BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET	1. CONTROL NUMBER PN-AAH-310	2. SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION (695) AE10-0000-G190

3. TITLE AND SUBTITLE (240)

Cooperatives, initiative, participation and socio-economic change in the Sahel

4. PERSONAL AUTHORS (100)

Derman, Bill

5. CORPORATE AUTHORS (101)

Michigan State Univ. Dept. of Agr. Economics

6. DOCUMENT DATE (110)	7. NUMBER OF PAGES (120)	8. ARC NUMBER (170)
1978	77p.	AFR334.683.D435

9. REFERENCE ORGANIZATION (130)

Mich. State

10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES (500)

11. ABSTRACT (950)

12. DESCRIPTORS (920)

Cooperatives
Cooperative farming
Sahel
Rural participation
Rural sociology
Agricultural policy

13. PROJECT NUMBER (150)

625092600

14. CONTRACT NO.(140)

AID/afr-C-1260

15. CONTRACT TYPE (140)

16. TYPE OF DOCUMENT (160)

AID 590-7 (10-79)

PN-AAH-310

AFR
334.683
D435

"Cooperatives, initiative, participation and socio-economic change in the Sahel"

Bill Derman

Michigan State University

AID/afr-C-1260
625092600

Introduction.

The paper follows the scope of work except for combining items B and C into B. This has the virtue of placing together all the material on cooperatives and taking up some aspects of what was C in a more logical order.

ARTICLE I -- Objective

The objective of this contract is to provide REDSO/WA with an analytical paper, as more fully described below, for the "Sahelian Social Development" series. The paper will deal with cooperatives and local participation in Sahelian development. The paper will be based upon the author's first-hand field work in Guinea and his professional travel and knowledge of the literature of other West African situations.

ARTICLE II -- Scope of Work

The Contractor will provide fifty copies of the foregoing paper to REDSO/WA to be airmailed not later than August 31, 1978. Said paper will cover the following topics:

(A) Review the literature on how rural economic change has been instituted in the Sahel. Assess the balance between external and internally induced change and what strata within any given society are supportive or non-supportive of specific kinds of change. Assess the kinds of changes that have been accepted and those that have been resisted or refused, and the degree to which structures of social stratification block or modify them.

(B) Review the literature on the structures of cooperative economic activity during the colonial period (and where possible, before). Analyze their capacities and limitations with respect to specific demands placed upon them, either internally or externally. Assess the degree to which rural economic change has been "spontaneous" or self-conscious.

Review the various efforts to build upon the old cooperative structures or to create new structures in the contemporary period by governments (e.g. animation rurale, promotion humain, etc...) and also review non-governmental efforts like the Mourides. Assess the degree, quality and basis of participation in these. Discuss the fate of such attempts, their

their bases of success and failure. Make general comments on the possibilities of cooperatives in general given Widstrand's pessimism about East Africa and in light of West African experience.

(C) Discuss indigenous initiative in its broad social and political context. Analyze how initiatives have been started and sustained in the past apart from "projects". In light of the above recommend procedures whereby indigenous initiative could be protected, recognized and enhanced rather than smothered. To the degree possible suggest a methodology by which one could find/discover such initiatives and utilize "indigenous" wisdom to find solutions to real problems (like nourishment at Bakel).

(D) Analyze the difficulties inherent in Sahelian development because of the potential conflict between national and local structures. Assess the degree to which such conflicts are inevitably antagonistic or can be avoided.

(E) Make policy/planning recommendations in accordance with the findings of the research.

(F) Include bibliography and guides to further expertise on the subject.

A. Socio-economic Change in the Sudano-Sahel

The two dominant and contrasting perspectives for examining socio-economic change in the Sahel are "modernization" and "dependency".[1] These are not exclusive but they lead to very different emphases, analysis, and conclusions. Modernization appears to be the dominant mode of analysis at this point in mainstream social science. Modernization emphasizes the notion of social and cultural barriers to development. In the case of the Sahel, emphasis is given to why the peasants and herders have resisted change and remain conservative. Sahelians are looked at as having been traditional, and being tardy in becoming modern. The solution then is to make or lead Sahelians to become modern. In shorthand form, the way to do that is to open up all of the Sahel to the market economy. In the words of Caldwell "...the need is for rapid economic development with an opening up of rural areas to the full market economy" (1975: 61). Development in this perspective is not possible without massive amounts of foreign aid and assistance. Change, in the modernization perspective, is beneficial or at worst benign. Development becomes the synonym for progress. After all, the Sahelians (and others) were much worse off in the past, and now they are at least seeing, if not actually enjoying, the fruits of the modern world. Change often becomes something only recently introduced. The weight of how change occurs focuses upon the colonial and post-colonial periods and not upon the precolonial past. In addition, change is seen as exogenously introduced to basically traditional, non-changing, non-progressive societies. In this view history playsonly a small or insignificant role in determining the current outcome of development efforts.

Two other points can be linked to the modernization perspective. First,

the colonial period constitutes the conditions for genuine progress or development. Colonialism breaks down the earlier isolation, introduces modern medicine, education, and despite its excesses leads to the possibility of real development. Second, those people who do not become market and economically (narrowly defined) oriented are described or characterized as irrational. Sahelians then are viewed all too often as obstacles standing in the way of economic advancement - an economic advancement which somehow is to be to their advantage. Those who do not partake of economic rationality, that is of a market mentality, are seen to be irrational, conservative, and opposed to development. In this perspective rural economic change stems from colonial and postcolonial interventions in the rural arena. Rural inhabitants, first called tribesmen and now called peasants, along with herders and/or pastoralists are seen as committed to an outdated mode of existence, one which can be altered through integration into a national political structure and economy. In turn, the national structures are integrated into world structures. Underlying concepts of modernization, and how change takes place in the Sahel rests both the assumption and conclusion that development takes place along a linear line, and that the process in the Sahel will at least in principle repeat Western experiences of development.

It appears that those who hold the modernization view believe that the changes introduced into the Sahel during the colonial period did not fundamentally alter the Sahelian economies, otherwise why label them traditional. And it certainly is an article of faith that change can be planned and consciously implemented.

There are alternate perspectives to modernization. These include a

critique of modernization but without suggesting an alternative view (except by implication) or alternative views of both the past and future. The starting point of most anthropological and sociological critiques of modernization or the modernization path toward development commences with the idea that there are a wide variety of socio-cultural factors that could facilitate development. One should not stop analysis by only looking at specific value orientations which are seen to be necessary. As Norman Long has written (1977)

> If, however, one adopts a more eclectic standpoint and recognizes that there are many varied outcomes to economic growth and different modes of organizing the pattern of development, then it would seem that a wide range of contrasting value commitments can serve as facilitating cultural ideologies. (68)

The implication is that there are a variety of ways toward development, and that one would expect to find great variability in the responses of rural peoples. In the case of the Sahel, we will discuss some of these below. At the same time as one questions whether there is any single outcome of development processes, the notion of traditional needs to be reexamined. Typically traditional implies that the societies have existed in equilibrium. But in the case of the Sahel, as elsewhere, many striking features of what are labelled traditional societies emerged as a consequence of the changes introduced by colonial rule. There is a different view of history involved, and how history affects the present. In my perspective Sahelian societies have been consistently changing. It is only when we have more historical studies of the Sahel (although there are already many excellent ones) that we can detail the different historical periods and their defining characteristics. Change can no longer simply be exogenous.

There are forces of change internal to the Sahel, and to the societies of the Sahel, as well as exogenous ones.

The modernization approach, or dualistic view of Sahelian nations, plays down the form and content of integration into West European nations. At the same time, the original poverty of the Sahel needs to be questioned. Poverty has not been a permanent condition of the peoples of the Sahel. Subsistence societies are not synonymous with poverty.

> Le fameux 'équilibre traditionnel' avait tout de même une certaine efficacité. Ce n'était certes pas l'âge d'or, et les régions sahéliennes et soudaniennes ont connu des pénuries alimentaires plus ou moins graves, plus ou moins longues. La disette récurrente existait indépendamment des facteurs externes. Mais les ethnographies du présent mi-précoloniales mi-coloniales insistent rarement sur la logique des structures socio-économiques précapitalistes. Les populations survivaient, mais ne connaissaient pas la désintégration sociale que les nouvelles conditions de production pour le marché ont imposée progressivement ou violemment. (Copans 1975: 31)

There were poor people in the Sahel prior to colonialism, but that was relative to their own societies. In particular, slaves in many instances were quite poor. However, the lack of material possessions per se does not mean a condition of poverty. Rather it is the relationship between means and wants, and the argument can be made which accounts for scarcity. If there was a balance between needs and wants then it would be hard to sustain the proposition that the Sahel was poor. In addition, there is historical and anthropological evidence to indicate that the relationship between population, resources, and trade led to a higher standard of living than that during the colonial and postcolonial periods. The current stagnation in food production, aside even from the effects of the drought, indicate a serious decline in availability of basic foodstuffs to some rural popula-

tions, below that known in the precolonial periods. It is the contention of at least some anthropologists and historians that there had been a more balanced relationship between humans and their environment prior to the colonial period.

In this second view, the underlying paradigm is "dependency theory." The Sahel, in this perspective, does not constitute an underdeveloped region, (although perhaps a 'backward' one) until the colonial period. The degradation of the environment and the decline in the standard of living begins or intensifies under colonial rule. It is not a necessary part of this argument that this was a conscious policy of the colonialists, but rather an outcome, if often unforeseen, of colonial policies.

Both modernization and dependency perspectives point to the market and market relations as being the prime factor in the institution of economic changes in the Sahel. Claude Raynaut sees the change from a substantive to a market economy. In the shift and breakdown of the economy comes agricultural decline and stagnation.

> ...through the breakdown of the fabric of society, collective control over material conditions of life has been has been taken away. The end point of the production and circulation of goods is less and less the satisfaction of needs linked to subsistence and the functioning of social groups, but more and more the acquisition by individuals of the money of which they have such great need (1977: 20).

The disintegration and disarray of the rural societies of the Sahel can be explained by the monetisation of the economy. For Raynaut subjection to external domination, and the diversion of the ends of the economy constitute the forces for change in the Sahel. This is in marked contrast to the modernization view whereby the market is a progressive force leading to better conditions and the amelioration of standard of living.

There has been a continual process of change in the Sahel, of which the

colonial period was of a particular form. What I have been trying to underline so far are the differing conceptions underlying the understanding of change to show how it leads to different conclusions about both the nature of the Sahelian crisis and its implications. But the overall point remains that the Sahel has never been an unchanging area. This can be shown through the nature and form of the trans-Saharan trade for which many Sahelian cities were important entrepots, to the introduction and spread of maize cultivation, and major political developments which had important economic consequences, such as events in the interior delta of the Niger in Mali, and micro-adaptations by the hundreds of Sahelian societies to major and minor environmental variations, including variations in rainfall. Other examples of incremental change are the increased use of animal manure for the fertilization of fields, the elaborate codes developed in the interaction of herders and farmers for the balanced use of areas for farming and herding, the development of flood agriculture in the river valleys, et al. In sum, there were vast, if often slow, changes in the Sahel, one of which might indeed be called a revolution--the development of pastoralism, and the spread of pastoralists through the more northerly Sahel where other cultural adaptations were less possible. The process of the institutionalization of these kinds of changes are less well documented than more recent ones.

But it is important to note that many of these changes came about without market incentives and without market relations. Other aspects of the institutionalization of change, the slave trade both with the north and the trans-Atlantic slave trade, the intensification of the use of slaves in the Sahel, and then the end of the Atlantic slave trade, and the beginnings of

what is called "legitimate commerce" has been subject to very high quality recent historical research (see Hopkins, Curtin, Meillassoux, Meiers and Kopyotoff,) and has raised much controversy concerning the form and structure of indigenous African economies. No one however is suggesting that they were stable, unchanging, or non-responsive.

While it can be argued that the colonial experience is no longer relevant in terms of understanding the Sahel, it is my view that it remains of importance. And the understanding of the kinds of economic change that were instituted during the colonial period provides the basis for an assessment of how change has taken place, as well as what changes are required. The colonial period was one of externally induced change - some of it voluntary on the part of Sahelians, some of it involuntary, and in general having consequences which could not have been anticipated. The most important changes were externally induced during this period. In more global terms, the evolutionary trajectory of West Africa was decisively altered by the colonial period. As Hopkins observes

> What happened to Africa was part of a global confrontation between the developing and the underdeveloped countries in the nineteenth century, though the nature of the interaction between them, and its outcome, varied in different parts of the world. The economic expansion of Europe in the nineteenth century had a profound and destabilising effect on West Africa because it changed the structure of export production and involved the region in the trade cycle of the new industrial economy (1973: 164).

As many have already commented, the Sahel was relatively isolated from some of the major economic developments in West Africa. But events further south would have great impact in the Sahel. For example, the development of cash crops, particularly peanuts, and the expansion of agriculturalists north. Sahelian patterns differed because of pastoral adaptations, lower

agricultural yields, and perhaps most importantly, difficulty in developing the profitability of the Sahel. Several anthropologists (Meillassoux, Raynaut, Copans, Samuel) suggest that the Sahel served primarily as a labour reservoir, an area where labor could be drawn to underwrite colonialism and its projects. As Raynaut has put it:

> Unlike other areas of Africa, blessed with great natural resources, the poverty of the territories of the Sudano-Sahelian belt, and the risks inherent in agriculture there, have never allowed direct exploitation to be sufficiently profitable for any interest to be shown by colonists from the Metropolitan power. The only aspect of 'profitability' which could be used by the colonial power - considered from the twin standpoints of politico-administrative power and commercial return - was to extract the maximum from the only wealth available: the labour of local populations (1977: 20-21).

Sometimes the colonial policy practiced in the Sahel and the Sudan can be described as acquiring the surplus product of the peasant, but without destroying the domestic mode of production, or the peasant mode of production. The levers of change were forced labour, forced cultivation, forced delivery of products and taxation. This is not to say that there aren't other factors of change (i.e. increased population of both animals and humans, shifting religious preferences, et al.) nor that these changes were wholly negative. This accounts for why the Sahel appears to be so "traditional". The colonial impact appeared at first to be less destructive by leaving the domestic economy intact, while at the same time permitting the African distributive system to intensify and to be sustained. Hopkins (1973: 244) has shown how the internal trade survived and expanded during the colonial era in West Africa. He points out that this is not intended as a defense of colonialism

> but rather as a tribute to the skill and adaptability of Africans at a time when unprecedented demands were being placed on indigenous production and marketing arrangements."(244)

Thus while the major forces for change in the latter part of the nineteenth and first part of the twentieth century have been external, this does not mean that Sahelian agriculturalists have been passive or have remained stable. Brokensha, Horowitz and Scudder (1977) have emphasized this even further for the pastoralists. They write

> There is no stable set of behaviors, no invariant set of behaviors, no invariant set of practices, no 'millenia-old customs' which characterize contemporary pastoral life in the Sahel. Apart from the ethnic and historical complexity of the region, which gives rise to a broad range of inter-group differences, the twentieth century has seen a series of changes introduced into the region to which the region responded. The ability of the people to respond, to experiment, to innovate has been documented again and again in the ethnographic literature which underscores the dynamism and opportunism of pastoralists rather than their stability and boundedness." (18)

Brokensha, Horowitz and Scudder locate the major change factors in the political arena - colonial rule and then independence, and the economic-modernization and development. Modernization and development includes improved veterinary practice, permanent sources of water and to which one could add the dependence of some nations upon the export of meat to generate national revenue.

