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

JOINT PLANNING OF U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN SENEGAL

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

MINISTRY OF PLANNING AND COOPERATION
REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL

Volume I **Documents de base/Resource Papers 1980**

INTRODUCTION

In the first half of 1980 USAID/Senegal undertook with the Government of Senegal an assessment of the general economic situation and the AID program, including an evaluation of four major assistance programs. The resulting report and annex, Joint Assessment of U.S. Assistance Programs in Senegal, was published in French and English in July, 1980. Subsequently it was distributed widely throughout the Government of Senegal and the Africa Bureau of AID, both at home and in the field.

The second phase of the year-long GOS/USAID effort of assessment and planning began in the summer of 1980 with the commissioning of a number of reports and papers as basic resource materials. Most of these authors and researchers and representatives of the official U.S. community - Embassy, Peace Corps, and AID - participated in a workshop chaired by the Mission Director, December 6-8, 1980, in Dakar. Based upon the conclusions of this workshop, the Mission then drafted its Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS) for FY 1983, and submitted it to AID/W in January 1981. After its Washington review in March 1980 the CDSS was translated into French and discussed with all appropriate ministers of the Government of Senegal.

These two volumes of reports contain the resource documents developed in Senegal as part of this process. Although the quality of the documents varies both in content and style, they form part of the historical record of development in Senegal. Copies are available (English only) from USAID/Senegal or the AID Africa Bureau, Senegal desk officer.

May 1981

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REPORT ON THE POLITICAL IMPLICATION OF THE JOINT ASSESSMENT AND U.S. AID TO SENEGAL

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July 28 - August 11, 1980

I A

PREFACE

I was asked to come to Senegal for two weeks in order to report on the political implications of the joint assessment on U.S. assistance efforts to Senegal, and more generally to look at the political implications of USAID efforts in Senegal. I was to examine the long-term implications of the joint assessment recommendations for Senegal's political and development structure.

Before going to the substance of my comments and recommendations, I should state the basis for these. I am not an expert on Senegal. I had read in the general literature on Senegal and had read extensively in Sahel materials for a seminar given in Princeton University in 1979 on Sahelian drought relief and development programs. These materials dealt with efforts of the CILSS and Club du Sahel to mobilize donor and recipient resources to deal with short term needs and to bring about structural change in Sahelian countries. To prepare myself for my evaluations in Dakar, I read in Princeton the Final Report and Annexes of the Joint Assessment of U.S. Assistance Programs in Senegal; the World Bank's Report on Economic Trends and Prospects in Senegal; various working documents associated with the joint assessment, including a report by Elliot Berg, a report by Lucie Colvin on migration, memos by USAID officials on the ground, surveys of the ENEA, the proposal for PL 480 Title III funding. On arrival in Senegal I continued my education by reading various working papers and reports done for USAID, including: Clark Ross's study of Producer Grain Transactions, and his work on Grain Demand and Consumer Preferences; Lucie Colvin's work on Private Initiatives in the Senegalese Economy; Work in Progress on Rural Animation by Sheldon Gellar; draft PIDs on the OMVS and Casamance; various CILSS's documents on external aid; I was also able to read further in secondary source analysis of the political economy of Senegal e.g., Rita Cruise O'Brien edited volume "The Political Economy of Underdevelopment: Dependence in Senegal". Working with the political officer of the U.S. Embassy, Mr. David Rawson, I had access to various political reports and memos.

I had discussions with various AID consultants including Director David Shear, the Program Officer, Mr. Donald Brown, Professor Sheldon Gellar, Mr. Axel Magnuson. I had frequent discussions with Mr. Rawson. While I traveled for a short time outside of Dakar, I could not and did not see a large part of Senegal. I did visit AID projects but not those of the joint assessment. I am no more an expert on Senegal than I was although I have learned a great deal.

I benefitted from open and extremely useful discussions with the afore-mentioned persons and others. I wish to convey my deep appreciation to all those who took the time and trouble to meet with me and to share their insights into U.S. programs and policies in Senegal and Senegal itself. I am grateful for the opportunity to have come to Senegal and to have participated in the joint evaluation effort.

I will remark in the text of my report on the unusual AID effort in Senegal. It is unusual in that from the Director down there is a strong commitment to monitoring and to continuously reevaluating policies, programs, and projects. It is a very selfconscious attempt to mobilize resources and to frankly try to understand difficulties in the exploration of solutions. Thus the AID programs in Senegal, both for what they are and for the attempt to analyze the aid undertaking, will be important benchmarks in our attempt to understand USAID and aid in the developing countries.

Finally, I have not restated obvious facts concerning the Senegalese economy. There was little point in recapitulating what others have said where that could be avoided.

Outline of Report

1) Why aid Senegal: are the U.S. goals clear and established? Are they consistent with wider goals?

2) How aid Senegal: are the instruments, projects and programs for aid consistent with wider goals? What are the implications of the framework chosen for aid?

3) Has the joint assessment process furthered the clarification for 1) and 2)?

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1) WHY AID SENEGAL?

Considered by itself, Senegal can be thought of as a middle rank African country, both in terms of its development and for its interest to the U.S. Senegal's level of development is bifurcated. That is, there is a highly trained elite, a relatively sophisticated civil service in Dakar, an advanced metropolitan development in Dakar, a relatively sophisticated military. The country has African and Third World visibility because of its leader, Senghor, and the place of Dakar as a West African, Atlantic, and to some extent international center. But these features all rest on a weak base. The country does not have a sound incipient industrial base: it has an extremely weak agrarian base compared to Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and its potential is weak compared even to Uganda's.

Senegal is not a place of major known resources like Nigeria, Zambia, or Zaire. It is not thought to be a place of major potential resources that are untapped like Angola. Its major export, groundnuts, is one that can be substituted by a number of other commodities from which oil may be made. Senegal falls on the low end of the population size spectrum in Africa.

Black Africa had not been defined by U.S. policy makers as being a place of strategic importance in terms of military balance or even in terms of resources, with the possible exception of Southern Africa (1)

With the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran, and Soviet intervention in Ethiopia, fears about access to Persian Gulf oil have risen markedly. Thus negotiations for bases in Kenya and Somalia have taken place. Still U.S. interests in Africa, and especially in West Africa, have not been defined in strategic terms except for continued access to Nigerian oil.

Access to Dakar as a port and for possible air/military use is convenient; it is not essential. That is, one would not, at least should not, structure U.S. aid programs around such access or any presumed strategic needs. Where the U.S. has done this, sometimes by rent-ng bases as in Ethiopia (Kagnew), the Philippines,, it often runs across the purposes of development assistance. While U.S. policy is to have access to transport and communications facilities in Senegal, this has not been a defining purpose of USAID and I would strongly argue that it should not become so. I could envision this arising as more of an issue than it has been.

(1) See Henry Bienen "U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing Africa", Political Science Quarterly, Spring, 1978.

After a period where U.S. foreign policy in Africa ceased to be derived from Soviet-US relations and was based on regionalist perspectives rather than globalist ones, the pendulum has swung back. After the revolution in Iran, growing concern with U.S. security positions in the Gulf and Indian Ocean, Cuban and Soviet intervention in Angola and the Horn of Africa. and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan high level U.S. policy makers have put the Sovient threat center stage. So far, this has not led to a change in U.S.-South African policies nor has it led to viewing U.S. bilateral relations with African countries largely as a function of U.S.-Soviet competition. But this could happen and we could see new U S. policies in the Horn Angola, and Southern Angola (1).

West Africa is not entirely removed from military conflict and competition. Such conflict already goes on in Chad and parts of Mauritania. Libya, Morocco and Algeria all have stated interests and claims in the Western Sahara and Sudan areas. South of Senegal, too, lies countries of potential instability. Thus the possibilities for disorder within and between states exist. Wherever conflict between states exists, or the breakdown of order within a state comes about, the potential for great power conflict in Africa becomes larger. Even where the powers do not have "traditional" interests nor strategic concerns, they are reluctant to see new political alignments arise.

Senegal's present relations with its neighbors are not highly conflictual. It is unhappy with the Gambia over smuggling. But only if the Casamance became an area of extreme tension and demands for autonomy rose would Senegal's southern borders and its borders with Gambia become uneasy. At present, discussions with Mali and Mauritania over regional development especially water development have been for the most part cooperative, not conflictual. Water is, of course, the life-blood of the Sahelian countries and thus cooperative development cannot be taken for granted. Relations between Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt have an underlying tension because of the importance of the Nile to them. When relationships become tense between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Soviet role in Africa or between Sudan and Egypt over Israeli-Arab questions, all parties know that water is a tremendous weapon. And real issues of control of water itself impact on wider concerns. Similarly, the potential for conflict between Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, and Gambia exists Such conflict, if it were to arise, is not likely to lead to great power involvement but that possibility always exists.

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(1) See Henry Bienen "Perspectives on Soviet Intervention in Africa", Political Science Quarterly, Spring, 1980.

Nor it is likely that migration flows between Sahelian countries, especially into Senegal from its neighbors, would lead to extreme tensions that could not be contained. Already, Senegal has absorbed significant numbers of people from Guinea Bissau and from Mauritania and traditional patterns of migration continue across borders. But again, either severe drought or disorder in one Sahelian country can impact on another. Thus while Senegal has not had the severe tensions that exist in the Horn of Africa or between Zaire and Angola, or between Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania, it would be foolish not to try and think through potentialities for conflict between Senegal and neighboring states. These potentialities have more to do with sharing of resources and flows of people than with differences that may arise over ideological or international issues regarding Soviet presence in Africa or Egypt's role in the Middle-East-issues on which the Senegalese have put their views forward boldly.

It is especially important to consider the ramifications of inter-state cooperation and conflict because the U.S. has put so much weight on regional frameworks for development aid. Planning for aid is supposed to take place within recipient countries' regionsl frameworks (CILSS)and within donor multilateral frameworks for the region (Club du Sahel) and within AID through Sahel Development. Also, projects for Senegal's development will focus heavily on water development in the Senegal and Gambia River Basins and through regional organizations to deal with those efforts. To go a step farther, West Africa has proliferated regional organizations for finance and development. Some of them are traditional Francophone African organizations for trade, aid, currency and finance. But ECOWAS, as a new organization bringing together French and English speaking states and dominated by Nigeria, raises important questions for thinking about Sahelian development.

In economic terms, Nigeria will provide major markets for foodstuffs from other African countries if they can produce and transport at world prices to that market Senegal does not have a comparative advantage against Ivory Coast and others for the Nigerian market through Nigeria, once a groundnut exporter, is likely to be a significant importer. Without getting into details of trade, the question is whether Sahelian development institutions can be made consistent with wider West African and African ones. The answer should be yes. Regional plans for food self-sufficiency face more the problem of individual country's desires to be secure and not reliant on each other than they face conflicts between CILSS and ECOWAS interests. Thus, for example, transportation grids within Senegal link the country internally rather than look to links with Mali for trade. But Sahelian countries do not,

basically, have complementary economies.

Nigeria is going to continue to be a much more important country for the U.S., and so is Zaire and Zimbabwe, than the Sahel countries put together. But again, this does not have much implication for U.S. development and aid efforts in the Sahel which do not fundamentally rest on major political interests nor on strategic ones.

The real question for the elaboration of U.S. programs in Senegal has to do with how to rationalize what makes sense within Senegal with multilateral frameworks for aid. This question has a number of components. At present, aid is funded significantly through Sahel Development within USAID. It is not likely that funding levels will rise greatly either bilaterally for Senegal or for the Sahel as a whole given the down cycle in USAID in general and the diminished interest in the Sahel and in aid to Africa as a whole. We can note that major drought and refugee problems in the Horn of Africa have not led to vast new programs for Somalia. Kenya did get a transfusion of food aid because of close relations with the U.S. and our Indian Ocean needs. Aid to Somalia is negotiated through military base concerns. We have not been able to fund aid to Zimbabwe at levels it had been hoped for.

Thus the mobilization of large new aid programs in Senegal will have to be done on some kind of consortia basis if it is to be done at all.

It is hard enough to organize and implement aid through bilateral programs. Aid through international consortia raise their own difficulties concerning the aims and interests of differenc donors and the coordination of projects For all the talk about coordination of aid through the Club, there appears to be relatively little coordination between aid missions in Senegal. The joint assessment complains that the donors still overlap and don't know what each other are doing. USAID officials at project and program level do not seem to have a good sense of French and other efforts. If an international consortium were put together even for Senegal alone, it would be likely to act in a concerted way on questions of balance of payment and recurrent costs. The French are, of course, key here. The IMF and World Bank have already put stringent conditions on aid to certain countries including Turkey, Zaire, and Tanzania. But one should not have the view that a country's internal development policies are truly hostage to such "receiverships". Important issues can

be affected, especially devaluation. Regimes may even fall over this issue, e.g. Busia's in Ghana. But has anyone argued that Zaire has become less corrupt of more efficient through international banks and IMF restrictions?

It may be argued that a consortium can exert great leverage through its macro-economic interventions. If a group of donors insist on recurrent cost limitations and on total budgetary restrictions, real changes can be brought about. This is true. If it were not, countries would not bulk so at IMF imposed budget restraints. However, one recipient strategy is to put more budget expenditures in to donors. Senegal is trying to do this. Another strategy is to let civil servants and military "live off the land". The society goes back to a paibend or "tormulence" (literally officials feed themselves) system. This is very unhealthy.

Concerted donor efforts can also produce changes in price policies and to some extent have done so in Senegal. And, since public investments over time do give direction to recurrent costs, and in Senegal such a large amount of public investment is from external sources, donors have far from negligible macro-imports.

In the case of Senegal, an argument can be made that for mobilizing new resources, consortium devices make sense. Indeed, the Club is already in place. But Senegal already operates within the franc zone. Its devaluation is not at stake. Already, large influence can be brought to bear on Senegalese trade policies and even, within real limits, on recurrent costs and Senegal's budget. The way aid agencies work on a project basis makes it seem less likely working towards that goal. The only way to do that is to have program officers down to technical level managers, agronomists, etc. meet and discuss joint problems. A strong effort should be made to do this. It is more important than having aid directors meet in Paris or Niamey with outside consultants. In the end, projects are implemented on the ground and it must be the agents of implementation who coordinate their activities.

There is, of course, always a dialectic between specific projects and their evaluation and the macropolicies a donor hopes to affect and implement. Since other donor agencies's projects impinge on macropolicies, the need for coordination again arises, not merely for consistency of projects. This has been recognized by the Club-CILSS framework. The structure for thinking about coordination is in place. How to make it work is another matter. The difficulties here are practical, not conceptual.

French assistance must loom very large in USAID thinking for the reasons given above with respect to coordination. But French aid also impacts on U.S. aid in other significant ways. To some extent, the French presence in Senegal and in the Sahel as a whole lessens some important problems associated with a growing AID presence. AID missions always have a potential to provoke nationalist feelings among an elite. The elite knows it is being bailed out - especially in Senegal, which has both a sophisticated elite and a high need for aid to maintain its governmental structure and is completely reliant on external sources for development funds. The French make the direct input into budget although PL 480 funds do this too. IMF, Bank, and Club interventions make the U.S. presence less salient. There still is a problem in the way that U.S. officials live compared to the way that the overwhelming majority of Senegalese live (though not the Senegalese elite).

There are real questions as to whether USAID officials get out and stay in the countryside as much as they should - questions that are the more salient when the aid programs are rural based. But the main point here is that should U.S. aid levels be increased, either through multilateral or bilateral channels, the counterproductive aspects of large presence which was so evident in India and southeast Asian countries is not likely to be felt here

The French presence is also relevant for the security situation in Senegal and West Africa. That presence in military terms is now removed from Mauritania and Chad. It continues to be important in Ivory Coast and Senegal. Nor have the French decided to lessen their economic commitments in the Sahel or other parts of West and Central Africa. Indeed, they have been assertive militarily and economically in Zaire. But it remains to be seen just what the form of the French presence will be after generational change takes place in leadership in Senegal and the Ivory Coast. Whether the political climate in France will continue to favor a French military and civil service presence and a large, overt technical presence, remains to be seen. Whether the French will continue to want this exposure cannot be taken for granted although it is likely to continue. There is a debate within the French government on the best way to extend French political and economic influence in Africa or even whether Africa should continue to be a place of major French focus.

While Senegal does not loom in U.S. security definitions either in terms of access to resources or in terms of military concerns, the lessening of French presence would focus those questions more sharply. So far, the argument for warm relations with Senegal has been put in other political terms. These terms are: Senegal has been a strong resistor of Soviet incursions in Africa. While it has taken positions on new international economic order negotiations that the U.S. does not find congenial, it has, more generally, been perceived as a force for moderation and cooperation with the U.S. in Africa.

Senegal has a relatively good human rights record domestically with respect to political prisoners, and civil liberties. It has perhaps the freest press in Africa; it has been outspoken in comdemning human rights violations elsewhere in Africa. It has allowed a more open electoral and party process than most African countries.

Thus in terms of political relations, an argument can be made for an aid program but not necessarily for a massive program. Senegal is not Egypt. Nor it is even Kenya politically and economically speaking. One could, before coming to economic and development issues, add other points that make Senegal an interesting country It is tied into Arab and Islamic countries through its own widespread Islamic networks; it has been a country of greater importance in French speaking countries and in Africa that its economic base would portend. It is a country worth being on good terms with and having an aid program to support those relations. There is, of course, no guarantee that aid programs and assistance do support political relations. They can have negative effects either by their size and impact which gets resented or they can fail on the ground and disappoint: or they can get one intimately involved with a particular regime or even faction and this creates difficulties when regimes change or factions lose. This point has some force since all agree that Senegal is at a point of transition in its internal governance.

Since I believe that the justification for aid to Senegal is largely developmental, I have some reservations about the idea that U.S. aid ought necessarily obtain high visibility for programs which benefit the rural population. Of course, it is natural to want credit if one does well One must accept the blame for failure too. But it is better to do well in Senegal than to have high visibility. If programs work, both elites and non-elites will know about them. People do not love one for one's aid in any case We do not have to win the hearts and minds of the

Senegalese, happily. Thus the only justification for visibility is to show programs to visiting Congressmen and most of those will not be too keen to go to Eastern Senegal or Bakel.

Let me return to Senegal being in a period of transition. Can U S. aid of any kind be an important element for stability in the period of transition? Assume that we would like to see a system perhaps more open to competitive party politics (would we?) but one where there is continuity of regime. At least we can safely assume that neither a radical Islamic regime nor a pro-Soviet regime would be in the U.S. interest. Whether or not a regime that might define itself even in Marxist-Leninist terms à la Congo-Brazzaville or Mozambique or sometimes Benin would matter much for the U.S.A. is also debatable but there is no reason for the U.S. to do anything to further such possibilities. We have to assess these possibilities and then ask what U.S. aid and AID's impact would be on them.

2) THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. AID

U.S. PL 480 assistance will ease balance of payments and recurrent revenue constraints. U.S. cooperation and mobilization of international aid will work to do this too. This kind of aid, largely from French sources in the past which have provided critical direct transfers to Senegal's recurrent budgets, has bailed out the regime. Indeed, neither the maintenance of this regime nor the development of Dakar as we know it would have been possible without such transfers. The productive base in Senegal, all agree, has been stagnating if not running down. Only these transfusions have allowed the wolf to be kept from the door. In this sense, aid would continue to be critical in a transition.

Senegal has very constrained options. Since it has high debt repayment, a desperate liquidity situation, relies on external sources for most public investment, aid and technical assistance allow the system to go on. At one level of generality then, the transfusions are a critical element in a transition. But in other senses, or at other levels of generality, U.S. aid cannot be an element, or at least a deliberately wielded element, in any transition. First, projects have too long a period of gestation before they can raise productivity, ease food production problems, etc. Even the immediate action components of the OMVS program in its first phase would not change the economic picture fundamentally. The current AID programs in the Casamance have not started. The health projects, the Bakel Livestock and irrigated

perimeters, and the Cereals project can hardly be thought of as being critical elements in a transitional period. It would admit that in Senegal it precluded bitter sectional, religious, and ethnic violence (1). However, the politics of patrons and clients and of political machines has a hard time flourishing in no growth economics. (What politics does not?). Since the machine pays off in material benefits, if it has to play zero-sum politics, it finds it hard to build support without excluding important segments. The trade-offs are severe politically.

Indeed, Senegal has got away with it this long because some regions have been neglected and because a traditional elite was in place in important rural areas that did use non-material incentives and had a non-material base of authority on its own turf. But this elite has been linked to the center through client networks The local notables now face pressures from their own clients and they must respond to them, as the Grand Caliph of the Mourides has been responding by emphasizing peasant interests. And the national government must continue to pay-off its own local clients.

If it cannot make these pay-offs, the networks decline. What then happens? Donal Cruise O'Brien raises the possibility of Mouride leaders leading a peasant revolt. Others will have to assess this. More likely it seems to me is that peasants and local leaders withdraw their support and their products from the s stem. Since the elite could not maintain itself without groundnuts exports, there would be changes at the center. Indeed, this loss of rural support is the most threatening possibility for this regime. For all the talk of lumpen proletariats and marginals in the swelling informal sector in Dakar, the informal sector is not full of revolutionary potential. It is hard to organize, very heterogenous by occupation and ethnic origin. Nor do students and discontented civil servants have much in common with its inhabitants. There is no reason to believe that if surveys were done with recent migrants to Dakar, the results would differ very much from surveys were done with recent migrants to Dakar, the results would differ very much from surveys done in Lagos, Mexico City, Lima, Nairobi and other large cities. Migrants say overwhelmingly that they are better off than they were and they except their children to be better off than they have been (2).

(1) Donald Cruise O Brien, op. cit.

(2) For a major summary of data and analysis on migrants and formal sector-informal sector relations, see Joan Nelson, Access to Power (Princeton: 1979)

World Bank income data which shows many low incomes among the informal sector in Dakar, as low as even some rural incomes, also shows a dispersion of income within the informal sector by occupation with many incomes at formal sector worker levels, (1) and does not in any case, lead me to alter that conclusion.

This is not to say that rising prices in urban areas, especially food prices, may not have severe political consequences. The Egyptians backed down very quickly after riots in Cairo followed the removal of food subsidies. Riots in Monrovia were a harbinger of more sweeping changes. There seems to be common agreement that since 1974 Government has been shifting the tax burden in Senegal from rural to urban populations. There is more debate over whether or not urban standards of living have declined. Wage increases have gone along with a reduction in food subsidies. Colvin says that adjusted for prices, real minimum wages went up about ten per cent from 1970-1980 (2). However not all urban dwellers fall within minimum wages. Most are outside of that structure. Informal sector workers usually feel a squeeze on the urban sector the most since they cannot protect themselves by bargaining for higher wages. If transfers from urban to rural sectors really are going on in Senegal, and if real urban standards fall, discontent will rise. But this is not necessarily expressed through effective political organization, especially for informal sector workers.

Probably more is to be feared by a Senegalese Government from its own employees and from small businessmen than from the urban poor or even from formal sector industrial urban workers who operate in trade unions It has been civil servants who have really held African Governments to ransom. All Governments find it hard to keep public employee wages down, especially military, police, and essential service workers. The critical thing is not to expand the size of this work force, advice the Senegalese Government has not taken as it hopes to absorb educated people. Indeed, the proliferation of government agencies and structures owes as much to this need as to any statist ideology in Senegal per so much less to any administrative or economic rationality.

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(1) World Bank, the Economic Trends and Prospects of Senegal, vol.4.

(2) Lucie Colvin. "Private Initiatives in the Senegalese Economy", USAID Consultant Report, Dakar, July 9-25, 1980.

Small businessmen and medium sized traders have been ignored groups in many studies of African politics They are people who have acquired both political and economic resources They have networks of contacts both within urban areas and back to rural ones and in Senegal are tied into Brotherhood organizations. They are highly leveraged and thus vulnerable to credit restrictions. IMF policies of restraint hit them very hard. Their potential for political action has to be assessed in specific contexts but policies of credit constriction should be evaluated with them in mind.

No one can say with certainty that a squeeze on urban groups will not provoke outbursts in Senegal. The role of police, gendarmerie, military and French forces would then be extremely important. The conventional wisdom about the Senegalese armed forces is that they are relatively professional, dependable and non-interventionist. Professional and non-interventionist are not necessarily highly correlated. Professional armies do intervene sometimes in the very name of prefessionalism. Their propensity for intervention depends more on their own internal dynamics and their relationships with social classes and ethnic groups than on their professional abilities per se.

There seems to be some parallels between Kenya and Senegal in that the security forces have remained avialable for use by political leaders and have not heavily involved themselves in domestic political decision-making. Moreover, the civil service, while not necessarily production oriented (less so in Senegal than in Kenya), does seem to be efficient in the sense that it establishes controls in society. And the civil service has a vested interest in continuing a political system from which it has benefitted. The Kenyan model is a transition to a leadership recruited from the close followers of the Grand Old Man and which rests on continued functioning of civil service and security forces. The Kenyan elite was and is probably more internally riven by ethnic and regional splits than the Senegalese. But Kenya has a more buoyant economy and has delivered more services to the rural areas and got more production out of them than Senegal. There is more of an entrepreneurial class in both rural and urban areas. Nor is there a strong traditional elite in most places in rural Kenya. No comparisons could be neat in making predictions about a transition.

The real question for the transition may be less that of order in the urban areas, as long as the security forces hold, than the matter of rural discontent. Rural discontent has been hard to channel into radical organizations for change. True in

Mau Mau in Kenya in the 1950's in Zaire in Kwilu and in the Eastern Congo in the 1960's, in Nigeria in the Aghekoya movements of 1968-69 in some Yoruba areas, there have emerged significant peasant movements or peasant based movements. But it has been hard to sustain them and to translate them into national radical movements. Typically they have a strong ethnic component even when they express class interests. In Senegal, strong peasant discontent, if channeled by marabouts back to the center, would be more likely to be a factor in internal elite factional politics than it would be in altering the nature of a regime. As has been pointed out by insightful political analysis in the Embassy, the Islamic Brotherhoods are themselves split and leaders tend to have circumscribed followings, with the exception of the Mourides. The emergence of an Islamic rural based leader appealing to the country as a whole seems small. Whether Cheick Anta Diop, who is both of the system and makes important challenges to it, could mobilize wide support for an Islamic regime, and what that would mean here, others will have to evaluate.

For those who think that the maraboutic structure can be the channel for radical changes in Senegal it should be recalled that representing peasant demands is one thing· commiting suicide is another. Could or would the maraboutic structure carry out radical land changes in Senegal? Would a Senegalese military, if it came to power, carry out Ethiopian-type revolutionary policies in the rural areas? There is no reason to believe so.

All in all, the judgement can be made that a regime not dissimilar from Senghor's would remain. Aid transfers are likely to increase that prospect but not to affect the make-up of the regime per se. That is, aid in general and USAID programs specifically, will be irrelevant to the playing out of factional politics in Senegal although they give a regime under severe constraints with few options a bit of breathing space and time. To ask space and time for what? and could this type of regime bring about development in Senegal? are fair questions. But they must be coupled with another question: can a different regime, whether Islamic right or left, or secular left, change Senegal in terms of the goals espoused by USAID of increased standards of living, more equity, and especially providing for basic needs in rural areas?

Senegal's "reformist" regime has not exactly had a good track records. But neither has Tanzania's "innovative", and in some ways radical regime, lessened rural-urban gaps or provided for increased productivity in either rural or urban areas although it

has delivered rural services, albeit on a narrowing productive base. Mozambique's experiment is coming about face. Angola's economy is a mess. Thus the peasant based, or self styled peasant based, regimes have not much to show in Africa so far. Any regime in Senegal, of whatever political stripe, would require external resources.

Whether a regime which labels itself Marxist Leninist or gets labeled by us one way or another is much less significant than the policies it tries to carry out and the resources it can mobilize. In Africa, policies are somewhat independent of social forces. That is, at one level of generality, regimes have real space for their price, investment, and development policies. Those policies are not derived from a class base or even from an institutional one. There has been as much diversity in the social, and economic policy outputs of military regimes as of civilian ones. What regimes do, of course, is related to their ethnic, social class, and institutional bases and constituencies but not neatly so.

I am arguing that there was nothing ineluctable about disastrous policies undertaken by Nkrumah or Mobutu. There was nothing ordained concerning Houphouet's or Kenyatta's directions. What there was and is in all these cases are heavy constraints: greater or weaker resource bases, both physical, human and infrastructural, severe political consequences for any policies undertaken because margins for error are small in most African countries. But there is policy space. This means a number of things for USAID in Senegal - or elsewhere. First, policies do matter. Thus the ability to influence, persuade, either by contacts, by showing possibilities, by providing resources for certain endeavors and by carrying out analyses which make connections and reveal options is no irrelevant undertaking. That is, it may not be irrelevant or need not be. Second, all politicians, whether in khaki or mufti, in bubas or Paris suits, try to capture donors and their resources and to use them for their purposes. And the politicians have real advantages in this game. They know vastly more about their political systems than the donors. They structure the interactions between donor and themselves by stating who will be the intermediaries, by providing the institutions through which funds are channeled. Even vast aid programs in Egypt or India or Vietnam at various times faced these situations. Where the regime is terribly weak, it can still capture donors and use them through its very weakness. And the aid administrators in the field have their own worries and need to succeed in their own terms which sophisticated recipients realize. The consequences of this are that while aid may relax constraints, and buy time, and while it

potentially can be significant, more through the options it opens up than through the particular projects it may fund, aid and assistance will always ne used and manipulated by those who are the recipients. The dialectic is always there.

In the case of Senegal, and before turning to the joint assessment itself and the political implications of USAID projects and possible formats for future AID relationships we can again note the following: 1) The politics of the relationships are complicated by the multilateral nature of possible USAID enterprises both regional and multidonor projects, and multilateral institutions, Club, CILSS, possible Consortium, Bank, OPEC funders, etc. Moreover, while USAID programs have grown in size, the U.S. operates in a country where the former colonial power still wields tremendous influence. This is some ways makes life easier in that the politi al salience of USAID is less but it also means that the USA is not the major actor. On balance, that fact and the multilateral nature of the relationships are a plus, not a minus, for exerting the kind of influence I have in mind. 2) The U.S. is not deeply plugged into the political system of Senegal. There are contacts at a high level between USAID officials and high level Senegalese political people and technicians. The Embassy has had good access. But it seems that unlike, Nigeria, for example, where large networks of contacts have been built up between unofficial Americans and Nigerians in the U.S.A. and in Nigeria, through student-teacher relationships, more commercial contact, the dialogue between Senegal and the U.S.A. is narrowly held. This means that we know less about Senegal, have fewer points of contact with it (The Peace Corps component is an exception here, and I hope we are learning from the PCVs). Even officially, my guess is that our understanding of what "Senegal" wants is heavily structured by top level contacts between U.S. officials and a few Senegalese. And those Senegalese risk being seen as too close to donors.

The best political reporting in the world from the Embassy, the greatest sensitivity to political variables on the part of USAID officials, cannot alter the fact that we relate to Senegal in a rather narrow way. This puts a heavy burden for persuasion with regard to policy change on a few officials and on the programs and projects themselves. We do not have many points of entry to influence the political system.

3) THE JOINT ASSESSMENT AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF AID PROJECT

I do not want to review the overviews of economic analyses of the Senegalese economy. Suffice it to say that there is general agreement on the problems of the economy and the constraints it suffers under. Most would agree that there is no conflict between raising productivity in Senegal and providing for basic needs since the economy cannot support extension of social services without increasing the productive base. There is little quarrel with the idea that basic needs and rural infrastructural development are complementary since marketing problems, storage, transportation affect agricultural output. Different people, marshalling specific data employing various techniques, and emphasizing individual factors will differ about whether the demand for millet can be expanded or at what price can be grown in Senegal or whether a particular health program can be adapted and made more efficient. It is in the nature of operating under limited knowledge with many interrelated and complicated variables, in a society with regional variations and social heterogeneity, that good analysts can have differing opinions. One of the strengths of AID's program in Senegal has been the very process of joint assessment which evaluates ongoing programs with a view to learning from them. It is absolutely essential that the difficulties in programs and projects be faced squarely both for the economic consequences and the political ones.

The joint assessment process is then an internal political process and an exercise in political relations between the Senegalese and USAID. We can end have learned about each other through the assessment process. This is a plus. An assessment process and the continued monitoring of AID projects implies that specific projects can be turned off or altered. This is a contribution made by the joint assessment process because it allows AID to have a way of ceasing to support unproductive projects and it tells the Senegalese that this can happen, with their participation in the analysis and conclusions. Indeed, it allows them to tell us that it should happen. Thus whatever the content of the joint assessment, as an undertaking it was important, beneficial in and of itself and for what it allows in the future.

The burden of my remarks above was to argue that the case for AID to Senegal is essentially a case for aid to get development in the context of a friendly country and in the context of a multilateral effort to alter the trends in a region of Africa, the Sahel. All agree that there is no quick fix in Senegal or

or in the Sahel for altering trends of environmental degradation: population pressure on resources: stagnant or declining productivity: lack of diversification of the economy: rural-urban dualism. Some of the goals desired are, in the short run, competing. A policy for food self-sufficiency in the wider Sahelian context, depending on transportation priorities and development of local and regional comparative advantages vis-à-vis neighboring countries. The desire to be more self-sufficient in food may work, over time, to lessen food imports and thus lessen foreign exchange constraints. But an immediate emphasis on exports might in the short run help balance of payments even more. Exports to Nigeria, in an ECOWAS context, may move Senegal away from closer Sahelian integration. These examples could be proliferated. The desire to lesson vulnerability to food shortages makes Senegal vulnerable to donors. The desire to produce more millet may have environmental consequence. And so on.

Trade offs in Senegal are sharp because the country is poor and the constraints are severe. Things cannot be done all at once and there are too many non-complementary aspects of Senegalese development. There are many structural imbalances. It is tempting to think that in poor countries, if we can only find good projects - that is projects that make sense in terms of social and individual profitability, we are in business. Life is not so simple.

For example, it may make good sense to explore the Casamance as an area of development potential and one that has been relatively neglected. It may appear that both growth and equity can be maximized. But the Casamance is a region with uneasy relations to the Senegalese Government. No where in the documents I have read on the Casamance Regional Development Project is the political aspect of Casamance to Senegal explored (1).

Because the Casamance projects have not been far enough along, they have not been part of the joint assessment. Another example: In the OMVS PID, it is suggested that new perimeters will displace a certain number of flood recession or rainfed cultivators who will be offered a share in the irrigated perimeters as compensation. "The same perimeters will also become

(1) I may not have full documentation. I am referring largely to the Action Memo to the AID Administrator of July 27, 1978 and Volume III of the Casamance Regional Development Project.

a resource for other elements of the population who traditionally have less access to land, since all social levels will be invited to participate on an equal basis" (1).

How does AID guarantee that? What leverage does it have to make sure who will be offered a share in irrigated perimeters. Does it know so much about the nature of caste relationships in the Fleuve that it can determine what groups will be offered a share? If so, it will be able to cut into critical social structural areas in a way not frequently accomplished by outsiders in Africa.

Perhaps AID is counting on the development of civil service structures which determine traditional authorities and would be available for egalitarian allocations. Colvin points out that Conseils Ruraux are given responsibility for land allocation and that village chiefs and their relatives are ineligible for membership. She says that the traditional lines of authority at the village level are negated by the Conseils Ruraux system. The weak councils are dominated by the sous-prefect who is appointed by the Ministry of Interior.

There are also cooperatives involved in the rural areas (2). AID is convinced that cooperative reform "will play a fundamental role in guaranteeing that the farmer receives his full share of the benefits to be derived from the new, higher farmgate prices"(3). This is very important because USAID/Senegal has a stated concern to see that increased production brings a maximum return to small farmers and to the poorest of the rural poor (4).

The putting in place of a new civil service structure does not guarantee either that traditional authorities will be undermined or that civil servants will act either for production or equality, much less for both. We have many examples in Africa of general administrators and agricultural extension workers getting

(1) P.52 of Draft PID, June 20, 1980. The July 1980 PID for the OMVS makes very few changes.

(2) Colvin, op. cit. p. 11

(3) AID, Senegal Country Development Strategy Statement, FY82, January 1980, p. 28.

(4) Ibid. p. 21

captured by better off farmers. Cooperatives too have usually been controlled by better off farmers. This happened even in Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania (1).

I am not suggesting that in Senegal civil servants cannot be agents of social change and equitable development. I am suggesting that this will not necessarily be the case any more than cooperatives will ipso facto fulfill those roles.

The concern for egalitarian development is again stated in the OMVS PID.

This document recognizes that with the introduction of irrigated plots, a woman may lose access to her private fields, "Ways to correct this situation are being examined." Not a very strong statement. If you set a process forward which raises the value of land and commercializes it, disurpting either traditional caste or sex defined rights to land use, you have changed fundamental parameters. One should not fool oneself into thinking that this is a process that can be controlled down the line by outside agencies, whatever legal stipulations they impose in the short run. I am not suggesting that all improvements or rise in land values work to the disadvantage of already relatively disadvantaged groups, be they women or low origin groups. Sometimes they contrary take place.

A great deal of status reversal took place in Africa when missionaries brought education to low social status groups or when roads or access to resources came to relatively disadvantaged areas. This process frequently took place not through deliberate colonial manipulation but through investments, education, and developments that had unforeseen impacts. The latent consequences of development were more significant for ethnic relationships between groups in the Congo or in Uganda that the conscious ones. Or, when the colonial regime did use divide and rule tactics or recruited militaries from marginal ethnic and economic groups, it could hardly know what it was setting lose in Uganda.

We can doubt whether excellent predictions can be made about the impacts that projects have on social mobility and on power relationships without knowing a very great amount about the indigenous social structures as well as actual economic outcomes which will occur.

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(1) See the work of Goran Hyden on Kenya's Cooperatives and the work of Dean McGowan on Tanzania's Ujamaa villages.

The PID for the OMVS is partially sensitive to the issues raised. It takes up the possible erosion of local institutions under the impact of outside agencies and the possibility that accumulation of land will create sharecroppers or wage laborers. Indeed, some traditional institutions prove highly flexible and capture new resources brought to them by outside agencies be they missionaires, colonial administrators or aid donors. The Baganda chiefs did so as did chiefs in Sierra Leone (1). The critical variables are the nature of organization in the traditional structures, the values of local belief systems, and the interactions between outsiders and locals, and the resources being exchanged.

Venema, in the Wolof of Saloum, argues that government organizations in Senegal that have been concerned with increasing agricultural productivity have insufficient knowledge of the fragmentation of domestic units or the hierarchy of local power networks - and aristocratic cultural patterns. This is consistent with situations elsewhere in Africa. There is no reason to expect, a priori, that civil servants will be sensitive to local political factors or know much about them.

Whatever the intervention of civil servants for egalitarian development in rural areas, it maybe that agricultural productivity is not going to rise without social differentiation on the land varies and the ability of urban areas to absorb those who lose from the rural areas or the ability of off-farm rural employment to absorb them varies too.

It can be fairly asked why not more of an attempt was made to come to grips with these questions raised in the context of the OMVS where they are very critical from the experiences of the Bakel Small Perimeters Projects.

The experience of Bakel is used to make estimates about operating costs but not social structural change or political-administrative relations, except by inference is some of the concerns with private sector-administrative agency relations.

This is an important point. The first stated conclusion in the Joint Assessment's Final Report reads: "In difficult environments as in Senegal, all projects are protypic and should be explicitly recognized as such. This means that an emphasis

(1) See David Apter, the Political Kingdom in Uganda (Princeton: 196); Martin Kilson: Political Change in a West African State: The Case of Sierra Leone (Cambridge: 196).

must be placed on data collection and analysis so that a project may be carefully monitored and conclusions drawn from project experience".

Agreed. If we turn to the Annexes of the Joint Assessment we find a frank appraisal of the Bakel irrigated perimeters and integrated crop production projects.

But no monitoring system on the impact of technology on local social and economic networks was in place. Recommendation 5 calls for one to be out in place (p.2.1 7.). The comments on Sociological Aspects (p.2.1.14.) are very sparse but presumably provided the base for the confidence which the OMVS PID faces social concerns. More is available on institutional analyses (p.2.1.16-17).

If a monitoring and reevaluation system is going to be useful, then what we learn from Bakel must be plugged into OMVS new projects. Of course, the timing is difficult. The OMVS PID is put forward when the Joint Assessment Bakel evaluation team is in the field and the ENEA team is carrying out their beneficiary survey. Since the social structural impact data was not there to begin with, and time for such data to be forthcoming was short, there was a built in problem.

<u>If trade offs are severe and the point of pilot projects is to learn about them by evaluation, not only must the evaluation be full but what we do have should be reflected in new proposals.</u> Was it in the OMVS PID?

A similar criticism can be made about the ways that what was learned concerning training and manpower difficulties, including those of SAED project staff was glossed over or not taken into account in the OMVS PID.
In the Annex A to that document, a number of severe difficulties are slipped over. The directing of skilled people to rural areas is a problem. The project proposes to deal with it through institutional development and policy reform components. These are worthy programs. But given the incentives in Senegal, it is a very intractable problem. I do not expect PIDs that propose programs to then state that the programs cannot work because of an inability to direct skilled people to rural areas, but the whole treating of manpower constraints in this and other documents seems overly optimistic. How are private sector groups to be

protected against resistance by the parastatals working in the OMVS? Surely not by the stipulation of legal conditions in a PID (1).

This brings me to a fundamental problem, almost all AID and other evaluations raise serious questions about the ability of Senegalese state structures to provide useful services and inputs to the rural areas at reasonable costs.
Indeed the image received of these structures is that they are inefficient, sometimes corrupt and frequently stifle the rural private initiatives that exist. Commentators do differ as to how much private rural and urban trade, investment, and entrepreneurial potential there is in Senegal, but they suggest that there are trade and investment network in rural Senegal (2).
There once was the belief that Regional Development Agencies would operate more efficiently as they took over responsibilities for directing agricultural production from central ministries. The joint assessment makes clear that this hope cannot be sustained and USAID no longer shares it.

Nonetheless fundamental political problems are rarely solved by administrative reforms. The Senegalese Government can abandon ONCAD when the opposition focuses on its corruption and inefficiencies. It can respond to donor pressures for administrative reform. It is much more difficult, even granting the political will, to transform a civil service built for control and the transfer of resources to a political and administrative center into a civil service that is production oriented or equity oriented.
Unfortunately, Africa provides rather few examples of this transformation.

Even when there is political leadership commited to creating "development administration" out of bureaucracy, as in Tanzania, bureaucracy persists. African state enterprises for trade, production and investment have invariably been high cost and inefficient.

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(1) See p. 7 of Annex A, OMVS PID.

(2) Colvin, op.cit. discusses this as does Martin Klein in "Colonial Rule and Structural Change: The Case of Sine-Saloum," in O'Brien, op.cit. pp. 65-99. Also see Bakel Livestock's Joint Assessment.

(3) Senegal, CDSS, op.cit p. 27.

Marketing boards have functioned to tax farmers in Africa much better than they have functioned to increase agricultural productivity. In Tanzania, the state bureaucracy itself is seen by the Left as an exploiter. But since those to the left of Nyerere, as well as he and his colleagues, are so commited to state intervention and the emasculation of private capital in production and trade, they have nothing to offer but the creation of "new men" in the civil service by exhortation and negative rewards.

It is true that a strong regional or provincial civil service can function better as a development mechanism than a highly centralized one in Africa. The Kenyan provincial administration was built for control. But it has also given production and low cost inputs to farmers a high priority. Indeed, the Kenyan provincial administration has been wary of rapid Africanization of trade networks through licensing and government intervention precisely because it feared that a low cost, albeit Asian dominated, trade network would be replaced by a high cost Africanized one and that farmers would suffer from high costs of inputs to them.
Whether the creation of new agencies in Senegal will produce more efficient services remains to be seen. A civil service does not operate in isolation from norms in the society as a whole. Furthermore, Kenyan farmers have been effective pressure groups on central policy making and implementation because there have been effective political links between districts, regions, and central political power. These links operate through party, ethnic groups and the civil service. Perhaps they can be made to operate in Senegal too, so that administrative reform is not merely rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. But this requires realignment and a different functioning of patron client networks and the party operation in Senegal; not administrative reform alone. So far reporting on SAED and other RDAs makes them appear unpopular, more a deconcentration of central power than a real effort at decentralization (1).

Furthermore, at the heart of the system lies a contradiction not easily overcome. The Senegalese leadership requires political support from rural areas. But this political support is based on a network of local leaders who do not wish to be administratively reformed, or "modernized" or programmed out of existence. These local notables may resist the ending of political restraints on

(1) See the work of Sheldon Gellar on Rural Animation
E. Schumacher's work in bureaucracy and rural development in Senegal raises serious questions too.

farmers just as civil servants will resist a dismantling of the state structures which they operate and through which they are rewarded. But USAID must ask itself if anything less than a dismantling of state structures or a truly radical reorganization of them will allow a more productive agriculture.

It is a major step forward that Senegal appears commited to rural development. Governments have a much harder time translating their commitments in the rural areas into workable programs. It is difficult to get resources out into the rural areas in a constructive way. It is hard to find good projects because rural development is a wholistic phenomenon. And, at every step, political questions of power-control of land, water, transportation, external resources-intrude. The political will and political strategies for development have to be constructed from within.

