


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Annex B
LABOR MIGRATION

A Report to the Congress on

**DEVELOPMENT NEEDS
and OPPORTUNITIES for
COOPERATION in
SOUTHERN AFRICA**



United States Agency for International Development/March 1979

LABOR MIGRATION IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA AND POSSIBLE
SUPPLIER STATE ALTERNATIVES

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A note on citations used in the Report:

An abbreviated citation system keyed to the bibliography has been used. Thus, "Smith (p. 60)" refers to page 24 of the bibliographic entry by Smith and "Smith (I. p. 60)" refers to the first entry in those instances where there is more than one entry for the same author.

PREFACE

The following report has been prepared by Pacific Consultants on contract to USAID over a 13-week period from 8 May to 4 August 1978. The Terms of Reference supplied by USAID for the labor migration analysis follow:

6. Manpower

a) Phase One

Assess impact of labor migration on the overall development of the majority-rule states with particular emphasis on migration to South Africa. Included will be an assessment of alternative employment possibilities.

In completing this segment, the contractor shall give special attention to the recently completed World Bank study, Migration from Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, and the experience of Malawi and Mozambique in re-absorbing returning labor. Strategy elements for lessening interstate labor migration problems, nationally and regionally, shall be proposed.

The Mission spent six weeks from 28 May to 8 July, visiting Europe and the Southern Africa region. It should be noted, however, that the mission was unable to visit Mozambique and was not permitted to hold discussions with the nationalist movements of Namibia, Zimbabwe, or Azania (South Africa). The analysis and conclusions presented here with respect to these countries have, consequently, not benefitted from advice and suggestions from officials of the Mozambique Government

or from representatives of the movements. The inability of the mission to visit Mozambique, in particular, has meant that information with respect to that country's efforts to reintegrate migrant workers returning from South Africa has been unavailable and the reader should be cautioned that the brief sections on Mozambique are based on limited secondary sources.

Acknowledgement should be made here of the significant assistance of Mr. William Lovelace who was seconded to this Mission on a temporary basis from the Africa Division of the Peace Corps. Mr. Lovelace participated in the mission to southern Africa, assisted in initial drafting of some portions of the text, and provided useful insights and sensitivities from a Peace Corps perspective.

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE REPORT

BLS	Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland
CSO	Central Statistics Office
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
EEC	European Economic Community
ILO	International Labour Office
JASPA	Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa
LICU	Labor-Intensive Construction Unit
MFDP	Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (Botswana)
NIDC	National Industrial Development Corporation (Swaziland)
ODM	British Overseas Development Ministry
PFP	Progressive Federal Party (South Africa)
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SABC	South Africa Broadcasting Corporation
SEDCO	Swaziland Enterprises Development Corporation
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
S.R.	Southern Rhodesia
SSDC	Small-Scale Development Corporation (Swaziland)
SWAPO	South West Africa Peoples Organization
TEBA	The Employment Bureau of Africa
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
VRG	Valid Reengagement Certificate

CURRENCY CONVERSIONS

<u>Country</u>	<u>Currency</u>	<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Value</u> [*]
Botswana	Pula	P	P1=\$.90
Lesotho	Rand	R	R1=\$1.15
Swaziland	Emalangi	E	E1=\$1.15
Malawi	Kwacha	K	K1=\$1.13
Mozambique	Escudo	ES	ES1=\$.03
Zimbabwe	Rhodesian Dollar	R\$	R\$1=\$1.54
Namibia	Rand	R	R1=\$1.15
Zambia	Kwacha	K	K1=\$1.33
South Africa	Rand	R	R1=\$1.15

* as of 7-24-78

SUMMARY AND REGIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. SUMMARY

Over 200,000 African men from countries on the South African periphery are employed in the mines in South Africa. Thousands more work as farm labor and domestic servants in the rigidly segregated and discriminatory environment of the white minority controlled country.

The absence of a significant percentage of the most able-bodied workforce (up to 60% of adult males in Lesotho) from its home country for most of the year, on balance, creates serious problems for the supplier states. Production and development opportunities can be adversely affected, family life is disrupted and the supplier state economies and, consequently, governments are highly dependent upon a powerful and racist neighbor.

