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AN EVALUATION OF RESOURCES FOR AWARENESS OF POPULATION IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT: A PROJECT OF THE FUTURES GROUP

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EDITOR'S NOTE

This document consists of two parts. Part One, The Evaluation, includes an assessment of the RAPID project--what it is, how it was developed by The Futures Group, how and for what purposes it is used, and how it can be improved. In preparing this section of the report, the evaluation team examined presentations of the model in specific countries, specific uses of the model, objectives, management and finances, and numerous other aspects of the project.

Part Two contains the trip reports of members of the evaluation team. Phyllis Piotrow, Ph.D., visited Brazil to examine the RAPID project in that country. Her report covers two days (June 25-26, 1981) of investigations into activities there. Dr. Piotrow also submitted trip reports on activities in Peru (June 20-24, 1981) and Honduras, where she met with staff of the project and numerous public and private officials to talk about RAPID. Barnett Baron, Ph.D., wrote about the RAPID projects in Egypt and Tanzania. Dr. Baron visited Egypt between June 28, 1981, and July 2, 1981. He traveled in Tanzania from July 13, 1981, to July 15, 1981. Team Leader Allen Kelley, Ph.D., went to the Sudan to talk with officials there about the development and use of the model and presentations. Dr. Kelley was in the Sudan from July 4, 1981, to July 9, 1981.

The persons who met with the different members of the team are listed in Appendix A of this report.

In addition to evaluating the RAPID project, the team examined the Population and Development II (PDP II) project of Battelle Memorial Institute. The findings from that assessment are contained in a separate document that was issued simultaneously with this report.

PREFACE

Two projects were evaluated during the consultancy: the Population and Development (PDP II) project, for which Battelle Memorial Institute is the contractor, and Resources for Awareness of Population Impact on Development (RAPID), for which The Futures Group is the contractor. The assessment covered two of the three major efforts in policy development in the Office of Population, Agency for International Development (AID). Extensive travel overseas was required. The evaluation was organized to collect information on both projects simultaneously to reduce costs and to expedite the evaluation. A briefing was held in Washington from May 26, 1981, through May 29, 1981. Meetings were held at the AID, the Department of State, and at the offices of The Futures Group and Battelle Memorial Institute.

In June and July, the members of the evaluation team collected information on the two projects in six countries and in Washington. Drs. Piotrow and Presser visited Brazil, Honduras, and Peru; Drs. Baron and Kelley visited Egypt and Sudan. Dr. Baron also visited Tanzania. Mr. Baker spent a week in Washington, D.C. Upon completion of their travel, the evaluators wrote and exchanged reports on their trips. These reports contained data which were used to prepare the attached document. The team also relied on documentation on the countries which it did not visit that was provided by AID/W and the contractors. Most of this documentation covered projects through late August, the end of the evaluation period.

Descriptions of the major components of the assessment were written and exchanged among the team members in August. From August 30 through September 2, the evaluators assembled in Washington to discuss the report and to debrief the AID and the contractors on their findings. Each member of the team had specific written assignments, and each trip report reflects the writer's position, although it was reviewed by the entire team. During the working session, the evaluators were able to consolidate their views into a single, final report on each project.

The RAPID and PDP II projects differ in scope, and each is at a different stage of completion. An approximately equal amount of time was spent on each project, but it was concentrated on different concerns. In fact, for the most part, the evaluators considered the projects separately. Because RAPID and PDP II are dissimilar, the team decided to write two reports rather than integrate all their findings into a single report on both projects.

The team would like to express its appreciation to the staff of the AID, Battelle, and The Futures Group for their full cooperation and assistance.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AID	Agency for International Development
AID/K	Agency for International Development, Khartoum
AID/W	Agency for International Development, Washington
ANACH	National Association of Campesinos of Honduras
APHA	American Public Health Association
ASHONPLAFA	Family Planning Association of Honduras
BEMFAM	Brazilian Society for Family Welfare
BRALUP	Bureau for Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning
CAPMAS	Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics
CDC	Centers for Disease Control
CONSUPLANE	National Planning Council, Government of Honduras
CPS	Contraceptive Prevalence Survey
FG	The Futures Group
FP	Family Planning
FPA	Family Planning Association
GNP	Gross National Product
GOS	Government of Sudan
IBGE	Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
IEC	Information, Education, and Communication
IFRP	International Fertility Research Program
INE	National Institute of Statistics
IPDP	International Population Development Projects
IPPF	International Planned Parenthood Federation

ISPC	International Statistical Program Center
LDC	Less Developed Country
PDP	Population and Development Project
PFPB	Population and Family Planning Board
PRB	Population Reference Bureau
RAPID	Resources for Awareness of Population Impact on Development
RFP	Request for Proposals
RTI	Research Triangle Institute
SIS	State Information Service
TDY	Temporary Duty
UMATI	Tanzania Family Planning Association
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USICA	United States International Communication Agency
WFS	World Fertility Survey
WHS	Westinghouse Health Systems

Part One

THE EVALUATION

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

The objective of the project known as Resources for Awareness of Population Impact on Development (RAPID) is to make high-level policymakers in less developed countries (LDCs) aware of the relationship between population and socioeconomic development. To achieve this objective, project staff prepare country-specific analyses of the effects of population on socioeconomic status. These analyses may be either written or developed as presentations for computers and television. The project provides also for limited training of nationals in the use of the microcomputer in LDCs where such equipment is left behind.

The original RAPID contract with The Futures Group was signed in September 1977. The project got off to a slow start, but staff were added, and by 1979 activity had increased significantly. The American Public Health Association (APHA) evaluated the project the next year, and, as a result of the findings, the contract was extended and additional resources were provided to cover the expanded scope of work. Basic changes were made in 1980 to provide for as many as 40 country-specific analyses and presentations, at least one preliminary visit to a host country before a presentation was made, the installation of micro-computers in as many as 20 countries, and the training of appropriate host-country nationals and AID personnel in programming and updating RAPID presentations in as many as 10 countries.* The contract will expire in December 1982.

The evaluation team thinks that RAPID is an imaginative approach to bring problems of population growth to the attention of policymakers in both the United States and the LDCs. The achievements of The Futures Group in developing and carrying out this technically complex project are impressive.

The evaluators examined different aspects of the project (these correspond to issues in the scope of work), concentrating on the model itself, the preparation of analyses, presentations, the impact that RAPID has had, follow-up and use of the computer, and management. Each of the different components is treated in a separate chapter in this report.

The RAPID Model

The RAPID model presents a scenario of a negative set of assumptions about the impact of rapid population growth on development. RAPID's

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* See Amendment No. 4, September 30, 1980; p. 3, Article I, Section B.5.

strengths are its depiction of the dynamics of population growth, its selection of dependent variables of general interest and importance, its simplicity, and its broad orientation. Its weakness is its use of a fixed economic structure that suppresses endogenous, dynamic feedback. Given the goals of the project, the structure of the model is, nevertheless, appropriate.

With only modest changes in the model, project goals could be enhanced by highlighting alternative or additional dependent variables which are of more immediate interest and which can be interpreted more readily, by stressing realistic policy tradeoffs (in contrast to single-sector outcomes) in the face of demographic pressures and economic constraints, by giving more attention to the effects of migration and urbanization, and by focusing more on short-term than long-term effects (beyond 2000).

Preparation of the Analysis

Neither the availability nor the accuracy of data appears to be a major constraint in preparing the analysis. Nevertheless, a greater effort should be made to involve host-country nationals in the selection and appraisal of the data that are used in RAPID models.

The printed analyses are an important part of the permanent record on RAPID. These booklets are well done, but they are not distributed widely because the number of available printed copies is limited. At least those who attend the RAPID presentations should receive copies of the booklets. The publication of a less expensive version and more widespread distribution also should be considered.

RAPID presentations had been completed in 11 countries as of July 1981; they have reached ministers, presidents, a prime minister, and a king. In at least 7 countries, the presentations, which were made by the staff of The Futures Group and an internationally recognized consultant who is fluent in the local language, went well. In a few countries, and especially where there is hostility or indifference to population policies and little in-country collaboration, the presentations were less successful. The new methodology may be more attractive than the model. The presentations are good, but they could be improved with a livelier style and more local input.

The evaluation team found that close collaboration with institutions in the host countries is important. It facilitates the arrangement of effective, high-level presentations and acceptance of the analysis. As a result of the 1980 evaluation and amendments to the contract, more time and funds are now being allowed for in-country collaboration. The team believes that, given the AID's expectations of the impact of RAPID, even greater in-country collaboration is warranted, particularly in follow-up activities.

Technical difficulties have prevented full use of the model in several countries. Where micro-computers are left behind, the AID should arrange to provide a color-television monitor and additional training for local personnel. Both are needed to ensure full use. Arrangements for a monitor and training could be made, for example, under the contract.

Impact

RAPID has been most effective in presenting a dramatic picture of the potential effects of population growth to elite but non-specialist audiences, the senior government officials who are in a position to influence government programs. The impact of RAPID should not be overestimated: RAPID is unlikely to change the minds of persons who are opposed to population policies for ideological reasons. But RAPID can strengthen the hand of those who are concerned about population growth, and it can increase the awareness of those who have not considered the implications of population growth. More consideration should be given to the need for continuing presentations by nationals to different groups.

Follow-up and Use of the Computer

Experience in making RAPID presentations has shown that the need for follow-up is much greater than was contemplated in the original contract. Follow-up activities in each country will necessarily reflect a consideration of local needs and circumstances. Much follow-up could be done in each country. It is imperative, therefore, that criteria be established to set priorities and identify possible follow-up activities, to specify how impact can be measured and effectiveness assessed before such activities are initiated, and to identify appropriate local follow-up institutions. Effective training of host-country nationals is critical for effective follow-up. Training programs to date have been somewhat perfunctory, although in compliance with the contract. Under the current contract, the RAPID project does not use the full capacity of the Apple micro-computer system. As was suggested in the 1980 evaluation, the AID should monitor closely the demand for follow-up and be prepared to expand the number and kinds of functions required of the contractor, especially training and new analyses. The AID will have to determine what continuing role, if any, it would like The Futures Group to play in this expansion (see Chapter IX).

Management

The number of person-days needed to prepare an analysis has ranged from 62 to 103; the linear time is approximately six months. Costs to

prepare a presentation for a Class II trip (a review of a draft analysis) have ranged from $19,313 to $27,579. The contracted number of analyses and presentations is reasonable, given the contractor's budget and staff resources.

II. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

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The RAPID Model

1. The current RAPID model should be expanded to include:

    a. policy-relevant economic tradeoffs;

    b. more attention to migration and urbanization;

    c. competing goals that are jeopardized by population pressures and economic constraints; and

    d. alternative policy costs calculated in the currencies of the countries.

    The current approach--taking, either separately or together, stated goals and costing them out--is a good starting point, but it is, ultimately, unrealistic and does not sufficiently highlight the kinds of difficult choices that will have to be made.

2. To have maximum impact on policymakers and to strengthen the credibility of the projections, the presentation should not extend beyond 2000. Data points should be labeled clearly as 1985, 1990, and 1995.

Preparation of Analysis

3. In-country collaboration has improved since the contract was revised in 1980 to permit staff to visit a country at least once before making a presentation. But increased effort would be useful. In preparing analyses, the staff of The Futures Group should spend more time in the countries identifying available data sets, introducing the project to staff at the missions and U.S. embassies, and to selected local officials, and learning about local perceptions of population issues, the consequences of population growth, and appropriate social responses.

4. A greater effort should be made to contact and involve official government data-collection agencies in the preparation of country analyses. The use of officially published data usually will not guarantee favorable responses to a presentation if personal contact has not been made and if interaction has not occurred. There has been improvement since the first analyses were prepared, but staff should spend more time with local sources of data.

5. The "User's Guide for the RAPID Socioeconomic Computer Model" and the RAPID program guide should be made available to the local sponsoring agency in the language of the country (Spanish, French, Arabic, or Portuguese) so that both the computer experts and the socioeconomic analysts can easily understand the model. The team has learned that efforts to translate the documents are now under way.

Presentations

6. Although it must recognize contractual pressures, The Futures Group should not rush (or allow itself to be rushed) into final presentations until all components are in place and the timing has been reviewed with the AID mission and host-country nationals. This may require that fewer presentations be made and that more attention be given to local collaboration and the quality of the presentations. A process recently was instituted in Washington to review both analyses and presentations. With this process, it may be possible to prevent premature action.

7. In-country presentations should be made in collaboration with a host-country sponsoring organization or interested individuals, and not as independent presentations by a U.S. organization. This seems to be the current trend. More than one presenter may be needed to make a skillful, effective, and informed presentation in a specific country.

8. Color-television monitors should be provided to all agencies that receive an Apple computer, because RAPID presentations cannot be made without equipment for visual displays. The current contract, which neither permits nor provides for such transfers, will have to be amended so that this equipment can be provided.

9. Technical difficulties should be addressed promptly, using any and all of the resources available either to the contractor or to the mission.

Impact

10. The description in the contract of the end-of-project status should be revised. RAPID is intended primarily for policymakers and political and national leaders, not planners and budget experts. In some cases, however, the latter may welcome and benefit from RAPID presentations.

Follow-up and Use of the Computer

11. The Futures Group should continue to try to identify local institutions involved in social and economic planning and training that are willing to do follow-up. Family planning associations which can and want to make RAPID presentations should be encouraged to do so, but The Futures Group and the AID missions should continue to seek first a government agency, or an institution with an established reputation in population or development analysis, that has been identified and is willing to help make presentations.

12. Training of host-country nationals in countries where computers have been left behind should be strengthened to enable local personnel to modify the basic presentation, to adapt it to new data or additional local concerns, and to correct mechanical problems with the computer hardware.

13. Technical support should be given to other AID contractors (e.g., the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), Westinghouse Health Systems (WHS), and World Fertility Survey (WFS)). If necessary, the contract should be amended to ensure that such support is provided.

14. If The Futures Group is to become involved in training host-country staff in the technical aspects of sectorial analyses, it must develop, with the help of the AID, a more comprehensive and operational set of guidelines on priorities, categories of staff to be trained, and the content of appropriate training programs. If necessary, the contract should be amended to clarify this role.

15. National agencies and AID missions which receive computer equipment and training should be asked to report to the contractor on presentations, audiences, related media coverage, and direct and indirect impact.

16. The Futures Group should try to maintain communication between local follow-up institutions and other RAPID projects around the world. This action would ensure that these institutions are better informed and less isolated from one another than they now may be. As part of an international network, they could learn about new uses for the model and other presentations. A quarterly report on the activities of The Futures Group, the countries that staff have visited, RAPID presentations, new programs, and training would suffice. The report should be translated into languages other than English and it should be distributed to the AID missions, which could use it to report on the use of computers that have been left behind. An elaborate or printed newsletter is <u>not</u> needed.

17. In countries where RAPID presentations have been favorably received, population staff in the missions should be encouraged to broaden their contacts among host-country officials who are not directly concerned with health and family planning. They should try also to identify ways to respond to some population-related needs and concerns. Centrally-funded intermediaries should be used if bilateral funds are not available.

18. All USAID and Embassy staff, in addition to population officers, should continue to be encouraged to introduce into their discussions with host-country officials their concerns about unchecked population growth.

Management

19 Additional in-country collaboration may cost more, but it can be financed by adjusting, if necessary, the total number of country analyses. The team recommends that this action be taken to increase collaboration.

Future Directions

20. The current contract with The Futures Group can be continued. Activities can be restricted to serving institutions that now have micro-computers; developing a limited number of new country or subnational analyses that follow the RAPID model; updating the data in a limited number of analyses; and providing additional special presentations when opportunities present themselves.

21. A new proposal can be prepared to develop additional software modules so that, in addition to RAPID presentations, the micro-computers can be used to address a broader range of population-related interests. The modules might include the components of fertility change that are based on Bongaarts' model of the proximate determinants of fertility; methods to set targets for family planning programs, including contraceptive mixes and the levels of use needed to reach demographic targets; a cost-benefit analysis of family planning programs; data from developed countries and from successful programs in developing countries; and a display of the results of the WFS and contraceptive prevalence surveys (CPS) for government leaders and national television. The AID should issue a Request for Proposals (RFP) on this work. Adequate lead time should be provided and widespread competition that involves the not-for-profit organizations should be encouraged.

III. THE RAPID MODEL: WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT DOES

III. THE RAPID MODEL: WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT DOES[1]

The RAPID model can be described as a projections framework which depicts alternative population growth rates (and family sizes) and their consequences for the selected consumption demands and, to a lesser extent, production possibilities of a national economy. In few country analyses are the effects of population redistribution (e.g., rural-urban) emphasized. However, a RAPID analysis is being developed at this time for a specific state in one country. It will be focused explicitly on internal migration patterns.

The model provides projections of population, aggregate economic production, economic consumption of selected commodities and services, and expenditures required for the provision of selected services. The framework allows for limited interaction among the components. Population growth is determined exogenously and is not influenced by economic production and consumption; the rate of economic consumption has little or no influence on the rate of production; and the rate of consumption of one good (e.g., housing) is largely uninfluenced by the rate of consumption of other goods (e.g., education or health services). The primary linkage in the model reveals the effects of alternative population growth rates on available labor force and consumption demands for individual commodities and services. In some RAPID analyses, the linkage between labor force and production is absent, because the rates of growth in output are exogenous, considered to be government targets or goals. In other analyses, there is a direct linkage through a simple production function.

What the Model Is

The RAPID model does not draw significantly on the dynamics and theory of economic growth and development. It focuses instead on the dynamics of demographics (a relatively strong element in its structure) and projects the consequences of population growth for individual consumption demands. These features set the RAPID model apart from recent paradigms in the economic and demographic literature, where one finds more complex characterizations of long-term growth. The RAPID model is not (and, the team would argue, should not be) represented as a serious

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[1] In this section, the author addresses only the formal structure of the RAPID model as represented in its equations. The presentation of this structure (on television and as written material) is described elsewhere. The description of the RAPID model is based on the "User's Guide for the RAPID Socioeconomic Computer Model" (May 1981) and on a review of the equations for the specialized presentations for Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, and Zimbabwe.

characterization of the dynamics of development.[1] In short, although RAPID shows the impact of population on demands for individual commodities and services, it is not a framework of economic growth within which specific consumption tradeoffs in the face of budget constraints or countervailing responses to resource scarcity are modeled realistically.

Underlying Assumptions

The underlying assumptions of the model are reasonable. For some observers, the model's somewhat limited characterization of the impact of population growth on economic development is a weakness of the paradigm. For others, RAPID's simplified framework is one of its strengths. RAPID should be viewed as a projections framework based on highly simplified assumptions, and not as a realistic model of economic development. Thus, although RAPID reveals tenuously the impact of population on economic growth and development, it provides a useful first approximation of the impact of population on selected consumption demands. First-order impacts typically take the form of estimates of per capita demands for selected population-sensitive components of consumption (food, education, housing, health, etc.).

In the RAPID model, the technologies of consumption and production are largely invariant to time and changing relative scarcities; thus, the resulting projections cannot be considered to be plausible long-term forecasts. RAPID's underlying structure is more appropriate to shorter-term (5-10 years) than longer-term (30-50 years) change. The projections depicted in RAPID analyses do, however, put a limit (or outer range) on the forecasts, which can be a useful input into planning and government decisionmaking.

