


EVALUATION CONJOINTE DU PROGRAMME D'AIDE AMERICAINE AU SENEGAL

AGENCE DES ETATS-UNIS POUR
LE DEVELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONAL (USAID)

MINISTERE DU PLAN ET
DE LA COOPERATION
REPUBLIQUE DU SENEGAL



JOINT ASSESSMENT OF U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN SENEGAL

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

MINISTRY OF PLANNING AND COOPERATION

REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL

Rapport final / Final Report 1980

Dakar 9 July 1980

From: Working Group of the Joint Assessment of U.S.
Assistance Program in Senegal

To: Management Committee of the Joint Assessment
of U.S. Assistance Program in Senegal,
composed of:

Mr. Minister of Planning and Cooperation
Mr. Ambassador of United States to Senegal
Mr. Minister of Rural Development
Mr. Minister of Public Health
Mme. Secretary of State for Promotion Humaine
Mr. Secretary of State for Scientific and Technical Research
Mr. Director of USAID

Subject: Aide-memoire of the Joint Assessment

The Working Group of the Joint Assessment has completed its work and has submitted, here in, its report to the Management Committee. The report is based on the evaluations of USAID-financed projects for livestock, rainfed cereals production, irrigated perimeters, and rural health. The evaluation was undertaken by expert observers and beneficiary surveys were completed by the Ecole Nationale d'Economie Applique. The review and analysis of all findings occurred in a series of meetings with the technical ministries, development agencies, and USAID technicians. An initial AID assessment of current practices in project management and implementation has also been completed.

The purpose of this report is to assist the Management Committee for the Joint Assessment in understanding both the progress and problems related to current programs and to use this knowledge in defining the broad outlines for joint planning of future U.S. assistance programs to Senegal.

The principal findings can be summarized as follows:

1. In a time of economic constraint and partial restructuring of the economy, the priority of USAID development assistance should be towards increasing productivity, especially in the rural sector. This also implies a renewed stress on improving the organization and management of Senegal's physical, natural and human resources and an emphasis on the training of rural residents for the construction and maintenance of rural infrastructure and new productive assets.

2. The USAID program in Senegal has been responsive to the needs of food self-sufficiency and self-sustained development. However, it needs at this point to more sharply concentrate its sectoral activities and strive toward building linkages between individual projects and the macro-economic and social needs of Senegalese society.

3. Many of the difficulties encountered in the process of project implementation are due to the non-involvement of beneficiaries in the original design, and to their lack of their participation in the management of project resources and service components. Remedial steps in the process of project design and in the timely training of beneficiaries to assume these responsibilities must be planned and undertaken.

4. USAID can improve the efficiency of its program by designing more flexible assistance projects by means of increased use of local currency along with the greater involvement of the beneficiaries.


The report by the Working Group also presented a series of recommendations developed by the professional staff of the U.S. Agency for International Development, for the purpose of establishing a more collaborative mode of planning, implementing, and evaluating projects and programs in Senegal.

The report further recommends that the present Committee be continued as the Joint Evaluation and Planning committee - the Comite Conjoint d'Evaluation et de Planification (CEP). At the operational level, a standing Working Group composed of the Director of Planning and his Deputy and the chiefs of both the Program and Projects Offices of USAID would be established.

The Working Group will be able to constitute multiministerial ad-hoc committees for the purpose of planning the U.S. development assistance program to Senegal. A special fund will be established to finance the operations of the Working Group. Its purpose is to develop a joint strategy for a U.S. development assistance program over the long-term. The Working Group will coordinate any needed complementary efforts for future planning and specific program design. The Working Group will present its report on the conclusions of the next planning phase to the Management Committee on April 1, 1981.


Read and approved

The Minister of Planning and Cooperation



Louis ALEXANDRENNE

Ambassador of United States to Senegal



FORWARD

Created in the difficult period immediately following the Great Sahelian Drought (1968-1973), the bilateral A.I.D. program in Senegal exists today in a period almost as difficult as that prevailing six years before. The causes of this present crisis are both external and internal, both recent and long-standing. As related later in this summary, the cumulative effects are grave. The curative measures required must be radical and far-reaching.


Even before the dimensions of the present situation were fully understood, USAID in November 1979, proposed to the Minister of Plan and Cooperation that a joint assessment of the AID program in Senegal, 1975-80 be conducted. The four month assessment proposed, would lead directly to the establishment of a process for the joint planning of U.S. economic assistance in the 1981-86 period. In accepting this proposal, the Minister agreed to chair, with the U.S. Ambassador, a joint Management Committee which would supervise both the assessment and planning activities.

It was agreed that the assessment, as summarized in the present document, would include two elements. The first task would be an evaluation of the four oldest AID projects, representing the four principle areas of USAID activity in Senegal: dry-land cropping, irrigated agriculture, livestock, and village health. This evaluation would include a beneficiary survey, carried out by Senegal's National School of Applied Economics (ENEA).


The second concurrent task would be an analysis of the entire contemporary economic context in which USAID/Senegal operates and which it must seek to address. Following completion of both actions performed over the period February through May 1980, representatives of the two governments would come together under the joint Management Committee to review the findings and to consult on a regular basis concerning future USAID directions.

Both the original thematic outline and the organization plan for the Joint Assessment are outlined on the two pages which follow. On the conceptual side, the constraints-to-growth methodology intended for the main analysis proved to be methodologically impossible and had to be abandoned. The incomplete results of this constraints analysis are presented in Annex 5.3. The following macro-economic findings are based on analysis of current official documents and interviews.

