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**REGIONAL PLANNING AND AREA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND PROGRAMS**

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COMMON ABBREVIATIONS

ADC	Area Development Council (Peru)
BRBDP	Bicol River Basin Development Project (Philippines)
CADU	Chilalo Agriculture Development Unit (Ethiopia)
CONSUPLANE	Regional Planning Office of the Ministry of Planning (Honduras)
CRYZA	Commission for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Affected Zones (Peru)
EGOLCD	Egyptian General Organization for Land Cultivation and Development
IDAs	Integrated Development Areas (Philippines)
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IRP	Integrated Reorganization Plan (Philippines)
NEDA	National Economic and Development Authority (Philippines)
OAS	Organization of American States
ORDEZA	Regional Organization for the Development of the Affected Area (Honduras)
PRODERO	The Western Region Rural Development Project (Honduras)
RDAs	Regional Development Authorities (Philippines)
RPADP	University of Wisconsin Regional Planning and Area Development Project
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
UAO	Urban Administrative Office (Peru)
UDC	Urban Development Commission (Peru)
UFRD	Urban Functions in Rural Development (Philippines)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

OVERVIEW

The University of Wisconsin Regional Planning and Area Development Project (RPADP) sponsored the Regional Planning in Integrated Rural/Area Development Conference in Arusha, Tanzania, March 9-14, 1980. The conference participants have had substantial experience in examining how activities under the broad, evolving rubric of rural development are conceived, designed, specified, approved, implemented, and evaluated. Many of the multilateral donor agencies involved in development assistance were represented, as well as a number of bilateral organizations (see Annex A for the complete roster of participants). Arusha provided an appropriate and stimulating setting for the conference, given the focus of discussion and the Government of Tanzania's strong commitment to a regionalized approach to rural development planning.

Several other conferences on integrated rural development have been held; and there is a vast body of literature and experience concerning rural development, regionalized or decentralized development strategies for planning and administration emphasizing integration, and the "area

"development" mode of development projects. Another addition to this body of knowledge, although possibly valuable, would do little to resolve the question of how development planning at the regional level can be better reconciled with conditions of uncertainty, scarcity, complexity, and inertia. Nor would it contribute to orienting the planning process and method to the mandates of the new development paradigm.

Instead, this report concentrates on the concerns expressed during the conference, and their implications for using a "reduced approach" to regional planning in less developed countries. Specifically, in light of the presentations and discussions at the Arusha conference, and the experiences of the Regional Planning and Area Development Project staff and associated University of Wisconsin faculty members, this paper presents the most recent thinking concerning the use of regional planning as the modus operandi for guiding multisectoral, decentralized development activities. Given the RPADP's applied research orientation and its desire to develop a communications network of interested professionals, this report becomes the next step in facilitating a continuing dialogue. The conference acted as a catalyst for this process of exchanging information, learning, and applying some of the most recent concepts in development planning (although the conference participants indicated that many of the key concepts are not entirely novel). This catalytic function has strongly influenced the design of both the conference and this report.

The report is divided into four chapters. Chapter I discusses the expected advantages as well as the difficulties in operationalizing and institutionalizing a regional planning approach to area development. These opportunities and problems explain the origin and basis for the University of Wisconsin's contract with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and, more specifically, the organization, strategy, and activities of the project.

The advantages of approaching development problems from a regional planning perspective have been postulated by scholars and practitioners and readily accepted by aid donor organizations and host governments. Such advantages include heightened sensitivity to local conditions, incorporation of new perspectives and models of rural development, and the chance to combine the further development of scientific knowledge through research with timely, implementable recommendations for guiding programming and investment decisions. The requirements for such an approach include new planning methods, conditional acceptance and testing of new development hypotheses, new institutions to provide the resources, legitimacy, and authority within which to conduct these activities, and an overall commitment to action in the face of great uncertainties and urgent needs. In order to best take advantage of the many latent opportunities for regional planning, an assessment of recent regional development planning programs is necessary.

Chapter II presents a brief description of each of the project case studies discussed at the Arusha conference. The unique and most interesting aspects of each experience are highlighted to indicate the broad range of issues surrounding development projects operating at a subnational level. These issues include project organization, location, and management; appropriate planning methods and techniques; development definitions and theories incorporated implicitly or explicitly; and the strategies adopted in pursuit of various objectives. The discussion of the case studies indicates both how broad and complex the subjects of rural development and subnational planning are, and the various approaches that have been taken to improve "effectiveness."

Chapter III discusses basic development planning themes that were presented in brief discussion papers at the conference. The presentations were prepared in order to guide the participants' attention from the specifics of individual case studies to the overriding development issues that the RPADP believes must be addressed. These organizing themes include:

- (1) Theoretical Underpinnings of Area Development, which stimulated discussion on using theory and practice from other disciplines in order to understand the context or situation within which planning must operate and to better specify the content of planning proposals.
- (2) Integration of Local and National Level Development Planning, which called attention to the institutional relations of planning--another aspect of the planning process involving external relationships--such as the role planning plays in the state and how that role is played out in resolving conflicting objectives and allocating resources.
- (3) The Reduced Planning Approach and the "sketch planning" variant, which focused discussion on the aspect of the planning process concerned with creating plans, translating goals into policies and policies into implementable projects.

An interpretation of the conference findings is given in the concluding chapter of the report. Discussion of the case studies and the themes outlined in Chapter III suggested the direction in which development planning must continue to move. There is both an ample precedent and a present need for a systematic endeavor aimed at designing, testing, and refining planning strategies and methods to arrive at the desired type of guidance system to direct the nature, rate, and magnitude of change in less developed countries. At the present time, the pursuit and further refinement of a "reduced" planning approach appears most encouraging; this conviction is reflected in the lessons learned, key issues, and future needs suggested by conference participants and listed in Annex D.

The conference in Arusha, and this report which attempts to summarize and highlight the most significant discussions and points of conflict and consensus, reflect and consequently suffer that malady which affects all development work. The lack of integration and synthesis needed to apply the vast and constantly growing body of scientific and non-scientific knowledge to solve complex societal problems continues to loom as an impediment to effective planning. The chasm between theory and practice, and the polarization of individuals through discrete academic disciplines, remain as two of the most potent causes of this pressing problem. If the conference in Arusha did not take a major step toward attacking these pathological agents, then at least it succeeded in isolating them for further treatment in the future.

Miles Toder of the Regional Planning and Area Development Project compiled and wrote this report; editorial assistance was provided by William Bateson, Mari Segall, and Deb Schmidt, also of the RPADP. The report was critiqued by Stephen Born of the University of Wisconsin Urban and Regional Planning Department, and Leo Jakobson, Ved Prakash, and Keshav Sen of the RPADP. Copies of papers presented at the conference are available upon request. We invite and encourage comments from all readers.

I. BACKGROUND

A. REGIONAL PLANNING AND AREA DEVELOPMENT

The current focus on subnational planning is a response to dissatisfaction with experience in national and sectoral planning approaches in conceiving, planning, and implementing development activities for the immediate and sustained benefit of the rural poor. The RPADP employs a regional development orientation in which economic and physical planning perspectives are integrated and implemented within a given political and organizational environment. The objective is to identify and implement projects and programs that, in relation to each other, encourage a more efficient use of local, national, and international resources to stimulate and sustain a process of growth and structural change, for the mutual benefit of both national and local target groups. The

approach reflects some recent historical experience with rural development efforts, current understanding of administrative dynamics, and a recognition of the importance of popular participation in any development activity.

USAID has identified several areas in which regional planning can be expected to be valuable in furthering development objectives. In USAID's Area Development Project Paper (1978), the following points were raised:

- (1) Regional planning can make public investment more sensitive to local conditions and needs by encouraging the development of local governing capacity, and by expanding local participation, responsibilities, and resources (p. 7).
- (2) Integrated regional planning and area development is seen as stimulating new perspectives and models of regional development and planning through offering alternatives to predominantly growth center-oriented models (p. 14).
- (3) The approach is seen as providing opportunities for research and social analysis, improving the understanding of the spatial and ecological aspects of rural/regional development and the host country's capacity to engage in this development strategy, and augmenting the diffusion of specific techniques as a means to direct and influence the development process (p. 19).

Despite the intellectual appeal of the regional planning approach and the attractiveness of decentralized decision making, it is clear there are substantial hurdles in the way of their achievement and institutionalization. Two of the most formidable obstacles are:

- (1) Devolution of planning and decision-making functions to the subnational level poses a challenge to investment allocation that is based heavily on criteria of comparative advantage. Notions of pure economic efficiency must be replaced with a broader concept that accounts for the achievement of other social objectives. This entails identifying these objectives, assessing trade-offs between them, and agreeing in principle and application on investment and allocation activities.
- (2) Subnational planning and decision making require different practices and procedures that could be facilitated by different kinds of institutional arrangements. The focus for assessing benefits must be changed from national/sectoral to regional or geographical. The point in the bureaucratic hierarchy at which certain critical decisions are made must be lowered, and the respective roles and functions of different levels of governance must be redefined to support each other.

What is required, then, is the commitment, will, and ability to deviate quite substantially from previous efforts in guiding the development process.

The irony lies in that the original emphasis on a subnational planning approach rests on the assumption that it represents a feasible and readily implementable development guidance strategy. Recent thinking on development issues is characterized by skepticism toward large-scale, often capital-intensive projects, designed and administered by people out of touch with the region. However, alternative approaches to development problems lack the reassuring quality of demonstrated success and have an output more difficult to visualize, measure, and appreciate--particularly those that do not have clearly defined technologies around which to organize professional capacity and resources (for example, those engaged in institution building). Even though these projects may better serve development objectives, they are admittedly more difficult to design and implement.

There is a gap between what a regional planning and area development approach ought to accomplish and what can be achieved in light of what is. Without a doubt, government commitment to area development projects is a necessary beginning to the establishment of "the cross-functional planning framework to link the micro-level village planning to the macro target setting and planning" (Zaman, p. 23). This in itself, however, may not be sufficient, since such projects require continued and broad commitment and support in terms of national policies and the technical expertise and resources of ministries and agencies. A necessary first step is to establish the coordinating mechanism at the regional level as part of area development projects; but this step alone is far from sufficient.

The integrative task--for which regional planning is supposedly better suited, and which is clearly called for in an area development project--is difficult. A major undertaking involved is to merge the specialized concerns of many agencies, reconciling and balancing the needs, resources, and opportunities of urban and rural areas with the perspectives of economic and social planners, government officials at various geopolitical/administrative levels, designers, decision makers, and administrators charged with implementation in an ex ante rather than ex post time frame.

Despite what can be interpreted as a need for regional planning in area development projects, Jakobson, for instance, has suggested that presently little or no regional planning is occurring that is truly integrative

notwithstanding the fact that many countries have legislated regional planning functions and established agencies to perform these functions. Many national plans recognize the need for regional planning; it is talked about in national ministries and subnational agencies. International bodies advocate regional planning, and academics and professionals profess to teach and practice it (Jakobson, p. 15).

And yet, there are many government officials who daily perform regional planning functions, albeit in a disjointed and atomized fashion. Given these beginnings, there is undoubtedly a need, demand, and, apparently, an opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of the regional planning and area development approach.

The RPADP is developing an operational regional planning strategy. The Arusha conference was organized to begin what is hoped to be a continuous dialogue on this subject.

B. CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION

Case-study projects were selected after a lengthy search. The intent was not to produce a perfectly representative sample from which to deduce the state of the art of regional planning and area development. Rather, the overriding consideration in the choice of case studies was to stimulate discussion on a broad range of subnational planning issues--not in the abstract, but grounded in empirical experience and evidence.

To achieve this purpose, a variety of projects operating in different geographical regions under the sponsorship of various donor agencies were selected. From each project, two individuals with first-hand familiarity of the project were invited to be discussants--one from the host government, the other representing the donor agency. Thus, each project was presented and discussed from two different perspectives.

The projects selected for presentation and discussion were:

- (1) Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit/Arussi Rural Development Unit, Ethiopia, sponsored by the Swedish International Development Agency
- (2) Central Lakeshore Development Project, Malawi, sponsored by the German Agency for International Cooperation
- (3) Bicol River Basin-Urban Functions in Rural Development, Philippines, sponsored by the USAID Urban Development Office
- (4) Saemaul Undong, Republic of South Korea, sponsored by the Government of South Korea
- (5) Nile Resettlement and Desert Reclamation, Egypt, sponsored by the United Nations Special Fund and the Government of Egypt
- (6) Western Region Rural Development Project (PRODERO), Honduras, sponsored by the Organization of American States
- (7) Planning for Reconstruction and Development of Chimbote, Peru, sponsored by various donor agencies

In addition to these projects, the Development Alternatives, Inc., staff gave a detailed presentation of the Arusha Planning and Village Development Project, which is under USAID sponsorship and is headquartered in Arusha, Tanzania, the site of the conference.

Three dominant themes were placed on the conference agenda to provide a framework for the iteration of the specific issues raised by case studies and the theoretical and conceptual concerns associated with the planning function. The structured agenda and the selection of conference participants were crucial to achieving the conference goals. To facilitate the exchange of views between those primarily educated and experienced in planning vis-à-vis those trained in a regional development context, conference participants were selected to ensure representatives from both perspectives. Participants were selected who had experience either with planning issues in regional development or the converse--regional development issues as examined from a planning perspective (see Annex A for a list of participants). Organization of individual sessions, including selection of chairpersons, rapporteurs, and discussants, as well as the programming of particular sessions, was undertaken to promote discussion and disciplinary interaction among participants (see Annex B for the detailed program).

II. CASE STUDY SUMMARIES: AN OVERVIEW OF EXPERIENCES WITH AREA DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

A. CHILALO AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT UNIT/ARUSSI RURAL DEVELOPMENT UNIT--ETHIOPIA*

In the mid-1970s, Sweden set the objective of providing one percent of its gross national produce (GNP) annually for development assistance to low-income countries. An element of the strategy was to work on agricultural development as a means of generating substantial improvement in the welfare of the poor in low-income countries. A Swedish team visited eastern Africa in 1965. Interest in this region stemmed from the Swedish personnel's familiarity with the cereals cultivated in the highland areas, which led them to believe that a rapid and effective improvement in agricultural technologies was possible.

* Discussants: Gebremeskel Dessalegn, Chilalo Project, and Mikael Ståhl, Swedish International Development Agency

The Swedes chose an integrated technical package to try to meet a wide spectrum of the needs of the poorest segments of the rural population. Five criteria were used in selecting a project area:

- (1) Good potential for intensive production (using nonexotic plant material)
- (2) Good communication with Addis Ababa, the capital city
- (3) The project area should be part of a larger region so that experiences could be replicated outside the project area
- (4) Peasants must own land
- (5) Peasants must be willing to accept change

The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) consultants reported that the criteria were met at Chilalo, although they expressed reservations concerning land tenure arrangements. The Chilalo region is relatively prosperous compared to areas of northern Ethiopia. The motivation for concentrating efforts in Chilalo was that the Ethiopian government and SIDA wanted rapid results, which were thought to be unattainable in the north.