Several models--competitors with RAPID--have attempted to capture more realistically the impact of population in a framework in which the dynamics of development are specified in greater detail. However, these models are difficult to interpret because of their complexity, and they impose significant demands on data. The cost of "economic realism" appears

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[1] The Futures Group claims that the economic section of the model calculates economic parameters which adjust employment estimates for relative capital and scarcity of labor. An example will illustrate this. A central, dynamic aspect of economic development is the way that the economy adjusts to scarcity. This element of growth is largely absent in RAPID models. In the RAPID models, as labor becomes relatively abundant, or as capital becomes relatively scarce, there are no feedbacks that attenuate the scarcity. Labor-using technical change does not respond to abundance of labor. Nor does capital-saving technical change result from scarcity of capital.

to rise geometrically with the number of empirical interactions and feedbacks incorporated into the paradigm. In selecting a model for use, one must weigh carefully the cost and benefits of realism in the context of specific tasks.

The choice of RAPID's specifications may be viewed as both cost-effective and appropriate. The simplicity of the model is one of its virtues. RAPID is designed to reveal some, but not all, of the relevant consequences of population growth on development in a single, brief presentation that can be easily understood by national leaders.

Some would argue that the simplifying assumptions embedded in the RAPID model take a specific form which results in an unbalanced, negative representation of the likely impacts of population growth on development.[1] The team concurs, but it does not conclude that this attribute of RAPID notably diminishes its usefulness or effectiveness. Indeed, most viewers of RAPID know well in advance that the role of population in development is negative in this model. They also realize that in any environment in which sensible decisions are made, such a scenario must be considered. In this context, RAPID may be considered to be highly useful. Its structural equations depict a negative but plausible, empirically-relevant, and fully defensible scenario of population's role in development. Both the AID and The Futures Group are aware that the model is an oversimplification, but they believe that a more complex model would not be as effective as RAPID with audiences who make policy. The team concurs.

Use of Other Demographic Variables

Other demographic variables (e.g., migration) should be incorporated into the model as separate, independent variables. The acceptability and impact of RAPID-type presentations in some countries would be greatly enhanced if urban growth and international and internal migration were addressed directly in the analysis and highlighted in presentations. (The team recognizes that this is being done now in some analyses.)

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[1] Although specific parameters of the model can be altered at the request of viewers, there is virtually no combination of choices of parameters in which population would have other than a deleterious impact on stated or implied goals. Indeed, in some RAPID formulations, a large, continuing negative population growth rate represents the logical optimum population policy. The exception would appear if the sum of the production elasticities significantly exceeded unity. The "User's Guide" appears to argue that the population representation is balanced. Biases in each direction are noted. Having read the literature, the team feels that the negative aspect of population is strongly represented in the framework.

Appropriateness of Dependent Variables and Sectors

The number and kind of dependent variables and sectors are appropriate to the objectives of the project. The variables are well chosen. The selection reflects a consideration of important needs--needs which are expressed in the goals for the countries.

Modifications to Enhance Objectives

The simplicity of the model should be maintained. Any modifications to its structure should be straightforward and easy to understand.

The concept of economic tradeoffs should be highlighted.[1] The current model reveals the impact of population on the resource demands of each sector. It does not reveal the consequences of population in the face of realistic resource constraints, when tradeoffs among the outputs of the various sectors are required. The RAPID model avoids confronting directly the difficult economic choices and policies that may be required because of rapid population growth. The team believes that RAPID's impact could be enhanced dramatically if decisionmakers were encouraged to recognize explicitly and to confront directly these difficult choices.

Currently, some viewers of RAPID are left with the impression that the key problem of population is primarily to plan for the future.[2] Representatives of government ministries think that RAPID will be useful particularly in projecting demands for specific sectors and in providing estimates that buttress requests for more resources from the central government. In fact, however, total government resources are constrained by total tax revenues, borrowing, and international aid. RAPID can (and, it should be stressed, should) force decisionmakers to confront specific (and unpleasant) tradeoffs in the face of such constraints. This powerful,

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[1] When the evaluation team was briefed by The Futures Group, the contractor indicated explicitly that a conscious decision had been made to suppress economic tradeoffs as a part of the model's structure.

[2] This has been revealed in several interviews, and it is suggested in some proposed follow-on projects.

empirical insight can easily be incorporated into RAPID; its presence would not detract from the model's simplicity in presentation.[1]

The current approach of taking a country's national stated goals and showing how much they cost leads to an inadequate and unrealistic representation of the impact of population. Moreover, the impact of population can be revealed more forcefully and clearly by adding to (or making substitutions for) some of the dependent variables a group of specific outcomes that can be interpreted more vividly and meaningfully.[2] It is important to force decisionmakers to realize that their goals and technologies may be implausible, given resource constraints and population pressures.

Some of the parameters in the RAPID model may reflect more effective concepts for communicating basic insights into the pressures of population than some of the dependent variables. It would be worthwhile to experiment with designating these parameters as variables and other variables as parameters (or as exogenous constraints).

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[1] This can be implemented mechanically in several ways. One needs only an assumption about the growth of resources available to the government (e.g., revenues grow as fast as or x times faster than the GNP) and assumptions about the way that a given sector's production (e.g., education) can be financed by other sectors' reduced outputs (e.g., defense, health), should total government revenues be inadequate.

[2] For example, in examining the impact of population on education requirements, a RAPID model might project the increases in teachers (and money) that would be needed to satisfy a set of educational goals (e.g., participation rates) with a given production technology (e.g., a student-teacher ratio). Charts would be prepared that would show as upward sloping lines thousands of teachers or millions of pounds or dollars. For many observers, these are meaningless magnitudes, or magnitudes that are less meaningful than alternative measures, such as student-teacher ratio. In a simple calculation, one can determine the implied student-teacher ratios consistent with alternative education goals (enrollment and participation rates), or the implied participation rates consistent with assumed student-teacher ratios, where both calculations are constrained by reasonable limits on total resources available to education. Under most plausible assumptions, the total resources available to education are likely to be extremely constraining; therefore, the resulting participation rates, or student-teacher ratios, will be disappointing and, notably, at variance with national goals.

Application of the Model

In certain circumstances, for example, where the size of the state is large and where health and other services are the responsibility of the state government, applications of the model to subnational populations are appropriate. An analysis of the state of São Paulo, Brazil, is being developed. When the state is taken as the unit of analysis, the model must be modified to present internal migration realistically, as in the São Paulo study.

Projections Beyond 2000

The RAPID model should not project beyond 2000 unless the host government specifically requests that such projections be provided. Policymakers do not plan 30-45 years in advance. Moreover, the reliability of projections is questionable beyond 10 or 15 years. Thus, it is easier for professionals to criticize the model if the period of time is projected. When the focus is on long-term forecasts, visually, the impact of population's consequences in the next several decades is diminished; however, these are the only consequences on which policymakers can act. The dates 1985, 1990, and 1995 should be included in the graphics to identify the data.

Recommendations

1. The current RAPID model should be expanded to include:

    a. policy-relevant economic tradeoffs;

    b. more attention to migration and urbanization;

    c. competing goals that are jeopardized by population pressures and economic constraints; and

    d. alternative policy costs calculated in the currencies of the countries. The current approach--taking, either separately or together, national stated goals and costing them out--is a good starting point, but it is, ultimately, unrealistic and does not sufficiently highlight the kinds of difficult choices that will have to be made.

2. To have maximum impact on policymakers and to strengthen the credibility of the projections, the presentation should not extend beyond 2000. Data points should be labeled clearly as 1985, 1990, and 1995.

IV. PREPARATION OF THE ANALYSIS

IV. PREPARATION OF THE ANALYSIS

Questions About the Scope of Work

1. *Are the problems of availability and accuracy of data major constraints on the preparation of the analysis? How could these problems either be resolved or handled more effectively?*

The RAPID model is efficiently designed to minimize data requirements and to focus on those kinds of data that either are available (at some level of defensible quality) or can be proxied with international data or indirect methods of estimation. RAPID presentations make explicit that alternative empirical assumptions may be used and that the results may be displayed. Thus, neither the availability nor the accuracy of data appears to be a major constraint on the preparation of the analysis.

The credibility and acceptance of the RAPID model and presentation directly increase with the level of involvement of responsible host-country nationals in the selection and appraisal of the data. Even with published data sets (or unpublished manuscripts), direct consultation with persons who collect data enhances the credibility of RAPID presentations. The 1980 amendment to the contract allows for increased collaboration with host-country nationals in identifying data for analyses. This change has had a useful effect, but the team would urge, nevertheless, that greater efforts be made to establish and maintain liaison with official data-collection agencies.

2. *Are the printed analyses a useful component of the project? How are they used? Are sufficient copies available for timely distribution? How accurate is the content? How can the analyses be revised (e.g., content, format) to enhance their effectiveness?*

The booklets are important because they are a permanent record, and they can be sent to persons who do not attend the presentations. That they are being used as effectively as they might after the presentations have been made is not clear. The team had little opportunity to determine this. The team was informed that copies are distributed to everyone who attends a presentation. This practice should be continued.

3. *Specifically, how can supporting documentation to RAPID be improved?*

Where computers are left behind, the "User's Guide for the RAPID Socioeconomic Computer Model" and the description of the basic computer program should be made available to the local sponsoring agency in the language of the country (Spanish, French, Arabic, or Portuguese) so that both the computer experts and the socioeconomic analysts will be able to understand the model. The team learned that translations are being made available.

4. *How effective has the contractor been in establishing a collaborative relationship with host-country officials and USAID and Embassy staff to prepare the analysis? How would this role be characterized? How can the project be revised to enhance the effectiveness of the collaboration?*

From the evidence gathered during visits to the countries, it appears that collaboration between The Futures Group and USAID and Embassy staff generally has been good. Local collaboration in preparing the country analyses has varied, however. In Tanzania, where a presentation was given before the contract was amended to permit visits in advance, local collaboration was not possible. In Sudan, the team found no evidence of local collaboration in preparing the analyses. (This may reflect the lack of interest of the Sudanese and the AID mission, however, and not a lack of effort by The Futures Group to seek collaboration.) In both Tanzania and Sudan, the presentations were criticized because, it was said, local concerns were ignored or misrepresented. Up to and through the period of the team's visit, local collaboration in Honduras and Peru was somewhat more extensive, but it still was not as great as it might have been. In Egypt, there has been considerable interaction between The Futures Group and Egyptian researchers and officials. Continuing collaboration in Brazil also appears to be the result of effective interaction among staff. From this evidence, one could conclude that The Futures Group is making progress in establishing collaborative relationships.

Local collaboration is possible, and it is desirable in determining the specific issues, sectors, or policies that can be highlighted in a RAPID presentation and in identifying appropriate and locally accepted data sets. Although extended visits in-country may not be essential to identify local issues and data sets, they can help set the stage for a better reception of the completed RAPID presentation. The experience in Egypt shows how valuable good, early local participation can be. Some of the problems with the presentation in Tanzania might have been avoided, or at least addressed more effectively, had The Futures Group been able

to make an advance visit to learn firsthand about the concerns and sensitivities of the audience.

The AID mission in Sudan criticized the draft of the country analysis, but it praised the report on the country's population problems and perspectives. (The report was prepared by Battelle staff and based on interviews in-country and on data that had been collected.) The evaluation team was told that the preliminary results of the Sudan Fertility Survey and the published report on the 1973 census are expected to be available by November 1981. Both are being prepared under the auspices of the Department of Statistics, Ministry of National Planning. They will be regarded as authoritative data sets. Neither report was included in the RAPID country analysis, and the Sudanese official who was responsible for both documents was unaware of the RAPID project. Given contractual obligations and the timetable for the RAPID project, The Futures Group requested permission to make a final presentation in Sudan in September 1981, two months before the documents were to be issued. The evaluation team recommends that this proposed schedule not be adopted.

Recommendations

3. In-country collaboration has improved since the contract was revised in 1980 to permit staff to visit a country at least once before making a presentation. But increased effort would be useful. In preparing analyses, the staff of The Futures Group should spend more time in the countries identifying available data sets, introducing the project to staff at the missions and the U.S. embassies, and to selected local officials, and learning about local perceptions of population issues, the consequences of population growth, and appropriate social responses.

4. A greater effort should be made to contact and involve official government data-collection agencies in the preparation of country analyses. The use of officially published data usually will not guarantee favorable responses to a presentation if personal contact has not been made and if interaction has not occurred. There has been improvement since the first analyses were prepared, but staff should spend more time with local sources of data.

5. The "User's Guide for the RAPID Socioeconomic Computer Model" and the RAPID program guide should be made available to the local sponsoring agency in the language of the country (Spanish, French, Arabic, or Portuguese) so that both the computer experts and the socioeconomic analysts can easily understand the model. The team has learned that efforts to translate the documents are now under way.

V. PRESENTATIONS

V. PRESENTATIONS

Introduction

As of July 1981, the full cycle of RAPID in-country presentations had been completed in 11 countries (Cameroon, Senegal, Turkey, Tanzania, Jordan, Sri Lanka, Honduras, Egypt, Malawi, Rwanda, and Peru).[1] It was reported that many of the presentations (e.g., the presentation in the Middle East) were successful in reaching policy-making officials. Others (e.g., the presentations in several African countries) were said to have been less successful in reaching their intended audience. In four countries (Egypt, Tanzania, Honduras, and Peru) a final presentation was made either before (Peru) or after the evaluators arrived. In these countries the entire cycle could be revised. None of the evaluators was able to attend an in-country presentation, however, or to judge reactions firsthand.

The strategy for RAPID presentations, which was adopted after the February 1980 evaluation, calls for at least three presentations. In the first, the Class I presentation, the staff use data from another country that have been programmed in the basic RAPID model. The purposes of this initial presentation are to stimulate host-country nationals to make an invitation and to arouse the interest of staff at the embassy or in the mission. A second, Class II, presentation is made six months to a year later. In this presentation, data are used and the efforts to secure sponsorship from an in-country institution and to correct and update information from local sources are increased. The final, Class III, presentation is made with the best possible national data by someone fluent in the appropriate language (French, Spanish, or Portuguese). A person of international stature who is fully familiar with the RAPID analysis and, perhaps, circumstances in the host-country, is preferred as a presenter. (Subsequent presentations by country nationals are not covered in the RAPID contract. They are discussed in detail in Chapter VII.)

The model itself is simple and straightforward in its demographic, sectorial approach; thus, the major impact comes from the presentation and the new computer graphics that are used to illustrate it. Although the use of new computer technology is sometimes described as "gimmickry," it is essential to ensure RAPID's appeal.

Like most population and family planning projects, a RAPID presentation appears to be most effective where the interest or support of staff of a mission and host-country nationals is strong. RAPID appears to be

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[1] In Nepal and Morocco, The Futures Group has completed its contractual requirements. Technically, however, final presentations have not been made at the highest level.

much less effective where there is either indifference or hostility to a fertility-oriented approach to development (e.g., in Tanzania). This pattern, although it should not be surprising, is worth noting, because RAPID was designed primarily to introduce population issues in countries that do not have a policy on population and family planning. RAPID is needed most in these countries, where careful preparation and special efforts to develop appropriate national collaboration are necessary. In some countries, other programs, such as the Population and Development II (PDP II) project of Battelle, may be useful, a starting point at which to build a nucleus of individuals (or institutions) in the country who would be interested in the RAPID approach.

Questions About the Scope of Work

1. *How effective is the strategy for in-country presentations? How can the strategy be improved?*

The current strategy for RAPID presentations is reasonable. The three-stage process in effect at this time should provide ample opportunity to identify persons or institutions in-country who are interested in RAPID. At every step, response to a RAPID presentation depends less on the model itself than on the skill of the presenters, the technical performance of all the equipment, and the type and expectations of the audience. Because it is extremely difficult to meet all three requirements in every country, staff should concentrate more on each step in the cycle of presentations and be less concerned with meeting a preconceived schedule of presentations. Reportedly, 7 of 11 presentations have gone well. This is a respectable record.

The strategy could be improved by working more closely with host-country nationals and by giving more attention to the role of the sponsoring agency. This has been happening as the project has gained experience. Under the terms of the contract, in approximately one-half of the countries where presentations are given, an Apple computer is to be transferred to the AID mission for use by a local agency. The relationship between the mission and the local agency which is using the computer should be clarified. Agencies in-country can play a key role in making RAPID known and accepted locally. Also, as in Honduras, Peru, and Jordan, they can provide critical guidance and help for presentations. If staff of The Futures Group or consultants are, for example, deficient in their knowledge of circumstances in a particular country, respected local experts can provide information they might need and respond to their questions. If data are known to come from local sources and agencies, government officials may be less likely to regard the message as foreign propaganda. Except in special circumstances, final high-level presentations should be organized less as a performance by The Futures Group and more as a collaborative effort that links American technology with local skills in socioeconomic and policy development.

2. *Is the expertise (the manner of presentation and the demonstration of technical knowledge) of the presenters adequate for the intended audiences? (This question should be expanded to include language capability and knowledge of the country.)*

The answer to this question varies necessarily with the presenter and the presentation. The staff of The Futures Group know the model well. Their presentations are competent and professional. The staff could benefit, however, from some training and additional polish in public speaking, which would make the presentations more lively and compelling. With a few exceptions, The Futures Group has recruited qualified experts in international development who are fluent in the national language. Any presenter who is not directly familiar with a situation in a country might be embarrassed if he were asked specific questions which he could not answer or if he did not have the qualifications for the job. It is difficult to find in any one person the full range of knowledge and skills that is required to make a first-rate presentation. For this reason, several people, and especially local experts, may have to be involved in a presentation. It may be useful to point to Peru to show how the technical skills of in-country personnel can be used to the fullest to achieve maximum local impact. In that country, a respected demographer joined a RAPID consultant and technician to make an effective presentation.

3. *How are the audiences for a presentation selected? Should the number and type of audience be changed?*

The objective of RAPID is to attract to presentations the highest ranking policymakers in a country. In fact, attendance at final presentations depends largely on the political influence of the sponsoring national agency, or the willingness of the U.S. ambassador or a high-level official in the mission to encourage the attendance of high-ranking persons. In Peru, the sponsoring agency, the National Institute of Statistics (INE), was able to arrange for cabinet members, including the prime minister, to see the presentation. In some countries, the U.S. ambassadors have taken the initiative to involve high-level officials. This action would not necessarily be appropriate in all countries. The presentations should continue to be directed toward the highest ranking policymakers to bring to their attention the subject of population. But an effort should be made to work more closely with host-country nationals in the process.

4. *Are there technical difficulties in making the presentations which could and should be remedied?*

The presentations pose technical problems. Technical difficulties have arisen in each of the six countries the evaluators visited. In Honduras and Brazil, for example, equipment did not function properly, either because the U.S.-supplied parts were defective or the specifications for presentation on television were unique to one country. A Sudanese visitor experienced problems even in the United States when he saw a presentation there. In any country where presentations are likely to be made, the lack of a television monitor (for which no provision is made in the AID contract) may limit the number of follow-up presentations.