Outline of USAID-Senegal Joint Assessment



Organization of USAID-Senegal Joint Assessment



FINDINGS

I. The Gravity of the Current Economic Crisis

A great deal was already known at the outset about the problems and short-comings of Senegal's economic performance, as well as its achievements. These achievements include the government's massive increase in rural development expenditure since 1974, Senegal's equitable wage policy since Independence in 1960, and the actions of the leadership to decentralize administrative authority, to maintain free expression, protect human rights and assure an open political system.

Senegal's constraints were likewise well documented. These included most notably, the country's lack of physical resources and its overdependence upon a single crop, the peanut, in the face of a fickle climate, depleted soils, and increasing foreign competition. Largely as a result of these factors, accentuated by the relative neglect of agriculture in economic policies before 1974, Senegal's growth performance since 1960 has been poor, or more likely, negative. The Government concluded an agreement with the IMF for a trust fund loan in 1977 and in 1979 for stand-by assistance. Senegal adopted a "Plan de Redressement" in 1979 aimed at bringing internal and external balance. All this was evident when the USAID began the Joint Assessment and was well expressed in the FY 1982 CDSS.

We were not aware, however, of the depth of the present crisis and of its full ramifications. Very recent events -- the OPEC price rises in 1979 combined with a disastrous growing season in 1979-80 -- have produced the most difficult economic situation in Senegal's history. The present assessment has forced us to look carefully at the accumulating evidence. It has brought out two related elements of special concern.

1. Senegal's balance of payments and budgetary constraints are now especially binding and are likely to endure well into the 1980s. Before, even in the worst years of the 1968-74 drought, Senegal was able to maintain equilibrium in its balance of payments, despite rapid rises in oil and grain prices. This was a result of compensating increases in Senegal's commodity export prices, massive foreign aid inflows (including food), and the short-term liquidity cushion provided by membership in the West African Monetary Union and the Franc Zone. Since 1975, however, the situation has steadily deteriorated.

While many factors have been at work, the principal new element is the growing debt burden. In 1972, Senegal's external debt was a modest 48 billion CFAF. In 1978, the public debt had grown to 191 billion, and a year later to 265 billion CFAF (\$1.33 billion). Debt service will take more than 22% of exports receipts this year and over 25% next year. Nor will the debt burden on current resource availability diminish much in the early 1980s.

Although the impact of the debt burden on foreign exchange receipts is diluted by the size of foreign aid inflows, Senegal has at the end of 1979 a negative balance in its foreign assets of 60 billion CFAF (\$300 million). The prospects are great that this deficit will increase in 1980 when the full impact of recent oil price rises, along with diminished crop production, will be felt. Senegal's drawing rights on the West African Central Bank (BCEAO) are limited.

2. The Assessment also helped to point out a second element in the current economic crisis, an element with even greater import for the direction of the A.I.D. program in Senegal. These are the organization and management problems of the major Senegalese institutions and instruments charged with rural development. Chief among these are the Regional Development Agencies (e.g. SAED in the Senegal River region and SODEVA in the Peanut Basin) and closely related to these, Senegal's cooperative system.

Regional Development Agencies (RDA's) in Senegal have constituted the principal instrument of agricultural modernization. As elsewhere, many RDA's originated as crop-focused agencies which provided inputs and purchased the crop. More recently they have become region-focused and concerned with the overall development of that region. The RDA's are the main instruments to channel foreign assistance for rural development.

For years, both Senegalese and foreign observers hesitated to judge the effectiveness of these agencies by the most relevant measure -- their impact on production -- because external factors, especially poor rainfall, were said to be influencing the result. But more recent analysis of SAED and SODEVA, completed in the past eighteen months, have concluded that the RDA's may have serious problems.

SAED's operation is documented in a report prepared by the Caisse Centrale, the FAC, and the IBRD (November, 1978). The report stresses severe problems of planning, budgeting, and supervision, an annual operation deficit of 800 million CFAF and generally difficult relations with the farmers.

More recently, a second Caisse Centrale/IBRD Mission looked at Senegal's other principal Regional Development Agency, SODEVA (November-December, 1979). This analysis reached the conclusion that SODEVA, as well, has fundamental management problems with uncertain impact on production, high costs, and difficulties in recovering loans made to farmers. These problems are compounded by the legal monopoly granted the RDA's in credit and marketing of farm inputs and production.

An even more profound disorder in the Peanut Basin, the population and production center of Senegal, has been that the cooperative structure seems in disarray, along with the system of rural credit upon which the production system has heavily rested. These difficulties have not sprung up overnight.

Senegalese cooperatives, with only a few exceptions, have been administrative entities created by the government. Very few were formed from any traditional, local organization. They were instruments needed to channel credit and other off-farm inputs to peasants, and to help in the marketing of the crop. Of the 2200 existing coops in the mid-70s, 1700 were concerned with peanuts. They dealt with the entire population in the Basin. This system put great responsibility upon the collective guarantee which tended to reward those who did not pay their debts. This disincentive has been strengthened by the need of the Government in years of poor rains to scale down or postpone repayment of debts.

Senegal's budgetary difficulties were well known and the government's rural development programs have long been an area of concern. But some important facts about the depth and character of the present crisis, driven by recent events, have only come to light in the course of the Assessment effort. Seen as a coherent whole, these difficulties present a somber context for the examination of USAID projects in Senegal and for the preparation of planning for the next five years.