The primary project goal was social and economic development for farmers in the lower income brackets. This was to be achieved primarily by creating better markets through which farmers could sell produce. A secondary goal was to establish and strengthen cooperatives to take over the marketing function and other project functions.

The interventions designed in the 1960s constituted one of the first integrated packages in Ethiopia. Elements of the package included:

- (1) Research on crop varieties and agronomy
- (2) Extension services
- (3) Provision of fertilizer and seed inputs
- (4) Credit to purchase inputs
- (5) Establishment of marketing institutions to purchase wheat at an incentive price (above local market)
- (6) Rural access roads

This extensive package of services developed as it became clear that a "minimum" (less comprehensive) agricultural package was insufficient.

The achievements of the first phase (through 1974) were significant. The credit program was highly successful. The number of farmers using credit to buy fertilizer increased from 190 to 25,000 (50 percent of the Chilalo farm units). Fertilizer doubled yields on demonstration plots. Prices paid by the project for farm products were higher than those paid by local merchants. Wheat from Chilalo was sold in the Addis Ababa market (200 km. distant). Rapid growth in farm incomes also characterized the period. Research was done on seed and animal draught-power technology. In 1971, a minimum package of in-kind credit (fertilizer) was disseminated outside the Chilalo region; this has been suggested as an endorsement of the program's approach to increasing farm production.

In the first five years of the Chilalo project, large landholders absorbed 40 percent of the available credit. Those large landholders owning 3-10 hectares accounted for the largest share of available credit. The scheme did not give credit to tenants unless the tenure agreement was acceptable to the Chilalo Agriculture Development Unit (CADU). A down payment of 25 percent on inputs effectively excluded the poorest farmers from access to credit.

In several other respects the project did not meet its intended goals. Cooperatives were dominated by landlords and prosperous farmers. A significant problem was identified in 1969 when landlords were observed to purchase farm equipment and evict existing tenants. In some parts, 20 percent of the population was evicted. Loans from the Ministry of Agriculture also assisted landlords' procurement of farm machinery. Project managers aware of these trends took the following actions:

- (1) CADU stopped giving credit to landlords with more than 20 hectares in 1969. This stopped landlords from getting locally available credit, but they could get credit for large-scale mechanization and inputs from the Ministry of Agriculture and banks.
- (2) CADU stopped giving tractor service in 1969.
- (3) CADU drafted model leases to protect tenants.
- (4) SIDA lobbied for legislation to protect tenants and allow them to remain on the land.

By 1974, the management of CADU had been turned over to the Ethiopians. In Sweden, the debate over continued support for CADU focused on the failures of the integrated project to address distributional issues. SIDA subsequently threatened to withdraw agricultural aid if the Government of Ethiopia did not provide the support needed to protect tenants within the project area. When such governmental action was not forthcoming, SIDA withdrew its support.

The Government of Ethiopia, through the Ministry of Agriculture, began in 1975 to expand the project to encompass a larger region. Perhaps the single most radical change to affect the project was the land reform that followed the revolution of 1974-75.

In 1975, the government declared that it would no longer enforce tenants' traditional payments to landholders. Within a year, evicted tenants had returned to their land, taking over the property of their former landlords. This breakdown in the feudal agricultural system resulted in several interesting phenomena. Cultivated area increased; simultaneously, the quantity of surplus agricultural commodities marketed in Addis Ababa declined. Peasants began to consume a large part of the production that previously had been regarded and extracted

as surplus. Another of the consequences of the revolution was the elimination of landlords' opposition to popular organizations and cooperatives.

At present, a semiautonomous unit within the Ministry of Agriculture manages the project. The technical components have not changed from their original design, although the area covered has doubled. In addition, new programs have been introduced to increase employment and provide social services.

Conference participants emphasized the following aspects of the Chilalo project:

- (1) Donor agencies should have expertise in the technologies and production processes which are under consideration for use in development assistance efforts.
- (2) Selection criteria for a regional or area focus should take into account the level of communication; the degree of homogeneity of the area; the existence, or nonexistence, of a progressive land tenure system consistent with income distribution goals; and the degree to which the population is receptive to change.
- (3) The national and local political and economic environment is critical to the design, implementation, and management of an area development project. This environment has two aspects: the minimum conditions necessary before a decision is made to undertake such an effort, and the changes that occur in the project's external environment and the appropriate response on the part of project management and sponsors.
- (4) There is a need for continued attention to distributional issues in relation to the introduction of new technologies and institutions. Flexibility in design and management of the project was suggested, particularly because of the unanticipated impact of change.
- (5) The value of an integrated package approach to agricultural production problems was recognized. It was further recognized that technical solutions alone were insufficient to address the needs of the rural poor.
- (6) The success of the project and attendant improvement in individual farmer well-being may pose problems for the towns that no longer obtain sufficient food from the region.
- (7) Area development projects require the cooperation and support of ministries and line agencies. Without this support, policies and programs may--and frequently do--operate at

cross-purposes. This lack of cooperation is indicative of fundamental conflict between development approaches and objectives at different levels.

B. CENTRAL LAKESHORE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT--MALAWI*

In November 1967, the Government of the Republic of Malawi, with the assistance of the Federal Republic of Germany, undertook an agricultural and regional development project in the central lakeshore region of Malawi. The project was administered by a division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and was connected with the Ministry of Youth and Culture and the Ministry of Public Works.

Malawi's economy is highly dependent on agriculture. Over 90 percent of the population lives in rural areas and engages in smallholder farming. Given the importance of the agricultural sector to Malawi's economy, the integrated development program was designed to meet several objectives:

- (1) To increase farm production, with particular emphasis on cotton, groundnuts, rice, maize, and beef in order to improve family income and the living standard of the rural population
- (2) To improve Malawi's economic position by increasing foreign exchange earnings or by import substitution
- (3) To utilize fully the human, ecological, and economic resources of the region
- (4) To provide equal opportunities for every farming family
- (5) To establish a settlement pattern appropriate to the resource endowment of the region
- (6) To institutionalize the capacity to replicate similar activities elsewhere in the country

The project was financed from several sources:

- (1) The Malawi Government was to meet recurrent expenditures and operating expenses, and to maintain infrastructural investments.
- (2) A German loan for Phase I (1968-72) was to meet the costs of extension buildings, infrastructural investments, bush clearing, cultivation assistance, credit, and livestock development.

* Discussant: Arnold Von Rümker, German Agency for Technical Cooperation

- (3) A German grant-in-aid for Phase I and Phase II (1972-77) was in the form of sales of German farm inputs. The proceeds contributed to financing the costs of a farm training institute, a pilot irrigation scheme, extension aids, and livestock development.
- (4) German technical assistance for Phase I and Phase II was to meet capital and recurrent costs for 20 German staff members.
- (5) A contribution from German churches to the Christian Services Council of Malawi was to meet the expenses for the establishment of health facilities.

Approximately 200,000 people live in the lakeshore region, the majority belonging to the Chewa ethnic group. Currently, some 49,000 families cultivate 58,000 hectares as smallholders under customary land tenure arrangements. The remaining land is forest, bush, or seasonal marshland used as pasture. The major crops are maize, cotton, groundnuts, and rice, with cotton being the most important cash crop. Livestock development is gaining in importance.

The land tenure system is based on the traditional practice of tribal chiefs giving tenants permission to farm land. Land itself poses no obvious constraint to development, since the region has surplus land relative to population. However, the fact that cultivators own land only in usufruct creates disincentives to improve land and engage in conservation-oriented farming practices.

The major components of the project were:

- (1) Infrastructure. The project provided for improving the conditions of smallholder agriculture. Feeder roads were built to increase access to extension areas and markets, and 240 boreholes were drilled in potential cotton-growing areas. Funds were allocated to the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation to improve the marketing of major crops, and to guarantee more efficient distribution of farm inputs to farmers at 38 markets. Provisions were also made to build storage facilities and a groundnut shelling plant.
- (2) Agricultural Measures. One hundred to 150 Malawian advisors were trained and then worked in the field to help farmers increase production by improving their farming methods. Significant improvements were recorded during the past decade in the quality of extension services provided for cotton and groundnut farmers, the quality of transport within the project area, and soil fertility. Water control measures, work oxen, mechanical cultivation assistance, and credit facilities were also introduced to the area.

- (3) Credit and Marketing. Since the majority of farmers were subsistence and low-income, cash-crop farmers, they required assistance in purchasing basic inputs necessary for increased production. Seasonal loans were issued for purchasing insecticides and fertilizers, and to provide assistance to clear the land. Medium-term loans were issued to buy 700 pairs of work oxen, farm implements, carts, and equipment. Improved extension services, and programs for credit and input supply, resulted in:
- a 226 percent increase in cotton production
 - a 304 percent increase in groundnut production
 - a 1,481 percent increase in rice production
 - a large surplus in maize production
 - a 110 percent increase in farm incomes
- (4) Farm Management and Mechanization. Improved labor productivity was identified as an important component of the agricultural development of the region. To improve labor productivity, the project demonstrated efficient land management, improved crop and animal husbandry practices, and trained farmers in the use of work oxen. The Farm Mechanization Unit, consisting of eight tractors, was established to assist farmers in preparing their land, which is the texture of heavy clay and difficult to cultivate by hand. The unit was established to operate as a nonprofit enterprise, providing its services to farmers through seasonal loans. Tractor services helped boost production by 1,481 percent for 3,600 rice farmers.
- (5) Livestock Development. Farmers were supplied with improved breeding stock to promote beef production and to produce larger-framed draught oxen. The project also provided for the use and management of underutilized grazing areas in the lakeshore lowlands.
- (6) Rice Research and Seed Multiplication Program. A fully mechanized Rice Pilot Scheme was begun on 40 hectares of irrigated land. This program's objectives included the testing, introduction, and evaluation of new varieties of rice for export, and an investigation of the economics of smallholder production under rainfed and irrigated conditions.
- (7) Other Components. The project established a farmer training institute and a rural trade school. Community development services were introduced and health facilities were improved.

In spite of the significant achievements in output, the project experienced a number of difficulties. The government's eagerness to implement the project clashed with the pace at which researchers were able to collect and analyze data on regional conditions and potential opportunities. In particular, the government reacted negatively to pilot schemes designed to permit the collection and analysis of critical information.

The fact that the government favored concentration of new investment and improvements in new areas, as opposed to already settled areas, complicated the development of specific projects and programs.

The German technical assistance effort was further troubled by difficulties in establishing a working relationship with the Government of Malawi to engage in on-the-job training and institution building. Initially, a great deal of emphasis was to be placed on working with Malawian counterparts. However, the Government of Malawi expressed a preference for the Germans to work by themselves. The effect of this decision was that the German advisors played the role of coordinating the work of the various ministries included in the central lakeshore region. To facilitate transition of the project back to the normal channels of government operation and Malawian staffing, efforts were made to give maintenance and follow-up responsibilities to the various ministries.

Conference participants discussed the following issues raised by the Central Lakeshore Development Project:

- (1) Can expatriates be more effective in coordinating the activities of ministries and line agencies in a region than indigenous project managers at the subnational level? Is such a role appropriate?
- (2) Although not extensively discussed, the implications of using male vs. female extension agents for various activities were raised.
- (3) The Malawi project pointed out the need to accommodate regional heterogeneity in the participatory aspect of project design.
- (4) A less-than-optimal land tenure system and the continued dominance of a local elite were seen as conditions that the project could not change in the short run.
- (5) The problem of conflicts between the host country's desire for project implementation and demonstrable development achievements vs. the need to establish base-line observations and to gather knowledge from pilot schemes was discussed but not resolved.
- (6) Difficulties and uncertainties encountered in locating public investment in unsettled areas may have posed a significant constraint on the area development effort. However, the lack of encumbrances caused by existing physical development may be beneficial in project conceptualization and design.

C. BICOL RIVER BASIN-URBAN FUNCTIONS IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT--PHILIPPINES*

In the early 1970s, the Philippines government adopted a national development strategy which placed emphasis on regional growth and development patterns. A presidential decree in September 1972 defined the government's Integrated Reorganization Plan (IRP). The IRP included a strategy for decentralizing the national administrative system initially into ten regions. Regional centers were designated as the common location of national offices in the regions. The IRP expressly provided for integrated development planning to be implemented by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). Two conflicting and duplicating national offices, the National Economic Council and the Presidential Economic Staff, were abolished.

Delineation of regions was based on the following criteria:

- (1) Geographical features, such as mountain ranges, river basins, plains, bodies of water, etc.
- (2) Transportation and communication facilities
- (3) Cultural and ethnic factors
- (4) Land area and population
- (5) Planning, administrative, and political factors

Regional centers were designated on the basis of accessibility to all provinces within the region, social and economic infrastructure, and the potential for economic, administrative, and political growth.

Despite a national policy commitment to regionalization as a development strategy, serious problems have emerged in implementation. Some of these are:

- (1) Failure of some departments and their bureaus to devolve functions to the regions as prescribed by the IRP
- (2) Inability of the region to recruit and/or attract people with the needed expertise
- (3) Indiscriminate regionalization of certain offices not belonging to the category of agencies recommended by the IRP
- (4) Lack of common regional centers for regional offices and inadequate facilities due to lack of funds

* Discussant: Emanuel Astillero, Bicol River Basin Project

- (5) Inadequate authority of the regional development councils over regional offices, local governments, and subregional or supraregional development bodies

Parallel to the regionalization program were subregional efforts focused on infrastructure and economic projects in specific areas. Three forms of subregional development activities evolved in the Philippines: the Regional Development Authorities (RDAs), corporate bodies created by legislation and funded by appropriations; the Integrated Development Areas (IDAs) or areal programs, initiated by national ministries either alone or in combination with other ministries; and the River Basin Councils, in which several ministries worked together within a river basin area with agricultural potential.

In all three approaches, the strategy was to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the area and to develop integrated area plans. Among these approaches, the river basin model appears to have succeeded, since this has been adopted in four well-funded pilot areas (Bicol, Samar, Mindoro, and Cagayan). The RDAs seem to have been least successful.

The Bicol River Basin is a prime agricultural area--a fertile basin of about 300,000 hectares formed by a 150-kilometer river and ringed by low hills and seven extinct volcanoes. Of the 1.7 million people inhabiting the area in 1975, most were tenant farmers targeted to be recipients of agrarian reform certificates of land transfer; many others were expected to benefit as leaseholders. In addition to its high agricultural potential, another reason for selecting the Bicol River Basin was its agrarian problems.

The objectives of the Bicol River Basin Development Project (BRBDP) were stated in economic terms and focused mainly on agricultural development. It was estimated that enough rice could be produced in the region to feed an additional 8 million people by the year 2000, even if only 83 percent of potential rice yields were achieved. Basin planners wanted to approximate the national average of per capita income, which at the time was 2.5 times that of the basin area. The planners projected a reduction in the unemployment rate from 8 to 6 percent.