It must be recognized that the predicament of the supplier states did not occur suddenly - it is the result, inter alia, of nearly a century of labor exploitation by profit maximizing private mining houses supported by minority controlled governments. Likewise, there is no quick or simple solution to the problem. African states have declared their goal to withdraw their labor and white South Africa plans, at least, to continue to reduce the proportion of its mine labor drawn from outside its borders.

Immediate withdrawal would have severe economic consequences for most states. A planned and phased withdrawal tied to new and strengthened development schemes in the supplier states which would promote modern sector job creation and increased productivity in the traditional sector would seem to offer the best approach from the perspective of supplier state governments and individual miners.

The donor community could facilitate this process by augmenting its level of bilateral technical assistance to the region, by stressing programs with employment creation potential, and by establishing a voluntary U.N. Fund for supplier state support which would focus multilateral aid on this problem. As detailed below, African states can also take initiatives to strengthen their position vis a vis South Africa. This may then elicit further donor assistance.

Although the apartheid nature of the white minority controlled government in South Africa is a primary reason for the need to reduce and ultimately eliminate migrant labor to the Republic, in the long term even a majority-ruled Republic of Azania will not necessarily solve the region's employment and migrant labor difficulties, since a democratic South Africa would presumably seek to employ its own citizens before turning to foreign labor. The particular onus attached to the migrant labor system in Southern Africa would be

removed with the abolition of Apartheid, and the phenomenon would then more closely resemble the labor migration patterns in Europe and elsewhere; however, the underlying center-periphery economic relationships would remain for the foreseeable future. It is, therefore, fundamentally the economic structures and relationships which have been built over the past century, largely upon cheap black labor, which must be modified, both within what is now South Africa and between South Africa and the supplier states. Donor states can make a positive contribution to the struggle to achieve such a transformation toward non-racist and more equitable forms of economic organization, they have a responsibility to do so and, by exercising that responsibility they can strengthen the chances for long term peace in the region.

2. DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL *

A. African Initiatives**

1. (Page 94) Promote greater cooperation and consultation among supplier states to improve working conditions and evolve a common strategy on labor migration.

a. Establish a Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) composed of Ministers of Labor who would meet at least three times a year. A small permanent Secretariat should be established to:

i. organize the logistics for regular Committee meetings;

ii. ensure the prior adoption of a specific agenda;

iii. arrange for appropriate background papers to be available or authorize their research and preparation. For this purpose, funds should be included in the budget of the Secretariat to allow it to contract for research from the universities of the supplier states or other suitable institutions or individuals.

iv. coordinate the activities of the national Labour Representatives from those supplier states who have them and encourage the others to create a similar post. The Labour Representatives could act as a continuous monitor of migrant living and working conditions in South Africa and function as a subcommittee of the JCC. The skills of the Labour Representatives could be strengthened through seminars and short training sessions organized by the JCC.

v. Lobby in support of trade union rights for

* Page numbers in parentheses are keyed to main text where recommendations appear in the context of the main report. In addition, country specific recommendations appear in Part VI.


** The four African Initiatives have been broadly endorsed by the concerned African states at the ECA/ILO conference on labor migration held in Lusaka in April 1978. The regional recommendations offered here are an attempt to translate broadly stated African goals into possible specific initiatives while also suggesting a concrete and positive U.S. response which could strengthen the ability of the African states to achieve their stated goals.

migrant workers and South African blacks before the Wiehan Commission and other such groups which may be formed in South Africa from time to time. Lobby for support from trade union movements around the world and request groups such as the International Long Shoreman's Union, for example, not to load or unload goods to or from South Africa until that country permits unionization of black workers. Seek cooperation from such places as the African-American Labor Center (AALC) in New York and from African, European, and other trade union movements.

vi. Participate in the identification of alternatives to labor migration on the national and regional levels, review various proposals for modification of the migrant labor system, and advise the Ministers of Labour at the regular JCC meetings of concrete measures which might be adopted.

vii. Prepare a code of conduct which supplier states can agree upon as the African standard with which private companies are expected to comply. This would go beyond a statement of principles and set specific employment and living conditions as minimum standards for mine and non-mine migrants. A Secretariat

could be established as follows with their respective responsibilities keyed to i-vi above:



Initially, four professional posts could be created and provided with secretarial and administrative support services as follows:

- a) Permanent Secretary, JCC
- b) Director of Research and Training Sections
- c) Two Public Information and Program Analysts

b. Strengthen the National University of Lesotho's (NUL) capacity to conduct research on labor migration questions. The NUL has a research unit dealing with migrant labor. The supplier states should consider establishing a central depository for documentation on the subject and request the NUL to act in this capacity since Lesotho is the most seriously affected by labor migration.

