

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

CONTROL NUMBER

2. SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION (695)

PN-AAH-662

JE30-0000-0000

3. TITLE AND SUBTITLE (240)

Integrating planning and implementation; a transactional approach

4. PERSONAL AUTHORS (100)

Warwick, Donald

5. CORPORATE AUTHORS (101)

Harvard Univ. Ctr. for Studies in Education and Development

6. DOCUMENT DATE (110)

1979

7. NUMBER OF PAGES (120)

59p.

8. ARC NUMBER (170)

309.223.W299

9. REFERENCE ORGANIZATION (130)

Harvard

10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES (500)

(In Harvard Institute for International Development, development discussion paper no. 63)

11. ABSTRACT (950)

12. DESCRIPTORS (920)

Planning Development Development strategy
Implementation Models

13. PROJECT NUMBER (150)

931008900

14. CONTRACT NO.(140)

AID/ta-C-1336

15. CONTRACT
TYPE (140)

16. TYPE OF DOCUMENT (160)

309.223
W299

PN-AAH-66

Development Discussion Papers

Harvard Institute
for International Development

H A R V A R D U N I V E R S I T Y

INTEGRATING PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION:

A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH

Donald Warwick

DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSION PAPER No. 63

June 1979

HARVARD INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Harvard University,
1737 Cambridge Street,
Cambridge, Massachusetts,
02138, U.S.A.

Development Discussion Papers 59 through 73 were originally prepared for the United States Agency for International Development under a research contract with the Center for Studies in Education and Development of the Harvard Graduate School of Education. The Harvard Institute for International Development collaborated with the Center in this project and the papers included in this series are a sample of the contributions by participants affiliated with HIID.

- © Under the terms of the contract with USAID, all rights are reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced in any form by photostat, microfilm or any other means without written permission by the author(s). Reproduction in whole or in part for any purpose by the U.S. Government is permitted.

Conventional approaches to rational planning have led to an unnecessary and usually counterproductive dissociation between planning and implementation. This paper suggests a conceptual framework, organized around the notion of transactions, for developing a better understanding of the links between these two processes. Key elements in the transactional model include the environment for planning and implementation, the processes and contents of plan formulation, and conditions facilitating and impeding plan implementation. The basic argument is that both the formulation and implementation of development plans are closely related to ongoing transactions with the environment, and that both the processes and contents of plan formulation will affect subsequent possibilities for implementation. Among the conditions facilitating implementation are the commitment of top leaders and implementers, organizational capacity, and interest group support. Impeding conditions include the magnitude of change involved, the number of actors required for implementation, the number of separate decision points, and delays.

CONTENTS

<u>Section</u>	<u>Page</u>
1.0 Introduction	1
2.0 Planning: Myth and Reality	1
3.0 The Transactional Approach	12
4.0 A Conceptual Framework	14
4.1 Environment	14
4.1.1 Remote Environment	15
4.1.2 Proximate Environment	17
4.2 Plan Formulation	28
4.2.1 Process	28
4.2.2 Contents	32
4.3 Plan Implementation	36
4.3.1 Facilitating Conditions	37
4.3.2 Impeding Conditions	43
5.0 Conclusion	51
Bibliography	

1.0 Introduction

One of the foremost challenges in promoting national development is to forge strong links between the planning and implementation of development programs. The record of the past two decades leaves little doubt that planning divorced from implementation contexts, or implementation unhitched from some form of planning, are often recipes for disaster. The field of development is littered with well-documented and tightly reasoned plans which were totally ignored by those in power, and with implementation schemes which perished for lack of central bureaucratic support. As we grope toward a more realistic and wholistic view of planning and implementation, it may be helpful to begin by setting both in their respective bureaucratic and political contexts. This paper offers a tentative conceptual framework for this purpose together with a variety of illustrations. Building on my previous work on organizations and bureaucracy, I will call the overall approach a transactional model.* This rubric is chosen to highlight the essentially interactive and political nature of effective development planning and program implementation. Before the transactional framework is introduced, however, some comment is in order on the orthodoxy of rational planning.

2.0 Planning: Myth and Reality

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to a more effective integration of planning and implementation is the myth of rational planning--a myth that is still widely held by international donors and national decision-makers.

*This paper is largely adapted from Warwick(1977b). Related work includes an analysis of bureaucratic growth in the U.S. Department of State and essays on population programs as well as the implementation of fisheries plans (Warwick, 1975, 1977a; Roemer and Warwick, 1978).

According to this view, planning is essentially a set of rules and procedures for relating means to ends in the most efficient manner possible. It is, in other words, an exercise in rational decision-making. The several components of the overall planning myth can fruitfully be contrasted with the corresponding realities of planning.

Myth I. The ends of planning are established by political leaders or other authorities; planners confine their activities to means.

For planners to become involved in the determination of goals, objectives, or targets they would have to enter the realm of "politics". Planners who meddle in politics tarnish their image of objectivity and value-neutrality, and therefore their credentials as rational evaluators of means. Writing about educational planning, Ruscoe sets forth the core elements of this myth:

The educational planner is neither a politician, responsible for broad educational objectives, nor an administrator, responsible for taking action to achieve those objectives. Rather, he is a technician whose job it is to develop and describe alternative technical means by which objectives may be developed (1969, p. 20).

The good planner, in short, must stay out of both politics and administration.

Reality: Effective planning is inherently a political activity; planners often form an interest group in themselves and advance the political ends of others.

The sharp segregation of the political and technical aspects of planning is untenable in theory and unworkable in practice. Such segregation is possible only in a situation in which planning is an academic exercise of no

practical import. Where planning has had a significant impact on development, such as Malaysia (Ness, 1967; Esman, 1972), its success lay precisely in its effective integration with the political process. Commenting on the successful educational reform undertaken by the Frei regime in Chile, Schiefelbein and McGinn conclude:

Planning done in ignorance of the structure of interests and the distribution of power in society can succeed only when the planner or his patron is all powerful. But these situations are found in few countries, even those with authoritarian governments. . . . The planner or administrator who seeks to direct change must, therefore, attend to the political context of the educational system (1975, Ch. 1, p. 2).

Moreover, within the political system planners are far from a value-neutral, dispassionate body concerned mainly with the public interest. First, like most skilled bureaucrats, members of planning units work to advance their own pet theories, enhance their influence or jurisdictional authority within the government, and otherwise pursue their own advantage. In fact, proclamations of political neutrality are often their most valuable bargaining chips in the game of bureaucratic politics. It is only by appearing to be neutral that planners will be in a position not to be. Second, planning units and individual planners are often used by presidents, ministers, and other leaders to consolidate authority, fragment the power of rivals, and to serve other frankly political ends. As Caiden and Wildavsky observe,

A government may find uses for planners as a group apart from the regular bureaucratic apparatus. Planning machinery may be a way deliberately to introduce a competitive element into the administration, either as a means of provoking reform or of blocking departmental ambitions. Planners may be used as a source of ideas outside regular administrative channels . . . , bypassing the normal chain of command (1974, p. 286).

Studies of planning in Tunisia (Ashford, 1965) and in Mexico (Benveniste, 1970) amply bear out this observation.

Myth II: In choosing political ends decision-makers do not consider means; in recommending means planners do not judge ends.

In the orthodox interpretation of planning, political leaders select goals mainly by weighing competing interests and varying conceptions of the common good. They turn to the planners for recommendations about means only when decisions about ends have been made. Planners, for their part, propose policy alternatives suggested by "rational" criteria such as development theories, input-output models, or calculations of the relevant production functions. Planners never reject an otherwise worthy policy option on essentially political grounds.

Reality: The choice of political ends is contingent on the availability of means; proposals for means hinge on perceptions of political ends and constraints.

First, the specification of goals for planning depends heavily on whether it will be possible to carry out the required activities. For politicians to set development targets without reference to the possibility or suitability of means for accomplishing them is to treat planning as a disembodied exercise in rationality. In planning, as in most decision-making, goal formulation is situational, fluctuating, and means-oriented. Rather than seeking the best of all possible worlds, political leaders are more likely to ask about what problems most need solution, and about strategies that will produce at least some perceptible results in a short time. (cf. Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963; Rondinelli, 1976).

Second, in proposing policy alternatives planners pick those which will be perceived as credible by policy-makers and which do not require major restructuring of the government or the society. Just as policy-setters do not choose goals which are unhitched from means, so do planners not recommend means which would be seen as foolish, disruptive, or simply impossible. A Peruvian planner who recommended the return to Standard Oil of the government's nationalized petroleum holdings would be widely regarded as irrational, however sound the proposal might be on economic grounds.

Myth III: Planners evaluate all policy alternatives to assess their efficiency, feasibility, costs, and benefits. The primary basis for assessing alternatives is objective information, which is shared with all concerned.

In the rational scheme each alternative should be carefully reviewed according to a set of precise criteria. While it is legitimate to include political costs and benefits in this assessment, they should not be allowed to override economic and technical considerations. To the extent possible all judgements about policy options should be based on reliable, preferably quantitative, data. Subjective impressions should be avoided and, to promote objectivity, the information on which judgments are based should be made available to others. When the appraisal is completed the alternatives should be ranked according to their overall desirability and then submitted to the decision-makers.

