

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET1. CONTROL NUMBER
PN-AAH-3562. SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION (695)
DE10-0000-G146

3. TITLE AND SUBTITLE (240)

Mobilization of rural savings; the case of the Sudanese Savings Bank

4. PERSONAL AUTHORS (100)

Mauri, Arnaldo; Mottura, Paolo

5. CORPORATE AUTHORS (101)

Ohio State Univ. Dept. of Agr. Economics and Rural Sociology

6. DOCUMENT DATE (110)
19797. NUMBER OF PAGES (120)
22p.8. ARC NUMBER (170)
SU332.2.M4549. REFERENCE ORGANIZATION (130)
Ohio State

10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES (500)

(In Paper no. 11, Second International Conference on Rural Finance Research Issues, Calgary, Canada, 1979)

11. ABSTRACT (950)

12. DESCRIPTORS (920)

Savings Rural finance system
Banks
Banking business
Sudan
Mobile banking units
Financial management

13. PROJECT NUMBER (150)

931116900

14. CONTRACT NO.(140)

AJD/ta-BMA-7

15. CONTRACT
TYPE (140)

16. TYPE OF DOCUMENT (160)

FN-MAH-356

SU
332.2
M454

Paper No. 11
Second International Conference on
Rural Finance Research Issues
Calgary, Canada
August 29-31, 1979

MOBILIZATION OF RURAL SAVINGS:
THE CASE OF THE SUDANESE
SAVINGS BANK

By

Arnaldo Mauri
and
Paolo Mottura

Professor of Monetary Economics (State University of Milan),
and Professor of Banking (University of Parma).

Conference Sponsors

Office of Rural Development
and Development Administration
Development Support Bureau
Agency for International
Development

Department of Agricultural
Economics & Rural Sociology
The Ohio State University
2120 Fyffe Road
Columbus, Ohio, USA 43210

1. INTRODUCTION.

The origin of the project must be placed in 1970 when the Association of Italian Savings Banks and the Bank of Sudan signed an agreement of technical assistance for the preparation of a feasibility study. It is important to recall that under the agreement it was specified that:

- (a) the headquarters and first branch of the SSB would be located in Wad Medani. The preliminary choice of this location had a great relevance for the whole project, since the geographical area involved by the project has very definite characters. The town of Wad Medani, with its estimated population almost of 150,000, is the most important agricultural center in the Sudan, being the main town of the Gezira province (35.057 Sq.Kms. and population of 2,5 millions inhabitants in 1978). Gezira represents the most advanced agricultural area of the Country: a wide and intensive irrigation system and a well established infrastructural organization make of Gezira a leading area in cotton production and a very important one in the production of other basic crops, such as sorghum, wheat, groundnuts and fruits. The irrigated area has an extension of about 1,5 million hectares and is cultivated by about 100,000 "tenant farmers", their families and a very large number of permanent and seasonal labourers.

Recently, also the industrial sector has been growing in the area with the establishment of ginning mills, wheat mills, spinning and weaving factories, other textile factories, tannery. Therefore the area is characterized by a high population density and by a high average income level by Sudanese standards and can be defined as a "rural area" since agricultural production is prevalent, trade and industry are strictly depending upon agriculture and rural population accounts for 85% of the total. The financial structure consisted, before the SSB establishment in 1974, of three commercial banks (four branches, of which three in Wad Medani) and of a single branch of the Agricultural Bank, besides the Wad Medani office of the Central Bank and the various Post Office Savings Bank branches. Even if it was not possible to analyze financial activity in detail, because of the reticence of commercial banks, however overall information indicated that both the population and economic activity were lacking financial services and financial infrastructure. In fact commercial banks operated in a very restricted market segment, that is mostly high-income level classes, wholesale trade and industry.

- (b) The capital would be entirely owned by the Bank of Sudan (Central Bank). Thus, the Sudanese Savings Bank has been defined as a public institution. Following the feasibility study, submitted to the Bank of Sudan in 1971 and by the same approved, the Sudanese Savings Bank Bill (1973) and its Amendment (1974) further specify the details of the SSB. In particular the law makes clear that:

- (1) the principal functions of the Bank shall be the promotion of the savings spirit, to encourage saving, to gather and invest savings in economical and social aspects of growth in Sudan, and to fulfil this the Bank shall:

- a) establish branches in provinces;
 - b) plan saving policy in provinces, setting rules of its supervision and shall coordinate between that and the State Policy in this aspects;
 - c) accumulate fluid money for local bank branches to undertake central investments which shall enforce the growth of local surroundings and participate in economical and social development;
 - d) generally do all work and banking operations which are connected with its functions or its fulfillment.
- (2) The initial capital provided by the Bank of Sudan will amount to 500.000 Sudanese Pounds (1 US \$ equals roughly 0.40 Sudanese Pounds).
 - (3) The Board of Directors will be formed by at least seven persons; among whom the Chairman-General Manager appointed by the Minister of the Economy with the consent of the President of the Republic and one representative for the Bank of Sudan. All members, except the Chairman, are appointed by the Bank of Sudan.
 - (4) The net profits will be disposed of according to the suggestions of the Board of Directors and with the approval of the Bank of Sudan.

The implementation of the project actually started in January 1974 with the signature of the Protocol for technical cooperation. The Sudanese Savings Bank was then inaugurated on the 31st of October and finally started operating in December of the same year. During this stage of the project two Italian experts have taken up the position of consultants in the SSB. This assistance was provided until the end of 1978. It is important to point out that, according to the basic objective of favouring the "social integration" of the new bank, it was decided to locate the headquarters and branch near the market area of the town. The branch office, the desk and the structure of the building have been specifically designed in order to differentiate the image of the SSB from the traditional image of commercial banks and in view of adapting the SSB approach to the typical psychology of the Sudanese semi-rural lower - and middle - income classes. The composition of the Board of Directors will be shown further on.

2. MEASURES ADOPTED IN COLLECTING DEPOSITS.

In order to promote the collection of deposits among the local savers and enterprises, the SSB has devised and implemented the following measures since 1974:

- Financial instruments.

- (a) savings accounts. This type of account, designed for the great majority of savers, is represented by a savings pass-book. The depositors receive initially a savings-box as a simple means of everyday saving. Such box is opened by the desk-employees, who then credit the pass-book for the existing amount. The savings-box has been a key-factor of the success of the saving accounts. There is no limitation to the withdrawal of any sum from the account, which bears an interest rate of 8%. However the Board of Directors has deemed necessary to set a floor-limit of 0.25 Sudanese pounds for the opening of the account

and to charge 0.25 Sudanese pounds for the savings-box. The rate of interest offered by commercial banks and by the Post Office Savings Bank is 8%. It is important to point out that commercial banks accept deposits only over 2 Sudanese pounds and that the POSB limits withdrawals over a certain amount by imposing on the depositor the obligation of giving a certain notice.

