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# **INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT: MAKING IT WORK!**

**AID PROJECT 936-5300**

## **ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT**

**A PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE STATE OF THE ART  
PREPARED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT BUREAU  
OFFICE OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

# INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT: MAKING IT WORK?

A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE ART  
PREPARED UNDER AID CONTRACT NC. DSAN-C-0065

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ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION  
OF  
INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT

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## FOREWORD

The Organization and Administration of Integrated Rural Development Project (IRD) is funded by AID's Office of Rural Development and Development Administration. The objective of the IRD project is to provide assistance to managers of IRD projects in improving the management and coordination of complex rural development undertakings whose success depends as much on effective mobilization of resources as it does on technical expertise and appropriate technology. Basically the project was designed to provide two types of assistance: (1) direct support in the nature of short-term technical assistance to field activities and (2) documentation and dissemination of the state of the art in IRD project management.

This state of the art paper, accompanied by an executive summary, is one of the methods utilized in this project to address the second objective. It attempts to document what can be found in the literature with regard to the contribution of management to the successful implementation of IRD projects. It also attempts to convey to rural development practitioners the emerging experience of DAI in providing technical assistance in this relatively undefined area. During the first two years of the project, the DAI experience has included management analysis and problem-solving missions in Honduras, Thailand, Botswana, Jamaica, the Philippines, Indonesia, Nepal, Liberia, Cameroon, and Tanzania.

An earlier draft of this document was submitted for review to over 60 practitioners and observers of rural development implementation. The reviewers came from both within and outside of the Agency for International Development, from universities as well as field project managers, from host country institutions as well as international donor organizations. Obviously the authors could not take into account all of the comments made by the reviewers, but they have made a significant effort to compromise between desires by some for specificity and desires by others for generality and comparability.

The subtitle of the paper indicates that it is a preliminary analysis. In the final year of the IRD contract, DAI will incorporate the findings presented in this version of the paper with a broadened understanding of the underlying processes of IRD management into a desk-top manual. The present volume, therefore, has no pretensions of being a definitive statement, but represents an evolutionary development in our understanding of both the contribution of good management and the relationship of good management to successful implementation. For this reason, too, the reader will find little in this volume that ad-

dresses the technical concerns which are so frequently the major focus of rural development analysis. DS/RAD has consistently urged the authors to avoid dwelling on technical or sectoral issues in favor of sharpening their analysis of the generic management and coordination issues.

Finally a word about the main title: "Integrated Rural Development: Making It Work?" Initially, I had hoped that the authors would take a more assertive stance with regard to the contribution of their paper and the role of management in general. I agree with the authors, however, that as practitioners we all must maintain a healthy degree of scepticism over the extent to which, even with good management, we can control a large degree of the variance in the outcomes of integrated rural development projects. Complex by their very nature, IRD projects are subject to a wide range of constraints which defy the capabilities of even the most competent and most committed managers. On the other hand, the paper is founded in the optimism that greater attention to what we know about the contribution of good management to organizational effectiveness will serve the interests of the practitioners responsible for implementing these projects. References to the earlier draft of this paper in mission IRD designs from Ecuador and Niger support this belief.

Both DS/RAD and the authors hope that the paper will provoke reactions, negative as well as positive, from practitioners and observers of rural development initiatives and that these reactions, if passed along to us, can contribute to the formulation of the desk-top manual. We look forward to your comments, both on what can improve the paper's presentation and what you find to be helpful in it.

James B. Lowenthal  
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and Development Administration  
Bureau for Development Support  
Agency for International Development

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## PREFACE

It is not easy to effectively manage an Integrated Rural Development (IRD) Project. The project manager's role and situation are typically characterized by complex designs, little control over the many actors involved in implementation, high expectations among beneficiaries, uncertain technologies, highly variable socio-political climates, and to cap it all off the IRD project is usually in the spotlight -- a constant flow of national and international visitors focus on every project dimension. This is certainly a formula for difficulty.

This report provides guidance for IRD project managers in this situation. That guidance is aimed at organizational and managerial tactics which can be used to improve the implementation process and raise the chances for positive impact.

Many problems encountered during implementation, however, result from decisions made during design. In fact "management" problems are often misdiagnosed -- they are actually the result of poorly designed organizations. Thus an examination of the implementation process generates information useful for improving program designs.

Other problems result from the complexity of an IRD strategy. For example, the interrelationships between poor health, inappropriate education, low food production, inadequate marketing, weak organizations and undeveloped physical infrastructure present a web of constraints. Since this interaction of elements appears to reinforce poverty, effective remedies for the total system must be concerned with the total system. Such remedies are merely a "balanced growth" strategy on a small scale. The combination of complexity and a need for balance among component activities, however, makes IRD efforts extremely sensitive to organizational weaknesses and management failings.

In September 1978, Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), and Research Triangle Institute (RTI) signed a four-year contract with the Office of Rural and Administrative Development, Development Support Bureau, United States Agency for International Development to assist donor agencies and host governments with the organization and administration of integrated rural development. This state-of-the-art report is one aspect of that assistance. Other aspects include a series of working papers which focus on specific problem sets and field visits which provide direct technical assistance for design and implementation.

To make the report accessible to busy field personnel, an executive summary is provided. To keep the summary faithful to

the full report and to offer more guidance than is possible in a simple "sketch," the major figures and the organizing framework of the complete work are reproduced in the summary. Additionally, major guidelines and critical propositions about how organization and management affect IRD processes and impact are included. The propositions are numbered to set them off from the surrounding text and bulleted items.

Organizational structures and management practices are obviously not the only factors affecting IRD implementation. However, most responses to any problem causes do have organization or management implications. Thus this report should provide some much needed assistance to rural development specialists who feel a need for guidance on the organization and administration of integrated rural development.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is traditional in a section of this type to thank those who have criticized early versions of the work, exonerate them from responsibility for the final product, and then go about business as usual. In the case of this report, however, its parentage is so mixed as to require another approach.

Rather than listing readers and minimizing their responsibility, the purpose of this section is to describe the process leading to this review and identify contributions made by various individuals.

Throughout the entire process of planning, researching and writing the first draft of the state-of-the-art paper, a core of three people played major roles: Peter Weisel and George Honadle of Development Alternatives, Inc., (DAI) and Jerry VanSant of Research Triangle Institute (RTI). Peter provided overall guidance as Director of the IRD Project (Organization and Administration of Integrated Rural Development) from October 1978 to January 1980. Upon Peter's departure in January, George took over as project director. During later stages of organizing and writing that draft, a principal role as both critic and author was played by Elliott Morss, DAI's Director of Research. During the production of the final version of the report, David Gow played a major role as writer and critic. Although George retained responsibility for all sections, authorship was truly shared among the principal writers.

Upon completion of the draft in February, copies were circulated to a limited number of IRD field managers, to interested AID staff in Washington and in countries where field visits were made, to DAI staff, and to selected university faculty and the staff of other consulting firms. The response was overwhelming. Not only was the general reaction positive, but many people took the time to offer very detailed comments, itemize criticisms, and develop suggestions for improvement.

Many of these suggestions have been adopted. For example, an Executive Summary was added to the full report to improve the usefulness of the study to field staff. Since the variety of reviewers introduced a wide range of perspectives, it was inevitable that some suggestions would cancel others. And often, the most critical comments and useful recommendations emerged from the insights of those who were furthest from the general consensus. The report has, therefore, benefitted from very divergent criticisms and suggestions.

Thus, this preliminary report is, indeed, a group product to a far greater degree than is often the case. In addition to the general authorship and reviews noted above, numerous people were intimately involved in the details of various sections.

The Executive Summary was written primarily by George Honadle, with major contributions by Jerry VanSant and David Gow. This summary, as did the full report, also benefitted from Paul Crawford's efforts to simplify the draft propositions and to make them consistent in format.

Chapters One and Two were the primary responsibility of George Honadle. His role, however, was bolstered by critical reviews and substantive contributions by Peter Weisel, Elliott Morss, Jerry VanSant and David Gow.

Chapter Three was also guided principally by George, though the cast of contributors to this chapter was far wider. Donald Mickelwait, Elliott Morss and Peter Weisel provided substantial direct input. In addition, Robert Alger, Thomas Armor, Michael Sarco, and Tony Barclay made various direct and indirect contributions at different stages in the creative process.

Chapter Four was the primary responsibility of Jerry VanSant and David Gow. Others who wrote sections include Raymond Isely, Elliott Morss and George Honadle.

Chapter Five was drafted primarily by Peter Weisel and written mainly by George Honadle. Jerry VanSant, Elliott Morss, Tony Barclay and Raymond Isely also drafted sections or offered insights.

The concluding chapter was drafted by David Gow, George Honadle and Elliott Morss, with the final version written by George. They nevertheless benefitted from interchanges throughout the entire process.

The draft contained annexes written by Craig Wenger, George Honadle, Donald Mickelwait and Thomas Armor. These annexes were subsequently incorporated into the text.

This product also results from activities which go back much further than the rigors of writing. The review of literature and experience was conducted by Robert Alger, Martii Ardito-Barletta, Tom Armor, James Carney, Paul Crawford, David Gow, George Honadle, Raymond Isely, Donald Mickelwait, Elliott Morss, Jerry VanSant, Peter Weisel, and Craig Wenger.

The draft was edited by Emily Bardeen. The final version was edited and critiqued by Tjip Walker. Word processing and typing was provided by James Woldahl, Cae Johnston and Arlette

Snyder. Additional support, both psychological and substantive, was given by James Lowenthal and Ronald Curtis, the DS/RAD project managers responsible for this project.

The contributions of all of the above are duly recorded and gratefully acknowledged.

G.H.H.

E.R.M.

J.V.

D.D.G.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

There is a growing recognition that without skillful management rural development programs are likely to fall short of their potential. Moreover, the organization of the effort either helps or hinders both the practice of good management and the development of good managers.

Integrated Rural Development (IRD) programs are especially susceptible to organization and management shortcomings. This is so because IRD efforts tend to be large and complex affairs requiring the support of other organizations but located in places where such support is weak. Additionally, since IRD strategies focus on an intricate web of constraints suppressing rural development, the failure to weaken a single strand may negate the entire effort and may even cause damages that result in conditions worse than the original situation. Thus management capacity is severely taxed by the problems associated with IRD.

This report directly confronts issues of organization and administration that are related to the following obstacles to IRD implementation:

- Lack of management authority over staff;
- Inaccurate data about project operations;
- Inability of project managers to supervise and lead technical teams;
- Lack of incentives for project staff or cooperating

organization personnel to act in ways that support IRD objectives;

- Delays due to procurement bottlenecks;
- Diversion of project resources to other uses;
- Inappropriate use of technical assistance;
- Non-response to project initiatives by beneficiaries; and
- Activities which cannot be sustained after project resources are exhausted.

This list is culled from a rapidly growing body of experience with IRD in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America. African examples of IRD experience include such well-known efforts as Lilonqwe in Malawi, CADU in Ethiopia, North Shaba in Zaire and Lofa County in Liberia. Asian experience is represented by ARD in Thailand, Rapati Zone in Nepal, the Bicol in the Philippines and PDP in Indonesia. Caribbean and Latin American experience is represented by DRI in Colombia, IRDP in Jamaica, PIDER in Mexico and PROTECPA in Honduras.

The authors of this report either visited project sites, interviewed project implementors, consulted project records, or were themselves involved in the implementation of IRD projects. Thus the state-of-the-art review is based on concerns expressed by those people charged with the task of field management. Additionally, these concerns are supplemented by the lessons contained in a wide range of scholarly literature relating to organization and administration.

This chapter presents the focus, approach and format of the report, examines strengths and weaknesses associated with the transfer of management experience between countries, and identifies the need to define key terms.

### CONSIDERING INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Although much previous research has focused on rural development project design, the fact remains that design documents are dominated by approval needs rather than by manageability considerations.<sup>1/</sup> Consequently, field staff often inherit implementation plans with unrealistic time frames and unmanageable organizational arrangements.

If high priority were given to implementation problems once projects were underway, this would not be too troubling. For several reasons, however, this has not occurred.

- Major donor staffs receive greater rewards for programming the expenditure of funds than for working to insure that projects are implemented sensibly;
- Developing country officials receive greater rewards for attracting additional foreign monies than for ensuring that monies already available are well-spent; and
- Until better project evaluation procedures are adopted, reliable criteria to provide rewards for good implementation performance will not be available.

The situation is aggravated by researchers' reluctance to give priority attention to the implementation dimension. Montgomery describes this state of affairs in the following way:

As encountered in current literature on public policy, implementation refers to the task of carrying out policies and programs made elsewhere. Policy studies are the "big sciences"; for reasons that are not altogether self-evident, implementation is often thought of as a subordinate function, lacking in social consequence or intellectual distinction.<sup>2/</sup>

A combination of these factors has left field managers without a practical, systematic guide for organizing and imple-

menting rural development programs. This report is an initial attempt to rectify that situation.

Due to a tendency toward complex interagency dependencies, integrated rural development efforts are especially susceptible to organizational and managerial failings. Thus, any practical consideration of the implementation of integrated programs must emphasize organizational arrangements, administrative systems and managerial behavior.

For the purposes of this report, integrated rural development will be considered the process of combining multiple development services into a coherent effort to improve the well-being of rural populations.<sup>3/</sup>

There are two advantages to this general definition of IRD. First, it is broad enough to include a wide range of potentially rich experiences. For example, projects falling within the definition can range from small-scale, community-based efforts by the Save the Children Fund in Indonesia to large-scale, physical infrastructure-dominated area development projects in the Philippines. Other examples include a national program in Botswana and provincial/regional planning projects in Indonesia and Tanzania. Each of these undertakings can contribute unique insights into the IRD implementation process and any rigid analytical definition which excluded those contributions would penalize those who might use the report. The second advantage to this approach is that the emphasis on the implementation process narrows the focus to a reasonable set of practical managerial considerations.

## APPROACHING LITERATURE AND EXPERIENCE

For literature and experience to provide guidance to managers, they must be presented in a way that suggests what factors affect what results and what can be done to improve those results. Such suggestions may be viewed as propositions regarding the relationships between organizational characteristics and management practices on the one hand, and project processes and impact on the other.

The approach taken in this state-of-the-art review is to derive such propositions from published sources, operational documents and personal experience, and then to present them to the reader.<sup>4/</sup> This accomplishes four things: first, it identifies items that require the attention of designers and managers, and suggests what might be done to deal with them; second, it provides specific questions for further research; third, it highlights the certainty of present knowledge by identifying contradictory conclusions about particular relationships; and finally, it clarifies messages hidden within pages of prose.

These propositions are placed within a general framework of the implementation process to show where they fall in relation to specific objectives. For example, some propositions deal with ways to deliver goods and services to rural people, while others focus on why those people do or do not use the services, and still others are concerned with the link between the use of services and improved welfare.<sup>5/</sup>

Each of these three sets of linkages (resources to goods and services; goods and services to behavior change; behavior change to welfare) can be either facilitated or constrained by organization and management factors. Chapters Three, Four and Five reflect this framework by separately presenting proposi-

tions related to each portion of the implementation process, thus allowing readers to focus on the phase most important to them. In this way, problems related to service delivery, participation and behavior change, or self-sustaining improvement in welfare may be related directly to the most pertinent propositions derived from experience as well as relevant literature.

### TRANSFERRING THE KNOWLEDGE

Some observers contend that organization and management experience is not transferable to or among the agrarian societies of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Although there are limitations on the direct export and adoption of management theories and practices, many general insights are in fact applicable to the management of rural development. This section presents the authors' perspective on the transferability issue and shows how it is approached.

#### Supporting the Potential Contribution

Many organizational dynamics occur regardless of the cultural context; for example, incidents of goal displacement are no less common in Ecuador than they are in Ethiopia.<sup>6/</sup> Additionally, much of the activity surrounding development projects placed within line ministries reflects the general tendency of special project units to be engulfed by their host organizations.<sup>7/</sup> These two instances suggest that an extensive examination of relevant literature and experience can yield meaningful generalizations and provide useful guidelines for the organization and management of integrated rural development.

Some social science theories provide keen insights which transcend national boundaries. For example, in his book focusing on the behavior of industrial organizations, James D. Thompson hypothesized that when the rationality of an organization differs greatly from the rationality of its environment, organizational resources will be diverted away from goal achievement in order to focus on activities that will cushion the conflicts occurring between the organization and its environment.<sup>8/</sup> This abstraction is supported by concrete examples of organizational dynamics in East African cooperatives.<sup>9/</sup> For example, an imported organizational goal of production efficiency was sacrificed to local preoccupations with equity and distribution when "big men" monopolized tractors and other organizational resources.

David Leonard's study of Kenya's Ministry of Agriculture also supports the usefulness of organization theory for understanding the effects of subordinate staff behavior on productivity. His examination of 36 hypotheses derived from organization theory supported 21 of them while only five appeared doubtful. Moreover, "In no case could a relationship opposite to a...hypothesis be established with statistical significance."<sup>10/</sup> He concluded that "Western theory...is grounded in sufficiently basic principles of human behavior that its use as a guide to research will lead more quickly to a valid body of organization theory for any particular region of the world than would a completely fresh start."<sup>11/</sup>

The conclusion, then, is that existing organization and management literature can provide a head start in the effort to construct a new state of the art in the organization and administration of integrated rural development. The approach to this report supports this potential contribution of the literature.

### Avoiding Misapplication

Although the Western literature has positive potential, a superficial projection of such models on to non-western environments could produce undesirable consequences. For example, the value of a matrix style of organization, such as that used successfully by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is often touted by management consultants in industrial societies. This matrix style overlays multiple project teams onto a traditional hierarchical organization. A number of NASA characteristics, however, make it difficult to transfer its form to IRD projects. First, NASA was equipped with an essentially unlimited budget. Second, since NASA was staffed mainly by engineers, there was a commonality of worldview which is seldom approximated in IRD projects. Finally, NASA had a particular structural attribute essential to effective operation -- the role of program manager.

A program manager has the authority to resolve conflicts that arise between a project manager and a functional officer whose project support is essential. Without the program manager role, the complex high-conflict matrix structure has little chance for success. In many developing countries, the program manager role does not exist. Since there is seldom any delegation of real decisionmaking authority below the ministerial level, conflicts between project and line agency staff would most likely be resolved at the national level. This could turn many field problems into hotly debated political issues which would hinder implementation. Thus, the matrix style of formal organization can produce undesirable consequences in some development environments.

The danger to be avoided when using the western literature, then, is one of misapplication rather than inapplicability.

That is, although the theories have value, the lack of attention to context can produce invalid conclusions. However, knowledge of context can allow either an estimate of transferability or a situational interpretation of the general statement. The relation of Thompson's theory to East African cooperative experience illustrates an interpretation of a theory, while the discussion of matrix organizations illustrates an estimate of the transferability of an organizational structure.

The approach of this state-of-the-art review to the transferability issue is to critically examine the literature through the lens of the authors' collected experience in managing rural development. This ensures that the most promising propositions for future examination are extracted and the danger of misapplication avoided.

The casual definition of terms also contributes to the misapplication of management concepts. This issue is addressed below.

#### DEFINING KEY TERMS

Many terms associated with rural development are used with uninhibited exuberance; items such as "participation" or "host country collaboration" or "management information system" or "integrated" or "coordinate" abound. Often, however, they refer to very different phenomena and sometimes seem to be used to hide a lack of understanding. For example, Robert Chambers has observed that:

...by using "integrated" and "coordinated" more or less synonymously and in alternate sentences, long sections of prose can be given an appearance of saying something while in fact saying very little indeed....

These two words have done grave disservice by allowing vague thinking and by discouraging identification in detail of certain important and potential benefits.12/

Such sloppiness impedes communication and analysis. Without consistent definitions of key terms it is extremely difficult to compare research results, since common terms may define different behaviors, or different terms may describe similar phenomena. Moreover, the loose use of words makes it more difficult for practitioners to recognize and apply the knowledge most appropriate for their particular situations.

To avoid this problem, each key term is defined either in the text or in a footnote when it is first introduced, and a glossary of these key terms is included as Annex A. This procedure assists both the learning effort and the communication of the state of the art.

#### SUMMARY

The purpose of this review is both to provide immediate practical guidance to practitioners and to focus further inquiry on specific questions about the organization and administration of integrated rural development. This is accomplished by presenting propositions about what sets of factors influence project processes and results in what ways. The propositions are extracted from published literature as well as from the unpublished experience of rural development practitioners.

Limitations on the transferability of management knowledge between cultural contexts are minimized by having rural development specialists critically examine the propositions. Those

found suitable are then placed into a management-oriented overview of the implementation process to facilitate the location of those propositions most applicable to particular field problems. The need for accurate, complete and consistent definition of terms associated with rural development is recognized. Key terms are thus defined as they appear in the text and a glossary is included as Annex A.

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NOTES:

- 1/ See Donald R. Mickelwait, Charles P. Sweet and Elliott R. Morss, New Directions in Development: A Study of U.S. AID, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979.
- 2/ John D. Montgomery, "Decisions, Nondecisions and Other Phenomena: Implementation Analysis for Development Administrators," in International Development Administration: Implementation Analysis for Development Projects, George Honadle and Rudi Klaus, eds., New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979, p. 56.
- 3/ This definition draws on two sources. They are: Tom Armor, George Honadle, Craig Olson and Peter Weisel, "Organizing and Supporting Integrated Rural Development Projects: A Twofold Approach to Administrative Development," Journal of Administration Overseas, vol. XVIII, no. 4, 1979, pp. 276-286; and John M. Cohen, The Administration of Economic Development Programs: Baselines for Discussion, Development Discussion Paper No. 79, Harvard Institute for International Development, October 1979.
- 4/ A proposition is an "if,...then" statement showing how one factor influences another. These statements summarize the relationships established in the literature. For backgrounds on the use of propositions in literature reviews, see James L. Price, Organizational Effectiveness: An Inventory of Propositions, Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1968.
- 5/ See Chapter Two, "Characterizing IRD Implementation: A Practical Framework," for detailed discussion of this general framework of the implementation process.
- 6/ Goal displacement refers to the tendency for means to become ends in and of themselves. For example, filling out a form correctly is sometimes seen as a goal and the purpose that a document fulfills is lost from the minds of those completing or reviewing it. Thus a goal is displaced by a means.

7/ See A.M. Cohen, E.L. Robinson, and J.L. Edwards, "Experiments in Organizational Embeddedness," Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 14, 1969, pp. 208-221.

8/ James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.

9/ Goran Hyden, Efficiency Versus Distribution in East African Cooperatives: A Study in Organizational Conflict, Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1973. Also see Nelson Kasfir, "Organizational Analysis and Ugandan Cooperative Unions," in Cooperatives and Rural Development in East Africa, Carl Gosta Widstrand, ed., Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1970, pp. 178-208.

10/ David K. Leonard, Reaching the Peasant Farmer: Organization Theory and Practice in Kenya, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977, p. 230.

11/ Ibid.

12/ Robert Chambers, Managing Rural Development: Ideas and Experience from East Africa, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974, p. 25.

## CHAPTER TWO

## CHARACTERIZING IRD IMPLEMENTATION: A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK

There are many ways to approach IRD implementation. One common way is to view the implementation phase as one segment of a project life cycle that begins with an initial idea, proceeds through preparation and design to implementation, and finally arrives at evaluation and termination. We have not chosen this approach for two reasons. First, such an emphasis tends toward "front end loading" which suggests that everything must be done in the beginning. Second, this view focuses too much on the project itself and not enough on why it exists and what it is supposed to do.

Other ways to characterize implementation range from loose collections of ideas about interpersonal communication on the one hand, to overly formalistic prescriptions about management systems on the other. These approaches have likewise not been taken because the communication emphasis misses too many important structural constraints while the management systems emphasis tends to result mainly in complex, confusing and unuseable diagrams.

Another approach is to view IRD as a response to a felt deficiency in some basic community need. Although this way

of beginning with the local situation is commendable, few such studies provide assistance to implementors in other circumstances. Consequently, it is necessary to conceptualize implementation as a response and then to step back and generalize about what constitutes the implementation process.

This report does just that. It depicts IRD as a response to local needs and then presents a simple framework for characterizing IRD implementation. From a combination of this framework and the lessons of literature and experience it then becomes possible to suggest ways in which organization designs and management practices can be used to improve the quality of that response.

This chapter presents a framework for the discussion of implementation. It also distinguishes between integration and coordination dimensions of the implementation process.

### THE FRAMEWORK

A conceptual framework is simply a tool used to order and categorize information. All reports are based on some view of relevant categories but sometimes their importance is not explicitly stated. There is a danger with unstated categories because different frameworks suggest very different implications for the same set of data. Thus it is

necessary at the outset to focus on the tool itself. This is well expressed by Robert Pirsig in his discussion of motorcycle parts and subsystem assemblies:

...there is a knife moving here. A very deadly one; an intellectual scalpel so swift and so sharp you sometimes don't see it moving. You get the illusion that all those parts are just there and are being named as they exist. But they can be named quite differently and organized quite differently depending on how the knife moves.

He proceeds to elaborate on this "intellectual scalpel" in a very concrete way.

For example, the feedback mechanism which includes the cam shaft and cam chain and tappets and distributor exists only because of an unusual cut of this analytic knife. If you were to go to a motorcycle-parts department and ask them for a feedback assembly they wouldn't know what the hell you were talking about. They don't split it up that way. No two manufacturers ever split it up quite the same way and every mechanic is familiar with the problem of the part you can't buy because you can't find it because the manufacturer considers it a part of something else.

It is important to see this knife for what it is and not to be fooled into thinking that motorcycles or anything else are the way they are just because the knife happened to cut it up that way. It is important to concentrate on the knife itself.1/

The first task of this chapter, then, should be to concentrate on the framework used to characterise IRD implementation.

### Sequential Objectives

Rural development projects and programs are responses to perceived situations where human well-being does not meet

desirable or acceptable standards. For example, infant mortality rates may be extremely high or income levels may not meet even basic needs. To alleviate these situations, new resources are introduced into areas which did not have them previously.

The jump from resource application to welfare improvement, however, is a leap of faith. Unless intermediate stages are identified, the transformation of resources into well-being will remain a mystical and unmanageable process.

The framework used here posits two intermediate sets of objectives between resources and welfare. They are (1) project initiatives in the delivery of goods and/or services; and (2) changes in behavior patterns of rural populations in response to those initiatives.

#### Goods and Services

Two of the first tasks confronted by development managers are obtaining the funds that have been promised for a project and then transforming them into goods and services that can be used by rural populations. For example, until funds are released staff cannot be hired; until staff are working roads will not be built, research will not be conducted, and extension programs will not be operating. Thus, the first set of problems besetting managers relates to producing goods and services.

There are many dimensions to this process, including overall strategy and development philosophy, physical barriers and seasonal difficulties in service delivery, as well as bureaucratic dynamics. In the attempt to overcome obstacles, projects are organized, systems are developed to routinize such things as financial management and procurement, and managers take actions to achieve results. Analysis of these problems and ways of getting around them are discussed in Chapter Three.

Although there is considerable knowledge about the relative advantages and disadvantages of different project organizations and managerial behaviors, much of what is known is ignored. The reason for this appears to be that even though better and worse ways for managing information and resources can often be specified, there are rarely incentives for using the better approaches. Thus a major factor affecting the conversion of resources into goods and services is incentives.

This is not the only step between resources and welfare. Unless goods and services are used, no change is likely to occur in the situation of those people who do not receive direct or indirect employment from project activities.

#### Local Response

In a discussion of the characteristics of good development administrators, Charles Murray identified two necessary

sets of tools. The first is expertise in a substantive area, while the second:

...involves the people who are the intended beneficiaries of...development; for, to be successful, it is almost invariably true that a development input must elicit a behavioral response. People must use the new road -- or grow the new crop, water their fields from the new irrigation canal or plow with the new tractor. Good planning and efficient implementation of rural efforts require therefore that the administrator understand the mainsprings of villager behavior.2/

This focus on local response is a keystone in development. Any examination of IRD organization and administration must regard beneficiary behavior as a pivotal point between project failure and success. Organizational structures and management practices must be geared to support this objective; this requires that goods and services be provided in ways that support villager response.3/

Just as there are many strategies for organizing service delivery systems, there are also alternative strategies for supporting behavioral response. This is the subject of Chapter Four.

The two intermediate objectives of goods and services and behavior change thus provide the connection between resources and welfare. During implementation, IRD efforts resemble a sequence of intended changes, each of which is a management or policy objective. First, resources are channeled to an area. These resources are often used to produce

goods and services that can be used by village populations. If local people do utilize these new goods and services, they are responding either by adopting new practices or by expanding or modifying traditional ones. These new behavior patterns should contribute to improved welfare. Thus implementation is applying resources and transforming them into goods and services in a way that leads to behavioral changes in the target group with the expectation that those changes will increase welfare in a self-sustaining way. Figure 2-1 presents the sequence of these objectives.

FIGURE 2-1  
SEQUENCE OF OBJECTIVES



Although this simple scheme provides a way of viewing a development project, it does not emphasize the substance or organization of this report. The focus here is not so much on the boxes as it is on the arrows -- the conditions required to bring about this sequence of objectives and the problems encountered when doing it. In fact, Chapters Three, Four and Five focus on organizational and administrative tactics for providing the conditions necessary for the three linkages -- arrows -- to occur.

### Conditions and Linkages

Although the framework above permits a simplified view of the implementation process, the complexity of IRD projects requires a brief application of this simple format to multiple-function IRD efforts. Further, the combination of the uncertainty and difficulty of social change makes it difficult to bring about the intended connections between resources and welfare. These issues are addressed by noting that problems associated with each linkage can be occurring simultaneously in different IRD components and by identifying organization and management as approaches for overcoming uncertainty.

### Simultaneous Sequences

In spite of the fact that it is impossible to deliver services without resources or to use services before they exist, it is nevertheless necessary to consider the latter stages of the sequence when implementing the former ones. For example, beneficiaries will not use new services if they expect their welfare, as they define it, to decrease as a result of using those services.

This forward-looking perspective is necessary to ensure that the earlier linkages are managed in a way that leads to the later objectives. For example, establishing a health care delivery system that bypasses traditional herbalists may make it unlikely that villagers will avail themselves of

the health services. Thus, managers must constantly focus on the probability that the process used to manage the resource to goods and services link will in fact support positive beneficiary responses and reinforce self-sustaining development.

Additionally, the multiple-service nature of IRD results in different project components undergoing different stages at the same time -- farmers may be using farm planning techniques, roads and health services while canal structures are not yet complete or before procedures have been established to administer a credit component. Thus one IRD project may simultaneously be experiencing successes and failures associated with multiple linkages in the implementation process.