Reality: Planners do not evaluate all policy options, nor do they give equal attention to the costs, benefits, and consequences of those evaluated. Far from being widely shared, sensitive information is often hidden, husbanded, and managed.

Some policy alternatives are not seriously evaluated at all, perhaps because they stand no chance of implementation or would be seen as "too far out." Among those that are seriously considered, the attention given is uneven. One reason is that planners usually lack the information necessary to carry out a thorough assessment of each possibility. Even if this information were on hand, the resulting evaluation matrix would be perceptually unmanageable. Moreover, the common human tendency is to be selective in perception and to move quickly toward the option that somehow seems best. As March and Simon note, "Most human decision-making, whether individual or organizational, is concerned with the discovery and selection of satisfactory alternatives; only in exceptional cases is it concerned with the discovery and selection of optimal alternatives (1958, pp. 140-141)." Schiefelbein and McGinn argue explicitly that "satisficing" is the modus procedendi in planning:

Planning is seldom a problem of optimization. He who plans does not look for the "best" solution, and often not even the best among the alternatives available. Because the "planner" often finds that objectives are undefined, and because his power is too limited to "force" all the variables to their optimal values, he usually seeks merely a better solution than now in existence. . . (1975, Preface, p. 5).

A further blow to rationality comes from the manner in which information--the very foundation of rational choice--is treated in the planning process. As elsewhere in the bureaucracy, both planners and their superiors typically regard information as a political commodity rather than as a resource freely available to all takers. Partly this is a matter of protecting oneself against potential assault from enemies, rivals, or critics. Generalizing

from his analysis of educational planning in Mexico, Benveniste concludes:

If the planners reveal the content of the plan ahead of time, they may immediately be under pressure to alter it, to accommodate the needs of this or that group. It, therefore, seems preferable to present all interested parties with a fait accompli, because it will be that much more difficult to alter a coherent whole with an inherent logic of its own (1970, p. 103).

Further, should planners release all of their exclusive information, they could easily lose whatever edge they hold over operating units in the bureaucracy. Benveniste again comments: "The initial advantage of planners is to have access to sources of information; this initial advantage will be lost and revert to the centers of power in the Ministry the moment the plan is discussed before the Minister approves it (1970, p. 103)."

Information is a closely guarded commodity in the exchanges between planners and other officials, and one of the few on which the planners have a prior claim.

Myth IV: A technically sound, clearly formulated, and internally coherent plan contains the essential ingredients for implementation. If the head is clear, the hands will follow.

Good plans can be translated into programs which are then assigned to the relevant operating agencies for implementation. An operating agency is best regarded as a single hierarchical structure in which authority is exercised on a top-down, chain-of-command basis. Thus if a plan for rural development is presented to the Minister of Agriculture and is approved, execution will follow when it is passed along to the relevant directors and so on down the line. At sub-ministerial levels the bureaucracy operates more or less as a machine. Employees are given orders and carry them out with

a minimum of slippage--a turn of the crank by the superior produces almost the same amount of movement in the same direction by the subordinate. With inefficient administrative machines of the type commonly found in the developing countries there is more play in the system, but adequate compliance can be produced through training and closer supervision. In any event it is not the task of the planner to worry about how to move the engines of implementation. Planning should be heaviest on the front end, lightest on the bureaucratic details of execution.

Reality: From the standpoint of implementation, the process of planning may be as important as the product. Technically sound and internally coherent plans may not be implemented at all, while less elegant plans with stronger backing may show a high rate of execution. Much depends on human factors, for organizations do not function as machines.

The machine theory of implementation breaks down at several points. First, however exquisite and logical the plan, there may simply be no central authority with enough power or motivation to carry it out. There may be a president, a prime minister, and a minister of Education, but their formal powers may have little to do with their de facto power in program execution. At the highest levels of government the president or prime minister may not want to or even be able to impose a plan on ministers who dislike it, perhaps because they were not consulted in its design. The ministers face similar problems in their own organizations. Many ministries operate as semi-autonomous fiefdoms over which the minister has titular but not great practical control. The fact that ministers are in office no more than two or three years before they are dismissed or rotated does **not** help their power position. It would be very difficult, for example, for a

planning unit in the Ministry of Education to convince the minister to undertake a major reform of primary education when the department involved was hostile to such changes. Ministers often do not have much political capital when appointed, and gain little while in office, so that they are loath to squander what they have on jurisdictional squabbles among their subordinates.

Implementation problems become even more complex when a plan requires action by several agencies responding to different authorities. In Mexico, for example, the semi-autonomous Mexican School Construction Agency was a force to contend with in educational planning.

While it is administered by its own board, and while the Minister of Education is chairman, the representative of the Minister of Finance is very influential on the board, which also includes representatives of the Federal District and of other financial agencies of the government. . . . The Agency plays an important role in controlling the expansion of the school system. . . . But the relations between the agency and the Ministry are, nevertheless, complicated by the fact that the Agency is close to operating decisions which the Ministry wants to control completely. From time to time, the Agency may build schools in an area in response to some local political pressure without the agreement of the Ministry. Instructions may have come from above, bypassing the Ministry, or the chief of zone may have felt it was within his degrees of freedom to build a few more schools in an area where he happens to have a few friends (Benveniste, 1970, pp. 51-52).

Here not only can a collaborating agency stop or stall the implementation of plans developed by the Ministry of Education, but it can even start certain construction projects which the Ministry never contemplated. McGinn and Schiefelbein (1977) describe a similar pattern of relationships in Chile during the Frei regime.

Second, within a single implementing agency compliance with directives

from "above" is far from guaranteed. The machine theory of organizations is now so badly discredited in the literature on organizations that one wonders how it can continue to survive in the mindset of planners and donor agencies. Not only may unconvinced bureaucrats fail to comply with the injunctions of their superiors, but they may mount acts of covert or overt sabotage. For instance, one Latin American country recently launched a modest educational change program which included the development of a "modern" curriculum. A sudden infusion of funds from an international donor allowed the curriculum unit to expand and its director to gain a certain prominence within the Ministry of Education. New curricula were produced, but jealousies over the director's new-found visibility dampened the motivation of key units to incorporate the materials in the teaching program. The attitude of some other directors seemed to be: "You had your time in the sun; now the curriculum can sit in the shade."

Should the Ministry make a determined effort to introduce the new materials into the schools, there would be further problems. To begin with the teachers would resist the use of any textbooks, whatever the curriculum they contain. In this, as in many Latin countries, teachers are accustomed to give instruction from notes, which the students are expected to copy down. Adopting a textbook would change this system and remove the psychological gratification of the lecture system. Moreover, even if the teachers were willing to change many would find it difficult for very practical reasons. Given the low salaries which they receive, a good percentage hold jobs in more than one school. As a result they have barely enough time to give their classes under the existing system, let alone master a new text. Finally;

one of the purposes of the new curriculum was to promote a more participatory approach to learning and a greater mastery of concepts than of facts. But to achieve this end teachers would have to modify not only their sources of knowledge but their whole mode of relating to students. To expect that such changes would flow automatically from a curricular reform, especially given the other constraints on the teachers' time and motivation, is totally unrealistic.

Third, the most common reason for poor implementation is not technical weaknesses in the plan but weakness of will among the implementers. While poorly-conceived plans will usually not be carried out, plans which pass the highest standards of project appraisal may meet the same fate if they have been developed without sufficient regard for implementation. Factors such as consultation and participation in policy formulation will often carry more weight at the stage of execution than considerations of technical soundness. Rolling plans which lack complete data and are otherwise technically imperfect but which are based on extensive consultations with the likely implementers may stand a much greater chance of producing action than polished documents generated by highly professional but isolated planners. Overloading the front end of planning may cause the entire development project to collapse.

In short, it is a mistake to draw either a sharp line or no line between planning and program implementation. To treat planners as a disembodied cerebrum mounted above the development effort is to consign them to irrelevance. To ask them to be the ultimate controllers of implementation is to cast them into the lion's den of bureaucratic politics. But between these poles of rational irrelevance and political over-control are intermediate positions

which link planning and implementation in sensible ways. To be able to discuss these positions, however, we must develop a new view of planning and implementation, one which relates these processes to each other and sets both squarely in the context of culture, social structure, bureaucracy, and politics. The approach which follows attempts to meet these specifications.

3.0 The Transactional Approach

The conceptual framework to be presented is built around the notion of transactions among individuals, groups, and organizations. The central idea of the transactional approach is that human actions involve regular dealings with one or more environments. The range of "dealings" is very broad, running from coercion and unilateral commands from superiors to complex exchanges among equals. The effects of these transactions may also run in any direction. Individuals may be influenced by their social environments or they may re-cast these environments in important ways. Organizations may be significantly affected by rules, precedents, and pressures from national governments. The concept of transactions is deliberately left broad to allow for the host of interdependencies which may affect human actions.

