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## PEASANTS, OFFICIALS AND PARTICIPATION IN RURAL TANZANIA: EXPERIENCE WITH VILLAGIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION

**Louise Fortmann**

PEASANTS, OFFICIALS AND PARTICIPATION IN RURAL TANZANIA:  
EXPERIENCE WITH VILLAGIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION

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## KISWAHILI TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

The English convention of writing Bantu words has been followed in this text. That is, except for a few place names, the prefixes have been omitted and only the stem given. Maps showing the regions, districts and location of several ethnic groups are provided for those who like to know where the action is taking place.

Bwana Shamba - agricultural extension officer

CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi) the Party of the Revolution: successor to TANU; after February, 1977 the sole legal party in Tanzania including Zanzibar

DADO - District Agricultural Development Officer

DDD - District Development Director

Halmashauri - village council

Heshima - honor, respect

Katikiro - term used historically among the Haya for a Prime Minister

Maduka - shops

Mukama (bakama) - term used historically among the Haya for King or Chief

PMO - Prime Minister's Office

RADO - Regional Agricultural Development Officer

RC - Regional Commissioner

RDD - Regional Development Director

TANU - Tanganyika African National Union, prior to February, 1977 the sole legal party on the Tanzanian mainland

Vijiji - villages

Wazee - elders (singular, Mzee)

## CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATED TO VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT<sup>1</sup>

- 1961 - Independence
- April 1962 - Publication of Nyerere's Ujamaa--The Basis of African Socialism
- 1962-1963 - Beginning of the Ruvuma Development Association, which grew to a group of 17 villages operating on a collective basis. Approximately 1000 voluntary settlement schemes sprang up.
- Dec. 1962 - Nyerere's inaugural address: "The first and absolutely essential thing to do, therefore, if we want to be able to start using tractors for cultivation is to begin living in proper villages . . . For the next few years the Government will be doing all it can to enable the farmers of Tanganyika to come together in village communities."
- 1963-1965 - Problems with voluntary settlement schemes led to a concentration on government-supervised settlement schemes, which numbered about forty.
- 1966 - The Ross report (never published) declared the settlement schemes to have been overcapitalized and badly planned and the settlers to have been spoon-fed--in sum, a waste of resources. The Presidential Special Committee of Enquiry into Cooperative Movement and Marketing Boards published its report identifying uninformed members, lack of democracy, incompetent personnel, corruption, and political interference as major problems.
- Jan. 1967 - The Arusha Declaration set forth a policy of national self-reliance based on local effort ("hard work is the root of development").
- Sept. 1967 - Ujamaa was announced as the nation's official policy in the President's paper "Socialism and Rural Development." ("Tanzanian Socialism must be firmly based on the land and its workers. . . . We shall achieve the goals we have set ourselves if the basis of Tanzanian life consists of rural economic and social communities where people live together and work together for the good of all.")
- 1968 - Ujamaa villages were begun, many of them (Handeni and West Lake most notably) by local politicians using force or threats of force. In response, a Presidential Paper, "Freedom and Development," was issued, stating, "No one can be forced into an Ujamaa village."

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<sup>1</sup>Parts of this chronology have been adapted from Coulson, 1974.

- March 1969 - Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1969: "All Government policies and the activities and decisions of all Government officials, must therefore be geared towards emphasizing the advantages of living together and working together for the good of all." Government departments began placing as many projects as possible in ujamaa villages. The regional Development Fund was made available for financing small projects in ujamaa villages.
- 1970 - Mtwara Regional Commissioner Dr. Wilbert Klerruu began 750 villages, many by force. Presidential Planning Teams went to the villages to try to compensate for the general lack of planning and organization. Based on a few days' stay in each village, their plans consisted primarily of unrealistic production targets and lists of aid to be provided by the government. "Operation Dodoma," moving all the people in Dodoma Region into planned villages near water supplies, was developed as the solution to the region's problems.
- 1971 - Over 30,000 Gogo families moved into 190 villages (two with over 500 families) in Dodoma. Dr. Klerruu transferred to Iringa, where he began 629 new villages (from a base of 22) within a year. He was subsequently shot by an angry farmer.
- 1972 - More people were moved in Operation Chunya and Operation Kigoma.
- May 1972 - The Iringa Declaration (Siasa ni Kilimo--Politics is Agriculture) stressed the need to raise production, emphasizing simple technology rather than communal work.
- July 1972 - Decentralization went into effect, putting a greatly increased number of government staff into the regions.
- 1973 - "Operations" emphasizing living in villages rather than communal production were undertaken in the low-density areas of the country. On November 6 the President announced, "To live in villages is an order," which was to be carried out by November 1974.
- 1974 - Daily News, 23 August (cited in Tabari, 1975:95): "Those who think they can avoid living in such villages are deluding themselves. Those who try to resist going into such villages are also fighting a lost cause. Every Tanzanian peasant will have to move and live in such villages. Anyone who refuses will be taken there by force. On this there will be no half measures." Operation Vijiji moved 11 million people into villages after using force. Food production plummeted. Although this was due in part to drought, the high production areas of the country did not suffer a lack of rainfall. There the drop could clearly be laid at the door of the disruption caused by Operation Vijiji. In the face of falling production, Operation Kilimo cha Kufa na Kupona (Agriculture as a Matter of Life and Death), which included the provision of free maize inputs, was instituted.
- Daily News, 13 August 1974 (cited in Tabari, 1975:94): "By-laws requiring people to cultivate the land and care for their farms


have been operating for many years. After independence, their enforcement was somehow neglected. They are now being reviewed in many parts of the country to combat laziness and drunkenness." Colonial by-laws (which had been used as an organizing issue in the independence struggle) were reactivated to force production up. In Dodoma, no one could use public transport without an identity card showing that six acres per wife had been cultivated.

- 1975 - The Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act was passed institutionalizing the results of Operation Vijiji. (See Appendix A.) Villages were to become registered corporate bodies, capable of entering into legal contracts.
- 1976 - Operation Maduka ordered the replacement of private shops with cooperative shops in the villages. In practice this took the form of closing private shops without first establishing a reasonable substitute and resulted in a general unavailability of consumer goods in the villages. The President announced that the point of the Operation was to open cooperative shops, not to close down private ones.
- May 1976 - All Cooperative Unions were ordered to dispose of their assets and liabilities and disband.
- 1977 - Government proclamations increasingly emphasized productivity, with little mention of communal production.
- Feb. 1977 - TANU and ASP are merged to form the CCM.
- May 1977 - It was announced that by June 1 experts would move to the villages. Few did.
- Nov. 1977 - Universal Primary Education was implemented.
- Dec. 1977 - The Prime Minister announced that in February 1978, 4000 village managers would be assigned to villages. Among their duties was "to help the villagers to increase the number of work hours."
- 1978 - Recruitment of village managers reportedly ranged from the postal clerk to the director of an agricultural research station and included students overseas for training. There was a notable lack of enthusiasm, as many new managers found excuses for not taking up their posts. Development efforts were interrupted by a major cholera epidemic and war with Uganda.
- 1979 - The Prime Minister announced: "Peasants should double their efforts in the production of food and cash crops. . . . Everyone must adopt a greater sense of responsibility and give his daily share of work to the nation during this difficult period."

**MAPS**

# ECOCLIMATIC ZONES OF TANZANIA

(Showing Regions and Districts)



Source: Deshler et al. 1979:10

**KEY**

- Zone 1 Uninhabited barren land
- Zone 2 Perennial crop mixed husbandry on high potential land, a semi-humid climate
- Zone 3 Annual crop cultivation on medium potential land, in equatorial climate
- Zone 4 Dry land crop cultivation on marginal potential land, a semi-arid climate
- Zone 5 Transhumant cattle/goat pastoralists on low potential wet season grazing land, in arid climate

# ECOCLIMATIC ZONES OF TANZANIA

(Showing Ethnic Group Names)





Fig. 2



Scale  
1:5,000,000



Source: Deshler et al. 1979:11

## KEY

- Zone 1 Uninhabited barren land
- Zone 2 Perennial crop mixed husbandry on high potential land, a semi-humid climate
- Zone 3 Annual crop cultivation on medium potential land, in equatorial climate
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- Zone 5 Transhumant cattle/goat pastoralists on low potential wet season grazing land, in arid climate

## Introduction

Tanzania has an ability probably equalled only by the People's Republic of China to elicit barricade-manning behavior from all parts of the political spectrum. The romantics respond to the Rousseauian vision of happy peasant communities contained in Nyerere's writing on ujamaa. The left applauds agrarian socialism, on the one hand, and condemns statism, on the other. The right applauds the re-emergence of small entrepreneurs and condemns nationalizations. Everyone respects the charismatic philosopher-president, Julius K. Nyerere. And there is much for everyone to respect in the implementation of his ideas as well--the excellent system of rural health delivery the relatively low (although rising) level of corruption, the emphasis on practical skills for rural living that is being inserted into the school curriculum. On the other hand, nearly everyone is appalled at the spectacle of a government burning down the houses of its own citizens. In short, despite the almost singular emotional appeal that is exercised by Nyerere's model for rural development with its emphasis on local self-government, cooperation, sharing and human caring, closer examination shows that this implementation is not all it might be.

There is so much that is so very right with the ideals espoused by Nyerere that it seems querulous to point out where practice departs from them. Who has a better model? Indeed, fairly vehement arguments against critiquing the Tanzanian experience are made on these very grounds. The answer is that while this model may well be one of the best we have, theory and practice have parted company, and it is important to understand why. Why in a country with relatively little multinational influence, remarkably weak class formation, and reasonably few dispossessed is there such slippage

between theory and practice? Is the model even being implemented? Are its premises inconsistent with the establishment of a modern nation-state? Are the structures left from colonialism (and those destroyed by it) the determining factor?

The answers are by no means easy to come by. Tanzania is far from being a homogenous country. It is composed of 124 ethnic groups with varying traditions. It varies widely by climate, topography, and available resources. There is much at all levels which happens behind closed doors and village research has been steadily discouraged since 1972.

But the answers are important for the Tanzanian experience brings sharply into focus the dilemma of the conflicting components of rural development. On one hand the allocation of scarce resources and the development of a unified, coherent nation-building strategy requires a modicum of central control. On the other hand, commitment to the development effort involves genuine local control of the decision-making process.

This monograph, then, explores the difficulties Tanzania has had in reconciling these conflicting forces. It focuses on the two main sets of actors in the rural development process--peasants and officials. It analyzes the structures which influence the actions of each, tracing them from colonial times. The research is based on the author's experiences in Arusha, Iringa and Morogoro Regions as well as on studies by others. We do not want to overgeneralize about either officialdom or the peasantry, but for purposes of analysis we deal with the predominant characteristics of each set of actors. A monograph such as this cannot be definitive, especially since economic, social and political evolution continue in Tanzania. But we need to seek an understanding of what has happened there, if only to remind us how fraught with difficulties is the process of implementing participatory development.

## I. THE COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIVE HERITAGE

Neither the unification of the territory nor the practice of centralized control through outside administrators came first to Tanzania with the Germans. Long before the Germans arrived local conquerors had unified large amounts of territory. The Nyamwezi ntemi, Mirambo (ca. 1840-1884), controlled most of the territory between Tabora and Lake Victoria and Lake Tanganyika and successfully stood off Arab forces (Bennett, 1971). Similarly, the Hehe warrior-hero Mkwawa (died 1898) united the area from Lake Tanganyika and Lake Nyasa eastward to Kilosa and Ifakara under his rule (Listowel, 1965:24). The Chagga chiefs were accustomed to keeping representatives in each others' courts (Kimambo, 1969:225). The interlacustrine tribes such as the Haya, the Zinza, and the Ha had long had a well-nigh feudal organization with a royal family and what amounted to a government service (Richards, 1960:passim). Seyyid Said, ruler of Oman who moved his court to Zanzibar the better to exploit the ivory and slave trade, maintained control over the coastal ports primarily to collect customs duties. Inland control was looser, designed simply to ensure the safety of trading caravans and depended on an alliance with the Nyamwezi (Friedland, 1966:244-245; Austen, 1968:15-16).

This discussion begins with the Germans because they were the first to try to establish direct control over the whole territory. It was the German administration which began the disintegration of indigenous political forms and imposed an organizational form which still has a faint reflection in the current bureaucracy.

The discussion which follows is concerned only marginally with the content of the German and British administrations. It is not that specific

policies and programs were trivial. It is obvious that they were not. But more important for the implementation of policies and programs in present-day Tanzania is the administrative institution which was handed down. Land tenure, economic structure, social service delivery systems are all recognized as matters of policy which can be changed through new policy initiatives. Less frequently is administrative structure viewed as a form of policy which affects the policies and programs under its aegis. It will be argued here that the structures of colonial administrations left their mark on the institutional forms of independent Tanzania and that these institutions in turn have profoundly affected the shape of implemented policy.

In order to examine this hypothesis, the administrations of the Germans and the British will be discussed in terms of the following aspects: the structure of their administration, the style of their administration, and the effect of their administration on indigenous social organization.

#### German Rule

The imposition of German rule was characterized by the treachery of Carl Peters (whose methods of obtaining "treaties" (schutzbrief) from chiefs placing their land under German "protection" were somewhat questionable) and by the spilling of a good deal of blood. Between 1888 and 1906 there were no fewer than eleven instances of armed resistance to the Germans. Three of these (Mkwawa's rebellion in Uhehe, around Iringa, 1894-1898; the Ngoni Rebellion, 1890-1898; and the Unyamwezi resistance, 1889-1894) lasted four years or more (Friedland, 1966:252). This opposition had the effect of forcing the replacement of German East Africa Company rule with military rule. It was not until 1907 that civilian rule was restored.

German administrative personnel were spread thinly over the territory. In 1896 there were 126 German personnel spread among 14 stations, including a major concentration in Dar es Salaam. By 1914 there were reportedly 79 German administrative personnel (Freeman-Grenville, 1963:448; Friedland, 1966:258).<sup>1</sup> This meant that a great deal of responsibility had to be placed on local shoulders.


The German administrative organization is presented in Figure 1. A semi-military commander, the Bezirksamtman, the rough equivalent of a district commissioner, was in charge of each station. Directly under him were the liwalis and akidas. The liwalis were officials in the coastal towns. Their rural counterparts, the akidas, were responsible for maintaining order, collecting taxes, and constructing roads and paths with conscript labor. Akidas supervised jumbes, or headmen, from a number of villages. Jumbes helped organize road construction, introduced new cash crops, regulated forest areas, and organized the control of predatory animals.

The use of hereditary chiefs as headmen turned out to be problematic. Many of the local groups were acephalous; hence there was no one obvious to choose. Although certain chiefs such as those of the Sukuma were openly friendly to the Germans (Liebenow, 1956:445), many more were overtly or covertly hostile--hardly an administrator's dream of a subordinate. Thus the Germans were forced to rely on Muslim-educated Swahilis from the coast to underpin their local government. These akidas were responsible for maintaining law and order, providing labor for public works, and collecting the hut tax (Freeman-Grenville, 1963:448). It was a centralized system in which

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<sup>1</sup>Friedland points out that there are certain problems with the German statistics. Were they to be made consistent with British personnel statistics, he says, the figure would be 551 rather than 79.

FIGURE 1  
GERMAN COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION



orders flowed from the top down and labor and taxes flowed upward. In 1911 an advisory council was established which provided representation for Germans only.

The German administrative style was characterized by a policy of "Schrecklichkeit," or frightfulness (Friedland, 1966:259). Although reforms were instituted in 1907 under the more enlightened Dr. Bernard Dernburg, the first Secretary of the German Colonial Department, the overwhelming impression of the period is one of a free use of coercion. Tanzanian elders who remember the Germans invariably refer to them as "very fierce."

The German style was calculated to wipe out local opposition with a no-nonsense use of force. Chiefs were publicly beaten for failing to obey orders, and the use of forced labor was not uncommon (Stephens, 1968:20). When the Mukama of Kizibe, under the impression that the Germans wanted to indulge in cannibalism, refused to turn over the bodies of plague victims, the German medical officer demanded that the Katikiro be sent to his camp. When the official arrived, he was hanged (Austen, 1968:46). Chief Mukinyamwinga of the Ilunã was hanged for killing the suspected murderer of Chief Chandang'ombe. The latter's successor was imprisoned for stealing tax money, and, in the words of the oral history, "the strokes of the hippopotamus hide whip wore away his buttocks" (Shorter, 1972:333-334). The Ngoni Rebellion was put down brutally. According to an elder who was five when the war began, "The Germans burnt all food stores in Ngoniland and hundreds of Ngoni's were arrested and 15 subchiefs executed following the war" (15 July 1978. Daily News). The Ngoni elders were brought to heel by the simple expedient of luring them into a trap and imprisoning them until they submitted to German authority (Mapunda and Mpangara, 1969:11-12). The German District Officer

in Songea District wanted to bring fighters in the Maji Maji Rebellion to their knees by preventing the people from planting and thus starving them out (Gwasse and Iliffe, 1967:27). The tone of the times was captured by the poet Hemedi bin Abdullah bin Said al-Buhriy (Freeman-Grenville, 1963:438):

Kilwa na Dar es Salaam  
Kuna Wazungu Nakama  
mtu hapati Kusema  
nti Wamezizuiya.

At Kilwa and Dar es Salaam  
There was a plague of Europeans  
There was no free speech:  
They had throttled the country.

The Germans had a single focus--facilitating production through the maintenance of the physical place and the supply of labor. In contrast to the British, the Germans placed great importance on East Africa ("For us, East Africa was the jewel of all our colonial possessions" (Brode, 1977:157). Hence, getting the colony on a productive basis rapidly was of prime importance to them. Any missionaries who thought their schools were for saving souls were quickly disabused of this notion by the Secretary for School and Mission Affairs, Dr. Heinke, who explained unambiguously in 1900, "The interest of the government consists in the first place in the quick training of suitable cheap labor" (Austen, 1968:70).

The Bukoba Resident in 1904, Major Willibald von Stuenkel, considered his task to be the utilization of local authorities:

"to educate their subjects, by compulsion if necessary, for economic undertakings so long as the natives have not attained a cultural development appropriate to the needs of the colonizing power" (Austen, 1968:94)

In 1910 Heinrich Brode, a consular officer, took up the theme of the need for labor, expressing explicitly the racial assumptions of the colonists:

"At the time when Germany and England acquired their East African possessions, the whole economic life was based on slavery and it would have been suicidal if for philanthropic reasons the sudden abolition of that institution had been proclaimed. There would have been no laborers on the plantations, no sailors for the

dhows, and it would have been difficult to get house servants and porters. . .

"The easy life which Nature grants to the aborigines of the Tropics could not develop in them a great instinct for hard working. This is an argument which justifies in some way the institution of slavery and even serious politicians have recommended a system of compulsory labor in the colonies. But apart from the ethical arguments, which controvert this, the carrying out of such a system would be very difficult for political reasons, and so the best way of accustoming the natives to regular work is to increase their economic needs." (Brode, 1970: 85-86)

One way of increasing economic needs was the levying of taxes. The Germans imposed a hut tax which led to "a disinclination to create new huts" (Brode, 1977:86) and a poll tax for those (such as migrant laborers) who were excluded from the hut tax. This had the double advantage of providing a labor force as well as government revenue. (Indeed between 1924 and 1938 hut and poll taxes accounted for 28-40 percent of total government revenue (McCarthy, 1977:585) ).

The effects of German rule were somewhat contradictory. The German style including their search for labor might be characterized as an overly quick hand on the noose and the whip. It was this style in the enforcement of a cotton growing scheme in Kilwa District which provided the immediate provocation sparking off the Maji-Maji Rebellion.<sup>2</sup> In a perverse way this had a positive effect, for the Rebellion created a new intertribal solidarity and was a source of inspiration for later generations. The roots of Tanzanian nationalism lie here. But the system was in more ways destructive. New rules, new obligations, new leaders were imposed without regard for local mores or values. Among the Sukuma, for example, the line of chiefly succession was changed from matrilineal to patrilineal because it was easier to understand (Schanne-Raab, 1974:54). The traditional social fabric was

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<sup>2</sup>For more information see Gwassa and Iliffe, 1967; Henderson, 1965:137-142; and Mapunda and Mpangara 1969.

weakened as chiefs and elders were humiliated or deposed and the unscrupulously ambitious sold out to the new rulers. The search for local leaders distorted the traditional structures. For example, a minor Chagga chief was able to maneuver the Germans into eliminating most of his enemies once he had convinced them that he had authority over most of Kilimanjaro (Samoff, 1974:16). The lack of legitimacy of some appointed chiefs was demonstrated by their overthrow by their subjects following the defeat of the Germans (Austen, 1968:121).

Where local government was perceived as strong enough to be a threat, it was eliminated or reduced to a fragmented form. As a later English officer wrote of Mkwawa's tribe, "The Wahehe having evolved for themselves a chieftainship of undisputed sway, the Germans thought it necessary to obliterate it. The Germans caused the tribe to revert to the clan organization." (Iringa District Book, Microfilm Reel 1/9) Local government was viewed by the center as a tool for the extraction of surplus. The central government was viewed by the people as something at best to be operated around, possibly manipulated; at worst as a source of oppression.

### British Rule

The British arrived after World War I with a brand new League of Nations mandate in their pocket and three hundred years of experience as colonialists. The first governor, Sir Horace Byatt (whom Austen (1968:149) describes as "authoritarian and somewhat inarticulate") did relatively little beyond the important step of increasing the district staff to 120.<sup>3</sup> In 1925 he was replaced by Sir Donald Cameron, fresh from Lugard's schooling in

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<sup>3</sup>Byatt was also important in that he explicitly stated that "the first duty of the Government was to the native" (Brett, 1973:224). For all the trials of colonialism, this commitment, also propounded by Cameron, provided a degree of protection against the demands of white settlers.

indirect rule in Nigeria.


The structure of the British administration proceeded from the German starting point. Indeed, Sir Horace Byatt simply retained the Germans' twenty-two districts (which had been established without regard to tribe) and, due to the shortage of European staff, the akida system. Cameron proceeded to establish eleven provinces, with districts as subunits; to establish indirect rule with a system of native authorities; and to set up a Legislative Council. This system is diagrammed in Figure 2.

The head of this administration was the colonial governor, whose activities were constrained only by instructions from the Colonial Office and the terms of the League of Nations Mandate Agreement. He could, if he so chose, act to the extent of enacting himself a bill blocked by the Council without consulting anyone. A similar situation obtained at the provincial level, where the Provincial Commissioner could act independently of the Provincial Council. Until the post-World War II period, when more technical officers were recruited, the District Commissioner was a jack-of-all trades-- a one-man court, commissioner of works, public health superintendent, agricultural officer, and keeper of the peace and (less successfully) the Victorian morals (Friedland, 1966:261,272; Stephens, 1968:53; Tordoff, 1965:64). In the words of Ralph Furse, "In most colonies the civil servant is the Government, and not the servant of the Government" (Heussler, 1963:164).

Cameron viewed the native authority system established under the Native Authority Ordinance of 1927 as a training ground for local government. What constituted a Native Authority varied according to local conditions. The possibilities included "(1) the paramount chief as the native authority having under him a group of subordinate chiefs; (2) a federation of chiefs,

FIGURE 2

BRITISH COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION



pooled for financial stability, each chief having authority over his own area but sitting as a council for common purposes; (3) a tribal council composed of petty chiefs or headmen, all of the same tribe, where a paramount chief does not exist; (4) a small chief or village headman of an isolated portion of a tribe" (Friedland, 1966:265).

