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**Annex B  
REFUGEES**

*A Report to the Congress on*

**DEVELOPMENT NEEDS  
and OPPORTUNITIES for  
COOPERATION in  
SOUTHERN AFRICA**



United States Agency for International Development/March 1979

**REFUGEES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA**

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**Pacific Consultants  
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## List of Abbreviations

AAI	African-American Institute
ABFE	Association of Black Foundation Executives
ANC	African National Congress
BPEAR	Bureau for Placement and Education of African Refugees
FNLA	Front for the National Liberation of Angola
GRZ	Government, Republic of Zambia
ICEM	Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
IUEF	International University Exchange Fund
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NLM	National Liberation Movement
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
OAU	Organization for African Unity
PAC	Pan African Congress
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization
UBS	University of Botswana and Swaziland
UNESCO	United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNITA	The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

**UNETPSA**            United Nations Educational and Training  
                         Program for Southern Africa

**UNTAG**             United Nations Transition Group for Namibia

**ZANU**                Zimbabwe African National Union

## PROLOGUE

At the close of 1978, approximately 200,000 people living in southern Africa could be classified as refugees. About 70% are from Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 18% from Angola, 10% from South Africa and the remaining 2% from Namibia. Of the group from Angola, rough estimates indicate that about 40-50% fled during the Angolan war for independence and about 50-60% fled during the subsequent civil war.

Nearly 40% of the refugees have sought asylum in Mozambique, about 30% took refuge in Zambia, 14% in Botswana, possibly 10% in Namibia<sup>1/</sup> and the remaining 6% are shared between Lesotho and Swaziland. With the continued escalation of the conflict in Southern Rhodesia and in Namibia and the maintenance of Apartheid in South Africa, the prospect is for the generation of more refugees at a faster pace in the future. Some principal relief agencies informed the Mission that they were quietly stockpiling blankets, medicines and other supplies at strategic locations in order to cope with any sudden increase of refugees, particularly from Southern Rhodesia. The UNHCR recently opened offices in Swaziland and Lesotho to deal with rather modest case loads of refugees. Thus the High Commission too appears to be strengthening its capability in the region in anticipation of increasing numbers of refugees both from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

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1/ The figure for Angolans in Namibia is based on two South African sources, the Embassy of South Africa in Washington stated the number "could be from 3-30,000" while another South African government source "estimated" (guessed?) 20,000. Obviously, these "statistics" can hardly be relied upon and it is wise to regard all estimates as approximate beyond those in settlements who have actually been counted. See footnotes to Annex IV for further detail

The refugee population is diverse. More than eight out of every ten have fled white minority controlled countries and sought safety in the majority rule states of the region. Most of the remainder fled during the Angolan civil war into Zambia and South African occupied Namibia. Some are sophisticated urban dwellers from Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa who fled rather than be imprisoned, re-imprisoned or possibly killed for their opposition to minority control of their countries. Some are students or would-be students motivated by a combination of idealism, nationalism and frustration with grossly unequal educational opportunities. Some are villagers unfortunate enough to live in the areas of the most fighting whose primary concern is the physical security of their families. Many are children. Some are pregnant and some are elderly. Some refugees are white - articulate liberals like newspaper editor Donald Woods who fled South Africa in early 1978 and increasing numbers of young South Africans who have refused a military draft to oppose Apartheid. Finally, some refugees are from majority rule states: Angolans in Zambia and Namibia, small numbers of Ugandan and a handful of Basotho.

Refugees share many things in common.<sup>1/</sup> All have been uprooted and nearly all have required humanitarian assistance in the form of rations, basic health care, clothes and shelter just to survive. Few refugees have time to pack, their

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1/ For the most recent description of conditions and host government attitudes in this regard, see "Southern Africa Refugee Assistance Program Final Report," AFRICARE, May 1978

belongings and many had very little to begin with in any event. Refugees share fear: fear for their security in settlements which have been attacked by Southern Rhodesian and South African forces with repeated loss of life and fear for the security of their loved ones left behind. They also share an uncertain future which will be shaped more by the unfolding crisis in southern Africa than by the efforts of numerous well-intentioned and dedicated individuals and organizations who can only treat the 200,000 symptoms of an underlying illness likely to persist for another generation.

Comprehensive aid at the three stages of refugee assistance - relief, rehabilitation and resettlement or return--delivered in a non-discriminatory and apolitical manner where the primary consideration is the welfare of the refugees themselves can have a significant impact on refugees. Not only does assistance in this form provide for immediate material needs, it can have a salubrious effect if it is seen to be dispensed equitably and dependably. This is discussed in Part V below.

Preferred assistance is usually programmed to move quickly beyond the relief phase, seeks permanent solutions for those who are unlikely to be able to return to their countries of nationality for the foreseeable future, is funded for more than one year at a time to ensure program continuity and is channeled through established agencies to minimize the further proliferation of program implementing bureaucracies which share in the refugee dollar.

To the extent possible, assistance should be development oriented with the needs of both the refugees and the

host state in mind. Once the emergency relief period is replaced by the longer term rehabilitation phase, assistance in the form of rations can be reduced or eliminated in many instances as refugees harvest crops at their settlements. Programs of vocational training, small scale self-employment schemes, expansion of health and education services, provision of scholarships for some for advanced education and training and other activities are sometimes indistinguishable from those carried out under technical cooperation programs for the welfare of the indigenous population of asylum states.

Although some projects and programs may have "development content" for the refugees, it is more difficult to view the presence of refugees as a "development opportunity" for their hosts. In fact, the presence of refugees is usually a financial burden for host governments which bear part of the costs of refugee care themselves (See Part II, b).<sup>1/</sup> From the above statistics, it is apparent that Mozambique is in the most difficult position with the greatest share of refugees.

Senator Inouye stated on September 22, 1978 that the Senate Appropriations Committee "believes that U.S. assistance to refugees is an international responsibility and should be

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1/ The UNHCR likes to point out in a publicity poster that "Einstein was a refugee." While it is true that Einstein was a refugee, it is equally true that most refugees are not Einsteins. Zimbabwean refugees are teaching in the Zambian and Botswana school systems and contribute to the welfare of their host countries thereby, however, on balance refugee populations are a serious problem for host governments and the number of opportunities to turn this liability into an asset in the southern Africa region are insufficient.

evenhanded on the basis of need both overseas and during resettlement for those coming to the United States."<sup>1/</sup>

The Committee then presented a report which attempted to estimate the per capita expenditures for refugees in various parts of the world. Though admittedly difficult to compare due to numerous special circumstances which can considerably alter the cost of assistance to a refugee, the figures provided by the Committee are nonetheless startling.

Senator Inouye stated, "How can we possibly justify \$351.14 for a Soviet refugee in Italy or \$2,500 per Soviet refugee in Israel when we provide only \$42.30 per Indochinese refugee in Thailand or \$28.88 for a Palestinian or \$26.68 for a South African refugee..."<sup>2/</sup>

The Committee report then points out that AID refugee funds for FY 1979 of \$14 million are "limited to use in southern Africa other than Mozambique," while the State Department's HA/ORM<sup>3/</sup> budget for refugees for FY 1979 of \$8.255 million "can be used for refugees anywhere in Africa except Mozambique and Angola." Thus the United States, on average, spends only one hundredth as much on each refugee in southern Africa as it does on refugees going to Israel

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1/ Congressional Record S15805, Sept. 22, 1978.

2/ Ibid.

3/ i.e. Humanitarian affairs, Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs.

from the USSR while at the same time EXCLUDING assistance to the most needy country in the region: Mozambique.<sup>1/</sup>

These funding disparities are reflected in the disparities discussed at some length in Part VI, "B" with respect to immigration into the United States. From 1946-1976 the U.S. admitted 1,113, 434 refugees of whom 8,814 or 8/10ths of one percent were from Africa. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) reported for 1977 that the U.S. took over 50% of refugees settled by the organization in that year and since its inception in 1952 had taken a third of the more than 1,200,000 refugees processed by them. The UNHCR, in comparison, spent 31.5% of its budget on African refugees in 1977 and planned to spend 48.6% in 1978.<sup>2/</sup> Clearly, the pattern of expenditure and the pattern of refugee resettlement into the U.S. bears further investigation to determine the reasons for these differences in order either to explain them or to establish a more coherent and equitable policy such as desired by the Senate Appropriations Committee in terms of expenditures and proposed by Senator Kennedy in the last Congress under S2751 in terms of refugee immigration into the United States (see Annex VII for text).

These few pages have outlined a situation which requires new initiatives on the project, program and policy levels

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1/ It should be noted that assistance in kind under the Department of Agriculture's PL 480 program of surplus food commodity grants is not included in the Committee's figures and some food aid has reached refugees in Mozambique. U.S. assistance is also having an impact indirectly since the U.S. contributes to the regular budgets of the UNHCR, ICRC, UNICEF, etc.

2/ Comparable per capita expenditure figures from UNHCR were unavailable.

if the U.S. is to be in the forefront of an international partnership for the development of a humanitarian, less politically vulnerable, sustained and equitable approach to lessening the plight of southern Africa's refugees. The rest of this report attempts to outline some of these possible initiatives and make recommendations which could lead to their realization.

Subjects for Further Analysis:

The time available for the preparation of this report obviously did not permit an in depth treatment of all aspects of the subject. Topics for further analysis which could usefully be undertaken by a consulting firm, university, branch of government or other appropriate entity include:

1. A detailed comparative analysis of the performance of various bilateral and multilateral channels of assistance on a cost effective basis. The strengths and weaknesses of UNHCR, ICRC, UNICEF, SIDA, Church World Service, USAID, HA/ORM of the State Department and other organizations and bureaux could be examined and recommendations made with respect to the most effective vehicles for which types of assistance at what cost.
2. The peripheral role played by the OAU and its Bureau for the Placement and Education of African Refugees should be assessed in detail and recommendations made which would either strengthen these institutions in this field or explain why they are not able or willing to be more active.
3. Institution building in host countries could be assessed. How might assistance be targeted to strengthen the capacity of local organizations to cope with refugee problems in their own country? A number of asylum states in the region have local Red Cross Societies, Boy Scouts, Brigades with various functions and committees whose responsibility is to deal with refugee problems. What institutional, staffing, organizational and other constraints might be lessened with what type and volume of assistance?

4. Examine host government readiness to cope with sudden refugee influxes in terms of their planning and organizing ability. Could a "Disaster Relief Office" be set up or strengthened in an appropriate ministry to encourage continuous planning for contingencies and the preparation of occasional reports assessing the country's state of readiness?
5. Greater examination of the interaction between refugees and host nationals under varying circumstances could yield valuable information. How much resentment actually exists among local people towards refugees who receive international assistance? Are there additional ways to integrate refugee and non-refugee aid? What are the economic and sociological implications of "spontaneous settlement" of refugees in border villages?
6. An opinion survey and census among refugees could be extremely instructive. A survey could provide some objective indicators of refugees' perceived needs and provide a clearer understanding of how the refugee views his status, the host country, donor officials, etc. It could also double as a skills inventory and provide better data on which donor agencies could base their budgets and target vocational and other training programs.
7. The prospect of substantial numbers of white refugees is mentioned in Annex VI, however, an in depth study of options for white refugees and the logistics of relief and resettlement would represent wise contingency planning. The policies of Australia and New Zealand toward whites from Southern Rhodesia are outlined in the report, but more should be known about occasionally mentioned schemes by certain Latin American countries. South African policy in this regard is also by no means certain and should be investigated in some detail.
8. The plethora of official and private assistance to refugees which flows from numerous governments, international organizations and private church and secular organizations makes statistics regarding the volume and nature of aid difficult to obtain and nearly impossible to make comprehensive. A focal point - probably in the UNHCR - needs to be established where all groups are expected to channel information which could then be assembled and published quarterly. More research is needed to determine the most appropriate monitoring mechanism in this regard.

## PREFACE

The following report has been prepared by Pacific Consultants on contract to USAID over a 13-week period from 8 May to 4 August, 1978. The Terms of Reference supplied by USAID for this analysis follow:

6. Manpower

a) Phase One

Assess the difficulties and opportunities presented by the presence of refugees in the region and provide specific recommendations for the effective training and deployment of refugee manpower.

This is the second of two reports<sup>1/</sup> based upon the findings of the consultant during a month of research in Washington and a mission to Europe and the southern Africa region for six weeks, from 28 May to 8 July, 1978. Both reports concern the problem of population movements and try to present a framework for analysis, as well as recommendations for action. Both also suffer from the fact that it was not possible to visit Mozambique. This is particularly true because of the magnitude of the refugee problem in Mozambique. For example, meetings were held in Swaziland with the UNHCR to discuss a caseload of 343 refugees, but none were possible in Maputo to assess the plight of 70,000.

This assessment of refugee problems has also been prepared not long after several others, as Annex I demonstrates. The El Tawil Mission from the U.N. and representatives of the Department of State (Humanitarian Affairs/Office of

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<sup>1/</sup> The first report is titled "Labor Migration in Southern Africa and Possible Supplier State Alternatives."

Refugee and Migration Affairs) and USAID's Africa Bureau were in the field at the same time as this Mission. Although the purposes of these missions vary and each trip may have been necessary, it is nonetheless suggested at this point that no further columns be added to Annex I until decisions have been made and approved projects mounted based on the findings of previous missions and this mission. Refugee aid is in vogue and a continual stream of representatives of dozens of governments, international agencies, and PVOs take up a disproportionate share of the time of asylum government representatives and of resident representatives of the UNHCR, ICRC, and other field personnel of key organizations. To maintain the goodwill of all concerned, the findings of reports must be seen to be acted upon: either translated into projects, programs, and policy, or explicitly not adopted with some explanation provided.

The report does not place its recommendations in an order of priority since not all are strictly comparable and some will be subject to political and other constraints which will affect their chances of being realized more than any stress given by the Mission. Rather, a typology of refugees based on achievement and intent has been constructed as a framework within which proposed assistance at project, program and policy levels may be assessed in terms of its impact on proposed beneficiaries. The report also does not offer a grand "strategy" for "solving" the refugee problem in the region. The harsh reality

is that the situation is in a state of flux, the number of refugees is growing (the report predicts over 500,000 by 1985) and the international community, will count it a success if it is able to cope with and manage the situation let alone resolve it in the absence of a resolution of its causes.

This is not to suggest an ad hoc approach but to stress the limitations placed on planning and developing strategies in a situation whose dynamics are likely to result in events overtaking them. Strategies have been devised on more micro levels to address particular needs of specific categories of refugees and it would appear that devising problem-solving approaches at that level may be more fruitful.

This report has been structured to avoid repeating much of the detailed information available in previous reports and to provide a sense of the larger context in which refugee problems might usefully be addressed.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The refugee phenomenon in southern Africa as it is defined by international law and Western political concepts is a consequence of the transfer of the nation-state system to the African continent. Prior to that time, individuals or groups crossing the arbitrary frontiers of colonial conquest were largely defined independently of their political motives for movement and relegated to the categories of nomad, trader, or malcontent despite ample political reasons for many to shift their habitual dwelling places.

The traditional European perception of African culture was considerably influenced by the tendency of Europeans to equate a superior technology with a superior civilization. The conquest of sub-Saharan Africa by European soldiers and missionaries, therefore, occurred in a different intellectual context from that which defined intra-European conflicts.

War, revolution and religious and ethnic intolerance generated legions of European refugees, many of whom populated the North American continent. Human suffering and displacement was and, to an unfortunately large extent, remains more comprehensible to the observers in those instances where the victims share ethnic and cultural attributes. Consequently, most Europeans of the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, during the height of the "scramble for Africa", failed to

perceive the human suffering borne by Africa's pre-independence refugees who fled in the face of French, British, Portuguese, Arab and other military expeditions as analogous to that of their European brethren. The Ashanti-British, Zulu-Afrikaner, French-Mandingo, German-Herero, Arab-Makonde, and other Euro-African conflicts, when combined with such intra-African conflicts as those between Dahomey and Yoruba, Temne and Mende, Shona and Ndebele, Hutu and Tutsi, and Ibo and Hausa suggest the dimension of Africa's historically largely unrecognized refugee problem. With the arrival of political independence in the 1960s and '70s for most colonial entities, the capacity of Africa to generate refugees--those outside their "country of nationality"--became, in the perceptions of the West, a logical corollary to the extension of state sovereignty south of the Sahara. Thus it was only in the 1960s that the UNHCR, the current international organization mandated to provide protection and assistance to many of the world's refugees, focused its attention first on the victims of the Algerian war for independence who had fled to Tunisia and Morocco and then on a host of human dilemmas burgeoning in the newly independent Africa.

The United Nations Convention relating to the status of refugees defined as a refugee anyone who "... owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a

particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or, owing to such fears, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country..." (Article 1, A2).

This definition, drawn from the Convention as reinforced by the 1967 Protocol, has been applied selectively to groups of Africans outside their "country of nationality" based upon:

- a. a judgment of how "well founded" was their fear of persecution,
- b. how conscious they were of reasons for their exile which were found to be consistent with the international legal definition of a refugee in an emerging global nation-state system, and
- c. to what extent individuals felt themselves able to return to their country of nationality without fear of repercussions.

In short, the task was to distinguish economic migrants in search of employment who were "pulled" from one country to another from political refugees who were "pushed" by events which, in their view, left them no choice but to flee across an international border. Such a determination seems relatively simple when Upper Voltans are found seeking jobs in the more developed economy of the Ivory Coast or when Hutus are obviously fleeing into Zaire in fear for their lives during a massacre in Burundi.

It becomes difficult, however, when people move for reasons clearly associated with persecution but fail to cross an international frontier in a chaotic situation such as existed at times in the Congo of the early 1960s, or leave a country for a mixture of strong economic and political reasons such as may be the case with many of those from the Republic of Guinea living in the Ivory Coast and Senegal. Further, some individuals may remove themselves from an identical situation for different reasons.

In Europe, the UNHCR and its predecessor organizations sought to determine the refugee status of each person on an individual basis. Due to several factors peculiar to Africa, however, the bulk of refugees on that continent has been declared as such on a group basis. Still, the contemporary problem of defining who is a refugee in southern Africa has been compounded by several factors.

(1) Some individuals have clearly fled zones of conflict in fear of the loss of their lives and crossed an international frontier (Angolans during the liberation war and subsequent civil war, Zimbabweans near the Mozambique border in particular, South African students from SOWETO being hunted by South African police).

(2) Although not in immediate fear of bodily injury, others have clearly fled due to a well-founded fear of being persecuted, particularly due to race (blacks from South Africa).

(3) Some have clearly fled owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for their political opinions (members of the banned African political parties in South Africa, activists from Zimbabwe who have fled into Zambia and Tanzania, and smaller groups such as FNLA members from Angola resident in Botswana).

(4) Others have fled primarily not as a result of persecution of them as individuals because of their race or beliefs but as a result of a perception of themselves as members of a class of oppressed people. Consequently they have been positively motivated to leave their countries to join National Liberation Movements (NLMs) in order to end the generalized persecution for reasons of race and political opinion which prevail in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

Some have argued that refugees forfeit their refugee status if they join NLMs; however, the international legal Convention quoted above does not provide for changes of basic status based upon activities in which the individual engages while in asylum. Just as Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany remained refugees when fighting with the British and French underground during World War II, African refugees from South Africa and Zimbabwe could also be considered refugees when they seek to change the conditions in their countries which have compelled them to become refugees in the first place. (Included in this group would be

members of ANC, PAC, the Patriotic Front, and SWAPO.)

The complexities of the southern African situation are such that refugees are not generated solely by white minority regimes but are also produced by conflicts within and between majority rule governments.

(There are FNLA members from Angola living in Botswana, Mozambiquans living in Swaziland, Malawians living in Zambia, Angolans living in Namibia, and Zairois in Zambia.)

The status of Zimbabweans has been complicated by the fact that they are technically British subjects but not British citizens under the terms of the 1971 British immigration law. They have been recognized informally for some time as refugees; however, for several years the UNHCR was legally prevented from assisting Zimbabweans since their protection and assistance was regarded as a responsibility of the British Government.

There is also some question with regard to the nationality and reasons for movement of some individuals who claim or are claimed to be refugees by their country of asylum (nationality?). For example, is an ethnic Swazi born in Swaziland in 1932, when it was a British protectorate, who moved into the Republic of South Africa in 1940 and had children born and raised in South Africa a Swazi national or a South African national? More importantly, if his children return to Swaziland to obtain

an education because educational opportunities are greater for blacks in Swaziland, does the child become a refugee from South Africa or a de jure citizen of Swaziland returning to his country of nationality? A Mosotho born in Lesotho who lived for a lengthy period in South Africa similarly may have children by an ethnic Mosotho born in South Africa or born in Lesotho whose children may have been born on both sides of the border, yet if they are returned for education to Lesotho, there is some question as to whether they can be counted as refugees for the purpose of receiving international assistance. The answers to such questions are of direct interest to the individuals involved and the countries in which they reside. During the April 1977 Farah Mission, the Lesotho Government requested assistance for Sesotho-speaking South African-born children attending schools in Lesotho. During the second Farah Mission of November 1977, Swaziland similarly requested aid for 6,000 ethnic Swazi children from RSA whose parents had been born variously in Swaziland or RSA. These children may not be "refugees" under the narrowest definitions, but they are "educational refugees" rejecting inferior "Bantu education" reserved for them in RSA and as such constitute a "displaced population" which has crossed a recognized international frontier. An almost infinite variety of situations of this nature can be envisaged, making the task of defining refugees exceedingly difficult.

The above examples illustrate some of the more subjective aspects of defining who is a refugee and the difficulty of quantifying such terms as "well founded," "persecution," and even "country of nationality." Thus refugees tend to fall more along a continuum of definition than they are susceptible to an unambiguous and objective description. Nonetheless, the majority of displaced people<sup>1/</sup> can be defined within the terms of the international legal instrument referenced above.

It is not the purpose of this report to belabor these fine points of definition, since this must remain a matter of judgment for the UNHCR and other competent authorities; however, it is important for the reader to have a sense of the difficulties inherent in defining who is a refugee in southern Africa in order to understand the conflicting estimates of the numbers of refugees resident in various host countries and the equally difficult problem of articulating a systematic typology of refugees which will permit a comprehensive discussion of refugee needs. Both these questions are addressed in the next section.

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<sup>1/</sup> "Displaced people" is another term which is difficult to define. However, it generally refers to a broader class than "refugees" while excluding purely economic migrants. To lessen the imprecision somewhat, the term "refugees" has been used throughout with qualifying adjectives added as appropriate.

## II. THE CONTEXT FOR ACTION

### A. Typology of Refugees

Given the definitional problem outlined above, it is not surprising that various observers have built different typologies of refugees as a methodological tool to describe and analyze the characteristics of the refugee phenomenon in southern Africa. Potholm (I, pp. 86-90) identified six types of refugees as follows:

(1) The classical refugee (largely agrarian and fleeing conflict zones),

(2) Adaptive refugees (a classical refugee who may come to prefer the host country or have been a de facto immigrant originally),

(3) An upwardly mobile refugee (one who comes to the host country ostensibly for political reasons but is actually seeking a new life or better opportunity),

(4) The vagabond refugee ("those who want neither work nor opportunity, citizenship or repatriation, but simply wish to see the world." Potholm states that many of these refugees develop skills in picking donor agencies which will respond to their needs),

(5) Mentally disturbed refugees (those who were mentally disturbed in their home countries and those who become disturbed through being a refugee) and finally,

(6) The infiltrator refugee (defined as the by-product of international intrigue and continued white minority domination in southern Africa and the existence

of repressive governments elsewhere). Potholm points out that South African and Southern Rhodesian agents have attempted to go abroad under the guise of refugees in order to infiltrate NLMs and refugee settlements.

