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**Sheldon Gellar**

**Robert B. Charlick**

**Yvonne Jones**

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**ANIMATION RURALE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT:  
THE EXPERIENCE OF SENEGAL**

**Sheldon Gellar  
Robert B. Charlick  
Yvonne Jones**

**Cornell University**

**Rural Development Committee  
Center for International Studies  
Cornell University**

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Chapter VII by Robert Charlick and Yvonne Jones

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## PRFFACE

This study is one in a series of country monographs which have been produced by the Animation Rurale project. This project, directed by Robert B. Charlick, was funded in substantial part by the Office of Rural Development of U.S.A.I.D. under a research grant entitled "Participatory Techniques for Base-Level Development-Lessons from Applications of Animation Rurale to Extension and Local Organization Development." The aim of the study has been to clarify the goals and method of the rural development technique known as Animation Rurale and to indicate the outcomes which can be associated with its use in a number of different environments. A synthesis volume which brings together the experiences of Senegal, Niger, Upper Volta, the Cameroon and Haiti is in preparation.

The case of Senegal is particularly interesting and important. It may well be the only instance in which Animation has been adopted by a State as a strategy of "integrated" development. As the monograph indicates, however, this option did not persist for long even in Senegal. As elsewhere, Animation is now being used as a technique for base-level organization and for non-formal education for development. Rather than to conclude that because Animation is no longer being employed as a strategy that it has failed, it is perhaps more fruitful to examine in detail why it was abandoned, how well it functioned in terms of the fulfillment of its objectives, and whether these objectives were uniformly realised everywhere in the country where it was attempted. It is also vital to examine the technique which the Animation approach implies, and to see whether it can be successfully employed, apart from the functioning of Animation as a strategy. An essay on one such application by the private voluntary agency, Maisons Familiales, is included to shed light on this question.

The current monograph brings together a wealth of scholarship and experience in order to give the fullest possible view of the experience of Senegal with Animation Rurale as a strategy and technique. The work has truly been a collective effort. Sheldon Gellar, the principal author, is exceptionally well qualified to treat the subject with an unusual historic perspective and depth of analysis. Gellar has the advantage of having been a student of Pere Lebret in Paris during the formative years of the theory of Animation Rurale. His own research spans the period 1962 to 1979 and includes his original doctoral research on Development Politics, and a number of follow-up consulting visits to the country to contribute to rural development projects. His publications on the Senegalese State are already well known. Chapters I through VI are primarily his work.

Dr. Gellar has been assisted in this study by a number of scholars whose original research works and observations cover the entire period under examination. The work of a co-author of this

study, Yvonne Jones, is especially important for giving a view of the uses of Animation in contemporary Senegal. Ms. Jones did field work in Senegal in 1977 and 1978 and is currently preparing a doctoral dissertation for University of California at Berkeley entitled "Policy Making in Senegal--The Evolution of Rural Development Policy Since Independence." Her contribution to this volume includes the co-authored essay on Maisons Familiales (Chapter VII) as well as her insights from an unpublished essay on the rural communal reforms. Other scholars contributed to the research by filling out a case observation data form covering their experiences and studies. Several of them added to this data base by sharing their work and experiences in depth through oral and written communications. Contributing scholars include:

Dr. Jonathan Barker--research on local politics in Kaolack District (1965-1968, and 1973-1975).

Dr. Victoria Bomba Coifman--research in the Linguere area (1964).

Dr. Clement Cottingham--research on bureaucratic politics and public policy (1963-1965).

Dr. Lucy Creevey--research on the Mouride Brotherhood (1965-1968) and recent consulting visits to Senegal.

Dr. Martin Klein--research on 19th century Serer history in Sine-Saloum (1963, and 1974-75).

Dr. Irving Leonard Markovitz--research on development policies (1964-65), with additional visits in 1968 and 1973.

Dr. Villaim Simons--research in the Upper Casamance (1964-66, and 1977).

To broaden our base of knowledge of local level experiences still further additional data collection techniques were employed. Foremost among these was the use of a case data collection questionnaire which was sent to a number of practitioners who had worked on projects involving Animation type techniques in Senegal. Many of these were American Peace Corps Volunteers who had completed several years of service working directly with the Animation Rurale program. We are grateful to these volunteers for their contribution to our knowledge. We have chosen not to cite their specific experiences indepth in deference to the people of the communitite they served, and to the Peace Corps in Senegal. Contributing practitioners include:

Karen Blyth--Tivaouane Women's Project, Thies, 1975-78.

Jeffery Eustis--Sine Saloum, 1970-73.

Robert Fishbein--Sine Saloum, 1972-74.

Thomas Gilroy--Sine Saloum, 1973-75.

Douglas Kennard--Sine Saloum, 1971-73.

Francis Leary--Casamance, 1966; 1973.  
Robert McGurn--Fleuve Region, 1973-75.  
Sid Rosebery--Fleuve Region, 1973-75.  
Steven Seidman--Sine Salcum and Senegal Oriental, 1971-73;  
1974-75.  
Michael Stankiewicz--Sine Saloum, 1973-74.  
Ann Stribling--Sine Saloum and Casamance, 1970-72.  
Irving Varkonyi--Sine Saloum, 1973-75.

We would also like to acknowledge the contribution of Mr. James Rugh who has provided information on the Maisons Familiales movement in general and in Togo in specific. Mr. Rugh is the West African Area Representative for World Neighbors, a private American voluntary agency.

Special mention should be made of the contributions of two former Peace Corps volunteers who assisted greatly with the preparation of the case material on Senegal. Cynthia Moore was an invaluable research assistant on this project while a graduate student at Cornell University. Frank Casey, who was both a former volunteer and a contractor with U.S.A.I.D. in Senegal, helped us to understand the activities of Peace Corps animators in the Fleuve region, and to identify other important sources of information on the country.

Finally, the authors were ably assisted in their bibliographical search by two graduate students at Cornell. Mathew Shulman conducted a thorough computerized search of the major machine-readable archives, and Fred Kobb tracked down sources.

This case study is presented somewhat differently from the monographs on Niger and Cameroon. These volumes deal with specific project level interventions and the applications of organizational schemes in specific locales. The Senegal monograph, on the other hand, presents an analytic overview of the Animation experience, and discusses regional variations wherever possible. This difference in approach was decided upon due to the nature of the information available to us for each of the countries. From this overview the reader can learn a great deal about Animation in Senegal which is not readily available in other published sources. He can, in addition, consider how the generalizations which emerge from the Senegalese experience reflect on the broader question of the utility of participatory base-level organizational and educational techniques in different countries around the world.

Robert B. Charlick  
Editor and Principal  
Investigator for the  
Animation Rurale Study

### Note on the Use of Foreign Words.


We have adopted the following conventions throughout this volume.

All foreign words (French, Wolof) are underscored. Except as follows:

--The term Animation Rurale or Animation is underscored when it is used to denote a theory or concept. When it refers to a proper noun, such as the name of a governmental agency, it is neither underscored nor placed in quotations.

--Terms repeatedly used with reference to Animation programs or techniques are underscored in their first mention, and are subsequently placed in quotations. This is done to avoid encumbering the text excessively with underscoring. Examples of the above are: "animateur," and "moniteur."

--Foreign words which are proper nouns or names of organizations are not underscored even in their first mention. Examples are: Union Progressiste Senegaliase, and Promotion Humaine.





## CHAPTER ONE

SENEGAL: THE CONTEXT FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Historically, modern Senegal's national development has been shaped by two factors: (1) its dual status as both a Sahelian and an Atlantic country and (2) the French colonial experience. These two factors have molded Senegal's political life, social structures and political economy and continue to set the parameters for political and economic choice in Senegal today. Any analysis of the context in which rural development is to take place should take into account the tensions created by these factors, and the extent to which the "two Senegals" have become politically, economically and culturally interdependent.

Sahelian and Maritime Senegal

Senegal's cultural and economic geography reflects its dual status as both a Sahelian and a maritime country. As a Sahelian country, pre-colonial Senegal was an integral part of the Western Sudan state system which flourished in West Africa during the Middle Ages.<sup>1</sup> Most of pre-colonial Senegal was detribalized and divided into chiefdoms and small states with highly stratified

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<sup>1</sup>For a detailed analysis of the West Sudan state system, see J. Spencer Trimingham, A History of Islam in West Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 34-103.

societies and similar modes of political and economic organization.<sup>2</sup> These societies consisted of four principal groups: (1) nobles; (2) commoners or freemen; (3) caste-defined artisans; and (4) slaves.<sup>3</sup> One might also include, as a fifth group, the warriors who constituted part of the nobility despite their lowly slave origins. For many Senegalese, particularly those in the countryside, social status today continues to be determined largely by caste and other traditional social norms. Thus, artisans and descendants of slaves rarely marry outside their caste, village chiefs continue to be chosen on the basis of their ancestral ties to the village founders, and political leaders are still expected to distribute their largesse generously to their following to fulfill traditional obligations.

As a Sahelian country, Senegal was also profoundly influenced by Islam which first came to Senegal more than a millenium ago. Islam spread largely through the efforts of Muslim clerics and merchants who occupied important positions in the courts of several pre-colonial Senegalese states. During the mid-19th century, Senegalese Islamic reformers, attempting to purify Islam and spread the faith "through the sword," came into direct conflict with French imperialism and offered stiff resistance to the

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<sup>2</sup>Senegal's pre-colonial political systems are analyzed in depth in Pathé Diagne, Pouvoir Politique Traditionnelle en Afrique Occidentale (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1967).

<sup>3</sup>Martin A. Klein, Islam and Imperialism in Senegal (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 8-21.

French conquest of Senegal and of what eventually became French Soudan. With the establishment of French colonial rule, Islam spread rapidly, first among the Wolof people toward the end of the century and later, among the Serer and Diola who had fiercely resisted earlier efforts at Islamization. Today, probably more than ninety percent of Senegal's population is Muslim, and most Muslims are members of one of several prominent brotherhoods.\*

As an Atlantic maritime country, Senegal has been greatly affected by Western influences and its early integration into the world capitalist system. Unlike her landlocked Sahelian neighbors to the east which had little direct contact with Europe before the nineteenth century, Senegal's ties with Europe and the West date back more than five centuries.

Maritime Senegal's proximity to Europe and the New World made it an important center for exporting slaves and an attractive site for Portuguese, Dutch and French coastal settlements during the heyday of the Atlantic slave trade.<sup>5</sup> Western influences obtained a foothold in Senegal when the French settlements of

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\*There are three major Muslim brotherhoods in Senegal; the Qadiriyya, the Tijaniyya and the Mourides. See Lucy Behrman, Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), and Cheikh Tidjiane Sy, La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1969).

<sup>5</sup>For a detailed analysis of Senegal's external economic relations during this period, see Philip D. Curtin, Economic Change in Pre-colonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the Slave Trade (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975).

Saint Louis and Gorée became "French Senegal" and were regarded by Paris as an overseas extension of France during the latter part of the seventeenth century. Euro-African communities of French culture emerged which served as intermediaries between the French and the Senegalese populations living in the interior. In the second half of the 19th century, maritime Senegal became the main base of operations for launching the French conquest and occupation of Sahelian Senegal and a good part of what later became known as French West Africa.

Under French colonial rule, maritime Senegal underwent Westernization at a much faster pace than Sahelian Senegal for several reasons.<sup>6</sup> First, the concentration in Cap Vert of modern European institutions-- e.g. banks, modern bureaucracies, and schools-- although controlled by Europeans, profoundly affected the Africans exposed to or involved in them. Second, the inhabitants of the urban communes of Dakar, Gorée, Rufisque and Saint Louis enjoyed the rights and privileges of French citizenship which brought them Western political ideologies and modern electoral politics.<sup>7</sup> Third, Westernization was facilitated by the presence of the largest European population in West Africa.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>Sheldon Gellar, Structural Change and Colonial Dependency: Senegal 1935-1945 (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publication, 1976).

<sup>7</sup>G. Wesley Johnson, The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal: The Struggle for Power in the Four Communes: 1900-1920 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971).

<sup>8</sup>Rita Cruise O'Brien, White Society in Black Africa: The French of Senegal (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972).

Senegal's dual status as a Sahelian and a maritime country also explains some of the dynamics of Senegal's past economic development and its potential for future development. As a Sahelian country, Senegal shares the poverty of its landlocked neighbors and the limitations on its rural development potential imposed by a harsh environment. Much of Senegal has a hot dry climate, a flat, bleak landscape, and light sandy soils suitable only for the cultivation of short-season crops such as millet, sorghum and peanuts. Most farmers are poor with average per capita incomes ranging from \$75-\$150 per year.<sup>9</sup> Since the mid-1960s, Sahelian rural poverty has been aggravated by chronic drought conditions which have obstructed government efforts to raise agricultural production and spurred the acceleration of the exodus from the countryside to the city.

The relatively high levels of economic development of maritime Senegal which encompasses the coastal band between Saint Louis and the Cap Vert peninsula contrast markedly with the poverty of the countryside. Half of Senegal's gross national product of approximately 2 billion dollars is concentrated in the Cap Vert region.<sup>10</sup> The relatively high levels of development of maritime

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<sup>9</sup>For more details on Senegal's income structures, see USAID, "Country Development Strategy Statement FY 1981: Senegal," January 1979, pp. 1-15.

<sup>10</sup>The socio-economic statistical data which follows has been taken largely from the following sources: Club du Sahel, Socio-Economic Data Book for the Sahel Countries (Paris, November 1978); République du Sénégal, Cinquième Plan Quadriennal de

Senegal are largely the result of five factors: (1) its proximity to Europe and the Americas; (2) Dakar's reputation as the best natural port in West Africa; (3) Cap Vert's excellent micro-climate; (4) abundant coastal fishing resources, and (5) heavy capital investments in social and economic infrastructure concentrated largely in Cap Vert.

Because of maritime Senegal's development, Senegal is the most highly urbanized country in West Africa, with more than 30% of its total population of 5.4 million living in towns of 10,000 inhabitants or more. Two thirds of Senegal's urban population lives in metropolitan Dakar which is expanding at an annual rate of 7%. Despite maritime Senegal's economic and demographic expansion, the country as a whole has not experienced real economic growth largely because of the lagging agricultural economy of Sahelian Senegal. The existence of two distinct but highly interdependent Senegals with unequal rates of demographic and economic growth raises difficult political, social and economic dilemmas which Senegal's leaders must resolve.

If the government continues to press for the development of maritime Senegal at the expense of Sahelian Senegal, it will widen the poverty gap, accelerate the rural exodus and promote

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développement économique et social, 1er juillet, 1977 au 30 juin, 1981, (Dakar: Les Nouvelles Editions Africaines, 1977); and USAID, "Country Development Strategy Statement FY 1981: Senegal."

widespread rural discontent which could undermine the stability of the regime. On the other hand, if maritime Senegal does not develop at a more rapid pace, the economy may not be able to provide sufficient numbers of jobs for Senegal's exploding urban labor force or to afford to support the high living standards coveted by the country's rapidly growing bourgeoisie, thus risking an urban revolt. Senegal's economic problems have been further aggravated by the drought conditions which have afflicted the rural economy since the late 1960s and the deteriorating terms of trade between Senegalese exports and imports. Senegal has been increasingly dependent on foreign aid and loans to finance its development programs, and its lagging peanut-based agricultural economy has made it ever more dependent upon food imports to feed the rapidly growing urban populations of maritime Senegal.

The Colonial Legacy: Peanuts, Underdevelopment and Dependency

After two decades of political independence, Senegal's political economy continues to be conditioned largely by structural patterns and constraints inherited from the colonial era.<sup>11</sup> The growing gap between maritime and Sahelian Senegal--"the development of underdevelopment"--has its origins in French colonial policies which oriented Senegal's economy around the peanut and

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<sup>11</sup>Much of the material in the following two sections on Senegal's colonial legacy is based on a monograph by S. Gellar, Structural Changes and Colonial Dependency: Senegal, 1885-1945.

made Dakar the imperial capital of the French West African Federation.

Senegal began to export peanuts to Europe as early as 1840. After the demise of the slave trade, peanuts replaced slaves and gum as Senegal's main export and became the mainstay of the colony's export economy. Peanut production was concentrated in western Senegal in those areas which had relatively easy access to the coast. Thousands of African farmers entered the market economy, drawn by relatively high peanut prices and favorable terms of trade. By the mid-1880s, Senegalese farmers were already exporting more than 40,000 tons of peanuts a year to overseas markets. Expansion of commercial agriculture based on the peanut continued until the outbreak of World War II, spurred by French investments in the colony's transportation sector.

Senegal developed three distinct but hierarchically interdependent economic sectors: (1) a "modern" sector concentrated in the four coastal communes of Dakar, Gorée, Rufisque and Saint Louis and based primarily on two main driving forces of the colonial economy-- foreign trade and colonial administration; (2) a cash crop sector built on peanut monoculture centered geographically in what are now the regions of Thiès, Louga, Diourbel and Sine Saloum; and (3) a subsistence sector which eventually provided an abundant supply of cheap wage labor for the towns and encompassed the so-called peripheral regions of Futa Toro, Eastern Senegal, and most of the Casamance.

The pre-eminence of peanuts and the peanut trade remained the main force behind Senegal's colonial export economy. Since the economic objectives of the colonial administration and French commercial interests were largely satisfied by simply expanding peanut production, the French had no incentive to invest in the modernization of agriculture as long as land and labor were abundant. Increases in production were due primarily to the opening of new lands, while production actually declined in the poorly maintained old peanut zones.

Senegalese farmers growing peanuts became increasingly dependent on external forces beyond their control. Downward trends in the terms of trade between peanuts and imported goods led to a decline in their purchasing power. The colonial administration permitted the major trading companies dominating the peanut trade to impose most of the costs of falling world peanut prices on the Senegalese producer. When the peanut farmers responded to this situation by switching to food crops, the colonial state stepped in to pressure the farmers to resume their cultivation even though peanut production was no longer a remunerative occupation.<sup>12</sup> French colonial economic interests were vested in the

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<sup>12</sup>For an excellent account of the Senegalese peanut farmers' declining purchasing power, see André Vanhaeverbeke, Rémunération de Travail et Commerce Extérieur: Essor d'une Economie Paysanne Exportatrice et Termes de l'Echange des Producteurs d'Arachide au Senegal (Louvain: Centre de Recherches des Pays en Voie de Développement, 1970).

peanut. Without this export crop, there would be little foreign trade and hence little business. The colonial state was equally dependent upon the peanut because most of its revenue derived from taxes levied on foreign trade.

While France's post-war colonial economic policies called for some modest industrialization and modernization of Senegal's peanut economy, the basic colonial economic relationships did not change. Senegal and the rest of French West Africa were still considered to be reservoirs of raw materials and markets for Metropolitan goods. Thus the basic contours of the Senegalese economy and its dependency on peanuts remained essentially unaltered. On the eve of independence, peanut products still accounted for 85% of Senegal's total exports; the cash crop sector continued to revolve almost exclusively around the peanut as little effort was made to develop other cash crops; the peripheral regions continued to be neglected and used primarily as reservoirs of cheap labor; and French businessmen and companies continued to control the modern sectors of the economy.

Despite some modest improvement in farmer income due to Metropolitan subsidies supporting peanut prices, post-war economic development in Senegal was accompanied by widening income gaps in the countryside, the persistence of structural underdevelopment

in the rural sectors, and a growing dependency on French capital which provided two-thirds of Senegal's investment funds during the post-war period.

### Colonial Class Structures

Senegal's colonial experience produced an interesting blend of traditional, colonial and industrial class structures which reflected Senegal's peculiar pattern of colonial economic development resulting from its special status within the French West African Federation. The immediate impact of the French conquest and occupation of the Senegalese interior was a leveling of the class structures of the pre-colonial African states. This was accomplished by destroying the power of the rulers and nobility, eliminating the warrior class, and abolishing the institution of slavery. All Africans living in the interior were reduced to the status of French subjects under the jurisdiction of the colonial administration. The leveling process was most pronounced in the Wolof states which encompassed a large part of the main peanut-producing regions and least pronounced among the Tukolor of the Senegal River Valley where feudal and caste structures persisted.

One of the most remarkable examples of adaptation to the colonial situation was the phenomenal rise of the Muslim brotherhoods and maraboutic authority. Although at first hostile to Muslim religious leaders (marabouts), the French came to accept them as collaborators and to incorporate them into the colonial system.

Cooperation between the marabouts and the colonial authorities was based on mutual interests. The French wanted peace, order and more peanut production in the countryside; the marabouts wanted more disciples and the chance to consolidate their religious movements. The French were willing to grant the Muslim leaders a good deal of autonomy and freedom of movement provided that the marabouts preached submission and obedience to French authority and exhorted their followers (talibés) to pay their taxes, settle new lands and grow peanuts as a cash crop.

Profiting from the voluntary labor contributions of their followers and from access to large tracts of land provided by the colonial administration, the leaders of the brotherhoods became Senegal's largest peanut producers. The wealth amassed by the marabouts and the recognition which they received from the colonial administration further reinforced their power and prestige. Within the peanut basin, the growth of the brotherhoods contributed to the peaceful transformation of former Wolof nobles, warriors and slaves into peanut farmers and to the expansion of peanut production. Outside the peanut basin, the marabouts exercised considerably less influence.

The development of the peanut economy affected the class structure of rural Senegal in several ways. First, it created two classes of farmers: those producing peanuts for the market and those who remained largely outside the market economy for

lack of a cash crop. Second, the influx of imported goods into the rural countryside reduced the economic importance of artisans. Last, the development of the colonial economy facilitated the emergence of a class of African traders, transporters and middlemen whose prosperity was tied largely to the peanut trade.

Class structures in the four "communes" differed markedly from those in the countryside. Urban-rural cleavages were aggravated by differences in the formal status of the Senegalese Citizens living in the communes and the Subjects in the countryside. The former enjoyed full political and civil rights and were spared the indignities of forced labor which the rural Subjects had to bear.

At the top of the urban class structure was the French community which consisted of civil servants, military officials, businessmen, and professionals. After World War II with the industrialization and modernization of Cap Vert's economic infrastructure, one also saw a large influx of working class white settlers (petit blancs) who came to Senegal to work as mechanics, technicians, skilled workers, barmaids and sales clerks. Senegalese class structure in the communes reflected the subordinate position of Africans in the colonial system and consisted of the following groups: (1) the Western educated auxiliary elite who served in the lower and middle echelons of the colonial administration and worked as clerks and bookkeepers in

the private sector; (2) merchants, petty traders and artisans concentrated primarily in the informal sector; (3) unskilled labor who worked as construction and maintenance labor or as domestics for the French and the wealthier Senegalese; and (4) unskilled peasants seeking seasonal work in the towns during the dry season.

Opportunities for urban Senegalese to advance professionally were extremely limited. Although Senegalese civil servants served in French colonial bureaucracies throughout the French West African Federation, their advancement to higher positions was blocked by discrimination and their lack of a university education. In the private sector, Senegalese also had little opportunity to advance professionally or commercially as they experienced discrimination in employment opportunities and in access to credit which inhibited them from being able to compete with the French and Lebanese businessmen. This long-standing economic and employment discrimination against Senegalese during the colonial era eventually led to growing demands for the Africanization of the economy.

The post-war modernization policies of the French--the industrialization of Cap Vert and the expansion of higher education opportunities--gave way to the rise of an industrial proletariat class and to an intellectual class whose educational attainments surpassed those of the older auxiliary elites and rivaled those

of the Frenchmen holding the top administrative and managerial posts. These new groups were more radical and militant in their nationalist aspirations than the older generation of elites. However, unlike the auxiliary elites, they often had fewer social and cultural ties with the rural populations and with the more traditional elements of the urban population who remained attached to ethnic and religious communities led by people strongly committed to traditional African and Islamic values.

### Politics and the Senegalese Political System

Politics in Senegal is essentially an activity of the elite based primarily on patron-client relationships and clan politics, reflecting Senegal's pluralistic society and changing class structures.<sup>13</sup> One of the main constants of modern Senegalese politics has been its domination by a Western-educated intellectual elite. Until World War II, activity in politics was confined largely to the Citizens of the four communes. The Western-educated auxiliary elites organized political parties, often in close collaboration with French politicians, but relied heavily upon the support of traditional notables and religious leaders to provide them votes when seeking political offices. Despite the

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<sup>13</sup>On clan politics, see Ruth Schachter-Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), pp. 125-126; Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, Saints and Politicians: Essays in the Organization of a Senegalese Peasant Society (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 149-200; and Clement Cottingham, "Political Consolidation and Centre-Local Relations in Senegal," Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter, 1970), pp. 101-120.

frequent use of democratic rhetoric, the Western-educated elite rarely went over the heads of the traditional elites to appeal directly to the masses.

During the post-war era (1945-1960) political life was extended to the rural populations who were granted the same rights previously enjoyed only by Citizens. But while the rural masses now participated in elections, they did so under the direction of their leaders, whose influence rose steadily with the extension of suffrage. The pattern which developed during this period continued after independence with the Western-educated elites running the government and the traditional elites delivering the mass support needed by the regime to survive.

Politics in Senegal cannot be understood without reference to what are called clans. A clan is a political faction consisting of leaders and followers working together to win elections. The term applies to economic interest groups, religious brotherhoods, and ethnic groups and can also reflect splits within groups. Local clan leaders use national politics to reinforce their power at home while national leaders use local clan politics to build a broadly based constituency throughout the country. Clan politics have continued to flourish to the present day, competing for power on the local and national level, and operating as rival groups within the dominant political party.

Efforts to build political parties around class-based politics have thus far failed dismally, despite relatively developed modern class structures associated with the industrialization of Cap Vert. During the post-war era, small radical parties, led largely by the younger generation of intellectuals who were influenced by Marxism and Socialism, drew very little electoral support despite their direct appeals to the urban proletariat and peasantry. Many of the former leaders of these radical parties eventually rallied to Senghor's party, and formed their own clans within the governing UPS.

The post-colonial political system has enjoyed a remarkable degree of continuity and political stability. Since 1959, Senegal has been governed by the same political party, the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS), which changed its name to the Parti Socialiste (PS) in 1976, and has been led by the same political leader. Although Senegal was in effect a one-party state from 1964 until 1976 when opposition parties were once again permitted to function legally, it has been one of the most democratic and least repressive countries in Africa. Today, it has a vigorous opposition press and a multiparty system consisting of four legal parties representing leftist and rightist ideological tendencies. Trade unions are permitted to function and even to strike. And the military leadership has respected the principle of civilian rule and military non-intervention except on a few critical occasions. Yet various factors threaten the stability

of the regime: deteriorating economic conditions, the destabilizing effects of Dakar's explosive population growth and burgeoning lumpenproletariat, and the intense political competition which has recently emerged in anticipation of the eventual departure of President Senghor from the political scene.

Senegal's post-colonial political system has gone through three phases: (1) 1959-1962, a period of fierce political competition and major institutional reforms which coincided with independence and the years in which Mamadou Dia was Prime Minister; (2) 1963-1969, a period marking the consolidation of Senghor's power and that of the central government, the elimination of other political parties, the slowing down of rural reforms, and rural and urban unrest; (3) 1970-1979, which saw the coming to power of technocrats, the deterioration of economic conditions, large inflows of foreign aid, and the legalization of political opposition in the late 1970s. Each of these periods has been marked by shifts in development strategies and rural development policies.

#### The Administrative Context for Rural Development

The administrative context for rural development in Senegal has been shaped primarily by the colonial administrative legacy and the 1960 administrative reforms which attempted to Africanize the administration, to bring it closer to the people and make it more development oriented.

Until the post-war era, the colonial administration was autocratic and paternalistic. The basic unit of colonial administration was the cercle, headed by a French commandant de cercle who represented the authority of France and was responsible only to the French colonial governor. He had three main tasks: to maintain order; to collect taxes and keep vital statistics; and to insure the maintenance and expansion of peanut production. He was granted wide and unrestrained power to achieve these tasks, including the power to order forced labor, to jail people without trial or hearing, and to preside over rural institutions, such as the Société Indigène de Prévoyance (S.I.P.).

The cercle was divided into cantons run by African chefs de canton. These were agents of the French colonial administration rather than representatives of the people and were assigned the unpopular task of enforcing the collection of taxes and recruitment of forced labor. Despite their subordinate position in the colonial state apparatus, canton chiefs wielded a considerable amount of power at the local level, especially when they were not closely supervised by the French commandant.

After World War II, several major changes in the colonial administration took place. First of all, it became less autocratic. The commandant could no longer administer his district like a feudal fief because post-colonial reforms gave rural Africans full political and civil rights. Second, the colonial

administration at all levels became more politicized and subjected to pressures exerted by Senegalese political leaders with strong ties to powerful Metropolitan parties. Third, the colonial administration became more responsive to Senegalese demands to give Africans a greater voice in making economic policy and running rural institutions. Despite the liberalization of the colonial administration, there was little evolution toward Africanization in the upper levels of the colonial administration until shortly before independence.

The transition from a colonial to an African administration was relatively smooth. It began in 1957 when an African territorial government led by Mamadou Dia shared administrative authority with the French colonial governor and ended with the administrative reforms of 1960 which reorganized the country's administrative structure.<sup>14</sup> As a result of these reforms, Senegal was administratively divided into seven régions, 28 cercles and 85 arrondissements, replacing the 13 cercles, 27 subdivisions and 135 cantons established during the colonial rule. In addition, Senegalese officials replaced French officials in field administration.

The most important administrative unit continued to be the

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<sup>14</sup>Sheldon Gellar, "The Politics of Development in Senegal," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Public Law and Government, Columbia University, 1967, pp. 234-244.

cercles which now corresponded roughly to the former sub-divisions, in area and population. By increasing the number and reducing the size of the cercles, the government sought to bring the administration closer to the people. While they were granted many of the same legal powers as their French predecessors, the Senegalese commandants did not enjoy the same real power and prestige due to checks on their authority stemming from the influence of local UPS party bosses.

One of the main innovations of the 1960 reforms was the establishment of the région and the arrondissement as developmental as well as administrative units. The région headed by a governor, was to be the main unit of decentralized economic planning. The arrondissement was to represent the smallest rural economic zone and to serve as the base for a multifunctional development administration. It was headed by a chef d'arrondissement who had much less real power than the old chefs de canton. In 1964, some changes in nomenclature were made to reflect the decolonization of Senegal's administrative structure. The cercle became the département and the commandant became the préfet. Later, the chef d'arrondissement became the sous-préfet. Despite changes in nomenclature and a redrawing of the administrative boundaries, the French administrative pattern with its hierarchical structure was largely retained. This was accentuated when, during the mid-1960s, the Senghor government moved to consolidate its control over field administration by strengthen-

ing the powers of the regional governors, who were charged with assuring strict compliance with all administrative orders emanating from the central government. Today, the regional governors are the most powerful civil servants in the countryside and enjoy much the same status and respect previously enjoyed by the French commandant.

