage
Mauritania	Integrated Rural Development: Guidimaka 682-0201	1977-83	7.6	
Niger	Niamey Department Rural Development 683-0205	1977-81	4.8	
Sudan	Abyei Integrated Rural Development Project	1979-81	1.3	Harvard Institute for International Development
Tanzania	Arusha Planning and Village Development Project 621-0143	1978-81	5.2	DAI implementation project
Upper Volta	Dori Integrated Rural Development Project (OPG) 686-0220	1976-80	0.1	SCF/CDF
Upper Volta	Eastern ORD Integrated Rural Development Project 686-0201	1974-81	4.8	

(continued)

Table A-1. (continued)

Upper Volta	Seguenegal IRD Project (OPG) 686-0231	1978-82	0.8	Africare
Zaire	North Shaba Maize Production 660-0059	1976-82	9.8	DAI implementation project
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Indonesia	Community Based Integrated Rural Development (CBIRD) 497-0240	1975-80	2.0	SCF/CDF
Indonesia	Kelapa Dua Human Development Project 497-0225 (OPG)	1978-80	0.1	Institute of Cultural Affairs
Indonesia	Luwu Area and Transmigration Develop- ment Project 497-0244	1976-82	43.0	
Indonesia	Provincial Area Development Program 497-0264	1978-83	8.0	DAI implementation project
Philippines	Bicol Integrated Rural Development (misc. AID loans)	1974-85	29.6	Includes: Bicol River Basin Dev. (492-0260; Bicol IRD (492-0303); Libmanan Integr. Ag. Dev. (492- 0275); Bula Integr. Ag. Dev. (492-0310); plus several minor or proposed projects
Philippines	Sorsogan Integrated Rural Develop- ment Project (OPG)			International Human Assistance Programs (IHAD)
Tonga	Integrated Rural Development (OPG) 498-0100	1978-81	0.7	Foundation for the Peoples of South Pacific
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Table A-1. (continued)

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Afghanistan	Helmand-Arghandab Valley Development 306-0090	1954-74		
Tunisia	Integrated Rural Development Siliana (OPG) 664-0307	1977-81	0.9	SCF/CDF
Tunisia	Siliana Province IRD Project 664-0285	1977-81		
Yemen	Community Based Integrated Rural Development: Mahweit 279-0031	1977-80	1.3	SCF/CDF

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Notes:

- a Donor contribution, not total project cost.
- b Abbreviations for implementing organization:  
 SCF/CDF = Save the Children Federation/Community Development Fund  
 CRS = Catholic Relief Service  
 IVS = International Voluntary Service
- c Phase I

Table A-2. World Bank Financed Integrated Rural Development Projects

Country	Project name/ project number	Duration	Funding (millions)	Comments
Bolivia	Ingavi Rural Development Loan #1211	1976-82	\$ 9.5	
Bolivia	Ulla Ulla Development Project Loan #1510, IDA CR. #762	1978-83	18.0	
Brazil	Rio Grande do Norte Rural Develop- ment Project Loan #1195	1976-81	12.0	Polonordeste Project
Brazil	Minas Gerais Rural Development Project Loans #1362 and 1877	1977-85	105.0	Polonordeste Project
Brazil	Bahia Rural Development Project Loan #1589	1978-83	37.0	Polonordeste Project
Brazil	Ceara Rural Development Project Loan #1488	1978-82	17.0	Polonordeste Project
Brazil	Paraiba Rural Development Project Loan #1537	1978-83	24.0	Polonordeste Project
Colombia	Desarrollo Rural Integrado (DRI) Loan #1352	1977-82	52.0	Jointly with IDB and CIDA
Colombia	Caqueta Land Colonization Project Loan #1118 and #739	1976-81 ?	19.5	(Caqueta Rural Settlement Project)
Ecuador	Tungurahua Province IRD Project Loan #1644	1979-85	18.0	
Jamaica	Rural Development I Loan #1464	1977-82	15.0	Cornwall County, Western Region of Jamaica
Mexico	Papaloapan Basin Development Loan #1053	1975-81	50.0	
Mexico	PIDER Loans #1110 and #1462	1975-81	240.0	
Paraguay	Small Farmer Credit and Rural Deve- lopment IDA CR. #509	1975-80	11.0	
Paraguay	Parana River Project (Second Rural Development Project Loan #1418	1978-81	22.0	

(continued)

Table A-2. (continued)

Country	Project name/ project number	Duration	Funding (millions)	Comments
Cameroon	ZAPI East Integrated Rural Development IDA CR. #776	1978-84	8.5	
Ethiopia	Drought Areas Rehabilitation IDA Credit #485	1974-82	10.0	
Ethiopia	Wolamo Agricultural Development Unit (WADU) IDA CR. #169 and #486	1970-1981	16.0	
Ghana	Upper Region Agricultural Development Project Loan #1291	1977-82	21.0	
Lesotho	Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project			Joint project with AID
Liberia	Upper Bong County IRD Project IDA CR. #700	1978-83	7.0	Joint project with AID
Liberia	Upper Lofa County Rural Development IDA CR. #577	1976-81	6.0	Joint project with AID
Madagascar	Village Livestock and Rural Development IDA CR. #506	1975-80	9.6	
Malawi	Lilongwe Agricultural Development IDA CR. #113, #244, and #550	1968-79	23.0	
Malawi	Karonga Rural Development Project Loan #1286. and IDA CR. #282	1971-80	15.0	
Malawi	Shire Valley Agricultural Development Project IDA CR. #114, #363, & #823	1968-82	25.0	
Mali	Integrated Rural Development IDA CR. #491	1974-78	8.0	
Sierra Leone	Integrated Agricultural Development Loan #1138	1976-81		Makeni and Kenema areas
Tanzania	Geita Cotton Project IDA CR. #454	1974-82	17.5	
Tanzania	Kigoma Rural Development Project IDA Cr. #508	1974-80	10.0	
Tanzania	Mwanza/Shinyanga Rural Development IDA CR. #803	1979-84	12.0	