Nor will USAID, nor any outside donor have much social engineering leverage on the reorganization of administrative and political networks. Even where AID has been much more massive than it will be in Senegal, whether mobilized by a consortium or not, the ability of outsiders to restructure according to their values and wishes has been very limited.
Outsiders can intervene but they can rarely produce the results they want in intended ways. Differents types of AID projects and technical assistance allow for various kinds of intervention. Indeed, the larger the projects and the more concentrated they are, the fewer the points of intervention in the system although the interventions may have more weight.

What occurs in the development process in Sen-gal will owe much more to internal political factors and to exogenous factors than to directed interventions by outsiders. The exogenous factors include world prices for commodities that Senegal must export and import. They include weather. Then there are semi-exogenous factors which USAID may have some effect on, e.g. the amount of AID flows from OPEC countries or Europe. There are also internal social and demographic factors/donors will not be able to alter in the short run Population growth will not slow down appreciably within the time horizons of envisioned AID programs. Whatever projects are put in place, total rural to urban migration will not slow down either. Rural incomes simply cannot be raised across the board for enough people to affect rural to urban migration although a sharp rise in urban costs of living will have some impact. These internal factors become parameters within which to work and to plan.

Given the severe constraints in Senegal and given the limited knowledge and abilities of all donors, USAID included, the start of wisdom is to realize one's limited ability to affect change. This need not be considered a statement of despair. Since US political interests in Senegal are modest and limited, the USAID programs can be thought of as development oriented, and protypical. It is important to learn from them both for AID to Senegal and for the AID effort in poor countries with limited resource bases. Moreover, the attempt to mobilize international resources and to plan in an organized multilateral way for both recipients and donors is a very important step which needs support. This is true for the commitment to evaluation of programs in Senegal and the Sahel as a whole. In situations where our knowledge is limited, constant reevaluation is critical.

There are a number of paths that AID can take in Senegal:

1) AID can continue with experimental/pilot projects that also try to make an impact through raising productivity in health and rural development areas

2) The projects selected can be better related to the wider economic transactions in society and their managerial costs can be reduced, or at least this can be attempted. The joint assessment suggests that projects can certainly be improved and also suggests that USAID might take on more direct managerial roles.
One and two are not different in kind. Nor would necessarily imply inexpensive projects in terms of cost per project or total costs. It is also difficult to monitor a large number of scattered projects or to influence the direction of many projects if one becomes unhappy about them.

3) There is thus a tendency to want to move towards larger, fewer programs because they are:

a) easier to relate to macro trends in Senegal;
b) it is thought they have more visibility;
c) they will be more appropriate for consortia type funding and also for group monitoring and evaluation;
d) it is thought that such programs give you policy leverage vis-à-vis government because they may be so critical to its development needs Such projects include OMVS development; Casamance Regional Development, redesigned; soil fertility reconstruction in Sine Saloum.

Within the larger projects, there is the view that one can still hold into a project mix. That is projects can still be pilot-protypical: they can still be labor intensive and spread out. They can still have a research component and can be adjusted while they go on.
But it is harder to keep large scale projects protypical. For one thing, there is more pressure to see direct output results when large funds are at stake. This is more true rather than less for multilateral donor programs. Thus there is also pressure for more visible hardware and physical output results when one moves to larger projects. There is pressure for more visibility.

The matter of leverage over the recipient government is a two way street. The large donor commitment with heavy sunk costs makes it more difficult to pull out or to adjust projects in mid-stream. The large projects may or may not get one more involved in the political system. They can become more involving as they are more critical to government. If they are large capital investment projects, the interaction is usually with government at very high levels, and may get one into inter-ministerial conflicts. If the projects are integrated regional development ones, the interaction may be taken place at more levels in the political system. Then, in order to make the projects "work", intervention seems necessary at levels in which AID officials have no comparative advantage. The more integrated the programs are meant to be, the more extensive and sensitive the interventions.

I do not suggest that it is easy to collect base line data from which to assess economic, social and political impacts. Moreover, the analytical structures for assessment are hard to develop. Strong social science theories for examining sound changes set loose by foreign and are not readily at hand.. The task should not be minimized. And, Governments frequently do not want this kind of work done be either nationals or foreigners.

Senegal has allowed a good deal of open and unfettered research to go in rural areas. Researc- organizations exist in Senegal with whom to collaborate This is an area where donors should concert their support for research, should make materials available to each other and support the collection and maintenance of documentary and research facilities together with Senegalese institutions.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Joint Assessment process has been useful in and of itself. Indeed, it points the way as an important model for AID evaluations. It does not clearly point the way to the kinds of projects and programs that ought to exist for Senegal. These depend on funding levels available and whether multilateral frameworks for the AID effort can be continued and extended. Moreover, it is early in the evaluations process. Especially, political and social impacts of AID programs and projects have not been determined. There is relatively little political analysis of projects. Thus while the political implications of USAID strategies on the macro level can be sketched out, the micro impacts of projects and the ways that macro policies will affect different social and economic groups in Senegal is hardly revealed by the Joint Assessment. Nor could that be accomplished readily.

1) One conclusion then is that since we still have many unknowns about impact of aid in Senegal, it is important to build more social and political analysis into the evaluation process. It also is noted that high visibility projects run the risk that unintended consequences and perhaps failure will also be very visible. Even if USAID goes the route of concentrating project resources both for reasons of economic impact, and/or managerial/implementation efficiency, and political visibility (and I am less impressed with the need for the last).

2) There is much to be said for program phasing as the OMVS does. That is, direct action programs, research and pilot projects, and aiming towards long term results should be continued and interelated (1). But as programs are developed, what is learned from one should be better integrated into others.

3) It makes sense to try to mobilize resources through integrated donor planning and coordination. Most international consortia under either IBRD/IMF auspices or consortia of banks have been involved in monitoring and controlling expenditures and to a lesser extent trade policies. It is harder to establish and

(1) As a matter of presentation, the interelationship of long run and short run goals as put forward on p. 3 of Chapter II, of OMVS proposal should be made clearer. This involves relating micro projects to macro programs and policies and making clear how monitoring will affect projects and programs.

maintain consortia groups for mobilizing resources, making commitments to specific projects, and coordinating programs in the field. The donors do not have the same interests politically nor necessarily in functional terms And project coordination is difficult because of different modes of operating, funding procedures, communications problems and time available for coordination. Nonetheless, given the anticipated AID funding levels available for Senegal, the US might be able to maximize its aid leverage by placing a key role in mobilizing funds and coordinating aid, although it is unlikely that the French will subordinate their aid and technical assistance efforts to a wider consortium group They might well collaborate and put partial funding through such a groups as they have done with the Club.

4) One warning signal. If the U.S. spends great effort in organizing consortia groups, will it be able to maintain its own funding commitments over time? Will the expectations of fellow donors and of Senegal be disappointed? We should not create a structure we cannot maintain and we should not create one that might depend on personal ties and influence within AID and State and with donors. This is danger in a country such as Senegal where U.S. interests are not large in political or economic terms.

5) Aid to Senegal is justified politically but the real thrust of aid should be towards serious development. This has been conceived of as immediate action programs to raise productivity, research, long term institution building and structural change. The conception makes sense. Even if USAID should move to concentrate its efforts in a few major areas, for example, reforestation, it is important to maintain a concern for evaluation and the strucutral impacts that programs have. We might no longer think of particular projects as "protypical". However, any project one can envision, including planting trees or recapturing land from desertification, has sound and political impacts and we ought to try and understand these. As we learn from experiences, projects, in one sense, cease to be protypical. But the need for evaluation and reevaluation is not lessened.

6) However, the United States does not have great leverage over Senegal. Nor at the program/project level can interventions easily be made into a political and bureaucratic system which has not yet been development oriented in an efficient and productive fashion. The ability of outsiders to effectively work with a social engineer is always limited although outside interventions may produce important impact - sometimes unintended ones.

The points of contact between USAID and Senegal seem limited. The highly factional and complex indigenous political system is extremely hard to manipulate even if there were some sense that US personnel knew how or thought it desirable to do so. While USAID, in conjunction with other aid, makes an important contribution to easing financial and food constraints in a period of political fluidity, USAID both cannot and should not be intervening in factional politics. Its efforts are not relevant to those politics; it has no tools to be determinative in that endeavor. USAID time horizons should be long term. Short run political changes in Senegal are not likely to lead to a political structure with which USAID could not work or would ask USAID to leave or to curtail its efforts. It would be wise to keep the goals of USAID foremost in development terms and in terms of learning how best to operate in Sahelian countries. It will be necessary to keep in mind the limited impacts of that aid both politically and economically.

7) Change cannot be brought about in Senegal in a controlled, directed way by USAID or any groups of outsiders. Too many intractable endogenous as well as exogenous factors are at work. No matter how much monitoring is done, it is extremely difficult to predict and to anticipate the effect of one's aid programs on social changes. Indigenous groups try to capture resources and to bend programs for equity and growth to their own purposes. Resources exist to try to maintain USAID goals but those goals will sometimes be at odds with those of local and national groups. This tension is built into any aid process. Even if we know this and try to take account of the fact, responses have to be partially ad hoc and contextually determined.

8) A strong tension in Senegal is the desire to play a role in reforming state structures that have not worked well and to help rationalize policies set by and implemented by those structures. Also, USAID looks forward to using private initiatives more. Can this be done in Senegal? Can reformist and incremental policies make an impact on real increases in standards of living and do so to produce more equitable outcomes between sectors and groups? It is worth trying to further those ends. It is not clear that either "radical" change is possible in Senegal or that it would produce more desirable outcomes in terms of USAID's stated goals and American interests. However, one must end up agnostic as to the political possibilities for effective reforms in Senegal.

ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF ROLES PLAYED BY PROMOTION HUMAINE, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES AND LOCAL INSTITUTIONS IN PROMOTING RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN SENEGAL.

by

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I. PROMOTION HUMAINE

A. Background

The Animation Rurale Service was established in 1959 as part of a rural development strategy to radically restructure the countryside along African Socialist lines. Self-governing rural communities were eventually to become the basic political unit in the countryside; efficient multifunctional cooperatives run by the membership were to become the basic economic unit of the rural economy; and state bureaucratic control and tutelage inherited from the colonial era would someday disappear as the rural populations took charge of their own destiny.

The Animation Service was part of a trinity of new development institutions designed to implement the government's utopian socialist development strategy. The Centres d'Expansion Rurale (CER) were supposed to be multidisciplinary services operating at the grassroots level (arrondissement) which would attempt to satisfy all the basic needs of the people in their district by lending their technical skills to improve production, productivity, health levels, housing, and educational levels. Unlike the traditional technical services which were concerned primarily with production norms, the CERs were to be concerned with the total development of the people in their district. The Cooperative movement was to provide the basic economic unit for organizing the rural populations. During the early 1960s the government established a network of hundreds of coops throughout the country and broke the monopoly of the major European import-export houses which had previously controlled the peanut trade. The coops did not evolve into the multifunctional coops envisaged in the original African Socialist theory, but remained primarily vehicles for peanut marketing and depositories for rural credit under the heavy tutelage of the State. The departure of Mamadou Dia from the political scene in December 1962 marked the end of the government's initial effort to give priority to an African Socialist development strategy built on Animation Rurale, the CERs, and the Cooperative movement. The Animation Service which initially was supposed to organize and prepare the rural populations for the radical changes implied in Dia's

African Socialism program was transformed into an agency for civic education. The CERs faded in importance as government policy put more stress on raising production and productivity first through foreign aid agencies like SATEC and CFDT during the mid 1960s, and later through Senegalized Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) like SODEVA, SAED, and SOMIVAC. The cooperative movement stagnated and became less popular as it came under the control of ONCAD which was regarded more as a generator of peasant debt and den of corruption by the rural populations than an instrument for improving their lives.

During the late 1960s, the Animation Service's influence waned and in 1970, it was reduced to being a minor direction within the Youth and Sports Ministry and headed for oblivion, a fact which led its founder and director to resign and leave the country.

Towards the end of 1973, the GOS decided to once again upgrade Animation Rurale which by now had become transformed into Promotion Humaine and to call back Ben Mahdi Cissé to head the newly reorganized agency. Cissé was given ministerial status and Promotion Humaine was raised to the level of a Secretariat d'Etat attached to the Ministry of National Education. PH was given responsibility for promoting various forms of non-formal education -- post-primary practical training (EMP), training rural artisans, fishermen, herders, and pilot farmers, functional literacy in the national languages, Maisons Familiales, etc.. Animation Rurale became a residual service which dealt with women and youth and small village level projects and gave some civic training to Rural Councillors. Much of PH's funding came from external donors and funding was never sufficient to do an adequate job in carrying out the various missions which had been formally assigned to it.

After the March, 1978 national elections, PH was in danger of being dismantled. The newly created Secretariat d'Etat à la Condition Feminine took away PH's control over women's projects and half of the Animation Rurale Direction's agents. At the same time the Ministry of National Education took direct control over the Literacy Direction. The government removed Cissé as the head of PH and put Robert Sagna in his place.

B. Recent Evolution

In January 1980, the Prime Minister reorganized his government. As a result of the reorganization, Promotion Humaine and Condition Humaine were combined into one Sécretariat d'Etat à la Promotion Humaine and placed under

the direction of Maimouna Kane who had headed Condition Feminine. Promotion Humaine itself was placed under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister's office, a sign which was to underscore the government's renewed interest in Promotion Humaine.

Analysis of the PM's speech justifying the fusion of Condition Feminine and Promotion Humaine indicates that Diouf still regards PH's mission and constituency as serving a) youth and b) women. That was the way in which Diouf defined Animation Rurale in 1970 when he transferred it to Youth and Sports. This suggests that the PM does not plan to resurrect PH as a major ideological force and influence in defining government policy. He still remains committed to a more technocratic rather than popular participation auto-gestion approach to rural development.

As to Maimouna Kane, she rose to prominence as an advocate of women's rights and improving rural women's status. She is a former magistrate and is well known in international women's circles, having headed the recent world women's conference in Copenhagen. While head of Condition Feminine, Maimouna Kane made many tournées in the rural areas distributing millet mills, equipment for rural maternities, and other items. She is a modern urbane sophisticated women with little (no?) concrete experience working in rural areas or on rural development. Since taking over PH, she still continues to stress almost exclusively women's issues to detriment of other PH functions. She seems to have no real political base outside support for her by the President and Prime Minister and thus far has showed little interest in either non-formal education functions of PH or traditional Animation Rurale and community development functions. Of course, it is possible that she will take more of an interest now that the Copenhagen conference is over. At any rate, unlike the directors and lower level agents, she has no real attachment to old Animation populist philosophy.

In recent months, the reorganization of PH now seems to be going beyond simply a fusion of Condition Feminine and weakened 1978-80 Promotion Humaine. The reform of ONCAD and "redynamisation" of rural structures discussed by the PS in its April 12, Conseil National meeting may mean an enlarged role for Promotion Humaine in rural development activities. This can be seen in two developments which have not yet become official:

1. The Secretariat executive des Actions des C.E.R.s which previously had been attached to the Rural Development Minister's office will be transferred to Promotion Humaine. This means that the CERs and Animation Rurale will once again be reunited under the same roof after being separated for a décade. What this means remains to be seen, since the CERs have been largely non-functional for lack of resources despite the importance which official texts give to them. Most of the 90 CERs do not have a full team. Even worse, they do not have any operating funds to get out and reach the rural populations. Each CER has about 250,000 CFAF a year which has to cover gas, vehicle maintenance, and other expenses. When vehicles break down there is no money to fix them; and even if they work, there is no money for gas to run them. Hence, it is easy to understand why some say that CERP stands for Centre d'Elegance et de Repos Permanent. Recent government support and a greater role for the CERs in planning social and economic development projects for the Rural Communities. Who will provide these resources? A) foreign donors and/or B) GOS possibly using revenues from a tax levied on marketing of agricultural products.

2. It is very likely that the Fonds Nationale pour le Développement Communautaire (FONADEC) will become a direction of Promotion Humaine. FONADEC will be a clearing house for collecting money from foreign donors -- governmental and non-governmental -- for community development projects. PH has had a long history of success in obtaining funds from PVOs for local development activities. Since the CERS which are charged with planning and executing community development projects will now be at PH, it seems to make sense to put FONADEC there too. Up until now, the CERs have been able to get external funding from Konrad Adenauer Foundation to put on seminars at grassroots level and from Belgians for a few ferme-pilote projects. With increased party and government stress on community development and greater role for CERS, I would predict that FONADEC will make a concerted effort to get more funding from external donors and channel some of that to CERs as well as to more traditional PH kinds of local development projects.

Growing government and party interest in activating CERs and upgrading status of Promotion Humaine are largely the result of:

1. The need to mend fences and keep the support of rural populations. The "malaise paysanne" is back again and peasants are losing confidence in government's ability to serve their interests. The resurrection of party

politics means that the PDS is there to capitalize on rural unrest. Local PS politicians want resources directed to their constituents whose main concerns are for wells, health facilities, schools, and community halls, items which can not be provided by RDAs. Community development projects can provide these services and meet needs expressed by rural populations. CERs can deliver (in principle) these services if provided with means.

2. A strong revival of pre-SATEC African Socialism ideology in the past year which stress auto-gestion, criticizes the "productionist" perspective of the RDAs as being too narrow, and calls for revitalization of the cooperative movement as basic economic unit of decentralized agrarian socialist society. Even SODEVA (see Journees d'Etude, juin 1979 report) is pushing for decentralized coop structures and its eventual demise. The ideological Left of the PS does not like the fact SODEVA has been given responsibility for promoting evolution of cooperative movement, even though it admits that SODEVA is probably better than ONCAD. The Left would like to see an independent National Cooperative Office which would not be under control of "productionist" regional development agencies.

3. The need for GOS to obtain resources to pay employees and keep services functioning. It can not fire that many people regardless of what IMF wants. Populer Participation, Community Development, Women's activities are "in" with many donors. Hence, one can capitalize on this trend to capture more resources.

Other changes in PH structures resulting from reorganization concern rearranging various directions inherited from old PH and Condition Feminine. These services will be reorganized into four distinct Directions:

A. Direction de la Formation Practique Rurale which includes:

1. Alphabetisation which comes back to PH after being at Education Nationale. Stress will be on functional literacy rather than mass literacy programs. It will work closely with RDAs. Functional literacy is now being stressed more in government documents. Its importance will probably grow much more rapidly once Senghor departs from political scene. Younger cadres generally interested in literacy programs in national languages which has been resisted by Senghor and French for many years.

2. Formation Professionnele Rurale: training of artisans, fishermen, herders, pilot peasants etc..

3. Enseigement Moyen Practique: post-primary school practical education.

B. Direction de l'Animation Rurale et Urbaine which is becoming more project oriented and tries to concentrate cadres around projects. It depends heavily on PCVs to reach villages.

C. Direction de la Condition Feminine: This service will be responsible for all activities relating to women. Monatrices d'Economie Familiale, women's projects, matronnes, etc..

D. Direction du Bien-Etre Familiale. This direction will have tutelle over Maisons Familiales. It also takes over Service de Menager et Sociale which used to be in Social Action Ministry. Finally, it is likely that family planning or espacement de naissance projects will also be located here. Stress will be on family planning as part of broader improvement of women's life.

As a government ministry, PH's star seems to be rising thanks to its expanded functions and missions. Maimouna Kane's political position could be pretty tentative in a society where Islamic pietism is on the move. It looks as though PH could retain its current position even if Kane goes.

The real question of PH's ability to be effective in carrying out its new enhanced mission depends on its getting the resources it needs to do the job. External financing will not be sufficient. PH's fate depends on Senegalese political developments. If it is just a front for capturing foreign aid, it won't be much more effective than old PH. If it gets more support both politically and financially, one could see improvement in its work. Demoralized cadres could begin some enthusiasm. Agents could get out in the field and actually have chance to work more closely with grassroots. More political support and resources would also enhance its ability to challenge the preeminence of the Regional Development Agencies even though the RDAs are more than likely to get their own way, particularly if the current leadership continues to hold sway.

C. USAID and Promotion Humaine

USAID's relationships with PH go back to early 1960s when AID provided vehicles to Animation Rurale Service to get around and some PCVs to help out. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Peace Corps developed close ties with the Animation Service. Today the Peace Corps is an integral part of Senegal's Animation Rurale program. USAID interest and involvement with Animation increased after 1973 when PH secretariat was established. New Directions policy with its stress on self-help, organizing the poor, promoting

women's status, etc. made PH a likely agency for USAID collaboration. PH was the only Senegalese government agency which worked directly with rural women in development projects; it was committed to self-help and community organization and reaching the people not touched by productionist agencies. Hence, over the years, USAID began to put PH components into larger projects and to finance small-scale PH projects -- e.g. Peace Corps self-help projects, Women in Development, etc..

Over the past couple of years, there has been growing disillusionment with PH and reluctance to continue to finance PH activities on the same scale as before. Recent evaluations of PH's performance have often been harsh. Here it might be useful to analyze the causes underlying PH's weak performances and the areas of its strengths:

1. Bakel Livestock Project:

One of the main problems here was that PH provided agents who were not prepared for the task at hand. PH did not provide an elevage specialist who had experience with herders. Hence, PH agents operated in a technical knowledge vacum. Even worse, they did not speak Poular. They thus lacked two crucial qualities needed to do their job, ability to communicate directly with their constituents and to understand their economic organization. PH's agents' lack of technical expertise has always been a major weakness. The lesson is not to use PH agents in projects requiring specialized knowledge which they do not have. On the other hand, small women's projects and Maison Familiale worked better. Why? Older female cadres spoke poular; they had entrée to women in village; they provided a service which was desired. Maisons Familiales generally work because they are not set up until villagers really want them. MF moniteurs and monitrices work closely with villagers. Hence, they are more likely to work better.

In all fairness to PH agents in projects, it must be said that they received little support from Dakar. This too is a constant problem. PH has little operating funds for logistical support. Moreover, Bakel is very far away and inaccessible. PH agents there felt abandoned, often did not get paid, and felt a sense of isolation.

2. Sine-Saloum Health Project:

PH agents were supposed to explain project to local villagers, organize local management committees to manage village health huts, and encourage

people to use health huts. Beneficiary surveys done by ENEA indicated that PH had done little to "sensibiliser" villagers about project or to help management committees get the knowledge and skills needed to keep project going. There were marked differences in PH performance. In the department of Kaolack, Animation was the main source of information about the health projects. On the other hand, in the department of Nioro, Animation came third after Rural Councillors and health officials as the main source of information. Why did things go relatively better in Kaolack? Was it because the Animation agent was more conscientious? Reports written by this particular agent reflect much concern and understanding of local problems on issues concerning health huts and delivery of services. Or was greater ability to reach rural populations in Kaolack largely a function of greater access to vehicles because PH agent can tap regional service's vehicles to get around. Kaolack agent is less isolated than the one in Nioro.

Another explanation of poor PH performance was that project in general and PH service in particular bit off far more than it could chew. PH did not have the resources to do the job. Poor job performance by a major PH official hindered the project. That agent was eventually removed. There were also problems of coordinating activities and clearly delimiting respective responsibilities of health and PH services. Unfortunately, little love is lost between the Health Ministry and PH. Interdepartmental rivalries thwart effective collaboration. PH still tends to be regarded as "not serious" by technical services and inferior in status. Necessity of being responsible only to own administrative hierarchy also hinders collaboration among field agents.

3. SODEVA Cereals Project:

PH component is considered as an add-on, by USAID officials. SODEVA cadres were disdainful of PH and wanted SODEVA to assume most of PH's functions -- literacy training, training rural artisans, women's projects, etc.. PH performance was horrendus in the department of Diourbel where nothing it did worked. Artisan center did not function most of the time; Literacy program never got off the ground; Maison Familiale did not open. Governor refused at one time to let PH agents to participate in scheduled PH development activities. Marabouts, administrative structures, and technical services also joined against PH in Diourbel, hence, big failure. PH worked better in

department of Thies because of better collaboration between PH and SODEVA cadres. Lesson: Do not support PH activities in areas where there is strong across the board opposition or hostility to PH service. Ministry of Interior also argued with PH over jurisdiction as to deciding when and where Rural Councillors were to get trained by PH agents. PH ineffective in literacy training was due to little logistical and material support from Dakar. No materials to use once basic training in transcribing done. Whose fault? Manque de moyens or lack of technical competence.

The issue raised by SODEVA project is who is most competent to do literacy programs, women's projects, organizing peasantry, small-scale projects? Regional Development Agency or PH? If RDA can do job as it claims, then why does one need Animation Rurale too? Are there some areas which RDAs can not [illegible] do which have to be done? PH claims that RDA is too narrowly production-programmed; they do not care about civic education and raising overall quality of life. More significantly, PH claims that RDAs do not have pedagogical skills necessary to organize villagers. SODEVA was ready to conceed that PH could do home economics better than they, but not much more. At any rate, rivalry between two services will continue and arguments over competence and philosophical orientation will continue to remain a bone of contention.

4. WID and PCV small-scale projects

Here USAID and Peace Corps work closely with Animation Rurale service of PH and set up number of women's vegetable garden projects, daycare centers, childcare, youth projects, wells, latrines, etc.. Results are mixed. Much depends on quality of PCV as well as quality and cooperation of Animation agents. Thanks to long experience, PC and Animation know each other well and can collaborate more effectively. PCVs often criticize some Animation officials for not getting out in villages more. Animation cadre are based now at department level. Thus, he is fairly well removed from constant grassroots activities. He does not have material means to get around. Hence, he is more a manager and supervisor of PC projects than a grassroots development agent. Animation officials thus rely on PCVs to "animate" village and to insure proper execution of small-scale projects.

Participation of villagers is crucial factor in success of project. Projects not initiated by villager demands or interests rarely succeeded.

PC evaluation of 1968-77 activities also indicated that external financing also a major key to successful projects. Projects relying exclusively on village resources rarely succeeded. Evaluation also noted that outside resources meant little if village initiative and interest in the project was not present. Projects requiring technical skills on part of villagers and upkeep tended to fail most of time while structural projects like building latrines or wells had more chance of succeeding. Village projects also suffered from lack of follow-up. Once PCVs left, villagers had no one to go to in case of technical problems. GOS did not provide technical service support needed to sustain project and, villagers lacked technical and managerial skills, e.g. literacy and ability to keep books.

In the past, it is clear why PH agents do not follow-up. One statistic is particularly striking. 96% of budgets of regional services go for salaries while only 4% for operating costs or $1.2 million for salaries and only $50,000 for operating costs. These figures explain why PH is so hungry to get into projects and thirsty for access to indemnities, gas, vehicles, etc..

And every time, the GOS announces austerity measures, the regional services and field operating budgets get cut back even more!!

5. <u>USAID and Family Planning</u>

This project is not yet operational. This project is a potentially dangerous one for USAID to handle and is unlikely to provide good results. Bad relationships between Health and PH ministries have delayed implementation of project. Quarrel over competence and who controls what.

USAID/Washington/the USA Government/World Bank/and Population Council are big proponents of population control and are pushing family planning as an important component of aid packages. In Senegal, there is no big demand for birth control information, especially in rural areas. This is a very sensitive issue. PH redefines family planning as spacing children in order to protect the mother's health. They also insist that efforts to cure sterility be included to allay people's fears and gain support. GOS accepting this largely for two main reasons:

1. Donors are putting lots of pressure and propaganda for birth control.

2. Senegal once again shows that it is modern, progressive and of international class in its attitudes. How many Black African countries have a Population Council?

Yet, there is some realization that population growth rates of 2.7% a year put strains on limited resources and that Senegal with 9-10 million people in the year 2000 will be hard-pressed to support such a population without major technological breakthroughs or discovery and exploitation of new resources -- oil, iron, etc..

But given political realities and growing Islamic pietism, no one is going to openly push family planning unless he/she wants to commit political suicide. Thus, USAID projects can best be regarded as "protypis". It can not possibly make a dent in lowering population growth rates; it could create anti-AID feelings if not handled carefully.

6. Conclusions:

Despite PH's shortcomings, it still has several strengths and/or features which argue for USAID maintaining its collaboration with PH:

A) There is a basic compatibility between official American policy and USAID New Directions philosophy and PH philosophy. The big problem remains implementation of philosophy. We have problems too.

B) PH only GOS agency experienced and equipped to deal with women's projects, community development, non-formal education, and other activities of interest to USAID. Thus, in many instances, it is the only game in town. USAID can not count on GOS letting us deal directly with local populations without passing through a state agency. That agency is PH, even more so if CERs and FONADEC will be located there.

C) USAID can benefit from long Peace Corps experience with Animation and PH ministry. Even more significant is the popularity of PCVs in rural Senegal. It makes little difference to rural people that projects do not work. They appreciate effort and PCV sharing of some of their hardships and the resources which PCVs bring to their villages.

D) GOS likes the USAID participation in these projects and appreciates the aid since we are one of few major community development type donors outside UN and NGOs. We get good marks for that.

E) Senegalese government and PS moving more towards local development and popular participation philosophy. Opposition parties and movements also more in favor of auto-gestion and against ONCAD and RDAs.

F) USAID should not put all eggs in RDA basket. PH another basket to put some eggs in.

Of course, USAID should also take into consideration PH's weaknesses and plan accordingly:

1. Lack of funding for operating budgets;

2. low technical quality of cadres in certain areas -- elevage, agriculture which make them less effective in agriculture or livestock projects;

3. low morale due to lack of resources to do job assigned to them;

4. limited contacts with local populations;

5. hostility of health ministry, Interior, and RDAs;

6. limited political support by PS national leaders and party cadres.

7. Recommendations : Food for Thought

A) Work to strengths of PH.

B) Strengthen PCV component. This can be expanded, but not massively. Village woodlots, community development, etc.. Use PC to get better base data at village level and feedback as to how villagers respond to various rural development projects. Closer collaboration between USAID, PCV, and PH in project design and data collection and evaluation. Experimental projects such as renewable sources of energy.

C) Continue to support women's projects. A political necessity. Do not expand much. PH women cadres often too urban and too educated to feel comfortable with village women. Do not overtrain.

D) Move with extreme caution in funding PH components which are parts of larger projects dominated by agencies/services which do not want to really collaborate with PH -- e.g. SODEVA/Health.

E) Beware of pitfalls of family planning project. Political risks may outweigh any possible benefits.

F) Explore ways with ENEA of providing training to PH cadres which will:

1. improve their ability to do applied research - e.g. dynamics of land use, social networks, responses to drought cycles, usury, etc..

2. really make them more responsibe to villagers needs and their perceptions of what is needed and how to get that.

3. encourage more creativity in adapting to different local situations. One often sees a tendency to apply same old PH/Animation Rural package of projects to community much like RDAs apply same technical packages everywhere.

G) Explore possibilities of how USAID might be able to help accelerate progress in functional literacy programs in national languages. Functional

literacy is key to "sensibilisation" of populations and giving them tools to manage own affairs. Literate farmers will not be so easily taken in by dishonest weighers and government officials.

H) Mend fences with PH personnel and improve relationships for better collaboration in future. This process is already begun. There is a need for USAID to understand PH constraints. AID officials should also have more sensivity to Senegalese sensibilities about going thru protocole and proper administrative hierarchies. On the other hand, PH officials have to understand more about how the AID system operates, AID's constraints and demands on it for accountibility from Washington, and other bottlenecks. Thus more regular meetings in designing, implementing, and evaluating projects are needed in order to make projects with PH components work better.

II. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES, ONCAD, AND COOPERATIVE REFORMS

A. Background

In 1979, the GOS began to think seriously about making major reforms and changes in rural policy. ONCAD, the state agency responsible for marketing peanuts, millet, and rice and distributing rural credit was under heavy attack for corruption and inefficiency. Peasant unrest and dissatisfaction with ONCAD were reflected, in part, by the growing unwillingness of the peasants to repay their debts to ONCAD. In March 1979, the Commission Nationale de la Reforme de l'ONCAD was set up to discuss changes in ONCAD. The rest of 1979 was marked by vigorous debate within the government and among the elite concerning how to reform ONCAD, revitalize the moribund cooperative movement, and transform the RDAs into more effective and responsive development institutions.

The discussions, debates, and studies took place in deteriorating economic climate. The 1979-80 agricultural season was marked by a drought which sent peanut and cereal production plummeting to near record lows and made debt repayment even more difficult for a hard-pressed peasantry. Rising oil prices and declining world market peanut prices further aggravated Senegal's balance of payment problems and forced Senegal to turn to the IMF and other foreign donors for help to keep the economy afloat.

Several positions were staked out which reflected three different approaches towards reforming ONCAD and the cooperative movement:

1. SODEVA's Position: All Power to the RDA SODEVA's position, was spelled out in a document entitled Rapport Presente aux Journées d'Etudes de la SODEVA, 11, 12, 13 juin 1979. This document reflected a sharp shift in rural development philosophy and policy which included:

a. rejection of the technocratic/productionist approach of SATEC and earlier SODEVA policies.

b. Praise of the holistic approach to rural development which stressed improving conditions of peasantry characteristic of the pre-SATEC 1959-1963 period.

c. Strong affirmation of the need to create a socialist society.

d. Stress on collective groups (groupement de producteurs) rather than individual farmers as the main target of rural extension efforts.

e. The need to reduce dependency on foreign donors in order for SODEVA to gain more control over rural development policy.

f. Call for greater farmer control over cooperative decision making.

SODEVA was sharply critical of ONCAD's past performance. ONCAD failed to deliver its inputs on time and messed up the agricultural calendar. Its credit system was not geared to meet other peasant needs besides agricultural credit for peanut production inputs. It promoted peasant indebtedness by pushing agricultural equipment regardless of possibility of equipment being used to raise productivity. ONCAD's structure was too heavy and not geared to rural development. And its cooperative service no longer served as an instrument for educating farmers as to how to run their own cooperatives.

The SODEVA solution to this problem was to decentralize cooperative decision making by making the groupe de producteurs the basic coop unit. Each groupe de producteurs would have about twenty members and be situated at village or quartier level. SODEVA agents would be responsible for providing both technical advice and cooperative formation. ONCAD's responsibilities would be limited to financing agricultural credit program, delivering inputs, and collectin peanuts. SODEVA would be responsible for helping peasants order inputs and executing the Programme Agricole correctly. SODEVA would try to cut down peasant indebtedness by encouraging peasants to conserve own seeds (seed repayment debts account for 60% of peasant ONCAD debts) and buy less agricultural equipment. SODEVA thus regarded itself as defender as the peasantry's interests vis-à-vis ONCAD and its enlightened guide leading them along the road to co-gestion and auto-gestion. At some point in the future, SODEVA's

advice would no longer be needed and the peasants would run their own cooperatives all by themselves.

SODEVA also saw little need for maintaining the CERs which according to the official texts were to serve the newly established Rural Communities and deliver all kinds of technical and social services to the local populations. SODEVA maintained that the CERs were too far removed from the daily life of the peasants to carry out this mission. Moreover, they had no resources at their disposal to enable them to function well. SODEVA argued that it was the only agency with regular grassroots contacts and thus was in a better position to provide the services which the CERs were supposed to provide. SODEVA was already broadening its role to do literacy training, small livestock and vegetable projects, reforestation, and other services. SODEVA maintained that it could take over the rest of the functions of the CERs. Eliminating the CERs would provide the rural populations with a unified and coherent rural development service and thus reduce peasant confusion as to which service is responsible for what as well as the proliferation of development services which wasted scarce resources.

It is interesting to note that the SODEVA document made no mention of Promotion Humaine and its activities. This was consistent with SODEVA's past disdain for PH.

Since the Rural Community was the basic unit of political decision-making, SODEVA maintained that it should be present at that level and serve as an advisor to the Rural Community. Local cooperatives would be regrouped around the rural community eventually as originally conceived in the old Animation Rurale utopian socialist blueprint.

Thus, SODEVA saw itself as fulfilling all the roles originally assigned to Animation Rurale, the CERs, and the cooperative service during 1959-63 era.

2. <u>The position of the PS theoreticians of Auto-gestion: Power to the CERs and an Independent Cooperative Service</u>.

The theoreticians of decentralized agrarian socialism in the PS rejected SODEVA's argument that it could become the major instrument for bringing about self-governing cooperatives. SODEVA and the other RDAs were still "productionist" in orientation and not concerned with meeting the total needs of the peasantry. Despite good intentions, the RDA would still be more concerned with using the coops as an instrument for raising production than in giving

the rural populations the cooperative training and education needed to run their own affairs. Instead of turning the cooperative service to the RDAs the government should establish a national autonomous Cooperative Service which would be free to promote true cooperative education and auto-gestion. This would also preserve the unity of the cooperative movement whose unity and coherence would be threatened by parcelling out coop agents to the various RDAs which had different perspectives and policy orientations.

The theoreticians of auto-gestion also argued that the role of the CERs should be reinforced and that the CERs should get the financial support needed, to carry out its mission of organizing planning at the Rural Community level and delivering global services at the grassroots -- better housing, health, and education as well as technical advice needed to raise rural productivity and output.

This position was articulated during the debates following the Minister of Rural Development's report to the national council of the PS on April 12, 1980.[1] By this time, the government had already decided to detach the Direction of Cooperation from ONCAD and to give SODEVA responsibility for absorbing the cooperative services field agents from the regional level on down. At the same time, the Ministry of Rural Development argued that the CERs should be given the means which it needed to carry out its community development projects.

3. The Technocratic Position : Rationalizing Development Structures

For the technocrats, reform of ONCAD and the cooperative movement is necessary in order to improve efficiency in the rural sector. ONCAD is a heavy administrative structure which has been beset by corruption and inefficiency. The peasants are getting tired of supporting it. Hence, it is time to strip ONCAD of some of its functions and perhaps to eliminate some of its personnel. The government is under heavy pressure from IMF plan de redressement to make cuts in personnel and the unpopular ONCAD service is likely to be the government agency to take the major brunt of such measures.

The decision to decentralize cooperative decision-making for the techno-

1. Also see the speech delivered by Cheikh Tidjiane Sy before the Club Nation et Développement in December 1979 entitled, "L'ONCAD est-il un Mal Necessaire?".

crats is one based more on economic efficiency than socialist criteria. SODEVA is probably in a better position to know peasants' real input needs than ONCAD. More rational purchasing will reduce debts, raise productivity, insure repayment of debts, and restore peasant confidence in the system. The rural credit system is in a shambles and so something must be done about it.

The technocrats are also committed to regrouping the existing cooperatives into larger cooperatives. They thus hope to reduce the number of Senegal's peanut cooperatives from 1658 to 600 eventually. At present, many cooperatives are too small to be economically viable. Regrouping coops will cut down operating costs and make coops more sound economically. One can then supply larger coops with equipment which will service its membership at lower costs.

SODEVA accepts the need for regrouping on efficiency grounds. But it argues that one should not suppress present cooperative collecting points. Peasants oppose having to bring their peanuts longer distances and are wary of government promises to provide special subsidies for coops further away from the center. Villagers also do not want to be farther away from weighers and coop presidents than before. They are afraid that weighers and presidents from the new coop center will be less likely to feel responsible to them. SODEVA officials thus maintain that peasant wishes should be respected in the short run. Otherwise their confidence in new reforms will be undermined and they will withdraw their support, thus sinking the chances for reforms to take hold. For SODEVA, this is a tactical rather than strategic concern.

The technocrats' position on upgrading the CERs is also based on economic rather than ideological criteria. The CERs are regarded primarily as a community development delivery service. Without resources, these services can not be delivered. Hence, there is a call for finding more resources for CERs, largely by setting up a FONADEC and making a pitch to sympathetic foreign donors. Technocrat's do not see CERs as decentralized planners attuned to needs of grassroots. Technocrats see Plan as the main planning body.

The technocratic position is best represented by the Prime Minister. Although his speeches mention socialist society in broad terms, one notes that the substance of the speeches is more concerned with economic rationalization. Promotion Humaine and Condition Humaine are used as part of "technical" reorganization of government. Different services are delivered to different constituencies in clearly defined patterns.

Given the present configuration of the power structure, Senegal's precarious economic situation, and extreme dependency on foreign donors and the IMF, it is likely that the technocratic position will prevail in the short run.

This means that the RDAs will continue to be given most of the real authority for promoting rural development, largely because of their productionist orientations. SODEVA is the only one of the large RDAs to have attempted to stake out a position based on strong socialist ideological principles. And even with SODEVA, auto-gestion is many, many years off. On the other hand, there is no sign that SAED, SOMIVAC, SODEFITEX, and SODESP are filled with the cooperative spirit. SAED pays lip service to auto-gestion as a goal. SOMIVAC has little to say on the issue. I suspect that most of the RDAs besides SODEVA will go on with business as usual. The coop tradition is largely one found in peanut basin. There are few non-peanut cooperatives. Millet coops exist on paper in the Fleuve and do not function. Herders coops also do not function very well.

On the other hand, there is a growing tendency to reaffirm auto-gestion agrarian socialist ideals among the younger cadres in the party. This may someday be translated into major policy changes which might lead to reduction in power of RDAs.

USAID in determining where it would like to channel its resources should probably consider the risks entailed in becoming too closely associated with an unpopular RDA. This raises a few policy questions:

1. Should AID provide assistance to strengthen ability of RDA to control rural development activities in the name of economic efficiency or should it work thru the RDAs as little as possible?

a. I would suspect that close identification with RDA would be more risky in Fleuve with SAED than with SODEVA or SOMIVAC.

b. Bakel livestock project indicates that it is possible to work directly with local populations without being tagged as agents of SAED.

2. Can AID do anything to strengthen local population's bargaining power vis-à-vis RDA? Should it?

3. Which RDAs should AID work more closely with and for what goals?

4. Is a RDA agency like SODEVA in danger of being too spread out to be the all-encompassing rural development agency which it aspires to become? If so, what does one do? Provide it with more resources to help it succeed? Or concentrate in one area where it is more likely to succeed? Or stay away.

The answers to these questions will depend on USAID's strategic goals and priorities, the extent to which USAID's strategic goals are compatible with those of the RDAs, and finally the potential of the RDAs to successfully implement these goals.

Like the Senegalese government, AID also has to debate whether it is to give priority to the "productionist" option or to the global, integral, development option with stress on basic needs, community organization, and development, and a myriad of other concerns.

Two final words about working with the RDAs in Casamance and Fleuve on rice growing schemes. First, unless there is a marked change in pricing policy, peasants will have little incentive to invest to grow rice for market. That has been the case in the past. One should also encourage investments in small rice huskers so that rice farmers can "valorize" production and sell the husked rice at higher prices. Second, one has to look more carefully into ramifications of dams and irrigated agriculture on land tenure and labor availibility.

On August 14, the National Assembly will begin debate on reform of ONCAD. The debates should be followed closely to see a) details about the nature of the reforms and who will get what and b) the reaction of the opposition as to which parts of reform will be criticized most.

As of now, one can make a tentative balance sheet of what ONCAD will retain and what it will lose:

A. Losses:

1. Control over the Cooperative Service

A. Direction will be centralized at ministry of Rural Development.

B. Field agents from regional level down will be absorbed by RDAs. Probably some firing will take place. Effective integration of coop agents will be difficult and require time. SODEVA has own tentative integration scheme. They hope to give coop agents technical training and SODEVA agricultural and livestock agents coop training. SODEVA hopes to put its own and coop agents at rural community level where they will serve as advisors. I do not know how other RDAs will handle integration problem.

2. Control over marketing of secondary products -- millet, maybe rice? Several options are open to government:

A. Let merchants in private sector handle marketing with minimum of regulation. This solution is highly unlikely.

B. License several dozen merchants to handle millet and other crop marketing. This option is more likely to be followed with careful regulation of prices, margins, and other aspects of commercial transaction.

3. Shelling operations of peanuts now handled by ONCAD will be turned over to private sector or to coops. Private sector shelling now concentrated in hands of two marabouts and one PS party big shot. Hopefully, ONCAD will lose monopoly over rice husking as well. This could provide more incentives for rice farmers.

4. Control over the execution of the Programme Agricole which will be turned over to SODEVA and other RDAs. ONCAD will deliver and SODEVA will see to proper distribution and use.

5. Loss of personnel. How many, remains to be seen. ONCAD has over 2200 permanent and nearly 1000 temporary employees. Some compression has already taken place.

B. Retains:

1. Marketing monopoly over peanuts. Although this function is eventually to be turned over to coops at some future date when coops are more "mature" and able to run own affairs.

2. Financing of Programme Agricole. ONCAD thus remains main channel for rural credit.

3. Delivering agricultural inputs.

4. Control over its own financial and budgetary system.

Questions to be asked : Will it still be responsible for collecting peanut crop or will this be turned over to private sector?

Note about the private sector. The Senegalese government is not likely to create any free market sector in the rural areas concerning the peanut, rice, or millet trade. Turning things over to the private sector means that the government gives out licenses and contracts to merchants and transporters which it favors. The government continually decries "anarchy" in the commercial circuits which are flooded by too many "inefficient" small merchants, traders, and transporters. Rationalization means reducing licenses and number of people involved in trade and careful government regulation of profit margins.

There is little prospect for revitalization of private sector in rural areas unless one sees a marked recovery in the purchasing power of the rural populations. That should be first priority. There is not much business to be

done there because peasants do not have money to spend. The main flourishing private sector group and the usurers and parallel market hustlers who buy cheap when peasants are hungry and have to pay debts. While they may help peasants survive when government does not pay on time or distribute food aid, they are not a very productive force. Trade flourishes only when there is some purchasing power. Hence, Saloum has more of a private sector going than Louga. Mouride traders also do well, thanks to links between rural and urban economy and social networks.

In theory, the Government expects the cooperatives themselves to become the "private sector". This has been a given of Senegalese policy since independence. Most GOS cadres are anti-business, especially commerce. Their attitudes are not likely to change. Hence, there is little likelihood of "unleashing" free market forces in near future. Government regulation is thus going to remain a feature of Senegal's economic institutional structures for quite some time.