- (b) Investment accounts. This type of account may be defined as a time deposit since withdrawals cannot be requested before a twelve-month period. The rate of interest is 9%. No savings-box is given to the customer. For other technical aspects the investment accounts are like the savings accounts. Also commercial banks pay a rate of 9%, but do not seem to have interest in investment accounts.
- (c) Current accounts. This type of account is exactly the same as in commercial banks and does not bear any interest.

- Innovations.

- (a) Mobile Units service. All the above-mentioned forms of deposits are collected also by the 3 mobile units which periodically visit the most important market-villages in the rural area around the main branch. Details about their performance will be provided further on.
- (b) Night-safe service. The main branch provides also this service, which has proved to be an efficient means for attracting new depositors. In fact the town of Wad Medani, being a primary market center, is periodically visited by out-of-town merchants, who usually arrive on the eve of the market-day bringing remarkable sums of cash. These people appreciate very much the night-safe service for obvious safe-keeping purposes.
- (c) Savings stamps. The promotion of the saving spirit in schools consists in the distribution of savings stamps. By collecting these stamps schoolboys are able to accumulate gradually the amount necessary to open a savings account.
- (d) Certificates of value. Anybody can buy a certificate of value to the bearer for any amount. The certificate does not bear any interest since it is devised to be used as a present (for instance, by relatives in case of circumcisions, marriages, other social and family opportunities). The introduction of the certificate was decided upon the consideration that cash is the commonest form of present in Sudanese communities. The bearer of the certificate can easily convert the non-interest certificate into a savings account. However it must be pointed out that both savings stamps and certificates of value have still not been fully promoted, because the SSB has until now been fully engaged in managing the fast growth of deposits collected through the other instruments.
- (e) Publicity programme. The entry of the SSB into the deposit market has been initially supported by a propaganda campaign carried out through the available media: radio (nation-wide diffusion), television (province-wide diffusion), newspapers (national and local), short-films (for

projection in local cinemas), posters, public relations inside any type of local associations (trade-unions, women associations, youth associations, farmers union, cooperatives, etc.). The initial campaign has been followed from time to time by a recall action mostly based upon public relations activity and upon the distribution of small items bearing the SSB name and sign (ash-trays, ball-point pens, check-holders, key-chains, schoolboys, satchels, etc.).

3. THE EVOLUTION OF DEPOSITS.

(a) Savings deposits.

During 1975, the number of accounts grew faster than the total balance of these accounts. The reverse is true for 1976, 1977 and 1978 (table 1). In fact, the average balance initially decreased and started increasing after January 1976. The most likely explanation for this is that the SSB initially attracted a great number of savers because of the novelty and because of the intensive promotion campaign. Savers confidence in the new institution was boosted in the period 1976-1978: it has been ascertained that most savers tested the SSB by opening small amounts and after sometime started depositing additional sums. It is very difficult to say which proportion of the growth of the average balance came from a reduction in the stock of cash in the hands of savers and which from the new flow of financial savings currently generated by the same. That the SSB has continuously promoted this type of account is demonstrated by the sudden growth of the average balance in March and October 1976. The SSB management made successful efforts to gain the confidence of middle- and higher-income savers, who were obviously attracted by the increasing competition of commercial banks. It is likely that the growth of the average balance has also brought about a greater scattering of the balances of the single accounts around the average. It may be surprising that in a town with approx. 150,000 inhabitants the SSB branch has collected more than 14,500 savings accounts (excluding, of course, the accounts collected by the mobile units) in less than three years. Considering the large size of the average Sudanese family, it would appear that nearly all urban families are savers at the SSB. This is not the case and the growth potential is still great. The Sudanese usually think of the savings deposit as a means for accumulating individual rather than household savings. In fact it is not uncommon to receive at the desk the family head who opens several accounts for himself, his wife or wives and his children. Consideration of the social and economic conditions of a sample of depositors supports this observation: more than half of them are students, while the other half is composed mostly by fixed-income earners (that is employees in public or private organizations).

(b) Investment accounts.

This type of deposit experienced immediate success in the first year of activity, but very few new accounts have been opened since 1975 (table 1).

Moreover, the slight decrease in the number of accounts in some months would show that some depositors subscribe to the one-year savings plan, but do not carry it out to its contractual conclusion. It is likely that time-deposits do not conform completely to the psychology of local savers, perhaps because of the slight rate differential vis-à-vis the interest rate on savings deposits (+1%). The abnormal increase in investment accounts in September 1976 is due to the decision of a few public organizations to invest their pension funds in this way. This operation brought to the SSB approx. one million Sudanese pounds. Not considering this extreme exception, it is possible to say that the average balance of investment accounts has steadily increased since the beginning, reaching a level of about 100 pounds. This would indicate that a minority of savers do appreciate the investment account opportunity.

(c) Current accounts.

Statistics on this type of account are not easy to interpret. The steady and rapid growth in the number of these accounts seems to contradict the extreme variability of monthly total balances, particularly during 1975 and 1976 (table 1). This variability may be explained by the initially strong competition of commercial banks in this market segment and by the fact that most depositors are merchants and traders, who make intensive use of their liquid capital in their business. For instance, the great drop in the total balance in the last quarter of 1976 was caused by the concurrence of two basic factors: a decrease in wholesale prices made it convenient for merchants to build up stocks in the same period that quite a number of current account holders were drawing on their balances for the pilgrimage to Mecca. It is very interesting to note that the relative stabilization of the total balance of current accounts in 1977 and 1978 may have been influenced by the loan policy: in fact the SSB began granting loans in 1976 and it may be that this policy has reduced the variability of current accounts since many of the current account holders have also become SSB borrowers and financial intermediation has in certain extent replaced direct money lending.

(d) Total deposits.

Overall deposit growth tends to follow a seasonal pattern with one peculiar low during July-August (rainy season), but it is difficult to correlate deposit variability with the production cycle of cash crops (table 1). However, one experience is insufficient for a sound interpretation of the overall pattern. Also the deposit mix by balance does not clearly indicate any trend followed by the SSB on the liabilities side: the deposit mix is in fact very much influenced by the unexpected growth in investment accounts and by the variability of current accounts. The deposit composition by number of accounts is much more reliable: it shows that savings and investment deposits account for more than 85% of the total number of accounts. This tends to prove that the SSB has gained a firm foothold in the function of savings mobilization in the social sense, without forgoing current accounts, which are directly re-

lated to local economic activity. In conclusion, it appears that the SSB is specializing as a savings collector in the deposit market, as was intended.