The planners also took into account that:

- (1) Flood control must first be instituted to minimize uncontrolled flooding of 40,000 hectares in the 65,000-hectare flood plain.
- (2) Water must be supplied to the 84,000 hectares of irrigable rice land, of which only 55 percent is presently irrigated.
- (3) Road density must be increased at least three times from the present proportion of 0.3 km. per square kilometer of arable land.

- (4) Potable water must be supplied to more than the 24 percent of the population which currently receives it, thereby decreasing the morbidity and mortality rates caused by gastroenteritis and waterborne diseases.
- (5) The denuded watershed must be reforested at a rate that will reverse the slash-and-burn effects of upland agriculture.
- (6) Agricultural extension and farmer training and organization must raise farmer competence from traditional to more modern, productive levels.
- (7) Farm mechanization must increase to reduce losses in post-harvest operations; and health, nutrition, education, and family planning must complement physical and agricultural infrastructure. BRBDP's areal programs have subdivided the basin into 13 IDAs, each targeted for a package of mutually reinforcing project components of irrigation, drainage, flood control, potable water, roads, agricultural extension, and farmer training and organization. An Area Development Council (ADC), composed of local political and civic leaders and government technicians, was formed as the subbasin BRBDP counterpart in integrated planning and implementation. The ADC was the prime vehicle for government-private organization partnership.

From its inception, the BRBDP was an interagency program. The first "framework plan" produced in 1973 was the result of combined works by the University of the Philippines, several national ministries (notably the Ministry of Public Works-Planning and the Project Development Office), USAID, and a private consulting firm. This plan, called the "blue book," became the basis for an executive order that established a council consisting of six key ministries and the governor of Bicol province. Planning expertise was to be located at the site of program activities. This contrasted with the tradition that planning be done only at the central offices of ministries. Thus, the development of local planning expertise became a major institutional component. The initial years were characterized by local planners living and working in Bicol and producing plans acceptable to national and international funding agencies.

While it is too early to make an assessment of the BRBDP experience, some significant lessons for the planning and implementation of integrated area development approaches have emerged. The most important obstacle to areal programs was coordination among national ministries, and between the ministries and area institutions (provinces, cities, municipalities, villages). The outlooks and priorities of these bodies were frequently inconsistent with each other. BRBDP, however, has demonstrated that coordination can be achieved despite these obstacles. In addition, BRBDP has been able to attract both public and private investment.

Another lesson learned is the importance of developing and nurturing local expertise in planning and implementation. BRBDP demonstrated that, through careful personnel management, local talent that had migrated to Manila could be lured back to work in the rural areas. It was necessary for planning personnel, once recruited, to be provided with the technical training needed to perform their respective functions. It is in this area that local universities played a major role. The training component, handled by the Ateneo de Naga (the local branch of a private university) in the field of social planning, and by the University of the Philippines in agricultural planning, provided the necessary support and access to information, ideas, experience, and expertise.

A supplementary research project, Urban Functions in Rural Development (UFRD), pointed out the need to include spatial analysis and location planning, or urban services supportive of rural development, in integrated area development schemes. In the Philippines, government planners have viewed IDA projects as not much different from sectoral physical infrastructure projects--the significant difference being that they were consolidated into one project package. Spatial analysis suggested that rural development planning must go beyond this, to examine market mechanisms and inquire into patterns of spatial groupings to determine the strategic location of services that will reinforce groups of settlements rather than single settlements. Spatial analysis also provided some insights into functional relationships among government interventions which helped evaluate the adequacy of such interventions. Finally, UFRD identified the need to plan in order to avoid problems in farm-delivery systems by providing efficient rural markets with storage and processing facilities.

The specific findings and related achievements of The Urban Functions in Rural Development Project included the following:

- (1) Clustering of settlements. Efforts in integrated area development planning in the Philippines in the recent past have appeared incompatible with the requirement that each province, city, municipality, and village should make its own development plan. No planning tool was found to provide a firm basis for grouping these areal subdivisions. UFRD research in BRBDP generated simple methods for mapping variables in space to identify related clusters of economic activities. The centers of these clusters were easily identified. Thus, a single plan, rather than individual municipal development plans, was formulated to integrate a group of adjacent and spatially related municipalities.
- (2) Patterns of dependencies. UFRD identified forms of spatial dependencies which acted as constraints on development of rural areas. These constraints were characterized by the primacy of one or two centers and the absence of lower level, intermediate rural service centers. For instance, market dependency on the primate centers meant that rural people located at increasing

distances from these centers were disadvantaged due to costs and time of transport. Productivity tended to fall in direct proportion to distance from market centers. Conversely, those families located near centers enjoyed clear and immediate social, economic, and political advantages such as government inputs.

These undesirable spatial patterns prevented less accessible rural areas from achieving higher levels of development. They also discouraged the surplus agricultural production necessary to generate cash income. Government attempts to provide services and infrastructure directly in order to correct deficiencies resulting from such an undesirable spatial pattern appear in many cases to have overcompensated, with equally undesirable effects. This situation accounts for rural people viewing government facilities--e.g., irrigation--as necessarily operated and maintained by the government, whereas farmers, with some training and organization, could manage these facilities themselves, as proven in other areas of the Philippines.

- (3) Internal development. The UFRD study found that existing linkage patterns discouraged interaction within the area. Instead, the improved transportation and communication links to Manila encouraged direct interaction with the capital. The study found the development of growth centers other than Manila to be encouraging. The study noted that development of growth centers within the Bicol basin would be desirable.

The following significant aspects of the Bicol River Basin Project were discussed by conference participants:

- (1) There was an observable tendency on the part of the government to locate services in areas where coordination was most possible rather than in areas where they might yield the greatest benefits.
- (2) The BRBDP, although initially designed without the input of its intended beneficiaries, demonstrated the usefulness of popular participation in the final planning and implementation of development projects.
- (3) In any development activity, it is conceivable that benefits will fail to flow to the target groups because of the nature of preexisting asset distribution, and that asset distribution may become more skewed because of the development activities. The BRBDP included a land reform component intended to improve the distribution of development benefits.
- (4) It was recognized that, although equity questions are important, agricultural productivity growth is fundamental to the sustained development of most rural regions.

- (5) The benefits of simplified techniques in understanding spatial relationships in planning were illustrated in the Bicol project.
- (6) It is important to focus on a level between the regional and local levels for the purpose of analysis planning.
- (7) The value of planning to benefit the poorest elements of the community in the context of the entire community and of considering the needs of nontarget groups was recognized.

D. SAEMAUL UNDONG--REPUBLIC OF SOUTH KOREA*

Saemaul Undong is a national modernization movement, begun in 1971, based principally on the support and participation of the intended beneficiaries. The objective has been to develop South Korea's almost 35,000 rural villages, taking into account differences in size, capacity for development, and environment. The development process has been directed at raising income through the expansion of productive capacity and the creation of off-farm job opportunities. This effort has resulted in a change in the amount of income generated by off-farm employment from 18.1 percent of total income in 1971 to 30 percent by 1981.

To carry out this plan, village residents have been required to select the most suitable projects given their village's characteristics and stage of development. Villages have been grouped into five topographic patterns: plain villages, hilly villages, mountain villages, seashore villages, and suburban villages. All the villages have been encouraged to focus on the production of staple crops. The plain villages have been encouraged to produce cash crops, fruits, and vegetables, and to engage in animal husbandry. The hilly areas were to emphasize forestry, cash crops, and animal husbandry. The mountain villages have been oriented to forestry products, cash crops, fruits, and animal husbandry. The seashore villages were to stress fish breeding, cash crops, vegetables, and animal husbandry. Finally, the suburban villages were to concentrate on cash crops, fruits and vegetables, and animal husbandry.

The government has classified villages into three groups according to their stage of development: underdeveloped, developing, and developed villages. Underdeveloped villages were to be concerned with environmental and infrastructure improvement. Developing villages were to concentrate on expanding infrastructure and promoting income-generating projects. Developed villages, viewed as relatively self-sufficient, were to further increase income levels and improve welfare services. By combining the topographic criteria based upon natural resource endowment with the relevant stages of village development, each village has been directed toward production specialization.

* Discussant: Sung Hwan Ban, Korean Rural Economics Institute

Plans and programs have been formulated at various levels of governance, including local autonomous bodies. Projects selected at lower levels are submitted to the central government for coordination with other development activities. The planning process for Saemaul Undong has been:

- (1) Plans and programs are formulated and organized by the village development committees, which consist of about fifteen members.
- (2) Plans and programs are reviewed and revised at the township level, in consultation with the Saemaul Community Council, and then sent to the mayor or the county chief.
- (3) The mayor of a city or the chief of a county regulates the programs developed in lower level organizations, with the consent of the city or county council. If any problems cannot be solved at county or city levels, they are sent to the governor of the province.
- (4) The provincial governor, advised by the provincial council, coordinates project plans submitted by cities and counties. The governor sends higher order problems to the National Council.
- (5) Finally, the National Council confirms plans and directs their implementation. The council also coordinates related projects and decides investment priorities based on the national budget.

The Saemaul Undong movement has a fixed set of procedures for discussing problems, electing leaders, formulating plans in the village assembly, and undertaking planned projects, without discrimination based on sex or age. The movement also provides the villagers with knowledge, based on experiences and experimentation, for future use. The movement, directly related to village life, is regarded as a training ground for democratic decision making. Practical democracy, self-help, and cooperation have been stated as the movement's key themes.

The South Korean government has provided financial, administrative, and technical support for villagers who lack the ability to face difficult problems. Most governmental support has been given to those villages that were perceived to have a high degree of popular participation. Financial support includes supplying such raw materials as cement and steel required for construction. The government also provides low-interest loans for income producing projects, as well as wages for land conservation programs. Administrative assistance is given to villages by extension workers chosen by the government; assistance is given in such aspects as agriculture, engineering, and construction. Technical assistance is supplied by public technical-guidance teams organized by local governments, private technical service units, and educational institutes. Publications with technical information are distributed.

Saemaul Undong has brought about a remarkable increase in income, production, and modernization. South Korea produced a record six million tons of rice in 1977, amounting to 4,940 kg. per hectare. Projects within the movement have contributed to increased production. Expanded feeder roads have facilitated transportation and a more efficient marketing system; irrigation facilities and consolidated farm lands have improved the agricultural structure; electrification and communication facilities within rural villages have extended production activities; villagers have cooperated in joint efforts to grow cash crops, produce compost, and raise livestock and fish; and the village development movement has mobilized unemployed labor in income-generating projects.

Conference participants discussed the following aspects of the Saemaul Undong movement in South Korea:

- (1) Favorable conditions in the international political economy must be assessed and incorporated into the design and management of rural development projects. For example, surpluses and shortages of commodities need to be monitored for their implications on production opportunities.
- (2) Similarly, national socio-political and economic conditions must be considered in project design.
- (3) The transferability of project design and experience may be severely limited because of the unique set of temporal and spatial circumstances in which a region or country finds itself.
- (4) Can urban centers absorb population from rural areas, in what fashion, and with what effects on the receiving and departed areas? The role of the urban center in an area development project that is mainly concerned with rural development was questioned. The role of middle-level urban functions, such as small-scale industry, arranged in a hierarchy of urban centers, was emphasized.

E. NILE RESETTLEMENT AND DESERT RECLAMATION--EGYPT*

Beginning in the 1950s, the Government of Egypt, with the assistance of USAID, the Ford Foundation, the Soviet Union, and later the United Nations, began to prepare vast plans for desert reclamation. This planning was still underway in 1980. While the geographical area receiving attention has changed, along with the government's philosophy, objectives have remained basically the same:

* Discussant: Jac Smit, Practical Concepts, Inc., U.S.A.

- (1) To increase agricultural production to meet increased demand
- (2) To relieve population pressure on densely populated areas
- (3) To raise the standard of living of the resettled families
- (4) To contribute to national economic development
- (5) To disperse industry and commerce
- (6) To contribute to national security

The last three objectives have been given greater importance in recent years, but have been part of the planning strategy since 1953.

Egypt's population growth and demand for land has increased three times as fast as land is being reclaimed. It has been recognized that the greatest land consumer may be continued economic development, as more diverse lifestyles demand more space. Accordingly, in a 1974 desert reclamation policy change, the government moved to include the development of new towns serving industrial, dormitory, and rural service center functions. These towns are being planned and constructed to reduce the population pressure on Cairo and Alexandria.

As in virtually all government-sponsored projects since 1953, desert reclamation in Egypt has had very high costs in relation to social and economic benefits. Some of the significant problems characteristic of the program include the following:

- (1) Most of the desert lands have sandy soils and thus require substantial water and fertilizer, and special cultivation patterns. Desert reclamation agriculture has been very dependent on electrical energy, chemical fertilizers, and machinery. All three have suffered from frequent interruptions in supply.
- (2) Although one million acres have been reclaimed since 1953 in Government-of-Egypt-sponsored projects, less than three-quarter million acres are being productively cultivated today. The majority are within the valley walls, not on the open desert.
- (3) Large state farms on reclaimed land have been relatively inefficient. Present irrigation infrastructure does not suit the current government policy, which turns back to the 1950s concept of small-farmer homesteads.
- (4) Agricultural credit and agricultural extension services have chronically lagged far behind demand and need.
- (5) Energy costs for lifting water have escalated beyond planning parameters, as have the costs for other critical inputs.

- (6) Prices of goods in cooperative stores for the reclamation farmers have been higher than for consumers in Cairo or Alexandria. At the same time, prices paid for agricultural products have been set below market prices, leaving farmers in an economic bind.
- (7) Housing and associated services have been chronically in short supply. Yet, settlers in planned villages have not been allowed to build for themselves or to add on to government-built housing.
- (8) In several projects, it has taken eight years instead of the projected four years to achieve acceptable yields.

The Ministry of Land Reclamation has been responsible for desert reclamation activities. Within that ministry, execution is delegated to the Egyptian General Organization for Land Cultivation and Development (EGOLCD), whose aim is to bring land areas already reclaimed up to the fertility and productivity levels they had prior to their distribution to settlers. EGOLCD is currently supervising the cultivation and development of about 700,000 acres, and is organizing and supervising cooperatives. The cooperatives provide loans in cash and kind under EGOLCD formulas. Cash loans are usually restricted to producers of cotton and rice.

As an initial observation, it might be said that management of desert reclamation and settlement has been too rigid, top-heavy, and centralized. The management process has been slow to incorporate lessons learned in the field. Perhaps too few decision makers are in the field and not enough field officers have been trained. Lack of good monitoring is another problem. For example, virtually no reliable data are available on crop yields, by categories, for reclaimed lands. Yield data are simple extrapolations of sales for large sectors, or company reports. Political and professional criticism, however, in addition to the drain on the exchequer, have brought about a reassessment. Egyptian planners hope that the result of this reassessment will be better projects and monitoring in the 1980s and 1990s.