Once constituted, a native authority was responsible for maintaining law and order, collecting the Hut and Poll Tax, and establishing a local treasury to disburse salaries and other expenses. (Colonies were required to be financially self-sufficient. The indigenous population bore the expenses of their colonial overlords, including the costs of their training! (Heussler, 1963:179).) The establishment of native authorities was like a giant game of hide and seek in which none of the players was identified. The British encountered the same problems as the Germans--most tribes were acephalous. Intratribal politics resulted in many candidates with claims of varying degrees of merit. By 1927, 679 chiefs had been gazetted (Friedland, 1966:271). Although the 1930 White Paper on Native Administration solemnly stated that the native authority system "aims at preserving that society intact," Tanganyika's 120 tribes had been split into 435 native authorities (Stephens, 1968:54, 57). Finally, in 1947-48, Lord Hailey did a resurvey which yielded 329 chiefs, 34 councils, and 44 nontraditional authorities (Friedland, 1966:271). Like the Germans, the British on occasion replaced chiefs they found to be unsatisfactory with men of their own choosing regardless of their local legitimacy (Austen, 1968:136-137).

The Legislative Council (Legco) was established in 1926. It had 13 official and 10 nominated unofficial members (two representing the Asian community and one European to represent the African community). In 1945

the unofficial members were increased to 14, including 4 Africans. Legco was expanded again in 1951 to 61 members, 31 official and 30 unofficial. The unofficial were comprised of 10 representatives from each racial group, the British notion of "balanced representation" consisting of the same number of representatives for each group regardless of their proportion in the population. The Executive Council had 2 unofficial representatives from each racial group and 8 official members (Burke, 1965:48-49). The utility of the Legco as a representative institution forcing governmental accountability was to all intents and purposes nonexistent. The official members (British colonial officers) outnumbered the unofficial members, who were, in any event, not representative of the population as a whole. And, finally, the governor, should he so choose, could ignore the Legco altogether. Such were the roots of Tanzanian parliamentary democracy.

In order to understand the style of the British administration, it is useful to understand who the administrators were. In one of his choicer moments, John Bright described the British Empire as a "gigantic system of outdoor relief for the British middle classes" (Heussler, 1963:35). It was the Empire which saved younger sons from having to take up ungentlemanly occupations. And the colonial service was composed of gentlemen. This was largely due to the philosophy and prejudices of the man who directed the recruitment of the service from 1919 to 1948, Major Sir Ralph Furse, K.G.M.B., D.S.O., M.A. Hon., D.C.L., Oxford, a graduate of Eton and Balliol, the scion of a "county" family.

As described by Heussler (1963:passim), Sir Ralph was quite taken with the trusteeship duty and its resemblance (so it seemed to him) to the English squire-tenant relationship. As Margery Perham wrote:

An unusual combination of qualities was needed--courage with adaptability; firmness with sympathy; enterprise with reliability; obedience with authority. In lonely stations far from the restraints of European public opinion and supported by no lavish remuneration, the officer must remain dignified and incorruptible.

He must, in short, be a gentleman--one raised to this sense of honor and responsibility.<sup>4</sup> And Sir Ralph did his best to recruit gentlemen--the sons of the gentry, students of the proper public schools, graduates of Oxford and Cambridge. The result was an elite colonial service sharing a common public school experience that was male-dominated, nonegalitarian, and authoritarian (tempered by a concern for the rights of the ruled). Training for the service was nearly nonexistent until after World War II. Rather, experience was held to be the best teacher. Action was based as much on intuition as on knowledge or policy. Politics was viewed as being an art form consisting of "honesty, devotion to duty, gentlemanly conduct, and a certain amount of respectable industry" (Heussler, 1963:43).

The result was a particularistic and paternalistic tone of administration. District officers were eager to get out and talk with the people. Foot safaris were common and lengthy. The sense of noblesse oblige was prevalent. So was the sense that noblesse knew best.

The system was authoritarian after the mode of the public schools. The relations between the top and the bottom of the bureaucracy were as authoritarian as those between British and Africans. The provincial and district commissioners had the final word on local issues, an authority not to be questioned. The tone is found in Government Circular No. 7 of 1954:

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<sup>4</sup>Tidrich (1978) points out that British officials were attracted to the Maasai because they felt they recognized in them these same gentlemanly qualities. The gentlemanly tenor of the colonial service can be found in Mason's (Woodruff, pseud.) (1953) description of the East India Company. Writing of "one of the worst," he remarks "He was not an Englishman, one is relieved to note" (p. 104). And later, on "some of the best," he concludes, "and he did try to be fair" (p. 118).

Division of authority and action by departmental officers not in conformity with the general policy of the district must be avoided and it is therefore essential that departmental officers should act not only in close consultation with, but also under the general directions of the Provincial or District Commissioners . . . . It is inevitable that there should be differences of opinion but it is essential to good administration that when they occur they should be resolved by consultation or referred to higher authority--to the Governor if need be--for decision, so that action shall not be weakened or confused by ambiguity or controversy. (Dryden, 1968:13-14)

In short, don't argue in public about policy.

Budgetary control was clearly at the top. Budget estimates moved up through the hierarchy from the native authorities via the district and provincial administrations. But it was the Governor and Executive Council who had the final say.

The much touted British sense of fair play had a tendency to disappear in the colonial context. Judith Listowel (1965:109) points out:

Even a European, who observed treatment which would not have been tolerated by the British public had it known about it, got no hearing at Government House. The line was that any criticism of officials was subversive and could not be countenanced.

The authoritarian nature of the bureaucracy was reflected in the relations between colonial officers and the Native Authorities. It was common knowledge that the Native Authorities were mostly a polite fiction. Provincial and district commissioners instructed the Native Authorities what regulations to make and forced their enforcement. Native Authorities rubber stamped. People who questioned could be replaced. As a British observer at the time remarked regarding District Officers, "They were justifiably called 'fathers of the people' and certainly no father could have had more complete mastery over his children" (Listowel, 1965:107). Liebenow (1971:113) comments, "Many of the council sessions had to be devoted to the scolding and educating of the wakulungwa (chiefs) with

respect to why they should be vigorous enforcers of the rules that they themselves had, in theory, adopted!" Schanne-Raab (1974:51) reports that in Sukumaland "the introduction of the Council System in the 1950's did not increase popular participation in the governing process but was used to enforce administrative regulations."

The mastery was not complete. Stephens (1968:60) has pointed out that Tanganyika, with its ratio of one civil servant to 761 people, compared to the British home ratio of 1:210, was a "vastly undergoverned country." And Stephens' figures apparently include both African and British administrators. (In 1938, there were 6,682 Africans on the "civil list.") Data on the ratio of British administrators only to African population, presented in Table 1, indicate that this was a very large ratio indeed.

This was fortunate from the point of view of the local population, for it lessened the amount of effective control. This was particularly important because, despite the insistence on public adherence to the official line, there were wide variations in the particulars although not the style of behavior of different district commissioners.

In his study of colonial rule among the Makonde, Liebenow (1971: 143) describes what the Makonde called wazimu wa mzungu, "White man's madness." This, he said,

seemed to compel each new district commissioner to make his own special imprint upon a district during his brief tenure in the area. The special "madness" of one man might be road construction, while that of his successor might be soil conservation. These in turn would be followed by a district commissioner with a penchant for getting the people to breed hybrid chickens, perhaps, or dig latrines, or dig wells. The arrival of a new European brought a period of uncertainty to a district until the people had ascertained what his particular "madness" was. Once this was discovered all energies could be directed to pleasing his idiosyncrasy and ignoring the pet projects of his predecessors.

Table 1. Colonial Administrator to Population Ratio

Year	African Population (in thousands)	British Administrators .	Ratio
1919/1920 <sup>a</sup>	4,900	109	1:45,458
1929/1930	5,800	177	1:32,768
1939/1940	6,500	179	1:36,312
1949/1950	7,730	260	1:29,730

SOURCE: Heussler (1963: 13) and Stephens (1968: 31).

<sup>a</sup>Population census figures are for 1920, 1930, . . . .  
Administrator figures are for 1919, 1929, . . . .

Liebenow presents a graph of the enforcement of Native Authority Rules and Orders. The infraction pattern presents a wild array of peaks and troughs which bear no relation to droughts, epidemics, or human behavior. Rather, they shift with the changing of officials.

This seemingly whimsical approach to policy reflected the British arrogance--the notion that they knew best and ought not to be questioned--that they had every right to meddle in local affairs. The arrogance and the sense of responsibility combined to produce conflicting kinds of behavior. One district commissioner forced people to stand whenever he walked by. Governor Cameron's aide on an inspection tour in 1929 found that villages were expected to feed officials on safari and noted the resulting "very strong disinclination of natives to live on roads where there is porter travel." (Cameron immediately issued a strong warning that produce must be paid for.) (Liebenow, 1971:145) Officers did not associate on a social basis outside of their own racial group, even in extremely isolated posts (Hopkins, 1966:92).

The obverse side of this paternalism and arrogance was officers who made frequent lengthy foot safaris around their district. These were the men who filled painstakingly page after page with genealogies, tribal lore and customs, geological information, agricultural schemes, detailed descriptions (complete with Latin names) of birds, butterflies, trees, grasses, flowers, fish and game, and so on.

In the end it was the arrogance which led to the enforcement of good intentions--coercion was seen as the most effective way of getting things done. Rather than use a participatory educational approach (and even had this been consistent with colonialism, which it was not, there was certainly

neither sufficient staff nor sufficient time for this approach), the Government had the Native Authorities pass by-laws requiring good soil conservation practices, the planting of famine crops, pest eradication, etc. Disregarding these by-laws could land one in jail or result in a fine of varying severity. In 1952 enforcement of a bench terracing regulation in the Uluguru Mountains led to violent protest culminating in one death (see Young and Fosbrooke, 1960). The British did not consider their production and conservation methods to be open to discussion. These by-laws which angered many peasants provided TANU with one of its strongest organizing vehicles in the pre-Independence period.

What the Germans began with their heavy-handed attempt to bring the area to heel, the British finished off with their authoritarian sense of duty.<sup>5</sup> The policy of indirect rule required that someone at the local level take up the reins of power (such power as the British were prepared to permit). Both the identification of that person and his/her exercising of that power resulted in distortions of the local system. First was the problem of selecting the chief. The acephalous nature of many groups led to appointments by the British which favored one faction over another or resulted in the appointment of persons who in the words of one provincial commissioner were "entirely unfitted for the posts they were expected to fill." Such "unsuitables" included old men, imbeciles, lepers, and women (Liebenow, 1971:117) One Sukuma chief told an interviewer, "I was elected by the banang'oma (a sort of council of state composed of male relatives eligible for succession), but

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<sup>5</sup> It is interesting to hear comparisons of the British and Germans. Two examples: "The Germans beat us, but they paid more than the British for the agricultural products we sold them" (Listowel, 1965:73). "Look at that boma. The Germans built it years ago, and it is still standing. The new bridge the British put over that river is the third one in five years." (Liebenow, 1971:84)

the people wanted my elder brother. So the district commissioner came and arrested some of the citizens and they came to normal." (Friedland, 1966: 267) Such procedures could not help but degrade the status of the post.

The British system also selected only a small part of the indigenous system and supported it out of context. Prior to British rule it was possible to curb the behavior of an autocratic leader. One could simply move elsewhere (Liebenow, 1971:59, 1956:451). The British control of population movements reduced or eliminated this method of leaving such leaders followerless.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, the British emasculated the traditional system of checks and balances. For example, Liebenow (1956:449-450) reports that the Sukuma had a number of organizations (dance societies, age groups, male relatives eligible for succession) which exercised control over the chief and could demand his abdication. No one but the British had legal control over the new chiefs.<sup>7</sup> Sometimes this led to very autocratic behavior. A 1929 report on Makonde and Mera tribal administration described the chiefs as "extorting money, suppressing open discussion in council meetings, exempting their kinsmen and friends from communal labor, and rendering decisions which were regarded as unjust." The report continues, "They . . . sit in their houses like great obese spiders in the centre of a web . . . . I have been informed . . . that no person was allowed to bring a complaint to the Boma under threats of severest penalties." (Liebenow, 1971:115) Such behavior, coupled with the British tendency to use the Native Authorities to enforce unpopular authority, tended to discredit the integrity of the local government system.

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<sup>6</sup>The degree of British control varied from place to place and time to time. Fleuret (1979) points out there was a massive movement of the Pare under the British and that one group of Maasai avoided paying hut and poll taxes by circulating between Handeni, Mbulu and Serengeti.

<sup>7</sup>In Bukoba one of the functions of the Native Treasury was to bring the chiefs

The colonial legacy, then, was the imposition of a centralized, hierarchical administrative structure designed to keep the physical peace and extract surplus. Local governing structures were either created or converted to support this process. The effect was to distort local government and participation. Certainly much of traditional life took place in the context of acephalous structures. And withdrawal rather than the development of constitutional forms was as often as not the solution for problems of autocracy and exploitation. But the forms imposed by the colonialists neither allowed the old forms of participation to work in the context of the new leaders nor allowed development of new forms. The colonial structures, even in the midst of trying to mobilize peasant resources for their development, served to maintain a demobilized peasantry and to teach the lesson that government was a tool of the center, not the people.

## II. THE BUREAUCRACY

In order to understand the actions of Tanzanian civil servants it is necessary to understand the structure of the bureaucracy. Regardless of the good will and personal inclinations of bureaucrats as individuals, it is the structure of the bureaucracy which ultimately constrains and compels behavior. The Tanzanian bureaucracy is hardly unique in this regard. The tendencies described here are typical of probably most bureaucracies. The purpose of looking at them in detail here is to make the resulting dynamics and outcomes of the development effort more explicable.


### Post-Colonial Structures

During the immediate post-independence period the colonial government underwent some change. The obvious starting place was the Africanization of posts, although many Europeans stayed on for a time. Structural change (see Figure 3) took place with the insertion of party officials into the bureaucracy in order to increase the representational quality of the government and to impart some accountability. Since TANU had swept the territorial elections of 1959 and 1960, there was no question as to which party should fill these political posts. (In 1963 it was made the only legal party, ending the question once and for all.)

The creation of political posts caused a certain amount of tension with the civil service. Until 1964 the colonial rule that no government employee could belong to a political party was maintained. Since government employees were typically the better educated Tanzanians, they tended to look askance at the less experienced, sometimes less competent Party people being

FIGURE :

ADMINISTRATION POST-INDEPENDENCE



From: Mascarenhas, 1976:15

foisted upon them. Once government officials were allowed to join the party, party and government officials circulated interchangeably. The phrase "party and government" for all intents and purposes could no longer be separated into its constituent parts.


The insertion of party officials into the structure did not affect the locus of decision making. Major decisions continued to be made at the top. Accountability was particularly hard to maintain, as technical decisions were made in the ministries, which operated through a structure parallel to that of the government. This meant that coordination was difficult and that the peasantry had no channel of communication to the ministries.

In 1972 the bureaucracy was reorganized under a policy of decentralization. Decentralization was considered possible at this time because increased numbers of trained, experienced staff were available to fill new posts. Certain local government structures (city and district councils) were abolished, and increased numbers of officials of the central government were sent out to the regions and the districts. This, it was said, would increase flexibility and responsiveness in decision making. Instead of government personnel being concentrated in Dar es Salaam talking to each other, it was argued, they would go to the people, where they could be responsive to local ideas and local conditions. Ironically, this policy which was to provide "more democracy, more efficiency" was never publicly discussed (even within Government). The actual organizational changes were designed with little or no consultation, by a team from an American management consulting firm (Finucane, 1974:175, 187; Hill, n.d.:6).

As can be seen in Figure 4, not only did decentralization increase the numbers of government personnel in the districts, but it changed their

FIGURE 4

TANZANIA GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AFTER DECENTRALIZATION



locus of control. Technical personnel were brought under the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). This meant functional managers (Regional and District Agricultural Development Officers, for example) continued to receive technical direction from their ministry but now were under the administrative control of the PMO. Since budgetary control--and hence the ability to hire, fire, pay, promote, and transfer--was located at the center, technical personnel became accountable to the center. The Regional Development Director (RDD) or Regional Commissioner (RC) or their district counterparts could utilize technical personnel as they saw fit. An RDD could transfer a livestock officer from one project to another or order a Bwana Shamba to move people.<sup>8</sup> Further, interconnection of the party and the government meant that government employees might be expected to carry out party duties.

#### The Bureaucratic Mode of Operation

One very important characteristic of the Tanzanian bureaucracy is the ideology of consensus under which it operates. Government Circular No. 7 of 1954 (see p. 16) was adopted by the new Tanzanian government. as Staff Circular No. 14 of 1962 (Dryden, 1968:13-14). The ideology of consensus, consistent with the philosophy of one-party democracy, requires that once a policy has been decided upon it must not be debated publicly.<sup>9</sup> This

<sup>8</sup> This has been a source of tension within the government. In an October 1978 meeting, Ministry of Agriculture officials complained bitterly that RDD's were unilaterally reallocating RADO's vehicles to other departments. Further they said, official communications from RADO's went to the PMO instead of to the Ministry. Daily News 30 October, 1978.

<sup>9</sup> While it is clear that national policy is not made by the National Assembly (see Barkan, 1974), it is not so clear by what process it is made. Legally the Party is supreme. Policy statements made by the President (who is also Chairman of the Party) are taken very seriously. The National Executive Committee of the Party issues a number of major policy statements. Some policies--the 1973 Decency Code and Operation Maduka, for example--are simply announced by high government officials. Depending on the official in question there is often some ambiguity about whether these pronouncements are national

insistence on conformity can be rather rigidly enforced. During Operation Vijiji, technical officials who argued for a slower pace in order to allow for technical planning (availability of water, soil quality) sometimes found themselves transferred to the remote districts which serve as the burying grounds for incompetent or recalcitrant officials.

The bureaucracy operates with a constant shortage of qualified personnel. Whenever possible, degree holders are assigned to fill slots, but the number of degree holders is limited. Vacancy rates have been estimated to run to 30 percent and above. Personnel who are in place lack adequate support. Clerical staff are often less than satisfactory, and available transport is limited. The lack of transport aggravates the problem that most staff do not know much about the place where they are stationed. As a matter of general policy, officials are rarely stationed in their home area. Officials are also often transferred frequently. (One district had three DDD's in the space of one year. While that was an extreme case, it is rare to find an official who has been in one place for as long as five years.) This prevents the creation of a power base in opposition to the government. It also prevents officials from knowing their district intimately or from feeling accountable to its inhabitants--they will be leaving soon anyway. The bureaucracy in a real sense has no constituency except itself. It is an elite--Shivji (1976:passim) describes it as the bureaucratic bourgeoisie--a class in its own right. Bureaucrats have had at least a secondary education, which means they have lived out of the village environment in boarding schools for a minimum of six years. Their distance from the village milieu is increased by their use of

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policy or not. Operation Maduka was a classic example of policy only partially enforced as regional and district officials tried to decide what the policy actually was. A reasonable rule of thumb is that most national policy is made by an elite group of party and government officials primarily responsive to the President whose formal positions are essentially irrelevant by a process not subject to public discussion or accountability.

Swahili rather than the local language (see Slater, 1976;48, 114-116). Speaking a different language, living in the houses of their colonial predecessors, having no local kin ties, they are almost inevitably a class apart.

Many bureaucrats are very dedicated, competent people, committed to bringing about rural development. Some are committed socialists. But the structure within which they operate impels them into courses of action which in the long run may be the antithesis of rural development.

#### The Effects of the Bureaucratic Mode

The bureaucracy is instrumentally rather than politically inclined, since its very existence depends on its ability to extract surplus from the peasantry. It is also in the position of not being accountable to the peasantry. Although, as will be discussed below, villagers do have ways of making their opinions felt, there is no effective formal way of doing this. There is no requirement for any government official (except the powerless members of parliament) to submit herself/himself to electoral review. (Party control of the nominating procedure may preclude even electoral review from being meaningful. Dissidents are simply not allowed to run. (See Liebenow, 1971: 313-314).) Although the philosophy of the government emphasizes participation and process, the bureaucracy must, of necessity, emphasize production. Bureaucrats must raise the money with which to pay the bills. The abolition of direct taxes on the peasantry has not meant that the government has ceased to view peasants as a source of revenue. To the contrary, they are as important as they ever were. The rather sizeable difference between the producer and world market price of export crops shown in

Table 2 accrues to the state and helps to pay for development programs, imports, and the salaries of bureaucrats. Similarly, by giving the government-owned fertilizer plant (which produces fertilizer at twice the world price) a monopoly on fertilizer sales, the government has managed to shift part of the burden of subsidizing the plant onto the shoulders of peasant-users of fertilizer (see Coulson, 1977).

Table 2

Producer Prices and Their Percentage of  
Export Price Levels<sup>9</sup>

	1972 <sup>b</sup>	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
<u>Export Crops</u>							
Coffee (Grade 1)	395 (56.4)	320 (38.9)	---	600 (67.5)	1200 (54.2)	1400 (30.8)	---
Cotton (seed):AR	113 (21.7)	113 (20.4)	150 (15.6)	200 (25.6)	200 (18.0)	230 (19.1)	240 (20.5)
Sisal <sup>c</sup>	102 (107.8)	195 (99.8)	319 (64.3)	302 (101.5)	262 (92.3)	387 (137.7)	---
Cashew nuts (standard grade)	95 (71.4)	95 (73.9)	105 (60.9)	105 (57.8)	110 (55.7)	115 (51.3)	130 (36.1)
Tobacco (flue-cured)	585 (66.2)	585 (64.2)	585 (58.6)	700 (53.3)	740 (43.6)	740 (46.2)	740 (41.7)
Tea (green leaf)	50 (8.5)	55 (9.6)	55 (7.8)	65 (8.3)	70 (6.2)	110 (5.8)	150 (6.2)
Pyrethrum (Grade 1)	321 (2.4)	421 (3.5)	421 (3.1)	650 (4.6)	650 (3.8)	650 ---	650 ---

Source: IMF, 1978

- a. Prices in Tanzanian cents per kilogram (percent of export unit values in parentheses)
- b. Crop years
- c. Sisal is primarily grown on government-owned and managed estates

Even if officials recognize participation as the most effective means of raising production in the long run, they cannot operate in the long run. There is an imperative in the Tanzanian bureaucracy best captured by President Nyerere's statement "We must run while others walk" (see Hyden, 1975). The bureaucratic mode demands visible results. The Tanzanian bureaucratic mode demands quick visible results. The slow, uncertain process of participation is incompatible with this. Units of participation cannot be cited in an annual report or viewed from the speeding land rovers of a government cavalcade. Nor does participation, in the short run, provide foreign exchange with which to pay bills. Participation in a system which emphasizes immediate instrumentality is of little apparent use. The Tanzanian bureaucrat, like his colonial predecessor, is in the position of having to leave his mark visibly, now. This leads to a number of tendencies--government by operation, showcase development, and the attempt to control.

#### Government by Operation

One result of the "we must run while others walk" style of decision making (which is in itself an indication of genuine commitment to rural development and an acknowledgement of the great distance to that development) is the preoccupation with "operations"--large-scale approaches to problem-solving, usually based more on an appeal to mass enthusiasm and ideological commitment than on technical considerations. A problem or need is identified--low crop production, the failure of cooperative shops, a cholera epidemic. A general solution is devised, often without a detailed plan for its implementation. The solution is announced as policy (national, regional, or whatever) to be put into effect immediately, often with a target date for its completion. A great deal of publicity and frenetic activity ensues.

Operations have the advantage of focusing attention and energies on a problem. For example, during Traffic Safety Week every car was required to be inspected. While this caused long lines and confusion, it did deal in a one-shot way with a problem for which an institutional capacity had not been developed. On the other hand, operations divert resources and attention away from other issues. They create the impression that this one effort will solve the problem. And they have a tendency to be long on unanticipated consequences.

The focus and scope of operations has been varied. Following the 1978 crop season, district level operations--"Operation Save the Cotton" and "Operation Save the Crops"--have been focused on trying to save crops rotting in godowns for lack of transport (Daily News 2 October 1978; Daily News 6 November, 1978). At an earlier time, "Operation Kila Mtu Kazi (Work for Every Person)," under various names in various places, was concerned with the problem of the urban unemployed, which was solved by rounding up urban loiterers and taking them to villages (from which they often returned on the next bus, often to the relief of the villagers upon whom they had been foisted). In 1976 "Operation Maduka" was intended to close down all private village shops in order to support cooperative shops but was not universally implemented.