4. THE MOBILE UNITS.

The information in table 2 supports the following comments. Since August 1975 the two Mobile Units (3 after February 1977) have carried out weekly banking operations in eleven small towns and villages surrounding Wad Medani. These were selected according to their estimated relevance, as shown by Figure 1. The activity of the Mobile Units has been quite regular until the summer of 1977, with some exceptions in the rainy season, when more distant villages are frequently isolated. Between middle 1977 and middle 1978 the service has been seriously hampered by a gasoline shortage. However after 41 months of activity, the results may be summed up as follows:

- the accounts opened by the Mobile Units represented 12,3% of the total number of deposits;
- the total amount collected represented less than 0,27% of the total deposit balance at the SSB;
- investment and current account performance is certainly not encouraging, as was foreseen;
- savings deposit growth is below expectations and must be further analysed.

As to the last point, it is interesting to note that in 1977 and 1978, the number of savings deposits grew less than the total balance: the average balance is very low, but nonetheless increasing. Since previous study has indicated that the savings potential of the rural area is good even if very much scattered, the most likely interpretation is that the reaction of people to the Mobile Units service has been uncertain and definitely below expectations. Probably, the majority of potential customers is not attracted by the opportunity to deposit at the Mobile Unit, which offers a limited, periodical and sometimes uncertain service. The performance of investment accounts has demonstrated that the average Sudanese saver is generally unwilling to forgo deposit liquidity and clearly prefers the saving deposit which makes available any sum deposited at any time. In fact, funds deposited at Mobile Units are not available six days out of seven. Moreover, the occasional suspension of the service during the rainy season has certainly helped to consolidate the opinion that the Mobile Unit service is not always regular. Moreover the increase in number of accounts and in total deposits has been slackened by the opening of 3 new branches in 1978.

The cost of the Mobile Units service is certainly high. Up to the end of February 1977, the two Mobile Units had accumulated an overall direct cost (except depreciation) amounting to about 40% of total deposits balance. Moreover it is impossible to forecast the average unit cost of the Mobile Unit service, since it is hard to foresee the number and the amount of deposits the single Mobile Unit can manage at full capacity. It is important to note that, however high, the running cost of the Mobile Units should also be considered a research and promotion cost, since their activity is both a fundamental means for surveying and sounding the potential deposit market

in rural areas and a useful propaganda medium. In fact, the performance of the Mobile Units has allowed the SSB Board to anticipate opening three new rural branches (El Hassaheisa, Managil, Rufaa) and it has generated a remarkable customer feedback to the bank's main branch. In conclusion, the experience of the Mobile Units service has not been altogether negative: results obtained in terms of accounts and funds collected do not justify their operating cost, but their collateral promotional effect and market-research function have definitely helped the SSB in enhancing its image and market-position and have given it an opportunity to expand its activity in the agricultural area, through the establishment of small rural branches. In this perspective, Mobile Units service will probably be restricted to the areas immediately surrounding the new branches and their function will consist mostly in supporting the growth of these branches.

5. MAIN FACTORS AFFECTING THE GROWTH OF DEPOSITS.

The achievements of the SSB liability management are not dependent upon deposit interest rate policy, since the SSB applies the same rates as commercial banks. Rather, the key factors of the SSB success may be summed up as follows, besides the comments already made:

- (a) the support of the Central Bank and of the local Government. In fact the financial contribution of the Bank of Sudan has been and still is essential, because the profit and loss account closes with a loss due mainly to the low loans-to-deposits ratio. Also the local Government has played an important role by favouring the positive reaction of the people towards the new institution;
- (b) the choice of the members of the Board of Directors. The Bank of Sudan has chosen the 7 Board members, except its own representative, among local well-know and esteemed personalities. In fact the Central Bank has called to sit on the Board the representatives of the following local organization:
 - Sudan Gezira Board (*) Workers Union,
 - Sudan Gezira Board Social Development,
 - Local Government for Education,
 - Gezira Province Workers Union,
 - Local Chamber of Commerce,
 - Tenants Union of Gezira.

Also the Chairman of the Board and General Manager is a well-known personality in the area. Moreover the staff of the bank is mostly formed by people originating in the Gezira area. Therefore, the people can really perceive the social reality of the SSB and have a direct knowledge of the Board and staff;

- (c) the location of the bank's headquarters. The first 34 months of activity have proven that the choice of the location in a semi-rural developing area was right. In particular, it appears that the local community has appreciated the decision to establish the SSB headquarters in Wad Medani, instead of the capital. No doubt this qualification of the SSB as an eminently local bank has induced a positive market reaction. In

(*) The Sudan Gezira Board is the organization for cotton.

this case the SSB has clearly made leverage upon the conflict which opposes rural to urban areas. The location and lay-out of the town branch. In fact the branch is favourably located in the trade area, near the "market". The architecture of the branch is normally Sudanese (i.e. not imposing). The lay-out of the branch has been designed in order to offer a reception adapted to local mentality. For instance, the door of the branch is permanently open during office-hours, the lay-out offers a number of sitting-places, etc. All this has favoured the SSB in achieving a high "social integration degree";

- (d) the opening of the branches during evenings. Owing to the customers' needs, the Board has decided to open the branches shortly during evening hours, thus allowing people to visit the bank after working time;
- (e) the orientation of the lending policy, that will be examined in the paragraph 7;
- (f) the specialized training of the SSB staff. The italo-Sudanese protocol of technical assistance provided that 25 officers and employees of the SSB receive specialized training by FINAFRICA. Such training has proven very useful not only to improve the banking knowledge and skills of the SSB staff, but also to improve and differentiate his behaviour and performance from that usual of commercial banks personnel, with particular reference to the customer's approach, promotional activities, mobile units operations, etc. (the SSB personnel now numbers about 70 people).

6. THE POSITION OF THE SSB IN THE DEPOSIT MARKET.

In the Province of Gezira both banks and the Post Office Savings Bank accept deposits. The growth rate of deposits in the latter is considerably less than that of bank deposits (the 7 years covered in Tables 3 and 4 show a 38% increase as opposed to 469% for the banks). However, it should be stressed that this phenomenon is not limited to the Gezira Province, but, as Table 3 shows, concerns the whole country which has a fairly constant ratio of total deposits to deposits of the Gezira Province.

On the other hand, bank deposits in Gezira Province increase at a higher rate than the national average (Table 4). This is explained not only by the area's greater demographic and economic growth, but also by the banks' effort to penetrate more deeply a market they consider interesting. Furthermore, the Sudanese Savings Bank and the People's Cooperative Bank, formerly Bank Misr, which opened its branch at Wad Medani in 1976, have joined the 3 banks which began operations in the beginning of the '70's (Bank of Khartoum, Unity Bank and El Nilein Bank).