In addition to reorganizing and Africanizing the old colonial apparatus, the 1960 reforms attempted to establish a developmental administrative structure which would serve more purposes than simply collecting taxes, maintaining order and sustaining the peanut economy.<sup>15</sup> The Dia government created a triad of development services to mobilize and organize the countryside: (1) An Animation Rurale Service which was to stimulate rural participation in development projects and to encourage the other services to be more responsive to the needs of the population; (2) a Cooperative Service which was to establish and provide technical assistance to a nation-wide network of rural cooperatives which were to be the foundation of an agrarian socialist economy based on the ideological principles espoused by Léopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia; and (3) Rural Expansion Centers which were to be multifunctional development services operating at the arrondissement level.

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<sup>15</sup>Edward J. Schumacher, Politics, Bureaucracy, and Rural Development in Senegal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 84-105.

After the departure of Mamadou Dia from the political scene in December, 1962, these institutions declined in influence and were no longer at the forefront of Senegal's development administration. During the mid-1960s the government began to focus its interest on specialized para-statal agencies to organize and implement the productivity-oriented projects.<sup>16</sup> This trend continued throughout the 1960s and intensified during the 1970s. Thus over the years, the Senegalese administration in its style of operation came to resemble the colonial administration it had replaced. Although it was now less autocratic and more politicized, it remained relatively paternalistic and elitist in its relationship with the rural population and did little to encourage local initiative.

#### Development Policy

During the colonial period, development policy in Senegal had been dictated by the needs of France which regarded Senegal as one cog within a larger imperial economic system. Although with independence Senegalese planners assumed full responsibility for formulating national development strategies and policies, their options were sharply restricted by the constraints imposed by the colonial economic legacy. The two major constraints preventing any radical dissociation from past economic policies during the early years of independence were Senegal's extreme dependency

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., pp. 106-130 and 186-218.

upon France and the crucial importance of the peanut to all sectors of the economy.

Senegal's economic dependence on France and the colonial system had reached such an extent that at independence approximately eighty percent of its foreign trade was with France and French West Africa, and nearly all of its peanut exports (85% of Senegal's export total) were bought by France at preferential subsidized prices. The peanut trade generated nearly one-quarter of the gross national product at independence and provided almost three-quarters of the monetary revenue of Senegal's peasantry.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, France provided two-thirds of Senegal's public investment and nearly all of its foreign assistance support. French private investors accounted for over ninety percent of the private capital in the modern sectors of the economy. Finally, France supplied most of the top-level administrative and technical personnel at the national level, and financed the bulk of the social service programs which were concentrated in Dakar.<sup>18</sup>

From 1957 to 1963, Senegalese officials, under the guidance of Mamadou Dia, formulated and began to implement a development

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<sup>17</sup>For the most detailed study of the impact of the peanut on the Senegalese economy, see J. B. Mas, "Le Rôle de l'Arachide dans la Croissance Economique du Sénégal," Dakar, July 1964. Prepared for the Senegalese Ministère du Plan et du Développement.

<sup>18</sup>Gellar, Structural Changes and Colonial Dependency: Senegal 1885-1945, , pp. 71-73.

strategy which stressed institution building, rural development, and structural transformation of the countryside rather than emphasizing immediate economic growth and rapid industrialization.<sup>19</sup> The strategy entailed nationalization of the financial mechanisms of the domestic peanut trade and the establishment of national financial and economic institutions which would give the government greater leverage over the national economy. It also included the creation of a Senegalese rural development administration and a rural cooperative movement, and the improvement of communication networks and social services to promote the integration of the peripheral regions outside the main peanut zones.

Industrialization under Dia's development program depended heavily on foreign capital, but the foreign sector was to be regulated by investment codes and licenses, and state participation in industries was considered vital to the national economy. The First Development Plan (1961-1964) concentrated on four large-scale projects involving Senegal's phosphate mining industry, its coastal fishing resources, an oil refinery and petrochemical industry, and a new textile industry.

Dia's economic policies enjoyed some measure of success in the rural sector. These policies, combined with excellent weather conditions and relatively high peanut prices, led to an increase

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<sup>19</sup>Gellar, "The Politics of Development in Senegal," pp. 229-318.'

of almost twenty-five percent in rural production between 1959 and 1962. Food crop production, however, rose more slowly as government efforts continued to concentrate on peanut producing areas. Dia's development policies were less successful in promoting economic growth in the more modernized urban sectors of the economy primarily because of some of the negative consequences accompanying decolonization. Senegal's loss of much of its three major West African industrial export markets (Mali, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast) had a dampening effect on its export-oriented industries. In addition, the withdrawal of the French trading companies following nationalization of the peanut trade, coupled with a decline in French military and civilian spending, led to the contraction of the urban commercial sector. A large outflow of private capital from Senegal from 1959 to 1962 also reflected a lack of confidence of French investors in Senegal's political and economic future.

Dia's economic policies aroused the hostility of several groups whose opposition eventually contributed to his downfall in 1962. His economic nationalism and socialist policies threatened the French business community, the ambitious Senegalese cadres in the private sector, and the local merchant class alike. Dia also antagonized the Muslim religious leaders by threatening to limit their political influence. Key members of the pro-Senghor faction of the UPS who felt that Dia was trying to replace Senghor as the country's undisputed leader were similarly disquieted. While

Dia's policies were radical enough to frighten conservative elements in the Senegalese political and economic system, they were not radical enough to win him the support of the left-wing opposition intellectuals and the developing industrial proletariat of Cap Vert.

Following Dia's fall from power the thrust of Senegal's development policies changed significantly. Now under President Senghor's undisputed leadership the emphasis turned toward quantitative production-oriented goals and project level interventions as indicated in the Second Development Plan (1965-1969). Development policies promoted during this period (1963-1969) could be characterized as neo-colonial since they maintained Senegal's political, economic and cultural dependency on France and French control over the modern sectors of the economy. Senegalese economic policies also closely resembled those which the French had furthered through FIDES during the last years of the colonial period.<sup>20</sup> These policies stressed a close collaboration between the French business community and the Senegalese state in economic planning, as reflected by the creation of institutions like the Economic and Social Council, and by the prominent role of the Dakar Chamber of Commerce in the formulation of state

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<sup>20</sup>FIDES stands for Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social. It was a fund to finance France's overseas development activities from 1948 to independence. See Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, French West Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 249-291; and Gellar, "The Politics of Development in Senegal," pp. 117-147.

policy. Import substitution and the development of a Senegalese peanut oil extraction industry was assured by liberal tax benefits and protective tariffs, thereby creating a lucrative market for French capital. In the rural sector the government fostered a technocratic approach to raising productivity through the diffusion of improved agricultural techniques and equipment. The main focus of rural development efforts was on the peanut crop, and was confined largely to the peanut basin of the country. Earlier policies of structural transformation embodied in the animation and cooperative programs were neglected in favor of the extensive use of French technical assistance personnel.

Despite its success in stimulating modest industrial growth, Senegal's industrial development strategy failed to generate adequate employment opportunities to prevent a steady decline in the real incomes of the urban sectors. The capital-intensive technologies used by Senegal's new and older modernizing industries created little new employment, thus doing little to alleviate unemployment levels.

After 1965, when peanut production reached 1.4 million tons, poor weather conditions and governmental policies contributed to the steady impoverishment of the rural sector. As in the past, peanut farmers switched from peanuts to food crops in times of economic difficulty and by the end of the Second Four Year Plan (1965-1969) peanut production had dropped to its lowest level

since the late 1950s, despite a major effort by a para-statal agency, Société d'Aide Technique et de Coopération (SATEC) to stimulate peanut production and productivity.

Toward the end of the 1960s, Senghor shifted his orientations, moving to accelerate nationalization and Africanization of the economy, and to give the younger generation of technocrats a greater role in running the country. A third phase in Senegalese development policy (1970-1979) began with the constitutional reforms of February 1970 which re-established the office of Prime Minister, suppressed since the fall of Dia. In this third phase Senegalese policy has been dominated by a group of young technocrats, politically loyal to Senghor and to his Prime Minister Abdou Diouf. This group has favored policies of increasing state control over the economy, and of a greater emphasis on industrialization. Development plans during this period have been extremely ambitious and focused on large-scale projects, primarily in the modernized urban and mining sectors of the economy. Large capital flows in the form of foreign aid and private investment have poured into the maritime area of the country. Advances have been made in the Africanization of the upper echelon of the state bureaucracy and in the nationalization of key sectors of the economy. Senegalese have begun to take a more important role in the private sector as well, due mainly to loans and contracts granted to Senegalese businessmen and to increased pressure on European firms to hire Senegalese managers and tech-

nicians. The main beneficiaries of these changes, however, have been the educated elites who assumed the roles, status, and economic advantages previously held by the Europeans they have replaced.

Rural development policy also shifted significantly, following several years of continual decline in peanut production and in the overall rural economy. In 1971, the government began to alter its policies which had previously squeezed the peasantry by raising the price of peanuts, lowering the cost of fertilizers, pesticides and improved seeds, and cancelling most of the peasantry's debts to the government. Good weather, combined with the restoration of economic incentives, led to a recovery of peanut production and peasant revenues in 1971-1972. This recovery was short-lived, however, as the sahelian drought of the early 1970s forced down agricultural production disastrously. Ironically, the drought and the economic hardships which accompanied it augmented the authority of the state and the prestige of the marabouts, as it was the government which administered the massive international drought assistance programs and the marabouts who assured that their followers got their fair share of the government aid.

The drought, Senegal's rapidly rising food dependency, and the oil crisis of 1973 convinced the government that Senegal's future economic prosperity could no longer be dependent on the peanut

trade. Thus, rural development strategies of the mid and late 1970s began to emphasize diversification of the rural economy based on irrigated agriculture and large-scale capital intensive projects outside the main peanut producing zones. Tomatoes, sugar cane, irrigated rice and cotton were introduced on an industrial scale in different regions of Senegal. Most of these projects were financed by foreign aid or loans and were implemented through the para-statal development agencies which assumed responsibility for developing certain regions of the country or sectors of the economy. These projects generally left little initiative for Senegal's rural populations whose participation was predicated on their following the guidelines laid down by the para-statal agencies.

By the end of the 1970s, Senegal was moving away from the neo-colonial dependency patterns characteristic of the first decade of independence. Dependency upon France was reduced, the relative importance of peanuts as the main source of foreign exchange was declining and efforts at nationalization and Africanization were advancing. On the other hand, the government was becoming increasingly dependent upon large volumes of foreign aid to fund the ambitious, large-scale agricultural projects administered by the capital intensive para-statal agencies. Given the Senegalese government's present technocratic orientation and ability to obtain large amounts of foreign aid, there is little likelihood that rural development policy will return either to

the agrarian socialist orientations of the Dia years or to the neo-colonial strategies of the mid and late 1970s.

Conclusions: The Context for Rural Development and Animation Rurale

Understanding Senegal's colonial legacy is particularly important to an appreciation of the Animation Rurale experience in Senegal, and especially of the experiences of the early years of independence. These were the years in which Animation Rurale had its greatest influence on development strategies as an agency to induce popular participation and decolonize the rural institutions of the colonial era.

Senegal's dual status as a sahelian and maritime country and its unique colonial experience have been major factors in the molding of Senegal's political and economic policies. Senegal's maritime location has given the country economic options not available to other landlocked sahelian countries. At the same time, it has created problems by increasing the gap between Dakar and the countryside, as the economic opportunities opened up by the maritime development have done little to relieve the poverty of the sahelian countryside. Senegal is thus caught in a vicious circle. The lagging agricultural sector is holding back the development of maritime Senegal which cannot develop rapidly enough to satisfy the increasing demand for wage employment. Continued stagnation of the rural sector will encourage rural exodus and intensify pressure on the urban sector. Yet giving

priority to the development of maritime Senegal will serve to reinforce the rural exodus to the towns.

While Senegal's maritime location has increased the range of economic options, its colonial economic legacy of dependency on the peanut has narrowed them. The shifts in post-colonial Senegal's rural development over the years and the changing role and relative importance of Animation Rurale reflected different approaches to dealing with the colonial economic structures and peanut dependence. Dia's policies stressed active rural participation in the new institutions which would lay the foundations for an agrarian socialist society -- policies which necessitated a major role for Animation Rurale. Senghor's neo-colonial policies of the mid and late 1960s represented an effort to make the colonial economy more efficient and essentially precluded a major role for Animation Rurale. Finally, the development policies of the 1970s which stressed Africanization, nationalization and large-scale projects marked an effort to overcome the constraints of peanut dependency and French control over the leading sectors of the economy. The managerial approach to rural development of the 1980s calls for Animation Rurale to play a more limited and professionalized role in contrast with its broadly defined populist mission of the early 1960s.

## CHAPTER TWO

ANIMATION RURALE: IDEOLOGY AND METHOD

The language of the theory of Animation Rurale is unfamiliar and often puzzling to the uninitiated Anglo-Saxon observer because there are no exact equivalents which have precisely the same overtones and connotations in English as the French words Animation, communautaire, and vulgarisation. To most Americans, animation conjures up the image of animated cartoons rather than "animated" people and communities.<sup>1</sup> However, to the small group of French Catholic humanists who conceived of Animation Rurale as a development ideology and methodology, the term animation encompassed a spiritual vision of what the world could become. Animation conveyed the image of newly awakened and mobilized masses marching together to build a new society based on communitarian values, cooperative economic structures, and participatory democracy.

Animation Rurale, as a theory, can best be characterized as a utopian socialist ideology as contrasted with the scientific

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<sup>1</sup>The term animation derives from the Latin noun anima which means breath or soul, and from the Latin verb animare, to fill with breath. The original Latin meaning is more faithfully reflected in the French usage of the term than in English. It conveys the idea of imparting life and soul to people and institutions.

socialism of Marx and Engels.<sup>2</sup> Unlike Marxism which provides a systematic explanation of the laws of historical development and the paths which all societies must take, Utopian Socialism is largely based on a vision of what society ought to be. It is predominantly moralistic and voluntaristic rather than scientific and deterministic as classical Marxism claims to be.<sup>3</sup> Utopian socialist ideologies usually take as their first cause a theory of the nature of man, his needs and capacities, and then deduce the kind of social order that could fulfill man's capacities and best satisfy all of his needs.<sup>4</sup> The new social order, in contrast to that posited by Marx, works to maximize communal autonomy.<sup>5</sup> Animation Rurale, as a theory, contained all the elements of a Utopian Socialist ideology adapted to the context of development in the Third World.

Animation Rurale derives much of its ideology and methods from the work of two major French Catholic thinkers, Emmanuel Mounier (1905-1950) and Father L.J. Lebret (1897-1966). Mounier was a Personalist philosopher, founder of the review Esprit, the most

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<sup>2</sup>For a spirited defense of the Utopian element in socialism see Martin Buber, Paths In Utopia (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958). For the classic Marxist critic of utopian socialism see Frederick Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966).

<sup>3</sup>Buber, Paths In Utopia, pp. 9-10. Buber notes that all voluntaristic socialisms are utopian from the Marxist perspective. But he also reminds us that there are many utopian elements in Marxism despite its claims to objectivity.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

influential opinion journal of the French Catholic Left, and was himself a hero of the Resistance.<sup>6</sup> Lebret was a Dominican priest, a moralist, and a pioneering development theorist and planner.<sup>7</sup>

As a philosopher Mounier provided much of the political theory for the doctrine of Animation. Mounier regarded both Capitalism and Communism as flawed systems. He condemned Capitalism because it destroyed traditional communities, atomized society, and perpetuated inequitable class structures. Communism was rejected because it suppressed personal liberty, subordinated the individual and voluntary associations to an omnipotent state, and imposed intolerably high human costs in order to achieve rapid economic growth. As an alternative to the evils of Capitalism and Communism, Mounier advocated Communitarian Socialism which would be based on decentralized and democratically controlled economic institutions.

According to Mounier, Communitarian Socialism would be achieved through the political education of the masses and the radical transformation of economic structures. To have an authentic revolution based on Personalist principles, the

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<sup>6</sup>For a fuller exposition of Mounier's Personalist philosophy, see Emmanuel Mounier, Le Personnalisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959).

<sup>7</sup>Francois Malley, Le Père Lebret, L'Economie au Service des Hommes (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1968). See also Denis Goulet, "Lebret: Pioneer of Development Ethics," in A New Moral Order: Studies in Development Ethics and Liberation Theology (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1974), pp. 23-49.

"revolution" would have to be both moral and economic.<sup>8</sup> Thus, individual attitudes as well as collective economic structures would have to be changed. Political education would "awaken" and mobilize the people who would organize their own grassroots peasant associations and worker movements based on communitarian values and opposition to unjust socio-economic structures. As peasants and workers gained more power the nature of the state would change. Instead of remaining an instrument of class oppression under the direction of the bourgeoisie, the power of the state would be limited and oriented towards meeting the needs of a pluralist and decentralized society. Like the theorists of Animation Rurale, Mounier placed great emphasis on the cooperative movement as one of the major foundations of economic democracy and the role of civic education in raising the political, economic, cultural, and moral levels of the people to transform them into better citizens.

Lebret, on the other hand, was both a theorist and practitioner of development. His work contributed directly to Animation's methodology. In 1941, Lebret and Francois Perroux founded Economie et Humanisme, an interdisciplinary research group which provided a philosophical structural critique of liberal and state socialist economic systems and called for a "human economy" based on need and service to people rather than on growth or profit.

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<sup>8</sup>Emmanuel Mounier, "Qu'Est-Ce Que le Personalisme?" in Oeuvres, 1944-1950 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1962), p. 183.

Denis Goulet, an intellectual disciple of Lebret provided the following account of Economie et Humanisme and its objectives:

It was, perhaps, the first serious team effort at studying the multiple dimensions of what later came to be called the development problem. Its goal was to examine critically the theoretical and political bases of competing economic systems, to create instruments for linking the analysis of small units with an understanding of national or world units, to discover how social change could be planned in cooperation with a populace in harmony with its values and objectives, and to discover guidelines for intelligent action at all levels.<sup>9</sup>

After World War II, Lebret turned his attention to the developing world. He traveled widely and stimulated the establishment of Economics and Humanism centers in Latin America, particularly in Brazil. Lebret also served as a development expert for the United Nations and as a planning advisor to several Third World governments. More significantly, he formulated a multidisciplinary developmental methodology and laid down a clear set of principles and guidelines for national planners to follow:<sup>10</sup>

1. Development was to be defined as the movement of all sectors of the population from a less human to a more human stage of existence.<sup>11</sup>
2. The developmental problem was essentially one of forging new values and civilizations which would preserve the best traditional values (usually perceived as communitarian) while eliminating or transforming those institutions which held back human progress.

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<sup>9</sup>Goulet, "Lebret: Pioneer of Development Ethics," p. 27.

<sup>10</sup>L. J. Lebret, Dynamique Concrète du Développement (Paris: Les Editions Ouvrières, 1961). For examples of Lebret's methodological sophistication, see Guide Pratique de l'Enquête Sociale, 3 Vols. (Paris: Les Editions Ouvrières, 1950-1955).

<sup>11</sup>Lebret, Dynamique Concrète du Développement, pp. 27-28. Lebret had a long list of concrete variables which could be used to measure the relatively "humanness" of stages of existence.

3. National development programs should give first priority to meeting the basic subsistence needs-- *i.e.*, food, clothing, shelter, and health care--of all the people.
4. Equity in the distribution of wealth and the achievement of dignity for all sectors of society should be priority targets of national development programs.
5. A pedagogy of austerity was needed to prevent national governments from squandering scarce resources on non-productive prestige products and to discourage conspicuous spending by the elite classes on luxury goods.
6. Development planning, guided by humanistic principles, also had to promote efficiency if it was to correct chronic structural evils and overcome underdevelopment.
7. National planning had to be based on a detailed inventory of the nation's resources and potentialities, an understanding of the diverse socio-economic context of the country, and an extensive survey of the needs and living standards of all sectors of the population if it hoped to be effective.
8. Regional and local development programs should be built around the specific economic developmental potential and comparative advantage of the locality, and planning should be coordinated at the local, regional and national levels.
9. Development planning should be decentralized as much as possible in order to give grassroots communities and local government a greater voice in economic decision-making.
10. National planning had to be based upon a permanent and close association between national decision-makers and grassroots communities, if it were to succeed.

In 1958 Le Bret founded IRFED ( Institut International de Recherche et de Formation en vue du Développement Harmonisé), to train Western and Third World development specialists in his interdisciplinary development methodology. During the late 1950s, Le Bret also worked closely with several French development oriented organizations and groups of scholars.<sup>12</sup> One of these

organizations was IRAM ( Institut de Recherche et d'Application des Méthodes de Développement ) which was founded in 1956 by a group of French educators, sociologists, economists, and agronomists.

IRAM was an offshoot of the original Economie et Humanisme group. However, unlike Economie et Humanisme which dealt primarily with the developmental problems of France and other industrialized nations, IRAM focused its efforts on promoting rural development in the Third World. Most of the people working for IRAM were Catholic Socialists who sympathized with Third World independence movements and the nationalist aspirations of France's overseas colonial populations. Many had extensive overseas experience and had developed good relationships with Third World leaders, particularly in Francophone North and West Africa. The IRAM group saw the newly emerging nations of the Third World as a positive force and hoped that they could use some of those countries as a testing ground for applying their theories and methods for developing Third World societies along communitarian socialist lines.

IRAM combined Mounier's Communitarian Socialist vision and Lebret's development principles and methods into a global

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<sup>12</sup>These organizations included CINAM (Compagnie d'Etudes Industrielles et d'Aménagement du Territoire) and SERESA (Société d'Etudes et de Réalisation Economiques et Sociales de l'Agriculture).

strategy for rural change in Africa which they called Animation Rurale. Yves Goussault, IRAM's most prolific theoretician of Animation Rurale defined it in the most general terms as:

an ensemble of educational means designed in the framework of a national development plan in order to foster certain socioeconomic institutions which support the process of social change and growth stemming from the participation of the rural peasant population... Animation programs aim to restructure the rural economy and to integrate economic life on the village level with regional and national economic institutions.<sup>13</sup>

IRAM's development strategy for post-colonial Africa sought to make the state more responsive to the developmental needs of the people, facilitate the full participation of the rural masses in national and local political and economic institutions and restructure rural society largely through the vehicle of the cooperative movement to conform with IRAM's Communitarian Socialist vision.

The restructuring of rural society was to be initiated by the government in power and should progress in several phases:<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> L'Animation Rurale dans les Pays de l'Afrique Franophone (Geneva: Bureau International du Travail, 1970), pp. 7-8. Cited in Jeanne Marie Moulton, Animation Rurale: Education for Rural Development (Amherst, Mass: Center for International Education, 1977), p. 20.

<sup>14</sup> Much of IRAM's strategy for rural reform was articulated and refined while IRAM officials were working in close collaboration with their African counterparts in Senegal from 1959-1962. For example, see the two important position papers formulating the stages for restructuring the countryside prepared by the Animation Service in 1962. "La Structuration des Populations Animées" (April 15, 1962) and "L'Animation au Sénégal ou le Sénégal en Marche" (June 1, 1962).

1. The government would have to reorganize the state administrative apparatus and technical services to bring them into closer contact with the people and transform them into developmental institutions rather than institutions primarily concerned with collecting taxes and maintaining order.
2. The government would "decolonize" the economy by replacing colonial economic institutions which exploited the rural masses with nationally controlled credit and marketing institutions designed to stimulate rural development and to allow peasants to keep a larger share of the fruits of their labor.
3. The government would foster the development of a cooperative network throughout the country. Village-based cooperatives would be the key economic institution in the countryside and the foundation of rural economic democracy and socialism. The cooperatives would be democratically run, multi-functional, and multisectoral. In time the village-based cooperatives would unite into larger cooperative unions which would be the main locus for development activities.
4. Villages would be revitalized (animated) and encouraged to participate in development activities. Local authoritarian administrative structures established under colonial rule would be democratized or eliminated. The revitalized villages would eventually be regrouped into larger units called development cells. Each development cell would have its own multifunctional cooperative and a host of collective services--schools, dispensaries, markets, storage facilities for grain and other products. These facilities would be concentrated in a strategically located village-center, and would be financed largely through local cooperative revenues.
5. After gaining sufficient experience and technical competence, the development cells would federate with other development cells in their area and would become self-governing rural communes.
6. Eventually cooperatives would take over most of the functions previously handled by governmental and private commercial agencies- e.g., credit, distribution of agricultural equipment, etc. Cooperatives would have also taken over those marketing and distribution functions previously handled by the private sector. The tutelage of the central government would then end, and the private sector would largely disappear. Communitarian Socialism would be firmly implanted in the countryside.

It is somewhat paradoxical that, despite its advocacy of grassroots participatory democracy, decentralized economic institutions, and communal socialism, the theory of Animation Rurale relied very heavily upon the state and a state bureaucracy to take the initiative in planning and promoting major structural changes in rural society. National leaders who formally adopted Animation Rurale as an integrated development strategy were regarded in this theory as "Philosopher Kings" actively seeking the well-being or the development of their people. Confidence in the state as the main instigator and motor of rural reform was thus based on the optimistic assumption that those in power would be fully committed to implementing an Animation program and that they would have the necessary power to overcome conservative opposition.

While Animation Rurale theory stressed the importance of institutional reforms and state planning in promoting the full participation of the people in the political, economic, and cultural life of the nation, it was equally concerned with changing people's attitudes to make them more receptive to social change. To change attitudes, IRAM developed a pedagogy for the civic and technical education of the rural masses which reflected Animation Rurale's basic assumptions about the nature of traditional rural societies.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>IRAM's pedagogy was formulated primarily by Yves Goussault, Roland Colin, and Guy Belloncle. For examples of their work, see

First, it was assumed that peasants were educable. So-called peasant conservatism, passivity, and fatalism were not necessarily a permanent feature of peasant culture. Peasant resistance to change was usually a defensive response to being trapped in repressive political and economic structures, such as those which characterized feudal and colonial societies. If the repressive structures which discouraged innovation were weakened or transformed peasants would be more likely to accept change. Suppressed energies and creativity would be unleashed and rural development would proceed more rapidly.<sup>16</sup>

Second, it was assumed that one could make a distinction between the social structures of traditional rural societies which were often inequitable and stifling and the traditional values of these same societies which were regarded in a much more favorable light. Animation theory argued that the value systems of so-called traditional societies were not inherently antagonistic to

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Yves Goussault, Interventions Educatives et Animation dans les Développements Agraires, Afrique et Amérique Latine (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970); Roland Colin, "De La Tradition à L'Evolution Consciente Vers le Développement Authentique," Développement et Civilisation, No. 28 (December 1966), 50-56; and Guy Belloncle, "Pédagogie de l'Implantation du Mouvement Coopérative au Niger," Archives Internationales de Sociologie de la Coopération, No. 23 (January-June 1968), 50-71. For a summary in English of their work, see Jeanne Marie Moulton, Animation Rurale: Education for Rural Development, pp. 20-37.

<sup>16</sup>This was a major theme of René Dumont's Révolution dans les Campagnes Chinoises (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1957) which had a great impact on many French development specialists during the late 1950s and raised their hopes that the Chinese experience could be replicated in Africa.

technological innovation and social progress. On the contrary, certain core traditional values like community solidarity could be harnessed and adapted to legitimize and promote Communitarian Socialism.

Third, it was assumed that new techniques and modes of social and economic organization were more likely to be accepted if they were introduced and explained in terms compatible with traditional cultural norms and values. Thus, cooperatives and collective fields, for example, could be presented as new forms of traditional community solidarity and communal work effort.

Animation theory tended to be more optimistic about the possibilities of transforming traditional rural social structures through civic education and state initiated institutional reforms than Marxist theorists who insisted that such changes could only come about through class struggle. In downplaying class struggle and conflict as central features of African society, Animation theory had much in common with the different varieties of African Socialism being preached by African leaders who maintained that the Marxist concept of class struggle was not applicable in their countries because of the relatively undifferentiated nature of their societies.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>Léopold Sedar Senghor, On African Socialism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964); Julius K. Nyerere, Ujamaa-Essays on Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).

IRAM's formula for educating and mobilizing the rural populations called for the establishment of an avant-garde government service which would train village-based peasant volunteers-- "animateurs" --who would organize, innovate, and inject new life into the rural communities from which they came. To insure their acceptance, the "animateurs" would be selected by the villagers themselves. Once chosen, they would be taken from their villages and given short training sessions by staff members of the Animation Rurale Service and other government officials. In these sessions, the "animateurs" would be introduced to the government's development program and learn simple techniques which could be applied in their village to improve agricultural productivity and basic conditions of life.

Upon completing their training, the "animateurs" were expected to return to their villages to apply some of the ideas and techniques they had learned and to encourage the rest of the community to follow their example. The dynamism of the village "animateurs" would activate the latent energies of the community which would then launch its own small-scale development projects and participate in new communitarian institutions like the village-based cooperatives. Participation in these projects would lead to measurable improvements in living standards and the quality of village life, increasing the community's self-confidence and organizational capacity, and reinforcing the people's initial receptivity to change.

IRAM maintained that the use of non-paid, village-based "animateurs" was a particularly appropriate method for organizing capital-poor underdeveloped countries. Peasants could be trained and mobilized quickly. The tasks they would be assigned need not require that they become literate at least initially. The training of "animateurs" was relatively simple and inexpensive and could be replicated fairly easily throughout the entire country.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, Animation Rurale provided an attractive ideology and methodology for many students, intellectuals, and political leaders of Francophone Africa seeking an alternative to Communism and Capitalism. During the 1960s, several African countries, including Senegal, Niger, and Madagascar, adopted Animation as an integral part of their development strategy and called upon IRAM specialists to help them establish an Animation Rurale service as a key agency in the planning and implementation of their development.

## CHAPTER THREE

THE EVOLUTION OF ANIMATION RURALE: 1959-1979

Since it was first introduced in Senegal in 1959, Animation Rurale has gone through several stages and transformations closely related to changes in the political orientations and economic policies of Senegal's national leaders. One can delimit four distinct periods in the history of Animation Rurale: (1) 1959-1962; (2) 1963-1967; (3) 1968-1973; and (4) 1974 to the present. During each one of these periods Animation Rurale's mission was defined differently by the national leadership. Much of our analysis will focus on the first period when the Animation Service had its greatest impact in shaping Senegal's rural development policies and programs.

Animation as a Movement to Radically Restructure the Countryside: 1959-1962

The late 1950s and early 1960s were an exciting and turbulent period in Senegalese history. These years span the last days of French colonial rule and Senegal's emergence as an independent nation. It was a period when nationalist feelings were high and most French-speaking African university students and intellectuals embraced some form of socialist ideology.<sup>1</sup> It was also a

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<sup>1</sup>For example, one major survey of African student opinion indicated that nearly 87% of those polled favored some form of socialist system while less than 7% opted for a predominantly

period when the Senegalese government made sweeping and dramatic institutional reforms and launched the new nation's First Four Year Development Plan (1961-1964).

Animation Rurale came to Senegal in 1959 under particularly favorable conditions. Popular enthusiasm for involvement in state affairs had been generated by the end of colonial rule. The UPS (Union Progressiste Sénégalaise) had just staved off challenges from the nationalist Left and conservative forces on the Right to consolidate its position as Senegal's ruling party.<sup>2</sup> Senegal's two main national leaders shared much of IRAM's ideological perspectives and seemed committed to making development the nation's number one priority. Finally, Prime Minister Dia, the architect of Senegal's development strategy, had called upon Father Lebret and IRAM to play a role in formulating new institutional reforms and development programs.