Land reclamation in Egypt is taking place on many levels simultaneously. Significantly, private reclamation has been succeeding while official efforts have failed. Individual entrepreneurs, land development associations, and large private corporations are reclaiming land and reselling it at good profits in as little as four years.

Several universities are applying scientific studies and experimentation on pilot farms to desert development. The Ministry of Agriculture has a special agricultural research unit that examines issues relevant to desert agriculture. The National Center for Science and Technology is directly advising the President in order to improve policy formulation. The result has been to move away from reliance on established irrigation methods and traditional crops toward new production strategies

and economic activities better attuned to existing conditions. In particular, the escalating cost of energy needed to pump water is stimulating a reassessment of priorities and techniques. A 1980 USAID study finds that "where water must be lifted more than about 20 meters...reclamation does not appear economically feasible."

Investments are being made to rehabilitate formerly noneconomical reclamation projects, such as those involving tile drainage, tenure systems, irrigation systems, crops, and improved social services. Development of the Sinai in both rainfed and river-irrigated areas is projected. International agri-business is being invited to begin operating plants and is being offered long term guarantees of access to Nile water. The greatest current interest among developers has been citrus production near the ports. The production of exotic foods for export to wealthy neighbors and the import of grain and meat are gaining acceptance as development strategies.

Several issues still remain at least partially unresolved and need further exploration. First is the relationship between population and arable land. In Egypt, as in many other countries, this relationship is characterized by conflict. In 1900, there were two persons for each cultivated and settled acre. Since then, the cultivated and settled area has increased by one-third while the population has quadrupled. To settle the 30 million new people, more land was converted from rural to urban uses than was brought into production. By design, the "new lands" are more sparsely settled than the old lands. In short, land reclamation has had much less positive impact on reducing the man-land ratio in Egypt than figures of absolute acreage suggest. The problem of population pressure on land resources remains critical in designing settlement policy.

The issue in 1980 is whether post-1974 planning is the best approach. Currently being proposed is the reclamation of two million or more acres of land outside the Nile Valley and beyond the Delta edge, including the Sinai; and more than 200 km. from the Nile, the northwest coast, and the so-called New Valley in the western desert. At the same time, new towns are to be built in the desert to decentralize urbanization and to save the soils near the Nile. The degree to which EGOLCD should continue to determine policy and the degree to which national policy can be initiated and influenced by the governors of the relevant provinces at the sub-national level is under consideration. Evaluation and redirection of the program based upon major policy shifts has taken a long time and may not have thoroughly considered alternative patterns or paths. The question remains whether the program should proceed without a well-designed, staffed, and funded monitoring/evaluation component to overcome the centralized planning and management approach employed in the past.

The possible solutions to the program's current problems suggested by those involved in Egyptian land reclamation and resettlement include:

- (1) Energy-intensive desert reclamation should be reassessed. It may present a very high risk in the development process.
- (2) Experiments in settling the desert should be considered in the areas of agro-forestry, reuse of water, new crops, mining, farming, and manufacturing.
- (3) New emphasis should be placed on low-lying areas, low-cost homesteading projects, and low-energy irrigation (drip and bubble).
- (4) A combined rural/urban type of settlement pattern might be devised.
- (5) The monitoring of reclamation should be thoroughly revamped. The following model has been proposed.

-A coordinated monitoring team should be set up with members from the provinces, EGOLCD, the line ministries, the Planning Ministry, and scientific institutions. Each unit of government would set up a special cell to do individual monitoring and assist and reinforce parallel efforts by the others.

-EGOLCD would monitor every crop season (two-to-ten months) for yield, energy consumption, machinery condition, infrastructure, and labor force for each public-sector project.

-As part of their annual planning and budgeting effort, the provinces would conduct a sector study on all reclamation effects from sample surveys and data such as taxes, sales, diseases, scholastic achievement, etc.

-Every two years, line ministries would study social change; relative success by province, farm type, settlement type; public and private reclamation; financial and economic returns; and energy use. The Planning Ministry would compare reclamation projects to other development projects in light of the stated objectives.

The proposed model covers a wide range of monitoring activities and would require varying skills and perspectives. Each activity would be carried out cooperatively to reinforce the others. Staff and data would be exchanged in an effort to respond quickly to new findings.

The conference participants determined these significant aspects of the Nile Resettlement and Desert Reclamation Project:

- (1) Agricultural activities need not dominate an integrated area development effort. The situation should be examined to determine the role of nonagricultural interventions and future decisions should be based on each area's resource endowments--including the area's location and proximity to economic activities and demands.
- (2) Economic development strategies should depend on opportunities that are presently at hand or anticipated, rather than on conventional or standardized approaches.
- (3) The need for appropriate technologies that are adapted to local conditions, constraints, and opportunities is apparent.
- (4) There is a clear need for pilot interventions prior to full-scale activities, given the lack of knowledge and undeveloped state of technology, and the resultant costs of erroneous decisions.
- (5) The issue of how to measure an acceptable return on project investment was raised. The limitations of cost/benefit analysis, as well as the limitations of calculation of the rate of return on investment, may require that other measures be used, given particular high priority socio-political objectives.
- (6) Can ecosystemic characteristics be incorporated into area development projects that are organized to be coterminous with administrative jurisdictions?
- (7) Difficulties in attempting integrated area development projects within a centralized planning and management framework were illustrated.
- (8) The impact of changes in national development policy and relevant prices on area development projects was demonstrated.

F. WESTERN REGION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (PRODERO)--HONDURAS*

The Western Region Rural Development Project (PRODERO) was designed in response to the Government of Honduras's latest economic policies oriented toward bringing about a lessening of "grave social and regional imbalances." This project was designed as a pilot project in the western region--one of the country's poorest and most densely populated areas--as part of a national effort to reach the poorest regions of the country and, within them, the poorest farmers and landless workers.

* Discussants: Carlos Garramón, International Fund for Agricultural Development, and Manuel López Luna, CONSUPLANE Planning Division

PRODERO covers the western region of Honduras, an 8,900 square km. area that borders on Guatemala and El Salvador. The region's inhabitants are estimated at about 330,000, or 12 percent of the country's population. The western region's economic structure is characterized by large holdings dedicated to cattle production, an incipient tobacco and coffee commercial agriculture, and a sizable sector composed of subsistence farmers who cultivate basic grains on the hillsides and live in small villages. The development of this subsistence sector has been restricted by discrimination in the allocation of public investments and by a lack of land, credit, and appropriate technology. There is a tradition of communal effort among inhabitants and a receptivity to developmental efforts. This has been regarded as an inestimable asset to this project's proposed development strategy. The region is characterized by a natural resource base that has been depleted in recent years by slash-and-burn practices and intensive grazing and agricultural use of steep hillsides; the ecological balance of the area has become a critical concern.

The project's main objectives are to improve both food production and cash income among the small farmers of the western region. Given the area's prevalent ecological imbalance, these goals must be achieved in the framework of appropriate management of natural resources. The beneficiaries of the first five years of the project are 9,000 small farmers and their families (54,000 inhabitants), living in small villages and settlements created as a result of recent land reform legislation.

An important precondition to these project objectives is the promotion and formation of agricultural committees at the small-village level. These committees will become the "formal" channel through which credit, technology, and training will reach each village--and through it, small farmers. Thus, PRODERO's target population will be reached through 250 small-village agricultural committees and 103 land reform settlements. In promoting the agricultural committees as the principal means for delivering the project's benefits, with technical support from the Organization of American States (OAS) and financial backing from the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the government is developing a workable approach to reaching small farmers. It is also revitalizing the small villages' communal tradition of self-government and self-support, and, consequently, placing the villages in a better position to face the present reality of rural development in the western region of Honduras.

The project has the following components:

- (1) Provision of credit for seasonal and development inputs for 9,000 small farmers grouped in 250 agricultural committees and 103 land reform settlements, and for small-scale agro-industrial projects organized at the small-village level
- (2) Research into the development of low-cost, low-risk technological innovations in the traditional production systems used by the region's small farmers

- (3) Extension services oriented to the transfer of appropriate technology, and the introduction of soil conservation techniques, firewood plantation, and improvement in pig breeding
- (4) Crop storage at three levels (farm, village, and regional) to avoid post-harvest grain losses and reduce seasonal price fluctuations
- (5) Organization and training of small farmers through specialized courses, adult education programs conducted at the village level, and the construction of a training center and communal centers at the village level
- (6) Construction of 142 km. of all-weather rural roads
- (7) Establishment of a Project Unit in charge of the project's execution
- (8) Development of institutional support for project implementation

PRODERO is being implemented over a five-year period. The Ministry of Natural Resources, as the main executing agency, is responsible for the overall coordination of project execution. For this purpose, the Ministry of Natural Resources has set up a Project Unit and appointed a Project Director. All the components related to the agricultural sector--where continuous review and decision making are required--are directly carried out by the Project Unit. The execution of the remaining components involving standard activities--i.e., crop storage at the regional level, road construction, health improvement--is coordinated by the Project Unit but carried out by the respective regional office of each of the ministries concerned.

The Project Unit is established within the regional office of the Ministry of Natural Resources at Santa Rosa de Copán, the principal town in the western region. In addition to the Project Director, the Project Unit includes a Research Coordinator and Extension Coordinator. The implementation of the credit, research, extension, and training components is the direct responsibility of the Project Unit; for this purpose it is supported by the Ministry of Natural Resource's regional office staff.

The Regional Planning Office of the Ministry of Planning (CONSUPLANE) will be in charge of monitoring and evaluating the project. This office was established two years ago as a first step in a program to decentralize CONSUPLANE through the appointment of four regional officers. This regional office has the responsibility for designing, monitoring, and supervising projects for regional development within the framework of the National Development Plan.

The Western Region Rural Development Project has been designed by the western regional office of CONSUPLANE. For this purpose, a six-man multidisciplinary team has been formed, with technicians drafted from various institutions working in the region, and coordinated by the Regional Planning Chief. After the Western Region Rural Development Project design was completed, the technicians preferred to return to their institutions. It is envisioned that they will serve as the desired links between monitoring and execution levels, joining PRODERO and the various institutions involved in the project's execution.

When food production is fully developed, PRODERO should yield an annual increase of 8,500 tons of maize, 800 tons of beans, 1,200 tons of sorghum, and 300 tons of meat (pork and beef). In addition, it is estimated that the reduction in post-harvest losses achieved by the crop storage component will amount to 800 tons of basic grains. The project will seek to avoid further ecological damage by modifying farming practices while increasing food production. In line with IFAD's lending policies, the project should have positive effects on income distribution, nutrition, and health. Moreover, it will strengthen the regional institutional capacity through the implementation of a pilot approach to reach small farmers with the benefits of rural development.

The most significant aspects of the PRODERO project brought out in the discussion at the Arusha conference were the following:

- (1) The planning approach developed at the subnational level, as embodied in the regional plan, is expected to become an important component of the National Development Plan. The PRODERO approach is a model upon which to pattern other regional development schemes. It can be viewed as a new dimension of bottom-up planning, where the application of strategy, method, and experience originates at the subnational level and feeds up to the center.
- (2) Replication of the planning approach is not taking place in two other regions in Honduras.
- (3) Successful coordination and integration of technical planning teams from all of the country's institutions at the regional level facilitates planning, design, and implementation of development projects.
- (4) The significance of "mapping" conditions, problems, and opportunities as a means for conceptualizing projects, and communicating between projects, local people, and national authorities, is illustrated by PRODERO.
- (5) Linkages intentionally developed between the PRODERO project and other regional/national programs are of potential importance.

- (6) The project's objective is indigenous development of rural areas. However, the fact that these rural areas exist within a heterogeneous region consisting of a hierarchy of urban centers is not ignored, but rather explicitly incorporated into the project's rural development strategy.
- (7) The need to organize target groups in order to reach them was recognized. The way these institutions are developed may be critical to the effort's success.
- (8) Projects addressing the needs for productivity and improved social welfare are recognized as necessary in PRODERO.
- (9) PRODERO has sought to understand how traditional self-governing and self-supporting mechanisms work and has explored their capacity to enable the population to face the present reality of rural development. Specifically, the tradition of communalism is used as an asset in designing a development strategy. This suggests that other such indigenous conditions should be examined as potential assets in the development process.
- (10) The role and significance of the planner's implicit objectives built into project design were raised. How do planners reconcile the demand for objectivity and the presumption of value neutrality with their desire (or lack of it) for directing social change?

G. PLANNING FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHIMBOTE--PERU*

The Chimbote project was undertaken as a consequence of the earthquake that struck the coast of Peru near Chimbote in May 1970. The earthquake caused the death of 47,000 people and left 500,000 people homeless. With this disaster, Chimbote's strategic importance in the area's economy and the priority it was given in the national development strategy made the area a logical choice for development efforts. The scope of the project, however, extends far beyond reconstruction efforts. Before the earthquake, Chimbote had become an important industrial center and a regional development pole that posed numerous development problems as well as opportunities.

Chimbote and its microregion encompass an area of about 8.6 thousand square kms. The area consists of subtropical coastal desert and the Cordilla Negra chain of mountains having an altitude of 3,500-5,100 meters. Vegetation is poor and is limited to river valleys and upper parts of the mountain slopes. Settlements are concentrated in the river valleys because of the available water resources. In 1970, only 39,000 hectares of land were used to grow sugar cane. Animal husbandry contributed insignificantly to total production.

* Discussants: Stanislaw Furman, Chimbote Project, and Cesar Solis, Chimbote Project

The total population of the microregion in 1970 was 245,000. The urban population of Chimbote, Santa, Coishco, and Casma was 182,000. The population of Chimbote itself was 170,000 in 1970, as compared to 4,000 in 1940. The rural population was widely scattered, and only 10,000 people lived in villages.

Concerted efforts have been made to modernize the city of Chimbote, largely through the efforts of the Corporacion Peruana de Santa, established by the government to promote the regional development of the province of Santa, of which Chimbote is the main city. The impetus for the city's extremely rapid growth has been the development of the fishmeal industry, based on the abundance of anchovy in the ocean waters. During the 1960s, Chimbote became one of the most important world centers for the fishmeal industry.

Demands caused by the rapid growth of the fishmeal industry, however, exceeded planners' ability to control the city's development and an unprecedented immigration flow occurred. The scale of migration toward the city exceeded employment possibilities. Spontaneous chaotic expansion within the city caused serious deterioration of the environment and the mass creation of shanty towns. Moreover, the fishmeal industry contaminated the waters of the Chimbote Bay and its beaches. A steel plant introduced by the Corporacion Peruana de Santa and the fishmeal factory polluted the air, contributing to further decline in the city's living environment.

The long-range national development strategy before the earthquake designated Chimbote as a development pole of the proposed industrial corridor of Chimbote-Trujillo-Chiclayo. This corridor was conceived as the backbone of one of six zones of accelerated growth. Chimbote, according to this strategy, was to be the national center of steel production and the metal industry, and also was to retain its leading position in the fishmeal industry.