This typology is not particularly useful for the purposes of this report because it is based upon highly subjective judgments as to the motivation of individual refugees and their likely behavior in particular stress situations. A second typology encountered in the literature is the obvious delineation of refugees according to their country of origin or their country of asylum. Frequently, distinctions are also made between those refugees fleeing minority-ruled states and those fleeing majority-ruled states. The disadvantage of such a typology is that it tends to fragment the discussion of refugee problems and yield primarily short-term recommendations of a relief character which fail to consider the context in which the refugees find themselves or the common features of the refugee experience in southern Africa. A third typology is found in the legal definition of a refugee as quoted in Part I in which refugees could be divided between those who have fled for reasons of race and others who have fled for religious reasons, membership in a political group, and so forth. The above three typologies could be summarized as representing a social, political, and legal typology, respectively.

In order to consider the needs of refugees at present and the impact of refugee assistance programs over the next generation, a more functional typology may be required, based upon achievement and intent. Although both of these elements can be altered by the refugees themselves, these two characteristics provide a somewhat more objective framework within which those refugee problems which may be susceptible to donor assistance can be considered, and it serves to link the similar difficulties of refugees in different countries in southern Africa to one another. The following functional typology has, therefore, been used as a framework for the analysis of refugee problems and an outline for the discussion of possible programs to meet two key refugee needs: training and employment. The four categories which emerge in this functional typology are:

- (1) well educated, likely to return to their countries of nationality within three years (ER)
- (2) well educated, likely to stay in the host country for the foreseeable future (ES)
- (3) less well educated, likely to return to their countries of nationality in three years (LER)
- (4) less well educated, likely to stay in the host country for the foreseeable future (LES)

Category	Examples of some Refugees who may fall into these categories
I-ER	Zimbabwean/Namibian students and recent graduates, some Angolans, some freedom fighters
II-ES	South African students, some Zimbabweans, Namibians, and Angolans, who may not be accommodated in independent African states
III-LER	Zimbabwean/Namibian refugees fleeing to Zambia/Mozambique for safety from conflict zones; some Angolans, some freedom fighters
IV-LES	Refugees already away from home area for many years (some Angolans) and those who've acquired economic assets or moved within same ethnic area

Lesotho distinguishes between political refugees and educational refugees; representatives of the UNHCR distinguish between official refugees (those recognized by the host government as refugees and given an identity card confirming this) and unofficial refugees (those who have not been granted asylum officially and those who have never requested it), and some relief organizations differentiate between urban and rural refugees. The latter is defined quite similarly to the distinction being made in the above functional typology between educated and less-educated refugees, since most of the better educated refugees tend to remain in cities, whereas the less educated refugees are usually found in the rural areas. It is, however, conceptually different since educational achievement rather than geographic location is the distinguishing characteristic.

For the purposes of the above typology, an "educated refugee" is defined as any individual who has completed the junior certificate (usually after two or three years of secondary school), and a "less educated refugee" is one who has less formal education than this, normally someone who has not completed primary school. Obviously, these definitions are imprecise, and lengthy refinements of these categories could be made in a more in depth presentation.

It should also be noted that individuals can move from one category to another, since the less educated may become better educated, and those who are likely to "stay" may be able to "return" at some future point. Conversely, those who now seem likely to return may be compelled to remain in their host country longer than anticipated in the event of further changes in the political situation in their country of nationality. Finally, it is not necessary to pigeonhole each refugee into one of these categories in order for the typology to provide a useful framework for the discussion of options for assistance to refugees. It is sufficient to note that there are some refugees in each category at any given time and that there are sufficient numbers of these to merit the attention of aid-giving organizations in such a way that their achievements and intentions are taken into consideration when a program of assistance is designed.

It is apparent from Annex IV that the bulk of the refugee population falls into the less educated categories. Frequently, however, the more difficult groups to assist are those who are better educated.

For example, ten thousand villagers who flee a conflict zone in Zimbabwe and arrive in Zambia can be provided (a) with emergency food and shelter, (b) with land on which they can resume farming and become largely self-sufficient in two or three seasons, (c) with supplementary food rations during the initial resettlement period until adequate harvests make this unnecessary and (d) with a socio-economic infrastructure which will improve agricultural productivity (improved local extension services, new Farmer Training Centers, provision of seeds and storage facilities, etc.) and provide for education, health, recreation and other needs. In effect, the village environment is recreated and services are improved (clean water, more schools, better health care, vocational training, etc.). While the successful organization and implementation of an integrated development program of this nature is complicated by many socio-cultural, economic and bureaucratic factors, most of the elements of such a program are designed to benefit the affected population in common and in a relatively equitable manner. Seeds are provided to all farmers, primary schools admit children from any family, health care, once provided, is available to all who are ill, etc.

By comparison, a large number of better educated refugees with correspondingly more rapidly rising expectations flee from SOWETO, from secondary schools in Zimbabwe or from similar environments, the character of the assistance which may be required tends to be more highly differentiated. The strong motivation to continue and complete their educations, the search for wage sector employment, and the heightened awareness of the political implications of their refugee status result in donor assistance for scholarships tenable in donor states or asylum country institutions, in refugee placement counselling for employment, and in more numerous and sometimes smaller scale programs. Programs must be tailored to the individual education, training or employment needs and strengths of each refugee in a way which is distinct from the village resettlement approach above. Particularly in the case of urban refugees who are better educated, the lack of an agrarian background means that they can no more easily adapt to a subsistence pattern for an indefinite period than can many European refugees from urban and industrial societies.

It is for this reason, and for the fact that the village pattern has been successfully implemented and can be replicated (with suitable modifications for local conditions) as required that more of the specific recommendations which appear in Part VI are directed toward the latter ER/ES categories.

This should in no way be interpreted as neglect of the problems of the LER/S refugees since a large number of them require relief and rehabilitation. The report specifically endorses the approach of UNHCR and related agencies in this regard. Rather, the objective in focusing on ER/ES refugees is to examine approaches and suggest initiatives which may address at least some problems peculiar to these categories.

B. The Impact of Refugees on Host Governments

The effect of the presence of refugees in an asylum country in southern Africa obviously varies according to the number and origins of the refugees, the circumstances surrounding their departure from their countries of nationality, and the general state of relations between home and asylum countries. The economic/political and social impact of a refugee influx will be considered in turn and specific country examples provided to illuminate more general points.

1. The Economic and Political Effect

The presence of refugees from areas of conflict in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa compels countries of asylum to divert limited resources for other purposes to protect vulnerable refugee settlements from military attack. Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia, and Angola have suffered military incursions from Southern Rhodesia in the case of the former three and from South Africa in the latter. In each country international observers have confirmed that loss of life has occurred in United Nations-assisted refugee settlements and that citizens of asylum countries have also been killed or injured in the attacks. In Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana cases have been reported<sup>1/</sup> and verified of kidnapping of refugees wanted for interrogation by the South African or Southern Rhodesian regimes. One majority-ruled state has even been successfully pressured by South

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1/ See U.N. Security Council document S/12262 of 22 December, 1976, the statement of the Foreign Minister of Botswana before the Security Council of 12 January, 1977 and documents S/12307 of 28 March, 1977, A/32/287 of 26 October, 1977 and S/12315 of 30 March 1977. Further confirmation of such incidents has been obtained in interviews with informed officials in the countries in question.

Africa to hand over specific refugees for questioning and incarceration in RSA.<sup>1/</sup>

The repercussions from these incidents for the asylum countries can range from internal disaffection by citizens who are victims of foreign attack and see that their governments are unable to protect them to discontent arising from anticipated development initiatives which are deferred so that limited financial resources can be diverted to meet urgent security needs. The Government of Botswana, for example, was compelled to create a defense force during 1977 after 26 incidents during 1976 involving Southern Rhodesian forces entering Botswana territory.<sup>2/</sup> These incursions resulted in 19 cases of kidnapping, detention or death. The Farah Report (March 1977, p.24) calculates the cost to Botswana as follows:

"The costs of the expansion of the Police Mobile Unit will have to be met from the resources of the Government of Botswana...during the first three years of the (National Development) plan, \$27.8m (P24m) out of the \$39.5m (P34m) which was to have been provided from local resources for normal development will now be required for the expansion of the Police Mobile Unit and for the recurrent costs of emergency projects. This is a measure of the extent to which resources will have to be diverted."

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1/This is a clear violation of the international legal principle of "nonrefoulement" which makes the forcible repatriation of a refugee to his country of nationality illegal.

2/See U.N.document S/12307.

Those refugees who are also members of NLMs pose particular difficulties since they represent an armed force inside the host country which is not always under the control of the host government. There have been serious incidents of inter- and intra-party strife resulting in loss of life, particularly between Zimbabwean groups in Zambia, Mozambique, and Botswana.<sup>1/</sup> Zambia has arrested NLM members on several occasions and has been concerned about weapons ostensibly destined for nationalists engaged in the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe ending up in the hands of domestic political rivals or common criminals.

Since all the majority ruled southern African states are militarily weaker than the white minority states, the governments of the independent African countries must balance their desire to see an end to racial oppression and to protect refugees from attack with their need to protect their own civilian populations and productive capacity. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are heavily dependent upon South Africa, and landlocked Botswana depends upon Rhodesia Railways to operate its vital railway system. Mozambique, despite its commitment to majority rule and its closure of the border with Southern Rhodesia, nonetheless cooperates with South Africa in the management of its harbor facilities at Maputo. Zambia has South

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<sup>1/</sup> For details of an unfortunately not unique incident of intra-party violence, see the report of the International Commission of Inquiry into the March, 1975, assassination of Herbert Chitepo published by the Zambian Government in late 1975.

African technicians employed in its copper industry, imports spare parts and machinery from RSA and recently reopened its border with Southern Rhodesia for the limited purpose of importing fertilizer and exporting copper. African governments are, therefore, torn between the commitment to principle and the frustrating realization that they do not yet have the ability to achieve that principle at an acceptable cost to themselves.

In addition to the above policy constraints and security costs similar to Botswana's, which divert resources from development to protection of citizens and refugees alike, asylum countries also bear part of the costs of feeding, housing, educating<sup>1/</sup>, and caring for the health needs of ever-burgeoning refugee populations. International donors have provided considerable levels of assistance (see Annexes II and III for details) to those refugees who have been officially recognized as such; however, as demonstrated in Annex IV, this represents far less than the total number of refugees subsisting in some way off the impoverished economies of the asylum states.<sup>2/</sup> The costs to asylum states - both direct and

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1/ Half of all refugees in sub-Saharan Africa are under the age of 14.

2/ For example, the Zambian Government officially recognized 15,889 refugees as of May, 1978, whereas the representative of UNHCR in Zambia estimated from 50-65,000 refugees receiving some form of assistance from international donors and/or NLMS, plus an additional 25,000 who have settled "spontaneously" with friends or in villages where they have some ethnic affinity. (Source: Interviews with the Zambian Commissioner for refugees and UNHCR/Lusaka Representative, June, 1978.)

hidden - are, therefore, probably considerable.<sup>1/</sup>

There can also be some positive economic consequences of a resident refugee population in the following ways:

a) Refugees can act as a magnet for international donor assistance to remote regions which might otherwise be more neglected. Some refugee aid also helps citizens of asylum countries through its spin-off effects since rural development projects have sometimes been "zonal" in scope. By incorporating the indigenous population in some aspects of refugee programs, resentment and accusations of favoritism from local people can be lessened and more balanced development can be assured. An example of this could formerly be found at the Meheba resettlement area in northwestern Zambia. Meheba sheltered over 13,000 refugees as of May, 1978, virtually all of whom were Angolans. For over a decade, the UNHCR, working through the Zambian Government and, at present, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), has provided schools, clinics, and assistance in raising agricultural productivity. During 1973-76<sup>2/</sup> the neighboring Zambian villages were able to benefit from some Meheba facilities as well. A new

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1/ For example, the salaries of government functionaries pre-occupied with refugee matters must be paid, the time and attention of high government officials is diverted from pressing development issues, and "spontaneously settled" refugees represent an additional burden for local schools, clinics and other services.

2/ According to a recent report by an AID official, policy at Meheba as of July 1978 was to exclude Zambians from using facilities there.

project, to be supported at Meheba by the American PVO Africare, will develop school gardens. The agricultural training could benefit both refugee and Zambian pupils if government policy permits access by Zambians.

b) Some refugees are relatively skilled and can provide a scarce labor pool for some professions. There are a number of Zimbabwean refugee teachers in Zambia and Botswana (17%). Black South African exiles are a potential source of skilled manpower for an independent Namibia, and several black South Africans are employed as lecturers at the U.N. Institute for Namibia, which is training young Namibians, inter alia, for a future Namibian civil service.

## 2. The Social Effect

A rapid refugee influx can result in overcrowding of already limited social services, in the introduction of particular diseases from one geographic area to another, and in cultural disorientation among the indigenous population of a receiving area which must cope with a sudden influx of people who may have different customs, language, and beliefs. In urban areas in particular, the presence of unaided displaced populations is sometimes accompanied by an increase of crime and prostitution, deterioration of urban services through overloading, and greater burdens on the civil service.

### C. Present Alternatives

All refugees have three logical options which are then variously circumscribed by their particular position:

- a) they can return to their countries of nationality
- b) they can remain in their country of asylum
- c) they can relocate to a third country which will accept them

In southern Africa it now appears that most Namibian refugees will be able to return to their country of nationality once an internationally acceptable transition to independence has been achieved. Some Angolans are able to return under the MPLA Government of President Neto; however, many supporters of the defeated FNLA and UNITA political parties remain in Zaire, Botswana, and Zambia while new refugees have fled from the southern Angolan conflict zone<sup>1/</sup>, into northern Namibia and western Zambia. Most Zimbabwean refugees are in a "holding pattern"--unsure of the outcome and unable to predict how many of them of which political persuasions will be able to return. South African refugees have, perhaps, the most difficult position since the minority regime is more entrenched in their country, and it appears unlikely that they will be able to return in the foreseeable future.

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1/ Southern Angola has experienced repeated conflict over the past several years. Prior to 1974, Portuguese and nationalist forces fought each other. Since then, MPLA and UNITA forces have fought and are reported still to be engaged in occasional combat; South Africa invaded the area during the civil war and has also repeatedly attacked SWAPO nationalist bases and refugee settlements with the killing at Cassinga alone of over 500 people in May, 1978.

The majority of refugees have, therefore, remained in their countries of first asylum, with some notable exceptions. Many Namibian refugees who fled into Angola continued to Zambia and some went to Tanzania to seek asylum. Zimbabweans have been flown out of the border regions of Botswana to "safer havens" in Zambia, which was formerly more distant from the fighting and better able to provide for refugees, since the Francistown and Selebi-Pikwe Camps in Botswana are overcrowded. Some South African refugees have been moved from Swaziland to Zambia and some of the SOWETO riot victims have been provided with scholarships tenable in the U.S., Europe, and majority ruled Africa.

### III. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF REFUGEE PROBLEMS, 1978-2000

The political conflicts in southern Africa of the 1960s and 1970s have been continual and intense, yet their transformation into conventional warfare has been limited in time, magnitude, and geographic area. They have nonetheless resulted in the withdrawal of British authority and the achievement of independence for Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland; the collapse of Portuguese colonialism which led to independence for Mozambique and Angola; the continued effort to achieve independence for Namibia; the serious erosion of the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia; and the increasing isolation of minority-ruled South Africa. The freeing of seven of the 10 southern African states from colonial hegemony and the prospect of internationally recognized independence for

Namibia and Zimbabwe leaves South Africa as the remaining bastion of minority resistance to a global historical trend away from colonial exploitation and institutionalized racial discrimination.

One consequence of this political evolution and the attendant level of violence and upheaval over the past two decades has been the generation of probably at least 150,000 refugees<sup>1/</sup> from Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa.

Given this background, any analysis of the likely volume and sources of refugees over the next two decades must assess the possible nature and direction of political evolution in the region over that period. From such an appraisal, which is the subject of the next section, some conclusions might be drawn as to the most appropriate policies and programs in the refugee sphere.

The number of variables and actors in southern Africa combined with the time period in question does not permit very definite projections of the nature or scope of the refugee problem; however, one point of departure is the two scenarios in the Terms of Reference for this project, which posit:

- (a) "maintenance of the status quo, including continued international sanctions applied against Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa with gradually escalating conflict";  
and

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1. For a more detailed breakdown, see Annex IV. Various Angolan conflicts have alone produced over 500,000 refugees.

- (b) "internationally-recognized majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia, with an end of sanctions and efforts to reduce dependency on South Africa."

While these scenarios are reasonable hypotheses for the near future, it seems probable that the evolving transformation of Namibia and Zimbabwe will result in some sort of independent, African-controlled governments within the next few years, whereas the problem of South Africa is likely to precipitate repeated crises at different levels of violence over the entire period. Consider the following hypotheses and their respective implications for greater numbers of refugees:

A. Short-term (late 1978 to end 1980)

<u>Hypotheses</u>	<u>Potential Consequences for Rate of Flow and Sources of Refugees</u>
1. Maintenance of status quo in Southern Rhodesia with escalating violence (scenario (a) above)	1. Increasing white emigration and a burgeoning refugee population. ICRC estimated 6,000 black refugees a month during first half of 1978 into Botswana. Recent announcement by Smith that blacks will be drafted to fight for the minority government has prompted protests and may cause increased refugee flow among draft age Africans.
2. Internationally recognized majority rule (scenario (b) above) with borad-based African governments	2. (a) Return of refugees to Namibia, principally from Zambia and Angola and some white emigration mostly to RSA, where many hold citizenship.  (b) Return of Zimbabwean refugees from asylum states and continued white emigration, principally to RSA.

## Hypotheses

## Potential Consequences-Refugees

3. Internationally-recognized majority rule in Zimbabwe, with the subsequent triumph of a single party or faction or an alliance of groups, possibly through undemocratic means (either the "internal" group, the Patriotic Front, or some combination of factions from both)
3. (a) Increased risk of civil war Angolan-style, with consequent rapid increase in refugee flow
- (b) Those refugees affiliated with defeated political groups may remain outside Zimbabwe and could be joined by others, while those who support victorious group likely to return
- (c) White refugee influx into RSA probable, and some will seek emigration outside Africa

### B. Medium-term (late 1978--2000)

#### Hypotheses

#### Potential Consequences - Refugees

1. South Africa maintains political status quo and basic Apartheid policies
- (a) Continued gradual and limited changes in "petty" Apartheid.
- (b) Continued Afrikaner control of government, refusal to share political power and attempts to define all RSA blacks as "citizens" of "foreign" countries now known as homelands, thereby denying black claims to a share of economic wealth or a political voice in "white" RSA, which will comprise 87% of territory for 16% white population
- (a) Gradually escalating violence,<sup>1/</sup> greater physical access to independent African states (Namibia and Zimbabwe), rising bitterness and militancy among RSA blacks and despair at Western inaction yield incremental but continuous increase in refugee flow not unlike pattern in Zimbabwe: Some flee conflict and seek education; others join NLMs, most are young, male, and politically conscious. This pattern likely to remain unless violence crosses threshold where many more flee conflict zones as per Angola civil war.

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<sup>1/</sup> Illustrative of this is the Washington Post report of November 1, 1978 stating, "Police aided by dogs and helicopters combed South Africa's rugged northern bushland yesterday in search of black guerrillas who wounded a policeman in the second ambush in four days ....." (p.A27)

## Hypotheses

(c) Continued official Western opposition to Apartheid, combined with business as usual--little or no economic sanctions, no disinvestment, minimal tangible support in behalf of majority rule

(d) Increasing incidents of urban unrest and violence by RSA police against black leaders and their supporters with gradually escalating violence by liberation groups supplied with weapons from Eastern countries.

(e) Consequent blurring of distinctions in Western perceptions between African nationalist and Communist organizations leading to possibly self-fulfilling prophecies of ideological character of black leaders of 1980s and beyond

2. South Africa announces abandonment of Apartheid, calls for national constitutional conference, accepts principle of majority rule as "ultimate goal" and vows careful decade-long transition with entrenched guarantees for white minority

(a) Most of international community applauds RSA move and promises aid and cooperation

## Potential Consequences-Refugees

(b) Continued erosion of white minority position and provision of military or economic support from Eastern countries to NLMs could result in U.S. confrontation with U.S.S.R. over its or Cuba's role in South Africa. Overwhelming African sentiment likely to be anti-U.S. in absence effective assistance. The number of both black and white refugees and casualties could rise rapidly if violence by proxy becomes part of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. equation over next decade.

(a) Depending upon when such a transformation occurs and whether it is in response to some form of mass uprising or the gradual erosion of an untenable position, the infusion of hope into the majority population would probably reduce the inclination to flee and a general amnesty for exiles and political prisoners could significantly reduce whatever level of refugees exists at that time.

## Hypotheses

(b) More militant groups dissatisfied since whites continue control nature and pace of change

(c) Increased factionalism among African groups maneuvering for leadership positions and dissension over position to take with regard white refusal permit "Marxist" or "militant" groups to participate

## Potential Consequences-Refugees

(b) On the other hand, African groups excluded by whites or who choose exclude selves due to dissatisfaction depth/nature changes likely remain refugees

(c) Degree of Western pressure (sanctions/U.N. transition team/blockade) or Eastern pressure (arms to NLMs, Cuban troops, Afro-Arab-Communist force) and consequent level and nature of conflict (conventional/ guerilla/rhetorical/economic) which helps precipitate RSA policy reversal will directly affect level refugee exodus

The possible causes and character of the South African refugee problem are considered above. It is quite revealing also to examine the possible magnitude of the problem over the medium-term, particularly under the first and most likely hypothesis which does not anticipate a radical or sudden transformation from any quarter.

Assuming that one consequence of the first hypothesis may be that the level of violence within and across the borders of South Africa by 1985 may reach approximately the same relative level, i.e., number of incidents per capita per annum, as that

which existed in Southern Rhodesia by mid-1978<sup>1/</sup>, what would be the probable rate of refugee influx into nearby states?

As of July 1978, approximately 2.1% of the black population of Southern Rhodesia had become refugees. If a similar percentage of the 1985 non-white South African population were to flee the Republic in response to similar circumstances, southern Africa and the international community generally would have to cope with approximately 567,000 refugees.<sup>2/</sup> A decade hence, the figure could reach

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1/ Various analogies could be constructed to examine the potential rate of refugee exodus under different circumstances. While no two situations are likely to be identical and there are factors in the South African situation which are different from that in Southern Rhodesia (e.g. the larger percentage of the population which is white, a different level of industrial development, more powerful military and secret police apparatus, different terrain, etc.), there are probably more elements common to the political equations of both countries than there are with other potentially analogous situations (e.g. history of legal racial discrimination; white minority control; evolution of Southern Rhodesia as the northern extension of white South Africa with consequent cultural, ethnic and historical links; perception of African nationalists of both situations being part of the southern African problem of racial oppression and economic exploitation, linkages and influences between African nationalists combatting minority rule in the two states, etc.)