#### National Planning, Development Administration

One of the rare African political leaders with a strong background in development economics, Prime Minister Mamadou Dia personally took charge of Senegal's national planning.<sup>3</sup> On October

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free enterprise system. Nearly 30% of the students favored some form of personalist or communitarian socialist system. See J. P. N'Diaye, Enquête sur les Etudiants Noirs en France (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1962), pp. 228-230.

<sup>2</sup>Gil Duque, Vers les Etats-Unis d'Afrique (Dakar: Editions Lettres Africaines, 1960), pp. 203-217 and S. Gellar, "The Politics of Development in Senegal," pp. 196-205 for an analysis of Senegalese politics during this crucial period.

7, 1959, Dia established several study committees to make a preliminary survey of the development problems of the Senegalese economy and asked Father Lebret to oversee and coordinate these initial studies. In January 1960, the Dia government launched an eighteen month survey which examined Senegal's political, administrative, economic, and social structures and also included studies of the living standards of various sectors of the Senegalese population. These studies were conducted by French consulting firms which closely followed Lebret's developmental methodology and shared the ideological perspectives of the French Catholic Left. CINAM (Compagnie d'Etudes Industrielles et d'Aménagement du Territoire) and SERESA (Société d'Etudes et de Réalisations Economiques et Sociales dans l'Agriculture) carried out most of these studies which were completed in June 1960. The CINAM-SERESA report, presented to the government on July 21, 1960, contained two volumes of synthesis, ten volumes of regional and special studies, and three volumes of maps, charts, and graphs.<sup>4</sup> The highlight of the report was Father Lebret's synthesis of Senegal's development perspectives for the next twenty-five years. Although the government did not accept all of the recommendations suggested by Lebret and the CINAM-SERESA group, their study, nevertheless, had a great influence in shaping the basic

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<sup>3</sup>For a discussion of the planning process during the Dia years, see Yves Chaigneau, Réflexions sur la Planification au Sénégal (Dakar: Institut d'Economie Appliquée, 1963) and S. Gellar, "The Politics of Development in Senegal," pp. 252-262.

<sup>4</sup>See CINAM, Rapport Général sur les Perspectives de Développement au Sénégal (Dakar: CINAM-SERESA, 1960).

orientations of Senegal's First Development Plan (1961-1964).

Dia saw the Plan primarily as an instrument for developing the country according to the spirit of African Socialism.<sup>5</sup> In preparing the Plan Dia worked very closely with a small inner circle of French advisors and young Senegalese administrators and technicians committed to African Socialism. Karim Gaye, the Minister of Development and a representative of the conservative wing of the UPS, did not take an active role in the planning process despite the fact that he, as Development Minister, was theoretically in charge of elaborating the Plan. Gaye's non-involvement meant that the Prime Minister was also, in effect, his own Planning Minister. Dia was widely criticized by UPS deputies and local party leaders for leaving them out of the planning process. The party politicians complained that, in ignoring them, the choice of the elected representatives of the people was not being heard. Furthermore, the planners in Dakar were too far removed from the people to understand their real needs. Dia was able to ignore most of these criticisms thanks to the strong backing which he received from President Senghor who insisted that the Prime Minister be given a free hand in elaborating the Plan.

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<sup>5</sup>See Dia's directive of August 1, 1960 entitled "Principes et Méthodes du Développement du Sénégal-Le Plan" (Dakar: mimeo., 1960) which defined the Prime Minister's approach to planning.

The First Four Year Plan (1961-1964) stressed qualitative rather than quantitative objectives and sought to promote structural changes in three main areas: (1) National political and economic integration; (2) Diversification of the economy; and (3) Modernization of the rural economy and socialization of the countryside.<sup>6</sup>

Political integration was to be achieved by propagating a common national language (French) and educational system, and by providing more administrative and social services and representation for hitherto neglected ethnic groups and regions. Economic integration was perceived as reducing the widening gap between Dakar and the countryside, promoting more inter-regional trade, and ending the isolation of the so-called peripheral regions outside the main peanut-producing zones by bringing them into the market economy.

The Plan insisted that diversification was needed to reduce Senegal's excessive economic dependency upon peanut monoculture. It was to be encouraged by promoting the production of other food and cash crops-- e.g., millet, rice, cotton, sugarcane, fruits, and vegetables--putting livestock production on a firmer economic footing, and modernizing and expanding the country's already

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<sup>6</sup>For a good summary of the contents and orientation of Senegal's First Four Year Plan, see IRPED, Le Sénégal en Marche: le Plan de Développement (Bruxelles: Editions Création de Presse, 1961).

flourishing fishing industry. Diversification also required more industrialization based on the transformation of local products and the development of Senegal's resources. Diversification would reduce food dependency and Senegal's chronic trade deficits and make the national economy less vulnerable to fluctuations in the world market.

Modernization of the economy was to be achieved by mobilizing the rural populations and creating effective development institutions which would show them how to effectively use modern agricultural techniques as well as provide them with sufficient credit to obtain the inputs needed to raise productivity. Socialization of the countryside was to be realized through the creation of a dense network of rural cooperatives which would cover the entire country and eventually take over many of the functions being performed by the private sector or the state.

Dia and his circle of planners counted on three new development institutions to lead the drive for rural development and African Socialism: (1) Rural Expansion Centers; (2) Multifunctional Cooperatives; and (3) The Rural Animation Service. The Rural Expansion Center (CER) was to be the principal development institution at the local level.<sup>7</sup> Each one of Senegal's eighty-

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<sup>7</sup>For a description of the role of the CERs, see Valy-Charles Diarrasouba, L'Evolution des Structures Agricoles du Sénégal (Paris: Editions Cujas, 1968), pp. 197-199.

five arrondissements (counties) was to have its own Rural Expansion Center. The CERs created in 1960 differed markedly in conception from those set up by the French during the 1950s. The original CER was primarily an agricultural extension service whose main purpose was to increase production. During the 1950s, CERs concentrated on restoring and surpassing pre-war peanut production levels. The new CERs, on the other hand, were to be multipurpose development centers seeking to meet the total needs of the rural population in a given district. Thus, the new CERs were expected to provide educational and health services, give technical assistance in the areas of livestock, farming, fishing, and forestry, help organize and supervise village cooperatives, and stimulate the adoption of new technologies.

In principle, each Rural Expansion Center was to have a complete team of cooperative agents, Rural Animation officials, agricultural, livestock, fishing, and forestry specialists, schoolteachers, medical personnel, and housing experts. CER agents were supposed to act as members of a coherent multidisciplinary team. They were to work closely with the rural populations in their districts, a task which would be facilitated by utilizing the network of village "animateurs" trained by the Animation Service.

The first Plan called for the conversion of 31 of the older CERs and the establishment of 43 new CERs so that most of the

country's arrondissements would have a Rural Expansion Center by 1964.<sup>8</sup> Although the Plan provided 700 million CFA for buildings and vehicles, it made no provisions for insuring that all the CERs would have a complete contingent of personnel.<sup>9</sup>

The cooperative movement was the second major unit in the triad of key development institutions.<sup>10</sup> The cooperative was to be the basic development cell and the cornerstone of African Socialism in the countryside. By the end of 1960, there were already 810 cooperative organizations in the country involving more than 100,000 producers.<sup>11</sup> Of these 173 were autonomous cooperatives while 637 were pre-cooperatives called Associations d'Intérêt Rural (AIRs) which were under the strict tutelage of the state. After two years of "apprenticeship" the AIRs would become fully autonomous. The remarkably rapid expansion of the cooperative movement was largely the result of government initiatives and pressures.

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<sup>8</sup>République du Sénégal, Plan Quadriennal du Développement, 1961-1964 (Dakar: J. & Charles Bompard, 1961), pp. 58-69.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>10</sup>For the most detailed description of the organization of the cooperative movement in Senegal, see Marquerite Camboulines, L'Organisation Coopérative au Sénégal (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1967). For two important studies of the cooperative movement sympathetic to Mamadou Dia and the socialist perspective of the Animation ideology see P. Laville, Associations Paysannes et Socialisme Contractuel en Afrique de l' Ouest, Etude de Cas: Le Sénégal (Paris: Editions Cujas, 1972) and Gabriel Gagnon, Coopératives ou Autogestion: Sénégal, Cuba, Tunisie (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1976), pp. 17-149.

<sup>11</sup>République du Sénégal, Plan Quadriennal, p. 59.

According to the government's strategy, the cooperatives during the early phases of the movement would assume relatively simple marketing functions and responsibility for distributing food and credit during the soudure or hungry season. To encourage the peasants to join, the government offered material incentives in the form of rebates to farmers selling their peanuts through the cooperatives, and technical assistance from government cooperative agents. Animation Rurale was called upon to play an important role in winning peasant support by preaching the virtues of cooperative-based agrarian socialism and the advantages of the cooperative system over the old marketing and rural credit system. The latter argument was more appealing to the peasantry than African Socialism.

Rural Animation was the third part of the triad of new development institutions which the Dia government created to transform the countryside. Animation Rurale was called upon to perform three vital tasks.<sup>12</sup> First, it was to promote a dialogue between the state and the local populations by explaining the government's development program to the people and enlisting their participation in the nation's efforts to foster development. Second, the Animation Service was to serve as the main catalyst for

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<sup>12</sup>Animation's role in Senegalese development strategy was most clearly defined in two important position papers issued by the Animation Service in 1962: "La Structuration des Populations Animées," (April 15, 1962) and "L'Animation au Sénégal ou le Socialisme en Marche," (June 1, 1962).

restructuring rural society by preaching socialism, encouraging support of the cooperative movement, and prodding the other technical services to work harder to serve the people. In its second function, Animation would challenge the authority of conservative political, economic, and social forces blocking the implementation of the government's development program and would assist in institutionalizing alternative structures to undermine their power. Third, the Animation Service was called upon to play an important pedagogical role in recruiting and training peasant volunteers to serve as village "animateurs" and in reorienting the staff members of the bureaucracy. As such it would teach villagers simple techniques to improve health care and agricultural productivity, organize the local populations for participation in local development projects and assist in motivating and coordinating the diverse technical services in their local level activities.

#### Organizational Structure of the Animation Rurale Service

The Animation Rurale Service began functioning in October 1959. At first, it was attached to the Ministry of Development and placed under the supervision of the short-lived Direction de l'Action pour le Développement which worked closely with the Prime Minister in shaping the development strategy and devising a methodology to stimulate mass participation in the country's new development programs and institutions. Within a short period of time, Animation Rurale was transformed into the Direction de

l'Animation , an indication of its rising status.

In 1961, the Animation Rurale Service was attached to the Prime Minister's office and placed under the supervision of the newly created Commissariat Général du Plan. The presence of the Animation Rurale Service in the Prime Minister's Office meant that Animation's leadership had direct access to the Prime Minister. As a new service enjoying the support and protection of Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, it was free of many of the organizational constraints and hierarchical traditions of the other technical services.<sup>13</sup>

During the Dia period, the Animation Service was relatively small. From the start, Animation was headed by Ben Mady Cissé, a former schoolteacher from the Casamance region whose dynamism and leadership qualities imbued it with a remarkable "esprit de corps."<sup>14</sup> The National Bureau of the Animation Service consisted of a small, well-knit group of ten Senegalese officials, four expatriate advisors from IRAM, and two UNESCO experts specializing in organizing and training women.<sup>15</sup> The National Office in

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<sup>13</sup>This point was made by Ben Mady Cissé, Director of the Animation Rurale Service in a interview with the author on July 8, 1963 and was reiterated in discussions with Animation Service agents in the field.

<sup>14</sup>See, for example, David Hapgood's enthusiastic discussion of Cissé and his work in Africa: From Independence to Tomorrow (New York: Atheneum, 1970), pp. 112-133.

<sup>15</sup>Henry Debecker, Nation et Développement Communautaire en Guinée et au Sénégal (Paris: Mouton, 1967), p. 335.

Dakar had a Management Unit, a Study Bureau, and five operational sections which included the following specializations: (1) Training; (2) Promoting Communitarian Structures; (3) Programming; (4) Urban Animation; and (5) Women's Animation.<sup>16</sup> The National Office was responsible for articulating and refining the ideology and methodology of the Animation Service, preparing the training of its cadres and those of the village "animateurs", developing grassroots projects and programs, collaborating with other development services, and supervising the activities and evaluating the performance of the Animation Service's field agents. Regional officials served as the intermediaries between agents of the Animation Service in the field and Dakar. They also served on Regional Development Committees and were responsible for planning and coordinating all the activities of the Animation Service in their region

Below the regional level, each of Senegal's 28 "cercles" was to have two Rural Animation Centers (CARs); one for men, and one for women. By mid-1962, nineteen men's CARs and 4 women's CARs were functioning.<sup>17</sup> Animation officials in charge of the CARs conducted socio-economic surveys of their districts, organized training sessions ( stages ) for the village "animateurs" and "animatrices" (female voluntary village workers), and tried to

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<sup>16</sup>Ben Mady Cissé, "L'Animation des Masses, Condition d'Un Socialisme Authentique," in Sénégal, 'An 2' par Lui-Même (Paris: IRFED, 1962), p. 44.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

prod the other technical services to work harder. Despite the important role which they were called upon to play, the CARs had only modest resources at their disposal. A typical Rural Animation Center had an annual budget of 1.5 million CFA (approximately \$6,000) which had to cover the salaries of all the personnel working at the CAR, gasoline and car maintenance, materials for the training sessions, and the costs of feeding the hundreds of peasants who attended the CAR training sessions during the course of the year.<sup>18</sup> During the Dia years, the average monthly salary of a Rural Animation Center Director was about 25,000 CFA (approximately \$100).

One of the most striking features of the Animation Service during its early years was the existence of close relationships between officials in the National Office in Dakar and the Animation agents in the field.<sup>19</sup> The National Director spent a good deal of his time on tour around the country to keep in touch with the many problems which his field agents had to face. Communications between Dakar and the field were good and decision-making much less cumbersome than in the more traditional technical services where lower level officials had to go through several layers of the hierarchy before getting a response to their requests.

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<sup>18</sup>Much of this information is based on an interview with D. Diallo, Director of the Rural Animation Center of Kolda, May 19, 1963.

<sup>19</sup>Based on personal observation and numerous interviews with Animation field agents during field work in Senegal between December 1962 and January 1964.

Animation field agents had fewer qualms about taking their problems directly to Dakar. During these pioneering years, most Animation agents were highly motivated and imbued with a sense of mission seeing themselves as members of a vanguard agency in the forefront of the battle to build African Socialism in the countryside.

#### Animation's Relationships with Other Services

In their ideological orientations, the Animation and Cooperative Services had the most in common during the Dia era. The Direction de la Coopération at that time was attached to the Ministry of Rural Economy. It was headed by Albert N'Diaye, a man who was ideologically committed to building a democratic and egalitarian cooperative movement based on communitarian traditions.<sup>20</sup> N'Diaye regarded the cooperative agent's role as primarily an educational one. They were to serve as tutors and technical advisors to the young cooperative movement and they would oversee the activities of the village-based cooperative to assure that they conformed with cooperative statutes and regulations. As the peasants gained more skill and experience in running their cooperatives, the role of the government cooperative agent would be reduced gradually until the cooperative would no longer need his services.

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<sup>20</sup>N'Diaye's cooperative philosophy is expressed in "L'Assistance aux Coopérationes," in Sénégal, 'An 2' par Lui-Même (Paris: IRFED, 1964), pp. 50-57.

Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, the theoretician of the cooperative movement in Senegal, stressed the importance of close collaboration between the Animation and Cooperative Services.<sup>21</sup> Animation's task was to make the rural masses aware of their civic and economic responsibilities and to prepare the way for their adhesion to the cooperative movement. The cooperative would be the basic development cell and economic foundation for peasant democracy. During the Dia era, Animation officials worked hard to mobilize mass support for the cooperative movement. In promoting the cooperative movement, Animation field agents frequently met resistance from merchants, local party leaders, and rural notables. Merchants and money lenders feared that a successful cooperative movement would put them out of business. Local party leaders saw the cooperatives as a potential threat to their power if these organizations escaped their control. Rural notables and marabouts worried that a democratic and egalitarian cooperative movement would eventually undermine their authority and traditional prerogative. Despite their general mistrust of state-sponsored institutions, the peasants saw cooperatives as a new source of rural credit and food during the hungry season and joined to take advantages of the rebates which the cooperative offered to its members.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>See Dia's "Circulaire 32," of May 21, 1962. Reprinted in Camboulivès, L'Organisation Coopérative au Sénégal, pp. 384-389.

<sup>22</sup>The rebate or dividend could amount to as much as 1.5 CFA per kilogram of produce marketed and would be distributed to the members of the cooperative just before the beginning of the hungry season. A good part of this rebate was used to purchase mil-

The Cooperative Service also included under its jurisdiction the Regional Centers for Development Assistance (CRADs)<sup>23</sup> which were established in 1960 to succeed the pre-cooperative Societes Mutuelles de Developpement Rural (SMDRs).<sup>24</sup> The CRADs were primarily responsible for the fiscal management of the cooperatives. They did the bookkeeping for the cooperatives, controlled the distribution centers which supplied the agricultural equipment, seed, fertilizers, and fungicides, and collected and transported the commercialized produce of the cooperatives. Unlike the cooperative division agents who were generally young recruits trained in cooperative philosophy and techniques in Senegal and abroad, the CRAD officials were usually former agents of the highly politicized SMDRs. Local politicians vied for control over the CRADs because it provided them with access to resources and services which could be diverted to their own use or towards their political clientele. Prominent politicians also used the CRADs to provide patronage jobs for their followers.

The Cooperative Service thus had a split personality. On the one hand it had one division more or less committed to educating the rural masses to participate more effectively in the

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 let and rice. See S. Gellar, "The Politics.." pp. 249-250 for more details.

<sup>23</sup>Camboullives, L'Organisation Coopérative au Sénégal, pp. 290-302, and pp. 317-318. For a critical account of the activities of the CRADs, see Edward J. Schumacher, Politics, Bureaucracy, and Rural Development in Senegal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 115-118.

<sup>24</sup>Gellar, "The Politics,..." pp. 194-196, 338-339.

functioning of what one hoped would quickly evolve into modern democratically run cooperatives. On the other hand, it also contained the CRADs which were a powerful and often corrupt instrument of state control. Given the ideological orientations and the mission assigned to the Animation Service it was not surprising that Animation officials often clashed with CRAD officials in defending the peasants' interests.

While restructuring the countryside along socialist lines necessitated close collaboration between the Animation and Cooperative Service, the developmental objectives of the Plan called for collaboration between the Animation Service and technical services, especially at the arrondissement level. The Animation Service relied heavily upon the expertise and participation of the technical services in planning local development projects and conducting its training sessions. The Animation Service also encouraged the rural populations to adapt new techniques and to call upon the technical services to help them. In addition, the Animation Service saw itself as a catalyst for transforming the multidisciplinary CERs into a more effective development institution which would show greater responsiveness to the needs of the people.

In practice, relationships between animation agents and their colleagues in the technical services were often far from ideal.<sup>25</sup> Many technical agents regarded Animation agents as big talkers

and little "doers". They also felt that the animation agents often incited the people to ask more from the technical services than could be possibly delivered. Many resented what they felt to be a "holier-than-thou" attitude on the part of Animation officials who frequently chided the technical services for their slowness in getting things done or for not keeping promises made to the peasantry. Finally, many technicians believed that all training of peasant farmers should be handled by the relevant technical service because Animation Service officials lacked the necessary technical competence. This last charge contained some truth since the majority of the Animation agents at the CAR level were former schoolteachers with little experience in agriculture.

For their part, Animation field workers took pride in their "gadfly" role. One of the basic premises of animation theory was that the bureaucratic structures inherited from the colonial era needed animation as well as the rural masses. In the past, Senegalese administrators and technical agents worked directly under the supervision of European superiors and were rarely permitted to exercise any initiative. In an independent and decolonized Senegal, this situation had to be changed. Civil servants and technicians had to become more dynamic and better attuned to the

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<sup>25</sup>Several scholars have noted the lack of good rapport between the Animation Service and the technical services. See, for example, Jacques Brochier La Diffusion du Progrès Technique en Milieu Rural Sénégalais (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), pp. 270-272; Henry DeDecker, Nation et Développement Communautaire en Guinée et au Sénégal, pp. 336-337.

needs of the people. By encouraging the rural populations to express their needs more openly, the Animation Service hoped to put more pressure on the technical services to work harder.

Collaboration between the Animation Service and the various technical services was also hampered by financial and organizational problems which made it difficult for the CERs to live up to expectations. Lack of funds slowed down the implantation of CERs in many rural districts.<sup>26</sup> Few CERs had a full contingent of development agents and CER agents rarely worked together as members of an integrated development team with a common approach and strategy for dealing with the developmental problems in their districts. Individual agents still looked to the chefs de service at the county level for guidance and instructions rather than to the CER team leader.

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<sup>26</sup>By the end of December 1962 only 35% of construction funds called for had been disbursed while only 4 CERs had a complete infrastructure. Présidence de la République, Plan Quadriennal 1961-64, Bilan d'Execution Matérielle et Financière Investissements Publics au 31 Décembre 1962 (Dakar; June 1963), p. 13.

The Animation Service's Relationship With Local Power  
Structures<sup>27</sup>

Given the perception which the Animation Service had of itself as a vanguard agency for politicizing the rural masses and restructuring the countryside along socialist lines, it was inevitable that it would often come into conflict with local power structures. During the Dia years bad feeling often existed between local party leaders and Animation Service officials. Many local UPS officials saw themselves as the legitimate representatives and spokesmen for the people in their district. As political leaders it was their role to motivate (animate) the people, not the role of a government agency which had no previous ties with the local population. UPS officials also resented the fact that many Animation Service agents were not even members of the party and often were openly critical of it. In fact, many of the younger Animation officials formerly had been members of radical student movements and opposition political parties. Animation officials did not see themselves as an auxiliary arm of the ruling UPS but as an alternative structure to which people could turn. They considered themselves to be above the clientelist politics and local clan struggles which were such common features of Senegalese political life. Through their activities and

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<sup>27</sup>For analyses of the relationship between the Animation Service and local power structures, see Gellar, "The Politics . . .," pp. 333-351; Jonathan Barker, "Local Politics and National Development: The Case of a Rural District in the Sine Saloum Region of Senegal" (unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1967), pp. 237-242; Gagnon, Coopératives ou Autogestion, pp. 107-130.

services, they hoped to politicize the rural masses to the extent that the peasantry would be capable of ridding themselves of corrupt politicians and replacing them with men who would better defend their interests.

The conservative wing of the UPS, led primarily by local merchants, traders, transporters, and local clan leaders, regarded the Animation Service and its ideology as a threat. Many UPS conservatives believed that Mamadou Dia was using the Animation and Cooperative movements to increase his own power and popularity in the countryside in preparation for a bid to take over the leadership of the party from Senghor. While Dia frequently referred in his speeches to the primacy of the party over other political institutions, he also made it clear that he thought the party itself was in need of "animation." In his frequent tours throughout the country, the Prime Minister often backed Animation agents as well as other development officials in their disputes with local party bosses.

Relationships between Animation Service agents and locally based traditional and religious authority figures tended to be less antagonistic. The Animation Service realized that rural society throughout most of Senegal was highly stratified. To reach the rural masses, one had to work with the notables and marabouts who were the acknowledged leaders of their communities. Fruitful collaboration between Animation agents and traditional

leaders was possible as long as the Service restricted its role to introducing new and economically beneficial ideas and institutions. The Animation Service generally met the least resistance in areas where traditional and religious authority structures were weak. It had the most difficulty in spreading its democratic and populist ideals in districts where maraboutic influences were strong.<sup>28</sup> This was especially the case in the Mouride-dominated regions where the major organizing principle of society was submission to the will of the marabout. Tensions between traditional power structures and the Animation Rurale Service also increased whenever local village "animateurs" took it upon themselves to challenge the authority of traditional village chiefs or to criticize long-standing village customs. However, in most instances, village "animateurs" were chosen by the notables and marabouts and, therefore, rarely went against the wishes of the traditional authority structure.

#### Receptivity of the Rural Population to Animation Rurale

The receptivity of the rural populations towards Rural Animation varied considerably from region to region. The response tended to be better in the Casamance where traditional social structures were less stratified and in the Fleuve region where Prime Minister Dia had a large following. The response was less positive in the peanut-producing regions.

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<sup>28</sup>The most extensive discussion of relationships between the Animation Service and the marabouts can be found in Cheikh Tidiane Sy, La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1969), pp. 249-258.

One important indicator of the people's receptivity to the Animation doctrine was the extent of their participation in programs sponsored by the Animation Service. During these early years, the Animation Service placed a great deal of emphasis on human investment projects which organized the local populations to contribute their labor for development projects directly affecting them.<sup>29</sup> Village school construction projects were the most popular, except in those areas where the marabouts discouraged their followers from sending their children to secular schools. Response was also good for projects involving the building of rural dispensaries and pharmacies. Popular participation in these projects reflected the high priority which rural people gave to health and education. Other Animation Service initiated human investment projects-- e.g., road-building, well-digging, dike construction, and collective fields--did not fare as well.

A second indicator of the rural population's receptivity to animation was its positive response towards the cooperative movement. Animation officials spent a good deal of their time enlisting peasant support for the cooperatives in the face of

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<sup>29</sup>See Bureau d'Etude Direction de l'Animation, "L'Investissement Humain dans le Développement Socialiste," (April 25, 1962), unpublished.

strong opposition from local merchants and moneylenders. Without the vigorous campaigns conducted by the Animation Service, it is highly unlikely that the cooperative movement would have expanded as rapidly as it did.

Participation in programs promoted by the Animation Service advanced rapidly during the Dia years. By the middle of 1962, the Animation Service had already trained 3500 village level "animateurs" and "animatrices" and had reached approximately 1000 of Senegal's 13,000 villages.<sup>30</sup> Although the Animation Service aroused considerable enthusiasm and preached the virtues of Communitarian Socialism and participatory democracy, it had little impact in changing the social structures inherited from the colonial era.

Animation Rural, African Socialism and the Fall of Mamadou Dia

Animation Rurale did not have much of a chance to achieve its lofty aims of radically restructuring the countryside along socialist lines. In the first place, the Service owed its existence and influence almost exclusively to the support it received from Senegal's national leaders, Léopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia. It had no independent political power base of its own outside the party. Radical intellectuals in the opposition did not support the Animation Service because it was a state agency serving the

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<sup>30</sup>Ben Mady Cissé, "L'Animation des Masses," p. 43.

interests of what they considered to be a neo-colonial regime.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, despite its populist rhetoric, the Animation doctrine had no real following among Senegal's rural masses who remained attached to their notables and religious leaders. There was little support for the Animation Service and its radical ideology among the rank-and-file of the UPS. Second, while the government was formally committed to implement the ideology of African Socialism as articulated by Senghor and Dia, this commitment could not be carried far since the regime's power base depended largely on its success in winning the support of traditional notables and religious leaders. Any effort to undermine the authority of the marabouts threatened the loss of backing of one of the major elements of support for the regime. As a result the Senegalese government had to move cautiously in implementing its socialist programs in the countryside.

In mid-1962, Mamadou Dia took several steps to accelerate the pace of socialization in the countryside which eventually led to his downfall.<sup>32</sup> First, the Prime Minister proposed to expand the role of the cooperatives and to permit them to sell at retail most of the basic consumer goods used by the rural populations. If implemented, this would have dealt a severe blow to the private sector in the countryside, particularly to those Senegalese

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<sup>31</sup> See Gellar, "The Politics,..." pp. 233-234, for a discussion of the Left's critique of Senegalese Socialism.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., pp. 344-351.

businessmen who had hoped to profit from the recent withdrawal of the European trading companies from the countryside. Second, Dia suggested that the nation's leading marabouts withdraw from politics and concentrate most of their energies on being the spiritual guides of their followers. The marabouts correctly saw this as a first move towards reducing their great political and economic influence. Third, Dia increased his attacks on local party officials who openly or covertly opposed his program for rural reform and attempted to replace them with men loyal to himself. The fact that most of the party leaders ousted by Dia supporters in local power struggles were followers of Senghor led to an eventual confrontation between the two national political leaders. The party became increasingly divided into two camps, one supporting Dia, and the other Senghor.

During the Fall of 1962, relations between Senghor and Dia deteriorated rapidly.<sup>33</sup> The political crisis which had been brewing for several months came to a head on December 14, 1962 when thirty-nine UPS deputies from the conservative wing of the party introduced a motion of censure against the Prime Minister in the National Assembly. Dia reacted by arresting four of his opponents and closing down the National Assembly. The deputies met

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<sup>33</sup>For a pro-Dia account of the Senghor-Dia quarrel and its aftermath, see Paul Thibaud, "Dia, Senghor et le Socialisme Africain," Esprit, No. 9 (September 1963), pp. 332-348. For an account more sympathetic to Senghor, see Ernest Milcent, Au Carrefour des Options Africaines: Le Sénégal (Paris: Editions du Centurion, 1965), pp. 74-98.

elsewhere and a majority decided to oust him. Senghor sided with the dissident deputies and argued that Dia was legally bound to leave office, but Dia refused to comply. On December 17, the army intervened and resolved the crisis by arresting Dia and several of his close associates. Dia was charged with plotting a coup d'état and later tried, convicted, and sentenced to imprisonment for life.<sup>34</sup> The fall of Mamadou Dia meant the loss of Animation's staunchest advocate in the government and the end of the Animation Service's role as the spearhead of a strategy for radical change in the countryside.

Animation Rurale: Agency for Civic Education, 1963-1967

Because the Animation Service did not take sides in the battle for power between Senghor and Dia, it was not compromised by its close association with the former Prime Minister. Senghor appreciated the Animation Service's neutrality during the crisis and shortly after taking over the reins of government reiterated his support for the idea of Animation in several major speeches.<sup>35</sup> However, despite Senghor's backing, there was a steady decline in the relative importance of the Animation Service as an instrument for promoting rural development and participation. Its diminished influence was largely a consequence of changes in Senghor's

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<sup>34</sup>For a full account of these events, see Victor D. Dubois, "The Trial of Mamadou Dia: Parts I-III," American University Field Service Reports, West Africa Series, July 1963.

<sup>35</sup>Senghor also demonstrated his support for Animation Rurale by making a six day tour of the Casamance in January 1963 with Ben Mady Cissé at his side.

rural development policy, most notably the decrease in emphasis on structural change (African Socialism) and a greater emphasis on immediately increasing agricultural production. In this context, Senghor defined the Animation Service's primary mission as the civic education of the rural population.