Tables 5,6 and 7 give an idea of the market for deposits in Gezira and its evolution over the last few years. In particular Table 5 shows that the commercial banks did not suffer as a result of the SSB's entry in the deposits market, with the possible exception of the Bank of Khartoum which, however, almost quadrupled its deposits during this period. Furthermore, any financial institution which controls over 60% of the market cannot be expected

to maintain the same rate of growth as the smaller institutions, especially the newcomers. One should not draw a false conclusion about the aggressiveness of the competition from the data contained in table 6. Keep in mind that, as table 7 shows, less than one-third of the SSB's deposits belong to the current accounts category, the typical liability of commercial banks.

On the other hand, except for the People's Co-operative Bank, only recently set up and which is not yet operating at full capacity, savings and time deposits account for less than one-third of the deposits of commercial banks.

Tables 8 and 9, which refer to Wad Medani Town, throw further light on the SSB's new market. At the end of 1977 SSB had in town more than twice as many live accounts as all the commercial banks together (table 8). But data on the average balance per account (table 9) show that the SSB, although registering an increase from an initial 26 LS to approximately 140 LS in 1977, is at a distinctly lower level than the commercial banks and only exceeds the average balance of the POSB. Inflation partially explains the increase in the period's average balances.

The rapid growth and consequent intensification of the SSB presence on the deposit market has not significantly conflicted with the interests of the four commercial banks now operating in the town area. In fact, the SSB has made successful efforts to find and develop market potentialities which did not attract commercial banks, particularly the small- and medium-income savers segment of the market.

7. LENDING POLICY.

a) Loans granted. At the beginning of credit activity, advances were of small amounts, their average size being about 300 pounds. The guaranty offered to support the applications was in this case just a personal one: a good job and a clean reputation were judged safe enough to allow the granting of these relatively small advances to be repaid in ten equal instalments; a personal guaranty in form of a signature of a well known character of the local economic scene was welcomed. Profoundly different the case for the merchants applying for facilities in form of current account overdrawing. Here, real estate was reckoned more suitable to cover the far bigger and riskier investments demanded by this type of customers.

In the following 1976 the Bank extended the range of its customers to further categories of people: farmers, craftsmen, industrial concerns, professionals. The aim was both the diversification of risks, brought about by lending to different sectors of activity, and enabling any kind of productive activities benefit from the funds collected.

As to the farmers, which initially the bank was mainly meant for, some obstacles in reaching this particular clientele were found in the shortcomings of the communication network. Without peripheral branches in the countryside, the granting of seasonal loans against future crops proved almost impossible for lack of transportation facilities. In fact,

the field inspection, made timely by a competent bank official, is to be regarded as a must in these cases. A bit easier was instead agreeing with the requests made for financing livestock and farming equipment purchases.

Further developments in the primary sector still depend upon the achievement of a suitable solution for the problem of branches, and perhaps, also a better utilisation of the mobile units, in the sense of switching from the mere collection of funds into a more complete range of services including the gathering of basic information about prospective borrowers, would help.

The figures refer to loans and facilities granting for 1976, 1977 and 1978 show a steadfast upwards trend. In the following table is given a synthetic picture for the four years.

Loans and facilities granted and utilised, £.S., end of the year.

	1975	1976	1977	1978
Number granted	95	431	954	1536
utilised	75,752	726,679	1,479,998	2,531,243
deposits collected	42,448	293,850	736,650	2,290,013
	238,485	2,282,898	2,880,775	4,201,885

The figures show the increase registered in the lending activity and compare the faster pace of the deposits trend, which the investments couldn't catch up with. If any remark is to be made on the slower development of the latter it should be pointed out that caution is never enough in the banking business, where what is lent out to a customer is for the greatest part other customers' money. And on security the Sudanese Savings Bank has really made a point working above any expectations. In the Auditor's report for the 1977 exercise only 15 borrowers, owing less than Ls 6,000 altogether, were reported behind schedule in loans repayments. No "accidents" were still recorded at the same date as far as facilities were concerned.

The breakdown of the different categories of customers is pictured in the Table 10. By far, the most outstanding one is made up by the different tradesmen operating in Wad Medani. As already explained, this is to be considered a provisional situation that is going to be modified towards a more equitable distribution of the SSB investments in other sectors of activity.

- b) Rates of interest. The range of interest rates charged to customers is fixed by the Central Bank at the same level for the whole of the Sudanese Banking system, according to the general economic and financial policy currently adopted in the country. They are obviously related to the rates paid on deposits.

Up to 1975 the remuneration for the sums deposited in savings accounts at call was 6% p.a.; for tied up deposits the Banks used to

pay 8% (one year fixing). Correspondingly, the rates applied to borrowers ranged between 10 and 12,5%, the actual conditions being left to the bargain, according to the evaluation of the single customers economic profile made by the officials in charge.

As from August 1975 the above mentioned rates were raised to 8% for savings accounts and 9% for fixed-term deposits and those charged to borrowers were lifted as well, up to the 12,5 - 14,5% spread. Since the SSB started its loans and facilities operations in August 1975, the rates applied for lending have always been the same present ones. The rates actually applied to customers vary according to the type of activity, to the security provided and to the single project the bank is calling to finance. Lower than average rates are charged for agricultural loans and to craftsmen, for personal loans backed by a sound guaranter and for public interest schemes intended to improve general living conditions.

- c) The problem of excessive liquidity. Under circumstances, in order to offset temporarily the costs faced to remunerate savers, the Bank has deviced to move part of its liquid funds, previously deposited with the Bank of Sudan in accounts which bore no interest, to other banks operating in Wad Medani. The authorisation of the Central Bank was obtained in early 1977 and in April same year 1,000,000 £.S. were deposited with El Nilein Bank. Following further formation of excessive liquidity, on the 31st. of July 375,000 £.S. were put with the Unity Bank and an equal sum with the People's Cooperative Bank, thus raising the total of these "investments" at 1,750,000 well above the outstanding figures of loans and facilities granted to the Bank's customers. These accounts bear an interest of 8%.

The move has long been pondered, but facing the urge of streightening the profit and loss accounts in the shortest possible time, not many chances were left to the Sudanese Savings Bank. In the Sudan there is no stock exchange. The few issues of debentures and bonds by the State have so far not been allowed to reach the savers and have been compulsory placed with the commercial Banks. Besides bearing a lower rate of interest than that got of the above mentioned investment they were not availaole for the SSB. Another possible solution would have been lending huge sums to few powerful businessmen, but this, besides tilting further the disproportion among the Bank's customers would have implied a heavy risk of immobilising a far share of the SSB assets, and in favour of privileged people to boot. Depositing with other banks part of the liabilities has so proved to be the best compromise between rentability and profitability.