II. The Slow Germination of A.I.D. Projects

A.I.D. began to design bilateral projects with the Government of Senegal in 1974-75, following the end of the seven year Sahelian Drought.

The basic purpose of the A.I.D. program in Senegal, as in the other countries of the Sahel, was to increase the capacity of the country to feed itself and so to minimize the threat of hunger and disease inherent in so harsh an environment.

A.I.D.'s Senegal program was conceived in a much wider context, in which the donors and the Sahel countries (CILSS) agreed to come together within a standing forum (the Club du Sahel) to achieve food self-sufficiency in the region by the end of the century. Senegal has been a leading participant in the Club/CILSS process since its conception when, in March 1976, President Senghor hosted the inaugural meeting of the Club du Sahel. Following upon earlier contributions, the United States Congress in 1978 authorized \$200 million to support this Sahel Development Program, which it recognized under special legislation.

All four of the projects evaluated in the course of this Assessment were conceived and designed in the 1974-1975 period, as the Sahel program was coming into being. In the context of the Sahel program, they concentrated upon improved food production (including livestock) and health care. The purpose of the present evaluation was to identify difficulties in the design and implementation of the projects and to estimate their impact upon the intended beneficiaries. Following this, these evaluations would be set beside the analysis of Senegal's overall economic situation. Taken together, these documents would permit the Government and AID to determine to what extent these activities really addressed Senegal's most important long-term problems, and to outline a future USAID program.

The written results of these evaluations are contained in the Annex to this report. The findings of each are summarized in the following pages. The major conclusions of the evaluation, however, are as follows:

(1) In difficult environments such as in Senegal, all projects are prototypic and should be explicitly recognized as such. This means that an emphasis must be placed on data collection and analysis so that a project may be carefully monitored and conclusions drawn from the project experience. There must be the flexibility to change elements of the project which are not working.

(2) The beneficiary surveys show that the local people involved support the projects, and their objectives. Much more needs to be done, however, to include the local population in the design and management of these and future projects.

(3) Public Sector institutions, especially the RDA's, have been the predominant focus of project efforts. This strategy must be reviewed. Expansion of development activities to other public and non-public institutions, particularly at the local level, should be undertaken.

(4) A.I.D. projects are experiencing considerable managerial difficulties. As a result, most are behind schedule. Certain problems are chronic: long delays in the opening of special bank accounts for project funds; delays in receiving customs clearances already assured under the A.I.D. bilateral agreement with Senegal; problems in obtaining qualified, French-speaking U.S. personnel; delays in the procurement, delivery, and repair of U.S. origin equipment; long delays in local contracting procedures. Both the Government and A.I.D. must devote greater attention to identifying and eliminating or minimizing the typical causes of these costly blockages.

(5) The economic productivity of the projects is proving lower than anticipated. Some technical production packages are questionable. Senegal's ability to meet recurrent costs has been generally overestimated. A great deal more thought needs to be given to ways in which A.I.D. resources may (a) stimulate local productive forces, both on and off-farm and (b) help to build institutions whose social value equals or exceeds the amounts spent to maintain them.

(6) A.I.D. has worked virtually exclusively via project grants. This is too restrictive given the dimensions of Senegal's economic problems.

A summary of the findings for each of the four projects follows.

A. Bakel Irrigated Perimeters (for full results, consult Annex 2)

The purpose of the Perimeters project, located on the Senegal River in the extreme east of the country, is to increase food production and provide food security through direct pumping irrigation from the Senegal River. The organization of this project, under SAED auspices, is based on a high degree of local perimeter self-management. Decisions on perimeter configuration, crop choices, debt management and, to an extent, commercialization, are made directly by farmers committees themselves.

The project is developing this small perimeters approach as an alternative to large plantation-type enterprises in the river's Delta region. In the Delta, where SAED controls and directs all activities, the forms of land tenure management and the roles of the farmers and SAED contrast sharply with Bakel. Under the Bakel model, land is held by individuals who share in all decisions and actions relative to the irrigation and working of their land. If it is successful, the Bakel model, in which SAED only participates to provide key inputs and services, may have significant ramifications for the future development of the Senegal Valley.

A three man evaluation team undertook a field evaluation of the Bakel Integrated Crop Production Project from March 28 to April 21, 1980. The ENEA team administered a beneficiary survey in the region during the three week period, April 11 to May 2. A de-briefing meeting was held on May 23, by the Working Group to present the evaluation findings to project officials and to invite their responses.

The evaluation team concurred with the basin water-control and self-management themes of the project. It found that the project was strongly supported by the farmers. This was substantiated with precision by the beneficiary study which found a strong desire on the part of the local population to continue with the project.

Despite variations between the two dominant ethnic groups in the area, the survey found that between 40% and 68% of those surveyed has registered a subsistence consumption surplus and between 7% and 23% a marketable surplus. This marks a significant achievement in the two years in which the project has been active.

Along with general support for the project, however, the beneficiary survey revealed strong criticism of various elements of project support. A large number of farmers, including a higher proportion of women than men, criticized the high price of inputs, the difficulty of procuring inputs when needed, as well as the failure of their pump units and irrigation systems to reliably and completely serve their fields.