In 1974 a food shortage developed, partly due to drought in some areas of the country, partly due to the disruptions caused by Operation Vijiji. The obvious solution was that everyone should grow more food. In order to bring this about, "Operation Kilimo cha Kufa na Kuona (Agriculture as a Matter of Life and Death)" was instituted. Flower beds in front of public buildings were uprooted and planted with maize and cassava. Individuals were required to cultivate minimum acreages of food and cash crops. (The infamous

colonial by-laws were reactivated to insure that proper practices were adhered to (Daily News, 13 August, 1974, cited in Taber, 1975:94). Free inputs (primarily maize seed, fertilizer, insecticide, and herbicide) were provided to villages for use on communal and individual farms.

As a response to a crisis, the policy was not unreasonable. However, its implementation in some areas took distorted forms. Because the President had mentioned maize in his speech about the Operation, some officials decided it was maize the President wanted and forced peasants to plant maize even when cassava or bullrush millet would have been more appropriate. Not unpredictably, such crops tended to succumb to moisture stress (Mdidi, 1977:84). Such are the fruit of a rigid bureaucracy. The diversion of resources to to provide inputs everywhere had the effect of getting them to places which otherwise had no source of supply. In some cases this was very helpful. In other cases, because the policy was implemented in a blanket fashion, it succeeded in creating stockpiles of unwanted inputs. (Reportedly, in Kigoma fertilizer was used for whitewashing walls.) It also created the expectation that henceforth all inputs would be provided free, an expectation which caused difficulties for the subsequent National Maize Project.

Operation Vijiji was the implementation of President Nyerere's declaration, "To live in villages is an order." The problem which had been identified was that the traditional pattern of living in scattered homesteads was not conducive to what were conceived to be necessary strategies of development--central delivery of social services and mechanized agriculture. After ten years of encouraging voluntary villagization without much success, the government decided to take things more firmly in hand. During 1973 and 1974, eleven million people were moved into nucleated settlements. (The

distances involved varied from a few hundred feet to several miles.) The use of coercion, an indication of the seriousness with which the government viewed this policy, varied from place to place but was not uncommon. Mwapachu (1976:6-7) describes the flight of peasants from one district to another based on the belief that the process must be some temporary local aberration. The refugees soon found that equal force was being used in neighboring districts. The rapid shift in the tenor of the times is captured in these quotations from the government-owned and -edited Daily News:

A lot of people are living there with all the necessary amenities like schools, dispensaries, and others provided. What remains is the allocation of building plots and to encourage other people (to) join villages. (9 August 1974)

It is quite possible to move a whole district into planned villages all at once and at minimum expense. (9 August 1974)

Those who think they can avoid living in such villages are deluding themselves. Those who try to resist going into such villages are also fighting a lost cause. Every Tanzanian peasant will have to move and live in such villages. Anyone who refuses will be taken there by force. On this there will be no half measures. (23 August 1974, cited in Tabari, 1975)

Operation Vijiji was the epitome of all an operation could be. It clearly was successful in moving an enormous number of people in a hurry. But there were costs inherent in the hurry which precluded any planning. In some places villagers were moved to the middle of nowhere with no housing, faced with barren soil and no water. In some cases people were moved away from existing clinics and schools. Areas with soil erosion found the problem aggravated by rapid population increases. In one area a previously nonexistent landlord class emerged when people with fields close to the village subdivided them and began rent to people whose fields were impossibly far away.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup>The Daily News 12 May 1978 described an apparently formerly prosperous village which after the addition of population from Operation Vijiji suffered overcrowding, water problems and insufficient land with some families walking 5 to 6 kilometers to reach their farms.

And the use of technical personnel such as extension agents in carrying out the move destroyed their effectiveness as teachers of new methods to people.

Operation Vijiji has generated a number of myths on both sides. The government maintains that the peasantry joyfully moved into villages and that only in a few cases did misguided officials use the force promised in the Daily News. The villages, on the other hand, are full of stories the symbolic content of which is clear. We hear of Shamans who stymied the officials forcing the move, causing truck tires to go flat and batteries to go dead, and the death and subsequent desecration of the graves of officials who forced people to move. There have been stories circulated of families eaten by lions, children dying of pneumonia, and the murder of officials who caused this. Only a few of these deaths could be verified. But that the burning and bulldozing of houses, the destruction of food stores, and the loss of unharvested crops took place in a significant number of cases is beyond question.<sup>11</sup> The level of feeling generated by these events easily led to the exaggeration of those deaths that did occur. People were angry. They felt they were treated roughly and apparently capriciously. In the areas of greatest violence, the bitterness still remains; and the bitterness has been aggravated by the inability of the government to deliver the social services it promised.

A second generation of post-Vijiji problems have to do with land allocation. Village registration has been plagued with squabbles over village boundaries. Some of the more extreme errors in siting have led to a second round of resettlement, leaving everyone's nerves frayed.

In discussing the negative effects of government by operation, it is important to remember that operations are not undertaken capriciously.

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<sup>11</sup> See Grimond, 1978:8, Kjekshus, 1977. As late as December, 1978 officials were threatening those who had not moved into resettlement "by force." Daily News 30 December, 1978.

They are instituted with the best of intentions to expedite the process of socialist transformation. There is little doubt that under pressure of the need for immediate visible results, their originators thought that operations would provide a focus for mobilizing peasants to do what they could not or would not do on their own. The apparent logic is that once peasants are placed in the position of doing the correct thing, they will see its virtue and continue doing it voluntarily. But development is more complicated than that. One problem with operations is that they do not allow questions to rise from the bottom. There are no referenda on "operations." Villages do not have the option of saying "no" or "later." Rather, operations tend to be announced by a major political figure in a speech which is taken by bureaucrats as a signal to move quickly. The ensuing trample over villagers' scope of decision making cannot help but convince villagers that present village government is as pro forma as its predecessors.

#### Showcase Development

Bureaucratic ties to the center often lead to an emphasis on projects that look good, regardless of their content or their place in an integrated development strategy. Showcase development is a tactic initiated by the bureaucracy (most often district officials, since they bear the brunt of implementation responsibility) as tangible evidence of the effectiveness of local development efforts. The important thing is to have something to show.

Some of these efforts are short-term. The progress of higher officials, particularly national officials, around the country can be traced by the trail of newly graded roads, newly painted buildings, functioning water systems,

and projects hurriedly completed. Ingle (1972:253-254) describes a classic case: "In Handeni in 1969 it is reliably reported that a local party official literally created an ujamaa village from nothing, solely for a pending visit by President Nyerere after which it was to, and did, disappear."

A more costly practice is to create a showpiece by massive infusions of resources. Accounts of early ujamaa are filled with the receipt of government gifts--tractors, seeds, fertilizers, godowns (see Wisner et al., 1975; Bugengo, 1973; DeVries and Fortmann, 1974). Such showpieces are rarely developed in consultation with the residents. Rather, they are simply told a project is being put there, and no peasant is stupid enough to look a gift tractor in the mouth.

Squelching participation is the least of the costs of such a practice. It can result in wildly distorted allocations of resources. In 1970 Finucane (1974:68) found that in one district 40 percent of the field staff worked exclusively on four operating and seven planned ujamaa villages. The total potential population of the eleven villages (2,800 in the planned villages and 155 in the existing villages) was just over one percent of the district total of 260,000. Chamwino Village, a model village near the proposed new capital, Dodoma, was made into a showcase including electrification at a cost (estimated by a Tanzanian accountant) of \$7 million (Hill, 1975:244).

Showcase development also causes a false demonstration effect. (Presumably this is not true for the visiting officials, who are unlikely to be so naive as to assume that such places are anything other than a demonstration of the local official's ability to mobilize resources to put on a good show.) Vail (1975:30) estimated that it would cost between 25 and 30 million dollars to provide each of the villages existing in 1972 with one

tractor and related equipment. This figure constituted 28-33 percent of the Ministry of Agriculture's budget for the period of the Second Five-Year plan. Providing all 7000 villages in Tanzania with the inputs provided the showcase villages is clearly a financial impossibility. Nonetheless, the expectation is aroused, and certain village activities are overtly directed toward attracting government largesse.

Showcase development can also result in an incoherent accumulation of projects and capital goods not unlike the pet projects of officers in the colonial period. These days the whims of donor countries also leave their mark. If a government official is excited about irrigation or the people of a donor country are sold on solar energy, then irrigation and solar energy it is.

#### The Attempt to Control

The peasant producer always has the at least short-term option of pulling her/his production back to the subsistence level. Nothing makes the bureaucrat so nervous as the prospect of this cessation of supply. As noted above, a reliable supply of food crops is necessary if urban workers are to be kept productive and dissuaded from any mischievous notions of bringing down the government. A reliable supply of cash crops is necessary if there is to be sufficient foreign exchange to finance development, not to mention the salaries of the bureaucracy. It is clearly in the bureaucracy's interest to keep the peasant producing and to keep sales moving through government-controlled channels. (High production moving through black-market channels does not benefit bureaucrats in their official status in the least.) Similarly, it is in the bureaucrat's interest to maintain a cooperative

peasantry in order that showcase development efforts may succeed. Two basic tactics tend to be used--closing out options or opening up options--that is, coercion and largesse.

The clever bureaucrat will maneuver peasants into a situation in which they have no options. The colonialists forced Africans into accepting positions as wage laborers or growing cash crops by the simple expedient of slapping a hut tax or poll tax on them. Taxes on peasants were abolished in 1969, as the rate of payment (only 20 percent of registered taxpayers paid taxes in 1968 (Ingle, 1972:217) was abominable. However, other means of encouraging "necessities" forces the peasant into production. The development of state-owned farms employing wage labor shifts control ever further out of the hands of the peasantry. The wage laborer has no choice but to produce.

Inducing production through opening options is far more difficult. An official can promise a dispenser if a dispensary is built, but that decision may be rescinded in the capital. Or an agricultural project may be started only to have part of the support system--the buyer, the supplier of inputs, any weak link--fail.

In the end, the bureaucrat will probably use the same means his colonial predecessor did--coercion--for very similar reasons.<sup>12</sup> Finucane has written: "From the innumerable actions of officials whom I observed it could be concluded that the approach of the bureaucracy was in no way different from that of the colonial officials in the 1950's." (1974:62). Coercion is used by officials because in the short run it produces the outward signs of compliance and success which are essential for advancement. Coercion doesn't

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<sup>12</sup> A somewhat more sanguine view of the past and the present is offered by a former colonial officer, visiting his old district: "Mr. Mosha. . . was actively pursuing basically the same policies as his colonial predecessor, and using the same means of persuasion, resorting to compulsion only as a last resort." (Brokensha, 1971:164)

take time, and "no" is never an option. Bureaucrats with no local ties and no prospect of a long stay in the area can afford the alienation coercion may cause. It is their successor who will have to deal with it. Coercion is used because the bureaucrat assumes the peasant's reluctance to do something is based on ignorance, superstition, laziness, or stupidity. "You can't reason with these people," is the bureaucrat's eternal cry. Thus in December 1978 the Mtwara Regional Party Secretary announced "that peasants who would not take part in the agricultural campaign would be dealt with accordingly" (Daily News, 16 December 1978).

It has been shown thus far that the post-Independence bureaucracy is in many ways similar in structure and style to its colonial precursors. It responds to the same imperatives--getting production up, getting visible results. Like their predecessors, post-Independence bureaucrats tend to view local government in instrumental terms--something to be used by them, in their own way, at their convenience--rather than as an institution with integrity of its own. And because the bureaucracy is an elite, albeit an indigenous elite, its distance from the peasantry is perhaps not unlike that of the British from the local people. But none of this is to point fingers at offenders. It is simply a fact that people placed in a similar structure with a similar task to perform are likely to behave in similar ways. The behavior of Tanzanian bureaucrats is unremarkably predictable.

### III. POST-INDEPENDENCE VILLAGE ORGANIZATION

As can be seen in Figure 4, party and government institutions are structurally distinct at the village level. The party organization culminates in the ten-house cell; the government, in the village assembly and village council. There is, of course, overlap. Party leaders and members of the formal village government may be synonymous. In the case of the village and party chairman and secretary, they are required to be so. It is nonetheless useful to discuss them separately, as the roles in each have evolved in somewhat different directions. A third important village organizational form is that of informal groups generally focused on mobilizing labor. Thus there are both continuous and intermittent work groups which do day-to-day agricultural work or more labor-intensive tasks--harvesting, house building, burial, and so on. As these organizations are particularly relevant to self-help, they are discussed in Chapter V.

#### The Party Organization

##### The Structure

At the village level the party is present in the form of ten-house cells (or, more commonly, kumi kumi, ten cells). Ten cells are units of roughly ten houses with an unpaid elected leader. Ten-cell leaders are the only popularly, directly elected leaders in the country. That is, they are elected by the members of the ten cell without prior screening by a higher party organ.

In August 1963 the National Executive Committee of TANU passed a resolution that "in order to strengthen the leadership of TANU in running the affairs of our republic, TANU cells should be established as an addendum to

the existing party machinery" (O'Barr, 1970:67). Ten cells first began in Dar es Salaam in 1964, partly in response to hooliganism and general security problems but also as part of a more general attempt on the part of TANU to penetrate the countryside (Omari, 1973:2). An early party pamphlet, Mashina ya TANU, cited in O'Barr (1972:440), lists the duties of a cell leader as follows:

- to explain to the people the policies of TANU and government
- to articulate people's views and opinions and communicate them to TANU and government
- they shall be responsible for collection of party dues
- to persuade people who are not members to become members of TANU
- to play their role in safeguarding the peace and security of this country by seeing to it that laws and regulations are obeyed
- to urge people to pay their taxes properly
- to foster strong cooperation amongst the members in the party cell
- to take overall charge of the affairs of the party in that cell
- the cell leader is the delegate of the cell to the Branch Annual Conference
- the cell leader is a member of the Village Development Committee

The duties reflect both the unity of government and party at the village level (the cell leader participates in village government and is involved in the effort to enforce the law, including the payment of taxes) and the general top-down nature of the party (only two of these ten duties are at all related to upwards communication). The formal structure of the ten cell has tended to be rather loose. How frequently elections for cell leaders should be held is unclear. There is a vague notion that meetings should be held, but the format and frequency remain undefined.<sup>13</sup> The result is that the role has tended to be defined by the incumbents of the positions.

#### Characteristics of Ten-Cell Leaders

Although there is variation, ten-cell leaders tend to be of a general type not dissimilar from that of traditional leaders. They are, first and

<sup>13</sup> In May 1978 the Party Chief Executive Secretary instructed "branch and district party offices to help the cells identify issues for discussion during the monthly meeting." Daily News 19 May 1978. How successful this was has yet to be announced.

and foremost, male. Data from places as diverse as Rungwe (Kabuka, 1976:49-50; Van Hekken and Thoden van Velsen, 1972:108-113), Iramba (Kokwebangira, 1971:46), Usambara (Mshangama, 1971:25), Iringa (Kawago, 1971:58; DeVries and Fortmann, 1974), Moshi (Mosha, 1976:7, 9), Kigombe (Landberg, 1977:480) and Monduli Juu (Omari, 1973:3, 5) confirm this. A major exception to this pattern reported by O'Barr (1972, 1975/76) occurred in Usangi, Pare. There one-fourth of the cell leaders were women. Women in this area have a history of political involvement stemming from their active role in tax resistance in the 1940's. Men in Usangi tend to seek employment elsewhere, leaving a disproportionate number of women in the area. Although the relative absence of men in other places (Njombe, for example) has not led to women's assuming political roles, in Usangi the tradition of women's political activism has had exactly this effect.

The age and wealth of ten-cell leaders varies according to the local perception of the role. In some cases the position is seen as an extension of traditional leadership roles in which even older, wealthier men, often clan heads or traditional leaders, tend to be chosen. The wisdom of experience tends to be seen as more important than formal schooling. Studies in Rungwe (Van Hekken and Thoden van Velsen, 1972:108-113), Ulanga (Njohole, 1971:9), Iramba (Kokwebangira, 1971:46), Bukoba (Bakula, 1971:78; Muzo, 1976:7, 9; Kokwebangira, 1971:46), Mbulumbulu (Uorro, 1971:53), and Moshi (Mosha, 1976:22) all found wealth and age to be criteria of selection. In some places the position of ten-cell leader is seen as a modernizing role. In these cases there is a tendency to choose better educated, energetic people--generally youth. Mshangama (1971:25) reports a village in which all cell leaders were under thirty. (One is considered an elder at about the age of 40 although

similar tendencies in Iringa, as did Omari (1973:9) in Monduli Juu. Ingle (1972b:175-176) found a mix of elders and "forward looking" men as leaders. Landberg (1977:480) found in Kigombe, that middle aged literate males of coastal origin tended to be chosen. However younger men who were literate in Roman as opposed to Arabic script were sometimes elected because they were "useful in representing the village to the government."

The unpaid nature of the ten-cell position complicates the selection process. One rationale for selecting wealthy people is that they can afford to spend the time required for ten-cell duties. However, since the nonmonetary rewards for being a ten-cell leader are also relatively low, there is little incentive to assume the post. Thus, in some cases the position of ten-cell leader may go to lower status (poorer, younger) people.

As a party leader a cell leader is required to have a paid-up party membership card. It is not clear, however, how many of them actually do. O'Barr's study (1970:91) showed 28 percent in one village and 100 percent in a second. Certainly party membership among the cell members varies widely. O'Barr (1970:84) found that 81.5 percent of the cell members in the Pare sample had paid dues within one year of the interview. Omari (1973:6) found among the Maasai that not all cell members were TANU members and remarked that asserted membership probably exceeded actual membership. McHenry (1979:61) points out that membership estimates, which vary between 10 and 25 percent of the population, tend to be exaggerated. With the apparent conversion of CCM into a vanguard party, membership may well drop.

#### Roles of Ten-Cell Leaders

The functioning of the ten cell has varied over time and from place to place. Some of the duties have been eliminated by virtue of changes in the

law. In 1969 the government abolished taxes on peasants. This was a relief to ten-cell leaders, who had found that helping to collect taxes poisoned their relations with villagers. In 1975 the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act replaced the Village Development Committee with the popularly elected Village Council (Halmashauri), on which ten-cell leaders are not guaranteed a seat. In many places the de facto function of the ten-cell leader has been reduced to that of arbiter (a traditional role of elders), the ten-cell having become the official tribunal of first resort in civil cases.

The most in-depth study of cell leaders was done by O'Barr (1972) in two villages, Usangi and Mbagaga, in Pare District. She found that settlement of disputes comprised 79 percent of requests to cell leaders in Usangi Village and 31 percent in Mbagaga Village. Witchcraft accusations, being "unmodern," were considered inappropriate for cell leaders to arbitrate. However, some people did judge such cases, but not in their capacity as cell leaders. Questions about taxes (i.e., how to avoid them) made up a substantial part of the requests (47%) in Mbagaga but considerably fewer (13%) in Usangi. Cell leaders had a more politically active role in Usangi, where 54 percent of their contacts with cell members were political (collecting TANU dues, accompanying census takers, announcing a meeting, asking a member to do something), in contrast to Mbagaga, where 82 percent of cell leaders' activities were social or neighborly. Cell leaders were most effective at solving problems within the cell. They were not particularly effective as brokers to the outside.

Cell leaders also have a mobilizing function. They may turn out appropriately enthusiastic crowds for rallies or self-help projects. A study of cell leaders in Mbulu showed that they tend to conceive of their role in terms of transmitting instructions from Dar es Salaam, working on self-help projects,

attending meetings, and settling disputes (Quorro, 1971:54).

As a political figure, commanded by government, elected by neighbors, but paid by no one,<sup>14</sup> the ten-cell leader is in an awkward position. Siasa (politics) has, as O'Barr (1970:110n) notes, come to have a definite meaning since Independence: "promising things which never materialize on the part of the leaders, appearing to agree to decisions but never working for their implementation on the part of the people." Like the colonial chiefs and headmen, the cell leader may find the goals of the village in conflict with those of the national government. This is what Samoff (1974:172) calls the "paradox of local leadership." It applies to village government leaders as well as ten-cell leaders. Leaders will not be effective in implementing national policy unless they are responsive to their constituency. But if their constituency is opposed to the national policy (which has tended to be true in certain areas regarding ujamaa and more generally regarding Operation Vijiji), then responsiveness to the constituency requires resistance to the policy. Leaders who help their people resist national policy are not considered effective by the center.

This, of course, highlights the more fundamental dilemma of the leadership role. Village leaders are ultimately regarded by the center as extensions of itself--tools to mobilize the peasantry to undertake development. They should be progressive mobilizers. But the traditional leadership role was not a mobilizing role. In Kigombe Landsberg (1977:417-418) found that a model leader traditionally was pious and learned above all as well as being wealthy, and having the support of his kin group. Their most important function was organizing and carrying out village-wide Islamic ritual. Hatfield (1972:10) lists the qualities that were valued in traditional Sukuma and Nyamwezi leaders--kind, untroublesome, non-ambitious, generous, determiners

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<sup>14</sup> Landsberg (1977:476) reports that villagers are also reluctant to be TANU

of consensus. This was the arbitrator, the protector of his people. To meet the government definition of the role is to conflict with the traditional role. Only rarely are the rewards enough to justify this.

A strategy often followed on the part of leaders is simply to duck the issue. Ingle (1972:172) notes that critical messages simply were not communicated upwards. Similarly, Juma Mwapachu (1976:12), who was DDD at the time of Operation Vijiji, complained that some leaders never told their constituents they had to move for fear of "annoying" them and thereby losing their position. Villagers who may not be all that keen on being mobilized often find this behavior quite acceptable. That the government may find it less acceptable is evidenced by the report that one Prime Minister had said that "Tanzania's rural leadership was not satisfactory. In certain areas it did not exist at all." (Daily News 8 June, 1977).

### Village Government

#### Organizational Form

Post-colonial village government has gone through a series of transformations designed and implemented by the central government. These will be described briefly to provide a historical background for the present structure.

As described by Ingle (1972: 145-169), the first change came with the repeal of the African Chiefs Ordinance in 1963, which abolished the office of chief. The chiefs' powers were largely assumed by divisional executive officers (divisions being roughly synonymous with precolonial chiefdoms). The Bwana Divisional had the power of arrest, summons, and seizure of property.

At the village level there was a fair amount of activity in the form of village development committees. Estimates as to the number of these committees range as high as seven thousand. The VDC, which generally was composed of the ten-cell leaders, the party representative from each cell, and

any ministry personnel in the area, was supposed to discuss village problems and draw up an annual development plan for submission to the district development committee.


The first set of changes began in 1968/69. The post of Division Executive Officer was replaced by a party post of Divisional Executive Secretary. The ward, which had been only a constituency from which district councilors were elected, was reformed as a unit of local government. A ward secretary replaced the village executive officer and the Ward Development Committee (WDC) was created.

In 1975 the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act (see Appendix A) was passed providing a legal framework in which to consolidate the results of Operation Vijiji. The Act required that every village be registered. To be registered the village had to have established boundaries and, with a few exceptions, a minimum of 250 households. The Act also mandated a uniform village government structure as outlined in Figure 5.

Every village resident over the apparent age of 18 is a member of the Village Assembly. The Village Assembly elects a Village Council of no more than 25 members, which is subject to re-election once a year. The council may elect a chair, vice-chair, and secretary from their own ranks unless there is a party branch within the village. In that event (increasingly the case), the chairman and secretary of the branch automatically become chairman and secretary of the council. The council is to form 5 committees: Finance and Planning; Production and Marketing; Education, Culture, and Social Welfare; Works and Transport; and Security and Defense. Under the provisions of the Act, the Village Council is a body corporate capable of entering into all manner of legal arrangements. The village is deemed to be a cooperative society. (The Act abolished all cooperatives established under the 1968

FIGURE 5

ORGANIZATION CHART OF A REGISTERED VILLAGE



Co-operative Societies Act.)