2. (Page 84) Develop strategies in the supplier states which would stimulate a pace of economic development

sufficient to permit alternative employment opportunities in the home countries.

a. An appropriate supplier state ministry or Office to be determined by each government should review project and program proposals for all sectors for their employment implications. The Ministries of Planning could submit drafts of National Development Plans and project documents from international donors for review to the reviewing Office or Ministry which might then produce "Employment Impact Statements" (EIS) for the Planning Ministries, submitting the proposal with a copy to an Employment Creation Adviser attached to the head of government in each country. The EIS should minimally include:

- i. a projection of the number and level of jobs likely to be created from the proposed project or program;
- ii. the estimated cost to government and in total to create each job;
- iii. the longevity of the jobs--will they be self-sustaining after project completion?
- iv. Are there alternative means of implementing the project which would create additional jobs?
- v. Will any jobs be lost in other sectors as a result of the project under consideration?

vi. Have labor-intensive techniques been considered and has a cost/benefit analysis been done to assess this option?

vii. Will there be a multiplier effect from the proposal, has it been adequately linked to other government activities, and will it require training of nationals to ensure that citizens are employed rather than expatriates?

b. Supplier states should strengthen their Central Statistics Offices and Labor Ministries/ Departments to provide policymakers with accurate, recent data on which to base their decisions. As will be noted in the body of this report, many conclusions and suggestions for action had to remain more tentative than one would like because so many statistics are estimates or deductions from dated information. Specific recommendations appear in the individual country sections.

3. (Page 85) Stimulation of Regional economic integration and trade among the supplier states. The recent ECA meeting to establish a preferential trade area in East and Southern Africa is a useful step. African states could take further initiatives in this direction by:

a. Identifying products for development on a collaborative basis to lessen duplication in manufacturing for a regional market when the domestic one is too small. For example,

Swaziland could hold trade talks with Mozambique and Malawi and agree to produce a certain item if her neighbors agree to import a fixed quantity. In return, Swaziland could agree to import products not planned for domestic production from Malawi and Mozambique. The Southern African Customs Union does not prevent such bilateral commodity-specific trade preferences.

b. Initial studies could be undertaken to identify areas and mechanisms for possible collaboration between the independent supplier states and post-independence Namibia and Zimbabwe in trade promotion which may have employment implications.

4. (Page 88) Supplier states could request the international community to establish a special U.N. Development Fund to facilitate the withdrawal of migrant labor from South Africa. Such a fund could be administered for example, by the UNDP and be limited to financing employment creation development activities in the supplier states which would affect labor migrants.

B. United States or Other Donor Responses to African Initiatives and Possible U.S. Initiatives

1. The U.S. or Other Donor Response

a. Once the Regional Joint Consultative Committee has been established and an initial

meeting of Labor Ministers held, donors should offer to provide technical assistance to the JCC in a manner to be decided by the JCC (possibly through the ECA, ILO or bilaterally). This could include (a) a grant to the Secretariat for research, training, and programming; (b) a seminar to examine forms of labor organization and identify research and support opportunities; and (c) provision of equipment and supplies for an initial period.

b. Once supplier states agree to establish a central depository and data center for information on migrant labor, donors could provide aid to the NUL either through the Government of Lesotho or indirectly through a research grant to the JCC's Research Division. Assistance should include the services of a librarian and facilities to produce a quarterly bulletin on research in progress in the region and throughout the world on this question.

c. Given the central importance of employment creation and migrant labor dependency to the supplier states, donors should respond to initiatives which promote the use of Employment Impact Statements (EIS) by assisting the countries in question to establish or strengthen manpower planning units in the appropriate

ministries or offices. Expanded capability in this field would facilitate the preparation of a rigorous EIS which could become a basic working document for decisionmakers. The provision of technical assistance on a project or even program basis has a greater chance of failure if an assessment of its employment impact remains on an ad hoc or cursory basis.

d. Once a special U.N. Development Fund has been established to facilitate the withdrawal of migrant labor from South Africa through the financing of employment creation oriented projects in the supplier states, the United States and other donors should begin discussions with the administering body with regard to the level of contributions. Funds should be committed for a minimum period of five years in order to ensure stable and guaranteed resources for the essential long-term planning which will permit the restructuring of the supplier state economies to allow for migrant labor reabsorption.