The evaluation team generally concurred in these criticisms. The team noted serious implementation problems and below optimum production. The team concluded that shortfalls in productivity and hectareage were primarily the result of failures of the implementing agencies to deliver technical

assistance and materials in sufficient quantities and at appropriate times. The team therefore recommended that no further expansion of the perimeters should be attempted until these essentially institutional problems could be rectified. Otherwise, more sub-optimal perimeters would be created, to the loss of potential high productivity.

Among the serious deficiencies the team noted was the poor quality of SAED's topographic and pedological studies, a key part of laying out the perimeters. This initial problem was compounded by construction activities proceeding without reference to the studies and without consistent technical control and supervision. The team further found that technical packages (including improved seed, insecticides, fertilizer, herbicides and recommended cultivation techniques) have not been developed and disseminated. This is a joint function of SAED and of ISRA, the government's agricultural research agency.

Training was found to be another serious project shortcoming -- both the training of SAED project staff and of the farmers themselves. Existing project funds for training have been underutilized and are, in any case, insufficient. The evaluation team found that there is not sufficient trained SAED staff to do basic engineering work before the construction of a perimeter. In addition, there are inadequate numbers of SAED personnel to train farmers in water control techniques, pump maintenance, and horticultural practices. This training could have an immediate effect on higher production, as the farmers are the first to acknowledge. As a consequence of the lack of training, farmers are dependant upon SAED to help with pump repair. Since this help is unreliable, farmers complain about their inability to consistently increase production to meet the high cost of inputs.

The evaluators found it difficult to make any definite quantified statements about the cost effectiveness of the project. They also found that lack of data made it difficult to assess what increases in productivity may have occurred, whether of food or cash incomes. Farm level records do not exist; therefore, the computation of charges in net income for representative farm budgets are not possible. Nor was SAED able to provide current figures on perimeter indebtedness. Even given this data, however, the team considered that the constant unrecorded flux in such critical economic indicators as fertilizer and seed costs, fuel consumption, labor and productivity would make conclusions based on the data open to question.

This lack of adequate data has three important consequences. First, at the project level, one cannot be sure that the project's rate of return is competitive with other alternatives, such as dryland farming or animal husbandry. Second, because farm-level data is of primary importance in identifying factors which unnecessarily increase costs or restrain production increases, it is difficult to develop and recommend technical packages with any assurance.

Finally, at the perimeter level, the lack of simple farm records render farmers extremely vulnerable, since they cannot be sure of their indebtedness nor of the wisdom of individual crop choices. Their ability to manage their own plots is thus limited.

In addition to the crop production portion of the Bakel project, USAID has also been responsible for the establishment of an associated health surveillance system and medical services program. The surveillance system, established in 1978, is designed to identify changes in the incidence of disease resulting from the new irrigation systems. The village health services, begun in 1979, are designed to improve the diagnosis and treatment of endemic diseases and to improve sanitation. This health component was added to the original Bakel Irrigation Project Paper. The activity is administered by the Health Service office in Tambacounda, and is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health.

The Health element is suffering from a number of problems. First, because it is an add-on component directed by the Ministry of Health, the health services and surveillance activities are not closely integrated with the perimeter production program. Supervision is not close, so that two year old data is not yet analyzed. The village health huts have supply and management shortcomings. There is an apparent need for better management of the health element more closely integrated with that of the crop production activity.

Management problems, however, went deeper than this and affected the project as a whole. The Evaluation found that there is serious confusion over the respective roles of the expatriate advisors, the AID Project Manager, the SAED Project Director, and, in the health sub-project, the health program staff. Lines of authority are mixed. It is not always clear who is in charge and who should be carrying out which tasks. USAID has served as a source of funds, but not as an active participant in the continuing development of

the project. Expatriate staff, supplied by AID, work with SAED and are thus viewed as representatives of SAED's policies and practices. This perception has too often compromised their value as technical experts, lacking the independence in some situations to make direct technical recommendations, based on their own training and experience.

Progress in implementing the perimeters program has been considerably retarded by the inability of both USAID and the GOS to speed up equipment procurement processes and the placement of field technicians. Commodity procurement on both sides is laborious, complicated, and slow. Likewise, AID staff recruitment process, which failed to provide experts at a crucial point to assist SAED personnel in perimeter layout. As a partial result, the farmers went ahead on their own with perimeter construction, causing substantial engineering problems.

In summary, the evaluators emphasized the prototypic nature of the Bakel small perimeter activity. "The benefits from the project will come, not from the few hectares brought under irrigation during the life of the project, but rather from replication of a refined system of irrigated agriculture in later years. The present state of the art, as currently practiced in Bakel, with high costs and low yields allows insufficient margin for error and runs the risk of being rejected by the producers unless efficiencies are produced."

B. The Eastern Senegal Livestock Project (See Annex I)

This cattle-production, range management project, located in an area south of Bakel in Eastern Senegal, tests a range management system which has shown promising results in dry areas of East Africa but which has been untried, until now, in the Sahel. In contrast to the standard use of wells with fixed grazing areas, this system is organized around the use of ponds, whose reserves of rain water are depleted concurrent with the carrying capacity of the surrounding range lands. Animals continue to move under this system in a modified transhumance, thus allowing the pasture lands to renew themselves annually. If successful, the ponds system could have an important effect on future range management schemes in the Sahel.