#### Changes in Rural Development Strategy

Although Senghor insisted that he did not intend to abandon the development program elaborated by the former Prime Minister, he made several important changes in orientation. According to Senghor, the fault of the Dia government was not in its choice of planning goals but in its failure to implement these goals because of the politicization of the development apparatus and the use of "leftist verbalism" as a substitute for efficiency.<sup>36</sup> Efficiency meant that production had to precede the sharing of wealth. In Senghor's words, "our socialism is production."<sup>37</sup>

One of the first manifestations of this new stress on production was a crash program to raise productivity by 25% within a three year period in the main peanut-producing regions.<sup>38</sup> To achieve this objective the government needed to make a concerted

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<sup>36</sup>See, for example, Senghor's general report to the UPS Fourth Party Congress entitled "Planification et Tension Mocrale," of October 10, 1963.

<sup>37</sup>Interview with Senghor in the UPS party newspaper, L'Unité Africaine, March 22, 1963.

<sup>38</sup>Schumacher, Politics, Bureaucracy, and Rural Development in Senegal, pp. 115-116.

effort to distribute better seeds, implements, fertilizer, and fungicides and to teach the rural populations how to use these inputs effectively. Rather than relying upon Senegal's Agricultural and Animation Rurale Services to carry out this task, the Seneghor government decided to call upon the Société d'Aide Technique et de Coopération (SATEC), a French technical assistance firm, to direct the campaign to raise peanut and millet productivity.<sup>39</sup> The arrival of SATEC in 1964 marked a shift towards a more technocratic approach to rural development and one which entailed a more passive role for the rural populations than the approach advocated by Dia and the Animation doctrine. SATEC's methodology and approach to rural development differed from that of the Animation Rurale Service in several important ways:

1. While the Animation Service had worked closely with the existing agricultural services, SATEC created its own self-contained and highly centralized extension service which managed all phases of the productivity campaign.
2. The main change agent at the village level was the SATEC-trained agricultural extension agent (vulgarisateur) who often had few ties with the community in which he was working. The Animation approach relied heavily on a village worker chosen by the community.
3. The SATEC extension agent was paid a salary for his efforts and was responsible only for diffusing the SATEC technological package. Village "animateurs" were volunteers who were supposed to be concerned with improving

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<sup>39</sup>For a favorable description of SATEC and its activities in Senegal, see Nathaniel McKinnon, "A Mass Attack on Low Productivity in Peasant Agriculture," International Development Review, (September 1967), pp. 2-6. For a more critical analysis of SATEC, see René Dumont, Paysanneries Aux Abois: Ceylan, Tunisie, Sénégal (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972), pp. 195-197.

the general quality of life in the village as well as teaching new techniques.

4. The SATEC agents efforts were aimed primarily at the wealthier "progressive" farmers who had the means and will to adopt the entire technological package while village "animateurs" efforts were supposed to be geared to the entire community.
5. In the SATEC approach the farmers were regarded as clients or targets of a campaign to promote narrowly defined technological goals. The Animation approach regarded them as participants in a dialogue between the grassroots level and the technical services.

A second major reorientation in Senegalese rural development policy was the downgrading of the cooperative movement as an instrument for social change.<sup>40</sup> Dia had regarded the cooperative movement as the key institution in the socialization of the countryside. He hoped that the cooperatives would eventually handle all the functions normally handled by the private sector. With Senghor in power, there was a pause in the expansion of the cooperative movement. In deference to pressures from Senegalese traders, transporters, and middlemen, Senghor decided not to eliminate the private sector from the peanut trade. In 1965, the government created the Société Nationale de Distribution au Sénégal (SONADIS), a consortium of state and private commercial interests to insure the regular distribution of basic consumer goods to the countryside.<sup>41</sup> While this measure pacified the Seneg-

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<sup>40</sup>Gellar, "The Politics..." pp. 375-376; Schumacher, Politics, Bureaucracy, and Rural Development in Senegal, pp. 150-179.

<sup>41</sup>For an analysis of changes in the Senegalese government's policy towards the private sector and the establishment of SONADIS, see Schumacher, Politics, Bureaucracy and Rural Development, pp. 135-148.

galese business community, it also signaled the end of the Senegalese government's commitment to use the cooperative movement to radically transform rural Senegal along socialist lines. In 1967, the government decided to eliminate the private commercial traders which had marketed 37% of the peanut crop in the 1966-67 trading season. Cooperatives were given the opportunity to market all of Senegal's peanut crop.<sup>42</sup> However, this move seems to have been taken mainly to reinforce the state's control over the peanut crop by forcing the farmers to sell only through the cooperatives. It was clearly not a move to accelerate the socialization of Senegalese agriculture.

In line with its program to raise peanut and millet productivity by 25%, the government used the cooperatives' credit facilities to promote the purchase of the agricultural inputs designated by SATEC. At the same time, government reduced or took away some of the advantages which had originally attracted the peasants to join the cooperative movement.<sup>43</sup> Food credits for the hungry season soudure were reduced because they were regarded as unproductive. The cooperatives had to pay for certain transportation costs previously assumed by the Agricultural Marketing Board (OCA). Ten percent of the value of the crop was withheld to insure the purity of the crop and to cover certain handling costs. In most instances, only a small fraction of the 10% was

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 163.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., pp. 175-178.

refunded to the farmer at the end of the marketing season. Finally, when the French subsidies for Senegalese peanuts ended in 1967 as a result of agreements between European Community Members, the government of Senegal reduced the price paid for peanuts by 15%.<sup>44</sup> While these measures were perfectly rational from the perspective of a government strapped for financial resources, they were highly unpopular among the rural populations. Moreover, these measures were taken unilaterally without any effort to consult the rural populations for their views on the matter.

During the Dia era, cooperative agents worked closely with Animation agents in preaching the virtues of a socialist society based on a democratic, egalitarian cooperative movement. After Dia was ousted, the government paid greater attention to making the Cooperative Service a more effective instrument for implementing its agricultural program. In 1966, the Senghor government established the Office National de Coopération et d'Assistance au Développement (ONCAD) as part of its effort to rationalize the functioning of the cooperative sector and to reduce corruption. ONCAD was given full responsibility for the execution of the agricultural credit and equipment program. In 1967, it assumed the responsibility for marketing all produce collected locally by the cooperatives and for trucking the peanut crop out from the rural areas, thus further tightening state

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 182. The French peanut subsidy had averaged 20% above the world market price between 1957 and 1965.

control over the rural economy.<sup>45</sup>

A third major reorientation in policy was the reinforcement of the central government's control over the different administrative development institutions.<sup>46</sup> Administrative centralization was promoted by reinforcing the powers of the regional governors who were given greater control over regional and local development programs and by reasserting the central government's tutelage over communal budgets.<sup>47</sup> While these measures were taken in the name of greater administrative efficiency, their main effect was to weaken the power of local party leaders by reducing their ability to channel local, communal, and regional budgetary resources to themselves, their political allies, and their clients.<sup>48</sup>

#### Reorientation and Reorganization of the Animation Service

The fall of Mamadou Dia left the Animation Service in a precarious position and obliged it to reassess its role. In March 1963, Ben Mady Cissé organized a series of meetings in Rufisque to discuss the future of the Animation strategy.<sup>49</sup> At these

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid., pp. 118-119.

<sup>46</sup>For an excellent analysis of the trend towards administrative centralization during the post-Dia era, see Clement Cottingham, "Political Consolidation and Centre-Local Relations in Senegal," Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter, 1970), pp. 101-120.

<sup>47</sup>Gellar, "The Politics...", pp. 368-369.

<sup>48</sup>Cottingham, "Political Consolidation and Centre-Local Relations in Senegal," pp. 116-120.

<sup>49</sup>The meetings were held from March 5-12, 1963. See Cissé's

meetings, Cissé redefined the Service's political role and laid down certain guidelines to be followed to insure its survival and to increase its effectiveness. Thereafter Animation Service officials were not to attack the UPS or to take sides in local political disputes and the Animation Service was to work more closely with the ruling party.

The Rufisque meetings were held at a time when Senghor was purging the UPS of Dia supporters and preparing for the national elections which were to be held later in the year. Thus, it was not surprising to see Cissé attempt to "depoliticize" the Animation Service and to insist that it would no longer act as a parallel and often hostile force vis-a-vis local UPS party officials. At the same time, it was also politically prudent and sociologically wise for Animation agents to refrain from openly attacking traditional social and religious structures. The Animation Service's leadership realized that it could not operate effectively in many districts without the approval of the marabouts.

The "depoliticization" of the Animation Service was accompanied by a greater stress on its civic education role.<sup>50</sup> The

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address, "L'Animation dans la Vie Politique," March 8, 1963, unpublished; and Ibrahima Sow, "Note de Synthèse sur la Session Nationale des Cadres de l'Animation," March 22, 1963, unpublished.

<sup>50</sup>See Moulton, Animation Rurale: Education for Rural Development, pp. 89-91.

Animation Service was called upon to arouse the civic responsibility of the elites and cadres as well as that of the urban and rural masses. A special section was created within the Animation Service to motivate officials at all levels of the bureaucracy.<sup>51</sup> During the mid-1960s, the Animation Service organized "Development Day" seminars, and held frequent meetings with different echelons of the bureaucracy to explain the government's development program and to encourage greater participation in and support for these programs. These programs sought to change the attitudes of civil servants and arouse their social consciousness through education and moral exhortation. This method was also practiced by President Senghor who flavored many of his major political speeches and policy statements with appeals to party and government officials to give up the bad and irresponsible habits which they had acquired under colonial rule.<sup>52</sup>

Another indication of the greater emphasis on the Animation Service's role as an educational agency was its new relationship with the Rural Expansion Centers. In June 1963, overall administrative responsibility for the CERs was transferred from the Ministry of Rural Economy to the Animation Service which became the Direction de l'Animation et de l'Expansion within the Ministry of

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<sup>51</sup>Henry DeDecker, Nation et Développement ... , pp. 334-335. A special effort was made to involve top-ranking civil servants--the Grands Corps de l'Etat--who were often isolated from the concrete problems of the rural masses.

<sup>52</sup>See, for example, Senghor's General Report to the Fourth UPS Party Congress, p. 4.

Planning.<sup>53</sup> The CER heads became hierarchically responsible to the director of the Animation Service in Dakar who was now in a better position to plan and oversee activities of the CERs. A greater effort was made to coordinate the educational and rural mobilization programs of the Rural Animation Centers (CARs) at the département level with the technical resources of the CERs at the arrondissement level. The CERs remained the basic grassroots unit for development planning and programming. The Animation Service increased its training sessions for the technical agents in the CERs in order to enable them to fulfill their new roles and duties as members of a multifunctional development team. The Animation Service also took steps to upgrade the professional qualifications of Animation and Rural Expansion officers by sending them to the Ecole Nationale d'Economie Appliquée (ENEA) for an eight month course.<sup>54</sup>

While the reorganization of the Animation Service in 1963 led to closer relationships between the CARs and the CERs, it did not bring the CER agents much closer to the rural populations or lead to more decentralized development planning. In the first place, the CERs continued to suffer from inadequate funding. The

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<sup>53</sup>Schumacher, Politics, Bureaucracy and Rural Development, p. 113.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 127. During the first year, sixteen Animation officials participated in ENEA's training program. The training had the short term disadvantage of taking sixteen of Animation's best agents from the field where they were needed to maintain the continuity of Animation programs.

Senhor government's austerity program reduced the amount of money which could be spent on vehicles and gasoline, thus preventing CER agents from making the frequent tours in their districts necessary for maintaining regular contacts with the rural population.<sup>55</sup> Perhaps even more significant was the fact that the CER's role as the principal agent for the diffusion of technical services at the grassroots level was undermined by the Senhor government's decision in 1964 to rely upon SATEC to carry out the peanut-millet productivity program in Senegal's major peanut producing regions. In effect, this meant a sharply reduced and subordinate role for an institution which had originally been considered one of the main pillars of Senegalese development strategy.

The animation network in the countryside, on the other hand, continued to expand and to consolidate its position with the support of President Senhor. Rural Animation Centers were set up in areas which had not been reached previously and the number of women's CARs caught up with the number of men's CARs. Thus, by 1967 there were 27 men's centers and 28 women's centres.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup>Senegal's austerity program was first announced by President Senhor in a radio address to the nation given on September 20, 1963

<sup>56</sup>Ben Mady Cissé, "Senegal," in John Lowe (ed.), Adult Education and Nation-Building. A Symposium on Adult Education in Developing Countries (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970), p. 104.

The Animation Service continued to perform much the same kinds of tasks as during the Dia era--training male and female village voluntary workers ("animateurs", "animatrices"), teaching simple and easily adaptable techniques, encouraging participation in the cooperative movement, and organizing small-scale labor intensive village projects.

While the tasks were similar, the manner of their presentation changed noticeably as the ideological functions of Animation were toned down and its educational aspects emphasized. Thus, the efficient operation of the new development institutions was stressed more than the importance of democratic control over these institutions. When the Animation Service organized short training sessions for village chiefs and cooperative presidents and weighers, these sessions were designed more to integrate local authority structures into the government's administrative apparatus and development programs than to stimulate local initiative and control over the new development institutions.<sup>57</sup>

During the mid-1960s, there was a decline in the efforts of the Animation Service to encourage mass participation in human investment projects. This correlated with the Senqher government's deemphasizing human investment as an important element in

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid., These sessions lasted four to five days and reached some 2000 village chiefs and 3500 cooperative presidents and weighers, and village level "animateurs."

Senegalese development strategy.<sup>58</sup> During the Dia period, the most popular form of human investments had been the construction of schools and dispensaries. Hopes had been raised that the government would provide schoolteachers, health personnel, and medicines for villages which had taken the initiative to build the facilities for schools and dispensaries. These hopes were largely dashed, however, when the Senghor government decided to slow down the rate of primary school and rural health service expansion in the rural areas on the grounds that the government could not afford to support the recurrent costs these entailed. In this context, it was logical for the government to de-emphasize the mobilization of rural populations for human investment programs which would arouse expectations the government could not satisfy.

Animation's vision of a decentralized agrarian socialist society as elaborated by IRAM and Ben Mady Cissé in the early 1960s did not materialize. The regrouping of neighboring villages into self-governing rural communes and development cells was postponed.<sup>59</sup> The cooperative movement, for its part, remained

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<sup>58</sup>The First Four Year Plan had a special section reserved for Human Investments. They were to provide the equivalent of 1.9% of the Plan's total investments. The Second Senegalese Four Year Plan (1965-1969) made no reference to human investments.

<sup>59</sup>While the idea of establishing Rural Communes did not die, it was not implemented until 1972. Unlike the self-governing Rural Communes envisaged by Animation ideology, the new Rural Communes had little autonomy, were closely supervised by representatives of the state, and were dominated by traditional elites. For a detailed analysis of the Administrative Reform of

primarily a state-controlled vehicle for marketing peanuts and channeling rural credit rather than the agency for creating independent and multifunctional cooperatives as had been envisaged originally.<sup>60</sup> The administration continued to work primarily through the traditional authorities and the Animation Service itself worked more closely with village chiefs and other rural notables than in the past. Moreover, the village "animateurs" potential as rural change agents was further undermined by the absence of concrete structures and activities in which they could exercise some initiative.<sup>61</sup>

By 1968, the possibilities for a true "dialogue" between the state and the rural masses had diminished considerably as the state tightened its control over the functioning of the rural economy and imposed its own conditions for rural participation in the institutions and programs that had been initiated by the Senegalese government since independence.

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1972, see Yvonne Jones', "Administrative Reform in Rural Senegal - The Rural Communes," unpublished manuscript, August 1979.

Based on extensive field work in Senegal during the late 1970s.

<sup>60</sup>The cooperative movement became increasingly unpopular with a large segment of the peasantry who resented its growing indebtedness to the state via the vehicle of cooperative credit.

<sup>61</sup>Village volunteer workers had no access to state funds or rural credit to launch their own projects, and only rarely served on village development councils which were dominated by the notables and the elders. Brochier makes this very pertinent point in La Diffusion du Progrès Technique en Milieu Rural Sénégalais, pp. 272-273.

Animation Rurale: A Movement in Decline, 1968-1973

Since its inception, the fortune of the Animation Service in Senegal has been closely linked to the existing political and economic situation, and to the extent of the support which the Service received from Senegal's national leadership. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, it became one of the major casualties of the political and economic crises which beset Senegal. During this difficult period its influence in shaping rural development policy dropped precipitously.

Following the ousting of Mamadou Dia, Animation's influence in the government depended upon the degree of support which it received from President Senghor. While Senghor had warmly endorsed the Animation program in 1963, five years later his support for the Animation Service was beginning to waver. At the Sixth UPS Party Congress held in January 1968, Senghor praised the Rural Animation Centers as the nation's leading school for the training and civic education of Senegal's peasant-citizens.<sup>62</sup> Less than two years later in December 1969, Senghor made no reference to Animation Rurale in his report to the Seventh UPS Party Congress.<sup>63</sup> By that time, the animation approach had fallen

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<sup>62</sup>Senghor, Politique, Nation et Développement Moderne (Rufisque: Imprimerie Nationale, 1968), p. 99.

<sup>63</sup>See Senghor's Le Plan du Décollage Economique ou la Participation Responsable comme Moteur du Développement (Dakar: Grande Imprimerie Africaine, 1970). It is interesting to note that there was no reference to animation despite the presence of the word "participation" in the title of this keynote speech.

out of favor. This rapid decline in favor was due largely to Senghor's response to two major crises which shook the regime: (1) the malaise paysanne (peasant unrest) and (2) the political crisis of 1968-69.

The malaise paysanne of the late 1960s was particularly acute in the peanut basin of Senegal which had been the center of SATEC's efforts to raise peanut and millet yields. A combination of poor crops, lower peanut prices, and growing indebtedness due, in part, to purchasing the agricultural inputs pushed by the SATEC program contributed to a sharp drop in rural incomes and growing dissatisfaction with government programs.<sup>64</sup> The malaise paysanne manifested itself by (1) a sharp drop in the volume of agricultural inputs ordered by the farmers during the annual agricultural campaigns; (2) a shift in production from peanuts to food crops as a means of insuring food security; (3) a growing reluctance to repay debts contracted through the cooperatives and ONCAD; and (4) disenchantment with government pricing policies and mechanisms, CNCAD, and the cooperative movement.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>64</sup>Peasant incomes derived from peanut sales dropped from 22.2 billion CFA in 1965 to under 9 billion CFA in 1970-1971. For a discussion of the malaise paysanne, see Schumacher, Politics, Bureaucracy..., pp. 183-185, and Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, Saints and Politicians: Essays in the Organization of a Senegalese Peasant Society (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 133-141.

<sup>65</sup>Schumacher, Politics, Bureaucracy, and Rural Development, pp. 171-182.

The Animation Service's past defense of peasant interests made it suspect in the eyes of many government and party officials who blamed Animation Service agents for stirring up rural discontent.<sup>66</sup> Moreover, the Animation Service had continued to battle within the state bureaucracy against those who upheld SATEC's technocratic and often authoritarian approach to rural development even after President Senghor had clearly thrown his support to SATEC's emphasis on productivity over structural change and popular participation.

The malaise paysanne in the rural areas also coincided with a political and social crisis in the capital which shook the foundations of the regime in 1968 and 1969.<sup>67</sup> Discontent was widespread among nearly all the sectors of urban society. Students and recent university graduates criticized the slow pace of Africanization and the continued French control of the University of Dakar and the national economy. Workers complained because wages had not been raised since 1961. Senegalese businessmen complained that the government had not done enough to help them compete with the French and Lebanese business communities. Unem-

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<sup>66</sup>Moulton, Animation Rurale: Education for Rural Development, pp. 95-96.

<sup>67</sup>For an account of the 1968-1969 crisis, see J. P. N'Diaye, La Jeunesse Africaine Face à l'Impérialisme (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1970), pp. 50-59, and Sheldon Gellar, "The Inheritance Situation and Senegalese Post-Colonial Development Strategies," unpublished paper presented at the Symposium on "Development Strategies in the Third World," University of Notre Dame, April 11-12, 1975, pp. 31-35.

ployed youth were restless over the lack of economic opportunities. The crisis came to a peak in May and June of 1968 when a student strike, a threatened general strike by the trade unions, and urban rioting combined to menace the stability of the regime. Senghor resolved the crisis by using force to crush the student and trade union strike and then offering to make some concessions to the various groups involved in the urban protest against the regime's policies. Because of the unstable political climate in Dakar and widespread peasant discontent in the countryside, Senghor decided to sharply reduce the Animation Service's role as an agent of social mobilization and heightened social consciousness.

The Animation Service's influence in shaping national development policy was also adversely affected by the rise of a circle of young Senegalese technocrats who assumed greater responsibility in running the government and making economic policy following the constitutional reforms of February 1970.<sup>68</sup> The reforms had re-established the Office of Prime Minister which had been eliminated in 1963 when Senegal had adopted a presidential regime. As his first Prime Minister, Senghor chose his protégé Abdou Diouf, a former Planning Minister who had an excellent reputation as a competent technician. Diouf and the technocrats

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<sup>68</sup>For a greater understanding of the position of these technocrats, see the series of essays, Club Nation et Développement (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1970).

focused their attention on Africanizing the upper echelons of government, increasing state control over the leading sectors of the economy, and attracting large amounts of foreign public and private capital to finance large-scale development projects. They regarded the Animation Service as outmoded and ineffective, and they further downplayed the promotion of socialist structures in the countryside.

The Animation Service continued to defend its original mission and the importance of educating and organizing the rural masses to articulate their own needs and grievances. It protested against the technocrats' efforts to give the technical services more control over rural development policies and institutions.<sup>69</sup> With Senghor's backing, however, the views of Diouf and the technocrats prevailed. The stage was set for the dismantling of the Animation Service.

#### Reorganization and Demise of The Animation Service

One of the early signs of the declining influence of the Animation Service was its transferral in June 1968 from the Ministry of Planning to the jurisdiction of the newly reorganized and strengthened Ministry of Rural Development.<sup>70</sup> The transfer meant a sharply reduced role for Animation in the national planning

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<sup>69</sup>Schumacher, Politics, Bureaucracy, and Rural Development, , pp. 213-218.

<sup>70</sup>See Gagnon, Coopératives ou Autogestion , p. 129, and Schumacher, Politics and Bureaucracy, and Rural Development, p. 216.

process. It also meant the loss of its Urban Animation office which remained attached to the Ministry of Planning.

During the course of 1970 the government decided to reorganize Senegal's rural development structures and to reinforce the powers of the technical services and specialized regional development agencies such as SODEVA (Société de Développement et de Vulgarisation Agricole.) SODEVA had been created in 1968 to take over SATEC's mission to raise productivity in the peanut basin, but by 1970 it had become a regional authority with control over most agricultural development activities in the peanut producing region. In September 1970, Prime Minister Diouf made a major policy statement which redefined Animation's role in Senegal's development strategy and stripped the Animation Service of many of its most important powers and functions.<sup>71</sup> First, Animation lost its control over the Rural Expansion Centers which now came under the direct control of the National Agricultural Service. Second, the Animation Service no longer took part in planning and coordinating CER activities at the national, regional, and departmental levels. Third, the Animation Service would no longer be responsible for promoting the cooperative movement or for the establishment of intervillage development cells and rural communes. Fourth, all agricultural extension activities in the broadest sense-- pedagogical and technical-- would now be organ-

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 265.

ized and managed by the Agricultural Service or by specialized regional development agencies and foreign technical assistance organizations. The technical services would thus take over the educational mission previously handled by the Animation Service. Finally, the Animation Service would no longer be the driving force for the moral and civic education of the rural populations. This task would now be the exclusive responsibility of the party.

Henceforth, Animation's primary mission would be the vocational training of Senegalese rural and urban youth who had not been admitted to secondary school.<sup>72</sup> In late 1971, what was left of the original Animation Service was transferred to the Ministry of Youth and Sports where it became the Division of Promotion Humaine (PH).<sup>73</sup> At this time, Ben Mady Cissé resigned as director and left Senegal to accept a post as the director of the PanAfrican Development Institute in the Cameroons.<sup>74</sup> Its status as a Division within one of the least prestigious ministries in the government was a good indication as to how far the Animation Service had fallen. For two years Promotion Humaine languished until the end of 1973 when Cissé returned to Senegal to take over the reins of what was now a radically different agency from the Animation Service which he had helped to create in 1959.

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<sup>72</sup>Schumacher, Politics, Bureaucracy, and Rural Development, , p. 217.

<sup>73</sup>Moulton, Animation Rurale: Education For Rural Development, p. 100

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., p. 99.

Promotion Humaine: Agency for Non-Formal Education, 1974-1979

Following Cissé's return to Senegal, Senghor decided to upgrade the importance of Promotion Humaine by giving it responsibility for administering most of Senegal's non-formal educational programs. In 1975, the Promotion Humaine division became the Secrétariat d'Etat à la Promotion Humaine (SEPH) and Ben Mady Cissé, its director, was accorded full ministerial rank to underscore Promotion Humaine's elevated status. At the same time, the SEPH was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Education where it enjoyed a high degree of autonomy.

Organization and Orientation of the Promotion Humaine Service

Promotion Humaine was divided into four bureaus (Directions): (1) Literacy (Alphabétisation); (2) Post-Primary Practical Training (Enseignement Moyen Pratique); (3) Rural Vocation Training (Formation Professionnelle Rurale); and (4) Rural and Urban Animation. <sup>75</sup>

One of the major characteristics of Promotion Humaine which distinguished it from the old Animation Service was its wide range of specialized pedagogical functions. Three of the four bureaus were devoted to some form of non-formal education. The Literacy section prepared and organized adult literacy programs in six national languages. The Enseignement Moyen Pratique (EMP)

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 105.

section was charged with devising practical training programs for rural school-leavers who would not be going on to secondary schools. The Rural Vocational Training section provided courses to upgrade the skill levels of craftsmen, fishermen, herders, and farmers. These three non-formal educational divisions required a much higher degree of formal education and specialization on the part of Promotion Humaine officials than that required of most Animation Service agents during the 1960s.<sup>76</sup>

In theory, the non-formal educational programs were designed to transmit new skills to different sectors of the rural society which would help them to become more productive. Thus, adult literacy programs would be used to improve village hygiene and to explain new agricultural methods. The EMP Centers would teach rural youth basic economic skills and integrate them into the local rural economy. The Rural Vocational Training Centers would upgrade the traditional skills of artisans, herders, and fishermen and teach them how to use more sophisticated modern equipment and techniques. Unlike the short training sessions utilized by the Animation Service during the 1960s, these new programs required the participants to spend from several months to two

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<sup>76</sup>République du Sénégal, Cinquième Plan Quadriennal de Développement Economique et Social (1er Juillet 1977-30 Juin 1981) (Dakar: Les Nouvelles Editions Africaines, 1977), p. 271. During the course of the Fourth Plan (1973-1977), Promotion Humaine had replaced all the former heads of the CARs who lacked post-secondary school diplomas with persons who had received diplomas from ENEA.

years in training.<sup>77</sup>

The newly revived Animation Rurale section had a much less precisely defined mission than the other three sections.<sup>78</sup> It handled a variety of activities which included:

- (1) Organizing the rural populations to participate in the diverse non-formal training programs conducted by the other Promotion Humaine divisions;
- (2) Mobilizing villages to initiate and participate in various social-welfare projects--village pharmacies, health education and nutrition programs;
- (3) Collaborating with different regional development agencies and technical services in promoting rural participation in such programs as agricultural extension, reforestation and bush fire prevention campaigns;
- (4) Setting up and supervising experimental youth projects built around potentially remunerative cash crops such as bananas in the Casamance or tomatoes in the Fleuve region;
- (5) Responsibility for a wide range of women's projects such as home economics training, daycare centers and vegetable gardening;
- (6) Supervising the work of American Peace Corps Volunteers serving as village level "animateurs", and;
- (7) Responsibility for providing literacy programs and civic education training for Rural Councillors in the regions where rural communes had been established following the administrative reforms of 1972.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>77</sup>For example training programs which provided rural artisans with upgraded skills in building construction, metalwork, and woodwork lasted nine months.

<sup>78</sup>Much of the following discussion is based on the author's personal observations while serving as a consultant to USAID for projects having a Promotion Humaine component, from 1977 to 1978.

<sup>79</sup>See Jones, "Administrative Reform in Rural Senegal," for a detailed analysis of Promotion Humaine's involvement in literacy and civic education training for the Rural Councillors.

Promotion Humaine has become far more Dakar-centered than the old Animation Rurale Service. Now nearly one-third of its personnel work in Dakar.<sup>80</sup> Top officials spend a good deal of their time organizing national and international conferences in Dakar and frequently travel abroad to represent Senegal in similar conferences in other countries. While these conferences undoubtedly improve Senegal's international image as a progressive and dynamic country, this allocation of staff time means that there are fewer opportunities for Dakar-based officials of Promotion Humaine to visit their agents in the field. Still another factor discouraging its leadership from visiting the countryside more often is the Service's heavy dependency upon funding from foreign aid agencies to finance its programs. Much time is spent in preparing project proposals and in negotiating with representatives of various donor agencies which might have otherwise been spent in the field.

Changes in the organizational structure and mission of Promotion Humaine have led to more formal and distant relationships between Animation officials and the grassroots. The main emphasis of the Animation director at the departmental level has shifted from recruiting and training local peasants as change agents, to managing projects initiated by Promotion Humaine and

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<sup>80</sup>Promotion Humaine, Annual Report for 1976-77. In 1975-76, three hundred and two of its nine hundred eight-two employees were based in Dakar.

supervising other Animation Service personnel under his jurisdiction. Abandoning the concept of the multifunctional volunteer village level "animateur" has meant less frequent visits by Animation officials to villages in their district. The Animation Rurale Service no longer trains hundreds of village level volunteers each year. Neither does it work closely with village chiefs or local cooperative officers. Since the end of the 1960s, Animation has been relying more and more upon American Peace Corps volunteers to serve as catalysts for change at the village level.<sup>81</sup> In some ways Peace Corps volunteers have become a substitute for the village "animateurs" originally called for in Animation theory. In many rural areas, Peace Corps volunteers have become the main link between the village and the Senegalese bureaucracy. The use of foreigners to stimulate innovation in the villages is, of course, a major departure from Animation principles.

#### Promotion Humaine's Struggle for Survival

Despite its elevation to the status of a Secrétariat d'Etat in 1975, Promotion Humaine exercised very little influence within the government or in Senegalese development planning. Its ability to survive depended largely upon the moral support it

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<sup>81</sup>This section is based on an analysis of questionnaires prepared by Professor Robert Charlick and distributed to former Peace Corps volunteers working on Animation projects in Senegal, as well as the author's own interviews with Peace Corps volunteers working on Animation projects in Senegal between 1977 and 1979.

received from President Senghor and its success in getting foreign donors to finance programs.<sup>82</sup> Thus, Promotion Humaine looked to external aid to provide 75% of its total investments during the course of Senegal's Fifth Four Year Plan (1977-1981).