This depiction of IRD as simultaneous sequences illustrates two important points. First, it highlights the complexity of IRD implementation and identifies both the difficulty of administering IRD efforts and the importance, therefore, of appropriate organizational arrangements and managerial behavior. Second, it shows the usefulness of our framework for identifying differences between problems associated with different objectives within the resource-to-welfare flow.

### Organization and Management


Rural development is a very complex and uncertain process. The application of resources does not guarantee

service delivery nor do services automatically get used. The sequence of objectives presented above is only a representation of the logic or *raison d'etre* of the project. What actually happens is often quite different.

Sometimes when budgets have been depleted, personnel have been employed and equipment has been used, roads remain unfinished or farmers untrained. Even when goods and services are provided, local people may see little value in them and not respond as expected; little-used facilities and ineffective extension programs dot the development landscape. Furthermore, even if villagers do respond to project initiatives, their welfare may not improve. For example, the use of new cultivation practices and seeds may not raise net income because prices fall as the market is glutted or because new taxes are imposed. Thus each linkage in the sequence of objectives is only an intention -- numerous conditions affect them and some critical factors must be identified and managed if resources are to lead to welfare. Figure 2-2 illustrates this logic.

All conditions affecting the sequence cannot be managed, of course. Weather and other physical factors must be viewed as constraints. Due to the limited certainty of social science knowledge, many human and social factors are difficult to anticipate or control. Nevertheless, appropriate organizational arrangements and management practices can make it

FIGURE 2-2  
AN UNCERTAIN SEQUENCE




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Source: George Honadle, "Implementation Analysis: The Case for an Early Dose of Realism in Development Administration," in International Development Administration: Implementation Analysis for Development Projects, George Honadle and Rudi Klauss, eds., N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1979, p. 16.

easier to either control the controllable or identify the constraints. Inappropriate strategies, arrangements and practices, however, decrease the probability that objectives will be met.

Examples of the importance of organization abound. For instance, IRD project managers who supervise the activities of personnel on loan from line agencies<sup>4/</sup> -- without having any control over the career path or remuneration of those personnel -- find it difficult to guide performance. In other cases, preaudit requirements and highly centralized authority make timely field actions and decisions nearly impossible. In still other situations, single organizational

units serving both estates and smallholders tend to neglect the needs of the latter clientele. It is easy to see that without a proper organization it becomes much more difficult to ensure that resources will contribute to rural development.

Even with properly organized resource flows, lines of authority, and communication channels and service units, efforts may not be coordinated and adequate results may not emerge. An unskilled or unwilling group of managers can turn an adequate organization into a non-functioning paper plan: delegation of authority must be accompanied by a willingness to make decisions at the lower level; authority over personnel must be accompanied by supervisory skills; division of service units must be accompanied by staff activity which reflects that division. Thus, management practice is also an important ingredient in any recipe for successful IRD.

This report does not focus on technical factors. Instead, it examines project implementation problems and how organizational and administrative conditions can influence the linkages in the process leading from initial resource application to self-sustaining development. Such a focus is appropriate for three reasons: first, without a well-defined boundary, any discussion of IRD will rapidly get out of hand; second, given the complexity of IRD and the difficulty of guiding such complex processes, organizational arrangements and management practices can be expected to have an important effect; and

third, no study to date has dealt specifically with these dimensions. Moreover, few existing studies relate the implementation process to development impact. The approach of this report, then, is to emphasize the development results which can be related to organizational structure and management behavior.

### STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOR

Many attempts have been made to define "integrated rural development"; none have been exceptionally insightful, most have added more confusion than clarity, and few have proven very useful.<sup>5/</sup> We have adopted a broad definition which has as its major advantage the capacity to include a wide range of project types.<sup>6/</sup> Without elaboration, however, this definition is not likely to assist the effort to understand organizational and administrative problems associated with IRD.

For the purposes of this report, the organizational and administrative conditions of the framework will be reduced to sets of structural and behavioral considerations. In such a scheme, "integration" becomes a structural feature whereas "coordination" refers to behavior.


### Integration

The principal difference between an integrated as opposed to a functional organization is indicated by the level where authority over the full range of organizational activities converges. In a functional organization it occurs near the top: all engineers report upward through other engineers to the minister of public works; all agriculturalists report through vertical channels to the minister of agriculture; all medical personnel are ultimately responsible to the minister of health; and only at the highest level -- the president -- does authority over the three sectors converge. In an integrated organization, on the other hand, convergence occurs closer to the bottom of the organizational hierarchy. In an integrated area development project, for instance, engineers, agriculturalists and medical personnel may all be accountable to a single project manager in a subdistrict area. Thus integration denotes structure.


This difference in structure is diagrammed in Figure 2-3. In this display, M represents senior management, S represents field-level supervision, and A, B and C represent functional specializations such as engineering, agriculture and medicine. In a functional organization, the supervisory level is filled by a specialist with the same background as those being supervised. Senior management (M), however, might be drawn from any of the functional specialties (A, B, C). In

FIGURE 2-3  
 INTEGRATED AND FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

INTEGRATED ORGANIZATION



FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION




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Source: James C. Worthy, "Some Aspects of Organizational Structure in Relation to Pressures on Company Decision Making," in Industrial Relations Research Proceedings, I. Tripp, ed., N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1953, pp. 72-76.

an integrated organization, S is confronted with the same organizational view held by M in the functional structure. That is, the field level oversees all of the various functional areas within the organization. Thus, integration implies comprehensiveness (a multi-sectoral focus) and control (direct lines of authority).

There are both advantages and disadvantages associated with each of these organization designs and they can be expected to be important factors affecting the type and magnitude of management problems occurring during IRD implementation. For example, integration is a form of decentralization. Since an integrated structure provides a cross-functional focus at a lower level, there is a decisionmaker with a "total system" perspective located closer to the point where services are provided. Thus information about the entire scope of activities is available for field decisions. This is advantageous when activities are highly interdependent.

On the other hand, some problems can be expected from this arrangement. For example, when an engineer is responsible for supervising and judging the work of agriculturalists and nurses, the latter two groups may suffer from low morale. This is understandable. Without the confidence that their superior shares a common disciplinary perspective and similar definition of acceptable approaches, professionals may be

less satisfied with working conditions, interpersonal relationships or career paths. Additionally, there will be fewer shared perspectives among coworkers. Integrated structures can, therefore, be expected to generate more anxiety than functional ones. As a result, morale problems and communication complexity are natural concomitants of integrated strategies.

These differences between functional and integrated organizations also have implications for personnel recruitment and staff development. A functional organization puts a premium on supervisors who are less independent. Consequently, the well-rewarded supervisors are not those with either the leadership experience or the personal characteristics needed for senior management. Instead, they are the narrow-focused compliant specialists. An integrated structure, in contrast, provides a good training ground for management but also creates a threat to senior management by providing supervisors with experience and skills similar to the higher levels. As a result, there is often an unwillingness to delegate real authority to a potential rival. Therefore, although integration creates a decentralized focus, it is sometimes handicapped by centralized control over decisions.

These difficulties are further complicated by the various degrees of "integration" actually embodied in field

projects. For example, some strategies are essentially functional approaches with a mixed group of interagency personnel temporarily attached to a lead line agency. Moreover, the level of control over these personnel may be minimal.

The impurity of actual field arrangements underscores the need to see integration and coordination as different, yet similar, aspects of IRD. This need has also been recognized as a necessary step in isolating problems of service delivery in the United States.

Integration...mean[s] that action which brings previously separated and independent functions and organizations (or personnel, or resources, or clientele) into a new, unitary structure; whereas coordination...describe[s] various efforts to alter or smooth the relationships of continuing, independent elements such as organizations, staff and resources.<sup>7/</sup>

Thus integration refers to structure while its behavioral parallel is coordination.

### Coordination

A combination of the complexity of IRD and the sensitivity of some activities to complementary activities suggests that the need for cooperation and coordination in IRD projects may be greater than in single-task, single-sector projects. Thus complexity and sensitivity make a concern for coordination a major management focus while the role of management becomes even more important. This requires that the nature of coordination be clearly specified.

Coordination describes the type of managerial behavior required to produce the impact visualized by the designers of an integrated project. The word itself provides a clue to the behavior it describes --"co-" suggests joint or shared activities while "-ordination" implies the ranking or the establishment of priorities. Establishing priorities includes consideration of the timing,<sup>8/</sup> type, quality and magnitude of resources applied and goods or services produced. It also infers joint decisionmaking and shared implementation responsibility. The joint effort refers to sharing resources and information to guarantee the needed mix of goods and services. The measure of coordinated activity is thus the degree of information and resource sharing, while the measure of integrated service delivery is the appropriateness (timing, quality, type, magnitude) of the opportunities offered to the target population.

For an integrated structure to produce the desired results, then, a high level of coordination will be called for. Thus, integrated strategies will be very dependent upon informal decision networks and communication channels.

This implies that any examination of the organization and administration of integrated rural development must pay attention to both formal structural characteristics and informal managerial behavior. The interaction between the two and the relationship between that interaction and project impact is the subject of this inquiry.

Since both structure and behavior and both formal and informal relationships can be expected to influence IRD, the state of the art should reveal what is known about how such factors influence the linkages of the conceptual framework. Chapters Three, Four and Five present propositions<sup>9/</sup> about the role of these factors in providing solutions to the problems encountered in each of the three linkages.

#### SUMMARY

Chapter Two accomplishes two tasks: first, the process of IRD implementation is conceptualized; second, a distinction is made between "integration" and "coordination."

The conceptual framework characterizes IRD implementation as the conversion of resources into goods and services, the use of those goods and services by target groups, and improved welfare resulting from that usage. Each of the elements in this sequence is depicted as a management objective and central problems related to each objective are identified. The focus of this report is on those organizational arrangements and managerial practices which help to address the problems arising during that sequence.

Integration is depicted as a characteristic of organizational structure -- an organization is integrated at the lowest point where cross-functional responsibility appears in the decisionmaking hierarchy. Coordination, on the other hand, is presented as a behavioral dimension represented by information sharing and resource sharing. These discussions provide the background necessary to examine IRD implementation in Chapters Three, Four and Five.

NOTES:

1/ Robert Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, New York: William Morrow, 1974, p. 79.

2/ Charles A. Murray, A Behavioral Study of Rural Modernization: Social and Economic Change in Thai Villages, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977, p. 96.

3/ Goods and services can be seen as "opportunity" for villagers, whereas the new behavior can be depicted as "investments" by villagers based on project-provided opportunities. This construct was, in fact, used by Murray, who attributed it to John D. Montgomery. See Montgomery's Technology and Civic Life; Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974.

4/ A line agency is a government authority responsible for implementing programs within one sector of activities (e.g., agriculture, education, etc.) and having a minister or other designated cabinet-level official occupying the highest point in the hierarchy.

5/ For a sense of the definitional quagmire that is IRD, see John M. Cohen, The Administration of Economic Development Programs, Development Discussion Paper No. 79, Harvard Institute for International Development, October 1979, pp. 32-54. Also see his "Integrated Rural Development: Clearing out the Underbrush", Sociologia Ruralis (forthcoming).

6/ See pp. 2 - 3, above.

7/ Robert Morris and Ilana Hirsch Lescohier, "Service Integration: Real Versus Illusory Solutions to Welfare Dilemmas," in The Management of Human Services, Rosemary Sarri and Yeheskel Hasenfield, eds., New York: Columbia University Press, 1978, p. 23.

8/ One dimension of this is duration, e.g., two weeks of farmer training versus a one-day training session. Another dimension is simultaneous versus sequential activity, such as training an irrigator association and building canals at the same time versus beginning training after the canals have been completed. A third dimension is pace, e.g., how much is done in a given time. In IRD programs, it is especially critical to synchronize the pace and sequence of component activities so that the overall result is complementary rather than self-cancelling or out-of-balance.

9/ Preceding each proposition is an identifying number. The Roman numeral indicates the chapter in which the proposition appears. The second figure indicates the order of propositions within each chapter. Thus, III-4 would identify the fourth proposition in Chapter Three.

## CHAPTER THREE

## DELIVERING GOODS AND SERVICES

In this report, IRD programs, projects and sub-project components are viewed as responses to deficiencies identified in rural situations. Many people have rightly emphasized the necessity for project and ministry staff to view their role as responding to villager needs rather than simply expecting villagers to respond in a sheeplike way to staff overtures, advice or commands.<sup>1/</sup> Although this is commendable, it does not go far enough. For staff to respond to villager needs invariably requires delivering some combination of goods and services. Moreover, as soon as the scale of the request exceeds the ability of a single person to carry it out, then it becomes necessary to organize and manage the efforts of the actors involved.

When these efforts are being organized and executed, the process used can be as important as the immediate results achieved. This is so because services, materials and facilities are not the ultimate objectives. Rather, they are simply means to the further goals of local response and self-sustaining improvements in local well-being. Since it is people who are at the core of these further goals -- and people hold values concerning the desirability of alternative ways to do things and they remember how they were done -- the service delivery process can directly affect the achievement of those goals.<sup>2/</sup>

Thus, service delivery is important for two reasons: first, without it the more distant goals of response and welfare will not be achieved; and second, the means through which services are produced can influence response and welfare.

However, many so-called "management" problems are actually caused by inappropriate organizational designs<sup>3/</sup> thus both design strategies and implementation tactics need to be examined. In order to do so, this chapter identifies alternative ways of organizing the delivery of goods and services as well as successful techniques to manage that process. More specifically, the first sections emphasize organizational aspects -- project placement, internal organization design, and relationships between a project and external support organizations. Later sections look at how management skills can be used to improve service delivery. Discussions include managing information, human resources and material resources. The management of technical assistance -- an important aspect of many IRD endeavors -- also receives specific attention.

Since the history of IRD covers many projects, many countries and many years, this chapter identifies numerous specific examples of problems encountered and actions taken to either deal with those problems or avoid others. The lengthy history of IRD has also generated numerous controversies over the most successful organizational design and implementation strategy. The highlights of the debate are presented below. Here the intention is to present a set of general, overarching issues that affect the various organizational and managerial considerations presented in this and following chapters.

#### FOUR CONTROVERSIES

Controversies surrounding the design of rural development programs focus on four dimensions. They are configuration, complexity, size and certainty. Both sides of each controversy are presented below.

### New Versus Old

Cumbersome bureaucracies can make it very difficult to deliver services to rural inhabitants or to obtain their participation in program decisions or benefits.<sup>4/</sup> A common strategy has been, therefore, to bypass existing agencies and create a new government unit or beneficiary organization.

Proponents of this approach claim numerous advantages for a newly-created structure focusing on a limited target area. These advantages include the following:

- Supporting the participation of rural people in project decisions and activities;
- Side-stepping permanent agencies or local organizations which may be hostile to the intended clientele;
- Avoiding oppressive bureaucratic controls and getting the job of delivering goods and services done;
- Supporting the use of experimental and analytical methods incompatible with established bureaucratic procedures;
- Providing a training ground for creative leadership which otherwise could be stifled in overly bureaucratic settings;
- Allowing measurement of impact in a target area and providing accountability; and thus
- Simplifying the funding process and reinforcing donor control.

One variant of a new organization is an autonomous project management unit. This is based on an engineering model of efficient operation which has been used for many decades to build roads, buildings, harbors and other physical infrastructure.

Opponents of this model, however, consider both the approach itself and the thinking behind it to be major weaknesses in present policies and strategies. Critiques of new agencies and autonomous management units stress the following items:5/

- Independent units are outside civil service regulations and their higher salaries drain line agencies of their most qualified personnel, thus further weakening already weak organizations;
- New agencies do not have established public clienteles or the ability to defend themselves against the encroachment of permanent institutions and thus interagency conflict and greater inefficiencies may result from their creation;
- Discrete projects are temporary efforts which are not capable of producing long-run improvements in the capacities of permanent institutions and thus they reinforce short-term direct action at the expense of true development;
- Rural landscapes are already crowded by an excessive number of agencies and organizations thus the challenge is to make them work rather than to increase the competition for resources and clients;
- Temporary projects perpetuate a dependence on outsiders bypassing the system thus reinforcing disbelief in the ability of the system to deliver the goods; and
- Time-bound projects cause personnel management problems because staff see their positions more as stepping-stones than as long-term commitments.

Proponents of using existing governmental bodies to implement rural development programs focus on the need to build local capabilities so that development can become a self-sustaining enterprise. Moreover, they see the "quick results" mentality of the independent management unit as one of the obstacles to eventual success. In their minds, established institutions must be used to ensure that creative initiatives become a more permanent feature of rural environments.

### Simple Versus Comprehensive

Simplicity is the key to success. In resource-deficient environments, complexity is likely to produce failure because it makes high demands on precisely those human skills and material resources which are in short supply. Consequently, rural development strategies based on comprehensive multi-sectoral programs are unfitted for poverty-targeted efforts.<sup>6/</sup> Moreover, by attempting to do too much too quickly the result is often high expectations combined with low performance.

The "simple is optimal" school argues that current donor practices for project preparation respond more to bureaucratic/technocratic needs for high-cost, methodologically sophisticated and faddish designs than to the needs of rural villagers. In other words, complex designs provide more employment for donor-agency bureaucrats and Western technicians than for peasant farmers.

The advantages of simple approaches are considered to be:

- A greater probability that local management capacity will be adequate to implement them;
- A greater probability of replication since they do not overtax scarce resources;
- A greater chance for beneficiary participation because they are more understandable to rural people;
- A greater likelihood that benefits will become self-sustaining because there is less vulnerability to lack of complex environmental support functions; and
- A higher degree of local control and independence from external experts and powers.

Opponents of "simple is optimal" contend that complex problems require complex solutions; since there is an intricate web of constraints which suppresses rural development, solutions must focus on the entire web rather than just individual strands. For example, long-term increases in farmer well-being may require reforestation of denuded slopes, feeder roads, storage facilities, strengthened local organizations, population planning, new marketing practices and health science knowledge as well as the fertilizer, seeds and planting methods which increase crop yields. Ignoring any one strand can negate the entire effort and may even cause damages that result in conditions worse than the original situation. Thus, multiple-function, complex programs are appropriate responses to rural realities. This is the logical foundation of "integrated rural development."

The strengths of more comprehensive and complex IRD programs are that:

- They focus on problem webs rather than on discrete problems;
- A mixture of professional disciplines improves the likelihood of accurate and appropriate responses;
- A simultaneous capacity-building process strengthens more than one dimension of a rural environment;7/
- A willingness to attack the complexity of rural environments, rather than offer false hopes for simplistic solutions which are unlikely to have more than isolated effects, improves chances for success;

- They create the opportunity for local administrators to gain experience in managing complex relationships and organizational processes; and
- An incentive for building cooperative relationships among the many agencies and organizations responsible for discrete development activities is provided.

Thus, both simple and complex approaches are arguably more realistic and more capable of facilitating self-sustaining change processes. Moreover, the arguments apply to both program and local organizational levels. For example, complex local organizations seem to have more staying power in Asia, whereas single-function ones work best in Africa and Latin America.<sup>8/</sup>

#### Small Versus Large

A variant of the "simple is optimal" slogan is the "small is beautiful" motto.<sup>9/</sup> Although smallness does not guarantee simplicity, nevertheless, it does make simple approaches more likely and it can have similar results. Just as simple programs are more fitted to areas with low absorptive capacity, so too, programs with small budgets may be more easily absorbed by rural government structures and user associations. In fact, the claims for the superiority of small-scale endeavors parallel the arguments for simple ones.

Arguments for large programs, in terms of both budget and area, also parallel the reactions against "simple-mindedness." The "small-mindedness" opponents stress two dimensions. First, operations with small budgets get low priority in bureaucratic battles. Consequently, a retreat to low level efforts runs the risk of no effort at all. Since the bureaucratic energy required to plan, approve and implement multiple low cost projects exceeds that needed to launch a few high cost ones, such an approach is administratively "inefficient." Moreover, the visibility of large programs makes them politically attractive.<sup>10/</sup>

The second objection to smallness emphasizes geography rather than budget. From this perspective, most area-based development projects focus on inappropriate boundaries. Although marketing centers and intermediate cities lie outside the limits of most area development projects, migration, transportation, revenue generation and resource transfers between them are important factors affecting project success. Thus, until the integration of the rural-urban continuum occurs, projects are not likely to attack the real web of constraints.<sup>11/</sup>

This geography-based criticism of "small is beautiful" also implies that the organizational placement of development programs should favor subnational or national agencies with a broad enough coverage to encompass the important areas. In cases where present administrative boundaries are inappropriate, new agencies focusing on river basins or market areas are warranted. Thus, the large program perspective encompasses budget, area and administrative hierarchy.

### Blueprint Versus Process

The typical approach to rural development planning and implementation treats a program design as a blueprint to be followed by managers. Since the design emerges from a concentrated pouring of high-level technical expertise into feasibility studies and appraisal teams, it is often considered to be the most authoritative estimate of what is possible.

In addition to embodying technical authority, the design also functions as a negotiating instrument. Project agreements form a contractual bond between donors and recipients. This allows donors to demonstrate accountability to their constituents by identifying the connection between expenditures and mandates. Moreover, it defines the respective roles of the

various actors in the implementation process and requires formal amendment to alter that process.

Thus the combination of authoritative and contractual dimensions of program designs results in their being treated as blueprints to be followed. The advantages of this perspective include the following:

- When technologies are tried and certain, a blueprint approach improves the likelihood of efficient execution of tasks;
- When procedures, mechanisms, magnitudes and substance are defined in the beginning as binding, greater attention will be paid to making the design as good as possible;
- When designs receive serious consideration it improves the probability that public funds will be wisely spent and lowers the likelihood that donors will be accused of supporting slipshod activities;
- When designs emerge from detailed feasibility studies it is easier for donors to allocate their scarce resources by choosing the best designs for funding; and
- When designs are detailed at the outset it is easier to hold management accountable and to ensure that resources are not diverted to other uses.

Although the blueprint approach has a long and fairly successful history in the construction of large-scale site-bound infrastructure, the advent of dispersed service delivery activities and IRD programs has raised questions about its universal applicability. The alternative which has emerged from these questions is called a "process" approach.

To understand the process alternative, it is first necessary to examine the criticisms leveled at the blueprint model.

The major critique of blueprinting is that it assumes that solutions to problems are known and that projects are merely vehicles for applying them. When such projects fail, blame is generally attributed to poor management rather than to the inadequacy of the design itself.12/

Unfortunately, critics argue, the world is not so simple as the blueprint model suggests. First, what appears to be a certain technology or an appropriate implementation strategy during design may subsequently appear unsatisfactory. Second, the situation for which a project was designed may change during implementation and locking management into a rigid design may make it impossible to successfully respond to such changes.

Additionally, the process of true development can be seen as one characterized by learning by innovation and by building the capability to deal with new situations -- not as the automatic and endless repetition of predetermined solutions. From such a perspective, a blueprint strategy exemplifies attitudes and practices which obstruct self-sustaining development.

Thus, when the uncertainty of social technologies and rural environments is combined with a capacity-building view of rural development, a flexible, adaptive, learning-oriented approach is needed. This is called a process model.

The elements of a process model vary among individual programs -- some are more process-oriented than others. Nevertheless, general characteristics of a process orientation include the following:

- A design broken into discrete phases;
- A large amount of short-term technical assistance;

- An emphasis on action-oriented training among both staff and beneficiaries;
- A use of temporary task forces;
- A reward system consistent with a learning orientation;
- An applied research component;
- A learning component, such as a "rolling" regional plan; and
- A redesign orientation, such as periodic revisions of project organization, project objectives and job descriptions of project personnel.

This is the basic alternative to a blueprint approach to organization design and program implementation. Although the depth of experience with process approaches is less than with blueprinted investment strategies, the strengths and potentials of the process model appear to be the following:

- A process strategy is rooted in dialogue with rural villagers and thus it is more responsive to rural potentials than the technically-oriented blueprint;
- A process approach allows variation through both time and space and thus is more likely to reach subsets of the target population and to adapt to political, social, economic and physical changes which occur during implementation;
- A process model is based on learning and capacity-building and thus it is well-fitted to the promotion of self-sustaining development dynamics;
- A process approach transfers "ownership" of the program to implementors and thus it creates an environment supportive of innovative problem-solving rather than routine application of pre-determined solutions; and
- A process strategy makes it possible to avoid negative side-effects by discontinuing design dimensions (technology, organization, goals, etc.) which are determined to be inappropriate.

In response to the high levels of uncertainty inherent in social systems and rural environments, then, a process-focused strategy has been articulated as an alternative to the blueprint model of service delivery.

The pros and cons of these general strategies should be kept in mind as we examine the tradeoffs common to organizational structures and management practices in more detail.

#### EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Regardless of the general strategy selected, two issues must be resolved during the macro-design of organizational arrangements: first, an appropriate organizational level for the intervention must be determined; and second, an appropriate institutional host for the effort must be chosen.

Each choice involves tradeoffs. In the case of level, the decision can be based on local context, project priorities and the advantages and disadvantages of centralization (integration with authority at a high level) versus decentralization (integration with authority at a low level). The selection of the host organization can also be based on local dynamics and project priorities as they relate to the strengths and weaknesses of the four most common placement strategies.

This section identifies the options available to organizational designers and presents a summary of the tradeoffs inherent in each alternative.

### Level of Centralization

A basic question to be answered during the establishment of an integrated service delivery strategy is "At what hierarchical level should integration occur?" IRD efforts range from the lowest level, e.g., multisectoral training for village-level paraprofessionals, to the highest, e.g., a cabinet-level coordinating committee for IRD.

The choice of an appropriate hierarchical point to provide an integrated focus is tied to the relative advantages of centralized versus decentralized decisionmaking. Some of the tradeoffs are well established. For example, a centralized decision structure tends to overload formal communications systems and it requires more infrastructure and resources than does a decentralized structure, if decisions are to be made within a similar time span. It is also known that decentralized structures require more elaborate informal channels. Thus, the tradeoffs in this case are relatively certain and defined.

Other tradeoffs, however, are less clear. For example, some research suggests that top-level administrators tend to make better decisions about linkages with outside organizations, though different studies conclude that a combination of decentralized decisions and multiple communication channels facilitates interorganizational cooperation. Thus, conflicting reports indicate that some tradeoffs are not yet clearly defined.

Additionally, culture and history influence the appropriateness of a decision structure and intervention level. For example, balances of power between ethnic groups, and cultural preferences for autocratic versus participatory decisionmaking are factors which affect the relative acceptability of centralized or decentralized organizations.13/

Potential tradeoffs between integration at high or low organizational levels are noted in Figure 3-1. It must be remembered, however, that although integrated rural development implies a more decentralized strategy, the choice of level is not independent from the choice of host.

### Organizational Placement

The placement of an IRD effort is also a macro-organizational concern. Expanding on the discussion in the previous section, the four basic choices for structuring a more or less integrated delivery system are:

- Using a lead-line agency with cooperative agreements between it and other sectoral agencies (e.g., the Philippines' Libmanan/Cabusao integrated area development project);
- Working at a program level through a sub-national government unit such as a region or province (e.g., Indonesia's provincial development program);
- Operating through an integrated development agency which is a permanent organization deriving its authority from a president's office (e.g., Mexico's PIDER); or
- Establishing an autonomous but temporary project management unit (PMU) to deliver integrated services within a specified but limited geographic area (e.g., Liberia's Lofa County agricultural development project).

There are numerous tradeoffs involved in the choice of placement strategy. For example, limited area development efforts have the advantage of providing a delimited catchment area where impact can be more readily identified and heterogeneous conditions can be minimized. Such project approaches can avoid artificial ecological, ethnic or economic boundary divisions such as provinces, districts or regions. In fact, limited-scope, area-based projects provide a successful

FIGURE 3-1

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION

	CENTRALIZATION	DECENTRALIZATION
STRENGTHS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Increases speed of decision with routine decisions and certain technologies;</li> <li>● Allows appropriate incentive system to affect focal organization and linked organizations;</li> <li>● Raises probability that a controversial policy will be implemented;</li> <li>● If an organization is both autocratic and centralized, change can be readily introduced;</li> <li>● Top-level administrators have longer tenure, and decisions made by them about linkages with other organizations tend to produce more valuable interactions;</li> <li>● Improves high-level morale and initiative.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Increases speed of decision with non-routine decisions and uncertain technologies;</li> <li>● Participative, decentralized and autonomous organizations are more productive, efficient and satisfying;</li> <li>● Decentralized decisionmaking and multiple communication channels facilitate interorganizational cooperation;</li> <li>● Although the direct power in the hands of national leaders is reduced, decentralization increases their ability to guide society by creating more communication links within it;</li> <li>● Improves low-level morale and initiative;</li> <li>● Nourishes new leadership;</li> <li>● Facilitates client participation.</li> </ul>
WEAKNESSES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Overloads communication systems and requires more infrastructure/resources than decentralization to produce decisions in a given time;</li> <li>● Changes <u>cannot</u> be readily introduced into a bureaucratic centralized organization;</li> <li>● Does not nourish new leadership;</li> <li>● Sensitive to situations where national-level elite is not sympathetic to client group.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Requires highly developed informal communications channels;</li> <li>● Without financial discretion at lower levels decentralized strategies will not work;</li> <li>● A wide range of goals facilitates decentralization;</li> <li>● Very difficult when inefficient disbursement systems exist;</li> <li>● Often requires a program element designed specifically to improve lower-level planning capability among those charged with implementation;</li> <li>● Sensitive to situations where local-level elite is not sympathetic to client group.</li> </ul>

strategy for promoting participation and avoiding control-oriented bureaucracies not overly sympathetic to rural poor beneficiaries.14/

Temporary PMUs also have the advantage of a limited life-span. Although this creates personnel management problems, it is compatible with the high level of uncertainty inherent in the development process. Since the most effective strategies and technologies are seldom known at a project's inception, it may be advantageous to use organizations that can disappear rather than continue to promote a failed strategy which has become a vested organizational ideology.15/

However, an argument can also be made that if integration of services is to be a more permanent feature of rural environments, then a program-level effort, grounded in established sub-national government entities, is required. Thus, the question of placement is not simple: it must be based on local circumstances as well as particular priorities and can be seen as a step in a strategy of sequential placements. And it follows that eventual choice will largely determine the immediate set of interorganizational dynamics and coordination problems besetting managers.

The major tradeoffs embedded in alternative placement strategies are summarized in Figure 3-2. Actual IRD projects, however, do not always conform to these four pure types.