The Livestock Project evaluation was conducted from March 20 to April 18, 1980. The field survey in the Toulekeddi zone and in the towns of Bakel and Tambacounda took place between March 26 and April 4. The team was

assisted by Government and USAID project officials. The ENEA beneficiary survey was carried out between April 11-25. A technical level de-briefing to present the chief findings of the evaluation was held on Friday, May 23.

As designed, the Bakel livestock project consists of a series of actions: the bull-dozing of 26 rain ponds (the key to the project), development of herd rotation plans by herder groups as part of a comprehensive land-use plan for the zone, a program of fire prevention and control measures, and a monitoring process of range use to provide for the correction and eventual replication of the project. The project also provides for an extension program to improve animal production.

The project got underway in 1978 with the initial "sensitization" of villagers in the project zone by Promotion Humaine, Senegal's community development agency. At the same time, the project saw to the preparation of water catchments and firebreaks and to the establishment of a veterinary health program under Senegal's Livestock Service. AID provided an engineer, a range management specialist, and a livestock expert.

In as much as only two of the 26 ponds had been completed prior to the onset of the rains in June, 1979, the evaluation team was unable to comment on the success or failure of the overall undertaking. The team did, however, reach important conclusions on the state of advance of other components of the project.

After two years delay owing to local contract negotiations, the administrative and laboratory structures, and the technician housing, is now complete. Some 200 kilometers of firebreaks and three firetowers have also been constructed. Ten more ponds are expected to be ready for the rains in 1980, leaving fourteen more to complete the system. Since only two ponds were ready to serve the project zone this past year, the ENEA beneficiary study showed herder dissatisfaction: the ponds were 10-15 kilometers distant from some villages and, being remote, attracted beasts of prey. The herders registered clearly in favor of the digging of new village wells or the repair of old ones. It will be important to determine if these attitudes persist.

The evaluation revealed a serious deficiency in data collection and analysis under the project -- a particularly important component in view of the prototype character of the range system being tried. Given the absence

of data, the team concluded that it was not possible to verify any gains which may have occurred, in forage or animal production. Related to the absence of data collection is the absence of an effective animal production package, and hence of effective animal husbandry services.

The Veterinary Services component, on the other hand, is in place and fully functioning. It offers impressive services to the herders. In the survey of beneficiaries, herders from the zone of the project expressed particular satisfaction with the animal health aspects of the project; including vaccinations and the provision of medicines for their herds.

As in the irrigated perimeters project, the evaluation team found that a more concerted effort must be made to train Government project staff. There are not sufficient numbers trained to carry out range monitoring and so to develop the required technical packages. Staff must be prepared to assess species composition, biomass data, herd size and movements, and the relation between the density of human settlements and transhumance.

According to the evaluation report, the most important remaining work to be done as the installation of the ponds continues is the development of the range management plan and of the livestock production technical packages. In order to accomplish these tasks well, the local herder organizations, called for under the project, must become more closely involved. For the time being, however, the ENEA survey indicates that the local herder organizations have only a "paper" reality. Their members do not know what role they are expected to perform. Yet, it is the local herder groups which must ultimately assume responsibility for the range plans and the production of cattle.

The evaluation revealed a number of knowledge gaps impeding the preparation of the overall land-use plan for the zone. To make the legal designation of control over water points by herder villages, sociological land use research is needed. The villagers themselves seem to have a good idea of the ecological necessity of these assignments. In no case, the evaluators stressed, should outside agents, whether expatriate project personnel, Promotion Humaine or the Livestock Service, make assignments of water points without close consultation with the herders. Legal assignments must be made quickly, however, to prevent outside herders from intruding into the area and disturbing the balance which the project seeks to assure.

Participation of the herders is also essential if the project is to achieve increased animal off-take. More will need to be known of the institutions and economics involved in cattle production and distribution. Once again, the herders are the prime source of this information. The same herder participation will be required if the project is to succeed in developing an appropriate extension package for livestock production. At this time, the herders appear to know more about how to produce animals in this zone than anyone else. In this regard, the ENEA beneficiary survey commented negatively on the technical level of field personnel. An attempt should be made to determine what technical levels of the staff are needed.

In short, lack of knowledge of the local environment on the part of the staff and lack of participation by the beneficiaries has restricted project accomplishments. Though there are few benefits so far to the local herders there is the positive fact, emphasized in the ENEA report, that the animal health program is very popular and can be said to contribute to overall productivity.

Regarding the organization of the project, the evaluation noted two important issues. First, those serving as extension personnel are Promotion Humaine "animators" rather than livestock technicians. They are not trained, or inclined, to gather necessary data or to give technical advice. Whereas their role has been to "sensitize" the villagers, the evaluation team concluded that the animators have instead tended to become a barrier to better understanding between villagers and project leaders. The fact that the animators do not speak the local language has hindered their own ability to communicate.

Secondly, no single manager is in charge of the project. Consequently, there is a confusion of roles and tasks. The evaluation clearly indicates that the Government's services are not successfully coordinated. The effectiveness of U.S. technical assistance is in turn limited by this situation. Since the evaluation concluded, however, meetings have been held, which have resulted in a clearer division of tasks within the Village Organization Group which coordinates activities.

Finally, the evaluation team remarked that even in design, the project was not well linked with either the national livestock sector nor with other sectors. Increasing the off-take of animals will be of little use if markets for these beasts are unavailable. The project design made no plans for

marketing activities. Unless corrected, it is questionable whether the project can make any direct contribution to the national goal of meat self-sufficiency.