As a residual Service with no independent base of its own, Promotion Humaine also faced considerable bureaucratic infighting and competition from heads of ministries and technical services seeking to take charge over many of the tasks which had been confided to Promotion Humaine. In the Lower Casamance, for example, officials from the Projet Intérimaire de Développement Agricole en Casamance (PIDAC) argued that the various women's and youth's vegetable gardening and banana plantation projects which had been launched by PH ought to be run by PIDAC because Promotion Humaine did not have the technical expertise necessary to insure the proper supervision of the projects.<sup>83</sup> Elsewhere, SODEVA, the regional agency responsible for the overall agricultural development of Senegal's peanut basin, was highly critical of Promotion Humaine's handling of adult literacy programs and training for the rural craftsmen. SODEVA officials suggested that it take over these and other Promotion Humaine programs which affected agricultural development programs in the region.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>82</sup>Promotion Humaine found it difficult to find foreign funding for its literacy programs. During the course of the Fourth Plan (1973-77) only 10% of the program was funded. Its inability to find foreign funding for its literacy programs was an important factor in losing control over the literacy division in 1978.

<sup>83</sup>Source: Interviews with PIDAC officials in May 1978.

Prcmotion Humaine also faced opposition from the Ministry of the Interior which exercised its tutelage over the Rural Communes established by the Administrative Refcorm of 1972.<sup>84</sup> The administrative reform, first implemented in the Thiès region, was supposed to bring government development agencies closer to the people and to increase the participation of the local populations in determining their development priorities. Promotion Humaine was entrusted with the task of providing literacy programs for the Rural Councillors and civic education training to help them to be more effective in their new roles and powers. These roles included: (1) allocating communal budgetary resources; (2) supervising local community development projects; and (3) the delicate and potentially controversial task of managing local land tenure systems. Promotion Humaine was also supposed to take the initiative in organizing annual planning sessions which would bring the representatives of the people--Rural Councillors, village chiefs, cooperative presidents, etc.--together to meet with CER agents to discuss their problems. However, these planning sessions rarely took place because of jurisdictional disputes between the Ministry of the Interior and Promotion Humaine. The Promotion Humaine Service was more interested in encouraging the Rural Councillors to speak out and exercise direct control over

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<sup>84</sup>Source: Interviews with SODEVA officials in Dakar, Diourbel, and Thiès in May 1979.

<sup>85</sup>See Jones, "Administrative Reform in Rural Senegal," for a detailed discussion of tensions between Promotion Humaine and the Ministry of the Interior.

local projects while the Ministry of the Interior was more concerned with communicating and imposing the central government's development priorities, largely through the sous-préfet who was responsible for supervising the budgets and programs of the Rural Communes in his arrondissement. The Ministry of the Interior intervened to reinforce the sous-préfet's administrative control of the deliberations of the Rural Councillors and to minimize Promotion Humaine's influence.

Following the national elections of March 1978, a government shake-up produced several important changes in the organization of Promotion Humaine. First, Ben Mady Cissé was ousted as its Director and was replaced by Robert Sagna, a young technocrat. Second, responsibility for Senegal's adult literacy educational programs was taken away from Promotion Humaine and transferred directly to the Ministry of National Education. Third, a Secrétariat d'Etat à la Condition Féminine was established to deal specifically with women's issues. The head of the new service immediately demanded that Condition Féminine be given full administrative control over female agents and women's programs currently under the authority of Promotion Humaine. This meant stripping Promotion Humaine of one of its oldest and most innovative programs.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>86</sup>Promotion Humaine had the largest percentage of women agents of any major service. In 1976, there were approximately 290 women working for Promotion Humaine or nearly 30% of the total personnel.

In mid-1979, Promotion Humaine found itself in a difficult situation. Although still receiving moral support from President Senghor, it suffered from overcentralization, inadequate budgets to carry out its various missions, and serious morale problems resulting from its uncertain future and position in the government development bureaucracy. It had long since lost the elan of the old Animation Service of the early 1960s. Other Ministries and services were vying to take over its remaining functions<sup>87</sup> and the enthusiasm of foreign donors for funding Promotion Humaine programs was waning. The future for Animation in Senegal, at least as administered by a separate and specialized agency, did not look very bright.

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<sup>87</sup>In January 1980 the Ministry of Women's Affairs (Condition Féminine) and Promotion Humaine were combined and were placed under the direction of the former Minister of Women's Affairs, Maimouna Kane.

## CHAPTER FOUR

TECHNIQUES OF ANIMATION RURALE DEVELOPED IN SENEGAL

While Animation Rurale was conceived primarily as a crucial component of a comprehensive strategy for rural change in Senegal, it was also regarded as a set of techniques which could be used to achieve the following objectives:

- (1) raise the level of civic consciousness of the rural masses;
- (2) stimulate the adoption of new ideas and techniques;
- (3) organize local communities to participate effectively in self-help development projects and government initiated development programs.

In this chapter, we shall examine four techniques used by the Animation Service to promote these objectives:

- (1) Training Village Level "Animateurs";
- (2) Animation Féminine;
- (3) Human Investments; and
- (4) Collective Fields.

Training Village Level Animateurs

According to Animation theory, the "animateur" was to be the key agent for stimulating popular participation at the local level. During its first ten years of existence, the Animation Rurale Service claimed to have trained 6,520 "animateurs" and

2540 "animatrices"<sup>1</sup> There is a relatively abundant literature describing the methods used in training village "animateurs."

The Rural Animation Center (CAR) director was responsible for choosing the villages in his district which were to be "animated" and for organizing the recruitment and training of the village "animateurs." The Animation Service laid down specific guidelines for the CAR directors to follow in choosing the villages which were to be the sites of "animation" programs.<sup>2</sup> The CAR director was expected to have an intimate knowledge of the socio-economic conditions in his district which would help him to choose those villages most likely to be receptive to animation programs, and geographic zones where villages could be expected to cooperate with each other.<sup>3</sup> The CAR directors were to be flexible in applying guidelines suggested by the national office in Dakar. While these guidelines called for training one "animateur" for every hundred people and two "animateurs" for each

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<sup>1</sup>See Ben Mady Cissé, Bilan de Dix Années d'Animation au Sénégal (Geneva: Institut International d'Etudes Sociales, 1971) cited in Gabriel Gagnon, Coopératives ou Auto-gestion: Sénégal, Cuba, Tunisie (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1976), pp. 128-129.

<sup>2</sup>For a comprehensive discussion of guidelines to be followed, see Direction de l'Animation, "Instructions Circulaires du 7 Novembre 1962," which was addressed to all regional Animation Service officials and CAR directors.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. The CAR director was expected to make a series of maps showing the size, location, and ethnic composition of the villages in his zone, the physical characteristics of the zone, the distribution of administrative services, and the dynamics of inter-village relationships. Few CAR directors had the training or the time needed to carry out such extensive socio-economic surveys.

village, adjustments had to be made to take into consideration such factors as the size of the village, relationships between villages, and social, religious, and ethnic heterogeneity. Hence, a small hamlet might have only one "animateur" while a large village might have several. In dealing with villages and zones with ethnic and/or religious heterogeneity, it was also important to see that all the different groups were represented by the "animateurs" selected in such a way that all would feel involved.

The CAR director was to hold frequent meetings with the people in the villages and zones to be "animated" to make sure they understood the rationale of the Animation training program. He was to stress the technical and economic advantages of participating in the programs as well as the importance of training in preparing the people to manage their own development. He was to make it clear that the selection of candidates for the training sessions would be made by the village, and not by government agents.\*

Ideally, the "animateur" would be between twenty-five and forty years in age--old enough to be married and be the head of a household, but young enough to be strong and open to new ideas.<sup>5</sup>

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\*Jeanne Marie Moulton, Animation Rurale: Education for Rural Development (Amherst, Mass.: Center for International Education, 1977), pp. 27-30.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

"Animateurs" were also respected members of their community and individuals who could wield some influence in the village. They would be volunteers and would remain farmers in terms of their primary economic activity.<sup>6</sup> Once villages in a particular zone had chosen the men they wished to designate as "animateurs" the CAR director would gather them together to attend an initial training session which lasted seventeen days.

The training session usually incorporated five components:<sup>7</sup>

- (1) Lectures by Animation officials concerning national political, economic, and social institutions and discussions with the trainees as to how they and their community fit in;
- (2) Lectures and contacts with representatives of the technical services so that the "animateurs" would have a better understanding of how these services functioned and how they could use these services;
- (3) Training sessions in which the "animateurs" were taught how to conduct simple village surveys and encouraged to define and analyze village problems and developmental objectives;
- (4) Dialogues between Animation officials and the trainees in which the latter were encouraged to express their own views about issues of importance to the local populations as well as their feelings about the training session; and

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<sup>6</sup>Ben Mady Cissé, "Senegal" in John Lowe (ed.), Adult Education and Nation-Building, A Symposium on Adult Education in Developing Countries (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1970), p. 99.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 99-101. Also see Moulton, Animation Rurale, pp. 30-32 for details as to how the lessons were presented.

- (5) Graduation day programs often included a short play presented by the "animateurs" which dramatized some aspect of what they had learned or a problem facing their communities, speeches by prominent government officials, the awarding of diplomas, and a banquet organized by the teachers to celebrate the conclusion of the training session and the "initiation" of the trainees in their new roles as "animateurs."

After completing the training session, the "animateurs" would return to their villages and share what they had learned with the rest of the population.<sup>8</sup> Their primary task was to inform, educate, and stimulate community participation in diverse development activities. The "animateur" was to work primarily through persuasion and dialogue and not attempt to impose his views on the others in the village. He was also to avoid getting involved in the quest for such offices as president or weicher of the local cooperative.

The first training session was often followed by a second session which lasted from two to five days. This session was usually organized around a single technical theme.<sup>9</sup> For example, in conjunction with government efforts to introduce animal traction, the Rural Animation Center might organize a training session to teach a group of "animateurs" how to harness and yoke oxen. The relevant technical service would assume responsibility for the training which consisted of practical demonstrations of the technique. If possible, an effort was made to hold the technical

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<sup>8</sup>Cissé, "Senegal," p. 101.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 102, and Moulton, Animation Rurale, pp. 33-34.

training session in one of the "animated" villages in order to stimulate other farmers to follow the example of the "animateurs." At a later date, the "animateurs" would be given refresher courses and more specialized training in different skills such as understanding the rules and regulations of the cooperatives, the proper care of livestock, and the use of chemical fertilizer.

The next stage in the training of "animateurs" involved them in planning the restructuring of rural life<sup>10</sup> around the development cells and multifunctional cooperatives called for in "animation" theory and reiterated in Mamadou Dia's development strategy. After "animateurs" had gained some experience in working with villagers on diverse development projects, they would meet with "animateurs" from neighboring villages under the supervision of the Animation Service to list their most urgent needs and priorities and to define their development objectives. They would also begin planning how to regroup their villages into development cells and to discuss the best location for common services such as schools, health clinics, and storage facilities.

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<sup>10</sup>For guidelines concerning the process of restructuring, see the Direction de l'Animation, "Note d'Orientation sur les Sessions Second Degré 'Structuration'," June 10, 1962. Also see Henry DeDecker, Nation et Développement Communautaire en Guinée et au Sénégal (Paris: Mouton, 1967), pp. 380-382.

### The Practice of Training "Animateurs"

A number of weaknesses in the practice of training for Animation Rurale programs significantly reduced the effectiveness of village level "animateurs."<sup>11</sup> Training programs were usually too short to give the "animateurs" the skills which they needed to carry out the many tasks they were called upon to do. In covering a wide range of topics, the initial seventeen-day training session could not go into any single topic very thoroughly. Thus, while the candidates would have their horizons widened and would be made aware of many new institutions and issues and ways of dealing with them, they could not be expected to assimilate and master so many subjects in such a short period of time.

The three to five day training sessions may also have been too short to provide the "animateur" with the technical skills it was designed to convey. Moreover, certain tasks required some degree of literacy and many of the farmers were illiterate. For example, an illiterate "animateur" could not easily verify the accuracy of the records kept by the treasurer/weigher of the local cooperatives, yet adult literacy programs were not part of the original village "animateur's" training.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>DeDecker, Nation et Développement Communautaire, pp. 258-259.

<sup>12</sup>Early Animation theory had nothing to say about adult literacy training, and at no time was it considered to be a major factor in choosing village level animateurs in Senegal. It was not until the government abandoned the village level worker that it began to take an interest in functional literacy in 1972.

Perhaps most critically, few "animateurs" were ever exposed to any training beyond the initial seventeen-day session and the three-to-five day technical follow-up. The planned "restructuring" sessions which would provide the animation strategy with its local organizational dynamic and the "animateur" with continuing motivation and supervision were rarely held. The Rural Animation Center at Kolda was one of the few exceptions to this rule. There, a serious effort was made, beginning in 1962, to encourage village "animateurs" from neighboring villages to set up these development cells and to promote cooperative activities in their area.<sup>13</sup> Initially, the Animation Service hoped to create twenty-eight development cells in Kolda. Between 1962 and 1964 "animateurs" from sixteen villages met in special training sessions to discuss plans for the structuring of these cells. However, with the ouster of Dia the Kolda program floundered as personnel were changed, financial resources were cut back and the Animation Service leaders lost the initial elan.<sup>14</sup> By the end of 1964, "restructuring" training sessions for village level "animateurs" were a dead letter. Although the Animation Service still aspired to conduct them, they no longer had the support of the central government for this activity.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>For a discussion of Kolda as a pilot zone, see Mansor M'Baye, "L'Organisation de la Vie Rurale en Casamance," in Sénégal, l'An 21 Par Lui-Même (Paris: IRFED, 1962), pp. 45-49. Also see DeDecker, Nation et Développement Communautaire, pp. 383-386.

<sup>14</sup>DeDecker, Nation et Développement Communautaire, p. 385.

<sup>15</sup>Direction de l'Animation, "Rapport sur les Problèmes d'Animation: Situation Actuelle et Perspectives," July 3, 1963,

By the mid-1960s the role of the village "animateur" in Senegal's development strategy began to decline. The Animation Service increasingly turned its attention to training village chiefs and cooperative officials, in addition to attempting to inculcate governmental officials with civic education. By 1970 the Animation Service was no longer training any village level "animateurs."

#### The Impact of the "Animateur" Training Program

It is exceedingly difficult to make a systematic evaluation of the impact of the "animateur" training program and of the network of local voluntary agents created in rural Senegal. Few studies have attempted to examine the day-to-day activities of these men and women and the long range implications of their actions. A few general conclusions, however, may be drawn from the data available. It is clear that the village level "animateur" did not evolve into the kind of dynamic social change agent described in Animation theory for several reasons. In the first place, the "animateurs" did not have the authority, status, or resources to exercise much leadership at the village level, or to challenge the local authority structures. After the fall of the Dia government, little effort was made to transfer needed material and training resources to them, nor was the government committed to supporting them politically in this role.

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for references to creating intervillage development cells.

Second, "animateurs" had no institutional base from which they could operate because of the failure of rural institutions to evolve in the manner prescribed by Animation theory. Intervillage development cells did not emerge and village cooperatives did not regroup into cooperative unions. Although in theory, "animateurs" were to play a major role in organizing the people to participate in self-governing rural communes, in fact, rural communes were eventually established without the participation of the "animateurs." By the time the Senegalese government established the first rural communes in 1972, the village level "animateurs" had already lost their original functions as key social change agents and representatives of the people.

Third, after the ouster of Dia, the Senegalese government's preference for using agricultural extension agents and vulgari-  
sateurs to promote new agricultural techniques at the grassroots level eliminated one of the "animateurs'" main functions and left them with little to do in their villages.

On the other hand, there are some indications that the rural population had a favorable opinion of the animation program, and of the work of village "animateurs." One major survey of the peasantry conducted in the late 1960s showed that seventy-eight percent of the villagers questioned had a positive attitude toward the Animation Service.<sup>16</sup> Many farmers cited the fact that they had received good advice on agricultural techniques from

"animateurs" and that this had contributed to improving their quality of life. Much more striking was the fact that nearly two-thirds of those with a good opinion of the Animation Service attributed this to the impact of the program on rural women.<sup>17</sup>

### Animation Féminine

While Animation Féminine started slowly, it seems to have had a more profound and lasting impact on rural life in Senegal than other Animation programs and techniques.<sup>18</sup> Originally, Animation Féminine was designed to be the women's counterpart to the men's village level "animateur" training programs. Each cercle was to have its own women's Rural Animation Center which would train women recruited from the same villages as the male village level voluntary workers. The selection of recruits more or less followed the same kind of guidelines as those used in selecting the men. The "animatrices" were also expected to be relatively young, married, and dynamic.

Despite apparent similarities in the formal structures of the men's and women's Rural Animation Centers, there was a marked

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<sup>16</sup>Pierre Fougeyrollas, Où Va Le Sénégal? (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1970), pp. 102-103. This survey was conducted during the period of the "malaise paysanne." The Animation Service was more favorably viewed than the ruling political party or the cooperative movement.

<sup>17</sup> Id., p. 103.

<sup>18</sup> Essé, "Senegal," p. 99. Animation Féminine was delayed by the need to recruit qualified female staff members, and by the need to obtain the agreement of men in "animated villages" prior to the initiation of the women's program.

difference in the contents and orientation of their respective training programs.<sup>19</sup> Animation Féminine built its program around traditional female sex roles, thus concentrating on training programs to help "animatrices" become better mothers and household managers and to give them knowledge which could lead to improvements in the quality of life in their villages. The curriculum for the "animatrices" included such topics as nutrition, family budgeting, childcare, household and village hygiene, sewing, and other domestic arts. Specialized training sessions were also organized to teach women how to start their own collective gardens whose produce could be used to improve family diets or sold to provide cash for other projects.

While Animation Féminine training programs stressed teaching skills which were compatible with traditional women's roles, Animation theory also insisted that the "animatrices" would have to go beyond these roles and participate fully in the new development institutions. This meant that women would have to be represented in the cooperatives and village level "animatrices" would have to meet periodically with their male counterparts to discuss mutual objectives and to plan projects for their villages. In practice, however, local development institutions and activities

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<sup>19</sup>For a description of these differences in orientation, see Annette M'Baye and Oulimata Fall, "Promotion de la Femme Sénégalaise: Son Rôle dans le Développement du Pays," in Sénégal, l'An 21 par Lui-Même (Paris: IRFED, 1962), pp. 67-71; and DeDecker, Nation et Développement Communautaire, pp. 281-289.

continued to remain predominantly male-oriented. Very few cooperatives had women members, and the officers of cooperatives were invariably men.

Animation Féminine did not insist upon promoting absolute equality between men and women or in radically altering power relationships between the sexes. Animation Féminine programs generally did not come into conflict with local power structures. Moreover, most of the projects organized by village level "animatrices" were acceptable to rural men because they were compatible with their own aspirations for a better life for themselves and their families. Animation Féminine was thus less controversial than some of the Animation Service's other programs which clashed with local political, economic, and social power structures or local development bureaucracies.

The main tasks of the "animatrices" were to organize village women to take advantage of government social and health services, and to participate in activities which would improve the quality of family and village life. The "animatrices" collaborated with such government agencies as the Promotion Maternelle et Infantile (P.M.I.) to improve the general health levels of pregnant women, young mothers, and infants by providing periodic medical examinations and information about nutrition and childcare. They also organized daycare centers to mind the children while the mothers worked in the fields. This latter project was more widespread in

the Casamance where women worked in the rice paddies than it was in the peanut basin where women's agricultural activities were limited.<sup>20</sup>

Women were also encouraged to engage in such productive activities as raising small animals and growing vegetables in collective gardens. These were considered to be "women's" projects, aimed at augmenting and improving family diets or providing supplementary income. In some instances, receipts earned from collective projects were invested to ease the women's heavy domestic workload. In one Serer village, for example, women used the proceeds from their collective field to purchase a donkey and cart to haul firewood.<sup>21</sup> In other instances, the proceeds were used to purchase millet mills or rice huskers to lighten the burden of preparing food.

Despite the fact that most married women had their own individual parcel of land and worked on their husband's land as well, development planners did not regard women as important agricultural producers. Agricultural extension agents worked almost exclusively with men. As a result, the women received little or no advice from the technical services or from the "animatrice" about growing vegetables, raising chickens, goats, and sheep, or about the use of fertilizer and other modern agricultural inputs.

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<sup>20</sup>DeDecker, Nation et Développement Communautaire, p. 286.

<sup>21</sup>Hapgood, From Independence to Tomorrow, p. 124.

Women were also generally left out of the cooperative structure even though they legally had the right to join as individuals if they wished. In most cases, the head of the extended family, chef de carré, or the head of the nuclear family, joined the cooperative and made all decisions concerning the purchase of agricultural inputs for the family farm. In some "animated" villages, women sought to have a voice in the affairs of the cooperative so that some of their concerns might be considered.<sup>22</sup> For example, the women might request that the cooperative purchase a millet mill or rice husker or set up a small store where they could buy basic consumer goods without enduring extensive travel to markets.

The decline of the Animation Rurale Service during the late 1960s adversely affected their women's programs and by 1970, the Animation Service was no longer training village level "animatrices." During the mid-1970s, Promotion Humaine once again began to organize women's projects in selected villages.<sup>23</sup> The elan, however, of the early and mid-1960s when Animation Féminine was a pioneering force was largely absent. The better educated younger generation of Animation Féminine Service staff members came primarily from urban backgrounds and were often reluctant to work in the villages.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, the large social gap between

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<sup>22</sup>DeDecker, Nation et Développement Communautaire, p. 287.

<sup>23</sup>The American Peace Corps played a major role in promoting many of these projects due to its interest in "Women in Development," as part of USAID's "New Directions" mandate of 1973.

the younger Animation Féminine officials and the more traditional and illiterate village women with whom they were expected to work made dialogue difficult.

Although the Animation Féminine Program directly concerned only a small percentage of rural women in Senegal and brought no major changes in their status or significant improvements in their living standards, it still had an important and lasting impact in raising their expectations and in providing them with experience in dealing with government officials and organizing their own small-scale projects. In the late 1970s, Senegalese rural women were becoming more vociferous in their demands for a greater role in Senegal's political and economic life and, in the process were becoming a potentially potent force for pressuring the government to do more to help satisfy the basic needs of Senegal's rural population.

#### Human Investments

Animation theory maintained that human investment projects could be useful instruments in promoting both economic development and African Socialism. During the early 1960s, organizing human investment projects was one of the major functions of the Animation Service. In an important position paper, the Animation

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<sup>2</sup>\*Interview with Marti Thompson, a doctoral candidate at University of Illinois who was conducting research on training programs and careers of Monitrices d'Economie Familiale Rurale. May 14, 1979.

Service laid down three general conditions which had to be met if human investment projects were to be successful:<sup>25</sup>

1. The decision to provide free labor for a particular project must be decided by the local communities themselves without any pressure from the administrative authorities or technical services. One of the most unpopular features of colonial rule had been the extensive use of forced labor. The Senegalese government could not continue to use forced labor and retain its legitimacy with the rural masses. "Animated" populations, free from coercion from above, would be more apt to spontaneously contribute voluntary labor for worthy projects.
2. The human investment contributed by the local population must be used for some local project which will directly benefit the community providing the voluntary labor. Local communities rather than the government should determine which projects would be most useful. They should also have the right to contest the state's choice of projects when in conflict with their own preferences.
3. The sacrifices made by some sectors of the population in contributing voluntary labor could not be justified unless all sectors of the population and members of the state bureaucracy were also committed to making similar kinds of sacrifices. The state could not expect the rural populations to bear all the burden. It had to make an effort to mobilize the urban populations to make similar efforts. At the same time, government officials and civil servants would have to work harder to improve their productivity as a counterpart to the extra effort the state was asking the people to make.<sup>26</sup>

These principles were sociologically sound. Hence, the most successful human investment projects launched by the Animation Service during the early 1960s were those which involving the

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<sup>25</sup>These guidelines are contained in a Senegalese government document entitled "L'Investissement-Humaine Dans le Développement Socialiste," April 25, 1962.

<sup>26</sup>For example, a five percent "Development Tax" was levied on the salaries of all civil servants as a concrete demonstration of urban solidarity for the rural masses.

local populations in projects which the community really wanted, such as the construction of schools, infirmaries and village pharmacies. On the other hand, it was much more difficult to organize local communities to work on projects which people normally considered to be the domain of government and which were initiated from the top down. Road improvement projects were a case in point since they were often associated with the forced labor practices of the colonial era. Local people also regarded building and maintaining roads as one of the few public sources of rural salaried employment and political patronage. For these reasons, human investment for road work was poorly viewed by the rural population.

By the mid-1960s, human investment was no longer an important feature of Senegalese national development strategy. The down-playing of human investment projects was, in part, a response to the rural population's reluctance to contribute free labor to government initiated projects. The government also de-emphasized human investment due to its concern that it did not have the resources or personnel to follow up on the most popular human investment projects. For example, the government simply lacked sufficient mid-wives, nurses, and medicines to send to all the communities which had voluntarily built their own local infirmaries and pharmacies in the hope of obtaining improved medical services by tapping national resources. Human investment projects in this way risked creating excessive demand which would only

lead to increased rural frustration.

After the initial enthusiasm generated by independence had worn off, it became increasingly difficult for the government to persuade the rural populations to provide voluntary labor for rural development projects. The people insisted upon material incentives in the form of cash and food as compensation for participating in government initiated local development projects. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, a scheme to build small dikes to contain salt intrusion in the Lower Casamance floundered because the farmers in the areas insisted upon being paid for their labor.<sup>27</sup> Once the project funds ran out, most farmers in the area no longer bothered to maintain the dikes because they were no longer being paid to do so, and because they still regarded the project as the government's rather than their own. A similar situation arose with fire fighting. In this case the United Nations World Food Program, in collaboration with the Senegalese Forestry Service, distributed food to the volunteers participating in the local fire-fighting brigades and firebreak maintenance campaigns.<sup>28</sup> Participants came to depend on compensation for their involvement, and without such compensation they would not perform the service. This represented a sharp departure from the view which the Animation Service had promoted of

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<sup>27</sup>Based on interviews with PIDAC agricultural extension agents in the Lower Casamance in May, 1978.

<sup>28</sup>République du Sénégal, Direction des Eaux et Forêts, Rapport Annual, 1975-1976.

human investment projects. For the Animation Service, these projects represented an expression of communal solidarity and a manifestation of an on-going partnership between the state and the local population. Through this partnership the pace of rural development could be accelerated by substituting voluntary labor for scarce capital.

#### The Practice of Human Investment

As a technique for spurring rural development, human investment did not work very well. There are several reasons for this outcome. First, the government's priorities were not always the same as those of the rural communities which they wanted to mobilize. Second, technical supervision of projects was often inadequate. A government service might get hundreds of people to work on dike construction only to see the dikes collapse after the first hard rains because of poor design or execution of the work.<sup>29</sup> Third, the government did not always deliver the promised services to the communities which had contributed their free labor in anticipation of the benefits they would receive. These factors dampened popular enthusiasm for human investment projects initiated by the state.

The failure of human investment projects guided by the Animation Service to mobilize substantial participation of villagers

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<sup>29</sup>Direction de l'Animation, "L'Investissement-Humaine," Dakar, April 25, 1962), pp. 18-19.

does not appear, however, to have been due to the absence of community solidarity in many of the villages. While animation projects had a great deal of difficulty tapping the reservoir of local community solidarity to obtain free labor, other local actors, notably the marabouts were mobilizing villagers to build mosques in their communities without material compensation. The Grand Khalife of the Mouride brotherhood during the same period mobilized thousands of his followers to voluntarily contribute their labor to clear land, plant trees, and harvest crops.<sup>30</sup> The fact that these village mosque projects were especially widespread in extremely poor Tukolor villages of the Senegal River Valley raises doubts that disadvantageous material conditions were accountable for the failure of human investment led by the Animation Service. The crucial difference appears to be the level of identity and motivation that the actors engendered.

### Collective Fields

Animation theory regarded the establishment of collective fields as an excellent means for promoting community solidarity and providing resources to finance projects of benefit to the entire community. Collective fields would be a concrete example of Communitarian Socialism built on what Animation theory perceived as traditional rural modes of collective action. The col-

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<sup>30</sup>D. B. Cruise O'Brien, The Mourides of Senegal: The Political and Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood (London: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 163-187, for a discussion of the institution of the dara among the Mourides.

lective fields projects promoted by the Animation Service did not require any radical restructuring of rural society or changes in traditional land tenure systems. Instead, they sought to reorient traditional rural communal activities towards new developmental objectives.

Animation theory assumed that African rural communities would readily participate in collective farming projects if properly motivated because African societies were supposedly organized around communitarian principles which required all members of the society to work for the common good. Since traditional African societies were not devoted to maximizing individual self-interest, they would be more receptive to contributing community land for collective farming projects as well as their labor than were rural communities of the West which were based on private property and the profit motive.

#### The Practice of Collective Fields

Contrary to Animation's assumptions, there was little popular enthusiasm for village-wide collective field projects promoted by the Animation Service. Several reasons seem to explain this fact. First, most rural communities in Senegal did not fit the ideal type of the traditional African community found in Animation theory. The integration of Senegal's rural population into the market economy had accelerated the breakdown of traditional communal and extended family solidarity patterns. This was par-

ticularly true of the Wolofs in the peanut basin where the nuclear family had already replaced the extended family as the basic social unit.<sup>31</sup> Thus, family heads were more apt to spend nearly all their time working for themselves and their immediate families rather than work diligently on collective farming projects which took them away from their own work. In addition, young unmarried males preferred to seek their fortunes in the towns or to start anew in some of Senegal's less populated "pioneer" zones if they did not have sufficient land of their own at home, than to work on collective fields which could not provide them with an adequate livelihood.

Second, local leaders were not very receptive to participating in Animation's collective field programs, particularly where these might conflict with previously existing systems for mobilizing free village labor to work on their own fields. This was particularly a problem in the peanut producing area where many local Muslim marabouts had champs de mercredi, collective fields cultivated by their followers.<sup>32</sup> In villages dominated by marabouts the Animation Service had to get his approval in order to obtain the land needed for the collective community field. This

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<sup>31</sup>Martin Klein, "Colonial Rule and Structural Change: The Case of Sine-Saloum" in Rita Cruise O'Brien (ed.), The Political Economy of Underdevelopment: Dependence in Senegal (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979), pp. 90-93.

<sup>32</sup>The champs de mercredi, or Wednesday fields, are so named because each Wednesday followers of the village marabout contribute one-half day's labor as a sign of respect and devotion. This is most frequently associated with cash-crop production.

constituted a major impediment to the development of the program in those parts of the country.

Within the peanut basin, even in areas where the Animation Service was fairly active and popular, the impact of the collective field program was very limited. In the cercle of M'Bour, which was supposed to be one of the most promising pilot areas for Animation, only nineteen collective fields were established. This was true despite the fact that there were ninety-one villages in the cercle which were designated as "animated."<sup>33</sup> One study of a Mouride village in the peanut basin found that young men participating in the Animation sponsored collective field project devoted less than one percent of their working time to the collective field.<sup>34</sup> The field itself was less than two hectares in size and produced only about 215 kilograms of millet. The low yield and work effort, not atypical of many Animation collective fields, reflected the relatively low priority accorded the project by the villagers. This was true despite the fact that in many collective field projects, including the one cited above, the benefit was distributed directly to the participating families rather than being invested collectively as was anticipated in the theories of Animation and African Socialism.

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<sup>33</sup>DeDecker, Nation et Développement Communautaire, p. 267.