- d) Special Projects. The SSB was not originally conceived as an investment bank, the funds collected were supposed to be lent out in form of short-term advances to finance seasonal or temporary gaps in working-capital supply. In fact, the economic developments in the Gezira Province have led the SSB to turn over to different employments part of the funds

collected, at least for a limited and definite share of its total assets. The financial support of the Bank was requested and given for a series of new industrial and public service initiatives promoted by the Local Government, anxious to contribute in closing the existing gaps between demand and supply for some services and commodities.

Some companies have been envisaged to carry on the projects, and the Sudanese Savings Bank has been invited to take over equity shares. The total capital investment requested for all the initiatives undertaken so far, will not exceed for the SSB some 300,000 £.S., round about 10% of the funds collected at the end of 1978. The ventures are on paper sound and profitable, and the SSB stake a minority one. If managed in a proper way they can easily come off. At the above mentioned date none of them had yet reached the operational stage and therefore is impossible to evaluate their technical and economic performances. The Bank intends to follow very closely these developments, in order to safeguard its own investments and keep up the reputation of wise money lender it has awarded so far.

The ventures in which SSB is involved so far are:

- i) the Gezira Province Public Transport Corporation Ltd., with 15% partnership (Local Government 50%)
 - ii) Taxi Cars Ownership Scheme
 - iii) Eastern Gezira Development Corporation
 - iv) Wad Medani Bakeries Scheme
 - v) Wad Medani Supermarket
- e) Evaluation of the loan policy. The loan policy, still in an initial phase, is oriented to provide financial support to local business and local investments. The SSB is working in strict cooperation with local Unions and Association in order to define local investment schemes. Some of these schemes will take the form of joint ventures between the SSB and its partners. People have generally reacted positively to the SSB policy of basing financial intermediation upon the local economy and of integrating itself into local socio-economic life. According to the original orientation of the loan policy - as it was outlined by the feasibility study approved by the Bank of Sudan - and to the statute, the SSB credit policy should have a specific social justification and qualification. It is important to stress that the "sociality" of such policy is not at all related to the application of subsidized interest rates and to the degree of social utility and usefulness of the investments financed, but rather it refers to the selection of customers among potential borrowers normally discriminated by commercial banks (small- and medium-size firms in the economic sectors typical of the area). Owing a deep-rooted tradition in the Sudan, the SSB must also grant a certain number of personal loans in order to consolidate its social image. However the Board of Directors has defined precise limits in this field of activity for obvious reasons. Moreover the SSB loan policy should conform to the general principle that borrowers belong to the social clas

ses and economic sectors which locally supply financial savings to the Bank and investments financed be part of the local economy. In other words, it has been decided that the financial intermediation circuit activated by the SSB should be a "closed and self-financing circuit" at local level (and possibly at sector's level), within the limits allowed by local capital demand and supply and by overall economic policy. This provision would ensure that the SSB does not channel financial resources from rural areas and agriculture to respectively urban areas (i.e. the capital) and other sectors, since such transfer has been judged negative in most LDCs. However, it is self-evident that the practical implementation of such policy may be difficult, because of local conditions. In fact, the loans statistics in table show that 73% of the credit is granted to the industrial and commercial sector, which represent only the 8,5% of total borrowers: thus, loans allocation appears to be less "social" than it was planned and expected, while the liability structure is certainly more "social".


8. CONCLUSIONS

A final evaluation of the SSB performance is, for the time being, impossible, since many factors show that the Bank has not achieved a stabilized position in the market. The first stage of growth, mostly concerned with the organization and the take-off of the new institution, has been successfully implemented and managed up to now. During this phase, deposit growth has been largely sustained by the conversion of cash hoardings (stocks) into SSB liabilities on the part of savers who had no previous bank deposit-relationships. The second stage of the SSB development will begin when deposit growth will be sustained mostly by the net flow of financial savings currently generated by savers. It is quite impossible both to foresee the passage from stage 1st to stage 2nd and to estimate the growth potential before and after the passage itself. Moreover, it will be necessary to wait for stage 2nd in order to assess exactly the conditions of the SSB financial and economic equilibrium. At present it may be stated that the average cost of deposits is rather high (high number of savings accounts, their limited average balance, high Mobile Units running costs, low incidence of non-interest bearing deposits), the loans-to-deposit ratio is rather low (55%), the maximum interest rate allowed by the Bank of Sudan on loans is rather low (14%). Moreover, the opportunity to increase the loans-to-deposit ratio contradicts clearly with the liquidity reserve requirements imposed by deposit volatility. In conclusion the SSB is going to enter a challenging future.


However, following the examination of the first four years' results, the Bank of Sudan has decided to invest more capital into the SSB, thus allowing it to expand. The lower deposits-to-capital ratio will significantly lower the average cost of financial resources to the SSB. The establishment of three new branches opens up new opportunities and their costs will partially offset the running costs of Mobile Units.

FIGURE 1

MOBILE UNITS SERVICE'S NETWORK




- ⊙ PROVINCE'S CAPITAL
 - MAIN TOWNS
 - OTHER TOWNS & VIL.
- (KM. DISTANCES FROM WAD MEDANI)



TIMETABLE:

- MO EL KANLIN (N.1) - HUDA (N.2)
- TU EL HASAHEISA (N.1) - EL MADINA (N.2)
- WE MUSELLEMIYA (N.1) - MANAGIL (N.2)
- TH RUFAA (N.1) —
- FR —
- SA TABAT (N.1) - FUTEIS (N.2)
- SU TABAT (N.1) - WAD RAIVA (N.2)