C. Senegal Cereals Production I (Annex 4)

In lieu of a full team evaluation, the Joint Assessment Working Group reviewed three recent USAID evaluations of the Cereals Project, along with materials from CILSS, the University of Michigan, and SODEVA, in order to determine what progress has been made in cereals production. The group had the benefit of contact with SODEVA officials from both the central office and the regions. ENEA carried out a beneficiary survey in the Department of Thiès and Diourbel in April 1980. Finally a technical-level de-briefing was held on May 17.

The SODEVA program of crop diversification and intensification was the result of the early 70's drought and recurrent food deficits, particularly in staple cereals. The program was part of Senegal's evolving agricultural strategy and focused on millet and groundnut production. The national SODEVA program had three objectives: First, it was to achieve increased production of peanuts through introduction of improved technical "packages" of seed, fertilizer, and other elements. Second, the program was to introduce similar packages for millet intensification. Increased production was intended to move Senegal towards cereals self-sufficiency and hence to result in savings in import costs. Finally, cereal reserves would be stocked for emergency use during future droughts. Food security would be enhanced.

The USAID component of SODEVA's program was designed primarily to increase millet production, given millet's importance for Senegal in food security. The USAID contribution was also designed to assist in crop diversification and intensification. Of the program USAID funded:

1. The training and payment of increased numbers of village level extension agents.
2. In-service training for existing extension workers.
3. Upgrading of training and extension facilities and materials.
4. The establishment of a farm training demonstration system using USAID funded equipment.
5. The establishment of an Economic Research and Evaluation Unit which would circulate agricultural production results back to the

agricultural research station as part of the process of improving the production package.

The evaluation of the SODEVA program, although much less extensive than the other three project evaluations, brought several important points to light.

Despite the laudable data collection work of the Economic Liaison Unit within SODEVA, it remains extremely difficult to assess either the real economic viability of SODEVA technical packages or the overall contribution of the program to national food self-sufficiency and import substitution. This is partially a data problem, but it also reflects the underlying difficulty of evaluating a program which is likely to take a long time to actually demonstrate farm level improvements. The evaluation recommended, therefore, that AID should keep an open mind concerning the overall performance of the Rural Development Agencies, and in keeping with the long time perspective of the Sahel Development Program, should not withdraw support from programs just because they do not show early results.

It is difficult to measure changes in productivity within a short period, given weather, pricing, input availability and other exogenous variables. The beneficiary survey conducted by ENEA of 281 farmers in the Thiès and Diourbel regions did, however, attempt to gauge changes in cultural practices and yields since 1974. The survey found that acreage reserved for groundnut production had increased in both regions. While there are no significant changes in the distribution of yields for Thiès, the number of farmers in Diourbel receiving between 500-600 kg/ha of millet has increased from 56% to 68% since 1974. The number of farmers has also increased from 30% to 45% receiving a yield of 50-100 kg/ha of niébé.

The evaluation showed that the project design failed to recognize that millet production is a system of tasks extending from research to marketing. While the USAID contribution to SODEVA concentrated upon the strengthening of extension work, other financial, managerial and institutional factors also play crucial roles in the ultimate increases in cereals production and in farmer and national returns. Given the fact of this train of activities, project officials in administering specific tasks, need to be sensitive to changes in the wider system. For example, the evaluation pointed out, the recent movement of CNCAD out of millet purchasing and marketing will have a strong effect on production and on the amount of millet reaching consumers.

Both may decline unless there are compensating actions taken elsewhere in the system.

The evaluation raised the prospect that, unless blockages can be removed to the timely delivery of seeds, fertilizers, and other inputs, there may have to be increased reliance on the private sector for inputs. The findings of the ENEA beneficiary survey showed differences in the behaviour of farmers from Thiès and Diourbel regions regarding the sources they turned to for some of the inputs they require. The Diourbel farmers are more likely than those in Thiès to make additional purchases in the open market of fertilizer and pesticides (70% and 66% compared to 9% and 4% for farmers in Thiès).

The evaluation also noted that the failure of the project at the outset to view millet production as an integrated system has resulted in cutting the project off from national objectives and from other projects. The evaluation felt that, if the cereals project were assessed relative to the consumer preference for rice and to the regional comparative advantages in production of millet, the goal of cereals self-sufficiency might be called into question. It was judged likely that Senegal can produce sufficient millet but, it is just as likely that this production would be at a cost greater than either imported rice or millet.

The evaluation devoted attention to the prospect that the recent enlargement of SODEVA's institutional mandate may overwhelm the technical and managerial capacities of the institution. SODEVA is expanding into new administrative functions (cooperatives, credit supervision), as well as into new sub-sectors (crops other than millet, livestock). In sum, the evaluators feared that SODEVA is being given greater responsibilities than it can handle, to the peril of both the farmers and the consumer.

D. Sine Saloum Rural Health Care Project (See Annex 3)

The Sine Saloum Rural Health Care Project was evaluated by a three member team assigned directly by the Administrator of AID. The Bennet Team visited Senegal from March 21 through April 18, 1980.

The basic concept of the Health project is to improve the level of health in the Sine Saloum region by establishing a system of village level health huts, staffed with local personnel who are trained to handle first aid, to assist births, to improve village sanitation and to dispense basic medicines.