### Field Complexity

Field situations are often mixtures and permutations of the four placement options identified in Figure 3-2. For example, the Provincial Area Development Program in Indonesia focuses both on improving integrated planning capabilities in

FIGURE 3-2  
ORGANIZATIONAL PLACEMENT ALTERNATIVES AND TRADEOFFS

No.	ALTERNATIVE Implementor	TRADEOFFS		
		Major Advantages	Major Disadvantages	Supporting Conditions
1	<u>National Line Agency</u> (permanent) such as Ministry of Agriculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Provides a base in a permanent institution;</li> <li>● Provides high-level decision involvement;</li> <li>● Sometimes appropriate for non-area focused projects;</li> <li>● Often simplifies initial preparation process and resource flows.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Limits sectoral focus of project strategy;</li> <li>● Often there is a preoccupation with national problems rather than local variations;</li> <li>● An unwillingness to delegate significant operational authority is common;</li> <li>● Often accompanied by jealousy of other line agencies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● High capability in appropriate agency;</li> <li>● High priority on institutionalization;</li> <li>● Agency has high target group orientation;</li> <li>● National leadership commitment critical for success.</li> </ul>
2	<u>Subnational Government Entity</u> (permanent) such as a region, province or district	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Provides local focus;</li> <li>● Sometimes helps to concentrate authority over project activities;</li> <li>● Can build planning and implementation capability in permanent entity.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Often has low institutional and human resource capability;</li> <li>● Subnational units often have little leverage over line ministries whose activities affect the project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● High commitment to decentralization;</li> <li>● Uniqueness of target area;</li> <li>● High capability in appropriate agency;</li> <li>● Agency has high target group orientation.</li> </ul>
3	<u>Integrated Development Agency</u> (permanent) such as a national authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Helps comprehensiveness of project overview;</li> <li>● Provides local focus with access to higher level authority;</li> <li>● Can avoid overly oppressive audit and control procedures.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Line agency competition can cripple performance;</li> <li>● Complex communication needs.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Good history of inter-agency cooperation;</li> <li>● Technology sensitive to lack of complementary inputs;</li> <li>● High capability in appropriate agency;</li> <li>● Agency has high target group orientation.</li> </ul>
4	<u>Project Management Unit</u> (autonomous and temporary) such as those often created as part of an IRD project design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Can be used to concentrate authority in project area;</li> <li>● Familiar to engineers who staff infrastructure projects;</li> <li>● Can avoid oppressive audit and control procedures;</li> <li>● Can avoid inappropriate boundaries.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Very difficult to institutionalize;</li> <li>● Temporary nature creates personnel management problems.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Environment hostile to target group;</li> <li>● Simple infrastructure focus;</li> <li>● Standard operating procedures very cumbersome;</li> <li>● Technology highly uncertain.</li> </ul>

provincial governments and on supporting short-term income-generating activities in small target areas. Since it works as an adjunct to provincial planning bodies but is implemented through the Ministry of Home Affairs, it is a mixture of the first two alternatives. Its subproject income-generation aspect also introduces some of the characteristics of the fourth alternative.

The Bicol River Basin Development Program and its associated integrated area development projects in the Philippines offer another mixed example. The program-level focus is embodied in a planning and monitoring unit which serves an ecological zone (the river basin) that overlaps subnational administrative boundaries. This unit has its own line-item in the national budget and draws its authority from a cabinet-level coordinating committee and the president's office. This represents the third strategy. On the other hand, the Bicol's smaller area-based project efforts use a discrete project management unit within a lead-line agency but with cooperating personnel assigned from other functional ministries. For example, the Bula-Minalabac project is implemented through the Ministry of Agrarian Reform but also uses personnel from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development and other functional agencies. Thus, characteristics of Alternatives 1 and 4 are also evident. Such mixtures can complicate the management process by confusing authority relationships and increasing resource dependency.

#### Resource Interdependence

As the examples illustrate, field situations seldom approximate true integration, where all those performing different sectoral services are encompassed by a unitary command with a

a program or project manager at its apex. Consequently, much management time and energy are devoted to horizontal coordination between the primary implementor and the cooperating agencies. Since both the nature and magnitude of problems encountered during management's attempts to coordinate activities are partly determined by resource dependency, the question of placement is intimately related to the tradeoffs between autonomous and interdependent resource control. The following propositions highlight some effects of using multiple sources of people, equipment, facilities or funds:

- III-1: If project personnel and funds are controlled by external actors, there will be less flexibility in influencing other actors.
- III-2: If a project manager's power to reward and punish supporting organizational units and personnel is low, conflict will increase and it will be more difficult to orchestrate coordinated efforts.

Thus, the net effect of organizational strategies based on multiple sources of resources, and relying on coordination instead of integrated resource control, is increased management difficulty.

This articulation of the costs and benefits associated with various placements for IRD activities highlights the importance of interorganizational relations. It also suggests that the distinction between "integrative" and "coordinative" organizational designs is useful for uncovering one of the reasons for many common problems in IRD implementation -- inadequate attention to the consequences of external organization arrangements.16/

Management problems plaguing IRD project managers, however, do not all derive from poorly designed or non-existent external arrangements. Some are created by internal organizational

dynamics resulting from the nature of and relationship among project subunits.

### INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

A singular focus on relations between organizations can miss a very important fact -- a major determinant of such relations is often a decision made within an individual organization using criteria not related to the interorganizational relationship. For example, a ministry decision to centralize vehicle control can lower the ability of a district office to continue to informally provide most of the transportation for a small multi-agency project. Although the reasons for the decision may be unrelated to the project, the effect on it could be drastic.

This chapter, then, must also be concerned with the internal decision structure of IRD projects or of the agencies cooperatively running those projects. This concern is based on the fact that interorganizational outcomes are determined by intraorganizational decisions.

In this section, three alternative criteria for determining project subunit configuration -- function, area, and clientele -- are discussed. Two major organizing strategies -- support and control -- are also presented. Finally, the relationship between staff and structure is discussed.

#### Organizing Principles

The most common way of dividing organizations into subunits is to classify the different things that people do. This

is called organizing by function. For example, the Project Management Unit (PMU) of an IRD project might be divided into the following divisions:

- Monitoring and evaluation;
- Finance and accounting;
- Training;
- Agricultural services;
- Research;
- Procurement and logistics;
- Land development;
- Cooperatives/credit; and
- Road building.

Similar functional classifications are common in PMUs throughout the developing world. One variation on this pattern is found in the Bicol River Basin projects in the Philippines. Here most projects emphasize irrigation infrastructure and the practice is to split staff into two basic divisions based on whether the primary focus is on objects or people. The two divisions are called "physical development" and "institutional/agricultural."

Line agencies, of course, are functional by definition and their internal structure follows this general approach. Indeed, this is a classic organizational principle. Its main advantage is an attempt to provide direct accountability for activities combined with an attempt to minimize functional overlap. Additionally, in functional organizations, different units tend to establish communications with different environmental organizations which support them. For example, in a ministry of agriculture, extension and personnel divisions may have university

connections, while procurement and maintenance divisions may have contacts with importers and manufacturers of equipment.

Although a functional perspective is often depicted as traditional, it does point out that expert consultants can become caught up in the fads of the day and may forget that mixed and competing functions residing in one unit can cause problems. For example, an agricultural extension agent with a dual function of disseminating information and managing credit repayment is a result of faulty design. In such a case, little information will be "extended" because farmers sighting the agent will not know which function he is performing. In this situation, the most prudent course of action for a delinquent debtor is to avoid contact. The effect on project performance is obvious.

In other situations, the effect is more subtle. For example, a ditch tender in an irrigation scheme may be charged with the collection of data which is unnecessary for the performance of the job. Rotation schedules, water levels and ditch conditions are necessary data; crop yields are not. If a ditch tender or watermaster is burdened with the collection of yield data, two problems may result: first, time may be diverted from the main task and then project performance will suffer; and second, due to the peripheral value of the yield data, it may be collected in a sloppy manner and then higher level decisions will be based on faulty information. Thus, the basic need for an appropriate functional division of labor is not always followed in IRD project designs.17/

A specific example of this is in Colombia's DRI program where extension agents were given the dual responsibilities of providing technical assistance and programming the credit extended by the Caja Agraria. The latter entailed drawing up farm plans and completing all of the necessary paperwork

involved in the extension and supervision of the credit. These extension agents have been spending so much time carrying out the credit responsibility, however, that they have not had the time to provide sufficient technical assistance to the farmers. They have been concentrating on credit extension rather than technical assistance because the goals of the former are more easily measured. Each extension agent must complete a given number of credit plans, each of which takes approximately four hours, and the incentive structure reflects this emphasis. On the other hand, providing extension assistance, since it is not as easily quantified, receives a lower priority.

A second way to determine the basic units of a project organization is to build it on geographic divisions. This is called organizing by area. Sometimes a project's environment dictates this approach. For example, island nations in south-east Asia (such as Indonesia or the Philippines) may place sub-project teams in different spots isolated from each other. In other places (such as Malawi, Zaire, or Brazil) the proximity of different ecological zones (riverine forest, savannah, arid lands, alluvial flood plains) may make it more practical to have semi-autonomous teams serving each zone. This is illustrated by the IRDP in Jamaica, which has two teams placed in non-contiguous watersheds.

The danger of a spatial approach is one of duplication -- each area team may be staffed with its own accountants, etc. One strategy to avoid such duplication is to centralize some routine functions within a PMU or subnational/national office and base service delivery units on areas.18/

A third basic design approach is organizing by clientele. If an IRD target population encompasses both nomadic and sedentary groups, then an effective service delivery system must take this fact into account; mobile units or seasonally-staffed fixed units along migration routes may separate

technical teams serving nomads from those serving settled groups. In other projects, different staff may be required in order to deliver services to women, as opposed to men. Sometimes a focus on different ethnic groups coincides with geographic divisions and the organizing principle is not so obvious.

When two separate clientele groups are served by the same unit, the level of conflict and confusion is raised and management is made more difficult. A successful way to rectify this situation is to assign responsibility for each target group to different units. Such a divided focus, however, should not be based on ethnicity unless the ethnic division coincides with another factor such as the above examples of mobility and location.

A better type of clientele focus is represented by a division based on economic or class interests. For example, one agricultural extension team could concentrate on services to rubber estates, while a second team could serve smallholder rubber schemes. This allows each group to concentrate on the particular needs of its clientele, and lowers the conflicting demands on the strategy, time and limited resources of each unit.

This discussion of organizing principles supports two propositions:

- III-3: If organizational units are based on clients with common economic, rather than geographic or ethnic interests, they will be more effective at delivering goods and services.
- III-4: If organizational units are matched to clientele groups or environmental support organizations, on the one hand, and to technical functions, on the other, then problems arising from improper organization will be minimized.

Divisions of costs and supervision are major issues blocking cooperation among units and organizations. This reflects common problems encountered during both internal and external organization design exercises. Furthermore, it introduces the very important role of organizing strategies and their effect on decisions, conflicts and project impact.

### Organizing Strategies

There are two basic strategies that can be used to approach interactions between an organization and its component parts. The first is control and the second is support. The choice of support or control approaches to a project sub-unit can be based on a number of criteria, such as:

- Potential for negative environmental impact;
- Potential for benefit diversion;
- Confidence in staff;
- Degree of interdependence between units; and
- Role of unit in relation to external organizations or actors.

Using such criteria can suggest whether management control is wise or whether it is best to give the particular unit free rein and act mainly as a supportive backstop for its efforts. For example, a need for greater control would be indicated by: a high possibility of the unit's operations creating human or physical environmental damage (schistosomiasis, death, blindness, erosion, etc.); a high probability of benefit diversion (equipment improperly used, credit to non-target populations, etc.); low confidence in the people running the unit; a high interdependence, either serially or simultaneously, with the activities of other units; and unit responsibility for

controlling antagonistic outside organizations (military liaison section, commercial land-clearing organizations, marketers of chemicals, etc.)

Each major project function suggests an organizational component with some degree of autonomy and resources. The priority given to each function is reflected in staffing, equipment and facilities. Although technical considerations dominate the range of units, task difficulty and project priorities determine the relative budgetary strength and operational independence of each unit.

Additionally, the organizing strategy influences the project's relations with its environment. Building up one section at the expense of another strengthens the internal role of the stronger unit and increases the likelihood that the range and nature (control or support of external actors) of its activities will shape organizational character. It can also lead to imbalanced operations when one unit forges ahead while others struggle to keep up, and the mix of goods and services "disintegrates." Job descriptions, reporting procedures, staffing levels, equipment and supply stocks, recruitment criteria, the location of decisionmaking authority and the control of equipment and funds should all be developed with this in mind.

Moreover, the internal design affects the ability of project managers to devote time to external relationships:

III-5: If there is one deputy project manager responsible for internal management, then the project manager can concentrate more effectively on external relationships.

The vacancy of this position has hindered implementation of the IRDP in Jamaica.

### Liaison Roles

Due to the complexity of IRD designs and the need for coordinated operations, liaison roles are often established. Sometimes a committee is given this function, such as a project-specific Country Coordinating Committee in Liberia, or a Composite Management Group or Area Development Committee in the Philippines. In other cases the function is assigned to an individual position such as a project monitor in a program office.

There are advantages and disadvantages to both of these strategies. Individual liaison positions are often caught in the middle, with no authority to make decisions and no independent resource base. Committees, however, may also be composed of members without authority to make commitments. Consequently, liaison roles often lead to information-sharing without resource-sharing.

A third strategy for promoting coordination is to budget funds which allow extemporaneous, temporary task forces, to help rectify design mistakes. Such task forces can be technical (e.g., government engineers without major physical design capability in the field redesigning irrigation system components in a project) or managerial (e.g., organization development specialists working with staff to improve communication difficulties).<sup>19/</sup>

Task forces may be drawn from permanent IRD staff, they may be composed of short-term consultants from outside the project, or they may be a combination of the two. Due to their temporary nature and their task orientation, task forces are potentially more flexible than committees or liaison positions. However, the temporary nature of this approach can be

costly, in terms of low impact and uncertain follow-through if influential actors are not included in the activity.

Nonetheless, temporary task forces do provide a mechanism to overcome the effects of overzealous designers who are overly specific on how coordinating committees should act, and exactly when and how units should interrelate.

III-6: If all relationships are 'blueprinted' in the design of an integrated rural development project, the frequency of interaction may increase, but also a feeling of powerlessness among staff may be created which, in turn, may produce token or debilitating relationships.

III-7: If committee activity is to facilitate IRD implementation, then coordinating committees must contain members who control the resources required.

A fourth strategy is the establishment of dual reporting requirements. For example, staff in a land settlement division may report to both an IRD project manager and to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. Although theoretically this provides a strong link between cooperating organizations, experience in such divergent places as Honduras, the Philippines and Tanzania suggests that it may be a source of difficulty rather than a workable solution. The determination of a reporting format, and the resulting paperwork burden can produce a diversion of energy, decreased performance and friction. This is especially true in interagency settings using coordination strategies and in locations with a history of interorganizational conflict. As an internal liaison strategy within an integrated PMU, however, this approach has been useful. An example of this is the Lilongwe Land Development Programme in Malawi.

The fifth strategy is the use of management methods rather than organizational relationships. Such techniques as organizational responsibility charts, bar charts or network analyses can all be used as a focus for joint planning among cooperating staff. Periodic meetings and on-site staff training programs also fall into this category. Each of these management methods has provided positive results.

### Staff Structure

Organizations are not pre-engineered, static, mechanistic blueprints for service delivery. Rather, they are dynamic combinations of human and material resources interacting with multiple objectives. Thus, the "people" factor is important.

Although donor-designed projects often assume that positions will be filled by "heroes on horseback," actual staff are not always the most qualified and they seldom receive adequate support or attractive terms of service. Consequently,

III-8: If programs require high levels of competence, skillful interorganizational coordination, or sophisticated management methods, then they are less likely to deliver adequate, timely mixes of goods and services.

In defense of a poor performance record, field personnel often complain that units are understaffed or that poor office locations and designs inhibit performance. Organizational research<sup>20</sup> suggests, however, some very different propositions:

III-9: If organizational units are slightly understaffed, they have fewer territorial battles because there will be more than enough activity to go around. Overstaffing, however, increases territorial battles.

- III-10: If organizational units are slightly understaffed, there will be increased participation, a higher sense of self-competence and a greater tendency to accept new members into the group.

Additionally, the physical layout of an office can be used to affect performance.

- III-11: If friendship or supportive social patterns exist they can be reinforced by removing spatial/physical barriers. Conversely, the presence of spatial/physical barriers will not mitigate existing friction and conflict.

Internal organization design, then is likely to be dominated by such considerations as organizing principles, strategies, liaison roles and staffing patterns. Once the organization is specified for the first time, project evolution begins. This is the point where designs confront dynamics -- management behavior. The next section of this chapter focuses on ways to manage a vital project asset: information.

### MANAGING INFORMATION

A manager's organizational position is indicated by a combination of resource access and information access. Moreover, an organizational structure can be defined by tracing information flows. The following analogy suggests the interdependence of information management and project organization:

An appropriate management information system is like the nervous system of an animal; its function cannot be understood without also knowing the skeletal and muscular structures. For example, if a serious burn is to be avoided, there should be

a short-circuit mechanism which sends a message from a fingertip directly to the muscle which can move a bone which will remove the finger from a hot stove. The message should not go all the way to the brain for processing and then be sent back down; the brain can be informed later. To design the short-circuit, however, it is necessary to know which muscles control what motions of which bones and which way the joints allow the limbs to be moved.

If organizational decision processes are examined this way, we often find that, in order to move a project finger, the entire body of a ministry must be criss-crossed with messages. This indicates that the information needs of present organizational arrangements will impede performance. The first step in constructing a management information system, then will be to bring about a more workable organization of the interactions between different levels and units.21/

The problem, then, is that systems for data collection and analysis are often structured as project addends; that is, as evaluation units with separate staff, a separate budget, and a place outside the normal decisionmaking structure. Data identified for collection seldom result from an assessment of the needs of project decisionmakers. The starting point is not to ask what is needed by whom for what purpose; rather, farm management surveys, for example, are carried out because "everyone knows farm management data is needed." Consequently few data collection systems feed relevant information to decisionmakers in a timely manner. Yet only if this occurs does information become a useful project resource.

### Information as a Resource

The value of skillful information management, as it is presented in this report, is related to the framework used to depict IRD implementation. Good information is relevant information used to accomplish the following objectives:

- Delivering goods and services to rural populations;
- Supporting the use of those goods and services by rural people; and
- Improving villager welfare.

Information systems that do not collect data useful for these purposes, or information users who manipulate information for other ends, such as self-aggrandizement or the extension of bureaucratic control, are obvious problems. However, without understanding the varying perceptions of useful information, there is little chance that workable information systems will be incorporated into organization designs.

Although information is needed by a wide variety of individuals, their needs are not the same. For example, in an agricultural project, farm families must have a basis for deciding whether to accept the recommended changes in their farming systems -- a decision that entails certain risks. These individuals become more than a target group to which agricultural extension staff must impart their knowledge. Rather, they are critical project decisionmakers who need selected information for their own management purposes.

Project management, on the other hand, will need to track the flow, distribution and use of resources in the project area. By definition, a good project manager will quickly recognize the information needed to make decisions and will then find ways to obtain it. Because of physical proximity to project activities, these information systems are likely to be less costly, rigorous or formal than those that outsiders such as central government or donor staff would desire.

Outsiders are likely to call for more costly systems that are unassailable on methodological grounds but often irrelevant

or even detrimental in relation to local practices and constraints. It is not unusual for donors to require analyses that demand a precision of data and a level of effort that is frequently beyond the capacity of local staff and largely unnecessary for efficient management and project assessment. Central government personnel often request data which are used to assert central control over project decisions.

Information is a source of power and control. The manner in which it is used -- whether disseminated or not and to whom -- may result in the diminution or enhancement of power and control of the original holder. For instance, project managers may be reluctant to share information which would invite the criticism and second-guessing that they would sooner avoid. This does not mean it is in the interest of a project manager to obstruct the flow of information to outsiders; obstructionist behavior has its own costs. It does mean, however, that a project manager may understandably assign formal information collection activities a lower priority than outsiders might.

Potential financial gain can also affect data collection and dissemination decisions. Examples include withholding information about road construction plans and then collecting information about land tenure along a project's roadway, so that land can be bought cheaply and sold at a higher price.

There is also an important relation between information use and career advancement within an organizational structure. Field staff report farmer visits which they did not make in order to bolster their performance ratings; project staff and ministry bureaucrats camouflage poor performance information about themselves to enhance their own prospects for promotion and transfer.

This discussion yields the proposition:

III-12: Since information access often provides power, alternative approaches to formal data collection will be more or less effective depending upon the placement of collection and analysis functions in relation to organizing strategies.

### Information Needs

Much of the information needed for IRD decisionmaking will not be available unless anticipated and collected in advance. Anticipating information needs is no simple task, and managers and policymakers, despite their ever-present needs for information to deal with ongoing crises, are notoriously bad at such anticipatory activities.<sup>22/</sup> In addition, data requirements that are over-specified can result in an overload of irrelevant data. A typical case is the Special Rural Development Program (SRDP) in Kenya. An assessment of this elaborate system after its first year of implementation identified numerous problems;<sup>23/</sup> much of the data collected were not relevant or used, and there was little chance that the system could be sustained.

The issue of anticipating information needs also relates to the question of specifying collectable information. One review of information activities of U.S. Federal agencies concluded:

Time and time again, federal agencies at the top have tried to impose nation-wide data systems; they have always failed. They have failed because of the very limited possibility of forcing the operating bureaucrats to provide data in which they were not interested and because of the complete impossibility of forcing them to make the data accurate.... The paradox that was never solved was that the simplest data system that could be designed was far more complicated than the most complex that could be executed in the field. <sup>24/</sup>

Based on bad experiences such as these, some useful sequential guidelines have merged from recent work in developing information systems. Suggested stages include:

- At the start, be sure that there is a need for something different from what is ongoing and that the interest and capacity for modifications exist, that is:
  - Never undertake any new data collection effort without doing an inventory of what formal and informal data are already available;
  - Never undertake any new data collection effort until a determination has been made of what information decisionmakers are currently using;
  - Never undertake any data collection until specifying how each piece of information is to be used; and
  - Never collect any information until the costs of collection and analysis have been budgeted.
- After the above have been established:
  - Determine the decisionmakers in need of information;
  - For each decisionmaker, determine information needs in the context of their potential use; and
  - Because an understanding of the decision process is a complex and long-term process, the initial identification of relevant data will be far from perfect; the project design must be flexible enough to re-define the data to be collected and analytical tools to be applied.

When this is undertaken, external information flows, organizing principles and organizing strategies must all be taken into account. If this is not done, the information

specified may not lead toward IRD objectives -- the nervous system may not fit the animal.

### Collection and Analysis

The collection of information, particularly if accompanied by an effort to employ a scientific method for analysis, is extremely costly if not impossible in many developing countries. This means a high emphasis should be placed on the collection of central, as distinct from "related," information. Focusing on central information is most easily accomplished by highlighting the critical stages in the project cycle and the critical assumptions underlying the development strategy.

Past incentive structures have rewarded those who develop information strategies that are methodologically masterful but are not implementable because of cost and skilled manpower demands. Greater rewards should be offered to those willing to experiment with less expensive and time-consuming data collection methodologies. While some work has been done in this area,<sup>25</sup> more attention is needed for further testing and application of these new methods.

### Information Use

The collection and analysis of relevant information is of little value if it does not influence decisionmakers. The literature on information utilization points out the importance of packaging and timing. Most decisionmakers are unlikely to have the time, need and inclination to read through a lengthy report. A summary statement of issues and recommendations will maximize the chances of use by such a person. With regards to recommendations, they must be made at an appropriate time and must focus on actions that the policymaker is in a position to affect; extraneous data should not be included.

It should be clear from the above that the format and content of an information report should be based on task needs. The inadequate attention given to this consideration is a major reason why the results of past information activities have not been effectively utilized.

### Organizational Decisions

Managed information is that which is relevant to project performance and that which is used to deliver goods and services in ways leading to response and welfare objectives. Managed information, as indicated above, is dependent upon need and supply. Another factor must also be introduced, however, to understand the effect of information on project performance. That factor is human decisionmaking in organizations.

Although much literature considers management to be a rational, deliberate, analytical, contemplative activity, recent research suggests that it is actually characterized by short attention spans, continuous crisis, and a constant bombardment of problems.<sup>26/</sup> Thus, the way the organizational structure and information system (both formal and informal) combine to channel data about events, non-events and new developments is an important aspect of a manager's environment.

Due to time pressure, managers rarely seek the best information available before making decisions. Instead, they "satisfice." That is, the search stops as soon as minimally adequate data is found.<sup>27/</sup> Therefore, simple report formats and direct, timely flows can be expected to characterize information systems that are used -- the first acceptable data that is heard or seen will be used. The definition of adequacy will be based on a combination of user needs and confidence in the source.<sup>28/</sup>

By combining previous discussions of integration and organization design with this interjection on the nature of managerial decisionmaking, the discussion of information management leading to improved project performance produces the following propositions:

- III-13: If IRD project managers develop informal information systems that provide them with simple, useful, and reliable data, then they will be more able to manage staff conflict and deliver goods and services.
- III-14: If simple information systems channel data directly from a problem source to a decision-maker with the power to affect that problem, then they will be used more and be more influential. Systems that filter data through multiple organizational layers to actors removed from direct interest in the problem will be less effective.
- III-15: If there exists a two-way flow of communication between beneficiaries and project staff, then IRD projects are more likely to deliver higher levels of the appropriate mixes of goods and services.
- III-16: If project administrators know how decisions are made within cooperating organizations, then they will be more able to coordinate the activities of those organizations.29/

Although this section has focused on the fit between organization, decisions and information, it must be added that the core of most decisions is the allocation and management of human and material resources. These processes are the subject of the remaining sections of Chapter Three.

## MANAGING HUMAN RESOURCES

One of the most common complaints of IRD field staff is that "the project manager does not know how to manage." This complaint is often substantiated by observations and evaluations. Two project visits undertaken through this contract provide support for this contention. In the first case, the expatriate chief of party for an East African project was a technician without management skills. Project performance suffered. In fact, this particular experience qualified as "unmanaged" human resources.

In the second case, an Asian IRD project manager with technical training, but with no management training, was grasping for assistance. Sensitive to the feelings of his staff that he did not know how to manage, he was observed reading an out-dated, low-quality management text based on limited, industrial workplace experiences. Although this text was largely irrelevant to his situation, it was the only source available.

This section focuses on the state-of-the-art knowledge in two areas -- supervisory management behavior and the management of horizontal relationships. Both of these factors can be expected to play an important role in service delivery and the present lack of field skills in these areas appear to be a major source of IRD implementation difficulty.30/

### Supervisory Management Behavior

Project managers are often chosen for their technical background rather than their supervisory skills. Consequently, they must learn new skills on the job. This can compound implementation difficulties by producing defensive, arrogant or

secretive behavior on the part of those who fear that their lack of management expertise will be discovered.

The following pages shed some light on the state of knowledge about how to manage subordinates. Both general characteristics of successful managers and general management strategies are noted.<sup>31/</sup> It must be remembered, however, that both time and place affect the relative importance of the characteristics and practices noted below.

### Participatory Decisionmaking

Although a functional organization design often works well with a directive management style, an integrated organizational structure requires a participative management style for effective operation. This is so in part because coordination is more easily achieved when all the individuals involved are committed to an action and in part because of the multiple perspectives encountered in an integrated situation.

However, there is a tradeoff in terms of the time required to make a decision and that needed to implement it: staff participation in decisions shortens the time between a decision and its acceptance by those who must carry it out, but the more people involved in making a decision, the longer the time it takes to make it. Given the complexity of IRD and the interdependence of subunits, however, both time and conflict can be minimized by joint decisionmaking.

Even so, it is not necessary for every staff member to be involved in every decision. In fact, both overparticipation and underparticipation in decisionmaking can increase dissatisfaction. Thus:

III-23: If good managers match the individual's desire to participate with the opportunity to realize that desire, individual satisfaction is higher.

### Task Supervision

There are four general requirements for effective supervision which approximate a sequential approach. The four requirements are:

- A clear work assignment;
- The specification of what is to be done but letting the subordinate determine exactly how to do it;
- An opportunity for two-way communication during the assignment; and
- The recognition of successful performance.

The most desirable process for assignment and specification is not clear. Much research supports the proposition that staff should participate in setting their own work schedules, standards and targets. In the case of IRD, joint programming exercises can be used to do this.

III-17: If joint planning exercises are used, service delivery will be improved, contingencies more easily identified, and overall staff satisfaction will increase.

Other studies, however, suggest that routine work standards should be assigned rather than self-set. Although this does not contradict joint programming, it does indicate that a mix of joint planning and assigned tasks is appropriate.

During execution of a task, two-way communication is needed to identify changes in the environment and provide feedback to

both the supervisor and the subordinate. This process should be characterized by a "supportive" management style rather than one with a punitive focus. This is particularly true when managing teams of professional. In this case it is better to use peer group sanctions and group processes to support performance rather than to rely on punitive measures. In short:

- III-18: If close supervision is used with mechanical repetitive tasks (such as construction), a subordinate's performance may improve.
- III-19: If close supervision is used with unstructured tasks (such as extension), a subordinate's performance usually will be hampered.
- III-20: If penalties are combined with close supervision, there is usually an adverse effect on performance.

Recognition for successful performance may be group or individually based. It may be formal, as an article in a project newsletter, or it may be informal, as praise occurring at a bar after work or in conversation. Nevertheless, an appropriate form of recognition should be forthcoming.

### Manager Characteristics

There is a fine line that distinguishes between what a manager does and what a manager is. Attitudes, values, ideologies and personalities are defined by actions. Thus, the characteristics of a good manager are largely inferred from observed behavior. For example, one proposition which emerges from both literature and experience infers attitudes but describes behavior:

- III-21: If managers view management as a bargaining process with external actors, then they will be more able to gain their cooperation than they would if they viewed management as simply adhering to preset rules.

This proposition describes characteristics which appear to be universal indicators of good managers. There are four other characteristics which also seem to be universal attributes of good managers regardless of task, setting, culture or position.

- III-22: If managers use informal processes to develop decisions or consensus and then use formal mechanisms (such as a meeting or a letter) to announce them, they will encounter less resistance in implementing those decisions than if they use formal channels to develop them.
- III-23: If managers are able to create a win-win rather than a win-lose definition of a situation, they will be more successful at resolving conflicts.
- III-24: If managers defend the interests of their staff, then will they encourage both performance and loyalty.
- III-25: If managers support subordinates' efforts, they will be more effective than if they focus on sanctions against non-performance.