(continued)

Table A-2. (continued)

Country	Project name/ project number	Duration	(millions)	Comments
Tanzania	Tabora Rural Development IDA CR. #703	1977-83	\$ 7.2	
Togo	Maritime Rural Development IDA CR. #638	1976-81	9.5	
Indonesia	Nucleus Estates and Smallholders Project Loan #1499	1978-82	65.0	
Indonesia	Transmigration and Rural Development Loan #1318	1977-81	30.0	
Malaysia	Federal Land Development Authority Loan #533, 672, 885, 967, &1044	1968-85	128.0	
Papua N Guinea	Smallholder Oil Palm Development Loan #1333	1977-84	12.0	
Philippines	Mindoro Integrated Rural Develop- ment Project Loan #1102	1975-1981	25.0	
Philippines	Second Rural Development and Land Settlement Project Loan #1421	1977-82	15.0	
Philippines	Rural Infrastructure I Loan #	1978-	28.0	
Cyprus	Pitsilia Integrated Rural Develop- ment Project Loan #1483	1977-83	10.0	
Morocco	Fes-Karia-Tissa Rainfed Agriculture Loan #1602	1979-86	65.0	
Nepal	Rural Development I IDA CR. #617	1976-81	8.0	
Turkey	Cankiri-Corum Integrated Rural Deve- lopment Project Loan #1130	1975-		
Yemen Arab Rep.	Southern Uplands Rural Development Project IDA CR. #545	1976-82	10.0	

Table A-3. Other Integrated Rural Development Projects

Country	Project name/ project number	Duration	Funding (million \$)	Donor
Ecuador	Integrated Rural Development (Zamora and Nangaritza) IDB Loan #550/SF-EC	1978-82	16.9	Inter-American Development Bank (implemented by PREDESUR)
Honduras	Bajo Aguan IDB Loan #HO-0017	1977-81	7.7	Inter-American Development Bank
Nepal	Sagarmatha Integrated Rural Development Project	1979-	14.1	Asian Development Bank (in conjunction with IFAD)
Sri Lanka	Walawe Development Project ADB Loan #16-CEY and 17-CEY	1969-77	26.5	Asian Development Bank
Cameroon	SODENKAM Land Settlement Scheme	1966-81		Government of Cameroon
Ethiopia	Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit	1967-75	1.3	Swedish International Development Authority
Philippines	Cagayan Integrated Agricultural Development Project	1977-		Government of Japan

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Table A-4. Recently Initiated and Upcoming Rural Development Projects

Country	Project name/ project number	Duration	Funding (million \$)	Donor
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Project	1980-	41.6	Asian Development Bank
Bolivia	Omasuyos-Los Andes Rural Development Project	1980-	11.8	World Bank (\$7.6 million IDA credit) and IFAD (\$4.1 million)
Bolivia	Chapare Regional Development Project 511-0548	1981-86		AID
Brazil	Pernambuco Rural Development Project (Polonordeste) Loan #1728	1980-84	40.0	World Bank
Brazil	Sergipe Rural Development Project (Polonordeste) Loan #1714	1980-84	26.0	World Bank
Brazil	Southeastern Parana Integrated Rural Development (Polonordeste)	1981-		Inter-American Development Bank
Burundi	East Mpanda Integrated Rural Development Project	1980-	14.5	IFAD
Cameroon	Mandara Area Development	1981-85	2.0	AID
Ecuador	Integrated Rural Development (Salcedo/Quimiag-Penipe) 518-0012	1980-84	11.8	AID
Ecuador	Western Pichincha Province IRD Project EC-0017	1980-83		Inter-American Development Bank
Ecuador	Quininde Integrated Rural Development Project			Appraisal by World Bank underway

Table A-4. (continued)

Honduras	PRODERO IDB #HO-0036	1980-85	16.0	IFAD (\$10.0 million), IDB (\$6.0 million)
Indonesia	Yogyakarta Rural Development IDA Cr. #946	1979-87	12.0	World Bank
Indonesia	Citanduy II	1981-85		AID
Malaysia	Kemasin-Semerak Integrated Rural Development Project			Asian Development Bank
Morocco	Loukkos Rural Development Project Loan #1848	1980-87	34.0	World Bank
Nigeria	Oyo North Agricultural Development Loan #1838	1980-85	28.0	World Bank
Peru	Puno Rural Development Project	1980-85	27.3	World Bank
Peru	Integrated Regional Development (Junin and Cajamarca) 527-0178	1979-84		AID
Philippines	Samar Integrated Rural Development Project Loan #1772	1980-85	27.0	World Bank
Senegal	Integrated Rural Development Project- M'Bour Louga	1979-84		IFAD and Islamic Development Bank
Sierra Leone	Magbosi Integrated Rural Development	1979-84		IFAD
Somalia	Bay Regional Agricultural Develop- ment IDA CR. #972	1979-87	12.0	World Bank and IFAD
Sri Lanka	Kurunegala Rural Development Project	1980-84	20.0	World Bank
Sri Lanka	Mahaweli Basin Development 383-0056	1979-86		AID
Thailand	Lam Nam Oon On-Farm Development 493-0272	1978-83		AID

(continued)

Table A-4. (continued)

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Tunisia	Central Tunisia Rural Development 664-0312	1979-86	27.4	AID
Zaire	Smallholder Maize IDA CR. #1040	1980-87	11.0	World Bank
Zambia	Eastern Province Agricultural Develop- ment	1981-87	22.0	World Bank and IFAD

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