III. Local Institutions : Rural Communities and the Territorial Administration

Since the early 1970s, the GOS has stressed the importance of both administrative deconcentration and political decentralization. This was reflected in the passage of the Administrative Reform of July, 1972 which created the institution of the Rural Community, the basic political unit in countryside. The reform was not applied to all of Senegal's eight regions but staggered in time -- first to Thies and Sine Saloum, in 1974 then in 1976 to Louga and Diourbel, and in 1978 to the Casamance. This year the reform will be applied to the Fleuve and Senegal Oriental is scheduled to have its Rural Community structures in 1980. As one can see, the government began the reform in the peanut basin where land tenure problems are less acute. At present most Rural Communities remain under the thumb of the sous-prefet.

Deconcentration is a means of extending government administrative control down to a lower territorial unit. The 1972 administrative sharply strengthened the powers of the sous-prefets who replaced the chefs d'arrondissements. The sous-prefets have the tutelle over the rural communities. They have to approve the budgets voted by the Rural Concils of the Rural Communities. They control the execution of the budget and they often intervene to impose or "persuade" the Rural Council to vote for projects which meet government priorities. For example, now the Ministry of Interior which controls the territorial administration wants the Rural Councils to channel its funds towards investment.

Thus most budgets earmark more than 80% of budget for investments in equipment, wells, schools, youth centers, maternities. Rural Councils are discouraged from using resources to hire personnel. This is done to discourage Rural Councils from being used as an instrument for patronage to local clients of politicians as well as to avoid need for recurrent expenditures. Sous-prefets also discourage spending for maintenance or replacement of materials needed. For example, one sous-prefet told a council not to vote funds to buy medicines to restock village pharmacy because UNICEF was supposed to give them out free; in another case, the sous-prefet said that the rural council could not spend money to maintain an important well because that job was the role of the state. Such attitudes discourage local initiative and the maintenance and upkeep of local equipment.

Traditionally, the Territorial Administration is primarily concerned with maintaining order, collecting taxes, and insuring balanced budgets of local institutions. The territorial administration does not like competitive politics because it makes their life more difficult. On the other hand, the government and ruling party needs some form of competitive politics in order to keep party alive and to funnel resources down to the grassroots which will be translated into support or acceptance of the government.

At independence, department centers were transformed into full communes which had its own elected mayor, council, and budget. The Department was and still remains the main unit of party life in rural Senegal. Communal budgets gave local party leaders resources to regard their followers with jobs, services, and money. The government also had a slush fund known as the Fonds de Concours Communal to channel money to the communes. This money was used mostly to hire personnel and for prestige projects-- fancy city halls, race tracks, etc.. In 1963, the Fonds was suppressed. More significantly, the government thru the Ministry of Interior took control of communal budgets from the mayors and administered them directly in order to make them more "productive" and stop plethora of personnel and patronage. This in turn coincided with the absence of competitive party politics in the country and the establishment of a one-party state. Party activities dried up as administration took tutelage over all spending at local level -- e.g. communes and also the regional assemblies. Administrative reforms strengthened the powers of governors and prefets and reduced those of local institutions. The result was the absence of political development in the interior.

The 1972 administrative reforms which created the framework by giving rural populations some voice in local government and control over resources. The head tax, then known as regional tax which went up to the governors level was transformed into the rural tax which was supposed to provide the Rural Communities with its budgetary resources. At present, there are 284 Rural Communities in the country, each with its own budget:

Rural Communities by Region

1.	Sine Saloum:	76	Total budget =	$4.1	million
2.	Thies :	31	Total Budget =	$1.3	million
3.	Diourbel :	33	Total Budget =	$1.6	million
4.	Louga :	48	Total Budget =	$1.0	million
5.	Casamance :	68	Total Budget =	$3.3	million ?
6.	Fleuve :	28	Total Budget =	$0.	million

Each Rural Community has a budget which averages between 40,000 and 50,000 dollars. This provides the local populations with some resources which are used primarily for wells, dispensaries and maternities, schools, and community and youth centers. Wells are by far the number one priority item in most areas. It should be noted that this expenditure follows the pattern of spending during the post-war era of local competitive politics in Senegal where the territorial Councillor promised their rural constituents this very same mix of resources.

By permitting rural communities to have control over some resources, the government is encouraging the flow of goods and services down to the local level. Local politicians then try and capture control over allocation of these resources and to use it to support their clients or for their own benefit. As in the past, the departmental party leader continues to control much of the allocation of resources. The Rural Council may say what projects they want, but often the departmental level politicians determines which village gets it. This was a source of complaints by local rural councillors in Louga, for example, who asked that sous-prefet enforce the decisions made by local rural council and not cave in to pressures of prominent politicians.

The peasant malaise and growing rural disaffectation with rural development institutions and policies makes it politically wise to get more resources down to the grassroots levels. This may in part explain why government is now once again speaking of upgrading the importance of the CERs which are earmarked to be the instrument for promoting community development. The establishment of FONADEC indicates a strong drive to find foreign donors to

feed community development projects which will provide more resources and services to rural populations. This in turn, the government and PS hopes will make the peasantry less hostile to the regime and more amenable to collaborating with RDAs and other government institutions.

At the same time, the decentralization of cooperative decision-making has also increased the RDA's interest in the rural community as a basic unit to work with. Or at least, this is the case for SODEVA which sees its role as advisor and guide to the development of the rural communities.

The Rural Community thus is becoming the object of a range of different government institutions and forces seeking to exert its influence. This will probably intensify rivalries between services and between the various services and the sous-prefet, and between the sous-prefet and the local politicians. Examples:

1. Sous-prefets want order. Hence, they are prone to intervene to stop a decision which may lead to bloodshed. This is more likely to happen if rural council which has power to allocate and takes land away from one group and gives it to another. Hence, recent government decision gives sous-prefet authority to veto rural council decisions about land allocation. On other hand, same decision gives rural council right to appeal to higher court.

2. Politicians want control over resources. They may come into conflict with rural council whose majority is not under their control. This can intensify political conflict. Now that there is a legal opposition party, the PDS, the danger is that dissatisfied people will go over to PDS. PS and government does not want this.

3. RDAs want control over basic land use and technology choice decisions. SAED may come out as greedy monster and come into direct conflict with rural communities. SODEVA could become defender of peasants against greedy politicians or local notables of their cadres are politicized and want reform. This too can raise political tensions and conflict.

Thus, the desire of the government to promote "responsible participation" is fraught with danger from their perspective. If they do not do something to regain confidence, rural economy will fold. If too much energy and competition over resources takes place, then political stability in the countryside may be jeopardised and the opposition may get an opportunity to erode the PS' traditionally strong rural base.

Thus, if USAID expands its role in Community development projects, it should be prepared to become embroiled in local politics. For example, the evalutation of the Sine Saloum health project noted that the choice of location of health huts did not make sense or follow the criteria laid down in the project. Many huts were located too close to health posts or in bigger villages instead of being spaced out to serve those villages which had less easy access to health post. Why was this so? Was it the lack of planning? Or was it the intervention of local politicians who had some clout who saw to it that their village got the health hut.

To do community development projects in the future, especially if one wants to work through the rural community/rural council structures, one will have to be more attentive to local politics and implications of local politics on project location and vice versa. Otherwise, one could get burned over and over again if AID can not assert some control over choice of localities to conform with project objectives.

It might be wiser to do village projects using Peace Corps and government services to make choice rather than working thru rural communities which are bound to become more politicized with revival of competitive politics. Of course, the GOS may decide to put a halt to this as it did with the communes, and reinforce territorial administration's control over local budgets. This is possible too.

Epilogue:

I was very much struck by the possibility of doing massive conservation/reforestation project. I think that it is a great idea and should be pursued. It has the advantage of providing vital resources which are collective goods which are more difficult to appropriate by local or national power structure. It could provide work in the dry season. It should also be very popular and would make a strong visible impact.

I also appreciated working with such a stimulating group of people. This has been my most intellectually stimulating experience during the six or seven times I have worked with USAID-Senegal.

I would like to thank Don Brown, Axel Magnuson, David Rawson, Henry Bienen, Erick Schearer, Charles Stedman, Lucy Colvin, Julie Owen, Ben Stoner, Rich Miller, Pat Daley, for their friendly collaboration and David Shear and Mel Macaw for running such a lively mission. I also appreciated support of the rest of AID staff from controlers, librarians, on down to chauffeur. All were helpful and courteous.

Sheldon Geller

USAID PROSPECTS FOR WORKING THROUGH NGOS IN SENEGAL

Right now the climate is right for stepping up the activities of NGOs in community development projects. The government wants more resources poured into rural areas directly to populations. It has upgraded the CERs designated as the unit for implementing community. It has created FONADEC as a clearing house for attracting funds for such projects.

However, before USAID plunges inco financing some of these NGOs, it should be aware of certain problems:

1. Thereis already a proliferation of NGOs and UN agencies distributing goodies in the countryside. These projects often do more harm than good and can sabotage projects in other areas of Senegal:

A. Example: USAID trying to set up health delivery system in Sine Saloum which tries to organize villagers to finance restocking. Village responsibility for running but and reordering was stressed and their financial obligations as well. This kind of approach is sabotaged by UNICEF which is running around distributing free medicine and other health equipment. Thus, sous-prefet in one arrondissement chides rural council for putting money in budget for buying medicine since UNICEF will come along in a while and distribute it free. This doe not encourage responsibility. Moral: There is a need to coordinate NGOs efforts so that one project does not work against another.

B. Example: Everyone wants wells. There are many PVOs doing wells all over Senegal. They come in and put in a well. Problem is that each PVO has own kind of well, motorpump, and equipment. Equipment upkeep of wells is extremely difficult once PVO leaves area. The casual observer of rural Senegal is struck by the number of wells put in by various kinds of projects which no longer function because no one bothered to find replacement parts or because no one knew how to fix the pump. Here again there is a need to coordinate NGO projects as far as equipment and training in order not to disperse resources and make survival of project possible after the toubabs are gone.

2. One also have to be careful about Senegalese sensibilities and not channel funds through PVOs which use lots of expatriate personnel which eat up much of the funds and create tensions with Senegalese counterparts.

Awareness of what other PVOs are doing throughout Senegal and how their projects impinge on USAID projects is essential.

It looks as though the GOS will be pushing PVO projects and they will proliferate. GOS is more likely to evaluate them in terms of how many resources come in than in their viability after project is finished or the possible negative impact on other projects or on other areas not touched by project.

I would recommend that USAID move cautiously in this area and make sure that it is not funding projects which undermine what USAID is trying to do in other AID projects.

Sheldon Gellar
Aug. 1980

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AN ANALYSIS OF NUTRITION IN SENEGAL

Three Views:

Marvin Miracle: Food Consumption and Nutrition Components of Development Efforts in Senegal, Sept. 1980

James Pines: A Nutrition Strategy for USAID/Senegal October, 1980

Linda Worthington: The Nutrition Factor in Senegal June, 1980

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Marvin Miracle
September, 1980

FOOD CONSUMPTION AND NUTRITION COMPONENTS OF DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS IN SENEGAL

My terms of reference were as follows:

1. To evaluate GOS goals/priorities in the nutrition/consumption area.
2. To evaluate GOS/donors performance related to these or more appropriate goals.
3. To assist the Mission in developing a nutritional/consumption strategy to be integrated into the overall joint planning effort.
4. To assist the Mission in determining future areas of study needed in the nutrition/consumption area.

G O A L S

Senegal's food consumption/nutrition goals for the 1977-1985 period are principally contained in the Food Investment Strategy 1977-1985, published by the Ministry of Rural Development and Water Resources in February, 1977. The Food Investment Strategy considers average food consumption levels to be near minimums needed and suggests that at the time it was published the principal food consumption/nutrition problems to be addressed were "seasonal malnutrition" and "inadequate food intake amongst part of the vulnerable groups", defined as children and pregnant or lactating women. The extent or severity of either "seasonal malnutrition" or inadequte food consumption among vulnerable groups is never fully considered and, while some interventions are proposed which are relevant to these problems, the main thrust of the Food Investment Strategy is anticipatory, addressing problems that its authors fear may arise in the future. The bulk of the document is focused on efforts to achieve import substitution in foodstuffs, particularly cereals. A critical reading suggests there is far more concern with reducing the burden of foreign exchange earnings imposed by imported cereals, especially rice,

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than on improving diets or preventing their deterioration over time.

One cannot demonstrate that they are wrong. There is as good a case for their position as for the contrasting one, taken by the World Bank, that, on average, food consumptions is conspicuously below minimum amounts needed throughout the country, and particularly among the 65 percent of the population that is rural. Both positions are based on construction of a national food balance sheet, an approach which yields debatable results even when there is an abundance of fairly reliable data. It is an approach which makes no sense applied to Senegal, given its present stage of development.

To construct a food balance sheet one starts with estimates of total supplies available and works backward to amounts available for consumption at the table, then converts these to calories and nutrients; divides by the size of the population; and finally compares the resulting estimate of calories available per person per day to amounts recommended. If estimated amounts available are less than amounts recommended it is common practice to say the population is, on average, hungry.

For such an exercise to be meaningful one needs good data on production; exports, imports, and changes in stocks; amount fed to livestock; amounts saved for seed; amounts diverted to non-food industrial uses; amounts lost in storage; processing losses; and plate waste (i.e., amounts served consumers but not eaten); the appropriate caloric and nutrient values for each item entering the diet (values that vary according to variety and which nutritional authority's tables one chooses); and the total size of the population and its breakdown by age, weight, sex, and, if female, whether pregnant or lactating. An occupational breakdown is also needed since some occupations require as much as twice the caloric intake as others.

One only needs to consider an item or two on this list to see that with such an approach we don't really have any idea whether in rural Senegal the average consumer is above or below target consumption levels, or by how much.

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Perhaps most fundamental is the inadequacy of production data. The enormity of gaps in information of agricultural production, other than for major crops such as peanuts, rice, millet, sorghum, and cotton is readily admitted by knowledgable observers, and even for these crops, published estimates are highly suspect. Our discussions in the Ministry of Rural Development reveal that official statistics come from poorly trained district agents. Moreover, in recent years only data on crops covered by regional parastatal organizations are reported with any regularity. Shortage of funds forced the Ministry of Rural Development to take personnel responsible for gathering statistics on other crops out of the field. But there are more fundamental problems than those associated with the adequacy of the staff and procedures for gathering agricultural statistics. Even for major crops much of the production is carried out under various systems of shifting cultivation which makes accurate estimation of acreage impossible with present limitations concerning funds and personnel. Harvesting may be spread out over a considerable period; storage is mainly on farm in granaries that vary greatly in size and shape; farmers keep almost no written records and often have substantial incentive to distort information they are requested to supply.

If there are numerous reasons that production estimates for major crops have extremely large margins of error, there are no estimates at all--or admittedly very crude ones--for other elements in the national food balance sheet. There is a complete lack of data on amounts stored at the village level. Storage losses are estimated by some studies as low as 3 and by others as high as 20 percent. There is no information on amounts sold locally and across frontiers with neighboring countries, although both are commonly thought to be sizeable in many areas.

Nor are the nutrient values of local foodstuffs adequately known. According to officials we contacted, regional and varietal variations of even the major foodstuffs are poorly established, and for the minor crops and wild foodstuffs collected the current state of knowledge is even more deficient.

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An alternative to the food balance sheet approach is to conduct a food consumption survey of a sample of the population and then project the results nation wide. Here there are also many problems and consumption surveys in Senegal appear to be thoroughly flawed. We are told by officials in a position to know that the most recent consumption survey, commission by GOS and the World Bank (supposed to be available sometime in 1980), covered 2,000 individuals. However, the survey team weighed food prepared for consumption only for a week for each family in the sample, sampling in one area then moving to another area for a week, etc. until 2,000 individuals had been surveyed. Thus not only does this study have no reliable measure of seasonal variations in diets, but the time frame is different for each segment of the sample. Even worse, according to local observers who are familiar with this exercise, the study was so poorly done that even the data that were obtained are highly suspect.

The next most recent consumption survey--one of a sample of families in Dakar, Louga, Linguère and Kédougou carried out in 1977 and 1978--found considerable variation in results by area. Dakar consumers were estimated to be getting approximately 96 percent of calories needed; those of Louga and Linguère were estimated to be at 95 percent of calories needed; but Kédougou consumers were estimated to be getting only 78 percent of calories required (Chevassus-Anges, et al., p.5). All areas in the study were above standards for protein consumption but below for calcium, vitamin A, and vitamin B_2.

It is hard to know how much credence to give this study. The survey covered 1,031 persons in Dakar, 1,382 in Louga-Linguère, and 666 in Kédougou. We are not told how the samples were selected or what measuring techniques were except that the method used was to weigh food prepared for meals for five days for each family in Louga-Linguere and Kédougou and only for three days in Dakar. The time periods covered are May to July, 1977 for Dakar; June and July, 1977 for Kédougou; and March to May, 1978 in Louga-Linguere.

If the data base doesn't allow us to make a convincing case on the adequacy of diets using the sort of statistical measures commonly employed in relatively developed countries, what other evidence is there? Probably the easiest and cheapest to obtain is

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the opinions of consumers themselves. If asked a leading question such as "Would you like to have more food?", most would probably reply in the affirmative, the response one is likely to get to that question in any country, including the United States. But if, on the other hand, one examines the concerns forthcoming when people are asked to list their problems--as in the beneficiary surveys of the recently concluded Joint Assessment-- widespread hunger does not seem to be suggested.

No doubt some segments of the population are concerned about food shortages in some years, e.g., years of drought, but hunger among some parts of the population some years is quite a different problem, calling for quite different solutions, than chronic hunger throughout the country all the time.

Seasonal Hunger

The only evidence the Food Investment Strategy cites for the "seasonal malnutrition" it talks about is a 1966 study in Thies and a 1968 study in Sine Saloum. It appears to project from these two areas nationwide. Many local observers seem to be of the opinion that although we don't have reliable evidence to document it, pre-harvest hunger is, indeed, widely experienced. However, one can also find thoughtful people, including some who have been involved in village-level dietary surveys, who argue that Senegal--as in many other African countries--pre-harvest dietary stress is sometimes more psychological than physical, with rural populations substituting foodstuffs low in their preference hierarchies for preferred foods but suffering little, if at all, in terms of inadequate levels of nutrient intake. In one of our discussions on the matter we were told of instances in which Senegalese farmers reportedly say they have no foodstuff reserves when, if fact, they had only a six to nine month reserve of millet rather than the two year reserve they normally strived for. Similarly, we heard reports of farmers not counting unharvested stands of manioc--a common famine reserve-- because it was not part of the reserves in their granaries. Also possibly relevant is the tendency of many Senegalese to say they havn't "eaten" no matter what they have ingested unless they have consumed their preferred staple.

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The Food Investment Strategy has no elements designed specifically to reduce or eliminate preharvest hunger, which seems to suggest that GOS does not really consider seasonal hunger a serious problem.

Vulnerable Groups

The last food consumption/nutrition problem addressed by the Food Investment Strategy is underconsumption (shortage of calories) by children under six and pregnant and lactating women. Referring to 1970 data, from a study and for locations and time periods never identified, the Food Investment Strategy suggests that these groups get only 70-88 percent of the calories needed even though the rest of the social groups to which they belong get 99 percent or more of the calories needed. There is no discussion of the cause of underconsumption among these vulnerable segments of the population but the programs proposed that are designed specifically to raise their food consumption are nutrition education programs, which implies that the problem is viewed as more one of ignorance than one of inadequate supplies of food available.

The Appropriateness of GOS Goals

GOS goals appear to be consistent with the present state of knowledge concerning the nature of consumption/nutrition problems. As we have seen, one cannot at this juncture document nationwide either chronic undernutrition or malnutrition. Either or both may well be found in some areas and there should be continuation of efforts to identify such areas or regions, the first step in improving present food consumption/nutrition programs.

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GOS DONORS' PERFORMANCE

Seasonal Hunger

Neither GOS nor donor agencies have projects designed specifically to alleviate seasonal hunger, perhaps because, as noted earlier, it seems to be largely ignored in the Food Investment Strategy.

Vulnerable Groups

Linda Worthington's June, 1980 survey of programs in Senegal related to nutrition (The Nutrition Factor in Senegal) suggests the largest program is USAID's PL-480 Title II program which has been operating through Catholic Relief Services for 19 years distributing supplemental food through PPNS (Program for Nutrition and Health for Vulnerable Groups) centers. This program has provided sorghum and weaning food to 230,000 mothers and children but its impact is not clear. World Bank studies in Diourbel and Casamance reportedly show no overall difference in nutritional status between families receiving such supplemental food compared with those who do not (Worthington, p. 6). Better understanding is needed of how deficient the diets of such groups are, the extent to which their nutrition problems are associated with their diets rather than with other factors, and the extent to which target populations actually consume foods earmarked for them.

USAID health programs in Sine Saloum and Bakel may also improve the nutrition of children indirectly by reducing parasitic infections and diseases which cause malabsorption of nutrients available in the foods they eat.

Other relevant donor activities are UNICEF's funding of equipment and training in health and nutrition and its pilot nutrition project in the Sine Saloum region. Canada also had a small rural health program in Sine Saloum.

Little can be determined at this juncture concerning the performance of these donors.

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FURTHER DEVELOPING THE MISSION'S FOOD CONSUMPTION/NUTRITION STRATEGY

In order for the Mission to develop an effective food consumption/ nutrition strategy it is essential to have better information on where diets are inadequate and why.

Unless one can get a better grasp of geographical variations in the severity and character of dietary inadequacy there is a risk of providing more assistance than needed in some areas and not enough in others--and perhaps the wrong kind of assistance in either case. For example, where childrens' diets are inadequate because of ignorance, educational programs are more likely to be successful than programs designed to change the production or distribution of food. Where shortages and surpluses occur simultaneously in different districts of the same region, programs to improve transportation, market information systems, or storage may be more effective than programs focused on increasing crop yields.

An effort that should pay high dividends would be to ask farmers in areas thought to have inadequate diets to list the major problems they need help with. Such lists, coupled with the impressions of knowledgeable local observers, such as project managers, Peace Corps Volunteers, etc., not only would help indentify areas where food consumption/nutrition problems are important but would also yield insights as to what the causes are, insights essential to designing effective solutions.
Such an approach would help provide information on a variety of things other than diets, information now often obtained only after a project has run into trouble, and it would allow programs to be tailored to the needs of each area or region. (It seems likely that needs vary considerably from one area to another because of the country's diversity in resources, agricultural systems, and population pressure on land, and opportunities for earning income outside of agriculture).

An additional effort that would quickly provide some of the information needed would be collection of clinical evidence (by weighing or measuring individuals, taking blood samples, etc.) from

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a sample of villages scattered throughout the country by a senior nutrition specialist. It has been suggested that such an individual could, in as little as two months, enormously increase our present understanding of where the more serious nutritional problems are, especially among vulnerable groups.

This sort of effort and the information obtained from local observers such as Peace Corps Volunteers, would nicely complement each other, the clinical data serving to provide a check on the incidence and nature of dietary problems while the observations of local observers can be expected to provide insights on why the patterns detected occur and what sorts of interventions are likely to be effective.

Reaching Vulnerable Groups

There is general concensus among knowledgeable observers that wherever childrens' diets are inadequate the causes are complex and likely to involve lack of awareness by parents of what their offsprings' nutritional needs are and the effect of disease and parasites on the capacity of children to absorb nutrients, in addition to such factors as food availability and family income. Thus it would make sense for the Mission, as part of its nutrition strategy, to follow a multifaceted approach to improving childrens' nutrition, never merely attempting to increase food availability without companion efforts in education and health. Such an approach might involve providing health and education programs in areas where nutritional problems among children have been identified, and including, as well, efforts to improve food availability in those areas where health and education alone are inadequate and increasing food supplies is also needed.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that there is a concensus of local opinion that merely increasing food availability at the household level often may fail to change the food intake of parts of the vulnerable group. Here one needs to be able to identify areas where this comes about through ignorance in contrast to those where it stems from the low status of part or all of the vulnerable group. Education programs may have little, if any, impact in the latter case.

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Dealing with Famine

Natural disasters, particularly drought, leading to hunger can hit some or all of Senegal's population at any time. It is likely that there will be hunger in some regions at least part of the year with some frequency, at least for the rest of this decade, even if hunger is not widespread throughout the country. The Mission may well want to maintain a capability to provide relief to such populations.

It is probably desirable here to clearly distinguish welfare efforts--e.g., programs to help procure foodstuffs needed for relief efforts or programs to improve transportation, storage, or other aspects of a system for distributing relief--from development efforts i.e., those which increase the capacity of the target population to survive a natural disaster without having to depend on outside help. Examples of the development component of a food consumption/nutrition strategy are the Mission's ongoing programs to increase production and improve income distribution in the Fleuve region.

Dealing with Other Special Problem Areas

The Peanut Basin, particularly, but perhaps other areas as well, would seem to deserve special attention because of the potential of becoming areas of chronic hunger if present rates of population growth continue without substantial improvement in productivity. Thus the Mission's food strategy for the Peanut Basin needs, first of all, to provide interventions which promise a rate of increase in productivity at least adequate to offset expected population growth in the next few years. In addition, it should include efforts of the sorts discussed earlier to determine whether there are undetected pockets of hunger or malnutrition already, and, if so, what their causes are, an effort which should provide a firm basis for including a fuller food consumption/nutrition dimension to the strategy for this region in the future. One cannot at this juncture specify exactly what form such a strategy should take (see Appendix).

Senegal and the World Food Council's Food Sector Strategy Studies

According to Charles French's May 19, 1980 memo, "Status Report Based on Judgement of Charles E. French of Countries Reported to be Interested in Food Sector Strategy Studies (FSSS) by World Food

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Council, May 16, 1980," Senegal is a potential participant but no donor has been identified although Canada was approached: "Canada approached them [GOS] but they said they had a food strategy and would accept $12,000 to publish it. [presumably the Food Investment Strategy]. Canada declined. France may be negotiating to work with them but they are probably still open."

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APPENDIX: Reflexions on the "Food Strategy" Comments in the Washington Review of the FY 82 CDSS.

The April 12, 1980 A.I.D. review of the CDSS for Senegal, FY 82, contains the following comment:

> "The GOS and Missions' plans to cope with "dust bowl" conditions in the Peanut Basin should be covered in the next CDSS including the necessary structural economic and institutional changes for improvement of the food and income levels of the general population."

There are at least two key assumptions here that are questionable. First, is the assumption that food consumption levels are below that needed by the general population. Second, is the assumption that raising food consumption levels can be accomplished only by "structural and institutional changes".

One cannot, at this juncture, make a convincing case for either assumption. As we have seen, we cannot demonstrate that diets are generally inadequate--that improving diets should have priority over everything else. It may well be that other things--for example, improved medical care, housing, or education--are more important to the beneficiary population. The more general objective of increasing income levels allows the target population to better meet whatever it finds its needs to be--and allows flexibility when needs are not identical among all members, or when the needs of any individual or family of the target group changes over the life of the assistance program.

Singling out a specific assumed need--e.g., a different level of food consumption--is questionable unless one assumes rural Senegalese in the Peanut Basin don't know their own needs, or that there are segments of the population that cannot be reached adequately by programs specifically designed to raise food consumption levels. Neither of these propositions can be demonstrated convincingly for the Peanut Basin at the present time and, moreover, the data available suggest both are unlikely.

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Suppose, for sake of argument, it were determined it was important to raise levels of food intake in the region. What basis do we have for thinking that structural economic and institutional changes are the vehicles required to accomplish this task? It is well possible that simply changing production or storage methods is more effective than structural or institutional changes. As good a case can be made for the various components of the Mission's ongoing program, e.g. dissemination of a superior agronomic package, expansion and training of extension staff, provision of wells for gardens and sheep, and assisting women with grain grinding mills, as for basic structural or institutional change.

In sum, the Mission has in the Peanut Basin a program which has an obvious potential for raising incomes. One could perhaps spell out the obvious in the next CDSS, but to mobilize Mission energies to develop a strategy for bringing about "necessary structural economic and institutional" changes when it hasn't been demonstrated such are more appropriate than the present strategy makes no sense. If and when the Mission has evidence of a food problem which cannot be effectively addressed by programs to raise income levels and improve income distribution then a separate food strategy may be called for.

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(This paper was prepared by a nutrition consultant as a comment on the Miracle paper)

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DRAFT 10/80

A NUTRITION STRATEGY FOR USAID/SENEGAL

The USAID can, with good reason, assume the existence of substantial malnutrition in rural Senegal. While a recent consulting report (Miracle, September 1980) assesses correctly the paucity and limited reliability of more direct nutrition status and family consumption data, disaggregated infant mortality and income figures, if anywhere near correct, provide incontrovertible evidence of malnutrition problems. At these high mortality and low income levels, serious malnutrition must be present. The widely-referenced, though poorly quantified, seasonal problems reinforce this conclusion.

The Mission's proper emphasis on agricultural production, and the limited capacity of Senegalese agencies to absorb and manage a necessarily complex nutrition project, suggest that the USAID nutrition strategy should be integrated with approaches to agriculture and rural development. This will contribute to eventual development of national nutrition planning and execution capability, as staff acquiring skills and experience in decentralized programs move to central roles.

The agriculture-based nutrition strategy begins with identification of priority geographical areas, in which malnutrition is suspected and current or projected USAID-supported efforts are likely to increase production and income. The strategy seeks to assure that improved nutrition will flow from the positive economic effects. In the absence of nutrition programming, there is little likelihood that those benefitting will be from malnourished families or, if malnourished families benefit in income, that their nutrition will improve. Nutritional consequences of agricultural projects easily become negative, for example, as a) families go to market for what they used to produce, b) increased commercialization leads to excessive sale of food crops, and c) economic improvement changes food habits.

The foregoing suggests an approach to integrating nutrition into agricultural production and integrated rural development projects. The nutrition components must include, for example, a simple system for establishing baseline nutrition status and monitoring it thereafter. This permits orientation of production and other activities to groups having most serious malnutrition. While it is desirable that the health system monitor nutrition status routinely for all, the component need only assure presence and operation of health services sufficient to provide the small sample of data required for adequate monitoring.

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Another step in the approach requires that production plans be reviewed to explore a) likely impact on food production, and b) inclusion of malnourished farm families among participating producers. This leads often to recognition that a project has neglected the need to assure that producer families can continue to feed themselves with little risk. It may also stimulate inclusion of poorer farmers among those served, or encourage development of a) extension services for food production, b) village and home gardens, and c) small livestock programs, to complement initial plans and reinforce attainment of nutrition goals.

Linking nutrition goals with production projects requires increased attention to disposition of production gains. Planners cannot assume greater production automatically improves nutrition. Systematic addition to, and replacement of, donated food by local production, in feeding programs, can be a useful step in providing nutritionally favorable markets for addtional production. Home economics extension to encourage nutritionally favorable consumer behavior may also be helpful. Storage and marketing interventions, geared expressly to nutritional needs, can also form part of a nutrition component. Village level community development, in which the commonly felt need for improved health leads to nutrition-related community activities (e.g., day-care centers, feeding programs using local food), may also be appropriate. Development of community and family responsibility for maintaining adequate nutrition of all, based on the production gains to be achieved through other USAID-supported activities, is a feasible outcome for complementary nutrition work. Where health services exist, or are part of projected development, the nutrition component can include a wide variety of nutrition-related health activities (e.g., oral rehydration, targetted feeding, de-worming, monitoring birth weights).

These suggestions illustrate possible range and content of a nutrition component within an agricultural or rural development project. Details of individual elements, and the variety and balance among them, will flow from exploration of specific project contexts, though the basic questions remain the same. The Mission's expressed priorities behoove it to ask:

a) Who and where are the malnourished families in the target area?

b) Can project-supported services include more of the malnourished families?

c) What is the likely disposition of any increased production in relation to nutrition needs?

d) Can the cultivation mix or disposition of production be modified in nutritionally favorable ways, without substantial reduction of economic benefits?

e) What other activities could improve nutritional impact of the project?

These questions need to be adapted and raised for all projects, but their relevance to agriculture and rural development is especially high. There appears to be considerable interest within the Mission in improving the nutritional consequences of other projects. The Central Nutrition Office (DSB/N) has a roster of IQC contractors, who can be called on to provide project design help.

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THE NUTRITION FACTOR IN SENEGAL

The evaluations for the joint assessment followed the log frames of each project. In only one of these, irrigated perimeters, were there any basic nutrition questions asked. USAID/Senegal in the 1982 CDSS has stated that "food/nutrition (has been chosen)... for special consideration" (p, 42). This paper is an introduction of the wide spectrum of the nutritional factor as part of overall policy and strategy for USAID and the Government of Senegal. It presents a brief overview of the present situation, of the USAID, Government's and other donor's current approaches to nutrition issues, and some suggestions for interventions.

Senegal's food and nutrition situation is both serious and deteriorating. Even in an average year, neither the quantitiy nor the quality of available food supplies is adequate to meet the nutritional needs of the nation's 5.5 million people.

There are three main inter-related nutritional problems: 1) Marked seasonal undernutrition, occurring especially in rural areas and during the 5-6 preharvest months (May-October); 2) Widespread protein-calorie malnutrition (PCM), particularly among young children and the rural poor, but also among low-income groups in peri-urban areas and small towns. The source of calories and proteins in different regions of Senegal is seen in attached Figure 1.3. Various nutrient and vitamin deficiencies, most notably of iron, certain B vitamins and iodine, mostly affecting the so called "vulnerable" groups (infants, young children and mothers, and working males). There are considerable variations among ethnic groups and religions.

Overall caloric intake in the rural areas is a little more than 2000 calories per day, a deficit of 300-400 by international standards. Fourty-five per cent of Senegal's total population receives less than 80% of calorie needs. As a whole the population does not seem to have a shortage of protein for the amount of caloric intake. These aggregate figures do not account for actual consumption levels over different seasons, especially of the vulnerable groups. Adult women on the average nearly meet the minimum daily requirement, but when pregnancy or lactation are factors they are 12-18% short of the goal. This, then, increases the possibilities of low birth weight, breastfeeding inadequacy and infant morbidity thus placing the young child at an early health risk.

Increasing evidence indicates that the pre-harvest seasonal shortage of food is the major nutritional problem. Though this is usually associated with rural food shortages the urban poor are also greatly affected. Because of crowded living conditions, low incomes and high prices and urban population never quite gets enough of the available food supply. As is true world-wide, where families are poor and under-educated, malnutrition is greatest. Calorie deficiencies, especially, are income related.

During this time, June through October (soudure), there is a sharp drop in food availability for all age groups. Aggregate caloric intake drops off by 10-15% even after a relatively good harvest year. Not only is less food available but there is also a sharp rise in infection and disease during the

rainy season, especially in the Casamance. World Bank studies during 1979-80 confirm that there is a critical situation in the Casamance for calorie deficits; the shortage is far more severe there than in the Diourbel region where comparable studies were done.

One reference shows that for these reasons infant mortality and morbidity greatly increase during the soudure. Babies are born more often with low birth weights because the mothers are undernourished. Since less food is available there is underfeeding of the children, making them more vulnerable to infections and diseases. Child care is at a minimum because the arduous work schedule during the millet and peanut planting and growing season requires all family members to spend their limited energies and resources on the fields.

At least half of Senegal's 1,218,000 pre-school age children are below recommended growth standards, with 40-50% affected by 2nd and 3rd degree protein-calorie malnutrition.

Government of Senegal's Efforts:

Past efforts of the government to increase local food production and raise nutrition standards have met with relatively little success. No substantive programs to make a permanent impact on malnutrition among the most needy populations have been successful.

Many crop development and diversification schemes were implemented with slight regard for their social or nutritional relevance. Attention to nutrition has so far focused on research rather than investment. Pilot programs in applied nutrition and on processing local food mixtures for children have been tried. Relief of malnutrition is done through distribution of donated food commodities to the most vulnerable groups. Nutrition problems are studied primarily as a public health issue with the health sector concentrating heavily on curative rather than preventive care, on large urban hospitals rather than rural community services, and on training physicians rather than village health workers.

The Government's new approach, however, signals a commitment to begin to change this situation. It began recognizing the importance of nutrition as a basis for overall development plans in the mid-1970s. The Fifth National Plan (1977-81) establishes a thorough foundation for a food and nutrition policy to undergird the National Planning in all sectors of the country. In particular it focuses on improving the nutritional status of the vulnerable groups. Some of the identified needs are to:

1) increase food supplies to compensate for seasonal, regional and socio-economic deficiencies;
2) improve and extend nutritional education;
3) develop and distribute a Senegalese weaning food;
4) consider an iron fortification program (48% of the population is anemic);
5) do detailed food consumption surveys, particularly in areas of widespread malnutrition.

To implement the Fifth Plan a Food Investment Strategy (1977-85) was designed. This is a pioneering attempt among Sahelian countries to address the complex food and nutrition issues in an integrated manner, and to adjust national development policies to meet nutritional requirements. It covers a period of time as the Sixth National Plan is being developed.

A constraint to implementing this strategy is the lack of knowledge in Senegal of how much is eaten by whom. Until this baseline information is available it is almost impossible to design projects or policies to meet the actual food needs of the people.

The GOS agencies and organizations which primarily are concerned with nutrition are as follows:

BANAS - Bureau of Food and Applied Nutrition - This organization under the directorship of Dr. Thianar N'Doye is responsible for all nutrition issues and services at the national level. It operates under the Ministry of Health. It has responsibility for fulfilling the nutrition education component of the maternal and child health program, but is ineffectual because "we don't have adequate resources." BANAS publishes technical materials on composition of foods in Senegal. They have done at least one report of food consumption patterns, but for the most part have very little information of this. Though they are the parent body for several research or service related projects in Senegal (for example, the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) program in the health centers and ORANA's research) they seem to be poorly organized, understaffed, and over extended.

ITA - Institute for Food Technology - Under SERST, this government organization, headed by Madame Basse, is primarily a food technology research center. It is the organization which originally developed the "pain-mi-ble", the millet flour bread, as a part of government policy to increase consumption of millet. Founded in 1963, ITA is doing research in storage and preservation of a number of staple foods, development of supplemental weaning foods, some work on soybeans as a possible cash crop in the Peanut Basin, or as a high-protein supplement in cereals, and assistance to develop new commercial products. They have clinical labs and do extensive analyses of food components. ITA has expressed interest in studying cultural patterns of food consumption and village testing of proposed new products. They have been primarily related to the commercial sector.

CANAS - Comite d'Analyse Nutritionnelle et Alimentaire au Senegal - Under an agreement on July, 1979, this coordinative organization, under the Ministry of Plan, was officially established, though it was originally organized as an ad hoc agency in 1976. The Committee is composed of:

- The Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs with the Director of Statistics and Director of Foreign Trade.
- The Minister of Plan and Cooperation with the Director of Plan and the Director of Finances and Plan.
- The Minister of Rural Development with the Director General of Agricultural Production and Executive Secretary of CER.

- The Minister of Public Health with the Director of BANAS, the Director of ORANA and the Director of the Institute of Social Pediatrics.
- The Secretary of State for Promotion Humaine with the Director of Rural Training.
- The Secretary of State of Specialized Research and Technique (SERST), with the Directors of ITA and ISRA.
- The Secretary of State of Women's Affairs with the Director of Program.

This high-powered group is supposed to act as a coordinative body with the representative ministries to design, plan, establish the policies and programs to solve the country's food problems.

ORANA - African Food and Nutrition Research Organization - This is a West African regional research institution based in Dakar, under Director Dr. Amadou Nakhtor Ndiaye. This organization has a wide capability in research of both technical and social natures. Though some work has been done in Senegal, particularly on anemia, much of the reserach is in other West African countries.. The nutrition research work is largely done through ORSTOM (see below).

ORANA research efforts encompasses: nutrition and infection, including effects of vitamin A on onchocerciasis; studies on the body's ability to absorb nutrients when parasitic infections are prevalent; fetal nutritional status; characteristics and prevalence of anemia and goiter. There research indicates that third-degree malnutrition (kwashiorkor-marasmus) is more prevalent in urban slums than in rural areas. They have done nutrition status surveys for the design of the World Bank program. They are also doing quality nutritive aspects of the millet bread and are advocating food fortification to counteract anemia. ORANA houses a library of the research materials which they have developed.

ORSTOM - Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer - This private French research organization does basic research in many scientific fields, several of which are related to nutrition, such as population and demography, health, soils and food. The food and nutrition category is largely done in the close cooperation with ORANA. ORSTOM has extensive libraries of their reserach findings, some of which are studies done over nearly twenty years. They keep careful records, particularly in the demographic studies.

SONED - National Company for Development Studies - Though this is a private consulting firm it is government funded to do specific design and planning of food related projects. Specifically it is the major agency designing the World Bank Food and Nutrition Project.

IFAN - Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire - Based at the University of Dakar this regional center is basically a cultural, socio-anthropological studies center. One of the staff, Dr. Solange Kamara, has done a major research on food consumption patterns in Dakar. Her findings could have many implications for future programming of AID or the Government of Senegal.

Specifically, she points out the great difficulty entailed in convincing urban Senegalese that they should eat more millet and less rice. Based on her

studies, the evidence indicates that the rice-based diet may now be so entrenched in the urban dwellers' cultural patterns of eating that it cannot be changed, at least through any democratic or propaganda efforts. She was commissioned by President Senghor to do radio programs a few years ago for this purpose, but found them largely ineffective. The question of economic incentives for purchasing rice substitutes was not sufficiently studied by her, and remains a needed field of research.

International Assistance

International assistance in the food and nutrition field has been provided at different times by United Nations specialized agencies, multilateral and bilateral donors, and several non-governmental and private organizations. Following is a brief statement of these general programs.

UNDP has financed a number of projects in food crop and fishery development, and an eight year project to establish and develop ITA.

FAO has provided funds, equipment and training, in health and nutrition centers and health posts, rural maternities and village pharmacies, and for a pilot nutrition project in the Sine Saloum region.

WHO is assisting several small projects for development of health services training of medical and para-medical personnel, combatting infectious diseases and improving environmental health.

UNICEF works primarily in rural maternities and health posts.

WFP is currently operating six supplementary feeding projects in primary and technical schools and rural training centers, and food-for-work projects in Sine Saloum and Eastern Senegal.

Though the programs of these agencies have a nutrition focus the scale and character of the problems of undernutrition and caloric deficiency in Senegal are such that these efforts could provide only partial and temporary improvements in the situation.

Bilateral Agency Assistance is focused more specifically on projects in the agriculture, health and education sectors. For example:

France is the primary donor to Senegal. Its aid programs are substantial in each sector; in health alone commitments amounted to $38,000,000 in 1976.

Canada has supported the development of artisan fishing, research on millet and sorghum cultivation, storage and post-harvest technology, and is pioneering a small rural health program in the Sine Saloum.

Belgium is supporting the Institute of Pediatrics in Dakar.

West Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Norway are also providing bilateral assistance. The European Economic Community through the FED gives considerable support to agricultural production.

There have been no measurements of nutritional impact in these agricultural production projects. There is no assurance that resultant gains in income and/or food output are reaching the most needy population groups.

World Bank

The World Bank's recent lending for projects in rain-fed agriculture, irrigation, and agricultural credit has supported the Government's program to diversify and expand food production. They do not necessarily address nutritional impact issues.

To do that the World Bank is nearing completion of an extensive food and nutrition proposal for Senegal. This project area is a new one for the Bank to support, and it is new in Africa. The project design is being done by SONED, with the Ministry of Plan. The project is expected to be finalized in mid-1980.

There are two major aspects which the Bank Project will address according to their draft proposal of December 1979. One is in institution building, or more specifically up-grading. The three major government offices which have responsibility for nutrition in Senegal will each be receiving funding to increase their operational and management skills and capability. They are CANAS, BANAS, and ITA.

The other aspect of the proposal will be to establish programs in health and nutrition in Diourbel and Casamance. Efforts are being made to not overlap with USAID's Casamance project. What the exact scope of these projects will be, or the amount of funding, is still unclear since the feasibility studies are not yet complete, nor has the Bank established what nutritional interventions should be done.

USAID's Role

USAID presently finances programs in agriculture, grain storage and rural health and assists in pilot-scale food production schemes for women's groups and considerable supplementary food assistance. None of these have a stated nutritional component though some may have nutritional impact on the beneficiaries.

The acknowledged major approach of USAID, to date, in terms of nutrition has been the PL-480 Title II program. This project has been operating through Catholic Relief Services (CRS) for the past 19 years, with a food distribution through the PPNS[1] centers. Totalling approximately $6,000,000 a year it supplements the food needs of 230,000 mothers and children with sorghum and weaning food. Little has been done to evaluate whether this program actually increases the nutritional status of the recipients. The World Bank, in its current studies of nutritional baseline data in Diourbel and Casamance, indicates that there is no overall nutritional difference between those families who receive this food and those who do not.[2]

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1. PPNS - Program for Nutrition and Health Protection of Vulnerable Groups.

2. Interview with IBRD representative May 20, 1980.

In May, 1980 a PL 480 Title III program was signed with the government of Senegal. The $7,000,000 per year for three years engendered from the sale of rice in the commercial markets is to be used for rural development projects. This project, though based on cereal, cannot be said to increase the nutritional status of the recipients since it will be primarily consumed by those who can afford to buy the rice, and are not part of the nutritionally at risk groups. However, the recipients of the development funds are all agencies whose objectives are to increase the productivity of the agriculture sector; as these agencies implement their programs some may incorporate nutritional programs.