The use of modern technology is a principal factor in RAPID's appeal. The AID should amend the current contract to provide color-television monitors to agencies which receive an Apple computer. These monitors are essential to any presentation. Also, The Futures Group should respond immediately to identified technical problems. The response to problems in Honduras was prompt because the population officer there took action, but in Brazil, where the AID official was in a different city and had not been informed of the problem, action lagged. Other means to backstop services should be explored.

Recommendations

6. Although it must recognize contractual pressures, The Futures Group should not rush (or allow itself to be rushed) into final presentations until all components are in place and the timing has been reviewed with the AID mission and host-country nationals. This may require that fewer presentations be made and that more attention be given to local collaboration and the quality of the presentation. A process recently was instituted in Washington to review both analyses and presentations. With this process, it may be possible to prevent premature action.

7. In-country presentations should be made in collaboration with a host-country sponsoring organization or interested individuals, and not as independent presentations by a U.S. organization. This seems to be the current trend. More than one presenter may be needed to make a skillful, effective, and informed presentation in a specific country.

8. Color-television monitors should be provided to all agencies that receive an Apple computer, because RAPID

presentations cannot be made without equipment for visual displays. The current contract, which neither permits nor provides for such transfers, will have to be amended so that this equipment can be provided.

9. Technical difficulties should be addressed promptly, using any and all resources available either to the contractor or to the mission locally.

VI. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

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Summary of Objectives

The "project outputs and achievements" that RAPID was designed to produce are summarized in the May 1980 Project Paper:

> At that time (end-of-project) LDCs will be including relevant demographic and fertility-affecting factors in their annual plans and budgets or will request assistance to develop their capabilities to do so. State/AID technical and regional offices involved in development planning will be aware of the importance of including demographic and socioeconomic factors in development planning, and will be engaged in tailored sectorial development analyses of various economic and social sectors . . . .

There seems to be a slight discrepancy between this goal and The Futures Group's approach to RAPID presentations and the results that have been obtained. At this time, presentations are directed to elite but non-specialist audiences. The evaluation team found little evidence that The Futures Group has specifically tried to change the way in which LDC planners and analysts develop their budgets, and there is little to suggest that presentations have been directed at professional development planners, many of whom are using more sophisticated, but less demographically-oriented, models. Such actions would require more sophisticated staff and close, long-term interaction. The purpose of RAPID presentations seems to be to increase awareness of population in a general way among ministers and other influential groups. The implicit objective of RAPID seems to be to strengthen political support for family planning programs, and not to persuade economists or budget planning officers to revise existing sectorial models. Building political support takes time, and such a long-term objective is not likely to be achieved with any single intervention. Rather, it would be one outcome of a cumulative policy-making process. The use of RAPID can enhance the process, provided that those who plan project activities give their full attention to the perceptions of the host countries and available institutional support.

Use of RAPID to Promote Awareness

RAPID presentations provide a striking new opportunity to introduce and promote discussion of population issues among high-level officials in

both the Department of State and the host countries. The issue of population rarely is cause for immediate political crisis (except when opposition develops); therefore, opportunities to introduce the subject to high-level officials in a rational, relevant, and interesting manner are worthwhile. At the highest levels, RAPID presentations may encourage leaders to put pressure on slow-moving bureaucracies. At the presentation he attended, President Sadat was quoted as saying, "This is a nightmare." That remark might be compelling enough to stimulate activity, but adequate follow-up from Egyptian officials and a variety of Egyptian agencies would be required to ensure progress.

No one is likely to change his mind because he has seen a RAPID presentation. Nonetheless, some host-country nationals and institutions are concerned about population issues, and for them RAPID is a useful tool. It strengthens their convictions and supports their positions; it offers new arguments, evidence to convince the skeptical; it provides its supporters with a new tool with which to communicate with other national constituencies; it focuses attention on population problems; and, finally, it creates a climate for legitimate official and public concern about the problems of population. Thus, for RAPID to be effective, there must be not only a good presentation, but also follow-up in each country.

Effects on Official Policy and Programs

In the countries which the team visited, no specific changes in either policies or programs can be attributed directly to RAPID presentations. In Honduras, Peru, and Brazil, RAPID might contribute to and accelerate changes in government policies and programs that are under way. In Honduras, a showing of RAPID prompted the leader of the farm workers union to submit to the AID a proposal for family planning services for farm workers. Already a supporter of family planning, he was encouraged by the presentation and by the favorable reactions of other labor leaders. In Peru, the head of the Council on Population sent printed copies of the presentation to his friends who are bankers. These examples illustrate how, at different levels, the supporters of population and family planning can use RAPID to generate support for their own work.

Personnel at the AID pointed out how RAPID has the potential to effect change. They noted the influence that RAPID presentations may have had in Rwanda, Cameroon, Malawi, and Jordan. For example, after seeing a RAPID presentation, the president of Rwanda gave his full support to the director of the National Office of Population, which is responsible for developing a national plan to provide family planning services. In Cameroon, the president gave a major State of the Union address during which he quoted at length from a RAPID presentation to demonstrate the need for a national policy and program of responsible parenthood. In Malawi, The Futures Group was the first organization ever invited to discuss the impact of population on development. The National Planning Council in Jordan

requested technical assistance to incorporate demographic variables into the planning process. All these examples highlight the importance of follow-up, by both host-country agencies and, in some cases, AID-funded population organizations.

Measuring Impact

The outcome of RAPID is likely to be cumulative and long-term, the result of more than a few isolated presentations. Thus, one cannot at this time determine what its impact is even where The Futures Group has fulfilled its contractual obligations. Some intermediate results can, however, be considered and recorded as output (not outcome) measures. These would be:

--number of people attending RAPID presentations (policymakers, U.S. or foreign nationals, and various influential groups);

--media coverage of RAPID;

--public criticism (or lack of criticism) of RAPID;

--use of RAPID data to support programs and policies; and

--presentations of RAPID by the national sponsors.

Recommendations

10. The description in the contract of the end-of-project status should be revised. RAPID is intended primarily for policymakers and political and national leaders, not planners and budget experts.

VII. FOLLOW-UP AND USE OF THE COMPUTER

VII. FOLLOW-UP AND USE OF THE COMPUTER

Priorities

Follow-up activities and the training of host-country nationals in the use of the Apple computer and the RAPID model have always been given secondary importance in the project design. They were not even included in the contract until 1980. The contract has been modified several times since the project began in September 1977, but at no time have appropriate follow-up activities been defined explicitly. Training of host-country nationals is limited to operation of the Apple computer to demonstrate or update the RAPID model. In his evaluation of RAPID, Professor Carlaw examined training as an aspect of follow-up, recommending only that "appropriate American and host-country staff . . . be trained to operate the computer" (p. 12). In the amended contract (September 1980), the following is stated:

> . . . After consultation with missions and upon their recommendation, a selected group of these countries, not to exceed 20, will also receive a computer hardware/software system with the appropriate country analysis to remain in the host country. Instruction will be given to appropriate Embassy, AID and/or host country individuals in the computer presentation of the country analysis, so that a greater number of host country decisionmakers can be reached.
>
> In the fourth and fifth years of the project, a selected number of AID and/or host country individuals, from not more than 10 of the 20 countries where a computer terminal is installed, will be given instruction in programming the software package so as to be able to update the presentations. These individuals will be chosen in consultation with the missions and must have past programming experience. The countries will be chosen according to the likelihood that population and development sectorial analyses will be produced and implemented by the host government. This instruction will enable these individuals to alter the assumptions and data used in the country-specific analyses, to up-date it as appropriate, and to apply these specifications to the particular economic or social sector being considered . . . . (Part 4.B, Plan of Work, Subparagraphs 13 and 17)

The evaluation team believes that, whether or not follow-up activities are undertaken by other AID contractors, the narrow definition of and provision for training of host-country nationals constitute a serious

weakness in the project design which limits the effectiveness of in-country follow-up activities.

Questions About the Scope of Work

1. *Was the quality and length of training adequate to prepare trainees to use the computer and to make presentations?*

In none of the six countries visited had training progressed sufficiently to be fully evaluated. A reasonable training plan was developed in Egypt and approved by the mission in July 1980, but training had not begun by the time of the evaluator's visit because of delays beyond the control of The Futures Group. The Tanzanian presentations were completed early in 1980; no specific training plans emerged, and only one preliminary request for local training in the Apple technology has been received since by the mission in Dar es Salaam.[1] RAPID has not been presented publicly in Sudan and Brazil.

In both Peru and Honduras, limited in-country training has been provided to enable local staff to conduct RAPID presentations. In Peru, four technicians are being trained to operate the RAPID program. The evaluation team noted that the trainees do not have copies in Spanish of the Description of the Basic Computer Program or the "User's Guide"[2] and have difficulty working with the English texts; they have not seen the original data input to the model and are not aware of the sources of the data; and they have had no opportunity to question the data and assumptions and to offer corrections and modifications.[3] The four trainees are aware of these problems and said that they would like several weeks of training so that they can use the model interactively, test new assumptions, and use the computer's capabilities more fully. The training they have received to date was provided by The Futures Group staff in two brief visits during which several public presentations were also made. This training has not, they feel, met their needs.[4] The evaluation team would support their contention.

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[1] RAPID project activities led to a request from the Ministry of Planning in Tanzania for technical assistance from Research Triangle Institute.

[2] The team was told by the AID that translations were provided at the next (and final) visit.

[3] The team was told by the AID that this, too, was planned for the next visit.

[4] The team was told by the AID that the training they desired was provided at the next visit.

In Honduras, two technicians and one presenter received training adequate to enable them to make presentations after The Futures Group completed its own in-country series in November 1980. The training was limited to operating the basic RAPID model. The technicians are not able to modify existing programs to incorporate new data or additional sector components; nor can they correct technical and mechanical problems with the computer itself. The two partially-trained technicians are employed by the National Planning Agency, and not the Family Planning Association (FPA). This is cause for concern because follow-up presentations are being made by the latter group. Local staff require more comprehensive training to take full advantage of the RAPID technology.

In summary, training of host-country nationals in the six countries the evaluators visited has been limited. Where it has been undertaken, its purpose has been to facilitate presentations, both those made in collaboration with The Futures Group staff and those which use the basic presentation developed by the contractor. The training has not been adequate to enable local operators to modify the basic presentation, adapt it to new data or additional local concerns, or to correct mechanical problems with the computer hardware. Only in Egypt was a more comprehensive training plan developed, and even there implementation was a year behind schedule and had not begun by the time of the team's visit. This was not the fault of The Futures Group, however.

2. *How were the training candidates selected? Were they the appropriate candidates?*

The evaluators had limited opportunity to assess trainees and training in the countries they visited. In assessing the quality of training and trainees, one must examine the objectives of the training. In both Peru and Honduras, for example, the training seems to have been appropriate, for the limited objectives were to assist in presentations by The Futures Group and to make a limited number of additional presentations using the same model. The trainees are both capable of and eager for additional training. The categories of prospective trainees from Egypt seem to be appropriate, but no persons have been chosen.

3. *Is the training of host-country officials an effective component of the project? What are the short-term and long-term benefits and how can they be improved?*

The goals and benefits of further training should be viewed in the context of the RAPID model and presentations and their utility in the host countries. The RAPID presentation is directed at an elite audience of decisionmakers and opinion leaders, and not technical experts. It can

be modified to emphasize specific sectorial concerns, and it can incorporate some modified data and assumptions during the presentation itself. Although the presentations are country-specific, the basic RAPID model is designed to be universally applicable; the relationships between population and other variables are built into the model itself. The same negative relationships between population growth and economic development will appear in each country presentation, regardless of specific differences in data input or sectorial focus. These basic characteristics of the model make it possible for The Futures Group to prepare country analyses for as many as 45 countries in the limited time provided in the contract.

From the perspective of individual countries and viewers, these same characteristics make the model less than fully persuasive in the local context, which is their principal concern. Officials in countries where RAPID is presented often are interested in seeing how new or alternative data might change national trends, how population growth is likely to affect subnational regions of the country, how internal and international migration affects the country, and how reductions in infant mortality might affect anticipated expenditures in the social sector. It is not possible for The Futures Group--indeed, for any similar foreign agency--to respond adequately to these concerns in terms of time, cost-effectiveness, language capability, and political acceptability, and with a full appreciation and understanding of local circumstances.

Presentations such as RAPID are best handled by credible local officials, researchers, or others with a detailed knowledge of specific conditions and contexts. Effective training programs for local operators and presenters are essential to ensure that RAPID (or its successor) is able to build on its initial favorable impact on senior government leaders. Training is critically important for any future activities, and it must be designed to accomplish specified objectives.

4. *How is the computer being used? What steps could be taken to increase its usefulness and use?*

Exhibit VII-1 is a summary of the information available in September 1981, on the location and use of computers left in-country by The Futures Group.

In addition to the 12 computers listed in Exhibit VII-1, 2 computers have been installed in Washington. One is at the International Statistical Program Center (ISPC), Bureau of the Census; the other is at the Population Reference Bureau (PRB). The ISPC plans to start using the RAPID presentation in September 1981, in its training courses for developing-country statisticians. The PRB has made 6 presentations to approximately 25 persons since receiving the computer in early 1981.

Exhibit VII-1

DISTRIBUTION AND USE OF COMPUTERS PROVIDED BY THE FUTURES GROUP

Region	Country	Date Installed or Left	Receiving Institution	Number of Subsequent Presentations and Viewers
Africa	Malawi	6/17/81	USAID	Unknown
	Rwanda	4/03/81	USAID	Unknown
	Tanzania	3/07/80	USAID	3 presentations at AID
Asia	Nepal	3/31/81	USAID Population Commission	Presumed to be in use; details unavailable
	Sri Lanka	7/10/80	USAID	Presumed to be in use; details unavailable
	Thailand	7/27/81	USAID (Temporary loan until mission acquires equipment)	Used for FG/RTI presentation on FP cost-benefit analysis; other uses unknown
Near East	Jordan	1/15/80	USAID Royal Scientific Society	Presumed to be in use; details unavailable
	Morocco	4/17/80	USAID Ministry of Health	Presumed to be in use; details unavailable
	Turkey	1/11/80	U.S. Embassy General Directorate of Population Planning	Unknown; damaged computer returned to U.S. for repair
Latin America	Brazil	3/28/81	Secretariat for Economic Planning, São Paulo	None, for technical reasons
	Honduras	11/21/80	Family Planning Association	5 presentations, 150 viewers
	Peru	7/13/81	National Institute of Statistics	Not available at time of visit

Two important points are illustrated in the exhibit. One, most of the computers have been left with USAID missions, and, two, little or no information about their subsequent use is available. It is not specified in the contract who is to be responsible for monitoring the use of the computers that are left behind. No regular mechanism exists for gathering and reporting this information. Final presentations had not been made in Brazil, Peru, or Sudan by the time of the evaluators' visits. A computer had been ordered for the Population and Family Planning Board in Egypt, but it had not been received at the time of the team's visit. A computer was left with the USAID mission in Tanzania after the February 1980 presentations. It is locked in a vault at the mission and has been used only three times, each time for presentations at the mission. The computer left with the Family Planning Association in Honduras has been used to make five presentations that have reached approximately 150 people.

The most direct and obvious use of the computers would be to increase the number of basic RAPID presentations made throughout a country to as many varied audiences as possible (political leaders; opinion leaders; labor, farmers', and women's groups; medical, business, and military groups; journalists; academics) at both national and subnational levels. A small number of presenters and computer operators (perhaps two of each) with more basic training than is now provided by The Futures Group might be sufficient to meet this objective.

It is implied in the amended Project Paper (May 1980), which resulted in the amendment, in September 1980, of the contract, that the computers will be put to a more focused and more highly technical use. As many as 20 countries will receive computers. As is stated in the contract,

> . . . the countries will be chosen according to the likelihood that population and development analyses will be produced and implemented by the host government. [In 10 of these countries, instruction will be provided to host-country] individuals to alter the assumptions and data used in the country-specific analyses, to up-date it as appropriate, and to apply these specifications to the particular economic or social sector being considered . . . .

Given the list of countries where computers have been left, one would have to say that the contractor has not used the criterion in the amended Project Paper to choose such countries: "the likelihood that population and development analysis will be produced and implemented by the host government." Moreover, the training which host-country nationals have received to date has not been adequate to address the needs and objectives indicated in the amended Project Paper, and the evaluation team is not of the impression that much thought has been given to the problem. If the AID's intention is to rely primarily on another contractor (e.g., the Research Triangle

Institute) or project to address this need, the objective should be deleted from the contract as an obligation of The Futures Group.

This paragraph in the amended Project Paper (May 1980) raises another related issue: the appropriate host-country institutions with which to leave computers. According to the Interim Assessment of the RAPID Project, written in December 1980,

> . . . because the RAPID project is viewed primarily as a tool to encourage the adoption of a population policy and to incorporate demographic analysis into a country's development planning process, the most appropriate collaborators may very well be officials from ministries of planning and economic development. An effort has been made, and should continue to be made, to minimize the role of individuals identified with family planning activities . . . .

In both Egypt and Honduras, officials are concerned that the two local organizations that have been designated to receive computers and undertake follow-up activities (the Population and Family Planning Board (PFPB) and the Family Planning Association, respectively) are too closely identified with specific programmatic interests to be able to present effectively to government planners and economists broad population and development concerns. This is a hypothetical issue in Egypt, because the computer has not been received, and no outreach efforts have been undertaken by the PFPB. In Honduras, the response of senior government officials to invitations to RAPID presentations from the Family Planning Association (the ASHONPLAFA) has been lukewarm. In part, this kind of response may be attributable to political sensitivities which surfaced before the national elections, although several respondents told the evaluation team that, as a family planning agency, the FPA cannot secure the attendance at RAPID presentations of the highest level of policymakers. Nevertheless, because of the lack of government policy on population, the planning agency CONSUPLANE has not shown much interest in the project and, for this reason, the FPA is a reasonable choice of institutions to make public presentations.

5. *What kinds of follow-up activities have been pursued and by whom?*

In only two of the six countries the team visited, Egypt and Honduras, are specific RAPID follow-up activities planned or under way. In Egypt, the Population and Family Planning Board intends to produce an Arabic-language version of RAPID for a "mid-level managerial and technocratic" audience; the State Information Service (SIS) has assumed responsibility

"for popularizing RAPID for mass audiences." (See trip report in Part II for details.) In assessing the proposed follow-up activities, the evaluators concluded:

> . . . There is only a limited role that The Futures Group itself can undertake beyond training a small number of Egyptians to operate the computer and make the presentations. It would not be cost-effective to fly in Futures staff to make additional presentations at the governorate level throughout Egypt. Nor can an English-language presentation have any impact below the very top layers of the Egyptian bureaucracy. Moreover, there is great sensitivity among many Egyptian officials to highly visible further involvement by American experts or USAID. These factors all suggest that follow-up activities by The Futures Group ought to consist primarily of short-term training and technical assistance to Egyptians to refine, elaborate, or modify the RAPID presentation as needed for specific audiences. The Population and Family Planning Board's program to create an Arabic version of RAPID and to train government staff in its presentation therefore seems to be a sound approach--although the effort is already over a year behind schedule.
>
> The SIS program to "popularize RAPID," on the other hand, is still poorly conceived, poorly organized, and without obviously committed leadership. Based on the interviews, it is hard to imagine that these efforts can have any impact on individual attitudes or fertility behavior, but they will certainly be very expensive. AID would do better to focus its efforts on improving information, education, and communication efforts on the individual- and household-level benefits of family planning, without tying these efforts to a presentation that is intended for and aimed at a totally different type of audience.