<sup>34</sup>Jean Roch, "Dans un Village Wolof Mouride," in J. Copans et al., Maintenance Sociale et Changement Economique au Sénégal (Paris: O.R.S.T.O.M., 1974), p. 157.

In some areas of the country, notably in the Casamance, the collective field scheme fared somewhat better. There are several reasons why this appears to have been the case. First, the Animation Service and its local "animateur" network were more extensively organized and more popular here than elsewhere in the country. Second, women in the Casamance were generally more receptive to participating in vegetable gardening and other women's activities involving collective work.<sup>35</sup> Third, more unused arable land which could be devoted to such projects was available in the Casamance than elsewhere in the country where higher population densities prevailed.<sup>36</sup> Finally, there were far fewer champs de mercredi, or collective fields cultivated by the followers of local marabouts, here than in the peanut basin. Local leaders, therefore, were somewhat less resistant to the activity.

Even with these seeming advantages, the collective field program fell far short of the expectations of the Animation Service in the Casamance. Collective fields were rarely more than three hectares in size, too small to generate much revenue to finance

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<sup>35</sup>M'Baye and Fall, "Promotion de la Femme Sénégalaise," p. 70, for a discussion of women's gardens in the Casamance. In 1962, there were twenty-eight such gardens in the Casamance, more than twice the number found in all the other regions of the country combined.

<sup>36</sup>In the more populous areas of the country, such as the Western peanut basin, densities approach 100 per square kilometer and no unused arable land is available for transformation into collective fields.

local village development projects.<sup>37</sup> In many instances, the money earned was spent on a community feast or divided among those who worked on the project instead of being used to support village pharmacies, the purchase of rice huskers and water pumps to make life easier for rural women, or to help fund basic amenity projects encouraged by the Animation Service.

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<sup>37</sup>DeDecker, Nation et Développement Communautaire, p. 268.

## CHAPTER FIVE

ANIMATION RURALE: REGIONAL AND LOCAL VARIATIONS

Although Animation Rurale was originally intended to cover the entire country, at its peak it never reached more than 10-15% of Senegal's rural population. During the early years of independence, the Animation Service was more active in so-called peripheral regions like the Casamance and the Fleuve than in the peanut basin. By 1964 approximately 21% of the villages in the Casamance and 18% of the villages in the Fleuve were "animated" compared with only 6-7% of the villages in the peanut-producing regions of Thiès, Diourbel, and Sine-Saloum.<sup>1</sup> In this chapter we shall be primarily concerned with identifying the contextual factors which contributed to the relative success or failure of Animation programs in reaching the rural populations and stimulating structural changes in different regions and localities throughout Senegal.

Animation Rurale in the Casamance

Since 1959, the Casamance has been the most vigorous zone of animation activities. On the surface it would seem that the Casamance would be one of the least likely regions for Animation

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<sup>1</sup> DeDecker, Nation et Développement Communautaire, (Paris: Mouton, 1967), p. 264.

to flourish. At independence it was one of the least integrated regions in the country both politically and economically. Geographically, it was separated by the Gambia from Northern Senegal which contained most of the country's population. Moreover, the peoples of the Casamance, for the most part, came from different ethnic stock than their countrymen to the North. Historically, the Casamance had been the last region in Senegal to be "pacified" by the French and incorporated into the colonial system. During the post-war era (1946-1960), the Casamance had strong regionalist political movements and during the early 1960s political opposition to the UPS was stronger there than in any other region.

Paradoxically, the Casamance's differences from the rest of Senegal made it more receptive to a reformist state agency like the Animation Service. The relative weakness of the UPS and the absence of strong maraboutic influences meant that opposition to Animation programs was less formidable in the Casamance than elsewhere. The lack of a highly developed market economy based on peanuts meant that there would be fewer powerful commercial interests to oppose the agrarian socialist programs promoted by the Animation ideology than in the major peanut producing regions in the North. The Casamance's relatively more egalitarian and decentralized social structures were more compatible with the ideals and programs of the Animation agency than were those in the North where caste was still an important determinant of

social status.<sup>2</sup> But perhaps the most important factor explaining why the Casamance was a favorable locale for Animation was the fact that Ben Mady Cissé, the director of the Animation Service, and many of the top officials in the service were themselves natives of the Casamance region.<sup>3</sup>

Within the Casamance, the Animation Service had its greatest initial successes in the départements of Bignona and Kolda. In 1959, Bignona was chosen as one of the first pilot zones in the country for the implementation of the Animation program.<sup>4</sup> Contextual conditions for introducing animation were favorable. The UPS Party leadership in the area supported the animation program and there was little organized resistance from traditional social forces. The Diola, the major ethnic group in the département, were fairly receptive to new ideas and had a much higher percentage of their children enrolled in school than was the case in Northern Senegal. In addition, Diola women played a more active social and economic role in family and village life than women in

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<sup>2</sup>This was particularly true of the Diolas, the largest ethnic group in the Lower Casamance. For a detailed analysis of Diola social and economic structures, see Paul Pelissier, Les Paysans du Sénégal: Les Civilisations Agraires du Cayor à la Casamance (Saint-Yrieix: Imprimerie Fabreque, 1966), pp. 645-891.

<sup>3</sup>The strong leadership of Cissé and other native sons from the Casamance helped to dispel some of the mistrust which the Casamanois might have had towards the Animation Rurale Service had it been headed by a "Senegalese." Regionalist sentiments are still very strong in the Casamance.

<sup>4</sup>The other pilot zone was the cercle of Matam in the Fleuve region. For a discussion of the criteria used in choosing the pilot zones, see IRAM, "L'Animation Rurale au Sénégal: Etude Générale, Orientation et Résultats," (Dakar, Décembre 1960).

other parts of Senegal.

Bignona had the densest network of village "animateurs" in the country. By 1963 more than one-third of Bignona's villages had been "animated" and the Animation Service had trained nearly 300 "animateurs" in 111 villages.<sup>5</sup> Senegal's very first women's Rural Animation Center was established in Tendième, a Diola village, in 1960.<sup>6</sup> By mid-1963, this pioneering women's CAR had proven to be very effective in mobilizing the women of Bignona to participate in a wide variety of new activities which included:

- (1) Collective gardens whose proceeds were used to support other small projects;
- (2) improvements in village hygiene;
- (3) regular distribution of medicines through village pharmacies;
- (4) acquisition of sewing and other homemaking skills;
- (5) setting up day-care centers to take care of babies and young children while the mothers worked in the fields.

The Animation Service also had some measure of success in stimulating the people of Bignona to participate in human investment projects and the cooperative movement.

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<sup>5</sup>See Bouly Dramé, "La Réforme Domaniale et l'Aménagement du Territoire," an unpublished Mémoire prepared for the Ecole Nationale d'Administration Sénégalaise (ENAS) for these and other details concerning Animation and other development institutions in Bignona during the early 1960s.

<sup>6</sup>DeDecker, Nation et Développement Communautaire, p. 286.

Kolda was another département in the Casamance where Animation achieved reasonably good results during its early years. The dominant ethnic group in Kolda was sedentarized Peulhs who comprised approximately 70% of the population. Animation owed much of its influence in Kolda to the personality, competence, and family connections of the director of the Rural Animation Center.<sup>7</sup> The director came from a prominent Peulh family. His older brother was chief of one of the largest villages in the département. He was also a cousin, friend, and political ally of the leader of a UPS faction who eventually became the political boss of Kolda. Despite, or perhaps because, of Diallo's excellent connections with powerful local families, Kolda became one of the rare areas in Senegal where the Animation Rurale Service actually succeeded in moving the people to replace the old conservative political leadership with one more committed to animation ideals. In 1963, Demba Koita, the leader of the pro-Animation UPS faction, defeated his opponents and became the undisputed political boss of Kolda.<sup>8</sup>

Under Diallo's direction a number of significant achievements were recorded by the Animation Service. Approximately one-third of the villages in the département were "animated." Fifty col-

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<sup>7</sup>The following comments are based on the author's observations made during field trips to Kolda in May and November 1963.

<sup>8</sup>See S. Gellar, "The Politics of Development in Senegal," unpublished Ph.D. diss., Department of Public Law and Government, Columbia University, 1967, pp. 347-349.

lective fields were established and villagers voluntarily agreed to contribute their labor to build feeder roads which would help end the isolation of their villages from cash crop markets. Kolda was also one of the few CARs in the country to initiate a successful program of working with herders. Diallo himself supervised training sessions in animal health and castration. Finally, the cooperative movement spread rapidly in Kolda during this period, despite the opposition of local traders.

The success of the animation program in Kolda during the early 1960s may be attributed to a number of factors. To a significant degree it depended on Diallo's own background and effort. Unlike most CAR directors who were former school teachers, Diallo had been an agricultural agent who understood the agricultural problems of local peasants intimately. This enabled him to form an excellent rapport with local producers, as well as with other technical service workers including notably the cooperative agents. In addition, Diallo was an exceptionally hardworking and dedicated agent. Finally, he was well connected politically which facilitated the transition within the party toward a pro-animation orientation.

The Kolda case, however, also demonstrates the limits of what the Animation Service could achieve even under highly favorable circumstances. Even under Diallo's direction problems quickly arose because of "over-animation." Communities would build

schools and dispensaries but they would not be assigned school teachers or medical personnel to run them. Farmers could be encouraged to use fertilizer and plows but it was not easy to assure that good use would be made of them. Peasants would join a cooperative to be eligible for rebates and then discover that the rebates were distributed late or not at all. Agricultural production loans would not arrive in time to provide funds for certain programs. Finally, efforts to move quickly to restructure Kolda into intervillage development cells or pre-cooperatives (Association d'Intérêt Rural), following the tenets of animation theory floundered.<sup>9</sup> Despite the fact that seventeen development cells were formed encompassing 94 "animated" villages, the proposed structural reform never became fully operational. When in the Fall of 1963, Diallo left Kolda to attend the Ecole Nationale d'Economie Appliquée in Dakar, his departure left a power and leadership vacuum which no one else could fill.

The Animation Service was less effective in other parts of the Casamance during the early 1960s.<sup>10</sup> In the département of

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<sup>9</sup>For a discussion of Kolda as a pilot zone for creating development cells see Mansor M'Baye, "L'Organisation de la Vie Rurale en Casamance," in Sénégal, 'An 2' Par Lui-Même (Paris:IRFED, 1962), pp. 47-49, and Dedecker, Nation et Développement Communautaire, pp. 383-386.

<sup>10</sup>This evaluation is based largely on field trips taken in the Casamance in May and November 1963 and extensive reading of numerous reports prepared by Senegalese administrators who worked in the Casamance during the early 1960s. See, for example, Mohamed Abdoulaye Diop, "Etat d'Avancement du Plan Quadriennal dans le Cercle de Ziguinchor au 30 juin 1962;" Mamadou Sadjî, "Etat d'Avancement du Plan Quadriennal 1961-1964 dans le Cercle de Ous-

Oussouye, it took Animation officials some time to overcome the initial mistrust of the local population towards any project introduced by external state agencies. In Sedhiou, the Animation Service had to contend with powerful local UPS party leaders and traditional notables who moved quickly to take control over the newly established cooperatives. The highly urbanized département of Ziguinchor which contained the regional capital of the Casamance was not a fertile field of activity for the Animation Services because of its small rural hinterland and the great heterogeneity and mobility of its population. The situation was somewhat better in Velinqara where the Animation Service and the cooperative movement got off to a good start despite that département's isolation.

During the mid and late 1960s, Animation activities slowed down considerably in the Casamance as elsewhere in the country. With the government's shift in priorities to raising productivity in the peanut zones, the agricultural development of the Casamance was again largely neglected. Despite a series of foreign aid projects to increase rice production, little was done to involve the local population in increased rice production and productivity efforts or to provide incentives to rice farmers to market their surpluses.<sup>11</sup> Rather than evolving along the lines

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souye au 30 juin 1962;" Papa Dabo N'Diaye, "Mémoire sur l'Etat du Plan Quadriennal à la date du 30 juin 1962," (Cercle de Velinqara); and Ousemane Diene, "Mémoire de Stage" (Cercle de Sedhiou). These reports were all prepared for the ENAS.

envisaged in early Animation Service programs, the cooperatives continued to be based almost exclusively on their peanut marketing functions and the rural credit system continued to favor peanut production over other crops.

During the middle of the 1970s, the Senegalese government once again began to pay more attention to developing the Casamance's agricultural potential as part of a drive to diversify the economy and reduce Senegal's food dependency.<sup>12</sup> This time the government did not call upon the Animation Service, which was now a subdivision of the Human Development Agency (Promotion Humaine), to lead the effort for agricultural development. Instead, it relied heavily upon external financial and technical assistance and specialized regional development agencies like the Société pour la Mise en Valeur de la Casamance (SOMIVAC) to plan and coordinate development projects in that region.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>For a critique of the Senegalese government's tendency to use foreign aid missions to promote higher food production without relevance to local market conditions, see Philippe Delande, "L'Aide Etrangère à la Vulgarisation Agricole," (Mémoire, Université de Dakar, September 1966).

<sup>12</sup>During the early 1970s, rice imports averaged more than 180,000 tons a year. For a discussion of Senegal's new food policy, see Republic of Senegal, Ministry of Rural Development and Water Resources, "Food Investment Strategy, 1977-1985," (Dakar, February 1977).

<sup>13</sup>The World Bank funded a major project in the Middle Casamance and the Senegalese government sought aid from the United States to fund a proposed integrated rural development project in the Lower Casamance.

In recent years, Promotion Humaine has concentrated on four major activities: <sup>14</sup>

- (1) Community development projects--village pharmacies, well-digging;
- (2) women's projects--vegetable gardening, daycare centers, health and nutrition education, sewing techniques;
- (3) youth projects, such as banana plantations, designed to provide remunerative economic activity for young people to keep them on the farms, and;
- (4) adult literacy training programs.

The first two activities were, of course, not new. Such projects had been initiated in the region back in the early 1960s. The latter two activities were first introduced in the 1970s.

By the end of the 1970s, the survival and expansion of Promotion Humaine's programs in the Casamance as elsewhere was heavily dependent upon foreign funding. Although the relationships between Promotion Humaine and other technical services and regional development agencies were somewhat better in the Casamance than in other regions of Senegal, they were not good. The other services more or less tolerated Promotion Humaine's existence rather than regarding it as an equal partner. Still, Promotion Humaine remained relatively more active in the Casamance than elsewhere primarily because so many of its top officials came from the region and retained close ties with the local populations.

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<sup>14</sup>Interview with officials of Promotion Humaine in the Casamance in May 1977.

### Animation in the Fleuve

During the Dia era, the Fleuve was one of the most "animated" regions in Senegal.<sup>15</sup> However, after the fall of Dia, the influence of the Animation Rurale Service declined rapidly, even more rapidly than in other areas of Senegal where the network of "animateurs" had been far less dense. The experience of the Animation Service in the Fleuve region provides a good example of popular participation induced from above on a predominantly feudal society with rigid social structures. It also demonstrates the fragility of reforms initiated from the top, once external pressures subside.

The shift of the locus of Senegal's colonial economy from Saint Louis and the Senegal River towards Dakar and the peanut producing regions to the south at the end of the nineteenth century transformed the Fleuve from a relatively prosperous region to one of Senegal's poorest.<sup>16</sup> The colonial regime neglected the economic development of the Fleuve and the lack of economic opportunities there stimulated a large exodus of young men toward the towns and other rural areas of the country. Economic stagnation and decline had little effect on the highly stratified caste system of the Tukolors, the largest ethnic group in the region.

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<sup>15</sup>DeDecker, Nation et Développement Communautaire, pp. 265, 269.

<sup>16</sup>For a brief discussion of the causes of the decline of the Fleuve, see Sheldon Gellar, Structural Changes and Colonial Dependency: Senegal 1885-1945 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 64.

Before the French conquest of the region, the Fleuve had been governed by powerful family groups (Grandes Familles). Their influence and power persisted throughout the colonial period because the French recruited most of their canton chiefs from the ranks of the Grandes Familles and took no steps to change traditional land tenure patterns. These feudal families also provided the political leadership in the region during the post-war period leading to independence. Clan rivalries among the Grandes Familles went back more than a century and divided the Fleuve into warring camps, a phenomenon which was expressed in the clan politics of the region.<sup>17</sup>

Prime Minister Dia himself was a Tukolor and was related to one of the Grandes Familles, the Kanes of Matam who provided Dia with his most faithful political support. During the Dia era, the Kanes controlled the cercles of Matam and Podor. Hence, it was not surprising that these two cercles became the main focus of Animation programs during the early 1960s.

The Animation Service assumed that the traditionalist Tukolor would be more receptive to communitarian values and community development projects than the population in the peanut basin where the development of the market economy had fostered more individualistic attitudes. Human investment projects launched by

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<sup>17</sup>S. Gellar, "The Politics of Development in Senegal," pp. 345-346.

the Animation Service in the Fleuve were more successful in attracting mass participation than elsewhere. For example, during a three month period in 1961, 345 men from seven villages near Saldé contributed approximately 7000 days of free labor to build and maintain dikes for an important rice project.<sup>18</sup> But large-scale human investment projects were exceptional. They were more an example of what was possible than of what was actually being done on a broad scale. During the Dia era a large number of schools and infirmaries were built by villagers of the Fleuve region.<sup>19</sup> There also seemed to be good cooperation between the Animation and the Cooperative Services.<sup>20</sup>

Thanks to the support which it received from some of the Fleuve's leading families and to the great prestige enjoyed by Prime Minister Dia among the Tukolor, the Animation Service was able to mobilize large numbers of people to participate in Animation projects. However, participation was not always voluntary and in accordance with the ideological principles of Animation theory. The selection of the candidates to become village "animateurs" was almost always determined by the village chief or religious leader. When the chiefs supported Animation, they would send their own sons and nephews. When they mistrusted Animation, they would choose a low caste dependent who had little

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<sup>18</sup>DeDecker, Nation et Développement Ccmmunautaire , p. 275.

<sup>19</sup>Direction de l'Animation, "L'Investissement-Humain Dans le Développement Socialiste," (Dakar, 25 April, 1962), pp. 14-16.

<sup>20</sup>DeDecker, Nation et Développement Ccmmunautaire , p. 269.

social standing in the village. Unfortunately, "traditional" community structures often reflected sharp cleavages between different clans which made it difficult to "animate" entire villages and localities.<sup>21</sup> In many instances when the leaders of one clan would support the "animation" program, the leaders of the other clan would refuse to cooperate or even attempt to sabotage the program. Tukolor traditionalism also meant a caste system in which the lower caste former slaves who stayed in the area remained clients of the "nobles". A feudal land tenure system gave the Grandes Familles control over much of the land. During the Dia years, the Animation Service did not attempt to radically transform the Fleuve's traditional social structures or its land tenure pattern.

After Dia's ouster, the influence of the Animation Service dropped sharply. Followers of Dia in the UPS were purged and replaced by the leaders of other clans or clients of Seydou Nourou Tall, the Fleuve's most prestigious religious leader who had little interest in promoting Animation programs. Lacking both national and regional support, the Animation Service languished during the remainder of the 1960s. During the drought of the early 1970s, it served primarily as a locus for community development activities such as well-digging, often in close

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<sup>21</sup>For a frank and perceptive discussion of the problems raised by clan rivalries and Tukolor traditionalism in the cercle of Podor in the Fleuve region, see Ibrahima Sourang, "L'Art d'Administrer," unpublished Mémoire, ENAS, 1962.

collaboration with Peace Corps volunteers.<sup>22</sup> The upgrading of Promotion Humaine in 1974 was not accompanied by a resurgence of Animation Service activities or efforts to reactivate the network of village "animateurs" and "animatrices" which had covered nearly 20 percent of the villages in the region during 1960s. Instead, the government relied primarily upon the Société d'Aménagement et d'Exploitation du Delta (SAED)<sup>23</sup> to plan, coordinate, and manage most of the developmental programs and projects in the region.

In its structure and operations as a development agency, SAED was, in many ways, the antithesis of what was called for in Animation theory. SAED was authoritarian, highly centralized, and primarily concerned with imposing its own master plan on the rural populations. It seized land, displaced populations, and relied heavily upon capital-intensive machinery to achieve its objectives. It had little interest in promoting a dialogue between itself and the rural populations. As a result, SAED was not very popular in the Fleuve, despite the strong backing it received from the central government and foreign aid donors.

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<sup>22</sup>Interview with Frank Casey, former Peace Corps volunteer, March 13, 1979.

<sup>23</sup>For a short history of SAED and its activities, see Le Soleil (Dakar), February 12, 1979.

<sup>24</sup>For a critical analysis of SAED's impact on the rural population, see A. S. Waldstein, "A Hydro-Agricultural Zone in the Global Economic System; Resettlement and the Constraints on Development in the Senegal River Delta, unpublished doctoral diss., Columbia University, 1980.

### Animation in the Peanut Basin

Animation Rurale got off to a slower start and reached a much smaller percentage of the rural populations in the peanut-growing regions of Thiès, Diourbel, and Sine-Saloum than in the Casamance or the Fleuve. In general, the Animation program was less effective in the peanut basin for several reasons:

- (1) The lack of political support from local party leaders;
- (2) the hostility and suspicion of the marabouts and other traditional leaders;
- (3) the intense politicization of the cooperative movement;
- (4) the lack of coordination and cooperation between the Animation Service and the technical services; and
- (5) the fact that many Animation officials were former school teachers from urban backgrounds who often found it difficult to develop a good rapport with the peasantry.

As an agency for introducing new institutions and promoting structural change, the Animation Service accomplished very little in the peanut basin. Thiès, for example, had a cooperative network which antedated the establishment of the Animation Service.<sup>25</sup> The Animation Service did not have to launch campaigns to encourage the local population to join cooperatives. In a similar manner Animation did not play an important role in stimulating the spread of fertilizers, improved seed, and modern agricultural implements since these had already been introduced to the

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<sup>25</sup>F. Laville, Associations Paysannes et Socialisme Contractuel en Afrique de l'Ouest (Paris: Editions Cujas, 1972), pp. 174-177. In 1956, for example, there were 159 villages affiliated to 23 cooperatives in the region of Thiès.

region during the early 1950s by the agricultural services. The rapid increase in the use of modern agricultural inputs in Thiès during the early 1960s was due more to the new rural credit system than to the effectiveness of campaigns to promote these inputs.

As late as 1964, only 6% of the villages in the region of Thiès had been "animated."<sup>26</sup> In one not atypical arrondissement, Thienaba, the Animation Service had trained only 14 "animateurs" and 19 "animatrices" for a district which had 39,000 inhabitants.<sup>27</sup> In Thienaba, the Animation Service focused most of its energies on organizing training sessions for cooperative presidents and weathers, and on seminars for school teachers and technical agents. The Animation Service's relationships with the technical services often left much to be desired. In several instances the Animation and other technical services planned different forms of community development programs without consulting each other. Animation officials in Thienaba tended to assume that they alone were in a position to judge the validity of the projects which they or the technical services wished to implement. The technicians resented this kind of attitude, particularly when coming from school teachers with little technical expertise.

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<sup>26</sup>DeDecker, Nation et Développement Communautaire, p. 264.

<sup>27</sup>Jacques Brochier, La Diffusion du Progrès Technique en Milieu Rural Sénégalais (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), p. 271.

In Thienaba, Animation did little to challenge the authority of local power structures or to stimulate the active participation of the rural populations in the political and economic life of the district. The network of "animateurs" was small and not politically active. The local cooperatives continued to be dominated, as in the past, by the marabouts, traditional elites, and local politicians.

Animation met its greatest resistance in the region of Diourbel where the Mouride brotherhood constituted a "state within a state."<sup>20</sup> Mouride religious leaders had enjoyed special privileges under colonial rule as a reward for their loyalty to the French and their major contributions to the growth of Senegal's peanut-based colonial export economy. They expected these privileges to continue after independence since they had provided Senghor and the UPS with their main electoral base. While they were willing to collaborate with the government on economic matters and to participate in the cooperative movement, they would not tolerate any encroachment on their authority.

The organizational principles of the Mouride brotherhood were

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<sup>20</sup>For three major studies of the Mourides, see D. B. Cruise O'Brien, The Mourides of Senegal: The Political and Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood (London: Clarendon Press, 1971); Cheikh Tidiane Sy, La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides: Un Essai sur L'Islam au Sénégal (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1969); and Lucy Behrman, Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

diametrically opposed to the democratic ideology embodied in the theory of Animation Rurale.<sup>29</sup> Relationships between the marabouts and their followers were based on the submission of the follower to the will of the marabout. There was no place for popular participation in the decision-making process of the Mouride collectivity. Decisions handed down by the Grand Khalife in Touka were expected to be followed without question by all the faithful. The Mouride marabouts controlled all rural institutions from the village councils to the cooperatives. They also obtained most of the benefits offered by the new development institutions.

In Diourbel, the peasants sent to the CAR for training were generally envoys of the marabouts. For the most part newly trained "animateurs" remained faithful to their marabout. But in some instances they began to criticize certain practices of the marabouts and to introduce new institutions which could potentially undermine the maraboutic system of domination. For example, "animateurs" in one village in the arrondissement of Kael decided to organize a collective field and convinced the villagers to devote one-third of their time to it.<sup>30</sup> At the same time

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<sup>29</sup>For an excellent discussion of the incompatibility between Animation objectives and Mouride organization, see Sy, La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides, pp. 254-258. Sy makes the interesting point that Mouridisme itself was a form of animation in its ability to mobilize the people for various activities. But it was animation from above in which the people had little voice in decision-making.

<sup>30</sup>Sy, La Confrérie Sénégalaise, pp. 255-257.

villagers decided to no longer work each Wednesday in the local marabout's field. This action, in effect, was a form of declaration of independence on the part of the peasants. The "animateurs" complained to the local authorities when the marabout diverted to himself most of the seeds which were supposed to be distributed to members of the local cooperatives. The marabout wished to continue his usual practice of making seed loans to the people which would be paid back with interest. When the peasants made their protest, the local marabout went off to Touba to complain to the Grande Khalife that such an attack on him represented an effort to undermine the authority of the Mouride brotherhood itself. In this particular case, the "animateurs" stood fast and won some satisfaction from the authorities. However, cases like these also stiffened the resistance of the marabouts who used their great influence in government to suppress, or at least dampen, activities of the Animation Service in the region. Today, the influence of the Mouride brotherhood in the region of Diourbel is stronger than ever.<sup>31</sup>

During the early and mid-1960s, the Animation Service was somewhat more effective in the Sine-Saloum than in Thiès or Diourbel.<sup>32</sup> Villages tended to be more receptive to Animation

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<sup>31</sup>For an analysis of the rising prestige of the Mouride brotherhood under the leadership of Abdul Lahat M'Backe, see Donal Cruise O'Brien, "A Versatile Charisma: The Mouride Brotherhood, 1968-75," Archives Européennes de Sociologie, 18, no. 1 (1977), pp. 84-106.

<sup>32</sup>Interview conducted by Robert Charlick with Alain Dubly,

Programs where local social structures were in fact more fluid and not dominated by marabouts or strongly entrenched commercial interests. The Animation Service was most active in promoting the cooperative movement and in combating the efforts of local African traders to sabotage or capture the movement.<sup>33</sup> In the Sine-Saloum as well there was less resistance to the women's animation program (Animation Féminine) than in Diourbel where the Mourides showed great reluctance to permit their women to participate in government-sponsored programs.<sup>34</sup> On the other hand, human investment projects did poorly in this area.<sup>35</sup>

The launching of the SATEC peanut-millet productivity campaigns in 1964 made it more difficult for the Animation Service to reshape the technical services in the peanut basin in accordance with Animation theory, even though it had been given the responsibility for coordinating the activities of the CERs in 1963. With the depoliticization of the Animation Service and with SATEC's assumption of the major responsibility for promoting

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CINAM sociologist who worked in Senegal during the mid-1960s. February 7, 1966.

<sup>33</sup>See, for example, Jonathan Barker, "Local Politics and National Development: The Case of a Rural District in the Saloum Region of Senegal," unpublished Ph.D. diss., Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 1967, pp. 237-242.

<sup>34</sup>By June, 1964, the Sine-Saloum had three women's Rural Animation Centers and 595 village "animatrices" while Diourbel had only 1 women's CAR which had trained only 59 "animatrices." DeDecker, Nation et Développement Communautaire, p. 265.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., pp. 269 and 275-276. DeDecker notes that the rural populations expected the "Providential State" to provide and finance all investments in the region.

technological innovation in the peanut basin, the Animation Service was reduced to being a minor auxiliary civic education and community development agency rather than a vital force for structuring rural society. The diminished role of the Service was reconfirmed when SODEVA replaced SATEC in 1968 and continued to practice the same kind of technocratic approach to rural development.

The upgrading of Promotion Humaine during the mid-1970s as the government's main instrument for promoting non-formal education was accompanied by a steady increase in activities in the peanut basin. This was particularly the case after the government of Senegal began to implement a SODEVA project to raise cereal production financed by USAID and containing a Promotion Humaine component.<sup>36</sup> Promotion Humaine was to undertake activities which would complement and support SODEVA's agricultural development programs. Thus, with the collaboration of SODEVA, Promotion Humaine was supposed to set up functional literacy programs to facilitate the diffusion of SODEVA's technical themes and to provide training programs for rural artisans so that they would be capable of repairing the simple farm implements which were being used to improve productivity. The project also called for establishing two more Maisons Familiales, a semi-autonomous

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<sup>36</sup>For details about the project, see Eugene Lerner, Moustapha Dia, Samuel Rea, and James Hoxeng, "Evaluation Report--Promotion Humaine Projects: Cereals Project, Eastern Senegal Livestock Project," Dakar:USAID, April 1978, pp. 1-26.

program for organizing villages, training rural youth, and organizing women's producer groups in more than a score of villages<sup>37</sup> which had come under Promotion Humaine's jurisdiction in 1973. To avoid tensions between Promotion Humaine and the technical agents, a protocol was signed between this agency and SODEVA which attempted to spell out each service's specific tasks and the nature of their collaboration.

For the most part, Promotion Humaine did little to promote local initiative in the formulation of projects.<sup>38</sup> Instead, Promotion Humaine agents would come into a village with a pre-programmed list of little projects and then encourage the villagers to participate in as many of them as possible. It was rare to see a women's project which developed out of some new idea suggested by the women of the village themselves.

During the late 1970s, working relationships between SODEVA and Promotion Humaine in the peanut basin were strained. SODEVA officials wanted to take over the functional literacy and rural artisan training programs run by Promotion Humaine. They argued that there was no need to have a separate agency to "animate" the rural population for the purpose of upgrading their technical

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<sup>37</sup>See Chapter VII below for a detailed description and analysis of the Maisons Familiales.

<sup>38</sup>The following observations are based on field work done in Thiès and Diourbel, the two regions covered in the USAID-SODEVA Cereals project, in May 1979.

skills and stimulating the use of new agricultural techniques. It would be more logical to have SODEVA assume responsibility for all activities directly pertaining to rural development. From SODEVA's point of view it was preferable to have their agents who had the technical expertise do the "animating" and educating than to entrust this important task to another service. For their part, officials of Promotion Humaine complained that SODEVA was taking a strictly technocratic approach to rural development and was insufficiently concerned with the overall development of local communities. They also complained about the lack of logistical support which they received from SODEVA.