2/ The 1976 estimate for the African population of Southern Rhodesia totaled 6.22 million, of whom an estimated 130,000 (2.1%) have become refugees. The mid-1976 population estimate for South Africa was 26.2 million, of whom about 21.7 million were non-white. With a non-white natural increase in population in excess of 3% per annum, by 1985 the non-white population is likely to be more than 27 million, 2.1% of which equals 567,000.

as high as three-quarters of a million--higher than the total present population of Botswana or Swaziland, two of the likely asylum countries! If an analogy is drawn with Angola instead, the number of refugees is correspondingly higher and estimates over one million can quickly be projected.

In addition to the sobering calculations above, further refugees in smaller numbers may be expected from:

- increasing numbers of young whites who refuse to fight in the RSA military for an Apartheid system and flee northwards.<sup>1/</sup>
- white refugees (as opposed to emigrants who normally hold dual citizenship or who, in an orderly manner after careful preparation move to a host country ready to receive them). The recent case of South African editor Donald Woods' escape through Lesotho is an example of one sort of white refugee. In conditions of chronic instability, some of those who support or are apolitical towards the present regime may be expected to leave as well.
- dissidents from one or another black RSA movement who are expelled from their party and are unable to remain in RSA or their country of asylum.

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1/ The South African Military Refugee Aid Fund (SAMRAF) office in New York stated that as of June, 1978 there were approximately 4,000 South African war resisters of whom 500 were in Europe, 50 in the U.S. and the rest in majority ruled Africa (chiefly Botswana and Zambia) and in hiding or prison in South Africa. The UNHCR recognizes South African draft resisters as refugees. The status of these refugees under U.S. law appears unclear and SAMRAF has been in contact with members of Congress and the Administration to inquire about admission of these refugees into the U.S. SAMRAF is contemplating bringing a military refugee to the U.S. and officially having him seek political asylum on that basis as a test case. (Those already in the U.S. are apparently here under other categories - immigrant, student, etc.)

● refugees from majority ruled African states who may fall victim to future changes of government, religious intolerance, or some other internal conflict. The uncertain character of future regimes in Namibia and Zimbabwe and the continued difficulties in Angola make these countries potential sources of refugees in this category.

Despite the obvious hazards involved in predicting the future and the complications arising from the large number of relatively independent variables, the above analysis is based on observable present conditions and trends, the measured and qualified application of somewhat analogous situations in the region, and the reactions of people who find themselves living under conditions of extraordinary political/military stress. The following conclusions, which are of central importance to the analysis and recommendations in Parts V and VI, minimally seem to emerge from this analysis:

1. The number of refugees in southern Africa (excluding Angola) is likely to at least quadruple over the next decade to a half million or more;
2. the average refugee is likely to be more literate, more urbanized, and more politically motivated;
3. the total and the per capita cost of refugee assistance is, therefore, likely to increase in real terms since the type of assistance provided to better educated refugees is generally costlier.

#### IV. REVIEW OF RECENT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ASSISTANCE

In Annex I, a ten-page quoted and paraphrased summary is presented of all recommendations made by several recent U.N.-and U.S.-sponsored missions charged with examining the refugee situation. The U.N. reports consistently present detailed and budgeted project proposals and supply regular follow-up information to permit interested observers to know (a) current needs as defined by asylum countries and interpreted by the missions and (b) the rate of project implementation.

The Van Egmond Report provides specific recommendations; however, its terms of reference were restricted primarily to educational needs of refugees in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. The Clark Report provides a very general descriptive overview of basic facts in each country and is not specific in its recommendations. The ABFE Report touches only occasionally on refugee problems and also makes mostly general recommendations.

The majority of the recommendations in Annex I offer useful ideas. However, those in one report are often redundant of recommendations in others; they are primarily piecemeal in nature and there is little assessment of their impact over time. With the partial exception of the Van Egmond Report, most of the recommendations are designed to meet specific problems observed by a particular mission and, as a consequence, tend to recommend aid primarily to meet immediate needs of a relief character and to expand the educational capacity of certain institutions. This is

both useful and essential when dealing with refugee problems which are almost by definition initially of an emergency character; however, evaluating the impact of the recommendations may be enhanced by placing them in a conceptual, policy, and program framework.

A review of Annex I in light of the conclusions in Part III above and a comparison of recommendations with projects being implemented (as enumerated in Annex III) leaves one with the strong impression that already inadequate efforts risk being swamped by enormous problems now on the horizon, that overworked institutions are devoting all their energies to coping with the present, and that both the implications of current activities and the probable scale of future difficulties are not being considered and planned for to the degree that may be required.

The above observations are not meant so much as a criticism either of prior reports or of institutions working to implement projects as they are designed to provide an understanding of the organization and emphasis of the remainder of this report which examines medium-term problems from a conceptual (refugee typology--Part II), policy (Part V), and program (Part VI) framework.

## V. ELEMENTS OF A REFUGEE POLICY FOR THE U.S.

A comprehensive policy for the U.S. towards refugees should be rooted in the principles of nondiscrimination, depolitization, and comprehensiveness. Acceptance of these principles as the foundation of U.S. refugee policy could facilitate contingency planning and program formulation by establishing a standard against which general recommendations can be measured and on behalf of which more specific recommendations can be implemented. Each of these policy elements will be examined in turn.

### A. Nondiscrimination

Historically, the refugee policy of the United States has been closely linked to its overall immigration policy. Prior to the twentieth century, that policy was largely one of open admission and it accounted for the presence in the U.S.A. of the majority of the ancestors of the present population. The distinction between refugees and other immigrants became important only when legislation restricting immigration was adopted early in this century and a national origins quota system introduced.

The repeal of the discriminatory quota system in 1965 returned the United States to its historic policy of nondiscrimination by ethnic or national origin and established quotas based upon more objective criteria. U.S. policy toward refugees, however, remained more restrictive and continued to reflect post-World War II priority concern for the welfare of those fleeing religious and ethnic persecution (Jewish refugees in Europe from Nazi Germany)

and those fleeing Communist governments in Eastern Europe.

Present U.S. legislation toward refugees is discriminatory in nature, since it only recognizes refugees from Communist areas and certain countries of the Middle East for the purpose of possible admittance to the U.S. This should be modified along the lines proposed in Bill S.2751 introduced in the U.S. Senate by Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Sub-Committee on Refugee and Migration Affairs and supported by the Carter Administration.<sup>1/</sup>

The effect of the proposed Bill would be to have U.S. legislation conform to the definition discussed in Part I and, thereby, be in accord with the 1951 U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees which was ratified by the U.S. in 1968 with two reservations. It places refugee admissions in the same category as all other immigrant admissions while increasing the annual limitation on regular refugee admissions from 17,400 to 40,000 without increasing overall average annual immigration. In addition, it provides flexible authority for the Attorney General, in consultation with both Houses of Congress and upon the recommendation of the Secretary of State, to admit additional refugees or displaced persons if their admission

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<sup>1/</sup> Similar legislation was introduced in the House during 1978 by Rep. Eilberg (D-PA.) which would end discretionary "parole" authority by the Attorney-General and replace it with Congressional guidelines. See Annex VII for an abridged text of the proposed legislation.

is not "possible or practical" under the annual limitation to meet resettlement needs.<sup>1/</sup>

Examples in The Congressional Record of differential treatment of refugees were drawn from Chile and Uganda (Asians) to illustrate the need for reform; however, with the adoption of this legislation the victims of legalized and institutionalized racial discrimination in South Africa would also become eligible for admission to the U.S. as refugees on the same basis as those who have fled Communist countries or the Nazis in the past. A U.S. refugee policy which fully recognizes the pernicious effects of racial discrimination will be consistent with the domestic civil rights efforts of the past two decades and will buttress President Carter's support for human rights around the world by eliminating a vestige of discrimination in U.S. legislation.

While supporting the modification of legislation as above, the Mission additionally recommends that the U.S. adopt a clear policy forbidding entry of individuals as refugees or immigrants who advocate, or have advocated over a to be specified period of years, legal discrimination based upon race. This can be demonstrated by membership in a political party which advocates this. At present, the U.S. does not generally permit entry of refugees or immigrants who are members of Communist or Nazi parties (who in the latter case also support racial supremacy). The Apartheid policy

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1/ For a complete discussion of this legislation see the Congressional Record for March 15, 1978 (Vol. 124, No. 37, Pp.S3756-3758).

of South Africa, which has been declared a "crime against humanity" and a violation of the U.N. Charter of Human Rights by the United Nations, is reprehensible to many Americans, is particularly offensive to black Americans, and is definable in terms similar to that of other prohibited categories: by membership in an organization rather than by a too amorphous belief in a given creed. Members of the Nationalist Party of South Africa and similar parties advocating racial supremacy would therefore be forbidden entry into the United States should circumstances lead to their request for refugee or immigrant status. Adoption of this policy would make U.S. entry restrictions consistent by placing restrictions on those who advocate legalized racism on the same footing as those placed upon persons belonging to other groups advocating policies which are illegal in the U.S. and inimical to the welfare of American society.

The practical importance of adhering to a nondiscriminatory policy will be demonstrated in Part VI when the range of options likely to be available to the refugees of the next two decades (see Part III) are examined and recommendations for U.S. assistance are made.

#### B. Depolitization

A second underlying principle of U.S. refugee policy should be to minimize opportunities whereby the nature and level of refugee assistance will be susceptible to political pressures. By stressing the humanitarian nature of refugee aid, the welfare of the victims becomes

paramount. A nonpolitical approach highlights the universal human aspects of the refugee experience and facilitates humanitarian relief even to those with whom the U.S. might have political disagreements.

One of the ways to encourage this approach is to continue to rely, to the greatest possible extent, upon multilateral channels of assistance (UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, PVOs with an international character, etc.). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is a notable example of the success of a nonpolitical and humanitarian approach in southern Africa. The ICRC is, at present, assisting victims of the Southern Rhodesia conflict through operations inside that country as well as in surrounding states. It is also helping Namibian victims in Angola and Angolan refugees in Namibia. It has been permitted to visit certain prisoners of war in South Africa while it simultaneously sent two tons of emergency medical supplies to Angola.<sup>1/</sup>

The Van Egmond Report recommends U.S. official bilateral initiatives which would be supplemental to continued and strengthened U.S. assistance through multilateral channels. The Report points out that some multilateral

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1/ For a detailed account of current ICRC activities in southern Africa see "Africa Report Number 1," (RO 820b) dated May 19, 1978. For all of sub-Saharan Africa for the six months ending 31 October 1978, ICRC appealed for SwFrS 20,524,900 (U.S. \$11,730,000) of which 60% was earmarked for southern Africa.

institutions have restricted mandates and views bilateral aid as a further source of assistance. While additional assistance would benefit refugees, it is the conclusion of the Mission that it would be preferable to channel this through multilateral agencies first and private voluntary organizations second. Direct AID projects and those funded entirely from U.S. resources may be more vulnerable to considerations not principally related to refugee welfare and could experience changes of funding levels which could have adverse consequences for the beneficiaries in the absence of other funding sources.

For the most part, recommendations for official bilateral actions in other reports are ones which could equally well be carried out by international agencies and PVOs already active in the region and represent an opportunity to expand the scope of multilateral assistance. Financial support for programs of the Botswana Council for Refugees, the Lesotho Christian Council, and other such groups can be provided through the UNHCR, which has used such groups to implement programs in the past. Similarly, the provision of scholarships tenable in the U.S. or Africa or support for programs to aid refugees at the University of Lesotho or at UBS can be routed through UNDP (UNEP/TPSA) or the Fund for Namibia. The AAI and The Phelps-Stokes Fund, though bilateral, are non-governmental and represent additional vehicles for assistance.

To the extent that there are constraints which hamper the effectiveness of multilateral institutions, the first

course of action for the U.S., as a member state of the UNHCR and other bodies, could be to work within the organization to increase its effectiveness. AID has its own constraints and would confront additional difficulties if it entered the field with a bilateral program of its own.

C. Comprehensiveness

Assistance should be provided at the three "normal" stages of the refugee experience--relief, rehabilitation, and resettlement or return. It should be coordinated with other donors and between stages, since each phase requires different kinds and levels of support. Relief assistance is usually more dramatic and easier to obtain. Without adequate and appropriate aid during the other stages, however, "temporary" relief can extend for decades. Dependency relationships can develop between entire refugee populations and donor agencies, while host governments discover that longer term and often growing refugee populations can present continual economic, social, and security difficulties.<sup>1/</sup>

The donor dependency syndrome is depressingly recurrent. Two examples would be: (a) Some refugees in Meheba, Zambia discover that the policy of full food rations for the first year, half for the second, and none thereafter when re-

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<sup>1/</sup> The Palestinian population in Lebanon and Jordan are familiar examples; however, Zimbabweans and Angolans in Zambia and South African schoolchildren from SOWETO living in Botswana pose similar security problems for their countries of asylum.

settled refugees are supposedly self-supporting will not be enforced if their plot is insufficiently productive. The relief agency cannot allow starvation, so exceptions are made, rations are prolonged, and a vicious circle of disincentives can quickly be introduced; (b) In Mboki, Central African Empire, refugees from the Sudanese Civil War in the early 1970s were encouraged by UNHCR to join together in a spirit of self-reliance to construct village primary schools for their children which UNHCR would equip. A church group then independently began paying villagers to build the structures. When church funds were exhausted, UNHCR was confronted by villagers accustomed to a donor-provided wage who were mostly not prepared to repair or enlarge the schools without remuneration.

For these reasons, preferred assistance is:

- a) programmed to move quickly beyond the relief phase;
- b) seeking permanent solutions for those individuals unlikely to be able--or who are unwilling to--return to their countries of nationality for the foreseeable future (Soviet Jews, Hungarians from 1956, South African black and white exiles opposed to Apartheid, etc.);
- c) funded for more than one year at a time to reduce uncertainty in, for example, the availability of resources for multi-year scholarship programs;
- d) channeled through established agencies to prevent the further proliferation of program-implementing bureaucracies which share in the refugee dollar, and to promote coordinated and comprehensive planning and programming.

Using the typology in Part II, proceeding from the principles presented in Part V above and being confronted with the present (see Annex IV) and future (Part III) magnitude of the refugee problem, the following Part of this report recommends a number of project and program initiatives and suggests categories for future project identification.

## VI. PROGRAM AND PROJECT INITIATIVES FOR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

As noted in Part II, the functional refugee typology is flexible. Both the general circumstances which induced individuals to flee from their countries of nationality (thus affecting their propensity to "stay" or "return") and their personal status (particularly educational achievement) can and does vary. As a consequence, some of the program recommendations below may apply to more than one category. They have, therefore, been placed under the heading which seems most appropriate.

### A. Educated Return (ER)

#### 1. Training<sup>1/</sup>

A principal outcome of current assistance and of recommendations contained in the reports summarized in Annex I has been an increase in the number of scholarships available to refugees and an expansion of the student capacity of African educational institutions. More than a dozen

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<sup>1/</sup> The terms "training" and "education" are sometimes used to distinguish between academic and vocational programs. To avoid needless repetition of both terms, they are used interchangeably here since each is also a form of the other.

sources of scholarship aid can be readily identified<sup>1/</sup> and Annexes III and V attempt to give some indication of the magnitude of the programs. There has been some program coordination among U.N. agencies<sup>2/</sup> and some cooperation between the U.N. and other aid-giving bodies; however, no organization seems to know how many scholarships are given to whom by whom for training in what fields of study. This is a worrisome trend because it becomes virtually impossible to measure the impact of educational assistance upon the supply of individuals in particular skill categories for--in this instance--primarily Namibia and Zimbabwe. The parallel and accelerating trend to provide further educational opportunities for the ES category (mostly South Africans) will have serious employment implications over time for their countries of first asylum and for the countries in which they are educated. This will be considered in "B" below.

For better or worse, training is not received in a vacuum. A refugee is exposed to new ideas, values, and experiences, and is frequently immersed in a substantially different culture from his own, when the objective of his sponsors is primarily to provide education in a much

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<sup>1/</sup> AAI, British Council, Commonwealth Secretariat, Fund for Namibia, IUEF, Phelps-Stokes Fund, UNETPSA, UN Trusteeship Council (conduit for some bilaterals), the West German Academic Exchange Fund, other bilateral programs, church aid, individual aid, and a few self-supporting students.

<sup>2/</sup> See the Goundrey-El Tawil Report of July, 1978, and the summary of their findings in Annex I.

narrower sense. Consequently, a continuing debate is heard at OAU meetings, at UNESCO, within the education and foreign affairs ministries of asylum states, and among policymakers in the PVOs. It has been the OAU position that African students should be educated on the African continent to the extent possible in order to limit the problems of "brain drain" and cultural adjustment. On the other hand, despite a great deal of verbal support for this principle, many African states find it exceedingly difficult to admit more than a token number of refugees to facilities that are usually grossly inadequate for the needs of their own citizens. The OAU's own BPEAR (Bureau for the Placement and Education of African Refugees) has been in operation for over ten years, yet despite numerous trips by its Executive Director and staff and a number of conferences and seminars, the Bureau has placed few refugees in educational institutions or in employment.

The Fund for Namibia has had more success (at the secondary level) with placements in West Africa in particular; however, by mid-1978 a discouragingly large number had returned to southern Africa without completing their studies due to various adjustment problems.<sup>1/</sup> UNETPSA has been more successful in placing students at universities

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<sup>1/</sup> The age of the pupils, serious language difficulties (in Namibia the two official languages are Afrikaans and German) and removal to a different climatic and cultural region contributed to this.

in Africa as well as in Europe and North America. It is the Mission's conclusion that training programs for refugees should continue to be used to expand and strengthen national training capacity in asylum states but that donor organizations should ensure that this approach does not adversely affect either the quality of education or the number of qualified refugees who can be placed. Some previous programs have had precisely this effect, and this has been to the detriment of all concerned.

Specific training initiatives oriented primarily towards the ER category (with the ES category included in some instances) follow:

a) Nkumbi International College<sup>1/</sup>

Nkumbi College is a secondary school in Zambia with vocational and academic programs. It is administered under the Ministry of Education's Department of Technical Education and Vocational Training (DTEVT), has a good physical plant (classrooms, dormitories, laboratories, equipment to teach agricultural, secretarial and other vocational skills, staff housing and dining facilities), admits refugees to a maximum 40% of total enrollment, and could potentially make a much greater contribution to refugee training if some of its recurring problems could be resolved.

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<sup>1/</sup> Nkumbi was supported in the 1960s through the African-American Institute and USAID no doubt has ample background information on the history of the school's development. Nkumbi received \$200,000 from U.S.A. through the UNHCR in 1978.

A key constraint is the inability of the school to attract and retain good teaching staff. The DTEVT has tried to use U.N. and various bilateral volunteers, direct recruitment in Zambia and abroad, and other techniques. Some teachers have had personal and professional disagreements with the schools' administrative staff, while others have found the location too remote or salaries too low. As of June 30, 1978 only 33% of the pupils were refugees, yet classes were overcrowded.

The Mission recommends that a major program be mounted for Nkumbi by beginning negotiations with DTEVT, UNHCR, and other interested institutions in Zambia to develop a project which would:

- (a) resolve the teacher shortage constraint;
- (b) revitalize the administration of the school;
- (c) mount an expanded program of training for Namibian refugees which would stress modern intensive English language training to prepare some pupils to transfer to other schools and the remainder to enter the full program at Nkumbi;
- (d) initiate short-term orientation courses for ER/ES refugees newly arrived in Zambia to ease the emotional, cultural, and academic transition, counsel them regarding their educational options, and provide standardized tests to facilitate placement; and
- (e) ensure that the upgrading and expansion of Nkumbi includes proper coordination and levels of inputs to minimize future constraints to the balanced growth of the institution. Funds could be channelled through UNHCR, UNDP, or a PVO with demonstrated competence in this field.

A short-term initiative would be to recommend the absorption into Nkumbi of two teachers now constituting the entire teaching staff of the secondary school opened with 35 pupils in Swaziland in 1977 by the Mennonite Central Committee exclusively for refugees. As of June 1978 the school had 60 refugees from South Africa attending, was surviving with minimal support and meager facilities, and had had repeated difficulties with government officials. Transferring the students and teachers to Zambia would provide two additional teachers (a husband and wife team) for Nkumbi<sup>1/</sup> and would provide the pupils with a greatly improved physical plant that would dramatically improve the quality of their education. Since the refugee quota at Nkumbi is undersubscribed, this should not pose difficulties, particularly if it was seen as part of a comprehensive effort to assist both the school and its refugee and Zambian students. This would resolve the considerable problems and insecurity of the South African students in Swaziland and represent a tangible commitment to expand Nkumbi to its optimal size.

b) The Institute for Namibia

The Institute, situated in the center of Lusaka, conducts research and provides classroom instruction for Namibians, many of whom are expected to form the nucleus of a new Namibian civil service. Its staff has also

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Obviously, initially the addition of the teachers would be offset by the students accompanying them in terms of teaching strength.

participated in reviewing project ideas submitted by various U.N. agencies under the Namibia Nationhood Program of the Council for Namibia and has subcontracted for a comprehensive study of Namibia's likely post-independence manpower needs and constraints.<sup>1/</sup>

The U.N. Secretary-General was quoted in the August 31, 1978, Washington Post as estimating the cost for the U.N. transition operation in Namibia at US\$300 million for 7,500 troops and 1,200 civilians to observe and implement a peaceful, democratic transfer of power. Namibia, according to the U.N. schedule outlined by the Commissioner for Namibia, Mr. M. Ahtisaari, is to obtain independence around August-September, 1979. To increase the chances for a successful transition and a stable post-independence government, the calibre of its civil service will be critical.

The Mission therefore recommends that detailed discussions be held with the Institute and the competent U.N. authorities in New York to ensure the rapid development of those training programs which suggest themselves as a result of the findings of the Namibian Manpower Survey. The U.S. should be a major donor to this effort, which can be viewed as a major opportunity to prepare

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The Namibian Manpower Survey, prepared by Dr. Reginald Green, Institute for Development Studies, Sussex, U.K., was not available to the Mission since it was still under review by the Institute, SWAPO and others as of July, 1978.

as many Namibian refugees as possible for the new roles which await them in an independent country. An active U.S. role would be consistent with the leading role of U.S. diplomacy in attempting to ensure a peaceful transition and with the probable leading U.S. role as a financial contributor to the costs of transition. At the same time that the U.S. announces its contribution to UNTAG, it would underline its commitment to development in Namibia by announcing a contribution for training of Namibian refugees of, perhaps, ten percent of the U.S. UNTAG contribution. This could be placed in a special account with the Fund for Namibia or UNDP, with amounts still unused at independence to be transferred to training projects inside Namibia or to continue support outside Namibia as requested by the new Namibian government. The provision of this assistance should be independent of judgements regarding a probable date for Namibian independence since the outlook remains uncertain.

c) Urban Refugee Center

The UNHCR is developing a skills training and transit center to be located in Makeni (near Lusaka), Zambia. Existing structures are being renovated and a multi-trade workshop is planned. Funds are available through UNHCR<sup>1/</sup> for most of the project; however, financing is required for the workshop budget. The Center will

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1/ Partly from U.S. contributions. See Annex III.

assist 300 urban refugees in the Lusaka area who are currently idle. The U.S. should consider providing the supplementary support UNHCR will require to ensure the facility is used to capacity. Initially, most beneficiaries are likely to be from Zimbabwe.

d) Development Management Training

In October 1977 the USAID Mission to Southern Africa headed by Mr. Thomas Quimby discussed with Tanzanian Government officials the possibility of scholarships for refugees to attend Tanzania's Institute of Development Management, which at the time had more vacancies than candidates. Development planning and management will be critical areas for the new governments of Namibia, and Zimbabwe. This idea should be pursued further. Assistance could possibly be channeled through the AAI or UNETPSA.