2. U.S. Initiatives

a. A significant amount of the original thinking which has occurred in the last few years with respect to labor migration has taken place in the Research Division of the ILO. The United States is at a distinct disadvantage in its

efforts to assist the supplier states on this question so long as it is not a member of the International Labour Office. The Mission would strongly urge that suitable measures be taken to ensure that the United States rejoins the ILO in order to work through that organization to make a constructive contribution to the resolution of the problems in question. On page 91 of the main report the Mission recommends that subject to African agreement USAID employ a labor economist specifically to work with the supplier states, the ECA, the World Bank, and the ILO to draw up a detailed and statistically comprehensive negotiating position that the supplier states could use as a basis for negotiating the financing, from South African resources, of a gradual return of migrant laborers to their home countries. The labor economist would best be placed at the ILO, which would presuppose that the U.S. would have rejoined that organization. In the event that renewed membership takes some time, the labor economist could, in the interim, be attached to the ECA (with their agreement) or to the regional AID office for Southern Africa (OSARAC). Regardless of where the labor economist is posted, it remains true that the U.S. could have a greater impact on and make a greater contribution to the resolution of the migrant labor problem were it to rejoin the ILO.

b. As demonstrated in the main report, the labor migration problem has both a regional and a national character. A number of initiatives can be taken on the regional level to ameliorate the situation, but this requires the active cooperation of the supplier states with each other and with donors such as the United States. It is counterproductive for the United States to limit assistance to Mozambique, while seeking ways of aiding other countries in the Southern Africa region, since this makes total regional cooperation among the supplier states just that much more difficult and places an obstacle before U.S. efforts to make a contribution on a regional level. Mozambique certainly requires assistance in developing employment-creation activities which would, inter alia, provide greater employment opportunities for returned migrant laborers. The country is also confronted by the prospect of the remaining 30,000+ migrant laborers in South Africa returning home.

By assisting Mozambique to spread its dependency among many donors in both the East and the West, the United States will facilitate a greater flexibility on the part of the Mozambique Government by maximizing its options. It is difficult for the United States to advocate greater regional

cooperation among the supplier states to achieve the goal of phased withdrawal of migrant labor from South Africa when the U.S. itself has placed artificial limitations on the level of cooperation which can exist between the U.S. and Mozambique.

c. To assist the Ministries of Labour and the Ministries of Planning in the supplier states, all future AID projects should be examined from an employment-creation perspective and a brief report on their employment impact should be included in any project assessment. This would provide a valuable input to the governments' own efforts to produce Employment Impact Statements.

I. FOREWORD

Foreign labor migration in Southern Africa refers to the large number of workers (primarily male) who travel from their home countries (often referred to as the "supplier states") in search of short-term employment, primarily in South Africa. The majority of these migrants work in the mines, principally in the gold mines, and together with domestic black workers they constitute the backbone of the labor force in the mining industry. Migration in Southern Africa is not a widely studied subject in the United States, although there has been a fair amount of research produced by the affected governments, the mining industry, sociologists, and the ILO. What is perhaps least understood in the U.S. is the role that labor migration plays in the socio-economic structures and the development efforts of a part of the world which is assuming an important place in US foreign policy. If one is to have a complete understanding of the relationships which exist between South Africa and its neighbors, the reasons behind and the arrangements supporting labor migration must be examined. There must also be an analysis of how migration affects both the suppliers and the recipients. It is therefore appropriate that labor migration is included in a comprehensive study of Southern Africa.