Important matters are supposed to be presented to the Village Assembly for discussion and final decision. However, the power of the Village Assembly appears to be more a function of such good will as it can muster and of its power to elect village officials than of explicit procedures and rights. The only appeal procedure is a rather vague reference to the powers of the President to provide for such an appeal. As will be seen in this and subsequent chapters, the issue of accountability is a real one.

The following discussion of village leadership and participation is based on roughly a ten-year period of observations. Thus, it covers different forms of village organization--before Operation Vijiji, various stages of transition, and more consolidated villages. The post-Vijiji phase is not yet over for many villages. Some villages have barely been registered. Others are still working out the dynamics of combining various old villages. It is possible that once the final shakedown is complete, what is described here will no longer be valid. However, this seems unlikely.

#### Characteristics of Village Leaders

Much of what has been said about ten-cell leaders can be said about other village leaders as well. They tend to be male, older, and wealthier--for basically the same reasons. The influence of traditional leaders varies but they often retain some importance. Ng'asi (1976:56), for example, found that candidates for election in a Zaramo village added "Pazi" (the traditional Zaramo chieftainship) to their name in order to garner votes through an appeal to sentiment. DeVries and Fortmann (1974:35) found that approximately a quarter of village leaders in 45 Iringa villages were former chiefs or members

of the traditional ruling class. Among the Nyamwezi, Miller (1972:152) found that traditional leaders filled many posts for lack of other candidates. Landberg (1977:420), writing five years later, in Kigombe, found a somewhat reduced role for traditional leaders.

"With regard to more recent political roles, village elders have less authority. They are accorded respect and deference at local TANU functions but apart from these formal gatherings where the presence of the Wazee is symbolically supportive of TANU, their effective local political roles appear to be confined mainly to traditional matters."

DeVries and Fortmann (1974:35-37) found village leaders in Iringa were generally male and better off than other villagers. As can be seen in Table 3, village leaders owned a disproportionate amount of expensive items ( $\chi^2$  significant at the .001 level).

Pipping (1976:92) found a similar relationship between farm size and leadership positions in Mbeya, larger farmers being disproportionately more likely to hold office than small farmers or the landless. These data are presented in Table 4. Van Hekken and Thoden van Velzen (1972) also found wealth to be associated with a wide variety of leadership positions, as shown in Table 5. In a Kisarawe District (Coastal Region) village, Ngasi (1976:45) found that "wealthy" villagers tended to hold more leadership positions. In a Kwimba District (Mwanza Region) village, Nyiera (1978:63) found that the primary chairman and secretary had relatively large holdings (23 and 9 acres, respectively) and were using hired labor. Rutabingwa's (1978:29) study of three Bukoba District villages found the chairmen to be wealthy and a source of loans for villagers. Sendegeya (1978:53) in Ngara District and Krokfors (1973:18) in Sumbawanga District both found village chairmen to be wealthy. Studies in Mtwara District of Kiterere Ward and Madimba Ward by Mddidi (1977:18) and Omari (1977:10-17), respectively, showed variations in the effect of

Table 3. Comparison of the Ownership of Expensive Items by Selected Leaders and Villagers

Item	Chairpersons Owning Item (N = 43)		Secretaries Owning Item (N = 43)		Committee Members Owning Item (N = 43)		Villagers Owning Item		Percent of Persons Owning Item Who Are Leaders
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Bati roof	30	70%	21	49%	21	49%	65	30 <sup>a</sup>	53 <sup>b</sup>
Concrete floor	22	51	11	26	10	23	25	12 <sup>a</sup>	63 <sup>b</sup>
Glass windows	16	37	9	21	7	16	17	8 <sup>a</sup>	65 <sup>b</sup>
Bicycle	21	49	17	39	--	--	95	37 <sup>c</sup>	29 <sup>d</sup>
Radio	34	79	24	56	--	--	101	39 <sup>c</sup>	36 <sup>d</sup>
Clock	14	33	6	14	--	--	24	9 <sup>c</sup>	46 <sup>d</sup>
Wristwatch	25	58	9	21	--	--	39	15 <sup>c</sup>	47 <sup>d</sup>
Tractor	1	2.3	0	0	--	--	4	1.5 <sup>c</sup>	20 <sup>d</sup>

<sup>a</sup>N = 215

<sup>b</sup>Leaders include chairpersons, secretaries, committee members = 37.5% of the respondents.

<sup>c</sup>N = 258

<sup>d</sup>Leaders include chairpersons, secretaries = 25% of the respondents.

Adapted from: DeVries and Fortmann, 1974.

Table 4. Proportion of Household Heads Who Have Held Administrative or Party Office, by Village and Size of Farm

Farm Size*	Ruiwa			Uhambule		
	Number Holding Office	Percent Holding Office	Percent in Farm Size Category	Number Holding Office	Percent Holding Office	Percent in Farm Size Category
Landless	1	2.6	14.3	1	1.9	11.9
1 acre	2	2.6	28.3	7	6.0	26.7
3 acres	7	8.6	29.8	20	13.4	34.0
5 acres	5	13.9	13.2	12	17.6	15.5
9 acres	11	28.2	<u>14.3</u>	14	26.9	<u>11.9</u>
			100.0			100.0

\*Pipping's categories.

Source: Pipping, 1976:34, 92.

Table 5. Distribution of Leadership Positions by Wealth in Five Rungwe Villages

Village	Number of Functionaries <sup>a</sup>	From Richest Half		From Richest 25%		From Richest 20%	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Itumba	39 <sup>b</sup>	--	--	--	--	26	65%
	6 <sup>b</sup>	--	--	--	--	5	83
	24 <sup>c</sup>	20	83%	15	63%	--	--
Ibala	11	--	--	9	82	5	45
Ilolo	28 <sup>d</sup>	--	--	--	--	17	61
	22 <sup>d</sup>	19	86	11	50	--	--
	8 <sup>e</sup>	7	87	--	--	4	50
	4 <sup>f</sup>	--	--	--	--	3	75
Bulomo	50	--	--	--	--	17	34
	N.A. <sup>g</sup>	--	70	--	37	--	--
Jerusalem	15	--	--	--	--	7	39

<sup>a</sup>Functionary: any person involved in some activity (including wage labor) under the auspices of the authorities.

<sup>b</sup>Top functionaries: TANU branch chairman, TANU secretary, VDC chairperson, VDC secretary, chairperson of the self-help committee, chairperson of the parents' committee.

<sup>c</sup>TANU cell functionaries.

<sup>d</sup>Top functionaries.

<sup>e</sup>Male members of Church Council.

<sup>f</sup>Female members of Church Council - reflects husband's economic status.

<sup>g</sup>TANU cell chairpersons - no N given.

Source: Van Hekken and Thoden van Velzen, 1972.

wealth. In Kiterere Ward and in traditional villages in Madimba Ward there was a significant relationship between wealth and leadership. Madimba Ward is particularly interesting, as wealthy migrants rather than traditionally dominant lineages were holders of leadership positions. In newly established villages there was no statistically significant leadership trend. It will be interesting to see if wealth emerges as an important criterion of leadership in the new villages.

The criteria for selecting village leaders are undergoing some shifts. An argument for selecting rich leaders is that because they already have a lot of money, they already know how to handle it and are less likely to be tempted by the village funds. (Others argue that the very fact of their wealth indicates that such people are by nature avaricious.) Some people vote for the rich in hopes that they will thereby establish the grounds for obtaining favors later.

When villagers are asked what qualifications are important in a leader, fairly predictable qualities emerge. Maeda (1976:198) asked leaders themselves what were the most important traits. The replies: hard work, cooperation, egalitarianism, and good politics. DeVries and Fortmann (1974:36-41) asked villagers why their leaders had been selected. Respondents most often reported that their chairman had been chosen because he was good or wise or that he worked hard. Secretaries, it was said, were chosen because they could read and write and were hard working and honest. These criteria reflected the leadership roles as they were perceived by villagers. The chairman was most frequently described as supervising village activities and representing the village in external affairs. This ambassadorial role is critical, as it requires a person who is self-confident and articulate, speaks Swahili, and can deal with civil servants as an equal. The secretary's role was seen as

far more technical--keeping written and financial records and making financial and organizational decisions. Landberg (1977:421) found that younger men could read Roman script. (Arabic script is taught in the traditional Koran schools.) This meant they could read official government pamphlets and letters to the other villagers and serve a mediating role between the village and the government. One effect of abolishing the cooperatives appears to be the resurfacing of cooperative officials who have bookkeeping and organizational skills as village secretaries.

Selection of village leaders may reflect (or provoke) various village agendas or cleavages. Maeda (1976:224) points out that electing "unenlightened leaders" may serve to reduce the demands they make on villagers. The shift to leaders elected for new instrumental reasons can be threatening to the elders whose traditional power base is being undercut. Rutabingwa (1978) describes the deliberate provoking of conflicts by elders in order to demonstrate their power.

A second line of cleavage is male/female. With a few notable exceptions, leaders are men. There are a number of reasons for this. Women traditionally are thought of as being low in cognitive skills--they cannot reason, they should not go to school, and so on (Swantz, 1970:141; Mbilinyi, 1969:43). Hence politics is considered, often quite explicitly (see Mshangama, 1971:25), to be men's concern. A second factor is that among some ethnic groups women have only a tenuous connection to the village. Ng'asi (1976:50), describing a coastal Zaramo village, remarks, "Women do not have a permanent residence. Through divorce, death of the husband, and marriage or remarriage, a woman may leave any time. Strictly speaking, a woman is not genuinely interested in uplifting a place she is bound to leave any time." This is indicative of the tension between the concept of the village as a secular, universalistic

institution and the traditional organization based on lineage ties. The rights and privileges of each are not always synonymous. Women have on occasion assumed leadership positions. But in one case when a female majority elected a female chairperson and secretary, the men of the village were absolutely outraged and complained to the Area Commissioner. He arranged a new election, which was appropriately won by a man (DeVries and Fortmann, 1974:66).

As a general rule, leadership selection shows a reasonable strategy on the part of peasants. Choosing the village elite for ambassadorial roles is quite logical. Those who argue against this on class grounds are generally influenced by a framework which fails to acknowledge that within the Tanzanian village, vertical (ethnic group) cleavages are far more important than horizontal cleavages. The wealthy peasant (who in most instances is not all that wealthy) is likely to side with his fellow villagers against the alien (and indeed wealthy) bureaucrat when the chips are down. This is not to say that he will not work the system to his own advantage. Wealthier peasants are clear beneficiaries in peasant/bureaucrat patron-client systems. And wealthy leaders may subvert projects which are against their interests. A village chairman in an Arumeru District Village, for example, denounced a cooperative shop begun by village women in competition with his shop, which had previously enjoyed the benefits of being a monopoly. It was only by appealing directly to district officials that the women were able to carry on with their enterprise. But these dangers aside, wealthy leaders are also likely to have loyalties to local social units, particularly the tribe or clan, which villagers can exploit.

#### The Selection Process

The selection process for leaders is not spelled out in the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act, and there are relatively few descriptions of how this is

done. The use of paper ballots in a society only partially literate is inappropriate. Even adapting such ballots with the use of symbols is not always effective. Hyden (1967) points out that in the 1965 national election, those in need of food voted for the hoe and those in need of better shelter voted for the house. An alternative sometimes used--physically lining up behind the candidate of one's choice--allows social control to be overtly exercised against voters. (Maeda (1976:194) reports the expression of fear of victimization with this method.) Boesen et al (1972:80) found that 300 out of 775 villagers took part in an election in a Bukoba village. Rutabingwa (1978: 61-62) has analyzed nonvoting in a Bukoba village election in which only 55 percent voted. Of 15 nonvoters, 8 did not like the candidates, 4 were too busy, and 3 already knew who would be chairman. (The opinions are not unlike those voiced by American nonvoters.) One might speculate that if this voting turnout is typical (and there is no basis on which such a judgment can be made), it may be a result of villagers' realization that decisions are made elsewhere.

#### Participation in Formal Village Government Activities

Before discussing participation in formal village government activities, it is worth considering exactly what meaning village government might have for villagers. In this respect it is useful to review the history of villages described above. The traditional pattern was often (but not always--the intralacustrine tribes being a notable exception) acephalous, with consensual decision making. Even where a formal head existed, there were generally strong checks on his power in the form of various advisers and obligation to the villagers. Flight also served as a means of control. If a chief became unbearable, people simply moved.

The effect of colonialism was to increase (or create) the power of the head and emasculate the means of control. Over time, flight was substantially reduced as an option, without the substitution of constitutional restraints. This was clearly in the interests of the colonial government, for whom chiefs served as tools of their rule. (This is not to say that a great deal of traditional activity did not go on behind a façade of compliance.) It was hardly in the interests of the Germans or the British to create a means of protesting this rule. The British did indeed try to control the sort of autocracy which offended their sense of fair play, but this control was exercised through direct appeal to the British District Officer and was decided by him in terms of his own values and priorities. Villagers could not in their own right depose a chief. The savvy chief did not unduly offend his people, but he was well aware that the first priority was to keep the British happy.

A similar pattern exists today. The Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act is vague on the subject of recall. According to Maeda (1976:196, 204), if there is no CCM branch or subbranch in the village (an increasingly rare situation) the village assembly may recall an elected village official. If there is a party branch or subbranch, incumbents can be removed only through lengthy process involving upper echelons of the party. In contrast, district leaders may on their own initiative suspend village leaders, regardless of their manner of election. Again villagers have little formal control over leaders, although they do resort effectively to nonformal means of control.

A related consideration is the scope of decision making which villages actually have. Much of the minutiae of village life is actually determined by the central government. The various "operations" described above determined where villages and individual houses should be placed, the nature of

village commerce, and who should live in a village. Other government regulations determine which crops should be grown; how many acres of each should be planted; which agronomic practices should be followed; and when local beer may be brewed. Primary cooperative societies were first mandated, then required, then abolished by fiat of the central government. The very existence and form of village government is determined by the center. As Maeda (1976:222) put it, "Because of the necessity for the village to meet certain national or political requirements, the villagers find themselves without much to deliberate upon except how to best meet the requirements."

There is good reason, then, for villagers to maintain a certain distance from village government. If the power is clearly elsewhere (and, as has been and will continue to be demonstrated, it clearly is elsewhere), there is little incentive to be involved in mere formalities. Schanne-Raab (1974:58) found exactly this phenomenon in Sukumaland.

"It seems that after a short interlude of popular participation in the pre-independence years, now administration, party, and cooperatives are again seen as impersonal power structures beyond the control of the local farmer. Therefore people resign and withdraw from participation in community affairs under state auspices."

This may be changing as villages gradually come to control more resources. Tanzania Rural Development Bank small farmer food crop loans are lent through the village government to individual villages. Villages now have direct access to revenue through cesses on crop sales. (Villages act as the buying agent for the National Milling Corporation.) The control of resources will make village government and village leaders more important. It should also serve to refocus the activity designed to influence the distribution and use of resources from outside the village to within the village.

### The Special Case of Women's Participation

Before the more general questions of participation are discussed, the special case of women will be examined. With very few exceptions, participation by women in village decision making is very low, even in otherwise participatory villages or where women outnumber men. Mapolu's (1973:166-167) study of 24 Mwanza District villages showed that 27.5 percent of the villages had no woman committee members, 27.5 percent had 10 percent or fewer, and only 22 percent had over 20 percent female committee members. An Iringa Region study of 16 villages found that four had no woman committee members and only five had more than one (DeVries and Fortmann, 1974:66). Sender (1974:34-35) found in the Usambara Mountains that even in villages where women outnumbered men two to one, they had no representation on village committees. Mpesha (1976:16) found 2 women out of 26 and 2 women out of 16 village committee members in two Bukoba District villages. Women are most generally found on committees dealing with "traditional" women's subjects such as health and education. And, as O'Barr showed (1970:102-103), even highly verbal and aggressive women behave in a very traditional fashion in the context of otherwise all-male committees, speaking only when directly questioned. Landberg (1977:423-424, 438) found that women who were elected were older, childless and already recognized leaders in the traditional women's sphere.

As a rule, participation of women in more general village meetings also tends to be low. Brokensha (1971:167) reports that women were not publicly consulted in village meetings in Handeni District. An exception, reported by Brain (1966:2), was the Ruvuma Development Association, where women were encouraged to speak. The data presented in Table 6 demonstrate statistically what other writers have described--a significant difference in participation between men and women. It is important to note that the mean score for

**Table 6** Comparison of Mean Participation by Men and Women in Village Meetings in Two Bukoba Ujamaa Villages (N = 60)

	Number of Meetings Attended	Number of Meetings in Which the Respondent Spoke	Number of Times Respondent Was Consulted by the Village Development Committee (VDC)
Men	4.4	2.0	2.0
Women	2.2	0.3	0.7
t	4.20*	3.41*	4.51*

\*Significant at the .001 level.

Source: Data from Mpesha, 1976, reanalyzed by the author.

speaking indicates activity by one woman only. The other women in the sample never spoke in meetings.

There are two basic reasons for this low participation in addition to the generally negative feelings about women described above. One is exhaustion. Women work very hard. Bartlett (1976) and Cleave (1974:57, 186) indicate that a woman's working day averages roughly ten hours. Fleuret (1979) found that in the Usambara Mountains women had a 64 hour work week. Significant amounts of time are spent fetching water. (One estimate is that 12-25 percent of daytime calories are spent in fetching water and firewood (Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs,) For estimates (which appear low) of the amount of time spent fetching water by distance from the source see Lwegarulila (n.d.). Fleuret (1979) found that women in the Usambara Mountains often carried three 75-pound loads of firewood uphill to their homes in a day. Exhaustion, as mentioned by Swantz (1977) and Lewin (n.d.), may preclude women's attending meetings or may cause them to fall asleep if they do attend. A second factor is that a woman who asserts herself in public is likely to be sanctioned not only by men but by other women as well. Generally, women will speak only to support a statement by their husbands. Women in various parts of Arusha Region report that public activity would earn them a good beating. Fleuret (1979) reports that women in the Usambaras appear to feel that the only way of effectively voicing their concerns is to go directly to officials or notables at the District rather than the village level. The general trend is summed up by a report by Kivukoni Ideological College students on Singida villages, which stated that "women in villages were highly oppressed, having no say in any village activities" (Daily News, 12 December 1977).

### The Effect of Leadership Style on Participation

In 1969 Rene Dumont commented: "Rural society in Tanzania is still very hierarchical. The democratic principle in the cooperatives, for example, is scarcely respected except in appearance; it is not accepted in reality nor in fact, nor in the depth of people's minds" (p. 36). Other observers have noted a tendency toward "high-handed authoritarianism" in Tanzanian institutions (Saul, 1977:333) and a cultural emphasis on deference and obedience (Hyden, 1969:46, 165-166, 197).

It is not surprising, then, that despite the consensual traditional model, the majority of reports of village government find it to be authoritarian.<sup>15</sup> It would appear that as often as not leaders simply issue orders for the villagers to carry out. Evidence from Gallu Village (Mashauri, 1971:58), Iringa Region (DeVries and Fortmann, 1974:43), Ngara District (Sendegeya, 1978:55-57), Bukoba District (Rutabingwa, 1978:passim), Boesen et al., 1977:82), Arusha (Maeda, 1976:219), Korogwe District (Daily News, 29 November, 1978) and Kwimba District (Nyiera, 1978:29-30) suggest that chairmen often act unilaterally and that VDC, VA, or committee meetings are called only irregularly, with relatively little participation permitted.

Maeda (1976:192) found in Arusha that "the constitutional clauses which are most frequently not adhered to are those dealing with the leadership's responsibilities such as holding both the council's and the assembly's meetings at specified intervals and giving periodic reports to the council or assembly meetings on the general progress of village activities as well as the village's financial transactions."

<sup>15</sup>In Tukuyu the party found it necessary to "advise village leaders, not to use force when mobilizing the peasants in preparation of their participation in the upcoming national agricultural competition show." Daily News 20 October, 1978.

Table 7. Information About Village Government in Three Bukoba Villages  
(Percent Correct Answers)

	Bwera (N = 126)	Kashasha (N = 131)	Kautare (N = 148)
When did the village government start?	60	49	43
Who elected the village government?	55	59	63
How many committees are there?	48	45	32
Who elected committee members?	43	51	47
How many regular VA meetings are there per month?	30	36	49
Who is supposed to attend the VA?	35	39	41

Source: Rutabingwa, 1978:24.

Table 8. Attendance of Village Assembly Meetings in Three Bukoba Villages

Village	N	Number of Meetings Attended						Percent Who Attended Meetings
		1	2	3	4	5	6	
Bwera	585	54	88	72	33	47	--	50%
Kashasha	490	36	56	109	--	--	--	41%
Kautare	540	46	93	41	28	9	33	46%

Adapted from Rutabingwa, 1978:26.

Table 9. Attitudes About Attending Village Assembly Meetings in Three Bukoba Villages

	Bwera (N = 126)	Kashasha (N = 131)	Kautare (N = 148)
	- - - - - percent - - - - -		
Don't care for VA and don't attend	40	44	32
Don't know what it's about	14	13	18
Attend at the request of a friend	11	5	7
Attend because VA does some good	15	20	16
Attend because VA has not done much good	14	15	18
Attend because one must participate in the VA	6	3	9

Source: Rutabingwa, 1978:26-27.

Authoritarian leadership can be expected to repress participation or to force it into alternative channels. Case studies by Rutabingwa (1978) suggest these results. As shown in Tables 7, 8, and 9, he found relative indifference to and lack of knowledge about village government. Attendance at meetings was low--half or fewer of the villagers attending. In a village of fewer than 600 adults one might well expect to find greater participation than this.

Rutabingwa (1978:20-30) suggests some reasons for his findings. In all three villages the chairman monopolizes decision making. (In all cases the chairman is a wealthy man from whom villagers borrow money.) Meetings are conducted in Swahili although many villagers do not speak Swahili. (Hatfield (1972) and Slater (1976) also mention the problem of meetings conducted in Swahili. This may reflect the presence of government officials who do not speak the local language, or it may indicate an attempt to be modern.) Committee meetings are attended only irregularly by the majority of committee members. Committee decisions are not always submitted to the VA. VA meetings are, in any event, arranged by the chairman or secretary and are announced either by word of mouth or by pinning the agenda to a tree. In 16 meetings no question had been raised about the agenda. Rutabingwa found that people remained silent in meetings because they did not really understand the issues.

The meetings generally proceed in the following manner: The chairman explains each item on the pre-set agenda. Decisions are made by a simple majority vote. (However, should the VA decide "incorrectly" the vote is overruled by the chairman or ward or district officers.) Agenda items are acted on immediately. They are not postponed for lack of adequate information. This is particularly true for agenda items originating from district or ward officials.

Rutabingwa (1978:72) comments on the difficulty of "getting the villagers to realize that village government is a live thing, that there is work to be done and responsibility to be shouldered by themselves." Despite the generally low levels of participation, Rutabingwa's case studies show a high level of dissatisfaction beneath the village surface and concomitant activity in circumventing unpopular decisions. The following case study (pp. 36-47) is illustrative.