In Honduras, the evaluators foresee a limited continuing role in-country for The Futures Group. The local Family Planning Association has proposed, and with the support of the mission plans to undertake, a continuing series of RAPID presentations for local audiences. The FPA is not the ideal sponsor for such presentations, but, given the organization's identification with and advocacy of family planning and the lack of a better alternative, both the AID mission and the evaluation team think that the FPA's efforts should be supported. In their words:

> . . . It appears to be in the United States' interest to have follow-up presentations conducted by Hondurans with minimal U.S. or AID involvement. Thus, after a brief training session,

> including provision of other Apple software, . . . [the Association] should be encouraged to carry on as independently as possible. This should include local fund-raising to support the project eventually, since it should be an easy venture to interest the business community in supporting.

In Tanzania, the Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning (BRALUP) of the University of Dar es Salaam, whose director was one of the principal presenters of RAPID in February 1980, has requested an Apple computer from the mission (under a separate contract). It hopes to use the technology, but not the RAPID program, to develop training materials for Tanzanian development planners.

6. *Has follow-up been adequate? What additional kinds of follow-up activities should be considered?*

It is too early to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of specific follow-up activities, but a number of questions suggest themselves immediately. Can objective criteria to measure "adequacy" or "effectiveness" be determined in advance? A large number of people may see the RAPID presentation, but how many is considered "adequate"? Are there other audiences who create or influence policy who should see RAPID? If so, how will they be identified and approached? Can eventual changes in policies or programs be convincingly attributed to such presentations? If no specific numerical targets or policy and programmatic outcomes are anticipated in advance, does the AID have a strategy with which it can impose on this otherwise perpetual process time and budgetary limitations?

Training is a critical component of follow-up. The narrow definition of and the provision for training of host-country nationals in the amended contract constitute a serious weakness in the project design which limits the effectiveness of follow-up. Unless and until host-country nationals are sufficiently trained to apply the micro-computer technology introduced by RAPID to the population-related aspects of particular economic and social problems that are of concern to local development planners and policymakers, follow-up efforts by local groups will be perfunctory and fail to achieve their potential impact. For those who are already committed to introducing or expanding family planning services and information, current plans for follow-up are grossly inadequate. The inherent micro-computer technology in the Apple system is ideally suited to demonstrate the potential impact of family planning and contraceptive use on fertility trends and to illustrate the experience of other countries that have adopted family planning policies and programs. Battelle and RTI both have carried out cooperative ventures with the RAPID project which demonstrate the potential for further use of the Apple system. In general, the evaluation team believes that more attention should be given to training and follow-up activities that would build upon these potential uses of the Apple technology.

One of the original objectives of the RAPID project was to educate USAID and Embassy staff about the role of population dynamics in achieving the economic objectives of developing countries. It was hoped that by increasing awareness and understanding, USAID and Embassy staff would introduce more concern about population growth in their own discussions with host-country officials, and thereby reinforce and broaden the outreach efforts of USAID population officers. The evaluation team had few opportunities to address this point. Indeed, it may be too early to determine whether this objective has been achieved. The team's impression is that in the countries that were visited, the project has had a minimal impact only on raising the levels of information, awareness, and concerns of USAID and Embassy staff. Those who earlier were convinced of the importance of population remain convinced; those who were not convinced continue to believe that population is someone else's business.

7. *Have the project's and contractor's staff fully supported the AID's population program?*

On the whole, the evaluation team found that The Futures Group is highly regarded as a competent group of professionals who are very responsive to the USAID's interests. Visiting staff keep the missions informed of their activities in-country, but they make no excessive demands on the time of mission staff. The RAPID presentation itself is well-suited to the AID's primary focus on fertility, its impact on social and economic development, and the rationale for developing policies and programs to limit population growth.

The mission in Sudan had problems with the substantive adequacy of the draft of the RAPID presentation, the mode of presentation, and the poor timing of the proposed final presentation (September 1981). It cited as its reasons the sensitivities about population in Sudan, the delicate process of developing population constituencies in the country, and the mission's timetable for developing the population component of its own development-assistance strategy. The mission felt that the draft presentation was focused too heavily on population growth in a country where political leaders are convinced that labor shortages exist, and not enough on the two demographic issues that are perceived to be of greater relevance, migration and infant mortality. (The issues of political sensitivities and timing are detailed in the trip report. See Part II.) These criticisms were made, however, in the context of a general concern that mission staff are heavily "burdened" by having to provide support to 17 centrally-funded population projects which, together, occupy "75 percent" of the health officer's time. (There is no full-time AID population officer in Sudan.) RAPID was seen as a centrally-funded project that reflects no understanding of local realities and over which the mission has limited control.

The evaluation team believes that the RAPID project is substantively well-suited to the AID's population program and that The Futures Group has been highly responsive to the AID's interests.

Recommendations

11. The Futures Group should continue to try to identify local institutions involved in social and economic planning and training that are willing to do follow-up. Family planning associations which can and want to make RAPID presentations should be encouraged to do so, but The Futures Group and the AID missions should continue to seek first a government agency, or an institution with an established reputation in population or development analysis, that has been identified and is willing to help make presentations.

12. Training of host-country nationals in countries where computers have been left behind should be strengthened to enable local personnel to modify the basic presentation, to adapt it to new data or additional local concerns, and to correct mechanical problems with the computer hardware.

13. Technical support should be given to other AID contractors (e.g., the IPPF, the CDC, Westinghouse, WFS) to help them integrate the Apple system into their projects. If necessary, the contract should be amended to ensure that such support is provided.

14. If The Futures Group is to become involved in training host-country staff in the technical aspects of sectorial analyses, it must develop, with the help of the AID, a more comprehensive and operational set of guidelines on priorities, categories of staff to be trained, and the content of appropriate training programs. If necessary, the contract should be amended to clarify this role.

15. National agencies and AID missions which receive computer equipment and training should be asked to report to the contractor on presentations, audiences, related media coverage, and direct and indirect impact.

16. The Futures Group should try to maintain communication between local follow-up institutions and other RAPID projects around the world. This action would ensure that these institutions are better informed and less isolated than they now may be. As part of an international network, they could learn about new uses for the model and other presentations. A quarterly report on the activities of The Futures Group, countries that staff have visited, presentations, new programs, and training

would suffice. The report should be translated into languages other than English and it should be distributed to the AID missions, which could use it to report on the use of computers that have been left behind. An elaborate or printed newsletter is not needed.

17. In countries where RAPID presentations have been favorably received, population officers in the missions should be encouraged to broaden their contacts among host-country officials who are not directly concerned with health and family planning. They should also try to identify ways to respond to other population-related needs and concerns. Centrally-funded intermediaries should be used if bilateral funds are not available.

18. All USAID and Embassy staff, in addition to population officers, should continue to be encouraged to introduce into their discussions with host-country officials their concerns about unchecked population.

VIII. MANAGEMENT

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The Futures Group is a private, for-profit organization incorporated in the State of Connecticut. (An organizational chart of The Futures Group is provided in Appendix D.) A corporate vice president is stationed full-time in Washington, D.C. Empowered to act on behalf of the corporation, he has full authority to negotiate and sign contracts.

The home office provides customary payroll, purchasing, legal, and accounting services. An imprest or "revolving" account is available to the Washington, D.C., office to facilitate operations.

The manager of the RAPID project is cognizant of the provisions in the AID contract for consultants, overseas travel, approvals for participants, trip reports, etc. (See Appendix C for a list of trip reports that were submitted during calendar year 1981. These reports were submitted promptly following the completion of travel.)

Personnel

Sixteen salaried staff (full- and part-time) are assigned to the RAPID project (see Appendix E). The Futures Group has always "charged-out" staff time by project. Computer summaries of staff time are available in the Washington, D.C., office. Recently, the "charge-out" system was extended to record staff time by country. (See Appendix F for a summary of person-hours recorded by country during the period November 28, 1980 - June 12, 1981.)

Finances

The approved budget of $3,957,438 covers a contract period of 63 months. It is qualified by Amendment No. 4 (September 30, 1980) which provides for firm funding of $2,674,999, and an additional $1,282,439, subject to no-fund availability. The financial status* of the project, as of June 30, 1981, is:

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* Additional details are given in Appendix H.

	AID Approved Budget (63 Months)	Expended Through 6/30/81 (45 Months)	Balance Available 7/1/81 - 12/31/82 (18 Months)
Direct Operations	$1,644,398	$ 877,635	$766,763
Subcontract	756,767	554,647	202,120
TOTAL	$2,401,165	$1,432,282	$968,883

Costs are recorded according to the customary object classes. Among direct costs are printing, graphics and reproduction, telephone, postage, messenger service, and consultants.

The Washington, D.C., office maintains a monthly financial summary of the actual costs of projects. This summary keeps management informed of variances from programmed fiscal objectives.

RAPID has not mechanized the system to capture by country such costs as travel, consultants, participants, etc.

The workload (output) completed between October 1977 and May 1981 was not as large as it should have been, given the $2.2 million that were expended. Apparently, this was due to:

--start-up requirements;

--the need to introduce the program to the missions; and

--time and money lost because of problems with the subcontractor.

The project's obligating history has been:

Date	Average Monthly Expenditure Rate
Actual	
October 1977-December 1979 (27 Months)	$32,830
January 1980-December 1980 (12 Months)	74,392
January 1981-June 1981 (6 Months)	81,385
Required	
July 1981-December 1982 (18 Months)	$93,891

To meet obligations in the last 18 months, the project will have to expend each month approximately $93,891.

Questions About the Scope of Work

1. *How much time is involved in the preparation of the analyses?*

Between 62 and 103 person-days have been used to prepare an analysis for a Class II trip (i.e., an "own-country" analysis that can be displayed to the country team and selected government officials). Approximately 62 person-days are indicated where data are reasonably available and acceptably credible; 83 days are needed where data are not readily available and require more detailed verification; 103 days are required where data are difficult to locate, acquire, and verify. In linear time, it usually takes approximately 6 months to finish the presentation on a Class II trip. These estimates of time were calculated during discussions with the RAPID staff. They have not been matched to the recently introduced system for recording time by country (see Appendix I).

2. *How could the preparation of analyses be more effective and efficient? (Consider staff capability, role of the subcontractor, etc.)*

This question implies the presence of alternate strategies to prepare analyses that reduce linear time (fewer than 180 days) or costs (or both time and cost). The compression of time requires consideration of augmentation of research staff, but at increased cost; reduction of scope of data that have been collected; and development of innovative techniques that are applicable to the preparation process (i.e., individual specialization with subsequent "teaming" to prepare text). The history of subcontracting with General Electric Tempo and Pennsylvania State University indicate that this approach has limited value. The specifications are too difficult to write, quality control is not practical, and enforcement of delivery schedules is unlikely. These alternatives should be considered and a final presentation scheduled only after all aspects of the analysis have been reviewed with the AID mission and host-country nationals.

3. *What is the range of costs to prepare analyses?*

The estimated costs to prepare a presentation for a Class II trip range from $19,313 to $27,579. One reason for the range is that additional time is required where the data are difficult to locate, acquire, and verify. (See Appendix J.)

4. *Are the number of analyses required in the contract reasonable, given the contractor's budget and staff resources? Should the number of required analyses be changed?*

The resources available at this time are sufficient to execute the contract. For programmatic reasons, it may be beneficial to reduce the number of analyses to meet the constraints on time and quality.

5. *Is the number of countries targeted for presentations reasonable, given the contractor's budget and staff resources?*

In responding to this question, one assumes that the budgeted $3,957,438 will be obligated and made available to The Futures Group. The respondent also must address not only the requirements for presentations, but other related efforts as well. The workload may be summarized as follows:

Workload (Outputs)	Estimated Per Contract	Completed As Of May 1981	Required June 1981-Dec. 1982
Preparation of Country Analyses	45	31[a]	14
Overseas Presentations	160	76	84
Computers To Be Installed	20	12	8
Personnel To Be Trained	30	15	15
Supplemental Studies	3	0	3

[a] 13 finished and 18 ready for Class II trip presentation.

The balance of funds available as of July 1, 1981, was $968,883. Given this figure, one can estimate the costs of the work that must be done between July 1981 and December 1982. For all the items listed above, except the preparation of country analyses, the costs would be:

84 Presentations To Be Done	
Travel, 63 Trips @ $4,430	$279,090
Consultants, 255 Days @ $193/Day	49,215
3 Supplemental Studies	
RAPID "Retro"	$ -0-
104D Study	150,000
Cost-Benefit Study with Consultants	50,000
8 Computers	$ 32,000
15 Participants	
Travel, 15 Trips @ $3,000	$ 45,000
TOTAL	$605,305
Dollars Available for Direct Operations and Subcontracts, As of July 1, 1981	$968,883
Balance Available for 14 Preparations	$363,578

It is more difficult to estimate the costs for 14 preparations because of the range of costs. If, for example, all 14 preparations are for African countries, exposure to the higher cost range would be greater. Assumptions have been made for a mix of costs to prepare analyses. The results are:

	Projected Balance	Projected Balance	Projected Balance
	$363,578	$363,578	$363,578
Assumption 1			
7 Preparations @ $19,313	-135,191		
7 Preparations @ $23,608	-165,256		
Assumption 2			
7 Preparations @ $23,608		-165,256	
7 Preparations @ $27,579		-193,053	
Assumption 3			
14 Preparations @ $27,579			-386,106
Estimated Balance, December 31, 1982	$63,131	$5,269	($22,528)

Admittedly, there are many other prospective "mixes" with an equal number of estimated balances as of December 31, 1982. Sixteen of 22 analyses for African nations have been drafted. Thus, it appears that the costs for the remaining preparations would not all be in the upper range. The team's conclusion is that the total workload, including presentations, is adequately funded.

Recommendations

19. Additional in-country collaboration may cost more, but it can be financed by adjusting, if necessary, the total number of country analyses. The team recommends that this action be taken to increase collaboration.

IX. FUTURE DIRECTIONS

IX. FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Recommendations

In two areas, improvements may be considered to guide the direction of the project.

20. The current contract with The Futures Group can be continued. Activities can be restricted to serving institutions that now have micro-computers; developing a limited number of new country or subnational analyses that follow the RAPID model; updating the data in a limited number of analyses; and providing additional special presentations when opportunities present themselves.

21. A new proposal can be prepared to develop additional software modules so that, in addition to RAPID presentations, the micro-computers can be used to address a broader range of population-related interests. The modules might include the components of fertility change that are based on Bongaarts' model of the proximate determinants of fertility; methods to set targets for family planning programs, including contraceptive mixes and the levels of use needed to reach demographic targets; a cost-benefit analysis of family planning programs; data from developed countries and from successful programs in developing countries; and a display of the results of the WFS and contraceptive prevalence surveys for government leaders and national television. The AID should issue a Request for Proposals on this work. Adequate lead time should be provided, and widespread competition that involves the not-for-profit organizations should be encouraged.

Part Two

TRIP REPORTS

I. RAPID IN BRAZIL

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Summary

The RAPID project in Brazil is still in the earliest stages. Despite two site visits, in October 1980 and March 1981, and the considerable interest of several Brazilian institutions, the computer that was left in Brazil has not been used because of technical difficulties. The final presentation and additional training have not been scheduled, nor have plans for follow-up been prepared.

The major decision about the local sponsors--both persons and institutions--was made following consultation with the USAID. The IBGE (the national census bureau), other state agencies, and BEMFAM* were interested in making a presentation and serving as the institutional sponsor. Dr. Rubens Vaz da Costa, a distinguished economist and secretary of economy and planning for the State of São Paulo, the most populous and developed state in Brazil, was selected. The final selection was based, presumably, on the personal interest and stature of Dr. da Costa. Dr. da Costa is well-respected and has long been an advocate of population and family planning. Dr. da Costa will keep the computer; five of his staff will be trained to use it.

The RAPID Model

Dr. da Costa is interested in using the computer interactively to show the economic and social repercussions of various population projections and to present these data to political leaders. He stresses the need for more data and a larger presentation on internal migration, by state and by rural-urban mix. He also is interested in determining and showing the date when the rate of population growth first began to decline and the date when the annual numerical increase began to decline. These dates may be 10 years apart. A program that could show relative costs and both short- and long-term implications would be valuable also, according to Dr. da Costa.

Dr. da Costa has not seen a RAPID presentation. He probably will have many more suggestions later. Others who were queried by the evaluators said that Dr. da Costa's excellent professional skills as an economist and his reputation will make him an effective high-level presenter.

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* Brazilian Society for Family Welfare.

Preparation of the Analysis

During the visit in March, The Futures Group worked closely with Dr. da Costa's staff on data, offered an initial set of data, and received updates and corrections from various sources. Better data are anticipated with the publication of the Brazilian census of 1980, which is due shortly. There has been close collaboration in putting the most up-to-date data into RAPID.

One of the weaknesses of the RAPID project is that The Futures Group makes only two or three brief (one-week) visits to each country. The staff cannot establish in such a brief time a close collaborative relationship. The sponsoring agency in Brazil did more than the agency in Peru to check and correct data and send new data to Washington, but in neither country did the local sponsoring institution seem to know at the time of the evaluation what The Futures Group planned to do next. Neither knew when to expect the next visit, whether additional training would be provided and, if so, when and where. In Brazil, it was not known when or how the technical problems would be solved. Also, neither the "User's Guide" nor the basic manual had been translated into Portuguese, although the blue-covered draft document was in that language.

A monthly status report on RAPID that contains descriptions of earlier trips, presentations, results, and future plans would be extremely useful to all institutions involved in the project. If regular communication were established, the other sponsors would feel less isolated, more knowledgeable about the entire project, and be stimulated perhaps to request additional presentations. These groups could get ideas from one another about models, new software, training, and presentations in other countries that would be useful during follow-up. This writer is not referring to a formal, printed newsletter, but to a typed memorandum sent from Washington to all RAPID users with APPLE computers and to the appropriate AID missions. The objective would be to keep all the parties in closer touch with the entire project. (Perhaps the project monitor at the AID could put together one or two reports as a model and have them translated into Spanish and Portuguese.)

Presentations

No presentations have been made since the March visit of Stover and Queralt. A major problem is that Brazilian television is incompatible with the television monitor. Brazil uses a modified PAL (European) system known as Pal-M which, with U.S. equipment, does not provide color and can distort image. The Pal-M format was devised to reduce foreign competition in manufacturing television sets, but Brazilians now adapt their own sets. Brazilians have no experience, however, in modifying a computer on Pal-M. Dr. da Costa is reluctant to risk any damage to the computer, and thus,

he has not used the computer that was left behind. Neither he nor his staff know if and when another RAPID visit will be made. No one knows if and when staff will be sent to the U.S. for training.

On April 2, John Stover wrote to Dr. da Costa, summarizing the agreement to provide data. On May 21, Dr. da Costa, who had been away when the letter arrived, responded that he and his staff were eager to begin work. It is not clear that staff training, which may take place in Washington, will precede the visit. The technical problem should be resolved promptly, either with the arrival of new equipment or the modification of old equipment.