In principle, the system is to be financially and administratively self sustaining. The project has instituted a system of user fees and local management committees have, in theory, assumed responsibility for the management and administration of the village level system. This system represents a bold departure from present practices in Senegal and, if successful, could set an important precedent. As a result, the project receives wide press coverage and political attention.

The evaluation determined that the Sine Saloum project is in many ways more about management and administration than it is about health. The project undertook the immense task of establishing 600 village level, auto-financed health care units in five departments of the Sine Saloum region serving 700,000 people. Although the basic medical interventions are simple, the organizational task and potential impact is immense. The project formally began three years ago, but the huts have only begun to function in the last nine months, in two of the five target departments.

The evaluation team observed that this massive and administratively complex project was undertaken without pilot project experience to guide it. Because the project is such a significant departure from the existing system, the GOS/USAID project staff could not have anticipated the implementation problems encountered. Additionally, because of pressure to open huts as soon as possible in other departments, few lessons from Niore, in the oldest in the project, are being applied. In short, the general Government/USAID management is not giving due recognition to the experimental nature of the program. Consequently, the direction has not made important redesign changes where required.

In this respect the evaluation team criticized the approach adopted by the USAID management. "USAID never provided, and does not now have, a strong cohesive technical assistance team to help administer the project." Instead AID adopted a "hands off" style of management which attempted to encourage full village and GOS responsibility for management. The evaluation advocated an AID role somewhere between a "smothering infusion of technical advisors" and the present approach of no real supervision at all.

The Bennet team paid close attention to local participation and supervision by Government agencies. The team revealed that the basis of the entire system, the village management committees, were not functioning

effectively. Few of the 460 villagers questioned in the ENEA beneficiary study knew the functions of the committees or knew who the members were. Furthermore, Government officials at zone and departmental levels did little to keep the management committees viable or to check on the financial status of the huts. There are several consequences of this and several probable causes to the problems.

The primary result is that many huts closed shortly after opening, primarily for lack of staff or medicines. This phenomenon will, in all likelihood, increase since the evaluation found the whole system is decapitalizing at the village level. Receipts are simply not sufficient both to pay the local staff and to replenish the initial stocks of medicine, particularly as the system is now established. In both departments of Kaolack and Niore, 65% of the villagers questioned indicated that they had not gone to the health hut in the previous three months. Non-use is noticeably higher in Niore where the project has been functioning for some time. In comparison to other medical care delivery services, the use of health huts ranks first (61%) in Kaolack and third (21%) in Niore, rated after the health post and dispensary. Use of health huts for drug supply also varies accordingly: first (72%) in Kaolack and third (19%) in Niore. Few surveyed people report a shortage of drugs at the hut. However, 19% of people surveyed in Niore expect to get other medicines from the hut than those usually distributed there.

The root cause of many of the implementation problems of the project, the Bennet team found, is that basic decisions were made on recruitment of staff, location of huts, payment of salaries from receipts, choice of medicines, and the organization of the medicine supply system at a higher administrative level than that of the users of the health huts.

Another factor accounts for the weakness of the system. The local management committees could not or would not exercise local control over the health huts. First, the major decisions on fiscal structure and recruitment had already been made for them. Secondly, they did not receive the kind of training necessary to make basic management decisions or to collect the right kind of data to make those decisions. Promotion Humaine was to have trained the local groups in administration. Between this factor and lack of local finance, the future of the village health system appears dim. There was

43% of the Kholack sample and 57% of the Niore sample said they do not believe villages will be able to take on the cost of the health hut once all external help ceases. In Niore this opinion was shared by 76% of the village notables.

Overall, the team saw the system's problems as stemming from primary failure to consult the local populations and to factor in observed results to modify the system. There are strong indications that the original agreements on lines of authority, division of tasks and basic structures were not adhered to. Decisions were made at the Dakar and Regional levels without adequate knowledge of local conditions. Poor records have made it difficult to monitor the system, to supervise work in this large geographic area, or to know if the project is being effective. Lack of training has compounded the supervision problem. This in turn significantly increased the responsibility and work load of the Health Post Chiefs, particularly since the local supervisory units never were created. The whole project, purportedly self-financing and managing, has thus taxed rather than augmented both the financial and administrative capacities of the existing health system.

III. Reading the Assessment: Pointers for the future

A. The Pointers

As the joint planning phase begins (July-November, 1980) the Government/USAID Management Committee does well to review what the Assessment has shown.

The Assessment spent little time elaborating the well-drawn descriptions which exist of Senegal's basic limitations and requirements. Much has already been written of Senegal's extremely narrow production base (peanuts and some phosphates) and the rapid expansion of her largely unschooled population.

What the assessment highlighted is that the present low productivity of Senegal's capital and labor resources is at the heart of Senegal's development problem. Further the Assessment has shown that, both on the side of the economic evaluation and on that of the USAID projects themselves, there are limitations relying exclusively upon public or para-statal agencies to carry out development activities.

A major conclusion of the project evaluations, though hardly unique to Senegal, was that without adequate incentives, training, and responsibility local populations will not carry forward project activities, much less

propagate them. For this to happen, local populations - the beneficiaries themselves - must play a key part in the design and administration of their projects. Training, the evaluations stressed, in addition to incentives and delegation of authority, is very important to true local participation and cannot be ignored.