Applied to development planning and program implementation, the transactional approach has some immediate and even heretical implications:

- There is no ideal plan in the abstract, divorced from historical, political, and organizational contexts. If the plan is to be a vehicle for change rather than a stationary expression of preferences it must be alert to specific situations and circumstances.

The balance to be struck between the "technical" and the "political" aspects of planning will also hinge on the specific socio-historical and political environment. Contrary to the conventional wisdom of rational planning, technical analysis may have to be cut short in the interests of constituency-building. Especially where formal planning is new, informational resources are meager, and the political system is turbulent, planners may be well-advised to rely on informal goal-setting and non-quantitative assessments based on conversations with knowledgeable individuals. There may be times, in fact, when projects are best started with no formal plan at all.

- How and where planning is carried out, the specific contents of the plan, and the language of expression will all affect its chances of implementation. A transactional approach might lead to a very different style of planning and policy development than is now seen in many planning offices. For example, rather than treating implementation in a semi-mechanical fashion, planners might ask who will be important gatekeepers at what stages in the implementation process, and proceed to consult these individuals as part of planning. Similarly, instead of assuming that sound technical language will be satisfactory for all concerned, the planners might well ask if the plan will be understood by those whose cooperation is essential, and if the choice of language is open to misinterpretation by potential adversaries.

- The degree of implementation will affect the future possibilities of planning. Planners who come up with policies that cannot be, or simply are not, carried out will develop a reputation for unrealism, or worse. If

off a storm in the press, the future options of these planners may be severely constrained. The entire unit may be suspected of being out of touch with national reality or of acting in the interests of U.S. imperialism. A high rate of implementation, on the other hand, may foster confidence in the planners and, thereby, open the way for more significant involvement in policy-setting.

4.0 A Conceptual Framework


In applying the transactional perspective to planning and program implementation it is helpful to begin with a framework specifying the key factors involved. The model presented here can serve as a kind of map which might be applied to a given situation. As is true with any map, not all parts are relevant to a particular task, while some parts will need greater detail than is provided. Nevertheless, the framework can be useful as a way of raising questions and suggesting hypotheses about critical transactions in planning and implementation. The key elements in the model are summarized in Figure 1.

4.1 Environment

Central to the transactional approach is the concept of an environment for planning and implementation. The essential notion is that the formulation and execution of any plan will affect and be affected by forces external to the planning process. The greatest challenge in planning for implementation is to identify the individuals, groups, organizations, issues, and conditions that comprise the relevant environment for a given policy or program. The

Figure 1

A TRANSACTIONAL MODEL OF PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION



environment that is salient for one policy area, such as agriculture, may be quite different than that for another, such as education, though key figures and issues usually overlap. In identifying the set of actors and circumstances that are crucial for the policy of concern it is helpful to distinguish between the remote and the proximate environment.

4.1.1 Remote Environment

The remote environment consists of those physical, historical, socio-cultural, ecological, and technological conditions with distant effects on planning and implementation. Planners and implementers do not have to become historians or anthropologists to be effective in their work, but they should have some sense of the background forces affecting development. Three overlapping aspects of the remote environment deserve particular attention: social structure and culture, political institutions, and formative historical experiences.

Social structure refers to the patterns of interaction between or among individuals and groups in the society. Culture, in turn, embraces the norms, values, beliefs, and symbols guiding the choices made by members of the society and shaping their interactions with each other. A core precept of the transactional approach is that both planning and implementation must pay close attention to the social structural and cultural meaning and impact of any plan or program. For example, a recent educational reform in Peru attempted to introduce bilingual education (Spanish and Quechua or Aymara) in the early grades of the country's highland areas. While the planners seemed to think that this step would be good for the indigenous population, the parents

thought otherwise: "Since social and economic power was associated with the language of the elite, they actually approved of teaching the children in Spanish from the first day in school (Cleaves, 1976, p. 17)." Here an aspect of the remote environment--cultural attitudes toward language--apparently became a significant barrier in implementing bilingual education.

Another crucial aspect of the remote environment is the structure of political institutions in the country. Although most of the readily identifiable actors will be part of the proximate environment, there may be others who lurk in the wings. The most obvious example in many countries is the military, who may hold no formal powers in planning but who influence its operations as a shadow elite.

A third part of the remote environment is the country or region's formative historical experiences. These are the trends and events of the past with a potential for carry-over to the present. If planners cannot become historians, they should at least have a feeling for the historical conflicts, crises, issues, and incidents which can shape present perceptions about development programs. For example, in Kenya and much of Sub-Saharan Africa, the experience of slavery has left lingering suspicions of the genocidal intentions of the white, Western nations. These have recently surfaced in discussions of family planning programs, much to the surprise of Western population planners (Ndeti and Ndeti, 1977). In Mexico almost any issue bearing on Church-State relations must be treated gingerly, even though there is no open debate along those lines when the topic is first raised. The areas of development most clearly connected to this tender area are education and population control (Lénero, 1977).

4.1.2 Proximate Environment

The proximate environment includes those actors, issues, and conditions with an immediate and/or direct influence on planning and implementation. The central question is: what counts in this policy, and for whom? Which individuals, groups, agencies, or other organizations can make a policy or program stop, start, and move along? What are the issues and conditions that will make a difference for either planning or implementation? In considering the proximate environment it is helpful to think of three interacting sub-parts: the power setting, the issue context, and the operating environment.

4.1.2.1 The Power Setting: Who Counts?

The power setting is made up of individuals, groups, or organizations with the potential for immediate and/or direct influence on a given policy. Since each area of development policy will have a somewhat different power setting, one should be clear about the actors who count for the case at hand. For many spheres of development the key actors will include national authorities, bureaucratic allies and rivals, gatekeepers, national interest groups, and international donors.

(a) National authorities. The most obvious question to be raised about the power setting is who has the formal authority to control that domain of action. In some cases a prime barrier to implementation may be confusion over precisely which office or agency is responsible for carrying out a plan. Responsibility for a national fisheries policy, for example, may be spread across the ministries of agriculture, commerce, transport (harbors), defense

(navy), and regional development authorities. As a result even a well-conceived policy to regulate the fishing catch may have no bureaucratic home for its implementation. In Kenya the FAO-sponsored Programme on Better Family Living, an innovative effort combining population with other kinds of development activities, foundered precisely for this reason. As a practical matter planners would be well-advised to take up the question of responsibility as part of policy formulation. In the transactional approach, which lays heavy emphasis on identifying key figures in implementation, this question would arise very quickly.

Several categories of national authorities are likely to be involved in approving and implementing most development plans. The most obvious is the chief executive, such as the president, the prime minister, or the head of a military junta. Without support from the top, planning on vital issues, such as educational or land reform, will quickly evaporate, and even with this support it may not go very far. Also important are the minister(s) with direct authority in the area of concern, the parliament (if any), the minister of finance, whose cooperation is usually needed in obligating funds, and perhaps the national planning body. From a transactional standpoint the critical task is to identify those authorities with the power to intervene at all crucial stages of planning and implementation, and to involve them in appropriate ways. For example, members of parliament representing a country's coffee growers may play a vital role in any policy measure affecting the employment or income of their constituencies, even if the parliament's role is nominal at best. The finance ministry should also not be overlooked, as it often is, for without its blessing no plan requiring

new expenditures will get more than a few meters from the drawing board (cf. Caiden and Wildavsky, 1974, p. 102).

(b) Bureaucratic rivals and allies. It is usually safe to assume that any consequential development policy will touch the interests of government agencies other than those directly charged with its implementation. The result is typically rivalries which impede implementation, alliances which facilitate it, or both. The rival units will usually include those which feel that they should have major jurisdiction over the policy, that they are more deserving of the funds than the actual recipients, or that they should have been consulted in the program's development. Their opposition, competition, or inaction at significant points in the implementation process may result in conflicts, delays, or even total paralysis. The national population program in the Philippines, which involves numerous agencies vying for limited funds, provides a classic example of bureaucratic rivalry and its consequences. Similar rivalries hamper the work of the government's coordinating body, the Commission on Population, which has experienced a high turnover of directors in recent years.

At the same time, planners may find bureaucratic allies even for controversial policies. Employment generation schemes proposed by the national planning office, for example, may win backing from the finance ministry, which sees possibilities for added revenues; from the ministry of labor, which favors expanded employment opportunities; and from the ministry of education, which might participate in new training ventures.

(c) Gatekeepers are those agents on whom a given policy or program depends for approval or action. In forecasting the chances for implementation

it is necessary to identify probable gatekeepers not only in the early stages but through the entire cycle of execution. While some are elusive and hold no identifiable office, most can usually be surfaced by asking four questions.