Training

As in Peru and Honduras, a careful assessment should be made of the various uses for the APPLE and the RAPID presentation, and full training and software should be provided as soon as possible to enable the Ministry of Planning in São Paulo to use the computer to capacity.

Installation of Equipment

Technical problems with Pal-M must be corrected. Dr. da Costa probably can provide a television monitor and cover other costs from ministry funds.

Follow-up

In Brazil, the major issue of follow-up (if technical problems can be resolved) will be how many, which, and in what priority will other institutions be given APPLE computers, training, and an opportunity to do RAPID presentations. BEMFAM, the family planning association, is eager to make a presentation and has sent a demographer to The Futures Group for more information. Probably, BEMFAM would use RAPID well, for example, at its numerous seminars and workshops, but RAPID should not be identified exclusively with BEMFAM. Brazil is a large and diverse country, with highly developed expertise, and population and family planning is a sensitive issue. Therefore, a number of different organizations, including agencies of the national government, other state governments, and, perhaps, research institutions, should be encouraged to use RAPID.

The first step in follow-up is for the AID, The Futures Group, and Dr. da Costa to devise a multi-institutional strategy for Brazil and to prepare a schedule for training, new presentations, and the installation of equipment over 12-18 months. Brazil has applied for a $26 million

UNFPA grant for family planning information and communication (which will, undoubtedly, include services). Attitudes seem to be changing fast, and RAPID could assume a useful role. An active, carefully developed strategy, and not a passive response to requests, is needed to maximize results and to help ensure that RAPID is seen as a broadly-based Brazilian effort, and not as a U.S. project.

Contraceptive prevalence surveys are now under way throughout Brazil. In São Paulo, the CPS had great impact when the results (showing 63 percent prevalence) were released, and it speeded the application for UNFPA funds. Other survey results may prompt other policy responses.

The Futures Group should develop immediately the software needed for graphic presentations of CPS results as soon as they are available. Such presentations could easily be shown on national television.

A meeting should be called to determine how data can best be presented (e.g., as comparisons of prevalence and method mix by state, age of user, population in need, and availability of information). There would be immediate opportunity for impact on policy that should not be ignored. The RAPID project should be sufficiently flexible to respond to such opportunities; it should not have to depend on one fixed model. (Presentations would be appropriate also for Honduras and Peru, both of which are undertaking a CPS.)

Impact

It is too soon to measure impact, but eventually an assessment could be made using the measures applied in Honduras and Peru. If RAPID can move vigorously along the lines suggested in Part I, Chapter VII, additional impact might become readily apparent.

Contractors' Relations with AID Mission

Both The Futures Group and Battelle Memorial Institute, which is conducting PDP II, have worked closely with the AID mission in Brazil. The distance between Brasilia and São Paulo and technical problems with RAPID have limited the mission's ability to provide help. More reporting from The Futures Group would be useful, even if (or, perhaps, because) no immediate actions are scheduled.

Relations Between the RAPID and Battelle Projects

To date, no real links can be discerned between the RAPID and Battelle projects. Battelle is working with BEMFAM, an institution that is interested also in RAPID (Battelle staff member Cynthia Gilley is highly regarded) and could be a funding mechanism for seminars and workshops where RAPID is shown. However, Battelle staff do not have the technical skills to resolve the operational problems of RAPID. Other organizations might be able to provide at a lower cost a mechanism to fund meetings and provide for non-technical needs.

II. REVIEW OF ACTIVITIES IN EGYPT

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At this time, Battelle is not conducting PDP II activities in Egypt. On this trip to Cairo, the consultant focused entirely on RAPID. Seventeen interviews were conducted in five days. (See Appendix A.) In addition, USAID files on the RAPID project were reviewed. The following is a summary of the interviews and the consultant's impressions.

Background

The initial demonstration of the RAPID technology, which used Jordan as the model, was presented to the USAID/Cairo staff in January 1979. This was followed by a request to prepare a presentation on Egypt. The presentation of the model for Egypt was reviewed in Cairo in December 1979. Five "final" presentations were made in the city in January 1980, including one before the prime minister and one before the Supreme Council on Population and Family Planning, of which Mrs. Anwar Sadat is a member. President Sadat and some of his senior ministers saw the presentation in January 1981. RAPID also was presented at the Symposium on Population and Development Issues in Cairo in April 1981. (Details of these presentations are contained in the trip reports for each of these periods.)

There was significant collaboration with Egyptian demographers to prepare and revise the presentation, particularly after the presentations in January 1980. It was suggested that additional and revised data be incorporated into the presentation. This was done.

One objective of the 1981 symposium was to examine the RAPID presentation. A concomitant technical review and political legitimation were intended also. The results of interviews in June and July, 1981, suggest that some questions about the data that were used in the presentation remain, long after the symposium.

Surprisingly, the validity of the RAPID model has never been questioned, either by the persons who were interviewed or in the written documents. There is some confusion, though, about whether the model is primarily a "planning tool" or a "teaching device." Several of the persons who were interviewed are well aware that RAPID is neither an economic model nor a planning tool, and everyone considers it to be a useful device for bringing together in a unifying format a large amount of information. Only one interviewee, an Egyptian who has been involved in the presentations and who is likely to take part in follow-up activities, discussed the facts that the RAPID model is designed to produce "negative derivatives" to show the impact of population growth on any sector of the

economy and cannot deal with economic tradeoffs or interactions among numerous sectors. For those reasons, this official said, there is some concern about presenting RAPID to technical economic planners in Egypt. He himself would be prepared to do this, because, he said, he believes that RAPID is an excellent heuristic device that is capable of incorporating a wide range of assumptions and data.

Several of the people who were interviewed raised questions about the data that have been incorporated into the RAPID presentation. With only one exception, these questions were political and not technical. Several people noted that Egyptian institutions themselves produce conflicting demographic and economic data, and that the RAPID data need to be reviewed further and "legitimated" by Egyptian scholars before they can be certified as free of external or imported taint. No one questioned the "accuracy" of the data used in the model, but several people suggested that widespread concerns about the "foreignness" of the model and the data it uses were not laid to rest at the April 1981 symposium, which was intended, in part, to review and legitimate the RAPID presentation. Only one person (in the Ministry of Education) complained that erroneous data were used. His proposed alternatives for the education sector are of dubious validity. Either for this or for other reasons, the specific objections of the Ministry of Education were not included among the comments about RAPID which were printed in the report on the symposium.

Several Egyptians said that the April symposium was "hastily prepared," and they suggested that another opportunity should be provided (in November 1981) to review the data. For the writer, the basic issues are bureaucratic in-fighting in determining whose data are to be considered the "official" or most accurate figures and political sensitivity to the highly visible external involvement of the USAID and The Futures Group in follow-up activities. These problems are not likely to be resolved at another large and public symposium.

Presentations

Embassy and USAID staff are unanimous in their praise for the professionalism and competence with which the RAPID presentations are made. The presenters, they observed, are responsive to the questions and concerns of their audiences. Neither stylistic nor substantive problems were cited. The Egyptian interviewees also are very positive about the professionalism of the presentations. Several suggested that although they had been aware of most facts, the presentation was useful in bringing the information together in a single framework. The assumptions underlying many of the projections were never explained, however; thus, "conclusions" were given even though adequate explanations and elaborations were lacking. This, it was felt, might detract from the effectiveness of the presentation. The assumptions may be elaborated during the

discussions that follow presentations, but some interviewees feel that pre-existing skepticism cannot be overcome in this way.

All the interviewees agree that the presentations were well-targeted at elite but non-specialist audiences. There is considerable doubt outside the State Information Service that the presentations can be adopted for mass audiences. RAPID focuses on the consequences of rapid population growth at the level of sectorial aggregates; it does not concentrate on consequences for the individual or the household. Nor does it consider the economic value of children to parents. As one respondent put it, "People are concerned about their families' welfare, not about the Egyptian budget."

This writer heard mixed opinions about the impact of the RAPID presentations on Egyptian policymakers. President Sadat's statement ("It's a nightmare") was cited often by Embassy and USAID officials, as was Mrs. Sadat's strong and favorable response. The Egyptian respondents agree that the presentations probably had a positive impact on senior government officials, but they noted that many of these officials (e.g., the prime minister, the deputy prime minister for economic and financial affairs, and members of the Supreme Council on Population and Family Planning) already are aware of the long-term impact of population growth on Egypt's development goals. Furthermore, the pre-existing or new interest of senior policymakers does not necessarily get communicated to the Egyptian bureaucracy, which is responsible for the implementation of policy. After all, Egypt has had an official, but ineffective, policy in support of reduced population growth and a national family planning program since 1965. According to the respondents, to increase impact among bureaucrats, RAPID will have to be translated into Arabic and accepted as an Egyptian product, and non-Egyptians involved in the project will have to maintain a very low profile.

Another point emerged clearly during several interviews: The technology itself is attractive. Several specific suggestions were made about the uses of the Apple II technology in health planning, economic planning, and communications. One person at the U.S. Embassy commented on this point spontaneously, warning that the Egyptians may be more impressed with the computer and its possibilities than with the underlying message about the effects of unchecked population.

Follow-up Activities

A series of follow-up activities has been planned that is based on RAPID. The Population and Family Planning Board intends to produce an Arabic-language version of RAPID for a "mid-level managerial and technocratic" audience. The State Information Service will work to "popularize RAPID for mass audiences."

The Population and Family Planning Board

In a Letter of Agreement, dated July 1, 1980, the USAID arranged to provide up to $155,000 to the PFPB to introduce RAPID demonstrations, training, and a curriculum to the Institute of National Planning, the Institute of Statistical Studies, the National Institute of Management, and the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). It also agreed to provide RAPID demonstrations and training workshops in Arabic for middle-level planners, other government employees, and graduate students and to increase public awareness of population issues by producing an Arabic-language film based on a simplified version of RAPID. To accomplish these objectives, the PFPB was to:

- Produce and distribute an Arabic version of the analysis of RAPID.
- Send teams of Egyptians to The Futures Group in Connecticut for training in RAPID presentations. The first group was to consist of five people: two operator-technicians, two presenters, and "a well-renowned and highly respected Egyptian commentator for an Arabic video presentation."
- Begin training seminars for "employees of Egyptian organizations and ministries in Cairo" after the Apple II computer arrived and the first group had been trained to present RAPID.
- Subsequently, train others who would make additional presentations in the governorates throughout Egypt.

One year later, in July 1981, this consultant learned that 1,000 copies of an Arabic version of the RAPID paper had been printed, but he was unable to find out whether they had been distributed and, if so, where. His impression is that the translations will be used in the training program. No one has been nominated for RAPID training in Connecticut, although a list of names had been promised by mid-July. A major difficulty, apparently, has been to identify a "well-renowned and highly respected" commentator who would be non-controversial and acceptable to everyone.

The Apple II computer was ordered from a distributor in California and was expected to arrive in Egypt on July 15. For all the other activities called for in the agreement, the computer and trained staff are required. The activities will not begin until training has been completed and the computer is on-site.

The State Information Service

Interviews were conducted with the senior consultant to the State Information Service's IEC project in population and with the chairman of the SIS. A paraphrase of conversations with these persons follows.

According to the consultant's sources, the State Information Service will mount a campaign of films, printed pamphlets, television programs, radio spots, and group discussions to convince rural peasants that they "must do their duty to help the government in facing this [population] problem." The SIS "will analyze the whole issue in a simple way and will convince them." The economic value of children is a complicated issue. In its analysis of arguments in favor of children, the SIS intends to show rural people that they are wrong, that more children cost them more money, that they will be better off with fewer better educated and healthier children. Convincing the population will be difficult, because the peasants say what they think an official wants to hear and do not speak their minds. But, as the consultant's sources emphasized, "We shall use our skills as communicators and we shall convince some, perhaps not all. Is there any other way?"

The SIS plans to produce 15 five-minute films. These will cover the relationship of population to five development sectors: education, housing, agriculture and land availability, labor, and health. Each film will be produced in three versions--one each for rural areas, the urban poor, and the urban middle-class. When this writer questioned the cost of the effort, he was told that perhaps only two versions would be needed. The urban and rural poor, perhaps, could see the same film. The consultant could obtain little information on the substantive content of the films, but he was assured that "the skills of a communicator can solve many problems."

The films will be produced in five steps.

1. The "raw material" for the films already has been requested from the relevant sectorial ministries. "Experts" in each ministry have promised to produce "data" by the end of July 1981.

2. A group of "experts" will meet to examine the raw data and "correct" whatever needs to be corrected.

3. SIS staff writers will prepare a manuscript for a popular booklet based on RAPID.

4. SIS staff writers will prepare film scripts.

5. Another group of "experts" will review the entire output.

Film production, this writer was told, has been scheduled for early August, despite the likelihood of delays while Ramadan is being celebrated (it begins on July 2) and the fact that the senior official responsible for coordinating the entire effort will be visiting the United States for a month, beginning August 2. The consultant is not of the impression that the substantive content of the films has been clarified. Nor does he think that the SIS is experienced in producing films of this kind.

The Ministry of Education has produced two manuscripts in Arabic that are based in part on RAPID. They are The Population Problem and Its Social Effects and The Population Problem in Egypt and Its Economic Effects. Intended for wide distribution through the SIS, they were given to that agency's staff for comment in May 1981. There had been no response by the time of the interview on July 2. The art in the manuscript is excellent and the messages are clear even to a non-Arabic reader. Some of the art is derived from RAPID graphics. The consultant was unable to determine the current status of the manuscripts, why the SIS has failed to provide feedback to the Ministry of Education, and whether the manuscripts are those which the SIS plans to use in its mass-communication effort.

Within the SIS, there appears to have been an internal shift of power over population activities. The recently-appointed chairman of the SIS declared that population activities "have reached a degree of sensitivity" that requires his personal involvement, and he intends to deal with population issues on a day-to-day basis. To this consultant, the chairman appears to be ambivalent about the proper role of government in family planning. The chairman stated that such words as "sex" and "contraception" still "cannot be used in Egypt" and that, although the Islamic clergy are somewhat more prepared to discuss birth spacing as a health measure, they are not prepared to support birth control. Some persons have suggested that the chairman is uncomfortable with the agency's efforts to promote the use of contraceptives and that he may regard RAPID, with its broader orientation and macroeconomic focus, as a politically safe and compatible approach to discussions of family planning. The consultant was not favorably impressed with the proposed approach, the substantive content, which appeared to be lacking, and follow-up efforts, which may or may not be valuable.

Conclusions

The RAPID presentations appear to have been well done and well received in Egypt. The Futures Group generally is regarded by both the USAID and the Egyptians as a competent, professional, responsive organization. The presentations afforded welcome opportunities to bring together senior government officials to consider population and development issues in a coherent and systematic framework. The Population Office of the USAID works primarily through the Ministry of Health; the RAPID project provided an opportunity for the staff to interact with senior

officials in other development sectors. Although the presentations may have created or increased awareness of population issues among some Egyptian leaders, the specific impact of RAPID on the views and perceptions of these persons cannot be determined.

Follow-up activities pose problems. Beyond training a small number of Egyptians to operate the computer and make the presentations, The Futures Group can assume only a limited role. It would not be cost-effective to send staff from The Futures Group to Egypt to make additional presentations in the governorates. A presentation in English is not likely to have significant impact below the very top layers of the Egyptian bureaucracy. Moreover, many Egyptian officials are highly sensitive to the further visible involvement of American experts and the USAID. What these facts suggest is that if it becomes involved in follow-up, The Futures Group should provide primarily short-term training and technical assistance to Egyptians to refine, elaborate, or modify the RAPID presentation for specific audiences. The PFPB has designed a program to create an Arabic version of RAPID and intends to train government staff to present that model. This seems to be a sound approach. Activities are, however, more than a year behind schedule.

The SIS program to "popularize RAPID" is poorly conceived, poorly organized, and lacking committed leadership. Given the responses of the interviewees, it is difficult to imagine that this program will have any impact on either individual attitudes or fertility behavior. Certainly, the effort will be expensive. The AID would do better to try to improve its efforts in information, education, and communication by concentrating on the benefits of family planning to the individual and the household than to support a program tied to a presentation that is intended for and aimed at an entirely different audience.

III. AN EVALUATION OF THE RAPID PROJECT IN HONDURAS

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Summary

The RAPID project in Honduras is the only RAPID project in Latin America that has been implemented in full. The progression of activities was as follows:

- An initial request for a RAPID demonstration was submitted by AID/Tegucigalpa in June 1978.
- A preliminary visit was made in September 1978.
- A draft of an analysis of Honduran data was prepared.
- A final analysis of the data was written.
- A Class II review presentation was made in Tegucigalpa in June 1978 by Claxton and Stover.
- A second Class II review presentation was made in February 1980 by Merrick and Yamashita.
- Computer training and training to present RAPID took place in Washington, D.C., in October 1980. Two Hondurans and one Paraguayan participated.
- Final presentations of RAPID were made in Honduras in November 1980. There were 16 sessions.
- An Apple computer was left with the ASHONPLAFA in November 1980.

The Futures Group met all its contractual obligations within the specified time. Delays occurred primarily because of the hesitation of the AID mission and the Embassy in 1979 and 1980.

Implicit in the concept of the RAPID project, as it was originally developed by the AID, is the assumption that policymakers will take immediate action after they have seen a presentation. The likelihood that this would occur seems to have been overestimated. Underestimated was the need to use RAPID in a continuing effort to build among the many different influential groups in a country an awareness of the effects of population. This is an important factor, particularly in extension of the project. Another major consideration in Honduras, and elsewhere as well,

is the selection of the sponsoring agency. In Honduras, the family planning association known as ASHONPLAFA was chosen.

In Honduras, as in all the other Latin American countries, several specific issues need to be considered. The following need to be examined:

1. Technical problems in ensuring full and versatile use of the Apple computer.

2. General plans to follow up the project (e.g., need for additional training, equipment, and personnel; need for funding to provide more presentations in different locations; etc.).

3. The relationship, if any, between the RAPID and Battelle projects.

Organization of the Report

In this trip report, the author discusses in order the questions raised in the scope of work. Two other questions about the relationship of the Battelle and RAPID projects to both the AID mission and to one another have been added.

The RAPID Model

The RAPID model is seen as an appropriate, simplified tool "to increase population awareness" among policymakers and other leaders in Honduras and to open a dialogue with many people. Those who have participated in presentations have suggested additions or changes to the model. For example, they have recommended the addition of modules on health and housing, assumption of a four- or five-child family by a specific date, which is considered to be more realistic than a two- or three-child family, and nonlinear changes in mortality.

Several of those who were interviewed suggested that presentations might be tailored to specific groups and even be simplified for use among regional and rural workers. Several persons noted that the enthusiasm and commitment of the presenter were the most important factors. The AID population officer and others responded positively to the following suggestions:

--that a new module be added and that it include factors that can influence fertility (e.g., age at marriage, breastfeeding, abortion, and especially family planning);

--that data be primarily for the period up to the year 2000, with the scale changed when necessary, because policymakers rarely plan that far into the future; and

--that regional RAPID presentations on Central America might be useful, because, if international travel were included, higher-level people would attend.

The ASHONPLAFA, encouraged by the AID mission, wanted to use the computer in management and operations (e.g., accounting, evaluation, commodity control, other activities unrelated to public presentations). For these purposes, additional programs and training would be required.