These characteristics may be very important during IRD implementation because they can affect a manager's ability to induce participating agencies and organizations to fulfill their roles and contribute their resources. Due to the complexity of IRD organizations, the nontraditional relationships often established as a result of an integrated strategy, the limited management control possible in many complex IRD field

situations, and the often contradictory nature of some sub-project activities, a fifth characteristic is also extremely important in IRD settings:

III-26: If managers are preoccupied with organizational rules, goal displacement will develop so that rule adherence becomes an end in itself, rather than a means towards achieving project objectives.

This proposition is also applicable to a manager's view of communication channels. Insisting that others always follow formal procedures with specific documents, carbon copies and regulated communication sequences, emphasizes the form rather than the substance of the communications.

The six characteristics noted above reflect a manager's need to be aware of both the human and the task dimensions of implementation. They are not, however, rigid attributes with which a good manager is endowed at birth. Rather, they are perceptions which can be introduced as part of a staff skill development program.

### Staff Development

Staff development seminars and workshops are common to many IRD programs. The LLDP in Malawi and the IRDP in Jamaica provide examples. The approach of the LLDP, however, is to use "packaged" technical seminars, whereas the IRDP uses action-oriented retreats and workshops to deal with real implementation issues.<sup>32/</sup>

Activities such as these serve numerous purposes: they provide a break from daily routine; they build staff skills; they help solve problems; and they can be seen as rewards to staff. In addition to skill training in methods such as PERT, GANTT charts and either management or technical skills, other

approaches to organizational development can be used.<sup>33/</sup> They include:

- Team Building. This focuses on early identification and solution of the team's potential problems, particularly the interpersonal and organizational road-blocks. Often these road-blocks can be avoided by working on such things as: communication skills, problems of hierarchy, trust, respect, and conflict management.
- Intergroup Problem-Solving. Groups are brought together for the purpose of reducing unhealthy competitiveness, to resolve intergroup conflicts due to such things as overlapping responsibilities or confused lines of authority, and to enhance interdependence when it exists and is appropriate.
- Goal Setting and Planning. Supervisor-subordinate pairs or teams throughout the organization engage in systematic and periodic target setting and performance evaluation. With mutual commitment to this procedure, joint goal setting becomes ingrained in the organization's dynamics.
- Role Negotiation. Through a systematic series of steps, members of an organization can realign their mutual expectations and commitments to avoid duplication and conflicts. This can involve redefining the role relations between organizational units as well as those between individuals.
- Confrontation Meeting. This problem solving activity is used when problems have been already identified. An action-research format is used. The entire management group of an organization is brought together, problems and attitudes collected and shared. Priorities are then established and commitments to action are made by setting targets or assigning task forces.
- Third Party Facilitation. The use of a skilled third party to assist in the diagnosis, understanding and resolution of difficult human relations problems is often a useful catalyst in the process of organizational introspection.
- Process Observation and Feedback. Through observation of the group and interpersonal relations that

characterize management behavior and through insightful critiques based on those observations, a third party can also help the groups or individuals in an organization to work more effectively together.

- Coaching and Counselling. Often a manager can benefit from a close and continuing relationship with someone inside or outside his organization with whom he can share his problems, and who will help him identify possible causes and solutions in an effort to improve the manager's effectiveness.

Given the complexity of IRD, such methods provide ways for promoting smoother implementation while increasing people's capacity to manage complex processes.<sup>34/</sup> This applies to project staff, beneficiaries and the members of support organizations.

This examination of supervisory behavior and staff development has been largely vertical, stressing interactions between the project management and internal subunits. Previous discussions of the occurrence of "coordinative" rather than "integrative" organizational approaches, however, have identified a need to determine ways for managing horizontal relationships as well.

### Horizontal Relations

Managing horizontal relations is a delicate task where the exercise of authority is precluded. Thus, to be successful at managing or coordinating horizontal relations requires a sensitivity to processes, personalities and the preferences of cooperating units.<sup>35/</sup>

An important function of this is the establishment of a smooth interorganizational climate. Cooperation is supported

by an atmosphere of respect for the operational autonomy and preferred image of each unit. The more that a project is seen as a threat to the role, clientele, or resources of a cooperating line agency, the greater the conflict.

An essential element in creating a supportive climate is the ability to manipulate symbols, such as words, and to create situational definitions that are win-win, rather than win-lose. However, the behavior of the IRD project manager may play a minor role in determining the outcome of a horizontal conflict. Two uncontrollable factors may be especially important in restricting the manager's role.

The first of these is the political salience of the project area, combined with the visibility of project operations:

III-27: If political actors can scrutinize all organizational activities, then cooperation between organizations will be lowered.

III-28: If a project has ambiguous or multiple goals, then coordination is made easier.

These propositions are influenced by project placement and organizational strategy. If true "integration" is used, they are not appropriate. However, if a "coordination" strategy is followed, these research results become extremely important. Although consistent goals and rigorous management systems can support a unitary command, dispersed power makes more informal management styles necessary.

The second factor is that interorganizational activity may be determined by decisions made within individual organizations. Thus, sensitivity to the decision processes within cooperating organizations is critical. Additionally, there is a direct implication for managerial behavior:

III-29: If managers cooperate directly with those with authority to make commitments, they will be more successful in developing inter-agency cooperation than those managers who deal with actors unable to make commitments.

Horizontal relations are not, however, just cross-organizational. Usually, they are also cross-professional. Recognizing this, three perspectives have been extrapolated from multidisciplinary team management research and experience. They are:

- Integrated organizational structures require an informal reward system more highly developed than that usually used by more self-contained structures.
- Professionalism engenders conservative attitudes and project management should sensitize staff to the occasional need for radical solutions which are not professionally prestigious.<sup>37/</sup>
- When managing a temporary group of multi-disciplinary professionals, it is best to use a two-stage approach, the first stage being characterized by inquiry, team-building and blurred role definition, and the second characterized by each specialist performing the roles associated with his or her specialty.

Since normal circumstances find managers saddled with sub-optimal organizational arrangements, the use of either a process strategy or the inheritance of an inappropriate blueprinted organization leads to an inordinate amount of managerial time being consumed by the quest for tactics to change existing horizontal relationships into new ones. Four alternative approaches to accomplish this, and appropriate situations for each approach, are summarized in Figure 3-3.

Although people are the primary resource base of any organization, managing material resources is, nevertheless, another

major source of implementation obstacles and managerial headaches. This is the subject of the next section.

Figure 3-3

## TACTICS FOR CHANGING INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Tactic	Appropriate Situations
Cooperative	Works best when power is dispersed among organizations, when each party has something of value to the other, and when each is capable of resisting the other's demands.
Disruptive	Works best when there is a power imbalance allowing the more powerful agency to disregard nondisruptive requests and when the weaker one's resource base is varied enough and certain enough to withstand the resistance of more powerful organizations.
Manipulative	Changing funding sources to create response to new pressures, or changing funding amounts to affect marginal programs, requires either control of funds or the trust and cooperation of those who do.
Authoritative	Mandating precise activities requires a concentration of power.
Source: J. Kenneth Benson, "The Interorganizational Network as a Political Economy," <u>Administrative Science Quarterly</u> , vol. 20, no. 2, 1975, pp. 229-249.	

## ADMINISTERING MATERIAL RESOURCES

Administrative support structures are essential to provide the tools and free time for other technical components to do their jobs. When administrative systems are not working, team frustrations climb, morale plummets, and professional staff may begin efforts to insure that their own administrative needs are met. The potential for confusion is limitless.

This section presents systematic approaches to the administration of supplies, funds, equipment and facilities. Some common administrative problems are identified; approaches found useful for dealing with those problems are presented; and the organizational context is noted.

### Common Administrative Problems

A recent review of problems besieging a rural development project highlighted the following items:38/

- Local vehicle dealers had foreign exchange constraints and they would not invest in parts inventories;
- Equipment diversion had been a consistent factor during implementation;
- Much dissatisfaction had been based on vehicle management;
- Port clearance difficulties delayed commodity arrival;
- Commodity procurement was characterized by wrong materials, no follow-up to orders, and delays sometimes exceeding two years;
- U.S. suppliers sometimes send available items rather than ordered items; and

- Expatriate technicians had "pet" equipment preferences and staff turnover resulted in technicians reordering equipment.

None of these findings are unique. In fact, it is their near universality that is disheartening. They clearly indicate a lack of administrative control. An administrative system which satisfies internal control requirements includes the following measures: safeguarding assets from theft and misuse, providing appropriate and dependable records and reports, promoting operational efficiency, and encouraging compliance with project management directives. A discussion of ways to improve the attainment of these objectives follows.

#### Improving Administrative Systems

Discussion of administrative systems emphasize fund movements and control mechanisms. All sources, amounts, and means for the use of grant, loan, counterpart, and host government-budgeted project support funds need to be thoroughly understood by project management. A full accounting of funds disbursed or earmarked is needed to understand what procurement activities are in process and what funds are still available. Additionally,

- III-30: If field managers are provided with sufficient operating funds to cover needs for goods and services during an entire reimbursement cycle, work stoppages resulting from cash flow problems will be avoided.

Administrative systems design should consider external organizations or persons who can be helpful or harmful to project success. There may be opportunities to sub-contract some functions, such as physical plant security, fuel distribution, parts stocking, and procurement. This may co-opt some

potentially threatening environmental organizations. On the other hand, interdependence can hamstring project efforts. Although the tradeoffs are not always clear, administrative systems need to be designed to reduce active or potential threats to project success posed by other organizations or individuals.

Vehicle management is a critical activity which can have a profound effect on project performance. The development of a system for accountability and the implementation of a rigorous maintenance program are indispensable requirements for development assistance.

Procurement is always troublesome but two things can help the process:

- III-31: If a liaison office in the port city is designed into a project to handle port clearance, the chief of party will be freed from excessive concentration on procurement.
- III-32: If the actual content of shipments are checked before they leave the port of origin, many procurement based delays will be avoided.

Such considerations should lessen delays, frustrations and the diversion of energy away from field performance.

Another common problem arises from preaudit requirements. Numerous studies have shown the negative effects of such systems when used either by local governments or by donors.<sup>39/</sup> Although organizational placement will determine the closeness of fit between a project administrative system and local practices, unless overly oppressive control systems are avoided, service delivery is likely to remain an unrealized objective.

Administrative procedures and reporting requirements should be made as simple as possible. A labor-intensive ap-

proach to administration that reduces processes to more simple and discrete tasks is more likely to succeed than the opposite strategy of combining functions, lowering personnel levels and complicating responsibilities.

The separation of custodial and record-keeping control is also important: the person with the cash is cross-checked by the person with the books; the warehouse clerk is separate from the inventory clerk; fuel is dispensed by one person but support records are maintained at a separate office. If these functions are combined, confusion, graft, inadequate support and a large amount of diverted management time and energy are likely to result. Neither serious implementors nor anxious villagers will benefit from such a situation. Thus:

- Custodial accountability for every project asset must be vested in a single, identifiable person.
- Custodial accountability and record-keeping control must be seen as separate functions vested in different people.

To avoid resistance to implementation, routine information should be reduced to mechanical processing, thus removing personality variables from the system to the greatest extent possible. To gain greater compliance with system procedures, then, technical team member comments and suggestions should be solicited before the system is installed.

But no matter how well-accepted procedures might be, as a general rule, simple procedures with cross-checks work best.<sup>40/</sup> Unfortunately for those who must manage them, simplicity is not an inherent characteristic of IRD strategies and organizations.

### Incentives

Some people think that management procedures are not important -- to succeed, all that is necessary is to hire or work through top quality people.

For example, in one Latin American project it was thought that the local priest was an authentic spokesman for the needs and values of the community, accountable for his action to project participants. In reality, the priest was autocratic and paternalistic -- the sole decisionmaker in the project. The shared labor of working together did not contribute to community cohesiveness. On balance, the project served to strengthen the already disproportionate influence of the priest at the expense of the community and its participation in the decisionmaking process.

Other decisionmakers subscribe to the opposite view. They expect that an increase in the stock of trained personnel, equipment and facilities will automatically lead to improved organizational performance. The folly of this view is demonstrated by an Asian example. Personnel of a rural development project were provided with training and vehicles. To simplify management and establish accountability, responsibility for each vehicle was assigned to a particular individual; to minimize false expense claims, each individual received a standard monthly cash allotment to cover the cost of gasoline and maintenance. Since any costs incurred above the allotment would come from the civil servant's own pocket, this practice provided an incentive not to make frequent visits to isolated rural areas because they would increase gasoline costs and raise the probability of minor repairs. Thus the procedure was an effective deterrent to delivering services to rural areas, monitoring field activities or incorporating villagers into project decisionmaking.

Clearly, then, neither just choosing the "best" people nor investing in physical and human infrastructure is an adequate view of the requirements for improved effort. Something is missing. This missing element is an appropriate incentive system.

Awareness and use of incentive systems varies widely in the field. In many cases, rigid financial management practices and uncertain pay times cause field staff to spend up to 20 percent of their time gathered in administrative centers waiting for their salaries. In other situations, poorly paid extension agents develop reasons for urban visits so that per diem can be collected. However, some positive examples do exist. In the Provincial Area Development Program in Indonesia, a focus on incentives is seen as an essential component for raising institutional capability. In Tanzania's Arusha Regional Planning and Village Development Project, mileage allowances for motorcycles are used to support rural travel and vehicle maintenance as well as to avoid down-time. In the Bicol Area of the Philippines, "incentive allowances" have been designed to promote interagency cooperation in projects following a coordination strategy.

Two conclusions follow from this. First, incentive systems are an important factor affecting IRD implementation. Second, the development of indigenous implementation capability requires an awareness of the role of incentives in promoting rural development.

The general lesson, then, is that neither the "man on horseback" nor the "administrative stock" approach are adequate predictors of administrative behavior. The improvement of implementation capability also requires organizational design, and one important ingredient in the design is the provision of appropriate incentives. The other side of the coin is that not only is dependable behavior desirable, but creative activity

that cannot be pre-targeted is equally desirable. Consequently, it is best not to be locked into a too rigid view of preferable practices. Flexibility is needed.

The nature of the relationship between material and non-material incentives is also important. A large body of research supports the view that a lack of financial incentives causes low performance, dissatisfaction, and energy diversion. Nevertheless, the mere presence of financial rewards does not necessarily lead to either job satisfaction or to better performance.<sup>41/</sup> To achieve these objectives, non-material incentives are also needed -- such as participatory decisionmaking, recognition and supportive relations with coworkers.

To fit incentives into the organizational context in a way that actually promotes control and performance requires attention to the use of material and non-material rewards and sanctions. Consistency in their use is the basis for an incentive system. Factors such as culture, family dynamics and other income sources can limit the power of incentives. For example, selecting an "extensionist of the month" would actually cause lower performance in cultures which discourage individual achievement.

III-33: If individual incentives are used to encourage staff who place a high value on group solidarity, then those incentives will lead to lower group and individual performance.

Moreover, the relative importance of the work setting will influence the effectiveness of job-related incentives:

III-34: If a project provides staff with a large percentage of their income, then project policies and incentives will exert a greater effect on staff behavior than if the project is a minor source of staff income.

Despite the limitations to incentive power, there are still some general lessons which emerge from the research. Some of them highlight the organizational context.

- III-35: If either very few (1-20 percent) or most, (80-100 percent) of the staff are covered by the incentive system, then it will work, but if half are and half are not, the result will be high conflict and low motivation.
- III-36: If coordination is required, then individual incentives can disrupt the group processes that support cooperation.
- III-37: If people's jobs are those requiring high dependence on others, then a group incentive system has more positive performance effects than an individual reward system.

Other lessons deal with the relative desirability of rewards versus penalties. In general, rewards are more desirable, yet at times penalties are appropriate.<sup>42/</sup> For example, enforced penalties can deter paymasters from diverting funds, but penalties will not encourage extension workers to provide farmers with better advice. This is so because rewards are more effective than penalties when staff behavior is concealable.

Two warnings also relate to the frequency and subject of penalties:

- The more penalties are used, the less effective they become.
- Penalties should not be used with people who hold themselves in low esteem.

There is also a difference between avoiding new behavior and inducing new behavior. This difference is also reflected in the paymaster/extension worker example. Penalties serve better to avoid new behavior. Finally,

- The greater the degree of staff behavior change sought, the greater the need to use rewards.

Thus, the design of an incentive system requires an examination and articulation of desired behavior on the part of project staff. Additionally, it requires a rudimentary assessment of the gap between present practices and intended practices. Desirable practices and matching rewards must also be based on consideration of factors beyond the employees' control. Further, the magnitude of rewards should reflect project priorities. For example:

- Incentive systems should not penalize employees for inconsistency and unreliability of equipment and materials.
- Rewards for down-time should not exist.
- Incentives should be consistent with the relative importance of quality versus quantity and the importance of particular goods/services in attaining project objectives.

Finally, two general characteristics of effective incentive systems must be noted.

- Simple incentive systems with little time lag between performance and reward work best.
- An effective incentive system requires a feedback mechanism to supervisory staff (such as a suggestion box).

Besides the delivery and administration of material resources, IRD projects often involve a technical assistance component. A discussion of managing technical assistance follows.

## MANAGING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Due to their scale and complexity, most IRD projects are designed to utilize technical assistance in support of project objectives. At the design stage it often appears relatively easy to specify required skill types but when implementation experience is considered, the value and effectiveness of technical assistance proves to be highly variable.

Some of this variability is certainly attributable to the staffing approach taken. This is noted by Iversen, in identifying two basic staffing strategies:

There are two approaches to staffing: in the first, one decides what one wants to do and then determines what mix of talent is needed to do it; in the second, one decides what mix of talent is available and then decides how these might be combined to do something that needs doing. The former approach has been traditional in technical assistance and has relied heavily on external experts to fill the talent gaps in projects, on the assumption that indigenous talent either was not available, was heavily in demand by competing projects, or was abroad being trained to Western standards.43/

He then presents a well-argued case for adopting a "folk-management" strategy utilizing tradition-based skills to manage social change. Furthermore, in his summation, he identifies the scale and complexity weaknesses so characteristic of IRD designs:

While most development assistance now acknowledges the importance of indigenous implementation if self-sustaining development is to occur, the design of development projects is still largely dominated by Western personnel and methodology. This often results in a sophistication and complexity of design that thwarts its implementation by indigenous personnel. This is not to say that indigenous personnel are incapable of managing well-designed projects, but rather that a project can not be considered "well-designed" unless it is manageable by indigenous personnel.44/

Although that is certainly a desirable ideal, interim measures are necessary to chop away at suboptimal practices. Current designs often require technical assistance, and yet its provision seems to be accomplished in ways that do not even provide the expected temporary relief.

This section considers four major problems which have been formulated primarily on the basis of field observations. They are:

- The size and nature of the talent pool that actually exists severely restricts long-term strategies;
- The types and amounts of short-term technical assistance that will be useful during implementation are often underestimated during design and assistance provided is rarely used effectively;
- Project designs do not adequately consider changing technical assistance needs during the life cycle of complex projects; and
- Many technical assistance "teams" do not function with a common approach and mutually supportive activities.

The following discussion elaborates these problems, presents probable causes identified during work done thus far in the present research, and points toward possible remedies that can be introduced during the implementation of ongoing IRD projects.

#### Long-Term Talent Pool

There is a common perception that there are abundant technical personnel available in developed countries for long-term overseas assignments in IRD projects. Unfortunately, this common perception does not fit experience. IRD projects, particularly those intended to benefit the poor, continue to demand a combination of talents that are extremely rare. To

take but one example, the following qualifications were requested for a project manager in Yemen:

Academic degree at the MA level (or equivalent experience), preferably in Development Administration, Economics, or Development Planning. The incumbent should possess a high degree of analytic, planning, management, and administrative skills. In particular, the incumbent should have demonstrated ability in problem identification, project design, preparation of technical documents, management and evaluation in a wide range of social and economic sectors. The incumbent should have at least ten years proven experience in program management with economic development programs with a minimum of four years in less developed countries, including experience in supervision of technical personnel. The incumbent should have a capacity (MLAT score of 55 or above) to learn and speak Arabic at the S-2 level....45/

It is clear that there are very few people with such qualifications, even without considering the issues of availability, interest or cost.

A partial solution to this problem is for those designing job specifications to give more attention to acceptable substitutes. For example:

- Is an agronomist really needed or could an agriculturalist do the job?
- Could the project be structured in a manner such that short-term technical assistance could substitute for a long-term position?

It is far easier and cheaper to find technicians for short-term work than for longer term assignments. Nonetheless, far better use can be made of short-term assignments than is now being done.

### Short-Term Assistance

There is room for improvement in the manner with which short-termers are currently utilized. For example, it is instructive to make a distinction between developing a plan of action and managing it. An agricultural specialist is clearly needed to determine what crops to grow, how to grow them in a given area and to specify the types of field trials that should be carried out. However, this specialist would not necessarily be needed to conduct field trials; he should be able to leave instructions that others could follow. In short, there is a role for a short-term specialist to devise a plan of action that could be left to others with less specialized training to manage. Short-termers can also play a useful "compassing" role for IRD project managers. It is easy for an IRD project to lose its bearings, such as moving away from stated objectives for unjustifiable reasons, or sticking to stated objectives when experience calls for some changes. However, the short-term specialist is often seen as a threat to long-term project personnel. Some long-termers who live with a project all the time may feel that they are doing as good a job as is possible in adverse circumstances and that outsiders, coming for a short time, cannot offer them anything they don't already know. Other long-termers may feel that they are not performing up to par and that the short-termer will make them look bad. Given such perspectives, it is important for the project manager to feel a real need for outside assistance before it is dispatched.

Through dialogue, outsiders and project personnel can both learn and teach. Yet all too often, the "bottom line" for the short-terms is the completion of a paper. While the reasons for this are understandable, it can be counterproductive -- cross-cultural communication is hard enough for most people and a requirement for a paper provides a rationale for

a minimum of direct dialogue with host country personnel. Solutions might involve far less emphasis on the paper input than is currently the case, although the learning which occurs as a result of the writing process should not be ignored.

An additional advantage to short-term technical assistance is that typical IRD project organizations have only two or three levels of management and supervision and perhaps five to ten functionally distinct organizational subparts. This sort of flatness limits the range of managerial and supervisory behavior styles because the direct effect of the particular style of the project manager is mediated by only one or two others for most of the project staff. In addition, flat organizational forms allow few, if any, degrees of freedom for matching compatible behavioral styles between individuals by transfers, promotions, or creating new position descriptions. As a result, such common, inflexible conditions support the use of short-term assistance focusing on managerial behavior and organizational development.

Research and experience support the following prescriptions:

- Short-term consultants should be informed of the hidden conflicts defining a problem.
- Short-term consultants should use consensus-building to establish a climate for norms which can be used by project staff under the consultant visit.
- Strict adherence to high technical competence should not be at the expense of personal flexibility because it will lower personnel effectiveness.

### Project Life-Cycle

Rarely, if ever, do the terms of reference for personnel reflect changing staff needs as the project life-cycle unfolds,

yet staff needs will change dramatically during the project cycle.<sup>46/</sup> This is important because project design papers rarely, if ever, reflect, either implicitly or explicitly, the staff changes required.

A related point, concerning staff movements, is likewise rarely reflected in project design papers. Many IRD projects take place in extreme hardship areas. At times, it is simply unreasonable to expect visitors to perform effectively in such areas over an entire project cycle. Most foreign service staff in developing countries regularly rotate every two years or so -- and they are usually housed in rather nice quarters in large cities. It would seem only appropriate that greater attention be given to how long project staff should be required to stay before rotation.

#### Home Office Support

Technical assistance is a response to the local unavailability of requisite skills. One model for providing technical assistance is to hire the best possible team leader and then get out of his way. This approach, which has been widely used in the past, gives the field team a free rein, thus minimizing friction between the contracting home office and the technical assistance team leader. Often, however, the model does not work well, or as well as it might, even when experienced managers, rather than technicians, are selected for field leadership positions.

An alternative approach is to utilize the home office as a backstop field management. Although few instances of an idealized model exist, a home office could accept responsibility for the substance of technical assistance provided to rural development projects, in order to insure that;

- The technical assistance provided is in fact that which is needed to reach project objectives;
- The development approach (strategy, tactics) being used is consistent and the best available;
- The individual team members work with and complement the overall approach;
- The pace of activities is neither so slow as to negate forward progress nor so fast as to leave behind host country officials who must continue the project after donor support has been withdrawn;
- The development planning (systems provisions) being provided is appropriate for the environment, staff capabilities and project objectives; and
- The development technology being provided is appropriate for the environment, staff capabilities and project objectives.

Technical assistance is too vulnerable to be left solely to the devices of a field team. There should be regular and defined interactions between the team and the home office, based upon certain preconditions -- such as inserting a permanent staff member into the team leader position -- and assigned responsibilities. The use of regular and scheduled evaluations of technical assistance performance based upon the criteria of appropriateness, development approach, staffing, pace, systems planning and organization, and technology transfer, is the cornerstone of successful management of technical assistance teams.

Alternative strategies for managing long-term TA are displayed with both strengths and weaknesses on the next page. Although a "management team" strategy offers the best hope in most situations, the local context and short-term TA needs must be considered simultaneously with the choice of long-term approach.47/

FIGURE 3-4

## A TAXONOMY OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE STRATEGIES

	STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
Personal Contract: "The Individual Strategy"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Low cost</li> <li>● Low profile</li> <li>● Allows specification of known individuals</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Limited recruiting pool for individual specialists</li> <li>● Isolation from new approaches to development</li> <li>● Reliance on donor or host governments for procurement</li> <li>● No mechanism for short-term TA</li> <li>● Difficult support services (insurance, retirement, household storage) for expatriates</li> </ul>
University Contract: "The Academic Strategy"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Link to research networks</li> <li>● Can improve quality of "development studies" program</li> <li>● Field team has permanent base</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Can be "dumping ground" for poor faculty</li> <li>● Reward system may support research but not action</li> <li>● Usually inexperienced in procurement</li> <li>● High cost</li> <li>● Not easy to deliver short-term TA</li> </ul>
Private Firm Contract with only Temporary Staff: "The Bodyshop Strategy"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Allows specification of known individuals</li> <li>● Builds "talent search" capability in domestic organization</li> <li>● Does not require strong capability in HO</li> <li>● Can deliver short-term TA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Temporary staff handicaps field management</li> <li>● Lack of previous experience with home office (H O)</li> <li>● HO incentive is to cut costs, provide minimal support</li> <li>● Reliance on donor for procurement</li> <li>● High cost</li> </ul>
Private Firm Contract with Permanent Chief of Party and Involved Home Office: "The Management Team Strategy"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Link to information networks</li> <li>● Facilitates field management</li> <li>● Facilitates procurement</li> <li>● Facilitates short-term TA</li> <li>● HO accountability for contract provides incentive to do job</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● High cost</li> <li>● Long communication and supply lines</li> <li>● Requires strong HO with knowledge and competence in development</li> <li>● Adds another actor into the development assistance project</li> <li>● Does not build procurement capacity in host government</li> </ul>

**SOME BROADER CONCERNS**

Although this examination of the "nitty-gritty" of implementation is an absolute necessity if results are to be produced, some broader concerns cannot be ignored if sense is to be made out of the details of service delivery. For example:

- Without a national-level political commitment to the economic and social objectives of IRD, as well as a willingness to reward bureaucratic power structures for achieving those objectives, there is little hope of success for IRD programs and projects;
- Without total replacement of incentive systems, recruitment mechanisms and career ladders, a development-oriented organization cannot be made out of a control-oriented organization; and
- Without taking account of what is required to do business in a particular country, a system of administration and procurement is not likely to work.

Thus the broader concerns are contextual and political: the organization and management of the service delivery process must not be totally at odds with local practices and powerful actors. And yet, goods and services are introduced for the expressed purpose of changing some practices and redistributing some power. Therein lies the focus on response and welfare considerations.

**SUMMARY**

The link between IRD resources and service delivery is strewn with barriers. Some of these barriers can be lowered through the use of more appropriate organizational structures and managerial practices.

**Common organizational failings are:**

- A tendency to design projects with fragmented authority, dependence upon a wide range of resources controlled by a multitude of organizational units, very complex coordination requirements; multiple functions combined in single roles; and
- A tendency to provide long-term technical assistance which is independent of an organizational base and neither answerable to nor supported by a Home Office.

**Common managerial failings are:**

- Using ineffective supervision and programming practices;
- Basing decisions on data and criteria which are not useful for providing goods and services to target populations;
- Making unrealistic assumptions about the long-term technical assistance talent pool; and
- Paying too little attention to the intra-organizational dynamics which often determine the limits to coordinating the efforts of independent organizations.

The problems above have been addressed in this chapter. In addition, the tradeoffs among alternative organizational arrangements have been specified, and the present state of knowledge about supervision, information systems, technical assistance and managing horizontal relations has been focused on the IRD problem set. Specific consideration has been given to:

- Centralization versus decentralization;
- Organizational placement;
- Complexity:

- Resource dependence;
- Internal organizational structure;
- Information needs;
- Information use;
- Supervision;
- Coordination;
- Routine administrative systems;
- Incentives; and
- Technical assistance.

This exercise has been useful; it has generated many propositions about actions which might improve IRD implementation. Nevertheless, there is no guaranteed strategy. Although there is an accumulated body of "traditional wisdom" about organization and administration, there is also a recognition that competing objectives, shifting situations and the political economy of IRD environments can complicate any set of prescriptions.

Some of these complications are related to the sequence of IRD objectives. Although the art of service delivery has a long history, much of the knowledge is not based on considerations of local responses or self-sustaining improvements in well-being. The most effective service delivery strategy may concentrate authority and integrate resources -- yet fail to encourage local responses. Thus, although there is little chance that IRD will succeed without providing goods and services, short-term project management concerns must be viewed in the more distant light of villager response and self-sustaining development.