The degree to which environmental degradation can be viewed as a major cause of social and economic change is controversial. Brokensha, Horowitz and Scudder argue against the notion that pastoral practices have led directly to environmental degradation. This conclusion is supported by others, including Jeremy Swift and the French geographer Toupet. Toupet maintains that it is the nomad in semi-arid zones who contributes to the conservation of nature. Contrastingly, sedentarists despite governmental preferences for them have been far more destructive of the Sahel and have led to a rapid degeneration of the land (1975).

One whole domain of colonial efforts at economic change, though, failed in West Africa as a whole. That was the effort to set up and maintain European or expatriate-run agricultural enterprises. This is linked to the earlier suggestion that the domestic economy remained relatively intact during the colonial period. There were famous efforts at the establishment of such enterprises, particularly on the Senegal river beginning in the 1820s. Although different, the Office du Niger was one of the largest efforts in this zone to dramatically change the mode of agricultural production. (See below for the Mourides, who successfully adapted to the new demands of the colonial order.)

Efforts both on the Senegal and Niger rivers instituted by the French were aimed at the development of cash crop production, both the crop and the benefits to be for the metropolitain power. Thus Marchal concludes his study of agricultural colonization of the Niger:

> Malgré les déclarations de principe, il en a été ainsi à l'Office du Niger, créé pour satisfaire les besoins d'une métropole. L'Office est né de considérations techniques. Il fallait profiter d'une circonstance à savoir "l'eau coule toute seule", pour développer un centre de production cotonnière. Ce n'est qu'en second lieu, lorsqu'il a fallu rechercher la main-d'oeuvre nécessaire à son exploitation, que les promoteurs ont songé au Mossi, au même titre qu'aux autres groupes du Soudan. Les premiers responsables de l'office n'ont pas été particulièrement animés par la volonté de soulager les fortes pressions démographiques du Yatenga. La colonisation agricole a été conçue comme une colonisation de production. Ce caractère n'a fait que se confirmer à mesure que l'exploitation des terres irriguées s'est orientée vers des modèles de mise en valeur de l'organisation du pays développés. (1974: 90)

In contrast to the colonially inspired and directed projects, one finds the Mourides of Senegal (composed primarily of Wolof-speaking peoples) as another example of an African response to the opportunities of a new cash crop. Some of the same characterization that has been made of the

Ghanaian cocoa farmers can be made of the Mourides

> The Ghanaian cocoa industry was the creation of local farmers, responding to the opportunities of a new cash crop. Foreign owned plantations or foreign settlers played no role in this development. As shown most clearly by Polly Hill, the driving force was above all a stratum of rural entrepreneurs investing in land and labour, moving to areas where soils were most suitable and where land could be acquired through purchase or leases. They reinvested the surplus in new land and new farms, but also in transportation equipment and other complementary services (Beckman 1976: 37).

It should be clear that during the initial development of cocoa, and until the establishment of the national marketing board, the trade of cocoa was handled by foreign corporations. One of the primary differences between the development of cocoa in Ghana and peanuts in Senegal was the rapid growth in Ghana of a labor market and of capitalist relations of production. "The bulk of Ghana's cocoa was soon produced on holdings using hired labour on a more or less permanent basis. (ibid: 38)".

A brief examination of the Mourides will provide a case study of the complex interaction between European colonialist and an African society and as a successful adaptation to colonialism. The Mourides are a religious brotherhood principally based among the Wolof peoples of Senegal. They are a Sufi order, but unlike other religious movements, they have been tied to a very specific economic as well as religious relationship. The Mourides order is based upon a tie of dependence between a master or marabout also called shaikh and a student or <u>talibe</u>. The shaikh is an essential intermediary between the fidele and Allah. The talibe gives both labour and products to the marabout. The key unit in the rural areas is the <u>dara</u>. The <u>dara</u> has a triple meaning: the place of religious education or the house of the teacher, the farm under the direction of the marabout, and a farming group of young men.

While there is not space here to detail the changes in Wolof societies and the beginnings of French colonial rule,[2] it is essential to point out the degree to which colonialism was disruptive of older patterns and the indigenous system of stratification. The basic kin groups of the Wolof - the extended family and clan - were undermined; the basis of political authority - warriors - was eliminated; the binding of chiefs to their clients was ended; and the economic support of the upper strata, slavery, was similarly diminished. In the varying responses to French colonial rule, there were those who argued for and used armed force against the French while others wanted an unarmed and subtle resistance to the colonists, the latter adopted as the strategy of the Mourides. The Mourides were founded on the basis of modifications in Islam, the charismatic position of Amadu Bamba (the religious founder of the Mourides), and the adaptation to part of the economic basis of colonialism. From beginning in opposition to colonial rule and meeting French resistance (1886-1915), there then was a long period of collaboration and cooperation with the French lasting until 1960. The Mourides then continued the same patterns with the new Senegalese government but it would appear that the long period of cooperation and lack of internal conflict within the Mourides themselves is drawing to an end.

According to Cruise O'Brien, one of the major students of the Mourides:

> The key to an understanding of the economic success of the brotherhood as a whole, and the saints in particular, lies in the organisation which the saints have provided for a mass movement of agrarian settlement. The Mourides, over the past half century or more, have established farming communities throughout a vast zone (thousands of square miles) of hitherto uncultivated land around the fringe of Senegal's central desert (the Ferlo). This massive agrarian colonisation has involved an evolution of social and economic organisation, from the original pioneer settlements to the constitution of economic communities (1975: 63).

The Mourides provided for the landless, the former slaves, the displaced "...the means of material survival - land - and in order to secure this land they needed organization and leadership" (1971: 289) and the shaikhs provided that. The French provided support as well in the conflicts with the Fulbe pastoralists whose land became the site of Mouride expansion. The Mourides based their organization upon the cultivation of peanuts and then the marketing of that crop. However, despite their becoming cash crop producers the basis of peanut cultivation was not wage labor. Rather, it was a religious relationship whereby the cultivators (students, talibe) worked for nothing but the promise of obtaining their own land in the future.

Initially the dara (villages) were very difficult places with poor housing, little water, and a great deal of work to put the land into peanut cultivation. Gradually through time they become much easier places to live and work. The tremendous amount of hard work involved was said not to be important for the talibe served the shaikh for the attainment of paradise. However, the material reward of land can no longer be carried out in the same way without threatening the vast fields and workers available to the Shaikhs. Thus O'Brien observes:

> Population expansion, and a consequent steady shrinkage in the supply of available uncultivable land, tend to compound the threat to the shaikh's domination. Lack of 'new' land may soon make it impossible for the Mouride leaders to compensate for the plots which must progressively be cut out of their present estates, as rewards for the faithful tak-der. Such a development would of course strike at the very basis of maraboutic economic dominance, menaced as it is by rapidly falling groundnut prices. Without land and without the cash revenues which land produces, it is difficult to imagine how the shuyukh would retain firm control over their clienteles. (1971: 299)

Fundamental socio-economic change transformed much of the interior of Senegal.

In the absence

> of bureaucratic staff; the confusion of household and 'official' affairs; the haphazard nature of such written records as are maintained; the intermittent communications between the brotherhood's leaders: superficial observation of these 'weaknesses' may tend to convey an overall impression of organizational inefficiency to the European outsider. This is certainly no 'modern' organization, deliberately designed to achieve specific goals, with a power centre to review performance and substitute personnel where necessary. (1971: 294)

In the case of the Wolof of Senegal, or at least of those who joined the Mourides, we find almost all sectors of the Wolof accepting profound economic change, that is change in the organization of production, and the basis of that production. There were some sectors among the Wolof who resisted change and the reorganization of Wolof society, in particular those linked to the warrior strata or tyeddo. However, they were historically bypassed as the basis of the strength was taken on the one hand by the colonialists, and on the other their legitimacy by the Mouride order and its new pattern of political relations and submission to the new religious hierarchy.

The case of the Mourides while instructive cannot be said to be typical of the Sahel. Two major differences stand out from the experience of other Sahelians. First is the production of the peanut as a cash crop. Most Sahelians retained a much stronger orientation toward basic subsistence crops, and second, the rise of a religious movement which reorganized the society, not only economically but socially and politically as well. Most other Sahelian groups did not undergo such a dramatic reorganization. But one should not overexaggerate the differences either; cash crops were introduced in all of the West African nations, if not peanuts, then cotton. And many Sahelians if not directly involved in the growing of cash crops were

effected by the push of those from the south who were.

For example, a very different story, but nonetheless one marked by profound socio-economic change has taken place along the Senegal river, among the Tukoleur.[3] Or, others could be shown for the Tuareg[4] and for the Maures[5] (who are less well studied). While there are several longer term studies both of individual societies and of projections for the future, it is difficult to formulate generalizations about the kinds of changes that are or are not accepted by the differing, and we should add changing, strata in the different Sudano-Sahelian societies. In my view we need further in-depth studies like those suggested by Brokensha, Horowitz and Scudder. In addition, I suspect that the generalizations which can be developed for the late precolonial and colonial periods will no longer hold for the contemporary postcolonial, and drought situation. The triple crisis of economy, population and ecology is indeed something new and without historical precedent for the Sahel-Sudan. The current Western infusions of large amounts of capital combined with the form and structure of West African governments, how they respond to the triple crisis, and the responses of the peasants and herders to that can only lead to speculations and suggestions.

Based upon the experience of other parts of Africa let us then examine the degree to which the Sahelian peasantry has or has not been supportive of change. I focus on the peasants because all too often they are regarded by both planners and government employees as obstacles to change. The pastoralists' experience has been summarized by Jeremy Swift. I have suggested earlier that there have indeed been great socio-economic changes in the Sahel-Sudan, although they may not appear that way to the casual observer. Or, in explaining differing responses observers tend to make ethnic or racial

assessments of why some people or groups of people have become more 'modern'. I agree with Hutten and Cohen when they note that conservative and innovative behaviour occurs in all societies, and that at our present state of knowledge there appear to be no uniform pattern of resistance to chance or acceptance of the new which enables us to say who will resist particular technological, scientific and cultural changes (1975: 105). There is now a large literature which documents that peasants do make strategies and calculations, but these strategies are based on different sources of information and consider different factors than those of economists or planners. Brokensha, Horowitz and Scudder (1977) call for a greater understanding of Sudano-Sahelian marketing systems. This would enable us to understand precisely how small producers - e.g. peasants and herders - respond to different incentives. To simply study economic incentives leads us to lose what indeed are the determinants of social behavior. It is possible that the conclusions might very well correspond to those of Scott in his intriguing study of peasants in Asia. Scott rests his analysis on the peasant household as a survival unit.[6] Peasants give highest priority to the survival and maintenance of their household. In particular Scott observes that the insecurities of the world market are much greater than those of local markets, or of non-market situations. He writes:

> In a smallholding subsistence economy, despite its profound disadvantages, a peasant family knows that if the harvest is sufficient its food supply is more or less assured. When the crop is sold, however, or when portions of it are valued at current prices for rent or interest payments and taxes, there is no such assurance. The crop may be larger but a price fall will reduce its real value. To the extent that the market determines the value of the peasant's crop, to that extent is he exposed to the insecurities of the price mechanism. Taxes, rents, and interest paid in cash might cost twice as much <u>in rice</u> (emphasis in original) this year as they had last, even though the amount of cash required and the size of the crop remained constant (58-59).

There is growing evidence that Sahelian peasants will be no different than peasants in other parts of the world. Peasants of course try to benefit from the market when they can. But the argument of Scott and others is that the structure of the world market, and often the manipulation of the market by national governments operates to the disadvantage of many peasants. Thus, resistance to the market, resistance to many development programs are from the poorer peasants' point of view, rational. Or, if the goals and purposes of market participation are to keep things the way they are, then the strategies may also be quite rational. For example, Hopkins cites that peasant strategy in forming cooperatives in Mali. The implication of such a view, according to Raynaut, Hutton and Cohen (op. cit.) is to abandon approaches centered on the idea of the model farm or the progressive farmer. The goals of development ought to be satisfying the needs of whole peasant communities, not the much greater advantage of the chosen few. That the peasants may be more rational than they think if they are trying to avoid having their food supply be subject to the vagaries of the market.

Peasants show a variety of responses to economic opportunities as well as to economic disaster (i.e. the Sahelian drought). Sometimes these are in a straightforward profit-oriented manner but more likely the responses are set in actual situations that cannot easily be classified as either impeding progress or facilitating it (Hutton and Cohen: 105). In this situation then a reanalysis of the composition of the Sudano-Sahelian peasantry is needed (that is, subdividing and classifying different sectors within the peasantry within and between different ethnic groups). Only in this context will we move from the traditional to modern framework and develop a more processual approach to peasant responses.

One other dimension of rural social stratification that needs to be examined in greater detail concerns the historical legacy of slavery.[7] Already several studies demonstrate that slavery remains an important issue for the social organisation of labor, for participation in the local political systems, and for access to land. This is true of peoples of slave descent among the Tuareg, Maures, Soninke, Fulbe, and many others. Despite legal efforts to end servitude it has occurred only unevenly. In many areas former slaves do not own their own land and continue to work for, or rent from landowners. In other instances they have some land, but not enough. Many without access to land join the stream coming to the cities - but of course all rural sectors members work in the cities. The question of how community structures and rural social stratification systems have impeded needed change in the rural sector is discussed in the next section. The implication of the different kinds of analysis for the Sahel is discussed in Sections D and E.

B. Cooperatives in the Sudano-Sahel

A distinction needs to be made between cooperation and cooperative activity and cooperatives or a cooperative movement. All societies contain cooperation and cooperative activity with any degree of division of labor. The practice of cooperative labor has received relatively little attention in the study of peasant societies (Moore 1975). I find it not useful to link all forms of cooperation under one rubric of cooperative as for example Seibel and Massing have done (1974):

> A cooperative is here defined as a voluntary, open, and permanent association of equalitarian [sic] structure in which the members secure for themselves certain economic interests through communal self-help. (45)

Their view is that almost all African societies have cooperatives, or at least in their terms, the "tribes" of Liberia.[8] From their general definition they specify that there are different kinds of cooperatives. Thus they distinguish work and savings cooperatives among the rural peoples. A work cooperative is defined as '...a group of farmers who work in turn on one another's farms. Distribution of labor services rendered and received is based on strict reciprocity." (49) While it is possible that cooperatives can be based upon an egalitarian or reciprocally-based society this is, in fact, very rare in the contemporary world. In particular, there are virtually no egalitarian societies in the Sahel. The division of labor during the later precolonial period in almost all Sudano-Sahelian societies was hierarchically organized. Work and the productive process were marked by a strong hierarchical division of labour involving slave and free labor, male and female labor, young and old, ethnic specialization and artisans. (The case for Liberia is somewhat different by the nature and form of the precolonial organization of Liberian societies.