A village building committee recommended that artisans (masons, carpenters) be paid for work done in the course of building a new school. The VA agreed to this. A subcommittee was established to work out the amount the artisans were to be paid and the method of payment. Villagers felt the fees decided on were too high, especially since the village did not have enough money to pay them. Fifty-eight (out of 580) people attended the next VA meeting and argued that self-reliance was better and would prevent the sort of economic differentiation paying the fees would cause. (The villagers were also annoyed at having paid Sh.18 per household for bus repair that never was done.) The committee decided to ignore the vote of the VA, although in theory nothing major can be done without its approval. As organizing against the committee began to take place, the committee decided on new lower rates, again posting them on a tree. These were still unacceptable to the villagers, who went to talk with the committee--one of whom reportedly said the villagers were stupid and knew nothing about money. Unproductive discussions continued until another VA meeting was demanded. The meeting was boycotted by the chairman, the building committee, the subcommittee, and the village artisans. The villagers responded with threats of violence and a letter to the Ward Secretary. He agreed to arbitrate, and new discussions began. He wrote a

formal letter saying the artisans should be paid. The views were presented in a VA meeting by the chairman, who showed the letter but refused to read it. A delegation of villagers went to see the Ward Secretary and finally, after requesting another meeting in writing, got him to agree to examine the case. Weeks later, they got a letter from him stating that the spokesmen had agreed to let him and the chairman determine the payments. Since the protesting villagers had been opposed to unilateral decision-making from the beginning, the protest now began in earnest and the chairman's removal was demanded. Letters appeared on the long-suffering trees asking villagers to withdraw from all self-help activities. It was demanded that all implementation cease and that the Ward Secretary step down as arbiter. A new delegation was selected. Yet another letter pinned to a tree said that enough agreement had been reached to allow the Ward Secretary, village chairman, village building committee, and spokespeople to hold a meeting. Villagers were asked to prepare for withdrawal from self-help schemes in case of a deadlock. People whom Rutabingwa describes as "more radical" sent undated and unsigned threatening letters to the chairman and the village building committee and suggested boycotting the Village Assembly. (Their ability to organize either boycott was questionable.) The Ward Secretary called a mandatory Village Assembly where he explained how much time had been lost (three or four months had gone by) and announced that each family had to contribute Sh.7 for employing the artisans at a rate lower than originally proposed but higher than the original compromise.

This case study is interesting in a number of respects. Unfortunately, it is not possible to tell whether more than the roughly ten percent of the villagers who originally protested were involved throughout. Nor do we know who they were, although it sounds as if they may have been the poorer

villagers. The leadership as described here behaved in an arrogant high-handed fashion.

The overruling of the VA and boycotting of a meeting by the leaders reflects the observation made earlier that the villagers have no control over their leaders except election and that the VA is basically an impotent body. It is interesting to note that villagers used the same tactics in dealing with their leaders as are used between village and lower government officials--the outside appeal, threats of violence, and attempting to capitalize on the importance of peasant labor by threatening withdrawal from self-help activities. There is a possible problem brought to the fore in this case. Council members are elected at large, which means that any group with a numerical majority could control the majority, if not all, of the council places. It is possible that the unhappiness expressed above was that of an unrepresented minority. Another problem made apparent in this case is that of assessing costs to be met. The village has no power to tax, and peasant taxes at the national level were abolished in 1969. But "contributions" are assigned quite frequently, and payment is enforced whether there is any legal basis for such an action or not. Such contributions tend to be highly regressive, as they are generally assigned on a household basis. In the case of self-help, labor can often be substituted for cash. But equivalence becomes a problem in such cases, and poorer households may end up bearing a disproportionate burden.

These themes are repeated elsewhere. Nyiera (1978:20) found in Misasi that the people who attended the VA to set village plans did not actually do ujamaa work themselves, rather sending their wives or children. They therefore had a tendency to plan more than could be done. Again, the problem

of unilateral action on the part of leaders arose. In one instance, village leaders contributed Sh.2,675 in cash to the Regional Commissioner towards the CCM headquarters in Dodoma with no consultation (Nyiera, 1978:29-30). It was Nyiera's impression that the rural elite neither innovate nor initiate action but relay or monitor information coming from the district Party office.

Sendegeya (1978:57) reports that the main preoccupation of leaders is persecuting people who contravene their decisions. Leadership/village splits can be observed in the exclusive socializing of leaders with regional or district officials at national events and the villagers' absenteeism from meetings called by leaders.

The lack of accountability and the relative power of village leaders is demonstrated in the Daily News (29 September, 1978) report that 12 villagers in Shinyanga District were fined Sh.3003/- (\$375.00) for disrupting "the village's Party branch meeting by shouts and threats to the members attending the meeting" and using "abusive language against the village chairman, alleging that he was unfit to lead the village." As the paper put it, "the accused are said to have been angered by a decision made by the village government to construct a road passing through their farms."<sup>16</sup>

There are, of course, participatory villages which demonstrate the positive effects of a democratic style. Maeda (1976:193) noted that the ujamaa villages which appeared to be the most likely to be successful were those in which the leadership used VA meetings for discussing and allocating tasks. Mpesha (1976) found a significant correlation between participation in village government and work on the ujamaa farm. This may be a circular relationship, with work on the farm creating an interest in being involved in decision-making about it as well as involvement creating commitment.

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<sup>16</sup>The average farm is 3 acres or less.

Mpesha's 1975 study showed some of the difficulties of establishing a participatory forum. Domination of meetings by government officials is a source of difficulty. He notes that in one meeting the agricultural expert spoke three times and at greater length than anyone else, thereby using up a disproportionate share of the available time. One of his sample villages had five village meetings in the course of a year; the other had eight. He found the low amount of time available for meetings to be a constraint on participation.

Another avenue of participation is, of course, outside formal village governmental channels. Van Hekken and Thoden van Velsen (1972) describe struggles between village factions and the importance of client/patron relationships. Ng'asi (1976) similarly describes the struggle between factions. As yet, village government does not seem adequate to serve as an instrument of allocation in such cases. This may be because it is still relatively new. The descriptions of villagization are still fairly recent. The process of integrating people from different villages and different sets of leaders is still going on. And because control is clearly outside the village, there is little incentive to force village government to work, little incentive for villagers to participate in a pro forma exercise. However, although participation in village government would appear to be minimal, to say it is minimal is perhaps misleading. There is plenty of political activity at the village level; it simply is not necessarily funneled through the formal channels.

The unanswered question is whether genuine power will shift to the formal village organization. If it does, a corresponding shift in participation could be expected as well as more intense struggles over power at the village level.

#### IV. PATTERNS OF BUREAUCRATIC AND PEASANT INTERACTIONS IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT

There was no question in anyone's mind that a major item on the agenda after Independence was development, primarily rural development. It was to this end that early mobilization of resources took place. The immediate post-Independence years were characterized by massive self-help ventures. Hyden (1969:50) says that T. shs. 68.7 million were saved for the government by self-help efforts in the first five years of independence.

How voluntary all these efforts were is not entirely clear. Tibanyendera (1972:20-21) reports that in Bukoba coercion was a definite factor in generating self-help and that as the coercion fell off, so did the self-help. It is probably the case that the solidarity engendered by the independence struggle, such as it was, sparked a certain amount of self-help which coercion then bolstered. The self-help boom gradually dwindled away for a number of reasons. One was undoubtedly loss of momentum. The first fires of enthusiasm were bound to die away eventually. The second was a short-sighted approach to the projects, focusing on construction and ignoring maintenance. As people watched roads overgrown with grass or wasted away or found their well didn't work, their energies flagged. Finally, there was no tie to a productive base--no means of recurrent funding.

##### Definitions of Development

What came to be was a pulling apart of the definition of development held by peasants and bureaucrats. To peasants, development was largely defined in terms of the delivery of social services--water, education for their children, adequate health care, transportation. Most of these had

production impact as well, but they tended to be defined in welfare terms by the peasantry. What had distinguished the peasantry from the colonial officials was, after all, standard of living. Such settlers as there were depended on African labor, so it would have been hard to make a case for a superior European standard of productivity. The face of development presented at the village level was one of consumption, not production. Peasants could, in fact, be mobilized for this sort of development. Digging a well or channel for water pipes is an event for which peasants can be counted on to turn out. Similarly, they will often donate money for such causes. But it is simultaneously true that the provision of such items is also defined by the peasantry as the responsibility of the government (DeVries and Fortmann, 1974:63-64).

Bureaucrats, as discussed above, have come increasingly to define development in terms of the production which will allow the financing of social services and the provision of productive infrastructure. The Prime Minister's New Years speech emphasized this theme:

"Ndugu Sokoine said that peasants should double their efforts in the production of food and cash crops . . . Everyone must adopt a greater sense of responsibility and give his daily share of work to the nation during this difficult period." January 2, 1979 Daily News.

Yet another difference is that while peasants tend to think in terms of their own locality, bureaucrats must balance the competing interests of different regions and develop some sort of integrated plan. Finally, a critical difference is that, ironically enough, peasants are producers and bureaucrats are the consumers of that production. Most bureaucrats already have the standard of living to which peasants aspire (although they themselves may have higher aspirations). Not only do the future increased consumption of the peasantry and improved productive infrastructure hang primarily on the

production of the peasantry, but the continuing present consumption by the bureaucracy does also. Thus bureaucrats have a very personal reason for insisting on production as a priority.

It is against this basic difference of definitions and priorities that the discussion of mobilization for development must take place. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to examining the theory and practice of how development decisions are made.

### Formal Peasant Participation in Development Planning

In accordance with Nyerere's philosophy of developing people rather than just developing things, the development process in Tanzania is supposed to be highly participatory. To this end a number of structures exist to channel peasant participation into the decision-making process.

Village government has been described in a previous chapter. Once a year the village assembly meets to draw up a list of development priorities, a development plan, and requests for assistance to the DDD and DPLO. Villages have not been particularly successful in utilizing this mode of communicating their agenda for development. They tend not to differentiate planning from a statement of needs. Thus their plans often consist of "shopping lists" of projects the village would like the government to undertake, with no indication of priorities (Finucane, 1974:89; Von Freyhold, 1977:82). The villagers are rarely if ever given any idea of what national or regional development priorities or financial constraints may limit possible programs. In such a situation the natural inclination is to shoot for the moon in hopes of maximizing what you get. Villagers also tend to operate in all innocence of the bureaucratic style. Their requests--which may not

even be couched in particularly good Swahili, let alone elegant (if that is an appropriate adjective) bureaucratese--are not very impressive entrants into the bureaucratic milieu. Their general fate, then, is not particularly surprising.

In theory, each village plan is discussed by district personnel and village representatives. The civil servants then work out a district plan based on the village requests, national development priorities, and what they think is reasonable. This plan is presented to the District Development and Planning Committee (DDPC), which includes village representatives. It then moves to the District Development Committee, which includes special interest groups and party officials among its members. The plan which is approved by this group is then forwarded to regional and national authorities for final approval and funding.

Despite their formal inclusion in the development decision making process, villagers in fact have very little effect on it. Both case studies and general statistics bear this out.

In Nzega District, Tabora, three villages made a request for government assistance because they were two to three miles from water in the dry season. They requested technical advice on designing a water project for which they would provide labor. The villagers never received any response to their request. When the records of the DDPC and the DDC were searched, it was found that there was absolutely no trace of the proposal, which had been forwarded through the proper channels (Mmbaga, 1977:58). In Mtwara District at least three ward proposals were lost track of altogether (Sari, 1977:59).

Leonard et al. (1975) show that on the whole decentralization did not lead to increased participation by villagers in decision making. In Table 10 the origin of projects costing more than T.Shs.10,000 is shown for projects

Table 10 The origin of development projects in three districts before and after decentralization

	Arumeru			Mafia			Sumbawanga			Total		
	1971	1974	Deferred									
Village Development Comm., Ward Development Comm.	.38	.67	.93	.20	.20	.20	.78	.25	.43	.50	.35	.65
District Development Comm.	.50	.33	.07	.20	.60	.80	.11	.50	.43	.27	.49	.19
Regional Comm.	.13	0	0	.20	.10	0	0	.08	.14	.09	.06	.15
National Ministries	0	0	0	.40	.10	0	.11	.17	0	.14	.10	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1.00</b>											
<b>N</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>27</b>

Source: Leonard et al. 1975-8

approved in 1971 (before decentralization) and 1974 (after decentralization) and for projects deferred in 1974. Except in Arumeru District, the majority of the development projects originated at the district level or above even after decentralization. (Indeed, the percentage had increased after decentralization.)

The general weakness of village proposals is duplicated in village representation on District Committees. Peasant representatives are generally less educated than government officials, less familiar with bureaucratic procedures and language. Such evidence as is available indicates that DDC and DDPC meetings tend to be dominated by the functional managers (DADO, DLDO, etc.). In Ngara District issues raised by village representatives were relegated to "any other business" in the agenda drawn up by civil servants. In the same district, civil servants drew up plans for ujamaa villages without consultation with or explanations to villagers, let alone any fact-finding visit by the Ujamaa and Cooperatives Officer (Ndaba, 1973:14, 43).

Peasant participation in the formal development planning process, then, has tended to be ineffective. It is ineffective because peasants lack the knowledge necessary to allow them to manipulate the system. They don't know enough of the techniques of planning to produce technically coherent plans. Nor do they have information on national plans and priorities as they would need to design plans easily integrated into regional plans. They lack knowledge of the bureaucratic style of operations, and in this still personalistic system they rarely know the right people. Hence they cannot effectively advocate their own position. Bureaucrats, faced with people whom they may look down on on class and/or tribal grounds and who present technically incomplete or unfeasible proposals, are likely not to be sympathetic. They certainly have no reason to be sympathetic. The system rewards responses to orders

from above. There is no one whose job it is to listen to and advocate for the peasantry. Bureaucrats, in addition to the national agenda, have their own career agendas to watch out for. The need to get something visible done fast in order to advance tends to wipe out any tendency to go through the slow and tedious process of eliciting real peasant participation. In any event, bureaucrats' definition of their job, is "to bring the thinking of Dar es Salaam even down to the village level" (Samoff, 1976:14), not the reverse.

#### The Predominance of the Bureaucratic Definition of Development

One indication of the relative effectiveness of the bureaucracy has been the predominance of their concern with production in national policy. There are a number of indicators of this. One is the gradual disappearance of the word "ujamaa" from the public vocabulary and its replacement with "production." In 1973/74 the newspapers were full of exhortations to "go ujamaa" and full-page success stories of ujamaa villages. Now the papers are full of exhortations for greater production and discussions of technical production problems. There is only one village in the country which has the legal status of "ujamaa village"--that is, a village in which "a substantial portion of the economic activities are carried out on a communal basis" (Daily News, 20 October, 1978).

Another indication of the attempt to stimulate production has been the reactivation of the colonial by-laws mandating minimum individual acreages and good cultivation practices. Failure to obey these by-laws can be (and is) punished by jail or fines (Daily News, 15 April 1977, 18 April 1977, 25 April 1977, 1 May 1977). Not only has there been no legislative force applied to communal acreages, but the amount of individual acreage required has sometimes

precluded participation in communal farming. Credit for individual smallholders is increasingly available and in certain crops such as tobacco the percentage of smallholder producers has increased significantly. Bureaucratic concern with foreign exchange has sometimes saved expatriate-owned estates from nationalization. Yet another indication has been the attempt to increase the proportion of crops grown on government-owned parastatals. While cash crops such as sisal have long been grown by parastatals, there has been a recent endeavor to add significant acreages of food crops to parastatal production. The effect of this would be to remove control of crop production from the hands of independent smallholders and place it in the hands of managers of parastatals, where peasants would work as wage laborers (Hill, 1977).

It is not only peasant incompetence at the project planning stage that leads to bureaucratic predominance. Development plans must be funded at the national level. This funding control tends to have the effect of bringing regional programs into line with national priorities. Second, there is a whole range of decision-making processes carried on outside the planning structures which have the effect of reducing the scope of village decision making. These include "operations," localized demonstration efforts, and the simple exertion of authority by lower level government and party leaders. That is, beyond the selection of development projects, much of what would appear to be minutiae of village life are subject to official control. In part this reflects the major employment role played by the central government. Even local primary school teachers and village extension agents are employees of the central government. Their contacts and expertise are a resource valuable to the village; hence they--school teachers particularly--may assume

roles as persons of some influence in a village. In a strict sense it could be said that in these cases government officials are making village decisions. (And this very argument is made by Kimaryo (1977) regarding village-school projects in Rombo.) But this may well underestimate the subtleness of the village dynamic. An alternative explanation is that villagers have succeeded in coopting government expertise for their own use.

### Government Control in the Villages

Operations and showcase development have been discussed to some extent above. The use of coercion in a few villages may also be used to demonstrate the point to other villages that government ultimately maintains the upper hand. A rather extreme example of this was an Mtwara village, which was considered a model village but was a fishing village, and therefore its agricultural production was less than district officials desired. District and ward officials led the villagers into publicly claiming that they had a 90-acre communal farm. When a district official came to inspect the alleged farm, he found the claim to be untrue. A field force unit was then marched in armed with rifles, which they did not use, and hoes, which they did. The villagers were forced to cultivate and plant all 90 acres. Not only was a large demonstration farm established, but a demonstration of the power of the state and the fruits of noncompliance was made (Omari, 1977:49-56).

Such busy pursuit of their own interests by government officials can cause a village problems with its neighbors. Izurya village, Mwanza Region, wanted government assistance to be kept to a minimum. They feared witchcraft and antagonizing their neighbors if they received large amounts of aid. And they wanted to demonstrate that economies of scale were beneficial, a demonstration which would be diluted by large amounts of aid. Contrary to their wishes,

the DEO ordered the local primary school children to help harvest the ujamaa cotton, thereby succeeding in annoying everyone. The wajamaa were annoyed because the quality of the work was poor. The parents were annoyed because they felt their children should either be in school or at work on the family farm. Only the DEO, who had arranged for some self-serving publicity in the Sunday News, benefited (Finucane, 1974:68-69).

Government control of villages occurs in other ways. In 1969, peasants were exempted from taxes. This was a very pragmatic admission that among non-wage-earners it was simply impossible to collect taxes. As shown in Table 2 above certain amount of revenue is collected via the differential between the world market price and the producer price of various cash crops. Money is also extracted from the countryside during visits of high officials. Such visits have their benefits: the road is usually graded, the water system is repaired, the peasants have a chance to put their requests directly to the officials, and the official usually brings some form of largesse--money, a project, more capital goods. The other side of the coin is that the village is expected to contribute to the African Liberation Fund, the Unity Bridge Fund, the Dodoma CCM Office Fund, a national stadium and so on. These "voluntary contributions" can be quite burdensome.<sup>17</sup> For example, during a presidential visit Kibosho village contributed Sh.2,000 "to help the operational costs of the newly formed national airline--the Air Tanzania Corporation." During the same visit in his role "as Chairman of the Party," the president "also asked Tanzanians to continue the contributions towards the construction of the Party headquarters in Dodoma." (Daily News 5 June, 1977).

<sup>17</sup> In the sisal estates there were a series of unreported strikes protesting this very phenomenon. In urban areas organizations may be ordered to contribute and pay may be docked automatically.

The government has also established a certain amount of control over village leadership functions. This is done in two ways--control over the leaders themselves and insertion of government personnel into leadership positions.

As noted above, there is not all that much of substance for village leaders to make decisions about. Nonetheless, leaders may prove to be recalcitrant. This has clearly been the case at the national level and has led to the dismissal of members of parliament (Boesen et al. 1977:166), and the prohibition of a strong local leader from running in an election (Liebenow, 1971: 313-314).

Finucane (1974:92) discusses the fate of Mayuyu village, which consistently resisted outside interference. In a fair election, a non-TANU member was elected village chairman over a TANU member. At the insistence of the Area Commissioner he was deposed in a meeting which was boycotted by half of the villages in the area. (A poetically just ending was provided by the TANU chairman's being jailed for allegedly selling the land intended for the ujamaa farm.)

The tactic of inserting government personnel into leadership positions has not been a rousing success. Starting with the settlement schemes there has been a tendency to solve the perceived problem of poor peasant management by employing managers. In the case of the settlement schemes, the managers were viewed as not distinct from European managers by the peasants, who called the manager's housing Uzunquni, the place of the European (Brain, n.d.). Cliffe and Cunningham (1973:136) report settlers on pilot schemes who referred to themselves as "Watumwa wa Serikali" (slaves of the government). Deployment of government personnel to the countryside has since been rationalized as making skills available to villages. There have been a recent series

of attempts at this.

In a 15 May 1977 Daily News article entitled "Experts to the Villages" the government announced that from now on district officials must spend four days a week in the villages in order to serve the peasants better and more directly. After a short period of newspaper enthusiasm, the matter was quietly dropped. District officials had finessed the whole matter by claiming (quite accurately) that there was not enough transportation and so on. The whole affair was an Operation which didn't get off the ground.

Round two was the village management technician (VMT) program. This program was intended to train management technicians to serve in four or five villages to help them plan and manage economic development. A special training course was established to train these people in bookkeeping and other management skills.

Before the VMT program had really begun, yet another initiative took place in the form of the establishment of the post of village manager. In December 1977 the Prime Minister announced that 4,000 village managers were to be appointed, noting "Next year all villages should prepare annual schedules of work to increase the number of work hours" (Daily News, 25 December 1977).

In theory, 4,000 village managers were to have been in place in early February 1978. Few arrived. Recruiting had suffered several setbacks. The argument was made that village managers would cost nothing, as they could be recruited from the existing network of government employees. The recruiting net was swung unjustifiably wide, catching in its tow large numbers of primary school teachers necessary to the implementation of Universal Primary Education, high-ranking government officials, students abroad for training, and obviously unqualified low level workers. Of the remainder, many were loath to live

in villages. No one was sure what they were supposed to do (least of all the villagers) or how they were to mesh with the VMT program.

What was clear about the village manager program was that it was intended to raise production and could probably be best understood as the next stage of government penetration of the countryside. Although the managers were billed as servants of the villagers, their salary was to be paid by the central government. This had two implications--they had no incentive to listen to the villagers and a great deal of incentive to listen to the government. Nor were their livelihoods tied directly to the results of any managing they might do. If village enterprises collapsed under their tutelage, they still would get their salary.

In May 1978 it was announced the "processing of applications for the posts of village managers had been suspended until further notice." The article went on to say "it was necessary for the government to know actual requirements of village managers throughout the country before recruiting new ones." Daily News 26 May, 1978. Available evidence would suggest that the rate of attrition among those who actually reported to the villages was fairly high.

A final form of control consistent with the ideology of unity is the intimidation of opposition. Past suppression of opposition may serve to control present questioning. As one researcher found:

"Because of the past house arrests and detention of some people who were against government policies, the Ujamaa Villagers did not want to speak anything against the Ujamaa Village policies. They didn't like in fear of being arrested or detained." (Kahama, 1973:7)

Similarly Shoka (1972:101) notes:

"There is a general belief in Shinyanga District as well as in other parts of Tanzania, that the Tanzania government has an entire network of undercover agents all over the country to keep track of people who oppose TANU and its policies."

This very real and widespread fear of "security agents" can be exploited by officials with gratifying effect.

"The situation was that officials went to various areas in rural Dodoma to hold meetings. Here they talked about whatever they had to say and allowed no time for questions from the audience. Where questions were allowed, people were not expected to ask as many as more than six. When more hands were raised, an official would stand up and address the people rather threateningly and with an air of authority, "Are you opposing TANU?", "Are you opposing the government?" These people put their hands down in fear." (Kayombo et al., 1971:Part IV:28)

Such tactics are usually successful in generating at least a facade of support for government policies.

#### Peasant Recovery of the Scope of Decision-Making

As we have seen, the power of villagers has not increased all that much since colonial times. It is not that all development resources are being exploited to support a luxurious lifestyle for a small elite. To the contrary such effort has gone into improving life in the rural areas. But these efforts are made according to the definitions and timetable of outside bureaucrats. Such officials tend to try to neutralize peasant involvement in decision-making, as it tends to be unpredictable, time-consuming, and sometimes contrary to central government policy. Hence it is in their interests to keep the peasants under control--either through largesse, coercion, or manipulation. Development has become an administrative task rather than the grass-roots effort described in the writings of Nyerere. Peasants have nominal entry into the decision-making system, but de facto they have practically none.

However, the concentration of decision-making power in the hands of the party and government bureaucracies by no means indicates that the peasantry is a group of helpless pawns. To the contrary, by extrastructural means (circumventing or manipulating the formal channels of authority) the peasantry has managed to recover some scope of decision-making.

The first and probably most familiar strategy is that of passive resistance. (Passive resistance is, of course, an active strategy of looking passive, playing the passive role.) Peasants seldom say "we won't"; they simply don't. Rald (1970:25) describes the strategy as "the 'ndiyo, Bwana' attitude: an attitude of acceptance, understanding, even enthusiasm (if the speech is really good)" followed by resistance of varying degrees of passivity.