In the USAID health hut program in Sine Saloum and Bakel emphasis is placed on general health conditions and only indirectly on nutrition. One of the causes of malnutrition in Senegal is malabsorption of nutrients available, often caused by parasitic infections and diseases. When these conditions are cured, persons, especially children, are more able to absorb the nutrients they receive.

As USAID increases its programs and projects in irrigated agriculture special emphasis should be put on the health/nutrition situation. Worldwide there is a growing body of knowledge which indicates an increase in negative health status in the irrigated areas, due largely to increase in diseases from water-borne vectors. Since AID's irrigated projects are in the areas of greatest poverty where food is least available, attention should be given to the nutritional level of the beneficiaries in these areas.

Considerations for Future Action

Senegal's nutritional security is expected to decrease in the next two decades. This follows the continued high population growth rate (Le Soleil, 23 May 1980, indicates a population of 10,000,000 by the year 2000); the deteriorating economy; erratic rainfall with concommitant drought conditions; the increasing rate of unemployment. The many donors have focused attention on increasing quantity of food with little effort to improve quality or appropriateness, and limited efforts to reach the most needy (hungry) parts of the population, except through relief programs that at best are temporary. Nutritional considerations are not major components of present USAID projects. Nevertheless it is important to ask of these projects, "Does this (project) help alleviate malnutrition?" or stated differently, "Will this help hungry people get fed?" With these questions in mind the following considerations are offered.

1) The GOS seems to have the "political will", the commitment, to solve its problems of hunger and malnutrition, but it does not have the resources to do so. The U.S. Presidential Commission on World Hunger's preliminary report of December 1979 calls for the mobilization of political will by developing countries as the first step toward solving their hunger problems. Senegal's commitment to this end is clearly stated in both the Fifth National Plan and the Food Investment Strategy. As USAID plans, and implements its projects, it should seek to support the GOS's policies and statements to increase nutritional well-being. As stated earlier nutrition should be a major consideration in project selection and design.

2) In each of USAID's programs possible consideration should be given to including a direct nutrition component to the project, especially as redesign takes place. A specific illustration of this would be to design and develop a nutrition education program for the Sine Saloum Rural Health project. This is particularly appropriate because nutrition education is a form of preventive medicine, adding a dimension to the curative medicine route that the health huts now attempt to provide.

As the Casamance Project begins its design of a village health program it could include from the start a nutrition education element. The World Bank food and nutrition project is proposing such a program for its health huts in that area.

3) Evidence is mounting pointing toward the seasonal shortages of food as the major cause of malnutrition in Senegal. But to date none of the donor agencies, nor the Government of Senegal have projects designed specifically to alleviate this problem. Creative research should be conducted to determine the best means of addressing this issue, then projects designed and funded to do so. Since it is a chronic problem, as well as periodic, the usual increase of food production, or food relief projects will not appreciably change this condition. What is needed is a means to stabilize the availability of food in an area over an entire year and make it accessible to the local population. Grain storage facilities and the development of a grain reserve which are being done for other purposes do not necessarily address this problem.

4) Because one of the most difficult problems to deal with developing nutrition-related programs in Senegal is the lack of reliable baseline data, perhaps USAID could consider funding a basic project in data collection and research. There are several possible ways to do this:

a) In each AID on-going project a data gathering component should be included. The question to answer is "Who is eating how much, when and where?" When the answers are ascertained projects to solve the nutritional deficiencies can be designed.

b) The initiation of a specific project to get information on this question should be done. It should be over a two year period, at least, in several geographic areas, and among a variety of ethnic groups. This should be centered in the rural areas, but include the urban and peri-urban as well.

c) There is increasing recognition of the inadequacy of baseline consumption data, in spite of a number of small studies being done in the past. It might be advisable for AID to work cooperatively with other donor agencies to create a national study to get this information which could then become the definitive work for use by all agencies. This could be done, with sufficient funding, through agencies such as ORANA. The World Bank feasibility studies in Diourbel and Casamance have done some of this. As their Food and Nutrition Project is developed and they support the up-grading of CANAS, it might be possible for CANAS to undertake such a study.

d) Using Peace Corps volunteers, or funding a PVO, to conduct a national consumption survey. This could be done through an OPG.

5) USAID could seek a liaison role with the World Bank in order to keep informed of the development of their Food and Nutrition Project, and find

specific ways to cooperate. There is a small precedent for this in a USAID initiated 'donors' meeting regarding the Casamance health project. All concerned agencies, including the Bank, seem anxious to avoid overlapping with each others projects.

6) Ways to increase consumable foods for rural populations should be sought. There are some small projects underway, largely by PVOs or Peace Corps. Some possible ways to do this are:

a) Promotion of and technical training in vegetable growing in the peanut-millet producing area, in the form of kitchen gardens;

b) Expanded marketing possibilities in the irrigated perimeters so that vegetables grown can be consumed locally, but with markets availabel for excess; the Joint Assessment indicated that the small irrigated perimeters farmers prefer to raise corn for consumption in the "green" or "fresh" stage, and that tomatoes sometimes spoil on the vines before they can be eaten or sold.

c) Training of extension agents to teach ways to more efficiently use local products to increase nutritional status. An example would be increasing family consumption of the protein and calorie rich peanut, before it is sold as a cash crop.

d) In the livestock projects the beneficiary survey indicates the people would like to consume (as well as market) more of their product through making cheese. Technical training in this method could be done through extension agents.

7) The mother is the key person in improvement of health and nutritional status in the home. Interventions should concentrate on her. Improved nutrition during pregnancy is one of the most cost-effective measures of reducing malnutrition. A baby born at or above normal weight begins life with much more chance of survival. When more infants survive the parents are less likely to produce more children, which in turn makes more of the limited food supplies available for all.

8) Since the most vulnerable population, nutrition-wise, in Senegal is the pre-school child, and the time of greatest nutritional deficiency is weaning, efforts to improve this situation should be undertaken. Nutrition education to the mothers, particularly of home preparation of appropriate weaning foods, should be initiated. Encouraging, training, enforcing the nutrition education component of the PPNS Title II food distribution could be a vehicle for this.

9) When people have adequate incomes to meet their basic needs they do not go hungry, nor are they as likely to be malnourished. (An exception is American teen-agers whose "mal"-nourishment is based on poor nutritional intake, not insufficient calories). One way to create incomes for rural families is through small rural-based industries which employ local persons, especially in the "off-season" of farming. Little has been done in Senegal to develop this decentralized approach to income generation. A serious study of this potential, as well as initiation on a trial basis, of such industries could begin the trend away from nutritional deficiency. Rural-based small scale industries could further support the food self-sufficiency concept by developing industries that directly support food production, i.e. fertilizer plants, canning and preserving factories, parts for farm equipment factories, crafts industries using agricultural products such as basket weaving and cloth (cotton or wool) making.

by Linda Worthington

FIG 13

APPORT DES ALIMENTS EN :

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

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

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

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





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POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN SENEGAL: SOME THOUGHTS ON USAID's ROLE AND THE PLACE OF FAMILY PLANNING

John B. Tomaro
Research Triangle Institute
September 30, 1980
Dakar, Senegal

(This is a resource paper for the Joint Planning Group).

PREFACE:

I must begin by stating candidly that I am not an expert on Senegal. What little I know was learned from reading numerous but largely disparate materials before leaving the United States for the Mission in Dakar. During my brief stay I have had an opportunity to read further, to converse a great deal on the subject of the relationship between population and economic development in Senegal, and to learn much of what has happened and is taking place. Still, my review of materials, and conversations with Senegalese, members of the USAID Mission and the donor community have allowed me to develop only a limited understanding of the developments in the country. I most certainly remain largely uninformed about the total situation in Senegal, and my appreciation of the nuance of any current development activity is limited at best. The report that follows should be read in the light of those comments.

What follows attempts in part to define the population dynamics of Senegal as determined from an analysis of published data. At the same time, the report tries to help the USAID Mission to assess the risks and benefits of directly supporting a population strategy in Senegal which is designed to limit the rate of population growth and readjust spatial maldistribution of the population. This brief paper is not a "how to do it" manual; it is rather an attempt to ask "whether" and "why" and only in passing suggests "how". This paper is designed to encourage USAID to raise and resolve issues pertaining to a population strategy for Senegal before selecting and implementing a course of action.

INTRODUCTION

The discussion that follows has four sections. The first attempts to assess the Government of Senegal's awareness of the nation's rapid population growth and its current strategy for accommodating a population that is annually growing younger and increasing currently at a rate of close to 3% per year. This section will attempt to define the magnitude and characteristics of the Senegalese population problem as it currently exists; it will further suggest the impact of continued growth on food demand, social services (especially schooling), the labor market (industrial, agricultural and informal), and the overall productive capacity of the nation.

The second section will outline the country's current sensitivities on the subject of population, and review briefly and generally those population-related activities (research, training and service) that are underway or planned within the context of Senegal's development objectives.

Section three will discuss briefly the strategy and extent of the current support given by USAID and other donors for population-related activities in Senegal.

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The fourth section is an attempt to assess the risks and benefits to USAID of proposing and supporting a more active and comprehensive population program in Senegal, and suggests the strategy that USAID might employ in working with the Government of Senegal to define a research, training and service delivery program in population that contributes effectively and efficiently to the overall development of the nation.

It is not within the scope of this paper to estimate the financial cost of a comprehensive population program nor can an estimate of the long-term financial benefits be made. While it would be highly desirable to know the economic difference between launching a comprehensive program within the very near future and continuing on the present course with only incremental or the present level of investment in health/population activities, the economic issue is paramount to only the donor community and a segment of the Senegalese society. It must be kept in mind that social, religious and political factors may be paramount among the majority of Senegalese, and thatintroducing a program that may have beneficial effects in the long term may have adverse political effects in the short term. Any strategy that is defined and put in place must reflect an understanding of this reality, and must be implemented in a manner that builds on existing resources and capabilities and ensures peaceful and steady development.

Part 1: The Population Dynamics of Senegal and Implications for Socio-economic Development.

While the population growth rate of Senegal is high for the world as a whole (2.7%/yr), the population problem takes its most fundamental expression in the regional maldistribution of the country's inhabitants- more than 40% of the 5.1 million Senegalese dwell on less than 4% of the land (Cap-Vert/Thies axis) - and the nation's present inhability to produce sufficient food to feed itself. The present situation is further compounded by the fertile age group (15-44). With this base and rate of growth, the population of Senegal will double within the next twenty-five years; the country will have more than 11 million inhabitants at the end of the first decade of the next century.

As bleak as these indicators portend for a country that has been growing in GNP/per capita at -0.4% annually; that has increased its annual debt service by more than 600% since 1970; that requires an ever-increasing amount of foreign capital in order to service the nation's debt and maintain the existing negative rate of growth, the future looks particularly dark for the more than 44% of the population who are less than 15 years old and have not begun to reproduce. (World Development Report, World Bank, 1980, pp. 110, 136).

Existing urban social services in the form of housing, education and health care are currently inadequate; the rates of under-employed and unemployed exceed 20 % annually, and the amount of land in cultivation has decreased over the last ten years. Moreover, in spite of already crowded urban conditions, especially in the Cap Vert-Thies region, the cities are growing at a current rate of 4.5% annually. At this rate, the Cap Vert region alone, which already has 16% of the population (985.000), will have approximately 40% of the population of Senegal in 2000 (4 million). (Economic-Trends - Senegal, World Bank, Vol. IV, 1979, p. 75). Urban growth through

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migration and natural increase seems certain to contiuue. A number of studies indicate that the poor are relatively better off in the cities than in the countryside, and that people born in cities seldom migrate to rural areas. (Colvin, Senegambia study; Birdsall Population and Poverty, World Bank Paper, No. 404, 1980).

In short, rapid overall increase in population presents a serious threat to prospects for economic development. The rapid growth of population slows per capita growth and exacerbates the inequality among the social classes because increases in the labor force without increasing job opportunities gives diminishing return on scarce factors of production, land and capital, and as the ratio of dependents to workers goes up, total savings go down and investments dwindle. But even more, rapid growth in urbanization and concomitant decrease in the ability of the country to feed its urban residents are matters that require the immediate attention of the Government of Senegal and the donor community. Urbanization through natural growth and migration threatens development by creating an ever-increasing need, first for food and then other services required by urban dwellers; it also reduces the amount of land in production and/or the productivity of the land. For a country that is already importing food to feed its urban population, increasing urbanization threatens to diminish the chances for economic development by forcing the government to borrow heavily in order to purchase needed food. This cycle can only be altered if the country is able to increase agricultural production or can purchase the needed foreign foodstuffs with income earned through increased exports of industrial and agricultural products. In the case of Senegal, the average annual growth rates in industry, manufacturing and services are lower now than ten years ago, and the growth rate in agriculture is far less than needed to feed the growing population or to secure the additional revenues needed to purchase food. (World Development Report, World Bank, 1980 p. 112.) Senegal's current per capita economic production is on the whole lower today than in 1960.

Senegal faces a critical imbalance between the needs of her population and existing food and services, and between the country's development needs and the current productive capabilities of all sectors. The imbalance is currently acute and threatens to become more severe as population growth and urbanization continue unchecked.

In its 5th Plan (1977-1981) the Government of Senegal recognizes the severity of the population problem by acknowledging an unexpectedly high rate of growth (2.7%), and notes with some concern the implications for socio-economic development posed by the large percentage of the population less than 15 years old. The government also points to the problems of population maldistribution and increasing migration to the urban centers, especially the Cap Vert region. (Cinquieme Plan, pp. 17-20.) In response to these realities the government proposed a Plan de Redressement designed to (1) emphasize programs for local self-sufficiency within rural areas, (2) to incorporate a high coefficient of manpower in the modern sector, and (3) to rely on the traditional, non-structured sector to absorb a large number of the unemployed and

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underemployed - principally the migrants newly arrived in the urban centers. (Cinquième Plan, p. 74) While proposing a campaign that would increase exports and taxes, decrease imports, and streamline the ministeries and parastatal organizations in hopes of returning the country to an overall position of annual economic growth through increased productivity, the Plan also calls for increased school enrollment, extended health coverage and the construction of more low-cost housing units. It is assumed that this combination of economic austerity and modest social service expansion will in part begin to redress the imbalance between the needs of a young and growing population and the existing productive capacities of Senegal.

It could be suggested that the Government of Senegal recognizes that population growth, especially urban growth, is a major problem, and that it has proposed a mixed response. First, in an attempt to deal with the unemployment problem, it gives more emphasis to manpower's role in production. Second, in an effort to find a means to stem the growing trend of urbanization, especially the Cap Vert-Thies axis, it defines the "absorptive capacities" of cities, especially Dakar, as a check on urban expansion.(1)

It should be pointed out that even with a lower rate of overall growth, given an ever-increasing base, the total number is ever larger. (Cinquieme Plan, p. 19). Third, the Ministry of Health advocates the adoption of a population policy directed toward the protection of mothers and children, proposes a family planning ("planning familial") program for the purpose of spacing births and educating and informing the people. (Cinquième Plan, p. 250) and encourages the establishment of more MCH centers and extended health coverage in rural areas. These measures, as well as other educational and employment proposals that could be cited, do not constitute an integrated health/population program, but do indicate that the government is aware of the nature of its population problem and moving to deal with it. At the same time the government seems to recognize that no matter what is done now, the country's population will double within 30 years.

It needs to be emphasized, as the government does not and cannot, that unless a comprehensive strategy is developed and implemented in the immediate future, there is a high likelihood that Senegal will become a ward of the donor community. In addition to increasing the prospects for self-sufficiency and economic growth, a comprehensive program that reduces birth rates in the urban areas will have an effect on the number and quality of Senegalese born after the first decade of the twenty-first century, and the rate at which the population will increase thereafter.

The current situation is critical and growing increasingly more unmanageable. Per capita income is declining, and the economy is stagnating at the moment when the general population requires an ever-increasing volume of services, most of which are beyond the capability of the government to provide. In 1960 social services required 17% of the annual budget; the figure was 30% in 1976.

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It is interesting and perhaps noteworthy that the Commission Nationale de la Population du Senegal (CONAPOP) in April, 1980, in preparation for its first plenary session (May, 1980) chose to focus on the impact of urbanization and rapid population growth on the social service sector, especially primary education, public health and housing. Only brief comments are made on employment and agricultural productivity. In large measure, this report does little more than emphasize the fact that current government objectives in the areas of primary education, public health and housing as defined in the 5th Plan are beyond the government's current fiscal capacity, and certainly much less than required to meet the estimated needs of the population. It does not seem to be CONAPOP's purpose to embarass the government by doing the study; rather, CONAPOP is implying that the government should pay particular attention to the urban sector requirements. These pressing issues have a primacy that must be taken into account when defining a population policy and program.

On review, the graph of Senegal's population growth over the next twenty-five years projects a doubling of the population (11 million) and increasing urbanization. In the year 2000, 40% of the population will be in the cities; Greater Dakar will have close to 4 million people. Overall urban growth will continue at a projected annual rate of 4.1%. While the rural population will still represent 60% of the total population in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and remain disproportionately poorer than the deprived living in urban environments, self-sufficiency in food in the rural sector is at least a possibility. Without a source of income and other public services adequate to meet their needs, the urban poor are incapable of surviving and perhaps susceptible to social and political positions that threaten domestic tranquility and peaceful social and economic development. This is not to suggest that the urban poor are a revolutionary element; they rarely are.(2)

The Senegalese urban population may not be the largest percentage of the population, nor the "poorest of the poor," but it is in a position to be the "squeaky wheel" in the country.

Some members of the Government of Senegal and various segments within the Senegalese society are aware of the need to develop and implement a comprehensive population program designed to produce in time a decreased rate of growth and an improved spatial distribution of the population. However, population - interpreted as a strategy to limit births and reduce growth rates - is a very sensitive issue in Senegal. These sensitivities should be outlined and discussed before considering the content of a comprehensive population program in Senegal.

Part 2: Senegalese Attitudes on Population and Current GCS Policies and Programs.

In a recent and still unpublished paper on"attitudes toward population" the factors favoring and opposed to a policy of limiting

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or spacing births are analyzed. In this analysis, procreation represents wealth and social prestige within the traditional Senegalese definition of the family. A woman's position is greatly enhanced by fertility. Children should be many, of both sexes, and are a living link with the ancestors of the family.

Among certain sects of Muslims - and Islam is the religion of 95% of the people of Senegal - limiting births is considered contrary to the precepts of the Koran. Children are riches measured by their social value and longevity, not their economic benefit or cost.

The Anti-modernists as they are referred to, are a third group that oppose policies framed to limit or even space births. This group is particularly sensitive to the racial implications of birth planning policies and blames urbanization, modern western culture and the White man for the ills of juvenile delinquency, drugs and prostitution. Blacks, only one generation from independence, have fears that adopting and advocating a population program represents a return to the domination of the African by the Whiteman. The Anti-modernists, who are ideologically linked with the Traditionalists, favor a return to the old ways, predominantly rural in nature, in which the White man and his "enslaving" culture have no part. Some political leaders as well as members of intelligensia are aware of this attitude and ambivalent toward population planning.

While this study does not attempt to single out one factor as being more important than the others, it is suggested that religious opposition may be the most significant and forceful. Moreover, since the Islamic religious leaders (marabouts) are strongest in the rural areas, resistance to policies designed to space births and reduce rates of growth is probably stronger there than in the urban areas.

There are also factors within both rural and urban Senegalese society that presently and traditionally support policies of limiting and spacing births. In traditional society, breast-feeding, abortion and abstinence have been employed to limit fertility and space births. There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that women in the rural areas who use traditional methods for spacing purposes are predisposed to accept modern family planning methods, especially the pill or IUD. According to one report, some women want to use these means in order to "get a rest" from the unending fertility cycle.

Islam, as well, has precepts that support abstinence and coitus interruptus as practices that allow a man "to ensure the well-being of all his family." Only abortion and sterilization are unequivocally condemned, according to this report.

Finally, this report indicates that the pressure of adjusting to the modern world, especially in the form of urbanization, is

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a strong force motivating the Senegalese to accept a small family norm.

This analysis implies that Senegal is a society between two worlds. It is a predominantly rural nation in which people live and believe the old ways, but it is also a nation of cities and towns in which growing populations are adopting modern, western attitudes and looking outward. Like so many developing societies, Senegal is two societies and both are in transition and to some extent in conflict with one another. Senegalese population policy must take into account both societies, and must see to it that the programs proposed are seen as influencing the positive practices of traditional society and as a means to establish a more equitable social and economic balance among all members of the society.

The Government of Senegal appears to be moving closer to formulating and advocating a comprehensive population policy designed to limit births, reduce the rate of population growth and readjust the spatial maldistribution. However, current proposals and programs are modest and reflect keenly the Government of Senegal's sensitivity to the issue. Current activities and proposed programs can be viewed as an effort to steer a middle course between the needs and fears of urban and rural constituents, and their implementation will do little immediately or over time to limit the rate of growth or to reduce the rate of urban migration.

The Government of Senegal is currently conducting a number of studies on fertility-related issues; migration patterns are one topic of study. It has also recently abolished restrictive French legislation banning contraceptives. (June, 1980). The government is allowing and encouraging a number of private and semi-private clinics, especially those in the Cap Vert region, to offer family planning services (not sterilization or abortion). The Ministry of Health has plans to include family planning services in the Maternal and Child Health program (P.M.I.).

Still, certain legislation and policies that can ultimately influence socio-economic development, reduce the rate of population growth and readjust the spatial distribution of the population remain to be framed. These deal principally with raising the age of marriage, involving more women in secondary education (currently less than 1%), and encouraging the employment of women. Also, a program to redirect migrants to areas under development, like the Fleuve, needs to be developed.

The government is moving cautiously toward the definition and implementation of a population program that takes into account the forces both favoring and opposed to the objective of limiting births. Within the service sector the government is utilizing the health units - hospitals, clinics and maternity centers - especially the MCH apparatus, to provide family planning services. (Economic Trends - Senegal, IV, World Bank, 1979, p. 29). Putting family planning in the maternity service stamps contraception as a health measure designed to reduce maternal and infant morbidity and mortality. Utilizing the MCH personnel enables the government to build on

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the largest provider base, which is in the Cap Vert-Thies axis. It further offers the prospect of reaching an urban and peri-urban population that is more receptive if not more in need of services than the rural population.

The government appears to have assessed the population's attitude toward the service aspect of a population program, namely family planning, and has began to put in place a small program that employs the existing health network to reach a large group of potential acceptors with a range of MCH/FP services for an undetermined but probably reasonable cost. The current service strategy calls for the provision of family planning first in the urban sectors; as more trained manpower becomes available and rural residents more receptive, the MCH/FP approach will be extended. In the light of Senegal's health manpower resources and the maldistribution of the population, this service strategy seems appropriate. (4)

However, the government's population policies are not widely publicized. The impact of its health service program is minimal at best and cannot be measured in either socio-economic or demographic terms. In short, Senegal is predisposed to enact measures that will ultimately effect the size and distribution of the population, but it is careful to emphasize the fact that the goal is improving human welfare. On the whole, the government is concerned about population in general but maldistribution in particular. Outside the Cap Vert region there is reportedly very strong resistance to any policies perceived as anti-natal.(5) Even within the Cap Vert region there is some resistance to endorsing family planning in the MCH program. A percentage of the political leadership is reluctant to advocate programs (family planning) that could be viewed as an assault on Islam. Also, there is a small but vocal segment of the community that questions donor interest in providing assistance for family planning but not massive economic aid. This group is not convinced that Senegal has a population problem.(6)

While the current government research and service strategy in population seems appropriately framed and a proper first step, there is limited programmatic visibility and impact and little in the way of research findings. More importantly, there is considerable tension and friction among the separate units of the governmemt that have an interest in and, it is suggested, a desire to control all population-related activities in Senegal. The three units are the Ministry of Health, Promotion Humaine and the National Commission on Population and Development (CONAPOP). There is evidence of competition among these units and no clear statement from the government, especially the Ministry of Plan and Cooperation, that sets forth the responsibilities and authority of each unit vis à vis the others, and the hierarchy of ministries in matters related to population.

USAID is aware of the politics of population in Senegal as they pertain to the competition among the ministries and the commission. USAID must also be sensitive to the fact that overall programmatic

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definition and impact in population will be delayed until the infighting is resolved. Moreover, since USAID's points of contact within Senegal seem to be narrowly based, rather fragile and in place at either the highest levels through diplomatic/technical contacts or the lowest levels through the relationship that PVCs have with villagers and local officials, it seems only wise to allow the government to resolve this situation without any outside suggestion or direction.(7)

Part 3: Donor Support for Population Activities in Senegal.

Donor support for population activities in Senegal is modest, relative to the overall needs; USAID, either directly through the Mission or through contracts or grants to US-based private voluntary organizations or non-profit groups, appears to be the only donor that has sponsored programs that deliver any direct services.

UNFPA has budgeted more than US$5 million over five years to support activities related to the collection, analysis and publication of demographic data. The UN group has also funded the establishment of a Unité de Population within the Ministry of Plan and Cooperation. This unit, among other functions, assesses the demographic implications of the government's development plans, and sees to it that demographic variables are properly incorporated in the plan. The Unité is also compiling a bibliography of materials on demographic studies, and socio-economic and fertility determinants in Senegal. The material will be used to assess the extent of knowledge on population dynamics in Senegal, and to identify those areas needing additional or new research and study.

ORSTOM (Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique d'Outre-Mer), supported by France, has been conducting fertility surveys in areas of Dakar and the Sine Saloum for more than fifteen years, and represents the type of activity that most donors seem to be doing on population-related issues. In general, donors other than USAID have been willing to support research and technical assistance projects but have not supported family planning service delivery projects, nor provided the contraceptives, information or instructional material needed to motivate and serve the population in the fertile age group.

Either through direct Mission support or the activities of US-based contractors, USAID finds itself alone in supporting the service component of Senegal's population program.
US Government funds have been used to train a limited number of Senegalese physicians and nurses in family planning techniques, and to provide contraceptives that are distributed through some of the MCH units of the Ministry of Health as well as through the clinics funded by US donors, e.g. The Pathfinder Fund.

Although it has supported demographic research and training, and the development of a comprehensive population program in Senegal,

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USAID is more closely associated with the service area of Senegal's population program than any other donor or organization. In a country where there is extreme sensitivity on the subject of limiting or preventing births, USAID is identified as the donor that is providing "birth control". Since services in family planning are presently quite limited, USAID's support for family planning activities is known within limited circles and probably only in the Cap Vert region, a region where general support for family planning is more likely to be found than in the rest of the country. Furthermore, since services are very low key, provided through the Ministry of Health and publicized by word of mouth, USAID exposure is limited.

Currently USAID is considering expanding its activities in support of family planning in Senegal. While the services would continue to be provided through the units of the Ministry of Health, USAID would have an even more visible posture in population activities defined as family planning services. Since USAID is already identified as the donor for whom a population policy means little more than programs in family planning, is it an appropriate step to increase activity in an identifiably sensitive area?

The USAID proposed family planning project for Senegal (Project Paper Senegal 685-0217) presents a firm understanding of the need to begin delivering services in the urban and peri-urban areas, and within the total context of maternal and child health services. The paper also notes the "ambiguous status of family planning" (p. 3) and the government's unclear posture.

While the project rationale and design appear solid, USAID's programmatic exposure is total and singular. It is USAID alone that is promoting this family planning effort. USAID recognizes the delicate nature of the situation but still proposes the establishment of a three-phase country-wide service delivery program. While the importance of the maternal and child health component is acknowledged, commodities and training are related only to the contraceptive issue (p. 30). In short, the service position identifiable with USAID is family planning. This policy seems a little short-sighted in view of the fact that the supply and distribution of basic medicaments required to remedy common childhood diseases are often in short supply in Senegal. A pill or condom will be little use to the mother whose child has chronic diarrhea. The curative abilities of the existing MCH system are not taken into account in this project paper. It is suggested that major training, management and supply inputs are required in order to maintain the existing MCH service capability. Is it wise to propose taxed structure? Did not the evaluation of the Sine Saloum project emphasize the need to develop appropriate management and distribution systems and proper supervision in order to ensure adequate coverage? In reality, little is known about the management effectiveness of the government MCH system, its coverage or patterns of utilization.

Is it wise to propose the establihsment of a preventive health component when most women will appear requesting curative assistance, something the government may or may not be able to provide?

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Promoting family planning as a child spacing technique is a particularly wise strategy in Senegal. Better spacing of pregnancies should have beneficial effects on the health status of mothers and children. Data from Thailand and a few other countries show very clearly that longer intervals between pregnancies lead to improvements in nutritional status of mothers and children. Also, the improvement is more apparent as the interval between births increases. Establishing an effective birth spacing program should lead women to conclude that spacing is beneficial and, subsequently, that fertility can be controlled and family size limited. It is difficult to believe that women are genuinely pleased with the idea of experiencing and unending cycle of pregnancy/birth/breast-feeding/pregnancy through-out their fertile years. It seems more likely that given the means to space births and the opportunity to spend more time caring for their children Senegalese women will choose to have fewer children.

However, a major unknown within this equation is the ability of the Ministry of Health to provide the curative and preventive services needed by children in the age group 1-5 years to overcome life-threatening illnesses. Unless the health services can offer some assurance to mothers that their children will survive the first five years of life, it will be difficult for any birth spacing method to be well-accepted. Child mortality is thought to be particularly high in the rural areas. It has been suggested that in a cohort of 1,000 children, 500 will die within the first five years of life. If the infant/child mortality in rural areas is this high, women lose on the average one of every two children born. Unless the child survival rate can be improved through a combination of improved nutrition and better health services, e.g., vaccination/immunization programs, women will have little incentive to limit their fertility. Is the government capable of providing the program inputs required to break the fertility/mortality cycle, and create the environment in which a child-spacing program would be acceptable?

Without firm data on patterns of utilization and quality of care measured in outcome indicators, it is difficult to determine the competence and coverage of the existing MCH system. It is suggested, however, that the existing system (found primarily in the urban areas) requires major training and management assistance, and that extension of coverage to rural areas can only be achieved through the design and implementation of a medical service plan that, like the redesigned Sine Saloum project, takes into account the overall development objectives of the community and is integrated with agricultural, environmental engineering and educational programs. The current MCH system needs a thorough assessment and strengthening before it can be extended or is prepared to adopt and implement a new service program, namely family planning.

This is not to suggest that family planning services be categorically excluded from the MCH program. These services are required but should only be offered when the delivery, post-partum and pediatric services can benefically influence maternal/infant-child mortality and morbidity, and allow potential acceptors to see family planning as an aid to better health. If the system designed to space or prevent births is better and more obvious than the services to maintain and improve the health of mothers and children, it is unlikely to be well-received.

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It would be valuable to do an assessment of the maternity care system in Senegal. The International Fertility Research Program (IFRP), a USAID contractor, has developed a form that evaluates the quality of obstetrical care in the country (in hospitals, clinics, maternities, etc.), assesses the outcome of pregnancies, and records interest in contraceptive acceptance and the method provided, if any. (See attached form). A computer program has already been developed and could be transfered to Senegal. Introducing the maternity care monitoring system will closely link Ministry of Plan and Cooperation and the Ministry of Health, and will provide substantive information on the caliber of service delivery, coverage and more explicit information on what needs to be done to up-grade the MCH/FP service in Senegal.

If this program is introduced by USAID alone or in collaboration with other donors - the UNFPA has supported the establishment of this program in Indonesia - USAID and the government's overall knowledge of the fundamental health/fertility equation will be increased. Also, the risk of USAID being labeled an agency only interested in preventing births would be considerably reduced. If the support of the Ministry of Plan and Cooperation and the other donors is acquired, it would not be difficult to introduce this monitoring system very quickly and extensively in Senegal. (9)

Part 4: Thoughts on a Population Strategy for USAID in Senegal.

It must be emphasized that the present discussion does not argue against Senegal's need for immediate implementation of a comprehensive population program in which family planning services have an important role. Without such a program in place it is difficult to see how donor efforts to improve the socio-economic well-being of the Senegalese can be sucessful. Still, it must be clearly understood that even if Senegal could launch a massive program designed to reduce fertility levels and redistribute the population, the total population of the country will still double before the end of the first decade of the next century when only marginal effects on fertility will be detected.

In the short period of time during which USAID plans, implements and monitors its programmatic activities (5 years?) there will be no macro-economic benefit associated with the implementation of a MCH/FP project. Moreover, given the suspected frail framework in which family planning services can be delivered in Senegal - it will be very difficult to achieve high rates of contraceptive prevalence. This observation applies to the urban and peri-urban areas, and even more so to the rural areas where manpower is limited, communications are difficult and the initial efforts must be designed to reduce infant and child mortality - a practice that will have the immediate effect of increasing fertility rates - before measures to limit or space births.

These comments are applicable only to the issue of delivering family planning services. As recent studies indicate, family planning has a significant effect on observed declines in fertility over time independent from socio-economic factors, but real impact on fertility seems to occur when effective family planning programs take place within a certain threshold of economic development. Significant fertility declines in developing countries are linked to overall development.

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efforts defined as:

1. increasing levels of literacy among the female population;
2. increasing the percentage of women in the work force;
3. increasing life expectancy by reducing infant and child mortality through improved health care;
4. increasing the average income of the poorest half of the population who contribute the largest amount to overall growth; and
5. providing access to the means to control fertility (FP).

The effects of these measures on fertility rates (as illustrated in the flow chart (1) on the following page) emphasizes the point that reduction in fertility will owe much more to the application of the political will and resources of the Government of Senegal than to the intervention and assistance from donor agencies such as USAID. Moreover, given the particular nature of the population problem in Senegal, defined more in terms of rapid migration and urbanization than overall population growth, it is suggested that the resources required to readjust the imbalance between population and social services are beyond the means of any single donor. Also, the period during which the aid is required is longer than any donor's planning and budgetary cycle. This is not to say that short-term projects are not instructive. These allow the government to test different population/development strategies; the overall impact of these efforts, however, is probably negligible in a macro-economic sense.

The flow chart further indicates that the management factor is an essential element. In order to ensure long-term and lasting effects the Government of Senegal must prepare and provide staff, systems and programs required to reach the people, improve their well-being and reduce maldistribution and rates of growth.

Flow Chart 2 illustrates the fact that donors have an influential but tenuous contact with the developing country, and that real programmatic impact is the result of what the government chooses and does not choose to do. No amount of aid in the form of funds, management systems and training will have any lasting and significant effect if the government is not prepared to marshall its forces in support of the program. At this moment, the Government of Senegal has by no means made the total commitment required to readjust spatial imbalance, reduce growth rates and raise socio-economic levels. The total population strategy remains to be defined, along with the matter of assigning ministerial responsibility and overall coordination. The "Rapport Provisoire et Recommandation" of the Seminaire National sur la Population et la Planification du Developpement (Dakar, February 12-17, 1979) reports that current rates of growth and urbanization make it impossible for the government to provide sufficient jobs, schooling housing, health care and food for the people, and indeed that current programs are becoming more costly to maintain much less expand. Nonetheless the conference participants endorse economic development as the only means to lower "indirectly" the fertility rate. (p. 6). In essence, the Ministry of Plan and Cooperation, one of the principal organizers of the conference, readily acknowledges the socio-economic problems of Senegal and the threat posed by population maldistribution

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Flow Chart 1:

Suggested relationships of development strategies to health determinants and health outcomes with consequent effects on fertility.



Flow Chart 2:

Suggested Donor influence on Development Planning and Program Implementation



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and the overall growth rate, but stops short on recommending the implementation of a development program that includes family planning services. (10)

If the Ministry principally responsible for assessing the total socio-economic situation in Senegal recognizes all the problems but is prepared to endorse only a partial solution at a time when there is relative agreement among policy-makers and planners that the most reasonable and effective way to reduce fertility rates is through a program that links socio-economic improvement and the provision of fertility regulating services, should USAID be identified with the family planning component of the MCH service? It is really the Government of Senegal that has to take the lead in requesting and endorsing the need for a family planning service in Senegal. If the government is currently unprepared to make a clear statement on the importance of family planning in the range of services offered in order to achieve the overall development objectives, and cannot in the immediate future work out a plan for motivating people, providing the services and evaluating their impact, USAID should offer to work with government planners to define a government position on population and to define a strategy for project implementation in which family planning services would be included.

In order to minimize the short term political risk - and a development policy that endorses family planning services is really a political issue since the socio-economic equation insists on the inclusion of the service in the total strategy - and to maximize long-term socio-economic impact, USAID might consider developing and supporting a comphrehensive population strategy that has the political and financial support of the other donors working in Senegal. This strategy would diminish somewhat USAID's risk of generating an anti-population sentiment capable of threatening its other projects in Senegal, and even its continuing presence in the country. Moreover, by acting in concert with other donors, massive and combined resources can be provided in a manner that can increase the prospects of overall programmatic success. The structure for coordinated thinking and acting is already in place; perhaps it is time for USAID to begin to work with other donors to develop the programmatic framework needed to support a comprehensive population program in Senegal. Might it not be appropriate to attempt a regional strategy in population? As amply illustrated in the Senegambia migration study, the overall population/development problem is regional. Could the Club du Sahel be a coordinator for donor aid in population?

It is admittedly difficult to establish an effective working relationship in program activities with all members of the donor community. (No example of close donor collaboration in the population field comes to mind.) In the light of the current and growing imbalance between a rapidly increasing population and the government's ability to supply a sufficient quantity of food and services, any attempt to secure donor cooperation and common action may not be an acceptable option; it may simply require too much time and effort for what is judged to be too little return. What are assessed as dim prospects

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for achieving successful cooperation may well dissuade USAID from following this course of action and may prompt USAID to proceed alone. However, since the essential issue regarding a population program - especially one that includes service programs in family planning - is more political than socio-economic, a careful assessment of the political risks in relation to the economic benefits must be conducted.

Since a population service program is admittedly necessary but politicallly risky, it may be appropriate to launch a program designed to increase technical knowledge as well as management and service capability in population within the educational system - specifically the Université de Dakar. The future leaders of Senegalese society, as well as a number of men and women who will be influential in other countries of Francophone West Africa pass through the university. The current curriculum does not include the range of courses necessary to inform the students fully on the relationship between population growth and distribution, and economic development, nor does it provide the training and management exercizes required to change the society's attitudes on population and develop the capability necessary to implement and sustain population education and service programs.

In the context of common donor action USAID might find it appropriate to define and support a series of courses in different faculties of the university. The curriculum should include courses on the socio-economic implications of the demographic transition. The social science sector would offer courses on policy and population dynamics. Human reproduction, family planning and population epidemiology could and should be core courses in the schools of nursing, medicine and public health. These courses should include a practicum in the field, as well as the normal didactic component. It is appropriate to establish a model MCH/FP/Infertility clinic within the university setting. This would provide a modest amount of service while giving training to students and research opportunities to professors. A course in population education, as defined in the Wileman/Lane text, could be incorporated in the School of Education. This would acquaint the future primary and secondary school teachers with the demographic realities of Senegal in particular, and West Africa in general.

Since the success of any population/development strategy in Senegal will ultimately depend on the resolve and ability of the Senegalese to implement and maintain a national program, it is suggested that a major effort be made to expand the capability and impact of the teaching, training and management institutes that are currently operating in the country, and doing work related to the population/development question. While the payoff of such a program will only be seen in the long-term, - the same as any family planning effort - it offers the prospect of extensive impact. Moreover, it might be an attractive course to follow while the Government of Senegal is in the process of defining its population strategy and assigning programmatic objectives and responsibilities to ministries and departments. A good amount of important applied population research can be conducted; it should have programmatic application and produce a more detailed understanding of the development issues

...

in Senegal and a sense of what is and is not redressing the imbalance between socio-economic development and population maldistribution and rate of growth.

This overall strategy does not deny the need for a family planning service. One will be needed and soon. This strategy is only an interim approach that allows USAID to identify with a broader population/ development program in which family planning, offered through the MCH program of the Ministry of Health, is only one small component. Further, this strategy allows USAID and other donors to discuss (and establish) the collaboration required to build the capacities of the Senegalese institutions, and to train the personnel required to administer, monitor and evaluate all aspects of the Senegalese development program. This strategy gives USAID and the other donors a good, visible return for the investment. It also increases the prospect of acquiring a large constituency that endorses all means that affect fertility and population distribution and improve the development prospects of the country.

Conclusions and Recommendations.

The USAID/Government of Senegal Joint Assessment was particularly useful in pointing out the management and evaluation problems associated with the major US-supported development projects in Senegal. It also noted the difficulty of assessing the relationship of one project to another and, more importantly, their potential impact on the overall development goals of Senegal. When framing a population strategy that includes family planning services USAID should bear these conclusions in mind as well as the particular cultural sensitivity to the issue of reducing population growth rates.

1. Since the success of any in-country development program, especially one that offers family planning services, is directly related to the degree to which it is defined and managed by Senegalese, USAID should be certain that the overall political, institutional and manpower elements are in place before launching a population service program. USAID should avoid supporting the long-term presence of foreign managers and trainers at all cost. Also, in order to avoid problems similar to those encountered in the Sine Saloum rural health project, USAID should begin with several small projects, and evaluate and modify them carefully and appropriately. USAID must avoid the temptation of the "quick fix", the massive program - something that some in the Government of Senegal would appear to be advocating.

2. USAID should explore the possibility of developing qn effective collaboration with other members of the donor community to design and implement a comprehensive and integrated population/development strategy for Senegal. Since the key development issues in Senegal are also those of the region, thought should be given to a regional strategy as well. Initially, it would be important to have a list of the applied research projects and programs in population/health/nutrition that donors are supporting or planning. Presently there seems to be little knowledge of these projects, minimal and informal communication and practically no programmatic cooperation. Too little is known about donor activity and interest, and even less about the relationship among

...

socio-economic variables and their impact on Senegalese development. Much more research needs to be done on Senegalese society and the economy in order to design appropriate programs and to enlist support from and/educate potential critics who could stymie program development.

3. As part of both a country and regional strategy in population and development, USAID (individually or in collaboration with other donors) should consider developing the teaching, training and research capabilities of the Université de Dakar, or perhaps another center, ENEA - l'Ecole Nationale d'Economie Appliquée -, in the field of population studies. The university offers an environment in which to influence and train students and professors on population-related issues, and holds the promise of programmatic application on the campus and in the field. The UNFPA has already begun to fund some studies at the university; it would be worthwhile to determine what the UNFPA has learned, and to assess the benefits and drawbacks of this strategy before going further.

4. By no means should USAID deny the importance of family planning services as a key factor in the development equation nor should it fail to provide commodities and services when requested by the Government of Senegal, especially when these services are to be delivered to those in greatest need - the poor. At the same time, USAID should very carefully assess the political risks associated with taking the lead in promoting a service - it makes no difference whether it is called "planning familial" or "espacement des naissances" - when the Government of Senegal has still not openly, clearly and officially endorsed this practice as an essential component of its development plan. USAID must keep three key issues in mind. First, USAID must be aware of the current unclear lines of authority and responsibility among the Ministries of Promotion humaine and Health, and the National Commission on Population and Development in regard to the definition of overall policy and the design, implementation, coordination and evaluation of programmatic activities. The Government of Senegal should be urged to resolve these ambiguities and establish clear lines of authority and responsibility among the ministries/commissions involved in population activities.

Second, in order to ensure a smooth and effective implementation of a family planning program within the MCH service of the Ministry of Health, USAID should carefully assess the service capability of the MCH centers and, if necessary, strenghthen the overall management, improve the quality of care, and upgrade the ability to evaluate the extent and impact of the care provided. This assessment should be done before initiating a family planning service, keeping in mind that vital information is needed on current levels of obstetric, gynecologic and pediatric care, as well as the attitude of providers to family planning.

Third, cultural sensitivities to the issue of family planning would dictate that services should first be offered in the Cap Vert region and extended as the population's receptivity allows. The first government family planning service should be modest in coverage and presence, well-integrated with other health/nutrition/education services, well-organized and supported, and regularly monitored and improved.

...

One final Comment: Population is a very sensitive issue, and family planning is, in the words of one government administrator "un probleme tres, très delicat." In short, it is a high risk operation that must be initiated with great care in order to ensure steady progress and success.

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NOTES

(1) Le taux de croissance de la population du Cap Vert a été estimé à 5 % : ce taux, inférieur à celui de la décennie passée, s'explique par le fait que la capacité d'absorption de la capitale arrive à saturation, ce qui devrait freiner son expansion.

(2) It should be kept in mind that urban dwellers, even faced with starvation, do not readily migrate to the countryside. A recent example took place in Cambodia. When the Khmer Rouge tried to encourage urban residents to leave the cities and live off the land by stopping food shipments into the city, the urbanites did not leave on their own and had to be driven out by military force.

(3) These comments were made by Ms. Robin Geller, Fulbright Scholar working in Sebikotane, Senegal, September 17, 1980.

(4) Since USAID and other donors are currently implementing projects in the interior of the country that could have an impact on migration patterns and lead to the establishment of new urban centers in regions like the Fleuve, the government should be kept well-informed and encouraged to plan and develop the services needed by the people likely to migrate to the new areas.

(5) There is resistance to the Code familial.

(6) One Senegalese told me with some sharpness: "Of course you are interested in family planning, you're American." Another asked why the donor community could provide so little economic assistance when the present world military expenditure was $1.5 billion/per day. He showed me the July, 1980 UNFPA Newsletter in which this fact was cited.

(7) I am suggesting that the American community in Senegal is rather small and that the contacts in Senegal are relatively few. The information available to this community is probably less comprehensive than that found in countries where there is a substantial American business community working with the local businessmen, in addition to the diplomatic, technical and development relationships.

