
**INTEGRATING RURAL
DEVELOPMENT:
THE PROBLEM
AND A SOLUTION**

A PASITAM Design Study

**Integrating Rural
Development:
The Problem and a Solution**

by

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THE DREAM OF IRD

Integrated rural development was one of the developmental catch phrases of the 1970's.

. . . an integrated rural development program (is) a series of mutually supporting (interrelated) agricultural and non-agricultural activities oriented towards a stated objective. It involves the progression of rural subsystems and their interaction leading to desired improvements in the rural system as a whole. (Ahmad 1975:119)

Both the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development have supported the philosophy behind such programs.

. . . a well-designed rural development program should reach large numbers of low-income producers; should be financially viable and able to raise the incomes of this group. (Yudelman 1977:16)

. . . the Bank expects to increase substantially the volume of funds committed to projects designed to strengthen critical rural support services, thereby breaking the constraints on production and in many circumstances permitting more effective use of physical infrastructure already in place. (Yudelman, *ibid.*, 17).

THE ROOT PROBLEM OF IRD

But there is a basic problem. As Vernon Ruttan (1975:14) argued:

A basic weakness of the integrated rural development approach is that policy or program objectives are adopted for which no readily available closed system technology or program methodologies are available. Integrated rural development can be described, perhaps not too inaccurately, as an ideology in search of a methodology or a technology.

The problem is simply how to achieve effective integration? Ahmad argues that vertical integration—contact with the elite levels of government—is necessary, and that it requires the administration of IRD programs by fresh and vigorous bureaucratic agencies.

Both the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development advocate local participation in integrated development programs.

The Bank's experience indicates that if fiscal and administrative problems are to be overcome, rural development programs must from the outset be designed to maximize local financing and maintenance of rural development investments. (Yudelman, *ibid*, 18)

A.I.D. officially emphasizes the importance of involving local level agencies in both planning and implementation. Nearly everyone has acknowledged the imperative—and the problem—of coordination.

Insufficient funds and skilled personnel in low income nations generally preclude creation of autonomous organizations for integrated rural development. The technical skills and the jurisdictions of independent line organizations must be co-opted to achieve successful rural development planning and implementation. Yet in the short run severe resource restraints make it irrational for these line agencies to contribute the resources necessary for successful integrated development. (Ahmad, 133)

Accordingly, the crux of the problem is to find incentives that induce independent line agencies to cooperate with each other. This paper explores that problem and describes one case where it was solved: the Bicol River Basin Development Program in the Philippines.

In principle the advantages of integrating and coordinating rural development activities are obvious. Road systems for marketing should be planned so as not to interfere with irrigation canals required to increase agricultural output. Effective land reform and redistribution require extension assistance for small farmers. Upland conservation and forestry efforts must take account of the potentials of lowland agriculture. And so forth. The development of local commercial agriculture requires the improvement of regional marketing and processing facilities. Small scale industrialization cannot occur without providing 'export' transportation, reliable local power and improved inter- and intra-regional communications.

Meeting such needs requires coordination of the activities of many line agencies—highways, land reform, extension services, industrial planning, power, irrigation, education, forestry and local government administration. Such cooperation is rarely forthcoming. Why?

It is generally rational for the managers of bureaucratic organizations to promote long term budget and staff expansion (Niskanen, 1971). This protects the agency from political vicissitudes and maximizes the security

of the staff. It also fosters competition among agencies. To the extent that coordination weakens an agency's ability to compete for resources, cooperation is not rational. For one agency to contribute ideas to planning 'integrated development' might enable a competing agency to outmaneuver it in the competition. For an agency to use resources in region A (to further an integrated plan) when it can justify larger expenditures in Region B is to upset rational priorities. So does the contribution of good personnel to coordinate outside planning activities. To surrender funds, personnel or decision making to an integrated development agency does not make bureaucratic sense.