Last, the accelerated growth and industrialization of the coastal towns were expected to initiate the development of the vast hinterland. This hinterland is rich in natural resources and can supply raw materials for coastal industries. It could also serve as an important market for industrial and agricultural goods, provided the transportation network is radically improved.

In view of the problems the Chimbote microregion faced--i.e., the deterioration of the environment, a low level of regional integration, insufficient social and technical infrastructure, the economy's dependence on the fishmeal industry, the disproportionate development of the Lima Metropolitan Region compared to the rest of Peru, and the unwieldy and uncontrolled development of Chimbote--the Chimbote Project for Reconstruction and Development was designed. Implementation of the project was assigned to the Commission for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Affected Zones (CRYRZA).

CRYRZA became the first regional authority in Peru concerned not only with integrated development planning, but also with the coordination of sectoral activities and direct implementation of development plans. It had the financial means necessary for implementation. In addition, the Ministry of Housing transferred to CRYRZA the authority to elaborate and approve urban development plans.

Initially, planning for Chimbote was formally limited to physical development planning. However, given the nature of the earthquake disaster and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) participation, the scope of planning activities was expanded. An attempt was made to provide an integrated approach to social, economic, and physical development. Nonetheless, rural and urban areas were assigned to different teams of specialists for analysis and planning.

There were three stages in the Chimbote Earthquake Relief Project's execution. During the first stage--October 1970 to September 1971--the Chimbote microregion was delineated; a preliminary evaluation was made of the feasibility of development in the microregion; a zoning plan for Chimbote was prepared; and studies were made of variant development patterns in the microregion. The second stage took place between September 1971 and December 1972. During this period, specialized sectoral studies and demographic and social surveys were undertaken, partially because of errors revealed in the 1970 census. A working document was formulated which contained the main planning assumptions for physical, economic, and social development of Chimbote and its microregion, together with the general principles of the master plan and its detailed solutions. The third stage--December 1972 to May 1973--was concerned with the preparation of the final technical reports, which were ultimately submitted to the Government of Peru in June 1973.

The project's organization and management procedures were carefully detailed. CRYRZA established the Office of Chimbote Development Plan, the staff of which was composed of national and international experts. The office was headed by the National Project Director, who cooperated with the UNDP Project Coordinator, the latter being responsible for UNDP personnel and fulfillment of the obligations assumed by UNDP.

In turn, the government was obliged to set up a consultative committee, whose tasks were:

- To advise on the relationship between the project activities and other planning and development activities in the country
- To advise on various activities specific to national agencies represented in the Consultative Committee
- To assist in the administrative actions necessary for the implementation of the project

The President of CRYRZA was to be the Chairman of the Consultative Committee and UNDP Resident Representative in Peru, and the UNDP Project

Coordinator was supposed to participate in the sessions of the committee in an advisory capacity.

At the local level, CRYRZA established in 1971 a system for urban administration in the form of the Urban Development Commission (UDC) and the Urban Administrative Office (UAO). The purpose of the UDC was to ensure proper application of urban strategy and policy and to provide the necessary coordination with other relevant institutions. The UAO was assigned responsibility for implementing urban plans and authorizing construction permits. More complex site problems were to be referred to the UDC for review and final decision.

The planning team and the UAO worked together in site selection for emergency programs and to assess the feasibility of reconstruction plans in accordance with proposed future development plans. In the course of the project, several industrial plants were rebuilt; 5,000 new dwelling units were started; urban social facilities were repaired; prefabricated schools were set up; road networks were expanded; the capacity of the water supply was increased; and the sewage system was repaired and expanded.

An important change in the project's plan of operation, however, adversely altered the outcome of the project. The Consultative Committee was never set up, limiting the project's ability to consult with the necessary authorities, and limiting access to data and information on current development policies. As a result, the project had to adopt the time-consuming procedure of directly consulting with many institutions and agencies, which was particularly difficult since the agencies and personnel in question were located in Lima.

The project represented Peru's first attempt to carry out an integrated long-range development planning activity at the subnational level. This attempt was indispensable in the case of Chimbote, given the area's complex problems, the lack of sectoral long-range development plans for the area, and the only general formulation of goals and objectives for developing the area in national and regional development strategies.

According to these plans, extensive industrial growth was to be promoted through:

- The rapid increase of employment in industry
- Encouragement of capital investment necessary for development
- Diversified industrial development and its strong link with local resources and local markets
- Dependence of industrial development on the ability of the country to develop the metal and mechanical industries
- The training of qualified workers

In order to accomplish industrial growth, the national development strategy highlighted the development of the steel industry as the key issue. Industrial development was promoted to encourage growth of small industries

and crafts and, on the other hand, to limit growth of the fishmeal industry. This strategy corresponded to national policy, which sought to preserve ocean fauna, and was consistent with the development directions in the latest Five-Year National Development Plan.

Prior to the Chimbote plan, no provision was made to ensure continuity in the planning process. The project recommended that after the completion of the Chimbote project's planning operations, the Office of Chimbote Development Plan would continue to operate. As a result, the Office of Chimbote Development Plan was transformed into the Direction and Office of Urban Development of the Coast, acting under the auspices of the Regional Organization for the Development of the Affected Area (ORDEZA), the successor to CRYRZA. This action prolonged planning activities for another two years and widened the boundaries of the Chimbote microregion. Direct implementation of the plans continued to be the responsibility of the Urban Development Commission of Chimbote and its executive agency, the Urban Administration Office.

The following aspects of the Chimbote Earthquake Relief Project in Peru were brought out by conference participants:

- (1) The trade-offs were discussed of using a multi-disciplinary team assembled by UNDP, familiar with each other and a particular type of project or situation (in this case an earthquake disaster), and the group's lack of familiarity and experience in a particular region or country.
- (2) Natural and manmade disasters, while costly and severe in terms of human suffering, create new opportunities for development and change in physical, institutional, and attitudinal arrangements.
- (3) This case study illustrates the problems of a decentralized area development project operating in the context of a centrist political and economic system, and the planning strategy adopted.
- (4) The issue was raised of providing, through a planning program, shelter and an acceptable living environment for urban squatters.
- (5) The need for implementing reconstruction activities simultaneously with longer term planning was pointed out. How can the conflicts between planning and immediate investment in physical infrastructure be reconciled?
- (6) How can specialist teams focusing on urban development be brought together with those concerned with rural areas to achieve desired rural-urban integration?

H. THE ARUSHA PLANNING AND VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT--TANZANIA*

The goal of the Arusha Planning and Village Development Project is to improve the production, income, and well-being of people in the rural areas of Arusha Region. To help achieve this goal, the project is designed to strengthen the development capabilities--including planning, implementation, and evaluation activities--of the region, three project districts, and the villages in these districts, within the framework of the policies and priorities of the Tanzanian government.

The project's initial emphasis is on the development of a regional plan for Arusha. The region needs this plan to utilize current development funds and to secure resources over the next ten to fifteen years. Unlike other regional plans, substantial funds have already been committed to this project's implementation by USAID. Thus, this regional plan becomes a document guiding the investment of existing resources and for seeking additional resources for Arusha Region.

The project emphasizes the process approach, not the more traditional approach where project designs are meant to function as blueprints for every activity, with inputs and outputs specified in advance in great detail. The critical question for which the planning process is to provide answers is how to generate projects that bring about developmental change in rural environments. The conventional approach assumes that solutions to the problems of the rural poor are known, and that projects are vehicles for applying them.

The Arusha project includes in its design and primary phase a systematic analysis of regional development planning in Tanzania. Based upon this critique, five implications have been drawn for the process design in the Arusha Project:

- (1) There is a need for a planning approach that is selective, as opposed to comprehensive, and is evolutionary and continuous--hence the emphasis on process as distinct from plan.
- (2) The question of the pace at which the process should proceed is critical. It is necessary for agencies involved in technical assistance to work with Tanzanian counterparts rather than ahead of them, to ensure that the process and its outputs are appropriate, relevant, and capable of being institutionalized or implemented.
- (3) It is necessary to consider resource constraints in terms of what could be expected from the regional government, parastatal organizations, foreign investment and USAID, and local resource possibilities. Activities have to be designed so as to minimize, if not exclude, recurring budget expenses.

* Discussants: Neal Cohen, Elliott Morss, Joyce Stanley, Charles Sweet, Development Alternatives, Inc.; Giles Mitema, Arusha Planning Office

- (4) There is a need to understand what is happening currently in the region.
- (5) It is necessary to continuously assess and reevaluate the project's activities.

The new project has four principal components:

- (1) To strengthen the planning, implementation, and evaluation capabilities at the regional, district, and village levels
- (2) To improve agricultural production
- (3) To identify and promote other economic activities
- (4) To improve the social and economic infrastructure directly related to productive activities

1. Strategies for Planning, Implementation, and Evaluation

A major tenet of the Tanzanian government's development strategy is to centralize development planning and administrative decision making. Village councils, elected by village assemblies, are to meet regularly to discuss the economic and social development of the village and prepare development priorities and requests for governmental assistance. At the same time, village committees, chosen by and composed of council members, are responsible for implementing village development and administrative decisions. While this structure is well-defined, the ability of villages to effectively carry out planning and technical responsibilities is severely limited. There is a lack of trained village leadership as well as inadequate coordination between villages and other governmental and quasi-governmental agencies. Many decisions related to the initiation of development activities which affect villages are made at the district level and above. Strengthening capabilities at all levels will be accomplished through continued dialogues with village councils and farmers. These efforts are aimed at identifying development activities, taking into account the production potentials and constraints within each geographical area.

Human resource capabilities will be strengthened through the training of local government officials and selected village leaders. This training will take place through:

- Advanced training at U.S. universities (At least two of the people trained will return to work in Arusha Region.)
- Work/study tours to the U.S. and visits to similar area development projects elsewhere in Africa
- In-country and on-the-job training to be developed for village and ward officials

2. Improved Agricultural Production

The project's main thrust is to improve village production and incomes, thereby establishing the financial and organizational base to support future social and educational services. This requires concentration on agriculture and livestock production. The regional planning exercise and initial village development work will yield information on the possibilities and problems of improved production. This will help determine the future course of project and other regional activities.

The project will initiate the collection of data regarding ongoing practices and farming systems in order to understand the differences that exist by locality. Concurrently, a systematic effort will be made to gather information on past and ongoing research which might be applicable. Ongoing projects, such as the National Maize Project, will be studied. These efforts will form the basis from which attempts to identify and introduce new practices and farm technologies will be made.

The Bwana Shambas (village chiefs) and their assistants will initiate the village dialogue on data collection. This will produce a primary agricultural production plan, or, more specifically, a plan of action for the village based upon the gathered information. A determination will have to be made of what crops need to be encouraged for production, what constraints exist, and what approaches will be used to increase production.

Fundamental to the project's operation are the existing ward and village structures. Villages will be encouraged to establish farm centers at the ward level, where the necessary agricultural support activities will take place. Centers will be established only when villages express a need for them, and are prepared to make a resource commitment for their construction. The Bwana Shamba assigned to a particular area will be in charge of the centers and will reside nearby.

In order to strengthen the agricultural support system, the project will tap the knowledge of experts at the National Research Institutes, as well as provide feedback to these institutes about village reaction to their recommendations. The officers can draw upon the findings and confer with the technicians of the Agricultural Research Project, which is conducting applied research on maize, legumes, and sorghum. A soil-testing capability will be developed at the district level to assist in the identification of appropriate technologies.

3. Identifying and Promoting Other Economic Development Activities

The potential exists for continued development of appropriate technologies and small industries throughout Arusha Region. Poor organizational, management, and accounting skills are recognized as major constraints to the smooth operation of current activities and to the initiation of new activities. Another problem is the inability of existing enterprises to respond realistically to demand. Last, there is a relative inability in the region to identify and develop appropriate production and

maintenance technologies, such as agricultural implements and processing equipment and small agricultural enterprises.

The project will assist in promoting viable small scale village enterprises. This will involve identification at the village level of what potential local demand exists for various consumer and producer goods, what local-level management capability exists, and what enterprises should be encouraged to facilitate production.

The project also will focus on improving production techniques as well as developing maintenance capabilities. Of particular interest will be local artisans who are already working toward improving production and maintenance techniques. Appropriate technology activities, on the other hand, will focus on establishing testing, production, maintenance, and evaluation centers for promoting the use of appropriate technology, as well as encouraging local-level enterprises at selected sites in different wards, depending on local needs, local supplies, and existing enterprises.

4. Improving the Social and Economic Infrastructure Directly Related to Production Activities

The project has planned the following activities for social and economic infrastructure development:

- (1) Rehabilitation and extension of the road systems-- the project will assist in improving the capability of the region and its districts to construct and maintain roads. Technical assistance, equipment, selected operating costs, and on-the-job training will be provided by the project. The intent is to strengthen the districts' capacity to plan and organize their road work, and to make the support linkages between the regions and their districts more effective.
- (2) Rehabilitation and extension of the drinking water and irrigation systems--the project will provide resources for developing village water systems where the lack of water is identified as a constraint to village production activities. In addition, it will supply construction materials and short-term technical assistance for rehabilitating selected village irrigation systems.
- (3) Provision of short-term training and assistance in support of soil and water conservation activities developed by village councils as part of their production plans--the project will attempt to identify and test methods for generating village investments in soil and water conservation measures. Because there will be no immediate return on this investment,

it will be a difficult process to initiate. The basic project approach will be to encourage the village councils to develop a land use plan as a major part of their village production plans. Technical advice on needed soil and water conservation measures will be provided as the villages formulate their plans. Where it is recognized that erosion is a problem, and where villagers are prepared to make the behavioral changes necessary to adopt conservation practices, existing funds will be made available to supplement the villages' contributions.

III. DOMINANT THEMES FOR OPERATIONALIZING REGIONAL PLANNING AND AREA DEVELOPMENT

Papers presenting three themes of primary concern were interjected into the discussion at the Arusha conference. Each paper was presented and initially discussed to clarify the issues involved, explain various viewpoints, and appreciate the themes' significance, individually and together, as interdependent building blocks of the regional planning and area development approach. The themes were:

- (1) Theoretical Underpinnings of Area Development, which stimulated discussion on using theory and practice from other disciplines in order to specify the content of planning proposals and understand the context within which planning must operate.
- (2) Integration of Local and National-Level Development Planning, which called attention to the institutional relations of planning. This aspect of the planning process involves external relationships, such as the role of planning in resolving conflicting objectives and allocating resources.

- (3) The Reduced Planning Approach and the "sketch planning" variant, which focused discussion on the process concerned with creating implementable plans; articulating and translating goals into policies; and identifying appropriate and feasible projects.

Each of these themes and the points raised in the ensuing discussion are presented below.

A. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF AREA DEVELOPMENT*

This theme was presented to identify and explore the theoretical foundations of the area development approach. Development theory from numerous disciplines needs to be brought together selectively in order to improve our understanding of how some types of rural development interventions are likely to affect the welfare of those who live and work in rural areas. Equally important is understanding the relationship of national policy variables and goals to subnational territorially oriented interventions and impacts. Without this composite understanding provided by a multidisciplinary perspective, the design of an area development strategy cannot be expected to approximate its desired results in any deliberate way.

William Bateson examined several prominent development models in terms of how they address area development problems and the relationships between the rural/agricultural and urban/industrial sectors. He summarized the most important points as follows:

- (1) Productivity growth in agriculture is important to the national goal of industrialization because productivity growth is a necessary--though not sufficient--condition for the release of rural labor for industrial employment and for the generation of adequate urban food supplies at constant or falling prices. This insight comes from the dual economy models.
- (2) The rural institutional forms that determine the distribution of the agricultural product between labor and the owners of land are important in determining whether productivity gains are translated into marketed surpluses or remain in the rural areas--where they enhance rural welfare but may effectively choke off industrial capital formation and urban/industrial employment growth. This insight comes from the distinction between the Lewis and the Fei-Ranis dual economy models. Further insight into the intersectoral transfer of food and labor is to be found in the differing assumptions of the dual economy models with respect to the existence of surplus rural labor and the mechanisms which determine the agricultural wage rate.

* Discussant: William Bateson, University of Wisconsin Regional Planning and Area Development Project

- (3) Farmers generally are not irrational in their utilization of traditional agricultural inputs. Moreover, they are quick to adopt new inputs and technologies when adoption improves their welfare. This proposition has been put forward most prominently by Schultz and is confirmed by a large and growing body of empirical evidence.
- (4) Inputs from the industrial and scientific sectors are critically important to increasing agricultural production and the productivity of traditional agricultural resources. However, the adoptability of new agricultural technologies depends on the appropriateness of the new inputs to the resource endowments of farmers and to the relative prices of inputs and farm products. In the environment of a profitable technology, extension efforts may have a high rate of social return, but are unlikely to have a high rate of return with respect to the simple introduction of exotic varieties and improvements in the management of traditional farm resources. Finally, empirical studies suggest that the "green revolution" technologies for wheat and rice are not implicitly biased in favor of large farmers, although large farmers may be the initial adopters in a given area. These generalizations came from the work of Schultz, Hayami, Ruttan, and others; they are broadly validated by empirical studies of the adoption of the new wheat and rice technologies in Asia.
- (5) The demand for new agricultural technologies depends on product prices and the relative scarcity of land and labor in a country or subnational jurisdiction. Land-scarce, labor-abundant economies tend to demand and adopt land-augmenting technologies and inputs such as irrigation and chemical fertilizers with appropriate high-yielding varieties. Labor-scarce, land-abundant economies tend to demand and adopt labor-augmenting technologies and inputs such as mechanization and the chemical control of weeds and insect pests. This insight about the predictability of the demand for new technologies and inputs is provided by Hayami and Ruttan.
- (6) The supply of new appropriate agricultural technologies in most developing countries depends on national and international investments in agricultural research. Transferability, particularly of biological research, across climatic zones is limited, and requires that crop improvement research be done on or near the site for which it is intended. This insight comes from work by Hayami, Ruttan, Evenson, and others.
- (7) Institutional forms may limit or inhibit the adoption of new agricultural technology. They also may skew the distribution of benefits in an undesired way. Institutional change may be instrumental in increasing agricultural productivity and in securing desirable distribution of the results of new technology and inputs. Conversely, the adoption of production-enhancing

inputs and technologies may create new income streams which create pressures for new institutions. Although Ruttan's insights into the interactions between technological and institutional innovation are suggestive, they lack the definition and resolution to be helpful on a case-by-case basis in rural development problems. Ruttan's insights are useful, however, in that they call attention to the need to consider the interrelationships between institutions and technology, and because they highlight the potential for augmenting the supply of appropriate institutional innovations through social science inputs.

- (8) The impact of urban/industrial growth centers on the surrounding rural/agricultural hinterland may be significant in some environments but not in others. In particular, the urban impact on rural welfare is likely to be small in the poorest of the developing countries and in countries which rely heavily on biological and chemical technology rather than on mechanical technology in agriculture (Bateson 1980, pp. 25-26).

Despite this large body of theory about development, significant omissions and absence of integration and synthesis remain, particularly in regard to the current interest in agricultural development. If developing countries and donor agencies are to commit resources to an area development approach, it is necessary that planners--with the help of other social, natural, and physical scientists--improve their abilities to describe the rural economy and to predict the effects of intervention.

First, there are important questions about the socio-economic implications of rural development which have not been adequately addressed by economists:

- (1) What are the institutional mechanisms and economic principles which determine the distribution of income between those who claim the income of land and those whose incomes are from labor? Do areal variations in these mechanisms and principles have significant implications for the design of rural development projects?
- (2) What determines the distribution of land and other productive assets among families?
- (3) What are the likely effects of different kinds of new agricultural technology on the production of agricultural and nonagricultural products, on income distribution, and on the demand for labor?
- (4) What are the likely effects of additions to the agricultural capital stock on national and areal income distribution, production, prices, wages, etc.?
- (5) What are the effects of improvements in rural infrastructure--such as drinking water, roads, and housing--on the national and areal production of agricultural and nonagricultural commodities, the incomes and welfare of landowners and laborers, the quantity of agricultural produce marketed, etc.?

- (6) What are the effects of changes in taxation, agricultural product prices, consumer goods, prices, and wages on such variables as production, income distribution, and marketed surplus? And how broad are the effects? (Bateson 1980, p. 27)

As Bateson suggested, these questions will have different answers in different areas because resources, institutions, and people's desires vary. In addition, the spatial organization and subsequent interaction of these characteristics will also differ from region to region, likewise producing differing results from a given intervention. The implication then is clear: there is a need for regional theory, capable not only of explaining differences in regional systems, but also of providing guidance in identifying, designing, and implementing effective development projects.

Conference participants agreed that there is a perilous void in the type of regional development theory necessary to implement development projects effectively and achieve the outcomes called for in the new development paradigm. There is a lack of understanding concerning two phenomena: poverty and inequality. Existing theories are often partial in terms of their disciplinary perspective, and employ measures that at best are of questionable value, and at worst are misleading as a basis for policy making and program design. Improved understanding of poverty and inequality, in particular their systemic nature and interdependency, would enable these conditions to be approached not solely as problems that need to be eradicated (a simple and direct, but ineffective--if not counterproductive--approach), but rather as conditions with certain key aspects of a positive nature that might be stimulated and directed toward desired change.

The second area in which increased knowledge is needed is in assessing the distributional implications of technological change, given an existing institutional system. Bateson posited the questions that need to be examined. How institutions change and who makes the changes are the most important considerations in determining the distributional consequences of a specific intervention. There is an undeniable need for structural change in decision making and in access to and distribution of resources if development objectives of increased welfare are to be realized. However, if little is known regarding the welfare implications of the technology-institutional interface, then once again prescriptive policy, no less programs and projects, are difficult to design.

Finally, there is a need to reexamine existing theories or assumptions dealing with an integrated regional or subnational emphasis on development. A system perspective--whereby the social, economic, political, and physical characteristics of a region are considered--provides a more realistic, albeit complex, mosaic for assessing project needs and implications. The question of whether our abilities to define the problem are outpacing our capacity to invent adequate solutions is very real. Even our view of existing and future relevant conditions may be inadequate.

There is a need to define the relationship between rural areas and farms if spatially integrated development is to be facilitated. Specifically, the interaction between agricultural and nonagricultural economic activities must be more clearly understood. Likewise, the relationship between those who control land resources, even nominally, and the landless must also be explored if projects of a truly integrative nature are to be conceived and implemented with desirable results.

B. INTEGRATION OF LOCAL AND NATIONAL-LEVEL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING*

The bridge between the decision-making levels at which resources are allocated and policy is made, and those at which action occurs in the form of programs and projects, has usually been viewed as having a one-way flow. In the Third World, recent development planning has moved from the "top" to the "bottom." National-level planning has been the starting point. For a variety of reasons, national planning is not sufficient and has to be supplemented by more localized efforts, creating a "bottom-up" counter-flow not only of information, but of ideas, opinions, needs, and expectations. It is obvious, based on past experience, that either flow alone is unacceptable as well as insufficient. What is less obvious is exactly how to stimulate, manage, and plan in a coordinative and integrative fashion so as to reconcile the signals and capture the strengths transmitted from these two different directions.

In the context of national development planning activities, there needs to be a subnational level at which planning and management functions can operate. In their presentation at the Arusha conference, Born and Prakash (1980, p.3) identified this level in the institutional hierarchy as one which is "readily linked to implementation and resource allocation decisions." Major factors in identifying this level for conducting subnational planning include:

- (1) Scale of jurisdiction relative to scale of problem
- (2) Capacity to plan
- (3) Authority to implement plans
- (4) Capacity for mobilizing needed resources
- (5) Proximity to the problems being addressed
- (6) Access to the intended beneficiaries so as to gain their participation

There is one additional consideration which supports the appropriateness and indeed necessity of focusing on some middle point between the national and local jurisdiction for development planning and administration. In the debate between the merits of top-down versus bottom-up planning strategies, Jakobson (1980, p.12) observed that what seems to have been over-

* Discussants: Stephen Born, University of Wisconsin Urban and Regional Planning Department, and Ved Prakash, University of Wisconsin Regional Planning and Area Development Project

looked is that "regional planning may well be the nexus at which one can meaningfully come to grips with reality in a way that national planning purposes--the grand abstractions--are not lost in the maze of local interests." In each country there is an optimal level where "the transactions between the national and the local interests can be best performed and where the top-down and bottom-up meet" (Jakobson 1980, p. 12). This position depends upon the administrative structure of each nation, particularly on the extent and types of decentralization policies and the permutations encountered in their implementation.

Born and Prakash discussed the conflict management and coordinative functions that need to be performed as part of a subnational planning effort. The conflict management function is described as follows:

Top-down plans are prepared by national agencies and reflect national policy perspectives. The Sub-National Planning can be developed by subnational administrative and/or elected officials, with a process designed to sequentially obtain inputs from the relevant governmental hierarchies. As such, the Sub-National Planning is a decentralized product, but falls short regarding the "participation" component of bottom-up planning. The Sub-National Planning process must be structured to incorporate expressions of the "felt needs" of the "people" (poor and intended beneficiaries). This consideration alters, but does not eliminate, the role that professional planning expertise plays, versus the concerns of non-professionals and non-officials, in development of the Sub-National Planning. In fact, the careful incorporation of needs expressed by people into overall Sub-National Planning objectives and priorities, respective of the national plan framework, will increase the acceptability and validity of the Sub-National Planning. And the aggregation of these genuine "bottom-up" expressions can provide a useful input to the national plan.

However, the incorporation of "local felt needs" in national plans and policies is not necessarily integrative--at least in the classical sense of a "nested hierarchy" of plans, i.e., a mosaic of local plans amalgamated and fit into subnational plans, which in turn fit into a national framework based on a common set of goals and objectives. Local desires may well be at least partly at odds with national goals and developmental strategies--and there is substantial evidence to this effect. Also, development programs may be aimed at separate goals and objectives resulting in interfunctional and inter-governmental tensions and inconsistencies (Born and Prakash 1980, pp. 3-4).

The second critical function in planning at the subnational level is the coordinative function. Born and Prakash have described this as

a process of informed negotiation and bargaining to harmonize relations, activities, and objectives. In some respects, it is an ex-post planning activity, i.e., functional and sectoral plans are independently prepared, but the planners try to predict and cope with the impacts of the plans upon each other. A recent (1977) American Institute of Planners publication candidly describes coordination as a "process by which those not directly responsible for making a decision are provided an opportunity to influence that decision." This is typically the exact role of Sub-National Planning units in relating to national functional agencies. Thus coordination, while admittedly ex-post, is a critical planning function.

The areal linking of functional programs and projects and the incorporation of a genuine bottom-up planning component into Sub-National Planning dictates that Sub-National Planning play a major role in conflict management and coordination. These roles are very distinct from the activities associated with the purely technical aspects of comprehensive plan-making. In fact, coordination involves communication and conflict resolution. It has often been observed by those involved with the budgeting process that planners talk about coordination, but lack any effective power to coordinate. In general, the historic disassociation of Sub-National Planning from the annual fiscal allocation and decision-making process tends to confirm this charge. But there are a variety of tools that can be deployed to improve planning coordination, including: adopted plans and policy statements; budget reviews; common data and projections; project notification and review processes, including environmental and economic impact assessment routines; and organizational devices such as committees, coordinating councils, and interlocking directorates. Some of these coordinative tools require strong central authority for successful utilization and serve the needs of central administrative officials. Others are likely to be more useful where this authority is lacking, and the Sub-National Planning body is trying to improve coordination by information exchange and the voluntary resolution of differences by program officials (Born and Prakash 1980, p. 4-5).

Thus, the level at which planning occurs--particularly that area of "regional/policy-making space" at which top-down and bottom-up forces can be reconciled--and how that level is organized and functions, are critical for the success of a regional planning and area development approach.

Born and Prakash point out that the institutional relations of the planning function at the subnational level have come under a great deal of scrutiny and criticism. Regional planning has been expected to provide,

among other things, the institutions and appropriate linkages for doing regional development. However, in all too many cases, the resulting projects have been designed and managed in such a way that they do little else than provide a convenient way for international organizations to package development assistance. Specifically, at the subnational level, these projects have a demonstrated tendency to become their own enclaves apart from the usual government channels of administration and governance, with varying degrees of financial and decision-making autonomy, in the interest of circumventing what is considered an inefficient and unworkable institutional structure for achieving development objectives.

The question that needs to be examined is how institutional organization and relationships of regional planning projects can be designed and implemented so that the presumed advantages of subnational development planning can be realized. In particular, given already existing institutions, power relationships, and interests, how can such institutional issues be resolved, taking into account the differences between and even within countries? Finally, how much change can countries be reasonably expected to accommodate in terms of institutional requirements for successful regional planning and area development projects?

The issue of the institutional relations of planning has been referred to as a question of form, as distinct from those questions relating to the theoretical underpinnings of area development or those of a more substantive nature. Nonetheless, just as institutional arrangements must incorporate coordinative and conflict management functions, there is the need to facilitate research and generation of scientific knowledge, and to link that fundamental activity of inquiry to technical, social, economic, and organizational issues in development with policy making, programming, and project design activities.

C. THE REDUCED PLANNING APPROACH*

Discussions concerning the theoretical underpinnings of area development and the institutional relations of planning have characterized these issues as ones of substance and form, respectively. A more accurate and useful distinction has been developed by Hightower (1969) and expanded by Faludi (1973). This typology divides the field into theories concerning phenomena with which planning is concerned and theories of the planning process (Hightower 1969). Planning process theory deals with helping planners understand themselves, the ways they operate, and the institutional and political environments within which they function. Thus, function should be given attention equal to that of substance and form.