SUMANESE SAVINGS BANK - DEPOSIT GROWTH: JANUARY 1975 - DECEMBER 1978

	SAVINGS DEPOSITS				INVESTMENT ACCOUNTS				CURRENT ACCOUNTS				TOTAL DEPOSITS			
	NUMBER	BALANCE	AV. BALANCE	Δ %	NUMBER	BALANCE	AV. BALANCE	Δ %	NUMBER	BALANCE	AV. BALANCE	Δ %	NUMBER	BALANCE	AV. BALANCE	Δ %
JAN. 1975	1,924	12,035	6,3		632	8,100	7,4		219	34,555	157,5		2,755	54,690	12,9	
FEB.	3,047	49,042	10,0	+ 312	1,090	15,427	14,2	+ 90	320	39,700	122,0	+ 15	4,513	104,223	23,2	+ 92
MAR.	3,515	56,810	16,2	+ 14	1,180	21,063	17,7	+ 37	400	69,430	173,0	+ 75	5,104	147,313	29,9	+ 41
APR.	4,343	61,305	14,1	+ 8	1,233	22,543	18,5	+ 8	465	105,305	226,0	+ 52	6,041	159,513	31,4	+ 29
MAY.	5,027	73,400	14,6	+ 20	1,256	25,897	20,6	+ 13	472	102,308	216,8	- 3	6,755	201,605	29,8	+ 6
JUN.	5,353	82,070	15,3	+ 12	1,280	28,793	22,5	+ 11	510	103,046	190,8	+ 1	7,173	215,900	29,8	+ 6
JUL.	5,925	84,710	14,3	+ 3	1,289	30,218	23,4	+ 5	599	89,551	149,5	- 13	7,813	204,473	29,2	- 4
AUG.	7,025	90,195	12,8	+ 6	1,297	33,138	25,5	+ 10	637	99,490	156,2	+ 11	8,959	222,821	24,9	+ 0
SEP.	7,252	94,337	12,2	+ 5	1,349	34,988	25,9	+ 6	801	120,203	150,1	+ 21	9,905	249,588	25,2	+ 12
OCT.	8,352	104,091	12,5	+ 10	1,335	36,785	27,6	+ 5	816	129,829	159,1	+ 8	10,803	279,295	25,8	+ 5
NOV.	9,613	108,271	12,6	+ 4	1,359	38,750	28,5	+ 5	871	65,247	74,9	- 59	10,843	212,208	19,6	- 22
DEC.	9,320	119,207	12,8	+ 10	1,403	42,190	30,1	+ 9	920	77,088	83,8	+ 18	11,043	228,473	20,5	+ 12
		50,075				12,112	17,775			7,000	32,300			100,000		
JAN. 1976	9,003	123,075	12,8	+ 3	1,337	39,109	29,3	- 7	1,018	115,000	113,0	+ 59	11,003	255,144	23,1	+ 17
FEB.	10,217	134,300	13,1	+ 9	1,357	43,639	32,2	+ 11	1,150	121,307	104,9	+ 5	12,750	299,241	23,5	+ 5
MAR.	10,692	243,191	22,7	+ 81	1,362	47,017	34,5	+ 8	1,315	133,125	101,2	+ 10	13,309	422,223	31,7	+ 41
APR.	11,514	251,042	22,2	+ 3	1,378	48,033	35,3	+ 3	1,440	115,392	79,8	- 13	14,135	415,090	29,4	- 2
MAY.	11,224	281,046	23,8	+ 12	1,391	58,695	42,2	+ 21	1,520	108,837	98,9	- 6	14,799	445,527	30,3	+ 5
JUN.	12,334	270,022	21,9	- 4	1,399	61,347	43,8	+ 5	1,674	69,401	43,5	- 36	15,277	408,550	29,1	- 11
JUL.	12,631	268,601	21,3	- 1	1,402	65,335	46,6	+ 7	1,678	84,006	50,1	+ 21	15,711	417,964	29,6	+ 4
AUG.	12,929	269,472	20,8	-	1,412	98,633	69,9	+ 51	1,806	263,771	146,1	+ 214	16,147	631,920	29,1	+ 51
SEP.	13,165	307,927	23,4	+ 14	1,416	1,098,248	775,0	+ 1,013	1,897	140,105	75,0	- 47	16,451	1,549,888	94,0	+ 144
OCT.	13,454	479,952	36,3	+ 59	1,440	1,112,910	772,9	+ 1	2,050	86,161	42,0	- 39	16,944	1,637,023	99,6	+ 9
NOV.	13,625	472,894	34,7	- 3	1,444	1,114,395	771,7	-	2,201	37,711	17,1	- 56	17,273	1,625,008	94,1	- 4
DEC.	13,821	517,773	37,5	+ 9	1,454	1,136,632	781,7	+ 2	2,270	628,493	276,9	+ 156	17,548	2,252,888	100,1	+ 40
	75,577	22,775			6,375	49,862			12,900	27,500			100,000	100,000		
JAN. 1977	14,072	501,733	39,9	+ 8	1,437	1,128,867	755,6	- 1	2,321	631,503	272,1	-	17,530	2,322,158	100,2	+ 2
FEB.	14,312	568,092	39,7	+ 1	1,447	1,131,945	752,3	-	2,410	687,235	285,2	+ 9	18,169	2,387,272	101,4	+ 3
MAR.	14,530	611,892	42,1	+ 9	1,456	1,118,214	768,0	- 1	2,499	737,840	295,3	+ 7	18,491	2,497,952	103,5	+ 3
APR.	14,810	650,810	43,9	+ 6	1,507	1,125,003	740,9	+ 1	2,608	809,107	310,3	+ 10	18,931	2,555,330	109,0	+ 5
MAY.	15,479	698,826	45,0	+ 7	1,514	1,131,364	747,3	+ 1	2,646	888,591	335,8	+ 10	19,639	2,716,281	105,3	+ 5
JUN.	15,317	718,628	46,9	+ 3	1,460	1,157,072	792,5	+ 2	2,611	871,680	333,9	- 2	19,588	2,747,284	141,7	+ 1
JUL.	15,499	696,291	44,9	- 3	1,495	1,159,770	773,7	-	2,749	901,611	328,0	+ 3	19,747	2,757,072	139,7	-
AUG.	15,640	699,731	44,7	-	1,463	1,157,052	790,9	-	2,865	843,204	304,3	- 6	19,968	2,789,045	135,2	- 2
SEP.	15,754	697,412	44,2	-	1,462	1,152,785	788,5	-	2,942	801,352	302,9	+ 6	20,192	2,741,544	133,4	- 2
OCT.	15,917	761,390	45,0	+ 9	1,471	1,141,690	776,1	- 1	3,042	738,591	242,8	- 17	20,430	2,644,071	129,5	- 4
NOV.	16,199	775,778	47,9	+ 1	1,470	1,144,184	778,3	-	3,123	995,882	318,9	+ 35	20,792	2,915,343	140,2	+ 10
DEC.	16,259	14,221	50,1	+ 5	1,512	1,169,382	773,4	+ 2	3,177	897,172	282,4	- 10	20,942	2,880,775	137,0	- 7
	77,000	25,300			7,200	40,600			15,200	31,100			100,000	100,000		
JAN. 1978	16,622	872,856	52,5	+ 7	1,469	1,155,893	786,9	- 1	2,942	807,445	294,8	- 3	21,033	2,806,224	132,7	-
FEB.	17,040	908,291	53,3	+ 4	1,486	1,177,977	792,7	+ 2	3,168	941,609	297,2	+ 9	21,604	3,027,927	139,0	+ 5
MAR.	17,349	1,022,499	58,9	+ 13	1,486	1,198,315	806,4	+ 2	3,220	1,089,470	337,4	+ 16	22,094	3,316,274	140,0	+ 9
APR.	17,636	1,034,919	58,7	+ 1	1,484	1,206,599	813,1	+ 1	3,345	1,104,200	347,7	+ 7	22,408	3,405,777	151,0	+ 3
MAY.	18,003	1,091,575	60,6	+ 6	1,481	1,226,877	828,4	+ 2	3,375	1,257,728	372,9	+ 8	22,557	3,576,488	150,5	+ 5
JUN.	18,265	1,183,483	64,8	+ 8	1,484	1,257,858	847,6	+ 2	3,405	976,029	281,7	- 22	23,214	3,417,538	147,2	- 4
JUL.	18,555	1,289,510	69,8	+ 9	1,527	1,267,399	829,9	+ 1	3,750	1,556,581	415,1	+ 59	23,702	4,013,488	173,1	+ 20
AUG.	18,802	1,259,810	67,0	- 2	1,497	1,278,105	853,3	+ 1	3,954	1,691,840	427,9	+ 9	24,253	4,229,755	174,4	+ 3
SEP.	18,924	1,310,608	69,3	+ 4	1,537	1,308,774	851,5	+ 2	4,072	1,577,458	367,4	- 7	24,533	4,199,840	170,0	- 1
OCT.	19,301	1,294,410	67,1	- 1	1,521	1,329,821	874,3	+ 2	4,372	1,553,539	355,3	- 2	25,194	4,177,720	165,8	-
NOV.	19,564	1,324,324	67,7	+ 2	1,526	1,326,896	869,5	-	4,478	1,651,518	368,8	+ 6	25,568	4,302,738	169,3	+ 3
DEC.	19,944	1,367,606	68,6	+ 3	1,535	1,358,147	884,8	+ 2	4,427	1,476,132	333,4	- 11	25,906	4,201,855	162,2	- 2
	77,000	32,500			5,900	32,300			17,100	35,200			100,000	100,000		