In a similar fashion local political administrators (mayors, governors, etc.) operate under incentives that are adverse to coordination. Their capacity for independent action is limited by their resources. Their best strategy is generally to cooperate in a piecemeal fashion with whatever plans individual agencies want implemented. This strategy is contradictory to any form of meaningful integrated planning. So rational actions by both national agencies and local managers are inconsistent with integrated planning and programming. Yet this unit-level rationality produces collective misfortune.¹

For example, for highway departments to coordinate their planning with public works and irrigation agencies makes sense. Yet to effectively coordinate infrastructure projects might require one agency to reschedule a project to fit another's program. Within bureaucratic budget constraints a rescheduled project can mean a lost project. Furthermore, each agency knows that if an alternative opportunity appeared to construct a larger project elsewhere it would do so. It assumes that other agencies would act in a similar fashion. Accordingly, no commitments for cooperation occur. And an irrigation canal sometimes ends up bisecting a highway, but without the needed bridge.

The potential for bureaucratic cooperation is also affected by the 'free rider' problem (cf. Olson, 1965). This exists in situations where all can benefit so long as some contribute to a common good. There is no effective mechanism to preclude a non-contributor from benefiting, and no means to force contributions. So agencies resist making contributions, hoping to benefit from common goods provided by others. Frequently no one provides the common good.

In integrated development one potential common good is the financial and personnel resource required for an effective regional planning. All agencies might benefit—their plans would be more likely to be sound and perhaps to be funded—but no one of them can afford the costs of such an apparatus. Even if agencies agree to establish a planning group the rational strategy for each is to contribute only its less competent planners.

Another impediment to coordinated planning and action is the 'commons problem' (cf. Hardin, 1968). In a commons situation each entity uses part of a common good. It makes sense for the individual agency to maximize that use. When several agencies do so—or try to—this overloads or uses up the common resource.

In rural development planning an existing 'common good' is the time, understanding and cooperation of local political administrators and village leaders. These can be important to agency projects. Bureaucratic agencies utilize the time and good will of these individuals by having them attend meetings, training seminars, and other discussions. The local administrators and leaders need little agency support; nobody else has a meaningful budget. So these individuals try to cooperate with everyone. The quality of their input and their ability to do their own work must be severely degraded.

Note: maladministration and miscoordination in local development projects need not imply bureaucratic incompetence. Such problems can stem from the rational efforts of agencies, acting independently, to maximize their respective interests. The lack of coordination in no way implies an inability to understand its potential benefits. What is lacking is a sound and reasonable *basis* for coordination.

THE PRINCIPLES OF A SOLUTION

These dilemmas do not preclude an external party—a central government developmental bureau or an international donor—from establishing a potentially effective coordinating agency. Such an agency must be able to balance several contradictory demands:

- (1) It must be useful enough so that line agencies will accept and promote its existence, yet not so strong as to threaten them. It will be judged by line agencies in terms of how well they are aided in accomplishing their *individual* goals.
- (2) It requires an effective relationship with central governmental agencies, yet must be seen primarily as representing a confined geographic area.
- (3) It must gain support by providing line agencies, political administrators and village leaders with resources, yet in the long run it cannot be seen only as a source of external resources.

The objective is not merely to *establish* a coordinating organization that is accepted by the line agencies. (So long as international donors or the central government use the integrated development agency as a conduit for funds to line agencies it will be accepted, or at least tolerated). The proper

aim is to create an agency whose existence remains effective beyond the period of high external funding.

The primary role of such an agency is to provide a setting which causes effective coordination among line agencies. In the short run it might have to administer some projects. In the long run this is antithetical to successful integration. A capability to administer projects makes the agency a rival of the line agencies. Basically it must restrict its role to that of planner and facilitator of line agency coordination. How can this noble aim be achieved?

- (1) The integrative development agency can provide a setting in which agencies can contribute information with reasonable assurance that useful information will be received in turn. The integrated development agency acts as a 'good office' by facilitating informal interaction between technical line agencies.
- (2) The integrative development agency provides a resource-claiming mechanism for independent line agencies. Its existence can force international donors to back their ideological support for integrated development with financial resources. Line agencies can also use the regional planning agency to lever the central government into increasing financial contributions to the region.
- (3) Finally, the integrative development organization can perform functions that the regional levels of individual line agencies cannot afford. Long term in-depth planning is usually too expensive for regional agency units. Much so-called local planning takes place at the national capital. A regional integrative development organization with line agency support can provide a local planning function.

The integrative development agency must not appear to threaten the budgets of the line agencies. Its budget must be small enough not to compete, but large enough to support technically competent individuals. Restricting the agency's function to planning and facilitating, while providing special incentives to its employees, should satisfy both objectives. So long as planning does not extend to implementation, line agencies may accept the 'free good' of a technical planning staff. Restricting the staff to a small but skilled planning group may also achieve the balance between specialization and informality that sociological literature claims is needed by an innovative organization (Rogers and Rogers, 1976).