* Discussants: Peter Waller, German Development Institute, and Leo Jakobson, University of Wisconsin Regional Planning and Area Development Project

Another set of issues that has been inadequately explored, and that must receive equal attention in constructing an operational regional planning and area development approach, pertains to problems of method. Method refers to how to do planning, including the design of projects, programs and plans, and, more generally, the process and tools required to "render actual and evident that which is potential and unevident" (MacKaye 1928).

The particular approach suggested can be labeled reduced planning. The demand for this particular strategy can be attributed to the following:

- (1) The social, economic, and political complexities and uncertainties of the environment in which planning takes place
- (2) The impossibility under the above conditions to project accurately for any prolonged period of time
- (3) The continuing rapid changes in technology and science which, in many cases, render current knowledge obsolete at an accelerating rate
- (4) The resultant "obsolescence" of the existing data base, and the difficulty of designing and maintaining adequate, appropriate, and accurate data systems
- (5) The growing demand for the provision of informed recommendations on a continuing basis to various decision-making bodies
- (6) The concomitant need to reduce the cost and the time necessary for the development of such informed recommendations (Jakobson 1980, p. 33).

The best rationalization for reduced planning from a Third World perspective can be found in the preface to Bendavid-Val and Waller's Action-Oriented Approaches to Regional Development Planning (1975):

...There is but a single principal theme that motivated the collaboration on this book and that unifies its chapters: the desire to develop and promote action-oriented approaches to regional development planning, in an effort to improve on its past dismal performance in leading to meaningful development.

So the reader is cautioned: This book is not intended to provide guidelines for development; its subject, rather, concerns approaches to planning as a process employed in the interest of development. Thus, within most chapters there will be found a description of a case-study region and a proposed development program of some sort. The purpose of the presentation, however, is in all cases to show the reader the process used to get from one to the other quickly and in a way that produces a development program with a high probability of having prompt positive impacts.

This book is designed for people who are busy and busily involved in regional development in developing countries at an operational level. Its purpose, like that of action-oriented planning itself, is to provide them with alternative tools of the sort not usually described in the literature, quickly, clearly, and in a form ready for application. Yet, since planning is a creative activity, this cannot be a handbook. It should be viewed as a compendium of ideas that can stimulate creativity in responding to the unique needs of each unique region and each unique planning situation.

Part I contains two essays on a purely philosophical-methodological level. They are very dissimilar, but, on reflection, they will be found to be much more similar than they first appeared. Both offer suggestions for dealing with the fact that "comprehensive" planning does not work and that a straight "project" approach is, on historical evidence, imprudent. They have in common a more realistic appreciation of the usefulness of quantification and formal models than more traditional approaches. They both aim at a reduction of the time-consuming process of data collection, and they truly try to direct it toward those data that are really needed for the decisions to be made.

Action-oriented planning must not only be quick, . . . it must also produce implementable projects and be easily understood by those who have to implement the measures it recommends. Thus, both approaches are organized about a logical sequence of planning steps that can be controlled by the decision makers and the implementing administration. Neither approach includes the use of models of optimum allocation among alternative projects, because both recognize that in reality the problem is more to identify viable projects than to choose among them. Ultimately, however, the search for concrete projects, to which both approaches are directed, has to be guided by some overriding goals or overall strategy. The way in which this is accomplished is the essential feature characterizing the action-oriented approach (pp. v-vi).

The sketch plan approach developed by Leo Jakobson is one particular variant of the action-oriented reduced planning school. The underlying philosophy states that the regional planning function must serve as an integrative, as well as simply a coordinative, device.

While accepting Born and Prakash's distinction between coordination and integration* as at least a starting point, Jakobson's sketch plan approach

* True integration refers to the simultaneous determination of objectives, the associated tradeoffs, and the joint use of policy instruments in all

rejects their conclusion for the the prospects of achieving integrated planning. It is argued that the sketch plan approach, by forsaking comprehensiveness and substituting a more limited sense of omniscience and omnipotence--termed select comprehensiveness--can attain an integrative mode of thought and action, and incorporate it into the process of development guidance.

The proper assessment and explication of the theoretical underpinnings of area development, careful consideration of the institutional relation of the development planning function, combined with judicious application of appropriate planning methods, are critical in moving beyond coordination toward integrative development planning. Goals and overall strategy, which guide the search for concrete projects, can be developed following consideration of these issues. The key lies in acceptance of "select comprehensiveness."

According to Born and Prakash, the selection of "key projects" as a focal point seems to be the best chance for incorporating the benefits of integration into the development process.

At the specific project level, however, most of the difficulties associated with integration can be overcome and an integrated approach to project planning may be developed in which spatial, programmatic, financial, budgetary and investment concerns, as well as social and environmental objectives, are woven into a comprehensive process (1980, p. 4).

However, Born, Prakash, and Jakobson agree that integration at the specific project level is not sufficient. If specific activities; economic, social, and physical perspectives; and urban/rural considerations are to be integrated into an encompassing decision-making framework consistent with newly stated development objectives, then such an integrative approach must be achieved at a higher level in the decision-making order. For example, Jakobson points out that these development projects do not emerge ex nihilo. If they did, barring the operation of Hirschman's "hiding hand," they may at best display characteristics of internal integration (i.e., good design), but together fail to promote or even approximate multiple objectives, which are currently associated with development. The total effect of the pieces may indeed be smaller than the sum of the parts.

sectoral plans involved. It implies maximization of all objectives and programs and is sequentially part of the planning process. Planning practitioners as well as educators have clearly recognized the need for integrating physical and economic elements into a comprehensive planning process for regional development. A strong case can be made for such an integration, because the best solution internalizes the approaches and initiatives in other sectors. However, in light of conceptual difficulties, and most importantly, operational constraints, real-life planning may never be truly comprehensive and integrated (Born & Prakash 1980, p. 4).

This approach suggests that true integration, if it is to be achieved at all, must be accomplished at the conceptual and policy levels. Integration--the combining of distinct parts into a new whole--must be done at the planning stage, between ministries and agencies. Once integration concepts are developed, endorsed, and understood, then projects designed and implemented by each entity will incorporate the benefits of integration into the development process.

The sketch plan approach emphasizes the development of tools, guidelines, people, and institutions capable of moving from articulation to implementation of desired alternative future states. Toward accomplishment of these ends, first the sketch plan document and the accompanying process of its development are critical. The sketch plan serves all of the usual, albeit necessary, functions in the planning and design process. The difference is that it is developed at exactly the nexus--in this case at the regional level--of policy space, and in an intermediate position along the abstraction-specificity ladder of conceptual space--where planning integrates specific activities with a broader purpose, and resources with needs.

The sketch planning approach, with the sketch plan document as focal point, attempts to overcome problems that may occur in communicating ideas, concepts, and information over time and distance. In particular, transmitting complex ideas between people requires increased attention to the mode of communication. The sketch plan serves as a guidance mechanism providing specific objectives, prioritization, and time elements as the reference points for making, legitimizing, and evaluating decisions in light of longer range objectives, broader societal purposes, and present priorities. The sketch plan document itself serves an institution-building function.

The most critical role of the sketch plan, however, is to facilitate the movement of thinking, concrete activities, and programs away from the present, in accordance with the idea that the future, within certain limits, can be directed and manipulated. This absence of a purposeful and deliberate future accompanied by a set of guiding principles is a weakness characterizing Lindblom's "muddling through" approach or incrementalist model (Lindblom 1959), which Lindblom himself has recently recognized (Lindblom 1979).

The fact that the planning approach is normative need not suggest that the development process itself, and the resultant end-states, likewise relate to or establish a norm. In fact, the sketch plan approach prescribes flexibility and open-endedness as key characteristics of the planning process. To the extent that these normative notions or "ideals" can be operationalized, the planning process should be able to accommodate any one or several ideologies and development theories in its adjunct role of development and change.

At the same time, it is recognized that there are definite limits to flexibility to which one must adhere if planning is to provide the guidance necessary to achieve developmental objectives. Change in planning strategies, methods, and philosophy may be relevant as certain dominant characteristics of the planning environment change. However, there is a need for a guiding set of principles to be incorporated through the sketch plan approach if the many seemingly independent decisions made by government,

corporations, and individuals over time are to result in a socially desirable outcome by means other than pure happenstance.

Needless to say, the reactions to reduced planning in general and sketch planning in particular have been polarized. This was clearly evident in the discussion held at the conference. The discussion reinforced Bendavid-Val's observations:

First, there are those who spend the bulk of their professional time engaged in practical regional planning activities in developing countries. Included are members of indigenous regional planning teams, central government planning officials assigned to concentrate all their efforts on a single region, certain Western planning consultants, and students from developing countries who have taken leaves of absence from jobs of a field-practitioner nature to improve their work-related skills.

A second category of critics includes those who are not regularly involved with the practical field problems of regional development planning in developing countries, because their efforts are concentrated on broader administrative or theoretical issues, national-level planning problems, or regional development in the context of industrialized countries. Academic scholars, government officials dealing with research or planning on a national scale, consultants without significant experience in outlying regions of developing countries, and foreign assistance administrators who supplied comments fell into this category.

The former group of professionals tends to be concerned with the day-to-day problems of "selling" the region's interests to national authorities; getting a first-draft plan out in time for inclusion of some of the projects in the next year's national budget; arguing the case for detailed regional studies for which insufficient funds have been allocated; convincing the local elite to support the local development planning effort; avoiding actions, statements, and recommendations that would offend and anger the politically powerful; and so on. In short, this group tends to view regional development planning as an ongoing activity, perhaps closer to art than to science. That is a valid view, and it reflects the reality in which members of this group operate.

By contrast, the latter group of professionals tends to view regional development planning as a subsystem or sub-process of a national planning system or process. That, too, is a valid view, and it reflects this group's operating realities. Because they are dealing with planning problems of enormous scale, involving complex issues of aggregation,

disaggregation, and coordination, and because there is a large body of literature recording experience and sophisticated techniques relevant to their work, these professionals have become accustomed to thinking very much in scientific terms.

Reaction to the [reduced] approach was generally favorable if it came from the activity/art group of critics, and unfavorable when it came from the system/science group of critics (1975, pp. 15-16).

The importance of this observation lies in the fact that the critics of the approach are the people in power: national planning officials and donor country or agency officials who insist on more data, more complex analyses, and more elaborate evaluation processes. Nonetheless, there are many important and as yet unsolved questions that have been raised by those government officials, organizations, and other individuals doing development work who are in touch with the realities of rural areas, mass poverty, and lagging regions.

In particular, the participants of the Arusha conference raised the following concerns:

- (1) How do we orient and design pilot interventions such that they are perceived, and continue to be viewed, as experiments? Can we avoid the tendency toward rigidity and permanence, and for such programs to be seen as ends rather than as part of a strategy working to achieve some broader and longer term set of purposes?
- (2) In separating plan making from planning (methodological from institutional concerns), it was asserted that regardless of the geographic level at which we work or the extent of participation--whether within the public or private sector, following a top-down or bottom-up approach--the plan-making subprocess can be the same. This implies that plan making is only a technical activity, which may be questionable. The activity is much more complex and central to the reduced planning approach. We clearly need to untangle, both conceptually and practically, this distinction between planning and plan making. They are very tightly woven together. Nonetheless, it was felt that their separation will shed light on this sketch plan concept and facilitate application as well as teaching.
- (3) If planning is defined as the application of scientific knowledge to societal problems, does the sketch or reduced planning approach facilitate or obstruct the generation of new knowledge? If we focus solely on projected impacts of various interventions rather than understanding why such an impact was or might be achieved, do we ever unravel the mysteries of cause-condition effect? This issue may be described as the classic confrontation between research and planning.

- (4) In a sketch plan approach, where and what capability is really being strengthened? Are we using this as an excuse to further educate ourselves (at the expense of others)? Does sketch planning, or the way we do it, perpetrate a dependency relationship such that our services are continuously needed? If sketch planning requires a planning unit (i.e., people involved in constant planning and monitoring), should we not make clear from the beginning what the resource commitment will be? Is this resource commitment really any larger than the vast sums of money and time allocated to planning activities in the past?
- (5) How do we incorporate groups we do not wish to reach, but with whom we must deal for the sake of implementation, into the sketch planning process (for example, using those with influence to facilitate rather than to obstruct our reaching target groups)?
- (6) How do we handle implicit goals that we as planners want to see built into the planning program? If we are not hiding behind a veil of "value neutrality," where and how do we incorporate our implicit objectives into the process? Are these objectives more important than the explicit ones?
- (7) How do we teach our educators and clients to be patient when trying to effect social change? How do we buy time to enable the results of our efforts to reach maturity without being thrown out in the interim?
- (8) How can we better reconcile our "ethnocentrism" with regard to the planning ethic with the facts that (a) most people do not understand the value of planning; (b) clients' motivations and directives might be different from those of planners; and (c) almost everyone else with whom planners deal has different time frames than do planners?

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The University of Wisconsin Conference on Planning in Integrated Rural/ Area Development began what is hoped to be a continuing dialogue between academicians and practitioners in regional planning. In retrospect, the conference performed two functions that are integral parts of the University's contractual agreement with its sponsor, USAID. First, in bringing together many individuals with common concerns, the conference has begun to establish a network within which experiences can be shared and ideas exchanged. Such a communications network will lend support to new initiatives and developments in the field of regional development planning. Second, this continuing exchange will enable past and present regional development experience to be critically reviewed and synthesized into a state-of-the-art compendium, providing guidance and direction for future endeavors. Future activities then can be based on the most current and informed thinking and field applications in regional planning.

In the concluding session, conference participants engaged in a modified Delphi technique to extricate the lessons learned, key issues, and future needs, as they viewed them, in the field of regional development planning (see Annex D). It is safe to assume that the themes brought out reflect many, if not all, of the popular topics that have been extensively discussed in current planning and development literature. One theme, however, emerged out of proportion to its representation in even the most recent literature--that of a reduced planning orientation. Conference discussion revealed the great extent to which reduced planning elements are used in the field--if not in word, then in deed.

The pervasiveness of various aspects of reduced planning in current regional development activities led to the Regional Planning and Area Development Project's observation that virtually nowhere is any attempt being made to organize and execute planning activities in a more traditional, comprehensive fashion. Due to practitioners' acceptance of reduced planning, the experience accumulated in using reduced approaches needs to be assessed and documented in order to bring about systemization and organization.

Reduced planning must be integrated with the changing but fragmented body of planning theory. The myths surrounding the approach need to be confronted in a positive rather than defensive manner. For example, the notion of reduced planning as less planning needs to be dispelled by clarifying the nature, characteristics, and purposes of the planning approach. Issues that appear frequently in planning literature must be addressed, if only to provide continuity with the past. Most important, the discussion underscored the need for specifying the implications of a reduced planning approach for future application. The institutions, procedures, methods, and the training of planners must be viewed in light of this approach. Finally, a series of hypotheses--and, when possible, testable propositions--needs to be formulated to guide the evaluation, modification, and further development of the state of the art of reduced planning.