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**NOTES:**

- 1/ John C. Ickis, "Structural Responses to New Rural Development Strategies," in David Korten and Felipe Alfonso, eds, Bureaucracy and the Poor: Closing the Gap, Singapore: McGraw-Hill, forthcoming.
- 2/ See George Honadle, "Organization Design for Development Administration: A Liberian Case Study of Implementation Analysis for Project Benefit Distribution," Ph.D. Dissertation, Syracuse University, 1978; also see Lewis Gawthrop, Administrative Politics and Social Change, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971.
- 3/ See William Smith, Francis Lethem and Ben Thoolen, The Design of Organizations for Rural Development Projects -- A Progress Report, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 375, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1980.
- 4/ John D. Montgomery, "The Popular Front in Rural Development: Or, Shall We Eliminate the Bureaucrats and Get On With the Job," Public Administration Review, vol. 39, no. 1, 1979.
- 5/ See David C. Korten, "Community Organization and Rural Development: A Learning Process Approach," Public Administration Review, forthcoming.
- 6/ Robert Chambers, "Project Selection for Poverty-Focused Rural Development: Simple Is Optimal," World Development, vol. 6, 1978, pp. 209-219.
- 7/ See pp. 187-190 for a description and discussion of capacity building.
- 8/ See Elliott R. Morss, John K. Hatch, Donald R. Mickelwait and Charles F. Sweet, Strategies for Small Farmer Development: An Empirical Study of Rural Development Projects, Boulder: Westview Press, 1976; Norman Uphoff and Milton Esman, Local Organization for Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience, Ithaca, Cornell University Rural Development Committee, 1974. Also see Judith Tendler, Intercountry Evaluation of Small Farmer Organizations: Ecuador and Honduras, Washington: AID, 1976.
- 9/ E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: Economics As If People Really Mattered, New York: Harper & Row, 1973.
- 10/ Judith Tendler, Inside Foreign Aid, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975.

11/ Dennis Rondinelli and Kenneth Ruddle, Urbanization and Rural Development: A Spatial Policy for Equitable Growth, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978.

12/ Charles F. Sweet and Peter F. Weisel, "Process Versus Blueprint Models for Designing Rural Development Projects," International Development Administration: Implementation Analysis for Development Projects, George Honadle and Rudi Klauss, eds, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979.

13/ In situations characterized by strong ethnic politics, administrative reforms tend to be more successful if they are initiated at the provincial level, but not the national level, and if the dominant group has a solid enough position to view "objective" management criteria as helping to legitimize its position. See David K. Leonard, Reaching the Peasant Farmer: Organization Theory and Practice in Kenya, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.

14/ See, for example, I. Livingston, "On the Concept of Integrated Rural Development Planning in Less Developed Countries," Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 30, no. 1, 1979, pp. 49-53.

15/ See Herbert Kauffman, Are Government Organizations Immortal?, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976.

16/ This is reinforced by Klauss' comment that "requirements for coordination become increasingly more demanding as the sharing of information and resources increases.... Such demands consume considerable time and resources in and of themselves and may detract from the larger purpose of the project, unless the interorganizational structural arrangements are clearly formulated, understood and accepted by participating members. Hence, this analysis warns of elaborate integrated projects requiring highly formalized coordinating structures too cumbersome to administer. It adheres to the notion that 'simple is optimal' and recognizes that complex interorganization structures inherently create opportunities for problems to arise." See Rudi Klauss, "Interorganization Relationships for Project Implementation," in International Development Administration: Implementation Analysis for Development Projects, George Honadle and Rudi Klauss, eds., New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979, p. 165.

17/ For further useful discussion, see Robert Chambers, Managing Rural Development: Ideas and Experience from East Africa, Uppsala: Scandanavian Institute of African Studies, 1974; Daniel Benor and James Q. Harrison, Agricultural Extension: The Training and Visit System, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1977; William Foote Whyte, Organizing for Agricultural Development, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1975; Burton Swanson, Organizing Agricultural Technology Transfer: The Effects of Alternative Arrangements, Bloomington, Ind.: PASITAM, 1975.

- 18/ In projects with large technical assistance contingents, such functions may be centralized in a Home Office.
- 19/ For views of task forces, liaison roles and coordinative functions in complex organizations, see Jay Galbraith, Organization Design, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1977.
- 20/ See Arlyn J. Melcher, Structure and Process of Organizations: A Systems Approach, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976.
- 21/ George Honadle, "Anticipating Roadblocks in Organizational Terrain: Lessons from a Case Study of How Organization Design Makes a Difference," in Honadle and Klauss, op. cit , p. 104.
- 22/ Robert F. Rich, An Investigation of Information Gathering and Handling in Seven Federal Bureaucracies: A Case Study of the Continuous National Survey, Ph.D. dissertation, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1975, pp. 63-66.
- 23/ Donald R. Mickelwait and others, Information for Decision-making in Rural Development, 2 vols., Washington, D.C.: Development Alternatives, Inc., 1978, pp. 322-324.
- 24/ Robert A. Levine, Public Planning, New York: Basic Books, 1972, p. 149.
- 25/ See, for example, papers delivered to the workshops on "Rapid Rural Appraisal" held at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex in September 1978 and December 1979. A moving force behind the synthesis of practical approaches is Robert Chambers.
- 26/ Henry Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work, New York: Harper and Row, 1973.
- 27/ Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior, 3rd ed., New York: The Free Press, 1976.
- 28/ Estimates of costs and benefits attached to further search are also related to needs and sources. See Elliot R. Morss and Robert F. Rich, Government Information Management, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, forthcoming.
- 29/ John M. Cohen, The Administration of Economic Development Programs: Baselines for Discussion, Development Discussion Paper No. 79, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Institute for International Development, October 1979, pp. 86-87.
- 30/ See George Honadle, "Supervising Agricultural Extension: Practices and Procedures for Improving Field Performance," Agricultural Administration, forthcoming

31/ Many of the propositions which follow are originally based on research results reported in Melcher, op. cit. and in such journals as Administrative Science Quarterly, Academy of Management Review, Academy of Management Journal, and others. They have also been directly corroborated by the authors' experience in rural development and by development literature, such as Robert Chambers, Managing Rural Development, op. cit.

32/ See George Honadle, Thomas Armor, Jerry VanSant and Paul Crawford, Implementing Capacity Building in Jamaica: Field Experience in Human Resource Development, Washington: Development Alternatives, Inc., 1980.

33/ Adapted from John Sherwood, "An Introduction to Organizational Development," The 1972 Annual Handbook for Group Facilitators. San Diego, CA: University Associates, 1972.

34/ See Thomas Armor, George Honadle, Craig Olson and Peter Weisel, "Organizing and Supporting Integrated Rural Development Projects: A Two-fold Approach to Administrative Development," Journal of Administration Overseas, vol. XVIII, no. 4, 1974, pp. 276-286.

35/ In interagency settings where personnel may belong to a "mother" agency but work part-time or on loan as IRD project staff, the ability to obtain loyalty and create a positive work climate may be the most valuable skill a manager can have. For discussion of reasons why, see A.O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.

36/ See, for example, Gary Wamsley and Meyer Zald, The Political Economy of Public Organizations, Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1973.

37/ Jack Rothman, Planning and Organizing for Social Change, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.

38/ George Honadle with Richard McGarr, "Organizing and Managing Technical Assistance: Lessons from the Maasai Range Management Project," IRD Project Field Report, prepared for the United States Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.: Development Alternatives, Inc., 1979, pp. 10-11.

39/ For an example of donor use, see Honadle and McGarr, op. cit. For local government use, see Organization for Agriculture-based Development, Washington, D.C.: Public Administration Service, 1975.

- 40/ This is supported by DAI experiences in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Perhaps the most skillful published argument for simplicity is Robert Chambers, "Project Selection for Poverty-focussed Rural Development: Simple is Optimal," op. cit.
- 41/ See Frederick Herzberg, The Managerial Choice, Homewood, Ill: Dow Jones-Irwin, 1976.
- 42/ See Arlyn Melcher, op. cit., and also Richard D. Arvey and John M. Ivancevich, "Punishment in Organizations; A Review, Propositions and Research Suggestions," The Academy of Management Review, vol. 5, no. 1, 1980, pp. 123-132.
- 43/ Robert W. Iversen, "Personnel for Implementation: A Contextual Perspective," in Honadle and Klauss, op. cit., page 88.
- 44/ Ibid., page 97.
- 45/ United States Agency for International Development (Yemen), Local Resources for Development, RFP No. 90011, September 19, 1979, pp. 8-9.
- 46/ Although it is not commonly appreciated by development specialists or technicians, an awareness of project life-cycles and the different skill mixes (interpersonal, technical, conceptual) needed at different times is an integral part of the most elementary management theories. See, for example, Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard, Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources, 2d ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972.
- 47/ A fuller treatment of home office support can be found in Donald R. Mickelwait, "Technical Assistance for IRD: A Management Team Strategy," IRD Working Paper No. 3., Washington, D.C.: Development Alternatives, Inc., forthcoming.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### CONSIDERING LOCAL RESPONSE

There is a growing consensus in the development literature that achieving effective local response to project goods and services is a gradual, evolutionary process in which both project staff and potential beneficiaries are willing to try various alternatives, discard them when proven unworkable, and try others.<sup>1/</sup> This is not to imply that the experts have learned nothing from either theory or practice, but rather that understanding the internal dynamics of society -- in the Third World or anywhere else -- is a very complex, potentially frustrating process. The events of the past two decades have made many "blueprints" irrelevant.<sup>2/</sup> Still, attention to the issue of local response to development initiatives is a major IRD project management concern.

Local responses may take several forms, but they fundamentally involve the willingness of the rural poor to adopt new technologies and to make resource commitments to achieve development objectives. A serious problem in the implementation of IRD projects has been the frequent failure to elicit such responses.

Response is an essential part of the development process precisely because development is a process and not just a pre-defined end condition. Development involves change, and the most important change is in the attitudes and actions of those people -- individually or in groups -- who become participants in the process itself. Outside assistance can play only a short-term catalytic role. If project goods and services do not serve the needs of target beneficiaries (or are not understood as addressing those needs), then people are unlikely to

participate in the process by which those outputs may contribute to improved welfare.

This chapter reviews responses supportive of IRD objectives, some reasons why they are often not forthcoming, approaches to organization and management which may help to elicit supportive responses, and difficulties associated with those approaches.

#### TYPES OF RESPONSE

Local people may respond to project goods and services in various ways:

- They may reject project outputs altogether as, for example, when farmers refuse to listen to agricultural extension advice or to use a new community well.
- They may use the outputs inappropriately as, for example, when elite villagers transform new local organizations into vehicles for extending their dominance or when small farmer credit programs are embraced but payments lag.
- They may respond positively in order to make effective use of project outputs; as, for example, when a farmer adopts a high-yield rice variety and commits resources to appropriate cultivation techniques.

Types of positive response will, of course, differ depending on the particular development initiative involved; the response needed for increasing agricultural productivity is quite different from that desired for a family planning program. However, it is possible to generalize and say that with both economic and social development initiatives, some behavior change on the part of the rural poor will be required for

success. In addition, development initiatives will not be sustained unless the rural poor make some form of resource commitment in support of these initiatives.

Unfortunately, behavior changes and resource commitments frequently do not occur. Furthermore, past project history indicates that problems of inadequate response are neither sector-specific nor area-specific. Instead, they permeate the entire development experience. And, in the case of IRD projects, a wide range of response problems may manifest themselves simultaneously and obstruct implementation. A necessary step toward improving IRD implementation is thus identifying some major reasons for low response.

#### REASONS FOR LOW RESPONSE

This section presents three major categories of factors that inhibit villager response to project initiatives. The first category is the one most sensitive and least amenable to control by project designers or managers -- national policies. The second relates to constraints in the immediate project environment which may, to a certain extent be amenable to modification. The third is the one seemingly most capable of correction -- inappropriate project initiatives. Each of these factors is examined below.

##### National Policies

Development experts and institutions have spent much time and effort studying the effects of macroeconomic policies on overall development.<sup>3/</sup> For most donor-assisted IRD efforts, however, macroeconomic policies are taken as given, either

because they are not considered important or because to try to alter them would be seen as an intrusion on national sovereignty. The complexity of issues and divergence of views calls for further work in identifying the benefits and costs of alternative macro policies. This section focuses on the ways that macro policies individually and in combination have affected local response and contributed to IRD implementation problems.

From an IRD project standpoint, a need exists for national economic policies that provide direct and continuous support for the goals of rural development in order for individual projects and programs to bring about significant change. Many developing countries have suffered from a lack of balanced and integrated food-cash/export economies; a lack of integration of the rural poor into the cash economy; and an emphasis on exportable crops, overvaluation of national currencies, and minimum wage and pricing policies that discriminate against rural economies and rural people.<sup>4/</sup>

Nevertheless, it does not follow that a macro policy should be changed just because it causes an IRD implementation problem. Macro policy judgments are based on other factors as well. Additionally, the power of present policy tools to deal with the range of economic considerations is limited and uncertain. Although a comprehensive review of alternative strategies and their effects is beyond the scope of this paper, the discussion below suggests ways that different policy sets affect local response and IRD success.

### Pricing Policies

Governments will often impose either price ceilings or price floors for domestic agricultural production. Ceilings are justified as keeping food costs down, but have potential negative consequences as well. These include the following:

- Production and investments in agriculture may be curtailed;
- Food imports may be increased;
- Black market trade, both domestic and foreign, may be encouraged; and
- Patterns of urban exploitation of rural areas may be extended, thereby accelerating the rate of migration to urban areas.

Such policies can thwart IRD programs because production levels that should be realized and sustainable on purely economic ground come to require continued foreign assistance.

Price floors are sometimes imposed to insulate the farmer from short-term market fluctuations and to provide an incentive for the farmer to increase agricultural output or adopt new production techniques or practices. While such floors can play a positive role, they must be well planned, administered and coordinated with other subsidies to be effective. For example, Uma Lele notes that, "ad hoc price policies which are often adopted by specific projects or programs as a reaction to unanticipated crises are usually dysfunctional, causing, among other problems, considerable income discrepancies among food and non-food crop producers, even within program areas."<sup>5/</sup> Inconsistencies between national pricing policy and local program policy also tend to constrain the adoption of new technologies and so divert scarce administrative resources to problems of marketing agricultural surpluses.

#### Tax and Tariff Policies

In an attempt to gain control of domestic savings for its own purposes, a government will often impose specific taxes, frequently in the form of export duties on individual agricultural products. Heavy taxation of agricultural exports will

reduce incentives to produce for export. Indeed, assuming an elastic export demand, the primary effect of an export tax will be to reduce the domestic price paid for export items.

Governments may also impose import tariffs or quotas on agricultural inputs to protect domestic manufacturers, including local producers of fertilizer, chemicals and farm implements. These import restrictions, while possibly beneficial to the manufacturing sector, can create terms of trade that are unfavorable to the farmers. At the very least, the demands of international trade may cause disproportionate attention to be paid to progressive farmers producing for export at the expense of subsistence farmers producing for home consumption.6/

Less obvious tax policies can have an important impact on the form and amount of rural development. For example, Chuta and Liedholm have pointed out that import tariffs on capital goods are often extremely low. Worse still, import duties on components that go into making capital equipment locally are frequently higher than the tax on the completely produced capital import.7/

These factors clearly have a bearing on what is economically viable in an IRD project. Although macroeconomics should not be formulated only to serve the needs of IRD projects, macroeconomic policy makers should be made aware of the effects their policies have on rural projects and on the local response necessary for such projects to succeed.

#### Other Incentive Policies

Incentives include direct subsidies, preferential foreign exchange rates, subsidized credit, foreign assistance, and marketing assistance. Incentives are sometimes clearly

warranted as an inducement for the adoption of new farming methods, but such policies must be coordinated with other macroeconomic policies or unwelcome imbalances may result. For example, direct subsidies, overvalued domestic currencies, and foreign assistance can cause the domestic prices of inputs -- including labor, credit, capital, fertilizers, seeds, and foreign aid -- to fall below their real market value, leading projects to use an input package that is not sustainable in the long run.

Subsidized credit may be offered to encourage small farmers to adopt new production practices. Given small farmers' risk perceptions, however, it will rarely be the case that the savings of a few percentage points on credit will make any difference on the adoption issue. And yet, once subsidized credit has been introduced, it is difficult to remove, and thereby becomes a continuing drain on the government. Moreover, in most cases, the availability of manpower to administer credit and the perceived profitability of the innovations affecting the demand for credit are the limiting factors in reaching small farmers -- rather than credit availability or cost per se.<sup>8/</sup>

The introduction of high-cost administrative marketing monopolies or hurried development of farmers' marketing organizations are common in the early stages of IRD projects. But such interventions occupy a disproportionate share of administrative effort and may blunt local participation. As an alternative, marketing services emphasis should be placed on improving the bargaining position of the farmer, as, for instance, through construction of public facilities for seasonal storage, improvement of roads and market information systems, and standardization of weights and measures.<sup>9/</sup> While these are not necessarily national policy issues, central support for these services can facilitate local participation.

### Combinations of Macro Policies

Development problems frequently result from the interaction of several policies. A classic example from Africa entails price controls and high export duties on domestic agricultural products. Both policies favor urban populations over rural groupings and are frequently imposed to attain such distributional effects. In other instances, a combination of policies will be developed to attain a stabilization objective. One Asian government, for example, severely devalued its currency at the urging of the International Monetary Fund. However, it failed to adjust its rice procurement price to offset the increased price of agricultural imports such as fertilizer. Normally, farmers could have sold their produce on the unregulated market, but the limited capacity of grain storage facilities in the private sector prohibited the level of market demand at harvest time that was needed to create an adequate return to the farmer.

Other examples of macro policy at odds with area project objectives and influencing local response can be cited. In Bolivia, a national policy of subsidized interest rates and lax repayment requirements has principally benefited large farmers and limited the supply of capital for small farmer credit programs. Currency exchange regulations in Zaire encourage imports of food into a food deficit area at the same time that a project is attempting to increase local food production. In Ethiopia and Indonesia, import restrictions and freemarket controls have aggravated the storage of critical project inputs such as fertilizer and spare parts, which in turn has limited subproject choices at the district, community, and village levels.

### Political Policy

Political commitment at the highest levels of national leadership can greatly facilitate achievement of the goals of rural development. Such commitment may take several forms, such as:

- Articulating rural development strategies in national policies and legislation;
- Ensuring a high priority for rural development in routine administration decisions; and
- Breaking barriers of entrenched interest in the redistribution of resources needed for rural transformation.10/

Frequently, political obstacles arise that prevent governments from adopting and implementing the requisite public policies needed to support particular development efforts.11/ It has also been argued that in many cases difficulties lie not with the intention of governments, but with their inability to affect their programs in the territory over which they formally exercise jurisdiction.12/

A political policy of particular significance to rural development is agrarian reform. Proponents of agrarian reform argue that it is essential to increased agricultural development. Equity arguments aside, 13/ it is argued that title security and intensive production, both of which are seen as resulting from a meaningful agrarian reform, will lead to significant production and income increases.14/ Two problems with agrarian reform policies warrant further attention. First, there is the danger that such policies, implemented in a country with rapid population growth, will result in such a high degree of land fragmentation that smallholding becomes uneconomic. Second, the "transition" costs of any agrarian reform -- where production falls off as the new landholders

take over are often not fully appreciated. These costs can be significant -- particularly when the transition period is long, when violence is associated with the reform, or more generally, when the reform is poorly conceived.

Macro policies represent a potential constraint to the predictability of local response to project interventions. In instances such as these where macro policies impinge on the prospects for project success, project management has several choices, assuming a decision to proceed. These include:

- Accepting the macro policies as given and designing the project with the macro constraints in mind;
- Influencing the policy prior to implementation. Often if summary change is not politically feasible, a gradual phase-in of a different set of policies may be possible; or
- Collecting specific data from the project area to influence policy during implementation or to alter project design. When governments are unconvinced by hypothetical arguments concerning the deleterious impact of certain macro policies on rural development programs, or when project staff may be uncertain about the effect of a set of policies, a data collection component can be designed to document the effect of policies on project performance.

These options must be used with sensitivity to the relationships between the success of rural development projects and macroeconomic policies. When project and national policies mesh creatively, the results can be mutually reinforcing. For example, Uma Lele and John Mellor report:

If the poor are employed and spend their income on food and other consumer goods, domestic prices tend to rise. Most governments then sacrifice employment of the poor in order to restrain the price increases resented by the

politically potent urban middle classes. New agricultural technologies can provide the food needed to complement increased employment. Concurrently, as agricultural production increases, the employment-generated purchasing power of the poor can prevent a fall in prices which would dull farmer incentives.<sup>15/</sup>

### Environmental Constraints

The environment is the set of conditions affecting both the use of goods and services made available to a population and the capacity of the population to generate organized responses to perceived problems and opportunities. The historical, sociocultural and physical environments are of particular concern in IRD projects.

#### The Historical Environment

Implementers of development projects frequently ignore the most important historical differences among the inhabitants of rural communities -- differences which may be responsible for a failure to respond to proffered goods or services or a breakup of participatory structures. Villages may be units of administrative convenience rather than reflections of local ethnic and historical patterns. For example, a given village may contain several groups with historical ties elsewhere.

History is not a matter of origins only, but also of collective experience. Responses and initiatives of populations as well as capacities to organize and to attempt collective innovation are all conditioned by the course of history, especially that of the recent past. In many parts of the Third World the colonial experience still exerts a strong influence. The harmful effect of cash cropping on the relative roles of males and females, of forced labor on community initiative, and of the suppression of local leaders on the effectiveness of local organization are a part of this unfortunate

legacy. As a result, it is understandable that those societies are much more skeptical than others about development initiatives introduced by outsiders. The colonial influence may also explain why some seemingly cohesive communities can readily adopt certain technical approaches to problems whereas for others, technical solutions must await the emergence of an organized structure.

A previous experience with an organized local effort may also condition the response. A village in south central Cameroon<sup>16/</sup> responded exceedingly well to efforts to organize and maintain a village health committee. As the success of this village became apparent, it was learned that at least four years of previous organizing effort had been invested in that village by others before the village health committee project.

IV-1 Rural development projects are more likely to be successful if a review of the history of a community is undertaken to determine if a foundation of organizational skills must be the first development effort.

Groups organized around certain specific tasks often go on to a more permanent existence and a broader utilization of their established organizational dynamic.

#### The Sociocultural Environment

The capacity of a population to engage in joint ventures is a critical element in local response. This "cohesiveness" is dependent upon relations among members of the community. If there is dissension among households or subclans, even the most rudimentary of organized efforts may fail; if leaders are perceived as weak and ineffectual, organizations may founder. Societies that emphasize the central roles of traditional leaders seem, on the whole, to be more cohesive.

Where decisionmaking is limited to a selected group and where the roles of others are equally well-defined, unified responses are more likely. In any case,

- IV-2 If a development program calls for community action then it is necessary for project management to understand local leadership decision-making and communication patterns.

Such an analysis may reveal indicators of success that run contrary to Western democratic principles. Instead of an egalitarian distribution of decisionmaking, success may depend upon convincing a handful of the powerful and wealthy. This is all the more likely since certain traditional elements of the political culture, such as clientelism, become more rather than less important as modernizing changes take place in a peasant society. The implication is that when power and authority are dispersed among a large number of individuals and households, a community tends to be less cohesive, and organized community responses to problems and possible solutions are less effective.

In one study, the three major ethnic groups of Nigeria (Hausa, Ibo, and Yoruba) were compared using a number of factors characterizing acceptance of innovation, such as adaptation to industrial working schedules, willingness to travel, and dietary changes. These variables were regressed against the social characteristics of each ethnic group. The only significant correlation with acceptance of innovation was the manner in which status is accorded within each group. Among the Hausa, where status is based on inheritance, innovation was found to be much less accepted than among the Ibo, where personal achievements count for as much as inherited authority. A similar study comparing subgroups of the Atetela in Zaire reached essentially the same conclusions.17/

The net result of these observations is paradoxical: cohesiveness -- seemingly necessary for an organized response -- may require a tightly knit authority group, which is more likely to occur in more traditional societies. Yet, such societies seem to be less accepting of innovation, even though acceptance is usually the local response intended by development projects. Every development project should monitor the differential responses to introduced innovations in relation to the success of organizing efforts in societies that assign status in different ways. The results would permit development planners to allocate training and administrative resources to various regions of a country on a differential basis.

An understanding of traditional sex roles is also important to planners. There is considerable support in the literature for the theory that rural development has a negative impact on women and, by extension, on the subsistence agricultural sector in which women often play a major role.<sup>18/</sup> One reason for this is the wide application of a Western model of sex-based division of labor in rural development projects, even in areas where women play a key role in decisionmaking and planning for food production and marketing. This suggests that the introduction of new technologies in rural areas has altered the traditional role of women but that the cultural constraints toward women have remained intact; as a result, women have become more and more powerless in the process of development.

In order to adequately understand the social structure of a population, it is essential to consider the extensive kinship and friendship networks linking individuals and households in both rural and urban settings, across generational and social status lines, and in some cases between the living

and the dead. In Notes from Africa, Aynor remarks on the enormous amount of time the average bureaucrat in an African ministry spends attending to the needs of his constituency, particularly his relatives.<sup>19/</sup> There is a high level of expectation for him, as the chief member of his network, to fulfill what are perceived to be his obligations. This has led to the postulate that:

- IV-3 If cooperation within a society is based only on friendship or kinship, then an alteration in the role structure of the community may be a prerequisite to the introduction of community level innovations.

The importance of networks to rural development lies in their function as channels of communication and influence. Many decisions about development options are based on information passed along such channels. Key sources of information could be anyone in the network but frequently are persons having some influence, power, authority; or a position of advantage such as being in an urban setting, in a government bureau, or on the staff of a development project. Other examples of people with authority are those with special knowledge and skills, such as healing, midwifery, masonry, forging, or wine making. Although their functions are frequently associated with magical powers, their real importance is their ability to give advice, and to provide services and tools which work. They exist in every society and form key points in the networks of which they are members.

In approaching rural populations, the IRD implementer is concerned with how people perceive not only their problems but also the goods and services offered. In many rural societies the reciprocal obligations of kinship are strong. In practice, this may mean that when one member of a kinship network accrues benefits (an education, a larger house, a well-

paying job, or a bumper crop of coffee), the other members perceive these benefits as also belonging to everyone else in the network. Because of this consideration

- IV-4 If development projects are organized around a framework different from locally perceived obligations, they may face pressure for benefit distribution at variance with what has been planned.

In addition, the IRD implementer is also interested in how people interpret both verbal and nonverbal communication. It is the fundamental function of language to convey meaning via symbols, and every society has a unique set of symbols and meanings. Certain gestures can also convey powerful meaning. In some societies, a gift is never received, food touched, or a greeting made with the left hand. Frequently, one should show deference to elders and other influential people. It is not the symbols themselves that are important, but rather the system of each rural society which must be learned and incorporated into the project approach, presentation and especially staff behavior. The task is often easier if the worker already understands the language and culture. Even so, as a side effect of education or experience, local behavior may be sufficiently altered as to produce a new set of symbols which are unintelligible or misunderstood.

#### The Physical/Biological Environment

The foregoing social and anthropological insights cannot be divorced from their relationships to aspects of the physical and biological environment. For example, consistent group behavioral differences exist between inhabitants of the forest and the savanna or Sahelian regions of Africa. The forest environment in the past could support only sparsely distributed, highly mobile hunting and gathering peoples who have been among the last to adopt patterns of sedentary

villages and cultivation. The savanna and Sahelian groups, on the other hand, have known cultivation and livestock raising for much longer. They developed villages with stockades for protection much earlier than forest people, and relationships of mutual cooperation between various ethnic groups, such as sedentary farmers and nomadic herders, are longstanding.

To a great extent, the capacities of rural people to respond to both perceived problems and to the resources made available to them will depend on the constraints imposed upon them by the physical and biological environment: the accessibility and quantity of available water, the productivity of the land, the availability of fish and fruits, the abundance of insects, the density of human population in relation to available natural resources, and the absolute quantities of those resources. Frequently, the importance of these concerns is reinforced by seasonal factors.

The range of factors outlined above represents a complex set of location-specific concerns for project managers. They constitute constraints to local response, particularly in terms of the predictability of that response. They also point out the need for local understanding and flexibility in project management.

### Inappropriate Initiatives

Numerous initiatives have failed to generate the needed local response because they simply didn't make sense. They were ill-conceived and the local population knew it. The literature is full of examples of inadequate attention paid to local realities.20/

### Risk Considerations

A variety of local factors are of particular importance to small farmers who, ultimately, have to decide what to do. Risk is a combination of the probability and magnitude of loss. Small farmers tend to be more interested in insuring a subsistence crop for their families than in undertaking slightly greater risks for a much higher yield.<sup>21/</sup> Action that is rational to the farmer in his circumstances may not be rational from the project designer's perspective. For that reason, "rational" designs often fail when the planned innovations invite little or no responsible action from target groups, who see the tradeoffs in their own terms.

Designers should generally assume that proposed innovations will not earn a ready response from local people unless certain conditions exist. For example, innovation is more likely to be accepted in rural areas where people have been previously exposed to, and have accepted, other innovations; where at least some portion of the community is highly motivated or generally open to acceptance of change; and where traditional attitudes, institutional structures, or customs do not impose overwhelming social costs on early adoption.

In the absence of an environment favoring acceptance of project innovations, the project design must permit sufficient time and appropriate activities to build local interest and confidence. Most likely this can be accomplished by building on cooperative solutions to specific farmers' problems so as to develop a base for broader responses. As Hirschman notes, there are many situations where actors commit themselves to a specific technical innovation without realizing the extent to which this commitment slowly and subtly, but irresistibly, induces additional changes in behavior.<sup>22/</sup> That is, social, institutional, or attitudinal

changes may emerge slowly from the workings of a project even when these changes were not planned for at the start.

### Complexity

Projects requiring a complex mix of planning, administrative, technical, and funding resources significantly beyond local capacities often result in dependence and yielding of control to outside elements. Moreover, up front provision of outside services has been found to constrain local resource commitment by project beneficiaries. Nevertheless, a common characteristic of IRD efforts is complexity of structure and undertaking.

Complexity constrains local response from the perspectives of both donors and beneficiaries.

- IV-5 If an integrated rural development project is highly complex, then it is less likely that donor agencies or national governments will encourage beneficiaries to be involved in project implementation. 23/
- IV-6 If a local population does not perceive that it has some control of, or influence over, project resources, then a sustained positive response is unlikely.

For designers there are difficult tradeoffs implied in all these considerations. A widespread network of small projects may facilitate response but requires field staff and local linkages to a degree that is uncommon for either central government or donor agencies. Thinly spreading resources over a large area may create serious difficulties for logistical and financial control. There are, in fact, few examples of generally decentralized projects taking on complex, integrated sets of tasks.

Historically, these and other tradeoffs have usually been weighted in favor of a large project approach. The failure of many of these projects to produce meaningful benefits for the poorest elements of society suggests that planners should focus their design risks on the side of more flexible approaches and the training of staff to support this strategy.