2. Employment

The employment of refugees who are likely to return to their countries of nationality can be divided into two areas of concern: (a) short-term employment in asylum states, and (b) facilitating employment upon return to their own countries and motivating particularly the more settled and skilled refugees to return to where their skills are needed the most.

Short-term employment principally of Zimbabweans has not been a major problem thus far, since the asylum countries face skilled manpower shortages. In Zambia hundreds of

Zimbabweans are teaching at all levels, some are farmers and others work in government ministries, parastatals, and in business. Similarly, in Botswana some Zimbabweans can be found in teaching and other professions. There are so few Namibians who have completed their education that virtually all of them have been absorbed in the independence struggle working for SWAPO, the Institutue for Namibia, or related activities.

Some difficulties have been observed in placing recent graduates and in locating part-time work for students; however, the problem is not serious enough to warrant action at this point. In the event that independence for Namibia and especially Zimbabwe are delayed beyond 1980, this could become a growing concern.

Facilitating the return of refugees could be accomplished as follows:

a) The Return of Talent Program

The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) has carried out a Return of Talent program for nationals of Latin American countries residing in Europe. During 1977 families were returned to Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador. Those who had been working in West Germany had their air fares paid by the W. German Government and intensive Spanish and Portuguese language training programs were arranged for those who required it.

A survey of expatriate Zimbabweans is being undertaken at present by the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation.<sup>1/</sup> Once the results are known and additional information included, donors should advocate the organization of a Return of Talent program for Zimbabwe and Namibia through the UNHCR or other suitable international body. The programs would become operative once internationally recognized governments are in control in each country and could identify places for returning skilled refugees. By planning and funding such a program now, valuable time will not be lost when newly independent states will need all the trained nationals available as quickly as possible.

b) The Regional Reunification Program

The Return of Talent Program would focus primarily upon motivating and assisting skilled persons resident in Europe, North America, Australia or other relatively distant locations. This program would be targeted to assist the many urban and educated or quasi-educated or skilled people who are not resident in a refugee resettlement camp but who reside in the general vicinity of Zimbabwe, e.g., Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania. In contrast to the Zimbabwean university professor in Toronto or the Zimbabwean doctor or nurse in London, the needs of primary school teachers in Zambia, students in Botswana, or a librarian in Tanzania may be

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Zimbabweans were sent a questionnaire in January, 1978, and the project is being implemented under the direction of Mr. Terence R. Dormer of the CFTC.

different and can be best handled by a more localized program perhaps administered through the UNHCR by a local PVO. Discussions with UNHCR and others should permit planning and budgeting for such an operation so that it can be mounted without delay once independence has occurred.

B. Educated Stay (ES)

Once basic education has been provided (such as at Nkumbi College where the project suggested above applies as well to ES category refugees), further training should take into account likely artificial constraints which will be placed upon employment opportunity for this type of refugee. Unlike ER refugees, the ES refugee often represents a quasi-permanent addition to the population of the country of first asylum. As such, asylum states are torn between fulfilling their moral obligation to provide training and, later, employment to as many refugees as possible and their sometimes conflicting obligation to provide maximum opportunities to their own citizenry.

The dilemma has been resolved temporarily for both ER and ES refugees in Zambia by the imposition of a regulation which limits the number of places which may be held by non-Zambians at any school to 5% of the total. Exceptions to this include Nkumbi (40% ceiling), the University School of Medicine (nil), and certain technical areas with very limited places (nil). In Botswana and Lesotho additional university places have been created with international donor assistance and Swaziland has requested similar aid for fifty additional university

students. This approach obviously places artificial limits on opportunities for refugee training and, as demonstrated by Annex V, a great deal of the shortfall in first asylum states has so far been compensated for by the international community. As the total number of refugees increases and the share categorized as ES does likewise, the already sometimes embarrassingly difficult question of ES employment in first asylum states will be exacerbated.

The OAU has promoted refugee employment through its BPEAR, yet very few have been placed. African governments voice solidarity with those who have fled Apartheid, yet numerous examples exist of African governments quietly employing expatriates from Europe instead, since the latter can be given a fixed term contract and repatriated once a trained national is available to replace him.<sup>1/</sup> It is comparatively more difficult to create wage sector employment in developing countries; the cost per job created is often higher and a larger percentage of the national work force is usually unemployed and trying to enter a much smaller job market than in developed countries. It is not surprising then that African governments, like those everywhere, seek to protect their citizens and meet their needs first.

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<sup>1/</sup> For example, the National Water Board of a small independent country bordering South Africa hired a South African national who had recently graduated from the national university. When the government discovered this, he was forced to resign and a citizen was hired instead.

Four logical approaches, to be examined in turn, might therefore be considered as ways to provide useful training and employment for ES refugees, which are not created at the expense of nationals of asylum countries and which serve to spread the refugee burden beyond states who, purely for reasons of geographic accident, become countries of first asylum.

1. Create employment which promotes progress towards the resolution of South African problems;
2. Create employment which aids other developing countries without cost to the host country;
3. Facilitate permanent residence or citizenship status in other African countries;
4. Facilitate immigration to the United States and other traditional immigrant-receiving areas of the world.

1. Employment to Assist in Resolving South African Problems

a) A Center for South African Conflict Resolution

The unfolding struggle for the transformation of South African society has been punctuated by numerous attempts by representatives of the African majority to persuade white minority governments to consider their fundamental demands for equitable political participation and economic opportunity. Leaders of the majority have been imprisoned, killed, or driven into exile for over thirty years while the minority retains considerable control of information and is supported by research and documentation provided by minority controlled ministries and university faculty sympathetic to Apartheid. As a

consequence, in the event that conditions in South Africa lead to a reversal of minority government policy and a genuine opportunity arises to negotiate a new social order, the minority will have a distinct advantage in terms of its ability to produce detailed position papers and documentary support for its approaches to a broad range of issues.

It is recommended that the capacity, primarily of black South Africans, to articulate their own positions and priorities under such circumstances be strengthened by providing a Center for the development and appraisal of detailed, sector-specific economic proposals. These would derive from the thinking of the most capable individuals who form part of the South African majority opposed to Apartheid. This could create meaningful employment for a number of ES refugees and would help to build cohesiveness among the South African diaspora. Therefore, the Mission recommends that exploratory discussions be instituted by the U.S. and other donors with leading South African exiles and representatives of institutions which may be able to accommodate such a Center.

Several institutions should be considered, including: a) the United Nations University in Tokyo, Japan; b) a new U.N. entity created for the purpose and possibly connected to the U.N. Centre Against Apartheid; c) an autonomous institute at a university in Sub-Saharan Africa; d) some other international "think tank" structured

on lines to be determined. The Center would be controlled, administered, and staffed by South African exiles and would receive financial support through a Fund maintained by an international institution to which other donors besides the U.S. would be asked to contribute.

The U.S. role could consist of a) providing support and encouragement for the establishment of the Center, b) providing funds to the U.N. to convene a conference of leading South African exiles to consider whether and how such a Center could be established and to create an Advisory Council of a cross-section of South African refugees to participate in the initial phases of organization and planning for the Center, and c) to pledge to contribute an equitable share of the budget of the Center through the Fund mentioned above for an initial three-year period, once an agreed framework for the Center has been developed.

The immediate employment impact of the Center would be limited to the professional and support staff positions created; however, one priority area of inquiry for the Center would be understood to be the present and growing refugee problem. For the first time, South African refugee ideas and opinions would be solicited for the resolution of refugee problems through an institution staffed by them. As the number of refugees increases, the inadequacy of ad hoc solutions and the adverse consequences of the proliferation of uncoordinated scholarship assistance programs would be examples of problems which could be addressed directly within the Center by those who

are most affected. The Center could monitor refugee aid programs for South Africans, recommend new ones, and suggest ways to ensure their optimal positive impact. Refugees could also establish a "job bank" at the Center - a clearinghouse run by refugees for other refugees seeking employment. The jobs created would not represent a lost opportunity for job creation for the Center's host country and the Center could have employment benefits for the host country in secondary areas.

b) South African Studies Programs

The majority-rule states of southern Africa often have governments which suffer from serious shortages of skilled civil service manpower. A critical element of much government planning, particularly foreign and trade policy, often relates to South Africa. In order to strengthen the decisionmaking ability of the majority-rule states on issues relating to South Africa, the Mission recommends that donors consider financing the creation or expansion of Departments of South African Studies at selected universities in the southern African region. These Departments would be responsible, inter alia, for providing government ministries with policy option and background papers when requested.<sup>1/</sup> As an academic support,

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1/ Examples of subjects which South African refugee academics might examine at the request of host governments might include: the economic consequences of present trade policy with RSA, options for government on labor migration, identification of commodities which might be produced competitively with RSA products, options in foreign policy approaches to RSA, etc. Obviously, analyses would be carried out at the specific request of a government ministry and the Departments would service the Ministry's informational needs. Alternatively, existing departments (agriculture, economics, political science, etc.) could be strengthened through financing additional posts reserved for refugees who would devote a proportion of their time to serve host government needs.

the Departments could employ South Africans without creating places which could as easily be occupied by host nationals. Presumably, most nationals who are knowledgeable in these areas are either already employed in the civil service as decisionmakers or are otherwise fully occupied. The Departments would be different from the Center for South African Conflict Resolution in that the former would function primarily as a source of expertise and information on the problems of the host country which relate to the country's position relative to RSA, whereas the latter would focus upon national South African problems, take a more global perspective, and be an autonomous South African refugee institution.

Donors could initiate discussions with several possible implementing organizations, including a) the Association of African Universities, located in Accra, Ghana; b) the Overseas Liaison Committee of the American Council on Education; c) UNESCO; d) UNDP. The OAU should be kept closely informed and their views solicited and leading South African refugees and potential host governments and universities contacted for their reactions to possibly locating such a Department in their country or at their institution.

c) Management Training in the Private Sector

Many leading U.S. transnational corporations with investments in South Africa have impressive brochures prepared which describe the contributions they believe they are making to the welfare of the non-white population employed by them in RSA. Given this stated commitment to

enlightened business practices and opposition to Apartheid within the American business community, the Mission recommends that the U.S. government or perhaps an interested Foundation in partnership with selected corporations launch a program of business management training and placement for South African refugees.

The program would involve a commitment to finance scholarships for business management degrees for refugees who would, at the time of their selection and subject to satisfactory performance in their studies, be placed in a supernumerary position at a given corporation for a complementary internship. Each student would be guaranteed a position outside South Africa, but with the firm where he had completed his internship, and the firm would further guarantee that the individual's duties--consistent with the level of his abilities--would be linked to the company's activities in South Africa. In this way, talented South African refugees could gain corporate experience in the headquarters and non-RSA branches of transnationals and would represent a valuable manpower resource for a future majority-rule South Africa. Corporations, on the other hand, would be developing some of the skilled African personnel who will be needed in South Africa in the future from among the growing pool of youth who have fled the country.

A pilot scheme involving fifty scholarships for two-year programs would cost approximately \$1.5 million (calculated at \$15,000 per year for two years for 50 students).

There are over three hundred transnational corporations with investments in RSA, so this program would initially involve the placement of only one graduate for every six companies after two years. Project implementation could be entrusted to a PVO.

d) Administrative Training for Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development

Given the likelihood that the presence of refugees will continue to be an element of southern African affairs, the ES category refugee would appear to be a suitable candidate for training in the administration of refugee programs. The refugee resettlement camp director, the relief supply logistics personnel, refugee counselors and various support personnel are frequently European nationals or employees of UNHCR or PVOs involved in project implementation.

The Mission recommends that donors begin discussions with UNHCR and other relevant groups to develop a training program for refugees which deals with the organization, planning, and implementation of emergency relief and follow-up development programming for refugees. Some could then be employed by international organizations, particularly at field level where their language skills will be of great benefit. Others might be qualified to serve as part of the staff of the projects thereby formulated. Such jobs also have the advantage that they continue to exist so long as there is a refugee problem.

2. Employment Which Aids Other Third World Countries Without Cost to Host or Asylum States

a) The United Nations Volunteers (UNV) Program

The UNV accepts candidates of any nationality as volunteers. They serve as technical assistance personnel throughout the world in a manner quite similar to the Peace Corps and other bilateral volunteer programs. They frequently compose part of a U.N. project team, but also work in other capacities as requested by host governments.

In 1978 the UNV is able to finance one volunteer for one year at a cost of US\$12,000. The Mission recommends that the U.S. consider providing approximately \$2.5 million to UNV to permit the recruitment and placement of one hundred refugee university graduates for two years each in positions throughout the Third World where their talents can be used. The Mission also recommends that adequate funds be included in the UNV project to employ a full-time career counselor at UNV headquarters who will work with the UNVs to identify other employment opportunities which will be required upon completion of their assignments. The project can be reviewed after twelve months of implementation and possibly extended to a subsequent intake of refugee volunteers if this approach is successful. There are strong indications that a UNV program of this nature would be a success, since some refugees have already served as UNVs<sup>1/</sup> and the Mission's discussions

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<sup>1/</sup> For example, one Zimbabwean graduate served as a UNV teacher in Maun, Botswana; another was a program assistant to the World Food Program in Zambia; a third taught in Indonesia; and a fourth worked on a U.N. project in South Yemen. These graduates of the University of Zambia were informally recruited through the UNDP Lusaka Office (which represents UNV in the field in many countries) during 1975-76.

with UNV officials in Geneva were very positive. The Acting Coordinator of UNV, Mr. N. Desai, indicated his willingness to prepare a draft project document along these lines in the event there is interest in this recommendation.

The refugee UNVs who have already served were at a disadvantage when they applied under the regular program because the cost of a UNV is deducted from a developing country's IPF,<sup>1/</sup> whereas personnel from some other similar programs such as Peace Corps and the UN's Junior Professional Officer Program, are free to the host government. If more refugees were accepted into UNV's regular program, it would also reduce the number of volunteers who could be accepted from other parts of the world. Therefore, a special program for refugee volunteer service will avoid possible displacement of other applicants, be attractive to host countries since they do not represent a charge to the IPF, and be an identifiable program directed both at solving the ES unemployment problem and the technical assistance needs of Third World countries.

b) Peace Corps Refugee Program

At present only U.S. citizens are permitted to serve as volunteers. The Mission recommends that Peace Corps examine the possibility of modifying this regulation

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<sup>1/</sup> An IPF (Indicative Planning Figure) is the total sum of resources allocated by UNDP for a given country's five-year Country Program of technical cooperation. Any expenditure of this sum for an item which could be obtained elsewhere under more open-ended financing arrangements, therefore, represents a net loss to the country's total flow of development resources for that period.

to permit refugees who are permanent residents of the U.S., or who are students in the U.S. and financed under a scholarship program for refugees, to serve as PCVs. This would permit them to contribute to Third World development, would represent a form of employment, would ease the brain drain problem, and would be an enriching experience for American PCVs to train and serve alongside refugees who have lived in and are familiar with the United States.

3. Facilitate Permanent Residence or  
Citizenship Status in Other African Countries

This option essentially overcomes the refugee's training and employment handicap by removing him from the restrictive category. For example, a refugee who obtained Zambian citizenship would then presumably not fall under the 5% refugee quota for admission to most vocational training institutes, and one who obtained Swaziland citizenship would then have equal access to the job market. Although refugees do benefit from special international programs not open to citizens of asylum states, this is in lieu of normal social services which would have been provided by the country of nationality under different circumstances. Despite occasional resentment from host nationals of "favored treatment" of refugees by international organizations, the plight of the typical refugee is worse in nearly every respect when compared to the opportunities of a citizen with a similar background living in the average majority-rule state.

The question of citizenship is a politically sensitive one. Some African states have restrictive

and lengthy procedures, requirements are sometimes inconsistent, and there have been well publicized cases of bribery of public officials in some southern African states in exchange for a passport and citizenship papers, which would allow the alien to engage in business. This is a proper subject for African states to examine themselves either internally or through the OAU. Moreover, there is a strong sense among some South African exiles that while changing one's status may represent a personal solution to a long-term problem of insecurity and rootlessness, it also represents an admission of the permanency of one's exile and, by implication, of the conditions in South Africa which prompted the individual to flee in the first place.

Despite such competing interests, on humanitarian grounds states may wish to review their policies in this area to ensure they reflect the considered judgment of governments on this subject.

4. Facilitate Immigration to the U.S. and Other Traditional Immigrant-Receiving Areas of the World

The final alternative to be considered in the event that ES category refugees in particular grow in number is fraught with political and emotional pitfalls. Consider the range of possible reactions, charges and counter-charges to this suggestion:

- (1) If the U.S. decides to admit more black RSA refugees
  - a) The U.S. is covertly supporting the white minority by reducing the political pressure created by the presence of large numbers of refugees on South Africa's borders.
  - b) The U.S. is trying to deny national liberation movements their natural constituency by co-opting refugees into an affluent American society and thereby protecting private U.S. corporate investments in RSA.

- c) The U.S. accepts disproportionate numbers of educated refugees and is contributing to the brain drain.
  - d) Bringing South African refugees to the U.S. will worsen unemployment rates among black Americans who will too often be in competition for the same jobs.
  - e) For one of the first times, black people are seeking refuge in the U.S. voluntarily as a result of conditions in their own country, which are unlikely to be resolved quickly. After so many people from Africa were brought here unwillingly as slaves, it would be both tragic and ironic to oppose their resettlement in the U.S. in an hour of need.
  - f) The U.S. is acting in a manner wholly consistent with the principle of nondiscrimination in refugee admissions and is demonstrating humanitarian concern for the victims of Apartheid by treating them as individuals and respecting the right of each person to decide whether he, and where applicable his family, wishes to remain in a first asylum country, join an NLM, or emigrate and resettle. For those who qualify for admission to the U.S., this represents the same option that was provided to refugees in Austria (from Hungary or the U.S.S.R.), in Thailand (from Vietnam), or in numerous other conflicts.
- (2) If the U.S. decides to minimize the admission of black RSA refugees
- a) The U.S. maintains a double standard and will not exercise the immigration option because of racist sentiment against increasing the black population of the U.S.
  - b) The historic period in which large numbers of refugees from whatever source could find a haven in the New World is over. The U.S. is an established industrial society that now and in the future must limit its refugee intake to ensure the welfare of its own citizens first. The U.S. already has a major illegal alien problem, and African refugees would only represent a legalized version of the same social difficulties.

- c) The entry of large numbers of refugees from African cultures would result in severe adjustment problems for them and clashes of values and behavior in the communities in which they were settled. The identification of resettlement areas would pose insurmountable difficulties, since placing them in predominantly black areas will place further burdens on the poorer segment of American society and appear to be a U.S. version of economic Apartheid, while placing them in integrated situations could result in embarrassing racial clashes.

The troubling aspect of this fourth option is that there may be some truth in nearly all of the above positions.<sup>1/</sup>The contradictory and sometimes inflammatory points could be hypothetical quotes, and it is left to the reader to ascribe them variously to leftist activists, African leaders, South African NLM spokesmen, black American organizations, liberal Democrats, conservative Republicans, official spokesmen for the Department of State, academics, and so forth. The degree to which any or all of these arguments gain ascendancy in various U.S. circles depends upon the number of refugees proposed for admission, their level of education, the general state of the U.S. economy at the time, the character of U.S. foreign policy toward overall southern African problems, the state of race relations within the U.S., and the nature of the conflict from which refugees are perceived to be fleeing by most Americans. It is beyond

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1/ The range of probable U.S. public opinion in the event of numerous African refugee applicants for asylum in the U.S. is focused on here to emphasize the kind of acrimonious debate which should be avoided if at all possible. Some of the recommendations in this report are meant to lessen the chance for such problems to evolve, however, as stated in the Preface, all assistance to refugees is fundamentally temporary relief for symptoms of the problems which generate them.

the scope of this analysis, and probably futile as well, to speculate on the likely interplay of these variables over time. However, there are relevant data on past refugee admissions which should be considered by policy makers as a guide to decisionmaking in this instance.

The table below reveals the number of refugees admitted to the U.S. by country<sup>1</sup> or region over the past thirty years. Out of a total of 1,113,434 refugees, only 8,814, or 8/10ths of one percent, were from Africa. Of this number, a substantial proportion were from North Africa and some were Ugandan Asians.

If, looking at the larger context, overall immigration figures maintained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service are examined, the following information is obtained:<sup>1/</sup>

- From 1820-1976 total voluntary, i.e., excluding slaves, immigration is reported as 47,601,208, of whom 112,111 were from "Africa." This includes North Africa and Egypt and represents 0.235% of total immigration.
- If only those figures for the decade 1966-1975 are examined, total immigration stood at 3,807,646, of whom 34,069 came from Africa excluding Egypt, which is less than one percent of the total.
- In 1976 immigration totaled 398,613, of whom 5,723 were from Africa including Egypt (1.44%), or about 0.9% excluding Egypt.
- Resident aliens reporting to INS under the Alien Registration System totaled 4,714,005 in 1975. Of this, 27,091, or about 0.57%, were from Sub-Saharan Africa.

Neither the total population of Africa nor Africa's past or present refugee population<sup>2/</sup> is less than one percent of world totals. The World Bank Atlas (1976) estimates world population in 1974 at 3.891 billion, of which Africa represents

<sup>1/</sup> Extracted from U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service Tables 13, 14, 34, and 6E.

<sup>2/</sup> See Annex IV.