SIAMSAVE SAVINGS BANK - DEPOSITS BY MONTHLY UNITS: AUGUST 1975 - DECEMBER 1978

	SAVINGS DEPOSITS			INVESTMENT ACCOUNTS			CURRENT ACCOUNTS			TOTAL DEPOSITS		
	NUMBER	BALANCE	AV. BALANCE	NUMBER	BALANCE	AV. BALANCE	NUMBER	BALANCE	AV. BALANCE	NUMBER	BALANCE	AV. BALANCE
JAN. 1975												
FEB.												
MAR.												
APR.												
MAY.												
JUN.												
JUL.												
AUG.	743	2,193	2,9	13	49	3,7	2	29	14,7	758	2,271	3,0
SEP.	1,217	2,731	2,2	18	120	6,7	9	285	31,7	1,244	3,130	2,5
OCT.	1,543	3,247	2,1	33	344	10,4	9	1,145	127,2	1,590	4,730	3,0
NOV.	1,572	3,249	2,1	33	428	13,0	14	893	63,8	1,619	4,570	2,8
DEC.	2,002	3,762	1,9	34	418	13,2	17	1,889	111,1	2,053	6,000	3,0
JAN. 1976	2,060	4,308	2,1	39	1,080	27,7	21	2,533	120,6	2,120	7,921	3,7
FEB.	2,216	5,218	2,3	39	994	25,5	26	3,000	118,8	2,311	9,302	4,0
MAR.	2,369	6,000	2,5	39	965	24,7	27	1,933	71,6	2,435	8,805	3,7
APR.	2,569	6,661	2,6	39	1,000	25,6	28	2,291	81,8	2,656	9,972	3,8
MAY.	2,726	7,743	2,8	39	1,282	32,9	29	3,070	106,1	2,794	12,101	4,3
JUN.	2,866	7,717	2,7	39	1,312	33,0	33	1,877	56,9	2,935	11,967	4,1
JUL.	2,934	8,512	3,0	39	1,427	30,6	38	4,551	119,8	3,011	14,700	4,9
AUG.	2,909	8,711	2,9	39	1,542	39,5	41	6,795	165,7	3,069	17,048	5,0
SEP.	3,013	7,920	2,6	39	1,661	42,6	45	10,417	231,5	3,102	19,905	6,4
OCT.	3,053	8,351	2,7	39	1,698	43,5	46	6,989	151,0	3,138	17,038	5,4
NOV.	3,053	8,971	2,9	39	1,669	42,8	47	7,655	102,9	3,139	18,295	5,8
DEC.	3,086	9,536	3,1	39	1,770	45,4	48	5,516	114,9	3,173	16,822	5,3
JAN. 1977	3,091	10,582	3,4	38	1,157	30,4	60	8,200	137,7	3,102	20,020	6,3
FEB.	3,119	11,452	3,7	38	1,229	32,3	62	14,431	232,8	3,219	27,112	5,4
MAR.	3,121	11,955	3,8	38	1,238	32,6	64	5,691	88,9	3,220	18,887	5,9
APR.	3,136	10,815	3,4	38	1,302	34,3	66	8,704	131,9	3,240	20,821	6,4
MAY.	3,136	9,418	3,0	38	1,306	34,4	66	11,294	171,1	3,240	22,018	6,8
JUN.	3,136	10,413	3,3	38	1,360	35,8	66	10,603	163,7	3,240	22,370	6,9
JUL.	3,136	10,525	3,4	38	1,360	35,8	66	13,718	207,8	3,240	25,605	7,9
AUG.	3,137	10,351	3,3	38	1,621	42,7	66	12,025	191,3	3,241	24,597	7,6
SEP.	3,151	11,793	3,7	38	1,650	43,4	57	9,627	153,9	3,240	23,070	7,1
OCT.	3,151	11,027	3,5	38	1,682	44,3	57	5,067	141,6	3,240	20,770	6,4
NOV.	3,151	10,490	3,3	38	1,682	44,3	57	8,225	144,3	3,240	20,397	6,3
DEC.	3,151	9,877	3,1	38	1,715	45,1	57	5,500	98,1	3,240	17,182	5,3
JAN. 1978	3,114	9,702	3,1	37	1,676	45,3	51	5,037	98,8	3,252	16,415	5,0
FEB.	3,116	9,754	3,1	37	1,486	40,2	37	3,168	85,6	3,100	14,851	4,7
MAR.	3,104	8,092	2,6	35	1,498	42,8	37	3,525	95,3	3,170	13,115	5,1
APR.	3,009	9,577	3,2	36	1,525	42,4	37	5,024	135,8	3,102	16,420	5,2
MAY.	3,169	10,332	3,3	36	1,498	41,7	47	7,164	152,4	3,252	18,094	5,5
JUN.	3,312	10,112	3,1	36	1,586	44,1	39	9,023	231,4	3,262	20,721	6,4
JUL.	3,185	7,190	2,3	36	1,585	44,0	36	3,841	106,7	3,257	12,010	3,9
AUG.	3,160	7,174	2,3	36	1,586	44,1	36	3,715	103,2	3,232	12,475	3,9
SEP.	3,158	6,995	2,2	35	1,585	45,3	33	3,612	109,5	3,226	12,192	3,8
OCT.	3,146	6,924	2,2	35	1,585	45,3	36	4,111	114,2	3,217	12,620	3,9
NOV.	3,138	6,577	2,1	35	1,594	45,5	32	5,407	169,0	3,205	13,578	4,2
DEC.	3,135	6,313	2,0	35	1,664	47,5	41	3,287	80,2	3,211	11,264	3,5