The issue of project complexity is related to the proposition that:

- IV-7      If the expected benefits are tangible, immediate, and highly probable in their realization then response is facilitated.

As noted above, putting one's subsistence livelihood at risk requires a high level of confidence in the benefits to be received. Long-range possibilities, however attractive, draw little response from poor farmers who calculate benefits on their own terms and from a perspective which is necessarily short-term.

One answer to problems caused by project complexity is training. Training is a project output that gradually prepares local people for productive response, particularly the assumption of leadership and decisionmaking roles. It also may increase their status in the community. Feelings of inadequacy or deference to traditional authority resulting from lack of knowledge represent a major constraint to meaningful local involvement in development projects. Indeed, it may be suggested that:

- IV-8      If it is not supported by knowledge and skills which facilitate participation in problem solving effective response is severely limited.

The Save the Children Federation found in Indonesia that training in basic management skills such as bookkeeping, planning, and project control gave villagers the confidence to contribute to project planning decisions, to detect financial irregularities, and, indirectly, to challenge and even remove corrupt committee leaders.<sup>24/</sup> The potential of skill training combined with participatory mechanisms and staff attitudes that are noncoercive should, therefore, be carefully considered.

#### SUPPORTING RESPONSE

Basically, there are three administrative options for dealing with local response. The first is to do nothing. To select this option is to implicitly deny or, at least, ignore the importance of local response. Such a denial, however, equates the delivery of project goods and services with welfare improvements -- a common, albeit unjustified, leap of faith.

The second option is to temporarily offer overwhelming incentives to induce a desired response. It has been argued by some that, for the most part, "development" has occurred as the result of one group attracting workers -- either by pay or by force -- to work for them. Such an exploitative approach can, indeed, lead to impressive economic growth, but these economic benefits fall short of authentic development on grounds of both equity and sustainability.

The third option is to seriously consider the organization and management implications of the issue of local response in both the design and implementation of development projects. This requires developing strategies to elicit authentic and sustainable local response to project outputs.

Developmental change is the result of more than external project interventions. It may occur as a purely local reaction to new circumstances or it may involve an interacting network of change among various participants in an area or nation. Nevertheless, if positive local responses are to be consciously facilitated, it is necessary for program designers and managers to pursue supportive approaches to IRD. While there are numerous instances of bad ideas and unsound national policies affecting local response, sometimes the problem is simply poor communications. At times, sound development initiatives have failed to take hold because they have not been communicated effectively to local populations.

The related problems of inadequate communication and response have received considerable attention. Two particular mechanisms -- local organization and participation -- have been widely suggested to improve implementation. The strengths and weaknesses of each of these techniques are investigated below.

#### Local Organization

Local response to project goods and services is often a collective matter. Local organizations can facilitate collective response by helping people define their needs and by providing a communications link with project personnel. Often they are valuable as channels of information about needs for specific services and, because they may be primary users of these services, local organizations have an important role in planning and implementing service delivery.<sup>25/</sup> Additionally, as a vehicle for benefit distribution, they can support project equity objectives.

Local organizations range from functional groups such as small farmer marketing cooperatives to social or religious bodies.<sup>26/</sup> Most communities have an official or semi-official development committee with close links to formal local leadership. These groups vary greatly both in terms of their community representativeness and their state of vitality, but even a moribund group may become a development resource.

Local organizations can play potentially positive roles as vehicles for:

- Providing two-way information flows of technical information that support those individuals who try new approaches, and break down barriers between groups or individuals;
- Minimizing risk and practicing economies of scale;
- Adapting project activities to local conditions;
- Marshalling local resources;
- Achieving greater political and economic independence for local people by exercising influence over the behavior of locally-based administrative personnel, asserting claims on government, and providing mutual assistance; and
- Coordinating and spreading the benefits of outside assistance.<sup>27/</sup>

Local organizations can play potentially negative roles by:

- Perpetuating inequitable social systems;
- Controlling the rural population; and
- Weakening, or even destroying, viable local cultures.

Historically, local organizations were often not based on broad participatory decisionmaking or, if oriented to the poor, lacked the resources and higher level support necessary to make them effective. But if the elite in a community are the only ones to have access to the benefits of organization, the net effect will be to increase local inequities. In this regard, it becomes particularly important that new organizations gain credibility with poorer elements in the community by addressing their specific needs and encouraging widespread user satisfaction. This process will require management ingenuity, particularly in areas lacking social cohesion and traditions of broad-based decisionmaking. It may also require considerable time.

Even so, new problems may arise. Majority rule may still lead to majority discrimination against the very poor, who are the real target of most IRD projects.<sup>28/</sup> Special attention may be required to prepare the most marginal members of the community for genuine participation. One approach is to give the poor the opportunity to participate initially in small functional working groups in order that they may begin to gain experience and skills which prepare them for participation in broader community organizations <sup>29/</sup> Through interaction between the working groups and community organizations, the poor have the opportunity to gain recognition and acceptance by members of the larger group.

In the opinion of the Cornell Rural Development Committee, which has done extensive studies of this issue over the past decade, local organizations are a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for viable rural development. Without the support of local organizations, the best technical packages and the most skilled administrative personnel are not likely to be of much benefit to the rural poor.<sup>30/</sup>

In general, while local, beneficiary-run organizations are no panacea for response problems, at certain times and places they may become important vehicles for providing the link between project-related services and village use.

Organizations which contribute to successful rural development tend to possess certain attributes. In Figure 4-1 several such characteristics are listed along with supportive criteria.

### Participation

A key factor affecting the choice of responses to project goals and services is the link between the felt needs of people and the goods or services offered to them through a project intervention. This link is most effectively created when rural people are actively and meaningfully involved in both (a) the decisionmaking process for determining societal goals and the allocation of resources to achieve them and (b) the voluntary execution of resulting programs and projects.

Participation is presently very much in vogue and widely seen as a necessary condition for any meaningful development effort. The benefits attributed to participation include the following:

- Identifying new development ideas;
- Adapting new ideas to local circumstances;
- Gaining acceptance for new ideas;
- Obtaining a resource commitment;
- Handing activities over to local people in a manner that will become self-sustaining; and
- Limiting or reducing exploitation.

FIGURE 4-1

## ATTRIBUTES OF ORGANIZATIONS CONTRIBUTING TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Attributes of Organizations Contributing to Rural Development	Supportive Criteria
Openness to participation by a broad spectrum of the community. (Boundaries drawn by functions), not economic or social status.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Local participation in organization design.</li> <li>● Broad and frequent interaction within organization.</li> <li>● Accountability to members by those allocating and using organizational resources.</li> <li>● Broadly-based managerial and technical skills.</li> </ul>
Consistency with culturally accepted practices.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Conformity of new organizations to norms of traditional institutions.</li> <li>● Adaptation of existing organizations to new functions.</li> <li>● Traditions of broad-based community decision-making.</li> </ul>
Capacity for multiple adaptations and functions. <sup>1/</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Delivery systems capable of meeting the needs of more than one group in a coordinated manner.</li> <li>● Capacity to respond to changing community priorities.</li> <li>● Multiple constituency support providing broader economic bargaining power.</li> </ul>
Linkages, both horizontally to complementary institutions and vertically with centers of power controlling policy and resources.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Mutual reinforcement of technical and administrative skills and services to the community.</li> <li>● Support from bureaucratic systems independent of local decisionmaking.</li> <li>● Access to resources and information not available locally.</li> <li>● Participation in communications networks to broaden awareness of local needs and circumstances at policymaking levels.</li> </ul>
Equitable distribution of organizational benefits.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Broad participation in organizational activities and leadership.</li> <li>● Relative equity in local asset ownership patterns.<sup>2/</sup></li> <li>● Organizational accountability to a community constituency beyond its members.</li> </ul>

<sup>1/</sup> This characteristic must be assessed in terms of the particular organizational environment and the relevant tradeoffs between single and multiple functions. Too many functions may lower performance or concentrate excessive power in a single organization.

<sup>2/</sup> Empirical evidence on this point is somewhat ambiguous. Gow (op cit, p. 120) found a correlation between organizational impact and unequal land holdings. In this case, unequal holdings may have been a proxy for the presence of progressive farmers able to give effective leadership to organizations. Furthermore, impact does not necessarily imply equitable distribution of benefits.

Of these benefits, participation can be most effective in adapting ideas to a local environment and inducing a local resource commitment; as a vehicle for generating new ideas it is less effective. At its best, information from participants can help project implementers to incorporate local modes of action into management policies and information transfer activities.

Such adaptation is obviously essential for strong local response. That response, in turn, builds on itself. Local leaders and progressive farmers play an important role in giving legitimacy to new modes of action. If leaders are persuaded to use a new technology, other members of the community will follow, providing they have the opportunity to do so.<sup>31/</sup> Participants can help by generating local pressures on the civil service to coordinate their activities at the local level and to lend political support to project activities. In these ways the value of yet broader response is enhanced.

A. O. Hirschman argues that strategies to increase the visibility of participation -- for example, published statistics on adoption of high-yielding seed varieties in a particular location -- will make authorities more sensitive to the risks of prestige loss and hence more interested in exploring ways of broadening utilization.<sup>32/</sup> Such strategies, however, may encourage participation for participation's sake, resulting in distribution of benefits to other than the intended target group.

Mobilization of local resources is a further benefit of local participation. These resources include labor, money, facilities, and management talents. Local resource contribution not only reduces needs for external inputs but, more

importantly, encourages owner-user identification with project goods and services. This identification, in turn, contributes to a minimization of dishonesty and malpractice in project management, especially where an open management style is adopted. Furthermore, local maintenance of project outputs is substantially improved when such outputs are viewed by local people as a result of their own efforts.

The potential of participation as a means to promote beneficiary response notwithstanding, some caution is in order. The participation issue has a history that is not particularly encouraging. Both the American community development movement and the French animation rurale, for example, were carefully considered attempts to introduce a participatory element into development projects. A review of how these concepts were largely overrun by political and bureaucratic imperatives reveals that

- A bottom-up to top-down control reversal took place as a result of pressures exerted by line ministries of central governments;
- There was an excessive emphasis on the expansion of social services relative to new economic production initiatives;
- There were problems concerning the technological soundness of social and economic initiatives generated by participatory approaches;
- Pressure for quick results led to over reliance on local elites; and
- Approaches were piecemeal, emphasizing individual villages rather than broader regions, leaving programs vulnerable to stronger bureaucratic imperatives.33/

Many current attempts at local participation fail for similar reasons or because they are motivated more by the

priorities of development theorists than the real interests of the local people.

Most individuals find it satisfying to take part in decisions only within the narrow sphere of activity in which they have experience or feel competent. Outside these realms, the need to make decisions generates anxiety which (in many societies) is avoided by transferring responsibility to officials higher up in the hierarchy.<sup>34/</sup> This suggests that, in most rural societies, no large majorities desire an active role in decisionmaking, even when they are informed of possible options. Local decisionmaking patterns, openness to change, and other cultural and historical norms will obviously influence local understandings of participation. Thus, an understanding of these factors is of obvious importance to project designers.

It is also the case that people are more interested in specific services than in action on long range solutions to basis issues of development policy. As a result:

- IV-9 If programs are perceived as improving specific adverse economic and social conditions affecting low income beneficiaries, the beneficiaries are more likely to participate than if the program is perceived as changing life-styles, attitudes or behavior.

Often, smaller-scale project interventions can serve as entry points for more comprehensive programs. A process of establishing increasing trust and confidence is established. This reflects the importance of relationship building as an element in a participation strategy.

Other constraints frequently work against easy implementation of participatory strategies. These include:

- Weak local governments dependent on higher authority for both decisionmaking and resources;
- Local dominance by elite groups controlling production relations;
- Dependency of poor farmers on patrons affecting perceptions of risk and attitudes toward change;
- Lack of local managerial, financial, and organizational skills; and
- Limited capacity of the poor to make resource commitments.

The complexity of these constraints is unnecessarily increased if project designs incorporate the concept of participation without defining what it means in a particular project context. Participation can be defined in terms of the number of participants, who they are, the nature and intensity of their participation, and variations in these factors over the course of project evolution. Effective management strategies for inducing participatory action require specification of these factors in the design. Based on this specification, project managers can more effectively look at the variety of factors that will influence local response to project outputs.

Participation, when widespread in a community, promotes equity in the distribution of project benefits. It thus contributes to local response to project outputs and also characterizes that response in effective projects. By contrast, narrow control over project management usually leads to narrow distribution of benefits.

In essence, however, the basic issue involved in local organizations and participation is that of power -- and ways in which the relatively powerless can gain more political clout:

The process of organizing is a political one. The organization and its environment has a political base ... Each of the steps [in the organizing process] represents an increase in the degree of power.<sup>35/</sup>

### Management

In considering potential strategies for implementing IRD activities in ways which support villager response, two mechanisms have been presented -- local organizations and beneficiary participation. Transferring these mechanisms from paper to practice is a function of management.

As noted previously, many past and present efforts to incorporate a participatory element into rural development projects have failed because of such problems as a lack of local interest, poor integration of participatory schemes with income or production objectives and, especially, bureaucratic opposition. These are management concerns requiring the ability to anticipate and deal with a wide variety of contingencies. In the Arusha project in Tanzania, for example, participation is designed into the project; village dialogues are supposed to be a critical element in the formulation and implementation of development initiatives. In actuality, regional and district officials have little use for these bottom-up exercises. Project management is involved in a delicate bargaining game with local officials. In return for a few dispensaries, some boreholes, and road repair activities, the officials allow some village dialogues. But, should these dialogues bear fruit in terms of local assertiveness, they may very well threaten government officials who have their own priorities or those urged on them by higher-ups.

It is virtually impossible to formulate guidelines for dealing with contingencies such as these. What can be done is

to identify potential problems and pitfalls and point to certain approaches which may assist implementers in overcoming these hazards.

### Project Style

Management approaches to project implementation range from what can be termed a "blueprint" style to what, at the other end of the spectrum, becomes a "process" approach. The former is typified by certainty on the part of planners and managers that predetermined technologies and intervention techniques will work in a given local situation. It assumes that solutions to problems are known and that projects are vehicles for the application of these solutions<sup>36/</sup> The process approach, by contrast, assumes considerable uncertainty and is characterized by flexibility and continual openness to redesign and adaptation to changing circumstances. On-the-spot study and solution of problems are relied on rather than remote expertise.<sup>37/</sup>

When proven technologies are to be utilized in a project and when relationships between target groups and outsiders are poor, the blueprint approach has certain advantages for efficient delivery of project goods and services. This approach, however, is unlikely to elicit a high degree of sustainable local response. Process approaches, by contrast, are directed by the needs and circumstances of local populations in their particular environments and are thus less time-bound. By and large they allow for more dialogue with local people and corresponding adjustment of project schedules and administrative routines to local capabilities. Almost by definition, such an approach is more likely to elicit voluntary local response than a blueprint project style. Process approaches are consistent with a sequential pattern of development, in which activities grow in scope and complexity at a

pace with the abilities of local people. They also make major demands on project managers and staff. For example, a radical reorientation of staff activity and attitudes is required to change from servicing elite, progressive farmers to servicing subsistence level farmers. Additionally, process approaches require constant redesign, testing and modification of procedures to broaden local response and adjust to evolving roles and modes of participation.<sup>38/</sup>

David Stanfield provides an example of a particular process strategy for a project area with little social cohesion. He suggests that, in such cases, an intervention should be geared toward an identified social grouping at the outset. This should not be overdone to the point that it generates irrevocable opposition from other groups, but should represent a temporary concession to social realities.<sup>39/</sup> In time, the project strategy can become more inclusive, particularly by including tasks whose completion is important to more than one party but which cannot be accomplished by any party working alone.

#### Local Leadership

Effective leadership at the local level is a critical factor in implementing and sustaining development initiatives.<sup>40/</sup> Uphoff and Esmann found that quite different selection processes can produce leaders who reflect the needs of a local population and are effective at solving rural problems. Their research suggests further that leaders who are drawn from the local community and have strong personal and family ties tend to feel an obligation to serve what is consequently decided upon as the community interest.<sup>41/</sup> There are problems, however, in trying to promote rural development through leaders who meet these standards. They may lack the skills required for certain organizational tasks or may be captive to

local interest groups unsympathetic to development efforts. These potential problems must be weighed against the advantages provided by the traditional "legitimacy" and community support enjoyed by these leaders.

The alternative, at least in the short term, is dependence upon stronger, skilled leadership, not as representative of the poorest elements in the community. Community organizations may benefit significantly from the expertise, influence, energy, and commitment of such leaders, provided they are willing to share decisionmaking.<sup>42/</sup> Indeed, it appears that in most circumstances, even when local groups are formed specifically to serve the interests or defend the rights of the most disadvantaged, effective leadership is most likely to come from those individuals who are relatively more advantaged and closely allied with the local power structure.

In that context, the following proposition gains importance:

- IV-10 If organizations are to contribute to effective participatory development, their leaders must be accountable to a broad constituency, regardless of their group of origin.

Such accountability may be defined by both locally and more centrally determined norms and standards. It will be more effectively enforced if incentives and sanctions are determined and applied not only from above, but also from below. For sanctions to be enforced by constituencies of rural poor, there must be an open management style in which all members have access to community activities and records. Training may also be required to equip persons to review and understand records made available to them for inspection. In one community-based project in Indonesia, a combination of open management and training in bookkeeping gave local villagers the

ability to call to account committee leaders who were siphoning funds from credit cooperatives.43/

However popular in theory, programs that attempt to simply undercut or bypass traditional leadership are not feasible. Either they fail, or outside authority in the form of project agents simply takes the place of the traditional local leaders.

The key is to develop a pattern of shared decisionmaking which is inclusive rather than exclusive. This requires project groups or organizations which encourage joint planning, management, and monitoring of activities. It also implies simple field-level management information systems with reporting procedures that incorporate local participants in the process.

#### Staff Roles

Involvement of rural people in project decisions and activities is partly dependent upon the relationship between project management and lower-level personnel. This relationship has a direct bearing on staff attitudes and performance. Much of the inactivity and low work output of staff can be understood as a rational response to a combination of terms of service, living conditions, working conditions, and supervision. In these circumstances, the potential capabilities of staff lie largely dormant -- a latent, but unrealized, resource.44/ Emea O. Arua outlines a variety of factors in the work climate of project staff which constrain their commitment to project objectives. These include:

- Lack of motivation;
- Lack of vital information;
- Erratic or nonexistent leadership and supervision;

- Inadequate staff welfare system;
- Lack of achievement-oriented assignments;
- Lack of a functional system of rewards and sanctions; and
- Bureaucratic interference.45/

These conditions and their consequences suggest that the lack of qualified staff -- a frequently cited development constraint -- may, instead, reflect failures in the management and use of available personnel. For example, when a work climate is characterized by strict hierarchical control, imposed decisions, and rigid routines, it is difficult to expect lower-level personnel to further constrain themselves by recruiting would-be overseers from among the project clientele. Rather, the desire for some autonomy is more likely to propel staff toward less interaction, not only with the target group but also with their fellow workers.

IV-11 If there is a low level of participation on the part of managers within their own organization, then the level of involvement of client/target groups in development programs administered by those managers is likely to be low since managers tend to adopt a self image consistent with the organizational environment in which they function.46/

An identifying characteristic of a participatory style is its "open" rather than "secretive" nature. Such openness lessens the feelings of conspiracy or manipulation which often accompany covert decision criteria.

This can also be extended to the relationship between staff and beneficiaries:

- IV-12 If project expenditures and management decisions are made public (e.g., posted, published or noted during meetings) then project activities will be viewed with greater credibility by local residents and project-related suspicions will be reduced.

Both of these propositions are supported by the Community-Based Integrated Rural Development (CBIRD) program in Indonesia. Although it is easier to espouse open participatory management than it is to practice it, this program conducted in Aceh demonstrates that it can be done.

Without an appropriate work climate, it is difficult to expect high participation. However, such a climate by itself is often insufficient. It may also be necessary to provide procedures (such as advisory committees) to facilitate the incorporation of beneficiaries into the project decisions. This is so because staff will often avoid conflict by deemphasizing opportunities for client participation when such participation is optional or unstructured. It may thus be necessary to provide some formal mechanisms to involve beneficiaries. Additionally,

- IV-13 If efforts to give beneficiaries a voice in project decisions are timed to take advantage of situations that provide encouragement to those who must yield some control, then the resistance to those efforts will be lowered.

For example, the introduction of periodic evaluations of extension agent performance in the Libmanan/Cabusao IRD Project in the Philippines was made easier by the award of "incentive allowances" to those staff who would be evaluated. In addition to the timing, the evaluation procedure was facilitated by the fact that pay was not tied to evaluation results and that farmers only evaluated 25-33 percent of extension agent performance. 47/

It is necessary to examine the local situation before determining when and how to develop structures and procedures to facilitate staff-client participation. Among the contingencies to be considered are the relationships between the local elite and the project target group:

- IV-14 If systems can be developed so that those local elements in control of the allocation and utilization of project resources are held accountable, then there is less chance that they will preempt the resources and a greater chance for the poor to participate.

Since project staff may be members (or drawn from the families) of the local elite, supervisory behavior toward staff must also be based on an understanding of socio-political dynamics affecting the interactions between staff and clients.48/

Such understanding, however, is not common nor easily developed. Alan Taylor notes that "even if we pay lip service to the idea that authentic development should be self determined, we inevitably interpret what has to be done in the light of our own cultural and educational experiences."49/ Ultimately, most choices on how project resources will be allocated between competing needs are made by project staff. This is likely to be done on the basis of staff members' own cultural preferences.

Adam Herbert suggests a set of managerial skills essential for effective administration in a decentralized project structure that seeks to elicit local response to project activities.50/ These include:

- Ability to operate effectively in a conflict situation;
- Familiarity with group dynamics;

- Ability to work in a setting which may require accountability to several possibly conflicting groups;
- Ability to work in a highly uncertain work situation;
- Ability to communicate effectively up and down in bureaucratic channels;
- Ability to shed the aloof and elitist image that local people often hold of professional administrators; and
- Ability to understand the feelings, demands, frustrations, and hopes of those with whom one works.

Such skills are uncommon in any setting and may, in some cases, violate traditional bureaucratic norms in many project environments. But greater attention to these factors, as opposed to pure technical competency, in the selection and training of project staff is a needed step in overall development program management. By and large,

- IV-15 If a project draws its staff from local talent, provides them with opportunities for personal development, and offers them appropriate rewards and incentives to assure continued involvement in local development, then it will be more effective at promoting local response.

#### METHODS FOR ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESPONSE

The recognition that effective local response to development initiatives is an essential link in the development process must be matched by the identification of acceptable methods for supporting this response. This section reviews factors which seem to be of particular importance to local response

and are susceptible to management control. These factors are discussed in terms of three considerations: felt needs and benefits, the social base, and local leadership and control.<sup>51/</sup>

### Felt Needs And Benefits

Small farmers will not respond positively to development initiatives unless by so doing they obtain tangible, relatively immediate benefits -- as defined from their perspective. Small farmers usually have an excellent idea of what their immediate problems are. It is the responsibility of an IRD project to provide some possible solutions. A related point made by Uphoff is well worth remembering in this context:

The paternalist view equates education with intelligence. Yet if there is anything which is well established scientifically by now, it is that intelligence is unevenly but widely distributed across all classes, races and castes. . . . In a country where 90% of the population lives in the rural sector and 80% are [sic] illiterate, most of the brainpower, most of the intellectual talent of the country must be in the rural sector and among the rural poor . . . This is a hard fact for educated people to grasp fully and to accept emotionally even if we nod our heads in conscious agreement.<sup>52/</sup>

The most reliable way of finding out what the problems and felt needs of potential beneficiaries are is, quite simply, to go and ask them. This is not quite as self-obvious as it seems. Care must be taken to avoid producing a mere wish list. Priorities must be established and consensus reached by soliciting the views of a wide spectrum of the local population: small farmers, women, leaders, progressive farmers, civil servants, store owners, merchants, and so on. Certain constraints must also be taken into consideration:

the government's development policies and priorities; the availability of personnel and resources; and the extent to which these felt needs are an expression of special interest groups rather than of the local population as a whole. A summary of methods for gathering information about local felt needs is presented in Figure 4-2.

In order to establish credibility and achieve effective response, a project should start with small, relatively simple activities which will produce results quickly. For example, small irrigation schemes, provision of focused credit, training programs, and the like. By no stretch of the imagination should a project either attempt or hope to identify all felt needs early in the implementation stage. Rather, it is a question of gathering sufficient information to make decisions, produce relatively simple plans, and implement them. The process approach is based on the assumption that neither designers nor implementers will ever know enough about a project area and its problems. Hence, the project must continue to gather relevant information (either formally or informally) and, as new information is made available, change or modify its activities accordingly.

### Social Base

To the extent possible, projects should try and work with organizations already in place. This may not always be feasible, particularly if the organization in question is not production-oriented or if it is composed of some special interest group which may well discriminate against other community members. This may appear to be the case with the formal organization in the project area but, just because it is authoritarian in structure, does not necessarily imply that it unduly discriminates against the rural poor.

FIGURE 4-2  
LOCAL INFORMATION GATHERING TECHNIQUES FOR RURAL PROJECT PLANNING

	Advantages	Disadvantages
1. Statistical Surveys	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Contact with a broad spectrum of the population</li> <li>● Potential for representative data</li> <li>● Objectivity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Complexity of technique/ time required</li> <li>● External control of data</li> <li>● Training and monitoring demands</li> </ul>
2. Review of Local Documents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Availability and accuracy</li> <li>● Potential for participatory involvement in analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Incompleteness</li> <li>● Limited scope</li> </ul>
3. Observation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Minimal disruption of normal community routine</li> <li>● Low informer bias</li> <li>● Low cost</li> <li>● Possibility of exposing data not anticipated by investigator</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Lack of comprehensiveness or representativeness</li> <li>● Risk of observer bias or misinterpretation</li> </ul>
4. Individual Interviews	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Potential for developing local interest and support</li> <li>● Opportunity for dialogue</li> <li>● Open-endedness</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Informant bias</li> <li>● Constraints on open communication</li> <li>● High cost</li> </ul>
5. Discussion with Community Leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Open-endedness</li> <li>● Cost and time effectiveness</li> <li>● Sample size flexibility</li> <li>● Direct involvement of decision-makers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Possible exclusion of poor</li> <li>● Potential for self-serving response</li> </ul>
6. Special Community Meetings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Facilitation of information transfer</li> <li>● Group refinement of perceptions</li> <li>● Potential for representative involvement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Limited range of perceptions communicated</li> <li>● Dependence on breadth and level of participation</li> <li>● Risk of deference to views of recognized leaders or vocal advocates of special interests</li> </ul>
7. Community Organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Vehicle for 2-way communication between villagers and planners</li> <li>● Link to village leaders</li> <li>● Potential for later project role</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dependence on organization's relevance to the nature of project intervention</li> <li>● Lack of representativeness</li> <li>● Potential for control by elite</li> </ul>
8. Creative Approaches (drama, games, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Opportunity for clarification of preferences and priorities</li> <li>● Lack of dependence on verbal communications</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Lack of contribution to community discussion or broad understanding of the development process</li> <li>● Limited scope and range of communications opportunities</li> </ul>

Source: Jerry Van Sant, Local Needs and the Planning Process for Rural Service Delivery. Mimeographed. Research Triangle Park, N.C.: Research Triangle Institute, May 1980.

In many rural societies functionally specific groupings may emerge for specific activities: maintenance and repair of irrigation systems, construction of a school, or installation of a potable water system. Tendler's study of AID-supported small farmer organizations in Ecuador and Honduras argues strongly for concentrating interventions on small groups oriented towards such specific tasks which satisfy small farmers' most immediate concerns. Rural development projects are urged to take advantage of this underutilized capacity:

Groups that are successful at achieving such an initial goal often go on to a more permanent existence. Or they go on to other things despite the fact that they did not achieve the initial goal, or while they are waiting to do so.53/

In terms of policy, Tendler recommends a sequential approach that is geared to the growth of farmer groups and organizations over time. Overstructuring, in her view, is a pitfall that development projects encounter by emphasizing form over content.

#### Local Leadership and Control

Small farmers need active and committed leaders if they are going to respond effectively to development initiatives. Such persons are generally available in rural communities. Some development strategies place great faith in the single charismatic leader, the Lawrence of Arabia syndrome. However, the evidence indicates that, while charisma adds to the power of local leaders, effective decisionmaking can take place among a broader segment of the local population. In short, a strong leader is a useful but unnecessary component for achieving effective response.54/

Local control is the "operational guts" of any strategy designed to encourage response. It has two facets which are closely intertwined and dependent on each other. If project staff do not feel they have some control over project activities -- in the sense that they have some decisionmaking authority and that their superiors take their ideas and suggestions seriously -- then it is highly unlikely that they will encourage any degree of control by the local population. By the same token, if project beneficiaries do not feel that they have some control not only over their own leaders and the involved project staff but also over project resources, then it is highly unlikely that widespread local support will be forthcoming.

The literature is full of examples of development projects where local control has meant control of project activities by local leaders for their own ends. It is often very difficult and virtually strategic suicide to try and circumvent them since they may well have the influence and power to scuttle any efforts directed primarily towards assisting the rural poor. Under such circumstances, the project must intervene directly -- as mentioned earlier in this chapter. It may be necessary to direct interventions towards specific social groups from the very outset. This, however, should represent only a temporary concession to social realities. In time, the intervention strategy can become more inclusive, particularly as it begins to implement activities whose completion is important to more than one group but which cannot be completed by any one group working alone.

Accountability in many rural development projects works up -- not down, such as when project staff are accountable only to their superiors and not to the people they are supposedly assisting. A frequent refrain is, "The extension agent rarely comes and when he does he has little or nothing to

teach us." Earlier sections of this chapter have suggested why this is a common occurrence -- poor working conditions and a lack of incentives to perform well. Local control over project staff implies the potential for providing some local incentive for better performance.

One example has been given from the Philippines where the introduction of small farmer evaluations of extension agent performance was made easier by the award of incentive allowances to those staff who agreed to participate. This was facilitated by the fact that pay was not tied to evaluation results and that beneficiaries only evaluated a certain proportion of the agent's performance. Another way in which to encourage this control is to organize what may politely be termed "bitch sessions," in which project beneficiaries have an opportunity to express their opinions of project staff -- in their presence. In the best of all possible worlds, potential clients would be able to pay project staff for services rendered. If these services proved mediocre, then clients would take their business elsewhere.