TABLE AC.  
REFUGEES ADMITTED BY COUNTRY OR REGION OF BIRTH  
YEARS ENDED JUNE 30, 1966-1976  
TRANSITION QUARTER - JULY-SEPTEMBER 1976

COUNTRY OR REGION OF BIRTH	NUMBER ADMITTED	PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE OF DEC. 22, 1965	DISPLACED PERSONS ACT OF 1960			REFUGEE RELIEF ACT OF 1953 1/	ACT OF JULY 29, 1953 (ORPHANS)	ACT OF SEPT. 21, 1957 (SECS. 4 & 15)	ACT OF JULY 29, 1950 (HUNGARIAN PAROLEES)	ACT OF SEPT. 7, 1950 (AZORES & NETHERLANDS REFUGEES)	ACT OF SEPT. 22, 1959 (SEC. 6) (REFUGEE RELATIVES)	ACT OF JULY 14, 1960 (REFUGEE-ESCAPEES)	ACT OF OCT. 9, 1965 (CONDITIONAL ENTRIES BY REFUGEES) 2/	ACT OF NOV. 2, 1966 (CUBAN REFUGEES)
			DISPLACED PERSONS ADMITTED	DISPLACED PERSONS ADJUSTING UNDER SEC. 4	GERMAN ETHNICS									
ALL COUNTRIES ...	2,113,434	40,326	352,260	3,470	53,766	189,021	466	29,467	30,751	27,213	1,020	19,794	96,513	273,616
EUROPE	764,911	39,802	349,751	1,794	53,609	171,689	140	10,833	30,712	9,896	1,376	15,075	66,510	6,735
AUSTRIA .....	16,467	2,015	6,425	2	2,529	4,658	75	102	107	2	76	96	230	10
BELGIUM .....	1,687	147	467	1	3	451	0	8	2	1	0	22	148	3
BULGARIA .....	1,457	22	567	10	12	470	0	197	5	0	0	513	2,148	3
CZECHOSLOVAKIA .....	27,195	1,386	9,527	277	2,839	2,916	0	53	180	0	0	82	7,937	3
DENMARK .....	114	11	55	0	0	29	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
ESTONIA .....	11,262	145	9,941	221	263	657	0	18	0	0	0	12	2	1
FINLAND .....	143	12	93	1	1	60	0	36	0	0	0	1	0	0
FRANCE .....	2,361	157	791	0	0	140	0	190	10	5	5	212	296	30
GERMANY .....	100,260	16,071	92,049	5	10,069	20,922	54	598	29	5	0	256	175	27
GREECE .....	29,498	7	10,277	3	2	16,922	0	1,508	12	7	397	80	248	20
HUNGARY .....	69,081	885	12,824	297	3,504	9,659	0	9,172	29,905	5	1	1,603	5,212	17
IRELAND .....	61	7	31	2	0	18	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
ITALY .....	62,792	154	2,237	12	19	57,026	4	1,885	2	2	941	168	654	76
LATVIA .....	38,260	518	35,158	211	645	1,547	0	95	0	0	0	21	6	0
LITHUANIA .....	27,369	740	23,702	18	1,478	1,681	0	0	0	0	0	27	0	0
NETHERLANDS .....	17,608	116	51	0	5	11,337	0	1,031	0	5,033	1	2	27	17
NORWAY .....	74	5	25	0	0	20	0	3	0	0	0	3	5	0
POLAND .....	165,966	11,660	128,569	341	6,392	11,912	0	1,139	14	2	2	775	4,707	655
PORTUGAL .....	5,036	8	14	1	1	36	0	125	0	4,811	4	1	13	18
ROMANIA .....	26,629	535	5,129	135	5,351	4,349	0	482	274	0	0	4,638	5,859	42
SPAIN .....	8,400	0	0	0	0	123	0	79	0	0	0	21	2,446	5,690
SWEDEN .....	448	10	347	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SWITZERLAND .....	121	66	131	1	3	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	7
U.S.S.R. .....	55,952	1,992	31,371	51	4,323	5,827	0	186	0	0	0	6	0	1
UNITED KINGDOM .....	2,825	183	1,814	4	7	679	0	25	2	0	0	230	11,862	101
YUGOSLAVIA .....	84,022	716	17,238	193	15,936	17,425	0	3,002	154	1	1	6,443	22,895	10
OTHER EUROPE .....	6,845	154	904	6	270	2,184	2	415	4	7	1	762	7,007	136
ASIA	72,476	416	2,157	1,888	11	16,133	324	10,869	4	12,262	431	794	26,180	937
CHINA & TAIWAN .....	26,653	284	900	1,729	2	4,901	3	2,820	0	14	115	14	13,275	485
INDIA .....	128	4	7	1	1	0	0	2	0	7	0	3	10	6
INDONESIA .....	15,744	0	2	0	4	1,168	0	612	0	12,133	1	0	43	1
ISRAEL .....	850	0	16	0	0	521	0	210	0	0	0	0	0	0
JAPAN .....	4,169	1	9	2	2	2,268	287	1,495	1	0	2	2	82	0
KOREA .....	4,640	0	0	0	0	610	4	3,793	0	269	1	1	13	7
PALESTINE .....	1,089	0	0	0	0	607	0	170	0	0	0	0	0	4
PHILIPPINES .....	187	1	77	46	0	121	15	167	0	4	2	90	93	8
OTHER ASIA .....	18,678	87	1,118	59	2	2,089	13	1,551	3	100	13	724	12,952	294
NORTH AMERICA	266,437	50	228	3	57	486	0	191	35	22	11	2	106	265,266
CANADA .....	124	3	17	0	0	15	0	7	1	0	0	0	0	60
MEXICO .....	229	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WEST INDIES .....	784,991	5	1	1	1	50	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	210
CUBA .....	264,688	0	0	0	0	0	0	164	0	18	4	1	90	264,647
OTHER WEST INDIES .....	503	5	1	1	1	50	0	164	0	0	0	0	90	264,589
CENTRAL AMERICA .....	711	4	3	1	1	7	0	3	0	18	4	1	2	258
OTHER NORTH AMERICA .....	882	18	204	1	47	409	0	16	16	4	2	1	5	190
SOUTH AMERICA	590	24	15	0	4	41	0	22	0	9	2	1	0	121
AFRICA	8,814	15	78	25	4	405	1	1,492	0	1	0	1,091	1,876	20
OTHER COUNTRIES .....	706	17	31	0	1	65	1	55	0	23	0	1	10	2

1/ INCLUDES 6,130 HUNGARIAN REFUGEES.

2/ INCLUDES 81,642 ALIENS WHO CONDITIONALLY ENTERED THE UNITED STATES AND 12,871 REFUGEES WHOSE STATUS WAS ADJUSTED TO PERMANENT RESIDENTS AFTER 2 YEARS' CONTINUOUS PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES. THE 83,642 CONDITIONAL ENTRANTS INCLUDE THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN ACCORDED LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS.

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403 million, or 10.4%. The UNHCR expended a total of \$119,528,000 in 1977 worldwide, and the share for African refugees was \$37,647,000, or 31.5%. The projected figures for 1978 show an increased share for African refugees, totaling 48.6%. Similar percentages for other refugee assistance organizations reinforce the picture of a large and growing African refugee problem concentrated in the south.<sup>1/</sup> These percentages reflect the disproportionate ratio between the number of African refugees admitted into the U.S. and the scale of the problem.

It is interesting to compare the above statistics with those from the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM).<sup>2/</sup> The following paragraphs speak for themselves:

"Since its inception in 1952 to the end of 1977, ICEM has moved over 1,200,000 refugees to countries of permanent resettlement. The United States with 33.3% of the total was the main immigration country." (p. 7)

"During the year under review (1977), over 26,000 refugees from Europe were resettled in new homelands. The United States of America continued its generous policy of admission and was the main receiving country, accepting over 50 percent of these refugees (13,000), followed by Israel (over 9,500), and Canada (almost 2,000). Of the total movements from first asylum countries, 22,500 had arrived from Eastern Europe: 18,200 coming from Russia and 4,300 from other Eastern European countries.

18,000 were Soviet Jews within the group from Russia arriving in Austria and Italy. 8,246 subsequently departed to Israel, while the remaining opted and were processed for resettlement in other countries, mainly the United States, Canada and Australia." (p. 23)

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<sup>1/</sup> See footnote on p. 42 for ICRC figures showing 60% of total Red Cross aid for Africa going to southern Africa.

<sup>2/</sup> ICEM, "Review of Achievements, 1977" (Geneva: ICEM, 1978), 47 pp.

"As a generous gesture of solidarity, the United States Congress approved in late 1977 a new immigration programme for Indochinese refugees, foreseeing a total of 15,000 admittances, 7,000 of which were reserved for the 'boat cases.'" (p. 23) 1/

The conclusions in Part II, which anticipate a quadrupling in the number of southern African refugees over the next decade and predict that they will be more urbanized and better educated, have a direct bearing on the relevance of the immigration option over the next generation, since the background of the typical South African refugee is unlikely to be much different from his Cuban or Vietnamese or Soviet counterpart. South Africans will also have the added advantage of speaking English.

Current and impending refugee problems in southern Africa might be viewed with the above thoughts and contrasts in mind. The deep concern of many black Americans (10% of the U.S. population) and of many informed white Americans as well for the welfare of Apartheid's victims should be of central importance to policy makers. The "generous policy of admission" referred to above for Soviet Jews who have ethnic ties to the 3% of Americans who are Jewish might set an example for the more generous policy which may be needed in the future for southern Africa.

More specifically, the Mission recommends that the U.S. adopt a policy of higher refugee immigration as one tool in the arsenal of initiatives which should be

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1/ In late November, 1978 the U.S., to its great credit, agreed to accept more "boat cases" and to facilitate the reunification of Cuban prisoners with their families in the U.S. (See Washington Post, Nov. 24, 1978)

outlined as contingency plans for the U.S. to cope with the probable displacement and consequent training and employment needs of the many ES category refugees in particular who may not be able to be absorbed in the programs recommended under points 1-3 above. The immigration option should, also be discussed with other countries, such as Canada, Australia and the U.K., and either ICEM or an African organization considered to draw up contingency logistics and tentative budgets.<sup>1/</sup>

C. Less Educated Return/Stay (LER/LES)

Numerically, the largest proportion of southern African refugees in the recent past and at present are included in these categories. Most Angolan refugees from the independence, civil, and post-independence internal wars are non-literate and have rural backgrounds. In Mozambique, large numbers of Zimbabwean refugees are rural people fleeing zones of conflict, although a greater proportion probably have some schooling and are more politically motivated than in the Angolan case.

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1/ The Johannesburg Star of September 2, 1978 reported that Australian Immigration Minister Mr. Michael Mackellar stated that his country was prepared to accept black Southern Rhodesian refugees as immigrants. Mr. Mackellar stated that there had been increased interest from people in southern Africa wanting to immigrate to Australia and, as a consequence, Australia has strengthened its immigration teams in the region. He stated, "people who fall within the normal migration criteria can come to Australia with the exception of those from Rhodesia... who can be considered to have furthered or encouraged the illegal regime." A report in the Johannesburg Star of September 16, 1978 quoted the New Zealand Minister of Immigration and Health Mr. Frank Gill saying that his country was prepared to accept 15,000 white Rhodesians a year if the U.N. designated them refugees. Mr. Gill stated that his government "had not considered settling black refugees," and added, "We would expect the UN would endeavour to rehabilitate the blacks in countries that offer similar cultural background."

It is difficult to classify the LE groups as S or R; however, a recent Zambian government survey of Angolan refugee sentiment at Meheba revealed that nearly 90% wished to remain in Zambia. Similarly, interviews by the Mission in Gaborone with several Angolan refugees normally resident in Maun, Botswana showed a strong antipathy to any return to Angola. The former group may prefer Zambia because the majority have been settled at Meheba for several years, there are primary schools and clinics provided through UNHCR and others, and the storehouse full of rations for new arrivals acts as a form of group insurance unknown in the Angolan bush, from where most Meheba residents fled. The smaller Angolan group in Botswana contains more educated and politically conscious individuals (mostly FNLA supporters who give political reasons for their exile), but many fall in the LES category.

The Zimbabwean refugees are more likely to be categorized as LER because a) they have been in exile for a shorter period, b) they are living in asylum countries which will be less able to provide them and their children with social services and rural opportunities than would an independent Zimbabwe, and c) they are geographically closer to the independence struggle than were the many Angolans at Meheba.

In general, this report can only support the sensible and pragmatic approaches to LE refugee assistance taken by UNHCR and others. Refugees are provided with initial relief and basic social services are developed (primary schools, clinics, agricultural extension advice, water wells, small maize grinding machines and employment schemes within the settlements in carpentry, handicraft development, vegetable growing, etc.). Settlements are sometimes fit into zonal development schemes which benefit the indigenous population as well. Those refugees who wish to be repatriated are assisted to do so, while those who are unwilling to return are, in principle, protected from forcible repatriation.

Within a multilateral framework, there are several initiatives which the Mission would like to recommend for donor consideration, and these are presented below:

a) Botswana Refugee Vocational Training Scheme

The UNHCR is exploring the possibility of developing a training center for refugees at Selebi-Pikwe, Botswana which would focus on skills providing self-employment and which would satisfy needs among the refugee population. Given the likelihood that most Zimbabweans will be able to return to their country of nationality in the next few years, a project of this nature would not compete with similar efforts on behalf of the Botswana. The artificial racially-determined limitations on skill training in Southern Rhodesia, combined with the relative sophistication of the economy, means that much more training could be provided before close coordination with the potential job market would become necessary.

The rapid increase in the number of refugees in Botswana and the likelihood of further large influxes argues for a large-scale program. The refugee settlement at Selebi-Pikwe has reached capacity and a new settlement at Dukwe, planned for 20,000, had 2,500 residents as of June 1978. The Mission recommends financing a program which would initially be targeted to provide skills training to as many as 1,000 persons annually. Although different courses require different lengths of time and different types and quantities of equipment and a budget could not be suggested until a detailed proposal has been worked out, it would be helpful for project planners to know of likely sources of support and the likely scale of assistance. An initial commitment of \$1.5 million over two years would provide ten instructors, equipment, and supplies, and simple facilities constructed from local materials.

b) Assistance to Zimbabwean Refugees  
in Mozambique

The most recent U.N. Report<sup>1/</sup> on this subject estimates that there were about 71,000 refugees in Mozambique as of June 1978. The number is expected to grow to about 90,000 by the end of 1978. About 51,000 were living in the four refugee settlements of Doroi, Tronga, Mavudzi and Memo while an additional 20,000 were in transit camps (two in Tete, two in Manica and one in

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1/ Report of the Secretary-General to the Economic and Social Council, "Assistance to Mozambique," (A/33/173), 12 July 1978.

Gaza Province). Of those who had arrived at the settlements, about 30% were children of school age and about 10% were infants. (see Annex IV)

The largest refugee settlement at Dóroi, with about 27,000 refugees in June 1978, was suffering from a serious food shortage and there was difficulty in buying food locally. The settlement had planted 600 hectares and there were plans to clear an additional 500 hectares, however, the rate of arrivals of refugees and the time it takes to plant and harvest means that rations are an essential life support in all the settlements. The Doroi settlement requires:

- 1) Additional food supplies and technical assistance with agricultural projects;
- 2) An all-weather warehouse to store food stocks at the settlement;
- 3) Additional clothing, blankets and shoes;
- 4) More classrooms, equipment and supplies are needed for the development of schools;
- 5) Technical assistance to improve the health situation.

The Tronga settlement, with about 15,000 refugees, is cultivating an estimated 350 hectares. Plans exist to clear another 520 hectares for food production, however, a "serious shortage of food" is reported by the U.N. The settlement is reported to be in need of:

- 1) Additional food to ensure continuous rations for settled refugees and new arrivals;

- 2) Equipment and technical assistance to help in land clearing and the implementation of agricultural projects;
- 3) Additional clothes, blankets and shoes;
- 4) More classrooms, school equipment and supplies;
- 5) Transport for food, equipment and refugees.

In Mavudzi (8,000 refugees) about 200 hectares are under cultivation and another 500 are planned. Conditions appear to be worse at Mavudzi than at Doroi or Tronga since the settlement has had to contend with the effects of floods as well as the continuous arrival of new refugees. The health situation was reported as generally satisfactory under the circumstances but more staff is apparently required. Mavudzi had no classrooms, storehouse, clinic or recreational facilities as of June 1978 and transport was a serious constraint.

The settlement at Memo is the most recent to be established and consequently has the fewest facilities. It has also been affected by floods. The people in transit camps are waiting to be transferred to the four settlements described above. They remain in the transit camps for from two weeks to three month depending upon transport. . Obviously, the temporary camps are likely to be even less well provided for than the settlements. Food aid, logistical assistance and transport are required for the camps.

The Government of Mozambique, itself affected by the border closure with Southern Rhodesia, hostile incursions into its territory from Rhodesia and economic difficulties associated with its recent colonial past, is not able to meet all refugee needs on its own. A total of \$9.2 million was provided by the international community during 1978 through the UNHCR and other agencies (see Annex II, iv). Mozambique provides assistance to the limit of its ability through the relevant Ministries for land clearing and transport associated with efforts to make refugee settlements more self-reliant in food. To strengthen their capacity in this regard, Mozambique required (as of June 1978):

- 1) Three track vehicles;
- 2) Ten tractors and miscellaneous agricultural implements estimated by the U.N. to cost \$825,000;
- 3) Twelve four wheel drive vehicles with required spare parts for an estimated cost of \$700,000.

The Mozambique government also reported that it would welcome a donor to provide a mobile dental clinic and mobile x-ray unit with required staff to circulate among the settlements and transit camps. Technical assistance in such fields as education, health, nutrition and agronomy could also strengthen Mozambique's ability to cope with the refugee influx.

The additional assistance needed for the settlements and transit camps was summarized as follows for the "remainder of 1978." Obviously, it can be assumed that these needs will continue and grow in 1979 as the conflict escalates and more refugees have to be cared for in some manner.

	<u>Assistance for four refugee settlements</u>	<u>Assistance for five transit camps</u>
Food supplements and cooking equipment	\$ 50,000	\$ 200,000
Basic foods	850,000	350,000
Transport and communications	250,000	165,000
Health	160,000	25,000
Soap	192,000	55,000
Seeds, animals and agricultural equipment and supplies	340,000	350,000
Water supplies	25,000	30,000
Education and recreation	645,000	25,000
Clothing	150,000	400,000
Construction of buildings and roads	400,000	150,000
Subtotal	<u>\$3,062,000</u>	<u>\$1,750,000</u>
	<u>Total</u>	<u>\$4,812,000</u>

The U.N. Report stated that over 1,000 refugees arrived per month in Mozambique during 1977 and that the number was greater for 1978. Twenty thousand more were anticipated between July and December, 1978. Without a cessation of hostilities, a conservative estimate indicates a probable total of around 130 - 150,000 by the end of 1979.

The U.N. Report was prepared prior to the attack on an Air Rhodesia flight, the declaration of martial law in over two-thirds of Southern Rhodesia, the invasion of Zambia by Southern Rhodesian forces, additional attacks on Mozambique and the statement by the influential Nigerian Head of State on November 26, 1978 that the Anglo-American proposals for peaceful transition "were dead." An escalation of the conflict will probably generate additional thousands of refugees.

The Congressional prohibition on assistance to Mozambique was nearly modified during the last session of Congress

to permit a Presidential waiver of the ban if the President should determine it to be in the interest of the United States. In addition to supplying PL 480 food assistance (which was exempted from the Congressional ban), the U.S. could have expanded its refugee aid inter alia to meet some of the basic needs enumerated above and to strengthen the capacity of the Mozambique government to assist refugees in land clearing and related tasks. The Presidential prerogative to suspend the Congressional ban, if exercised, would have permitted the U.S. to provide assistance to all refugees in the region on an equal basis rather than to continue favored treatment for refugees located primarily in Botswana and Zambia.

Obviously, the current Congressional position adversely affects the ability of the U.S. to render optimal assistance to those in need and hampers regional coordination by excluding direct aid to a key nation which is in great need. Removing the Congressional prohibition should be among the highest priorities of the U.S. in its evolution of refugee assistance policy.

In the meantime, the UNHCR, the World Food Programme, ICRC, UNICEF and other multilateral organizations and PVQs are willing to augment their programs and hasten the delivery of assistance and implementation of projects now in the planning stage in the event of major supplementary contributions from the United States. From a humanitarian perspective, and in view of the interest in maintaining good will in the

region toward the U.S., it cannot be too strongly recommended that the U.S. provide major assistance to refugee relief in Mozambique both (1) through aid to the refugee settlements through suitable international organizations and PVOs and (2) through the Government of Mozambique on whom the longer term burden inevitably falls once this becomes permissible.

The most critical and immediate problem confronting refugees in Mozambique is their vulnerability to attack by Southern Rhodesian forces.<sup>1/</sup> The Mission urgently recommends that the U.S., together with the U.N. and the affected states in the region, examine the feasibility of physically removing bona fide refugees from the border areas and re-establishing them in new settlements in other parts of Mozambique at locations to be identified by the Mozambique government.

The U.S. was able to provide logistical support to French and Moroccan forces early in 1978 in Shaba Province of Zaire to remove refugees from the conflict zone around Kolwezi. During the Nigerian Civil War, thousands of refugee children were airlifted out of danger to nearby Ivory Coast and Gabon. For several months in 1977-78 charter flights brought refugees from Botswana to Zambia which was believed to be a safer haven with greater facilities to cater for

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1/ For details concerning the considerable loss of life and property in the refugee settlements and transit camps attacked by Southern Rhodesian troops, see Security Council documents S/12466, S/12471, S/12413, and A/32/268.

refugee needs. A similar airlift of refugees in areas of Mozambique (and for that matter in Botswana and Zambia as well) threatened by attack could be organized by international relief agencies with the agreement of the asylum countries and National Liberation Movements, could save lives and would represent a major American humanitarian commitment in the region.

Another option which should be examined would be to propose the establishment of a U.N. Peace-Keeping Force whose duty would be to protect refugee settlements from attack. Alternatively the OAU may wish to consider a Pan-African Force to guard refugee settlements. Used defensively around relocated settlements, such a force could provide a major deterrent to further mass killings of refugees by the Southern Rhodesian forces.

In addition to the immediate needs of security, food and shelter, more medium term programs involving vocational and agrarian training could prove invaluable to the refugees and to Zimbabwe once they are able to return home. Assuming that a land redistribution scheme will be a priority for an independent Zimbabwe, it is likely that agricultural training in Mozambique will have direct application in the lives of those so trained. This would be consistent with the emphasis on comprehensive assistance discussed above: relief, rehabilitation and resettlement or return. It would represent a longer term commitment to contribute to the welfare and development of the refugee population. As a consequence, it would have a longer term payoff in strengthened local capabilities for the future.

c) Assistance to Refugees in Zambia

A recent U.N. Report<sup>1/</sup> has provided the following table which identifies supplementary relief assistance required for refugees in Zambia during July-December 1978:

Additional assistance for refugees, 1978

<u>Project</u>	<u>Estimated cost</u>
	(Dollars)
Multipurpose assistance - all refugees (July 1978-30 June 1979)	80,000
Farmland/settlement for Zimbabwean refugees	150,000
School for Zimbabwean refugees	210,000
Farmland for Namibian refugees	150,000
Clothing, blankets and shoes for Zimbabwean refugees (5,000 women and 18,000 children)	1,000,000
Supplementary assistance - South African refugees	33,000
<u>Total</u>	<u>1,623,000</u>

The identifiable costs to Zambia of providing assistance to refugees in 1977 amounted to \$3 million, whereas the total provided through international assistance approximated \$1.7 million. For 1978, assistance pledged or provided totaled \$1.5 million as of June.<sup>2/</sup> Given the accelerating pace of the refugee influx, the total donor

<sup>1/</sup> Report of the Secretary-General to the Economic and Social Council, "Assistance to Zambia," (E/1978/114), 5 July 1978.