(8) I do not claim to know the full extent of donor activity in Senegal as it pertains to population. I think my general observation is valid. After further investigation it may have to be modified. One of the general recommendations of this paper is that USAID undertake a small study to determine the full extent of population-related assistance in Senegal.

(9) Given the existence of a birth/family planning form for illiterate midwives, it would be possible to assess and improve services in the general areas.

(10) The conference participants recognize the importance of implementing measures to reduce infant and child mortality, extend educational opportunities, increase worker productivity, distribute income more equitably and, especially, improve the status of women. p.6.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

IN SENEGAL

BY

JOSEPH CARVIN

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This paper was prepared as a resource for the Joint Planning effort.

The views expressed herein are those of the author only and should not be attributed to the Agency of International Development.

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CHARTS

1) Ia	Structure of the Educational System
Ib	Senegalese or American degrees
Ic	Different (BAC) High School "majors"
4)	Bureaucratic Hierarchy
5)	Geographic and Sectoral Distribution of TFR (Technical Field Agents)

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S U M M A R Y

"L'Université africaine ne doit pas être une île des nantis dans un océan de misère et d'obscurantisme" J.Ki-Zerbo.

The African university should not be an island of well-to-do in an ocean of misery and darkness.

Mr. Ki-Zerbo's warning notwithstanding, it is this image which best describes Senegal's entire education system. The Government of Senegal (GOS) in the twenty years since independence has been unable, or unwilling, to change the urban oriented, elitist nature of the colonial education system it inherited. Seventy per cent of Senegal's school age youth never attend school. Most of these reside in the rural world. Those that do attend school are said to be "uprooted" (World Bank) and "deformed" (President of Maison Familiale).

The education system raises expectations and changes attitudes. A study conducted by the Centre de Recherche et de Documentation Pédagogique in 1978 received very revealing answers to the following question: what trade would you like to practice? (Quel métier souhaitez-vous exercer?).

- 35% of the 900 lyceens interviewed wanted to be teachers,
- 9% wanted to go into industry,
- 6% wanted to go into a liberal profession,
- 3% chose the Army,
- 6% wanted to pursue diverse professional careers (salesmen),
- 2% chose agriculture.

(The rest either didn't answer or chose a category that did not constitute 1%).

In a country where 80% of the population makes a living in the agricultural sector, it is not hard to imagine a scenario of substantial educated unemployment.

A B R E V I A T I O N S

BAC	Bacalaurent (High School Diploma)
DUT	Diplôme Universitaire de Technologie (Diploma awarded by the IUT after 2 years of study.)
DFEM	Exam taken at 10th grade level in order to pass on to the Upper Cycle.
BEPC	Brevet d'Etudes du Premier Cycle; same exam at 10th grade level, just another name.
CEPE	Certificat d'Etudes Primaire Elementaire (Primary School Diploma)

Planning Research Institutions

DRP	Direction de la Recherche et la Planification (Research and Planning Bureau)
COUD	Centre des Oeuvres Universitaires Dakar (Office for University Housing and Restaurant Services
ISRA	Institute Senegalais de Recherches Agricoles (Agricultural Research Institute
MES	Ministère d'Enseignement Supérieur (Ministry of Higher Education)
MEN	Ministère de l'Education Nationale (Ministry of National Education)
IRFED	Institut de Recherches et de Formation au Development (Development Institute for Research and Training).
ILO	International Labor Organization
MDRH	Ministère du Développement Rural et de l'Hydraulique (Ministry of Rural and Hydraulic Development)
SEPH	Secrétariat d'Etat à la Promotion Humaine (Secretariat for Human Development and Promotion
DEMST	Direction d'Enseignement Moyen Secondaire Technique (Bureau for Secondary Technical Education)
INEADE	Institut National d'Etude et d'Action pour le Developpement de l'Education (National Institute for the Investigation and Development of Education)

Training Institutions - Non-formal

CEMT	Collège d'Enseignement Moyen Technique (Mid-level School for Technical Education)
CEMG	Collège d'Enseignement Moyen Général (Mid-level School for General Education)
CEPR	Centre de Formation Professionnelle Rurale (Center for Rural Technical Training)
CFPP or CPP	Centre de Perfectionnement Permanent de Dakar (Center for Upgrading Industrial Skills
CQID	Centre de Qualification Industrielle de Dakar (Center for Industrial Training)
CERP	Centre d'Expansion Rurale Polyvalente (Multi-purpose Rural Development Center)
EATA	Ecole des Agents Techniques d'Agriculture (School for Technical Field Agents in Agriculture)
MF	Maisons Familiales (Village level farmer Association)
AR	Animation Rurale (Rural Extension Agency)

Training Institutions - Formal

EN	Ecole Normale (Primary School Teacher Training Institute)
ENS	Ecole Normale Supérieure (Secondary School Teaching Training College)
ENAES	Ecole Nationales des Assistants et Educateurs Sociaux (National School for Social Workers)

Parastatal Organizations

RDA	Sociétés de Développement Agricole (Rural Development Agency)

Jobs Titles

TFA	Technical Field Agents (Agents Techniques)
IT	Ingénieur de Travaux (mid-level manager)

Law

EOA - 71	Education Orientation Act - 1971.

INTRODUCTION

Education and training in Senegal is a purposely general title. In Senegal almost all governmental institutions have a training component, especially those that intervene in the rural sector. In the time allotted, it was impossible to evaluate each of these institutions and their training components. What this study attempts to do, instead, is make clear Senegal's education and training policy, by:

1. giving an overview of the classical (European) education system and the problems confronting it;
2. providing an overview of some of the most important training schools operating within Senegal's formal education sector;
3. providing analysis of the most important non-formal elements of Senegal's training/education system.

This is a preliminary study which should be expanded (especially the section on the RDA's), extended (to schools not included, e.g. ENAES, health training institutes), and updated. See Annex 11 for a list of all training institutes in Senegal.

Senegal's educational planners seem to demonstrate the same preferences as its lyceens. Modern technical training institutions are housed in new modern campuses, with the latest in sophisticated equipment. The University of Dakar is, as one incredulous freshman student exclaimed, "a different world" (un monde à part). She is right. It, with its modern buildings, spacious green walkways, and sophisticated student body, is a world by itself.

Rural institutions, on the other hand, have been housed in decaying, shabby buildings. Only now, with Title III grants from USAID, will some of these institutions take on a brighter look.

Even so, the students who attend these rural institutions are no exception to the rule. They have been "deformed" and urbanized like their colleagues at the university. While one might hope that the students that apply to these institutions do so because they are interested in rural development, this is not always the case. (Traditionally, the rural institutions have been a second best choice). When these students graduate, they don't view themselves as peasants or farmers, but government agents, there to assist the peasants. They are paid whether the crop is good or bad, whether their program is successful or not. They are bureaucrats, whose primary allegiance is to Dakar and not to the farmers.

Whereas the rural training institutions find themselves in a state of indifference, Senegal's non-formal education structure, with the exception of the RDA's, is on its last legs. The combined budgets of the non-formal institutions, AR, MF, CFPR, Alphabétisation and EMP, do not equal one-half of either of the modern engineering colleges, IUT or EPT, budgets. These institutions, which have been bounced around for years, are in the midst of yet another reform. This reform of Promotion Humaine further reduces their budgets and status in Senegal's governmental structure.

Senegal's educational priorities seem to be clear. The GOS has built shiney new technical schools which feed the modern sector. It spends $1,573 per university student. These students are for the most part destined to become bureaucrats after having attended either the teacher training colleges (ENS) or the College of Administration (ENAM). It seems as if much money is spent on training an elite for a limited modern sector. On the other hand, little money is spent on human resources development in the rural sector, where 70% of the population lives. If this misallocation of resources continues, the rural exodus Senegal is experiencing will continue to accelerate no matter how many EMPs, MFs or CERPs are implanted in the rural world.

B. Primary Education: (See charts Ia - Ic)

"Human potential can represent an important resource as long as it is trained and mobilized to service the basic and essential needs of the nation. Given the natural growth rate (3% for school age children), a passive education policy will result in the rapid deterioration of the quality of life for people who already live on the brink of disaster and in parasitic situations in urban centers, which are themselves peripheral and marginal to the world economic circuit" (2).

Senegal's policy towards primary education, as expressed in the Fifth National Plan is passive: "..... realistic planning must take the possibilities of continued development and financial constraints into account ... The minimal objective of the Fifth Plan will therefore be to attain a 3% growth rate of school age children" (3).

Senegal did manage to obtain this minimal 3% growth objective in the course of the Fifth Plan. In fact, Senegal has been able to maintain that rate throughout the years since Independence. In 1978/79, the Senegalese school system numbered 370, 412 students, as compared with 128,755 in 1960/61. This tripling of the educational mass was accompanied by increased internal effectiveness, as the number of repeater students dropped from 20% to 15%. This improvement might be attributed

to the increase in the number of primary school teachers as compared with assistants and monitors. 37.9% of primary school agents were teachers in 78/79 as opposed to 10.9% in 67/68.

Not only did the quality of the teaching improve, but so did its make up, as the GOS teaching staff became entirely Senegalese at the primary level.

These achievements were not made without great sacrifice. While the portion of the budget allocated to primary education remained the same (60%), the unit cost per student increased from $60 in 1974 to $131 in 1978/79. The budget for primary education rose from 7.475.013.000 CFA ($35,595,000) in 1976/77 to 10.456.832.000 CFA ($49,794,000) in 1979/80. This was in keeping with the increase of the overall budget for education which rose from 12.932.592.000 CFA ($61,584,000) in 1976/77 to 17.936.062.000 CFA ($85,410,000) in 1979/80.(4).

In this past Fiscal Year (FY 80), spending on all types of education accounted for 33% of the government's recurrent costs. The most revealing statistic, however, is that this $85 million dollar allotment goes to no more than a third of the population. The "Conseil Economique et Social" in a report prepared earlier this year, points out that the percentage of school age children actually attending school levelled off at 35%-38% at the end of the sixties, and then actually dropped to between 30%-33%. Thus, despite a considerable effort on the part of the government towards the education sector, over 700,000 children have never seen the inside of a classroom.

Most of these potential students live in rural areas. For every 30 persons who live in a village, one has attended primary school. In contrast, one in every three people have attended school in the urban areas. As for secondary school, one in every five hundred villagers have attended, as opposed to one in 12 for urban dwellers. Koranic schools, on the other hand, outnumber traditional schools 10 - 1 in the countryside (5). (See Annex 8 for a brief description of Koranic schools).

Obviously, easy access to educational infrastructure is a major cause of this dichotomy. Another more disquieting reason, however, is rural parents' disillusionment with the "tubab's" (foreigner) school. "I won't send my son to the tubab's school because he will just become a thief", remarked one rural parent. Other pragmatic parents don't see any benefit accruing from a school that throws their sons out into the street after five years of schooling and five years of sacrifice on their part to keep him in school. What's more, after having attended school, students often lose respect for traditional ways and beliefs, and refuse to work the fields. This discontent seems to vary from region to region in relation to various social factors.

Senegal's expensive education system can best be described as being "push-up" (pousser vers le haut ou fuite en avance) and "push-out".

From the time the student enters school, he is taught skills that do little to better equip him for rural agricultural life. The majority of the time he is in primary school is spent learning to read and write French (See Annex 1). This learning does not integrate the rural youth into his local environment (where practically no one speaks French), but rather pushes him up to the next level and closer to the big city. The World Bank refers to Senegal's primary school curriculum, thus: "Curriculum is conceived for urbanities and leads to a precocious uprooting of rural youth which breaks ties with their environment and their families" (6).

The GOS has recognized this problem, but the solution proposed-three hours a week of environmental studies - does not seem to be sufficient. There are no textbooks and teachers rarely take the initiative to go outside the classroom into the village. (The World Bank is financing a project to introduce national languages. Experimentation with Ouolof started in 1978, but there are no conclusive results yet.

The extreme irrationality and cruelty of the system does not manifest itself until CM2 (sixth grade), when the students take an exam to enter the middle level education level. Only 20% of the students pass the exam! Thus, the system, after having uprooted the rural youth and propelled him upward and forward, slaps him back down because there isn't enough room at the middle level. The Government of Senegal estimates that

between 40 to 50,000 youths are left to fend for themselves every year (7). While the numbers receiving their primary school certificate are greater than 20% (38-50%), this is some small consolation for students that have their own and their families' expectations raised, only to have these hopes dashed before they ever get started.

The Education Orientation Act - 71 attempted to respond to this situation by creating Enseignement Moven Pratique (EMP). This is the major innovation of the reform and will be reviewed in a later section.

C. Middle and Secondary Technical Education:

Along with the creation of EMP, the new emphasis given to technical education is a second major concern of EOA - 71. It was proposed that in the near future, Senegal would have an equal number of "technical" and "general" students. This new technical education was supposed to respond more effectively to Senegal's concrete development needs. As such, it was to serve a dual purpose:

1. Prepare student for the next level of teaching - second cycle General or Technical Lycees for CEMT, or university level professional schools for the lycees techniques.

or

2. Ensure practical training that would, if so desired, allow the student to immediately begin a job.

Middle Level Technical Education (CEMT)

(Seventh to tenth grades, or 6 -Sixième to -3 Troisième).

At this level there are six technical colleges (CEMTs), three of which are integrated with technical lycees. Students of these technical establishments follow the same program and take the same test (DFEM) as the students in the general colleges. They differ in that in addition to these general courses, they follow a technical curriculum which consists of six hours of "technology", one hour of "initiation to economics" and one hour of "home economics". The course in technology is designed primarily to familiarize the student with the technological apparatus in his environment, repair radio, fans, etc...

The major objective at this level seems to be to incite the student to opt for a technical lycee at the secondary level which traditionally has been a second best option. In Diourbel, 32 students out of a class of 138 decided to continue their technical education at the same lycee. (This statistic is difficult to judge because we don't know how many students went on to other technical lycees).

This middle level publicity may no longer be necessary. The Director of the Lycee Technique in Diourbel explained that more and more students are applying to the technical schools because of a plethora of graduates in other areas. In fact, there was an important increase in numbers registered for the technical series (B, E, F, F2, G, G2) in 79/80.

While the CEMTs may be effective in preparing their students for the next level of schooling, there is no way these students could begin to look for a job with the technical knowledge they have acquired. They don't learn skills at this level, but rather are introduced to what the ILO experts call a "technological culture" or the world of technology.

Secondary Technical Education

The Fifth Plan foresaw the building of technical lycees in Diourbel, Kolda, Kaolack and Tambacounda, none of which have been started. The only construction that has been accomplished is the Lycee E.H.Limamou Laye of Pikine, a general lycee which contains a technical department.

Not only are buildings and material costs expensive for technical education, but the GOS must pay for the maintenance of technical, often imported, equipment. As a result, the unit cost for technical secondary education is four times that of primary education. In 1976 it was:

	(U.S. Dollars)
Primary (including general lower secondary)	117
General Secondary (upper cycle)	260
Technical Secondary (CEMT's)	255
Technical Secondary (Upper)	477
University	573

Senegal now has three technical lycees: Lycee Delafosse in Dakar, Andre Peytavin in St-Louis, and Ahmadou Bamba in Diourbel. The lycee in Diourbel, lodged in temporary quarters for ver five years, has dropped industrial technical training because of a lack of equipment and now educates only G2 Bac candidates (quantitative methods of management). Funds have been acquired from FED and architectural plans are ready to build the long awaited lycee which will go back to teaching industrial "F" students.

A commercial lycee is supposed to be constructed in Kaolack but work has not yet begun. As for the other two proposed lycees, their construction has been put off pending the results of the second reform of technical education.

The World Bank reinforced Lycees Delafosse and Peytavin by building a workshop and providing equipment. Unfortunately, the workshop constructed in Peytavin has not been used due to a lack of material.

The quality of the instruction given at these lycees seems to be improving. In 1975, technical high schools (LT) graduates experienced difficulty entering the IUT, because high academic requirements favored general lycees of high caliber. It now seems that IUT and Ecole Polytechnique de Thiès compete for LT graduates who achieve better results in these technical schools.

While education has improved in quality, it has not yet become sufficiently job oriented. In theory, students are supposed to be able to choose between a job and further education. In practice, very few students choose to leave the school system after having received the Bac. Only two students in forty sought jobs after completing their technical secondary education in Diourbel. Ousmane Camara, the Minister of Higher Education, says, "Essentially, the training given is conceived as a step towards higher technological training. The only real outlet for graduates, whose diplomas are rarely accepted in professional circles, is admission into university institutions or the equivalent. This is contrary to a suitable equilibrium, at all levels, between training and employment. It is time to put a stop to this..." (8).

ILO experts went even further in their criticism by raising questions about the content and the structure of technical education.

"... The creation of certain sections, for example, automobile mechanics and copperwork, seem to have been born from a spirit of imitation rather than from precise knowledge of the real needs of the Senegalese economy.

It is important to remember two things. First, nowhere do classical schools train students for immediate employment in a given profession; a phase of adaptation is necessary in order to learn the necessary manual dexterity. Secondly, it is a mistake to authorize classical educational structures to do the

teaching of all sorts of trades. If there were efficient planning of human resources, one would become aware of the need to use other structures that often already exist outside the school and are better suited to train for specific jobs".[*] Not only does this type of education need substantial restructuring before it will be able to meet the practical needs of its students: it will also be years before the parity between general technical students is achieved (See Annex 12).

D. Middle and Secondary General Education:

Experiencing a high growth rate after independence (7.9%), middle and secondary education levelled off in 1975 to about 70-80,000 students per year. This levelling off has been necessitated by budgetary, technical and human constraints. These constraints are also the principal reason for a 20% limit on students entering mid-level education.

It is frightening to note that this levelling off has led to the same sort of rigorous selection at the DFEM level (10th grade).

In 1977-78, only 23% passed DFEM entrance exam; in 1978/79 it was only 20%.

The year 1979/80 saw a further tightening of the selection process with the reform of the baccalaureat. Students are now required to pass an exam in the first year in order to continue on to"terminale". Half of the students taking the exam succeeded in continuing on to the last year of secondary level.

(*) the CFPR, CPP for example.

This reform was instituted in 1979/80 in order:

1) to better select the students finishing secondary level education and

2) to rectify certain other problems:

a) decline in general level of studies;

b) the loss of value of the Senegalese Bac:

c) overcrowding in first years at the University.

About 40% of those who made it to terminale could be assured they would make it to the university.

The rate of success for the Bac in 1976/77 was 41.61%; in 1977/78 was 42.81%, and in 1978/79 was 42.95%.

The push out phenomena has caused a boom in private schools which currently received above 35% of all students, and 45% of the 6 th year students (See footnote 7). At the upper level, private schools account for 20.9% of all students enrolled. Private education is, of course, limited to the cities.

The major direct impact of the reform on this type of education was the reinforcement of scientific and technical disciplines. General schools were instructed to increase the amount of time alloted to the teaching of scientific and technical subjects. As a result, the proportion of literal arts students to the scientific students dropped from 48.6% to 33.7% in 1976.

It seems as if this policy has had its intended effects; in 1979/80, the number of candidates for series A4 (pure literature) were less than those of series D (sciences) with 4054 to 5091 respectively, for the first time since 1968.

E. University of Dakar

The Educational Reform of 1971 calls upon the University of Dakar to elaborate and transmit its wisdom in an African context to an African audience.

According to the Pecta Commission, the university has missed its calling: "The impact of the university of Dakar on Senegalese society is sporadic. This huge institution gives one the impression it lives closed into itself. That is why the university does not bother to follow the progress of its graduates.

The case of Gaston Berger University (a University of Dakar extension) seems to illustrate once more the lack of interest decried so often by both the public and private sector. Located in St-Louis at the mouth of the Senegal River, whose attributes weigh heavily on the future development of the region, it would have been normal to see the university take certain actions in that direction. That type concern must have escaped the founders of that institution of higher learning, which prefers to ensure the development of humanities in a region where the first condition of any development coming from the local population continues to be the mastery of water. The overwhelming number of high-school graduates (Bac), growing in number each year, has been the determining factor in this extension of the University of Dakar. What is more, planning at this level limits itself to creating bigger and more infrastructure, rather than questioning where all those new graduates are going to find jobs. High level unemployment can already be felt for (Univ. of Dakar) graduates in economics and law (615) and humanities (658).

A serious change of mentality is necessary, now, before it's too late, if the University of Dakar is ever going to participate in Senegalese and African society"(1).

Presently, the most serious problem at the university lies with the students' choice of disciplines. The majority tend to select the least productive, most saturated disciplines. As such, despite attempts at lower levels to reinforce scientific and technical disciplines, university students prefer the "literary disciplines" - Law, Economics and Humanities. The percentage of students in these areas of study is increasing rather than declining (See Annex 3).

Students concentrated in these areas are destined to become administrators or teachers. But the openings for these jobs are few. So many are unemployed. The needs as indicated in the Vth Plan are the following:

	LAW	ECONOMICS	HUMANITIES
Needs From 1977-1981	60	130	378
Enrolled 1979-80	520	693	578
78-79	432	531	839
77-78	308	331	704

The enrollments outnumber the need. Can the GOS push those they don't need out of the education system at this level?

(1) Pecta Report, p. 127, 128. See footnote.

In just one year, 1978, the university produced more lawyers than Senegal needed (95), one-half of its needs in economists, and 65% of its need in humanities (247).

While the university seems confronted with the same types of problems as all other levels of education, it is ironic to note that it seems aware of the grave problems that confront it. The construction of Gaston Berger University to house literary students, hailing from essentially urban backgrounds, will not only serve to exacerbete rural-urban dualism, the elitist nature of the educational system and the neo-colonial structure of the whole education system, but it will also push the country "up" and "out" into fairy land.

F. Teacher Training

Senegal's teacher training institutes seem to be efficient. The GOS has succeeded in "Senegalizing" the whole of the primary school teaching corps. While teachers trained at ENS are insufficient in number to fulfill Senegal's middle and secondary level teacher needs, production of teachers has greatly increased in recent years without affecting the quality of the graduates.

The major action that should be taken in this area is to adapt the training curriculum to Senegal's specific needs, especially at the primary school level.

Ecoles Normales (EN) - Primary School Teacher Training

There are five "Ecoles Normales" to train Senegal's primary school teachers.

- Ecole Normale de M'Bour - trains 60 teachers for Thiès and Sine Saloum regions. Created in 1964.
- Ecole Normale de Saint-Louis - trains 30 teachers for the Fleuve region.
- Ecole Normale de Bambey - trains 30 teachers for the Diourbel region.
- Ecole Normale des Filles à Thiès - trains 30 women teachers for the Thiès region.
- Ecole Normale William Ponty Thiès - 60 teachers for Senegal Oriental and Casamance.

These schools are able to adequately meet Senegal's annual requirement of two hundred odd primary school teachers.

While the teaching corps is entirely Senegalese, the curriculum taught at EN still needs to be adapted to the nation's needs. Primary school teachers are ill-prepared to carry out an eventual reform of the educational system.

The World Bank has made provision in Education Project III to more adequately prepare teachers for their future tasks. The Bank will provide an educational specialist to work with Ministry of Education to design an integrated program of teaching.

The World Bank will also construct a new teacher training college (EN) in Kolda. This school, which is to cost approximately $3 million to construct, is supposed to be ready in September 1981, but construction has not yet begun. The Kolda school will replace William Ponty of Thiès which is housed in decaying army barracks. The construction of this school will finally allow Senegal to take a large step towards achieving its policy of one teacher training institute per region (1). The Kolda school will serve Senegal Oriental and Casamance.

As it now stands, the EN program lasts four years. The students, who are recruited at the DFEM level, take the usual general courses in French, geography, history, natural sciences, etc.. In addition, they receive practical and theoretical pedagogical training and courses in applied linguistics. Every year in July, the students conduct an "Etude du milieu" (Environmental study) which is designed to better acquaint the prospective teachers with their teaching environment. It is these additional courses that the World Bank seeks to make more efficient.

Students: Students sign a contract in which they promise to serve GOS for the next fifteen years. Once they have agreed to this contract, their future is virtually assured. At the school, they are housed, fed and receive 8.500 CFA stipend. During the summer months, this scholarship goes up to 15.000 CFA.

In the fourth year, students take over a class for two months for which they are paid 24.000 CFA. Once the students have finished their schooling they can expect a starting salary of 55.000 CFA/mo ($225).

The Director of EN William Ponty of Thiès felt that the financial security offered by the school enabled him to recruit and select candidates of high quality.

Comments:

1) Every effort should be made to construct the EN school in Kolda by 1981, because the present quarters of the William Ponty school are in state of total decay. These gloomy surroundings surely exert a negative influence on teachers trained to serve in Senegal Oriental and Casamance.

2) EN teachers who are taught applied linguistics, do not yet use this training, because GOS is still experimenting with national languages. This is not a reason to stop teaching the course, but is rather an excellent opportunity to teach the primary school teachers("instituteurs")how to "alphabetize" in local languages.

At present "instituteurs" are given no alphabetization training. This is unfortunate, because "instituteurs" are also well-placed to teach rural adults how to read and write. They live in the community year round. They already possess high-level pedagogical training and they are often respected members of the community. Before independence, "instituteurs" taught French classes in the

evening to adults; there is no reason to believe the Senegalese teaching staff could not make the same effort. Furthermore, this kind of effort might work towards removing some of the rural world's suspicions, regarding the tubab's (foreigners) school.

Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS)

Goal: Train teachers for middle and secondary level general education. The ENS also trains educational inspectors (inspecteurs de l'éducation).

Students: Students destined to teach at the middle level (6th - 3rd) are recruited after having achieved their "licence" (B.A.). Students who will teach at the upper secondary level (2nd to graduation) are required to have a masters degree (See chart I b for American equivalency). ENS students receive a 60.000 CFA scholarship and sign a contract which binds them to serve Senegal for fifteen years.

Program: The program which lasts for one school year is divided into three parts.

I. Theoretical Training

a) Systematic analysis of the programs of study utilized at both the middle and secondary levels.

b) Psycho-pedagogical and professional training

1. Information on the psychological make-up of future students.

2. General and specific pedagogical analysis of students aptitudes.

3. Follow a course in the history of education.

4. Written reports on a subject of particular interest.

II. Methodological and Practical Training

1. Practice lessons at ENS applied high school, sometimes with audio-visuel feedback.

2. Practical training at high school outside of Dakar

3. Initiation to printing and various audio-visual techniques.

III. Moral Professional Training

1. Courses that outline the roles and responsibilities of a teacher.

In July 1980, 225 students graduated from ENS, a marked increase from the four teachers that graduated in 1975. As for 1980/81 ENS provided 280 scholarships but was only able to find 220 qualified candidates.

ENS has experienced enormous difficulties finding teachers for the scientific disciplines (math, physics, and natural sciences). Only 20 of this year's 220 candidates come from the scientific fields. To compensate, ENS has started recruiting students at the Bac level. ENS chose 100 candidates from a field of 300. Again, ENS provided more scholarships (150) than there were qualified students (100).

Although ENS administrators don't know Senegal's exact needs in teachers, it does not seem that "Senegalization" of the secondary teaching corps is near, as the MEN has told ENS directors to train as many teachers as possible and even that won't be enough.

Budget: 75 million CFA

Teaching Corps: ENS employs 60 teachers, of which approximately two-thirds are foreign. The school currently benefits from a project which is training 10 teachers per year in Belgium.

Problem: (1) The school's heavy dependence on foreign teachers is an impediment to appropriate curriculum reform. ENS officials hope that the 10 annual scholarships offered by UNESCO will allow them to resolve this problem. This may take some time, however, as this scholarship program has only recently been reactivated.

2) Space is a serious problem at ENS. Classrooms which were originally built to hold 20 students now hold as many as 40. The French have agreed to finance an extension of the school. Construction has begun and the classrooms should be ready for next year's school opening.

The ENS also has a research center, Centre de Recherche et de Documentation Pédagogique. This center is "responsible for the definition and orientation of training given at ENS". As such, it can use the ENS applied high school as a testing ground for any new pedagogical method that is worthy of consideration. Its principal task is to conduct research geared towards making Senegal's high school curriculum more relevant to the African context.

The Center reinforces these research actions by developing appropriate materials, by keeping in touch with former students through publication of a newspaper, Le Lien, and by conducting seminars to upgrade the teachers' pedagogical skills.

Since ENS is administered by MES, its research center has little impact on curriculum change because its contacts with the MEN are minimal. For example, the Director of the research center, Mr. Bouna Gaye, was not informed by MEN that they were planning to create a new bureau for planning and research. He first heard about INEADE over the radio, like everyone else.

G. Future Prospects and Options

Primary	Unit cost $130	1978/79
	Public	Private
Schools: 1,493	1,334	159
Classrooms: 7,188	6,158	1,030
Number of Students 78/79	370,412	
Student/Teacher	53/1	43/1
Internal efficiency:	Public	Private
Repeaters	15.2%	16.4%
CM2 Repeaters	26.9%	
Rate of promotion CI to CM 1		85.7%

Regional disparities:

	Enrollment	Classrooms per School	Teacher/ Student
Cap-Vert	63.3%	10.1	1/62.6
Thies	33.5%	5.2.	-
+Diourbel	13.4%	4.5	1/42.5
+Louga	14.7%	4.2.	1/42.5
Fleuve	31.3%	4	-
Sine Saloum	-	3.6	-
Casamance	38.5%	2.8	-
+Senegal Oriental	18.5%	-	1/39.1

+ The reason for these low rates of enrollment is not necessarily due to the lack of infrastructure as the teacher/student ratios are well below the national average of 1/53.

Source: Bilan statistique des Actions d'Enseignement et de Formation du Cours au Plan.

Given the present cost structure, the future of elementary education in Senegal is bleak. The possibility of providing education for all by the year 2000 is zero (See Annex 5).

The Fifth Plan tells us that the unit charge for a classroom has gone from 1.5 million CFA up to 3.5 million CFA, making the chances for expansion even less likely.

There does, however, seem to be room for some saving if the GOS opted for more reasonable infrastructure. Rural Koranic schools certainly don't spend 3.5 million CFA to build a classroom. On the other hand, the unit cost of $130 per student can only increase as costs increase. Almost all recurrent costs (99%) go to personnel. You must have teachers in order to teach.

Even if it were possible to extend primary education, it is not sure that it would be desirable. To extend a school system inherited from colonial times which only serves to raise the child's expectations, cut him off from his milieu, and then slap him back down is ludicrous. The Director of DRP, Moussa Georges Mbodj, says, "School is something for everyone, that concerns everyone. In order for it to work it must be an integral part of our society, so as to promote our own cultural values. It should be both a source of heritage and a factor of development. This cannot happen without a profound change of the structures, ties and goals of elementary education".

Mr. Mbodj proposes that double sessions be instituted and the school year lengthened. The student would attend school in the morning, for example, and in the afternoon someone from the community would instruct the students in community-related subjects. This type of elementary school would be more closely associated with EMP than with the formal school structure. It would provide 20% of its students to middle schools for development of middle level managers and send the rest to EMP.

Since the students would attend school only 2 1/2 days a week their school year would be cut from 185 days to 127 days. This sort of solution is not feasible at the present time since EMP's present enrollment capacity at all centers is 1000 students. It is, nevertheless, a good example of the type of profound change that is needed.

Although, Senegal has recognized the need for radical change since 1971, it has been unable to implement or apply a coherent response. Mr. Aw, also of DRP, attributes this to the lack of educational planners. The World Bank agrees with Mr. Aw and has agreed to form a National Bureau for Educational Research and Planning (INEADE). This bureau will seek to:

1. Coordinate the many commissions already working on the educational reform (Commission Nationale de Réforme de l'Enseignement du Français, Commission Nationale des Sciences Naturelles, Commission Nationale d'Histoire et de Géographie, Commission de Langues Nationales).

2. Give the educational system some focus and coherence. Until now, most Senegalese educational institutions train without really knowing the country's needs.

INEADE will immediately undertake two studies which should help it in its tasks. It will study 1) the relative costs implied by using different techniques and materials, 2) the education process as a whole at each of its different levels, in order to be able to ensure coherence between the national needs and its educational programs.

To summarize, the need for expanding elementary education is great. Senegal's passive education policy has already lead to parasitic situations in the cities, not to mention the great waste of human resources.

But, Senegal will not be capable, nor would it want, of expanding its elementary educational system without radical reform of the model and content.

Technical Education

Middle level (CEMT) Unit cost $ 255 1976

Colleges: 6

Students enrolled: 4096 6.1% of middle level general education

Teacher/Student: 1/46 4.0/62.5

Internal Efficiency (General figures for both mid-level general and technical education).

	Public	Private
Repeaters: 14.3%	15.1%	12.6%

3rd level Repeaters: (19.1%)

Rate of promotion: (76.3% from 6th to 3rd)

Regional disparities: Senegal Oriental, Thiès and Sine Saloum have no technical education.

Classes: 83

Cap-Vert: 33
Casamance: 17
Louga: 13
Diourbel: 13
Fleuve: 12

Secondary Technical: Series B, E, F, G.

78/79-3 lycees techniques

1 technical department Pikine

Series B and E taught at Van Vollenhoven

Students enrolled: 2,268 23.4% of general or 2968/12.699

Unit Cost: $ 477 in 1976

Commercial 1,953 or 65.8% & Economic Sections

-Technical education at the secondary level is divided into two areas.

Industrial Section 1,015 students 34.2% commercial and industrial.

Repeaters: 14.8%

The government's call for parity between technical and general students is doubtful except in the very long-term. In 1978/79, the unit cost for general middle and secondary level education was $242, compared to $433 for middle and upper level technical education. If Senegal would have attained parity by 1978/79, its recurrent cost would have increased by approximately $7.5 million dollars.

Not only is technical education in Senegal very expensive but it does not meet the country's needs. Few, if any, technical lycee graduates attempt to find jobs. Those that do experience difficulty because their practical skills are lacking.

Another more serious result of this "push upwards" is that Senegal is meeting its needs in superior technicians but not in skilled workers (see Annex 6). There is an immediate need, and jobs available, for people trained at this level. Since the government has not been able to meet this private sector need, the larger enterprises are creating their own training programs; Centre de Senelec, Centre de Formation de Taïba, Centre de Formation de Dakar Marine.

The Director of the IUT suggested that a professional high school modelled after the IUT be created to fulfill this need. It would guarantee its students a job before they start. It would establish a good working relationship with the business community, something the technical schools lack. The "lycee professionnel" would most differ from the "lycee technique" in that its students would receive a CAP, as opposed to the Bac.

In sum, the technical lycees have been unable to deliver practical professional training necessary for immediate employment. While materials are definitely lacking (one need only visit IUT and EPT and then the technical lycee to understand the GOS emphasis is on high level technicians) it is hard to imagine students passing up higher education and future benefit to go out and work in the industrial sector, even if materials were available for practical training. There is still a certain aura about having the Bac. Students seeking a Bac are looking for a ticket to higher education, not to become an industrial worker. Technical lycees don't do a bad job in preparing students for the next level of education, but they have been incapable of providing job skills.

The GOS is conscious of the inadequacy of the present system. Following an interministerial meeting in July, a second reform of the technical education system was proposed and adopted.

It was suggested at the end of this meeting that twelve actions be taken in order to implement this second reform. The principal actions consist of:

1. Creation of a national office for professional training;

2. Payment by all enterprises of a 1% training tax. GOS officials hope to raise 1 billion CFA ($5 million) from this source;

3. Reactivating diplomas for skilled workers - CAP, BEP (see Chart 3);

4. Conducting an exhaustive study of all training that goes on in Senegal.

These actions are designed to make GOS's technical education planning more coherent and as a result its training more flexible. Technical education planners should be able to foresee how many mechanics will be needed by the year 1990 and then adapt their training accordingly.

The CPP (see below) in Dakar has been singled out as a model institution of this genre.

Centre de Perfectionnement Professionnel (CPP)

Goal: To improve the productive capacity of Senegal's industrial laborforce. More precisely, to provide specific skills needed for industrial tasks.

Program: The CPP program is extremely flexible, "Stages" (training periods) last anywhere from 8 to 70 hours, spread out over several weeks or condensed into a few days.

At present, CPP offers courses in general mechanics, building construction, electronics, air conditioning and refrigeration, metal works, automobile diesel mechanics.

The CPP is capable of providing training in other areas on demand. In 1979/80, for example, CPP trained 18 workers in pipe installation in response to a request from local enterprise.

Students: Students are sent to the school by local enterprises, who pay a nominal fee. CPP does not accept individual candidates.

Professors: The CPP employs 15 professors and a director. Six of the professors are ILO experts, each of whom trains a Senegalese colleague to take over for him.

Campus: Located in the heart of the industrial zone, the CPP buildings are modest but well-kept. CPP possesses sophisticated machinery of all sorts donated by the World Bank.

Problems: The CPP seems relatively problem free for the time being. It remains to be seen whether the Senegalese colleagues will be able to maintain the quality of instruction and whether the GOS will be able to pay the new increased recurrent costs.

Comments: In September 1982, CPP will be fused with Centre de Qualification Industrielle de Dakar (CQID), an industrial training center located next door.

At present, CQID provides vocational training for students who have completed the 10th grade (3ème). The CQID program lasts two years and is broken up into four sections: electricity, general mechanics, motor mechanics and metal work construction. Teaching is divided between theoretical courses (eight hours of French, math, English and gym) and practical courses (16 hours). At the end of these two years, the students are awarded a BEP (Brevet d'Etudes Professionnel).

CQID also offers a third year of specialisation in refrigeration technique, motor mechanics and electronics. Most students opt for immediate employment after the second year. In 1979/80 there were no candidates for motor-mechanics, ten for electronics and nine for refrigeration technique.

ILO experts at CPP felt that CQID should put more emphasis on practical work as some enterprises were dissatisfied with CQID graduates' technical level.

These same experts pointed out that French cooperants teaching at CQID don't train Senegalese counterparts to take over from them. The experts saw these as two areas which should be reformed with the union of the two centers.

GENERAL EDUCATION

Middle level: There are 83 public establishments - 13 lycees; 7 colleges of Secondary Education; 63 colleges CEMG. There are 76 private establishments - 25 parochial and 48 non-dominational. Students in all middle-level institutions number 40.582.

Unit Cost: Primary and Mid-level $117 1976

Mid-level and Secondary $242 1978/79

Secondary level: There are 13 lycees publiques; 12 colleges - 6 parochial, 6 non-denominational. Students number 12.699 which represents a decrease of 1.9 % from 1977/78.

	Public Schools			Private Schools		
Bac Series:	A.	C.	D.	A.	C.	D.
# of Students:	2958	2183	4769	896	634	1269
	(Total 9910)			(Total 3799)		

Teacher/Student ratio: 1/37 1.35.9

Internal efficiency: Repeaters: 14%

Terminal level repeaters: 20.6%

Rate of promotion: 67.6% from 2ème to terminale

Enrollment has been fairly stable at the secondary level for the last five years, which means that competition to get into and within this level is getting more and more difficult (see annex 7). This tendency should continue for the next few years as the GOS will not be able to increase facilities, given the huge investment needs elsewhere in the education system. The principal change at this level will take place in the teachers's ranks with the progressive Africanisation of secondary school teachers.

UNIVERSITY OF DAKAR

Built in 1956 to receive 5000 students, the University of Dakar housed 10[illegible] students in 1978/79. There has been a 17% increase for each of the last 3 years.

Unit Cost: $1,573 (1976)

	Total	Senegal's part
Budget 1978/79	2.325.351.000 CFA	1.578.250.000 CFA (65% of total)
1979/80	2.680.625.500 CFA	1.944.007.000 CFA (73% of total)

University professors are not required to have pedagogical training but they are required to have a third cycle doctorate degree. In 1978/79, 58% of the University teaching staff was African. The University is progressively implementing its policy of Africanisation by offering scholarships for "third cycle" study. (See Chart Ib). The number of Africans teaching at the university has increased by 10% over the last five years, and is expected to continue at approximately the same rate. 74% of the assistant professors at the university are African.

University officials attempted to meet this increased demand on infrastructure by building additional amphitheatres, classrooms, offices, etc. The cost of this construction was 2.100.000.000 CFA. In addition to these, four new dormitories, a new restaurant and 5 new mini buses were all added to the university's operations.

Theses additions are only a stop-gap measure, while waiting for the Gaston Berger University to open its doors in October 1982. There is considerable doubt that the university will be finished by 1986, as voiced by a professor who is the University representative to the National Planning Commission. The Government has been obliged to reduce the plan of the University to a "minimum program" which will permit the transfer of the first cycles (first two years of university education) of law, economics and humanities to Saint-Louis. This minimum program will cost 10.500.000.000 CFA and is available in the short and middle term. Money still has not been found to pay for materials for the restaurant and library.

The university will receive from 4000 to 5000 students. The students will be housed in "villages", three of which have already been built; three more are underway.

Normally one would think that this new construction was the result of a thriving economy and university. Judging from this expansion one would think that the future of university education in Senegal was bright.

But all this construction is deceiving. Neither the economy nor the university are thriving. Construction is carried out to meet increasing numbers of students but not the country's development needs. The university is nothing more than the culmination of a self-contained education system that produces to replace itself.

The students at the university are definitely the cream of the crop. But how many of them will work toward Senegal's development? Become development agents? Consecrate their hopes, efforts, thoughts to Senegal problems? Few if any. A stroll around the university campus is enough to convince one that the students are more concerned about the latest Paris fashion than health care. Everyone is worried about passing exams. Passing to go where? The next level. To do what? To teach, of course. For the few who do want to address Senegal's development problem, the university is unable to provide an appropriate forum to develop these ideas. The best of Senegal are wasting the nation's time and money struggling in 15th century French poetry, memorizing decrees or learning theoretical economics which have little or no application in Senegal.

The university is the final stage in a process of alienation which begins in the primary school. The rural youth who is lucky enough to get to the university will have a difficult time returning to his family after having attended this prestigious institution.

Rather than channel Senegal's best human resources towards development, the university turns them away from it. The university channels students' hopes, perceptions and thoughts away from the rural world, and away from Senegal.

PART II TRAINING SCHOOLS

A. Introduction:

Rather than modify the university structure inherited from the colonial era, Senegal's education planners have decided to develop parallel technical and professional institutes designed to meet the specific needs of its economy.

This policy is clearly expressed in the Fifth four-year plan, "The University of Dakar was already in being before independence was achieved. Since then the number of students in higher education has risen remarkably, while the number of institutions providing specialized instruction has also risen. The system inherited from the colonial era was copied, however, from that of France, and aimed essentially at the integration of the African elite and such a system could not easily respond to the exigencies of a society in the throes of change, and to the specific requirements of the public administration (of the social and cultural services), and of the various sectors of economic activity. The predominence of the classical school and of the literary and legal instruction has led to the creation of schools known as "training" schools, aimed at satisfying specific requirements and recruiting students on the basis of the demand expressed by the users."

Although the general heading "training schools" (écoles d formation) has been used, some of the establishments which will be evaluated are administered by the University alongside the four largely autonomous faculties. This is the case for the IUT, CESTI, ENS, and EISMV. In addition to these schools, the education system covers at least another fifteen training institutions dispersed throughout Senegal, such as ENAM, ENEA, ENCR, etc.

This study does not attempt to evaluate all five university institutes and fifteen training schools but rather Senegal's most important training institutions. Three criteria have been used here to determine a school's importance:

1. resources allocated to the school;
2. tasks to be performed by future graduates (how will the future technicians contribute to Senegal's development?)
3. relevance to U.S. AID program (this leads to a more thorough analysis of rural training institutions).

In this way, the author hopes to present a representative study which will highlight the general trends of Senegal's education system, as well as provide more detailed analysis of a school's importance to Senegal's development and USAID's program. (Health training institutions are not mentioned because of logistical constraints, but will be the subject of a later annex).

In order to facilitate comparison of these three criteria, schools have been classified by professional vocation rather than administrative status. The schools have been artificially grouped into three separate categories: technical schools, administrative schools and rural training schools.

It is important for the reader to keep in mind that this is a logical but artificial classification. There exists little or no coordination between schools of the same category (between EPI - IUT or ENEA - ENCR for example), not to mention between schools of different categories. Again, the Fifth National Plan clearly points out the need for reform: "If these establishments (training schools) have succeeded in satisfying the requirement for staff to a large extent, it is still necessary to recognize their isolation in relation to the rest of the educational system, and their comparatively high costs".

TECHNICAL SCHOOLS

B. Institut Universitaire de Technologie (IUT)

Objectives: To meet Senegal's need for mid-level technical manpower, Provide post-secondary sub-professional foremen and technician training in mechanical, electrical and civil engineering, industrial chemistry, food technology, and business studies. Graduates are to replace expatriate mid-level staff and fill new positions as industry expands.

Program: Two year course leading to university diploma in technology (DUT). The students attend school for 32 weeks a year, 34 hours a week. They can choose from the following options:

Industrial Division - Bac C,D,E	§	⊠
- Department of Electrical Engineering Options: Electronique Electromecanique	227	32
- Department Chemical Engineering and Applied B Options: Biological analysis Chemical engineering	128	9
- Department mechanical Engineering Options: Maintenance Construction	100	20
- Department of Civil Engineering Options: Building and civil works Rural engineering Geometrics	186	25
- Department of Meteorology	26	10

§ Number of students who have received DUT from 1968 - 1978.

⊠ Number of students who have completed two extra years of training leading to either a high level technical diploma or an advanced diploma in management or administration 1968 - 78. There are two groups that participate in this program; those students that have graduated with DUT and then go on to work for two years and the top 10 of the graduating DUT students.