Seibel and Massing's notion of openness has been challenged by Widstrand (1972) and others for East Africa. In East Africa it has been argued that work groups in traditional societies were too small to form modern cooperatives, and the work groups were not open ones. Further, the notion so strongly emphasized by Seibel and Massing among others, including Senghor, Dia, Nyerere that the traditional or communal forms of organization of precolonial Africa can be used to form modern cooperatives has been disputed by Worsley (1971), Gosselin (1977), Gagnon (1976), Hyden (1973), Nash and Hopkins (1976).

The significance of the cooperative movement cannot be overemphasized even though cooperatives have not been particularly successful. Cooperatives gain their significance from efforts to control one's own social forms, and to emphasize and develop cooperative behavior. Cooperatives are an effort to mold the future. But cooperative systems always retain an ambiguous character. Cooperative systems are at the same time both a type of production organization and a social movement with a socialist cast. While cooperatives have been used to integrate peasants into a capitalist or modern system, they are also supposed to be organized on a different basis than capitalist enterprise - e.g. cooperatives are in principle based upon formal equality of cooperative members, and internal democracy. There however is a difference between cooperatives in Africa, both East and West, and those that have developed in Europe and the United States. The crisis that led to cooperatives in Europe appear to be different than the crises that have led to cooperatives in Africa. In both cases, though, there is an implicit critique of the status quo, and of the direction of society. The degree to which cooperatives form part of the status quo then becomes an issue within

the cooperative movement. To the degree to which cooperatives actually function and work according to cooperative principles, they will then be in conflict, more or less, with those who hold power (one might add whether in "socialist" or "capitalist" nations.) Both these conflicts are part of cooperative history and practice in West Africa.

The vision of cooperatives in West Africa was perhaps best expressed by Mamadou Dia, in his early study and plea for cooperatives. He wrote in 1952:

> Je crois...à la possibilité d'élever techniquement l'Afrique au niveau du monde moderne sans détruire la civilisation propre et le type d'économie qui en est le substratum. La coopération permet précisément d'agir sur l'économie africaine dans un double sens: d'abord en lui restituant son véritable visage: d'économie de traite à laquelle elle a été réduite, elle pourra en faire une économie autonome tournée essentiellement vers la satisfaction prioritaire des besoins du monde africain; d'une économie scélerosée, elle fera une économie vivante et féconde, capable d'expansion économique sans danger d'appauvrissement pour le producteur. En second lieu, la coopération permettra la régénération et l'adaptation des techniques nouvelles. Agissant directement et du dedans sur les structures, elle assurera la transformation de l'économie dans le sens d'une évolution normale des institutions traditionnelles. (58-59)

Dia argued that the cooperative form of organization could lead to the preservation of what was best (and natural) to African societies as well as to lead to genuine economic development. The economic development of Africa in general and of Senegal in particular could be done only with the full participation and support of Africa's rural masses to whom Dia referred to as peasants. (In itself an interesting and significant advance over earlier characterizations of African rural populations as tribal.) The notion that Africa was communal prior to colonial rule was also argued by Leopold Senghor:

> La société négro-africaine, elle, met l'accent plus sur le groupe que sur l'individu, plus sur la solidarité que sur l'activité et les besoins de l'individu, plus sur la communion des personnes que sur leur autonomie. C'est une société communautaire (1961: 122).

Cooperatives were formed in Senegal for several reasons, including the key idea that they were consistent with the fundamental structures of African societies. In addition, they were to increase peasant productivity, and to incorporate the peasantry into the national economy. However, there was a tension (and we look at this in more detail below) between the views of Dia and Senghor as to the purpose of cooperatives and the degree of democracy and decentralization contained within them. This tension between what cooperatives are supposed to do, between whether they are to be viewed from above (the government view) or below, the cooperators' view, and the degree to which one takes solely a business perspective on cooperatives, will be addressed below (Widstrand 1972).

It is possible to detail how collective work (not cooperatives) was carried out in some areas prior to colonial rule. This would involve examining the different monographs on Sudano-Sahelian societies and specifying their economies and the organisation of work. In addition, recent historical work has begun to clarify the form and structure of Sudano-Sahelian economies prior to, and during the colonial period. There is not the time and space here to summarize this significant work, although it needs to be done in a regional framework.

Cooperatives, as a specific form of organization, were introduced initially to Africa by the French and British. In the case of former French West Africa, they were introduced by the colonial administration and did not develop spontaneously from African farmers and peasants (as was the case

in some parts of East Africa). Camboulives (1973) makes the significant point that the French colonial experiences did help form the contemporary cooperative structures because like the present

> ...le mouvement coopératif est l'oeuvre des gouvernants et non de l'initiative privée, ce qui la différencie et l'oppose à la coopération classique européenne dans laquelle la réalité promue par les particuliers a précédé et conditionné les institutions. (14)

According to Hyden the French set up cooperatives but without any role for cooperative members. They were run as just another branch of the government bureaucracy from 1910 until 1950. The first cooperative groups to be formed were les sociétés de prévoyance whose purpose was to assure the economic development of the colonies and promote the social well-being of the masses. These began in 1910 but were modified again in 1915, 1919, 1923, 1933, 1936, 1937 and 1938 (Camboulives: 16). They were not insignificant in Senegal where in 1952 there were fourteen sociétés de prévoyance with 1,110,968 members (Camboulives: 21). They were also significant in Mali, Niger, and Upper Volta.

The role of the Sociétés de prévoyance were, according to the decree of June 29, 1910:

1) "constituer des approvisionnements de graines en vue de pourvoir aux semailles, aux époques convenables;

2) acheter pour les sociétaires les instruments agricoles indispensables et leur en faire l'avance à titre de prêt;

3) venir en aide en cas de nécessité à leurs adhérents atteints par la maladie et les accidents;

4) les prémunir contres les conséquences de la sécheresse, des inondations, des épizooties et autres fléaux naturels." (Camboulives: 20)

In summarizing the weaknesses of the Sociétés and why they failed Camboulives among others has pointed out that the Sociétés neglected their role as a promoter of cooperative activities to focus on commercial activity. In addi-

tion, their hierarchical and authoritarian organization prevented the members from participating in the Sociétés. Rather than members genuinely participating they were obligated to belong and to pay fees as though they were just another tax.

The anthropologist Raynaut (1975) in his study of the Hausa of Niger has been highly critical of the Sociétés' role with respect to grain storage. He notes that the French administrators payed no attention and didn't respect indigenous methods of grain storage and preservation. They insisted instead on central storage in conditions which in fact were worse than what was there, and placed the grain in the hands of illegitimate authority, in the eyes of the people. After World War II and with a new government, the French applied in the colonies principles of the cooperative movement already begun in France. The most important cooperatives begun in Senegal were based upon peanut production. These cooperatives failed for a variety of reasons, (see Dia, Camboulives and Gagnon for the reasons) and were terminated by a new decree in 1955. The new law created special organisms for the creation of new cooperatives and their economic and technical support. Two new public services oversaw the reorganized cooperatives. First was the Service d'assistance technique aux coopératives. This agency was to provide technical and administrative assistance to promote the cooperative movement. It was supposed to be gradually replaced by a union of cooperatives. The other new agency was Les Sociétés mutuelles de développement rural (SMDR). These were to gradually replace the Sociétés de prévoyance They had a double mission; to assist the cooperatives commercially and financially, and to promote cooperation. They did not fully replace the S.P.'s. Gagnon's summary is adequate for our purposes here:

> La S.M.D.R. est devenue l'institution dominante en milieu rural: en effet l'ensemble de ses tâches, regroupées en trois secteurs principaux, l'accroissement de la production, l'écoulement, les services et le crédit, en font un organisme polyvalent ayant jurisdiction sur toute l'activité économique du paysan: ce dernier y appartient obligatoirement par une cotisation perçue en même temps que l'impôt. Grâce à ces contributions, auxquelles s'ajoutent des subventions gouvernmentales, des emprunts et des produits d'opérations, la S.M.D.R. dispose pratiquement de la totalité des ressources financières de son territoire; elle manque cependant souvent de l'équipement technique et humain nécessaire à l'accomplissement efficace de ses tâches et sa gestion compatable accuse presque toujours d'importants déficits. Très valorisée politiquement son contrôle suscite de nombreuses querelles entre les diverses factions du parti au pouvoir. (110-111)

Cooperatives were most developed in Senegal, and were part of the production of the most important product of that nation. To which one must add immediately that cooperatives were not important outside of the peanut areas in Senegal. And cooperatives were much less important in the other Sudano-Sahelian nations. For example, cotton while critical to Chad was not grown cooperatively, nor were peanuts in Niger. While for the pastoralists, cooperatives were not even attempted during the colonial period - and of course only rarely so even now.

In Mali, (the old French Soudan) the Sociétés de prévoyance (Jones translates as Natives' Provident Society) were quite significant obliging the peasantry to contribute stock to central storage areas in the towns. The villagers according to Jones regarded the society as a foreign entity and their payments to it as just another tax (1976: 108). As in Senegal, the French changed the Sociétés into Les sociétés mutuelles de développement rural (SMDR, which Jones translates as Mutualist Rural Development Societies). Jones however regards the cooperative principle as having been alien to Malian peasants. He writes that all the rural cooperatives provide that "the alien principle had not been accepted by the people; they disintegrated as

soon as the outside support was removed" (1976: 108-109).

The structures left by the French, however, were either transformed, or subject to dramatic reform in Senegal, Mali, and Niger (less so in Chad, Upper Volta, and Mauritania). It is to the experiences of parts of the rural areas of Senegal to which we now turn for assessing what cooperatives can and cannot do, and the relationship between cooperatives and earlier forms of cooperation, the kind and form of participation in cooperatives, and the possibility of further development of cooperatives in the Sudano-Sahel.

Cooperatives, Rural Animation, Promotion Humain and Rural Conflict

One of the fundamental problems for the Sudano-Sahelian nations has been what kind of state to build, what kind of participation and integration should there be of the rural peoples - of the peasants and herders. How can the rural sectors of these countries be turned to greater involvement, productivity of benefit to the entire nation. I will deal specifically with some of these issues in the last section on local/national conflict. For now, I want to emphasize the history of cooperatives and the associated mass movements. While these did not involve many of the peoples in the Sudano-Sahel, (particularly those not in commercial areas) they nonetheless are significant to understand the potential for cooperatives and mass participation viewed historically. The major movements were in Senegal, rural animation; in Niger, rural animation but different because of the lesser degree of commercialization, and lateness of cooperatives; and in Mali, an effort to develop the material and human productive forces of the peasantry through cooperatives based upon traditional community relations. (I have left out the other Sahelian nations due to lack of time to adequately survey the literature).

Senegal, Mali and Niger. Three Cooperative Experiences

Unlike East Africa, cooperatives in these three nations came to be the organizational form for increased crop production (primarily peanuts) and the modernization of the rural masses. Included in the latter were improvement of educational and health services, improvement and greater accessibility of manufactured goods essential for agricultural production but also for general improvement of the standard of living. The context in which cooperatives were developed and sustained varies from one nation to another, as well as from one region to another. In all three cases, there appears to be rather wide agreement, although for different reasons, that the cooperatives have either been not particularly successful or outright failures. In addition, programs which went along with the cooperatives, specifically rural animation in both Senegal and Niger, did not succeed, or were too successful, and were ended by either regional or national authorities.

In this section of the paper I will not attempt a full review of the cooperative and rural animation programs in each of the three nations but will point to some salient characteristics of each trying to understand some of the structural reasons for their lack of success. Let me hasten to point out though that despite dealing at a national level in some cases this should not be overstated nor reified. There is tremendous variation in all Sahelian countries, and the form structure and operations of the cooperatives (where introduced) varies tremendously. The blockages for the operations of the cooperatives among Mouride Wolof in Senegal will be very different than among the Tukoleur in the Senegal valley than among the Soninke in the Bakel area. At the same time, the ethnic characteristics may not be salient, as in some of the marketing cooperatives in Mali.

One major theme in all three nations concerns the degree to which entrenched local structures of power have diverted or blocked efforts at exchanging production and the organization of work as well as rural political processes. Let me quote from three recent studies of rural economic change in Mali, Senegal, and Niger: First Mali. The GRPSM's are the village cooperative bodies.

> In my experience, villagers had a radically different reaction to government imposed GRPSMs (groupement rural de production et de secours mutuel) than they did to political and administrative norms, while preserving the form of the innovation to keep the central government happy. Not so with the cooperatives. Despite the belief of some politicians that the cooperatives were building on primitive rural socialism, villagers perceived the GRPSM as something novel. They conformed to government desires to varying degrees, but did not bend the cooperative structures much or fit them into existing village institutions. (Jones 290)

> The decisive inhibiting factor proved to be the colonial backwardness in the village and the persistence of ossified traditional community structures linked with it. The latter inevitably became an obstacle to the broad development of the productive forces to rapid development of agrarian production because of the laws governing their internal function and structures, especially their system of production and distribution. The traditional structures also hindered socio-economic progress. So long as they continued to function, the founding of cooperatives did not lead to a qualitative change in the social life of the village. On the contrary, the co-operatives became so much influenced by the traditional structures and leadership that their own laws of development did not come into effect, but the system of traditional relations, under the co-operative label, were stabilised and inhibited social progress (Ernst 202-203).

Senegal

> ...the Senegalese government's policies during the mid-sixties had only a marginal adverse effect, if any at all, on rural elites and private economic interests. Most of these groups were quite able to adapt to the commercial reforms launched at independence, and many continued to secure ample material and status compensation through the network of political machine ties. Although various groups did register their opposition to certain governmental policies and

> particular decisions (through anomic as well as associational and nonassociational interest articulation), decision-making affecting rural development policy throughout the sixties was concentrated in arenas high within the government and the state bureaucracy relatively free from outside pressure-group activity...(Schumacher xx).

> Those familiar with the workings of co-operatives elsewhere in Africa doubtless will not be startled to find that the institutionalization of the government's agricultural development programme has worked conspicuously to the advantage of privileged elements in rural society, often permitting a more authoritarian pattern of local leadership than previously (O'Brien 1975: 118).

> Le système coopératif s'y est bien calqué sur les structures traditionnelles autoritaires, en particulier dans la zone mouride: en ouvrant les portes de l'économie capitaliste à la hiérarchie maraboutique, il contribue cependant à perpétuer et à accentuer les les clivages sociaux déjà existants (Gagnon 444).