But perhaps the most effective way of stimulating local response is by assuring that project beneficiaries have some control over resources -- not only those that they themselves have provided, but also those provided by the project. With some resources at their disposal, project beneficiaries can act on the decisions that they take. Without resources they can do nothing -- except make a noise, hardly a desirable response in the long-term.

A case study from Nepal illustrates this clearly.<sup>55/</sup> At the district level there are several coordination committees for development activities -- the most important of which are those for public works and agriculture. The former is the

more active and the more impressive -- precisely because it has control over resources. It has a budget of its own, provided by the central government, and the local population decides how this money will be spent. The agriculture committee, on the other hand, has few tangible resources and their allocation is dictated largely by priorities established at the national level. This crucial distinction is not lost on the local populations.

Management strategies to support local response are summarized in Figure 4-3.

#### SUMMARY

This chapter has considered the developmental linkage between project goods and services and local response to those goods and services. Since a serious problem in IRD implementation has been the failure to elicit appropriate responses, improvement is a necessity for future success.

The response problem is usually manifested as either non-adoption of new technologies or noncommitment of rural resources. Information about nonresponse is thus required to signal management that a problem exists.

Common causes of nonresponse include:

- National policies;
- Environmental constraints; and
- Inappropriate initiatives.

FIGURE 4-3

## METHODS TO SUPPORT LOCAL RESPONSE TO PROJECT GOODS AND SERVICES

Management Strategy	Factors to Consider
<p><u>Felt needs and benefits</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Define nature of response intended (target group, intensity of response, channels of response, etc.)</li> <li>2. Specify environmental factors affecting local risk perceptions</li> <li>3. Establish and maintain two-way communication links between project staff and beneficiaries</li> <li>4. Design initial benefit package which is specific, visible, and oriented to particular target group economic needs</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Requires cultural sensitivity</li> <li>● Risks excessive "blueprinting"</li> <li>● Best understood by local personnel</li> <li>● Particularly important in projects directed towards subsistence farmers</li> <li>● Essential for feedback to project staff re beneficiary needs</li> <li>● Keeps beneficiaries informed about project activities</li> <li>● Served by direct contact between staff and villagers (i.e., home visits)</li> <li>● Suggests sequential approach building on relatively simple, tangible components</li> <li>● Reduces risk of misapplication of new technologies</li> </ul>
<p><u>Social base</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Utilize process approach to build local interest and capabilities</li> <li>2. Utilize flexible planning methods</li> <li>3. Draw project staff from local talent with strong cultural identification</li> <li>4. Emphasize capacity-building in local organizations</li> <li>5. Engage in multi-level training for beneficiaries</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Adds to project time and possible cost</li> <li>● Resistance likely from donors or bureaucrats needing quick, measurable results</li> <li>● Suggests joint-planning mechanisms to maximize inputs from different project levels</li> <li>● Adds to project credibility</li> <li>● Improves understanding of local conditions essential for appropriate response</li> <li>● Helps equip organizations to mobilize and lead local response</li> <li>● Supports process approach as organizations mature</li> <li>● Builds competence to participate in project decisions and activities</li> <li>● Develops understanding of broader project objectives</li> </ul>
<p><u>Local leadership and control</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Incorporate participatory staff structures in project organizations</li> <li>2. Utilize open project management style (publish management decisions and financial records; broaden access to project activities)</li> <li>3. Orient project staff toward service to poor farmers</li> <li>4. Utilize simple field-level information systems</li> <li>5. Enlist local leadership/progressive farmers in support of project objectives and activities</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Increases willingness of staff to yield control to beneficiaries</li> <li>● Provides beneficiaries with opportunity and information need to respond effectively to project initiatives</li> <li>● Served by training and capacity-building activities</li> <li>● Influences staff selection and training</li> <li>● Most effective if supported by incentives to encourage appropriate staff priorities</li> <li>● Supported by mechanisms for staff accountability to beneficiaries</li> <li>● Incorporate local people in reporting procedures</li> <li>● Disseminate information in local language and in understandable form</li> <li>● Takes advantage of existing sources of leadership and power</li> <li>● Increases risk of benefit control by elite</li> </ul>

Although some of these causes can be influenced during design, many of them either are beyond the control of design teams or do not surface until implementation is already underway. Consequently, flexibility should be a cornerstone of IRD strategies.

Numerous suggestions have been made for ways to encourage local response. Major approaches include:

- Working through local organizations; and
- Incorporating villagers into project decision-making structures.

Furthermore, management initiatives to improve villager response have been suggested. These include the use of "process" strategies, effective coordination with local leadership, and incentives for supportive staff behavior.

An important point is that nonresponse by villagers is usually very rational behavior. Until this is understood and projects are designed which address the problems defined as significant by rural people, and rural people are reasonably confident that resource commitments and behavior changes will not make them more vulnerable to natural and social forces, there is little chance that IRD efforts will be any more successful than they have been in the past.

Although the strategies which have been discussed are primarily oriented to local requirements for response, they also serve the essential need for broader political support. Organizations and local leadership provide linkages to higher authority. Appropriate project management structures facilitate communication which, in turn, helps to generate bureaucratic support.

Methods for achieving effective response fall into three categories related to the following considerations:

- Felt needs and benefits;
- The social base; and
- Local leadership and control.

A common thread through proven management strategies is flexibility -- the capacity to struggle with local people to continually learn and modify project activities accordingly.

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NOTES:

1/ For example, see William E. Smith, Francis J. Lethem, and Ben A. Thoolen, The Design of Organizations for Rural Development Projects -- A Progress Report, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank Staff Working Papers #375, March 1980., pp. 42-44; David C. Korten, "Community Organization and Rural Development: A Learning Process Approach," Public Administration Review (in press).

2/ "The only problem was that my entire education, everything I had ever been told or had told myself, insisted that the production was never meant to be improvised: I was supposed to have a script, and had mislaid it...By way of comment, I offer only that an attack of vertigo and nausea does not now seem to me an inappropriate response to the summer of 1968." Joan Didion, The White Album, New York: Pocket Books, 1980, pp. 12-15.

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- 31/ Gow and others, op. cit. p. 154.
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49/ Alan J. Taylor, The Intertect Disaster Management Training Package, no. 1, Dallas: Intertect, October 1977, p. 17.

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## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONSIDERING SUSTAINED IMPROVEMENTS IN WELFARE

The ultimate goal of the implementation process is to create self-sustaining improvements in beneficiary well-being. Unfortunately, it is common to find few, if any, benefit-generating activities continuing once foreign assistance has ended.<sup>1</sup> Since the degree of benefit continuance is the "bottom-line" of IRD, such failure proclaims a dire need to develop ways to produce self-sustaining welfare improvements.

This chapter identifies practices for improving the chances that development efforts will have a positive, long-run effect. First, the notion of beneficiary welfare is articulated and defined in the context of IRD. Second, the importance of unintended project effects is noted. Third, an applied approach to improving the sustainability of positive effects is outlined. Finally, improved welfare is related to a view of development as a process of social learning. This elaborates the third linkage in the conceptual framework of IRD implementation and sets the stage for the summary of the state of the art in Chapter Six.

#### THE NOTION OF WELFARE

Welfare, as it is used in this report, does not refer to financial assistance programs that provide support to the unemployed, incapacitated or otherwise disadvantaged. Rather, its use is reflected in such terms as "well-being," "quality of

life," or "authentic development." One ideal, using the latter term, has been posited by Denis Goulet. He wrote:

Authentic development aims at the full realization of human capabilities: men and women become makers of their own histories, personal and societal. They free themselves from every servitude imposed by nature or by oppressive systems, they achieve wisdom in their mastery over nature and over their own wants, they create new webs of solidarity based not on a domination but on reciprocity among themselves, they achieve a rich symbiosis between contemplation and transformation action, between efficiency and free expression. This total concept of development can perhaps best be expressed as the "human ascent" -- the ascent of all men in their integral humanity, including the economic, biological, psychological, social, cultural, ideological, spiritual, mystical, and transcendental dimensions.<sup>2/</sup>

The difficulty of measuring such an all-encompassing definition is readily apparent. Attempts that have been made range from those that focus on the complexities of developing the capability to influence one's own destiny to those that emphasize improvements in a limited number of economic or social variables. There is, however, a growing consensus that measuring material improvements alone is not adequate.<sup>3/</sup> Moreover, self-sustainability requires measurement of dynamic processes, not just static conditions. This section discusses both static and dynamic categories of proxies for determining welfare improvements.

### Measuring Welfare

Macroeconomic variables, such as Gross National Product (GNP), were once seen as legitimate measures of welfare states and levels of economic growth. In the past decade, however, a combination of social equity concerns (demanding a better welfare definition) and a project-by-project approach to development assistance (demanding micro measures of project impact) has prompted a search for more meaningful measures.

Many project-specific and sector-specific indicators have been generated. Examples include:

- Decreased travel times;
- Lowered incidence of particular diseases;
- Reduced infant mortality rates;
- Increased monetary income; and
- Decreased commodity imports.

The usual thrust is to select a set of quantifiable variables which are used as proxies for broader, less quantifiable definitions. Proxies which have been suggested are many, from limited measures of improvements in material well-being, such as income measures, to measures that attempt to capture changes in human and institutional capabilities. The former are nearly always inadequate; the latter are often unwieldy. Notwithstanding potential problems of accurately measuring impact, material proxies capture only limited dimensions of broader welfare concerns. Because of this, unmeasured effects may offset and even outweigh the effects which are measured by the proxies. Under these circumstances, project initiatives with a negative net impact may be continued even though they should be suspended; thus, more complete measures are needed.

An additional problem is that measures of welfare may be time-bound as well as space-bound, making either complete or universal indicators impossible. For example,

Divorce rates as an indicator of family stability may be valid in a country where divorce is a normal concomitant of family break-up but invalid where there are religious or legal sanctions against it.... Infant mortality was a valid indicator of the health of the population when communicable disease was the dominant health problem and life expectancy was low. Today, in

developed countries, it is almost meaningless as a health index since the majority of health problems are non-fatal or are diseases of old age.4/

The situation is further compounded when observer bias is considered. Project-related welfare definitions are often based on the values of western technicians rather than on the perceptions of local populations. As a consequence, evaluation studies may miss important relationships. An attempt to deal with this in one IRD project resulted in the creation of two sets of "prosperity indicators" to be used in selecting project beneficiaries. The first set is based on unobtrusive proxies amenable to measurement by outsiders; the second draws on the values and knowledge of villagers. Both sets are displayed in Figures 5-1 and 5-2. The second set has two advantages: first, it has a higher probability of continuation as a yardstick after external project assistance is withdrawn because it is rooted in a local context; and second, it improves the likelihood that locally-defined social categories will not be overlooked by technical staff.

Although the importance of context in the measurement of welfare is generally acknowledged, some people continue the search for comprehensive, universal and quantifiable proxies. For instance, one attempt to generate culture-free universal welfare indicators resulted in a list of only three macro measures: life expectancy, infant mortality and literacy. There are many difficulties with this list, however, including its blindness to the effects of burgeoning populations.5/

These observations on the importance of context and unmeasured effects become more significant when development efforts follow an "integrated" strategy. Since IRD is targeted at interactions among variables such as agricultural production, health, physical, infrastructure and organizational capability,

FIGURE 5-1  
MEASURES OF PROSPERITY IN RURAL JAVA\*

INDICATOR	PROSPERITY LEVEL		
	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
House	Bamboo	Combination	Brick and Plaster; Teak
Rooms	1-2; small	--	Many; large
Floor	Dirt	Bricks covered with cement; limestone blocks	Polished cement blocks
Roof	Straw; fronds	--	Tiles
Windows	None	Wooden with slats	Wooden frames with glass panels
Bedding	Mats on floor	Bamboo slat bed with mats	Wooden or iron beds with mattresses and mosquito nets
Lighting	Small oil lamps	Hanging kerosene lamps	Home generator
Water Source	Neighbor's well, river; spring	--	Own well
Toilet	Outdoor not enclosed	Outdoor enclosed	Indoor
Transportation	None	Bicycle; draft cart	Motorcycle; scooter; truck; minivan
Entertainment Equipment	None	Radio, Tape recorder	Battery TV
Refreshment served to interviewer	None; tea without sugar	Tea with sugar, other sweet drink	Tea or coffee with sugar plus snacks

\*Source: Adapted from Ann Soetoro, "Prosperity Indicators for Java," Washington, D.C.:  
Development Alternatives, Inc., March 1979.

FIGURE 5-2

A LIST OF POVERTY INDICATORS  
SUGGESED DURING A MEETING AT KECAMATAN WONO SALAM\*

1. A man is poor if he has no land, or if he has to rent out his land.
2. A man is poor if his house costs less than 10,000 rupiah ( $\pm$  \$16) to build and nobody would want to buy it, and if anybody bought the land the house is on they would rather burn the house than use it; an exception is persons who are poor themselves but who have inherited old teak houses.
3. A man is poor if he has to work as a buruh (paid laborer). (A man is rich if he can hire buruh).
- 4.. A man is poor if he has to make handcrafts, i.e., if he cannot live by farming alone.
5. A man is poor if he has to borrow a bicycle when he wants to go someplace.
6. A man is poor if he has to mix his rice with cassava or corn.

\*Source: Ann Soetoro, "Prosperity Indicators for Java," Washington, D.C.: Development Alternatives, Inc., March 1979.

side effects reducing the impact of any one dimension could dampen total effects; or extraordinary effects within one component could throw the rest out of balance. Thus accurate measurement is very important.

In a discussion of field experiences with IRD projects, Sweet and Weisel suggest, but do not limit themselves to, combinations of the following factors for identifying the multiple impact dimensions of IRD:6/

- Increases in income;
- Improved health and nutrition;
- Increased levels of literacy;
- Increases in individual or group capabilities to solve development problems;
- Increases in the capacity for the benefits of development to become self-sustaining; and
- A more equitable distribution of benefits.

There are two notable characteristics in this list. First, narrow, sector-specific objectives are broadened to include the complementary, total-system targets inherent to the concept of IRD. Second, the identification of "problem-solving" and "self-sustaining" effects introduces the dynamic nature of success. That is, true welfare improvements are not just one-time increases; rather, they involve the ability for benefits to continue and grow.

Noticeably missing from this list, however, are any measures of the way rural people perceive what is happening to them. Such perceptions are obviously important, both from utilitarian and ethical perspectives. Unfortunately, attitude surveys often fail to penetrate the "calculated response" shield that villagers

raise for self-protection. Nevertheless, recent work suggests that creative approaches using exercises and games to obtain perceptual data offer some promise in this effort.<sup>7/</sup>

Thus, although progress has been made, even static welfare measurement is not yet a complete art. In addition, there is a perceived need both to incorporate villager views of welfare and to focus on dynamic dimensions, such as the sustainability of benefits.

### Measuring Sustainability

A recent study of development program impact divided benefits into three constituent categories:

- Direct benefits;
- Benefit continuation; and
- Benefit growth.<sup>8/</sup>

The first category deals with the immediate results of project initiatives; the second encompasses self-sustaining benefit flows after project resources are withdrawn; and the third considers the likelihood that project outputs may lead to a diversification of development benefits not specifically within the original scope of the project (e.g., the investment of resources in dairy cattle after a project makes water available to smallholders).

In the attempt to capture broad welfare improvements, this study suggests that effective IRD strategies will require different activities to achieve different welfare goals. This point is illustrated by the following measures for evaluating a smallholder agricultural project:

FIGURE 5-3

## MEASURES OF INCREASED WELFARE

Direct Benefits:	Increased farmer income.
Benefit Continuation:	Increased capability by farmers to manage activities associated with the project.
Benefit Growth:	Increased investment of farmer resources in activities promoted by the project or in new activities consistent with overall project goals.

In this example, desired direct benefits can result from production-specific activities, such as the provision of farm inputs, marketing facilities, etc. However, if benefit continuation is to be realized, an additional set of activities related to improving individual and institutional capabilities must be undertaken. This classification is thus useful for measuring welfare improvements when an IRD strategy is followed.

The discussion above supports the following propositions:

- V-1: If project welfare objectives are defined within the social, cultural and economic environment of the project, then staff activity can be directed toward actions which complement beneficiary values and promote beneficiary well-being.
- V-2: If situationally defined indicators of direct benefits, benefit continuation and benefit growth are used, then the measurement of self-sustainability will be more exact.

It is easy, however, to be lured into this deceptively simple view of welfare promotion. Unfortunately, the real world is not so easily categorized and managed.

### Illustrating Benefit Complexity

Given the various types of benefits that have been proposed, there is a danger that some benefits will be missed, double counted or improperly aggregated. What types of benefits then, are appropriate to measure? The following illustration, dealing with a program to provide increased supplies of potable water, addresses this question.

The benefits from a potable water program could be expected to manifest themselves in two different ways, One way would be the benefits resulting from an increased volume of water, including:

- Time savings resulting from increased availability of water;
- Health benefits resulting from improved physical hygiene;
- Healthier cattle, if the water is used to water cattle; and
- Better crops if the water is used for crops.

Secondly, there also should be health benefits resulting from the improvement in the quality of water. However, if health benefits are not as great as expected, the reason could be that the water is contaminated in transport from the well to the home. This offers two possibilities: either pipe the water into the home (an undertaking that is simply too expensive in some countries), or provide health education that will reduce the water contamination. The latter would seem appropriate, but the absence of cleaning materials such as soap might invalidate the efforts in certain areas.

Additionally, more distant consequences must be considered. The reduced time taken to obtain water will be beneficial for increased income or leisure, improved cattle and crops will result in higher income, improved health will mean people feel better, and have fewer diseases, but improved water quality can also lead to increased fertility and reduced mortality.<sup>9/</sup> Thus, the potential negative effects of increased population growth must also be considered as outcome of the new water supply.


The complexity of project effects is pictured in Figure 5-4. This figure highlights the difficulties involved in accurate welfare measurement and the importance of developing a conceptual scheme for identifying benefits.<sup>10/</sup> Without such a scheme, it is possible that some benefits will be either missed or improperly measured. Even with a "benefit tree," conceptualization of project impact, however, important impact dimensions are likely to escape the techniques and tools of project planners.

#### THE CENTRALITY OF SIDE EFFECTS<sup>11/</sup>

Despite careful planning and expert management, integrated rural development projects may produce many effects neither planned nor foreseen. Unanticipated effects are usually perceived as negative, though unforeseen positive effects may also occur. Unfortunately, some projects are best remembered for their seeming success which turned to failure before everyone's eyes, once the side effects developed.

FIGURE 5-4

BENEFIT TREE FOR NEW POTABLE WATER SOURCE



Such was the case of a rural Indian village<sup>12/</sup> whose inhabitants had adopted a newly designed, relatively smokeless stove. Less eye irritation and fewer respiratory ailments were among the pleasant effects, but soon the villagers noticed that the roofs of their huts, which had usually lasted for three years, began to deteriorate in six months, or less. The smoke, although a nuisance to the inhabitants of the hut, had helped to keep termites under control. The villagers soon turned in their new stoves for old ones. This was neither a matter of love of tradition nor a lack of understanding of the advantages of the new stove. They had simply considered the trade-offs and decided that the disadvantages of accepting the innovation outweighed the advantages. Thus, to continue to use the stove would have meant a decline in welfare from their perspective. Luckily, the damage was easily reversible.

Unanticipated project effects such as this affect the link between local response and beneficiary welfare. The following pages discuss such effects and ways to deal with them.

### Social Sources of Side Effects

Many unanticipated project effects result from social, economic and technological changes that accompany the investment of project funds, delivery of goods and services, and stimulation of responses in a community

Some observers contend that project emphasis on behavioral response evades the real issue of structural change and reinforces false assumptions that welfare deficiencies in project areas are the fault of the people themselves.<sup>13/</sup> In this regard, Donald Emerson argues that:

modernization (partly spontaneous and partly inflicted in the name of an elite ideology of development) is undermining the reciprocity basis of traditional societies and that long-term welfare improvement cannot occur without a revolutionary transformation of class and power relationships.14/

Such a transformation of relations clearly disrupts the traditional order. The established distribution of power and wealth and existent social stratifications have a stability that interventions -- accidentally or intentionally -- upset. Once upset, interventions often do not provide an adequate or timely alternative social organization. This social disruption is a likely source of negative side effects. The only antidote is an awareness of the potential negative side effects, an appreciation of the particular social structures of the project area, and a sensitivity to the inevitable disruptions that are a part of development.

#### Economic Sources of Side Effects

Economic change frequently brings far-reaching effects on human behavior -- effects that may be sufficient to undermine entire systems of belief and practice. Among the Serer of Senegal,15/ for example, the introduction of groundnut cash cropping at the turn of the century was followed by the successive introduction of improvements in credit, marketing, and agricultural methods. This led not only to the allocation of all available land to groundnut production but to significant social changes as well. Where household units in the past had been the domain of headmen, ready cash availability now made it possible for women and other men to challenge or ignore their authority.

The population growth of the Serer continues at a rapid rate. The loss of authority of headmen over such matters as

age at marriage, pregnancy interval, divorce and remarriage, has apparently had profound effects on these determinants of fertility. With a very low rate of out-migration, the Serer are beginning to feel the burden of overpopulation.

Although not yet the case among the Serer whose millet production has kept pace with the population growth, in other societies, similar economic development has decreased food crop production, either through a shrinking of land available for food crops or through a diminution in available labor.

In many underdeveloped countries, the bureaucracy may look at economic activity as a potential source of gain for itself through taxation, sale of various required permits, or partnerships and other privileges in private enterprise for select officials. Such parasitic behavior can turn positive local response to new opportunities into a more inequitable distribution of wealth, or even into a decline in net wealth.

#### Technological Sources of Side Effects

Destruction of delicate ecological balances among natural resources, plants, and animals -- including human beings -- is a generic problem. Sometimes the balance involves disease, as in the case of onchocerciasis (river blindness) in West Africa. Because of the severe complications of onchocerciasis, potentially productive agricultural lands have been abandoned and whole populations displaced.

Since the flies which carry river blindness depend upon highly oxygenated, fast-moving streams for their reproduction, one method of control has been to erect small earthen dams along infested streams in order to retard the reproduction of flies. However, much to the consternation of program implementors, the

slow-moving waters upstream from the dams have provided ideal conditions for the reproduction of schistosomiasis-bearing snails.

Countless examples can be found in the literature describing other applications of technology to biological relationships: insecticides, herbicides, irrigation schemes and alterations of drainage patterns.<sup>16/</sup> The frequent deleterious results yields the proposition:

- V-3: If project technologies alter basic relationships between humans and their environment, then the probability is high that unforeseen long-term social or physical imbalances will be created.

#### Positive Side Effects

As noted earlier, unanticipated effects of rural development approaches may be either negative or positive. A positive result is illustrated by the Polela Health Project among the Zulu of South Africa. This was one of the first models of a comprehensive rural health center to be implemented anywhere in the world.<sup>17/</sup> Beginning in 1940, the project's objectives were the improvement of diet, the control of pulmonary tuberculosis and the control of soil erosion -- all assumed fundamental to health promotion. The work was carried out by interdisciplinary teams emphasizing the integration of health education, community participation, and medical care.

Ultimately, all the original staff of the project left South Africa, though one returned to Polela 25 years later. The health center had disappeared. Many of the African staff were also gone. In that community, however, there were more teachers, nurses, social workers, and service workers of all sorts than in any comparable community in the area. Apparently, what had taken root was a behavioral model of service and not merely a form.

In the same vein, project accomplishments are not necessarily reflected by the services delivered to the population, nor by the responses of the population to innovation. Rather, the true measure of accomplishment may well lie in the numbers of local personnel who are trained and who ultimately return to the community after a project has been dismantled. This increase in the stock of human resources can generate the most lasting contribution to improved welfare. Thus, improving human skills can be one way of promoting positive side effects.

#### Dealing With Side Effects

Conscious strategies to minimize negative consequences and support positive ones have been identified. Among those that have proven most useful is the following proposition:

- V-4: If project strategies allow for change in project initiatives or direction, then they will improve the chances that positive side effects can be built upon, and negative side effects can be minimized, by conscious project adjustments.

This approach, commonly referred to as the "process" approach to project design and implementation, gives management the flexibility to adjust the course of a project as more knowledge is gained about appropriate approaches, and as negative effects appear. One of the integral components of a process approach is an information system which also improves management's ability to cope with side effects.

- V-5: If an information system provides timely management and impact data to project staff and policy-makers, then side effects may be identified early enough to either incorporate them into the strategy or to counteract them.

As discussed in Chapter Three, to effectively design and implement information systems that are both relevant and usable is a difficult -- and infrequently achieved -- task. Nevertheless, early warning systems are critical for project management to detect negative effects and to be able to ascertain the effects of project initiatives.

Another form of early-warning system is provided by beneficiary involvement in project decisionmaking.

- V-6: If beneficiaries participate in project decisions, then side effects may be identified and appropriate reactions may result.

The strengths and pitfalls of local participation are treated elsewhere. Nonetheless, involvement of local residents can help to avoid unwanted effects -- both because participants can pass their knowledge to project staff (and thus assist with management decisions that might be critical to project impact) and because beneficiaries themselves often will make decisions and take actions that will avoid potential problems before they occur.

Three strategies for dealing with side effects, then, are flexible designs, information systems and participation. Unintended consequences, however, are not the only factors inhibiting welfare. Unsustained benefit flows can limit project success to those few years when external resources are provided. Thus, the sustainability issue must also be addressed.

## SUSTAINING IRD BENEFITS

IRD benefits are rarely sustained after foreign assistance ends, yet far too little attention is given to this problem. Donors, host governments and project staff are, more often than not, driven to show immediate "results." The long-run objective of continued improvements in well-being is eclipsed by these shorter-run concerns, with the predictable result that the objective is not realized.

When considering benefit continuation, an initial question must be the definition of what it is that "ought" to be sustained. There is the concern, discussed above, of measuring improvements in welfare; the concern that the project-specific indicators used are, in fact, adequate measures of improved welfare; and the concern that negative factors do not outweigh what might appear to be positive direct results. Our interest is in sustaining positive results. To the extent that benefits do not accrue, there is no justification for encouraging activities aimed at inducing these benefits.

Related to this is the need to make a distinction between benefit continuation and project activity continuation. While these two notions are interrelated, they are distinct concepts. For example, IRD projects are frequently designed to provide a series of input supply and marketing services to farmers, such as the supply of improved seed, fertilizer and credit, and the purchase and marketing of cash crops. Equally as common is the effort to improve the capability of local farmer organizations to perform these functions. To the extent that local organizational capability is developed, these functions no longer need to be performed by the expatriate staff. Continuing project activities to carry out the tasks taken over by local

organizations is no longer of value, and resources should no longer be expended toward that end.

Finally, a note of caution needs to be made concerning project expansion. Cases can be cited where increased resources aimed at expanding project activities to a wider target population are justified on the grounds that expansion will result in improving what had been disappointing results. However, in no instance has this claim been substantiated.

Expansion or continuation of project activities, then, is not automatically desirable. If positive responses are to be sustained, it is individual and organizational capabilities to support those responses that must be present.

#### Organizational Capability

Organizational capability refers to the likelihood that a particular unit can perform a specific task up to a certain standard. For example, could Bank X operate a credit program for poor farmers in a way that disbursed funds quickly and to the right people without losing money from either diversion or non-repayment? The answer reveals the bank's task capability. To provide that answer, a number of factors would be examined. They include:

- History of performance;
- Organizational structure;
- Information flows;
- Physical facilities;
- Quality of personnel;
- Quantity of personnel;
- Legal charter;

- Capitalization;
- Funding sources;
- Communication and travel equipment;
- Scale and type of present operations;
- Operational procedures;
- Degree of control over (or types of relationships with) other organizations that affect the performance of that task; and
- Expected environmental changes that will affect any of the above items.

A similar list of factors can be drawn for any unit within an IRD project. When examining these aspects of an IRD project, discontinued external funding is a major item under the last factor. The amount and nature of the effect of discontinued funds, however, is related to the organizational placement of the project.

#### Organizational Placement

Much has been said about how alternative project placements<sup>18/</sup> affect long-term development. On balance, autonomous project management units (PMU's) offer the poorest prospect. Frequently these units are selected in order to effectively concentrate authority in a project area and facilitate project management. Control of funds and personnel are commonly lodged with project management. Under such an arrangement, the probability is high that during the period when external resources are being provided to the project, goods and services can be delivered. Thus, there are often short-term advantages associated with a PMU.

The disadvantages of this organizational form, however, are well known: there are many cases of projects that receive the needed political and administrative blessing for institutional autonomy only as long as external resources constitute the bulk

of the project funding. When this funding ceases, internal support is not forthcoming and resources to maintain project activities dry up. Because management functions are not institutionalized within ongoing government ministries, or other agencies with some longevity, the PMU and project activities cannot be sustained -- they collapse.

A possible exception to the general rule that autonomous management units are poor prospects for sustaining project benefits is a case in Liberia. The Lofa Country Agricultural Development Project, financed jointly by the World Bank and AID, is organized around such a PMU. It is autonomous of the existing government structure, although that structure is not well developed in rural Liberia. Line ministries have few staff in the field, and services are not adequately provided. The PMU structure provides a prototype model for organizing rural development activities in the future. Whether or not this will happen has not yet been decided. It does, nevertheless, offer one alternative. This suggests the following proposition:

- V-7: If there is not existing service delivery capability in an area, then a project management unit offers the best strategy for establishing the initial capability and providing a focus for future efforts. Moreover, in situations of political instability, the autonomy associated with a PMU structure may provide some protection from rapid policy reversals or reorganizations of line ministries.

The alternative to new units, of course, is placing projects within existing governmental structures. The immediate choices of level and host revolve less around concerns of whether government support will be continued after external resources are withdrawn, and more around issues of coordination and integration of local level activities. These concerns notwithstanding, the problems stated above support the following proposition:

- V-8: If project functions can not be institutionalized within a government structure, there is a low probability that sufficient support, both political and administrative, will be available for the continuation of project activities after external resources are withdrawn.

Current thinking on PMUs tends to focus on their non-sustainability. Although this perspective is largely accurate and certainly commendable, two welfare concerns suggest that self-destructing, non-sustainable project organizations may sometimes be more capable of "protecting" rural welfare than strategies that cannot be stopped:

- V-9: If technologies are highly uncertain and experimental, then it may be preferable to test them using a project management unit where there is less chance of detrimental approaches becoming permanent policies.
- V-10: If permanent government institutions are not sympathetic to the welfare concerns of an intended beneficiary group, then it may be preferable to use temporary Project Management Unit-type project organizations responsible for transferring functional capabilities to beneficiary-oriented groups.