First, from which individuals or organizations must the implementers obtain formal concurrence before moving ahead? In building new schools, the education ministry may need approval from the ministry of public works or a special school construction agency. Similarly, a rural development program devised by the ministry of agriculture may need the explicit benediction of the provincial government before it can move into action. Second, which groups or organizations are involved in the joint administration of a program? In Egypt the national family planning program is in many respects a joint venture involving the Executive Family Planning Board, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Social Affairs. The result, according to one report (Gadalla, Mehanna, and Tennant, 1977) is a confusion in the lines of responsibility, difficulties in supervision, competition, and duplication of activities. While such problems are quite common, some could be eliminated or reduced through careful advance attention to the transactional context. Third, is the policy dependent on some outside body for external coordination? A common actor in this role is the national development authority or planning agency, which is nominally responsible for integrating the work of all sectoral planning units. Finally, whatever the formal structure of government, will the success of the program depend on informal clearance from individuals or groups? In some African societies, ethnic group leaders have no formal authority over programs devised for their areas,

but planners would be mindless to by-pass them in planning for implementation. Such purveyors of informal blessings are usually linked to one of the interest groups to be mentioned next.

(d) Interest groups. In most countries effective policy formulation and implementation will be closely tied to the society's interest groups. Contrary to a politically neutral vision of planning, the transactional approach advocates specific and sustained attention to actors such as political parties, ethnic groups, unions, marketing associations, religious organizations, and the media. The identification of key interest groups sometimes requires considerable skill and subtlety, for the concerned parties may be working behind the scenes or may not appear until the later stages of implementation. But in many policy areas the most crucial actors are there for all to see. In educational planning, for example, they would usually include teachers and teachers unions; political parties; universities and university student organizations; and, though rarely organized, parents.

The educational reforms launched in Chile and El Salvador in the 1960's underscore the pivotal role of teachers and their unions. Teachers and their allies in the ministry of education usually keep a wary eye on reform plans, and are not slow to react if they disapprove what they see. In El Salvador the precipitous changes introduced by the Minister of Education, Walter Béneke, provoked the teachers' union (ANDES) into a 58-day strike in 1968. While the strike was fierce and led to violence, Beneke waited and eventually won out. In Chile the teachers were less concerned about the contents and processes of the reforms than about the more mundane question of wages. Still, the climate of change fostered by the reform created an ideal opening for pressing their demands. The result was two protracted

strikes and increasing militancy by the unions. But in good part, because of effective planning, the conflicts did not destroy or debilitate the substance of the reforms. The teachers continued to work with curriculum planning groups and to try out new materials. "It was as though by this time the Reform was considered as a product of everyone's efforts, and not a creation of the Christian Democratic government (McGinn and Schiefelbein, 1977, p. 63)."

(e) International donors. Foreign assistance agencies will occupy a prominent place in the power setting of many development programs. Organizations such as the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), the United Nations Development Programme, regional development banks, and private donors have an enormous impact on the issues addressed in development and on the organizational structures for dealing with them. There is now a substantial literature on the operation of donor agencies, although few studies have traced out the full range of their impact on planning and program implementation (cf. Tandler, 1975; Krassowski, 1968; Cerych, 1967; Montgomery, 1962). Both this literature and the author's own research suggest several broad hypotheses about donor impacts.

First, donors can affect the creation, structure, and content of planning operations. By making funds available for planning, insisting on planning as a pre-condition for loans and grants, or otherwise communicating their favorable disposition toward planning, donors may influence (i) decisions to create a planning unit (cf. Wynia, 1972); (ii) the organizational location and structure of the unit; (iii) the operating assumptions about the unit's work, such as underlying ideas about the "problem" to be solved; and (iv) the

priorities and strategies followed in planning, such as sector analysis, sector assessment, or input-output analysis. Second, donors affect the total context of planning through their influence on development priorities and programs. International assistance agencies often shape the environment for planning by making funds available for some types of activities and not for others, by the conditions and requirements attached to the spending of funds, by informal pressures for certain kinds of results, and in other ways. These influences are seen most clearly in three areas: (i) overall development priorities, such as capital development strategies vs. emphasis on the rural poor; (ii) priorities within sectors, such as a heavy concentration on instructional television within the education sector; and (iii) project design, including specific components, timing, and organizational structure. Third, donors may exercise a critical influence on program implementation. AID, for example, commonly appoints a U.S. - based contractor to advise and monitor the project at all stages. The contractor, in turn, usually hires technicians and other advisors to work with local counterparts. To complicate matters, either AID/Washington or members of the country mission may take an active, though sometimes extra-official, part in screening the advisors chosen, in determining the length and timing of their visits, and in approving other aspects of the contractor's work. Mission representatives, such as the Mission Director or Education Officer, may also develop local contacts which can support, neutralize, or even undercut the contractor's work. At later stages the donor agency may also press for certain kinds of results in program implementation, such as the dispensing of the "more effective" methods of contraception in a family planning program (the intra-

uterine device and the pill vs. condoms, for instance). Anyone familiar with foreign assistance knows that these are but a few of the many "transactions" with donors that mark the life of a complex project. The question here is not whether these interventions are admirable or deplorable in themselves, but whether they can be anticipated and effectively dealt with in planning and program implementation.

(f) Implementers. Finally some mention should be made of a group that is often overlooked by planners and project designers: those who will be directly charged with executing a policy or program. Once a program is underway the implementers are not, properly speaking, part of the power setting, for they are within the organization itself. But during the planning stage it would be eminently sensible to view key implementers much as one would regard crucial interest group representatives--as persons to be consulted and involved in the project's design so far as possible. There is now clear evidence from several sectors that a failure to do so may not only generate resentments about a lack of participation, but miss information vital to proper design. At the simplest level these administrators may point out that the program as conceived is bureaucratically unworkable. They may also indicate, directly or indirectly, whether they believe in the program in general and in the activities it will sponsor, such as sterilization and abortion in a family planning program. In Egypt, for example, the government initiated a family planning program almost overnight without consulting the personnel expected to carry it out. A recent study of this effort produced this finding:

When questioned indepth regarding their analysis of family planning efforts in Egypt, the majority of the implementors

interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the present national family planning program. They tended to focus their attention on the numerous difficulties and constraints involved in the implementation of the program. Complaints varied from a criticism of constraints operating within the program itself to a discussion of problems existing on the community level inhibiting the facilitation of family planning objectives even in the absence of program constraints (Gadalla, Mehanna, and Tennant, 1978).

Had these implementers been consulted they could easily have pointed out some of the straightforward difficulties that did, in fact, arise in the program, such as confusing lines of authority. Their own motivation to take this program seriously might also have increased.

4.1.2.2 The Issue Context: What Perceptions Might Be Aroused?

In evaluating the possibilities for the initial acceptance of a plan and its subsequent implementation, decision-makers must also pay heed to the perceptions likely to be generated by the formulation, the content, or the language of a policy. In making such assessments it is useful to consider the issue context for a given policy--the points of discussion, debate, or controversy in the society. Some issues will be energizing in that they serve to arouse interest or mobilize support for the policy. The 1969 agrarian reform program in Peru was strongly energized by its connection to the larger objectives of the military government. Basically President Velasco and his military associates saw the land reform as the most effective way of breaking the back of the landed oligarchy and thereby consolidating their own political position. As Cleaves observes,

The reform thus had the effect of establishing the regime's authority throughout the society and help(ed) gain compliance for other initiatives. Strong-armed measures against recalcitrant teachers or university students . . . could not possibly have had

the same positive effect in priming the society for inclusive policies in the mining, financial, and industrial sectors (1976, pp. 34-35).

Issues may also be debilitating if they devitalize or contaminate the policies with which they become associated. A Latin American family planning program could be crippled if it became generally linked with "American imperialism" or other unpopular images. In Kenya comparable issues would include tribal rivalries and genocide of black peoples through birth control. Significantly, some of these issues may lurk in the background and emerge only when a development program is underway. This possibility underscores the need for a rather thorough and subtle understanding of the country's remote environment, which may, without warning, become quite proximate.

4.1.2.3 The Operating Environment: The Impact of Conditions

The operating environment is the set of conditions--more or less impersonal circumstances--impinging on planning and implementation. Three conditions are especially important. The first is threat, which arises when the environment is perceived as a source of impending danger. The most clear cases of threat include imminent warfare with another country and armed insurrection within the country. Faced with the prospect of war, political leaders will typically fix their attention on questions of defense and will have little time for the niceties of development planning. One example is seen in the Egyptian family planning program after the 1967 war with Israel:

The widespread recognition and serious attention which family planning received from the political leadership and top governmental officials in 1965 and 1966 declined very rapidly after the 1967 war with Israel. The prime concern and commitment of Egypt was directed to the necessity of rebuilding its armed forces and introducing rapid changes in its political system and external relationships in

order to pull the country out of the humiliating state of defeat (Gadalla, 1976, p. 16).

The degree of uncertainty or unpredictability in the political, economic, or social environment will also have pervasive effects on development programs. Political uncertainty, especially the threat of a military coup, may encourage chief executives to scramble their cabinets or juggle other appointments to ward off criticism and to prevent the formation of hostile cliques. This strategy may make great sense from the standpoint of survival, but it does pose problems for continuity in planning and implementation. Economic uncertainty, such as that produced by rapid inflation and balance of payments deficits, may also lead to short-term crisis management in preference to long-range planning. In general, while uncertainty can sometimes be a motivating force for development, more often it will result in caution, incrementalism, and personnel turnover.