<u>Niger</u>

> ...these programs [i.e., cooperatives, and rural animation] have led to new types of economic differentiation in an unpredicted and anti-developmental way. For the relatively wealthy and customarily powerful Hausa farmer who purchased the new agricultural innovations, these programs have resulted, not in an improvement of his productivity and his capacity to make economic investments, but rather in a reinforcement of his traditional social power through the development of new clients (Charlick 428).

Thus despite the diversity of ideological and analytical perspectives represented by the above quotes, the analysts all agree that cooperatives have not led to the goals of increasing equality and increasing participation (particularly of the poorer and less powerful). The analysts all point to the perpetuation of rural political and economic structures whose power has been intensified rather than diminished by the cooperatives. However, a caution must be added immediately. This did not occur without conflict, locally, regionally, and nationally.

Niger and Senegal and the Setting Up of Rural Animation

Much of the conflict occurred around rural animation. Rural animation was a movement initially developed for France by a group of Catholic socialists and then applied to Africa. It represented a humanistic orientation and direction which was to be based upon the communal ideals and structures of indigenous African societies. It was to avoid authoritarian forms of socialism and the ravages of early capitalism, and it was to induce participation by Niger's peasants; for Senegal it was to transform Senegal through the economic and political mobilization of the peasantry. In both cases they were to be linked with cooperatives, but not identical to them.

In examining rural animation it is clear that it needs to be seen in national, regional and local perspective. At the same time, it was a contradictory movement. Its success, i.e. increased economic and political activity by the peasantry, would jeopardize the power holders in the rural areas, and even alter national political balances since it would alter the bases of wealth and power that many national politicians held locally. The hope that activated peasants would simply follow nationally determined goals and policies turned out not to be the case precisely because what was often not examined were the local structures of power. Let us turn to the specifics of each country.

Senegal

Senegal underwent a major crisis concerning the role of cooperatives and rural animation in 1962. Senegal, because of its favoured status as colony, and its relatively more developed commercial economy, also had more entrenched national class interests. Because the dominant peanut sector was neither based upon modern agriculture nor controlled by large landlords the cooperative movement presented itself as a new mode of integration of

the country. The cooperative movement did threaten commercial interests and the rural religious hierarchies. The peasants involved in rural animation and the cooperatives were supported by members of the civil service and the unions. They of course had their own interests in bypassing the traditional colonial intermediaries of marabouts and merchants. Thus despite what appeared to be common ideology of Senghor and Dia, they differed on the nature of cooperatives and rural animation. As is well known Senghor triumphed in this instance while Dia was defeated. Rural animation and the cooperatives rather than developing and intensifying as a social movement became the agency by which the peasants were to be integrated into the national economy and to provide the surplus for both the religious and bureaucratic elite while remaining relatively powerless.

Without detailing the history and shifts in cooperatives in Senegal (see Gagnon, Schumacher, Camboulives, and De Decker) the cooperatives were not succeeding in the terms set by the national government. Simultaneously the peasants were in increasing opposition to the cooperative system. The Senegalese government shifted away from questions of democracy and participation to those of increased production and profitability, pricing, credit and marketing arrangements. These changes were carried out from "above" and ultimately generated what is referred to as the "peasant malaise." Schumacher summarizes the failure of one part of Senegalese rural development in these words:

> By the end of the sixties the programme agricole and the peanut-millet productivity program launched in 1964 had been brought to a virtual standstill in face of mounting peasant distrust, anger, and outright defiance (1975: 185).

This was due, according to Schumacher, to a variety of reasons (and I only include several): the government's decision to lower the official producer's price of peanuts by fifteen percent, without holding of part of price, confusion

and delays in the payment system, combined with bad weather, and increased pressure to buy new fertilizers, fungicide, and machines. Donal Cruise O'Brien reports for the same time period that membership in the cooperative did not imply any control of the institution from below.

> Democratic assemblies of members (certainly those which I witnessed) were usually rather silent gatherings, held only in the presence of government officials who could ensure that popular decisions were in conformity with administrative regulations (1975: 133).

It certainly would not take the peasants long to recognize the same conclusion that O'Brien came to (1975):

> Co-operative marketing institutions also enable the state bureaucracy to appropriate a large part of the revenue derived from commercial agriculture, to make legal and illegal profits on a scale at least rivalling that of the private traders of the colonial period (134).

O'Brien makes explicit the link from national conflict to the fate of cooperatives and rural animation.

> With the fall of Mamadou Dia in 1962, the marketing co-operatives appear to revert to colonial precedent: Dia himself, just before his fall, had warned of the danger that co-operatives might become a mere 'excresence of technical administrative services'. Even this 'danger' now seems something of a technocratic utopia, and as peasant incomes decline or at best stagnate, it is increasingly clear that government bureaucracy (or in other terms the ruling elite) is more parasitic on peasant production than 'generative of agrarian progress' (1975: 137)

I might point out that Schumacher while looking at the same facts comes to the opposite conclusion. Rather than bureaucracy acting in its own interest being the problem, he finds the problem as not being enough bureaucracy. That the ruling elite in Senegal has not acted bureaucratically enough but rather has acted too much on the basis of clientalism. I tend to think that O'Brien is the more accurate because he gives greater weight to the peasant perspective than Schumacher.[9]

Cooperatives in Senegal haven't been nation-wide, and in recent years rural development planning has moved away from much of the earlier thinking about cooperatives. In particular the rural development of the Senegal river basin seems to give minimal attention to rural participation and power. Waldstein's analysis of Kassak Nord and Sud demonstrates the determination of cooperative policy and operations by SAED and SONADER and not by cooperative members.

Non-cooperative movements, like that of the Mourides, were initially quite successful in directing peasant energies. But the Mourides, like any other movement needs to be examined in its context. The context as already pointed out in Part A. was the defeat of the Wolof, the rise of a religious movement, and then the support of the French colonialist for the peanut colonization of large interior areas of Senegal. The Mourides built upon some of the older institutions of Wolof society. O'Brien tends to be quite reluctant though to attribute Mouride success to the work groups characteristic of the Wolof. Rather than emphasizing the continuity of Wolof work groups he points to the nuclearisation and individualisation within what had been larger family groups. In particular there has been a marked decline in the larger stable working groups which O'Brien attributes to the development and spread of commercial agriculture.

Perhaps one of the most significant questions that can be asked of the Mouride experience is the degree to which it can continue to be of significance in developing a more successful agricultural system in Senegal. The answer to that question by the French scholars, Philippe Couty, J. Roch and G. Rocheteau economists, and Jean Copans anthropologist, is negative. They have worked near the Mouride capital of Touba as well as in the pioneer areas of Mouride expansion in the western Ferlo. Their studies have focused on the

detailed study of time allocation of Mouride peasants including how they decide between millet and peanut production, the allocation of labor and the kind of exchange used for labor, inter and intra-village exchanges, the economic support given to the marabouts, the degree of dependence of Mouride peasants upon labor migration and other work apart from farming. And, of course, there is specific attention given to the Mouride ideological system and its practical implications for the Mouride productive system and the distribution and use of resources. There is neither time nor space to summarize the vast amount of data and analysis included in their work but only to say that there appears to be agreement among the French scholars and O'Brien that the Mouride system has reached its limit. Mouride organization certainly will continue but it will become more and more involuted, consumed with internal conflicts and unable to cope with the stagnation of agricultural production. Interestingly and perhaps against general knowledge, despite the integration of the Mourides to the world market through peanuts, the internal relations of production are not based upon profitability. In Rocheteau's work in comparing the older Mouride areas with the pioneer ones, he suggests that the:

> L'exploitation pionnière demeure ainsi une exploitation paysanne où le comportement du producteur est essentiellement basé sur des calculs d'utilité du travail, et très éloignée d'une exploitation capitaliste axée sur la recherche du profit et la prise en considération du coût des facteurs du production (1975: 45).

He goes on to observe that production is essentially household based with the household head serving as the key organizer and responsible for production. The precise description of the organization of work and the balance between peanuts and millet production is excellently described in the major monograph from the French research group, and supplemented by Rocheteau for the pioneer areas.

In addition to the question of the organization of work are other questions concerning the continued allocation of land for Mouride expansion by the government in return for continued political support. There has been much controversy over the destructiveness of the cultivation methods used on the maraboutic estates (these are different than land used and owned by Mouride peasants although the technique of agriculture may be the same). (see O'Brien 1971: 220-225)

Cooperatives have been formed in the Mouride areas but fell under the control of the marabouts. The marabouts vigorously opposed rural animation. They disliked the animator's enthusiasm for Thursday fields - for the benefit of the whole community as opposed to the Wednesday work which the talibe did for their marabouts on Wednesday. In addition, the early animators in O'Brien's view publicly opposed the religious leaders for their corruption, usury, and other practices. It was rural animation according to many that led the Mourides to oppose Mamadou Dia. And, so again we find that national politics and overall development strategies impact upon village and household organization. Perhaps more in Senegal than elsewhere.

Senegal has entered a new stage since the peasant malaise, or more appropriately the continuing peasant malaise. It is turning away from reliance upon cooperatives and peanuts and basing its prospect more upon the development of the Senegal river area relying upon international funding. This however, is another story and is not appropriate here, but needs to be examined in light of the relationships between rural animation, the cooperatives, the Mourides, the peanut economy, and the conflicts within the Senegalese state.

Niger

Unlike Senegal, Niger was a relatively neglected colony. There is much

less national organization and unity both politically and economically. The variation from region to region and from society to society is much greater than in Senegal. The variation between the interior Niger delta, to the pastoral nomadism of the Tuareg, and the Fulbe, to the peanut-dominated economies of Tillaberi, and the Hausa of the southeastern region, et al. make it virtually impossible at this time to make generalizations about Niger as a whole concerning the subjects of this paper. Given the limitations of time and space it is not possible to summarize and analyze the rather substantial amount of anthropological material on the populations of Niger. What I will do is to review briefly some aspects of rural animation and cooperatives among the Hausa where they have been studied, and where many of the earliest and experimental programs began. In particular, Charlick's study of four villages in the county of Matameye, where there has also been substantial anthropological work, particularly by Guy Nicolas, provides a wealth of information about the weaknesses and strengths of the rural animation and cooperative effort in Niger.

Because of the specific features of Hausa society, which is among the best studied of African societies,[10] and the degree of contact with rural animation, it is hard to generalize to all of Niger from the experiences of Matameye. It appears that the effects of rural animation and cooperatives on a nation-wide scale was much less than the impact of cotton and peanut production initiated by the French. Yet they are significant in terms of understanding the potentials for rural change in Niger. In Charlick's study of rural animation and in his effort to specify both rural modernization and to measure participation, he is very pessimistic about its effects, despite earlier claims that rural animation had been successful in Matameye.

There is neither the space nor time here to summarize the anthropological material on the economy of different Hausa communities in Niger nor the rich study of Charlick. Rather, I will just make a few comments on contradictions inherent in rural animation and cooperatives in Niger which substantiate some of the material in the more general discussion of cooperatives.

The basis of rural animation in Niger as in Senegal was an effort to help mobilize peasants, what Charlick calls "induced participation". It was hoped that this induced participation would release new political forces in the village which in turn would power local agrarian development. The origins of rural animation in Niger was mixed. In part it was based upon the desire to improve the living conditions of Niger's rural population but at least as much it had the political origins of trying to undercut Sawaba's appeal (the then opposition party which was also engaging in the beginnings of armed resistance) to Niger's peasants, as well as the increase in peasant discontent based upon no change in their real economic, social and political position despite independence. Charlick also points out that the options open to the national government were exceedingly limited because of the weak control that the Diori regime had in the rural areas. And, the degree to which it had control in the countryside based upon chiefs and merchants who were the main supporters of continuing the colonial trade economy.

But, as Charlick observes, the Diori government was not simply interested in mobilizing peasants nor in decentralizing power. It was as much, if not more interested in "...directing change and in mobilizing village level society for national priorities. It [the national government] instituted a number of descending linkage structures to guarantee that mass organization did not become too autonomous. Both animation and cooperatives

would be supervised by professional and national bureaucracies responsible to top leadership." (84) However, the reasons that Matameye became the site of the first and most intensive animation program was because of the strength of the traditional political leadership. But the strength of that same leadership thwarted efforts to change the position and situation of the peasantry. For example, members of the local political elite accompanied rural animation teams when meeting all local contacts, a process which according to Charlick intimidated the poor peasants.

Among the Hausa, the work group is essential for the well-being of all members of Hausa society. Charlick defines the work group as "...those individuals who pursue a range of common economic activity designed to satisfy basic food, tax and social needs for their members." (156) All work group members do acknowledge the leadership of a single head (typically male in Hausa society). And, virtually all Hausa villagers participate in a work group. In the four villages studied by Charlick (although this is different for other Hausa villages) the work group coincided with the household (gida) in most cases. Linguistically work groups are called gida and the head of the work group is also called the head of the household, maigida. Nonetheless work groups can be more and less comprehensive than the gida. Charlick appropriately describes the variation in work groups so that some provide taxes for their members, others do not, some eat from a single pot or grain store, others do not; some provide food from a common supply for the whole year, others do not.

Charlick investigates two questions important for our purposes: 1) the relationship between work group characteristics and responses to economic innovation opportunities, and 2) is there any evidence that the process of individualization explains the existence or frequency of nuclear work group

organization in Southern Matameye today? (160-161) There is much of interest methodologically in Charlick's work that I cannot go into here as well as the data itself. Charlick concludes that there is little, if any, evidence to support the notion of decline in work groups. To which I might add that this gives added weight to arguments for the resiliency and strength of indigenous African institutions, and indeed their adaptability to changing conditions. However, the context in which the work groups function has changed dramatically and thus despite the continued strength of work groups Charlick writes that "Economic inequality among individual farmers exists principally because of extensive individualization of economic activity." (226) Because most work groups do not produce any surplus, the degree to which there are surpluses must come from individual economic activity - which would include farming as well as nonfarm occupation (which is indeed quite widespread).

The point of the discussion of work groups, variation in the production of surplus, individual economic activity demonstrates for Charlick the extent to which great rural inequality already exists within Hausa villages. He observes that there are wide gaps "between the resources available to the few relatively well-off and the bulk of less fortunate villagers," (227) a conclusion which is being increasingly verified throughout West Africa. How this differentiation will affect participation in the development process, and one needs to add, the kind of participation, remains at issue.

Charlick then turns to a long, and fairly complicated discussion of participation and its measurement. Again, like wealth, participation was and is not equal in Hausa society.