The migrants have also become part of the politics of the region. In a June 28, 1978 newscast, SABC quoted the then-

Minister of Information, Dr. Connie Mulder, at a Washington news conference as saying that the "guest workers" in South Africa would be the first to be affected by any withdrawal of U.S. investments in South Africa. This comment from a senior South African Government official underscores the possibility that the migrants represent not only an economic--but also a political--factor in U.S. policy formulation for Southern Africa.

The fundamental conclusion of the Mission which underlies the structure and emphasis of this paper is that, in the absence of fundamental change in South Africa which will end institutionalized and legally sanctioned race discrimination under Apartheid, U.S. development policy should help to enable the supplier states to reduce and subsequently to eliminate their labor migration to South Africa. In doing so, the U.S. would help these countries realize three basic accomplishments:

1. There would be a minimization of exposure to South Africa's racially discriminatory policy of Apartheid upon the citizens of majority-ruled states who currently work as migrant laborers.
2. There would be an increased capability on the part of supplier states to formulate an economic policy which is more independent of South Africa.
3. By facilitating the reintegration of the current migrants into their own societies, U.S. assistance would enable these workers to contribute their labor to the development of their own economies in a direct manner while lessening the social costs incurred through family separations and an artificial domestic population pyramid.

For reasons which are outlined in the following pages, migration patterns in South Africa are changing. Now is therefore an opportune moment for the U.S. to play a supportive role in a process which will have an important effect on all of Southern Africa.

II. BACKGROUND

Migration has been one of the dominant forces in the history of Southern Africa. Indeed, the Bantu-speakers migrated south of the Limpopo River about fifteen hundred years ago, while European settlements began in 1652 with the establishment of a refueling station at Table Bay. The two groups had little contact with one another until in the third quarter of the Eighteenth Century they clashed as they expanded in search of land and game. This confrontation led to a series of bloody struggles which were to continue for a hundred years. Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho trace their independent status to a grant by the British of Protectorate status to the people of those territories, many of whom had migrated and taken refuge there. Much of the current policy of the South African Government can be traced to its version of migration and to its interpretation of who arrived first in much of the Republic's territory.

Migration for the purpose of employment has also played an important role in the area's history. The earliest inhabitants were able to survive on the products of their widely-dispersed farms. The colonial powers, however, used taxation as a revenue-producing technique and a means to force Africans off their land and into wage labor in mines and on European-controlled farms. As a result, the rural population had to look

for ways to earn money. The discovery in 1886 of extensive gold deposits in South Africa created the need for a large labor supply. Recruitment was begun by the British and Portuguese colonial governments and streams of laborers began to be employed in the mines. Earnings from the mines gradually produced two important effects on the traditional population. The wages paid in the mines introduced cash into the everyday life of peasants who, up to that point, had largely depended on an exchange of goods for payment. Money, for example, became the way for young men to buy cattle or to pay the bride price. The availability of money also created situations and expectations which in turn required money, thereby creating a consumer class. Tastes were developed, plans were made, and goods were bought with the cash from the mines. This "progress" was experienced by succeeding generations of males, with the result that labor migration became a way of life and a source of revenue for large numbers of young men from all over Southern Africa.

There was also considerable migration by both men and women in agriculture. Unlike migration to the mines, agricultural migration often led to the settling of the migrants in South Africa where they established families and became unofficial residents. The practice was particularly common for migrants from

Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana who did not need passports or travel documents prior to 1963 and who found that the developing agricultural sector of South Africa represented a source of wage income and, therefore, an alternative to the marginal opportunities for paid employment and the neglected subsistence economies of their home countries. Other migrants moved toward the industrial centers of South Africa and became settled urban workers. It is virtually impossible to calculate how many past migrants chose to remain in South Africa as settlers and residents.

The detailed records for migrants to the mines, on which much of the literature on this subject bases its findings, obviously do not include people who are not recruited through official channels. As recently as 1960 this so-called "spontaneous" migration officially represented slightly more than 77% of the total migrants working in South Africa. This percentage had dropped to 50% of the total by 1970 and continues to decline, partially as a result of political and economic changes. Thus, current figures quoted in this paper in no way represent the totality of the number of migrants working in South Africa. Recruitment and processing of miners is well organized but there has been too much free passage across the borders to allow for precise and comprehensive tabulations.