<sup>2/</sup> U.N. Report E/1978/114 (5 July 1978), p. 36.

contribution is likely again to fall short of expenditures by the GRZ. The need for refugee assistance will probably extend some years beyond any settlement of the dispute in Zimbabwe, since repatriation takes both time and money. Medium-term projects (1-3 years) which focus on vocational skills, basic literacy, agricultural training, etc. would, therefore, appear to be a logical means of meeting some refugee needs. Discussions would be held with the major multilateral donors to develop a comprehensive training program in areas that are secure from attack by Southern Rhodesian forces. The Meheba settlement in Zambia is far from the conflict and offers a location at which vastly expanded training opportunities could be provided.

d) Assistance Particularly to Namibian Refugees in Zambia

One of the most damaging effects of Apartheid in Namibia has been the exceptionally low educational attainment of the indigenous population. Despite ample funds for Namibians, those who are recipients of university scholarships under programs listed in Annex V represent only 5% of the total because so few have obtained the entrance qualifications. Since the educational level for Namibians and to a considerable extent for South Africans is so much worse than for Zimbabwean refugees, it is recommended that a goal be set of universal primary and perhaps 50% secondary enrollment among Namibian school-age refugees. The Institute for Namibia and SWAPO, working with the Council for Namibia, and the UNHCR would outline a program to establish a floor for Namibian refugee education--a

minimum target to be achieved within 12 months. A budget would then be drawn up and a major initiative mounted to educate the entire present generation of Namibian school children refugees. The budget would include provisions for prefabricated classrooms, teaching supplies, and equipment and teachers. If fifty percent of the Namibian refugees are of school age, there may be as many as 2,500 eligible. A corps of fifty primary school teachers would provide a rough teacher-pupil ratio of 1:125, or five classes per day of 25 pupils. The UNV Program for ES South African refugees might be able to provide teachers familiar with the culture of the region and acceptable to all interested parties. Once the transition to independence occurs, the Namibian government could then decide how and at what pace this program should be moved inside the country. In the meantime, a solid educational foundation can begin to be constructed for those Namibians able to benefit from international assistance.

## ANNEX

<u>ANNEX I</u>	<u>REPORT I</u> (Farah Report) April 1977	<u>REPORT II</u> (Farah Report) November 1977	<u>REPORT III</u> (Van Egmond Report) April 1977	<u>REPORT IV</u> (ABFE Report) July 1977	<u>REPORT V</u> (Clark Report) November 1977	<u>REPORT VI</u> (El-Tavil/Goundrey Report) July 1978
<u>COUNTRIES VISITED</u>	Botswana Lesotho Swaziland	Botswana Lesotho Swaziland	Botswana Lesotho Swaziland	Zambia Botswana Lesotho	Botswana Lesotho Swaziland Mozambique Zambia Zaire Kenya Sudan Djibouti	Botswana Lesotho Swaziland Zambia
<u>FIELD TIME</u> (Dates)	Feb. 7-22, 1977	Sept. 5-14, 1977	March 10- April 3, 1977	July 6-30, 1977	August 8 - Sept. 24, 1977	May-June, 1978
<u>REPORT FUNDING SOURCE</u>	UN	UN	AID	USDS/Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs grant to ABFE (Association of Black Foundation Executives)	AID	UN
<u>MISSION MEMBERS</u>	A.A. Farah, Ass't. Secretary General for Special Political Questions; William Conton, UNESCO; T. Gordon-Somers, UNDP; F.J. Homann-Herimbey. J.R. Williams, ECA	A.A. Farah, Gary Perkins, UNHCR; James Ilett, Inter-regional Advisor, Economic Planning, Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, UN	Alan Van Egmond, Consultant	Milfred Pierce, Executive Director, ABFE; Harriet Michel, Executive Director, New York Foundation; Ronald Gault, Program Officer, Ford Foundation; Milton Page, Executive Director, Presbyterian Economic Development Corporation	G. Edward Clark Ambassador (ret.); Jesse L. Snyder, AID General Development Officer; Karl O. Kohler, Transport Engineer	<u>BLS Countries</u> J. El-Tavil, Director, Office of the ASG for Special Political Questions; J. Ilett, Interregional Adviser, Economic Planning, Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs; S. Pearson, Senior Economic Affairs Officer, Office of the ASG for Special Political Questions.

REPORT I  
(Farah Report)  
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REPORT II  
(Farah Report)  
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REPORT III  
(Van Egmond Report)  
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REPORT IV  
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July 1977

REPORT V  
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Report)  
July 1978

RECOMMENDATIONS  
(COSTS US \$)

NOTE:  
K=thousands of \$'s  
N/E=no estimate  
N/A=not applicable

BOTSWANA

Refugees

1. Create 50 additional places for South African refugees at the University: hostels, extension to library and dining hall, classroom, lab equipment, staff houses, offices, books

50 scholarships: 203K  
P/A

2. Provide educational facilities at secondary level for 960 South African student senior secondary refugees: hostels, classroom labs, toilets, offices, dining hall, staff houses

479K

203K  
P/A

1655  
K

Findings

1. Construction begun and scheduled for completion by May 1978.

2. Sites selected and land survey completed for construction completion by January 1979.

\*FY '77  
\*\*FY '78  
\*\*\*FY '79

1. Strengthen U.S. Agencies

a. Strengthen U.S. refugee taskforce \* 50K  
b. Refugee self-help fund \* 50K  
c. Improve USIS library \* 30K

2. Bilateral Assistance

a. Botswana Council for Refugees \*\* 120K  
\* 70K  
\*\*\* 70K  
b. Botswana Extension College (for 50 refugees) \*\* 40K  
\* 30K  
\*\*\* 30K  
c. Botswana Nat'l. Vocational Education Center (for 25 refugees) \* 50K  
\*\* 55K  
\*\*\* 61K

"The Provision and maintenance of facilities for Zimbabwean and South African refugees inside Botswana and those desiring or needing to leave Botswana"

A. Refugees

1. The U.S. should contribute \$400,000 to UNHCR for current operating expenses in Botswana.

2. Support refugee counseling services for education; jobs and housing, possibly at a small reception center (ref. Farah Report I, paragraph 19).

3. Establish an "Ambassador's Refugee Contingency Fund"

B. Refugee/Developmental

4. "Provide continued support to multi-purpose secondary schools and University

Zambia

G. Goundrey, Joint Coordinator, Special Economic Assistance Programs, Office for Special Political Questions

Findings

1. Hostel nearly completed with \$447,000 HCR grant from U.S.A. donation; equipment purchased; thus additional placements possible in Sept. 1978.

Scholarships at New Education Resource Centre providing correspondence courses with Centre serving 220 refugees.

400K

N/E

N/E

ANNEX I (3)	REPORT I (Farah Report) April 1977	REPORT II (Farah Report) November 1977	REPORT III (Van Egmond Report) April 1977	REPORT IV (ABFE Report) July 1977	REPORT V (Clark Report) November 1977	REPORT VI (Havil/Goundrey Report) July 1978
<u>RECOMMENDATIONS</u> (COSTS US \$)	tuition, books, teacher costs 419K		d. University scholarships 88K (for 25 re- 96K fugees) 106K		hostel programs; increase number	
<u>BOTSWANA</u>	junior secondary 1892 costs K		e. State Dept. scholarships 150K (for 20 re- 165K fugees) 182K		of scholarships for South Africans at UBS, Botswana Agricultural Col- lege, other African universities or possibly American institutions; top- ping off faculty salaries; money for library books and lab equipment; ex- pansion of academic and vocational training courses (ref. "for cost es- timates, see Van Egmond Report").	3. Planned con- struction of 100 units low-cost housing not pos- sible due to lack of serviced land
	3. To provide a reception/transit center together with classroom and library faci- lities for up to 480 South African refugee students	3. Project shel- ved with option for low-cost housing instead	f. University material aid 35K		5. AID consider aid to Francistown Hospital for help to ill in-transit Zimbabweans.	adjacent Gaborone; GOB reconsidering reception center near Molepolole similar Botswana brigade system.
	buildings, hous- ing, site works 766K		3. <u>Multilateral Assistance</u> (U.S. Share)		6. AID consider support for a low- cost integrated housing program for refugees and locals.	N/E
	The Mission strongly sup- ports the Gov- ernment's re- quest for strengthening the existing counseling ser- vices.	Two additional social counse- lors are being recruited. In addition, a three-member team of profes- sional social welfare staff is providing technical ad- vice to the counseling service.	a. University dorm construc- tion 250K		7. AID consider provision of tools, wells, and irrigation for small re- settlement projects for rural Namibians and Angolans if Botswana proceeds with these.	N/E
	N/E		b. Secondary school con- struction 300K 700K 400K		8. AID continue its plans help fi- nance increase of 5,000 tons grain storage over next two years.	One additional Social Counsellor appointed and 2 more being re- cruited; 2 UNICEF vehicles provided
			c. Refugee ac- commodations/ Gaborone 200K		9. Annual Self-Help Fund allevia- tion should be restored.	N/E
			Need to estab- lish interminis- terial relief and rehabilita- tion commission, possibly within the Office of the President. N/E		C. <u>Developmental Refugee Related</u>	N/E
					10. In view refugee drain on Bot- swana's resources, US should con- tinue to examine ways to increase AID assistance.	N/E
					11. US consider joint aid to develop self-sufficiency in railway sector.	N/E

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November 1977REPORT III  
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November 1977REPORT VI  
(D. Divil/Counrey  
Report  
July 1978RECOMMENDATIONS  
(COSTS US \$)LESOTHORefugees

1. To accommodate 60 additional South African refugee students at the National University:

hostel accommodations, dining hall and laundry, six staff houses

437K

Sixty scholarships

223K

N/A

2. To provide facilities at the secondary and technical school levels for 730 South African refugee students, of whom 700 will be in secondary and 30 in technical schools:

28 classrooms, 9 labs, accommodation 28 staff houses

1779

K

28 additional teachers; 30 scholarships

139K

N/A

Findings

1. Construction underway with completion of first part funded by different donors of which UNDP contributed:

refugee student accommodation and maintenance at University

546

K

2. Agreement to complete construction of 7 classrooms, 2 labs, and accommodations for 200 students

300

K

3. Funds from UNHCR will strengthen the refugee counselling services operated by the Lesotho Christian Council

N/E

4. A coordinating committee of the Lesotho Christian Council, the Ministry of the Interior, with technical

1. Bilateral Assistance

a. Lesotho Christian Council \* 20K

b. University \* 70K  
Scholarships \*\* 77K  
\*\*\* 85K

c. University extension service development \*\*\* 145K

d. State Dept. \* 75K  
scholarships \*\* 83K  
(10 refugees) \*\*\* 91K

2. Multilateral Assistance

Expansion of secondary schools for additional 730 students \*\*\* 50K

N/A

A. Refugee

1. Ambassador's Refugee Contingency Fund should be established.

N/E

B. Dual Purpose

2. US consider more educational aid at primary and secondary levels for refugees and Basotho particularly through Peace Corps TEFL and Fulbright Prog.

N/E

3. Help UL establish Maseru Campus especially for extension courses and vocational training for refugees

N/E

4. Assist housing if AID analysis of Housing Investment Guaranty Program shows this required; possibly use SSA

N/E

Findings

1. Second phase underway with \$286,000 from PRG and USAID (via AAI) to provide hostel space for 200 students; funds required for 4 staff houses.

2. Second phase now commencing with \$600,000 additional from HCR for 16 classrooms, 8 labs and 9 staff houses in various schools.

3. GOL reported to mission continuing need to expand university and secondary facilities, accommodation and counselling services.

ANNEX I (5)	REPORT I (Farah Report) April 1977	REPORT II (Farah Report) November 1977	REPORT III (Von Edmond Report) April 1977	REPORT IV (ABFE Report) July 1977	REPORT V (Clar Report) November 1977	REPORT VI (2-Bivil/Goundrey Report) July 1978
<u>RECOMMENDATIONS</u>						
<u>(COSTS US \$)</u>						
<u>LESOTHO</u>		<p>support from UNDP, to meet regularly starting in June 1977.</p> <p>5. The question of Lesotho's adherence to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol was discussed. The Government assured the mission that this question was being given serious consideration. In the meantime, there would be a continued application of the principles of the Convention and Protocol.</p> <p>6. 60 scholarships through UNETPSA recommended.</p>			<p>7. Restore Self-Help Funds to US Mission</p> <p>8. AID should accelerate review of projects now on design stage especially in education and grain storage.</p> <p><u>C. Developmental/Refugee Related</u></p> <p>7. Expedite feasibility studies related to construction of Southern Perimeter Road.</p> <p>8. US continue work with other donors to assist Lesotho and lessen its dependence on South Africa.</p>	<p>N/E</p> <p>N/A</p> <p>N/A</p> <p>N/A</p>

ANNEX I (c)	REPORT I (Farah Report) April 1977	REPORT II (Farah Report) November 1977	REPORT III (Van Edmond Report) April 1977	REPORT IV (ABFE Report) July 1977	REPORT V (Clark Report) November 1977	REPORT VI (El-Tavil/Goun Report) July 1978
<u>RECOMMENDATIONS</u>  (COSTS US \$)  <u>MOZAMBIQUE</u>	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	A. <u>Refugee</u>  1. US continue or increase contribution for life support programs through UNHCR or PVO's as providing right of access to camps be given to observers to oversee supply distribution. Clark points out HCR requests \$2M & State recommends US allocation of \$400,000, but Clark makes no recommendation in dollar terms. N/E  2. US provide through UN or PVO's educational equipment for Zimbabwean teachers in camps; in future US consider scholarships. N/E  B. <u>Dual Purpose</u>  3. As possible, given direct assistance constraints, US help develop some camps into potential resettlement areas to serve local needs after refugee departure through provision equipment, fertilizer, etc. N/E  4. Title II, Food Assistance. US should plan to contribute \$10M in 1978 minimally and perhaps \$20M. 10M or 20M  5. In general, US should do more to help Mozambique developmentally while thus better serving refugees. N/E	

ANNEX I (7)	REPORT I (Farah Report) April 1977	REPORT II (Farah Report)- November 1977	REPORT III (Van Eqmond Report) April 1977	REPORT IV (ABFE Report) July 1977	REPORT V (Clark Report) November 1977	REPORT VI (El-Tawil/Goundrey Report) July 1978
<p><u>RECOMMENDATIONS</u></p> <p>(COSTS US \$)</p> <p><u>SWAZILAND</u></p>	<p><u>Refugees</u></p> <p>To establish a center for the shelter of some 100 student refugees together with school facilities.</p> <p>Phase One - classrooms, labs, offices, toilets, dorms, dining hall, and kitchen staff houses, furniture</p> <p>2.A counseling service is needed to help refugees adjust to the new situation. There may not be enough work for a full-time counselor.</p> <p>3.The current rates of allowance for care and subsistence should be reviewed taking into account increased cost of living</p>	<p><u>Findings</u></p> <p>That original idea should be split into two centers. Improvement of existing facilities for a travel center.</p> <p>Construction of a residential center for 100 students wishing to remain in Swaziland</p> <p><u>New Project</u></p> <p>To provide added facilities at the University to allow admittance of 50 more South African student refugees</p> <p>hostel, classroom, offices, staff house, equipment, books</p> <p>Mennonite Central Committee with HCR funds provides correspondence course work to 44 students.</p> <p>Trained social worker selected. Will be attached HCR office as full-time counselor.</p> <p>8 scholarships through UNETPSA recommended</p>	<p><u>1.Bilateral Assistance</u></p> <p>a.University scholarships for 20 refugees</p> <p>b.State Dept. scholarships for 10 refugees</p> <p>c.Swaziland Refugee Council</p> <p><u>2.Multilateral Assistance</u></p> <p>Construction of refugee center for 100 refugees</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p><u>A.Refugee</u></p> <p>1.US consider contributing to school/reception center recommended in April Farah Report (total cost est \$433K of which FRG pledged \$150K).</p> <p>2.US respond to WHO appeal to provide trained social/psychiatric workers to deal with refugee psychological problems.</p> <p>3.US continue support HCR programs.</p> <p><u>B.Dual Purpose</u></p> <p>4.US might assign a few Fulbright teachers to raise quality of Swazi education.</p> <p>5.State/AID consider a few scholarships at US or African schools esp. in vocational trg.</p> <p>6.If Swazis accept concept of integrated secondary school US consider contributing to construction.</p>	<p><u>Findings</u></p> <p>1. Construction underway at Mpaka for accommodations and a secondary school for 200 students;HCR has obtained \$300,000 of the needed \$736,000 however,GOS now estimates capital cost at \$1,459,433 and HCR has requested cut-back in scale of project. Mission concludes additional financing will be required to make investment useable.</p> <p>2.Mission notes that no donor has come forth to expand university as per Nov. 1977 report. GOS asked Mission to urge donors to support project and Mission reports GOS request.</p>

ANNEX 1 (B)	REPORT I (Farah Report) April 1977	REPORT II (Farah Report) November 1977	REPORT III (Von Egmond Report) April 1977	REPORT IV (ABFE Report) July 1977	REPORT V (Clark Report) November 1977	REPORT VI (El-Tavil/Goundrey Report) July 1978
<p><u>RECOMMENDATIONS</u></p> <p>(COSTS US \$)</p> <p><u>ZAMBIA</u></p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>1. "Census and survey of refugee needs".</p> <p>2. "Establishment of a revolving fund to enable Zambia to cover the up-front expenses of its refugee program."</p>	<p>A. <u>Refugee</u></p> <p>1. US continue aid through HCR plus provide more for remainder of 1977 to upgrade education facilities for Zimbabwean refugees under 16</p>	<p>N/E</p> <p>N/E</p> <p>N/E</p> <p>N/E</p> <p>N/E</p> <p>N/E</p> <p>N/E</p> <p>N/A</p> <p>N/E</p>
			<p>2. "US consider grants to PVO's such as Lutheran World Relief perhaps through UNHCR."</p> <p>3. US consider further aid to program development, especially in education to camps with SWAPO and ZAPU refugees, if access is permitted.</p> <p>4. US continue support for Namibian Institute; arrange internships in West African countries or US; US scholarships in specialized fields for Namibians/Zimbabweans useful.</p> <p>5. If camp access permitted, US might give aid in medical/maternity areas perhaps through PVO's.</p> <p>6. Establish Ambassador's Refugee Contingency Fund and restore Self-Help Funds.</p> <p>B. <u>Dual Purpose</u></p> <p>7. US strengthen existing institutions like Nkumbi College.</p> <p>C. <u>Developmental/Refugee Related</u></p> <p>8. "As for general assistance US should move very slowly in building any long-range developmental relationship."</p> <p>9. Zambia requested US help to improve Pedicle Road, (across Zaire) and, "though remotely related to refugee needs, might be viable as a toll road."</p>			

ANNEX I (9)	REPORT I (Farah Report) April 1977	REPORT II (Farah Report) November 1977	REPORT III (Van Egmond Report) April 1977	REPORT IV (ABFE Report) July 1977	REPORT V (Clark Report) November 1977	REPORT VI (El-Tavil/Goundrey Report) July 1978
<p><u>RECOMMENDATIONS</u></p> <p><u>REGIONAL</u></p>	<p>1. Necessary establish central machinery to coordinate programs, eliminate duplication. Farah recommends UNHCR take initiative this regard.</p> <p>2. Official figures do not reflect true magnitude of problem in any country since many reluctant register as refugees for fear of repercussions on families in RSA; thus needs greater than realized and international community should respond accordingly.</p> <p>3. Need to coordinate stipend rates for students aided under different programs.</p> <p>4. Consider strengthening HCR in BLS states.</p> <p>5. Farah Mission reported recommendation by PAC to create an Institute for Azania similar to that, for Namibia and stated this had been proposed to the OAU.</p>		<p>1. The capabilities of US Agencies in the BLS Countries should be strengthened (esp. Botswana)</p> <p>2. Ambassador establish refugee task-force which should receive authority disburse up to \$50K during crisis necessary emergency relief. Also discretionary authority disburse up to \$50K assist self-help effort of secondary school refugees.</p> <p>3. Improve service by USIS. Probably \$30K needed to upgrade reading resources available to refugees. Additional student activity rooms should be obtained. USIS should make available temporarily an educational counselor capable of establishing counseling programs for refugees seeking places in African and American universities.</p> <p>4. Highly recommend that an AID staff person knowledgeable in relief and rehabilitation be</p>		<p>1. AID should be prepared to backstop/supplement UN programs esp. education manpower training, health delivery systems, and supplementary rations, using PL-480 as necessary.</p> <p>2. US plus other donors begin study/improve structure for identifying and coordinating refugee educational assistance on regional basis. This should clarify AID policy re: infrastructure; also examine US student immigration policies/procedures.</p> <p>3. US consider more exchange teaching staff; salary supplementations. US scholarship support at African institutions.</p> <p>4. US consider construction special facilities to strengthen educational institutions in African countries (providing places for refugees).</p> <p>5. Continent-wide effort to develop all-Africa refugee student placement</p>	<p>3. Stipend rates coordinated among UN agencies; however, "very difficult to achieve with organization outside UN."</p> <p>4. HCR offices now open in Mbabane, Gaborone, and Maseru.</p>

ANNEX I (10)

REPORT I  
(Farah Report)  
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Report)  
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assigned full time to AID Gaborone to design and administer refugee-related projects and serve as chairperson of refugee taskforce.

5. Peace Corps should help prepare for staff needs associated with expanded educational programs for refugees, and perhaps help administer programs.

6. UNETPSA scholarships - \$100K.

mechanism with aid from BPEAR, AAI, and IIE.

6. Conference of educators to consider range of refugee education problems. Conference to include African and American educators, government officials, OAU, PVO's, etc.

7. Strengthen present assistance delivery of PVO's in relief, counseling services, urban and rural resettlement. To achieve this, consider conference voluntary agencies dealing with refugee assistance to define program/administration needs which US and other donors could consider. During conference PVO's could submit supplemental funding requests.

8. AID possibly augment administrative capacity UN agencies dealing with refugees through funding posts for Junior Professional Officers; special training perhaps organized to produce refugee management specialists.

9. Exploratory conversation might be held with Peace Corps Director to examine feasibility establishing special category of refugee support volunteers.

10. Establish Ambassador's Refugee Contingency Fund each relevant country with \$25K immediately and \$100K maximally available per country.

11. AID should utilize flexibility of SSA to fill gaps and anticipate future refugee needs. This may require broader guidelines, new legislation, or special aid to relevant institutions.

12. AID/State examine pros and cons assisting liberation movements and determine US policy and if aid given, role for AID.

13. Coordination. US should urge HCR or other umbrella improve coordination refugee assistance. US consider convening or urging HCR convene conference pursue coordination with OAU participation. Within US Government, special committee on refugees might be created for greater US/PVO coordination:

14. Recommend ensuring projects assist refugees become self-supporting rather than dependent international aid.

ANNEX II\*

I. Bilateral contributions as at 22 June 1978 in connexion with assistance programmes for South African and other student refugees as reported to UNHCR (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland)

1. BOTSWANA

<u>Donor</u>	<u>Amount in US dollars</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
Friends Service Committee (United States of America)	5 000	Care and maintenance of refugees
International Committee of the Red Cross	12 552	Care and maintenance of refugees
OXFAM (United Kingdom)	6 039	Care and maintenance of refugees
UNICEF	36 000	Procurement of two trucks and one landrover
Total (Botswana)	<u>59 591</u>	

2. LESOTHO

Germany, Federal Republic of	225 527	Completion of second phase of Africa Hall hostel at the National University of Lesotho
Senegal	57 670	Two staff quarters at National University of Lesotho
United Nations Development Programme	546 000	Refugee student accommodation and maintenance of university students at the National University of Lesotho
African-American Institute	79 000	Completion of second phase of Africa Hall hostel at the National University of Lesotho
Total (Lesotho)	<u>889 187</u>	

\*As reproduced from U.N. General Assembly document A/33/163 of 7 July 1978, Pp.16-17.