Tertiary Division all Bacs

- Department of Business Administration
  Options: Finance and Accounting
  Administration and Personnel
  Department of Commercial Techniques
  Department of Hotel and Tourist Management

The IUT offers part-time training for people who are working full-time. It also hires itself out to do research.

Students:

In 1978/80 there were 461 students matriculated at the Institute:

- 126 in the Tertiary Division (86 1st year, 40 in 2nd year)
- 243 Industrial Division (146 1st year, 97 second year)
- two year additional superieur course 92 (21 tertiary, 71 industrial)

All IUT students have a scholarship of 24,000 CFA. An additional sixty students from the Ecole Normale Supérieure d'Enseignement Technique et Professionnel were trained at IUT. These students are destined to teach in the technical lycees.

The Director of IUT is currently a French man but he will be replaced by a new Senegalese Director.

Budget: 1976/77	(millions of CFA)
General recurrent costs	25
Rest	85
Scholarships	120
Personnel	35
	265
French Assistance	60
Personnel	100
	160
	Total 425 million CFA

UNIT COST per graduate: 1.250.000 CFA

Problems: Most employers are generally satisfied with the quality of the education but they complain that the teaching is too theorical. The upper

level program runs into difficulties because it takes students away from their job in order to learn again. Employers complain this disrupts their management production cycle.

Comments: From 1971 - 1975, the IUT had found employment for all its 442 graduates. In 1980, some students were experiencing difficulty finding a job. But the IUT is a flexible institute that can change to meet new employer needs. In fact, just this year it opened a new department of Informatique (Systems Analysis) for 20 students, all of whom have already been promised jobs with the DATI, a research group that makes up part of the Ministry of Finance. This is an example of the type of training upon demand done so well at the IUT. It requires a lot of work on the part of the School Directors, going out into the business community to determine their needs. So far, this policy seems to have paid off for IUT, as it has already been able to find jobs for 80% of its graduates. As a result of surveys done this year, enrollment in mechnical and chemical engineering courses will be cut back.

Not only does the IUT have a good relationship with the business community, but it also seems to be integrated and interested in Senegal's development effort. The Director has spent the last four years forming a research team which he estimates to be one of the best in Africa. Whether true or not, it is encouraging that the research efforts are conducted by people who know Senegal (4 years experience at least) and who consequently conduct research oriented toward Senegal's specific development problems. Thus, the major thrust of IUT research goes into Solar Energy, and Hydraulic works.

The IUT on-the-job training program is also geared to meeting Senegal's needs. Night course in accounting have been offered for the last few years to approximately 150 students annually. This year, courses have not yet been

started because previous courses taught French law and accounting methods, which are different from those of Senegal. IUT will not begin these courses until the government decides whether the new textbooks developped by IUT are appropriate.

The IUT internal efficiency is very good, as it should be, since they select 140 students from 1500 candidates; in the first year 70% of the students pass and in the second year approximately 95% pass.

Campus: Modern and well kept, although the dormitories need some attention. Many laboratories, a computer room, and an audio-visual complex provide the school with necessary materials and also a heavy maintenance and recurrent cost bill. The vast amount of audio-visual equipment, which looks like a CBS television studio, does not seem to be justified.

C. Ecole Polytechnique de Thies (EPT)

Goal: Train high-level civil and mechanical engineers.

Program: This school has opted for the North American University curriculum. Thus, they meet for two semesters a year, for five years. At the end of the five years they receive a "diplôme d'ingénieur de genie civil" or "Mecanique". Work is equally divided between theory, laboratory work, and practical exercises.

Campus: Pretty, neat and well kept as any in the world. The EPT appears as a green oasis in the middle of the desert. Maintenance of this oasis is costly, however, as the EPT spends annually 12 million CFA ($60,000) just to water the grass.

The machines at the EPT are very sophisticated and very expensive to maintain and repair. They come from all over the world. The school is thereby obligated to send all over the world for spear parts. The Director of the school cited this as a major problem, as he considers these machines to be indispensable to the teaching program.

Students: There are at present 193 students at EPT, well below its capacity of 350 students. There seem to be two reasons for this under utilisation of resources:

1) Originally EPT admitted approximately 98 students in the first year, to find that only 26 or 27 would make it to the second year. Now the school recruits 45 students a year, but approximately 70% make it to the second year. This new recruitment is obviously much more rigorous. (Students following series C or are eligible to apply for the school.) (See Chart Ic).

2) The school is beginning to have difficulty in finding work for its students, only 7 years after its conception, and 2 years after its first graduate class. The EPT turns out approximately 30 engineers a year. When one takes into account the students studying abroad and the engineers that follow the four year program at IUT, it is easy to understand that in three or four years the market will be saturated. Senegal's economy can only absorb so many high level engineers.

These EPT graduates are obligated to work in Senegal for 15 years after graduation, but they can opt for either the private or public sector. What is surprising is that 65% of the students choose the public sector where salaries are sixty per cent less than in the private sector. They seem to prefer the job security.

Students are fed, housed and clothed by the state. They receive a monthly stipend from 17,000 - 25,000 CFA.

There are no women at the EPT, but plans have been made to receive women next year.

Administration: The EPT is run by the Armed Forces. This is why the students are provided clothing, they are all in uniform. They are all reserve officers.

The commandent of the school explained that the armed forces is the best organized, best structured administration in Senegal. They have a high sense of civic and moral duty which makes them much less corruptable. This does seem to be true. In fact, the GOS seems to have much more confidence in the Armed Forces probity than in any other administration. The GOS soon plans to militarize its agents of economic control, because military personnel caught swindling don't go before a civil court but a military tribunal.

While this military option does seem to contribute to the efficiency of the school it is discouraging to note the military's own engineers are still trained in France. This despite the under utilisation of the EPT.

Teachers: Almost all are Canadian. Eight professors from the University of Dakar teach the non-specialized courses. Otherwise, there are 32 Canadian "cooperants" who come for a period of two years. The Director of studies and his assistant are both Canadian.

Budget: 305 million CFA

275 - recurrent costs, fonctionement

30 - to pay civil workers

Does not include Army nor the teachers' salaries.

UNIT COST - 1,600,000 CFA ($7,600)

Problems: The major problem confronting the school is obviously that of finding work for its graduates. A second major problem is the high unit cost caused by expensive repairs and under utilization of the facilities. One solution to under utilization may be to open the school to other West African States. The EPT already receives a few students from Upper Volta.

Comments: 1) Many people complain that donor agencies conduct too many studies. Nevertheless, some studies are necessary. It is astounding to discover that the GOS has borrowed millions of dollars from Canada to construct this beautiful campus without ever having attempted to make a long-term analysis of its needs for high-level engineers. After having spent millions of dollars, the EPT is beginning to experience difficulties placing its graduates. They are having difficulty finding jobs, not because students are incompetent but because Senegal's economy does not have that many high-level engineering jobs to offer.

2) The machines at EPT are extremely sophisticated and costly. One of the professors who showed us around said that these students, after having been exposed to these machines, would be capable of working anywhere in the world. I wonder if students will work on the same type machines here in Senegal?

3) Little research is done because the Canadian professors, for the most part, stay only two years.

4) There seems to be little or no coordination between the EPT and IUT. The IUT, originally conceived to train mid-level engineers, is training more and more high-level engineers who enter into direct competition with those of EPT. At a time when the EPT is operating below capacity, it is discouraging to think that these two schools can't complement one another's tasks. Why can't the EPT train all civil and mechanical engineers?

The duplication of the same tasks in an area where technology is so expensive is a waste of resources. Petty bureaucratic infighting and donor competition seem to be the major obstacles to a more rational policy.

D. Ecole Supérieure de Gestion des Enterprises (ESGE)

Goals: Train high-level managers for private and para-statal business;

Improve the management skills of people currently holding middle and high-level positions;

Furnish consulting services to businesses.

Implementation: The school should open its doors in September, 1981. Recruiting will begin in April for six groups of 20 students who will participate in six weeks part-time programs. Twenty full-time students will also begin. At this time, upgrading the skills of existing executives seems to have priority over training new executives.

Program: The program is divided into two parts. The first part lasts six months, during which the student is required to spend all of his time at the school. In the second part the student alternates between school and work. During this time the student works on a thesis directly related to the enterprise for which he will be working.

Since this school only accepts students who have worked for at least two years, and thus who are often actively working, its calendar must be very flexible and estabilished in close collaboration with the enterprise it is trying to help.

Students: University graduates with two years working experience, including economists, engineers, sociologists and jurists.

Administration: The school will be run by a Counseil d'Administration which will have as its president someone from the business community.

Costs: ESGE has received a loan for $3 million, ($2.8 million from World Bank - $.2, Senegal) to cover construction, equipment and technical assistance costs.

Teachers: Need six permanent professors on exchange programs. The Director of Studies, a Canadian, has already been chosen as well as the Department Chief for in-service training. By 1982 the School will need three more permanent professors.

Comments: 1) The regionalisation of the school will not take place for some time for what seem to be good reasons. That is, the success of the school depends on close collaboration between the school and the business community, which has already expressed interest. The Director, therefore, wants to capitalize on this interest before supernationalizing the bureaucracy, with all the concommitant dialogues, negotiations and grandiose speeches. It would also be much more difficult to establish school/business community relations on a regional level.

Mr. Sylla, the Director, prefers to gain the confidence of the local business community, establish a good reputation, and once established, open the school to other African States.

2) In addition to close relations with the business community it should establish close relations with the IUT and the Department of Economics of the University of Dakar. In fact, the IUT already does the three things the ESGE proposes to do. While they don't do these tasks on a level to meet Senegal's needs as estimated by CEGIR*, i.e., train 45 high-level managers annually and provide 6-week training courses to upgrade the skills of some 2,500 managers, they could certainly increase output if more resources were given. Also, the IUT already has an expensive and sophisticated audio-visual center which serves its own management students. The IUT opened a department of systems analysis just this year. The ESGE feels that given the increasing importance accorded to systems analysis it must also treat this subject and it must have a computer.

The Department of Economics could certainly benefit from ESGE seminars or professors in courses or research.

* CEGIR is a Canadian consulting firm which came to Senegal in 1978 to determine GOS management needs.

E. Centre d'Etudes des Sciences et Techniques de l'Information (CESTI)

Goal: Train journalists for radio, televised and written press.

Administration: This school is different from the other technical training schools in that it has a regional (West African) vocation. It is affiliated with the University of Dakar, but quotas of students are reserved for each country according to their contribution.

Students: Come from seven different West African member countries - Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, Benin, Upper Volta, Mali and Ivory Coast. Students are recruited at the Bac level, although professionals who have worked in journalism for two years or students who have a bachelors degree (license) can take the entrance exam as well. Students with a bachelor's degree are admitted directly into the second year of study.

The entrance examination is given in May. This year 208 candidates vied for approximately 40 openings at the school. 123 candidates were Senegalese, 70 Malian, 12 from Benin and 1 from Niger. The number of candidates applying to the school has decreased significantly since 1975 when there were 422 candidates. There were 365 in 1977; 292 in 1978; 280 in 1979 and 208 this year. No explanation for this drop was given in the school newsletter article which described this fall.

Most students receive a scholarship of 42.000 CFA per month which up until this year has been paid by the ACDI, (Canadian donor Agency). From now on, the school will have to assume responsibility for its student's scholarships.

CESTI now has a student body of approximately 100 students. It has graduated 200 students since 1970.

Program: The CESTI program lasts three years. The first two years are equally divided between general instruction (courses in the Modern World, Contemporary Africa, International Relstions, Political Economy, Social Economic Development, Methods of Sociological Investigations, French and English) and professional instruction (Typing, Collection and Treatment of Information, Introduction to Communications and Mass Media, History of the Press and Communications, Electronic Press, Written Press, Photography, Audio-Visuals, and Communication Sciences).

In the third year of the program the students choose their major in either written press or electronic press (Radio-TV). In this third year, students are taught the practical techniques essential to their future profession. At the end of the third year, students travel to France (One month), Canada (1 month) and the U.S. (15 days), in order to further this practical knowledge.

Faculty: There are twenty teachers at CESTI, the majority of whom are Canadian. The Africanisation of the teaching corps has been initiated, with six CESTI graduates being sent to Canada to follow a doctorate program in journalism. France has offered five more scolarships to begin in 1981.

Campus: On the University of Dakar grounds, CESTI is located in a modest but pleasant building. Whereas the building is modest, its audio-visual and printing equipment are very sophisticated. CESTI has a radio station from which it is capable of transmitting radio programs.

CESTI students who work at Radio Senegal claim that the school equipment is more sophisticated than that of Radio Senegal. However, no programs are broadcast for the public from CESTI!

CESTI is also capable of printing a respectable University newspaper, but for the time being, they have limited themselves to printing a school newsletter, the "CESTI Echo".

Operating Budget: The Director claims it to be 50 million CFA. The reader should keep in mind that these figures are difficult to compare, because there does not seem to be a uniform policy for including diverse items in the budget. Even when there is a uniform policy, donor agency's will pick up the bill for certain activities such as faculty salaries, trips abroad, or equipment which often are not entered in the budget.

Comments: 1) It seems a shame that Senegal possesses sophisticated radio and printing equipment but only use it for pedagogical purposes. There are few extracurricular activities for university students; a campus radio station and newspaper could help to get students thinking about their country's development. These would have to be carefully monitored by the government, of course, but GOS would do more good than harm by giving students some responsibility rather than fearing them. After all, they are Senegal's future leaders.

2) Recurrent costs may become a problem for the school, as the Canadians pull out. Students were given scholarships of 42.000 CFA instead of the 24.000 CFA Senegalese scholarships. Maintenance, repair and replacement cost for the school's sophisticated equipment may become onerous as well. The students' trips to Europe and North America at the end of the third year are expensive also, as air fare alone costs from $1,000 to $2,000.

F. Ecole Nationale de Formation Hoteliere et Touristique de Dakar

Purpose: Train qualified hotel staff in order to meet national requirements and provide adequate services to an international clientele.

Financing: Budget is exclusively funded by Senegalese Government. Other resources are in the form of donor-funded teacher salaries and scholarships (i.e. West Germany provided 10 scholarships in 1975; Belgium, 12 scholarships in 1976; Morrocco provides scholarships and training every year to students in Morocco; France gives about 2 scholarships every year through FAC.)

Students: Recruited every 2 or 3 years

Student population is as follows: Senegalese 73, French 1, 23 students are expected from Niger.

All students have a scholarship (granted by their government). 15 students sent to Morocco in 1975; 10 in 1980.

Training Program:

Hotel Section: Students entering this section must hold such diplomas as B.E., B.E.P.C., or D.E.F.M. Involves theoretical and practical training. Subjects taught are: food hygiene, applied science, hotel techniques and management, applied calculus, tourism geography, French, legislation and languages (German, English, Italian) The studies last two years. Graduates are awarded a diploma.

Teaching Staff: There are 17 teachers including 10 Senegalese and 7 expatriates. Teachers of hotel and cooking techniques must hold a higher education degree in those areas. Teachers of other subjects must hold same degree as secondary school teachers and have received special training. There are not enough teachers.

Performance: School is seriously affected by students dropping out during training. Drop out rate is about 10%. Success rate is 99% for hotel section, 100% for tourism section.

Placement of graduates: Very difficult, due to competition from hotel staff locally trained on the job and much cheaper. Often graduates find jobs by themselves. Jobs are mostly available in hotels, at Dakar airport, or in travel agencies. Job market is limited primarily to Dakar.

Problems: Student dropout (10%) is usually due to job openings elsewhere during the training period. A number of students in tourism section are former University students who are not motivated and just join the school for the scholarship it provides(24.000 CFA for tourism section students, 17.000 CFA for hotel section students) and look for other opportunities while undergoing training. They frown upon hotel careers.

- School buildings are run down, equipment is inadequate and not operational. Kitchen equipment has not been operational since December 1979. Refrigeration system does not work.
- Lack of teachers.

ADMINISTRATIVE SCHOOLS

G. Ecole Nationale d'Administration et de Magistrature (ENAM)

Goal: To train all of the nations non-scientific high level cadres (managers). These managers will obtain the highest possible level, hierarchy A, in the Senegalese administration upon graduation. (See Chart 4).

Students: Recruited after having received a university diploma in Law, Economics or Arabic studies. Most students obtain a master's degree (maîtrise) before taking ENAM's entrance exam.

Professionals who have worked at the hierachy B level for at least four years are eligible to take the entrance exam as well. Those that succeed are required to do an extra year of study.

This year's entrance exam proved to be extremely competitive. There were 40 student candidates for ten spots in the judicial branch and 152 student candidates for 72 chairs in the other divisions. The professional contest was much more severe (Students with diplomas should not be unemployed), as only 12 candidates were selected from a field of 204.

ENAM is modelled after the French "Ecole Nationale d'Administration" which trains France's governing elite. ENAM's scholarships are 92.000 CFA per student and its modern surroundings embody this elitist training policy.

Program: ENAM's program is divided into three divisions:

I. Administrative Division

a. General Administration
b. Social
c. Diplomacy
   - general option
   - Arabic option

II. Judicial Division

III. Economic and Financial Division

a. Customs
b. Treasury
c. Taxes
d. Economic surveys
e. Cooperative section

Once students have been admitted to ENAM, they choose their speciality according to the rank they received on the entrance exam. Those that rate highest on the exam invariably choose customs. The tax and treasury sections are also very popular.

The ENAM program which lasts two years is mostly theoretical, although the students participate in practical "stages".

Professors: All the professors who teach at ENAM are "vocataires" (Professional people who do not teach for a living, but give a course at the school which pertains to their field of work). This lends a practical flair to the theoretical teaching. Almost all of the professors are Senegalese.

Unit cost per student is 1 million CFA.

Problems: 1) GOS has put a freeze on bureaucratic hiring. This measure has not yet directly affected ENAM, as the school can still place its graduates in Ministries for whom they train on demand. It seems clear however that Ministries' requests for ENAM graduates will begin to decrease. This coincides with a time when the university is producing more and more graduates who will vie for entrance to ENAM. It will be interesting to see how ENAM's administration (Hierarchy A bureaucrats named by decree to serve the school and composed of a Director, a Director of Studiés and three division heads) reacts to these adverse trends. This year, for example, there was no need to recruit for the diplomatic sections, as Senegal has recently closed twenty embassies. The school did recruit students for this section, however, for political reasons.

2) ENAM recruited its first class of cooperative agents two years ago, but was not quite prepared to furnish these students with an appropriate program. ENAM officials, therefore, decided not to recruit a second class this year and are in the process of collaborating with ENEA in an attempt to adapt their program to cooperative agent needs.

Comments: 1) Many ENAM graduates from the administrative sections are destined to work in rural areas as sous-prefets. The ENAM curriculum does not seem to offer courses that will initiate (or re-initiate) the predominately urban students to the rural sector. With the onset of the administrative reform, sous-prefets are called upon to exercise a developmental role. Again, few if any of ENAM's courses prepare this future developmment agent for his role as a catalyst of community development.

ENAM administrators are aware of this and try to send former field agents who have passed the professional entrance exam to fill those positions. Nevertheless, this does not justify the lacunes in the teaching program.

2) One has to ask why the customs section is year after year the first choice of the elite of the elite. When we look at the second (taxes) third (treasury) and fourth (economic surveys) most popular sections, it would seem that the possibility of receiving bribes is one of the motivating factors.

H. Centre de Formation et de Perfectionnement Administratif (CFPA)

Goal: Created in 1965, this center trains middle-level cadres for hierarchy B bureaucratic positions. These cadres support ENAM graduates by doing general administrative work.

Students: Recruited at the Baccalaureate level. They must pass an entrance exam to get into the school. There is also a professional exam for hierarchy C bureaucrats.

Students receive a scholarship of 24,000 CFA per month and sign an agreement to serve the state for fifteen years.

The first class graduated in 1966, with 19 students in three different sections. By 1975, the school trained 80 students in the different sections.

In 1980, 80 students were trained for 11 sections. According to CFPA's Director the school, which trains upon demand, should be educating 200 instead of 80 bureaucrats to meet ministries' annual needs, but since CFPA does not have the space, it can train no more than 80 students per year. This may be a blessing in disguise because now CFPA will be less susceptible to the surplus situation with which ENAM is confronted. In fact, the CFPA Director complained that there

already is a plethora of hierarchy A ENAM graduates who are beginning to occupy hierarchy B positions.

Program: The CFPA program lasts for two years and trains:

1) Secretaries for the territorial administration
2) Secretaries for financial administration
3) Secretaries for chancelleries
4) Secretaries for cultural affairs
5) Work inspectors
6) Tax inspectors
7) Treasury inspectors
8) Economic inspectors
9) Scholastic administrators
10) Court recorders
11) Secretaries for scholastic and university texts

The first year of training (November to June) includes eleven general courses which all students follow. From July to October, students participate in a practical "stage" in their prospective ministries. They are counciled during this time by a "tutuer de stage".

In April, the students participate in a second 2-1/2 months practical stage which terminates in the middle of June.

Professors: Like ENAM, all professors are "vocataires"; 80% of the teachers are Senegalese. The Director, who is named by decree, is Senegalese.

Campus: CFPA students are cramped into what were at one time beautiful buildings, but are now badly in need of maintenance. The campus is located in the residential section of Point E, Dakar.

Comments: CFPA is an important school in that it trains agents for each of Senegal's ministries. As CFPA Director boasted, it is impossible to go into a ministry without finding at least one CFPA alumnus.

While CFPA seems to run smoothly and quite adequately fulfills its modest goals, the administration it prepares its students for is in bad need of reform. One does not have to be an efficiency expert to realize that many Senegalese bureaucrats are working at less than full capacity. To what extent CFPA alumnus, or personnel, are capable of effecting this reform, or even willing to bring it about, is difficult to determine. One does not, however, receive the idea that Senegalese bureaucrats, where CFPA graduates are so predominate, are highly motivated.

RURAL TRAINING SCHOOLS

Ecole Nationale d'Horticulture (ENH)

Goal: This school has a dual objective: train "skilled workers" and/or "technicians" in either vegetable and fruit gardening or in landscaping and ornamental cultivation.

Students: Students who enroll in the skilled worker section are required to have their CEPE. Students who aspire to be "technicians" must obtain either the DFEM or the Bac level.

Most applicants for the skilled worker section are graduates of the Centre d'Initiation Horticole (CIH). There are 8 CIH centers, each of which trains approximately 30 vegetable gardeners. ENH takes five from each center. In the technician section, there are presently 90 students enrolled in the three year program.

Problems: 1) The school is overcrowded. There are little if any pedagogical materials. The school is a last resort for most of its students. The applied studies fields have not produced for two years due to problems with the acquisition of water. Students sometimes have difficulty finding work upon graduation, especially the skilled workers. Many other problems lead one to conclude that ENH needs a major overhaul.

Some steps have been taken in this direction. An irrigation system is being implanted this year with the help of French experts. This should allow the school's cooperative to function for the first time in two years. Other steps towards reform, such as conducting recruitment at the same time as EATA and other schools, in order to enable ENH to compete for quality candidates, are being considered by MEN's technical training division.

Comments: The Director of ENH remarked to us that the CIHs, which are originally designed for peasant's sons, have lost favor with the local population, and it is now urban dwellers who most often attend these centers. It is interesting to note that even at the local level, urbanites are taking agricultural jobs.

The important thing to note here, however, is that Senegal's extension agents recruited at the DFEM and Bac level are not really taking agricultural jobs; they are taking jobs as bureaucrats. ENH is the only school that does not guarantee service in a bureaucracy upon graduation.

Given the Senegalese view, which equates riches with a bucreaucratic position, the extension agent bureaucracy presents a not unattractive alternative for urban dwellers with a DFEM or even a Bac. This, coupled with GOS personnel policy which requires that agricultural extension agents hold at least a DFEM, tends to create a corps of rural extension agents who are either a urban origin, or who have at least spent their last few years of schooling, prior to DFEM or Bac, in an urban area.

the ENH graduate access to higher education. On the other hand, EATA students who are recruited at the same level and who also study for three years are given bureaucratic status, (Hierarchy C) and a job upon graduation, whereas ENH graduates are left to fend for themselves. There are approximately 30 students each year in this section.

Technicien Supérieur: Students recruited at Bac level, study for two years. This section has been closed for the last two years due to a lack of space.

The three year programs for each of the two levels is approximately the same in structure, only the content and the intensity of the courses differ from one level to the next.

First year: General education, maths, biology, etc. is combined with essential courses such as zoology and horticulture. The students also participate in eight hours of practical work each week.

Second year: The technical courses, horticulture, ornamental cultivation, etc. are given more importance. Students again consecrate eight hours a week to practical work.

Third year: Students in their third year a .ge an applied term with a possible future employer, be it governmental or private. At the end of this time, students are required to present a thesis which is graded by both the professors of ENH and the service at which the student worked.

Professors: There are twelve professors for approximately 240 students. Nine of the professors are "French cooperants". At present, no program has been devised to allow for the training of Senegalese colleagues to take over for the French.

Budget: 9 million CFA per year. It has not changed in the last ten years.

Students are given 4,000 CFA scholarships to cover their transportation costs and meal at midday. The school has no dormitory facilities. The students live in the area surrounding Camberène (located at the outskirts of Dakar), Pikine, Rufisque and Dakar.

The entrance exam for ENH is held in October of each year. They are usually 100 - 150 candidates for 30 - 35 slots at the technician level. Since the exam is held in October, however, the 100 - 150 candidates are those that have failed to gain entry to the schools for field agents, EATA, EATEF and EATE. As the Director of ENH explained, "those that fail everywhere else come here".

Program: ENH offers a two-fold program:

1) fruit and vegetable gardening or 2) landscaping and ornamental cultivation at two different levels:

Skilled workers: Recruited after having attended a CIH center, these students spend three years at ENH. At the end of three years, they are presented with a "certificat d'aptitude professionale d'horticulture" (CAP). There are presently 40 students each year in this section.

After having obtained their CAP, students can spend another two years at the school and prepare a "Brevet Professionnel" (See Chart 3 for equivalency) which is the same level as a Brevet Technician except that it is more vocational oriented and therefore does not permit the student to enroll at the university. There are approximately 15 students each year in this section.

Technicians: Recruited after having received the DFEM, these students also spend three years at the school, after which they receive a "Brevet Technicien Horticole". This diploma is actually superior to that received by the field agents of EATA and EATEF as it is the equivalent of the Bac and therefore gives

As we saw in the first part of this paper, the classical educational system uproots the student from his traditional, rural environment. We have also seen how it favors urban dwellers. If one accepts this hypothesis, then one could say that the further along the student progresses in the educational system, the further he becomes removed from the rural environment. Since urban dwellers tend to be more competitive, the percentage of urban dwellers will increase the farther one goes in the system. While this is by no means a hard and fast rule, a certain trend does seem to exist.

This does not mean GOS should not recruit at DFEM or Bac levels. What it does mean is that each school's training policy should be conscious of this urban influence and attempt to reorient the students towards the rural world, by providing much practical application (travaux pratiques) and by conducting frequent visits and "stages" in the rural areas.

J. Ecole des Agents Techniques

EATA - Ziguinchor created 1962, D'Agriculture (agriculture)

EATEF - created 1962, Des Eaux et Forêts (water and forestry)

EATE - Saint-Louis created 1959, De l'Elevage (livestock)

Goal: Train technical field agents for Ministry of Rural Development (MDRH). In theory, these field agents work at the local level to implement the agricultural programs conceived of by agricultural engineers trained at INDR and managed by mid-level cadres trained at ENCR (See chart 4 & 5). In practice, there are not always sufficient mid-level managers; as a result, technical field agents are sometimes called upon to take on additional responsibilities.

Program: These three schools are currently the object of a Swiss project. This project, begun in 1977, has served to revitalize stagnant teaching methods and deteriorating infrastructure.

After having conducted an exhaustive study of MDRH's needs for technical field agents (TFA's), the Swiss proceeded to apply an extensive reform of the teaching program. Practical training (travaux pratiques) for these schools increased from 20% to 50% of the curriculum. In order to affect this change, the Swiss constructed an application center in St-Louis and revitalized the already existing center in Ziguinchor. Summer vacation was eliminated for first year students and shortened for second year students, so that the test fields could be productive and maintained during the summer months.

Student cooperatives were formed to handle the marketing of the produce from the student fields. The receipts are reinvested in the school.

The teaching method has also been revitalized. Swiss technical advisors were placed at the disposal of the Director of each one of the schools. Courses which had been previously dictated word by word were photocopied so as to permit normal lectures. Improvement of laboratory equipment, audio-visual equipment and library materials further contributed to the amelioration of the program.

The program lasts three years. Theoretical and technical courses are mixed with intensive practical work.

Students cited the following courses as being most helpful, once they began working:

<u>EATE Livestock</u>: pathology, zootechnic, therapeutic feeding.

<u>EATEF Agriculture</u>: general and specialized agriculture, topography, zootechnic, horticulture, crop protection, machinery.

<u>EATEF Water and Forestry</u>: Forest law, topography, botanical forestry, sylviculture.

Students: Recruited at the DFEM level. Consequently, a majority of the students hail from an urban environment or have been living in an urban environment for a number of years preceeding their selection. Other than the urban character that influences the quality of the student body, there is the prestige that surrounds higher degrees. Thus, since the education system pushes the best students forward these technical schools don't always receive the best students.

The Swiss, in an effort to improve the quality of the student body, conducted a massive information campaign publicizing the advantages of the schools. The campaign seems to have been successful as the schools received 375 applications in 1980, as opposed to 243 in 1979, for the same number of spaces.

In the years since the Swiss have taken over the project the number of graduates has been the following:

	EATE	EATA	EATEF	TOTAL
1977-78	23	27	19	69
1978-79	25	13	38	76
1979-80	20	25	19	64
Total since schools opening	289	400	236	925

Each school has anywhere from 60 - 80 students.

Students receive a 24.000 CFA scholarship per month, after signing an agreement to serve GOS for fifteen years. These students will serve as Hierarchy C bureaucrats.

Professors: For the first phase of the project, 1977/78 - 1978/79, the Swiss sent eleven technical assistants to the three schools. In addition, assistants to the Director of each of the schools, and applied agriculture instructors (chefs de travaux) were sent to the schools. Since French "cooperants" were already working with the schools, the expatriate staff rose to 25 for the first phase of the project.

In the second phase, 1979/80 - 1980/81, of the project, the Swiss participation will increase from 11 technical assistants to 16, one of whom will work in MEN as a councilor for technical education. At the same time, expatriate presence will decrease to 20 by 1980/81 as French cooperants' contracts will not be renewed once they expire.

A major thrust of this program is the eventual Senegalization of the teaching corps of each of these schools. Nine mid-level cadres (ingénieurs des travaux) were sent to ENSAA in Dijon, France where they will study for two years. Four more were sent in September 1980. These graduates will replace expatriate professors upon their return.

As for the applied farm instructors (chefs des travaux) recent graduates of these schools, who finished at the top of their class have been sent to Switzerland for 12 months, where they will be trained at Swiss agricultural schools in application field techniques.

Costs: As of September 30, 1979, the approximate cost of the project was 100.000,000 CFA or $500,000.

(1) Recurrent costs of project	10.492.041 CFA
(2) Investment EATE	39.994.141 CFA
(3) " EATA	9.688.963 CFA
(4) " EATEF	4.207.829 CFA
(5) Scholarships	4.678.700 CFA
	69.061.674 CFA
Substitute credit to provide for schools recurrent costs	30.000.000 CFA
	99.061.674 CFA

Problems: The Swiss have just completed a follow-up survey of students who have graduated from the three schools and who are now working in the field. The survey found that the vast majority (80%) of the TFA's are well trained and encountered no serious difficulties. They also found that the technical training was sufficient and appropriate. The principal gaps in the program were of a practical nature:

lack of knowledge of administrative procedures, inability to drive a car or repair a mobylette, and difficulty experienced in adaptation to the rural sector. These concerns, voiced by the TFA's themselves, coincided with their supervisors' evaluations. They were primarily (1) a lack of experience in cultivation (vulgarisation) and animation techniques (especially CERPs and (2) a lack of practical training.

TFA agents felt that increased time allocated to practical training and vocational courses would serve to improve the training.

Another problem, as always, is that the GOS may be confronted with increased recurrent costs once the Swiss leave in 1983.

Comments: As far as I can judge, this seems to be a model project. These schools floundered for fifteen years before the Swiss arrived. At the end of six years (1983), the Swiss will have made the schools operational, effective, and most importantly, self-sufficient in TFA training capacity.

K. Ecole Nationale des Cadres Ruraux (ENCR)

Created in 1960 under the Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur

Goal: To train mid-level managers, (ingénieurs des travaux) who will coordinate the TFA's actions. These agents, destined to become "chefs de section, région, division, périmètres, etc" are also put at the disposition of MDR. Their distribution within that Ministry should be similar to that of the TFA's (See chart 5).

Program: The first year consists of common study for all three branches after which the students specialize in their field-agriculture, livestock or water and forestry. The teaching consists of theoretical courses, practical work in field studies located behind the school, and on-the-job-training with different rural development organizations around the country.

Students: Recruited after the Bac. They must have a scientific Bac; series C, D, E, F. The school screens anywhere from 140-300 candidates but only takes 35-40. Eight students working in the field are taken after having passed a professional exam. The number of professional candidates range from 70-150. The teachers felt that, in general, the students work hard and are motivated.

Campus: Run-down, especially the application fields, where the students do their practical work. They had been left untouched for the two months students were on vacation.

USAID title III funds ($400.000) should do a lot to give the campus a new look. The possibility of giving some of the construction work to CFPR artisans should be investigated. If that is not possible, AID might ask the local entrepreneurs working on the project to employ some graduates from EMP of Bargny.

Budget: Unit cost 400.000 CFA or $2,000.

Problems: In 1979, Ousmane Camara, Ministre de l'Enseignement Supérieur wrote "ENCR is confronted with numerous obstacles; in effect these obstacles, not the least of which are the paucity of financial resources, lead to serious shortages in classrooms, equipment and books for the library". AID's contribution should go a long way towards solving these shortages.

While USAID funds will give the campus a new look, there will continue to be a shortage of professors. The water and forestry section has not functioned for the last two years because there are no professors. This year school opened November 20 and still no professor has been found for this section. This water and forestry section will probably remain closed again this year, and this in a country that is undertaking a major reforestation compaign!

This lack of professors highlights ENCR's total dependence on foreign professors, all French. The Director of the school cited this as their most serious problem. It is difficult to understand how this institution, which was founded in 1960, did not attempt to "train the trainers". It seems that graduates leaving the school have better salaries and other advantages, such as access to a car, while working in the field. The school has sought to rectify this situation by sending two of its graduates in water and forestry to the Ecole des Barres in France.

According to one French teacher we interviewed, it takes two years before foreign teachers can really become effective. In light of this, the delay in implementing a teacher training policy is all the more incomprehensible.

ENCR suffers not only from a deficiency in theoretical training due to an insufficiency of teachers, but its practical training seems to leave much to be

desired as well. A study conducted by the Swiss ORT in July 1977 had this to say "Alongside this deficient theoretical teaching, one must consider the practical training given almost non-existent compared to the training needs of these future "ingenieurs des travaux".

The fields allocated for practical training are only used to one-fourth of their capacity. The addition of one well (forage) would enable cultivation to take place year round.

The laboratory, mounted and equipped by Germany, like the veterinary clinic, has been abandoned and closed since 1968.

It has been said that ENCR students take theoretical courses on how to recognize plants and grow a crop, but they never actually do it themselves. How can they? They go home on summer vacation for three months which coincides with the major planting season. This does not seem to be the way to reorient "urbanized" students.

The problems encountered in both the theoretical and practical teaching have caused the agencies using these ENCR graduates to complain that they are incompetent.

That same Swiss report echoed these sentiments. "Impressions gathered by the authors of the present study; impressions of deterioration and adjustment, have been confirmed by several Senegalese officials. The user agencies are particularly upset with the young graduates.

"At MES, everyone implicitly recognizes the profoundly ill-adapted character and degradation of the teaching program, One sees the need for a preliminary study to anticipate the total restructuring of the school, rather than introduce temporary assistance,... which will only serve to prolong the agony".

A CILSS mission report published in April 1978 continued along the same lines

"At present the school finds itself confronted by many difficulties, due to a lack of pedagogical material and full time professors. The sections for fishing and rural engineering have been transferred to the Ecole Nationale de Formation Maritime and the I.U.T.".

Training given in the other sections has been judged extremely insufficient by the agencies which use ENCR graduates.

MES is keenly aware of the problems confronting ENCR. Mr. Toulez, a technical advisor at MES, voiced the same concerns and suggested that USAID (this was before he knew AID was going to donate $400,000 to the school) move in a big way to support this middle level school. He indicated that it is the weak link between the proposed INDR and the schools for technical agents, which have been fortified by Swiss AID in an integrated project. He wanted USAID to move in with an integrated project and contribute to the administration of the school.

It may very well be that these complaints were uttered before the reform of 1977 had a chance to take effect. In 1977, it was decided that training would be extended from two to three years. The third year would be largely devoted to practical work and on-the-job training in different agro-industrial services of Senegal. The test class of the reform graduated in 1979. They have just recently finished their first year of field work. The Director, who arrived in 1977, is planning to call a meeting of the Conseil de Perfectionnement in December to attempt to evaluate the results of the reform.

AID should make every effort to attend that meeting, to make sure that the money it's donating is being used as planned. This meeting will group representatives of the different ministries who use ENCR graduates as well as students and teachers of ENCR. The meeting, the first in a couple of years, will treat all questions concerning the functioning of the institute.

Comments: (1) The school whose capacity is 100 (with 88 interns), is running at less than full capacity. While agriculture received its quota of 33 students,

livestock was way below its capacity of 30 at 12. The problems with water and forestry have been mentioned.

(2) Agents, once they have graduated, are put at the disposition of the Ministry of Rural Development, who spend three days at the school communicating their needs to school officials who then try to satisfy their needs. According to the Director there is close coordination between trainers and the principal "employer", MDRH. One teacher felt that the need for agricultural technicians was diminishing and foresaw the possible saturation of the market.

(3) AID is correct in not wanting to give support to schools that will only reinforce top-heavy intervention agencies. But when AID does decide to donate to that type of an institution, it should make sure its investment will lead to the increased effectiveness of the graduates. Equipment and materials donated by AID will contribute to this goal. Nevertheless, if the teacher problem is not soon resolved, there is every chance AID's money will serve "to prolong the agony".

(4) It is unlikely that the reform which has been implemented will have resolved all the problems confronting ENCR. Just last week French officials went to ENEA to discuss how its 'alternate policy" might be applied to ENCR. It seems that ENCR graduates continue to experience difficulties adapting in the field.

L. Ecole Nationale d'Economie Appliquée (ENEA)

Goal: In contrast to the aforementioned school which trains technical agents for MDRH, ENEA trains IT's for a network of agencies which promote grass roots development. ENEA opened in 1962, trains co-op agents. The school's responsibilities have grown along with Senegal's community development organizations. It now includes six different colleges.

1. College Cooperation: Trains cooperative agents, who will in turn train peasants in management organization and promotion of cooperatives. These agents, many of whom were previously destined to serve the new defunct ONCAD, have now been tranferred to the RDAs where they are conducting the "assainissement.+

2. College de l'Animation: Trains agents to organize local populations to take charge of their own development. ENEA graduates often serve as Chef de Service Départemental.

3. College de la Planification: Trains middle level planning managers. Usually become chefs de CER or Regional and Departmental Assistants. Sometimes go to Ministry of Plan.

4. College d'Aménagement du Territoire: (Environmental Studies or literally Environmental manipulation). Trains inspectors of Aménagement du Territoire. Ministère de l'Urbanisme et de l'Habitat.

+ "Assainissement" clean-up. Attempt by GOS to clear up and clear farmer's debt situation.

5. College de l'Enseignement Moyen Pratique: Trains agents to take over as Director of an EMP center.

6. College de la Statistique: Ingénieur des travaux de statistique, go to Direction de la Statistique (Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances).

Program: There are two programs at ENEA, one lasting two years, the other 3 years. Whereas the longer training is valid for all six colleges, the shorter applies only to Animation, Statistics and Cooperation.

Longer training activities:

First Period: Lasts six months and takes place at the school. Covers theory and case studies. Economics, sociology and applied planning are the principal topics.

Second Period: Lasts five months, takes place in a village where students living in small groups with local families write an analytical report which has three objectives.

- compare rural realities with classroom instruction;
- give students practice in working in a group;
- provide the different "employers" with original research.

Third Period: Lasts 3 months and takes place at the school. Provides students with a chance to go over reports and evaluate them.

After this third period of common study, the students are placed into one of the six colleges. The course is specialized according to:

1st phase - Lasts 3 months and takes place at the school. Gives the students an initiation in their chosen field.

2nd phase - Lasts 5 months, on-the-job training with the student's future employer.

3rd phase - Lasts six months and takes place at the school. Provides students with the techniques and methods they will need in their future professions.
4th phase - Lasts 5 months. A second stage with the future employer but this time the student takes on real responsibilities.

Training for future EMP teachers is a little different from the other colleges, in that the "alternance" between school work and field work is more frequent and consequently the stages are of shorter duration. The statistical college also has its own special training.

Short-training: The short training program is designed to train technical field agents in two years, for either the cooperation, extension or statistical colleges. This program also utilizes the "alternance" training method. Emphasis is placed on practical training as these TFA's will be working at the local level.

These TFA's, like other TFA's have an important role to play. Training at the extension agent college is exclusively for technical agents. The coop college's major thrust is also in the area of TFA's. The coop college trains 29 TFAs and only 12 IF's. It would appear that there is an over abundance of mid-level managers in at least some areas.

Students: Are either recruited at the level of the Bac or after having worked in the field for four years, then passing the school's exam. All ENEA students have scholarships and live at the school. TFAs are recruited at the DFEM level.
TFAs are recruited at the DFEM level.

Campus: Beautifully situated, the ENEA campus was badly in need of maintenance and upkeep. USAID Title III money ($400,000) is being used for this purpose.

Comments: 1) Along with the IUT, the ENEA seems to be one of the few schools in Senegal that succeeds in integrating its theoretical and practical training into Senegal's development effort. The ENEA trainees are, thanks to their practical training, impregnated with the realities of the country.

The ENEA trainees are not the only ones to profit from their field experience; the documents they develop during the field assignments are an invaluable source of information. The ENEA library is a gold mine of original research!

Imagine, if only the University of Dakar were like ENEA. In a country struggling to develop scarce natural resources, it would seem more useful to have 10,000 development agents and 90 poets rather than vice versa.

2) ENEA has trained 151 Chef d'équipe de CERP, of which only 45 are still working in some of the 93 CERP centers. This college intends to reorient its training to agents for the Ministry of Plan, until GOS decides what it wants to do with the CERPs.

3) ENEA is an extremely important institution not only because it trains all CERPs, co-op, extension and EMP agents, but also because of the extensive applied research its "stagiaires" perform. ENEA is Senegal's foremost training and research institution at the grass roots level. It seems as if the last few years have witnessed a steady increase in the research component of ENEA's program.

The increased emphasis on research seems to have caused some grumbling, as professors complain that the training component of the applied research project has at times been neglected.

One should also note that the applied research project brings additional income to the school. It seems as if some teachers fear that the monetary advantages accruing from applied research will exert pressure on the school to increase research activities, to the detriment of training.

This pressure will continue to exert itself, as ENEA has been called upon to cut costs and consolidate its program. A reform is in the making; the Planning College is to be fused with the College d'Aménagement and EMP will be joined with animation.

M. Institut National de Développement Rural (INDR)

Opening 1982 in Thies.

Goals: Train agricultural engineers who will intervene directly in Senegal's rural environment. As such, the training objectives will be to:

- ensure a high scientific level
- associate theory and practice
- train general agronomists by giving them a specialty
- train rural development agents
- impart a spirit of enterprise

Program: The program lasts five years. The first year approximately 120 students will be enrolled at the Science faculty of the University. After completing this preparatory year, 120 students will compete for between 50 - 70 second year slots. This second preparatory year will take place at the Institute itself in Thies. By the third year, the class will be whittled down to 40 students. Senegal's needs in agricultural engineers have been estimated at 40 per year by SATEC, a French research organization that conducted a preliminary study in 1976.

The school will be divided into four departments:

- Department of Vegetable Science and Techniques
- Department of Animal Science and Techniques
- Department of Rural Engineering and Industrial Agriculture
- Department of Economic and Social Sciences

These departments will permit students to specialize in one of six areas: vegetable production, animal production, rural engineering, water and forestry, horticulture, industrial agriculture.

Students: To be selected from the Science faculty and from professionals with several years experience in the field who will have succeeded in passing an exam.

A first class had already been recruited, but because of the delay in the opening of the school, they have been sent to Morocco to finish their training. A second group will be recruited from the Bac series C and D for the opening of the school in 1982.

Costs: The project will cost approximately $7,312,000 over seven years. This includes construction, materials, experts, consultants and scholarships. Once the school gets started, the unit cost will be 1.260.000 CFA or $5,700. This does not include money for agricultural fields for practical work.

Administration: The Institute will be administered by the Ministry of Higher Education (MES) but the Ministry of Rural Development (MDRH) will actively participate. An option with the Armed Forces has been rejected. MDRH representatives will comprise 50% of the Conseil d'Administration, and more than half of the pedagogical committee. This is an excellent idea as it is precisely MDRH who will use the agents once they are graduated from the school. Thus, MDRH will be able to contribute to the training of the people it will employ and at the same time the INDR should have a very good idea of Senegal's needs for high-level agricultural personnel.