This paper will deal primarily with foreign migrant labor in the mines, since over 80% of all legal foreign migrant workers are mine employees and the percentage of those migrants in commercial agriculture has undergone a steady decline in recent years due to poor pay and increasing mechanization.

Labor migration to the mines has occupied a major place in the economies of all of the supplier states and their governments have recently exhibited a heightened concern for the possible consequences of this for their development efforts. The supplier countries met in Lusaka, Zambia in March-April 1978 to discuss their common concerns and to examine joint projects and programs which could lessen their dependence on labor migration. Although specific information from the Lusaka meeting is not available at this time, it is reported that the states have emphasized better working conditions for the migrants currently in South Africa, while at the same time seeking alternative employment to migration.^{1/} Part of this paper is devoted to an analysis of possible alternatives. Working conditions and employment practices in the

^{1/} For a list of many of the papers generated by the Conference, refer to entries in the bibliography relating to the ECA/ILO MULPOC Conference. These documents are to be reviewed by government officials at a follow-up meeting scheduled for September 11, 1978 and are likely to be derestricted thereafter by the ECA.

mines will be examined, the effect of migrant labor on the economies of the area as well as on the individuals involved will be assessed, and the particular situation each of the supplier states will face in the future will be explored and recommendations for U.S. assistance presented.

III. THE EFFECT OF LABOR MIGRATION ON THE SUPPLIER STATES

A. Botswana

The danger to Botswana of continued dependency on South Africa for the present level of wage employment (est. 46,000 compared to 65,756 in the domestic economy) and foreign exchange deriving from this lies in its uncertainty for the individual miner and for the Botswana economy as a whole. Gradually or suddenly, for economic and/or political reasons, Botswana could experience a substantial increase in the number of job seekers inside the country above that already encountered as a result of the natural increase in population.

The South African strategy with respect to foreign migrant labor which may result in a reduction, though probably not elimination, of Botswana workers could actually have positive implications for Botswana. It would compel government to stimulate alternative employment opportunities without being held responsible by mine workers for any loss of mining jobs which might result from a deliberate policy of phased withdrawal. It would achieve a lessened dependency on South Africa for wage employment and reduce the uncertainty with regard to future numbers of mine recruits.

In order to ensure the optimal benefit for Botswana from any change in the migrant labor

pattern, Part VI outlines a strategy which could promote domestic employment through agricultural and infrastructural development and stimulate employment creation, partially through the use of labor-intensive techniques. A comprehensive approach could have a significant effect on labor migration by beginning to make it possible for Botswana, inter alia, to meet, from domestic production, the rising demand for foodstuffs and manufactured goods which exist in the expanding sectors of Botswana's economy: mining, public sector employment, and beef production.

Almost half of all Botswana aged 20-30 are employed in South Africa. They are not uniformly recruited from the entire country but tend to come from the poorest households in the poorest regions with a reasonable proximity to the mines. The following table shows the geographic distribution as well as the decline in numbers:

TABLE I
RECRUITMENT FOR SOUTH AFRICAN MINES, BY REGION

<u>First Quarter</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>Central</u>	<u>North</u>
1976	15,050	10,215	3,523	1,312
1977	15,579	10,927	3,072	1,580
1978	7,104	6,360	544	200

Source: Botswana Statistical Bulletin, March 1978 and interview with CSO, Gaborone.

The total number employed at the end of the first quarter of 1978 was 24,500, compared to 31,284 for the same quarter in 1977, while recruitment was down to 7,104 from the 1977 figure of 15,579.^{1/}

The total income of Botswana miners in 1976 was just over P32 million. The CSO has broken this figure down as follows:

TABLE II
DISPOSITION OF MINE WORKERS EARNINGS
(P Million)

	<u>Total Wage Earnings</u>	<u>Deferred Pay Earned</u>	<u>Remittances</u>	<u>Imports of Returning Mineworkers</u>	<u>Cash Holdings Returning Mine Workers</u>	<u>Cash Spent for Consumption in South Africa</u>
1974	11,20	4,18	0,63	1,02	0,60	4,77
1975	21,89	7,06	1,09	3,40	1,20	9,12
1976	32,17	10,52	1,84	4,50	1,70	13,71

Of central importance to an understanding of the impact of labor migration on Botswana are the findings of the Rural Income Distribution Survey (Chapters 7 and 9) conducted during 1974/5 which reveal the following:

^{1/} Slight discrepancies in figures between those reported by CSO above and those in tables for the entire Southern African region can be explained by noting that CSO figures are more comprehensive than TEBA figures, which are limited to those recruited for affiliated mines.