### 3. SWAZILAND

<u>Donor</u>	<u>Amount in US dollars</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
UNICEF	84 000	Fifty tents for Swaziland
UNICEF	11 000	Air freighting of 50 house tents
Total (Swaziland)	<u>95 000</u>	

### 4. SCHOLARSHIP ASSISTANCE IN VARIOUS AFRICAN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING BOTSWANA, LESOTHO AND SWAZILAND

United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa	2 300 000	Total of 1,156 new and ongoing scholarships for Namibians, South Africans and Zimbabweans
United Nations Development Programme	1 980 963	Placement and scholarship assistance channelled through liberation movements in 1977
Germany, Federal Republic of	142 200	Thirty-five university scholarships in Botswana
Misereor - Federal Republic of Germany	17 094	Scholarships for Botswana
Total	<u>4 440 257</u>	
GRAND TOTAL	<u><u>5 483 935</u></u>	

## Annex III

### I. Summary of projects being implemented in co-operation with UNHCR or proposed for UNHCR financing (up-dating as at 31 May 1978)

#### I. BOTSWANA

Value in US dollars  
(actual or projected)

1. Capital expenditure projects for refugees from South Africa	
(a) Construction of a 72-bed hostel and procurement of library books and audio-visual equipment for the University College	447 000
(b) Construction of a senior secondary school with 16 classes and a junior secondary school with 12 classes at Palapye and Moshupa, respectively	4 200 000
(c) Construction of low-cost housing in Gaborone	665 000
2. Provision for scholarships in Botswana at the university and secondary levels, and for the recurrent cost of the two secondary schools to be constructed at Palapye and Moshupa	1 353 000
3. Other assistance measures (recurrent expenditures for 1978)	
(a) Care and maintenance of South African refugees	180 000
(b) Organization of correspondence courses	50 000
(c) Counselling services	17 000
	<hr/>
	6 912 000

#### II. LESOTHO

Value in US dollars  
(actual or projected)

1. Capital expenditure projects for refugees from South Africa	
(a) Extension of laundry and catering services at the National University of Lesotho	56 632

As reproduced from U.N. General Assembly document A/33/163 of 7 July 1978, Pp.18-20.

(b) Construction of classrooms, laboratories, hostels and teachers' accommodation at existing secondary schools (\$300,000 has already been provided in 1977 and \$600,000 in 1978 against estimated total requirement at \$1.78 million)	1 780 000
(c) Construction of a transit centre and an educational centre in Maseru (provisional estimate)	110 000
2. Other assistance measures (recurrent expenditures for 1978)	
(a) Care and maintenance of South African refugees	90 000
(b) Counselling services	11 000
	<u>2 047 532</u>

### III. SWAZILAND

1. Capital expenditure project for refugees from South Africa	
Mpaka refugee centre	1 030 000
2. Other assistance measures (recurrent expenditures for 1978)	
(a) Transportation of refugee students to the United Republic of Tanzania	50 000
(b) Organization of correspondence courses (Thokoza School)	70 450
(c) Care and maintenance of South African refugees	60 000
(d) Counselling services	12 000
	<u>1 230 450</u>

### IV. EDUCATION IN OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES

	<u>Value in US dollars</u> <u>(actual or projected)</u>
Projected additional needs for 1978 for the placement in lower secondary and vocational training schools in African countries (includes costs relating to selection, transportation and scholarships of South African student refugees)	1 180 000
	<u>11 370 082</u>
GRAND TOTAL	<u>11 370 082</u>

## II. ASSISTANCE GIVEN TO REFUGEES IN ZAMBIA IN 1977

<u>Project symbol</u>	<u>Type/Purpose</u>	<u>Amount</u> (thousands of dollars)	<u>Donor</u>
77/LS/ZAM.5	Local settlement - Meheba	215.8	
77/IV/ZAM	Multipurpose assistance (all refugees)	78.0	Except for 450,450.00 German Federal Republic earmarked contribution for the ZAPU School, everything was financed from the 1977 regular contribution for UNHCR General Programme.
77/IIA/ZAM.2	Multipurpose assistance (Zimbabwean British Concessionary Passport holders only)	13.5	
77/OV/RP/ZAM	Repatriation of Angolans	0.2	
77/MA/ZAM.3	ZAPU school	500.0	
77/CL/ZAM.1	Counselling	6.8	Norway (Norwegian Special Committee)
77/ED/ZAM.2	Educational assistance, non-UNEPTSA	5.6	Norway (Norwegian Special Committee)
77/EF/ZAM.1	Airlift of donations in kind by CARITAS, West Germany value 282,051	51.0	Government of France
77/EF/ZAM.1 (balance)	Airlift, West Germany value 282,051	3.6	Financed from 1977 UNHCR Approved Fund/Allocation for Emergency Assistance
77/EF/ZAM.2	Beds and bedding (ZAPU Centre)	79.4	
77/EF/ZAM.3	Mobile clinic	30.0	
77/EF/ZAM.4	Emergency food aid to Zimbabweans	30.8	
EDAC/ZAM.1/77	Nkumbi College	200.0	Government of USA
EDAC/ZAM.2/77	Higher education assistance	34.0	Government of Norway
EDAM/ZAM.3/77	Higher education assistance for Ugandans	10.8	Government of Denmark
RF/ED/ZAM.1/77	Maintenance costs, southern Africans, pending travel	18.8	Government of USA
RF/LS/ZAM.1/77	Makeni Transit Centre	125.0	Government of USA

<u>Project Symbol</u>	<u>Type/Purpose</u>	<u>Amount</u> (thousands of dollars)	<u>Donor</u>
RF/AFR.1/77(ZAM)	Supplementary aid to South Africans	24.9	United Nations Trust Fund for South Africans
RF/AFR.1/76(ZAM)	Supplementary aid to southern Africans	14.9	U.N. Trust Fund for South Africans
RF/SA/ZAM.1/77	Supplementary aid to Southern Rhodesians (Zimbabweans)	35.0 8.6 46.2	Government of UK Government of USA Government of Netherlands
	Educational assistance to Namibian refugee students (several projects in various countries)	133.4	Various sources
	<u>Total</u>	<hr/> \$1,666.3	

III. AMOUNT OF ASSISTANCE GIVEN TO OR  
UNDER IMPLEMENTATION FOR REFUGEES IN ZAMBIA IN 1978

<u>Project symbol</u>	<u>Type/Purpose</u>	<u>Amount</u> (thousands of dollars)	<u>Donor</u>
78/EA/ZAM/ED/1	Nkumbi College	200.0	Government of the USA
78/EA/ZAM/ED/2	Higher educational assistance	11.5	Government of Norway
78/SR/ZAM/LS/2(CON)	ZAPU School	525.0	Government of the UK
78/SR/ZAM/LS/2(CON)	ZAPU School	245.0	Government of Canada
78/SR/ZAM/LS/2(CON)	ZAPU School	5.0	CORSO (New Zealand)
78/AP/ZAM/CL/1	Counselling	6.0	Norway (Norwegian Special Committee)
78/AP/ZAM/LS/5	Meheba	244.0	
78/AP/ZAM/MA/1	Multipurpose assistance (all refugees)	69.0	
78/AP/ZAM/MA/2	Multipurpose assistance (Zimbabweans)	7.8	
78/AP/ZAM/MA/3	ZAPU School	144.2	Financed from 1978 regular contributions for UNHCR General Programme
78/AP/ZAM/MA/4	Multipurpose assistance (southern African refugees)	30.0	
78/AP/ZAM/MA/5	United Nations Institute for Namibia	20.0	
78/AP/ZAM/EP/1/CV	Repatriation to Zaire	1.2	
78/AP/ZAM/ED/1	Education, non-UNETPSA	9.0	
78/TF/ZAM/AG/1	Purchase of maize shellers	4.6	Baptist Mission, Zambia
77-78/SR/ZAM/LS/1	Makeni Transit Centre	24.0	Government of the USA
	<u>Total</u>	<u>1,546.3</u>	

Source: UN document E/1978/44, 5 July 1978.

IV. ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWEAN REFUGEES IN REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS IN  
MOZAMBIQUE

<u>Item</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Assisting agency</u>	<u>Amount</u> (thousands of dollars)
Local procurements and services in terms of food, clothing, health, transportation, construction, agriculture, animal husbandry, education and part of government administrative expenditure	Dec. 1977-March 1978	UNHCR	450
		UNHCR	2390
Emergency food assistance	Nov. 1977-Jan. 1978	UNHCR	118
Emergency food assistance	May 1978	World Food Programme (WFP)	106
Food rations for six months under Quick Action Procedure Project	Autumn 1978	WFP	1700
Health/water supply/education	May-December 1978	UNICEF	190
Cash contribution towards assistance to Zimbabwean refugees	1978	SIDA	1600
Food assistance total	Dec. 1977-July 1978	United States of America	1000
Medicaments	Jan. 1978-July 1978	Various agencies*	50
Blankets, shoes, clothing	Jan. 1978-July 1978	Various agencies**	60
Food/agricultural equipment	Jan. 1978-May 1978	ICRC	90
Educational assistance	Jan. 1978-May 1978	Overseas Book Centre Terre des Hommes	<u>20</u> 7774

(Foot-notes on following page)

\*Japanese Red Cross, Yugoslav Red Cross, LWF, ACOA, Brot fur die Welt.

\*\*LWF, Yugoslav Red Cross, Caritas Suisse, AFSC.

Source: UN document A/33/173, 12 July 1978.

## ANNEX IV

## Volume of Refugees, Countries of Asylum, and Sources, June 1978

Country of Asylum	Footnote	Countries of Origin											
		ANGOLA		MOZAMBIQUE		NAMIBIA		SOUTH AFRICA		ZIMBABWE		TOTALS	
		Off.	E/T	Off.	E/T	Off.	E/T	Off.	E/T	Off.	E/T	Off.	E/T
BOTSWANA	3	--	150	--	--	--	?	--	3,000	--	23,000	--	26,150
LESOTHO	1	--	--	--	--	11	11	1,842	5,842	1,991	1,991	3,844	7,844
MOZAMBIQUE	4	--	--	--	--	--	--	?	?	71,000	71,000	71,000	71,000
NAMIBIA	5	--	20,000	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	20,000
SWAZILAND	2	--	--	67	317	--	--	242	6,242	7	7	316	6,566
ZAMBIA	6	13,700	14,000	--	200	300	4,200	32	3,000	317	38,300	14,349	59,700
ANGOLA	7	--	--	--	--	?	?	?	?	--	--	--	--
TOTALS		13,700	34,150	67	517	311	4,211	2,116	18,084	73,315	134,298	89,509	191,260

## Key:

Off. -- Official estimates of refugees formally granted asylum as received from UNHCR or governments of the asylum states.  
 E/T -- Estimated total number of refugees as of June 1978, unless otherwise indicated.

Note: The latter figure, normally from UN, ICRC, PVO, government, or a combination of sources, includes the former figure.

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Estimated number of Zimbabwean refugees in Mozambique at the end of May 1978

	<u>Adults</u>	<u>Children of school-going age</u>	<u>Children in creches</u>	<u>Children in Gondola awaiting placement</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Doroi (inc. Gondola)</u> (Province of Manica)	17 500	6 500	1 500	1 500	27 000
<u>Tronga</u> (Province of Sofala)	10 000	3 500	1 500	-	15 000
<u>Mavudzi</u> (Province of Tete)	3 000	4 000	1 000	-	8 000
<u>Memo</u> (Province of Gaza)	500	300	200	-	1 000
<u>Total in refugee settlements</u>	31 000	14 300	4 200	1 500	51 000
<u>Total in transit camps</u> (2 camps in Tete, 2 camps in Manica and 1 camp in Gaza)					20 000
				<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>71 000</b>

Source: Government of Mozambique

#### FOOTNOTES TO ANNEX IV

1/ GOL informed the El-Tawil Mission in June 1978 that there were 1,842 South African student refugees who had been formally designated (58 at university, 867 at secondary schools, 412 at primary schools, and 55 in vocational training; in addition, 450 are awaiting placement at university). An evaluation of educational projects in Lesotho by a World Bank Mission revealed that there were up to 11% more children on the school register than in the census count for certain age groups. This finding lends support to the findings of a sample survey of 20 primary schools, conducted by the Ministry of Education, which revealed that an average of 5% of the enrollment came from families domiciled in South Africa. GOL estimates from these figures that at least 4,000 educational refugees from South Africa have fled "Bantu education" and enrolled through friends or relatives resident in Lesotho at primary level.

UNHCR/Maseru reported to its Headquarters that, "1991 Zimbabwean and 11 Namibian foreign students are awaiting placement at University." (p. 25 of internal memorandum provided to the Mission) No information was obtained about other Zimbabweans in the country, but it appears that those "awaiting placement" may include most or all of them, since total university foreign student enrollment in 1977/78 was only 119 (RSA 58, Zimbabwe 59, and Namibia ?). Of this group, 30 scholarships were awarded via UNDP and 71 through UNETPSA.

2/ Official figures are from UNHCR and include only those formally granted asylum, most of whom receive aid from UNHCR. About 30 persons have been refused refugee status by GOS from Jan.-June 1978. As of early July, an additional 22 Mozambicans were detained in Swaziland pending a GOS decision regarding their status. The El-Tawil Mission reported 61 RSA refugees in secondary schools, 8 at university, and 5 awaiting placement. An interview with an official of the GOS revealed that an additional 200-300 unaided Mozambique refugees have settled in the area around Siteki. At primary level, GOS estimates 6,000 children born in RSA have enrolled through friends and relatives in Swaziland as a means to escape "Bantu education."

3/ Figures for Botswana have been complicated by the rapid influx of refugees and the long border with Zimbabwe, which allows for spontaneous movement and resettlement in some cases. Following are estimates from various sources regarding the average influx rate:

- a) ICRC Report of 19 May 1978 "Continual inflow from Rhodesia/Zimbabwe about 6,000 monthly..." Two camps are full with "approximately 9,000 persons" and a third (Dukwe) just opened.
- b) GOB official concerned with refugee influx, in interview with Mission "4,500-6,000 per month from Zimbabwe, plus 180-360 per month arrive from RSA and are predominantly young males."
- c) UNHCR/Botswana "40-50 per month from RSA"
- d) El-Tawil Report, July 1978 Estimates about 4,500 arrivals per month from Zimbabwe, plus 20-50 per month from RSA for the period Jan.-Apr. 1978.

From 1 January 1975 to 25 February 1977 UN figures show that 12,072 refugees entered Botswana (1,146 from RSA and 10,131 from Southern Rhodesia). Many of these have moved on to Zambia or elsewhere, leaving a net total number of officially recognized refugees of 4,478 resident in Botswana on 25 Feb. 1977. Since then, the rate of influx and total numbers have increased significantly. The chartered flights paid for by UNHCR to move refugees to Zambia have ended and the Dukwe settlement is under construction to accommodate 20,000. An initial 2,500 were settled there in mid-1978. Most mid-1978 estimates are in the range of 20-30,000 refugees from both RSA (about 3,000) and Zimbabwe, based upon new arrivals calculated as above and the ever-changing numbers in the settlements.

In addition, about 150 Angolans who supported FNLA during the Civil War are in Maun and Gaborone. Some Namibians from Caprivi may be in Botswana, but the Mission has no information on this.

- 4/ Figures as presented in UN Report A/33/173 of 12 July 1978.
- 5/ Official RSA Government sources as reported in The Washington Post in September 1978 claim an additional 1,200 Angolans fled into Namibia after the recapture of the town of Calais by forces of the central government. The most recent RSA rough estimate totals 20,000, but the Embassy of RSA in Washington stated that estimates range from 3,000-30,000 people.

6/ The Zambian Commissioner for Refugees provided the following breakdown of the official refugee population as of May 1978:

Meheba Settlement	13,079
Mayukwayukwa Settlement	1,259
Urban	180
New-Shaba Province	<u>1,371</u>
Total	15,889

The Meheba population can be further divided by nationality, with 12,607 Angolans, 295 Namibians, 159 Zairois, 8 Zimbabweans, and 10 others. Meheba has a capacity of about 30,000 people.

The UNHCR estimates a total of between 50-65,000 refugees at the settlements, under the care of NLMs and in urban areas, plus another 25,000 who have resettled spontaneously in border areas. Among this number are about 3,000 Namibians at the SWAPO Farm. The El-Tawil Mission conceded that, "there are no reliable statistics on the number of RSA student refugees in Zambia." In April 1978 only 32 were officially registered with GRZ. A May 1978 ICRC report stated that, "there are about 17,000 victims of the Rhodesian/Zimbabwe conflict distributed in six camps and the number is increasing by some 1,800 per month, mostly via Botswana; 60% of them are children aged 6-16 years." The SADAP Housing Sector Survey claims there are 33,000 Zimbabwean refugees in Zambia out of a total between 65,000-100,000. Finally, a U.N. Report dated 5 July 1978 stated: "There are now between 65,300 and 67,300 refugees and displaced persons in Zambia. The approximate breakdown of this number at the end of April 1978 was as follows: 33,300 Zimbabwean; 29,500 Angolan; between 2,200 and 4,200 Namibian; and, smaller numbers from other countries in Africa. The situation regarding Zimbabwean refugees has changed dramatically in the past six months. These refugees, mainly women and children, are in several centres established within 20 kilometers of Lusaka. Some 14,000 Angolans are in Meheba and Mayukwayukwa in the north-western and western provinces; the remainder are living in rural areas and villages." The numbers in the table above are derived from this potpourri.

7/ Angola has accommodated some Namibian refugees in southern Angola, many of whom have moved to Zambia. Continued fighting in the area between pro- and anti-government forces, together with periodic invasions by South African troops, would lead one to believe that people in the region are in distress. The ICRC has allocated SW FR 485,000 for the region, but has provided no estimates of the number or sources of beneficiaries.

See also Part III and Annex VI for assessments of the possible future volume and sources of refugees.

## Annex V

### Principal Scholarship Programs for Refugee Students from Minority-Controlled States in the Southern Africa Region \*

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- \* Over the next decade, as both the total number of refugees and number of those graduating from various educational institutions as a result of assistance enumerated in part in this Annex increases, it will become more important to link training to employment opportunities and to counsel particularly ES refugees on their options in the event that minority rule continues in South Africa for some time.

It is beyond the scope of this report to attempt to link specific ongoing training with likely employment options; however, it so far appears to be a neglected topic that would benefit from thorough analysis. The first pages of this Annex present a summary of scholarships awarded and the last page attempts to summarize the recommendations made elsewhere in this report in terms of the probable number and kinds of jobs created and their impact in general.

Assembling information of this sort has proved difficult because the numbers change continuously, new organizations begin programs while established ones change their requirements and procedures, some are reluctant to divulge details, the type of statistical breakdowns vary by source, a number of Eastern, Arab, and African countries have bilateral programs but do not provide readily available statistical information, and some students are self-sponsored, obtain scholarships directly from universities or are supported by philanthropic friends or relatives. (For example, former Peace Corps Volunteers in the U.S. have sponsored hundreds of students from their own resources or a combination of resources from church and civic groups and personal friends. A percentage of these students are refugees from southern Africa.)

Despite such difficulties, it is believed that this Annex represents a start toward the compilation of this data and it is recommended that USAID build upon this report by contracting with someone for six months or so to pull this data together in a comprehensive way which will permit better long-range planning and programming.

## ANNEX V

## NUMBER OF STUDENTS SPONSORED AT PRESENT, BY LEVEL OF TRAINING

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION AND COUNTRY OF NATIONALITY	NUMBER AWARDS COMPLETED	UNCLAS-SIFIED	SECON-DARY	UNIVER-SITY (U)	UNIVER-SITY (G)	VOCA-TIONAL	TOTAL ONGOING	TIME PERIOD TO WHICH INFORMATION REFERS
1. AFRICAN-AMERICAN INSTITUTE a. Namibia b. South Africa c. Zimbabwe d. Total <u>1/</u>	61 (to 11/76) 141 (to 3/77) 352 (to 11/76) 554	1 8 58 67	- - - -	0 47 160 207	1 19 75 95	1 9 31 41	3 83 324 410	Includes those in program as of 21 Aug 1978
2. COMMONWEALTH PROGRAMME FOR RHODESIAN <u>2/</u> AFRICANS a. Namibia b. South Africa c. Zimbabwe		380					380	As provided by letter of 8 June 1978.
3. BRITISH GOVERNMENT a. Namibia b. South Africa c. Zimbabwe			400	765			1165	As provided by letter of 8 June 1978.

## NUMBER OF STUDENTS SPONSORED AT PRESENT, BY LEVEL OF TRAINING

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION AND COUNTRY OF NATIONALITY	NUMBER AWARDS COMPLETED	UNCLAS-SIFIED	SECON-DARY	UNIVER-SITY (U)	UNIVER-SITY (G)	VOCA-TIONAL	TOTAL ONGOING	TIME PERIOD TO WHICH INFORMATION REFERS
4. INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY EXCHANGE FUND (IUEF)								
a. Namibia			1	1	-	27	29	Taken from 1976-77 Annual Report
b. South Africa			594	203	-	29	826	
c. Zimbabwe			76	177	-	367	620	
d. Total			671	381	-	423	1475	
5. PHELPS-STOKES FUND (NEW YORK)								
a. Namibia			-	7	-	-	7	Data as received on July 19, 1978.
b. South Africa			-	32	-	-	32	
c. Zimbabwe			-	61	-	-	61	
d. Total			-	100	-	-	100	
6. UN EDUCATIONAL & TRAINING PRDG. FOR SOUTHERN AFRICANS-UNETPSA								
a. Namibia	99 (1970/76)		90	93	8	-	191	UNETPSA Report covers period 24 Oct 1976-23 Oct 1977 -- (Doc. A/32/283)
b. South Africa	92 (1976/77)		21	416	23	-	460	

ANNEX V

NUMBER OF STUDENTS SPONSORED AT PRESENT, BY LEVEL OF TRAINING

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION AND COUNTRY OF NATIONALITY	NUMBER AWARDS COMPLETED	UNCLAS-SIFIED	SECON-DARY	UNIVER-SITY (U)	UNIVER-SITY (G)	VOCA-TIONAL	TOTAL ONGOING	TIME PERIOD TO WHICH INFORMATION REFERS
6. UNETPSA (contd.) c. Zimbabwe d. Total <u>3/</u>	300 (1970/76) 491		42	425	38	-	505	
		153		934	69	-	1156	
7. SCHOLARSHIPS THROUGH U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY a. Namibia b. South Africa c. Zimbabwe d. Total							?	In 1977, 31 member states offered at least 250 scholarships, but data is incomplete. <u>4/</u>
8. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN USA * a. Namibia b. South Africa c. Zimbabwe d. Total		6	-	-	-	-	6	
		9	-	-	-	-	9	
		4	-	-	-	-	4	
		19	-	-	-	-	19	
GRAND TOTAL							4705	<u>5/</u>

## Notes

- 1/ In addition, between 500-550 Secondary level scholarships were provided for Nkumbi College as of November 1976, and some students must have completed their awards in 1976-77, the year for which data were not available coming between aggregate 1970-76 figures and the 1978-79 figures presented above.
- 2/ In January 1978, the Special Commonwealth Programme for Rhodesians, established in January, 1966, reported as follows: "Under the Programme, more than 2,800 Zimbabweans have been offered study places, scholarships and employment opportunities as a result of offers made by more than 25 Commonwealth governments."
- 3/ Additional graduates from South Africa 1970-76, data not available. Therefore, total equals only the sum of figures presented, not total for program. Also, in 1976/79, 239 new awards were granted to Zimbabweans whereas a total of 1498 applications were received giving some idea of the magnitude of the problem.
- 4/ This program has a small office at the UN/New York and acts as a conduit for bilateral offers and has forwarded information to candidates on scholarships available from, among others, Czechoslovakia, Brazil, Greece and Egypt. See UN document A/32/277 of 18 October 1977 for more details.
- 5/ Broken down as Namibian, 236; South African, 1410 and Zimbabwean, 3059.