Finally, planning and implementation must take account of environmental complexity--the number of elements in the policy environment and the intricacy of their connections. Complexity increases with the number of ministries or other organizational units involved in policy-making and implementation, the number of interest groups with some stake in the policy, the number of sensitive issues raised by the policy question, and the variety of rules and bureaucratic layers involved in execution. Overall, the greater the complexity, the more formidable the planning required and the more difficult the implementation. Thus an integrated rural development program involving four ministries and five other government agencies will often be much more difficult to plan and carry out, though perhaps ultimately

more beneficial, than more narrow programs run independently by these organizations.

4.2 Plan Formulation

A careful assessment of the environment, which need not require vast amounts of time, will often suggest far-reaching implications for both the process and the contents of development planning. Process and contents are connected in that different styles of plan formulation will yield different policy options and strategies for implementation, while initial statements and perceptions about the goals and contents of planning will affect the potential participants as well as the conduct of the deliberations. Perhaps the most basic requirement of the transactional approach is that planners and other decision-makers identify the significant interests at stake in the particular policy domain and take steps to deal with these interests in formulating and implementing plans. Meeting this challenge demands not only intimate familiarity with the environment, but a high degree of self-reflection about the very processes being used in planning and implementation. Transactional planners, in other words, must not only plan with the environment in mind, but be aware of how their very actions touch that environment and how the resulting perceptions redound upon both planning and program implementation. Planning in this sense is inherently political.

4.2.1 Process

Three basic questions can be raised about the processes of plan formulation:

4.2.1.1 Is there a perceived problem which can be solved through planning?

Is the situation ripe for planning, or will the plans formulated, however sound in their technical design, fall on barren ground? The critical "transaction" at this point is between the planner and the environmental demand for action. If there is no sense of concern about population growth, land reform, or educational change, or if such concerns are confined to politically insignificant groups, new policies may simply have no audience and stand no chance of implementation. Unless the planners are in a position to stir up the requisite concern, which they usually are not, they may do more harm than good for future development programs through premature planning. The transactional approach suggests, as a rule of thumb, that the formulation of plans should not run far ahead of societal concerns about the issues they address.

4.2.1.2 Who should participate in plan formulation? The specific participants will affect not only the options considered, chosen, and rejected, but also the perceived legitimacy of the resulting plan and its chances for implementation. In general, the more those involved in implementation have had a part in the planning process, and the more they feel that the resulting plan is their own, the more likely they are to support its translation into action. Participation in itself may not mobilize them into strong support, but it may at least defuse their opposition. The more, by contrast, a plan is perceived to be the creation of a disconnected group of planners, a narrow elite, a special interest group, or some other unrepresentative body, the more likely it is to generate controversy or be scuttled before being implemented.

There is, nonetheless, a deep dilemma in participation. On the one hand, when potential rivals, gatekeepers, or other interested parties are excluded from plan formulation, they can use their absence as prima facie grounds for opposition. If they are hostile and included, on the other hand, their presence provides them with a delicious opportunity to stall or sabotage the entire effort. For this reason development planners often show marked ambivalence toward generalized pleas for participatory planning. They realize that, especially in a highly polarized or fragmented power setting, they can live neither with nor without participation.

Case studies of successful planning suggest, however, that there are alternatives falling between pure planning by planners and opening the doors to all of one's potential enemies. It would be well worth the planner's effort to prepare a list of those who might want to be consulted, and then organize it along two dimensions; first, their significance for implementation, and second, their initial favorability or hostility. In many cases this exercise will yield names of individuals whose cooperation will be crucial during implementation, and who are at least neutral on the matter at hand. In sectoral planning these may well include the directors of the operating units in the same ministry or allied bureaus. While such individuals may harbor some suspicions about planners and planning, they can often be won over by the very invitation to participate. To the extent that they see tangible evidence of their views reflected in the plans, they may even be converted to enthusiastic advocates, but such conversions are infrequent. The Office of Educational Planning created during the Frei regime in Chile, for example, followed a strategy of this sort in developing a curriculum

reform. The planners began with a small but broad-based committee which set forth a broad outline for reform.

Once the basic ideas were laid out, however, membership on the Committee was expanded, as a series of task forces were created in each of the major curriculum areas. . . . Each of the original members recruited teachers and professors of education to help in the development of curricula. The task force members were chosen on the basis of professional prestige and creativity. . . . Contact with the Directorate of Primary Education was high.

Participants in the curriculum area task forces were encouraged to try out new materials and procedures as they developed. To make this possible, the Office of Planning solicited the collaboration of primary school principals. The curriculum people then worked directly with classroom teachers, from time to time bringing in groups of them to discuss ideas for new approaches in curriculum. The word quickly spread among teachers that the Ministry was really interested in their ideas (McGinn and Schiefelbein, 1977, pp. 47-48).

A further sign of the positive effects of this collaboration was that during a subsequent teachers' strike, during which there were numerous criticisms of the education system, the teachers made no attacks on the curricular reforms.

4.2.1.3 How are the deliberations conducted? The Chilean example also underscores the importance of the procedures followed in planning. One key issue is the degree of their secrecy or openness. When deliberations are conducted in secret and the policies are then simply announced, the feeling may arise that a plan has been "sprung" on the country without adequate opportunities for debate. There is still the sentiment in Kenya, for example, that the government's family planning program was whisked past the parliament and ordinary citizens as a means of pleasing insistent donor agencies. This belief, coupled with the fact that the policies

adopted were almost identical to those recommended by the U.S.-based Population Council, has left a foreign taint on the Kenyan program which seems to impair its implementation. Completely open deliberations, on the other hand, are not only time-consuming but may invite political sniping and organized counter-offensives by general or specific adversaries. Once again a practical alternative may be to have openness within the circles that count most, such as the teachers and principals in the Chilean reform, but without permitting access to all comers.

4.2.2 Contents

The substance of a plan will also have an obvious bearing on its possibilities for implementation and impact. In thinking of a plan's contents the planner must scan the environment for two sets of signs: those relating to the plan's chances of being accepted merely as a plan; and those pointing farther ahead to the implementation process. Some planning options may draw pious nods of assent in the short term, but evaporate in the heat of squabbles about execution. For others the hurdles of immediate acceptance may be greater than those of implementation. The advance determination of these varying reactions lies at the center of transactional planning.

Three questions can usefully be raised about the contents of any plan. First, how effective are the single policy options? Second, how will response to the plan be affected by the clustering of policies? And third, what reactions will follow from the language of presentation?

4.2.2.1 Single policy options. The field of project analysis suggests dozens

of specific questions that might be applied to a given element of development policy. The following are two others that are often ignored in technical appraisals. First, what is the policy's credibility to those who will be charged with implementation? Many plans set targets which are simply unattainable for institutional, financial, or other reasons. Population planners have been notorious for inflated estimates of the number of users of family planning services, and of the probable impact of such use on the birth rate. Other administrators, ranging from ministers of education to directors of fisheries programs, have been given to similar optimism. While elevated targets and optimistic projections may conceivably have a beneficial effect on public morale, over the long run they carry enormous costs for credibility among the implementers. These individuals and others in their power setting will either completely disregard the latest estimations, or make their own subjective discounts. The net result will often be not only poor information for decision-making, but a general discrediting of the offices involved, with obvious implications for implementation.

Second, what is the policy's acceptability to elements in the power setting? A planning office may decide that the most effective strategy for increasing rural employment is to raise the price of capital by altering the exchange rate. If, however, such changes would significantly increase the production costs for multi-national corporations which import foreign technology, and if such corporations have strong leverage with the president, this policy option may stand no chance of serious consideration. In general, options which raise an assortment of red flags for politically influential groups may be stillborn, however compelling their economic logic.

4.2.2.2 Clustering. Beyond any single policy alternative, planners must consider the perceptions created by the entire package of which it is a part. A plan to provide credit to small businessmen in a Southeast Asian country might generate little controversy if it is open to all takers. If, on the other hand, it is billed as an effort to promote indigenous (i.e., non-Chinese) entrepreneurship, the reactions from the non-indigenous groups might be quite strong. Sometimes association with a broader set of changes will lend energy to a policy that it would not have if it stood alone. Cleaves (1976) has argued that a major factor favoring the 1969 agrarian reform in Peru was the interlinking structure of its various elements. Set in a broader context of national reform and containing policy alternatives with a high "spread effect" from one to the other, the reform package had to be taken seriously by friend and foe.

The result was that in the agriculture ministry policymakers could obtain a multiplier effect from the investment of relatively few resources. By touching the right string, they could have the whole orchestra playing. When the music was out of tune, they wrote a slight modification into the score. . . . It took relatively few political resources to keep the agrarian reform on track once begun. . . . (1976, p. 36).

But the same principle can work in reverse. One rotten apple in the policy barrel may have less wholesome spread effects.

4.2.3.3 Language of presentation. Finally, reactions to a plan will hinge on the language in which it is couched. In most Catholic countries a family planning program billed as "responsible parenthood" would set off more harmonious vibrations than one called "birth control" or "population control". An educational plan including classes on "family life education"

might raise fewer hackles than the same option identified as "sex education." While it may be both unethical and counterproductive to seek a silky euphemism for every prickly policy option, there are many cases in which palatable language neither distorts the truth nor camouflages the intended action steps.