The size of the geographic area covered by the integrative development agency also matters. For agencies to cooperate in planning projects bargaining and tradeoffs are necessary. Within too small a region line agency

representatives might have nothing to trade. An official in a small region does not benefit from projects outside the region. Integrating a larger geographic area permits 'logrolling'—a road built in one municipality can be balanced against a canal in another. However, the region cannot require an unacceptably large staff for the planning agency.

**A CASE IN POINT:
THE BICOL RIVER BASIN
INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM²**

The Philippine development experience shows the need for—and the problems of—integrated rural development:

. . . first of all closer coordination among public agencies, not to mention technical agriculturists, is difficult enough at the national level; with several executive agencies at the local level, the direct services at the local level remain on the whole widely dispersed and often conflicting if not competing for the farmer's attentions and response (Dalisay, 1975:55).

Overholt (1976:427) attributed many of the difficulties of land reform in the Philippines to the lack of integrated planning:

. . . land reform must be accompanied by agrarian reform, defined as the creation of physical and institutional infrastructure necessary for small holders to maintain themselves. This infrastructure includes irrigation, transport, communications, credit facilities, education, markets and access to markets, access to fertilizer and seeds, etc. . . . Even successful land reform and agrarian reform will fail unless they are integrated into a larger program of modernization. . .

This need has been officially recognized: In accordance with the concept of integrated rural development, the Philippines has transformed the implementation of its land reform programs from a piecemeal operation to a broad, earnest implementation of simultaneous and related projects . . . (Marcos in Cabinet Coordinating Committee, 1977:21).

Economic and social problems in the six provinces in the Bicol region justified governmental concern. Though geographically close to Manila, both inter- and intra-regional transportation have been lacking. Income was roughly two-thirds of the national average; rice production was slightly below average and well below potential. Health conditions were poor. Population was increasing rapidly, and large out-migration (approximately 1%/year) to already overcrowded Manila occurred. In United Nations jargon the area has been described as 'downward transitional.'

The Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP) is the third major effort to establish an integrating or coordinating apparatus in the region. In 1965 "a loose confederation of six executive and management oriented provincial governors and two city mayors . . . organized them-

selves into the Bicol Development Planning Board'' (Parco, 1965:265). Special seminars and training sessions were held and the support of the (Rockefeller-funded) Agricultural Development Council was obtained. A package of projects was prepared. Many of them matched those actually undertaken twelve years later. Verbal support was obtained but not much happened. DeGuzman and Pacho (1973) noted that of the 8.70 million dollars the BDPB called for only 170,000 were forthcoming.

In 1971 the National Economic and Development Administration (NEDA) established the Bicol Development Company (BIDECO). Tight control was maintained by NEDA and the BIDECO staff was recruited in Manila. Not much support was obtained from line agencies or local politico-administrators. BIDECO accomplished little.

The third effort to establish an integrative development apparatus began in 1973 with the establishment of the Bicol River Basin Council. In 1976, under Presidential Decree 932, the organization took on its present form as the Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP). Certain circumstances facilitated its initial growth:

- (1) The need for rapid development in the Bicol became compelling. A Maoist insurgency was gaining adherents. Natural disasters had brought the area to the attention of national and international agencies.
- (2) International donors had adopted the ideology of integrated development. In the Bicol the U.S. Agency for International Development was willing to finance an integrative regional development organization.
- (3) The central Philippine government established a Cabinet Coordinating Committee for Integrated Development. In effect Cabinet ministers acted as bureaucratic liaisons for three integrated development programs, in the Bicol, Mindoro and Cagayan regions. Individual ministers were assigned responsibilities for specific programs. This cabinet level support partially sheltered the budgetary requests of the integrated programs from attacks by the line agencies and legitimated the ideology of integrated development.
- (4) Martial law had been declared. It reduced the piecemeal approach to financing local projects.
- (5) A start was made to decentralize line agency administration. It created a group of powerful administrative figures responsible for large geographic regions.
- (6) A national land reform program had been established (Overholt, 1976). The ideology of this program supported integrated develop-

ment. The Director of the BRBDP Program Office was concurrently the regional director for agrarian reform.