Critics of RAPID, especially some social scientists, point out that factors other than fertility and family planning (e.g., income redistribution) are also important and that if the government were more efficient, development would be more successful. The presenters do not deny the importance of these other factors, but they emphasize that fertility, as well as income redistribution, needs to be considered. (This seems to be a common issue in Latin America. The standard response of family planning advocates is to avoid general criticism of the government.)

Preparation of a RAPID Analysis

There was some contact among RAPID staff, personnel at CONSUPLANE, the state planning agency, and other Hondurans involved in gathering and inputting data. Data were collected between 1978 and 1980; those who were involved in the efforts are no longer working on the project. For this reason, it is difficult to ascertain the level of in-country involvement at that time. It does not seem to have been great. In fact, two Hondurans suggested that more local participation would have been beneficial. The interviewees were unanimous that the Honduran data that were available were not good. No one suggested that there were any serious problems with the substance of the model because local participation was minimal. The model is not perceived to be a Honduran creation, but the product of a private American agency. The model may have less impact because of this perception, but if presentations are now made by Hondurans, most audiences probably would be indifferent to the fact.

A booklet is available for distribution and is effective, not as a substitute for the computer, but as a reference tool. Errors in the first Spanish version are being corrected, and additional, attractive copies are being reprinted by the AID mission. One person who observed the presentation thinks that a simple pamphlet would be useful if RAPID were presented to less-educated audiences.

RAPID Presentations

Questions about presentations of RAPID relate to the activities which The Futures Group conducted between September 1978 and November 1980. The evaluators feel that The Futures Group successfully applied the basic strategy for various in-country presentations. (See Appendix B for a list of RAPID presentations in Honduras.)

In general, the key aspects of the strategy were well applied in Honduras. After the Honduran data were included in the model, a distinguished Paraguayan, Dr. Luis Ramirez-Boettner, was recruited by The Futures Group, and a "blitz" of presentations was made in November 1980 which reached approximately 500 people. (These presentations are described in K. Yamashita's trip report of December 5, 1980.) Three Hondurans were trained. One, Dr. Rigoberto Alvarado, was once the vice minister of health. The other two trainees, Rudolfo Aplicano and Margarita Suazo, are computer specialists from CONSUPLANE, the Honduran National Planning Council. These persons participated in briefings and have made five presentations that have reached between 100 and 150 people.

On four occasions, the computer did not function; the substitute slide show which was used for three presentations was not considered to be as effective as the computer. One computer presentation scheduled during the evaluators' visit was canceled because the new disc drive did not work. An additional problem was the lack of technical instruction manuals in Spanish. The technical presenters implied that RAPID would be a "dead project" if the disc drive and related technical problems were not corrected. They said that they were disappointed that fewer presentations than expected had been made since November 1980.

The presentations are now seen as a team effort to which Dr. Alvarado, a former vice minister of health and the chief presenter, lends stature and provides medical expertise and to which the computer experts add their knowledge of demography. All three seem to be confident of their ability to present the material and to anticipate and lead discussions about the model following a presentation. An official at the AID mission commented that Dr. Alvarado is an excellent teacher who knows when to include personal anecdotes and how to relate the model to the experiences of the viewers, be they rural labor leaders or physicians.

Persons who attend the presentations tend to fall into one of three groups. They may be persons in high (or potentially high) positions--vice ministers or ministers of finance. It was for high-level officials that RAPID originally was intended. In a second category fall the influential groups to which the presenters have personal ties and for which sessions can be arranged readily. This group includes Rotary clubs, medical groups, the Forestry Cooperative, unions, and one of the three

political parties. The third group includes all other persons who are willing to attend a presentation.

At least four groups have not responded to invitations to attend or arrange presentations. Among them are most of the current government ministers, except the minister of finance, and members of the Constituent Assembly, women's organizations, and international agencies. To what can this apparent lack of interest be attributed? In part, it may reflect the current political situation: Elections are scheduled for November 29 and most political decisions are being postponed. It may, as in the case of a key woman leader, be attributed to personal opposition. The need to attend to more pressing current business may also be a reason.

To date, medical personnel appear to have responded more enthusiastically than any other group. They recognize that there is an unfilled demand for family planning. Perhaps they respond especially well to Dr. Alvarado. The National Association of Campesinos of Honduras (ANACH), a union, also has responded warmly. This may be because rural labor leaders have direct experience with population pressures on land and resources and want to change lagging land reform. Although the minister of finance seems to be enthusiastic and wants to arrange a showing for the president, it is possible that there will be no follow-through because government officials seem to be refraining from expressing any official reaction or effecting any policy. This is disappointing, given the objectives of RAPID, but it is a situation beyond the control of both the AID and The Futures Group.

Opposition to population policy and family planning in Honduras comes from various sources. Most vocal are the Marxist-oriented social scientists and the university and the Catholic Church, which is said to be weak in Honduras. Others oppose population control because they take the geopolitical or military view that Honduras is relatively large and underpopulated compared to other countries in Central America.

Those with whom the evaluators spoke indicated that the situation in Honduras had changed in the last five years. Some are surprised that Dr. Alvarado speaks about family planning during RAPID presentations without provoking criticism. Others think that as a family planning agency, the ASHONPLAFA still cannot attract the highest-level policymakers to RAPID presentations.

Training, Installation, and Follow-up

The training in and installation of RAPID in Honduras must be discussed in the context of follow-up because the issue is, training and installation for what? Training and the installation of equipment are adequate, given the current level of activity (less than one presentation per month) and technical problems (approximately 20 percent (1 of 5)

technical breakdowns). They cannot be considered adequate if more extensive follow-up is desired. Thus, the issue of what kind of follow-up would be desirable should be considered, given the potential of the project as a whole.

What institution should assume responsibility for follow-up? In Honduras, there is no official population or family planning policy, no influential government body willing to give frequent, active RAPID presentations, and no strong and distinguished social science research institute or university population center.

The population officer in Honduras feared that RAPID would "stay on the shelf" if presentations were assigned to CONSUPLANE. AID personnel, therefore, recommended that the ASHONPLAFA be assigned to follow up RAPID. Under the circumstances, the selection of the agency seems to have been reasonable. This family planning association is eager to take on the role, if resources are available. But it faces a number of serious constraints, several of which are described below.

A. Training

Training is not adequate to modify the existing programs with new data or new modules for individual sectors. It is not adequate to operate RAPID interactively, to input data or models from CONSUPLANE, or to analyze data from the contraceptive prevalence survey now under way. Westinghouse plans to use RAPID at a CPS seminar, but it will not be possible to display and manipulate the CPS data, which are important for policymaking.

Staff are not trained sufficiently to deal with technical and mechanical problems and to use the Apple computer for accounting, evaluation, analysis of the CPS, and other internal activities for which additional software is needed. Moreover, the technical personnel who have been trained work for CONSUPLANE, not the ASHONPLAFA, and they are not readily available for presentations. One person may join the latter organization, however. In addition, funds are not available for travel and per diem for staff who could make presentations elsewhere in the country.

B. Installation of Equipment

A television monitor was not provided with the computer. It is not stipulated in the contract that the equipment must be provided, even though the monitor is the dramatic element in the presentation. When staff present RAPID, they must borrow a monitor from the United States International Communication Agency (USICA) or give presentations at the

U.S. Embassy, or buy or rent a monitor. The ASHONPLAFA is trying to procure a monitor. Until a monitor is made available, staff cannot use RAPID as a communications tool to promote awareness of the effects of population.

At this time, neither the disc drive nor the cassettes for RAPID are functioning properly, and either new discs or additional training is needed to enable staff to make presentations. Cassettes can be damaged by humidity. The ASHONPLAFA would like to receive funding to refurbish a room for regular presentations. With this kind of facility, the need for travel around Tegucigalpa would be minimized and equipment probably would function more reliably.

It appears to be in the interest of the United States to have Honduras conduct follow-up presentations in which U.S. involvement is kept to the minimum. After a brief training session, which would include training in the use of other Apple software, either in Honduras or the U.S., the ASHONPLAFA should be encouraged to carry on independently of the AID and other external agencies. Funds should be raised locally to support the project. It should not be difficult to interest the business community in supporting the effort.

Other agencies could use RAPID to make their demographic presentations more interesting. CONSUPLANE might be able to use RAPID graphics to illustrate some of its models. The UNFPA expert adviser noted that RAPID could be used in training demographers, either to stimulate interest initially or to test knowledge acquired in seminars.

To launch an immediate, organized follow-up program in which RAPID models and technology are used would require more training, more software, more equipment, improved facilities, and an operating budget. The ASHONPLAFA has prepared a budget of $17,000 and is seeking help from the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) or the USAID to implement the program. No other agency has either the capability or is willing to carry out this task at this time. Increased efforts to stimulate awareness of population could contribute to more vigorous population family planning policies in 1982, when a new government is installed. For these reasons, the evaluators recommend that the ASHONPLAFA receive support to conduct follow-up activities.

Impact

Those who are involved in RAPID presentations all say that the presentation in Honduras "had great impact" and that it attracted people's interest and attention. They believe it is a good technique to stimulate discussion even among critics. The obvious enthusiasm of the three presenters and their desire to do more presentations seem to be a genuine testimonial to the reception that RAPID has received. The evaluators were

unable to attend a presentation because the drive disc was not functioning. They missed their only opportunity to assess the effectiveness of RAPID with people who are not closely involved in and promoting the presentations.

The political hiatus in Honduras makes it unlikely that RAPID will have any effect on government policy before 1982. Three events have occurred, however, that are linked to presentations of RAPID.

- The Pinu Party, which includes 3 of the 70 members of the Constituent Assembly, adopted the Declaration of Gualala that contains a plank on the need for family planning to limit population growth.

- A member of the Pinu Party who is the treasurer of the ASHONPLAFA inserted into the draft of the new constitution a clause on the right to family planning services.

- ANACH, the rural workers' union, is negotiating with Development Associates to set up a rural development and family planning program for 80,000 families. Jolin Mendez, head of the union, has favored family planning in the past, but, according to an AID official, it was other ANACH leaders' enthusiastic reception of RAPID that encouraged Mendez to seek a specific project at this time. (An earlier project of the Family Planning Association had collapsed.)

In none of these instances did RAPID change the minds of persons who are opposed to population and family planning, but the presentation did strengthen the hand of known supporters and it may have encouraged them to take further action.

Policymaking is a gradual, cumulative process in which a single intervention, such as RAPID, rarely causes a major shift but may contribute to a changing climate of influential opinion and thus to an eventual shift in policy. At this time, because of the political hiatus, RAPID might best be used to create a climate of population awareness among a number of influential groups and among persons who may come into power in 1982 but who are unlikely to express their commitments now. RAPID should be presented by respected Hondurans, and not under the auspices of the U.S. Government. It should be modified and tailored to the interests of different groups, including grassroots organizations and regional workers, not only top policymakers.

Contractors' Relations with AID Mission

Several AID personnel in Washington have questioned the role of and need for intermediaries in the development of policy and their relationship with AID missions. The evaluators questioned staff at the AID mission specifically on their relationships with the two contractors and with intermediaries generally. Four persons at the mission stated unanimously that staff of both Battelle and The Futures Group keep the mission fully informed of their activities in Honduras and work well and closely with the mission. The contractors' staff are considered to be well qualified. Asked specifically whether RAPID should be included in the operating budget of AID missions to encourage internal use of the model, all AID officials replied in the negative. They think that the project should be conducted by an intermediary working closely with an Honduran agency.

AID staff who monitor the activities of the intermediary and the local agency value the technical expertise of the contractors. They want the contractors to spend much more time in-country so that they can provide assistance when it is needed and help relieve the heavy burden for monitoring that falls to a limited number of personnel at the mission. Their major complaint is that temporary duty (TDY) should last several weeks or months, and not several days. They regret the cutbacks in funding of intermediaries such as Pathfinder and the lack of a PDP II program in Honduras.

Of particular concern is the need for support from Battelle, because no other agency is available to translate the demographic and budgetary data from CONSUPLANE into simple, policy-relevant papers and proposals that policymakers might review and adopt. CONSUPLANE can produce models with data, but it is not likely to prepare policy options as recommendations. This would be a useful and appropriate role for a politically-skilled intermediary, but no such intermediary seems to be available at this time. Although in the view of the AID this task has lower priority than extension of family planning services, it would be worthwhile to undertake the effort now to encourage the creation and adoption of policy after the election.

Both the U.S. Ambassador and the acting director of the mission mentioned that the subject of population is sensitive, that an earlier bilateral program had backfired in the mid-1970s, and that intermediaries could take on and promote activities to test reactions while permitting the U.S. Government to keep a distance. Ambassador Binns said that he would be pleased to invite ministers to watch RAPID and then discuss it with them, but he does not want to have to "twist the arms" of Honduran officials so that they will come to presentations.

Relations Between the RAPID and Battelle Projects

It was thought that Battelle might provide follow-up after RAPID presentations. This was part of the rationale for a combined evaluation of the Battelle and RAPID projects. In Honduras, follow-up by Battelle would not appear to be either possible or desirable. In fact, the history of the two projects suggests that the character of each is entirely different and that close liaison would not be possible. The purpose of the Battelle project was to produce a Honduran model for analyzing the budgetary costs of social services in light of trends in population growth, a knowledge of which would be useful to trained government planners. The computer programs are supposed to be interactive, but the equipment cannot produce graphics. It is housed in the government planning ministry, a weak unit in the government's policymaking process that has the potential for greater influence. The RAPID project was designed to produce a simple but dramatic visual presentation of the effects of population growth on food, resources, education, employment, etc., that would attract the attention of policymakers. It is not interactive. Furthermore, because only a computer, and not a television monitor, was left behind, it is difficult to give additional visual presentations.

The Apple computer was left with the ASHONPLAFA, an activist family planning association with which the high-level presenter has close ties. The two trained technicians are government employees in CONSUPLANE and are not readily available to the ASHONPLAFA. To date, CONSUPLANE and ASHONPLAFA have cooperated only in jointly sponsoring the CPS. RAPID eventually may be used to present the results of that survey, but appropriate software and training will have to be provided first.

The head of the statistics unit at CONSUPLANE has not seen RAPID. There are few staff in the unit and the director has not considered how the Battelle and RAPID projects might be related. Because there is no government population policy, the unit cannot use RAPID to promote population control. This is the principal reason that the computer was left with the ASHONPLAFA, and not CONSUPLANE.

Eventually, if the ASHONPLAFA obtains a television monitor for graphic presentations and if personnel are able to use the new Honduran model and data with the Apple equipment and monitor, the Apple and the monitor might be used to make CONSUPLANE's material easier to understand. Conversely, the CONSUPLANE model might be used to make the RAPID presentation more sophisticated. These are hypotheses. Such steps are not likely to be taken soon.

The persons who will be using the RAPID and Battelle models seem to have little in common. Their methods also appear to be quite different. The Family Planning Association, and not a budgeting or social science research institution, would seem to be the most appropriate agency in

Honduras to provide follow-up to RAPID. If it is selected, it will need substantial assistance in a variety of forms to organize extensive presentations.

IV. THE RAPID PROJECT IN PERU

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Summary

In Peru, two of the three visits required in the subcontract have been completed. An appropriate collaborating institution in the government has been identified, and technicians are being trained. At the time of the team's visit, RAPID staff were planning the final high-level presentation, which was scheduled for July. This report contains an assessment only of activities completed through June 1981. It is impossible to state in advance what the impact will be of the major presentation scheduled for July. Staff of The Futures Group visited Peru in November 1980 and May 1981. Progress toward the final presentation has been rapid.

The RAPID Model

The persons with whom the evaluators talked are neither technical demographers nor economists, and they have had little experience in building models. They noted that the RAPID model is simple and one-dimensional, and they understand the need for this kind of model and for explanations that different assumptions may be used. Peruvians frequently mentioned that the model should include:

--health data;

--migration between regions and rural-urban mix;*

--nutrition;

--other short-term factors (e.g., employment, health costs) that have immediate relevance to policymakers; and

--assumption of a four-child family. The two-child family by 2000 is seen as too unlikely to be taken seriously by policymakers in Peru.

One person proposed that a caduceus, and not a nurse's cap, be used as a symbol of medical personnel because medical doctors are held in higher esteem than nurses.

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* Migration is a major concern in Peru.

During interviews, the evaluators asked for suggestions to improve the model. The respondents recommended that a module on the Bongaarts model be included to show how age at marriage, lactation, abortion, and contraception can affect fertility at various demographic and developmental levels. It also was suggested that the model include data on costs of health and other services that are calculated per capita, per family, per clinic, etc. These data are available in Peru. Because policymakers usually must make decisions about differences in funding levels rather than demographic projections, the model should give an indication of costs, however simplified and short-term it may be. (This problem is not the same as the issue about tradeoffs which was discussed in Washington, D.C., but talks are moving in that direction.) Such information is especially important to the National Institute of Statistics, where the computer will be housed, because the INE is in the Finance Ministry and prepares the budget.

The evaluators asked whether it was necessary to emphasize short-term data over long-term data. Most respondents think that short-term data should receive the most attention. Many said, "No one looks beyond 18 months or two years or, at the longest, four years." A shorter period of time would, it is felt, not only increase RAPID's impact on policymakers; it also would eliminate some of the dissatisfaction with data and projections that are so far into the future that officials regard them as unreliable and improbable.

To stress short-term data, the dates 1985, 1990, and 1995 need to be indicated in the graphics and projections must stop at 2000. This would change the scale to make population growth in the near future appear to be greater than it is now. Currently, it is visually reduced because the scale must be large enough to encompass data to 2010 or 2025. (See Exhibit A.) The director of the INE wants to retain the long-term (post-2000) data and to use RAPID in the schools to educate youth about conditions likely to be present in the future.

Preparation of an Analysis

Several questions were raised about the preparation of the analysis and the extent of collaboration. In their discussions with the evaluators, the director of the Institute of Statistics, which will make RAPID presentations after the final showing in July, and the four technicians who are being trained to operate the program specified a variety of problems. These persons do not have a Spanish translation of either the "User's Guide" or the instructions for the basic model, and they have difficulty working with the English text. They said that they have seen neither the data that were input nor a data loading sheet that lists both data and sources. They noted that they have no opportunity to question the data or the assumptions and to offer corrected data. The precise dates to

Exhibit A

POPULATION GROWTH UNDER THREE FERTILITY ASSUMPTIONS, 1960-2025



which data such as birth rates refer are not indicated in the working draft in Peru. Thus, it would be difficult to verify the data. The Embassy and the AID mission have contributed no data and do not expect to do so.

The four trainees feel that two brief (two to four days) visits by The Futures Group, during which there are many public presentations, are not adequate. They said that they would like "two weeks of training" to learn how they can use the model interactively, test new assumptions, and use the computer's capabilities fully. They also would like additional software and instructions to program the Apple.

One AID official commented on the speed with which The Futures Group responded to the request for a presentation. The U.S. Ambassador seriously questioned the high overhead costs (usually more than 100 percent, he said) of the Washington-based contractors. Availability of data and of persons to analyze data is not a major problem in Peru.

The president of the Peruvian Population Council praised highly the booklets on analysis. He sends the booklets to bankers and industrialists with a personal note. They can be a useful reminder once a visual presentation has been made.