The Mexican government's handling of the language for its population policy provides one of the clearest cases on record of the search for linguistic legitimation. Leñero (1976) shows how policy-makers made a deliberate effort to draft the 1973 Population Law in terms that would appeal to or at least mollify all of the concerned interest groups. To ward off the usual charges from the socialist wing, the law stated that population policy was intended to pursue development rather than substitute for it. For critics who might charge that birth control programs were an American import, the government could say that its policy was an expression of sovereign self-determination. To satisfy cultural nationalists as well as potential Catholic critics, the law proclaimed an absolute respect for human rights and national cultural values. Seemingly to draw support from feminist groups, the law proclaimed equality of the sexes as one of its formal objectives. The language, in short, tried to convey the impression that Mexican population policy was purely Mexican in origin, reflected Mexican values and traditions, was designed to address pressing national problems, and would serve all sectors and interests in the society. The carefully tailored language, together with adroit publicity moves, seem to have had a favorable impact on public reaction to the law.

4.3 Plan Implementation

The transactional perspective applied to policy formulation is equally salient for plan implementation. In fact, as already noted, the chances for implementation will depend in good measure on the processes and contents of planning. Plans which ignore crucial actors in the power setting, which are not perceived as credible or palatable, which touch off conflicts or resentments among those closest to them, and which are presented in insensitive or inflammatory language, will be hobbled at the starting gate. Those that have been developed with the participation of those to be affected, that are tailored to the needs and interests of target populations, that have strong political and bureaucratic support, and that are realistic in their organizational and management structure, will have at least some chance in the implementation race.

The foremost challenge in planning for implementation is to identify and deal with the forces promoting or preventing the program's movement. From a transactional standpoint a plan, considered in itself, is best regarded as an object with no velocity. Like a stone, it will remain at rest unless some force acts on it from the outside. It will never go into motion simply because of its own logic, elegance, or wisdom, though these qualities may increase its momentum once other forces induce movement. The task, then, is to activate those forces which will set the plan moving in the desired direction, and to counter-act those forces which would stop it from moving at all or cause it to move in undesired directions. Here the mechanical analogy ends, for the essence of transaction is to relate to and deal with key elements in the environment. In most development programs this is much

more of a process of consultation, negotiation, and exchange than of corking and uncorking bottled "forces." The following scheme suggests some specific possibilities for applying this transactional approach to implementation.

4.3.1 Facilitating Conditions

If the plan, as plan, is assumed to be a mass at rest, and the aim is to have it develop sufficient momentum to be implemented, one must ask about the potential sources of velocity. Principal among these are the commitment of the political leaders involved; the organizational capacity of the implementing agencies; the commitment of the implementers; and interest group support. If none of these can make it go, chances are that it will remain at rest a long time.

4.3.1.1 Commitment of political leaders. Significant development plans, such as those proposing educational or agrarian reforms, will usually not be carried out unless they are backed by the political leadership of the country. In practice, commitment means a willingness on the part of these leaders to provide the positive weight of their authority to implementation and to refrain from actions which would undercut the plan. A perfect example is seen in the educational reforms undertaken by El Salvador in 1967. The Minister of Education and the main protagonist of the reforms, Walter Béneke, knew full well that they would be controversial and that they could be completed only with the backing of the president. Fortunately for Béneke, President Sanchez Hernandez was willing to stand behind this effort, even when teacher strikes almost brought down the government. Sanchez was firmly

convinced that expanded education was essential to Salvador's development, and that it should be the centerpiece of his administration. As one of Béneke's closest advisors put it in an interview with this author,

Sanchez was not a very dominating person, and was somewhat shy with the ministers, most of whom were mediocre. Béneke was not shy, and was able to move ahead partly because of his personal connection with the president, but also because of the president's personal conviction about education.

Béneke made the following comment in an interview with myself and Noel McGinn:

We knew that if we didn't have the changes we would have trouble in the future. Salvador had nothing but people. Everything is people. (Sanchez) told me later that members of the Board of the official party came to him and said: "If you keep Béneke on we are not responsible for losing the elections." He said to them: "I have confidence in him." He never tried to stop me, and he told me this only after leaving office.

In the opinion of everyone consulted, the reforms simply would not have been installed without the support of the president. And, as this example illustrates, top-level commitment is doubly necessary when the proposed changes readily feed into national, as distinct from ministerial, politics.

4.3.1.2 Organizational capacity. Success in implementation will further rest on the capacity of the implementing agencies to carry out the necessary tasks. One prerequisite, noted earlier, is clarity about who, precisely, is to carry out which aspects of a plan. Ambiguity on this front may easily produce inaction, delays, jurisdictional conflicts, or totally fragmented action. The following comments about the Egyptian family planning program underscore the importance of clear lines of responsibility:

The confusion and diffusion of authority lines has resulted in numerous day to day administrative problems for clinic personnel and their immediate supervisors. Administratively, medical personnel belong to the Ministry of Health and social work personnel to the Ministry of Social Affairs, but they performed their tasks in the family planning clinic under the jurisdiction of the Executive Family Planning Board. Several questions related to routine administrative procedures were raised for which no precise answers were provided. What was to be done, for example, in the case of a physician who neglected his tasks in the family planning clinic in the afternoon but performed his duties in the health unit in the morning? What was the procedure when clinic personnel requested summer vacations, sick leaves, or temporary absence from their work? Who was to decide on and approve personnel promotions, rewards, punishments, and transfers (Gadalla, Mehanna, and Tennant, 1977, p. 93)?

These last items are the horseshoe nails for want of which more than one development program has fallen. While sharply drawn organization charts and the managerial philosophy behind them can also be barriers to development, uncertainty about who is to do what will often produce temporizing or bureaucratic stumbling.

For any given implementing organization, capacity has three central ingredients. The first is the technical skill to carry out the necessary action. An agency which is asked to prepare a manual on how to use chemical fertilizers, and which has had no experience with either manuals or fertilizers, may require a long starting time. The second ingredient is the ability to relate well to other organizations operating in the same policy arena. Agencies with a reputation for bureaucratic expansionism, inter-ministerial intrigue, or general untrustworthiness will not be well placed to handle implementation requiring inter-agency cooperation. The third element is the presence of or the willingness to develop appropriate routines. Recent organization theory, especially the work of March and Simon (1958), places strong

emphasis on the notion of standardized ways of solving problems and handling requests. Most implementing agencies will have developed certain basic routines for accomplishing their normal work, and will probably have the type of personnel who adapt well to such routines. For example, an agency whose main tasks are interpreting rules and auditing the work of other units is unlikely to possess either the operating procedures or the mentality for innovative action in the field. The practical questions, then, are two: first, does the agency now have the organizational routines and the corresponding mindset to carry out the program? and second, if it does not, can it modify its routines quickly enough to get the necessary work done? If the answers to both questions are negative, the planners might best look elsewhere.

4.3.1.3 The commitment of implementers. One of the most common mistakes in rationalist planning is to assume that if the generals are ready to move, the captains and troops will follow. We now have striking evidence that staff willingness to carry out approved policies is variable and subject to bureaucratic, cultural, and psychological influences. It is also clear that such commitment does not remain fixed over time. Initial holdouts can sometimes be brought on board, while starting enthusiasts may show reduced motivation when a program moves into its more difficult stages. As an aid to assessing staff commitment it is useful to think of implementation at three organizational levels: (i) top-level authorities, such as the president or prime minister or the minister responsible for the program; (ii) intermediate administrators, such as a bureau director or a district commissioner; and (iii) field administrators, such as doctors and nurses in a health clinic, teachers, and agricultural extension workers. Experience with various

development programs suggests the following hypothesis about commitment.

First, the commitment seen in the top echelons will be a predominant influence on lower levels, but especially on intermediate administrators. If the prime minister, president, ministers, and other senior officials are lukewarm to hostile, a program is not likely to generate much momentum in the middle. Intermediate administrators, being in close contact with the top, will usually be aware of ambivalences at that level. Since many will themselves want to move up, they will be under strong pressure to behave in ways consistent with the attitudes perceived above them. In Kenya, for example, there is ample evidence that the president and the responsible ministers are at least ambivalent about the government's family planning program. Interviews with intermediate administrators (Ndeti and Ndeti, 1978) show considerable awareness of doubts by the "politicians", and suggest that the officials' perception of these doubts reduces their own enthusiasm for active implementation.

Second, field administrators who are in close contact with local communities will be especially sensitive to the attitudes, values, and beliefs at that level. Teachers or village-level health workers may care more about the opinions and feelings of local leaders than the orders administered by their superiors. If program implementation means that they must run the risk of antagonizing significant others in their environment, they will often find ways of balancing their need for a job with their desire for local esteem. Moreover, some field implementers may feel that their long-term career prospects lie outside the bureaucracy that employs them. They may aspire to mobility through a political party, a tribal organization, or some other political

channel. Faced with implementation orders that violate the expectations of actors crucial to their plans, they may decide that subversion or inaction is the most "rational" course.