> In the rural Hausa community, 'power' aspects of political decision making have been circumscribed by a history of hierarchical organization and as a consequence conflicts for 'power' and for great material gain may appear less apparent in this setting than in more familiar 'Western' political arenas. Nevertheless, even at the local level of Hausa society, political acts involve the struggle for status, deference, well-being, and security. (263-64)

In one dimension, little has changed in terms of participation of the poorer Hausa peasants. The customary Hausa aristocracy has remained in their privileged position; they continue to extract peasant resources and labor. Because the aristocracy has adapted itself to the new patterns of trading and administration, they have increased their power. At the same time Charlick does find differences in participation between the three experimental villages which were part of rural animation and one which was not, but had many similar characteristics as the other three. Again I must leave out a detailed consideration of Charlick's work but state some of his conclusions most relevant to this paper (and not pretending to be a complete summary of his study nor a critical discussion of his methodology and the degree to which one can really move from questionnaires of the Hausa to conclusions about their values and attitudes). Charlick found that there was an intensification of participation in the experimental villages. But simultaneously he found that political participation had "very little consequence for efficacy attitudes. The narrow measure of belief in one's capacity to secure political assistance from extra-local authorities was the only one which seemed to have any relationship to participation." (388) And finally that Charlick found no evidence from his questionnaires and their statistical analysis to support the view that innovative personal economic responses could be produced through political participation. He found

that participation is both an independent and dependent variable. It can play an independent role in the rural economic process although one needs to detail who participates and why as well as the form of that participation, and as a dependent variable in terms of the explanation of who participates and why.

In summary, Charlick does not think that rural animation and cooperatives in Niger achieved their goals. Unlike the earlier and optimistic literature of some of the participants, including Roland Colin, both the failure of Nigerien agriculture and the cooperatives formed under rural animation seems to bear out the conclusions of Charlick. He attributes the failure to a series of factors but does say, which supports the general view taken in this section, that

> Most notably, the fact that the national government never effectively reduced the power of residual elites and hence failed to radically restructure villager political participation in national politics means that this study can draw no data-based conclusions on the effects of such restructuring on the modernization of the rural economy. (424)

The question of the conflict between national and local will be taken up in another section. But the perspective that cooperatives and rural animation always take place in the context of national development programs is clear once again. As well as the corollary that one can never underestimate the resilience and strength of local elites, and local political structures. Cooperatives, as the case of Niger shows, operate in a highly political environment even when they are not meant to. And, cooperatives in Niger have led to

> a growing gap between the rich and traditionally powerful and those less affluent individuals who overextended themselves economically and socially to take a change on the programs proposed to them. The 'middle strata' of rural Hausa society has all but disappeared as a conse-

> quence. Already the political impact of this growing inequality is obvious. (429)

While there may be some overstatement, the conclusions fit with analysis of other cooperatives in West Africa. They have benefitted and have come to serve the richer in the rural areas, and to heighten power disparities.

Mali

No effort is made here to provide a complete discussion but only to point toward one important commonality with other Francophone experience. The case of Mali appears on the surface to be quite different than Senegal and Niger. This is due to the use of rural cooperatives in the socialist years of Mali. If one can speak of a tension between the form and structure of cooperatives to the wider society, this theoretically should be reduced in socialist societies. Yet two scholars from markedly divergent perspectives view the failure of cooperatives in Mali as due to the ability of local authorities to use the cooperatives to thwart governmental efforts at changing rural structures.

Ernst wrote

> These economic results [lack of development of agrarian production] despite the comprehensive investments and measures show that it is impossible to change traditional agriculture through material support, training and education alone, without changing socio-economic relations and taking into account a number of secondary factors which we will speak of later. They underline the interrelationship between development of the productive forces and the character of the production relations (Ernst 1976: 81).

Ernst says that this happened because the traditional village leadership throughout Mali resisted the changes desired by the revolutionary single party. And, in a process not dissimilar to Niger, the members of the elite village structures became the leaders in the new party rural structures and

were able to frustrate many of the social and economic programs of the national government.

Thus from a Marxist view Ernst argues against identifying the traditional collectivism of the extended family with socialist or cooperative ideology, or even that it will accelerate socialist ideology. In fact its the reverse

> as long as the extended family and the traditional community function as a socio-economic system, they continually reproduce traditionalist ideological elements in the whole movement, i.e. they will always nourish illusory conceptions of the allegedly socialist character of traditional relations and are an objective hindrance to the ideological process of cognition that is necessary for working class ideology to be able to penetrate the whole movement (op. cit. 99)

Jones, in assessing Mali's development plans concludes that agricultural stagnation was the key to understanding the plan's failure. He emphasizes the degree of variation and complexity in the village structures of Mali. He cites three dimensions of the failure: institutional failure, effects of economic disincentives and technical mistakes. An assessment of these dimensions in comparison to cooperatives and rural development at a comparable time period in other Sahelian nations is beyond the scope of this inquiry. But the point that needs emphasizing is Jones' observation that there was a tremendous underestimation of the

> ...importance of institutions which differentiate and structure the economic roles of rural Malians. Many politicians thought of these differentiating institutions as 'feudal' or colonial hangovers destined to wither away rapidly in socialist independence; many were simply townsmen and had little understanding of rural Mali. In any case, overlooking village structures made it impossible to adapt them for Plan purposes and often guaranteed that village solidarity would work at cross-purposes to the Plan (1976: 278).

Jones views cooperatives in Mali as a total failure. However, his characterization tends to be one-dimensional and does not take into account the rich complexity of social and political experience embedded in the cooperative experience. We do not have many accounts at the village level of this time but Hopkins work does show its texture and complexity. We do not have comparable material on the process of participation that we have for Senegal and Niger. Hopkins description for Kita, though, provides evidence for a great deal of discussion and debate much greater than that described for Senegal and Niger. One would expect to find, despite the analysis of Jones and Ernst, greater participation and more new structures in Mali than in Senegal and Niger. However, this would need to be qualified for in Senegal there have been certainly intensified efforts to alter rural life but these have been top-down. In addition, greater effort was made in Mali to break the power of merchants and traders who throughout West Africa bought peasant agricultural products at low prices, and charged high prices during the hungry season. However, according to Ernst, the administrators and members of the Union Soudanais misused their positions and benefitted privately from many of the efforts to develop fair and equitable marketing and trade relationships for the peasantry. Hopkins provides an interesting account of the Kita buying cooperative and the degree of local support for altering the buying and selling of essential commodities (see pp. 103-109).

While Mali contrasts with Niger and Senegal in terms of the consistency of the view of the role and place of cooperatives in a national development strategy, it nonetheless manifested the same problem of local, elite adaptation and resistance. The key problem with such resistance has been braking increased production and the use of the limited agricultural surplus for the maintenance of the elite and not for increasing the accumulation of surplus

and its more productive use. Thus while appearing to be different, Mali reflects the overall dilemmas of cooperatives in Francophone West Africa during the 1960's.

Conclusion

Goussault (1977) has summarized well the history of cooperatives in Africa in general and in West Africa in particular. He emphasizes the use of cooperatives as an instrument of governmental policies. This use of cooperatives in the contemporary period to include peasants in the market economy but without political participation will create further conflicts.

> La création de coopératives est depuis un demi-siècle l'instrument privilégié des politiques agricoles dans les campagnes sous-développées. Les administrations coloniales en ont usé abondamment pour le contrôle de la production et de la population paysannes; les planteurs et colons eux-mêmes y ont trouvé une forme efficace d'organisation de leurs intérêts professionnels; les programmes contemporains de développement rural ou de réforme agraire en font un usage d'autant plus généralisé qu'ils y voient le seul moyen de rentabiliser leur aide à la paysannerie pauvre, d'orienter le plus grand nombre de petits agriculteurs vers la production marchande et de leur offrir un cade de participation économique et sociale. Le coopérativisme demeure ainsi la panacée. (281)

The question of the intent and purpose of cooperatives remains at issue. While governments have been concerned with terms of credit, investment, the amount of production commercialized, the implementation of national programs, this has often meant the decline in peasant participation and the control of the cooperatives by those designated as the traditional elite and the emerging rural classes in alliance with the national elite. The socio-economic studies of West African cooperatives have shown that rather than reduce rural inequality cooperatives appear to be intensifying rural

stratification, and this is part of the process of increasing commercialization of peasant production. All too often cooperatives have been used to implement national plans and goals which governments have been unable to do otherwise. But it does leave the governments open to charges of manipulation and deception, which in turn will lead to a decline in participation in cooperatives. However, cooperatives have served those who had the means to use increased access to credit, to agricultural technologies, even if they were not always used for the intended purposes of a cooperative. Cooperatives then become another institution, and a powerful one, for maintaining the hierarchical structures of both the national bureaucracy and the local ones. The view that indigenous forms of African social and economic organization would lend itself to strong cooperatives keeping the best of Africa and avoiding the worst of the West has turned out not to be the case. The dilemmas of cooperatives in Africa are the dilemmas of cooperatives everywhere. Perhaps the key difference lies in the use of cooperative organization for the production of key commodities in Francophone Africa and therefore continuous and direct national government intervention in the running of the cooperatives.

In conclusion it would appear that cooperatives at this point will not be the means to avoid conflict, but rather may become the battleground for conflicts between the rural elites and the poorer peasants for the control or even participation in the cooperatives.

C. Indigenous Initiative

Indigenous initiative is just as characteristic of the Sahel as stability and tradition. Not only does initiative need to be examined in historical perspective but the context and structure of initiative requires consideration. Many aspects of Sudano-Sahelian societies change in the name of trying to sustain society as it was. For example, much Soninke migration from Mali, Senegal and Mauretania to France is based upon trying to keep the villages intact. The numbers and kinds of historical initiatives are great although not always apparent. According to Paul Lovejoy (1978a), for instance, the Wangara merchants were responsible for the introduction of new products into the Central Sudan such as kola nuts and the Songhay monetary system based upon cowries and gold. Plantations similarly were a major economic innovation in the Sokoto caliphate (Lovejoy 1978b). Other dimensions of Sahelian life, like the spread of pastoralism itself, or shifting balances of herd composition can also be viewed as "indigenous initiative".

One of the major initiatives of West African populations, including the Sahel, has been gardening. In particular the growing of cabbage, tomatoes, green beans, lettuce, onions, pimentos, peppers, et al. were adopted by many groups located near urban or semi-urban areas. These gardeners catered to European populations although there has also been dietary shifts among West Africans. These gardens might involve (as in Mauretania and elsewhere) irrigation, the use of digging to construct wells for irrigation, to make them successful. At the same time, the gardens initiated and developed by Hausa peasants near Maradi in Niger, for example, were not run simply on profit. Despite the sale of produce there was no separation of the cash crop gardens from overall household economy, nor were they expanded or dimin-

ished simply on the basis of profitability. As Raynaut (1969) points out in trying to understand why many Hausa gardeners operated their gardens at a loss and did not have separate budgets for them, we must always include social pressures, social aspirations, and ideology in understanding any apparent incoherence in the operation of the economic system. Nor can the Hausa gardeners be dismissed as non-initiatory nor non-economically oriented. Rather, their investments, labor, marketing are in the context of their social system which includes kinship, friendship, hierarchy, religion, et al. In the same way as cooperatives were influenced by the Hausa, so also are apparent simply economic family enterprises, like gardens.

Markets, market exchanges are part of the indigenous evolution of West Africa. Olivier de Sardan (1969) reports that among the Wogo before colonization the elders perceived the dissolving role that market exchange had upon traditional social relations. Markets were indigenous to the region but the market of Meanna became the most important and that was founded by the French around 1920. Linked to the markets is an ethnic specialization. Yet if one examines that market specialization (even though we don't understand or know the process underlying it) there must be very dramatic changes involving economic shifts to rice, tobacco, peanuts, onions, green beans, as well as the older patterns of milk, butter, mats, baobab leaves, etc.

There is no question but indigenous wisdom and initiative needs to be protected; for example, the maintenance of the diversity of plant and animal species current in the Sahel to save plants that are used by indigenous healers for curing purposes. Other studies will and are being carried out on the use of herbs and leaves for their nutritional values and what would be lost if they were dropped from rural diets. The question of local and

specific initiatives is not controversial. What remains the major issue from an anthropological/sociological perspective is what initiatives are selected for and why? What initiatives are seen for or against development, which in turn raises the whole concern over development for whom?

The key questions, though, for initiatives are not simply economic, nor only those that lead to more "rational" production or distribution, but also social and political ones. For example during the drought several West African governments continued their taxation in the most devastated areas. There is evidence of serious rural discontent in Niger and Mali (Ormières 1975 and Derriennic 1977). The efforts by Malian peasants to not pay taxes was certainly a significant effort to reduce their economic burden and to make their government more responsive to their pressing needs. We have already discussed the longer term agricultural crisis in Senegal whereby many peasants have withdrawn fields from peanuts to increase food crop production. This reflects resistance to authority as well as an initiative against a strong hierarchy.

Initiative, then, always takes place in a given social, political, economic, and physical environment. That environment is now in the process of being transformed by internal developments of the Sahelian nations, the drought and its aftermath, and the international strategies and linkages to the Sahel. In another paper I tried to show how this context can directly effect what appears to be a small project in a relatively isolated region of Senegal (Derman 1977). As the scale of the programs and projects increases, the political dimension will take on increasing significance. Projects such as the damming of the Senegal river will become part of political debate and disagreement.

Selection and award for initiative need to be examined. Are only initiatives which increase participation in a market to be rewarded? What about initiatives to withdraw or pull back from dependence on the world market? What about initiatives to cut-back peanut, cotton or other production when revenues fall - an economically rational decision for a cooperative or an individual but perhaps disastrous for a national government dependent upon exports? Should initiatives to resist the commercialization of food crops be supported or opposed? What about the initiatives of those people in various parts of the Sahel who oppose the variety of projects and programs designed to help them? The answer to many of these kinds of questions can only be in the social and political domain. That is, they inhere in the relationship between those who hold power and those who don't, locally and nationally. It inheres in the process of education and the nature of participation. Initiative can also being constrained and blocked or turned to resistance. To try to confine initiative, though, solely to efforts to increase market involvement or to efforts to support projects and programs may miss, divert, or block genuine initiatives. The question then is which initiatives are selected for support, and which ones are to be opposed? And who decides support and opposition? This is linked back to the earlier analysis of change and cooperatives whereby increasing class stratification and inequality in the rural areas are reflected in rural power structures.

As far as I can determine, the questions raised above need to be decided prior to decisions about which indigenous initiatives are to be recognized and enhanced. The linkage, though, of projects to local elites or to emergent national bureaucratic elites who are viewed with increasing suspicion

and hostility by the rural poor probably means increased conflict and probably a diminishment of initiative (except in narrow terms).

Two further points might be made with regard to the question of initiative. First, one needs to look at the approach of those attempting to change Sahelian society, and second, who are being selected to do that from both within and without the Sahel. This is a very broad enquiry and goes beyond what I can do here for again it would need a country by country, and sub-region by sub-region analysis. The approach of change agents all too often is that of this writer who wrote:

> ...the peasant cultures [of the Sahel] had evolved over long periods of time, had assimilated new movements such as the Islamic religion and, more recently, the colonial administration; the status quo provided security, if not wealth and equity for most members of the society. The cultural and religious mores of their ancestors were accepted without question; for example, they firmly believed that their future life depended in part upon their cooperation and subservience to the Muslim marabouts. They had no desire for economic growth and change, no concept of working to earn profit, to save and reinvest, and to use time as a resource in development. Their traditional leaders met their modest needs, and their ambitions did not go further. Like most human beings, they were willing to try new ways, as long as these did not threaten the structures which had been providing them with security (Moulton 1977: 190).