Presentations

The strategy for RAPID presentations seems to be effective. The selection of an organization to house the Apple II and trained personnel and to sponsor presentations is the most crucial decision to be made. On the AID's recommendation, the Institute of Statistics was selected. The INE is directed by the highest ranking woman in the Peruvian government, Dra. Graciela de Valdez, a well-qualified and dynamic leader. The INE recently was upgraded and now collaborates with the Ministry of Finance to prepare budget options. Dra. de Valdez has shown great enthusiasm for the RAPID project and is eager to make presentations to the cabinet and other high-level officials. She scheduled a 10-minute advance discussion of RAPID for the cabinet meeting on Friday, June 22, which the prime minister is expected to attend. Politically astute, Dra. de Valdez will involve as many top officials and members of Congress and the media as possible in the project.

Officials of the AID raised two issues: To what extent is a Paraguayan likely to have influence in Peru? To what extent should the U.S. Embassy and the mission be involved? Several think that there is no special merit to any other Latin American, especially a Paraguayan, and that Dra. de Valdez would be the best choice because she knows Peru and can handle well specific questions.

The principal qualifications for presenters are:

--an understanding of RAPID;

--fluency in Spanish;

--knowledge of Peru;

--high standing in Peru; and

--study or training in the U.S. in use of computers.

No computer was left in Peru. This is a major technical problem because the technicians, who are qualified in mathematics, economics, and programming, have had no additional opportunity to experiment and become more familiar with the computer. Another problem that will become apparent after the next presentation is the lack of a color-television monitor. The director of the INE has loaned her personal set to the office until the equipment is obtained.

Training, Installation, and Follow-up

Training, the installation of equipment, and follow-up cannot be assessed because training has not been completed, no equipment has been installed, and no follow-up has been done. It is planned that Battelle will fund several INE seminars at which RAPID will be used. It is hoped that it also will provide a television monitor for display. Dra. de Valdez has plans for national television coverage, stories in one or more popular magazines, and an array of presentations. The results of the census and other major findings may be presented via RAPID if new programming can be developed. Much will depend on the impact of the final presentation. The USAID expects to maintain a low profile so that follow-up can become an entirely Peruvian effort.

Impact

The project has had no impact, although the initial reactions of several high-level officials who favor population policies have been good. These persons want to arrange other showings. U.S. and Peruvian officials describe RAPID as "a dramatic communications tool" that can be "a valuable instrument" in discussions about population policy. An international official who believes that RAPID is "gimmicky" and simplistic feels, nonetheless, that it can be useful, especially if it is limited to a shorter period of time (e.g., to 2000). One high-ranking official has observed

that Latin Americans are especially interested in devices such as RAPID which use advanced technology.

To determine whether or not project activities have had an impact on the development of population policy, one might use the following indicators:

--number of officials and influential persons at presentations;

--amount of favorable publicity;

--lack of vocal opposition, especially from the Church;

--favorable public comment or a speech by the prime minister or the president;

--rapid implementation of Ministry of Health policies to include family planning in the services of health centers;

--removal of barriers to voluntary sterilization in Ministry of Health programs;

--strengthening of the INE or of other government agencies which influence and implement broad policies to reduce population growth;

--increased acceptance of family planning by the Peruvian population; and

--the addition to the proposed CPS of a question about public awareness or media messages to try to detect impact on the public (if RAPID is used on national television).

Contractors' Relations with AID Mission

The AID mission and The Futures Group have establishied a correct but not particularly close relationship. As one person at the AID commented, "They are a very professional group and spend most of their time working with the counterpart agency." Except for its involvement in the crucial decision about the collaborating agency and efforts to ensure that the final presentation is effective, the mission has encouraged the contractors to work independently of the AID to provide the necessary technical assistance.

When queried about intermediaries in population programs, the staff said that they expect that intermediaries eventually may be phased out, but they added that their help is needed now in many areas where private

American intermediaries can act faster and more effectively than the government and bilateral funding agencies. The high overhead of some intermediaries is a special concern, as is the need to build strong local institutions.

Relations Between the RAPID and Battelle Projects

There is no integral relationship between the Battelle projects and RAPID in Peru, although it may be possible to establish a relationship of convenience in the next two years. The Battelle contract could be a funding mechanism through which to obtain a color-television monitor for RAPID and to sponsor social science seminars where the RAPID model is shown and where the visual equipment is used to present other data (e.g., the census, the CPS, budgets). It might also be a mechanism to fund subcontracts to acquire the technical expertise and training INE personnel need to use the Apple computer fully.

Battelle staff who are part of the PDP II program cannot provide the technical expertise that is needed for further training and programming.

It appears that the planned series of seminars could be funded under the bilateral agreement which contains funds for the INE. For this reason, some AID personnel expect PDP II to provide little additional funding for the INE. Moreover, they assume that Battelle has successfully achieved its purpose in Peru and can be phased out. Others expect Battelle to continue its work for another year or two, but no longer.

V. A REPORT ON RAPID ACTIVITIES IN SUDAN

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Status and History of Development

The full potential of RAPID in Sudan has not been realized, in part because there is a lack of support from the mission in Khartoum (AID/K) that stems from an assessment that population growth per se is not the most important demographic problem confronting Sudan and that there are other pressing economic, social, and demographic problems for which the limited resources of the mission should be mobilized. It is in this context and within these constraints that a RAPID model for Sudan is being developed. Without passing judgment on the mission's priorities or on the decision of The Futures Group to push ahead with the development of a RAPID program, the writer would emphasize that, given the design, institutional structures, and timing, the implementation of the "standard" RAPID model in Sudan presents considerable difficulties.

To date, an initial draft has been prepared, the draft has been presented and a demonstration has been given in Khartoum, and feedback from the initial presentation has been incorporated into a second draft. The Futures Group is trying to arrange for a final presentation, or, failing that, for a second review (with possible modifications to the model) in advance of a final presentation.

The following is a summary of efforts to develop RAPID in Sudan.

- In 1979, The Futures Group targeted Sudan as a candidate for a RAPID.

- Communications among The Futures Group, AID/W, and the mission in Khartoum failed to result in an invitation from the AID mission, or from any other Sudanese group, to develop a RAPID model for the country.

- The Futures Group and AID/W decided to develop a RAPID program as "speculation" (i.e., without an explicit invitation from the AID/K or any Sudanese agency).

- An initial draft of the document and the computer program was prepared in Washington, although Sudan was not visited and there was no input from the Sudanese.

- In July 1980, AID/W requested concurrence from the AID/K for a representative from The Futures Group to make a preliminary presentation in Khartoum.

- A presentation was made in August 1980. The Futures Group obtained suggestions for revisions to the proposed model. The group that attended the presentation was composed of Embassy and AID personnel, save one Sudanese national from the Ministry of Health. It was agreed that a steering committee would be constituted and convened to review the draft documentation and that the results of the review would be transmitted to Washington for incorporation into the draft.

- The committee was not formed. The AID/K felt that a successful program could be developed only if it were initiated and sponsored by a Sudanese group. Although the AID/K confirmed its support, it was reluctant to identify and assemble a Sudanese group. It preferred that the Sudanese themselves take the initiative.

- In May 1981, Dr. Hamid Rushwan, an obstetrician-gynecologist from the University of Khartoum who is active in population-control organizations and programs, visited Washington on business and, at the same time, viewed the proposed program. He indicated that he would discuss with the AID/K the constitution of a steering committee.

- Dr. Rushwan feels that RAPID would benefit from significant Sudanese input. Possibly, after such input has been incorporated into an acceptable revision, RAPID could be presented under the sponsorship of the National Population Committee. (The committee is being formed, but it has yet to convene.)

The RAPID Model

The RAPID model for Sudan must be evaluated in the context of the country's demographic and economic conditions, especially as they are perceived by Sudanese leaders and the mission. Sudan is viewed as land-rich, with considerable potential for agriculture. Agriculture requires extensive labor which, at least during peak seasons and in various regions, is scarce. As extensive migration to the Gulf countries continues, both skilled and unskilled labor becomes increasingly scarce. This scarcity of labor is considered to be a possible constraint to the development of Sudan. To many Sudanese and development analysts, migration and labor scarcity thus appear to be priority "demographic" problems.

The principal concern of government officials seems to be the high levels of infant mortality. The development of a health care system to reduce the rate of mortality and to improve the quality of life of the Sudanese has emerged as a primary theme in government policies, and is reflected in the AID's assessments as well.

Some observers contend that the RAPID model for Sudan does not highlight the key demographic and policy themes of the government. In reviewing the second draft for RAPID, the evaluators concluded that there is little justification for such criticism. The "quality-of-life" theme is present; concerns about health care are emphasized; the issue of high infant mortality and the relationship of infant mortality to fertility are examined. The evaluators believe that the criticisms may be based on an oral presentation in which the themes may not have been highlighted sufficiently and in which the most important immediate concern of the Sudanese--migration--was not treated analytically or as significant. It is unrealistic to expect politicians to concentrate on the long-term benefits of population control when their immediate, most pressing problems are labor shortages and international migration, subjects that are not emphasized in RAPID.

In summary, the written document on the model is sensitive to many Sudanese goals. However, these goals have not been highlighted properly in oral presentations. An audience attending a RAPID presentation should come away feeling that the presenter has a significant store of knowledge about that country and that he is genuinely sympathetic to the needs and problems of the population. Even if the oral and written presentations do put more emphasis on Sudanese concerns, if the effects of international migration and scarcity of labor are not examined, RAPID is likely to have a limited impact in Sudan.

Presentations

The presentation in Sudan was not received well by key AID and Embassy personnel. The simplicity of the model was criticized ("It would be insulting to Sudanese politicians."); the focus on presentation rather than content was faulted ("gimmickry" was the word used); and the need for a highly skilled expositor to ensure a successful presentation in Sudan was questioned (the presentation was plagued by power outages). The only Sudanese national to view the presentation found it to be useful, but he thought that more input from the Sudanese would improve the model and increase the likelihood of its acceptance.

The presentation was made to a group of Americans who were not convinced that RAPID would benefit Sudan at this time. The unfavorable reception indicates that AID and Embassy staff have not been "sold" on RAPID.

The presentation in Washington for Dr. Hamid Rushwan was favorably received. Dr. Rushwan liked RAPID's orientation and thought the model could be used productively in Sudan. (Ironically, because of technical problems with the computer, Dr. Rushwan had to visit the Washington office twice to see the presentation. He was genuinely amused that frequent power outages, a way of life in Khartoum, are not the only constraints to making highly technological presentations.)

The Future

The successful implementation of RAPID in Sudan will require modifications to the model and documentation and presentations that are more in accord with Sudanese problems. If international migration were a conspicuous component, the AID/K probably would show more interest in promoting and supporting RAPID in Sudan.

It would be unwise to push for an early final presentation in Sudan. At the earliest, a final presentation should not be made before mid-1982. The Futures Group has no control over timing, which dictates that the development of RAPID proceed at a slower pace in Sudan than elsewhere. Important data will be available later in 1981. There are at least two, and perhaps three, Sudanese with some influence who are willing to help organize efforts to obtain more input from the Sudanese. The National Population Committee is being formed, and it is possible that it could host the final presentation.

The AID mission seems to be warming to RAPID, but it has yet to commit itself. Much depends on the results of the mission's own review of population programming in Sudan. This review should be completed by the end of the year.

The Battelle (and perhaps the RTI) projects are important, because they may help to create a climate and generate support for the development and presentation of RAPID in Sudan. Interestingly, Sudan may be one country where a low profile and less dramatic efforts to stimulate interest in population policy may be a better approach than high visibility and presentations targeted only to top politicians.

Indeed, one could speculate that "follow-on" projects, such as PDP II, which create a constituency of researchers and politicians that revolves around population issues, and the International Population Development Projects (IPDP), which may work with the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the AID to develop a policy on migration, could set the stage for a major presentation of RAPID in which the synthetic strengths of the model are displayed to advantage. More than once it was said that RAPID will have little impact if coordinated follow-on programming is not developed. In some cases, however, follow-on activities may productively lead to improvements in the model that might, in turn, increase RAPID's effectiveness.

VI. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RAPID PROJECT IN TANZANIA

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Introduction

The consultant spent three working days in Tanzania. Although the visit was brief, the time probably was adequate to evaluate the RAPID presentations that had been made in February 1980. Ten interviews were conducted with six Tanzanian officials, the assistant resident representative of the United Nations Development Program, who also is the UNFPA's coordinator, and three USAID officials. (See Appendix A.) Appointments could not be arranged with two other Tanzanian officials, one in the Ministry of Health and one in the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, nor with several other persons who had seen the RAPID presentation in February but who had changed jobs since and were unavailable.

This trip report contains a summary of the interviews and the consultant's impressions of RAPID in Tanzania. It is organized into three sections: background, presentations, and follow-up.

Background

The initial request for a RAPID presentation in Tanzania was made by the AID mission in March 1979. On November 5, 1979, a demonstration of the draft presentation was given before a small group of staff in the mission and the Tanzanian directors of the Central Bureau of Statistics and the Bureau for Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning of the University of Dar es Salaam. According to the printed version of the presentation, The United Republic of Tanzania: Population and Development (March 1980), "data [were] taken from national sources, including the census and the economic survey, and from information compiled by international organizations, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the United States Agency for International Development." There is no evidence, either in written records or statements from the interviewees, that there was any direct collaboration with Tanzanian officials, agencies, and researchers to compile data and develop a draft presentation. This point was raised several times during the consultant's visit.

Presentations

Eleven RAPID presentations were made in Tanzania on February 19-29, 1980. (For details, see Thomas J. Goliber's RAPID Trip Report, Tanzania,

February 19-29, 1980.) The purpose of the consultant's visit in July 1981 was to interview Tanzanian and AID officials who saw the presentations in February to learn how they reacted to RAPID. A summary of the respondents' reactions follows.

The consultant's sources said that the technology of the presentation is impressive and that RAPID is an effective tool to convey information. They feel that there may have been too much information for a single showing, especially because the explanations of the underlying assumptions and the interrelationships contained in the model were not clear. Nonetheless, they agreed that the basic message is well presented and easy to understand. The data appear to be accurate. (They were taken from preliminary reports that had been made available to the public.) The difficulty with the presentation is neither the technology nor the data, but the simplistic conceptualization of population problems that totally ignores the Tanzanians' perceptions of those issues and appropriate policies to address them. This problem might have been avoided had Tanzanian officials and researchers been consulted before the model was developed. The model and the technology may be "interactive" technically, but absolutely no interaction with any of the audiences took place. Nor was there any "meeting of the minds" to define Tanzania's problems. The presentation seemed to assume that Tanzanian officials either are unaware of or ignore population issues and the impact of population growth on Tanzania's development goals. It suggested (but stopped short of explicitly prescribing) that birth control is the only appropriate response to Tanzania's population problems. These assumptions are based on misinformation and, to some viewers, are insulting.

Tanzanian officials are well aware of population issues. President Nyerere has spoken about them on many occasions. He says that producing children is easy. The difficult part is to raise them properly and provide for their basic needs, especially their education, housing, and health. Children should be planned, he says, but the emphasis should be on proper spacing, not the limitation of births. Tanzania has adequate land to absorb a larger population. Traditional methods of birth spacing have always been practiced in Tanzania, and even the least educated and poorest people are aware of the relationship between spacing and health. What is new is Western contraceptive technology. It is that technology that presents problems. Some people, including senior government officials, are asking if they are being used as guinea pigs, whether the Western countries want to stop the growth of population in Africa for political reasons. They note the shift away from use of the pill in the United States; they know that Depo Provera has been banned there. Why, they are asking, are those things being dumped here?

Tanzania has a people-centered, rural-based, socialist development policy. It is not worthwhile to talk about population unless one also examines that policy. To insist on the primacy of population, to discuss it in an isolated context, is to raise questions about the motivation behind the presentation. Tanzania is concerned about improving the quality

of life of its people; its programs naturally include efforts to improve maternal and child health and reduce infant mortality through better child-spacing. This fact is exemplified, for example, in the decision in 1975 to allow the Tanzania Family Planning Association (UMATI) to provide contraceptive services through government clinics and the decision in 1977 to change the law governing maternity leave. (Paid maternity leave is now provided only at a minimum of three-year intervals.) Migration is another major problem of concern to the Tanzanian government. The entire village program is based on the recognized need to improve the distribution of the population in Tanzania to reduce urban growth, to make it possible to provide cost-effective services in rural areas, and to make better use of Tanzania's land and other natural resources.

In sharp contrast to Tanzania's broad and humanistic concern with population issues, RAPID focuses almost exclusively on population growth as though the reduction of fertility were the solution to all other problems. This is nonsense. Discussions about the carrying capacity of the land, for example, ignore questions of management, agricultural technology, and agricultural development policies, which are much more important than total land area in terms of agricultural production. By depicting just one aspect of the problem, RAPID distorts the issue. As one respondent observed, "Our objectives are entirely the same--to have reasonable levels of population, given our limited resources. [But the problem is not solved] by presenting a grim picture [or] by trying to alarm people. We don't need that kind of thing. We know about the trends already." Given Tanzanians' sensitivities, RAPID might even be counterproductive because it "introduc[es] a bit of poison into the minds of policymakers who have not considered the population issue in its full context."

The implication is that "if one agrees with RAPID, then Tanzania would have to change its path." Indeed, Tanzania may have something to learn from the experience of others. But a more sophisticated understanding and presentation of the relationship of population to development are needed to make RAPID convincing. Tanzanians have expressed their own position on this matter. If the intention is to help, they say, then "probably we know best how to make our decisions." And the degree to which outsiders on short-term visits can influence those decisions is limited. Everyone is aware of population issues, "but the severity of the problem does not require the policies that others are urging on us."

Follow-up

It is difficult to evaluate the impact of RAPID in Tanzania, because Tanzanians contend that they already were aware of population issues, but conceptualized them differently than those who presented RAPID. Indeed, the consultant was surprised to hear several officials accurately cite various demographic rates and statistics during interviews. But there

are indications that RAPID has had some impact. After the presentation in February, the then prime minister spoke several times in parliament about population issues and several dozen senior government officials were, for the first time, exposed to a focused discussion about the interaction between population and development. There have been no requests to the USAID for additional presentations, however, and the two Tanzanians who expressed interest in gaining access to an Apple computer were explicit in their intentions to use the technology for other (although related) purposes. The AID mission has the Apple computer that was left behind after the February presentation. The computer is locked in a vault and has been used only three times in the last 17 months, each time for presentations at the mission. (The acting director of the mission said that he recently learned, with some embarrassment, that the computer could be put to a wide variety of other uses if minor additional hardware were provided. For example, the computer could be used to maintain and process accounting and management records and as a word-processing machine.)