The peasants may do nothing. For example, after the rather traumatic disruptions of Operation Vijiji (villagization) maize production dropped dramatically. Although drought affected parts of the country, it would appear that a major cause of this maize shortfall was that in response to the disruption large numbers of peasants simply pulled back to subsistence production, ceasing production for the market.<sup>18</sup> The effect on the economy of the required importation of food grains was devastating. One government response was to raise the producer price of maize.

They may undertake a token effort--an initial showy burst of energy and visible signs of compliance, after which the whole thing is allowed to slide. One example of this is the prevalence of two-acre weedy communal plots around the country in compliance with ujamaa. Another example is a mountain village which was exempted from the villagization effort that moved most such villages down to the road. Their exemption was based on their promise to build a road connecting the village with the plain below. The village indeed has been busy building a road in the intervening four years. It is a lovely two-lane affair which stretches exactly a quarter of a mile from the village.

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<sup>18</sup>The integration of the peasantry into the monetized economy limits the degree to which peasants can do this. However, in 1973-74, there were no school fees to be paid. The periodic shortages of basic consumer goods (salt, sugar, cooking oil) which leave the peasantry with nothing to buy anyway, also help make this a reasonable option.

The remaining 8-3/4 miles consists of a steep footpath. The village is singularly undisturbed by visits from officials. Similarly, in 1963, after an order by the Regional Commission resulting from decreased cotton production, all the bars in Mwanza were closed down. Within five days all had reopened, a fact the Regional Commissioner thought it "best not to take note of" (Finucane, 1974:129).

Unfortunate accidents may happen. These accidents tend to happen to grade cows given to villages, which then have to be eaten. An Iringa village forced to grow tobacco cured it at 160° C., thereby curing it of all commercial value (DeVries and Fortmann, 1974:41).

Villagers may misunderstand instructions, as happened in colonial times in a village where the people were quite convinced that the extension agent had told them to boil their cotton seeds before they planted them (Coulson, 1977b:75).

A second general means of nullifying bureaucratic decisions is explicit active resistance. Active resistance is relatively rare. It tends to be the response of last resort. Sometimes, however, resistance is unambiguous. Hess (n.d.:37-38) describes an incident in which villagers suggested to an Area Commissioner that he include his extensive banana holdings in the ujamaa farm he wanted them to start from their plots. When he angrily refused, they simply laughed and walked out of the meeting. Samoff (1976:15) reports peasants' refusal to sell meat to processing plants. Or they may put officials on notice that their behavior is unacceptable. This may take a symbolic form, as when officials are the objects of witchcraft (Thoden van Velzen, 1973:170). Or it may take the form of physical violence, as when the homes or fields of officials are burned (Hess, n.d.:50; Holmquist, 1977:54).

This technique is particularly effective at more local levels. As mentioned above, the process of villagization was certainly not helped by ward secretaries and ten-cell leaders who neglected to tell villagers that they must move because they were afraid to "annoy" them. It also has a certain efficacy at higher levels, as evidenced by the timidity with which regional and district level officials discuss the explosive subject of destocking cattle.

As a general rule, nullifying government actions is probably easier than getting the government to do something. But the peasantry is also reasonably adept at mobilizing the bureaucracy.

Probably the most ingenious of these techniques is a sort of preemptive development (Omari, 1972:21, 26). A village begins a project, perhaps sponsored by an M.P., and then appeals to the government to finish it. For example, the floors and walls of a dispensary may be built and then the government is asked to provide a tin roof, a dispenser, and supplies. The government is thus maneuvered into living up to its rhetoric about self-help and people's planning. Not only does this strategy get the village what it wants, but it may divert the government from undertaking what the village does not want.

Villagers are also able to bargain for what they want. A village in Pangani refused to send its women to the ujamaa farm until the government completed the water supply it had promised. Later they insisted on the provision of famine relief before they would begin planting (von Freyhold, 1973:8-10, n.d.:14). Rugamisa and Barnes (Holmquist, 1977:45) report a Morogoro Region village in which "the 18 acre plot seems to be something to bargain with for more benefits and attention." Villagers can sometimes use a squeaky wheel technique to capitalize on their own permanence in the

landscape to control lower level officials. Villagers have no formal control over such officials. However, since transfer is easier to accomplish than conciliation, villagers can sometimes get rid of an official they dislike by vigorous complaining. In this manner the officials of one village succeeded in getting rid of a road foreman. Although their real reason for dissatisfaction was his refusal to employ the relative of the Party Branch Chairman, they complained loudly that he had engaged in adultery and corruption, and he was transferred.

Such tactics are successful only when the issue is a personal one. When the source of conflict is not the person but the policy he/she is enforcing, the government is more likely to take a hard line, perhaps softening it with token placatory action. A case in point involved a cashew grading officer in Mtwara. Under a previous system of self-grading, peasants had cheated the government with awesome regularity. When grading officers were sent to the villages, peasants considered them superfluous, since the former system had operated quite satisfactorily from their point of view. As far as the villagers were concerned, it was impossible for the grading officers to perform in a satisfactory manner. To make matters worse, the grading officers in one village were also personally objectionable--disrespectful and abusive.<sup>19</sup> The villagers threatened that unless the graders were removed from the village they would beat them up, use witchcraft against them, and refuse to sell any cashew nuts. As noted above, staff may be sacrificed in order to defuse a conflict, while the policy remains in force. But in this case the conflict was too intimately involved with the official role of the graders.

<sup>19</sup>The importance of respect and honor (heshima) cannot be over-emphasized. One constant theme in Daily News interviews with elders is the lack of respect for elders among today's youth (Daily News 5 July, 1978). Klingelhofer (1971:193-194) found that secondary students considered heshima or obedience to be the most important thing they could teach their children.

Hence the Area Commissioner dealt with the personality conflict by promising to give the offenders political education, but they were not transferred (Mdidi, 1977:37).

Finally, the clientelist pattern which characterizes intravillage affairs is also found in village/official relations. Direct appeals to higher authorities are a popular tactic. If a national leader (Minister, Vice-President, or President) is present at a rally, people turn out en masse to voice their complaints. Geneya (1976:206) reports the following song sung at a Union Day mass rally in Shinyanga:

"You M.P.'s who go to parliament send the following message to Nyerere. Tell him that we are grieved that we are paying taxes even for our dogs. Tell him that we can not build corrugated iron houses because taxes are too high. It seems as if destocking has come back because even cattle are paying taxes. So you M.P.'s tell him the truth."

Lower officials do their best to neutralize these direct appeals by controlling the contact that takes place (Daily News, 12 December 1977). Villagers in poor, remote, or recalcitrant villages are rarely afforded this opportunity, in any event.

Villagers denied access to an official may actively seek one out. In 1973 the Party promulgated rules on what constituted decent attire. At the height of this dress code campaign no Maasai woman wearing the traditional beaded skin skirt was allowed to use public facilities--buses, dispensaries, shops, government offices. The women rose to the occasion by gathering together to curse the Maasai leader of the community who had made the announcement and to collect money for a bus trip to Dar es Salaam to protest en masse to the President. This evoked considerable activity on the part of officials. The curse was lifted by the slaughtering of a number of cattle, and the women were dissuaded from their expedition.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> This incident is illustrative of the apparent tendency for people to think that "if only Mwalimu (Nyerere) knew" a policy would be changed.

A great deal of effort is also centered around wooing anyone with power or influence. Anyone who has ties to the village by virtue of kinship or elected position is exploited. Members of parliament are used to advocate the village position to district officials. Those who are ineffective in this respect are often voted out of office in the next election (Hill, 1974: 217). High placed government officials are expected to favor their home area with development projects. "Prizes" and "contributions" may be used to curry favor with lower level officials (Mddidi, 1977:50, 59). It is generally assumed that a village without such patrons can expect to get nothing.

The skewed distribution of certain goods and services does provide some support for this belief. In Kiterere Ward, Mtwara District, schools are concentrated in a few villages, despite the lack of students, because of the influence of party officials. In the same area a tractor was given to the village where the ward chairman lives. During Operation Vijiji large villages were moved to the sites of small villages for reasons of official favoritism. Villages in the area adjusted their expectations according to the strength of their patron-client relations. A village in which former government officials lived was presumed to be cooperative because their presence ensured government assistance. Another village expected absolutely nothing from the government, since they were in conflict with the district TANU chairman. Another village was convinced the sole factor which accounted for their proposals' not being funded was the hostility of government officials. Accordingly, they sent a delegation of wealthy peasants to complain to the M.P., whom they perceive as "their man from among themselves." He is seen as someone who can deal with the civil servants, who are considered foreign (Mddidi, 1977:50, 59; Omari, 1977:20-21, 24). Another strategy is to leapfrog the structure, dealing with the equivalent official at a higher level.

What has been demonstrated here is that although at first glance the bureaucrats appear to hold all the trump cards in the strongly centralized system, the peasants maintain a certain amount of power. By manipulating or circumventing formal channels of authority, they are able to compel the bureaucracy to initiate parts of their agenda. And they can do this because they hold a trump card in the form of their labor--what the bureaucrat gets done depends on what the peasants do, and they both know this. If the bureaucracy wishes to implement its agenda, it must be willing to implement part of the peasant agenda. Sometimes this tradeoff is explicit--early settlement schemes and ujamaa villages were showered with goods and services. Sometimes the relationship is far more subtle. But that the rules of exchange are implicit in the minds of the peasants is indicated by their outrage when the government fails to observe the rules--for example, by burning down an ujamaa village during Operation Vijiji or failing to suitably reward a cooperative village.

While bureaucrats have a near monopoly on the use of force, such coercion is costly in both financial and social terms and hence is not practical as a frequent or long-term strategy to bring about compliance. As long as government policy is not too far removed from the interests of peasants, and vice versa, one can expect grounds for compromise. One reason Operation Vijiji was so bitterly fought (and in places it was, in fact, a genuine battle) was that it threatened the basis for peasant production. The elite and alien nature of the bureaucracy tends to reduce the grounds for compromise, and the demands of bureaucratic operations reduce the time available to establish it. Again the pattern becomes apparent that to the central government, local government is a tool either for advancing a particular bureaucrat's career or for furthering the center's definition of development. Rhetoric to the

contrary, local government is not viewed as having integrity in its own right. The patterns of colonial time--the disposition and imposition of leaders, the precipitous imposition of projects, the proforma nature of most village participation in central operations--all reappear to the detriment of building local capacity for undertaking development efforts.

Thus the exchange system has an important function. One of the characteristics of Tanzania is, a tension between the ideological commitment to local participatory self-government and the pragmatic need for centralized, integrated planning. The bureaucratic structure which has been established to do the latter has little capacity to be flexible or responsive to local needs and demands. It is peasant initiative in defense of their own development agenda which has forced responsiveness into the system. It is in this context that Tanzanian rural development is taking place.

## V. PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT: SELF-HELP AND UJAMAA

With 95 percent of the population on the land, presumably to remain there for some time yet, Tanzania's development is inevitably rural development. Rural development has taken many forms. One is the placement of institutions--secondary schools, hospitals--by the government with preferential treatment given, in accordance with the policy of frontal development, to less developed areas. Facilitation of cash crop production--provision of inputs, extension services, purchase and transportation of the crop--has been the responsibility of the respective crop authorities, supplemented by various donor activities. But village development has been seen, at the conceptual level, as a participatory process to be undertaken by the villagers themselves. There have been two major explicit components of village development efforts--self-help and ujamaa. Both have been viewed as means of mobilizing village resources, particularly labor, and placing responsibility for progress at the village level on the shoulders of villagers themselves. However, the tendencies toward central control described above have fatally affected both self-help and ujamaa.

### Self-Help

Traditionally, labor could be mobilized on both a community and an individual basis. In some areas villagers belonged to work groups which worked regularly on the members' fields. A farmer who faced a singular need for help could mobilize festive labor--calling his/her neighbors together to harvest or weed or whatever and providing drink and some food afterwards. Group efforts were also devoted to the provision of infrastructure. Mbawala

(1977:62-65), describes the organization of traditional irrigation in Uchagga along cooperative clan lines. These projects, focused primarily on production, benefited the community to the extent that the community was interdependent, but their immediate beneficiaries were individuals--the rewards were divisible.

The colonialists mobilized labor for less divisible purposes. Under the Germans, self-help tended to mean that the African self-helped the colonial effort. The akida system was utilized for the purpose of turning out laborers for road building and so on. Under the British, self-help shifted towards community development and cooperatives. With Independence, self-help became a rallying cry for building the nation.

In the case studies presented below, the central variable which appears again and again is participation. Some self-help projects, as shall be seen, are initiated from the outside; others are initiated by a small group of insiders, and still others through general participation. Participation is important in mobilization for self-help for these reasons. As noted above, peasants and officials differ in their definition of development. Officials are likely to try to initiate production-oriented projects--building storage facilities or a road, terracing, planting trees, etc. Peasants, on the other hand, are more interested in social services, as reflected in the plans they submit to the government. Leonard et al. (1975:5, 16) found that of all the projects in their sample, social infrastructure projects were most often considered to be satisfactory. At the same time, the government's attempt to shift efforts towards directly productive projects could be seen in the drop in the proportion of social infrastructure projects from 57 percent of all projects over T.Sh.10,000/-in 1971/72 to 31 percent in 1974/75. Villagers who participate in project planning are

obviously unlikely to choose a project which they are not interested in completing. (A clue to government planners should be those things on which people are already spending money. They spend money on medical services (sometimes in preference to free government services) and water. Some herders have constructed and run their own dips, hired their own veterinarian. Schools, teachers' quarters, and roads vary in their appeal. A second important aspect of participation is the commitment it generates. Self-help is, after all, a form of taxation and thus is subject to evasion. Self-help can only stagger along with token efforts unless sufficient commitment is generated. When genuine commitment is forthcoming, the village is likely to enforce sanctions against the recalcitrant. (Fleuret (1979) reports that in the Usambara Mountains failure to contribute labor to a community project results in the fine of a hen, for example.)

An instructive example of how self-help can operate occurred in the mid-'50s on Mount Meru. In the late '40s the British had developed a scheme for establishing a hoof-and-mouth-free zone on the mountain by resettling the people living there. After an attempt to bring about resettlement by force and an appeal to the United Nations by the Meru, the plan was dropped. The struggle had created solidarity among some of the Meru, who subsequently decided to carry on their own economic development without the assistance of the British. They hired their own expatriate advisor and proceeded to build roads, bridges, schools, and a coffee factory and to undertake improved agricultural production, particularly coffee production. Although the organization was not without its problems, the level of energy and commitment was high, in all probability as a direct result of both the solidarity engendered by the land case and the continuing control of the enterprise by the people involved. (See Japhet and Seaton, 1967; Mbise, 1974; and Nelson, 1967.)

As development projects become more technically sophisticated and more expensive, government involvement becomes almost inevitable. It becomes necessary to develop a balance of government and village participation and responsibility. There is always the chance that projects undertaken with no government input will stall for technical or financial reasons. The Daily News of 15 June 1977 described a ten-kilometer water trench which, dug without technical advice, had to be completely redug. Msuya (1978) describes a case of an attempt at preemptive development that failed--a clinic begun with T.Sh. 2,600 in contributions but which came to a standstill for lack of government commitment. It is important, too, to think beyond the establishment of the project to the on-going process of maintaining it. Since only the national government has the power to raise revenue, and since it has discouraged users' fees, it is often the only source of funds for recurrent expenses. Some of the early self-help efforts failed because they were viewed as one-shot efforts with no long-run maintenance component. Roads constructed with the expectation that the government would take them over and maintain them rapidly became overgrown. Thus it must be understood when the argument for village participation is made, it should not be an argument for isolation or total autonomy. That is no longer a practical proposition. It is an argument for village control, including veto power, in the process of mobilization for self-help.

The importance of this can be seen in the following case studies:

Msuya (1978) describes three projects. A nine-kilometer road project was undertaken through hilly rough terrain by villagers with absolutely no notice or help from ward or district leaders until four kilometers had already been completed. Lacking modern equipment, villagers used traditional methods

to blow up huge boulders. When the road had reached four kilometers, government officials decided to assist the effort by requiring people from other villages to contribute labor to complete it. Not motivated by the strong sense of need felt by the people who began the project, other villagers were less enthusiastic about working. Government officials found it necessary to apply sanctions (fines) to get the work completed. In this case participation by the villagers provided the initiative to get the project under way. Government participation was supportive but ultimately succeeded in annoying neighboring villages by demands for their labor.

The fate of two school buildings illustrates the effect of no consultation. One school building which was initiated by outsiders took seven months rather than the normal two to complete. Local enthusiasm for the project was low, as schools were simply not perceived as important. Yet another school building took over a year to complete due to the organization of its financing, which narrowed support to the parents of school children. The plan was that parents would contribute a fixed amount of money for each child in school. This eliminated the option of contributing labor rather than cash, which people with low cash incomes often prefer, and placed a large burden on people with many children.

The issue is not just village participation but participation within the village as well, as illustrated by the case study presented in Chapter III. While the battle over payment to the artisans raged, the project remained at a standstill.

Coerced or nonparticipatory self-help has additional costs. Hatfield and Ole Kuney (Hoben, 1976:50) point out that in Maasailand it is increasingly rare for anyone other than officials to be involved in the planning, locating,

and construction of water facilities. Not only does this reduce commitment to long-term maintenance, but it may result in siting and construction errors.

Coordination between various parts of the government is also important. Nyiera (1978:24-26) describes the case of Misasi village, which sent three villagers to be trained as agriculturalists only to have them and the village tractor driver snatched up by the nearby agricultural research institute. "Hence the villagers have now declined any government offer to select some of its members to undergo training, for the past experience is still fresh in their minds."

Such an example raises the issue of stability. Villages do make rather spectacular commitments of resources. One village in Arumeru District contributed T.Sh.76,000/- for a water system and yet another contributed T.Sh.60,000/-, with a further commitment for T.Sh.325,000/-, for a coffee factory water supply. Four villages banded together with T.Sh.203,000/- for a bus. Members of a new ujamaa village arduously cleared 1,000 acres of sisal and thorn trees by hand and then committed an entire year's ujamaa earnings to buying a tractor (Fortmann, 1977:50). Such commitment requires an assurance that the government is not going to change the ground rules tomorrow. The sense of collective responsibility implies government responsibility to and respect for the collective decision as well.

The attempt of the central government to control mobilization at the village level can interfere with self-help. One manifestation is the tendency to try to contain all organizations which are not part of the official party/government structure. In 1975, 93 percent, and in 1976, 96 percent of the youth in Misasi who belonged to any organization belonged to traditional cooperative youth organizations which the party youth organization refused

to recognize (Nyiera, 1978:51-60). Thus these organizations could not officially be used for self-help. A second problem is demobilization resulting from the government's insistence that it pay for certain infrastructure (Hoben, 1976:71). Or the government may discourage self-help because it conflicts with government priorities (Liebenow, 1971:304).

The bureaucracy not only restricts the channels it will work through but has a tendency to force self-help projects it fancies through the official channels. The urge for showcase development surfaces here. Self-help may take place only for appearance's sake (highly paid administrators doing road work miles from their offices while papers pile up on their desks) or because some bureaucrat likes the particular project--then villagers work because they have been told to, not out of any sense of mutual self-interest. Technical officers complain about the resulting quality of the work.

"Self-help is just words. People might come out for half an hour and then go home. You can't force them to work on projects like digging a pipeline. You can't sack them if they don't work. We are always losing time and money with this self-help thing."  
(Fortmann, 1977:51)

The complaint of inefficiency seems universal. It is widely believed in Tanzania that if the famous Kondoa pipeline had been built with hired labor, it would have been cheaper and faster than building it with volunteer who had to be transported, fed, and housed. Leonard et al. (1975:20) found that in 75 percent of the self-help projects undertaken with popular participation and 60 percent of those without it, the project was completed late.

The degree to which self-help has been successful varies from area to area. Water projects still command a high turnout in arid areas. Operation Bootstrap still regularly mobilizes labor and cash for building classrooms and teachers' quarters. But often self-help is not viewed as rewarding and the overall rate has dropped. Leonard et al. (1975:23-24) found that the

percent of self-help projects with good participation had dropped from 64 percent in 1971-72 to 29 percent in 1974-75. Samoff (1976:9) maintains that there is now a higher level of self-help in Kenya, where it has been integrated into the political patronage process. In Tanzania self-help has tended to become one more vehicle for the implementation of an outside development agenda. As Tibanyendera (1975:23-24) points out, when the coercion involved in the early self-help efforts fell off, so did the self-help. The experience with self-help demonstrates the need for integrated participation. With the abolition of district councils, the last representative subnational policy-making body disappeared. This has left only the bureaucracy as an integrator of village activities. Self-help thus has the potential for consisting of many incoherent units. It is only through the bureaucracy that coherence can be arranged. It is simpler from the bureaucrat's point of view to dictate the coherence to start with. It is this very dictation which destroys the commitment to self-help, resulting in the inefficiency noted above.

### Ujamaa

Some of the concerns involved with self-help are repeated in the case of ujamaa, but in an exaggerated form due to the policy emphasis on ujamaa. Ujamaa policy has two components--nucleated village settlement and collective agricultural production. The latter has tended to receive the greatest publicity while it is rather the former which has been implemented. As will be shown in greater detail below, there is very little collective agricultural production in Tanzania.

Living in nucleated settlements (villagization, as it has come to be called) has been an important part of rural development policy since 1962,

when Nyerere in his inaugural address stated:

The first and absolutely essential thing to do, therefore, if we want to be able to start using tractors for cultivation, is to begin living in proper villages . . . . For the next few years, the Government will be doing all it can to enable the farmers of Tanganyika to come together in village communities.

The vision of ujamaa life is best captured by the words of Nyerere himself (1968:348, 351-353):

The basis of rural life in Tanzania must be the practice of cooperation in its widest sense--in living, in working, and in distribution, and all with the acceptance of the absolute equality of all men and women.

. . . In a socialist Tanzania then, our agricultural organization would be predominantly that of co-operative living and working for the good of all. This means that most of our farming would be done by groups of people who live as a community and work as a community. They would live together in a village; they would farm together; market together; and undertake the provision of local services and small local requirements as a community. Their community would be the traditional family group, or any other group of people living according to ujamaa principles, large enough to take account of modern methods and the twentieth century needs of man. The land this community farmed would be called 'our land' by all the members; the crops they produced on that land would be 'our crops'; it would be 'our shop' which provided individual members with the day-to-day necessities from outside; 'our workshop' which made the bricks from which houses and other buildings were constructed, and so on.

. . . Most important, of all, any increase in the amount of wealth we produce under this system would be 'ours'; it would not belong just to one or two individuals, but to all those whose work had produced it. At the same time we should have strengthened our traditional equality and our traditional security. For in a village community a man who is genuinely sick during the harvest would not be left to starve for the rest of the year, nor would the man whose wife is ill find the children uncared for--as he might do if he farms on his own.

The bases of appeal implicit in this are three-fold: the benefits of the economies of scale associated with larger scale production and modern agricultural practices; social security in a communal setting; and the reduction of inequality. However pursuing "ujamaa" did not necessarily ensure the adoption of modern agriculture. At the village level traditional arrangements for social security still function. And, as can be seen in

Table 11, although there is skewed distribution of landholdings, the inequality with a few exceptions is not all that great. As the table shows most peasants own less than 5 acres. Further, such inequality as existed has tended to persist after the implementation of ujamaa. There were, then, often no compelling reasons for peasants to "go ujamaa" as was demonstrated during the implementation period.