Teachers: A Senegalese Director has been named. Recruiting is going on for teachers who will, of course, be expatriate. The Director and his assistant have contacted AID asking for infrastructure financing. They seem, at the same time, very amenable to greater American participation such as professors, consultants, etc.

Comments: 1) This structure will round out Senegal's rural training program. The Ecoles des Agents Techniques in Ziguinchor and St-Louis train low-level "cadres". The ENCR of Ba bey trains middle-level personnel and now the INDR will train high-level agricultural engineers. This type of institute would seem to have much more meaning for Senegal than a business school. Not only do 80% of the active population work in the agricultural world, but just as importantly the study of agriculture is not necessarily universally applicable. It takes at least two years for foreign teachers to learn local trees, fauna and the environment in general. Senegalese who go abroad to study agriculture must make the same sort of readjustment upon arrival.

2) The INDR should make every effort to coordinate its programs with ISRA as well as the economics department of the university, which does not offer a single course in rural or agricultural economics.

N. Ecole Inter-Etats des Sciences et Medecine Veterinaires - Dakar (EISMV)

Administration: Created by the OCAM in 1968, the school has been opened to all African States. They send students to the school, pay a share of the budget, and all are represented on the governing council.

In 1976 the following states participated in the governing council: Benin, Cameroun, Empire Centrafricain, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Haute-Volta, Mauritanie, Niger, Senegal, Tchad, Togo.

Goal: This school, like ENEA, has a dual mission: research and training. The EISMV, as it name indicates, trains veterinarians.

Students: Recruited at Bac level. Candidates must have followed either series C or D. Each country decides how much its studnets will receive in scholarship aid.

Program: The program lasts six years. The first year is preparatory year in the Science faculty. This is followed by four years of veterinary study. The sixth year is consecrated to the preparation of a thesis. After having defended the thesis, students receive a diploma of "Docteur Vétérinaire".

The school is divided up into ten departments:

1. Pharmacy - Toxicology
2. Biological chemistry
3. Anatomy, histology, embryology
4. Physiology
5. Zoology, parasitology, parasital sickness
6. Hygiene and animal products industry
7. Medicine and pathological anatomy
8. Reproduction and surgery
9. Microbiology - General pathology - Contagious sickness, Sanitary legislation
10. Zootechnic, food, law, economics.

Courses in each of these departments are equally divided between practical work and theoretical. Fourth and fifth year students also attend practical classes at the SERAS clinic which is located next to Dakar's major slaughter house.

Campus: The campus is divided into two parts. The academic section has just been built with financing from FED and 142 billion CFA. These new modern buildings were completed and occupied this school year. Construction is not yet finished. The school administration is still looking for someone to finance construction of a volley ball court and a tennis court, and recreational facilities. This section is located next to CESTI on the university grounds.

The second section of the school is the clinic for practice work. It is located next to the SERAS slaughter house.

The school would like to build a third section, an applied farm in Rufisque. This farm would enable EISMV to carryout its research objective. The school's Secretary General said that this farm would provide the school's students with a place to conduct preventive practical work. He saw this as a model farm for all of Africa. A very rough estimate of the farm's cost is 400 million CFA, or $2 million.

The Secretary General of the school was unaware that INDR is in the process of building an applied farm in Thies. He was, nevertheless, very dubious of collaboration between these two institutes of different character, one Pan-African and the other national.

Professors: The school in theory should have 3 professors per department, or 30 total. At present EISMV has at most ten full-time professors, the rest are "missionaires" who come from France, Belgium and Canada, on intensive teaching missions of two to four weeks.

The Director of EISMV is Senegalese, the Secretary General from Upper Volta, but the majority of professors are expatriate. The school has called upon its member states to furnish either professors or scholarships for students who would like to become professors.

Problem: The major problem of the school is, obviously, the teacher situation. It is impossible for "missionaire" professors to conduct research for the school. Not only does research suffer but so does teaching, as the school calendar must be adapted to the "missionaire's" schedule. Also, it would seem that the school's "raison d'être" is that it provides an African alternative to European and American veterinary schools. Despite its location in Dakar, the institute cannot hope to completely fulfill its African vocation, so long as it is dependent on temporary expatriate personnel.

Comments: 1) This year EISMV has 165 students, 48 in the first year, 40 in the second, 30 in the third year, 25 in the fourth year and 22 who are preparing their theses. The school is growing slowly but surely. In 1975 - 1976, EISMV graduated 16 veterinarians, 4 of which were Senegalese.

2) EISMV maintains an interesting relationship with the University of Dakar, in that its campus is located on University grounds, its students are, for the time being at least, housed in University facilities; its diplomas are defended before a university jury. Nevertheless, EISMV is an autonomous institute which is working toward further independence. At present, its budget of 300 million CFA is totally autonomous.

PART III

NON-FORMAL EDUCATION

Most non-formal education is conducted at Promotion Humaine (SEPH) in one of its five directions: Enseignement Moyen Pratique (EMP); Direction de Formation Professionelle Rurale (CFPR); Alphabétisation; Maison Familiale Rurale; and Animation Rurale.[13] A structural reform of SEPH has been approved by the President and will soon be implemented. (See Annex 10) The most important innovation of the educational reform was the creation of EMP to recuperate the 40,000 youth who fail to enter middle level education each year. In fact, many people think that EMP is the reform and that it stops there.

A. Enseignement Moyen Pratique (EMP)

Goals: According to President Senghor the school's objective is to "reinforce the training of youth who have finished primary school but who will not continue on to middle level education, so that they will be efficiently placed in the nation's productive circuits. It's a matter of reinforcing their general culture by developing their manual dexterity, in short, by giving them pre-professional training, and preparing them for a trade..."[14]

To be more specific the objectives are four:

- consolidate and reinforce the learning that has already taken place at the primary school level;

- give pre-professional training to rural youth aged 12-18;
- despite their young age, insert these graduates in the production circuits so as to stop the rural exodus;
- contribute in the long-term to economic and social development.

Method: The pedagogical methods of EMP have been the subject of much experimentation and debate. In theory it is supposed to work like this:

First Phase: 9 months.

a) Analysis: EMP mediators initiate contact with the local population. They analyze the problems of the locality. The mediators attempt to help the peasants define their own problems and understand the long-term implications. By way of preparing possible solutions, peasants are asked to identify the resources of the region. (See Annex 4 for an idea of how fascinating, frustrating and difficult this task is).

b) Joint Assessment: After several meetings where problems and resources have been evaluated, a joint report is made to make sure everything is clear.

c) Identification of Training Needs: The villagers evoke their desires and wishes for bettering their sort i.e. by improved housing.

d) Changes to Be Made: Together mediators and villagers attempt to find appropriate solutions.

e) Program is developed that is acceptable to everyone, after which the "foyer" (home) is opened.

Once the "foyer" has been opened, training is divided into 3 parts: transition; training cycle; decentralization.

Transition cycle : This period lasts 3 months and is construed to teach the child to think for himself. It is an attempt to eliminate the bad effects of six years of primary schooling - submissiveness, rote memory, detachment from local milieu. The student is taught to actively question everything that goes on in his environment and to think of ways he might improve it.

Teachers who conduct training at FMP's are not called teachers but selbés. A selbé is a young adult (an older brother) who was traditionally given responsibility for educating the young men before they were circumcised.

Training cycle: After this introductory phase takes place, the student will spend the following 4 years alternating between general classes (French, Math for approximately 12 hours) and pre-professional courses in masonry, carpentry, agriculture or home economics (girls).

Decentralizad Cycle: The selbé is supposed to accompany the student to his village where he helps him observe and ameliorate village life. This phase was not conducted in Nguekoh because of lack of transport.

Application: President Senghor predicted that, "The extension of EMP, to all of Senegal, should be completed by 1982. At that final stage, there will be 800 rural foyers and 400 urban foyers".(15)

As of today there are at most sixteen foyers implanted in 1978, five in 1979, and five this year.(16) These foyers train approximately 1,000 students, far short of the 40,000 students per year EMP was supposed to train.

The reasons for this delay are numerous. Due to the frequent change of

directors, uncertainty of selection criteria (only receive CEPE's or anyone interested whether he can read or not) and as we've seen, a very theoretical pedagogical method, application has been slow and difficult.

The experimentation period directed by IRFED came to an end, four years after it started, in 1976. Implementation of the centers began in 1978. The World Bank, which had originally agreed to construct 30, then 15, now 5 foyers per year, finances the construction and equipment of the centers at a cost of 40 million CFA.

Problems: (1) The principal problem is one of conception. The EMP is caught between trends and tendencies, and is trying to accommodate them all at once:

a) Animation as a low-cost alternative directed at great numbers of students vs. technical training:

The EMP wants to, and needs to, involve the local population in the administration of the school. The peasants, who are very pragmatic and reticent after years of deception, will nevertheless accept a program that will give their sons and daughters skills and improve their own quality of life. The EMP has to make sure it's capable of providing those skills! If the peasants decide that the resolution of their problems is technical training, EMP must be capable of financing that kind of training. If the EMP is unable to provide community oriented skills then their project will be just one more "rock that has fallen on the peasants' heads".

EMP can't realistically hope to provide concrete technical training with expensive materials and at the same time provide a low-cost alternative to formal education. If EMP "must be expensive", as the Director of Nguekoh said, then it will never be able to reach the great number of youth it was designed for. It certainly won't be able to, at 40 million CFA per center.

b) Rapid expansion vs long, time-consuming theoretical process.

President Senghor talked about 1,200 centers by 1982; at present approximately 100 people work for EMP. Their budget is 2 million CFA this year. There is no way the EMP agents can spend nine months sensitizing local populations in twenty different areas at the same time. The first class of EMP teachers graduating from ENEA has not even graduated yet! The teachers in the field were trained in Langonock during the experimentation period if they were trained at all.

c) Rural option vs primary school leavers.

One of the major conclusions of the experimentation period was that the EMP should not be implanted in an area where the population exceeds 5,000 people. But, now that it has been decided that only CEPEs are eligible for instruction, it will be difficult to find enough CEPEs in rural areas of less than 5,000 people.

It does not seem as if these problems have been resolved. In fact, the Director of EMP at Bargny, a dynamic, semi-urban center, decried the need for a structure at the national level which would offer some direction. EMP will not be able to accelerate its implementation until it has reconciled these dilemmas, nor, should it try to, "Ndank Ndank muy diappa golo chi niaye"

(slowly, slowly one catches the monkey in the bush.) Since the first centers were not implemented until 1978, the GOS should take time to look at the results of these centers and then try to move ahead.

As indicated earlier, there is a definite need for EMPs, not only to receive the 40,000 school leavers, but just as importantly to present a viable alternative to classical education.

(2) A second serious problem is one of means. To date, EMP has only been allocated 2 million CFA to run its program for this year. This is six times less than the EPT uses to water the grass! The new director of EMP, Mr. Cisse, is hopeful that another 20 million CFA will soon be coming from the government to replace IRFED's contribution of 20 million, which ended in 1979.

An interesting solution to these financial difficulties is the very real possibility of auto-financing the centers. The center we visited in Bargny had not received any money from Dakar, but was able to remain open, thanks to the 72,000 CFA it has made the previous year from the sale of furniture, vegetables and tie-dye products. This center will soon make another 100,000 CFA from a classroom its masonry students are making for the local girl's school. They will also do some work for USAID in Rufisque.

With the right management and some initial capital it is possible for the centers to be self-sufficient.

Comments:

Next year (1981-82) will be a critical year for EMP, because the first promotion of graduates will leave the school and try to find jobs. People are

already beginning to talk about problems of "insertion" (placing these youths in the productive circuits). Their ages, 16-22, could present a real handicap, especially in African society where youth are to listen and not to be listened to. AID should follow this process closely.

1) Any EMP center's success ultimately depends on its relationship with the community it is trying to serve. If there is a good school/community relationship, then the school can be very effective. The community gives them work to do, the parents pay 1,000 CFA school fees for their children and once the students have graduated it is the community who will employ them.

Not only does the community provide jobs and materials, but it is supposed to also provide direction for the school. The educational reform which coincided with the Administrative Reform, attempts to bring the local population into the educational process. If the EMP is to provide a low-cost alternative and technical training, this can only happen if community artisans, exemplary farmers, etc., icipate in the teaching.

In Bargny, the local community was very supportive of the center. They gave the center scrap wood, the "chef de quartiers" participated in the running of the school, and several people purchased furniture, etc. at the school. These good relations are due in large part to the dynamism of the center's Director, Mr. Jouga, who makes things go in the face of incredible odds.

2) EMP is isolated. It is a time bomb which everyone (MEN, CFPR, MRDN) seems to be trying to avoid. There is a total lack of coordination between EMP and the MEN. Both criticize this lack of coordination but neither seems capable of surmounting bureaucratic pettiness and infighting.

MDRH agents, as well as CER's, are supposed to teach at the EMP centers when they have the time. They do, but only when they have the time; nevertheless, the director's request for badly needed technical agents has been turned down by all except the CER.

There is great room for coordination and collaboration between CFPR's and EMP. EMP needs technical instructors. Neither the reconverted elementary school teachers, nor the ENEA graduates (33 will graduate this December) possess sufficient technical training. CFPR teachers, or even their graduates could teach at EMP centers, but aid from the CFPR's which are experiencing their own problems is doubtful.

3) EMP has been much criticized. When one looks at the goals that were set for it (1,200 centers to receive 40,000 students a year) and compare those with its results, then one would have to admit that EMP has failed. What's more, after eight years of tinkering, the goals and methods of the program have not been clearly defined.

Even worse, it now seems as if there is some peasant discontent with the program. It is necessary to gauge that dissent and determine whether or not it will jeopardize the future of the program.

There is also peasant dissent with the regular school program. One of the peasants from Belanacourt had this to say to the EMP mediator, "We believe that the most efficient thing for peasants is agriculture. I want my son to be a better farmer than myself and to make more than I do. If someone can help him do that, that would be good. And it is just that which would improve the village. The school has made the youth go away but nothing has changed here in the village."

It seems to me that a structure like EMP would be better suited to respond to this man's needs. It will probably take EMP another ten years before it can present an adequate adapted program but most school systems aren't created overnight. In any case, 2 million CFA is not too much to pay for the continuation of an experiment.

4) One other reason EMP should be continued in what should be called an experimentation phase is that it could fit in very nicely with the proposed cooperative reform. After the cooperatives have put their ship in order, ("Assainissement" will continue until September, 1981.) GOS plans to implement an important structural change, forming one cooperative per rural commune (RC). Each cooperative will have several village sections.

The EMP, administered by representatives of the rural commune and the co-op's, could train people to meet specific development needs. In Fenghary, e.g., EMP was integrated with a project called "Kalounayes". The students were all trained to carry out specific tasks involved with the project. There is no reason why EMP's elsewhere cannot train students to fulfill the rural commune's needs as depicted in the Chef de CER's development plan. There are 283 rural communes in Senegal. Not an impossible target for remodelled low-cost EMP's.

All of this is of course, still very theoretical, since all of these institutions (EMP, RC's and co-op's) are still encounteting enormous difficulties.

E.. Centres de Formation Professionelle Rurale (CFPR)

		Annual Training Capacity
Teachers	100	24
Perfected Farmers (Paysanne Pilotes)	2,906	520
Artisans	1,106	240
Fishermen	744	40
21 Centers		

Goals: Perfect and modernize the skills of rural artisans, vegetable producers, farmers and fishermen.

Method: Modular training (series of exercises) where the students are to acquire a certain level of technicity B, which is one step above their previous level. Most of the training is practical, (26 hours), with 10 hours of theoretical work. This theoretical teaching comprises courses in "professional arithmetic, estimates, health, and functional literacy.
As for the pratical training, farmers are taught modern agricultural techniques, co-op methods, health and civil studies.
Artisan training is broken down into two 4 1/2 month stages. The first 4 1/2 months the student learns new industrial techniques. After having acquired the techniques and returned home to cultivate his field, the artisan-farmer returns for another 4 1/2 to construct his tools.

Students: Representatives of their community, the peasants are to be perfected in either agriculture techniques, vocational techniques (carpentry, metal work and construction), vegetable gardening or fishing skills. The students are selected by either the rural communes, CER's, RDA's, or are recommended by farmer stagaires. A stagaire has to meet the following criteria:

- have practiced his respective trade for 3 years previous to enrollment;
- be active in the community;
- be designated by his village who will in turn agree to help his family while he is training;
- agree to return to the village after training;
- be between 21-45 years old;
- be a member of a cooperative or a productive group, or become a member upon return;
- pass the tests of preselection.

The stage lasts nine months. Students are given 5,000 CFA per month. They are housed but not fed.

Campus: The buildings are in need of maintenance, like all buildings in Senegal, but otherwise the grounds seem neat and well-kept.

Teachers: Are trained in either Kaffrine or Guerina. These centers also train peasants at the same time.

In this way, the teachers learn pedagogical techniques, bu they must be able to import their own pedagogical methods to the "paysannes pilotes" who in turn will train their neighbor.

Agricultural teachers are recruited from amongst "field agents" (agriculture, livestock; and water and forestry). Rural artisanal teachers must have Brevets d' Enseignement Professionel or DFEM and three years of practical experience. The fishing teachers are recruited from the Director of Fisheries at the "Centre de Formation des Instructeurs et Perfectionnement des Artisans" in Kaffrine.

Teacher traniing, which lasts two years, is divided between general education (French, chemistry, physics, and mathematics) and technical education (vegetables, livestock, irrigated cultures and industrial design).

Problems : These centers, created in 1963, under the auspices of the ILO, have been struggling to stay open since 1976 when the ILO's contract terminated. In 1963, when the centers opened, CFPR had a budget of 102 million CFA, in 1979 the budget had fallen to 60 million CFA. In 1976, the last year of ILO participation, the budget was approximately 190 million CFA.

This reduction in the budget has caused the centers to cut back on their training. While each center can train a minimum of 36 stagaires, their number varies between 20 and 25. The centers can't afford to pay for more students, or extra material.

Three centers have not been completed because of this lack of funds. (Nianga, Niaro, Joal).

2) The teachers of CFPR seem to be of good quality. So good in fact, they don't stay very long. As many as 50% of the CFPR teachers leave after one or two years to go to ENEA or one of the extension agencies. This is because the possibilities of advancement of a CFPR teacher in the administrative hierarchy are inferior to those of a field agent, even though the teachers have had supplementary education.

Comments: (1) GOS has in CFPR's which were initiated by an international project, an excellent tool for promoting Senegal's rural development. That is, the CFPRs are flexible and diverse, able to adapt to new situations, and capable of responding to the needs of administrative reform . (17)

This seems to be an accurate analysis of the CFPR by ILO expert, Gerard Dulphy.

It is this type of structure that will be much more effective in stopping the rural exodus. The CFPR's train adults who already have their roots in the rural community and gives them the means by which they can stay there.

The CFPR structure fits the administrative reform like a glove and vice-versa. The stagaires are chosen by the rural commune and once they have returned to their communities, they are obligated to teach and spread the same techniques to their neighbors. If they need a parcel of land, the rural commune will give it to them. The vegetable training center in Mboro recruited all its students from the same rural commune. A piece of land has already been chosen (by the rural council) for the stagaires who will work the land together when they return.

The administrative reform calls upon the local population to take charge of their own development, but they won't be able to, if they don't have the techniques.

(2) The CFPR offers an excellent opportunity for maximizing benefits with a minimum of input, because all ot the infrastructure and teachers are already in place. The cost effectiveness of these centers can be greatly increased by simply donating funds for students for scholarships.

To make these institutions active one would also need to help with material costs. This is one of the major reasons why the centers (artisan centers in particular) are operating at less than full capacity. Material costs have skyrocketed and their budgets have plummeted.

One problem is the CFPR's have been having is with "reinstallment". The peasants don't always have the same tools they had at the center. In order to rectify that situation, the centers have the students make their own tools. This has been working, but materials are too expensive to do that for 30 people, thus the centers receive only 10-15 students. In Kael, the construction section built the whole center at a tremendous savings; 18 million instead of 35 million CFA.

These centers offer tremendous capacity for integrated development. They do not have an elaborate and sophisticated pedagogical method but they do have prattitioners in the field with experience and extensive infrastructure with which to work. They could expand their services to meet new needs in the rural world (mechanics for water pumps and millet machines, well diggers, etc.). But again, money is lacking.

If something is not done soon, this worthwhile program will drift off into obscurity, like so many other Senegalese institutions.

The CFPR's each have a follow-up team which is responsible for ensuring smooth reinstallment of stagaires. This team also serves as a source of constant contact between the center and the field. In one center we visited this follow-up was because their car didn't run.

(3) The unit cost of training for a student in a CFPR if 288,000 CFA. This does not take into account the multiple effect the people trained are supposed to have. If it were assumed that 10 people adopted the techniques exposed by "the perfected farmer", then the unit cost would be reduced to 28,800 CFA. A study done in Casamance revealed that the multiplier effect

was in fact not 10 but 21. As such, the unit cost for a perfected farmer in 1976 would be 13,714 CFA. This same calculation, taking into account budget increases, showed unit cost to be 16,931 CFA in 1977. The cost effectiveness of the centers has certainly diminished as the number of stagaires drops each year.

(4) A final advantage of this program is that it is not extension agents who train the local populace, but rather peasants who show other peasants by example. This seems to be particularly important given the "crise de confiance" that prevails in the Senegalese countryside.

C. Direction de l'Alphabétisation

At present, this Direction has no teachers of its own but trains teachers who go out in the field and teach. Graduates work in social centers, extension agencies, in USAID projects, UNICEF projects, etc. They have no projects of their own because they can't afford to.

This Direction has been able to create materials for each of Senegal's six national languages, with someone capable of training agents in each national language:

Diolla - 1
Poular - 2
Mandingue - 1
Soninkê - 3
Sérère - 4
Wolof - 4

Besides this personnel, there are regional representatives who coordinate literacy activities in each of the eight regions. With the directors of

each of the 3 divisions (functional literacy, design and follow-up, and programming/evaluation) total personnel comes to about 30.

The staff was promised that a massive literacy campaign would be conducted in January, 1981. Not only have these hopes been dashed, and the "direction" turned into a "division", but the assistant director was not even sure that he would be able to pay the electricity bill.

Despite the paucity of their means, Alphabétisation does have technical assistance and materials in all six languages which they offer to anyone capable of utilizing their talents; they even put out a newspaper in Wolof. They are working on literacy projects for AID Bakel and Sine-Saloum. UNICEF has supported a project to train rural council in Diourbel and Thies how to read.

D. Les Sociétés de Développement (RDA's)

The RDAs are:

SAED - Société d'Aménagement et d'Exploitation des Terres du Delta - with responsibility for development of Senegal River valley;

SODEVA - Société de Développement et Vulganisation Agricole, with responsability for the Peanut Basin;

SODIFITEX - Société de Développement des Fibres Textiles, in Eastern Senegal;

SOMIVAC - Société de Mise en Valeur de la Casamance; coordinates development in lower Casamance;

SODESP - La Société de Développement de la Zone Sylvo-Pastorale; the livestock development agency in Northern Senegal.

Goal: Promote the development of the agricultural economy of the respective zones and improve the general conditions of life for the farmer. These responsibilities include:

- increasing the farmer's income by increasing production;
- training farmers technically and structurally (Cooperatives) in order to attain that goal;
- training families in order to better the living conditions of the farmer.

The Fifth National Plan claims that, "RDA's are essentially training enterprises", in view of the fact that their quantitive objective, increased production, must converge with their qualitative long-term objective of creating truly powerful cooperatives.

Method: The methods, of course, vary from one RDA to the next, but one can trace certain common threads:

- they transfer techniques immediately useful to a specific production method;
- their training is primarily concerned with agricultural methods which are fitted into a work-production cycle;
- they attempt to form an elite who will provide an example for other farmers;
- functional literacy usually is a component of this training

Target Group

They reach from 19% to 51% of the rural population in their zones.

RDA	Region concerned	Total rural pop.	Working rural pop.	Working pop. reached	Percentage
SAED	Fleuve	421,960	232,100	120,000	51%
SODEVA	Diourbel Louga-Thies Sine-Saloum	426,000	236,500	69,853	30%
SODEFITEX	Senegal-Oriental Lower Casamance Sine Saloum	1,881,200	1,034,600	194,361	19%
SOMIVAC	Lower Casamance	615,200	338,200	118,838	34%
SODESP	Louga	250,600	131,000	--	--
	TOTAL	3,600,310	1,972,400	502,552	

BASE 55% of the rural population between 15/60 yrs old
Source: Evaluation de la Formation Professionnell Rurale FAO p. 58

Agents: Field agents are recruited at EATA of Ziguinchor or ENH at Cambrene. Each of the RDA's initiates the new agents to its program and provides supplementary training. Mid-level managers are recruited at ENCR.

Budget: Between 3-5% of the recurrent cost budget goes to training programs.

Comments: These actions, devoted to increasing production, can have a beneficial impact in the short-run. They will not, however, lead to the peasant taking charge of his own development because he will be dependent on RDA agents for materials and advice. This leads those who want to promote "grassroots development" to attack the RDAs for being "anti-formation" (anti-training). They claim that the RDA's turn the pesant into a "salaried worker", thereby smothering any private initiative or creativity he might attempt.

Another reason why these programs lead to increased peasant dependence is because the RDAsneed the peasant just as much, if not more, than the peasants need them. If the RDAs had no one to train, what would they do? Peasants notwithstanding, some RDAs (SOMIVAC) have their eventual disappearance and disolution as their long-term goal, but bureaucracies seldom disappear.

E: Maisons Familiales (MF)

Goal: Foster a community development perspective by organizing local population to take control of their own destiny. Once local populations have been organized, MF moniteurs help local associations solve the problems they consider most urgent.

Method: MF receives a request from a local group or personality (usually the village chief) to install an MF center in their area. MF responds by sending a "moniteur" to live with that community and make them aware of their problems and possible solutions. If at the end of two years the "moniteur" estimates that there is sufficient local interest to warrant the opening of an MF center, a "local association" is formed.

The Local Association is the center piece of all MF community organization work. Membership in the local association is voluntary. Members are required to contribute a small donation and are asked to participate in the various group activities. The association selects an administrative council (comité de gestion) which manages the activities of the MF. There are separate associations and councils for men and women.

The council, composed essentially of farmers, meets regularly to administer MF affairs, such as decide which youths will be sent for specialized training; which services and training agencies will be requested from government agencies; and which two members of the local association will represent them at the national level. The council also oversees the activities of the MF moniteurs placed at the village level to assist in association activities.

Each local association is further represented at the national level by two elected association members. While this national committee is still in an embryonic stage, it does provide a means through which peasants could build a strong national association. For the time being this seems unlikely, given the infrequency of the meetings (once a year) and the lack of political backing for such an association.

Once the local association has been established, a center is built and three "moniteurs" are put at the disposal of the local association. Most often a women's center and men's center are initiated at the same time, which brings the theoretical number of "moniteurs" to six, although this depends on the centers activities. (Moniteurs" are not members of the association; only local villagers are eligible for membership.)

The principal activities conducted at the local level seek to promote group projects and train youth in technical areas. In the male centers, training in agricultural techniques, (particularly vegetable gardening) constitutes the primary thrust of activity. Masonry, carpentry, blacksmithing and well-digging are also taught where funds are available. As for the women's centers, sewing, cooking, nutrition, handcrafting and vegetable gardening are the principal activities.

In providing this training, the MF's utilize the "alternation" method. That is, MF members who are trained at the centers alternate between attending classes at the center and practicing those skills in the village. This alternation method provides for immediate adaptation and utilization of the technique at the local level. Furthermore, the trainees' ties to the village remain strong throughout the training process, as the student is constantly searching for ways to improve his local environment by applying his new-found techniques.

This "alternation" training seems to have enabled MF's to successfully meet one of their primordial goals - slow down the rural exodus. Only 6% of MF members have left the villages.

Although MF moniteurs are given training in agriculture and vocationla techniques, they cannot be expected to be experts in each of these domains. Consequently, the ability of MF "moniteurs" to coordinate their action with other local agencies (RDA's, CERP, Technical Services, SEPH, the territorial administration) is vital to the success of any MF program.

It seems as if this desired coordination in the field sometimes gives way to competition. The traditional services of MDRH require MF to send a letter requesting that their agents be utilized. This letter, which must go to the Cabinet, often takes weeks before returning to the field with the required authorization. As a result, agricultural agents who were supposed to train Fleuve farmers in rice growing techniques, showed up two weeks late...two weeks after the first rains!

Even at SEPH, where MF is currently housed (soon to be transferred to the Director of Bien Etre Familiale) there seem to be difficulties. MF agents who are in an ideal position to train co-op agents, have to struggle with animation agents and CERPs for this right. They in turn must fight with Co-op agents to determine who will do the training.

At present, MF is waiting for SEPH's Directeur de Cabinet to sign a letter which will release funds allocated to MF by GOS. MF has waited two months for this signature.

Teachers "Moniteurs": MF teachers undergo a rigid selection process. Recruited at the DFEM level, candidates take a written exam. Those that pass this written exam are interviewed by a MF panel which is comprised of association members (peasants) and MF professional workers. The panel closely questions the candidate, in an attempt to discover the candidate's willingness to live in the rural world and his readiness to accept association members (peasants) as his future boss.

MF candidates who pass this scrutiny are then sent out into the field for two weeks, where they participate in MF activities. MF members and "moniteurs" evaluate the candidates' performance. These evaluations are sent to national headquarters in Thies. MF retains one-half of the candidates it sent out into the field for the two-week period and sends the unsuccessful candidates home.

The candidates that have survived the selection process to this point are fairly sure of being selected. Nevertheless, in order to make sure that these are the right people for MF, and that MF is the kind of organization they want to work for, the students are sent back into the field for 3 months. If at the end of the 3 months the candidates are sure they want to work in the rural areas and that the rural world has accepted them, then and only then, do MF candidates begin their three-year training period.

The three year training program utilizes, of course, the alternation theory. That is, students learn general and technical skills at national headquarters in Thies and then go out into the field to apply these techniques. The third year is consecrated to an analysis of pedogogical methods and problems encountered in the field. In this way MF not only trains its moniteurs in the latest pedogogical methods but it also revitalizes its teaching program with each succeeding class. It also enriches information of the local environment as each student agents. is expected to write an "étude de milieu"(environmental studies).

Since MF trains its own teachers, it can afford the luxury of training only when it is necessary. Since the process is a long and costly one, MF recruits only every other year. At present, MF employs approximately 150 people. 15 people work at national headquarters (8 for training); there are six regional coordinators and approximately 130 moniteurs and eleves-moniteurs (MF agents and agents in training).

Finances: Eleves-moniteurs receive a scholarship that progresses from 14,000CFA to 23,000CFA by the third year. Upon graduation, they can expect to be housed and receive a salary of 45,300 CFA. The government of Senegal pays their salaries.

The budget allocated to MF was 150 million CFA up until this year. This year MF's budget has been cut to 50 million CFA. This presents enormous problems for MF, who's moniteurs are devoid of bureaucratic status. The moniteurs who were already working in a void, when it came to equivalent rank in Senegal's governmental system or to the possibilities of promotion in the limited MF structure, must now make further sacrifices. Even then, MF will be obligated to lay some of its moniteurs off as their salaries account for 75 million CFA. While MF is adamant about maintaining its non-governmental status (thus that of the teachers as well), it is difficult to imagine what the impact of the lay-offs will have on MF's moniteurs.

131 locations have asked MF to open a center in their areas. MF, which was in the process of slowly expanding from 45 to 54 centers will now have to reconsider even this limited expansion, despite the fact that each new center only costs 6 million CFA. Recruitment for new moniteurs has been stopped as well.

Problems: Obviously, MF's most immediate problem is a lack of funds. There are, however, some people who would say that this cutback is good for MF.

MF claims that its moniteurs are different from all other bureaucratic agents intervening in Senegal's rural world, because they are responsible not to Dakar but to the peasants themselves. MF claims that the peasants themselves are the moniteurs'immediate and omnipresent boss. Some people feel that if the peasants are the boss, then it should be they who pay their workers. MF officials argue that peasants don't have that kind of money. They also point out that the peasants participate in many other ways. In any case, the GOS budget cut does not seem to have been motivated by theoretical reasons.

Comments: MF seems in many ways to be a model development agency. Its workers live at the village level, and are responsible and responsive to villagers' demands. MF tries to expand at neither a rapid pace nor a high cost.

Devoid of demagogic declarations and impossible objectives, MF presents a refreshing picture of serious people making sacrifices to accomplish limited objectives.

F. Animation Rurale et Urbaine (AR)

Goals: Assure the "animation" training, organization and structuring of the rural and urban populace, within the context of different development projects.

Programs: AR, like alphabetisation does not have the means to carry out a project on it's own. It is therefore dependent on GOS and donors to propose projects which exploit its potential to coordinate, animate and control projects.

At present, AR's major activity involves Rural councilor and local leader training. Working closely with a German organization Weltfriedendiest (WFD) since 1975, AR has perfected a new pedogogical method (visualisation and "game of errors") which has already been tested in Casamance and proven to be effective.

AR applied this same method in the newly reformed Fleuve region, this past November. Their training may have been too effective, as AR agents were asked to discontinue training until local tensions calmed down.

AR wants to extend this training to all of the "reformed" regions and is presently looking for financing for this project.

Agents: AR counts on Inspecteurs d'Animation and Chef de services Departmenteux located at the regional and departmental levels to carry out their program. This method has proven to be over-centralized, so ENEA was called upon to train the first class of technical field

agents for AR. They graduated in December, 1980. Other than this personnel AR relied on PCV's working at the village level.

Comments: Like almost all SEPH organizations AR suffers from a lack of funds, government support and low morale. AR has never really recovered from its hey day when Mamadou Dia was in power. The structural changes it was supposed to foster and implement are no longer desired by the GOS and haven't been for a number of years. Consequently, AR has floundered. It may be, however, that with the administrative reform, AR, like the CERs, will take on renewed importance. It seems as if GOS finally decided that AR is best equipped to train rural councilors. This is good for AR, for now it will have concrete training to perform in a field in which it has recently proven its effectiveness.

G. Centre d'Expansion Rural Polyvalente (CERP)

Goal: Coordinate all developmental actions at the arrondissement level, in order to promote the global development of each individual in the territory.

Method: "Waterfalls" (cascades). That is, the idea begins at the top and falls down to each succeeding level, until finally it splashes down on the local populace.

Nation-wide seminars are organized (for all CERPs) every four months in order to distribute main ideas and guidelines. These ideas are looked over and adapted at regional meetings which take place every three months and are made more concrete and further adapted at the departmental level where meetings are held every two

months. These ideas and training topics are discussed on a monthly basis at the arrondissement level.

The subjects of these seminars concern a variety of topics which seek to resolve specific problems confronting the rural world. They range from health talks for women, to rural councilor training. In general, the Chef of CERP attempts to decipher the peasant's concerns, communicate these to higher-ups, who will then give the general guidelines for the seminars.

Target Group: Anyone immediately concerned by the subject.

Budget: The CERP recieved 250 million CFA from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation to carry out these training programs, from 1977 - 1980.

Problems: The Chef de CERP was unable to use the expensive audio-visual equipment bought to train the local populace.

Konrad Adenauer demanded receipts for training that took place in villages. The village market women didn't have receipts to give, of course. In any case, the 25,000 CFA allotted for the two-day seminars was deemed insufficient because if 25 people were invited to a seminar, 40 would come - African custom.

As a result of these problems, the Chef de CERP held seminars only infrequently. In fact, all CERP programs have been frozen until they can justify both the means and objectives of the program.

Comments: 1) It seems a lot of time and money is spent on getting from the top to the bottom. Are CERP's training their agents or peasants?

2) There is no specific, consistent, permanent training done by the CERPs. This is not a criticism because it is not their principal task. They are responsible for the global development of the arrondissement and not specific training tasks.

C O N C L U S I O N S

1. Senegal's educational priorities are clear. Its highly selective educational system efficiently produces a top-grade elite. Dakar University students are as intelligent and bright as any in the world. Judged in terms of social economic development, however, it seems to be highly inefficient, if not counterproductive:

A. The formal education system aggravates differences between rich and poor, rural and urban residents. Urban and well-to-do youth are favored by an education system whose primary selection criteria is an ability to speak French.

B. This top-grade elite is not channeled into the agricultural sector, the sole sector capable of producing an important increase in economic activity, but rather, the majority of this elite become bureaucrats.

Senegalese bureaucrats are competent but the country is already "over-administered".

C. Those students that decide to attend rural training institutions have been "urbanized" by the education system and they therefore often have difficulty adapting to the field. Once in the field, most agents make every effort to get themselves transferred to a city or Dakar. Once they get to Dakar, they compete with the top-grade elite for scholarships to study abroad. It has been said that the Senegalese can adapt anywhere except in Senegal.

D. The education system takes Senegal's best minds, uproots them from their local environment and gives them a new set of modern values and urban tastes. Once these new values and tastes have been acquired, it is difficult to redirect graduates back to the rural world, and Senegal's production base. One IMF expert remarked that Senegal's highly developed consumer tastes are way out of proportion with its low productive capacity. The education system, as it stands today, only serves to aggravate this dichotomy.

This elitist approach to development would not be so harmful if the GOS were making parallel investments towards human resource development in the rural world through informal channels. But .....

2. Morale is extremely low in most of Senegal's non-formal educational structures. These agencies have been bounced around from one ministry to another for years. SEPH has had to sit by and watch as the RDA's usurped their duties and responsibilities.

GOS has favored rural development by using the RDA's since the mid-sixties. While GOS has undecidedly given its support to the RDA's, it has neither had the courage to supress non-formal educational structures, nor choose among them. GOS has preferred to give each of these structures just enough money to keep its bureaucracy running but not enought to do any work. It is no wonder relations within and without SEPH are marked by competition rather than coordination. Its components are not only fighting for territory, they are struggling for survival.

This no-decision policy makes everyone a loser. The rural world certainly receives only minimal benefits from their actions. Most SEPH agents do want to work, but they don't have funds to do anything. They, too, are unhappy. GOS certainly doesn't benefit from this situation, where peasants and bureaucrats alike become more and more disillusioned.

There is no question that these agencies do many of the same things. There is certainly room for consolidation. GOS could help itself a lot, just by defining and clarifying the role to be played by each intervening agency. For example, CERPs which were to be the bulwork of the administrative reform, have been given no official role to play. At present, a reform of SEPH is in the works. This reform will do little more than bounce the various agencies form bureau to bureau instead of from ministry to ministry.

3. Senegalese officials all talk of peasant participation. Political (rural commune), economic (co-ops), and educational (EMP, MF, CFPR, AR, CERP) structures have been developed to give the peasant a legal institutional framework within which he can work. Nevertheless, peasants will not be able to take advantage of these structures put at their disposition, nor take charge of their own development, until they receive some functional literary and basic accounting techniques. There will be no peasant control of development so long as they are illiterate. GOS can continue to publish "une belle literature"; the peasants will remain incapable of managing their own affairs.

If Senegal had invested in literacy training instead of the EPT, it would have 180 less engineers, no beautiful campus, far fewer mechanical gadgets-and a literate populace.

4. Senegal's educational training system is out of whack, it is not synchronized. First, there is little or no coordination between schools that should normally have close ties (EPT - IUT, ENEA - ENCR, ENCR-INDR-EATA, ESGE-IUT etc). There is no reason why ENS stagaires should not be allowed to use IUT's or CESTI's audio-visual equipment; nor is there reason to create five different application forms in a small area, EISMV-Rufisque, INDR-Thies, ENCR-Bambey, ISRA-Bambey, ENH-Cambèrène. This kind of overlapping repeats itself throughout Senegal's educational system.

5. Guy Bellonde says that donors are morally responsible for this state of affairs, since it is they who finance the projects. Certainly the multiplicity of donors intervening and investing in Senegal make a coherent and coordinated education policy very difficult.

6. All training institutions should have the "Senegalization" of its training corps as a main goal. Some training institutions that have existed for twenty years (ENCR) still don't have a concrete policy along these lines.

There really isn't any reason why all of Senegal's rural training schools can't be fully "Senegalized" in the next ten years. It seems that "French cooperation" has been dragging its heels in this area. The French assure teaching at Bambey, ENH, ENEA, COID and were important in the EATAs. Despite their omnipresence, there is little evidence of programs designed to train Senegalese colleagues. In contrast, both Swiss and ILO experts felt that this was one of the most important components of their training programs at EATA and CPP.

The GOS education system is not synchronized with its economic system. Construction of the University of St. Louis was not based on economic considerations; neither was the choice to build EPT, nor the choice to cut back on CERP's budgets. Students are educated and trained without knowing the precise needs of the economy, or worse in spite of difficult economic conditions. This "ostrich training" will lead to disruptive educated unemployment or oversized bureaucracies or both. It seems as if Senegal is making short-term political decisions which will have serious consequences in the long run.

7. One positive side of the Senegal's educational and bureaucratic systems is the possibility of advancement offered at almost every level. All of the training schools hold an entrance exam for professional as well as student candidates. Many Senegalese have used this system to propel themselves from "rags to riches".

IMPLICATION FOR AID POLICY

1. AID should continue to channel resources into the rural sector in order to increase Senegal's production base and productivity. How?

a. Use AID's influence and resources to promote literacy in national languages. Non-formal educational structures are in a state of flux, as they have been for years. AID is searching for an alternative to the RDA's. The best alternative open to AID is the peasants themselves. GOS has put two democratic, participating structures at the peasants' disposal, the rural commune and the co-operatives. Peasants really will be able to control their own development if they know how to read books and numbers. As we have seen, Senegal's educational structure doesn't reach the rural populations. If AID does nothing except push "literacy" for the next five years, it will have helped Senegal take a giant step towards economic viability and becoming a third world democracy.

Literacy has not been a priority of Senegal since Independence. Perhaps, now, with the new President, the GOS will give increased importance to literacy training in national languages. If Senegal refuses to promote literacy at this point in time, the cooperatives and rural communes will continue to weaken as farmers lose confidence in them. It is important to note that both the cooperatives and the rural communes are at critical stages of their implementation.

b. Senegal has in the CFPRs (Centre de Formation Professionnelle Rurale) an institution that teaches new agricultural, artisan and fishing techniques. They also teach literacy, and were designed to train the wives of farmers at the same time. This organization has tremendous potential for community development, except that it does not have the funds to realize this potential.

CFPR already has extensive infrastructure in place (21 centers) and still manages to run at about 50% capacity despite severe budget cuts.

This is one agency AID might want to look at more closely to determine how they can be included in AID projects. They could, for example, give literacy training, train mechanics and demonstrate rice growing techniques to farmers in the Fleuve.

2. When AID does give funds to different schools it should attempt to ensure that:

a. Appropriate practical training takes place at the school. This means limited or no summer vacation for agricultural students, (They can take their vacation at some time other than the principal farming season) and an adequate application field.

b. That training policy meets the needs of the agency that will eventually employ the students. Frequent "stages" in the field with future employers should help to keep the lines of communication open between school, students and employer.

c. Coordinationa between different training schools, institutes and the university takes place. ENDR, EISMV and ENCR all have asked AID for funds to build application farms in Thies, Rufisque and Bambey respectively. It would seem that GOS should attempt to coordinate these efforts so as to ensure minimum expenditure and maximum exchange of information. ENS and ESGE have asked for sophisticated audio-visual centers, while both CESTI and IUT already have huge centers. Again, these schools could coordinate their efforts.

d. Coordination of donor efforts. It sometimes seems as if donor relations are marked by competition rather than coordination. The lack of coordination between schools can be attributed in some degree to the lack of coordination between a multiplicity of donors.

e. The creation of an information network. Many of the numerous schools, institutes and university faculties conduct research in Senegal. Almost all donors, the GOS , and international organizations (ENDA, IDRP) conduct research on Senegal. This information constitutes

an invaluable resource, but it is a resource that is not exploited. Various studies conducted rarely serve anyone except the institution's employees, despite the fact that information might be useful to a much larger group. It is not that these groups don't want to contribute their information to others, but there is not a system for distributing documents.

The lack of an information system leads to overlapping studies and thus wasted money. Furthermore, research is not guided, but is conducted in a haphazard manner. The PECTA Commission report clearly depicts the situation: "Since the multiplicity of agencies intervening in the rural sector rarely achieve their objectives, the evaluations multiply, each with a specific objective, which at the limit is its own existence. The peasant who lives at the base of this structure sees himself invaded by a series of experts, submerged by one haphazarded intervention after another, and forced to work for agencies that are not of his own making.

In effect, this system, which is supposed to help and aid the peasants in a difficult economic situation, seems to them to be essentially destined to give life to a heavy crushing superstructure replete with international experts, national bureaucrats, governmental and RDA agents, all of whom dispose of monthly salaries that are far superior to the aleatory revenues (which are sometimes negative) provided by an unsure agricultural sector whose product is subject to changing climatic conditions".(1)

This situation is clearly untenable. SERST now demands that their visa be put on all new research they supervise. AID, which conducts important research, might offer them a copy of each of their reports. If all donors, international organizations, and GOS agencies contributed their literature to a central library or computer, Senegal would have a new valuable resource at its disposal.

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(1) Rapport de la Mission d'Emploi au Sénégal (Jan. - Feb. 1980, BIT p. 13)

In addition, SERST might take the lead in deciding in what areas research is most needed.

f. The Senegalization of the teaching corps to provide low cost construction work, wherever possible.