Promotion Humaine had fewer problems when it was involved in activities which did not fall under SODEVA's domain. Agents of Promotion Humaine were relatively more successful in organizing local communities to participate in health projects like the Sine-Saloum village health scheme, launched in 1978 to provide trained village level health specialists and health stations in 600 villages.<sup>39</sup> A Promotion Humaine team was to work closely with the newly established rural community councils in départements in the region to insure the community's active participation in the project. Each rural commune would select its own candidates to be trained as village health workers, construct its own community health facilities, and finance the purchase and restocking of

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<sup>39</sup>Interview with Cynthia Moore, USAID consultant, May, 1978.

medicines and simple first aid equipment. The Promotion Humaine Agency was to work closely with the Health Service. The Health Service would provide technical training to village health workers, while Promotion Humaine agency would "animate" and organize the village and provide literacy training. In point of fact relations between the Health Service and Promotion Humaine were erratic at best, and literacy training never really got going.<sup>40</sup> But the health programs designed to meet basic health care needs were very popular with villagers and did not engender any real competition between Promotion Humaine and SODEVA.

The wide variety of responses that occurred in the peanut basin and other parts of Senegal clearly underscores the importance of local contextual factors in determining the relative success or failure of Animation programs. Politics, socio-economic structures, bureaucratic rivalries, and the competence and dynamism of local Animation officials were all important factors contributing to the differential impact of the Animation Service in the country. Thus, it was easier to promote women's projects in the Casamance where the social status and individual freedom of women were relatively high than in areas like Diourbel where women were far less independent. Similarly Animation programs did better where the local politicians were on their side than in areas where the local party leaders were opposed. The wide var-

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

ity of responses to these programs also suggests that animation as a set of techniques for inducing popular participation cannot be applied in every situation with the expectation of achieving the same uniformly positive results.

## CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS: THE LIMITATIONS AND POTENTIALITY OF ANIMATION RURALE

In this study we have discussed the basic tenets of Animation Rurale theory, traced the history of the Animation Rurale experience in Senegal, and looked at the relative effectiveness of certain animation techniques to induce popular participation in rural development. On the basis of the evidence examined in this study it is clear that Animation Rurale failed to achieve many of the ambitious goals it had set for itself. But did it fail because its theory was so flawed that it could not possibly work in a concrete situation, or were its difficulties due primarily to organizational weaknesses in the Animation Rurale Service? Or was the Animation Rurale experience in Senegal aborted largely because of its lack of political support at the national level and the stiff resistance of local power structures to the Animation Rurale Service's programs and policies?

In order to provide an accurate evaluation of Animation Rurale's potential and limitations as a strategy and a technique for inducing popular participation and economic modernization, it is necessary to weigh the relative importance of theoretical, organizational, and contextual factors underlying its relative success or failure.

In different contexts, Animation Rurale has been referred to as a Utopian Socialist ideology, a "bottom up" development strategy, a government agency, and a set of techniques designed to organize and mobilize local communities. In making generalizations about the relative success of Animation Rurale in a given situation or in assessing its potential and limitations, it is vital to keep in mind which aspect of animation is being referred to.

#### Animation Rurale as Utopian Socialism Ideology and Strategy

As a Utopian Socialist ideology, Animation called for the creation of a democratic, communitarian, socialist society based on decentralized political and economic institutions. Such a society, of course, necessitated a radical transformation of existing social structures. Animation theorists assumed that sweeping changes could be brought about with a minimum of coercion if an enlightened government made key structural reforms and initiated a dialogue with the rural masses. It was also assumed that rural dwellers would readily accept the new institutions since they were presumably compatible with "traditional" communitarian values.

Two major theoretical weaknesses help explain why Animation was so difficult to translate from theory to development practice. First, its idealization of "traditional" African societies was clearly inaccurate. Rather than being egalitarian and commu-

nitarian most "traditional" West African societies are based on hierarchical principles and modes of social organization.<sup>1</sup> The formally democratic and egalitarian principles governing the cooperative movement in Senegal, for example, were simply incompatible with the aristocratic and hierarchical principles governing rural community life.<sup>2</sup> It is not surprising then that, rather than democratizing the foundations of rural life, the village cooperatives were themselves captured by the local power structures.

Second, Animation theory was ultimately excessively optimistic in its view of the reformist nationalist state. It both overestimated the capacity of the "enlightened" state to transform existing social forces through consensual and national means, and the will of its leaders to do so even were it in their power. All indications point to the fact that little will existed to devolve power down to popularly controlled institutions. Instead the Senegalese state seemed to move toward deconcentration to

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<sup>1</sup>See, for example, the Senegalese historian Cheikh Anta Diop's thesis about the monarchical and aristocratic nature of African political organization. Diop insists that the African is by nature an "aristocratic collectivist" as distinguished from a "proletarian collectivist." While the aristocratic collectivism of the African is conducive to accepting some form of socialism, this socialism will not be based on the democratic and egalitarian principles espoused by Western socialist traditions. See L'Afrique Noire Pré-Coloniale (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1960), pp. 57-59.

<sup>2</sup>This point is cogently made by Marquerite Camboulives, L'Organisation Coopérative au Sénégal (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1967), pp. 5-6.

increase its effective penetration of the countryside without risking the misallocation of public resources on investments which did not coincide with nationally defined objectives.

Concrete contextual factors also contributed to the difficulty in implementing this utopian socialist strategy for transforming rural Senegal. First the political regime which initially sponsored the Animation Rurale program was itself heavily dependent upon the political support of the very same social classes and categories most likely to resist rural reforms which an Animation strategy implied. Ultimately, the government was thus caught between its need for political support and its desire to implement a program which would undermine that political support.<sup>3</sup>

Third, the implementors of Animation Rurale could not count upon widespread rural discontent as a force which could be used to mobilize mass support behind its visionary programs to democratize local power structures. On the contrary, in Senegal, the majority of the rural population displayed more confidence in their marabouts and local notables than in the central government which sponsored Animation Rurale.

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<sup>3</sup>See Jonathan Barker, "The Paradox of Development: Reflections on a Study of Local-Central Political Relations in Senegal," in Michael F. Lofchie (ed.), The State of the Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 47-63.

Fourth, the Animation Service in Senegal was neither a radical mass movement nor the avant-garde of a popular mass-based political party. It was only a small state agency with a staff of little more than one hundred officials and with an extremely limited budget. As such it could hardly be expected to radically transform the attitudes and social structures of millions of Senegalese peasants.

Fifth, Animation ideology, as a model for bureaucratic behavior, has never been able to overcome the entrenched interests of both party and bureaucratic actors. At best it may have inspired the administrative reforms of the early 1960s. But these and other mass-elite decisions were quickly dominated by technocratic approaches to national development which weakened the power of the Animation agent to act for radical social change and strengthened the control of the masses by the state.

Finally, Animation Rurale was heavily dependent upon the support of one or two major Senegalese political leaders. As such it was very vulnerable to attack or major modification as the forces of personality and policy swung away from Dia and toward Senghor.

Given these severe disabilities and the narrowness of its base of support, it is rather remarkable that Animation Rurale exercised as much influence as it did in Senegal. Although propo-

nents of Animation never succeeded in implementing their utopian vision for transforming the countryside, the Animation Movement did inspire major pieces of legislation for the reform of the land tenure system (1964 National Domain Law), the cooperative institutions (1960 cooperative statutes), and local governing and planning institutions (1972 rural commune act). It left its mark as well on Senegalese development planning which has continued to stress the desirability of decentralized planning, the establishment of regional plans, and the formal participation of representatives of the rural populations on regional and local development planning committees. Finally, the impact of Utopian Animation can still be detected in the official ideology of the regime which continues to stress democratic and voluntaristic forms of Socialism and a state-mass consultation process characterized by a tolerance for some degree of political pluralism.\*

Overall, however, the Senegalese experience seems to indicate that without mass support there is little chance for a regime to implement a utopian socialist strategy from above, even when the national leadership is committed to such a strategy.

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\*See, République du Sénégal, Ministère du Plan et de la Coopération, Cinquième Plan Quadriennal de Développement Economique et Social, 1er juillet 1977-30 juin 1981 (Dakar: Les Nouvelles Editions Africaines, 1977), p. 73.

Animation Rurale as a Set of Techniques for Participation in Development

It is possible to conceive of four types of participation which a development intervention such as Animation Rurale can foster. According to Uphoff, Cohen and Goldsmith they are: (1) participation in decision-making; (2) participation in implementation; (3) participation in benefits; and (4) participation in evaluation.<sup>5</sup> Unlike most other state agencies in developing nations, Senegal's Animation Service was committed to promoting all four forms of participation.

In practice, the Animation Service succeeded best in inducing the voluntary participation of villagers in the implementation of governmental programs. In quantitative terms even this function was restricted to approximately ten to fifteen percent of the population organized by the Service. Where contextual factors for its work were relatively favorable and where local Animation officials were committed to the programs, however, results were much better than these numbers alone indicate.

Favorable contextual factors which contributed to the Animation Service's relative success included: (1) the political support of the area's most prominent political leaders; (2) the

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<sup>5</sup>Norman T. Uphoff, John M. Cohen, and Arthur Goldsmith, Feasibility and Application of Rural Development Participation: A State-of-the-Art Paper (Ithaca: Cornell University Center for International Studies, Rural Development Committee Monograph Series, January, 1979), pp. 5-6.

absence of rigid and hierarchical social structures which would be more resistant to campaigns to encourage broader participation in local decision-making; (3) the absence of powerful commercial interests; (4) the participation of the technical services in local "animation" programs and their willingness to share their technical expertise with the "animated" populations; (5) the extent to which the projects and programs initiated by the Animation Service were compatible with the social norms and interests of the populations to be "animated"; and (6) a high degree of acceptance by the local population of the Animation Rurale Service as an organization committed to serving their interests.

Favorable personnel and organizational factors contributing to the Animation Service's success included: (1) a thorough understanding of the Service's methodology and pedagogical techniques; (2) a good knowledge of agriculture and the ability to relate to farmer populations based on the Animation official's rural background and experience; (3) dedication to the job and the ability to improvise when resources were scarce; (4) high social status and close family or personal ties with prominent local authority figures; (5) close and regular communications between local Animation officials and Animation officials at the regional and national levels; (6) ability to get along with the other administrative and technical services in the district and to exercise the leadership needed to motivate them to participate in local self-help projects; and (7) the absence of large-scale regional

development agencies or foreign aid rural development projects competing for the attention of the local populations.

The Casamance was an area where a number of the contextual factors were favorable. In that region the Animation Service was able to induce more mass participation in the implementation of a wide range of projects than elsewhere in Senegal. Given this experience it may have been a major error for promoters of Animation to have insisted upon the need to organize and mobilize the entire country. Tactically, they might have achieved greater success had it been more selective in its choice of intervention sites. Instead they spread the Animation Service's limited resources and qualified staff too thinly.

As a set of techniques for inducing popular participation Animation Rurale was most significant in two areas: (1) getting people involved in the cooperative movement; and (2) organizing rural women to participate in a number of local activities. The Animation Service certainly played a major role in fostering popular support for the cooperative movement during the early 1960s by encouraging people to join cooperatives. It was much less successful, however, in transforming cooperatives into instruments of mass participation in decision-making, evaluation, or even in relatively equitable distribution of benefits. In some instances Animation officials did act as effective catalysts in promoting popular involvement in the management of coopera-

tives. Generally they were more effective in getting villagers to speak out against corruption and abuses by local cooperative presidents and weighers than in democratizing cooperative decision-making.<sup>6</sup> Generally, the cooperatives which villagers were induced to join continued to be dominated politically by rural notables, religious leaders and local party politicians who also captured most of the economic benefits. To the degree that evaluations of the cooperative movement were conducted at all they were undertaken unilaterally by the government without consulting and often against the wishes of the rural population. It is questionable, therefore, whether the Animation Service's effectiveness in inducing participation in cooperative institutions was in the interest of the induced group.

The long range implications of Animation Féminine as a technique for organizing rural women appear to be more significant than those of the cooperative program. Women's projects focused mainly on improving the quality of village life through the organization of new services (such as day-care centers) and behaviors (improved nutrition). These services were simply unavailable from State agencies. Therefore, where they were

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<sup>6</sup>In most instances, rank-and-file members had little objection to the cooperatives being run by rural notables and religious leaders as long as these men fulfilled traditional norms of distributive justice and did not exploit the other members of the cooperative unduly. A "good" cooperative in the Senegalese context thus depended far more on the honesty and integrity of the rural notable who served as president than on broad-based popular decision-making.

undertaken, they engendered of necessity a great deal more local initiative and effective local organization than did the men's activities. Even where they dealt with income producing activities such as collective vegetable gardening, the women together with the Animation Service agent had to organize all phases of the activity since this form of extension was ignored by the Agricultural Service. Nor were the women's organizations as likely to be dominated by local notables. Their activities were seen to be largely peripheral to the village and extra-village economic structures. Hence, they seemed to pose no threat to male rural elite dominated power structures. For this reason they were more readily accepted and permitted some scope for internal development. Technically, the impact of these projects cannot be expected to have been very satisfactory. They suffered from a lack of technical assistance and critical inputs. Their main impact, however, was in stimulating rural women to take initiative and to be more open to new ideas and patterns of behavior.<sup>7</sup>

Animation as a development technique can be credited with little success in stimulating the adoption of new agricultural methods and in increasing agricultural productivity in Senegal. Agricultural training had been a major theme of second-cycle training sessions for village "animateurs" during the early

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<sup>7</sup>Pierre Fougeyrollas, Où Va Le Sénégal? (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1970), pp. 213-214.)

1960s. The training, however, was probably too brief to expect village "animateurs" to master such complex tasks as the use of chemical fertilizers, animal-drawn plows, and modern animal husbandry practices. In addition, trainees were rarely afforded the technical supervision which they required for success, and what technical help was available tended to focus on one aspect of the farm system while ignoring the broader problems. This was true because the anticipated close relationship between the technical agricultural and Animation Services failed to materialize. The CERs were never really given the opportunity to function as integrated rural development extension services. Instead, from 1966 on, government support focused on specialized crop extension bureaucracies such as SATEC. Finally, the role of the Animation Service in agricultural productivity was reduced to encouraging peasants to cooperate with specialized technical services and to accept technological packages being promoted from the top-down by their agents. These programs were often indiscriminately introduced with insufficient attention to local conditions and to the ability of local farmers to afford their components, and so it is not surprising that they too have failed to produce successful outcomes. Increasingly agricultural programs have concentrated on serving the larger farmers in an effort to obtain better technical results. This is a far cry from the theory of the animation approach.

Limitations and Potentiality: The Lessons of The Senegalese Experience

What are the lessons to be drawn from the Senegalese experiences? Several generalizations concerning Animation's potential and limitations as an ideology, development strategy, extension service and set of techniques can be drawn.

First, Animation Rurale cannot become a major force for radical political economic or social change when operated as a state agency under the control of a government which lacks the will or the power to radically transform national and local power structures.

Second, Animation Rurale's status and influence as a national development strategy depends largely upon the extent of support it receives from a broad segment of national leadership.

Third, when the national leadership stresses economic growth over structural reforms in its economic policies, the goal of participation will be subordinated to technical outcomes and the Animation Service will be used primarily as an adjunct of the technical services.

Fourth, national leadership is more likely to use Animation Rurale as an instrument for inducing popular participation in government-initiated projects and programs than as an instrument for promoting broader participation in decision-making, the

distribution of benefits, and evaluation of programs and policies.

Fifth, Animation Rurale can be an effective vehicle for promoting popular participation when contextual and organizational factors are favorable at both the national and local levels. Where contextual factors are unfavorable it is unlikely to be effective, even in mobilizing participation for implementation.

Sixth, the most crucial factor in insuring the technical success of an operation in which Animation is being employed as a technique is the integration of Animation into a comprehensive policy and implementational framework. In the absence of integrated technical and social services, the correct organizational structures and proper economic incentives Animation techniques cannot be expected to produce sound results. Hence, the most crucial technical factor is beyond the control of an agency such as the Animation Rurale Service in Senegal.

Finally, in assessing Animation Rurale as a technique for promoting rural development in a concrete setting, it is more useful to evaluate its capacity relative to that of other approaches than to measure its accomplishments against the utopian socialist goals of an abstract theory. As Animation is separated in the

day-to-day reality from that theory, its goals are transformed as well. It is legitimate to note which goals it is in fact promoting, and even to make judgements about the desirability of those goals, without assuming that an animation which no longer embodies the goals of its ideological parent has failed.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

MAISONS FAMILIALES RURALES  
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO LOCAL ORGANIZATION AND PARTICIPATION  
IN SENEGAL<sup>1</sup>

Introduction

The preceding chapters have traced the evolution of Animation Rurale as a strategy and technique for rural development in Senegal. They demonstrate conclusively that the Government of Senegal has abandoned its commitment to Animation as an instrument of social change and as a strategy for reorganizing the rural political and economic system. In effect, the Animation Service no longer works at the village level. Its network of village voluntary agents (animateurs, animatrices) is moribund. Apart from the special linkage and catalyst roles which American Peace Corps Volunteers play as "animateurs" in some parts of the country, the Human Development Ministry (Promotion Humaine) no longer promotes local organization through the Animation Service.

Paradoxically, at the same time another method of rural organization and training has been gaining ground in Senegal. Under the terms of its 1977 Convention with the Government of Senegal a

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<sup>1</sup>This study is co-authored by Robert B. Charlick and Yvonne Jones. The data were collected by Ms. Jones who conducted interviews in the village of Fadial, and at the National Office in Thies during the period June-August, 1977.

semi-autonomous social service agency-- Maisons Familiales (MF) is authorized to greatly increase the scope of its activities by setting up a center in each "arrondissement" in the country, apart from the urbanized Cap Vert region<sup>2</sup>. By 1981 it is anticipated that there will be 115 Maisons Familiales centers in the country. Maisons Familiales, as we shall see, employs Animation techniques involving the creation of new local and extra-local organizations, the selection and training of paid "animateurs", and the linkage of technical services to village communities through joint training programs for locally recruited youth. In essence, Maisons Familiales, with its "moniteurs" (paid local "animateurs") and local associations may become a new approach to Rural Animation in the decade to come. The fact that the government of Senegal has committed itself to this approach indicates that, despite the demise of animation as a strategy and a Service, the Senegalese state may still desire to find a formula whereby the broad-based participation of villagers in rural development can be obtained.

This essay will attempt to answer the question, "Why Maisons Familiales?" by describing the character of the intervention, and by contrasting its conception and practice of animation with that of the Animation Service. It will also characterize MF in

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<sup>2</sup>See Convention #4 (March 1, 1977), pp. 2-3. This is an agreement between the Government of Senegal and Maisons Familiales de Formation Rurale.

terms of the potential effectiveness of its organization structure, and will draw what conclusions seem possible at this time concerning its impact on Senegalese Society in terms of a number of rural development goals.

An examination of this alternative, largely privately initiated technique of animation in Senegal is important, not only because it provides a contrast to the experience of the earlier Animation Service activity, but also because it gives a basis for comparison with similar non-governmental or quasi-private animation approaches currently being attempted in a number of other countries.<sup>3</sup>

#### The Origin and Concept of Maisons Familiales

Maisons Familiales Rurales d'Education et d'Orientation is a private organization formed in France in the mid-1930s to combat the problem of the exodus of rural youth to urban areas.<sup>4</sup> Its initial goal of stabilizing rural life through an improvement of rural conditions, translated into programs to foster community organization and practical non-formal educational programs. This

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<sup>3</sup>See other monographs in this series on private voluntary animation approaches in Cameroon and Upper Volta. For a brief description of such agencies in Haiti see Robert Maguire, Education Development in Haiti (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Foundation, Paper no. 1, October, 1979).

<sup>4</sup>Information on the origins of Maisons Familiales is based in large part on responses to the case data questionnaire by Mr. James W. Rugh, Area Representative for West Africa, for World Neighbors. Mr. Rugh works closely with Maisons Familiales in Togo.

orientation made the approach highly attractive to a number of African and Latin American countries where problems of rural exclusion were even more preoccupying than those experienced in France itself. Shortly after independence the French Maisons Familiales organization offered to provide technical assistance to a number of former French African countries. The most extensive MF programs were undertaken in Senegal, Togo, and Chad where national MF associations were eventually formed. Additional MF programs took place as well in Congo, Cameroon, Rwanda and Central African Republic.

While MF adapts to the different environments in which it operates, in organizational terms, its basic philosophy and methodology remain the same. Essentially, MF fosters a community development perspective in which rural people are encouraged to take charge of their own fate by organizing and undertaking action for positive change at the local level. Its philosophy promotes the view that, while not all constraints on the quality of rural life are to be found within village-level society, significant advances can be made toward upgrading the quality of rural life by developing new individual and group values and behaviors at that level, and by mastering new technical skills appropriate to the resolution of problems which local groups and individuals identify as crucial.

The Maisons Familiales approach uses village-level catalyst agents, which it calls "moniteurs," to initiate a two-step change process. Initially, these change agents engage the local population in a series of "conscientization" dialogues<sup>5</sup> (the French prefer the term sensibilisation) designed to induce the desire on the part of the local population to improve its quality of life, and to lead them to a perception of their own responsibility in taking action to reach those goals. A second phase commences when the local people have sufficiently gained the habit of self-help to institutionalize their efforts into a local organization. The organization eventually becomes fully capable of managing its own development, including controlling the "moniteur."

Generally Maisons Familiales operate as private voluntary agencies in a given country. The agency eventually takes on a national character, forming an autonomous national association of base-level Maisons (localized training centers). Typically, the national organization operates by finding a tutelary agency

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<sup>5</sup>"Conscientization" refers to a process of learning to perceive social, political and economic contradictions, and to take action against the oppressive elements in one's life. It is widely associated with the work and pedagogy of Paulo Freire. See his Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), p. 19 and Chapter 3. The French term sensibilisation does not have such radical overtones. It means to induce a sensitivity to a phenomenon, in this case the phenomenon of underdevelopment. MF techniques, as we shall see, certainly did not promote a view of underdevelopment which stressed class relationships and political action.

either in the private sector (usually the Church) or within the public sector (a given government Ministry). The National Association is usually funded through a combination of local member contributions, and bilateral assistance from major donors such as the French Fonds d'Aide et Coopération (FAC) or U.S.A.I.D. Small additional grants may be obtained from foreign private voluntary organizations. The host government may also contribute to the MF budget.

### The Maisons Familiales in Senegal

The Maisons Familiales (MF) program began in Senegal in 1963. The first center was constructed at Sokoné in the Sine-Saloum.<sup>6</sup> The corps of young European agents quickly found it extremely difficult to work in this area of heavy dominance by the Islamic religious leaders. The Center collapsed and it was not until a group of Serer farmers saw the opportunity to make use of MF as a device for attracting income generating-programs into their area that the program got under way. These young educated men made a direct appeal to MF in Paris, and as a result an agreement was signed between the MF organization and the Government of Senegal to create a center at Fandane (Thiès). The center was authorized to work with both men and women in ten villages. In the next

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<sup>6</sup>See Institut d'Etude du Développement Economique et Social, L'Association des Paysans: Moyen de Formation et d'Animation dans les Villages Africains. Le Cas des Maisons Familiales Rurales au Sénégal et au Tchad (Paris: Institut d'Etude du Développement Economique et Social, 1974), for the evolution of the Maisons Familiales in Senegal.

decade it grew slowly, working intensively in the original area and forming ten village associations for women and nine for men. By 1977, additional Maisons existed in Senegal Oriental (2), Casamance (3), Fleuve (2), Diourbel (2), and Sine-Saloum (5). Still the bulk of the effort had been restricted to Thies.<sup>7</sup>

Maisons Familiales began its local level work at Tandene in response to demands from some local farmers for training and resources to employ in off-season market gardening. For the initial members MF probably represented a vehicle for obtaining agricultural inputs which would have been difficult to acquire through the Agricultural Service. This initial focus on economic activities was greater here than is ordinarily the case for the MF approach which stresses individual training, and village social and physical infrastructure activities in the community development mold. For its part the MF staff attempted to broaden the basis of its intervention to include a growing awareness of related health, nutrition and basic amenity problems in the village. Its dialogues focused on promoting group action following the awakening phase. Finally, it began to organize local associations based on common experience in solving local problems together. In the early years, then, local association actions and youth training programs were guided by a combination of local initiative and the inducement of a local catalyst agent.

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<sup>7</sup>See "Formation Rurale Permanente: Les Maisons Familiales, (Rapport Provisoire), " (Dakar: ENDA, April, 1977), p. 3.

As the first Maisons seemed to gain acceptance among both men and women in the Thiès region, the Government of Senegal perceived it as a valuable partner in local level development. For the Government the MF program and its staff could provide a useful linkage by which the technical services (Agriculture, Health, etc.) could promote their own activities at the village level. This role was clearly established both in the official structure set up to supervise MF (see below), and in the Convention between MF and the Government in which "peasant associations (were called upon) to become the direct interlocutors between the National Association and the government services at the village level..."<sup>8</sup> With the planned expansion of MF under the Fifth Development Plan (1977-81) the MF staff has increasingly become dependent on the Senegalese State. Despite the fact that MF "moniteurs" are entirely paid by the State they have no civil service status.<sup>9</sup> The Government, however, looks to them to serve as local level agents for the promotion of national planning priorities, and as trainers to help implement these programs. This is best illustrated by the fact that the Maisons planned for the Fleuve region have been directed to participate in the construction of small irrigated rice plots. It is unclear whether the population in the specific sites selected would have chosen this as their priority, or whether it represents an extension of SAED's policy of

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<sup>8</sup>See "Convention 4" (March 1, 1977), p. 3.

<sup>9</sup>See Maisons Familiales Rurales, "Rapport d'Activite, 1975," p. 53.

mobilizing all existing village level organizations for the fulfillment of its plans, sometimes in contradiction to local wishes.<sup>10</sup> The infusion of funding for MF from external donors such as the FAC (five percent of MF's budget under the Fifth Plan) and U.S.A.I.D. (approximately 1.3% of MF's budget) has added to the reorientation of the agency's development strategy and methodology.<sup>11</sup> External donor funds are given in order to obtain MF support for particular projects which, again, are normally planned and implemented from the top-down.

To the degree that the evolution in MF procedures and methods suggested has in fact been realized during the Fifth Plan, MF has been transformed from a community development technique to a mobilizing Animation device. With the decline of the ruling party (PS) as an instrument of mass mobilization, and with the demise of the village-level animation program, MF may be one of the few means available to the Senegalese state by which it can encourage the participation of villagers in nationally planned rural development actions. Participation through MF, moreover, is particularly attractive to the State since village members themselves contribute a large and increasing percentage of the budget of their national organization.<sup>12</sup> This contribution not only helps

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<sup>10</sup>For a discussion of SAED's activities in the Upper Fleuve region and their impact on village organizations see Adrian Adams, Le long Voyage des Gens du Fleuve (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1977.)

<sup>11</sup>Interview with Famara Diedhiou, Director of Maisons Familiales, Thiès, August 1977.

to pay for the housing of MF village level workers, and for MF training programs, but it underwrites a substantial proportion of the expenses incurred in village self-help actions. On the other hand the MF is not a total captive of the State and the foreign donors. Its degree of budgetary and personnel autonomy and its growing network of peasant associations may well give villagers some capacity to influence the distribution and perhaps even the nature of government services at the arrondissement level. In addition, it can initiate some local-level programs without the direct support of the State.

#### The Structure of Maisons Familiales in Senegal

There are three distinct components to the organization of the MF as an actor in Senegalese rural development; the peasant organization, the professional organization, and the State supervisory organization.<sup>13</sup> The interplay of these three components creates a dynamic which distinguishes MF both from most community development interventions, and from the official Senegalese Animation Rurale program.

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<sup>12</sup> Maisons Familiales Rurales, "Rapport d'Activité, 1975," p. 53.

<sup>13</sup>Based on organizational diagrams found in the National Office of Maisons Familiales, and on interviews at that level in August, 1977. MF conceives of only two components--the peasant organization and the supervisory organization (MF staff and the State agencies). We think the tripartite conception is closer to the reality.

In theory, the centerpiece of the entire approach is the peasant organization, particularly the local peasant association. The local peasant association is a new local organization in rural Senegal. Membership in the association is voluntary and is not coterminous with the entire residential community. Separate local associations are formed for men and for women based on different interests. Members signify their willingness to participate in a MF association by their involvement in the group activities and by paying annual dues (approximately \$.50 per member). Local associations are governed by an administrative council which is constituted theoretically by the proven natural leaders of association activity. Once the local association is formed and is fully operational it decides upon its own activities, largely through the administrative council.<sup>14</sup> In addition to managing association activities the members of the administrative council determine which youths will be sent for specialized training, which services and training assistance to request from government agencies, which local people will represent the association at the national level, and ultimately who the paid staff members who assist the association in its activities will be. The peasant organization is theoretically a two-tiered structure,

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<sup>14</sup>Because a local association has no legal status in Senegal there are significant problems of maintaining internal control over officers. In a case observed in Fadiol a local association officer collected dues and refused to turn them over to the treasurer. The Association had no legal recourse against its officer, except to take the issue to the National Committee which could expel him if it deemed that the act was severe enough.

with a National Committee coordinating the activities of all the local associations. In Senegal this national committee is constituted by two delegates from each functioning local Maison. It has an elected Executive Bureau. These national institutions have not yet developed far. They meet only once or twice a year and have little clear authority either to act on behalf of the individual Maisons, or to intervene in their affairs. In rare instances the National Committee may attempt to represent association interests to national actors, apart from their tutelary Ministry. In at least one instance National Committee members went to the President concerning an association matter.<sup>15</sup> This capacity to provide additional channels whereby villagers can be connected to national actors and policymakers is very embryonic in Senegal. It is far from being a peasant union or from having the legal-status and prestige of its Togolese counterpart.<sup>16</sup>

The second component of MF is its professional organization. This section consists of national, regional, and local level staff members whose primary task is to bring the peasant organization into being, and to assure that it develops properly. At the heart of the MF professional organization is its network of

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<sup>15</sup>This matter was essentially a struggle to get the Ministry to authorize budget funds for the MF organization, and the representations to the President were made, not by peasant leaders, but by leaders of the National Office. It took place in 1974 when MF staff members had not been paid for several months.

<sup>16</sup>Response to case data questionnaire by James Rugh, June 20, 1979.

"moniteurs." Technically they are employees of MF, and are accountable to both the professional organization and to the local association. "Moniteurs" are recruited by competitive written examination from candidates between the ages of twenty and thirty, who pass both psychological tests and who demonstrate an ability to work with villagers during a trial period. Their entire training takes three years and is marked by continual cycles of alternating theoretical training, and field exposure, work and practice. The MF professional organization in Senegal has provided a model for one of the most intensive systems of supervision and evaluation of local agents currently in practice. The training system, however, remains low-cost and stresses constant confrontation of technical and organizational ideas communicated in two week sessions held on a quarterly basis with the work realities of local level organizational activity.