This issue has been more extensively discussed in Section A but impacts as well on the question of initiative. Initiative then can only be in Moulton's view adoption of profit motivation. I have suggested that initiative needs to be seen in a much broader context on the one hand, and that on the other, such a conception of initiative selects for only some initiatives of peasants and herders to change their circumstances. This particular point is expanded on by Lecomte (1978) who argues that rural initiative is stifled by the political structures of projects which prevent independent action on the part of peasants and herders once enmeshed in a project. Their experimentation and initiative is truncated because of the combination of the way

management is conducted or projects, and because of the views held by the managers. There is, in Lecomte's view, no substitute for respecting peasant responses and initiatives. If indeed development is for them, then they must be involved at all levels, from the planning to the implementation process. Lecomte links the issue of initiative with that of participation. To have peasant initiatives, modifications, and participation, Lecomte asks

> Comment alors imaginer qu'ils vont prendre en charge et acquérir maîtrise de leur développement, s'ils ne participent pas à la mise au point et à une sorte de découverte locale des techniques et des méthodes qui deviendront les leurs et qu'ils maîtriseront de ce fait?

Initiative and participation are further linked to the structure of authority in any given project. Lecomte fears that all too often management of projects slides toward the dictatorial. Without project structures that encourage participation and experimentation management will be dictatorial.

> La correction raisonnée des erreurs du project est-elle possible dans la pratique de ce mode de gestion? On peut en douter, car la source des rectifications est essentiellement la volonté paysanne exprimée par coups de force et non la volonté commune exercée par négociation, après réflexion, entre des groupements de paysans et la société. (1978: 105)

Before turning to the other question which this perspective raises, whether or not conflict between national and local structures is inherent, we might examine briefly whether or not there are marked differences between West African views of peasants and herders and some Western administrators and scholars. Again there needs to be a more detailed regional and national assessment of who represents the national governments in the Sahel and their approaches and attitudes toward the peasants and herders. Lecomte cites a statement by an agronomist (unnamed) working in Francophone West Africa which pinpoints many of the difficulties of the relationship between the

new technicians, project employees and peasants

> J'ai négocié de nombreux projets avec les aides: l'argent va à l'encadrement, c'est la plus grave erreur. Les agents sont des obstacles au développement. Le paysan se dit: 'Puisque l'Etat paie bien cet encadreur qui fait si peu pour moi, pourquoi ne paie-t-il pas mon développement aussi.' Et quand l'encadreur rentre par une porte, la paysan sort par l'autre. Plus tu augmentes le nombre d'encadreurs plus le pays recule. L'un d'eux a vidé l'encadreur de son champ en criant: 'Ton papa t'a nourri, il ne venait pas au champ avec des bottes, lui; sors-toi de là!' Si nous pouvion faire comprendre que le paysan n'est pas idiot! Qu'il peut faire tout cela lui-même en s'organisant, en regardant, en visitant des essais bien faits...L'encadrement va contre le développement, cela le paysan le voit. Il voit qu'ils ne sont pas à son service. Certains disent: 'Ils sont payés pour nous détruire...' (1978: 107)

Unless the relationship between managers and employees and participants in the projects can be altered, then indeed peasant initiative will be stifled.

D. Analyze the difficulties inherent in Sahelian development because of the potential conflict between national and local structures. Assess the degree to which such conflicts are inevitably antagonistic or can be avoided

Development cannot be without conflict. No society or nation consists of people with entirely common interests, goals and values. These conflicts are rural-urban, ethnic, regional, (distribution of services, regional disparities in wealth, resources, etc.) as well as national/local. One can certainly envision situations in which there would be little or no antagonism between national and local goals. Despite statements that there is no such conflict in the Sahel, this is not the case. While national policy and goals often assume a commonality and conflict-free development, this needs to be critically examined. The fundamental question underlying questions of national and local conflict concern the role of the peasantry and herders in plans for development (i.e. both agricultural and industrial). The question of the importance of the agrarian sector, what direction should development take, how much can the Sahelian nations industrialize, what priority to which sectors of the economy, remain under live and heated discussion. Many writers have pointed to an urban bais in the structures of power and the flow of resources in the Sahelian nations despite the fact that the vast majority of the population has lived in the rural areas. It appears that current efforts are designed to take the little control that remains to peasants and herders, to intensify this exploitation.

There is agreement among virtually all sectors of Sahelian nations on the urgent need for more effective development, a development which generates not only the ending of the conditions of famine but a process of economic growth leading to real and rapid change in the standard of living of Sahelian rural populations. How this is to be done, the balancing of environmental factors with narrow economic ones, with appropriate technology versus advanced

technology, the relationship of Sahelian nations to the industrial world and patterns of trade, food self-sufficiency versus increasing dependence upon food imports is greatly contested. We have already discussed increasing social divisions in the rural areas. How will these different divisions see and respond to national development plans? To which sectors of the peasantry will different development programs appeal?

One of the most interesting aspects of rural animation both in Niger and in Senegal was an effort to set up a different type of relationship between animators and peasants. To what extent can the national governments of the Sahel actually field technicians and rural extension workers who will be sympathetic, understanding and responsive to the peasantry? Will they live as peasants, will they find their rewards in the success of small-scale changes or will they aim to live as their urban wealthy counterparts? As Markovitz (1977), Hapgood (1965) and Dumont (1968) have all pointed out, despite plans and the advice of foreign experts and technicians the money goes to where the power is; the power is not in the control of the peasantry and usually doesn't go to benefit them. As Markovitz asks "Does this group [the small group that holds power, military or otherwise] really want to innovate? Do they really desire 'progress' if a rise in the standard of living of those in rural areas would threaten their own way of life, their own positions in society?" (1977: 334) The new bureaucracies will not be apolitical and will not be able to assess the interests of the peasants in an objective, disinterested manner. That is not the nature of politics. As Markovitz states

> The ideology of the technocrats, their mode of operation, and their class interests - in conjunction with the political alliances of other elements of African's organization bourgeoisie - threaten the interests of the dispossessed. What

> a tragedy if encadrement ends only in the firmer entrenchment of the bureaucrats in their offices. Foremost among the political obstacles to real economic development, therefore, may well be the 'developers' themselves. Who indeed will not only 'guard the guardians' but also develop the developers? (1977: 340-41)

If the national power structures do not include the peasantries, then if analyses like that of Markovitz are accurate, then we can expect greater conflict between national and local structures. Waldstein in his analysis of the Kasak scheme in Senegal poses similar questions:

> ...do structures and terms of production fixed by agencies of the national government strengthen the peasant producer's position as he moves farther into the world economy or do they restrict his manuverability to the point where he becomes more vulnerable than in a subsistence economy to crisis? More concretely, is participation in hydro-agricultural production a rational economic decision for a peasant producer? Will he be materially better off for having chosen to participate? According to some acceptable definition of development do these hydro-agricultural works qualify as development projects? If not, how might the waters of the Sahel be used that they genuinely fuel development? (1978: 1)

Waldstein poses the other side of the development question from the perspective of the peasant; what appears to be rational and development for the planner may cause real loss to the peasant, economically, socially and politically. Waldstein's analysis of the Kasak zone observes that "The results show that the natural and institutional constraints [on meeting objectives of planners] ...have conspired to push the peasant producer's net income in the zone of Kassak in the direction of, if not below, the threshold of his subsistence needs." (1978: 28)

Some see genuine possibilities for development within the current framework. Others, like Wallerstein are exceedingly pessimistic. In discussing the integration of Africa into the World Economy from 1975 onwards, he writes:

> This same period will be one of acute suffering for truly peripheral areas (of which the Sahel is one, and in contrast to semi-peripheral ones) whose non-essential exports will find a very weak world market and whose internal food production may collapse further. They will bear the brunt of death from famine and major transfers of remaining populations from rural areas to bidonvilles. The corresponding political regimes will almost certainly be that of corrupt and repressive pretorians. The principal consequence for the social structure will be the disintegration of the third zone, the so-called subsistence sector, clearing the land areas of men and largely sounding the death knell for the concept of a proletarian labor force. The 'reserve army of the unemployed' will thus become visible but also will have to be kept alive by some process of social redistribution of income (1976: 49).

This grim vision is contested by increasing numbers of West Africans both from left and right perspectives - those who base their optimism upon increasing outside funding to CILLS, and those who base themselves upon the increasing activism of peasants and workers. (e.g. Sine 1975) What does appear inevitable from either perspective is an increasing politicization of the assessment of development plans.

Most governments and international agencies present the Sahelian development programs as though they had no political implications or dimensions. The well-being of the population, recovery from the drought, environmental rebuilding, and increased food production remain the most oft-stated goals. Yet how local populations are to be mobilized, why and how they are actually going to support the development plans is typically left unstated. An identity of interest is assumed between international development agencies, national governments and local populations, or alternatively, local populations are viewed as obstacles to development plans. In both instances they are characterized as "traditional", living in outmoded societal forms, and have to be made to work, act and think as "moderns." Even when plans include efforts at popular or local participation they do not usually study local

inequalities or national inequalities, and assess who will actually benefit economically. What is different is that the Sahel is presented as being outside of ordinary development concerns.

However, this is no longer the case and is certainly not understood in this way any longer by Sahelians. For example Adrien Adams quotes a peasant from Bakel as saying:

> La S.A.E.D. [Société d'Aménagement et d'Exploitation des Terres du Delta] travaille pour la S.A.E.D., pas pour le paysan. Tous les paysans du fleuve Senegal, on sait ça. Parce qu'on a vu ce qui se passe à Matam. Alors on veut travailler indépendants, paysans, travailler un peu et bénéficier nous-mêmes. Si les paysans ne peuvent pas avoir de bénéfice eux-mêmes, ils n'ont qu'à continuer leurs petits champs-là. Tout le monde, à la maison, on n'a jamais manqué, quand on a notre petit daba. Maintenant, on veut bénéficier en plus. On travaille pour nous. Si on a un peu, on s'en sert nous-mêmes. Comme cette année: on a eu dix tonnes de riz. Les dix tonnes de riz on en a vendu à cinquante francs le kilo. Toute la ville en a acheté, ils sont contents. Si on avait envoyé ces dix tonnes de riz à décortiquer là-bas, à la S.A.E.D. on n'aurait rien.
> Alors, pour la question S.A.E.D., on sait. S.A.E.D. c'est le gouvernement, et nous, nous sommes les paysans. On est là. S.A.E.D. est là; mais les paysans doivent exister aussi. Ils doivent vivre. Comme le monde entier. Notre décision de développement, c'est sur ce point-là. Si ce point-là est perdu, le développement est négatif. Voilà. (Diabe Sow, April 1976 in Adams: 175)

In the Bakel example which Adams is discussing, national and international forces combined to prevent local initiative on the one hand, and on the other to determine how and what crops were to be grown, the techniques to be used, the crops to be grown, and the organizational forms to be employed. The working conclusion cannot be escaped; peasants cannot be permitted to develop or control their own organization. Despite the rhetoric of S.A.E.D. employees that there was no conflict of interest between them and the peasants, there is in fact. S.A.E.D.'s objective is to increase rice production in the Bakel region (and elsewhere) to meet food deficits in

the cities, and to diminish rice importation. S.A.E.D.'s principles of operations are fixed and cannot be altered by peasant wishes and organization. At one level, it represents the conflict between national needs and priorities on the one hand and local needs and priorities on the other. However, that conflict hasn't been acknowledged or made explicit, in fact, it's been denied by S.A.E.D. At another level, the conflict is an international one. Since the funding of many projects come from international sources, and because of the overall stagnation of the Senegalese economy and indebtedness of the government, international forces have their claims upon Senegal. Simultaneously, the Senegalese state has a fundamental interest in preventing the tension between it and rural peasants or producers from being politicized, or intensified. The stability of Senegal hinges upon the prevention of class conflict. Development programs in Bakel and in the rest of the Sahel act, either intentionally or not, to prevent that politicization.

While discussion of the political dimensions of development lead not only to difficult questions but to potential problems with the Sudano-Sahelian nations, there can be no full assessment of them without such consideration. In my estimation, politicization is necessary. If production and productivity are to increase, then there must be the release of peasant energies, and the orchestration of peasant energies in more organized forms. Otherwise those peasant energies will continue to be absorbed in patron-client relations, or individual or family solutions. The process of increased vulnerability of peasants and herders to market forces, demands of the state, and metropolitan powers will increase.

There appears to be a critical dilemma in the Sahelian programs. Namely,

that popular participation and mobilization will be necessary for their success. But, in order to get that release of peasant energy peasants will have to be included in the processes of decision-making, and the programs will have to be in greater accord with their interests. The directions will go against the goals and objective of many of the projects. Thus when peasant initiative and organization does develop in directions opposed to "development" then it has to be stopped. (For an example see Derman 1977).

All too often those who oppose the development programs are viewed as conservatives, against progress, traditional on the one hand or conspiratorially-minded utopian radicals on the other. Development in the Sahel has been presented as an apolitical process and one which appears more to be that way because of the weak development of classes in the Sahel. But we will not be able to understand the action of, for example, the S.A.E.D. unless we view it not as the representation of modern forces for development within Senegal, but rather the expression of particular class interests - class both within and without Senegal. Thus the question of popular participation cannot be separated from the question of class. The questions about development for whom, and if it is for the "poorest" (as the World Bank and other aid agencies claim) why can't the poorest be included at all levels of decision making?

I have cited Lecomte earlier in his contention that one needs to alter the basic decision making structure of projects to include those most affected. Franco (1978) argues that one needs to alter the basis of many projects. Both Lecomte and Franco suggest (as have many others) that too many projects do not include a full enough assessment of both the needs of a com-

munity and the consequences of a project. Thus Franco writes:

> L'introduction des cultures commerciales a donné aux paysans la possibilité d'augmenter leur niveau de vie à court terme. A long terme, pourtant, l'intégration dans le marché a enlevé aux FST [traditional social formations] le contrôle de leur processus socio-économique. Les mécanismes qui déterminent le niveau de vie des producteurs se situent maintenant au niveau national et même mondial. Les méthodes de production sont imposées et ne laissent que peu de marge d'adaptation aux conditions locales. Le premier objectif des projets de développement doit être de rendre aux communautés de base le contrôle de leurs conditions de vie. Ceci implique la nécessité d'une approche globale permettant de couvrir plusieurs aspects de la vie sociale et de l'environnement en même temps et mettant l'accent sur la mise en place de structures nouvelles de délibération et décision (147).