Two other factors strengthened BRBDP in its early years. The U.S. Agency for International Development entered into an agreement to finance establishment of a BRBDP Program Office. Line agencies assumed that it would command significant funds for infra-structure projects. And the BRBDP was fortunate in its leadership.

In its formative years the agency survived several difficult battles. The director of one of the larger line agencies tried to take over the program. He failed. Had he succeeded, the cooperation of other powerful agencies might have been lessened. A governor in the Bicol region opposed the program. He was removed from office.

A third problem concerned the geographic scope of the project. BIDECO and the BDPB had been responsible for the six provinces of the ethnically related Bicol Region. The new agency originally tried to restrict its work to the one province containing most of the Bicol River Valley. It later (and fortuitously) expanded its scope to include parts of two provinces, 42 municipalities and three chartered cities. The area was small enough to have relatively homogeneous problems but large enough to permit inter-agency logrolling.

In the summer of 1977 the BRBDP contained five distinct but related structures:

- (1) The *Bicol River Basin Program Office*, with a staff of about 100 technical, professional, clerical and service personnel, provided planning and support services for integrated development. It was headed by a Director responsible to the Management Committee of the Cabinet Coordinating Committee. The Office was financed by a line item appropriation from the central government and a grant-in-aid from AID. The Director *ex officio* chaired many of the committees described below. The Program Office maintained a small liaison staff in Manila, but most important Manila business was transacted by the Director or one of his three chief assistants. (This structure contrasted strongly with the Mindoro Integrated Development Office which maintained most of its staff in Manila.)
- (2) Formally in charge of the program was the *Bicol River Basin Development Board*. This Board met monthly. Its membership consisted of the Program Director, two provincial governors, and the regional directors (or equivalents) of fourteen line agencies. The regional director of the national planning agency, NEDA, sat as a member.

- (3) Advising the Development Board was the *BRBDP advisory committee*, chaired by the regional archbishop. The Board itself contained representatives of farmers' groups, Barangay associations, civic clubs, business, and the communications media.
- (4) *Project offices* containing officials from line organizations were established to plan and conduct individual projects. Usually a representative from the line agency which received the bulk of the project funds headed the project office; working with him were representatives of other agencies concerned in the project and usually a senior member of the Bicol Program Office staff.³ Rivalries between line agencies occurred over the designation of which one would be appointed the lead agency for individual projects. A large part of the cost of project development was absorbed by the Program Office.
- (5) *Subregions*, usually defined in terms of rural municipal boundaries, were designated. Within each subregion conference groups called *Area Development Teams* were established. The teams contained local political administrators, representatives from line agencies and local notables. These teams were responsible for information sharing, social monitoring, and (putatively) for sub-area coordination. Area Development Teams provided some coordination among the local line agencies, and information feedback to the Program Office. The Teams acted as lobbying groups to secure projects within their sub-regions.

This *formal* structure provided the potential for *informal* interaction among regional directors and stimulated the participation of recalcitrant agencies (compare Rubin, 1974).

On a typical day there would be a formal morning meeting of the Highway Project Office, with representatives from public works, highways, political administrators, and the Bicol Program Office. Business would continue to be discussed over lunch. The same group minus the technicians and mayors, but including the regional agency heads and the governors, would then proceed to an afternoon meeting of the BRBDP. Important formal discussions would occur, and important private compromises would be worked out at a subsequent dinner party at the Director's house. Participation by all agencies was virtually required at the formal meetings (lest another agency establish a commanding position), yet much of the decision making occurred in informal inter-agency agreements at the parties or meals.

Complicated networks of formal and informal relations developed. For example, the Program Office helped the governors establish a separate Provincial Development Administration Program. They in turn aided the

Bicol Program Office in influencing line agencies. To the extent that the governors could be co-opted, the Program Office could increase its influence over line agencies.

BRBDP surpassed its predecessors in establishing an integrative development organization (cf. Mosher, Corpuz, et al., 1977). Many problems continued. National level officials sought to increase their control of the program. Rivalries for program leadership and project funding occurred between the line agencies. There were personal frictions. Some of the weaker line agencies felt their interests were ignored by the lead agencies. The first baseline social survey ignored line agency input and was poorly done. Over-optimistic estimates were made of the costs of infra-structure projects. National offices failed to release funds on time and work was delayed.