I would like to thank the many people who contributed to this study. In particular, Mamadou Ndao and Julia Owen who were a source of constant support both in the field and with their ideas.

Mr. Ndao wrote the sections on private schools, Koranic schools (Annexes 8 and 9) as well as on the National Hotel School. Ms. Owen tirelessly edited this rather long paper.

I would also like to thank Sam Rea for specific planning assistance.

As I mentioned in the introduction this paper is only a start. One area that should be further researched is the RDA contribution to training. The RDAs seem to be growing in importance all the time. They are expanding their activities and training is one of them.

Annex 2

Technical Education in mid and secondary levels

YEARS	1970-71	1971-72	1972-73	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76	1976-77	1977-78
Mid-level Tech. Education	408	306	1102	1856	2541	3466	3729	3891
Total mid-level	46801	48600	50243	54419	56891	60681	?	62987
Per Cent	0,9%	0,6%	2,2%	3,4%	4,5%	5,7%	?	6,2%
Secondary -level Tech. Education	1318	1383	1386	1277	1374	1567	1930	2393
Total Secondary level	8875	10179	11284	12774	14515	15426	?	15162
Per Cent Tech. Education	14,9%	13,6%	12,3%	10,0%	9,5%	10,2%	?	15,8%
(1+4)	1726	1689	2488	3133	3915	5033	5659	6284
Mid & Secondary level	55676	59409	61527	67193	71406	76107	?	78149
Per Cent Tech. Education of both levels	3,1%	2,8%	4,0%	4,7%	5,5%	6,6%	?	8,0%

EMT = Enseignement moyen technique (Mid-level technical education)
EST = Enseignement secondaire technique (Secondary level technical education)
EMST = Enseignements moyen et secondaire technique (Mid-level & Secondary Tech. Education)

Source: Ministère de l'Education Nationale, Direction de la Recherche et de la Planification, statistique 1977-78

ANNEX 1

Schedule of the Six years of Primary School

The weekly schedule of the Primary School is 28 hours, with 6 hours per day on Monday through Friday, and 4 hours on Saturday morning.

Schedule of courses - Hours dedicated weekly to each course:

SUBJECTS	1st Year 1st Quarter	1st Year 2nd/3rd Quarters	2nd Year	3rd Year	4th Year	5th Year
FRENCH						
French language	9 h 30	7 h	7 h	7 h	7 h 15	6 h 30
Reading		7 h 30	5 h	5 h	4 h	4 h
Sensory Activities	2 h 15	0 h 30				
Graphic Activities	3 h 15					
Writing		1 h 15	0 h 30	0 h 30	0 h 30	
MATH	4 h 30	4 h 30	5 h	5 h	5 h	5 h
SOCIAL SCIENCES						
History & Geography			1 h 30	1 h 30	1 h 30	2 h
Civics & Morals			0 h 45	1 h	1 h	1 h
Natural Sciences			1 h	1 h	1 h 30	2 h
Health Education	1 h	1 h	0 h 15	0 h 30	0 h 30	0 h 45
ARTS						
Drawing	1 h 30	0 h 45	0 h 45	0 h 45	1 h	1 h
Handcrafts	1 h	0 h 45	0 h 45	0 h 45	0 h 30	0 h 30
Music	1 h	1 h	1 h	1 h	1 h	1 h
PHYSICAL EDUCATION	1 h 45	1 h 45	1 h 45	1 h 45	2 h	2 h
BREAKS	2 h 15	2 h 15	2 h 15	2 h 15	2 h 15	2 h 15

ANNEX 3

The imbalance of training channels

Evolution of Parall[illegible] in the Departments (Law & Philosophy)

Compare to the whole between 1969 and 1979

	1969-70	70-71	71-72	72-73	73-74	74-75	75-76	76-77	77-78	78-79
Growth indicators										
1. Philosophy & Humanities	100	130	152	181	194	218	231	233	253	293
2. Law & Economics	100	163	188	217	244	290	324	374	407	372
3. Total (1+2)	100	148	166	196	214	247	268	289	315	330
4. Other departments (total students minus under groups)	100	131	139	154	166	188	207	232	255	290
Proportion of "literary" students (groups 1 & 2)	53%	56%	57%	59%	59%	60%	59%	58%	58%	60%

Source: Université de Dakar

DOSSIER DES REUNIONS TENUES AU VILLAGE DE BELANGOUT

(31 Mars 1972 : présentation officielle citée pour mémoire, elle ne figure pas dans le dossier).

21 Avril 1972 : réunion de présentation.	pages 1 à 7 (intercalaire)
22 Avril 1972 : 3 réunions d'exploitation de celle de présentation.	pages 1 à 2 (intercalaire)
	pages 1 à 3 (intercalaire)
	pages 1 à 5 (intercalaire)
17 Juin 1972 : Clarification et approfondissement des acquis des réunions précédentes.	pages 1 à 14 (intercalaire)
10 Juillet 1972 : 2 réunions d'analyse.	pages 1 à 10 (intercalaire)
12 Décembre 1972 : réunions de bilan et mise au point des acquis.	pages 1 à 13 (intercalaire)
12 Janvier 1973 : réunion pour définir le contenu de la formation en fonction des idées forces.	pages 1 à 8 (intercalaire)
30 Janvier 1973 : idem.	pages 1 à 7

Vendredi 21 Avril 1972 - Après-midi

Réunion avec les deux quartiers, tardives à cause du retour des champs et du repas. Sont présents : le Chef de Village et 12 Chefs de carré.

EMP : Rappel des objectifs du projet et questions sur réflection ou remarques faites après la réunion de présentation.

Chef V. : parle en sérer.

FAYE : (Adjoint du chef). Nous nous sommes réunis après la présentation. Nous souhaitons travailler avec vous. Mais le projet est peu clair.

EMP : Quel est leur sentiment à propos des jeunes, actuellement ?

PY : Nos enfants sont éduqués pour l'agriculture et l'élevage. Si vous avez remarqué quelque chose, il vous faut nous le dire. Nous éduquons les jeunes comme nous pensons devoir le faire.

EMP : intervention pour éviter concertation en sérer avant les réponses

PY : les sérers ont pour seule activité la culture. C'est difficile pour nous de comprendre ce que vous voulez, d'autant plus qu'il y a un blanc, ce qui montre bien que c'est difficile.

EMP : j'étais absent à la 1ère réunion. Pour qu'il y ait une dette il faut connaître le montant. Quand nous saurons ce que vous voulez nous répondrons Mais nous ne sommes que des pauvres types qui ne connaissons que l'agriculture.

PY : il faut nous montrer ce que vous voulez pour que nous disions si nous sommes d'accord ou non.

PY : Le sérer, quoiqu'il sache, doit d'abord savoir ce que vous voulez

PY : Vous êtes étrangers, on répond à votre appel, mais pas pour faire n'importe quoi. Vous parlez d'éducation ; nous ajoutons au travail l'honnêteté et la solidarité. Nous ne savons pas ce que vous voulez. Si ça concerne notre travail, la culture, on vous dira quelque chose.

EMP : il existe un problème de jeunes dans les villes, ils viennent des villages comme Bélangout, Langomack etc... Cela révèle-t-il un problème entre adultes et jeunes ? Ou bien les choses sont-elles toujours comme dans la tradition ?

VIEUX : Peu de jeunes vont à Dakar. Et même quand ils y vont, c'est pour travailler honnêtement.

EMP : les adultes sentent-ils que l'attitude, les préoccupations des jeunes changent ?

PY : le village n'a pas envoyé de jeunes à l'extérieur, sauf un. Ce qu'on dit dans les autres villages n'est pas valable ici.

EMP : si le gouvernement a pensé à former les jeunes, c'est qu'il y a un malaise des jeunes au Sénégal. Et au lieu d'imposer une solution, notre équipe vient en chercher une avec les adultes.

PY : Si vous avez la vérité, dites-là. Nous en sommes au point où votre auto, et à plus forte raison vous, nous impressionne !

Chef de V.: Le sérer connaît peu de choses. Je pense que vous connaissez ce qu'on doit faire. Nous ne savons pas ce que vous cherchez. L'un de nous parle le français et peut contrôler la traduction de ce que nous disons.

Nous contrôlons le passé, le présent, mais l'avenir ? on n'en sait rien.

EMP : Ne pensez-vous pas que les innovations croissantes vont accentuer une séparation adultes-jeunes ? Les jeunes sont plus portés à innover...

EMP : Pensez-vous nécessaire et souhaitable que les jeunes aient les mêmes connaissances que vous ou d'autres en plus : dans ce cas, lesquelles ?

Chef V. : Les adultes contrôlent les jeunes dans le présent, mais dans l'avenir ? A vous de voir si dans nos activités, on peut ajouter des innovations.

VIEUX : Depuis tout à l'heure on parle de jeunes : mais si vous dites ce que vous voulez faire : recrutement, inscription, nous discuterons à ce moment-là. On tourne autour du pot et maintenant ça suffit.

Chef de V. : la maison en zinc, là, était à mon père. Je souhaite en avoir 10 comme celle-là, donc améliorer mon sort. Nous tous ici, nous savons, ce sur quoi compte le sérer, l'origine de son revenu. Chacun doit dire ce qu'il connaît. On ne peut ni accepter, ni refuser ce qu'on ne connaît pas.

EMP : Vous ne contrôlez pas l'avenir. Souhaitez-vous qu'ils sachent plus que vous ? Ou la même chose que vous ?

PY : (francophone) l'essentiel de ce qu'on a dit : on ne contrôle pas l'avenir. Des innovations ont créé des problèmes :
l'école pas ex: au début on nou' forçait à y aller. Et puis on a vu que c'était le moyen d'avoir une bonne situation. Nous souhaiterions avoir une école dans le village. On ne peut refuser une innovation inconnue de peur de la regretter après.

EMP : ils souhaitent donc que leurs enfants sachent ce qu'ils savent, plus des choses nouvelles ?

Chef de V. : Nous sommes tous d'accord.

VIEUX : Je n'ai rien compris à ce que vous dites. Si c'est une chose intéressante, on acceptera sinon on refusera. Soyez brefs maintenant. (Il harangue le public en sérer).

EMP : On a dit qu'on s'occupait de formation et d'éducation des jeunes. Mais on n'a pas de projet précis pour éviter un refus, ou des palabres après. On veut d'abord voir si ça vous intéresse. On ne force pas à boire quelqu'un qui n'a pas soif.

Chef de V. : Dites-nous ce que vous voulez. C'est à cause de vous qu'on discute tant.

EMP : le gouvernement voudrait que les jeunes soient formés (ceux qui ont quitté l'école) pour être utiles. Mais pour la 1ère fois, on demande aux paysans avant d'avoir prévu quelque chose, ce qui les intéresse et la façon dont ils pensent aux solutions de ces problèmes. Si on vous donne quelque chose d'inadapté dont vous n'avez pas le mode d'emploi, à quoi cela servira-t-il ?

VIEUX : Vous êtes une mission officielle, mais pas la première. Beaucoup sont déjà venues, avec des buts précis. Depuis que vous êtes là vous tournez autour du sujet. Mais vous n'avez pas obtenu de nous la réponse que ceux de Dakar vous ont envoyé chercher ici.

EMP : On vous demande, avant toute chose, ce que vous souhaitez en matière de formation des jeunes.

VIEUX : L'année dernière, l'école de Tokomak a recruté. Nous avons refusé. On nous a expliqué l'utilité de l'école. Mais les gosses non seulement n'y apprennent rien, mais en plus on leur demande 100 CFA, et des poulets. Ca a gâté les enfants. On préfère ne pas être d'accord ; de peur d'être étouffés par ce que vous mettrez dans le plat que vous nous offrez.

EMP : la réaction est étonnante. Si on voulait former des jeunes à quelque chose, on les recruterait sans discuter ! Mais nous pensons que votre idée sur le contenu et l'objectif de la formation est essentielle pour sa réussite. Aussi nous vous demandons ce que vous souhaitez.

PY : Ce que vous dites est bien : mais le pensez-vous vraiment ?

VIEUX : Nous avons déjà eu beaucoup de choses : le travail forcé, le service militaire etc...

Vous venez nous parler des jeunes : dites-nous le métier que vous leur apprendrez, sans attendre.

EMP : Ce que tu veux qu'on fasse, c'est justement ce que tu critiques !

PY : C'est vrai : beaucoup d'enfants ont abandonné ou quitté l'école, et sont ici, inutiles

EMP : nous parlons de même language que le vieux. Lui, il veut qu'on propose quelque chose pour répondre oui ou non. Nous, nous voulons qu'il dise ce qu'il souhaite pour éviter qu'il refuse ce que nous pouvons dire.

VIEUX : la culture et l'élevage sont notre OR. On peut vivre éternellement avec cela.

EMP : Oui, mais vous êtes d'accord pour dire que les jeunes devraient savoir plus que vous, or si nous décidons ce que les jeunes doivent apprendre de nouveau, ceux-ci risquent de partir à Dakar, après.

Chef de V. : tout ce qu'on dit ne nous avance pas. Un travailleur dans son champ est toujours content de recevoir des bras en plus.

Il n'y a pas de problème entre jeunes et adultes. Si tu proposes du miel à quelqu'un qui mange du sucre, c'est encore mieux. Mais est-ce que tu ne vas pas amener du sel après ?

EMP : Le gouvernement sait qu'il y a un problème des jeunes et veut le résoudre. Mais il pense que c'est nécessaire que les paysans soient associés à la recherche d'une formule pour qu'elle soit adaptée. Si vous ne dites rien on risque de vous imposer des solutions que vous jugerez mauvaises.

FAYE : le gouvernement a fait peur aux gens en imposant trop de projets qui n'ont jamais été comme celui d'aujourd'hui. Votre méthode est surprenante. On ne l'a jamais fait avant. Pourquoi ? Mais je vois ce que vous souhaitez : que ce soit nous qui définissions le contenu de l'action.

EMP : C'est ce que vous souhaitons.

FAYE : Vraiment, vous venez nous demander d'examiner nous-mêmes notre situation ? C'est un rêve.

PY : Depuis l'indépendance, tout ce qui a été fait, c'est des propositions de Dakar. Il les font même si ça rate. Aussi nous, par prudence, et méfiance, nous ne disons pas ce que nous voulons.

VIEUX : Vous venez d'arriver à un point où on comprend. Repartez et laissez-nous réfléchir pour que demain on vous dise quelque chose de sûr. Si c'est non, vous nous obligerez à faire ce que vous voulez. Si c'est oui, on vous dira ce qu'on veut.

EMP : Le but essentiel de notre travail c'est à quoi former les jeunes ?

VIEUX : On est embarqué depuis longtemps dans le changement : au début c'était bon, maintenant c'est mauvais. On a reçu beaucoup de projets mais jamais on a eu de fruits. Sinon des pierres qui nous sont tombées sur la tête.

Chef de V. : Nous sommes prêts à travailler et nous restons derrière vous.

FAYE : s'il y a des pas en arrière, c'est que nous avons peur d'avancer.

VIEUX : Nous sommes tous unis ici. Quand le gouvernement envoie ses ordres, nous les appliquons s'ils coïncident à nos idées. A vous voyant ouverts et disponibles pour chercher des solutions avec nous, nous vous accueillons.

ANNEX 5

Effect of the Development Hypotheses on the National Education Budget

Hypothesis 1 - 3 show how much money will have to be spent in order to a) hypothesis 1 continue to extend education to 33% of the school age children b) hypothesis 2 - extend education to 41% of school age children c) hypothesis 3 - extend education to 52% of school age children.

These figures are based on a 1.5 million CFA investment expenditure for each new classroom and 1.6 million CFA expenditure for recurrent costs per classroom.

Source: Ministry of National Education

Costs of Hypothesis 1

(Primary School)

Maintain same number of students enrolled in the school system (millions of CFA) i.e. 33% of school age population

Year	Number of classes	Investment in new classrooms (1.5 billion CFA/ classroom	Increase recurrent costs	Total recurrent costs
197[illegible]				8 000
1979	158	237	252	9 253
1980	161	241,5	257,5	9 517
1981	165	247,5	264	9 781
1982	169	253,5	270,5	10 051,5
1983	172	258	275	10 326,5
1984	176	264	281	10 607,5
1985	180	270	288	10 895,5
1986	184	276	294	11 189,5
1987	189	283,5	303	11 786,5
1988	192	288	307	12 093,5
1989	196	294	314	12 407,5
1990	201	301,5	321,5	12 729
1991	206	309	330	13 059
1992	210	315	336	13 395
1993	215	323	344	13 739
1994	220	330	352	14 091
1995	225	333	360	14 451
1996	230	345	369	14 819
1997	235	352	376	15 195
1998	240	360	384	15 579
1999	245	368	393	15 971
2000	251	377	402	16 373
2001	258	387	413	16 786

The total budget equals the sums of Investment (3) and Recurrent cost (5) columns.

Hypothesis 2

(Cost of increasing primary school age population to 41.6 % by 2001)

Year	Number of classes	Investment in new classrooms (1.5 billion CFA/ classroom	Increase recurrent costs	Total recurrent costs
1978				9 000
1979	280	420	448	9 448
1980	290	435	464	9 912
1981	303	455	485	10 397
1982	315	473	504	10 901
1983	328	492	525	11 426
1984	340	510	544	11 970
1985	354	531	565	12 536
1986	368	552	589	13 125
1987	381	572	610	13 735
1988	396	594	634	14 369
1989	412	618	659	15 028
1990	430	645	688	15 716
1991	448	672	710	16 432
1992	465	698	744	17 176
1993	484	726	774	17 950
1994	504	756	805	18 756
1995	524	786	838	19 594
1996	544	815	870	20 464
1997	566	849	905	21 370
1998	588	882	941	22 311
1999	612	918	979	23 290
2000	635	954	1 018	24 308
2001	663	995	1 060	25 368

Hypothesis 3

(Cost of increasing primary school age population to 52% by 2001)

Year	Number of classes	Investment in new classrooms (1.5 billion CFA/ classroom	Increase recurrent costs	Total recurrent costs
1978				9 000
1979	350	525	360	9 560
1980	368	552	588	10 148
1981	386	579	617	10 765
1982	405	608	648	11 413
1983	425	638	680	12 093
1984	446	669	714	12 807
1985	469	703	750	13 557
1986	493	739	789	14 346
1987	518	777	829	15 175
1988	542	813	868	16 043
1989	570	855	912	16 955
1990	599	899	958	17 913
1991	629	944	1 006	18 919
1992	660	990	1 056	19 975
1993	692	1 038	1 107	21 082
1994	728	1 092	1 165	22 240
1995	764	1 146	1 222	23 469
1996	802	1 203	1 283	24 752
1997	841	1 262	1 346	26 098
1998	835	1 322	1 416	27 514
1999	927	1 391	1 483	28 997
2000	975	1 463	1 560	30 557
2001	1 023	1 535	1 637	32 194

ANNEX 6

Senegal's industrial pyramid, as reflected by its graduates, is exactly the opposite of what is needed and expected. There are too many chiefs and no indians.

- Diplôme Universitaire de Technologie 87
- Baccalauréat de Technicien 777
- B.E.P., industrial sector 65
- C.A.P., industrial sector 51

There is a considerable need for skilled workers.

Sources: Etude de Conseil Economique et Social, p. 124.

ANNEX 7

Senegal's education system is extremely selective. To get a clearer idea of the intensity of this selection process, let's follow the class that entered school in 1978 until University graduation.

Approximate enrollment figure of 75,000 students. Since only 33% of students ever attend school there are 225,000 students that are left by the wayside right from the start. The students that are then "rejected" by the school system will be added to their ranks.

Not enrolled after exam	Rejected	% Rejected	Enrolled after exam	by year	Exam
225,000			75.000	1978	
285.000	60,000	80%	15.000	1984	CEPE
297,000	12,000	80%	3.000	1987	DFEM
298,000	1.500	50%	1.500	1989	Exam of end of 1st year
299,250	750	50%	750	1990	BAC
299,550	300	40%	450	1994	Licence

Thus, of 75.000 students that enter schooling in 1978, only 450 will receive their college degree in 1994.

ANNEX 8

KORANIC EDUCATION IN SENEGAL

Informal in character, attendance is voluntary. Each Koranic school has its own rules and regulations.

Purpose: Primary purpose is to provide Islamic and moral education through the teaching of the Koran.

Financing: No Budget. Resources are scarce, in the form of symbolic fees paid in cash or in kind to teachers, or alms.

Students: Mostly boys. Involves only Moslem students. School age is now between 4 and 6 years in urban areas, before entrance to the French school.
Older children (aged over 6) mostly attend schools in rural areas. Most school age children who do not go to the French school attend Koranic schools. Attendance is higher during the summer break. About 40% of school age children attend Koranic schools.

Training: No training for a specific career other than the teaching of the Koran. Children learn to recite verses in classical Arabic from the Koran by rote memory. No questioning. They are also taught how to read and write the Koran on wooden tablets.

Teachers: Are literate in Koran to varying degrees. Do not hold any certificate or diploma to qualify them for teaching. Hired or considered on the basis of their ability to read, write and recite the Koran. Each Koranic school usually has one teacher, no matter how large the number of students is.

Performance: Students are graduated on the basis of performance. No degree or diploma awarded. The completion of a certain curriculum determines graduation.

Placement of graduates: No systematic placement. No job opportunities except teaching.

Problems: Decline of Koranic education both in urban and rural areas due to increased attraction of French schools which are the way to socio-economic success.
No salaries for teachers, they only collect symbolic fees. Classes usually take place in the open air, no buildings.
No budget, no equipment.

ANNEX 9

PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN DAKAR
AN OVERVIEW

This overview is based on a survey taken in six private schools in the Dakar area, between November 18 and November 21, 1980. These schools are:

- Cours de la Chambre de Commerce de Dakar,
- Collège Saint-Michel de Dakar,
- Cours Pigier de Dakar,
- Ecole Privée Commerciale du Cap-Vert de Dakar,
- Ecole Privée Seydou Norou Tall de Pikine, Dakar,
- Ecole Askia Mohamed de Dakar.

Through our discussion with the President of UNEPLAS (Union Nationale des Ecoles Privées Laïques du Sénégal) we were able to learn as much about problems affecting private schools in Senegal as possible. At the outset, a distinction should be made between parochial schools (Collège Saint-Michel) managed by Catholic priests, and lay schools (the others, managed by Senegalese nationals). Another dichotomy is between private schools offering technical education programs, Cours de la Chambre de Commerce, Ecole Privée Commerciale du Cap-Vert, Cours Pigier and Saint-Michel to some extent, and those offering general education programs i.e., Seydou Norou Tall, Askia Mohamed and Saint-Michel.

Technical education basically involves courses in accounting, typing, shorthand and/or business. Students enrolled in these programs are trained to be secretaries or typists (girls mainly) and accountants.

General education includes extensive courses in languages, e.g. French, (the medium of instruction), English, Spanish, Portuguese, German, Italian, Arabic, Latin, and/or Russian, mathematics, science, physics, chemistry, history and geography. These programs are designed to prepare students for higher education or train medium level administrative professionals.

Thus, it should be borne in mind that these are all secondary schools. Following is a summary:

1) Goal(s): To meet Senegal's developmental needs by training mid-level professionals or preparing students for higher education level.

2) Admission requirements: Two cycles of studies exist: the first one lasts 4 years, the second cycle is 3 years long. Students entering the first cycle are required to hold the CEPE (a primary school diploma) and pass an entrance test. Age limit is 14 years.

Students wishing to enter the second cycle of studies have to hold the DFEM (first cycle studies diploma) or pass an entrance test. Sometimes a satisfactory grade report or a school attendance certificate from the previous school year have to also be submitted. Furthermore, a school fee advance is required at the beginning of the school year.

3) Student population and teachers: Most private schools in Senegal fulfill a complementary function vis-à-vis their public counterparts. As such, they absorb a sizeable number of students who have been dismissed from the public system because of poor performance or age requirement, etc.

All surveyed schools are coed, with the exception of Cours Pigier and Cours de la Chambre de Commerce which admit female students only. The number of students varies from one place to another, and in the course of the school year.

Teachers comprise two groups:

- Professionals with a relatively long experience, working mostly full-time, with the exception of a few outside teachers.
- University students working as part-time teachers.

4) School fees: Vary from one school to another, and according to the grade or the type of training provided. Fees include an advance payment at registration, and are payable on a monthly or quarterly basis. Seydou Norou Tall has the lowest rates, ranging from 3,600 CFAF to 4,800 CFAF.

The highest fees were recorded at Cours de la Chambre de Commerce. They range from a low 40,000 CFAF per year to 200,000 CFA per year.

It should be noted here that these high rates apply to business employees enrolled in special refresher courses or training programs, whose expenses are covered by their employers.

A number of schools reported giving discounts (10, 20, 40, 50%) to a sizeable number of students.

5) Financial resources: Mostly drawn from school fees and other related income. However, most of these schools, with the exception of Pigier and Cours de la Chambre de Commerce, are annually subsidized by the Senegalese Government.

As these State grants represent an insignificant amount, all schools report being self-financed.

6) School curricula and diplomas: School curricula in these schools are, with a few exceptions, similar to those prevalent in the public system. These are of two types:
- a general education curriculum including courses such as languages, mathematics, science, physics, chemistry, history and geography, etc.
- a technical education curriculum, with courses such as shorthand, typing, business, accounting, etc.

Diplomas offered are similar to those from the public system, i.e., DFEM and Baccalaureates for general education, and, CAP, BEP and Baccalaureates B, G1 and G2 for technical education - secretaries, typists, accountants and mid-level business managers.

Cours de la Chambre de Commerce offers a special degree sponsored by a local organization of business executives.

It should also be noted that some business schools may train students in special areas in response to local needs (Cours Pigier may sometimes train medical secretaries or certified accountants).

7) Follow-up and job opportunities: Follow-up activities are difficult to carry out and schools cannot keep track of their graduates after their departure. However, some business schools advertise for their graduates in their bulletins or newsletters distributed to local business managers, or write recommendations. Job opportunities are becoming scarce, but it was reported that most graduates eventually succeeded in securing a job over a certain period of time.

8) Major problems:

- A sizeable number of students drop out every year after the Easter holidays. This results in a decline of income for these private schools and consequently operational difficulties.
- All lay schools no longer have access to bank loans and therefore cannot carry out their expansion projects planned because of increased enrollments. They cannot always meet operational deficits because of a decrease in income during the school year and a grant cut over the past few years.
- School performance in lay schools is low because of lack of equipment, books and teaching materials.

ANNEX 10

The new structure of Promotion Humaine will be made up of the following "Directions":

Bureau for Rural and Urban Extension Agents

- Division of Rural Extension Agents
- Division of urban Extension Agents
- Division for Administrative and Financial Affairs

Bureau of Family Well-Being

- Division of Planning and Family Protection
- Division of Information and Documents
- Division of Village level farmers' Association
- Division to help place workers returning from abroad

Division of Administrative and Financial Affairs

Bureau for the Promotion of Women

- Division for Women's Advancement
- Division of Women's work
- Division of Household and Social Work

Division of Administrative and Financial Affairs

Bureau for Practical Training

- Literacy Division
- Division of Practical Mid-level Education
- Division of Rural Technical Training

Division of Administrative and Financial Affairs

Bureau of Community Development

- Division in charge of non-governmental activities
- Division for Study and Planning of Projects
- Division of Evaluation and follow-up

Division of Administrative and Financial Affairs

ANNEX 11

List of all Educational Institutions in Senegal

Establishments		Conventional Establ. Level of Recruitment			Non Conventional
No	Category	Bac	BEPC	Autre	
	1 - Literary Careers				
1	Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines	+			
2	Centre d'Etudes des Sciences et Techniques de l'Information (CESTI) Dakar	+			
3	Ecole des bibliothèques, Archivistes, Documentalistes (EBAD) Dakar	+			
4	Centre de Formation Pédagogique Spécial de Thiès (CFPST)	+			
5	Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS) Dakar	+			
6	Centre de Perfectionnement en langue anglaise				+
7	Institut Sénégalo-Britannique				+
	2 - Scientific & Technical Careers				
8	Faculté des Sciences	+			
9	Faculté de Médecine	+			
10	Institut d'odontologie et stomatologie	+			
11	Institut Universitaire de Technologie (IUT)	+			+
12	Ecole Nationale des Cadres Ruraux de Bambey (ENCR)	+			
13	Ecole Polytechnique de Thiès	+			
	3 - Law, Economic & Commercial Careers				
14	Faculté des Sciences Economiques	+			
15	Faculté des Sciences Juridiques	+	+		

Establishments		Conventional Establ. Level of Recruitment			Non Conventional
No	Category	Bac	BEPC	Autre	
16	Centre de Formation et Perfectionnement administratifs (CFPA) Dakar	+			+
17	Ecole Nationale d'Economie Appliquée (ENEA) Dakar	+			
18	Ecole Nationale d'Administration				
19	Ecole Nationale des Assistants et Educateurs sociaux (ENAES) Dakar	+	+		
20	Ecole Inter-Etats des Sciences et Médecine Vétérinaires - Dakar	+			
21	Centra National de formation et d'action de Rufisque				+
	1 - Professional Training				
22	Ecole Normale d'Enseignement technique Féminin (ENETF)	+	+		
23	Ecole Normale d'Enseignement technique Masculin (ENETM)	+			
	2 - Specialized Training				
24	Ecole Nationale de Formation Maritime (ENFM) Dakar	+	+		+
25	Ecole Nationale de Secrétariat Dakar	+	+		+
26	Ecole Nationale d'horticulture deGambérène	+	+		
	3 - Technical High Schools				
27	L.T. Delafosse - Dakar		+		+
28	L.T. Peytavin - Saint-Louis		+		+
29	L.T. A. Bamba - Diourbel		+		+
	4 - Middle level technical Education				
30	C.E.M.T. Dakar filles			Primaire	

Establishments		Conventional Establ. Level of Recruitment			Non Conventional
No	Category	Bac	BEPC	Autre	
31	C.E.M.T. LT Delafosse Dakar			"	
32	C.E.M.T. LT Diourbel			"	
33	C.E.M.T. Louga			"	
34	C.E.M.T. LT Peytavin - Saint-Louis			"	
35	C.E.M.T. Ziguinchor			"	
	5 - Schools for Technical field Agents				
36	Agents techniques d'agriculture Ziguinchor		+		
37	Agents techniques eaux et forêts Ziguinchor		+		
38	Agents techniques d'élevage Saint-Louis		+		
39	Agents techniques des pêches Thiaroye		+		
40	Centre national de formation de monitrices Economie Familiale rurale - Thiès		+		
	6 - Professional Training Centers				
41	C.E.P. Dakar (industrie) ex CQID		+		
42	C.E.P. Dakar (commerce) LT Delafosse		+		
43	Centre apprentissage Chemins de Fer - Thiès		+		+
44	Centre formation artisanale - Dakar		+		
45	Institut Coune-Couture-Mode Dakar		+		+
46	C.E.P. Saint-Louis (ind-Commerce) LT. Peytavin)		+		

Establishments		Conventional Establ. Level of Recruitment			Non Conventional
No	Category	Bac	BEPC	Autre	
47	C.E.P. (commerce) Diourbel		+		
48	C.R.E.T.M (commerce) Ziguinchor		+		
	7 - Region Training Centers for Women				
49	C.R.E.T.F. Dakar			+	+
50	C.R.E.T.F. Ziguinchor			+	+
51	C.R.E.T.F. Kaolack			+	+
52	C.R.E.T.F. Tambacounda			+	+
53	C.R.E.T.F. Thiès			+	+
54	C.R.E.T.F. Saint-Louis			+	+
55	C.R.E.T.F. Diourbel			+	+
	8 - Miscellaneous				
56	Centre de Perfectionnement Permanent - Dakar				+
57	Centre National des Cours Professionnels - Dakar				+
58	Centre Technique de Formation Professionnelle - Dakar				+
59	Association pour la formation du Sénégal (AFORS)				+
	9 - Private Establishments				
60	Centre Commercial privé Cap-Vert - Dakar		+		+
61	Institut Grandjean - Dakar (commerce)		+		+
62	Cours Pigier - Dakar (commerce)		+	+	+
63	Collège Saint-Michel - Dakar (commerce)		+		
64	Cours de la Chambre de Commerce Dakar		+		+

Establishments		Conventional Establ. Level of Recruitment			Non Conventional
No	Category	Bac	BEPC	Autre	
65	Immaculée Conception Dakar		+		
66	Cours enseignement technique de Banque - Dakar				+
67	Cours commerciaux Chambre de Commerce Ziguinchor				+
68	Cours Pigier - Thiès		+		+
69	Cours Grandjean - Dakar				+
70	Centre de Formation Air Afrique Yoff		+		
71	<u>Private Family & Homemaking vocational Schools</u>			+	
72	Centre ménager St-Sacrement			+	+
73	Centre ménager familial à Bignona			+	+
74	Centre ménager familial à M'lomp (Casamance)			+	+
75	Centre ménager familial de Brin (Casamance)			+	+
76	Centre ménager familial de Kolda			+	+
77	Centre ménager familial de Vélingara			+	+
78	Centre ménager familial de Bambey			+	+
79	Centre ménager familial de Tambacounda			+	+
80	Centre ménager Jean XXIII de Kaolack			+	+
81	Centre ménager familial Assunta Fadiouth			+	+
82	Centre ménager familial "Thiadiaye" à M'Bour			+	+

Establishments		Conventional Establ Level of Recruitment			Non Conventional
No	Category	Bac	BEPC	Autre	
83	Centre ménager familial Ndiaga gnao à Thiès			+	+
84	Centre ménager familial de Soutou (Casamance)			+	+
85	Centre ménager familial de Sédhiou			+	+
	1 - Training Rural Professionals				
86	C.F.P.R Guérina (formation moniteurs agri.)			+	+
87	C.F.P.R Kaffrine (formation moniteurs artisanat)			+	+
88	C.F.P.R. Ogo (élevage et artisanat)				+
89	C.F.P.R. Sédhiou (artisanat agriculture)				+
90	C.F.P.R. Missirah (agricole artisanat)				+
91	C.F.P.R. Kérouane (agriculture coton)				+
92	C.F.P.R. Lagbar (élevage)				+
93	C.F.P.R. M'Boro (cultures maraîchères)				+
94	C.F.P.R. Kael (artisanat)				+
95	C.F.P.R. Tivaouane (artisanat)				+
96	C.F.P.R. Nioro du Rip (polyculture)				+
97	C.F.P.R. Joal (pêche artisanale)				+
98	C.F.P.R. Nianga (culture irriguée)				+

Establishments		Conventional Establ			Non Conventional
		Level of Recruitment			
No	Category	Bac	BEPC	Autre	
	2 - Horticultural Initiation Centers				
99	C.I.H. Dakar			+	+
100	C.I.H. Saint-Louis			+	+
101	C.I.H. Thiès			+	+
102	C.I.H. Diourbel			+	+
	3 - Fishing Centers				
103	à Mbane				+
104	à Goudomp				+
	4 - Rural Community Centers				
105	45 M.F.R. (22 masculines - 23 féminines) dans 23 centres				+
106	Ecole nationale d'hôtellerie et de Tourisme	+	+		
	National Institute of Arts of Senegal				
107	Ecole des Beaux Arts : section formation professeurs d'Education artistique	+	+		
108	Section formation professeurs éducation musicale	+	+		
109	Section professeurs art dramatique	+	+		
110	Ecole d'Architecture	+	+		
111	Centre d'enseignement supérieur en soins infirmiers de Dakar-CESI	+			
112	Ecole des Infirmiers et infirmières d'Etat à (EIIE)		+		

Establishments		Conventional Establ. Level of Recruitment			Non Conventional
No	Category	Bac	BEPC	Autre	
113	Ecole des Sages Femmes d'Etat Dakar (ESFE)		+		
114	Ecole des Agents Sanitaires à Saint-Louis(EAS)		+		
115	Ecole des Agents d'Assainissement de khombole (EAA)		+		
116	Ecole Militaire de Santé - Dakar	+	+		
117	Ecole de Gendarmerie - Dakar		+		
118	Ecole Nationale des sous-officiers d'active à Kaolack	+	+		
119	Ecole Nationale de Police à Dakar	+	+	+	
120	Ecole des Douanes - Dakar	+	+	+	
121	Institut National Supérieur Education populaire et Sportive de Thiès	+			
122	Ecole Nationale des Postes et Télécommunications - Rufisque	+	+		
123	Ecole multinationale des Télécommunications - Rufisque				
124	Centre formation Radio - Sénégal	+			
125	Ecole des Agents techniques de l'hydraulique de Tambacounda	+			
	<u>Enterprises Establishments</u>				
126	Ecole régionale Navigation aérienne - Dakar		+		
127	Centre formation SOCOCIM - Rufisque				+
128	Centre formation phosphates Taïba				+
129	Centre formation bancaire (banque centrale) Dakar				+

Establishments		Conventional Establ. Level of Recruitment			Non Conventional
No	Category	Bac	BEPC	Autre	
	Enterprises Establishments (cont')				
130	Centre formation SENELEC		+	+	+
131	Centre formation de la SAED (Saint-Louis)				+
132	Centre de formation de la SODEVA (Pout)				+
133	Centre de formation SISCOMA (Pout)				+

REGION	PLACE	TYPE OF CENTER	TYPE OF TRAINING
Sine-Saloum	Toubacouta	EMP	General pre-professional
	Kaffrine	CFPR	Artisan instructors and trainers
	Nioro du Rip	CFPR	Agriculture
	Latmingué	MFR	
	Diaulé	MFR	
Thies	Deni Malick Guèye	YMCA	"Mixed farming" project
	Ngué Nkokh	EMP	General pre-professional
	Joal	CFPR	Fisheries
	Tivaouane	CFPR, MFR	Artisans
	Mboro	CFPR	Vegetable gardening
	Fandène	MFR	
	Diogo	MFR	
	Gaelial	MFR	
	Kaere	MFR	
	Bayakh	MFR	
	Malicounda	MFR	
	Pekesse	MFR	
	Meur	MFR	
	Notto	MFR	
	Chérif Lô	MFR	

ANNEX 12

VOCATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAMS IN SENEGAL

REGION	PLACE	TYPE OF CENTER	TYPE OF TRAINING
Cap Vert	Dakar	Centre de Qualification	Artisans
		Centre de Formation Artisanale	Artisans
		Cours d'Entrainement à la Vie Active	Artisans
		SONEPI-BIRD-AFCOPA Pilot Project	Artisans
		YMCA Training Center	Artisans
	Bargny	Enseignement Moyen Pratique (EMP)	General pre-professional
Casamance	Kubana	EMP	Fisheries
	Goudomp	Centre Formation Professionnelle Rurale (CFPR)	
	Adéane	Maisons Familiales Rurales (MFR)	
	Guérina	CFPR	Agriculture Instructors and trainees
		Thionkessy	MFR
		Tankanto	MFR
	Sedhiou	CFPR	Artisans
	Kerokane	CFPR	Agriculture
Diourbel	Kael	CFPR	Artisans
	Ndioufene	MFR	
Fleuve	Makhana	EMP	General pre-professional
	Nder.	MFR	
	Mbane	CFPR	Fisheries
	Guetê	MFR	
	Ogo	CFPR	Agric. & Artisans
	Nianga	CFPR	Agric. & Artisans
Louga	Labagar	CFPR	Livestock
Senegal Oriental	Koussanar	EMP	General pre-professional
	Ndia	MFR	
	Mako	MFR	
	Bota	MFR	
	Missirah	CFPR	Agric. & Artisans

CHART 1a

ADMINISTRATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM



Notes:
A: Teacher Training Technical School
B: Teacher Training Regional School for primary education
C: Secondary General Education
D: Secondary Technical Education
Diploma: BEP = Brevet d'Enseignement Professionnel
CEPE = Certificat d'Etudes Primaires Elémentaires
DFEM = Diplôme de Fin d'Etudes Moyennes

CHART 1 B

Senegalese Degrees	American Equivalent
CEPE	Primary School Certificate
DFEM	10th Grade
BAC	High School Diploma plus one year University

University

First Cycle	- 1st year		
	- 2nd year		
2nd Cycle	- 3rd year	- licence *	Bachelors' degree
	- 4th year	- maitrise*	Masters' degree
3rd cycle	- 5th year	- Doctorat de 3ème cycle	Doctor - P.H.D.
	- 6th year		

Doctorat d'Etat - after several years of research.

* The student receives no degree at the end of the first cycle, but two degrees during the second cycle.

CHART 1 C

BACCALAUREAT - SERIES

A: Humanities - Philosophy
B: Economic and Social Sciences
C: Mathematics and Physics
D: Physics and Natural Sciences
E: Mathematics and Techniques
F: Industrial Techniques
G: Commercial Techniques

A, C, D equals General Secondary "Upper Cycle"
B, E, F, G equals Technical Secondary "Upper Cycle"

Chart 1c

Baccalauréat - Series

A: Humanities - Philosophy

B. Economic and Social Sciences

C: Mathematics and Physics

D. Physics and Natural Sciences

E: Mathematics and Techniques

F: Industrial Techniques

G: Commercial Techniques

A, C, D equals General Secondary "Upper Cycle"

B, E, F, G equals Technical Secondary "Upper Cycle"

CHART 4

Nomenclature		Years of Study		Bureaucratic Status
Ingénieur (de conception) (Engineer)	=	Bac + 5 years of study	=	Hierarchy A
Ingénieur des Travaux ou Technicien Supérieur (Mid-level Manager)	=	Bac + 3 years of study	=	Hierarchy B
Agent Technique (Technical Field Agent)	=	DEEM + 3 years of study	=	Hierarchy C
	=	CEPE		Hierarchy D

CHART 5



Geographical distribution of technical field agents (TFA's)

34.4%	A	Traditional Services	6.4%	B	Projects
17.3%	C	CERP	3.7%	D	Research & Teaching
19.4%	E	R.D.A.'s	6.3%	F	Training

12.5% Undecided



Sectoral distribution of TFA; that is 19.4% work for RDA's, 17.3% work for CERPs, etc.

FOOTNOTES

1) Conseil Economique et Social ; Etude sur l'Enseignement en Général, l'Enseignement Technique et Professionnel en Particulier. pp. 4-5

2) Rapport de la Mission d'Emploi au Sénégal (Janvier-Février) 1980, B.I.T. p. 23

3) Cinquième Plan Quadriennal de Développement Economique et Social. p. 264.

4) Elément d'Analyse des Chapitres 501, 502, 504 du Budget de l'Education Nationale, Direction de la Recherche et de la Planification D.R.P. p. 22

5) Sénégal : Développement de l'éducation, analyse et perspectives, Volumes I, II, III Paris, Juin 1977. p. 52

6) World Bank, Second Education Project Appendix I p. 1

7) While the number of students that pass the exam are only about 20%, an important number of students manage to continue their education without having passed the exams by enrolling in private schools. Thus, whereas in 1978/79 10,391 students passed the entry exam, 18,119 new students enrolled in 6th class. (7th grade). It can be assumed that these 7,728 students were able to skirt the exam obstacle by going to private schools.

This phenomena seems to be verified by the big drop in enrollment experienced by the private schools from the 6th year to the 5th year and the corresponding increase in public schools from the 6th year to the 5th year.

	Public			Private	
6th year	9.981	10.780	6th year	7.901	9.096
5th year	10.085	10.643	5th year	4.233	5.679
	1977/78	1978/79		1977/78	1978/79

This social phenomena is valid, of course, only in the cities. There are few if any private schools in the rural areas. Consequently, the private schools serve to reinforce the urban-rural dichotomy already present in the biginning.

8) Camara Ousmane, Communication sur la Rentrée Universitaire 1979/80. p. 5

FOOTNOTES

9) Op. Cit. PECTA Commission P. 126

10) Bid p. 128

11) Mbodj, Georges, Recherches de Solutions ou Problèmes de la Généralisation de l'Enseignement Primaire. p. 2

12) Op.cit., Camara p. 25

13) Three of these "directions", each of which at present, include three divisions, will be demoted to divisions under the same direction. Thus, EMP, CRPR and Alphabetisation will be grouped under the same direction of "Formation Professionnelle Rurale". The alphabetisation people are particularly discouraged with this demotion which will further impede their financial autonomy.

14) Op. cit. Conseil Economique and Social, p. 84.

15) Bid, P. 86

16) According to a PCV who works in an EMP and just recently took a tour of all the EMP's there are only 5 EMPs that are actually operating.

17) Bilan et Avenir des Formations Professionnelles Rurales, Dulphy, Gerard, Expert Consultant BIF (ILO) p. 27.

18) ORT - Suisse, Rapport de la Mission d'Etude dans le cadre de l'Enseignement Sénégalais, Genève; Huillet 1977, p. 25.

19) IBID, p. 26

20) Mission CILLS/USAID/BIT, Rapport Final, p. 17

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	Mr. Bouna Gaye	Director CRDP de l'ENS
IUT:	Mr. Kergreiss	Director IUT
	Mr. Fall	Secrétaire Général
EPT:	Mr. Jourgas	Directeur des Etudes
	Mr. Ndiaye	Commandant de l'EPT
ESGE:	Mr. Sylla	Director
CESTI:	Mr. Boubacar Sine	Director
ENAM:	Mr. Boubacar Kebe	Directeur d'Etudes, Div. Judiciaire
CFPA:	Mr. Sidy Fall	Director
ENH:	Mr. Ndiaye	Director
EATA:	Mr. Locher	Coopérant Suisse
ENCR:	Mr. Boucom	Director
INDR:	Mr. Bilguez	Assistant Director
ENEA:	Mr. Samba Dioun	" "
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