Finally, the attitudes, values, beliefs, and expectations of the implementers themselves may strengthen or weaken commitment to implementation. A good part of the literature on the social psychology of organizations (cf. Katz and Kahn, 1967) boils down to a single question: how will individuals in the organization react as human beings rather than as employees? One might ask, for example, if the implementers really want to be implementing this program at all. The Egyptian study cited earlier provides a clear illustration of low motivation for work in a development program:

Most of the clinics are staffed by recently graduated physicians who are required to spend a two-year term of service in public health. Those assigned to rural clinics often regard such an assignment as an unwelcome ordeal to be tolerated until they can return to the city to begin a real medical practice. . . . Not only are doctors serving in rural clinics cut-off from opportunities available to their urban colleagues, such as research activities, teaching appointments and the like, but, in addition, they are prohibited from establishing a private practice in these areas. Consequently, one can easily understand why commitment among such personnel would tend to run low (Gadalla, Mehanna, and Tennant, 1977, p.98)

In other programs implementers may have no objection to the organization or to the broad lines of action, but still take exception to specific activities. In one Catholic country, family planning workers seemed generally favorable to the idea of birth limitation, but considered sterilization immoral. Nevertheless they were under heavy pressure from the government population organization to meet posted quotas for sterilizations as well as other methods. Under these conditions even otherwise well-motivated doctors and nurses might develop strong antipathies to the program.

4.3.1.4 Interest group support. A final condition favoring implementation is the degree of support from critical interest groups. Planners must always ask if anyone is really interested in this policy and, if so, what is the intensity of their interest. Policy-makers sometimes assume that the absence of negative or positive reactions means that the road is clear for implementation. This may be the case, especially with an inconsequential policy, but it may also mean that no one of importance really cares about the program, in which case political leaders may have trouble whipping up their own commitment. As a rule of thumb, unless a program is a technical change of no great import, if it has no strong advocates outside the planning unit it will stand little chance of implementation, particularly if obstacles arise along the way.

4.3.2 Impeding Conditions

Several conditions will also work against the implementation of development plans. These are:

4.3.2.1 Magnitude of change. The greater the breadth and depth of a change to be accomplished through a program, the smaller the chances that it will be carried out. Breadth refers to the number of groups, decisions, and sectors involved, points that will be discussed shortly. Depth has to do with the intensity, profundity, or impact of the modifications proposed for any one area. The more a plan requires fundamental changes in social structures, in cultural norms, in political exchanges, or in other established behavior patterns, the greater the inertial forces and chances of recoil. In the recent Peruvian educational reform it was not coincidental that the element requiring

the most superficial change--the formation of new education districts-- was also the one that provoked the least resistance. When the government tried to modify entrenched patterns of social behavior, such as through schemes for community participation in decision-making, the obstacles were much greater (Cleaves, 1976). The deeper a change penetrates, the more likely it is to entail the abandonment of established routines, such as rule books and reporting patterns; losses arising from "sunk costs," such as existing data forms; modifications of satisfying personal relationships or economic arrangements; and alteration of environments that, however bad, are at least familiar and understood. Thus, from a transactional standpoint planners would be well-advised to examine the deeper social, economic, political, and psychological costs of any proposed intervention.

4.3.2.2 Number of actors involved. The more numerous the individuals, organizations, interest groups, or other bodies involved in implementation, the smaller the chances of success. These are several reasons for this gloomy prediction. First, more actors mean more demands for communication and thus greater chances of delay. If a single bureau has sole responsibility for executing an integrated rural development program, if most of the implementers are under its direct jurisdiction, and if interest groups have no significant opportunities for direct intervention, the possibilities for action may be quite good. When, on the other hand, responsibility is shared across the ministries of agriculture, health, education, and public works, the sheer mechanics of communication can be formidable. Bureaucratic precedent may make it difficult for implementing officials from the ministry of health to resolve matters directly with their counterparts from the ministry of agriculture.

Rules or custom may dictate that each official prepare a memorandum which is routed to the top of the home ministry, across to the top of the other, down to the counterpart, then back up, across, and down the same pathway. Many agencies, of course, find ways of circumventing these ladders, but policy-makers at the top sometimes resist any dilution of their authority.

Second, the complexities of communication will often be aggravated by differences in perspective and divergencies in goals across the implementing organizations. Representatives of the different bureaus will think in different ways, use a different technical language, and press for different objectives. In an integrated family planning program doctors from the Ministry of Health may insist on a high quality of medical care for each person who attends the clinic. Administrators appointed by the government's population commission, perhaps with some nudging by donor agencies, may put greater stress on contraceptive distribution to homes and less on medical supervision. Social workers from the social affairs agency feel, for their part, that educating people about the need for family planning is more important than either distribution or individual supervision. Difficulties in communication will be accentuated when normal professional biases are reinforced by promotion systems and other reward schemes favoring such proclivities.

Third, the problems mentioned will be multiplied when policy implementation involves not only overlapping bureaucracies but heterogeneous and warring interest groups. In these circumstances, which are common with plans proposing major changes, each interest group will have its allies in the participating bureaucracies, and perhaps elsewhere in the government, such as in the

legislature or the military. Much to the chagrin of the planners, the parliament may decide to hold special hearings on the plan and the press may set out to expose its folly. As a general rule, when a plan becomes entangled in political scimmages, senior officials are reluctant to press for rapid action out of fear that they may personally become targets of attack. The more heated the political climate surrounding a plan, the stronger the impulse within the bureaucracy to let it cool through inaction.

4.3.2.3 Alternative commitments or preferences. In some cases the collaborators, gatekeepers, or other participants may agree in principle with a plan but still default or hold back on implementation. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) provide a lucid illustration of this phenomenon in their study of a poverty program in Oakland, California. They cite several reasons why participants might accept the ends of a plan but still not carry it out. First, participants may be in favor of the project but find it incompatible with other goals or more favored projects. Thus the ministry of finance may consider a proposal to build new health clinics highly desirable and perfectly feasible, but still decide that available funds should be used for other purposes, such as bombers. Given limited funds, new expenditures for health would mean fewer resources for defense, so that there are incompatibilities. Second, even where there is no incompatibility, participants may simply prefer other projects. The ministry of health may not be in any way opposed to a family planning program, but might still decide that it should stay with its traditional specialties of health care rather than venture into new areas. Third, participants may see no incompatibilities and not prefer an alternative program, but nonetheless have other projects with greater claims on their

time and attention. The budgetary review office in the ministry of finance may be well-disposed in principle toward an irrigation project, but unwilling to review it ahead of the 180 other projects towards which it is also well-disposed. The result may be substantial delays in implementation. Fourth, participants may fully agree with and support the plan, but lack the power to overcome obstacles arising during implementation. The minister of education may be theoretically, as well as practically, behind a curriculum reform. However, when the new curriculum is finally developed, the teachers threaten to strike if it is introduced without a reduction in teaching hours and an increase in pay. For all of his good intentions the minister may decide that he simply does not have the political muscle to push the reforms through in the face of such stiff opposition. These examples suggest that a sharp distinction must be drawn between noble intentions about ends and the capacity, opportunity, and willingness to deliver the requisite means. Statements of good intentions in themselves are not an indicator of behavioral ability and willingness to overcome obstacles to implementation at critical junctures.

4.3.2.4 Intrinsic complexity. The greater the number of separate elements in a plan or program, and the more intricate their interconnections, the greater the difficulties in implementation. Several specific aspects of complexity will bear upon the implementation of a development plan. These include: (a) technical complexity, such as difficulties arising from engineering considerations; (b) fiscal and economic complexity, including problems arising from the linkage of a plan to accurate market forecasts or to reforms in tax policy; (c) supply complexity, especially the length and

interdependency of the supply chain; (d) organizational complexity, such as the number of overlapping units and the levels of supervision needed to keep the plan on track; and (e) behavioral complexity, particularly the amount of change which implementation will require in long-standing attitudes and practices among the implementers. Some of these factors are quite familiar in project analysis, while others, particularly those dealing with behavioral and attitudinal change, are often slighted.

Roemer and Warwick (1978) illustrate the role of intrinsic complexity in the fishing sector. Faced with a very real danger of overfishing, a government considers two possible strategies for reducing the fishing catch. The first involves banning all fishing in its waters during specified seasons and enforcing the ban with naval patrols. The intrinsic complexity of this strategy is low, for the behavioral change required is simple (no fishing) and the enforcement straightforward if patrol ships are available. This first method would undoubtedly create many other social, economic, and political problems, but these would not arise from intrinsic complexity. The second approach is to combine restrictions in fishing with compensatory programs of employment-generation for the displaced fishermen. Complexity would rise dramatically because of the inherent uncertainties involved in creating jobs and having them accepted, difficulties of establishing the credibility of the government's intentions in this area, the loss of cultural satisfactions, such as the informal marketplace that "happens" when a boat comes in, and the likelihood of strong opposition from local and national leaders. In general, fisheries policies showing low intrinsic complexity generate highly complex externalities, while those with high intrinsic complexity are usually

designed precisely to minimize such externalities.