Table 11.     Land Distribution among Private Smallholders

<u>Place</u>	<u>This % of the population</u>	<u>Hold this % of all land</u>	<u>% of the pop. with less than 2 acres</u>	<u>% of the pop. with less than 5 acres</u>
Ismani <sup>a</sup>	9%	53%		
	.01%	21%		
Rungwe <sup>b</sup>	6% - 10%	0%	37% - 78%	75% - 96%
Bukoba <sup>c</sup>	3%	0%		
	50%	33%	60%	99%
	47%	66%		
Bukoba <sup>d</sup>	25%	10%	about 60%	about 90%
	30%	40%		
Bukoba <sup>e</sup>	10%	19% - 27%	more than	
	60%	36% - 38%	50% (f)	
Usambara <sup>g</sup>	33.3%	66.6%	90% <sup>h</sup>	99.5% <sup>h</sup>
Usambara <sup>i</sup>	33.3%	60% - 76%		
Usambara <sup>j</sup>	Wealthiest 25% hold mean of 6.8 acres; poorest 75% hold mean of 2.5 acres.			
Mbeya <sup>k</sup>	12.8%	0%		
Kilimarjaro <sup>l</sup>	Leaders own 15 - 19 acres; common people 0.56 acres			

a. Awiti 1973

b. Van Hekken and Thoden Van Velzen 1972

c. Reining 1967

d. Friedrich 1968

e. Boesen et al. 1977

f. Rald and Rald 1975

g. Attems 1968

h. 1975-1980 Tanga Regional Development Plan

i. Sender 1974

j. Fleuret 1978

k. Pipping 1976

l. Sawe 1975

The implementation of ujamaa has brought out the contradictions inherent in relations between peasants and officials. These contradictions began with the very first ujamaa villages, which had banded together in the Ruvuma Development Association (RDA). RDA was started in 1963, four years before the Arusha Declaration, and was reputedly part of the inspiration for Nyerere's idea of ujamaa. By 1969 the Association had 17 member villages and a number of communally owned enterprises--a grain mill, a timber mill, a diesel truck, a tractor, and so on. The primary school was organized around education for village life. The village and the Association was the symbol of ujamaa village life. (See Wenner (1970) Shamba Letu for a description of daily life in Litowa village.

Strangely, with the implementation of ujamaa, this spontaneous "pilot project" was shut down. The unpublished account by Ralph Ibbott (1969), who helped to begin the communal experiment, states that the TANU Central Committee decided the RDA should be disbanded and the Minister for Rural Development flew with Central Committee members to Songea (near RDA) to see that this decision was implemented immediately. According to Ibbott,

This group told the people of Litowa village that the Association was plotting against the party; that the party was to put a Secretary into the village; that the party was to control all village development; that development in the Association's villages was too slow.

In this situation at present there is nowhere where people can challenge such action, and it had to be accepted. Questions by the villagers received intimidating answers and showed that apart from deciding that there was to be absolute party control, other details concerning the future of activities carried out by the Association had not been thought out. (p. 1)

It is Ibbott's contention that the RDA, with its emphasis on village democracy, was perceived as a threat by insecure district and regional officials, who felt the need to be in complete control of village activities. It is possible that RDA, with its countrywide connections was

perceived as a potential power base and hence as a threat. (It is not clear whether the presence of an expatriate exacerbated this perception.) It may also be that strong village democracies--particularly groups of villages working in association--that might question government or party officials were simply not acceptable. It has been noted that historically horizontal links have been reasonably rare in Tanzania. (McCarthy, 1977: 585.) And government actions have tended to increase fragmentation. Previous cooperative unions were broken up and replaced by the village as the unit of buying and distribution. District Councils were broken up and replaced by direct village representation to and interaction with government officials. The only viable links are vertical ones from the village as a single unit to the government. Integration is done at the upper layer of administration, well above the mass of individual, fragmented village units.

Ujamaa as described in Nyerere's writings and as practiced in the RDA was a highly participatory organizational form for practical as well as philosophical reasons. If people were to work a common field and share its produce, they had to have some common understanding of what was going to happen, what the ground rules were. They had to be committed to making it work, and such commitment would best be engendered by participation. But participation was a slow, uncertain thing. Participatory decision making could take months and result in "no." Once ujamaa was announced as a national policy, it was the responsibility of bureaucrats to implement it. Nyerere's writings about voluntariness to the contrary, bureaucrats could not afford months of participatory process or a "no" answer. Bureaucrats, as noted above, had to produce something visible quickly, lest they appear to be in opposition

to the policy or administratively inept. Hence they began implementing ujamaa in the most efficient way they knew, which tended to involve a high amount of force.

From the beginning the implementation of ujamaa tended to focus on getting people into villages. And it tended to be concentrated in the less productive areas. There are two reasons for this. Many of the cash cropping areas were characterized by dense population concentrations and land pressure. For all practical purposes, people were already living in villages. Any movement encouraged in these areas tended to be movement out to new areas in order to alleviate land pressure. Second, cash crops provided most of the country's foreign exchange. Reportedly, in some areas orders came from the Treasury to leave existing production patterns (even including expatriate-owned estates) alone--the country couldn't afford the loss in foreign exchange which disruption would inevitably bring.

So implementation began in the poorer areas, where the people and the nation had little to lose. The first order of business was to get people into villages. Once they were there, it was less clear what was to be done with them. The first problem was that there was a fair amount of confusion about what ujamaa might mean. Many people thought that it meant living together in villages. Others thought it must mean utilizing traditional labor-sharing practices. District officials often proved to be as vague as anyone else on the subject, which may account for the emphasis on the villagization component, which was unambiguous (Ndunguru, 1973:106, 275). Dire descriptions of ujamaa began to circulate, sometimes encouraged by those who felt their private interests to be threatened by ujamaa. Wild rumors (which resurfaced during Operation Vijiji) had it

that ujamaa meant the nationalization of such property as wives, children, and cattle. Uncertainty about the implication of communally owned property produced fears that if your child was hungry, you would not be able to take a cob of maize from the communal field. Local tensions were expressed in beliefs that ujamaa meant moving to a village where you would be bewitched and unknowingly forced to work (see Chale, 1973:24, 27; Ntirukigwa, 1971:40, 43; Mboya, 1971:66; Muzo, 1976:41, Mdidi, 1977:57; Bugengo, 1973:4; von Freyhold, 1973:8). Elsewhere, settlers in a new ujamaa village were astonished to find that hiring labor was forbidden (Mboya, 1971:65).

In the midst of the atmosphere of uncertainty, implementation took place in varying bursts over a six-year period following the Arusha Declaration. The initial implementation was of two sorts--starting communal production in existing villages or starting new villages including communal production. Some of this was done voluntarily, but two places were noted for force or threats of force--Handeni District and West Lake Region. In West Lake the Regional Commissioner announced he had "started a war in the region and anyone opposing it would find himself in a precarious position." And some people who were unwilling to move into this new village in fact found themselves in jail (Musoke 1971:4). Such enforced ujamaa was disastrous, and four years later some of these villages were still dependent on famine relief for survival. In response to this bureaucratic excess, President Nyerere issued a paper stating, "Socialist communities cannot be established by compulsion." (Nyerere, 1968:356). Presidential Circular Number 1 of 1969 followed, directing government agencies to put their efforts into demonstrating the advantages of communal farming and discouraging private farming. The day of the carrot had arrived. Villages announced they were

"going ujamaa" and became the recipients of maize mills, storage sheds, tractors, seeds, fertilizer, and any number of things which might or might not contribute to the viability of the village but which were certainly unrelated to the level of productivity of the ujamaa farm.

Despite the statement about voluntariness, 1969 was the occasion of the first mass movement of people. Operation Rufiji moved the entire population of the lower Rufiji floodplain into ujamaa villages on higher ground. While the move was well organized, at no point were peasants consulted about the nature of their new villages (Turok, 1975:154).

By 1970 it was becoming apparent that ujamaa villages were not all that it was hoped they would be. The response was to deploy civil servants to the field in the form of Presidential Planning Teams. These stayed a few days in each village and generally came up with unrealistic targets and list of aids to be given to villagers (Coulson, 1974:13). Again, meaningful peasant participation in the process was impossible.

Meanwhile, Dr. Wilbert Klerruu, who was literally a driving force behind Ujamaa, moved the peasants of Mtwara into 750 villages within the period of one year. (Mtwara, it should be understood, was a military zone due to the liberation war being fought in Mozambique; hence to some extent villages were required for strategic reasons.) The following year he was transferred to Iringa, where within a year he had raised the number of new villages from 22 to 629. (It was there that he was subsequently killed.)

In 1971 the government undertook Operation Dodoma. Under the policy that only those living in villages would receive famine assistance, 30,000 families moved into 190 villages, two with over 500 families each. The government ploughed 21,000 acres, which were to be planted and harvested individually (Coulson, 1974:13). From this point onward, various Operations

made it clear that the emphasis was on villagization rather than ujamaa.

This brief chronology of the implementation of ujamaa does no justice to the small groups of peasants who settled new land or pooled their holdings and began cultivating communally. There is no question but that there were smallholders who responded to the vision. But the masses of people involved were those moved in one Operation or another. For them there was no consultation or participation. When one begins to look at ujamaa in practice, the results of this nonparticipatory implementation become apparent. It is, in fact, very difficult to talk about ujamaa, since so much of what was called ujamaa was bureaucratically imposed form with little if any ujamaa substance. Ujamaa became a tactic used by both peasants and bureaucrats. Bureaucrats forced ujamaa fields and villages into existence so they would look good to their superiors. Peasants "went ujamaa" (sometimes by the simple expedient of sign painting) in order to get officials off their backs or to get in on the general largesse. Genuine grass-roots efforts tended to fall afoul of bureaucratic agendas. (And it is interesting to note that the policies forced on peasants, from Operation Maduka to ujamaa, were rarely enforced in the towns where the bureaucrats lived.)

Even without bureaucratic meddling in their daily affairs, ujamaa villages created by force had a tough row to hoe. Nyerere's descriptions of ujamaa left a number of issues vague.

Where was ujamaa land to come from? Private production was permitted to continue side by side with ujamaa production. Who, then, would be fool enough to contribute his or her best land to an enterprise thrust upon the village by a fashionably dressed official whose land rover would never pass that way again? The problem was more easily solved in newly settled villages or villages where expropriated land was made available. In others

some token patch of land would be designated the ujamaa farm. Block farming, which was another bureaucratic enthusiasm, was more easily finessed. Village leaders would explain that the village had a 250-acre block farm, neglecting to mention that it consisted of private plots scattered all over.

There are no data available on the quality of ujamaa land, although informal observations indicate it tends to be some of the poorer land. Figures are available, however, on quantity of land, although there is no guarantee on the accuracy of these figures. As related above, there is good reason to exaggerate the size of these fields. Further, simple measuring inaccuracies could lead to either over- or underestimations. But the figures presented in Appendix B are probably indicative of the general trend of ujamaa land.

Two facts are apparent from this analysis. For those villages for which time series data are available, it is obvious that the size of the ujamaa plot does not increase in proportion to population increase. This may indicate a number of things. It may indicate that the original field was simply established as a token, or it may indicate that new land was not available for expansion. What it would seem to indicate is that new members are not contributing private land to the enterprise. (And it is fairly likely that they do have private land, since few ujamaa plots produce enough to meet subsistence needs.)

A second thing these figures show is that although ujamaa data may be impressive on an aggregate basis, on a per capita or per family basis the amount of land devoted to ujamaa is very small. The average family holding varies by area, depending on availability of land and on climatic conditions, but the rule of thumb is that at least an acre is necessary to support a family, and most families farm one to two acres. Of 118 ujamaa farms for which data are

available, only a third had more than an acre per family (or per member when family could not be estimated). The implication of this is that even if the ujamaa farm is exceptionally productive, in most villages it is unlikely to produce enough to meet village subsistence needs.

A second point on which Nyerere's vision tended to be vague was the organization and reward of labor. Early experiments in adopting the working party concept on all village land in rotation proved to benefit large landholders disproportionately and hence were abandoned (Thoden van Velsen, 1970:5). The systems which evolved tended to be based on work points or piece work. The former system had problems. It was difficult to control quality of labor. In most villages one got points simply for turning up for work. Whether one spent the subsequent four hours leaning on a hoe or working vigorously was irrelevant. Some villages evolved systems which gave more points for harder or more skilled jobs and tried to establish quality control. Others would excuse skilled laborers such as masons and carpenters from all work except when their particular skill was required. Then they would be expected to pitch in full time. All these arrangements inevitably produced arguments over equity and equivalence. Why should tractor drivers who rode around all day get more points than women wielding hoes in the hot sun? Unhappiness over work organization and the priority placed on private fields tended to produce high absenteeism (rates higher than on nearby private estates in some cases -- Nellis, 1970:22, 26) and sloppy work. As a result, output was low, turning fears about ujamaa into self-fulfilling prophecy. Low expectations led to low effort, which resulted in low productivity. Figures on ujamaa production are difficult to come by, but with one exception they show it to be of negligible importance. McHenry (1976:5) found that

communal contributions to GDP/capita from agriculture, veterinary, fish and forestry in 1974 were 0.17 percent in Dodoma Region, 2.11 percent in Iringa Region, 0.09 percent in Kigoma Region, and 0.16 percent in Kilimanjaro.

(Both Dodoma and Iringa had been the sites of large-scale ujamaa campaigns.) Sumra (1975:8) compared private and communal yields for five crops in three parts of Handeni District. On the average, private yields were 2.7 times greater--the range being from 1.5 to 6.7 times greater--than ujamaa yields. Ndissi (1975), in contrast, claiming that findings of low productivity were a function of the relative newness of the villages concerned, found ujamaa yields to be 2.0 to 3.2 times higher than small-holder yields for ground-nuts, beans, seed cotton, and maize. (Unfortunately, data are not available to test his hypothesis.) Mismanagement and corruption further reduce what is available for shareout. Sender's Usambara study (1974:23, 29-33) found a universal pattern of mismanagement and corruption in which thousands of shillings were undistributed and unaccounted for. In one instance women simply stopped turning up for work after the proceeds of their UWT maize farm were stolen by a District Council official who was given their money for safekeeping.

Ujamaa, then, has not been quite the success that was hoped for. Much of the difficulty can be laid to problems of participation at two levels. The first level is that of village/government interaction. Exclusion of villages from decision making leaves villages in a position of being able to respond to force only in kind (which occasionally happens but is not a particularly viable strategy) or to acquiesce. The sort of commitment which should typify ujamaa is found in Makiba village. Makiba was formerly the site of an expatriate-owned sisal estate which was turned over to the workers.

The villagers have shown great vigor in the way they have undertaken to solve their problems--they have also made the decisions themselves. The villagers cleared a backbreaking 1,000 acres of old sisal plants and thorn trees by hand and planted 300 acres to maize. In order to obtain a reliable water supply, they built a water tank--also by hand. Five hundred chickens are kept to provide eggs for the village children. After the 1975/76 season the village met together and decided that rather than dividing the ujamaa profits among the members, they would use all the money to buy a village tractor. Such sustained levels of commitment and enterprise seldom result from government fiat. Rather they arise from village identification of problems and solutions. When officials identify the problem as production and the solution as ujamaa, the response may not be too enthusiastic, even if the identification of the problem and the answer are correct. Official failure to recognize this can be a problem. One of the greatest wishes of the people of Makiba is to have a typewriter in order that they might communicate more effectively with district officials. The villagers hold national leaders, especially the President, in great esteem. They consider local officials to be the source of problems--terminating village enterprises without explanation or warning, transferring village workers, and ignoring their requests. If only they had a typewriter, they say, they could present their communications in a more official form and perhaps they would be taken more seriously.

P. Fleuret (1979) documents another case of government interference in the Usambaras in Misunguli Village. In that case farmers banded together to market vegetables from their private farms on a cooperative basis, calling the enterprise an ujamaa village. This worked well, and the village proceeded

to outproduce its neighbors. However, district TANU officials, on the grounds that socialist organizations were being used for non-socialist purposes, dismissed all village chairmen in the area. The marketing organization fell apart in the resulting confusion, and the following year vegetable acreage decreased.

In both these cases district officials destroyed village development initiatives apparently because they did not fit with the officials' notion of what was appropriate. Whatever the motive of the official, the effect is ultimately the same--discouragement and alienation.

Whatever the level of participation of the village as a unit vis-a-vis the government, participation within the village is important as well. As noted above, some ujamaa villages have become fiefdoms operating for the convenience and profit of a few leaders who skim off some or all of the surplus. Declining levels of ujamaa work seem to characterize these villages. Other descriptions of villagers' simply refusing to work seem to support this.

Mpesha (1976) collected data on participation in village decision making and participation in ujamaa work in two Bukoba villages. When his data were reanalyzed, the following regression equation resulted:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{WDAY} = & -7.885 + 28.755 \text{ VILL}^{**} - 8.518 \text{ MALE} + 7.540 \text{ MEET}^{**} + \\ & (8.039) \qquad (9.194) \qquad (2.392) \\ & 5.872 \text{ TALK}^{**} + 7.191 \text{ CONS}^* + 9.722 \text{ AGED} - 13.602 \text{ UNED}^* \\ & (2.162) \qquad (4.109) \qquad (7.696) \qquad (7.849) \end{aligned}$$

$$\bar{R}^2 = .70^{**}$$

\*F significant at .05 level \*\*F significant at .01 level

where WDAY = number of days worked on the ujamaa farm during the previous cropping season (mean = 44.65)

VILL = 0-1 variable: 0 Village 1  
 1 Village 2

MALE = 0-1 variable: 0 Female  
 1 Male

MEET = number of village meetings attended by the respondent in the past year

TALK = number of meetings in which the respondent spoke in the past year

CONS = number of times the respondent has been consulted by a member of the VDC about village affairs in the past year

AGED = 0-1 variable: 0 Under 40  
 1 40 or over

UNED = 0-1 variable 0 Standard 4 or over  
 1 Less than Standard 4

As the analysis is based on only sixty cases, the results should be taken as indicative of trends only. Nonetheless the results bear out the hypothesis that participation is important.

Because one village had a more intensive ujamaa enterprise than the other, the effect of village is quite strong. But the effect of participation in village government is also significant. Attending meetings and speaking in those meetings are more significant than being consulted by a village leader privately. It must be pointed out that the sample villages were reasonably participatory villages where decisions were in fact made in meetings. In a different village the relationship might not hold. However the data would seem to offer statistical support for the following arguments. Where there there is allocation of resources taking place, there will be more participation, as there is then a point to participation. People who attend meetings and are involved in discussion and decision making about ujamaa activities will come to have a commitment to implementing those decisions which they translate into action--in this case actively working

on the ujamaa farm. Clearly the relationship is likely to be somewhat circular. That is, if one works on the ujamaa farm, one is likely to wish to defend one's interest by participating in decision making.

Although the primary focus of the analysis is participation it is interesting to note that the effect of education is significant; more educated peasants working more which is consistent with McHenry's findings (1979: 180-181).

Both the case studies and the statistical analysis point in the same direction. Participatory forms of activity and organization can only be implemented in a participatory fashion. Imposition of participatory forms by fiat tends to have negative results. The implications of this can probably be extended. That is, interference with participatory forms initiated from below are likely to make it more difficult to bring about participation in the future.

## VI CONCLUSIONS

The most obvious conclusion from this study is that the policy of participatory socialism has not really been implemented in Tanzania. To be sure certain formal structures of participation have been established. But it has been shown that these structures at best provide pro forma participation. Indeed, they sometimes serve primarily as a tool of a central government in directing village activities. Nor has collective agricultural production been established to any significant degree.

One of the reasons that practice has been so different from theory has been the structure of the institution responsible for implementing the policy. It has been shown that the structure of administration has been relatively stable since colonial times. It has from the beginning been centralized, hierarchical and relatively rigid. Even decentralization did relatively little except to move people physically. As in checkers, the movement of pieces across the board had no effect on the rules of the game. Indeed decentralization (which, ironically, was designed and implemented in a highly centralized and non-participatory manner) largely served to buttress the centralizing tendency of the bureaucracy. In short the colonial heritage has been a bureaucratic structure which tends to produce officials who behave in ways not dissimilar from their colonial predecessors.

A second clear lesson of this study is that despite a clear desire and effort on the part of the government to control the peasants, often the government is not in control. To be sure, it can, as in the case of Operation Vijiji, marshal large amounts of force and impose its will. But the costs

of this strategy are high and its occurrence on a massive scale rare. The limits to government control stem from a variety of causes. First, despite decentralization and the attempt to implement policies such as the village manager program, there is not a government presence in every village or even in every ward. The lack of someone on the spot to enforce policies serves to limit the amount of enforcement. Second, despite the ideology of unity, the Tanzanian populace is not characterized by a unified ideology even at the upper levels of government. This means that some policies are more enthusiastically enforced than others. The peasants are often able as has been shown, to turn this lack of unanimity into operating room.

What the peasants basically do is to utilize extra-structural means to negotiate a new order as it were (see Strauss et al. 1963). The peasants have power stemming not from any formal position in the decision making structure but from the necessity of their labor and cooperation in the general development effort. Although it is in some ways limited, they do have the ability to withdraw their labor or kick up a fuss. The exercise of power in recovering their scope of decision making described above has much more to do with participation than the sending of representatives to meetings.

This leads to a third and inescapable lesson that peasants and bureaucrats may have quite legitimate conflicting interests. Bureaucrats may for very excellent reasons want peasants to do things which they for equally excellent reasons resist. Bureaucrats must think about the nation, about keeping an economy afloat in the face of unfavorable terms of trade. Bureaucrats may want peasants to act in a way responsive to the international business system producing predictable amounts of a predictable quality crop. They may want peasants to put their money into storage or latrines or party flags--none of

which may be all that important to the peasant who has other priorities.

Much of what has been described here then can best be understood as a struggle for control of the process of building the nation or for the right to be left out of building the nation. This is not to cast aspersions on anyone's activities. But it does highlight the major shoal on which participation may run aground. Much of the enthusiasm for participation is based on the implicit assumption either that one side has the answer or that the various sides can decide on a mutually satisfactory solution. But if the sides differ significantly, there may be no mutually satisfactory solution. In such a case if there were real participation, which involves some significant sharing of power, then the unacceptable answer "no" might arise. In this event, the government is most likely to be inclined to let only the forms rather than the substance of participation exist.

The Tanzanian government might be said to be in exactly this position. What the government identifies as in the peasants' interest is not always exactly what the peasants define as their interest. In the cases of conflict, the government seems to adopt a posture of "forcing people to be free," presumably on the assumption that the peasants will eventually see the light. Faced with a peasantry that might well say "no," it has established a facade of participation that threatens to become permanent.

The question left unanswered is what kind of structure is conducive to participation? What structure allows the reconciliation of the need for central coordination and the need for local participation? It is already clear that the establishment of formal channels may be meaningless--the puppet advisory board, the rubber stamp legislature are all too familiar. What the Tanzanian case may show is that the creation of political space--room to

maneuver---may be the most important variable. From the viewpoint of efficiency, a regularly functioning system of participation is far more desirable. The kind of participation which has been described here is erratic, and unpredictable. The planner would undoubtedly prefer regularly presented inputs, opinions. But given the lack of such a structure, room to operate is not a bad second best. In this sense, the Tanzanian claim that they have a participatory society is not far from true--participation simply does not take the form they say it does. Participation as it is actually taking place is in fact building the nation.

THE UJAMAA VILLAGES REGISTRATION,  
DESIGNATION AND ADMINISTRATION ACT 1975

PART I

PRELIMINARY

1. This Act may be cited as the Villages and Ujamaa Villages short title (Registration, Designation and Administration) Act, 1975.
2. (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires "the Area Commissioner" in relation to any village, means the Area Commissioner of the District within which the village is situated;  
"kaya" means a household or a family unit;  
"the Regional Committee" in relation to any village, means the Regional Executive Committee of the Party for the region within which the village is situated;  
"Registrar" means the Registrar of Villages appointed under section 3;  
"Ujamaa Village" means a village designated under this Act as an ujamaa village;  
"village" means a village registered under this Act;  
"Village Assembly" means, in relation to a village, the Village Assembly of that village and in relation to an Ujamaa Village the Village Assembly of the Ujamaa Village;  
"Village Council" means, in relation to a village, the Village Council of that village and in relation to an Ujamaa Village, the Village Council of the Ujamaa village.

(2) Where a village is situated partly within one district and partly within another, the Minister shall determine which Area Commissioner and Regional Committee shall have jurisdiction over the village.

3. (1) The Minister shall appoint a public officer to be the Registrar.