ANNEX V

Recommendations with Employment Implications	Likely Number of Jobs Created	Nature and Purpose of Jobs Created
1. Center for South African Conflict Resolution	50 (directly over first two years; secondary impact potential high)	Research & Writing; Academic. Purpose: Assist resolve RSA problems by enhancing input ideas/proposals of majority population
2. South African Studies Program	20 Professional plus 10 Support Staff	Advisory; Research & Writing. Purpose: Strengthen data base & provide options/proposals for majority rule African states in response to specific trade & other relations with RSA.
3. Private Sector Management Training and Employment Program	50	Executive; Managerial. Purpose: Work experience RSA refugees in business and participation RSA exiles in companies with investments in RSA.
4. Administrative Training and Employment for Refugee Settlement Rehabilitation and Development	50	Administration & Mgmt. Purpose: Plan, administer, and coordinate activities in refugee settlements
5. The U.N. Volunteer Program	100 (over first 2 yrs.)	Third World development; type of work depends on host country needs.
6. The Peace Corps Refugee Program	100 (estimate for first intake)	Third World development; type of work depends upon host country needs.
<p>In addition, training programs for ER and LES/R refugees have employment implications in that new skills open new opportunities. In the LE groups particularly, there is scope for self-employment in the settlements meeting basic needs of the refugee population in various artisanal areas.</p>	Undetermined	Stress on vocational training for LE adults augments self-employment and self-sufficiency in settlements; agricultural training has similar objectives

# White-black exodus

## worries racists

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

A 16

THE WASHINGTON POST

Wednesday, August 30, 1978

### More Whites Quit Rhodesia

SALISBURY, Rhodesia — The number of whites leaving Rhodesia rose sharply last month to 1,342—the most for any month since last December.

Figures released yesterday by the Central Statistical Office showed that only 231 immigrants arrived in July, so that the net loss was 1,111. This was the biggest drop in the dwindling white population now totalling about 230,000, since May 1977.

The surge in the white exodus is widely attributed to a loss of confidence in the ability of Rhodesia's biracial transitional government to end the country's six-year-old guerrilla war.

Meanwhile, government leaders, including Prime Minister Ian Smith, planned meetings with former U.S. Treasury secretary John Connally, who arrived from South Africa yesterday for a two-day visit. Connally and his wife were met at the Salisbury airport by Pieter K. van der Byl, white minister of foreign affairs, and were to be guests at the ranch of Andre Holland, a white member of Parliament.

In Geneva, a United Nations panel made public the names of 1,439 corporations, banks, organizations and individuals it accused of giving political, economic or military aid to white minority governments in southern Africa. The list covered links with Rhodesia in violation of U.N. sanctions.

In another development, police reported that the government's "most wanted" black nationalist guerrilla whom they did not identify, was killed near Salisbury Monday night during gun battles in which a white policeman and two black civilians also died.

The guerrilla had been the object of a manhunt since last week's fighting between security forces and guerrillas in Highfield Township, about eight miles from the white center of Salisbury.

Police said he was the last survivor of a squad of assassins sent into the country by Johna Nkomo, co-leader of the Patriotic Front nationalist guerrillas, to kill leading black members of the government.

ONE of the loudest noises coming out of South Africa these days is that of people voting with their feet. The rate of emigration from the land of apartheid probably has never been higher.

Whites generally are looking for greener—and safer—pastures; blacks are making illegal border crossing in the hope of returning as guerrilla fighters against institutionalised racism.

Last year, South Africa lost more than 12,000 whites—more than in any year since Sharpeville in 1960.

And had it not been for the influx of about 8,000 white Rhodesians, the net loss to the country would have been even more serious.

Nobody keeps statistics on the number of black emigrants. At best they are educated guesses. The head of the South African special branch Brigadier C F Zietsman, said recently that about 4,000 blacks are being trained as guerrillas in Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania and Libya.

Last year, the UN deputy high commissioner for refugees estimated that there were 3,000 blacks who had fled apartheid living in other African countries, probably the majority in neighbouring Botswana.

Both these estimates for black emigration are almost certainly too low. And it spells trouble for Pretoria.

Almost as worrying is the white exodus. Those leaving are from the well-off middle class doctors in particular, lawyers, accountants and the like.

They have marketable skills in other countries and many are getting out now

By Roger Omond

before the market becomes over-crowded—particularly at a time when the world economy and unemployment situation is looking far from buoyant.

Some are lucky enough to travel on British passports which are treasured possessions, guaranteeing most entry into the "old Commonwealth" countries of their choice. Others "holiday" abroad while they size up the job market and try to find employment to which they will return as soon as they have sold houses and cars.

Some of the white emigrants have fallen victim to Pretoria's intolerance of dissent. Donald Woods, former Editor of the liberal Daily Dispatch, is the most famous, and he has been joined in what they term "temporary exile" by at least two others banned in police minister James Kruger's security crackdown of last October 19.

But the majority of white emigres are relatively unpoliticised. They see, however, little future for themselves and their children in a country that appears to be heading for racial confrontation. Many have teenage sons who are soon due for military call-up.

They are getting out now before their children have to fight for apartheid.

On the other side of the racial divide are the teenagers tip-toeing over the border in the hope of receiving military training to fight against apartheid. The young revolutionaries joining the African National or Pan-Africanist congresses in camps dotted around the African continent.

#### Patrolled

Since Soweto exploded two years ago, this trickle has grown into a stream and there are few signs that the reservoir is drying up. South Africa's borders are long and cannot be patrolled every kilometre of the way.

And although some get caught—either on their way out or on their return—an effective escape route into Botswana and Mozambique seems to have developed.

Not all of the whites leaving South Africa are on the left of Prime Minister John Vorster's regime. A few months ago, the far-right Herstigte Nasionale

Party sent a team to Bolivia to investigate resettling there if Vorster "sold out the white man".

Other South American countries are reported to have shown some interest in an influx of tough, hard-working whites from southern Africa to develop backward areas.

Africa magazine reported recently that Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela are interested in pure-white settlers. Certainly, Pretoria in the past few years, has forged stronger ties with dictators like Stroessner of Paraguay and there have been official visits between the leaders of both countries. Trade is being stepped up and military alliances forged.

#### Supposed

Africa said Uruguay is investigating a project to install 20,000 "rich, conservative and often racist" whites in the country. Bolivia, it added, is supposed to be planning the transfer of 150,000 whites to the southern part of the country near Santa Cruz and has earmarked about K200 million to meet costs.

West Germany is reported to have initiated a scheme for the transfer of southern African whites to Latin America. Many would come from Namibia, whose white population is 60 per cent of German origin.

It is mainly English-speaking white South Africans who are leaving. The year 1960-61—which saw Sharpeville, the referendum favouring the establishment of a republic and South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth—produced the first big rush.

Since then, the country has had a net increase in white population as thousands of immigrants arrived from overseas, mainly Britain.

But it is still the emigration of white South Africans that must be worrying Pretoria most. Currency regulations have been tightened to prevent emigrants taking too much money out of the country.

So serious has the exodus become, and so great is the concern that it will grow, that the liberal University of the Witwatersrand recently warned medical school applicants not to begin studying if they planned to leave the country on graduation.—GEMINI.

*South Africa: White Immigrants and Emigrants 1924-1970*

Year	Total immigrants	Total emigrants	Immigrants from U.K.	Emigrants to U.K.	Net gain from U.K.	Net total gain
1924	5,265	5,857	3,755	2,770	+ 985	- 592
1925	5,428	4,483	3,704	1,997	+ 1,707	+ 945
1926	6,575	3,799	3,817	1,455	+ 2,362	+ 2,776
1927	6,598	3,988	3,324	963	+ 2,361	+ 2,610
1928	7,050	4,127	3,263	802	+ 2,461	+ 2,923
1929	7,895	3,597	3,093	674	+ 2,419	+ 4,298
1930	5,904	4,623	2,477	932	+ 1,545	+ 1,281
1931	4,140	2,697	1,976	952	+ 1,024	+ 1,443
1932	3,098	2,339	1,169	1,264	- 95	+ 759
1933	3,031	1,829	1,235	777	+ 458	+ 1,202
1934	4,702	1,767	2,052	696	+ 1,356	+ 2,935
1935	6,500	1,865	2,954	681	+ 2,273	+ 4,635
1936	10,840	2,716	3,119	887	+ 2,232	+ 8,124
1937	7,927	3,716	3,767	832	+ 2,935	+ 4,211
1938	7,435	4,022	4,035	869	+ 3,166	+ 3,413
1939	6,304	3,650	3,224	710	+ 2,514	+ 2,654
1940	3,021	2,284	1,968	160	+ 1,808	+ 737
1941	1,509	1,702	882	77	+ 805	- 193
1942	1,665	1,839	643	178	+ 465	- 174
1943	896	2,153	370	147	+ 223	- 1,257
1944	953	2,441	312	335	- 23	- 1,488
1945	2,329	4,818	1,265	1,518	- 253	- 2,489
1946	11,256	9,045	7,470	2,396	+ 5,074	+ 2,211
1947	28,839	7,917	20,596	1,386	+19,210	+20,922
1948	35,631	7,534	25,502	739	+24,763	+28,097
1949	14,780	9,206	9,655	1,057	+ 8,598	+ 5,572
1950	12,803	14,644	5,097	1,906	+ 3,191	- 1,841
1951	15,243	15,382	5,903	1,259	+ 4,644	- 139
1952	18,473	9,775	6,942	1,033	+ 5,959	+ 8,698
1953	16,257	10,220	5,416	1,617	+ 3,799	+ 6,037
1954	16,416	11,336	4,629	1,715	+ 2,914	+ 5,080
1955	16,199	12,515	4,444	1,763	+ 2,681	+ 3,684
1956	14,917	12,879	4,474	1,515	+ 2,959	+ 2,038
1957	14,615	10,943	4,723	1,242	+ 3,481	+ 3,672
1958	14,673	8,807	4,450	1,481	+ 2,969	+ 5,866
1959	12,563	9,378	3,782	2,119	+ 1,663	+ 3,185
1960	9,789	12,612	2,292	4,166	- 1,874	- 2,823
1961	16,309	14,903	2,323	5,073	- 2,750	+ 1,406
1962	20,916	8,945	4,968	2,783	+ 2,185	+11,971
1963	37,964	7,156	10,135	1,860	+ 8,275	+30,808
1964	40,865	8,092	12,807	2,385	+10,422	+32,773
1965	38,326	9,206	12,012	2,535	+ 9,477	+29,120
1966	41,920	9,888	13,130	3,338	+ 9,792	+32,032
1967	32,487	10,737	12,993	3,232	+ 9,661	+21,750
1968	40,548	10,589	16,044	3,144	+12,900	+29,959
1969	41,446	9,018	19,000	3,100	+15,900	+32,428
1970	41,523	9,154	21,323	3,041	+18,282	+32,369

(Source: John Stone: "Colonist or Uitlander", pp 276, 277).

# RHODESIA: IMMIGRATION

White immigration into Rhodesia began at the end of the last century. Most of the immigrants arrived either from or via South Africa and the majority of them were British. Because of the late date of conquest no white residents can trace their families' residence in Rhodesia back more than 2-3 generations and a large proportion of today's adult whites are immigrants in the sense that they were born outside Rhodesia, though they may have been brought there as children. In 1969 Rhodesian-born whites formed 41.2% of the white population, British-born 23.9% and South African-born 21.3%. Actual figures from the 1969 Census were as follows:

total white population	228,296	
born in Rhodesia	92,934	
born in Britain	52,468	
born in South Africa	49,585	
born in Portugal	3,206	
born elsewhere	30,103	( <i>Sunday Mail</i> 15.4.73)

there appears to have been a large British influx into Rhodesia in the immediate post-war period. Statistics earlier than 1955 are not available, and those between 1955 and 1963 are rather rough estimates, because of the difficulty of disentangling the components of the Central African Federation. Those figures which follow are from the *Monthly Migration and Tourist Statistics*, published by the Central Statistical Office in Salisbury in April 1974.

## *Immigration into Rhodesia 1955-73*

	Immigrants	Net Migration (immigrants over emigrants)
1955	14,000	+ 8,000
1956	19,000	+11,000
1957	18,000	+ 7,000
1958	14,000	+ 5,000
1959	9,000	+ 4,000
1960	8,000	+ 1,000
1961	8,000	- 2,000
1962	8,000	- 4,000
1963	7,000	-11,000
1964	7,000	- 8,710
1965	11,128	+ 2,280
1966	6,418	- 2,090
1967	9,618	+ 2,050
1968	11,864	+ 6,210
1969	10,929	+ 5,040
1970	12,227	+ 6,340
1971	14,743	+ 9,400
1972	13,966	+ 8,820
1973	9,433	+ 1,680

Source: International Defence and Aid Fund, "Southern Africa: Immigration from Britain," (London: March, 1975).

The information contained in this Annex is not directly relevant to the question of contemporary refugee problems since whites are classified in most cases as emigrants. They are not fleeing their country of nationality owing to a well-founded fear of persecution; the manner of their departure is well planned and they are able to take most assets with them. It is not certain whether this will continue to be the case in South Africa, and particularly in Southern Rhodesia where the level of conflict and uncertainty regarding the survival of the white minority government is manifest.

The number of whites residing in these two countries is, therefore, of interest to the Mission because large numbers of the white population could suddenly become refugees in the event of the collapse of either government. This is not anticipated in South Africa in the next decade and was not included in the hypotheses offered in the text of the report. In the event of a mass exodus from Southern Rhodesia, it is likely that the vast majority will flee to South Africa. Most Rhodesian whites have ample means to do so and would probably drive there under armed escort of the remaining white Rhodesian security forces or perhaps a South African force in the event of a sudden and major upheaval.

Despite the unlikelihood of a sudden need for an international humanitarian relief effort for white Rhodesians, the possibility is there and some contingency planning would be wise.

## ANNEX VII

### Proposed Refugee Reform Legislation

#### S.2751

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Refugee and Displaced Persons Act of 1978".

#### ADMISSION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

Sec.2 (a) Section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)) (hereinafter in this Act referred to as "the Act") is amended by adding after paragraph (41) the following new paragraph:

"(42) The term 'refugee' or 'displaced person' includes (A) any person (i) who is outside the country of his nationality or who, not having a nationality, is outside the country of his habitual residence, and who is unable or unwilling to return to such a country because of persecution or well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, or (ii) who has been uprooted by catastrophic natural calamity, civil disturbance or military operations and who is unable to return to his usual place of abode, and (B) the spouse and children of any such person if accompanying or following to join him".

(b) Chapter 1 of title II of the Act is amended by adding after section 206 (8 U.S.C. 1156) the following new section:

#### "ADMISSION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

"Sec. (a) Immigrant visas shall be made available, pursuant to such regulations as the Secretary of State may prescribe and in a number not to exceed forty thousand in any fiscal year, to refugees and displaced persons described in section 101(a)(42), who are not firmly resettled in any country and apply for admission to the United States.

"(b)(1) In addition to the authority conferred upon him by subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary of State may in his discretion recommend to the Attorney General that all or any portion of a group or class of persons, who are refugees or displaced persons described in section 101(a)(42), may be admitted to the United States conditionally, if the Secretary of State finds that the admission of such refugees or displaced persons--

- "(A) is not possible or practical under subsection (a);
- "(B) is justified by emergent or humanitarian reasons; or
- "(C) is in the public interest.

"(2) Upon receiving a recommendation pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Attorney General immediately shall consult with the appropriate Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives with respect to the recommendation of the Secretary of State. Immediately after the conclusion of such consultations or thirty days after the Attorney General's request for such consultations, the Attorney General may admit into the United States conditionally, pursuant to such regulations as he may prescribe, any alien with respect to whom the Secretary of State has made a recommendation and who is not firmly resettled in any country.

"(c) (1) Any alien admitted into the United States conditionally, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, shall return or be returned to the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and shall thereupon be inspected and examined for admission into the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the provisions of sections 235, 236, and 237, if--

"(A) the alien's conditional admission has not been terminated by the Attorney General, pursuant to such regulations as he may prescribe;

"(B) the alien has not otherwise acquired the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence; and

"(C) the alien has been physically present in the United States for at least two years.

"(2) Notwithstanding any numerical limitations specified in this Act, any alien who, upon inspection and examination as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection or after a hearing before a special inquiry officer, is found to be admissible as an immigrant as of the time of his inspection and examination, except for the grounds of

exclusion specified in paragraphs (14), (15), (20), (21), (25), and (32) of section 212(a), shall be regarded as lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence as of the date of the alien's arrival".

(c) Section 245(b) of Act (U.S.C. 1259(b) is amended to read as follows:

"(b) Upon the approval of an application for adjustment of status made under subsection (a) the Attorney General shall record the alien's lawful admission for permanent residence as of the date the order of the Attorney General approving the application for the adjustment of status is made and the Secretary of State shall reduce by one the number of immigrant visas authorized to be issued under sections 202(e), 203(a), or 207(a) within the class to which the alien is chargeable for the fiscal year then current".

## ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PAROLE AUTHORITY

Sec. 3 Section 212(d)(5) of the Act (8 U.S.C 1182(d)(5)) is amended to read as follows:

"(5) The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily, pursuant to such terms and conditions as he may prescribe and for emergent or humanitarian reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest, any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of any alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien to the United States. When the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served, the alien shall return or be returned to the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States).

### CONFORMING AMENDMENTS

(Technical amendments to conform legislation to existing law)..

### EFFECTIVE DATE

Sec. 5(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the amendments made by this title shall take effect on October 1, 1978.

(b) The repeal of subsections (g) and (h) of section 203 of the Act, made by section 4 (c)(8) of this Act, shall not apply with respect to any individual who before October 1, 1978, was granted a conditional entry under section 203(a)(7) of the Act (and under section 202(e)(7) of the Act, if applicable) as in effect immediately before such date.

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- E. U.S. House of Representatives
1. ALAN VAN EGMOND, Legislative Assistant to Representative Don Bonker
- F. The World Bank
1. QUILL HERMANS, Senior Planning Advisory Officer
  2. ROBERT MAUBOUCHE, Senior Economist, Country Programs, Department II

- II. New York--July 7
  - A. African-American Institute (AAI)
    - 1. WILBUR JONES, Director, Division of Education
  - B. United Nations Education and Training Programme for South Africa (UNETPSA)
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- III. Sussex, England--May 31
  - A. Institute for Development Studies (IDS)
    - 1. CHRISTOPHER COLCLOUGH
    - 2. REGINALD GREEN
    - 3. PERCY SELWYN
- IV. Uxbridge, England--May 31
  - A. Brunel University
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- V. London, England--May 30-June 1
  - A. Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM)
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    - 2. PETER FREEMAN, Area Officer for Zimbabwe
    - 3. CHRISTOPHER JERRARD, Assistant to the Director, Division for Southern and East African Affairs
    - 4. PETER S. MC LEAN, Director, Division for Southern and East African Affairs
- VI. Geneva, Switzerland--June 1-June 6
  - A. United States Mission to the U.N.
    - 1. MS. DENSDALE, Secretary to J. Hill
  - B. International Labour Organisation (ILO)
    - 1. W. R. BÖHNING, Economist
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- 4. CHARLES STAHL, Economist
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  - 3. R. VON ARNIM
- H. Lutheran World Federation (LWF)
  - 1. BRIAN NELDNER, Secretary for Programme Administration
- I. World Council of Churches (WCC)
  - 1. WALTER MAKHULU, Area Secretary for East Africa and African Refugees

VII. Johannesburg, South Africa--June 8-9

- A. Chamber of Mines
  - 1. MR. HOLMES, Assistant Manager

**B. Anglo-American Corporation**

1. DENNIS ETHERIDGE, Vice President
2. SELLO MONYATSI, Industrial Relations Department
3. DONALD NCUBE, Industrial Relations Department.
4. MARSHALL SWANA, Industrial Relations Department

**VIII. Cape Town, South Africa--June 9**

**A. University of Cape Town**

1. DUDLEY HORNER, Research Officer, SALDRU, School of Economics
2. FRANCIS WILSON, Senior Lecturer, School of Economics

**IX. Gaborone, Botswana--June 10-June 13**

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**X. Maseru, Lesotho--June 15-June 16; July 6-July 8**

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XI. Lilongwe, Malawi--June 18-June 22

A. United States Embassy

1. GIL SHEINBAUM, Deputy Chief of Mission

B. Government of Malawi (GOM)

1. B.Y.C. GONDWE, Ministry of Labour

2. A.J.H. JERE, Under Secretary of Education

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4. B. B. MAWINDO, Ministry of Labour

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XII. Lusaka, Zambia--June 23-June 30

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2. R. TIERNEY, Political Affairs Officer

- B. Government of Zambia (GOZ)
  - 1. Y. K. LIBAKENI, Senior Economist, National Commission for Development Training
  - 2. H. MANDONA, Ministry of Economic and Technical Cooperation
  - 3. MR. MBEWE, Ministry of Economic and Technical Cooperation
  - 4. E. H. SIKAZWE, Commissioner for Refugees Office, Ministry of Home Affairs
  - 5. Director, Department of Technical Education and Vocational Training, Ministry of Education
- C. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
  - 1. C. KPENOV, Representative
- D. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
  - 1. JERRY BERKE, Acting Resident Representative
- E. Economic Commission for Africa - Lusaka (ECA)
  - 1. KHAMIS AMEIR, Director
- F. United Nations Commissioner for Namibia
  - 1. BERYL MC GOVERN, Programme Officer
  - 2. HISHAM OMayAD, Regional Representative
- G. Institute for Namibia (U.N.)
  - 1. MARK BOMANI, Deputy Director
  - 2. HIDIPO HAMUTENYA, Assistant Director
  - 3. BILLY MODISE, Lecturer
  - 4. BETHUEL SETAI, Lecturer
- H. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
  - 1. FREDERIC STEINEMANN, Regional Representative
- I. Development Bank of Zambia
  - 1. LEONARD M. LIKULUNGA, Planning Division