Table 3

DEPOSITS COLLECTED BY THE POST OFFICE SAVINGS BANK
1970-1977, LS-END OF THE YEAR

Years	Gezira Province	Whole of Sudan	%	no. of Offices in Gezira
1970	443,076	11,576,727	3.83	17
1971	512,114	12,576,684	4.15	18
1972	503,187	12,473,675	4.03	18
1973	502,973	12,844,251	3.92	19
1974	536,285	13,876,836	3.86	20
1975	558,937	12,865,838	4.34	21
1976	509,937	14,552,083	3.50	21
1977	620,829 *	16,000,000 *	3.88 *	21

* estimate

Table 4

BANKS' DEPOSITS IN THE GEZIRA PROVINCE
AND SUDAN (LS. ~~MILLION~~ ^{THOUSANDS} -END OF THE YEAR)

Year	Gezira Province	Whole of Sudan	%G.P/W.S.
1970	2,580	54,875	4.70
1971	2,627	58,360	4.50
1972	3,259	81,352	4.01
1973	3,486	101,538	3.43
1974	6,253	136,231	4.59
1975	8,577	165,965	5.17
1976	11,771	213,058	5.52
1977	16,250	313,150	5.19

Table 5

BANK DEPOSITS IN THE GEZIRA PROVINCE, END OF THE YEAR (L.S.)

BANK	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Bank of Khartoum	1,843,931	1,749,278	1,996,997	2,126,888	3,894,271	5,225,121	6,632,662	8,619,010
Sudanese Savings Bank	-	-	-	-	26,571	238,485	2,282,593	2,880,775
Unity Bank	548,000	658,000	785,000	879,000	1,560,000	2,082,000	1,437,700	2,360,364
El Nilein Bank	188,825	220,034	476,628	772,497	7,030,884	1,302,884	1,302,857	1,631,150
People's Cooperative Bank	-	-	-	-	-	-	115,185	758,431
P.O.Savings Banks (including Savings Bonds)	443,076	512,114	503,187	502,973	562,222	669,694	631,768	772,631
TOTAL	3,023,832	3,139,426	3,762,082	3,989,430	6,815,561	9,246,184	12,403,070	14,022,501

Table 6

BANK DEPOSITS IN THE GEZIRA PROVINCE MARKET SHARES, END OF THE YEAR

BANK	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Bank of Khartoum	60.98	55.72	53.08	53.31	7.14	56.51	53.48	50.63
Sudanese Savings Bank	-	-	-	-	0.39	2.58	18.41	16.92
Unity Bank	18.12	20.96	20.87	22.03	22.89	22.52	11.59	13.87
El Nilein Bank	6.25	7.01	12.68	12.05	11.33	11.15	10.50	9.58
People's Cooperative Bank	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.93	4.46
P.O.Savings Bank	14.65	16.31	13.37	12.61	8.25	7.24	5.09	4.54
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 7

COMPOSITION OF DEPOSITS COLLECTED BY THE BANKS IN THE
GEZIRA PROVINCE, 1977 (LS)

BANK	Savings Deposits & Time		Current Accounts		TOTAL	
	LS.	%	LS.	%	LS.	%
Sudanese Savings Bank	1,983,603	68.86	897,172	31.14	2,880,775	100.00
Bank of Khartoum	2,711,311	31.46	5,907,699	68.54	8,619,010	100.00
Unity Bank	908,314	38.48	1,452,050	61.52	2,360,364	100.00
El Nilein Bank	449,952	27.58	1,101,198	72.42	1,631,150	100.00
People's Cooperative Bank	434,551	57.30	323,880	42.70	758,431	100.00
TOTAL	6,487,731	39.93	9,761,999	60.07	16,249,730	100.00

TABLE 8

NO. OF BANK'S CUSTOMERS IN WAD MEDANI TOWN
(LIVE ACCOUNTS), END OF THE YEAR

BANK	1974	1975	1976	1977
Sudanese Savings Bank	1,017	11,643	17,548	20,907
Bank of Khartoum	5,629	5,968	5,890	5,793
Unity Bank	3,254	3,365	3,606	3,938
El Nilein Bank	2,100	2,700	3,000	3,300
People's Co-operative Bank	-	-	386	816
Post Office Savings Bank	2,900	3,150	3,300	3,533
TOTAL	14,900	26,826	33,730	38,257

TABLE 9

AVERAGE CONSISTENCY OF BANKS DEPOSITS IN WAD MEDANI
TOWN, END OF THE YEAR (LS)

BANK	1974	1975	1976	1977
Sudanese Savings Bank	26.13	20.48	130.09	137.79
Bank of Khartoum	487.78	565.20	751.33	962.91
Unity Bank	479.41	618.72	398.69	599.288
El Nilein Bank	367.85	381.81	434.29	494.29
People's Cooperative Bank	-	-	298.41	929.45
Post Office Savings Bank	75.35	86.54	87.28	95.25
General Average	356.14	260.83	292.08	353.79

TABLE 10

SUDANESE SAVINGS BANK
LOANS AND FACILITIES BY CATEGORY AT THE END OF 1978 (L.S)

CATEGORIES	NUMBER	GRANTED	UTILISED
Personal	887	265,683	265,683
Industrial	5	262,000	197,678
Agricultural	40	85,669	59,602
Commercial	133	1,330,913	1,220,862
Services	38	88,709	51,910
Craftmen	16	12,873	8,882
Housing	361	92,673	92,673
Transports	53	392,557	392,557
Sundry	3	166	166
TOTAL	1536	2,531,243	2,290,013