(2) The Minister may appoint such number as Assistant Registrars of Villages as he may deem necessary.

(3) The Registrar shall have such functions as are conferred upon him by or under this Act or as may be conferred upon him by any other written law

(4) The Registrar may, by a writing under his hand, delegate to an Assistant Registrar any of his functions under this Act or any other written law.

## PART II

### REGISTRATION OF VILLAGES

4. (1) In any case where the Registrar is satisfied that not less than two hundred and fifty families have settled and made their homes within any area of Tanganyika and that the boundaries of such area can be particularly defined, he may, subject to any directions given in that behalf by the Minister register the area as a village:

Provided that the Minister may, in any case -

(a) authorize two or more such areas to be registered as a single village;

(b) authorize the registration of a village notwithstanding that there are less than two hundred and fifty families within the village.

(2) The Registrar shall from time to time and at least once in every calendar year cause a notice to be published in the Gazette listing every village registered by him since the publication of the previous notice and specifying the boundaries of such village.

PART III

VILLAGE ASSEMBLY AND VILLAGE COUNCIL

5. (1) Every village shall have a Village Assembly and a Village Council.

(2) The Village Assembly shall consist of every person who is ordinarily resident in the village and who has attained the apparent age of eighteen years.

(3) As soon as may be practicable after the registration of a village, the Village Assembly of the village shall meet for the purpose of electing a Village Council for the villages.

(4) The meeting convened under subsection (3) shall be presided over by a Chairman elected by the Village Assembly from amongst its members.

(5) The Village Council shall consist of such number of members, not exceeding such number as may be prescribed, as the Village Assembly may, at the meeting convened for the election of the Council, determine.

6. No person shall be qualified for election as a member of the village Council of a village unless -

(a) he has attained the apparent age of twenty-one years;

(b) he is a member of a family within the Village and is ordinarily resident in the village.

7. Every member of the Village Council shall, unless he otherwise ceases to be a member by death or resignation, continue to hold office as a member of the Council until such time as the Village Assembly next meets for the election of the members of the Village Council in accordance with the provisions of subsection (1) of section 9:

Provided that -

(a) where a member of the council has ceased to be ordinarily resident within the village and the Area Commissioner has, after proper

inquiry, certified in writing that such member has ceased to be so resident within the village, such member shall cease to be a member of the Village Council;

- (b) any person who ceases to be a member of the Village Council by the expiry of his term of office or otherwise howsoever shall, subject to the provisions of section 6, be eligible of re-election or appointment.

8. Any casual vacancy occurring in the membership of a Village Council may be filled by the Village Council by appointment of a member from amongst the residents of the village:

Provided that -

- (a) no person shall be appointed under this section unless he is a person who would qualify for election as a member under section 6;
- (b) any person appointed under this section shall hold office for the remainder of the term of office of his predecessor;
- (c) the Village Council may, if in its opinion it is desirable so to do, convene an extraordinary meeting of the Village Assembly for election of a member to fill the vacancy.

9. (1) The Chairman of a Village Council shall, as soon as may be practicable after the expiry of twelve months from the date when the Council was elected by the Village Assembly, convene a meeting of the Assembly for election of new members of the Council.

(2) At a meeting convened pursuant to the provisions of subsection (1), the Chairman of the Council, or in his absence or inability to act, the Vice-Chairman of the Council shall preside.

(3) It shall be lawful for the Village Assembly, at a meeting convened pursuant to subsection (1), to enlarge or reduce, subject to regulation made

under this Act, the membership of the Village Council to be elected.

(4) The Village Council may, if it considers it necessary or desirable for any reason whatsoever so to do, convene an extraordinary meeting of the Village Assembly to discuss and decide upon any matter.

10. (1) The members of a Village Council shall, as soon as may be practicable after their election, hold a meeting at which they shall elect, from amongst their number -

- (a) a Chairman of the Village Council;
- (b) a Vice-Chairman of the Village Council;
- (c) a Secretary of the Village Council:

Provided that in any case, where at the time of any election there is a branch of the Party within the Village, the Chairman and the Secretary of such branch shall by virtue of their offices be members of the council and the Chairman and the Secretary, respectively, of the council.

(2) A Village Council may, by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of members present and voting, remove from office any office bearer of the Council and elect another member to that office.

(3) Where a vacancy occurs in the office of any office bearer of the Council, the Council may elect a member to fill the vacancy.

(4) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) an office bearer of a Village Council shall continue in office until the determination of his membership under section 7.

11. (1) As soon as may be practicable after the election of the first Village Council following the registration of a village, the Registrar shall issue the Council with a certificate of incorporation in the prescribed form.

(2) Upon the issue of a certificate of incorporation in relation to a Village Council the Village Council shall be a body corporate with perpetual

succession and a common seal and shall be capable in law of suing and being sued in its corporate name, of purchasing, holding, alienating, managing and disposing of any property whatsoever, whether movable or immovable, and whether by way of investment or otherwise, and of entering into any such contract as may be necessary or expedient for the performance of its functions under this Act or any other written law.

12. (1) Every Village Assembly and Village Council shall have such functions as are conferred upon them by this Act or any other written law and in addition thereto the functions of Village Council shall be -

- (a) to do all such acts and things as are necessary or expedient for the economic and social development of the village;
- (b) to initiate and undertake any task, venture or enterprise as is designed to ensure the welfare and well-being of the residents of the village;
- (c) to plan and co-ordinate the activities of and render assistance and advice to the residents of the village engaged in agricultural, horticultural, forestry or other activity or industry whatsoever;
- (d) to encourage the residents of the village in undertaking and participating in communal and co-operative enterprises;
- (e) to participate, by way of partnership or otherwise, in economic enterprises with other Village Councils.

(2) A Village Council shall have the power to do all such acts and things as appear to it to be necessary, advantageous or convenient for or in connection with the carrying out of its functions or to be incidental or conducive to their proper discharge.

(3) A Village Council may establish committees and delegate to such committees any of its functions.

13. A village shall be deemed to be a co-operative society for all intents and purposes.

Provided that the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1968 or of any Subsidiary Legislation thereunder shall not apply to a village.

14. (1) No co-operative society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1968 shall, save the consent of the Minister in writing, operate within a village, and any such co-operative society operating within a village at the time of its registration under this Act, shall, if so directed by the Minister, wind up its affairs and dispose of its assets and liabilities within such a time and in such manner as the Minister may direct.

(2) The Minister may, by regulations made under this Act, modify in their application to the co-operative societies to which subsection (1) applies any of the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1968 or of any subsidiary legislation under that Act which relate to the dissolution of cooperative societies and of the disposition of their assets and liabilities.

15. Every Village Assembly and Village Council shall perform its functions, whether conferred by or under this Act or any other written law, under the auspices of the Party.

#### PART IV

16. (1) Where in relation to any village the Regional Committee is satisfied that a substantial portion of the economic activities of the village are being undertaken and carried out on a communal basis, the Regional Committee may recommend to the Minister to designate the village as an Ujamaa Village.

(2) Upon receipt of a recommendation under subsection (1) and after such inquiry and investigation as he may consider fit, the Minister may, by order in the Gazette, designate the village as an Ujamaa Village.

17. Where a village has been designated an Ujamaa Village the Minister shall issue to the Village Council a certificate of designation in such form as he may approve.

PART V

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

18. (1) Where the President is satisfied that for the proper and efficient administration or management of the affairs of a village, or of the conduct of the affairs of its residents, or for the political, economic or social development of a village, it is necessary or desirable that the Village Council of the village enjoy, in relation to the village or its residents, any power (including any judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative power) which is by any other written law conferred upon any authority or person, whether generally or in relation to any specified area

(whether or not such specified area includes the village or in relation to any group of persons or specified matter, the President may, by order in the Gazette, provide that, subject to such limitations and restrictions as he may in such order specify, the Village Council or any organ or committee of the Village Council exercise such power in relation to the village or its residents as if such power, subject to such limitations and restrictions, if any, specified in the order, were in relation to the village or its residents, conferred upon the Village Council or such organ or committee of the Village Council as may be specified in the order by such other written law).

(2) Where the President makes an order under subsection (1) conferring upon a Village Council or upon any organ or committee of a Village Council any power provided for in any other written law, he may by the same or any

subsequent order, modify such other written law to such extent as he may deem necessary for the avoidance of any inconsistency or conflict between the provisions of the order made under subsection (1), or for providing for an appeal against the decision of the Village Council or of the organ or committee of the Village Council in the exercise of such power or for any matter incidental to or connected with the exercise by the Village Council or the organ or committee of the Village Council of such power.

(3) The provisions of any order made under subsection (1) or (2) shall have the same effect as if such provisions were made by and set out in this Act.

(4) The President may, by order in the Gazette, delegate his power under this section to the Minister or any other Minister.

(5) An order under subsection (1) may confer any such power as is referred to in that subsection either to or in relation to Village Councils generally or to or in relation to any category of Village Council or to or in relation to any particular Village Council specified in the order.

19. It shall be lawful for the Area Commissioner, the Registrar or an Assistant Registrar to attend any meeting of the Village Assembly or of the Village Council and assist the Assembly or, as the case may be the Council in conducting the business of the meeting.

20. Subject to the provisions of this Act a Village Council may regulate its own proceedings and may make by-laws governing its procedure.

21. It shall be lawful for a Village Council to act notwithstanding any vacancy in the membership thereof and no act proceeding of a Village Council shall be invalid by reason only of some defect in the election or appointment of a person who purports to be a member thereof.

22. Without prejudice to the provisions of section 284A of the Penal Code or of the Specified Officers (Recovery of Debts) Act, 1970 or of the Parastatal Employees (Recovery of Debts) Act, 1974 no act or thing done, or omitted to be done, by any member of a Village Council shall if done or omitted bona fide in the execution or purported execution of his duties as such member, officer servant or agent, subject any such person to any action, liability or demand whatsoever.

23. (1) The Minister may make Regulations for the better carrying out of the purposes and provisions of this Act, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing may make regulations -

- (a) prescribing forms of application for registration of villages and certificates of incorporation of Village Council;
- (b) providing for powers of Village Councils to borrow monies;
- (c) providing for the manner in which the accounts of Village Councils shall be kept, maintained and audited;
- (d) regulating the expenditure and investment of monies by Village Councils;
- (e) prescribing anything which may or is required to be prescribed.

## APPENDIX B

COMMUNALLY CULTIVATED ACREAGE IN SELECTED VILLAGES<sup>1</sup>

Place	Year	Population	Acres	Acres/Population	Crops
<u>Arusha Region</u>					
Gallapo	1975/76	700 families	350	0.3/family	Beans
Singe <sup>2</sup>	1975/76	250 families	150	0.3/family	Maize
Endakiso <sup>2</sup>	1975/76	461 families	900	0.51/family	Maize
Upper Kitete	1975/76	126 families	1720	13.65/family	Maize, wheat
Titiwi <sup>2</sup>	1975/76	57 families	400	7.02/family	Maize
Sashay/Karatu	1975/76	523 families	166	0.32/family	Maize, beans, wheat
Nshupu	1975/76	90 families	138	1.53/family	Maize
Ziwala Damu	1970	60 members	16	0.26/member (1.30) <sup>3</sup>	Cotton
Sangaiwe A	1971	30 members	35	1.67/member (8.35) <sup>3</sup>	Maize, millet
	1972	30 members	37	1.23/member (6.15) <sup>3</sup>	Maize, millet
	1973	14 members	8	0.57/member (2.85) <sup>3</sup>	Millet
Sangaiwe B	1972	12 members	5	0.42/member (2.10) <sup>3</sup>	Maize, cotton
<u>Coast Region</u>					
Kipo	1970/71	1152	60	0.05/person (2.50) <sup>3</sup>	Cashew nuts
	1972/73	1196	15	0.01/person (.05) <sup>3</sup>	Cashew nuts
Mbunju	1970/71	637	20	0.03/person (.15) <sup>3</sup>	Cashew nuts
	1972/73	692	6	0.01/person (.05) <sup>3</sup>	Cashew nuts
Mvuleni	1970/71	313	40	0.13/person (.65) <sup>3</sup>	Cashew nuts
	1972/73	292	3	0.01/person (.05) <sup>3</sup>	Cashew nuts
Ndundunyi Kanza	1970/71	1938	80	0.04/person (.20) <sup>3</sup>	Cashew nuts
	1972/73	1504	0	0	
Ngorongo	1970/71	2162	18	0.01/person (.05) <sup>3</sup>	Rice, cashew nuts, coconut
	1971/72	1865	0	0	
Mkongo	1970/71	3126	258	0.08/person (.40) <sup>3</sup>	Cashew nuts
Ikwiriri	1970/71	9080	140	0.02/person (.10) <sup>3</sup>	Rice, cashew nuts, cocconut
	1971/72	13,000	0	0	
Muyuyu	1971/72	737	60	0.08/person (.40) <sup>3</sup>	Rice
	1972/73	849	30	0.04/person (.20) <sup>3</sup>	Cashew nuts
Kibindu	1974	59 members	103	1.75/member (8.75) <sup>3</sup>	Cotton

Place	Year	Population	Acres	Acres/Population	Crops
<u>Dar-es-Salaam Region</u>					
Msongola <sup>4</sup>	1974	11 families	45	4.10/family	Corn, bananas, coconuts, cashew nuts, oranges
<u>Dodoma Region</u>					
Kigwe	1974	932 families	15 <sup>5</sup>	0.02/family	Vineyards
<u>Iringa Region</u>					
Lulanzi	1974/	260 members	553	2.13/member	Maize, wheat, pyrethrum, fruit
Mangawe	1970/71		10		Maize, sunflowers
	1971/72		630		Maize, sunflowers, beans
	1972/73		504		Maize, sunflowers, beans
	1973/74	503 members	376	0.75/member	Maize, sunflowers, beans
Tagamanda	1971/72		36		Maize, beans
	1972/73		72		Maize
	1973/74	510 members	108	0.21/member	Maize, beans
Kitayawa	1971/72		18		Maize, beans, tobacco
	1972/73		19		Maize, beans, tobacco
	1973/74	204 members	23.5	0.12/member	Maize, beans, tobacco
Igosi	1969/70		153		Wheat, maize
	1970/71		318		Wheat, maize, vegetables
	1971/72		228		Wheat, maize, vegetables
	1972/73		343		Wheat, maize, vegetables
	1973/74	362 members	441	1.22/member	Wheat, maize, vegetables
Kipengere	1969/70		109.3		Wheat, maize
	1970/71		342		Wheat, maize
	1971/72		632		Wheat, maize
	1972/73		864		Wheat, maize, pyrethrum, vegs.
	1973/74	418 members	550	1.32/member	Wheat, maize, pyrethrum, vegs.
<u>Kigoma Region</u>					
Mkatanga	1978	504 families	44	.08/family	Maize, beans, fruit
<u>Kilimanjaro Region</u>					
Mhwera	1978	4,800	566	0.12/person (50) <sup>3</sup>	Coffee, maize, pasture

Place	Year	Population	Acres	Acres/Population	Crops
<u>Mara Region</u>					
Kibwera	1972	180 members	56	0.31/member	Rice, maize
Butiama	1969/70	26 families	118	4.54/member	Maize, cotton, bananas, cassava
	1970/71	130 families	611	4.70/member	Maize, cotton, bananas, cassava
	1971/72	253 families	349	1.38/member	Maize, beans, rice, peanuts, vegetables, bananas
	1972/73	302 available workers	194	0.64/worker	Maize, beans, vegetables
<u>Mbeya Region</u>					
Rugwe District (308 villages)	1974	39,880	7000	0.18/person (.90) <sup>3</sup>	Maize, beans, cotton, wheat, cassava
Mamba	1970/71	4 families	3	0.75/family	Various food crops, tobacco
	1971/72	21 families	24	1.14/family	Tobacco
	1972/73	131 families	114	0.87/family	Tobacco
Malocha	1968/69	7 families	30.1	4.3/family	
	1971/72	52 members	86.1	1.6/member (8.2) <sup>3</sup>	
<u>Mtwara Region</u>					
A	1974/75	360 households	50	0.14/household	Maize, cassava
	1975/76	360 households	50	0.14/household	Maize, cassava
B	1974/75	302 households	20	0.07/household	Maize
	1975/76	302 households	90	0.30/household	Cassava
<u>Morogoro Region</u>					
Zombo <sup>2</sup>	1976	568 families	117	0.21/family	Maize
Mvumi <sup>2,4</sup>	1976	1135 families	220	0.19/family	Maize
Mwandi	1976	546 families	4	0.01/family	Cotton
Msolwa <sup>4</sup>	1976	280 families	239.5	0.86/family	Maize, sugar cane
Loholele	1976	26 families	25	0.96/family	Maize
<u>Rukwa Region</u>					
Mwongozo <sup>4</sup>	1974	19 families	96	5.05/family	Maize, beans vegetables

Place	Year	Population	Acres	Acres/Population	Crops
<u>Ruvuma Region</u>					
Matetereka	1977	58 families	329 (1975)	5.68/family	Maize, beans, cassava, groundnuts, vegetables coffee
<u>Tabora Region</u>					
Igagala	1974	358 families	596	1.66/family	Maize, tobacco
Nate	1977	600 families	708.2	1.18/family	Wheat, rice, maize, cassava, cotton
Mole	1977	1616 adults	4723	2.92/adult	Tobacco, maize, groundnuts, cassava
<u>Tanga Region</u>					
48 recognized villages	1971	5788 adults	7560	1.3/adult	-
Kabuku	1974	223 families	1053	4.72/family	Sisal
Nkamai	1974	250 members	3.5	0.01/family	Tea
Mlesa	1974	323 adults	3	0.01/family	Tea
Mgweshi	1974	180 members	4	0.02/member	Tea
Zaha	1974	52 families	1.5	0.03/family	Tea
Nkama	1973	350	50	0.14	All villages grew maize; some also grew beans, sorghum, simsim and kunde ( <u>Phaseolus vulgaris</u> - garden beans)
Mvungwe	1973	100	22	0.22	
Masagalu	1973	175	22	0.12	
Kwamba	1973	174	31	0.18	
Myaruzi	1973	135	40	0.21	
Kwadundwa	1973	160	12	0.08	
Kilwa	1973	143	24	0.17	
Bokwa	1973	157	13	0.34	
Kwediboma	1973	292	15	0.09	
Mgera	1973	176	17	0.10	
Rusanga	1973	300	12	0.04	
Kwediwandili	1973	204	16	0.08	
Kwingi	1973	324	46	0.14	
Kwakikhwembe	1973	340	24	0.08	
Kigwama	1973	40	34	0.85	
Kwedyamba	1973	84	63	0.75	
Kwabaya	1973	10	8	0.80	
Kidelelko	1973	150	26	0.17	

Place	Year	Population	Acres	Acres/Population	Crops
<u>Tanga Region (cont.)</u>					
Misima	1973	176	90	0.51	
Mzeri	1973	79	50	0.63	
Kwedisewa	1973	160	20	0.13	
Kwamatuku	1973	121	32	0.25	
Komsala	1973	25	54	2.16	
Mazamba	1973	156	50	0.32	
Bogolwa	1973	342	30	0.09	
Mazingara	1973	238	100	0.42	
Mkata	1973	713	110	1.15	
Kitumbi	1973	248	32	0.13	
Manga	1973	75	80	1.07	
Kwameganga	1973	370	260	0.70	
Kwedisinga	1973	90	25	0.28	
Mandera	1973	124	100	0.81	
Magambe	1978	421 families	154.98	.36/family	Maize
<u>West Lake Region</u>					
Rugari	1968	162 families	11	0.07/family	Sweet potatoes, wheat
Bukoba village 1	1971/72			1.7/adult(8.60) <sup>3</sup>	
Karagwe village 1	1971/72			0.29/adult(1.47) <sup>3</sup>	Maize, sorghum, beans, groundnuts peas
Bukoba village 2	1971/72			0.9/adult(4.50) <sup>3</sup>	
Bukoba village 3	1971/72			1.4/adult(7.38) <sup>3</sup>	
Karagwe village 2	1971/72			0.09/adult(0.45) <sup>3</sup>	
Bukoba village 4	1971/72			1.97/adult(9.84) <sup>3</sup>	
Karagwe village 3	1971/72			0.009/adult(0.05) <sup>3</sup>	
Bukoba village 5	1971/72			0.49/adult(1.97) <sup>3</sup>	
Karagwe village 4	1971/72			0.17/adult(0.86) <sup>3</sup>	

Place	Year	Population	Acres	Acres/Population	Crops
<u>Mwanza Region</u>					
Inonelwa	1972	2830	410	0.14/person (0.70)	-
Ibindo	1972	1140	370	0.32/person (1.60)	-
Ngulla	1972	1040	280	0.27/person (1.35)	-
Kahangara	1972	580	280	0.48/person (2.40)	-
Kakora	1972	1430	250	0.17/person (0.85)	-
Ndagallu	1972	1480	60	0.04/person (0.20)	-
Mwama Shimba	1972	290	20	0.07/person (0.35)	-
Misasi	1969	76 members	15	0.19/person (0.95)	Cotton, maize
	1976/77	450 families	33	0.07/family	Maize, millet

<sup>1</sup>All figures should be considered to be rough estimates only - apply grain of salt.

<sup>2</sup>Only crop asked about was maize; acreage may include other crops.

<sup>3</sup>A rough estimate of acreage per family has been obtained by multiplying by 5.

<sup>4</sup>Village has been "best village" in the region.

<sup>5</sup>Excludes "other agricultural activities."

Sources: Bugengo, 1973; von Freyhold, n.d.; Sender, 1974; Fortmann, 1976; Musoke, 1971; United Republic of Tanzania, National Bank of Commerce, 1974; Daily News, 12 January 1974, 13 January 1974, 31 January 1974, 6 February 1974, 20 March 1974, 10 May 1974, 12 May 1974, 10 June 1974, 10 October 1974; Omari, 1977; Angwazi and Ndulu, 1973; Muzo, 1976; Krokfors, 1973:19-22; Guillotte, 1973:6-9; Sumra, 1975:13; Nyiera, 1978:15-17. Boesen et al., 1977:102; "Mkatanga--Picked as Best Village" Daily News 22 May 1978; "Tanga's Best Village" Daily News 8 September 1978; "Village Carved Out of a Forest" Daily News 30 November 1978; "Mbwera Villages on Top of Kilimanjaro" Daily News 17 August 1978; "Reaping the Fruits of Ujamaa" Daily News 17 November 1978.

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Tanzania has failed to realize its goals of participatory socialism and collective agricultural production. The fault lies with the definition and implementation of these policies by a central government bureaucracy structurally and attitudinally similar to its colonial antecedents. This report examines Tanzania's colonial and post-independence bureaucracies in relation to rural development's two conflicting driving forces: the need for genuine local decisionmaking to ensure a commitment to development programs and the need for central control to allocate scarce resources in a coherent nation-building strategy. The degradation of local government begun under German and British rule has continued into the present, with the peasantry excluded from all decisionmaking and subjected to programs encouraging only passivity and surplus production--to the bureaucracy's benefit. Efforts to ensure government accountability, such as decentralizing the bureaucracy, have had no impact. The peasantry has no voice in the development process, as the government ignores village councils and leaders and allows no debate on its policies. Peasant participation is thus gained through largesse or coercion, with the latter exemplified under Operation Vijiji, where the government forcibly relocated 11 million people to nucleated settlements. The peasantry can only bargain with officials; actively or passively resist unpopular policies; initiate local projects, forcing the government to finish them; or petition individual government leaders. The situation's resultant negative impact upon self-help projects and the ujamaa village program (which emphasizes communal agricultural production) has been substantial. Self-help project participation has fallen sharply, increasing project costs, and the ambitious ujamaa program has not worked, as the non-participatory cycle nurtured self-fulfilling prophecies of failure. The bureaucracy's recent emphasis upon surplus production over the ujamaa program's socialist aims and its reactivation of the hated colonial by-laws (laws mandating development participation, e.g, cultivation practices) suggest that the aspirations which sustained Tanzania's drive for independence have yet to be realized.

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