Conclusions

Generally, the RAPID presentations cannot be said to have had any significant, positive impact on increasing awareness of the relationship between development and population dynamics in Tanzania. The content and method of presentation may have confirmed the suspicion of some viewers that the USAID is interested only in birth control. A serious effort by the USAID to influence Tanzanians' thinking about population issues will have to be based on a more sophisticated appreciation of current thinking in that country and a willingness to acknowledge Tanzanians' perceptions of their own problems and needs. Several of the Tanzanian officials who were interviewed suggested that the most effective way to influence policymakers might be to help develop a data base and an analytic capacity to evaluate the impact of rural development policies. Training and operational-level research that is focused on the impact of population dynamics on development policies and programs that are conducted by Tanzanians might be the most effective way to establish trust and to increase awareness of population issues in a non-ideological context. The USAID might want to consider providing assistance in operational research and basic management to the UMATI, which is understaffed and unable to generate data and make a case for family planning services in Tanzania. Existing demand for family planning services in Tanzania is modest (there were approximately 225,000 new and current acceptors in 1980, according to the UMATI), but those who are using the services can be served more effectively.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

LIST OF CONTACTS AND INTERVIEWS

Appendix A

LIST OF CONTACTS AND INTERVIEWS

1. Brazil

Brazilian Society for Family Welfare (BEMFAM)

Mr. Jose M. Arruda, Assistant to the Director

Ms. Carmen Gomez, Adviser, Planning and Programming

Mr. Marcio Schiavo, Director, Information, Education, and Communication

Brazilian Association for Population Studies (ABEP)

Dr. Elza Berquo, Demographer, General Secretary(H)

Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE)‡

Dr. Manoel Costa, Director, Special Projects Division(H)

Ministry of Finance and Planning

Dr. Rubens Vaz da Costa, Minister(P)

Dr. Jaco Charcot Pereira Rios, Chief, Special Projects(P)

Ministry of Social Welfare

Dr. Roberto Alcantara, Adviser, Secretariat of Social Assistance

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(P) = Seen by Phyllis Piotrow only.

(H) = Seen by Harriet Presser only.

‡ Census Bureau of Brazil.

Maternal and Child Center

Dr. Milton S. Nakamura, President, Training, Research, and Assistance in Family Planning(P)

United States Officials

Mr. Samuel Taylor, Social Development Attaché, U.S. Embassy

Mr. Dale M. Povenmire, U.S. Consulate(P)

(P) = Seen by Phyllis Piotrow only.

(H) = Seen by Harriet Presser only.

2. Egypt

Egyptian Government

Dr. Helmy El-Bermawy, Director-General, Supervision and Follow-up, Ministry of Health

Dr. Awad Mokhtar Hallouda, Director, Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics

Ambassador Shafie Abdul Hamid, Chairman, State Information Service

Mr. Mohammed Sharaf, Consultant, Family Planning Information, Education, Communications Project, State Information Service

Dr. El-Sayed El-Sheikh, Director, Population Education Division, Ministry of Education

Population and Family Planning Board

Mr. Mohamed Osman, Director, Statistics Division

Dr. Mustafa El-Samaa, Deputy Chairman

Others

Dr. Fouad El-Hefnawi, Director, International Islamic Center for Demographic Studies and Research, Al-Azhar University

United States Embassy

Mr. Alfred R. Atherton, Ambassador

Mrs. Atherton

Mr. William North, Second Secretary, Economic Section

USAID

Dr. Rose Britanek, Rural Health

Mr. Donald Brown, Director

Ms. Emily Leonard, Urban Health

Ms. Keys McManus, Assistant Administrator, HRDC

Ms. Laura Slobey, Population Adviser

Mr. Mark Winter, Acting Agricultural Officer

3. Peru

Andean Institute for Studies in Population and Development (INANDEP)

Mr. Carlos Aramburu, Director of Research

Mr. Alberto Varillas M., Coordinator General

Multidisciplinary Association for Research and Training in Population (AMIDEP)

Dr. Roger Guerra Garcia, Director

National Institute of Statistics (INE)

Dr. Graciela Fernandez Baca de Valdez, Chief

Mr. Alfredo Ledesma Delgado, Computer Expert

Institute of Peruvian Studies (IEP)

Dr. Jose Matos Mar, Director

National Council on Population

Dr. Carlos Muñoz, Director

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

Ms. Helen Alderman, Consultant

Ms. Janet Ballantyne, USAID/Lima

Ms. Helene Kaufmann, Population and Health Officer, USAID/Lima

Mr. Howard Lusk, USAID/Lima

Ms. Gloria Nichtawitz, Consultant, USAID/Peru

Ms. Alicia Unger, Consultant, USAID/Peru

Others

Ambassador Edwin Corr, U.S. Embassy

Mr. George Walmsley, UNFPA Coordinator

4. Tanzania

Government of Tanzania

Mr. Ernest Mbalilaki, Government Statistician, Head, Central Bureau of Statistics

Professor Samuel Mbilinyi, Personal Assistant to President Nyerere, Economics

Mr. Joseph Rugumyamheto, Director, Manpower Planning, Ministry of Manpower Development

Mr. N.N. Shimwela, Director, Macro-Economics Division, Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs

Mr. U.K. Tenende, Economist and Demographer, Macro-Economics Division, Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs

University of Dar Es Salaam

Professor Adolpho Mascarenhas, Director, Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning

Tanzania Family Planning Association

Dr. Rhodes C. Mwaikombo, Medical Director

United Nations Development Program, United Nations Fund for Population Activities

Mr. Erick De Mul, Assistant Resident Representative, and Acting UNFPA Coordinator

USAID

Mr. John Burdick, Public Health Adviser

Mr. Paul Ehmer, Public Health Adviser

Mr. Barry Riley, Acting Director

Appendix B

LIST OF RAPID PRESENTATIONS IN HONDURAS

Appendix B

LIST OF RAPID PRESENTATIONS IN HONDURAS

Sixteen presentations were made in November 1980 in three different cities in Honduras. The schedules were as follows:

	Date	Time	Place
1.	Wednesday, November 5	8:00 p.m.	Rotary Club of Tegucigalpa
2.	Thursday, November 6	11:00 a.m.	Social Security Institute of Honduras
3.	Friday, November 7	10:00 a.m.	U.S. Embassy and AID
4.		1:00 p.m.	Chamber of Commerce, Ministry of Economy
5.		4:00 p.m.	National Forestry Cooperative
6.		8:00 p.m.	Honduran Farmers Union
7.	Monday, November 10	1:00 p.m.	University of Tegucigalpa
8.		7:00 p.m.	Meeting of Vice Ministers
9.	Tuesday, November 11	2:00 p.m.	Labor Union, La Ceiba
10.		7:00 p.m.	Rotary Club, La Ceiba
11.	Wednesday, November 12	11:00 a.m.	Labor Union, San Pedro Sula
12.		2:00 p.m.	Farmers Union, San Pedro Sula
13.		7:00 p.m.	Rotary Club, San Pedro Sula
14.	Thursday, November 13	10:00 a.m.	Junta Nacional de Bienestar, Social
15.		7:00 p.m.	Opposition Political Party, Pinu
16.	Friday, November 14	8:30 a.m.	Private Showing, Minister of Finance

Since November 1980, five presentations have been made. At least one, to a third group of physicians in social services, was cancelled because of equipment problems.

17. RAPID was presented at the Centro Universitario de San Pedro Sula (part of the Universidad National Autonoma de Honduras) as part of

a two-week population workshop organized by the Population Unit of CONSUPLANE. The participants were 25 faculty members of statistics, sociology, mathematics, economics, etc.

18. A presentation was made to doctors from all parts of Honduras working in social services for the MOH at a training course supported by the International Fertility Research Program (IFRP) and organized by the ASHONPLAFA.

19. Staff of the Population Unit of CONSUPLANE received a presentation.

20. A presentation was given to the staff of the Department of Preventive Medicine, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Honduras. This was organized by the Population Unit of CONSUPLANE.

21. Doctors in social service training (one of three groups; see #18) attended a presentation. (This is reported in J. Seltzer's trip report of April 8-10, 1981.)

Appendix C

LIST OF TRIP REPORTS

Appendix C

LIST OF TRIP REPORTS

Country	Date of Visit	Date Report Submitted
Egypt	January 18-28, 1981	February 19, 1981
Haiti	January 25-30, 1981	February 10, 1981
Rwanda	February 1-5, 1981	March 13, 1981
Burundi	February 6-10, 1981	March 13, 1981
Nigeria	February 23-26, 1981	March 11, 1981
Liberia	February 26 - March 2, 1981	March 13, 1981
Rwanda	March 22-28, 1981	May 13, 1981
Brazil	March 23-28, 1981	April 9, 1981
Haiti	April 5-10, 1981	June 1, 1981
Egypt	April 17-26, 1981	May 10, 1981
Botswana	April 22-28, 1981	May 13, 1981
Tanzania	April 29 - May 1, 1981	May 13, 1981
Peru	May 11-15, 1981	June 4, 1981
Ecuador	May 18-19, 1981	June 4, 1981

Appendix D

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART, THE FUTURES GROUP

Appendix D

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART, THE FUTURES GROUP



Appendix E

PERCENT OF STAFF TIME ON RAPID PROJECT
(January 1, 1980 - March 31, 1981)

Appendix E

PERCENT OF STAFF TIME ON RAPID PROJECT
(January 1, 1980 - March 31, 1981)

Washington, D.C.

Senior Staff (Salary Range, $37,500 - $50,112)	Percent Time
Robert Smith, Vice President	20
Philip Claxton, Principal Investigator	60
Malcolm Donald, Manager, Development Studies	95
Henry Cole, Chief Economist (May 1981)	50
Senior Research Staff (Salary Range, $21,500 - $36,000)	
Thomas Goliber	100
Robert Noth (March 1981)	100
Charles Dana (June 1981)	100
Research Associate Staff (Salary Range, $14,500 - $17,600)	
Margarita Queralt	100
Murray Kenney	100
Support Staff (Salary Range, $11,500 - $14,500)	
Pawnee Parker, Administrative Assistant (June 1981)	90
Secretary	50

Home Office, Connecticut

Senior Staff	Percent Time
John Stover, Associate Principal Investigator	95
Senior Research Staff	
Jonathan Bye	95
Norman Graham (July 1981)	100
Research Associate Staff	
Edward Able	100
Support Staff	
Secretary	50

Appendix F

PERSON-HOURS, BY COUNTRY, RAPID PROJECT
(November 28, 1980 - June 12, 1981)

Appendix F

PERSON-HOURS, BY COUNTRY, RAPID PROJECT
(November 28, 1980 - June 12, 1981)

Country	Hours	Country	Hours
Botswana	362	Nigeria	286
Brazil	457	Nepal	10
Burundi	561	Peru	870
Costa Rica	2	Panama	33
Domestic	88	Paraguay	61
Egypt	143	Rwanda	867
Haiti	471	Special	17
Honduras	47	Sri Lanka	40
Kenya	9	Sudan	251
Liberia	96	Swaziland	80
Lesotho	104	Upper Volta	136
Mauritania	325	Zaire	3
Malawi	234	Zimbabwe	442
Mali	349	TOTAL	6,344

Equivalents

Person-Days	793
Person-Months (20 Work Days/ Month)	39.65

Appendix G

FORM FOR MONITORING ACTIVITIES

Appendix G

FORM FOR MONITORING ACTIVITIES

Name_____ Employee No._____ Department/Account No._____

W/E_____ Signature_____ Date_____

Mgr. Approval_____ Date_____ Corp. Approval_____ Date_____

SUN	MON.	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	TOTAL	DIRECT ACTIVITIES/Project Title	Project/Client Code
							INDIRECT ACTIVITIES	
							Management and Administration	2101
							Secretarial/Clerical	2104
							Recruiting	2107
							Seminars and Conferences	2108
							Independent Research and Development[1]	2109
							Vacation	2502
							Holiday	2503
							Sick	2504
							Marketing[2]	2103
							Proposals[2]	2114
							TOTAL	

1. Designate type of work done.

2. Designate Proposal by name and type of marketing.

Appendix H

DETAILS OF BUDGET, RAPID EVALUATION

DETAILS OF BUDGET, RAPID EVALUATION

Evolution of the Budget

Object Class	Per Initial Contract, September 30, 1977 Sept. 30, 1977 - Sept. 30, 1980			Per Mod #2, August 31, 1979 Sept. 30, 1977 - Dec. 31, 1980			Per Mod #4, September 30, 1980 Sept. 30, 1979 - Dec. 31, 1982			
	Firm Funding 9/30/77-9/29/78	Projected Funding 9/29/78-9/30/80	Total (36 Months)	Firm Funding 9/30/77-9/29/78	Firm Funding 9/30/78-12/31/80	Total (39 Months)	Firm Funding 9/30/77-12/31/80	Firm and Projected Funding 1/1/81-12/31/81	Projected Funding 1/1/82-12/31/82	Total (63 months)
Salaries	40,116	143,876	183,992	40,116	292,186	332,302	332,302	263,914	285,914	881,581
Consultants	15,700	6,700	22,400	15,700	27,150	42,850	42,850	9,637	9,637	62,124
Travel and Transportation	16,908	33,915	50,823	16,908	111,915	128,823	128,823	142,000	142,000	412,823
Other Direct Costs	3,000	3,000	6,000	3,000	43,600	46,600	46,600	40,183	40,184	126,967
Materials and Supplies	23,930	0	23,930	23,930	28,333	52,263	52,263	54,330	54,320	160,903
Subcontracts	144,956	254,935	399,891	144,956	343,105	488,061	488,061	134,353	134,353	756,767
TOTAL	244,610	442,426	687,036	244,610	846,289	1,090,899	1,090,899	644,417	666,138	2,401,165
	a) Total Funded		400,000	a) Total Funded		1,674,999	a) Firm Funding			2,674,999
	b) Subject to Fund Availability		613,469				b) Subject to Fund Availability			1,282,439
			1,013,469							3,957,438
	Monthly Average		28,152	Monthly Average		42,949	Monthly Average			62,816

June 6, 1981

Object Class	Initial Budget Sept. 30, 1977 - Sept. 30, 1980: AID Approved Budget (36 Months)	Average Per Month, Straight-Lined (36 Months)	Percent To Total	Total Expended, Oct. 1, 1977 Through Dec. 31, 1979 (27 Months)	Average Per Month (Straight-lined)	Percent To Total	Revised Budget Per Mod #2, Effective Aug. 31, 1979 (39 Months)	Free Balance Available Jan. 1, 1980
Salaries (Direct Labor)	183,992	5,111	18.2	182,265	6,751	20.6	332,302	150,037
Travel and Transportation	50,823	1,412	5.0	33,089	1,226	3.7	128,823	95,734
Consultants	22,400	622	2.2	0	0	0.0	42,850	42,850
Consultations and Subcontracts	399,891	11,108	39.5	309,080	11,447	34.9	488,061	178,981
Computer	0	0	0.0	343	13	0.0	0	(343)
Equipment	0	0	0.0	19,392	718	2.2	0	(19,392)
Other Direct Costs	6,000	167	0.6	25,967	962	2.9	46,600	20,633
Materials and Supplies	23,930	665	2.3	0	0	0.0	52,263	52,263
GRAND TOTAL	687,036	19,085	67.8	570,136	21,117	64.3	1,090,899	520,763

Object Class	Free Balance Available Jan. 1, 1980	Total Expended, Jan. 1, 1980 Through Dec. 31, 1980 (12 Months)	Average Per Month	Percent To Total	Revised Budget Per Mod #4, Effective Sept. 30, 1980 (63 Months)	Free Balance Available Jan. 1, 1981
Salaries (Direct Labor)	150,037	180,569	15,047	20.2	881,581	518,747
Travel and Transportation	95,734	79,400	6,617	8.9	412,823	300,334
Consultants	42,850	0	0	0.0	62,124	62,124
Consultations and Subcontracts	178,981	214,759	17,897	24.1	756,767	232,928
Computer	(343)	0	0	0.0	0	(343)
Equipment	(19,392)	17,672	1,473	2.0	0	(37,064)
Other Direct Costs	20,633	81,365	6,780	9.1	126,967	19,635
Materials and Supplies	52,263	0	0	0.0	160,903	160,903
GRAND TOTAL	520,763	573,765	47,814	64.3	2,401,165	1,257,264

Object Class	Free Balance Available Jan. 1, 1981	1st Quarter, Jan. 1, 1981 Through Mar. 31, 1981	2nd Quarter, April 1, 1981 Through June 30, 1981	Total, One-half of Calendar, 1981	Average Per Month	Percent To Total	Balance Remaining, July 1, 1981-Dec. 31, 1982 (18 Months)	Required Average Per Month	Percent To Total
Salaries (Direct Labor)	518,747	44,812	66,752	111,564	18,594	22.9	407,183	22,621	24.1
Travel and Transportation	300,334	30,428	39,485	69,913	11,652	14.3	230,421	12,801	13.6
Consultants	62,124	0	0	0	0	0.0	62,124	3,451	3.7
Consultations and Subcontracts	232,928	(34,533)	65,341	30,808	5,135	6.3	202,120	11,229	12.0
Computer	(343)	0	0	0	0	0.0	(343)	(19)	0.0
Equipment	(37,064)	11,987	20,681	32,668	5,446	6.7	(69,732)	(3,874)	(4.1)
Other Direct Costs	19,635	15,074	28,354	43,428	7,238	8.9	(23,793)	(1,322)	(1.4)
Materials and Supplies	160,903	0	0	0	0	0.0	160,903	8,939	9.5
GRAND TOTAL	1,257,264	67,768	220,613	288,381	48,064	59.1	968,883	53,826	57.4

Appendix I

PERSON-DAYS REQUIRED TO PREPARE CLASS II TRIP ANALYSIS, RAPID PROJECT

Appendix I

PERSON-DAYS REQUIRED TO PREPARE CLASS II TRIP ANALYSIS, RAPID PROJECT

	Situation A Data are reasonably available and acceptably credible.	Situation B Data are not readily available and require more detailed verification.	Situation C Data are difficult to locate, acquire, and verify.
Preparation			
Collect the data, make calculations, critique, suggest new approaches, design the graphics, and prepare presentation of rough draft.			
Senior Research Associate	13	20	26
Research Associate	26	40	54
Review			
Circulate working draft among senior staff for comment and criticism and develop new draft.			
Senior Staff	8	8	8
Programming			
Enter data into computer and create graphics.			
Senior Research Associate	2	2	2
Research Associate	3	3	3
Support			
To account for secretarial staff in draft preparation. This requirement extends through all three phases described above.			
Secretarial	10	10	10
TOTAL	62	83	103

Appendix J

RANGE OF COSTS FOR CLASS II TRIP ANALYSIS, RAPID PROJECT

Appendix J

RANGE OF COSTS FOR CLASS II TRIP ANALYSIS, RAPID PROJECT

	Situation A Data are reasonably available and acceptably credible.	Situation B Data are not readily available and require more detailed verification.	Situation C Data are difficult to locate, acquire, and verify.
Preparation			
Collect the data, make calculations, critique, suggest new approaches, design graphics, and prepare presentation of rough draft.	$ 3,029	$ 4,666	$ 6,180
Review			
Circulate working draft among senior staff for comment and criticism and develop new draft.	1,403	1,403	1,403
Programming			
Enter data into computer and create graphics.	625	625	625
Secretarial Support	462	462	462
Total Direct Labor	$ 5,519	$ 7,156	$ 8,670
Overhead @ 144%	7,947	10,305	12,485
Graphics, Translation, and Printing	4,500	4,500	4,500
Subtotal	$17,966	$21,961	$25,655
Fixed Fee @ 7.5%	1,347	1,647	1,924
TOTAL, Estimated	$19,313	$23,608	$27,579