4.3.2.5 Number of decision points. The greater the number of decisions and clearance points in the implementation process, the smaller the chances of success. There are two paramount reasons. First, the greater the number of choice points, the greater the possibilities of delay. Even without conflict, sabotage, opposition, or other forms of non-cooperation, each decision or clearance will require consultation, which takes time. Second, the longer the string of choice points, the greater the likelihood of intentional delays by hostile or unconvinced actors in the power setting.

As a rough guide for assessing the overall chances and probable timing of implementation, planners should calculate first, the number of known or probable decision and clearance points along the projected implementation chain; and second, the chances of reaching agreement at each point. Assuming independence of events, even with only five clearances and a probability of agreement as high as 80 percent at each stage, the overall chances of success would be less than one in three; with ten clearances the figure would drop to one in ten. Pressman and Wildavsky went through such calculations for the Oakland poverty program. They concluded, in retrospect, that with 70 clearances and a probability of agreement of 80 percent the chances of success for that undertaking were less than one in a million!

4.3.2.6 Timing. Finally, the greater the length of time required for implementing a plan, the smaller its chances of success. There are great advantages to changes which can be accomplished quickly, though swift action may lead to false impressions about the depth and permanence of change. A long time span, by contrast, will often produce several impediments to implementation.

For one, the longer the time required, the greater the likelihood of a change in political leadership. Ironically, the very conditions which produced strong support for a plan in one regime may lead to its undoing in the next. Anxious to discredit their predecessors or desirous of obtaining new supporters for their own regime, the new leaders may jettison programs which alienated significant interest groups in the country. For example, both Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Indira Ghandi of India gave strong backing to their government's birth control programs. In both cases, though for different reasons, the programs generated heated controversy and were cut back after the regime was put out of office. In general, the more a plan symbolizes the distinctive values or liabilities of a predecessor regime, and the more these values or liabilities come under attack in the new government, the greater the chances that the program will be shelved.

In other cases the problem is not that the incoming government is hostile to a program but that it has other priorities which excite greater interest. Thus when asked to energize a lagging family planning program, a new leader may conclude that his heft can be applied more usefully to other, perhaps newer, programs. In still other instances the government may decide that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the program, but that it should be shunted aside because it does not provide enough instant visibility for the leadership.

Even if the same leaders stay in place the passage of time may weaken the original commitment to the program. The crisis that gave rise to a housing program, for example, may have passed or been suppressed, so that there is no longer a sense of political urgency. Then there may be new

crises, such as demands for land reform from organized peasant groups, which deflect attention from older priorities. Another casualty of time is the sense of organizational dynamism and flexibility found with new policies and programs. As the months and years pass, forceful leaders and organizational climbers may leave out of frustration with a sluggish bureaucracy. Pressures may also mount to have the program even further bureaucratized in order to ward off the inevitable criticisms about "irregularities." Action may thus be slowed so that it can be done in the right way. Moreover, enthusiastic supporters at the program's baptism may conclude that their interests do not warrant commitment through its childhood and adolescence. Declining allegiance from interest groups, together with mounting criticism for inefficiency and a lack of results, will further dampen the ardor of top-level leaders. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) again provide a penetrating analysis of the anatomy of delay in the Oakland poverty program.

5.0 Conclusion

The danger with the predictive scheme just presented is that it can foster a sense of hopelessness about implementing any development program. Anyone who completes the suggested exercise will undoubtedly conclude that a complex project will be laden with difficulties, uncertainties, and delays. As a counterbalance to pessimism, it should be noted that the model contains a positive as well as negative side, and that there have, in fact, been many successfully implemented development programs. Sometimes such success is the result of analytic foresight and shrewd intuitions, but in many cases it seems to have resulted from what Albert Hirschman has called the Principle

of the Hiding Hand:

What this principle suggests is that, far from seeking out and taking up challenges, people are apt to take on and plunge into new tasks because of the erroneously presumed absence of a challenge--because the task looks easier and more manageable than it will turn out to be. As a result, the Hiding Hand can help accelerate the rate at which men engage successfully in problem-solving: they take up problems they think they can solve, find them more difficult than expected, but then, being stuck with them, attack willy-nilly the unsuspected difficulties--and sometimes even succeed (1967, p. 13).

Hirschman concedes, however, that the Hiding Hand is a crutch for decision-makers who cannot face risks, and recommends that its use be as short as possible.

The transactional approach suggests a middle road between paralytic pessimism and salvation by the Hiding Hand. The strategy might be called binocular implementation forecasting--one eye on the positive resources which can be mobilized to support implementation, the other on the barriers and obstacles to action. If careful analysis shows that a plan is fraught with ambiguities and difficulties, but that the implementers are resourceful people who can command adequate political support, they should be given a chance. Whether through a hiding hand or a gun to the head, they may discover unanticipated allies, resources, and energies along the way. Moreover, this kind of implementation forecasting can produce its own corrective to despair if it makes a deliberate effort to project the favorable developments that at least may work in the project's interest. With these in mind the implementers and their supporters can make positive efforts to build constituencies and prevent roadblocks so that anticipated setbacks do not happen. In sum, while the transactional approach is likely to uncover more

pitfalls to implementation than conventional planning methods, it should also find compensating assets if a plan is at all viable. An English proverb offers good concluding advice:

For every evil under the sun
There is a remedy or there is none;
If there be one try and find it,
If there be none, never mind it.

REFERENCES

- Ashford, Douglas Elliot (1965)
Morocco-Tunisia: Politics and Planning, Syracuse, New York:
Syracuse University Press.
- Benveniste, Guy (1970)
Bureaucracy and National Planning--A Sociological Case Study in Mexico,
New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Braybrooke, David and Charles Lindblom (1963)
A Strategy of Decision, New York:
Free Press.
- Caiden, Naomi & Aaron Wildavsky (1974)
Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries, New York: John Wiley.
- Cerych, Ladislav (1967)
The Integration of External Assistance with Educational Planning
in Nigeria, Paris: UNESCO, International Institute of Educational
Planning (IIEP).
- Cleaves, Peter S. (1976)
"Implementation of the Agrarian and Educational Reforms in Peru,"
A paper prepared for the Conference on Implementation in Latin
America's Public Sector, held at the University of Texas, Austin,
Texas, April 29--May 1, 1976, mimeo.
- Gadalla, Saad (1976)
"Development and Prospects of Egypt's Population Policy and Family
Planning Program." Cairo: Social Research Center, The American
University in Cairo, mimeo.
- Gadalla, Saad, Soheir Mehanna, and Christine Tennant (1978)
Country Report: Egypt. Cultural Values and Population Policies.
Social Research Center, The American University in Cairo, mimeo.
- Hirschman, Albert O. (1967)
"The Principle of the Hiding Hand," The Public Interest, 6, pp. 10-23.
- Katz D. and R. Kahn (1966)
The Social Psychology of Organizations, New York: John Wiley.
- Krassowski, Andrezej (1968)
The Aid Relationship, London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Leñero, Luis (1977)
Research on Cultural Values and Population Policies in Mexico
(translated by K. Williams). Mexico City: Instituto Mexicano de
Estudios Sociales, mimeo.

- March, James and Herbert A. Simon (1958)
Organizations, New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- McGinn, Noel F. and Ernesto Schiefelbein (1977)
"Political Action for Educational Change" Harvard University,
Graduate School of Education, mimeo.
- Montgomery, John D. (1962)
The Politics of Foreign Aid, New York: Praeger.
- Ndeti, Kivuto and Cecilia Ndeti (1977)
Cultural Values and Population Policies in Kenya. Nairobi: D.L.
Patel Press.
- Pressman, Jeffrey L., and Aaron Wildavsky (1974)
Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed
in Oakland, Berkeley, California: The University of California Press.
- Roemer, Michael and Donald Warwick (1978)
"Implementing National Fisheries Plans." Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Institute for International Development, Development Discussion Paper
No. 36.
- Rondinelli, D.A. (1976)
"Public Planning and Political Strategy." Long Range Planning,
9:2, pp. 75-82.
- Ruscoe, G.C. (1969)
The Conditions for Success in Educational Planning, Paris: UNESCO
International Institute for Educational Planning.
- Schiefelbein, Ernesto and Noel F. McGinn (1975)
"Power for Change: Educational Planning in the Political Context,"
Harvard University, Graduate School of Education, mimeo.
- Tendler, Judith (1975)
Inside Foreign Aid, Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University
Press.
- Warwick, Donald P. in collaboration with M. Meade and T. Reed (1975)
A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality and Organization
in the State Department. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Warwick, Donald P. (1977a)
"A Framework for the Analysis of Population Policy." Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Institute for International Development, Development Discussion
Paper No. 22.
- Warwick, Donald P. with the assistance of Hugh Snyder (1977b)
"Planning as Transaction: Dealing with Bureaucratic and Political
Contexts." Cambridge, Mass.: Analysis Methodologies Project,
Center for Studies of Education and Development, Harvard University.

Wynia, Gary W. (1972)

Politics and Planners: Economic Development Policy in Central America
Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.