In a larger sense, as well, the economic assessment underlined the importance of reducing our reliance on public services -- subsidized credit and government extension services, for example -- to increase rural production. More needs to be understood about how less regulated markets work for credit, inputs and crop sales. More needs to be known about how these markets might be used as instruments of development policy in Senegal. In the same way, cooperatives need to be formed around activities which the farmers really want to do together; otherwise they are likely to fail. Productive off-season employment opportunities need to supplement agricultural production. Alternatives to the government co-operational form of organizing local initiatives need to also be explored.

Thus, ways must be found, and urgently, to begin building from the bottom, to create an environment conducive to the emergence of decentralized rural institutions and to the greater "ownership" of projects and programs by the people for whom they are intended.

Beyond this point, however, the Assessment had several things to say about AID projects themselves in relation not only to the local beneficiaries, as we have seen, but to the larger economic picture, as well. AID projects, it appears, are too insular, too inward-looking and self-contained. The projects do not appear to be part of an overall strategy in which all the various donors relate and exchange information. Possibly this is because, until Senegal adopted the new "Plan de Redressement", massively supported by the IMF and World Bank, such a plan has not before existed in earnest. But this self-contained quality of AID project assistance may also be a limitation of AID's log-frame design concept. AID, the Assessment suggests, should perhaps look beyond project goals to the adequacy of projects to meet national needs.

The Assessment, in this way, raised fundamental questions about the purpose and adequacy of the project approach when faced, as here, with a national economic emergency. Projects appear from this Assessment to assume

their true importance chiefly as prototypes, on the growing edge of the economy, pointing the way towards better ways of organizing irrigation, managing the range, treating the sick. Their time pay-out is never in the short or even medium term. Faced with these acute difficulties, however, shouldn't projects be supplemented with another kind of aid -- ones, if possible, which could make even the projects themselves impact more effectively?

These very points suggest the outline of a revised AID program for Senegal. The essential task of the Management Committee (which will be continued as the Joint Evaluation and Planning Committee, or CEP) will be to determine what the shape and content of this USAID program should be over the next five years.

B. Main Precepts for Future Planning

The Assessment, together with much prior analysis, has revealed the major constraints to development in Senegal.

The macro-economic aspects of those constraints have also been well defined by the IBRD and IMF. Senegalese policy makers have agreed with that analysis and are undertaking an extensive reform program. As a result, the IMF and IBRD are in the process of making major resources available to alleviate Senegal's balance of payments and budgetary difficulties.

The analysis by these international organizations also coincides with AID's policy view, especially in agriculture. The sectoral framework for AID policy was clearly established by the formulation of the Title III program now under implementation. This overall picture of balance of payments requirements, internal economic structural changes, and the resulting budgetary needs provides a cogent outline for AID program formulation. The principal policy framework for AID over the next five years, therefore, may be summarized as follows:

Balance of Payments: AID will participate with the World Bank, France, EEC and Germany in support of the economic reform program being initiated under the aegis of the IMF. AID will do so by supplying balance of payments assistance directed at the agricultural sector. AID has already scheduled Title III funds of \$7 million a year over the next three years. The USAID is proposing an Agricultural Sector Grant of approximately \$5 million a year

for fiscal years 1982 through 1985. The grant will be tied directly to the import of agricultural requirements needed to support production activities. While the combined total of \$12 million a year in agricultural sector support is modest in comparison with Senegal's requirements, it is substantial enough to permit AID to play a constructive part in the macro-economic considerations of the Government. This contribution also provides important political support for the IMF sponsored program.

Local Currency Program: Local currencies generated by the Title III Program and the Agricultural Sector Grant will be used to address internal structural constraints within the agricultural sector. Ways of dealing with these constraints may include revisions of price policy and market systems, the encouragement of village level cooperatives and the establishment of the means for creation of capital in the rural areas leading to the reestablishment of a dynamic African private sector within the rural economy. The growth of a private sector could involve the beginning of a rural banking system focused on agricultural production and related off-farm employment. A second way in which local currency proceeds will be utilized will be in removing the constraints identified in the agricultural sector: both by the policy analysis being undertaken in the first phase of the Title III program, as well as by the agricultural planning and research activity to be implemented in early 1981.

Project Assistance: The Joint Assessment of the on-going USAID program has revealed some limitations of AID project assistance. Nevertheless, project assistance will remain the principal form of USAID assistance in the near term. But, the local currencies generated by the Title III and the Agricultural Sector Grant will become increasingly important in helping create more flexible project assistance. The local currencies will be used in concert with direct dollar aid to permit more efficient project procurement, thereby accelerating implementation significantly. The local currencies will also be used to create linkages between the projects on one hand and local societies and administrative structures on the other. Such linkages will facilitate the involvement of these local organizations in the achievement of project objectives and will build grass-root capacities to utilize project aid more completely and rapidly. Assisting this process

in the future, a complete evaluation of the beneficiaries' needs by Senegalese organizations such as ENEA will precede the design of each project.

The AID program, therefore, for the period from FY 82 to FY 86 will be concentrated on a well integrated series of investments stemming from support for monetary reform encouraged by international financial institutions; direct involvement in removing internal constraints to increased production and economic growth; and finally, the establishment of project mechanisms which will impact much more directly and efficiently upon the beneficiary population.

The achievement of this strategy will in many ways depend upon close coordination with other donors, for it is clear that AID's share of total external assistance, while important, will continue to be comparatively modest. A more efficient mechanism for coordinating the inputs of other donors will, therefore, have to be identified and established. The modalities for this coordination, along with other important questions raised in the course of the assessment, will be pursued in the context of the joint planning activity.