Thus, when the current state of public services, side-effects, sustainability, and the uncertainty of rural development are considered simultaneously, the welfare implications of alternative organizational placement strategies become more complex. Such considerations also suggest that it might be more important to focus on the sequence of project/program strategies rather than merely depicting placement as a one-time choice.

Emphasizing the sequential roles that different organizational forms can play reaffirms the need to build performance

capability either in permanent agencies or in the beneficiary organizations that inherit project functions. This need is discussed below.

#### Performance Capability 19/

Both central governments and international donor agencies have limited resources. In order to secure the greatest impact from the application of these resources, conscious selection of project focus and project area is required. One aspect of selection that determines investment level is the magnitude of the problem being tackled. Another aspect is "absorptive capacity." That is, if an area cannot absorb new resources, they will simply "spill over" and be wasted -- they will not contribute to reducing the problem.

One dimension of absorptive capacity is the ability to spend money quickly. That is, if a provincial budget is increased tenfold but the money just sits in the treasury account, it will not contribute to rural development.

With this example in mind, three alternative ways to deal with absorptive capacity can be identified. The first way is to accept the situation as a constraint and not overtax current capacity. For example, to adjust to a limited spending capacity, added resources can be kept to a low percentage of present expenditures, or new expenditures can be made routine fixed costs (such as salaries) rather than non-routine variable costs (such as funding multiple, sporadic subproject activities), or disbursements can be provided on a one-time only basis (such as the initial capitalization for a cooperative revolving credit fund).

The second way to deal with low absorptive capacity is to raise it -- to employ more treasurers, paymasters, bookkeepers, auditors, etc., and to develop less cumbersome procedures for turning money into rural development activities. Training both new and existing personnel in streamlined procedures is also an aspect of capacity-building.

The third way to develop absorptive capacity is to create a mixed strategy which simultaneously, or sequentially, uses elements of both of the previous approaches.

IRD objectives, however, are not limited to increasing personnel, vehicles or money-spending ability. Self-sustaining welfare improvement requires much more than just raising the stock of administrative resources -- it is also concerned with creating new relationships and behavior patterns between government levels, among local organizations, and within civil servant groups. Furthermore, it is this new behavior by civil servants which is expected to deliver higher levels and new mixes or types of services to rural villagers. After all, it is the improvement in villager welfare that justifies the expenditures to change administrative behavior.20/

V-11: If projects are not specifically designed to build organizational capability, then they are less likely to promote self-sustaining welfare.

Thus, it is necessary to conceptualize ways in which IRD efforts can contribute to improved organizational capability.21/ It should also be recognized that the focus of capacity-building (or institution-building) efforts can be on government bureaucracies, such as line agencies or provincial/regional bodies, or it can be on village-level organizations, such as cooperatives or irrigator associations. In either case, however,

capacity-building requires going beyond simple inventories of human and material stocks -- it also requires an examination of power relationships and incentives for action.

For example, in the context of Indonesia's Provincial Area Development Program (PDP), one desirable practice would be to use objective criteria for selecting subprojects aimed directly at the rural poor. In order to do this, however, it is first necessary to be able to identify the rural poor.

Recognizing this, one product of the technical assistance team has been a set of indicators to be used to identify rural poor target groups. Even so, simply establishing a set of prosperity indicators does not automatically lead to their use. If supervisors discourage staff from using these indicators and, instead, reward them for using other criteria (such as friendships or contributions), then organizational capability will not have been raised. Thus, incentive systems can be expected to play a very prominent role in organizational performance.

- V-12: Capacity-building requires not only an increase in stocks of material and human resources, but also an examination of desirable organizational behavior, as well as the way organizational incentives and procedures do or do not support desirable behavior.
- V-13: Increasing organizational capability for poverty-focused integrated rural development requires the replacement of disincentive systems with rewards for undertaking bottom-up, integrated action to help poor villagers to improve their welfare. Supportive incentives should be reinforced or expanded, whereas disincentives should be discarded or suppressed.

In general terms, capacity-building is improving the ability of people to deal with their own problems. More specifically, capacity itself is the ability to:

- Anticipate and influence change;
- Make informed decisions
- Attract and absorb resources; and
- Manage resources to achieve objectives.22/

To realize these capabilities, people form informal groups and formal organizations. The latter also allow capacity to continue independently of the individuals who constitute the organization at any one period.

The requirements of a capable organization include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Organizational skills, such as the ability to forge effective links with other organizations and to make it possible for local residents to participate in decisionmaking;
- Information for decisionmaking and the ability to utilize those data;
- Staff or a stable membership; and
- Processes for solving problems and implementing decisions.

To enhance self-sustaining capacity-building, IRD projects can focus on strengthening a few beneficiary organizations and then have them act as consultants to other local organizations.23/ Alternatively, the focus can be on providing government institutions or local universities with assistance in attracting new resources.24/

Thus, training people, time-phasing the gradual expansion of IRD project functions and area coverage, and providing initial capital, can support capacity-building efforts. Additionally, a self-conscious examination of both operational procedures and societal incentives are necessary for local performance capability to develop. This includes an assessment of incentives for resource commitment after project completion.

#### Commitment of Resources

External resources typically cover project costs that exceed normal budget levels. For example, a high percentage of local staff costs, more often than not, are assumed by the government -- from local administrative and management staff to field personnel. External assistance generally covers technical assistance, and possibly the portion of local staff that is a net addition to that which is normally budgeted by the government. Likewise, external resources are used for project-related materials and equipment which are an addition to costs normally assumed by a host country. The question critical to sustaining project benefits is whether and how the costs of continuation will be provided after external assistance ceases.

The answer to this question revolves largely around three factors:

- The extent to which the government is committed to the project activities;
- The degree to which the activities have become institutionalized; and
- The extent to which the needed resources are generated at the local level -- whether through local taxes, contributions, or charges for services.

Clearly, these three factors are related. Without the commitment of the government, public sector support will not continue, whether or not the activities are institutionalized. On the other hand, if no institutionalization occurs, continued government support will be less likely.

Local level resource generation is a key indicator of the extent to which local residents have become committed to both project activities and the changes necessary to sustain those activities. It may also become a primary source of resources needed for continuation. For example, if local input supply and marketing organizations become financially self-sufficient, they will be able to continue to provide needed services. Likewise, irrigation systems or local potable water systems must be maintained. Also, if local resources are not generated for that purpose during the project period, the likelihood is high that they will fall into disrepair and disuse after project completion.

Finally, the importance of scale must be noted. Projects which are implemented on a small scale can frequently take advantage of "slack" resources in the system. That is, existing extension and credit staff who are functioning at less than full capacity can be used in expanded project activities -- their numbers need not be increased if their efficiency is improved. As project scale increases, a limit is reached beyond which improved efficiency can no longer take place. Up to this point, concern for sustained resource commitment is minimal; beyond this point, when a commitment must be made for additional finances, the concern is substantially increased. Furthermore, local government reluctance to fund recurrent costs in place of more visible capital investments makes it more likely that small scale efforts will not overtax slack resources.

This perspective may also be applied to project components. Although an integrated effort may be large, if subprojects are small and self-contained, then the most appropriate ones may "take." In sum, then:

- V-14: If local people contribute some of their resources to project activities, those activities are likely to continue after project resources have been exhausted.
- V-15: Small-scale projects, with functions devolve to beneficiary-run groups, will have a high chance of sustainability if:
- projects focus on critical constraints;
  - organizational capability is built into the group; and
  - the group is not vulnerable to antagonistic organizations.
- V-16: If projects have self-contained, small-scale components, then it is likely that some component activities will continue to provide benefits after project termination.

To this point, the discussion has emphasized the difficulty of both identifying and measuring self-sustaining welfare, the centrality of side effects, and the role of organizational capability and resource commitment in sustaining IRD benefit flows. Before summarizing this chapter, the discussion should briefly be broadened to incorporate the idea of development as a process of social learning.

**SOCIAL LEARNING, SUSTAINABILITY AND GROWTH**

The categories of direct benefits, benefit continuation, and benefit growth provide a useful way to introduce the notion that the sustainability of welfare improvements is dependent upon social learning. That is, rural development is ultimately a process of raising the ability of villagers to manage their own lives in ways consistent with their values. This requires an increase in the knowledge and power residing in individuals and institutions.

**Direct Benefits**

To judge the results of an IRD strategy, it is necessary to know whether rural villagers have, in fact, received direct benefits -- have incomes gone up relative to those not having access to project services? Has nutrition improved? Has illiteracy declined?

For these questions to be answered, even in a non-scientific sense, requires some form of information system providing feedback to those responsible for future policy. For example, if higher taxes, or poor post-harvest storage facilities, or bureaucratic ineptitude, have negated the response-to-welfare linkage, then a lack of information about these influences will lead to mistakes being repeated or a decline in response.

Knowledge of direct benefits also has a reverse side -- knowledge of direct burdens. This was noted in the potable water illustration, but the point should be emphasized. For example, in one project, an access road had occupied the former site of a farmer's field, the installation of irrigation facilities had been delayed, a new field had not been cleared, and the

farmer's livelihood was threatened. Knowledge of such factors is extremely important because of the central role of side effects. Unless burdens are somehow signaled, it is not likely that steps will be taken to ameliorate such situations.25/

### Benefit Continuation

Much of the focus on organizational placement is based on conflicting desires for both immediate direct benefits and a benefit stream extending beyond the provision of external resources. PMUs often symbolize the choice for quick visible results, whereas low-profile augmentation of line agency or subnational programs symbolize the choice for benefit continuation. An overemphasis on structural alternatives, however, can miss the simple fact that benefits are continued or discontinued not only based on where people sit, but also based on what people do.

Benefit continuation will eventually be based on improved organizational capability. As previous discussion has shown, this requires activity by government agencies. In situations where other organizations, such as cooperatives, must continue to act, their ability to do so should also be built during implementation. This includes access to resources and an accumulation of knowledge.

Organizational learning during implementation, then, is a likely prerequisite for continued organizational functioning after implementation has ceased; the benefit of direct knowledge (information resources) may raise the chance that other benefits will continue to flow.

### Benefit Growth

The true test of capability lies not in the mastery of the mechanics of a technique but rather in the ability to identify when a technique is not appropriate for the problem at hand and to search for new alternatives. It is this ability to go beyond routine replications to creative responses that is at the heart of benefit growth. It is often exemplified as the difference between "training" and "education." It is also the essence of development.

Benefit growth is obviously something that cannot be programmed. However, if the focus of an IRD project is truly on those most central constraints to rural welfare, then it is more probable that spontaneous initiatives will follow project interventions. If the major social and physical constraints are not addressed, however, it remains unlikely that self-sustaining growth processes will emerge.

Organizationally, this may mean a devolution of power to local levels. Moreover, it may mean the installation of organizational climates supportive of human potential and conscious inquiry. Such terms as "development" or "benefit growth" or "self-sustaining welfare," when, are eventually based on a social learning process, which has been defined as "the creation of an ability of the human being to solve his problems, (and) to discern better pathways to goals, no matter how the environment may change."26/

## SUMMARY

The link between clientele response and self-sustaining welfare is highly uncertain. It is also highly problematic until there are better ways to identify what welfare is. Until it is possible to understand the complex side effects that can result from IRD endeavors, this link will remain tenuous.

In terms of measuring self-sustaining welfare improvements, the state of the art suggests the following:

- Measures must be both material and non-material and they must be grounded in the perceptions of rural villagers as well as incorporating scientific knowledge;
- Welfare measures are time-bound and space-bound and they should be developed within the context of project environments;
- Although attitude surveys are subject to confounding, a combination of the use of unobtrusive indices and information-generating exercises is a high-potential direction for future inquiry; and
- A focus on direct benefits, benefit continuation and benefit growth offers promise.

In terms of managing self-sustaining welfare improvements, the state of the art is less developed. The core of any advance, however, is likely to be related to improvements in:

- Managing participation;
- Identifying organizational capability;
- Devolving performance capability away from government agencies to local organizations in some settings but raising agency capability in other settings;

- Avoiding the institutionalization of harmful programs;
- Designing projects with institution-building activities combined with desolved resource control and semi-autonomous small-scale components; and
- Creating information management processes capable of swiftly signaling negative impact as well as building a data bank on successful experience.

Compared to the other linkages in the implementation process, this is the most uncertain. Although recent initiatives show promise, much more hard thought and experimentation are required.

## NOTES:

1/ Elliott R. Morss, John Hatch, Donald R. Mickelwait, Charles F. Sweet, Strategies for Small Farmer Development, 2 vols., Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976, Chapters 2 and 5.

2/ Denis Goulet, "An Ethical Model for the Study of Values," Harvard Educational Review, 41, May 1971, pp. 206-207.

3/ See Bernard Van Heck, "The Involvement of the Poor in Development Through Rural Organizations," FAO Rural Organizations Action Programme (ROAP), 1977.

4/ Judith Innes de Neufville, "Validating Policy Indicators," Policy Sciences, vol. 10, No. 2/3, 1978, p. 183.

5/ See Morris David Morris, Measuring the Condition of the World's Poor: The Physical Quality of Life Index, New York: Pergamon Press, 1979.

6/ Charles F. Sweet and Peter F. Weisel, "Process Versus Blueprint Models for Designing Rural Development Projects," in International Development Administration: Implementation Analysis for Development Projects, George Honadle and Rudi Klaus, eds., N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1979, p. 133.

7/ See Robert Chambers and Mick Howes, "Rural Development: Whose Knowledge Counts?" IDS Bulletin, vol. 10, No. 2, 1979, for a discussion of Indigenous Technical Knowledge (ITK) and ways of obtaining it.

8/ A. H. Barclay, Jr., and others, The Development Impact of Private Voluntary Organizations: Kenya and Niger, Washington, D. C.: Development Alternatives, Inc., February 1979, p. 13.

9/ For evidence of potentially serious population effects, see Research Triangle Institute and South East Consortium for International Development, "Rural Development Problems and Their Impact on Fertility: State of the Art," report prepared for the United States Agency for International Development, Office of Rural and Administrative Development, May 1979. For a very different view of the desirability of population increases, see Mahmood Mamdani, The Myth of Population Control, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972.

10/ Even this figure, however, is an oversimplification. This is illustrated by attempts to develop dynamic models. See Jay W. Forrester, "Counterintuitive Behavior of Social Systems," in Search for Alternatives: Public Policy and the Study of the Future, Franklin Tugwell, ed., Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1973.

11/ This heading borrows from the title of Chapter Five, "Project Appraisal: The Centrality of Side-Effects," in Albert O. Hirschman, Development Projects Observed, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967, pp. 160-188.

12/ See George Foster, Traditional Societies and Technological Change, 2 ed., New York: Harper and Row, 1973.

13/ This is the "Blame the Victim Syndrome." See Willian Ryan, Blaming the Victim, N. Y.: Pantheon, 1971. Also see Harrell Rodgers, Jr., Poverty Amid Plenty: A Political and Economic Analysis, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

14/ Donald K. Emmerson, "Biting the Helping Hand. Modernization and Violence in an Indonesian Fishing Community." Based on a paper presented to the American Political Science Association, Sept. 2-5, 1975, p. 15. Mimeographed.

15/ J. K. Herzog, "Population Change and Productive Activity Among the Serer of Senegal: Some Hypotheses," prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, Seattle, 1975.

16/ M. Taglir Farvar and John P. Milton. The Careless Technology. Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press, 1972.

17/ Recounted in Benjamin D. Paul, "A Comprehensive Health Program Among South African Zulus," in Health Culture and Community, John Cassel, ed., New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1955, pp. 15-41.

18/ See Chapter Three, especially Figure 3-2.

19/ This section draws on George Honadle, "Managing Institution Building: An Action-Oriented Model Based on the Provincial Area Development Program in Indonesia," Unpublished draft, Development Alternatives, Inc., Washington, D.C., November 1979.

20/ Administrative behavior is what organization members do that results in goods and services being delivered during a given period of time.

21/ It is easy to drown in the many related terms which characterize "capacity" and the literature which surrounds it. In the 1960s there was a focus on organizational capability which emphasized the survival of organizational forms. This was called "institution building." It was formalistic and theoretical. Another approach which is very informal and interpersonal, focusing on individuals and groups is "organization development." Recently, a combination of these

two with organization theory, management procedures and political economy has begun to use "capacity" as a substitute for implementation capability. This use of capacity goes beyond the simple ability to absorb resources. See Anthony Brown, "Technical Assistance to Rural Communities: Stopgap or Capacity Building," Public Administration Review, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1980, pp. 18-23.

22/ Beth Walter Honadle, "A Capacity-Building Framework," paper prepared for the White House Task Force on Capacity-Building, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., April 1980.

23/ See, George Honadle, Thomas Armor, Jerry VanSant and Paul Crawford, Implementing Capacity-Building in Jamaica: Field Experience in Human Resource Development, Washington, D. C.; DAI, 1980.

24/ See George Honadle, Manpower for Rural Development in Malawi: An Integrated Approach to Capacity-Building, Washington: DAI, 1980.

25/ In the case noted above, it was recommended that villagers who must bear the burden of such negative project side effects should receive priority consideration for direct project employment. See George Honadle, "Farmer Organization for Irrigation Water Management: Organization Design and Implementation in Bula and Libmanan," Final Report, Washington, D. C.: Development Alternatives, Inc., 1978.

26/ C. West Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems: Basic Concepts of Systems and Organization. New York: Basic Books, 1971, p. 275.

## CHAPTER SIX

## CONCLUSION

In this report, integrated rural development was defined as the process of combining various development services into a coherent effort to improve the well-being of rural populations. Numerous ways for delivering goods and services, supporting beneficiary response, and promoting self-sustaining development were presented. Organization design and management behavior were further identified as important factors influencing both the implementation process and the resulting modifications in rural environments.

The purpose of this final section is to summarize major points, to emphasize pervasive concerns, and to suggest some implications for program design and support.

## ORGANIZATION DESIGN

Many so-called "management" problems in IRD can be traced to inappropriate organizational arrangements. For example, a coordination strategy which disperses authority among numerous independent agencies and then expects a powerless manager to somehow orchestrate and blend their activities into a well-sequenced and coherent program is a common organization design failing.

Inadequate consideration of the importance of organization also affects beneficiary response to IRD activities and the

sustainability of program-related innovations. When such organizational mechanisms as committee representation, resource control, two-way information flows, check-off procedures and local organizations are designed to support beneficiary participation, then local response is facilitated. However, when formal mechanisms are unspecified, there is a tendency for daily concerns of vehicle maintenance, pay schedules and other short-term issues to dominate the scene. In such situations, the more distant issues of response and sustainability receive less attention.

Given the complexity of most IRD programs and their sensitivity to organization and management, it is imperative that the designers of IRD efforts give organization design a high priority. Moreover, it must be remembered that each program organization must be custom-tailored to the local context. Such factors as local history, local and program technologies, intended beneficiary groups, socio-political systems and the incentives for important actors to cooperate should all be examined during the organization design process. Additionally, organization design must be seen not as a single determination of an optimal strategy, but rather as a sequence of organizational forms adapting to emergent conditions; what begins as a PMU might become a permanent agency attached to a provincial planning body. The scenario, however, should be stated during design while implementation workshops should be used to elaborate or modify the initial idea. Thus there is an important interrelationship between organization design and management behavior.

**MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOR**

In this report, the tradeoffs between alternative organizational arrangements were specified and the present state of knowledge about supervision, information systems, technical assistance, and managing horizontal relations was focused on the problems of IRD. Nevertheless, there is no single guaranteed strategy. Although there is an accumulated body of "traditional wisdom" about management practices, there is also a recognition that competing objectives, organization designs shifting situations and the political economy of IRD environments can complicate any set of prescriptions.

A common weakness, however, is the fact that most IRD project managers have not been trained to manage complex processes. They are usually technicians who must learn supervisory skills on the job. To rectify this situation, human resource development activities should be a major emphasis of IRD projects. Staff training programs and joint staff/beneficiary workshops should be used to build management capability at all levels and to provide action-oriented settings for problem resolution and implementation planning. This can also help observers and implementors to keep in mind that the objective of IRD is not the perpetuation of organizational forms or the placement of physical infrastructure; rather, it is the self-sustaining development of human beings by increasing their ability to exploit new opportunities and to solve their own problems in an environment characterized by uncertainty.

## UNCERTAINTY

A recurrent theme throughout this report has been the relationship between the complexity of IRD project designs, the uncertainty inherent in the implementation process, and the need for a flexible "process" approach to project design and implementation. One way to view this is as a cop-out -- an abdication of responsibility for discovering the optimal strategy, organization and substance for an IRD effort. This view, in effect, is an admission that the state of the art is too rudimentary to give any guidance and therefore all beginnings are equally appropriate as long as it is possible to adjust to the constraints identified during implementation.

An alternative view, however, is that the organizational and administrative state of the art has advanced to a post-mechanistic stage. Although many tradeoffs between alternatives are known, it is also recognized that unless the dynamic nature of implementation processes and socio-political environments is accepted, IRD goals are not likely to be met. In fact, a review of the propositions in this report suggests that much is known and one of the things recognized is the need for flexibility. Another recurrent theme is the critical role of incentives which support efforts that lead toward IRD objectives.

## INCENTIVES

This report supports two general observations about the important role of incentives:

- For project implementation to follow the design, incentives for people to act as intended must be strong-

er than pressures which support competing behavior patterns.

- Leaders often do not emerge because organizations provide disincentives for creative leadership. Thus, selecting personnel is not enough -- incentive systems must support desired staff behavior.

Further problems also develop as a result of differing incentive structures. A key question with any IRD project is its location in the government structure. It is a well-known phenomenon for government bureaucracies to compete for power, control and resources. With the decentralized development emphasis in poverty-focused IRD, this competition between government bureaucracies is often vertical as well as horizontal. Frequently, these issues are not resolved in project agreements, with the result that bureaucratic competition and haggling continue throughout the lifetime of the project.

Since good project design is not something that is rewarded by existing donor incentive structures -- projects are designed for funding approval, and easily anticipated problems are glossed over, resulting in the emergence of problems that have been discussed earlier in this report -- less time is given to the development of internal project incentive structures than is warranted. This results in individual project components pursuing their own ends rather than overall IRD objectives. Thus, a major, pervasive barrier to successful design and implementation is inappropriate incentives.

This has very important implications for the design and management of IRD programs because they tend toward complex interorganizational relationships, complementary inputs, and a multidisciplinary staff with a variety of functions. Therefore the awareness and use of staff incentive systems are likely to be even more crucial for IRD efforts than they are for single purpose rural development programs. Unfortunately, this whole

problem of project incentives is often ignored in project design and management.

#### A FINAL WORD

Numerous issues have been raised in this report, issues as diverse as the scope of integrated rural development itself. But as diverse as these issues might be they all reflect the fact that the environment in which IRD is implemented is highly political on a number of levels. Ultimately IRD works to improve the welfare, and hence the political power, of the rural poor. The means and speed of this transformation concern numerous actors, everyone from the established local elite to the expatriate staff, the line ministries, the host government, and the donor agencies. The result is an environment that is uncertain and politically charged. The only sensible management response to such an environment is one of flexibility tempered with conscious attention to building the capacity for project sustainability. Such an orientation to a politically charged, dynamic environment is the best way to ensure that IRD is indeed made to work.

#### SUMMARY

This report has identified numerous ways in which organization design and management practices can be used to improve the preparation, implementation and impact of IRD. Pervasive concerns include:

- A need to focus on building capacity in particular local contexts rather than emphasizing replicability;
- A need to emphasize developing human resources and managerial skills;
- A need to recognize and deal with the critical role of incentives; and
- A need to accept uncertainty and complexity by using flexible approaches to IRD design and implementation.

It is the complexity and uncertainty noted above which caused a question mark to be placed at the end of the title of this report. Although knowledge of tradeoffs among organization designs and management practices has been collected in these pages, much remains to be studied and analyzed. The only certainty is that efforts to make IRD work must continue to record and analyze when and how it does and when and why it doesn't. Such a self-conscious focus on learning processes, after all, lies at the heart of any improvement in the organization and administration of rural development.

**ANNEX A**

**GLOSSARY OF TERMS**

## ANNEX A

## GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Absorptive Capacity -- The ability to accept and use resources.

Administration -- Getting things done through the manipulation of people and resources.

Administrative Behavior -- What organization members are doing that results in goods and services being delivered during a given period of time.

Administrative Capability -- An estimate based on both administrative stock and administrative behavior which suggests the probability (high, medium, low) that an organization can perform a particular task up to a specific standard.

Administrative Stock -- A static inventory of resources (human, material, etc.) controlled or used by an organization.

Adoption -- To voluntarily take up and use an idea or practice.

Behavioral Outcome -- Administrative behavior which results from a combination of institution-building efforts and environmental dynamics whether or not that behavior is targeted.

Benchmark Survey -- A survey which is done to establish the parameters of a project environment and to place the environment into a static perspective which can later be examined to measure environmental change. This is also known as a baseline survey.

Beneficiaries -- Those people who are expected to improve their welfare as a result of project initiatives.

Benefit Continuation -- A flow of direct benefits extending beyond the withdrawal of project resources.

Benefit Growth -- The generation of benefits not specifically within the original scope of the project but which result from project-related factors, such as smallholder project-provided water leading to investment in dairy cattle.

Blueprint Approach -- A managerial approach to project implementation which is typified by certainty on the part of planners and managers that predetermined technologies and intervention

techniques will work in a given local situation. Implementors assume that solutions to problems are known and that projects are vehicles for the application of these solutions.

Collaboration -- A dynamic situation where two or more individuals participate together in obtaining a goal.

Communication(s) -- The giving or exchanging of information.

Cooperation -- When two or more individuals carry out actions which are complementary in reaching a desired end.

Coordination -- Various efforts to alter or smooth the relationships of continuing, independent elements such as organizations, staffs and resources.

Coordinative Rural Development Strategy -- The process of independent development services working in harmony to improve the well-being of rural populations.

Direct Benefits -- The immediate results of project initiatives which improve welfare, such as raised income, etc.

Folk Management Strategy -- A management strategy that uses tradition-based skills to manage social change. It is the managerial analog of folk music, folklore and folk medicine.

Goal Displacement -- The tendency for means to become ends in and of themselves.

Implementation -- The task of carrying out policies and programs made elsewhere; the process of converting resources into goods and services which support behavioral change in target populations.

Incentive System -- A system of rewards to support desired behavior.

Indicator -- A proxy for a phenomenon.

Informal Reward System -- A network of incentives built upon interpersonal dynamics and recognition rather than organizationally prescribed sanctions or rewards.

Information -- Data which are used for decisionmaking.

Information System -- A set of procedures for providing management with information about project processes and impact - may be formal or informal.

Institution -- An organization staffed by people who were not present at its inception.

Institution-Building -- The conscious application of external resources, over a limited time period, to increase administrative capability.

Institutional Progress -- Institutionalization which supports self-sustaining improvements in the welfare of rural villagers.

Institutionalization -- The continuation of practices (that were introduced as part of an institution-building effort) by people who were not the subjects of the institution-building program after external resources have been withdrawn.

Integration -- Action which brings previously separated and independent functions and organizations (or personnel, or resources, or clientele) into a new, unitary structure.

Integrated Planning -- The exercise of looking at a desired end and coordinating all planned and possible unplanned inputs and variables into a complementary network of future events which will lead to that end.

Integrative Rural Development Strategy -- The process of combining various development services into a single coherent organization to improve the well-being of rural populations.

Interorganizational Climate -- The atmosphere of trust, collegiality, deception or threat which characterizes the relationships among people who work together but represent different organizations.

Line Ministry -- A governmental authority responsible for implementing programs within one sector of activities (e.g., agriculture, education, etc.) and having a minister or other designated cabinet-level official occupying the highest point in the hierarchy.

Local -- A person or object that is indigenous to the geographic site of a project.

Local Leaders -- Those members of the community who, operating formally or informally, are able to influence the attitudes and, eventually, the overt behavior of others.

Managed Information -- That which is relevant for and used to deliver goods and services in ways leading to response and welfare objectives.

Management -- Getting things done through people.

Management Capacity -- The degree to which managerial personnel can get things accomplished through people.

Matrix Organizational Structure -- Overlaying multiple project teams into a traditional hierarchical organization.

Organization -- A social system created for attaining some specific goals through the collective efforts of its members. Its most salient characteristic is its structure, which specifies its operation.

Organization Development -- A management orientation concerned with the course of change in the behavior of organizations, groups, and individuals, aimed at bringing the interpersonal processes that are fundamental to the functioning of any organization into the domain of management.

Organizational Capability -- See Administrative Capability.

Participation -- To have or take part or share with others in some activity, enterprise, etc.

Process Approach -- A managerial orientation to project implementation which assumes considerable uncertainty and is characterized by flexibility and continual openness to redesign and adaptation to changing circumstances. On-the-spot study and solution of problems are relied upon, rather than remote expertise.

Project Management Unit (PMU) -- A project organization that is coterminous with external funding, separate from permanent institutions, relatively autonomous in its control of project resources, and limited with respect to geographic area.

Proposition -- A hypothesized cause and effect relationship.

Replicability -- The potential for duplication in another area by other people.

Self-Reliance/Self-Sufficiency -- The successful use of one's own abilities and reasoning in sustaining an effort or in meeting a goal.

Staff -- Those people receiving a salary or wage from the organization.

Subsistence -- A level of nutritional intake and material wealth at which one can remain alive, but which is limited to mere survival.

Sustainability -- The ability of a project to demonstrate a continued flow of resources leading to goods and services which cause behavioral change and increase welfare.

Sustained Resource Commitment -- A continual flow of inputs to a project in order to maintain IRD benefit flows.

Target Population -- Those who are intended to reap the benefits of a project.

Targeted Administrative Behavior -- Consciously determined behavioral objectives of institution-building efforts.

Teambuilding Activities -- Using the behavioral sciences to forge common understandings and harmony among people whose jobs are interdependent.

Technical Assistance -- Providing people who have specific technical skills (e.g., agronomy, parasitology, civil engineering, economics, public administration, organization development, electronics) to help accomplish project-related tasks.

Technical Assistance (Long-Term) -- Technical assistance personnel who remain on site for over six months.

Technical Assistance (Short-Term) -- Technical assistance personnel whose individual project visits are each less than six months in duration.

Transferability -- The ability of a system of knowledge to be applicable in another situation.

Welfare -- Well-being, quality of life, or authentic development.

**ANNEX B**

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

## ANNEX B

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

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