V. ANNEXES

ARUSHA CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

NAME	AGENCY
Willy D. F. Alenus	Embassy of Belgium, Tanzania
Itil Asmon	Practical Concepts, Inc.
Hugh Allan	Development Alternatives, Inc.
Emmanuel I. Astillero	UNICEF, Indonesia
Richard Barrows	University of Wisconsin
William M. Bateson	University of Wisconsin
James Blackburn	AID North Shaba Maize Project
Stephen M. Born	University of Wisconsin
Paul Brandford	Cornell University
Thomas F. Carroll	Inter-American Development Bank
Sung Hwan Ban	Korean Rural Economics Institute
Glynn Cochrane	Syracuse University
Neal Cohen	Development Alternatives, Inc.
R. Carey Coulter	USAID, Upper Volta
Martin David	University of Wisconsin
Stanislaw Furman	Warsaw Development Planning Office, Poland
Mathew Gadi	Monduli Development Office, Tanzania
Carlos Garramón	International Fund for Agricultural Development
Gebremeskel Dessalegn	Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit, Ethiopia
John Gerhart	Ford Foundation, Nairobi
Michael Hoffman	University of Wisconsin
Per Holm	Royal Technical University, Sweden
Klemens Hubert	Tanga Integrated Rural Development Programme (TIRDEP), Tanzania
Leo Jakobson	University of Wisconsin
John Koehring	USAID Africa Bureau
Kenneth Kohen	USAID North Shaba Maize Project
Bruce Koppel	East West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii
Herbert Lewis	University of Wisconsin
John Lewis	USAID Rural Development Office
Thomas C. Luche	USAID, Tanzania
Manuel López Luna	Regional Planning Office, Ministry of Planning (CONSUPLANE), Honduras
Justice Mathake	Ministry of Agriculture, Botswana
Om Prakash Mathur	UN Centre for Regional Development
Giles Mitema	Arusha Planning Office, Tanzania
Linus Mkali	Ministry of Development Planning, Tanzania
M. D. Mkumbwa	Office of the Prime Minister, Tanzania
Elliott Morss	Development Alternatives, Inc.
Amba Mtawa	Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs, Tanzania
A. A. K. Mwasajone	Dodoma Planning Office, Tanzania
J. A. Ngasongwa	University of Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania
Israel Ole-Karyongi	Regional Development Directorate, Arusha, Tanzania
Klaus Pilgram	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
Ved Prakash	University of Wisconsin
Michael Sarco	Development Alternatives, Inc.

Jac Smit	• Practical Concepts, Inc.
Cesar Solis	U.N. Centre for Human Settlements, Bangladesh
Mikael Ståhl	Swedish International Development Association
Joyce Stanley	Development Alternatives, Inc.
Charles F. Sweet	Development Alternatives, Inc.
Miles F. Toder	University of Wisconsin
Arnold Von Rümker	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
Peter P. Waller	German Development Institute
Ian Walton	Development Alternatives, Inc.
W. Zevenbergen	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands

SCHEDULE FOR THE CONFERENCE ON INTEGRATED RURAL/AREA DEVELOPMENT
Arusha, Tanzania
March 10-15, 1980

PROGRAM

Sunday, March 9	a.m.	Participants and observers arrive Kilimanjaro International Airport-- Check in at Hotel 77
Monday, March 10	9:00-9:45 a.m.	Opening Session: Ved Prakash Hosea Z. Talawa Thomas C. Luche Leo Jakobson
	9:45-10:45 a.m.	Coffee Break
	10:45-1:00	Case Study: PRODERO (Honduras) Chair: Thomas Carroll Discussants: Manuel López Luna Carlos Garramón Rapporteur: Miles Toder
	2:30-5:00 p.m. (3:00-3:30 p.m.-- Coffee Break)	<u>Reduced Planning: Action-Oriented Approaches</u> Chair: John Koehring Discussants: Peter Waller Leo Jakobson Rapporteur: Michael Hoffman
	7:30-9:30 p.m.	Reception at Mount Meru Hotel, hosted by the University of Wisconsin
Tuesday, March 11	9:00-10:30 a.m.	Case Study: Chilalo (Ethiopia) Chair: Per Holm Discussants: Mikael Ståhl Gebremeskel Dessalegn Rapporteur: Martin David
	10:30-11:00 a.m.	Coffee Break

**GROUP D: Integration of Foreign
Technical Expertise
and Training into Regional
Planning Exercise,
Including Foreign-Host
Country Relationships**

M. Sarco
G. Mitema

12:00-12:45 p.m.

Summary of Discussion Groups

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Discussion Groups

**GROUP A: Political and Bureaucratic
Dynamics That Affect
Policy Goals**

Charles F. Sweet
M. Gadi
O. Karyongi

**GROUP B: Time Phasing of Activities:
Ideals and Second-Best
Solutions**

E. Morss
M. Sarco

**GROUP C: Small-Scale Industrial
Sector--Alternative
Approaches and Techniques**

H. Allan
I. Walton

**GROUP D: Integrating and Coordi-
nating National, Regional,
District and Village
Priorities and Constraints**

N. Cohen
G. Mitema

3:00-3:30 p.m.

Coffee Break

3:30-4:45 p.m.

Summary of Discussion Groups

Thursday, March 12 9:00-10:30 a.m. Case Study: Saemaul Undong (Korea)
Chair: Om Prakash Mathur
Discussant: Sung Hwan Ban
Rapporteur: Herbert Lewis

10:30-11:00 a.m. Coffee Break

11:00-12:30 p.m. Case Study: Nile Resettlement
Project (Egypt)
Chair: Charles Sweet
Discussant: Jac Smit
Rapporteur: Miles Toder

2:00-3:30 p.m. Case Study: Bicol River Basin
Urban Functions in
Rural Development
Project (Philippines)
Chair: Stephen Born
Discussant: Emmanuel Astillero
Rapporteur: William Bateson

3:30-4:00 p.m. Coffee Break

4:00-5:30 p.m. Case Study: Chimbote (Peru)
Chair: Thomas Carroll
Discussants: Stanislaw Furman
Cesar Solis
Rapporteur: Miles Toder

Friday, March 14 9:30-12:00 p.m.
(10:30-11:00 p.m.
Coffee Break) Integration of Local and National
Level Development Planning
Chair: Glynn Cochrane
Discussants: Stephen Born
Ved Prakash
Rapporteur: William Bateson

2:00-4:30 p.m.
(3:00-3:30--
Coffee Break) Past Approaches for Area Develop-
ment and Direction for the 1980s
Chair: John Lewis
Discussant: Om Prakash Mathur
Rapporteur: Miles Toder

7:00-9:00 p.m. Reception at New Arusha Hotel,
hosted by Office of Regional
Development, Arusha

Saturday, March 15	7:00 a.m.	Departure for Lake Manyara Park
	2:00-4:00 p.m.	Concluding Session

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LESSONS LEARNED, KEY ISSUES, AND FUTURE NEEDS

At the closing session of the conference, a modified form of the Delphi technique was used to stimulate a synthesis of the week's proceedings. Participants identified the following lessons learned, key issues, and future needs in development.

Lessons Learned

1. There is a need as well as a unique opportunity for experimentation in an area development scheme. Regional planning may facilitate the realization of this opportunity.
2. As with all such efforts, it is difficult to predict changes in conditions, both internal and external to the project. This makes attempts to predict intended as well as unintended effects resulting from a project's interventions even more problematic.
3. It is important for integration and coordination to be achieved. Planning may have its greatest value in the realm of integration.
4. In rural development efforts there is a need to integrate rural and urban functions spatially.
5. In addition to establishing an immediate link between planning and project execution, there is a need to maintain a continuous planning and monitoring function.
6. The potential for experimenting with different regional planning approaches requires an extension and evaluation mechanism.
7. Providing individual incentives and understanding motivations are critical to the success of any development approach.
8. Attempts to capture planning externalities encourage a broader and more penetrating look at problems. We try now to include inter-relationships and complementarities, and to avoid system conflicts. In so doing, we greatly increase the complexity of our task.
9. There is a need to incorporate informal sectors in development planning activities and efforts.
10. Area plans must promote internal development, not just maximize externally oriented growth and change.
11. Macro-policy can be as much an opportunity as a constraint on the functioning of area development projects and the impact (or lack of it)

realized through specific activities. What are the significant aspects of the external policy environment that need to be reconciled with project design and implementation?

12. Economic power--its distribution, concentration and legitimacy--determines subsequent distribution of development project benefits.
13. One needs to consider explicitly the political reality within which the planning and development activities must operate.
14. There is no ideal reality or environment for planning and development activities.
15. For numerous reasons, there is a real need for participation on the part of beneficiaries (target groups) and actors involved in project implementation. Such participation in the planning process may be viewed as a development objective.
16. Inflexibility of national plans as well as other centralized institutions, such as ministries, and various types of legislation, protocol, objectives, and standards, creates a series of difficulties for rural development.
17. Land tenure arrangements and ineffectiveness of government policies and/or lack of commitment are just a few of the national conditions that must be taken into account.
18. Reduced planning is not less planning. The requirements, at least intellectually and politically, may be greater than ever considered. The existence of an able and effective planning unit attached to the mainstream of decision making and resource allocation authority is required.
19. There is a need for devolution of decision making and fiscal authority to enable subnational government units to coordinate and integrate actions of function agencies and line ministries.
20. We need to explicitly consider and design projects with operation and management in mind for specific interventions; there is also a need to consider needs and capabilities.
21. Planning has the potential to direct energies from or impede implementation.
22. Action-oriented planning must be designed such that elements of continuity, sensitivity, and flexibility are built in (institutionalized).
23. There is a need to stress implementation, keeping in mind that this is the link between planning (in the design sense) and people (the subject and object).

Key Issues

1. How do we identify regional comparative advantage with respect to production activities and services? How do we address the issue of scale of activities and, in general, differing scale dimensions of regional systems?
2. Target areas are becoming increasingly marginal, therefore more difficult in which to work and design effective development strategies. What then are the implications for project goal setting, the need for improved knowledge and applied research, and the time frame established by sponsor organizations, host governments, practitioners, and intended beneficiaries within which results are expected?
3. The attitudes, philosophy, and constraints within which donor agencies are forced to operate must also be carefully considered and factored into the design of rural development projects.
4. The need for vertical and horizontal coordination, internal and external to rural/area development projects, must be considered.
5. The issue of the minimum requirements or pre-conditions necessary for the effectiveness of a regional planning/area development approach begs the question. What constitutes effectiveness?
6. What characteristics are desirable in designing and managing an information system? How can such amenities be built into an information system?
7. What effect does intragovernmental competition have on the development process? In an area development scheme in particular, with what problems and/or opportunities might this phenomenon be associated?
8. How can disparate sets of priorities be reconciled--particularly those of the host and donor countries or agencies?
9. How is a balance to be achieved between the priorities, policies, and resources emanating from the "top" and the needs, desires, customs and resources flowing from the "bottom?"
10. There is a need to anticipate distributional aspects, particularly the impact of interventions and who will become the winners and the losers.
11. Given the inevitability of conflict, how do we deal with it in a positive fashion through the mechanism of development planning?
12. How can sector-oriented research expertise and resulting knowledge be integrated with regional authority for planning and development projects?

13. There is a need to design methods for conducting empirical research on responses to a package of interventions, as opposed to a single project.
14. The timing and sequence of activities conducted by a project are probably at least as important as the activities themselves. What criteria can be used in designing a sequence of activities to enable integration in a temporal, spatial, and sectoral sense?
15. The use and analysis of data, its precision and breadth in planning and development, are critical concerns, particularly in the Third World.
16. What are the requisite conditions for achieving implementation of desired outcomes? How are these conditions developed through the planning and management functions?
17. How do we orient and design pilot interventions such that they are perceived, and continue to be viewed, as experiments? Can we avoid the tendency toward rigidity and permanence, and for such programs to be seen as ends rather than as part of a strategy working to achieve some higher set of purposes?
18. If planning is defined as the application of scientific knowledge to societal problems, does the sketch or reduced planning approach facilitate or in effect obstruct the generation of new knowledge? If we focus solely on what the impact of various interventions might be rather than understanding why such an impact was or might be achieved, then do we ever unravel the mysteries of cause-condition-effect? This is the classic confrontation between research and planning.
19. In a reduced planning approach or any development planning strategy, where and what capability is really being strengthened? Are we using this as an excuse to further educate ourselves (at the expense of others)? Does reduced or sketch planning, or the way we do it, perpetrate a dependence relationship such that our services are continuously needed? If sketch planning requires a planning unit (i.e., people involved in continuous planning and monitoring) should we not make clear from the beginning what the resource commitment will be?
20. How do we incorporate groups who we do not wish to reach, but with whom we must deal for the sake of implementation, etc., into the sketch planning process (i.e., role of influentials to facilitate rather than to obstruct our reaching of target groups)?
21. What do we do about the implicit goals that planners want to see built into the planning program? We are not hiding behind a veil of "value neutrality," but where and how do we incorporate our implicit objectives into the process? Are these objectives more important than the explicit ones?

Future Needs

1. The relationship between area development projects and the basic needs approach to development must be clarified.
2. There is a need for an improved methodology for analysis of regional poverty. If amelioration of poverty is an objective of (or at least a stepping stone on the path to) development, then it is necessary first to understand this phenomenon, thus enabling design and implementation of specific and interrelated interventions to be carried out.
3. We need to understand relationships--both support and dependency--between the poor and the not-so-poor.
4. There is still a need to understand how the poor survive and what they want and why.
5. A system for continuous monitoring and contingency planning is necessary.
6. We need to develop measures of good planning, as well as a definition and statement of purpose on which to base such measures and their subsequent interpretations.
8. There is a need to develop, enlarge and make more effective the exchange networks between practitioners and academics working in the fields of rural development and planning.
9. Efforts should be made to prepare comparative studies of rural/area development projects to determine key factors in their success as well as failure.
10. There is a need for better identification of local production and social organization institutions that exist, and ways to improve their effectiveness.
11. There is a need to develop methodologies for resolution of conflict, particularly between regional and national levels, and regional and subregional levels of government.
12. There is a need to develop indigenous mechanisms that mobilize local communities for area-wide integrated types of development, i.e., to expand perspectives of people at the local level.
13. We need to develop techniques for circumventing constraints imposed by legislation and bureaucracy. Action orientation should be preserved, thus necessitating strategies for development planning to deal with a complex and often stagnant political, administrative, and legal environment.

14. We need to develop better and more appropriate assessment indicators for rural/area development projects.

15. Given agreement on the need for spatial integration, it is necessary to promote research on such linkages as national/local, rural/urban, and interregional.

16. There is a need to understand the significance and the implications of alternative parameters used to define geographical and/or functional areas.