In examining the question of the participation in development by those most affected very rarely is there any disagreement among academics, although there often is with technocrats and bureaucrats. Thus despite verbal and rhetorical acknowledgement of participation it doesn't emerge. There must be structural constraints stemming from whose interests these projects and plans represent to prevent peasant or local participation and mobilization. The overcoming of years of drought and the increasing likelihood of recurrent famine to be successful must engage rural energies which have yet to be tapped in the Sahel. I am afraid that the example of Bakel stands for the ultimate neglect of the interests of the peasants, against the interests of the state.

At the same time, despite all the discussion about the effects of drought upon the pastoralists Jeremy Swift writes "At no stage have serious efforts been made to re-think development of Sahelian pastoral economies in their entirety, with the principal aim of improving the standard of living of the pastoralists themselves" (1977: 474-75). I would point out that often the situation of pastoralists and herders cannot be understood without a full political discussion placing them in location to who holds power over

them, both locally and nationally.

The reliance upon international agencies and developed organizations to undertake development in the Sahel reflects the weakness of the West African nations to undertake that process themselves, even within a capitalist framework. The development of the productive forces in the Sahel is being done under the design primarily of non-West Africans. And it is also being done to prevent or inhibit rural instability from increasing. In sum, the dilemma of Sahelian programs and reconstruction efforts on how to use peasant and pastoral energies without permitting politicization and organization is not resolvable. To be able to genuinely transform the Sahel back to a productive environment and to increase the Sahelian contribution to economic development there must be real mass participation and enthusiasm. However, for such a possibility to emerge, it appears that the governmental structure now attempting to control rural populations will have to be changed. This appears unlikely without a great increase in rural political conflict and resultant instability, and the development of opposition political movements in the Sahel countries.

FOOTNOTES

This paper has been principally based on academic sources, not upon AID documents, reports and studies. I took my task to primarily look at the non-A.I.D. literature.

1. The modernization literature is now enormous. It includes both political, economic and psychological dimensions. At the same time there are a variety of approaches within the general framework. It is too large a literature to provide adequate references here. Dependency, like modernization, has a large literature and similarly reflects different approaches. Both dependency and modernization have as many critics as proponents. Perhaps the foremost dependency theorist at this time is the Egyptian economist Samir Amin. One of the major strengths of dependency theorists, despite their weakness, is their emphasis that development will not and probably cannot take place in the same way in most of the Third World as it did in Europe and the United States and Japan.

2. The best work on the early history of the Wolof remains Boubakar Barry's Le Royaume du Waalo: le Sénégal Avant la Conquête. Paris: Maspero, 1972.

3. The Tukoleur are very strategically located in Senegal along the Senegal River. The most complete study remains La Moyenne Vallée du Sénégal (Etude Socio-économique) by J.L. Boutillier, P. Cantrelle, J. Causse, C. Laurent, and Th. N'Doye, published in 1962 by the Presses Universitaires de France. Abdoulaye Diop has written an excellent study of Tukoleur migration called Société Toucouleur et Migration, Dakar: I.F.A.N., 1965. The best anthropological general study is that of Yaya Wane, Les Toucouleur du Fouta Tooro, Dakar: I.F.A.N., 1969. In addition, there has been a great increase in historical writing on the Fouta-Toro including David Robinson's Chiefs and Clerics: Abdul Bokar Kan and Futa-Toro, 1951-1891, Oxford University Press, 1975 and B.O. Oloruntimehin's The Segu Tukolor Empire, New York: Humanities Press, 1972.

For contemporary Senegal, the Senegal River area is once again looked on as being of central significance. For a critique of current plans see Adrian Adams "The Senegal River Valley: What Kind of Change?" in Review of African Political Economy Number 10, September-December 1977 (pp. 33-59). For a critique of the development plans, see Mark Franco "Le Programme de Développement du Bassin du Fleuve Sénégal," in S. Amin, M. Franco, S. Sow, La Planification du Sous-Développement: Critique de l'Analyze de Projects, Paris: Anthropos-I.D.E.P., 1975.

4. The Tuareg have been relatively well-studied by several anthropologists from a variety of theoretical perspectives. These include: E. Bernus, Les Illabakan. Une Tribu Touarègue Sahélienne et Son Aire de Nomadisation. Atlas des Structures Agraires. ORSTOM, Paris: Mouton; "Les Composantes Géographiques et Sociales des Types d'Elevage en Milieu Touareg," in Monod's edited volume on Pastoralism in Tropical Africa; "Les Eleveurs Face à la Sécheresse en Afrique Sahélienne: Exemples Nigeriens" in Drought in Africa II edited by David Dalby; "Possibilités et Limites de la Politique d'Hydraulique Pastorale dans le Sahel Nigérien." Cahiers ORSTOM, Sér. Sci. Hum. 1974, Volume 11 pp. 119-26, Jeremy Swift.

"Disaster and a Sahelian Nomad Economy," in Drought in Africa I edited by D. Dalby et al; "Pastoral Nomadism as a Form of Land-Use; the Twareg of the Adrar n Iforas," in Monod, Pastoralism in Tropical Africa; J. Nicolaisen, Ecology and Culture of the Pastoral Tuareg. The National Museum of Copenhagen, 1963.

In addition, there is the thesis of Pierre Bonte entitled Production et Echanges Chez les Touaregs Kel Gress du Niger which I wasn't able to obtain along with the new book of Jeremy Keenan, not yet published. Part of Pierre Bonte's work has been published as a monograph in Etudes Nigeriennes, Number 23 (1968) entitled L'elevage et le Commerce du Bétail dans l'Ader Doutchi-Majya. In addition A. Bourgeot has an excellent article entitled "Analyse de Rapports de Production Chez les Pasteurs et les Agriculteurs de l'Ahaggar" also in the Monod Pastoralism volume.

5. The Maures are much less well studied than other groups like the Tuareg and Fulbe. Much of the best recent work has been done by the French human geographer Charles Toupet. His work includes "Le Nomade, Conservateur de la Nature? L'exemple de la Mauritanie Centrale" in the Monod Pastoralism volume; "La Grande Secheresse en Mauritanie" in Drought in Africa II, edited by D. Dalby et al; and, the major work of Toupet La Sédentarisation des Nomades en Mauritanie Centrale Sahélienne, Dakar: I.F.A.N., 1975. A recent effort to summarize what is known is L'étrier, la Houe et le Livre: 'Sociétés Traditionnelles' au Sahara et au Sahel Occidental by Francis de Chassey, Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1977. The book concerns principally the Maures but also the Tukoleur.

One of the few studies of recent changes is that of Pierre Bonte entitled "Conditions et Effets de l'Implantation d'Industries Minieres en Milieu Pastoral: l'Exemple de la Mauritanie" also in the Monod Pastoralism volume.

6. There is a very rich literature now on peasant rebellions, revolutions, as well as stability. Some of it is based upon the work of the Russian economist Chayanov, The Theory of Peasant Economy (Homewood Illinois: Irwin, 1962, originally published in Russian in 1926). More recent literature rests upon the pathbreaking work of Eric Wolf including studies like that of Joel Migdal, Peasants, Politics and Revolution: Pressures Toward Political and Social Change in the Third World, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. There is not the space here to present a full bibliography but only to suggest that Sahelian and West African peasantries need to be put into the context of what we already know about peasant political and social responses. This is not to suggest ignoring what we know about peasant economics which is another area similarly filled with disagreement both at the theoretical and practical levels as I have tried to indicate.

7. There has been a recent revival of interest in the question of African slavery, its historical development as well as its residue. For a general assessment there is the forthcoming paper by Martin Klein and Paul Lovejoy "Slavery in West Africa," in H. Gemery and J.S. Hogendorn, The Uncommon Market: The Economics of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade (New York). For specific studies including societies of the Sudano-Sahelian zone see the edited volume by Claude Meillassoux L'esclavage en Afrique Precoloniale (Paris, 1975) and Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff, editors, Slavery in Africa: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977. I know of no studies dealing with the current significance of former slaves in the current division of labour although there are many hints in specific studies.

8. "Tribe" while commonly used outside of anthropology retains no clear meaning or definition. In fact it is subject to contradictory and conflicting use. Virtually all definitions of "tribe" would be so broad as to include almost all humans (as in common language, or common cultural heritage) or so narrow as to rule out any contemporary society as being organized on a tribal basis (for example, lack of central government, or politically autonomous). Liberian forest societies, though, during precolonial times were organized in a less hierarchical and more egalitarian fashion than the states of the Sudano-Sahel. For a recent discussion of all the difficult intendant upon the concept of tribe see Morton Fried The Notion of Tribe, Menlo Park: Cummings Publishing Company, 1975.

9. O'Brien is more pessimistic about Senegal's future than Schumacher. He posits that Senegal can't escape its underdevelopment because of the vicissitudes of climate and geography. Senegal, in O'Brien's view, has found greater than expected stability in a system of patronage, clientism and peanuts. Schumacher tends to identify more human limits on Senegal's underdevelopment. But because in his research Schumacher relied so heavily on French and government sources this predisposed him toward bureaucratic solutions. His view of politics is as a disruption from norms of good bureaucracy. He does not treat the diverse and differentiated Senegalese peasantry which lessens the impact of his work.

10. The most detailed economic studies of Hausa rural economies has been done by Polly Hill in a series of books: Rural Hausa: A Village and a Setting (Cambridge University Press 1972); Population, Prosperity and Poverty: Rural Kano 1900 and 1970 (Cambridge University Press 1977) and Studies in Rural Capitalism in West Africa (Cambridge University Press 1970). In addition there is the earlier political and historical work by the anthropologist M.G. Smith including The Economy of Hausa Communities of Zaria. Colonial Research Series no. 16, HMSO, London, 1955. The references for Nigeria are far too many to attempt to attempt to list here.

For Niger the work on the Hausa is primarily based upon three anthropologists, Guy Nicolas, Claude Raynaut and Ralph Faulkingham. Their work is listed in the bibliography. However it is important to point out that there is great variation both between Nigeria and Niger as well as regionally within each nation for Hausa communities. The mere fact of speaking Hausa is not enough to know what the economic characteristics of any given community will be.

REFERENCES

Adams, Adrian
1977 Le Long Voyage des Gens du Fleuve. Paris: François Maspero.

Amin, Samir
1976 Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Amin, Samir and Kostas Vergopoulos
1974 La Question Paysanne et le Capitalisme. Paris: Editions Anthropolos - I.D.E.P.

Angey, Gerard
1977 Recensement et Description des Principaux Systèmes Ruraux Saheliens. Cahiers ORSTOM, ser. Sci. hum., 14 (1):3-18.

Apthorpe, Raymond, ed.
1970 Rural Cooperatives and Planned Change in Africa: Case Materials. Rural Institutions and Planned Change, 4. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Apthorpe, Raymond
1972 Rural Cooperatives and Planned Change in Africa: An Analytical Overview. Rural Institutions and Planned Change, 5. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Baier, Steven
1976 Economic History and Development: Drought and the Sahelian Economies of Niger. African Economic History 1: 1-16.

Ball, Nicole
1977 Drought and Dependence in the Sahel. International Journal of Health Services 8 (2): 271-298.

Barker, Johnathan
1977 Stability and Stagnation: The State in Senegal. Canadian Journal of African Studies 11 (1): 23-42.

Barral, Henri
1974 Mobilité et Cloisonnement Chez les Eleveurs du Nord de la Haute Volta: Les Zones Dites 'd'Endrodomie pastoral.' Cahiers ORSTOM, sér. Sci. Hum., 11 (2): 127-135.

Bernus, Edmond
1974 L'évolution Récente des Relations Entre Eleveurs et Agriculteurs en Afrique Tropicale: l'Exemple du Sahel Nigerien. Cahiers ORSTOM, sér. Sci. Hum., 11 (2): 137-143.

Bernus, Edmond
1974 Possibilités et Limites de la Politique d'Hydraulique Pastorale dans le Sahel Nigérien. Cahiers ORSTOM, sér. Sci. Hum., 11 (2): 119-126.

Bernus, E. and G. Savonnet
1973 Les Problèmes de la Sécheresse dans l'Afrique de l'Ouest. Présence Africaine 88:131.

Bodenheimer, Susanne J.
1971 The Ideology of Developmentalism: The American Paradigm-Surrogate for Latin American Studies. Sage Professional Paper in Comparative Politics. Beverly Hills, California: Sage.

Bonte, Pierre
1968 L'élevage et le Commerce du Bétail dans l'Ader Doutchi-Majya Etudes Nigériennes 23. Niamey, Paris.

Bremaud, O. and J. Pagot
1960 Grazing Lands, Nomadism and Transhumance in the Sahel. In The Problems of the Arid Zone. Proceedings of the Paris Symposium. Paris: UNESCO.

Brokensha, David, Michael Horowitz and Thayer Scudder
1977 The Anthropology of Rural Development in the Sahel: Proposals for Research. Binghamton, N.Y.: Institute for Development Anthropology.

Caldwell, John C.
1975 The Sahelian Drought and Its Demographic Implications. Overseas Liaison Committee Paper No. 8. Washington, D.C.

Campbell, Bonnie
1977 Elements d'Analyze Pour l'Etude Comparée des Sociétés Dépendantes: Afrique, Amerique Latine. Revue Tiers-Monde 18 (72):737-762.

Camboulives, Marguerite
1967 L'Organisation Coopérative au Sénégal. Paris: Pedone.

Chambers, R.
1969 Settlement Schemes in Tropical Africa. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Caldwell, John C.
1975 The Sahelian Drought and Its Demographic Implications. Overseas Liaison Committee Paper No. 8. Washington D.C.: American Council on Education.

Charlick, Robert
1974 Power and Participation in the Modernization of Rural Hausa Communities. Thesis. Berkeley: University of California.

Cissoko, Sekene-Mody
1968 Famines et Epidémies à Tombouctou et Dans la Boucle du Niger du XVIe au XVIIIe Siècles. Bulletin de l'IFAN 30:806-21.

Cliffe, Lionel
1970 Traditional Ujamaa and Modern Producer Co-operatives in Tanzania. In Co-operatives and Rural Development in East Africa. Carl G. Widstrand, ed. Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

Cliffe, L., et al., eds.
1977 Government and Rural Development in East Africa: Essays on Political Penetration. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Cohn, Theodore
1975 The Sahelian Drought: Problems of Land Use. International Journal. Canadian Institute of International Affairs XXX (3): 428-444.

Comite Information Sahel
1974 Qui Se Nourrit de la Famine en Afrique? Le Dossier Politique de la Faim au Sahel. Paris.

Copans, J., P. Couty, J. Roch and G. Rocheteau
1972 Maintenance Sociale et Changement Economique au Sénégal I. Doctrine Economique et Pratique du Travail Chez les Mourides. Travaux et Documents de l'ORSTOM No. 15. Paris.

Copans, Jean, ed.
1975 Sécheresses et Famines du Sahel. Two volumes. Paris: Maspero.

Copans, Jean
1977 Politique et Religion: d'une Relation Idéologique Inter-individuelle à la Domination Impérialiste: Les Mourides du Sénégal. Dialectiques No. 21.

Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine
1977 La Mise en Dépendance de l'Afrique Noire: Essai de Périodisation, 1800-1970. Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines 61-62;016 (1-2):7-58.

Curtin, Philip
1975 Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the Slave Trade. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Dalby, David, R.J. Harrison Church, and Fatima Bezzaz, eds.
1977 Drought in Africa 2. African Environment Special Report 6. London: International African Institute.

Derriennic, Hervé
1977 Famines et Dominations en Afrique Noire: Paysans et Eleveurs du Sahel Sous le Joug. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Dia, Mamadou
1952 Contribution à l'Etude du Mouvement Coopératif en Afrique Noire. Paris: Présence Africaine, 3rd Edition.

Derman, William
1977 Agrarian Structures, Class Formation and Development Strategies in the Sahel. Paper Presented to the American Anthropological Association.

1978 Pastoralism, the Sahelian Drought and Famine: Anthropology and Response to a Crisis (A Review Article). Reviews in Anthropology.

Downs, R.E. and S.P. Reyna
1976 Socio-Economic Report on the 10th Region of Mauretania. AID: Unpublished Document.

Dresch, J.
1959 Les Transformations du Sahel Nigérien. Acta Geographica 30:3-12.

Dumont, Rene
1969 False Start in Africa. New York: Praeger.

Ernst, Klaus
1976 Tradition and Progress in the African Village: Non-capitalist Transformation of Rural Communities in Mali. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Esseks, John D.
1975 The Food Outlook for the Sahel: Regaining Self-Sufficiency or Continuing Dependence on International Aid. Africa Today 22(2): 45-56.

Fals-Borda, Orlando, Raymond Apthorpe and Inayatullah
1976 The Crisis of Rural Cooperatives: Problems in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In Popular Participation in Social Change. J. Nash, J. Dandler, and N.S. Hopkins, eds. The Hague and Paris: Mouton.

Franco, Marc
1978 La Rentabilité, Critère du Développement Rural en Afrique? Revue Tiers-Monde 19 (73):139-148.

Gagnon, Gabriel
1976 Coopératives ou Autogestion: Senegal, Cuba, Tunisia. Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal.

Gallais, Jean
1967 Le Delta Intérieur du Niger (Two volumes). Mémoires de l'Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire No. 79. Dakar: IFAN.

1972 Essai sur la Situation Actuelle des Relations Entre Pasteur et Paysans dans le Sahel Ouest-Africain. In Etudes de Géographie Tropicales Offertes à Pierre Gourou. Paris.

Gallais, Jean
1973 Les Sociétés Pastorales Ouest-Africaines Face au Développement. Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines.

1975a Traditions Pastorales et Développement: Problèmes Actuels dans la Région de Mopti (Mali). In Pastoralism in Tropical Africa: Studies Presented and Discussed at the XIII International African Seminar, Niamey, Dec. 1972. London: Oxford University Press.

1975b Pasteurs et Paysans du Gourma: La Condition Sahelienne. In Mémoire du Centre d'Etudes de Géographie Tropical. Bordeaux, Paris: CNRS.

Gellar, Sheldon
1976 Structural Changes and Colonial Dependency: Senegal, 1885-1945. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Green, R. and S. Hymer
1966 Cocoa in the Gold Coast: A Study in the Relations Between African Farmers and Agricultural Experts. Journal of Economic History 26 (3):299-319.

Grenier, P.
1960 Les Peuls du Ferlo. Cahiers d'Outre Mer 13 (49):28-58.

Goussault, Yves
1970 L'animation Rurale dans les Pays de l'Afrique Francophone. Geneva: I.L.O.

1977 Stratifications Sociales et Coopération Agricole. Tiers-Monde 18 (71): 281-295

Hapgood, David
1965 Africa: From Independence to Tomorrow. New York: Atheneum.

Haswell, Margaret
1975 The Nature of Poverty: A Case-History of the First Quarter Century After World War II. London: Macmillan Press.

Hill, Polly
1972 Rural Hausa: A Village and a Setting. London and New York: Cambridge University Press.

1977 Population, Prosperity and Poverty: Rural Kano 1900 and 1970. New York and London: Cambridge University Press.

Hopkins, Nicholas
1972 Popular Government in Kita, Mali. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

1976 Participatory Decision Making and Modern Cooperatives in Mali: Notes Towards a Prospective Anthropology. In Population Participation in Social Change. J. Nash, J. Dandler, N. Hopkins, eds. The Hague and Paris: Mouton.

Horowitz, Michael M.
1976 Colloquium on the Effects of Drought on the Productive Strategies of Sudano-Sahelian Herdsmen and Farmers: Implications for Development, Held at Institut de Recherches en Sciences Humaines, Université de Niamey, Niger, June 25-27, 1975: Report. Binghamton, N.Y.: Institute for Development Anthropology.

1978 Sahelian Pastoral Adaptive Strategies Before and After the Drought. In Proceedings of the Arizona West Africa Conference.

Hutton, Caroline and Robin Cohen
1975 African Peasants and Resistance to Change: a Reconsideration of Sociological Approaches. In Beyond the Sociology of Development: Economy and Society in Latin American and Africa. Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett, and David Booth, eds. London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Hyden, Goran
1973 Efficiency versus Distribution in East African Cooperatives: A Study in Organizational Conflicts. Nairobi, Kampala and Dar es Salaam: East African Literature Bureau.

Long, Norman
1977 An Introduction to the Sociology of Rural Development. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, inc.

Jones, William L.
1976 Planning and Economic Policy: Socialist Mali and Her Neighbors. Washington, D.C.: Three Continents Press.

Kohler, Jean Marie
1971 Activités Agricoles et Changements Sociaux dans l'Ouest-Mossi. Mémoires ORSTOM No. 46. Paris: ORSTOM.

Lall, Sanjaya
1975 Is Dependence a Useful Concept in Analysing Underdevelopment? World Development 3(11-12):799-810.

Lecomte, Bernard
1978 Participation Paysanne à l'Aménagement et Techniques des Projets. Tiers-Monde 19 (73):93-108.

de Latour. Dejean, Eliane
1975 La Transformation du Régime Foncier: Appropriation des Terres et Formation de la Class Dirigeante en Pays Mawri (Niger). In L'agriculture Africaine et le Capitalisme. Samir Amin et al, eds. Paris: Anthropos-I.D.E.P.

Lofchie, Michael F.
1975 Political and Economic Origins of African Hunger. Journal of Modern African Studies 13 (4):551-567.

Lovejoy, Paul
1976 The Desert-side Economy of the Central Sudan. In The Politics

of Natural Disaster: The Case of the Sahel Drought. Michael Glantz, ed. New York: Praeger Publishers.

1978a The Role of the Wangara in the Economic Transformation of the Central Sudan in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries. Journal of African History 19 (2):173-193.

1978b Plantations in the Economy of Sokoto Caliphate. Journal of African History 19 (3):341-368.

Madland, Marc and Marguerite Madland
1976 Selibaby Range-Livestock Project. Field Study of the 10th Region. End of Tour Report. AID Unpublished Document.

Mainet, G. and G. Nicolas
1964 La Vallée du Galbi de Maradi: Enquête Socio-économique. IFAN-CNRS: Document des Etudes Nigériennes, 16.

Marchal, Jean-Yves
1974 L'office du Niger: Îlot de Prospérite Paysanne ou Pôle de Production Agricole? Revue Canadienne des Etudes Africaines 8 (1):73-90.

Marnham, Patrick
1977 Nomads of the Sahel. London: Minority Rights Group.

Markowitz, Irving L.
1977 Power and Class in Africa. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Meillassoux, Claude
1974 Development or Exploitation: Is the Sahel Famine Good Business. The Review of African Political Economy 1:27-34.

1975 L'esclavage en Afrique Précoloniale. Paris: François Maspero.

Migot-Adholla, S.E.
1970 Traditional Society and Co-operatives. In Co-operatives and Rural Development in East Africa. Carl G. Widstrand, ed. Upssala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. New York: Africana Publishing Co.

Monod, Theodore, ed.
1975 Pastoralism in Tropical Africa: Studies Presented and Discussed at the XIII International African Seminar, Niamey, Dec. 1972. London: International African Institute; Oxford University Press.

Moore, M.P.
1975 Co-operative Labour in Peasant Agriculture. Journal of Peasant Studies 2 (3):270-291.

Moulton, Jeanne Marie
1977 Animation Rurale: Education for Rural Development. Center for International Education. Amherst: University of Massachusetts.

Nash, June and Nicholas S. Hopkins
1976 Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Cooperatives, Collectives and Self-Management. In Popular Participation in Social Change: Cooperatives, Collectives and Nationalized Industry. J. Nash, Jorge Dandler and Nicholas S. Hopkins, eds. The Hague and Paris: Mouton.

Newman, James L., ed.
1975 Drought, Famine and Population Movements in Africa. Foreign and Comparative Studies/Eastern Africa 17. Syracuse: Syracuse University.

Nicolas, Guy
1977 Remarques sur Divers Facteurs Socio-économiques de la Famine au Sein d'une Société Subsaharienne. In Drought in Africa 2. David Dalby, R.J. Harrison Church, and Fatima Bezzaz, eds. London: International African Institute.

O'Brien, Donal B. Cruise
1971 The Mourides of Senegal. London: Oxford University Press.

1975 Saints and Politicians. London: Cambridge University Press.

1978 Senegal. In West African States: Failure and Promise. John Dunn, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Olivier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre
1969 Système des Relations Economiques et Sociales chez les Wogo (Niger). Paris: Institut d'Ethnologie.

Ormieres, Jean-Louis
1975 Les Conséquences Politiques de la Famine. In Secheresses et Famines du Sahel (I). Jean Copans, ed. Paris: François Maspero.

Perinbam, B. Marie
1973 Social Relations in the Trans-Saharan and Western Sudanese Trade: An Overview. Comparative Studies in Society and History 15 (4):416-36.

1977 Homo Africanus: Antiquus or Oeconomicus? Some Interpretations of African Economic History. Comparative Studies in Society and History 19 (2):156-178.

Pallet, Eric and Grace Winter
1971 La Société Soninké (Dyakunu, Mali). Bruxelles: Editions de l'Institut de Sociologie.

Provent, Albert and Francois de Ravignan
1977 Le Nouvel Ordre de la Faim: Révolutions Paysannes. Paris: Seuil.

Raynaut, Claude
1969 Quelques Données de l'Horticulture dans la Vallée de Maradi. Etudes Nigériennes No. 26. Niamey: IFAN-CNPSH.

Raynaut, Clayde
1975 Le Cas de la Région de Maradi (Niger). In Secheresses et Famines du Sahel II: Paysans et Nomades. Jean Copans, ed. Paris: Maspero.

1977 Lessons of a Crisis. In Drought in Africa 2. D. Dalby, R.J. Harrison Church, and Fatima Bezzaz, eds. London: International African Institute.

Rey, Pierre-Philippe, Emile le Bris and Michel Samuel
1976 Capitalisme Négrier: la Marche des Paysans vers le Prolétariat. Paris: François Maspero.

Riddell, James C., Kenneth Parsons and Don Kanel.
1978 Land Tenure Issues in African Development. Preliminary, Unpublished.

Riesman, Paul
1974 Société et Liberté chez les Peul Djelgobe de Haute-Volta: Essai d'Anthropologie Introspective. The Hague and Paris: Mouton.

Roch, J.
1975 Les Migrations Economiques de Saison Sèche en Bassin Arachidier Sénégalais. Cahiers ORSTOM, sér. Sci. Hum., 12 (1):55-80.

Rocheteau, G.
1975 Pionniers Mourides au Sénégal: Colonisation des Terres Neuves et Transformations d'une Economie Paysanne. Cahiers ORSTOM, sér. Sci. Hum., 12 (1):19-53.

Samuel, Michel
1976 Les Contradictions Internes à la Paysannerie Continuent à Agir au Sein de la Migration en France. In Capitalisme Négrier. Pierre-Philippe Rey, ed. Paris: François Maspero.

Santoir, Christian J.
1976 Les Sociétés Pastorales du Sénégal Face à la Secheresse (1972-73): Réactions à la Crise et Degré de Retablissement Deux Ans Après; Le Cas des Peuls du Galodjina. Dakar: ORSTOM.

Schumacher, E.J.
1973 Politics, Bureaucracy and Rural Development in Senegal. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Senghor, Leopold
1961 Nation et Voie Africaine du Socialisme. Paris: Présence Africaine.

Seibel, Hans Dieter and Andreas Massing
1974 Traditional Organizations and Economic Development: Studies of Indigenous Cooperatives in Liberia. New York: Praeger.

Sine, Babakar
1975 Impérialisme et Théories Sociologiques du Développement. Paris: Editions Anthropos-I.D.E.P.

Smith, Dennis
1977 Domination and Containment: An Approach to Modernization. Comparative Studies in Society and History 19:177-213.

Stallings, Barbara
1972 Economic Dependency in Africa and Latin America. Sage Professional Paper in Comparative Politics. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Swift, Jeremy
1977 Sahelian Pastoralists: Underdevelopment, Desertification, and Famine. Annual Review of Anthropology 6:457-78.

Toupet, Charles
1963 L'évolution de la Nomadisation en Mauritanie Sahelienne. In Nomades et Nomadisme au Sahara. Claude Bataillon, ed. Paris: UNESCO Recherches sur la Zone Aride, 19.

1975 Le Nomade, Conservateur de la Nature? L'exemple de la Mauritanie Centrale. In Pastoralism in Tropical Africa: Studies Presented and Discussed at the XIII International African Seminar, Niamey, December 1972. Theodore Monod, ed. London: Oxford University Press.

Waldstein, Abraham S.
1978 Peasantization of Nomads and Nomadization of Peasants; Responses to State Intervention in an Irrigated Agricultural Development Scheme in the Senegal River Delta. Prepared for a Conference on the Sahel, University of New Hampshire.

Wallerstein, Immanuel
1976 The Three Stages of African Involvement in the World Economy. In The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa. Peter Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Ware, Helen
1975 The Sahelian Drought: Some Thoughts on the Future. United Nations.

Widstrand, Carl G, ed.
1970 Cooperatives and Rural Development in East Africa. New York: Africana.

1972 African Cooperatives and Efficiency. New York: Africana.

Widstrand, Carl G.
1972 Problems of Efficiency in the Performance of Co-operatives. In African Co-operatives and Efficiency. Carl G. Widstrand, ed. Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

Wilcock, David C.
1978 The Political Economy of Grain Marketing and Storage in the Sahel. Working Paper No. 24. M.S.U., E. Lansing: Department of Agricultural Economics.

Williams, Gavin
1976 Taking the Part of Peasants: Rural Development in Nigeria and Tanzania. In The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa. Peter Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Wolpin, Miles
1975 Dependency and Conservative Militarism in Mali. Journal of Modern African Studies 13 (4):585-620.

Worsley, Peter
1971 Two Blades of Grass. Manchester: Manchester University Press.