Such problems are hardly unique; they hinder most developmental agencies. They did not prevent important accomplishments by the BRBDP.

- (1) An organization with well-trained social, economic and technical planners was established in an isolated area in a developing country.
- (2) National and international attention were focused on the Bicol Region.
- (3) Coordinated social and infra-structure projects were established, involving different combinations of staff from irrigation, highway, public works, agrarian reform, health, planned industries and fisheries.

BRBDP for a time at least established reasonable incentives to inter-agency coordination.

This did not develop spontaneously. It grew out of experimentation by the Program Office. The BRBDP provided incentives to assure line agency cooperation and to minimize line agency fears that the BRBDP would be a major rival for funds. The BRBDP convinced the line agencies that bureaucratic competition at the center need not be detrimental to the aspirations of regional officials in the Bicol. A benefit received by the regional office of any of the line agencies would make it easier for other agencies to receive similar benefits. BRBDP established a structure in which it became rational for individual agencies to support each others' projects.

The Program Office devised schemes to help the regional offices of line agencies: Information obtained at Program Office and BRBDP meetings improved the chances of the individual line organizations succeeding at their own projects. So long as regional directors could be made to look good to their center offices, participation in regional planning was assured.

As the individual regional directors and local political administrators came to participate in Program Office meetings they found that valuable information could be exchanged. Governors learned which roads were being built by national agencies and coordinated smaller provincial projects with them. The Bureau of Fisheries and the Irrigation Department learned from the local leaders about local obstacles to technically feasible projects. For example, a plan to provide certain subsistence weavers with commercial fishing generated villager fears that the construction involved would destroy the weaving industry without immediately replacing it with fishing. The plan was modified. Similarly, a governor, a highway official and an irrigation director learned that no one had taken responsibility for a vital bridge on a new highway crossing an irrigation channel. It was to the benefit of all three to rectify the oversight. They did so.

BRBDP activities could be exploited by regional offices within their own agencies. Both political and technical agencies could benefit from the same successful projects. For example, a low cost project using native herbs to cure worms required additional funding; a governor learned of the program at a Program Office meeting and volunteered to obtain funds. The health agency, the Program Office and the Governor could all claim credit for this beneficial project. Similarly, credit for establishing land redevelopment, agricultural, and irrigation societies was claimed by several agencies. Each provided part of the input; each could claim (to their own central offices) responsibility for the successful project. Thus was mutual back scratching institutionalized.

The burden of failures could also be diffused. For example, an irrigation project was badly planned and more poorly implemented. The tendency in any bureaucratic agency is to cover up such matters. This has its costs: the lessons of errors don't get learned. In this case the Program Office contracted for a report detailing the errors and absorbed a disproportionate share of the blame. Of course the Program Office placed much of this blame on inadequate preliminary coordination.

The Bicol Program enabled line agencies to individually exploit the 'integrated development' concept. In preparing funding requests highway agencies, fisheries, irrigation, health, etc. emphasized work which could only be justified under the 'integrated planning' rubric.

In preparing such proposals the line agencies were able to draw upon the specialized planners of BRBDP. Technical plans had to be provided by the line agencies. But the economic and social data required by international donors could now be obtained from a responsive and accessible regional planning organization.

The line agencies could also use BRBDP to whipsaw the central government into increasing their regional budgets. With support from the

Program Office one agency could claim that a project had to be built in the Bicol to complement a project of another agency. This argument could increase the share of a line agency's budget. The gains of such whipsawing tactics were to the career advantage of regional directors.

The Program Office could suggest specific projects to line agencies. This does not imply their willingness to accept the BRBDP as a project innovator. For example, local government and health department officials were reluctant to support a Program Office proposal for a village health worker program. It would have established barefoot doctors in isolated villages, with initial funding from international donors. But the proposal would require long-term budget commitments which were seen as diversions from the health department's mission, and it was opposed and rejected.

This illustrates the care the Program Office must take in defining its role. It can be most successful in coordinating line agencies in projects which maximize their individual long term goals. Planners who expect integrative development agencies to modify line agency objectives assure the failure of their agency. Improving coordination between agencies in projects they already can handle constitutes a marked gain.