When there are a sufficiently large number of local-level "moniteurs" operating in a given area, MF engages a regional coordinator to follow-up their work and to facilitate the resolution of common problems (such as training needs). But the real coordination and staff support takes place at the level of the National Office in Thiès. The National Office provides two technical assistants (one for women's programs and one for men's) to each region in which MF is active. Its Director is primarily responsible for all training programs. All staff personnel in the National Office are Senegalese, apart from two French techni-

cal advisors who continue to assist with program development. In theory, the National Office exists to develop a strong and autonomous peasant organization. Initially its sole purpose goes well beyond providing technical assistance to the peasant associations. A major task of the MF professional organization is to link into the appropriate governmental channels at all levels. The professional organization essentially negotiates and maintains relationships with the tutelary Ministry on a day-to-day basis. It both defends the interests of the peasants, and adjusts its activities to serve the needs of the State.

Finally, paralleling the MF organizational structure is the organization of the State which has been adapted to deal with actors such as MF. At the base-level, the Senegalese government has constituted Local Development Committees, which encompass village authorities, official representatives of cooperatives, communes and the Animation Service (village "animateurs" where they still exist) and MF local level staff workers ("moniteurs"). In theory this committee coordinates all development activities including those initiated by the Maison at the local level. In reality, however, there is a marked lack of communality between the official community and the local MF association.<sup>17</sup> The Local

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<sup>17</sup>See Robert B. Charlick, Animation Rurale--A Technique for Local Organization and Participation in Development: A State-of-the-Art Paper, (Washington D.C.:U.S.A.I.D., Office of Rural Development, September 15, 1980). The parallels between the problems of private versus State sponsored local organizations in Haiti and in Senegal are worth noting.

Development Committee has little real power to supervise or control local level MF activities.

The Departmental Committee, on the other hand, can affect local associations to a considerable degree. Departmental Committees are constituted by representatives of the various technical services (Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry, etc.) and are headed by a State Administrator--the Préfet. Where MF is active, the Departmental Committee also includes representatives of the MF professional staff. Departmental Committees determine where new MF centers will be allowed to locate. They do so, in theory, on the grounds of high economic potential and population density of perspective sites.<sup>18</sup> MF "moniteurs" must work with the technical staff people represented on the committee, if they expect to get material and technical support for their training programs. Committee decisions, however, may be made on the basis of goals and priorities which local association members would not choose to stress. Conflicts may therefore arise between the interests of the MF professional agents as part of the State administrative apparatus, and as catalyst agents for local community groups.

Capping the State organization is the tutelary Ministry (currently Promotion Humaine). This Ministry has established a commission to supervise the activities of MF which consists of

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<sup>18</sup>I.E.D.E.S., L'Association des Paysans, p. 42; and an interview with Michel Tine, Fadiol, June 15, 1977.

representatives of the various government social services. Most of the dealings which take place between the Commission and MF are handled by National Office staff members, rather than by peasant representatives. The relationship between the Commission and MF seems to be a loose one, much looser, for example, than is the case for Promotion Humaine's control over the Rural Animation Section.

#### Maisons Familiales's Activities at the Local Level

Apart from the process of forming local associations, the main tasks of MF at the local level are to promote group projects, and to train youth in technical areas. In theory it should be impossible to specify what kinds of project activities will be undertaken by given Maisons, as they are supposed to be determined locally. MF staff members are supposed to respond flexibly to felt needs by tailoring their technical assistance and training to facilitating peasant defined activities. An examination of the types of projects which local MF groups undertake however, suggests that local initiative may be quite limited.<sup>19</sup> Men's groups do get involved in market gardening projects which seem to address a locally perceived need for off-season income and agricultural inputs. Other men's projects, such as literacy training, and improved technology for millet and peanuts appear to be related more to the interests of government or para-statal actors

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<sup>19</sup>See I.E.D.E.S., L'Association des Paysans.

(such as SODEVA). Women's projects are generally non-economic activities designed to improve the quality of life for villagers, particularly for children. Such programs as pre-natal and post-natal care (P.M.I.) attract interested participants. Programs to improve the nutrition of traditional dishes, and to dress children better through home sewing clearly do not seem to originate with the expressed needs of local women.

The selection and training of rural youth in specific skills does not appear to be clearly related to local level projects, at least insofar as men are concerned. Rather it is related to MF's original goal of stabilizing rural life and of slowing down rural migration by improving the quality of village services. Young village men are selected to be trained in skills such as carpentry, masonry and the repair of agricultural implements. Their training involves repeated cycles of four days at the training center, followed by fifteen days of work and supervision in the residential village. The trainees are prepared for gainful employment on an individual basis. Ideally, their skills can be used to improve village life through the provision of needed services. Young women, on the other hand, are trained in tasks which are closely related to the types of projects which MF "moniteurs" propose to village women (child care, improved nutrition, sewing). Apart from sewing, there is no clear relationship between the training and the ability of the trainee to use the skills for material gain. Were there organized groups of rural

women engaged in collective projects in these areas, the trainees might be able to serve as para-professionals or volunteer workers for the Women's Local Association. As we shall see, however, women's activities do not tend to be conducted as group enterprises.

### The Concept of Animation in Maisons Familiales Programs

It is clear that the theory of the Maisons Familiales approach to rural change is quite different from that of Animation Rurale. The practice of both approaches has evolved over time in Senegal, so that it can be suggested that the MF approach has become more like an animation intervention in the past several years. Nevertheless there are some important differences between the two which should be noted.

#### As a Strategy

It is difficult to ascertain whether MF in Senegal has developed a coherent strategy upon which its activities are based. Its approaches are deeply rooted in local-level problems and vary from one center to another. If indeed there is an underlying strategy it is that strong local associations provide a long-term basis of organizational pluralism, as can be inferred from the linkage of local associations to higher levels of the system through the National Committee. This aspect of MF is extremely embryonic and not clearly articulated. No clear role is ascribed to the local association beyond its apparent task of stimulating self-help projects at the village level. It is not even evident

how the local MF association should interact with existing local institutions, such as the Local Development Committee. The assumption seems to be that no conflict will exist between these institutions, despite the fact that their membership is not identical, and that their interests on any given issue can differ significantly. On infrastructural issues, for example, members of a local Maison may not agree to participate in work to provide infrastructure which may be used by villagers who are non-members. Where economic issues are more closely involved, such as the use of land and labor for the benefit of members in off-season market gardening, the potential for conflict with village and extra-village level economic interests is greater. Yet there is no discussion in the MF literature about the need to form groups combining a number of local associations for mutual support on economic issues. All of this is in sharp contrast to the theory of Animation in which the local group is seen as the basis for an alternative structure of society reaching up to the national level.

Animation theory also differs in its view of the role of the State in the change process. It hypothesizes that the real locus of resistance to the full development of the peasantry lies at two levels: the civil service which initially is not a viable partner in development due to its colonial heritage, and the local political and economic and political structures. Animation proposes to use the instruments of the State, combined with the

growing power of "animated" communities to transform both forces.

The Maisons Familiales approach, on the other hand accepts the bureaucracy as a valid partner from the outset, and neither requires nor seeks to effect any change in its working methods. Neither does it seek the assistance of the state in supporting MF organizations politically. In fact MF associations have no linkage to other organizations with an economic role, such as the cooperatives. Since, in the view of MF, the problem of underdevelopment is primarily at the local level and the remedy is there for the most part, as well, much less external intervention on the part of the state is required or desired.

This contrast is of course, an oversimplification of the way in which both approaches have been used in Senegal. As we have seen, the Animation Service was able to do very little about either motivating and restructuring the bureaucracy, or about supporting its organizational network against local and extra-local level political and economic actors. This structural part of its method was quickly abandoned. What remained was a method of inducing local people to participate in projects initiated largely by technical services, national planners, or even foreign donor organizations. This is antithetical to the theory which guides Maisons Familiales organizational activities. But, as we have seen, MF has become increasingly involved in externally defined projects, as well.

## As a Technique

It is at the level of technique that Maisons Familiales differs most significantly from the approach of the Animation Service in Senegal. First, MF puts much more emphasis on the formation and training of local groups than does Animation. Local groups emerge over a relatively long period of experience together. They are voluntaristic, and are based on common interests and ties. MF "moniteurs" continually supervise these groups and help assure their proper functioning. Animation Service agents, on the other hand, never directly fostered groups at the local level. Instead they recruited and trained "animateurs" who were supposed to do the organizational and motivational work in the village. The Animation Service's organizational intervention was limited to forming "development cells" encompassing several villages and bringing together a number of "animateurs." These efforts, as we have seen, were short-lived.

Both the concept of the "animateur" and of the local client group differs in the techniques of these two approaches. The "animateur," in the practice of the Animation Service was a locally selected volunteer who theoretically represented a village, or a neighborhood. As such he or she was almost certain to be illiterate, uneducated (in Western terms), and untrained in technical domains. The main task of an "animateur" in this view was to mobilize popular opinion in the village toward participation in State-initiated development projects. It was rare, even

during the heyday of the "animateur" network program under Dia, to find village volunteers serving as true para-professionals, expected to perform services for their fellow villagers.<sup>20</sup> Hence the training of "animateurs" was very brief, with little attention given to the teaching of technical tasks. Retraining and field supervision by Animation Service agents was more the exception than the rule. Instead, Animation agents counted on the village "animateur" to organize and motivate the village so that it would then be "open" to the activities of technical service personnel. In practice, however, the technicians often distained cooperating with Animation agents and simply left the villagers without technical support, or offered it only in the context of programs which ignored the animation structures.

In the Maisons Familiales approach, the "moniteur" is a technical assistant employed by the National Office of a private organization, and responsible ultimately to the local association with whom he works. MF "moniteurs" are literate, Western-educated to the elementary graduate level, and trained over a period of three years in technical matters relevant to their locally defined projects. They are closely supervised and evaluated by National and Regional MF officials. Members of local MF associa-

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<sup>20</sup>For a discussion of "animateurs" as para-professionals, see Robert B. Charlick, John D. Collins, and David Groff, Local Organization and Development-The Experience of Animation Rurale in Niger, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1980).

tions are supposed to participate in these evaluations. MF "moniteurs" in turn, work directly with local individuals who voluntarily agree to participate in common activities. The bulk of their assistance is practical, providing information and training to help with the execution of projects which local individuals want to undertake. Very little of their time is spent in teaching an ideology of self-help or autonomous local development. Eventually they assist in establishing an organization-- the local association.

"Moniteurs" in the MF approach do not normally create an additional layer of "animateurs" as a special category of volunteers who are expected to receive different training and to carry differential responsibilities toward the group. The only instance which is documented of this type of activity, the training of pharmacists in four communities, ended in complete failure.<sup>21</sup> Instead MF "moniteurs" promote a broad sharing of leadership and implementational roles. Young villagers who are selected for training in technical areas are not seen as "animateurs" when they return to the village, but are allowed to use their skills to augment personal income and other benefits for their family group. Of course, it is hoped that they will become active members in the association and will help constitute a core of local individuals who are open to modernization.

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<sup>21</sup>I.E.D.E.S., L'Association des Paysans, pp. 136-141.

Unlike Animation Service agents, MF "moniteurs" reside for long periods in the village in which they work. Despite their educational level they are paid at a level which allows them to live no better than a middle level peasant (they earn only about \$550 per year).<sup>22</sup> In a sense they become full members of the community. But in another sense they are outsiders upon whom the local association members are heavily dependent. In no instance has a local association been able to finance the salary of an "moniteur" and given the separation of MF associations from economic institutions such as cooperatives, their long-term ability to do this is extremely problematic. Nevertheless, available data suggests that MF "moniteurs" are appreciated and are more readily accepted by association members, than are the agents of government services.<sup>23</sup>

Finally, MF "moniteurs" seem to be able to win effective cooperation of technical service agents for supporting their training and project implementational activities. This is due both to their own technical competence in given areas, and to the fact that they do not attempt to change the methods or attitudes of county level technical agents. Sometimes an initial period of reticence is reported on the part of county level technical personnel.<sup>24</sup> This disappears as MF and technical service agents

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<sup>22</sup>Maisons Familiales Rurale, "Rapport d'Activité, 1975," p. 53.

<sup>23</sup>Based on interviews at Fadiol, June 1977, and on discussions at the National Office of MF in July and August, 1977.

begin to work together on specific activities. Villages which have MF "moniteurs" therefore, are more likely to receive technical and material support from the State for their activities than are other villages.

The Achievements and Limitations of the Maisons Familiales Approach

Any effort to evaluate the accomplishments of MF and to examine its impact on Senegalese society is limited by the evidence available. Maisons Familiales have been operating in Senegal now for nearly two decades, yet only one systematic study has been conducted of Maisons Familiales at the local level, and that study was restricted to two Maisons in Thiès (Fandene, and Diogo).<sup>25</sup> The I.E.D.E.S. study, moreover, is limited by the fact that it entailed only three weeks of field work in Senegal. The only other data available are based on the personal observations by one of the authors of this monograph of the MF at Fadiol, and on interviews and documentary research at the National Office level in Thiès. By no means, therefore, should this account be viewed as definitive, or even as an accurate description of the success of MF programs in different parts of the country. If Maisons Familiales represent an important example of a private

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<sup>24</sup>Interview with Fatou Bacoum, Head of "monitrices" at Fadiol, June 14, 1977.

<sup>25</sup>Institut d'Etude du Développement Economique et Social, L'Association des Paysans: Moyen de Formation et d'Animation dans les Villages Africaines. Le Cas des Maisons Familiales Rurales au Sénégal et au Tchad (Paris: I.E.D.E.S., 1974).

organizational approach to Animation for participatory rural development, then it warrants more careful examination in a comparative framework of its efforts in different contexts within Senegal, and in other nations as well.

An evaluation of a technique like Maison Familiale, moreover, should be based on multiple criteria of evidence. Technical results in specific projects cannot adequately summarize the total impact of a program which stresses local organizational capacity. Nor should an evaluation of MF be restricted to its impact at the local level. It must be viewed in terms of its role as an instrument for bottom-up as well as top-down linkages to the broader system.

#### Technical Results

Technically, the results of most MF projects for which data exist are unimpressive. Two distinctions must be made in considering the subject. Women's association activities are quite different than men's. Economically oriented projects should also be judged separately from more socially oriented activities. Projects in Fandene and Dioqo which have attempted to raise the literacy and health care levels of local people have been remarkably unsuccessful. Literacy training in French has tended to be irregular and poorly attended.<sup>26</sup> Very few trainees (even at Dioqo

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., pp. 91-92, 146-147.

where sessions were more regular) achieved a good level of competence in reading and writing. The results for functional mathematics on the other hand were much better, as men could see the applications in peanut trading and other commercial activity.<sup>27</sup> The establishment of village pharmacies at these two Maisons was an unmitigated disaster. Only one of the four villagers trained to dispense medicines continued in his job. The pharmacy scheme appears to have been initiated by the MF "moniteurs" who obtained funding from Rotary Clubs to supply the medicines. No effective system of supervision of pharmacists emerged as the local association played only a minimal role in the project.<sup>28</sup>

Economically oriented projects for men which have been undertaken primarily through the efforts of MF "moniteurs" have been concerned mainly with off-season market gardening. At Fandene the income effects of the project appear to have been significant with some participants gaining \$470 in additional revenue.<sup>29</sup> The data are inadequate to evaluate the range of outcomes for individual participants, or the net gains after costs. The real attraction of the scheme, however, seems to have been in the ease of obtaining agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilizers which were otherwise available only with considerable difficulty from the Agricultural Service.<sup>30</sup> Economically oriented projects

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., pp. 92, 148-149.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., pp. 136-141.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 104.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., pp. 119-122; and personal interviews.

in banana gardening and small livestock production at Diogo encountered the usual litany of natural and technical disasters. Although both projects seemed promising at the outset within a few years they had been decimated by drought and disease. The local association and the MF "moniteurs" were unable to obtain timely supplies of vaccines against poultry disease.<sup>31</sup> They could do little about the fact that the site of their banana plantation simply dried up.<sup>32</sup>

MF "moniteurs" have also been active in working with technical services to introduce new techniques for producing millet and peanuts, the two main crops of the area. Their particular contribution has been to develop excellent training methods for educating illiterate peasant farmers in the use of inputs, such as fertilizer.<sup>33</sup> In this capacity, however, MF works closely with SODEVA. It would be difficult to determine what the relationship between the work of an MF agent and of a local association might be in this context, even were the results positive. Erratic weather and input supply have rendered the question moot, at least for the short-term period under observation. Here, however, it should be noted that impetus for the activity has come from the State and from SODEVA rather than from the local community. There is considerable evidence to suggest that during this

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid., pp. 158-159.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., pp. 156-158.

<sup>33</sup> Interview with Michel Tine, at Fadial, June 15, 1977.

period Senegalese peasant farmers were trying to withdraw from further market involvement with peanut production, rather than to increase the place of peanut cultivation in their farm systems.<sup>34</sup>

Women's projects have been almost entirely oriented around domestic activities which are not compensated, such as their roles as providers of improved nutrition, health care, and clothing for their children.<sup>35</sup> Pre-natal and infant care projects do seem to have improved health practices in the two communities.<sup>36</sup> Nutritional programs, however, have been largely unsuccessful in getting women to incorporate in their food preparation more fresh produce or more animal protein from the production of market-garden or small livestock projects. Nor have women shown strong interest in sewing better clothing for children. There are numerous reasons for this lack of response, all generally traceable to the extreme poverty of women in this society, to the existing situation of full utilization of their labor, and to their difficulty in obtaining the resources required for effective participation. The labor problem has not been made easier with the institution of men's market garden projects which have created

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<sup>34</sup>Jonathan Barker, "Stability and Stagnation: The State In Senegal," Canadian Journal of African Studies, XI, 1(1977), pp. 38-40; Donal E. Cruise O'Brien, "Co-operators and Bureaucrats: Class Formation in a Senegalese Peasant Society," Africa, XLI, 4(October, 1971), p. 275.

<sup>35</sup>Female MF staff workers in Fadial did try to introduce women to income-producing projects such as market gardening and the extraction of salt from sea water. Interviews at Fadial, June 1977.

<sup>36</sup>I.E.D.E.S., L'Association des Paysans, pp. 175-180.

additional labor demands on women who carry this produce to market. One labor-saving project for local women which was undertaken reveals some of the critical weaknesses of MF project activity, at least in this area. The MF staff, seeing that the labor bottleneck all but precluded women's involvement in projects, initiated the purchase of a millet-grinding mill to lighten their food preparation workload. After only two months of operation the mill experienced mechanical problems and could not be repaired due to the lack of spare parts, and trained local mechanics. Local women were probably not consulted on the choice of technology, which seems to have been clearly inappropriate. This project, like most of the women's activities, did not involve an organizational commitment. Instead, MF women's projects are normally conducted by the female MF staff worker, and individual local women are invited to participate as trainees or beneficiaries.

#### Organizational Impact

Several different criteria can be employed in evaluating the organizational impact of the MF approach. We will first consider the scope of its impact in system-wide terms. Next, the consequences of MF for local organizational capability will be judged. Third, we will examine this intervention in terms of its impact on different types of participation open to villagers. Finally, MF may be evaluated in terms of organizational implications for the broader system, both in terms of fostering intermediary

"constituency" or advocacy organization<sup>37</sup> for furthering local level interests at higher levels of the system, and in terms of its role in contributing to the fulfillment of nationally defined priorities through the mobilization of local efforts.

Until 1977 MF was essentially in its pilot phase. It had operated intensively only in the Thiès region and even in this region it reached only about ten percent of the villages. Its voluntaristic method meant that not all residents in these communities were involved. Its impact on the total Senegalese system, therefore, has been quite limited. As MF is called upon by the Senegalese government to expand rapidly, its potential impact will grow considerably. There are already some indications that this expansion will not be easy. One effort to move into Dicur-bel apparently resulted in failure as local marabouts resisted the new organization.<sup>38</sup> Elsewhere in this volume it has been shown that contextual factors can be very important to the success of a rural development intervention. The Thiès region benefits from some very favorable initial conditions as compared to a number of other regions of the country.<sup>39</sup> But beyond this,

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<sup>37</sup>For the notion of constituency organizations see Milton Esman, "Development Administration and Constituency Organization," Public Administration Review, 38,2 (March-April, 1978), p. 166. For a discussion of advocacy organizations, see Mary R. Hollnsteiner, Development from the Bottom-Up: Mobilizing the Rural Poor for Self-Development (Manila: Institute of Phillipines Culture, April 1978).

<sup>38</sup>Interview with Famara Diedhiou, Director of Maisons Familiales, in Thiès, August, 1977.

<sup>39</sup>Cooperative formation had been earlier and more intense in

expansion carries with it a number of crucial organizational difficulties for an approach which is highly dependent on motivated, well-trained and closely supervised staff who work intensively with local groups. It is questionable whether MF can expand its staff quickly while retaining the elan and quality which has marked its efforts in the pilot communities.\*<sup>0</sup> The obvious risk is that as MF expands to have a truly national impact the content of its intervention will change dramatically as it will be called upon to rapidly create local associations.

There is little doubt that MF has contributed to the organizational capacity of the local communities in which it has operated. Not only has it created an alternative to the formalistic Local Development Committee, but real leadership and group decision-making processes have begun to emerge in MF associations. This is patently more clearly the case for male associations than for female groups. At the time of the evaluation studies cited above women seemed to be participating individually rather than as members of local associations. Youth training programs, while

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Thiers than in many parts of the country. Traditional political leaders, and Islamic marabouts were not as powerful here as elsewhere in the peanut basin.

\*<sup>0</sup>See Gerald Sussman, "The Pilot Project and the Choice of an Implementing Strategy: Community Development in India," in Merilee Grindle (ed.), Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.) Sussman presents evidence of how the Indian Community Development program changed from its pilot to its national implementation phase, and how this was related to staff management and political issues.

not explicitly connected with local association projects, may well provide the basis for a new generation of community leaders which will broaden the basis of participation. There are several indications of the growing capacity of MF local associations. They not only have the ability to tax themselves for development activities, but the share of local contributions to the total invested in MF is increasing.<sup>41</sup> They also have the capacity to propose projects based on their own requirements, and to ask their "moniteur" to identify the proper technical assistance to further their goals. This is a significant departure from the practice of state or para-statal organizational efforts in rural Senegal.

The extent of this organizational capability, or autonomy, should not be overstated, however. There is ample evidence in this study to indicate that local associations are still heavily dependent upon their "moniteurs" that they cannot yet effectively control them, and that a significant percent of the projects detailed above have been initiated, not by local members, but by the MF staff. As MF "moniteurs" become more nearly state employees, and as they are expected to work more closely with regional and para-statal authorities there is a real danger that the capacity of the local association will decline.

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<sup>41</sup>Maisons Familiales Rurales, "Rapport d'Activité, 1975," p. 53.

The impact of MF in terms of the participation of local people can be viewed along several different dimensions.<sup>42</sup> Evidence of participation on some of these dimensions has already been offered. The MF approach quite clearly offers opportunities for villagers to become involved in decision-making, at least as regards local projects and training programs. Despite the fact that the "moniteur" is a paid outsider the relationship between staff workers and association members appears to be remarkably devoid of authoritarianism.<sup>43</sup> For the pilot associations at least, the continued reliance on "moniteurs" to make many of the crucial decisions seems to be due more to the lack of experience and of resources on the part of villagers, than to their exclusion from responsibility by the "moniteurs." Decision-making which has implications beyond the local level, however, is quite limited. As we have seen, even the choice of sites for new Maisons is in the hands of département level technical and administrative officials. Although peasants serve on the National Committee, essentially they are represented in day-to-day affairs beyond the local level by MF staff workers. Since MF attempts to

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<sup>42</sup>See Norman T. Uphoff, John M. Cohen and Arthur A. Goldsmith. Feasibility and Application of Rural Development Participation (Ithaca, N.Y.: Center for International Studies, Cornell University, Report 3, Appendix 2).

<sup>43</sup>During a group meeting in Fadial in June, 1977 one village leader offered this view of the MF moniteurs: "(Before you came) we were blind. Now we have begun to see with one eye. We were enclosed (in our villages); now we have begun to be more open because you, the cadres of the Maisons Familiales, you have made yourselves very simple, you have made yourselves peasants (badola) in order to come and live with us."

orient most of its actions strictly at the local level there is, in theory, little need for members to make decisions beyond that arena. Clearly, however, decisions are made for them beyond the village which severely limit their range of effective action.

Similarly, local MF members have opportunities to participate in implementation. They can contribute resources and labor to activities decided by local associations. Since the vast majority of MF activities, however, are training programs, opportunities for playing responsible roles in implementation beyond the choice of training desired are limited. Since with few exceptions MF "moniteurs" do not train specialized village volunteers to carry out specific functions, local associations are dependent on interested natural leaders, or on youth trainees who normally expect compensation, for the skills to carry out project activities.

It is difficult to discuss participation in the benefits of MF projects thus far. Apart from market-garden activities they do not seem to have produced significant benefits for individual members. There is a real question as to how beneficial their project interventions have been for the quality of life of members as a group. Rather, the issue must be posed at the level of potentials. To the extent that membership and involvement in MF can yield benefits, there is reason to believe that economically better-off farmers would capture a disproportionate share.\*\* This

is the case because MF recruits on a voluntary basis, and requires financial as well as time commitments from its members. Better-off farmers can more easily afford these. They also may have more experience with organizational leadership roles and are attracted to another opportunity to manifest them. Finally, to the extent that market-garden programs facilitate access to agricultural inputs, the wealthier farmers are in a better position to use these inputs as they are more likely to have irrigable land. The MF approach does nothing about altering differential access to productive resources, such as land, through efforts at collective land use or tenure reform. The IEDES study found that poorer farmers are just as likely as wealthier ones to participate in MF programs initially, but that they become discouraged and drop out. This indicates that either the programs have little to offer in economic terms, or that poorer farmers are effectively excluded from participating in whatever potential economic benefits may exist.

Unfortunately, no data exist on the socio-economic origins of youth trainees. This occupational training represents an additional source of potential benefit. Considering, however, that trainees are selected by the Administrative Council (the most active members) of the Local Association, it would hardly be surprising to find that they are drawn from better-off farm

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♦♦I.E.D.E.S., L'Association des Paysans, pp. 92, 134, and personal interviews in Fadial and Thiès.

families. One additional issue concerning participation in benefits is the question of ethnic differences in MF involvement. In both Maisons studied there is evidence that local associations are dominated by one ethnic group, almost to the exclusion of another.<sup>45</sup> In Diogo the situation is easily understood, since Wolof constitute ninety percent of the population. The Fulani simply do not consider the local MF Association their group. But in Fandene where Wolofs and Serers are nearly equally represented in the population, the problem is more complex. Despite the fact that Serer farmers initiated the program and still hold several positions on the Association Council their ethnic group is markedly underrepresented in the Maison. It is unclear whether this is a deliberate effort on the part of one ethnic group to use the association for their purposes, or whether cultural and work pattern differences account for differential participation rates, as appears to be the case for women. If real benefits accrue to members as opposed to non-members, the use of the association by one ethnic group may pose problems of present and future equity in the impact of the MF program on local-level equity.

The Maisons Familiales intervention seems considerably more open to the involvement of villagers in evaluation than either the Animation Service or the para-statal approaches. Members are

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid., pp. 119-134, 190.

encouraged to participate in review of MF staff members, and to critique their training sessions based on their efforts to apply their lessons. Members are also trained to think about project activities or innovations proposed to them by technical services in terms of cost-effectiveness.<sup>46</sup> It is rare indeed for a technical service to encourage farmers to make decisions about adoption of technology based on its true on-farm costs versus its actual contribution to increased revenue. This kind of critical thinking, while perhaps not appropriate for every project intervention, can be an important tool in encouraging villagers to question technical decisions and help them to deal on a more equal basis with government services in the future.

Finally, the organizational implications of the MF approach reach beyond the local level in two directions. First, the MF system of linking local associations to a National Office, and paralleling the peasant structure with a professional organization represents an attempt to defend peasant interest at higher levels of the system through a sort of intermediary constituency organization. Thus far, as has already been mentioned, most of the power seems to be in the hands of the professional organization. Examples which are given of the MF seeking to influence national level decision-makers are restricted to the professional

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<sup>46</sup>Detailed examples of the way MF moniteurs train participants to assess the return on market-garden investments were provided by Michel Tine, in an interview with the author at Padiar, June 15, 1977.

organization defending its budget and prerogatives. Even in this narrow domain the success of MF has been limited. It is tied to a tutelary Ministry (Promotion Humaine) which is weak in national power by comparison with some of the technical ministries. Its programs are therefore always vulnerable. It is not clear, as well, that this is the best way to defend peasant interests. The ability of the MF staff to moderate the demands on the part of the para-statal for the use of local associations in their plans is suspect, given the direction in which MF programs appear to be turning under the Fifth Development Plan.

On the other hand, MF has expressly discouraged its staff and members from developing into a local political force, or from engaging in partisan politics. In the light of the experience of the Animation Rurale program in the early and mid-1960s this decision may appear wise. However, it is unclear how MF can hope to promote its goals of becoming more involved in the rural communes<sup>47</sup> and of possibly influencing land tenure and distribution issues<sup>48</sup> if it continues to deny itself a role as an interest group in politics. With the return to quasi-competitive electoral processes at the level of the rural communes<sup>49</sup> the

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<sup>47</sup>For the desire of MF to get involved in the rural communes see: "Maison Familiales Rurales," an undated mimeograph paper circulated in Senegal in 1977, especially page 22.

<sup>48</sup>Under the Loi sur le Domaine National, and law 72-25 (April 19, 1972) the rural councils have the authority to allocate all lands except those which are privately held and those designated as State Classified Forests.

<sup>49</sup>For a brief discussion of the rise of electoral opposition

opportunity for MF to begin acting as an advocacy group may become more attractive. If it does so, MF associations will constitute one of the rare non-theocratically dominated agencies in Senegal which can play this role. It remains to be seen whether MF's leadership will take the risk, and whether the Government of Senegal will tolerate this degree of political pluralism.

Thus far, at least, MF seems to serve more fully the needs of the State. The MF programs studied have had one major impact which corresponds with the original goals of the program in France. They have slowed down the exodus of rural youth from villages where MF training programs have been conducted. Only about six percent of the young men trained at Dioqo and Fandene have left their villages.<sup>50</sup> This is a considerable plus for a State confronted with massive urban unemployment and potential discontent. In addition, MF staff members constitute a core of inexpensive village-level workers who can facilitate the efforts of the technical agencies of government to mobilize the support

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see "Que veut l'Opposition?," Jeune Afrique, 943, January 31, 1979.

<sup>50</sup>I.E.D.E.S., L'Association des Paysans.

of villagers for their programs. The high level of mutual cooperation and acceptance on the part of county level technical service personnel and local MF moniteurs cuts both ways. It may facilitate the introduction of improved techniques and resources to MF villages, and it may make them more vulnerable to control and mobilization by the State.

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