The planning function provided by the BRBDP Program Office was a useful free good for the line agencies. Economic and social planning is costly, and most planning is done in centralized national offices. Unfortunately, central planning is often remote from rural reality and useless to implementing agencies.

The Program Office provided a *local* staff of competent social and economic planners that none of the regional agencies and certainly none of the local governmental agencies could afford.⁴

The planning function indicates the line between an acceptable free good and an unacceptable rivalry. Successful planning stimulates expansion of the planning agency. This leads to staff expansion. This can raise doubts among line agencies about the ultimate costs of a planning office.

Planning skills may create temptations to enter into project implementation. This would destroy the motivation for line agency cooperation.

Bureaucratic restraints on growth and intervention are costly to the regional planners. Chances for promotion are reduced. In the BRBDP three strategies were used to ameliorate these costs. Officials were given generous salaries and fringe benefits (especially international travel and training). The Program Office recruited individuals who could return to other agencies or academia.

Finally, an appeal was made to the ethnic loyalty of the staff members. Most of the higher staff of the BRBDP Program Office are from the Bicol. They enjoy working in an informal yet innovative atmosphere for higher

than average salaries. They are also paid in part with the personal satisfaction of helping the people of their area. To pay its staff with psychic satisfaction—and to communicate with regional directors—requires the location of a regional planning office in the target region and not at the center of government.

CONCLUSION

An integrative development agency must walk the line between being strong and effective enough to garner support from line agencies but not so strong as to threaten their resource bases. It must attract enough resources to 'sweeten the pot' for the line agencies; yet it cannot in the long run justify its existence entirely as the provider of large scale funding.⁵ The Bicol River Basin Development Program seemed to meet these requirements.

The particular institutional forms required by integrative development agencies depend upon the political contexts in which they operate. But several lessons apply to the institutionalization of integrated development programs in general:

- (1) Integrated development programs can only be established in conjunction with existing line agencies, which are initially reluctant to cooperate. Cooperation must be induced.
- (2) Over the long run an integrative development agency can only act as a coordinating and planning body. Its ability to coordinate will be strengthened if national or international funding agencies require it to sign off on line agency plans. But the actual implementation of projects must be assigned to those line agencies. Anything else guarantees bureaucratic opposition and program failure.⁶
- (3) A valued function performed by integrative agencies is facilitating informal communications among line agencies. A skilled integrative development organization will blend an informal communication function with its more formalized planning activity.
- (4) The career motivations of the members of integrative development organizations must be considered. Civil service procedures must permit easy entry and exit and the lateral movement of well paid planners.
- (5) Integrative development organizations cannot succeed unless there is a modicum of regional autonomy. Regional deconcentration creates bureaucratic administrators with enough power to permit bargaining and log rolling. As noted, the size of the region is important.

- (6) Finally, an outside agency—such as an international donor—can provide leverage and seed capital for organizing integrated development. The donor agency must emphasize its interest in the development of the planning and coordinating function. If the line agencies interpret integrated development to mean only “jargon required to secure international funding,” line agency support for the coordinating agency will be withdrawn when large scale funding ends.

NOTES

1. A major underlying assumption of the ‘public choice perspective’ is that entities act independently of each other. Problems occur when rationally acting entities (i.e., acting to maximize utility) co-exist in a social system that combines their actions in an undesired fashion. Articles in the journal, *Public Choice*, illustrate this school of political economy. The approach has been applied to organizational behavior by Tullock and by Niskanen (1971). Amacher’s (1976) reader illustrates public choice approaches to other policy oriented problems.

2. Material on the Bicol was collected through extensive interviewing and observation during the summer of 1977. Though many ideas were given by the participants, the interpretations are entirely my own. I do not claim that the Program Office staff consciously analyzed the administrative requirements. Rather, I am simply trying to simulate the logic they, as skillful administrators, used implicitly.

3. For example, a fisheries project office involved officials from the Program office and the Bureaus of Public Works, Soils, Fisheries and Lands.

4. Minimally such data was needed to satisfy the demands of international donors.

5. This problem becomes increasingly acute as integrated development programs develop in other regions. The Bicol or Mindoro could easily absorb the entire discretionary development budget of the Philippine government.

6. The ‘Council of Government’ concept in U.S. administrative planning and the role of ‘A-95’ in particular should be compared (cf. Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations, 1973).

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