1. The poorest ten percent of rural households had incomes of less than R233 per annum.
2. This group derives 25% of its income from "transfers"--remittances from migrant laborers, free meals, and gifts.
3. The mean income from crops after deducting expenses for crop-producing households was R114 per year.
4. In contrast, mean income from livestock after subtracting costs for livestock-owning households was R481 per year, or more than four times greater than stockless households.
5. The richest ten percent of rural households with incomes over R2,094 per year depended on livestock for 63% of their income.
6. Five percent of the population own fifty percent of the cattle and 45% of the population owns no cattle.
7. About 45% of rural households had incomes below the poverty datum line.

The correlation between cattle ownership and economic well-being is evident to most Batswana and many migrants use their savings to invest in cattle. The advantage to the individual is clear and the redistribution effect of miners' incomes flowing disproportionately to the poorest households has a positive impact on the society. On the other hand, the national herd is already of record size and threatens the fragile ecology of a drought-prone country forced to co-exist with the Kalahari Desert. In short, cattle raising has traditionally offered greater returns on investment and represents less difficult work than

crop agriculture. The injection of cash into the poorer households has simply enabled more people to act in their own economic interest.

To the emerging balance sheet must be added the negative consequences of foregone production from those economically active Batswana whose labor contributes to South African output. On the other hand, many migrants were only marginally productive when they were in their home areas and the individual opportunity cost may be relatively small. On the aggregate national level, however, the absence of young males places an added burden on women, children, and the elderly. Some studies have also shown that adoption of new farming techniques is sometimes deferred by women, who prefer the absent household head to make such decisions. Rural families are sometimes more reluctant to permit children to attend school if there is farm work to be done and older males are unavailable. Mitigating this likelihood is the fact that contracts average nine months, making some migrants available during the critical period of the agricultural cycle.

The impact on Botswana of labor migration might be summarized as follows:

<u>Positive</u>	<u>Negative</u>
1) Employment	1) Uncertainty and dependency
2) Income	2) Income Expenditure pattern
3) Redistribution effect	3) Foregone production
4) Foreign exchange	4) Social costs - family disruption
5) Some training	

The columns demonstrate clearly that in purely economic terms, on balance, migration benefits the individual and by extension has positive consequences for the macro-economy. It provides large numbers of jobs at comparatively good wages for unskilled labor, serves to lessen the skewed income distribution pattern, exposes workers to industrial procedures, and provides some limited skill training.

The effect on the macro-economy is less clear. On the one hand, Botswana earns foreign exchange and, at present, has employed in RSA a substantial number of its unskilled citizens who have no or only marginal alternatives in the present domestic economy. On the other hand, it is difficult to envisage the normal development of a society with such a high proportion of its most able-bodied males absent for much of the year and engaged in economic activity in a neighboring country which is fundamentally hostile to Botswana's principles and interests.

The case for gradual withdrawal from the South African labor market, therefore, does not rest primarily on economic considerations. Rather, the impact of labor migration on the total development of the country's political, economic, and social fabric must be assessed. From this perspective, the need for lessened dependency and alternative economic activities to facilitate this trend is apparent. The goal of Botswana, therefore, would seem to be to achieve this in as orderly a manner as possible, with the cooperation of RSA where feasible and with the support of the international community.

B. Lesotho

The dominant role of migrant labor in the economy of Lesotho has resulted from a number of historical factors, the most important of which was probably the combined ascendancy of Afrikaaner nationalism and British imperialism at the end of the 19th Century. Although by being incorporated into the British Empire the Basotho were saved from absorption by the Boers into South Africa proper, the best agricultural and grazing land in what was then Basotholand was ceded to the Orange Free State at the Aliwal North Convention. The British colonial administration then proceeded to impose a hut tax in order to

force the Basotho to work for cash in South Africa. The colonial government's policy of integrating Lesotho into the South African labor market is demonstrated by the quotation from the report of the Resident Commissioner for 1898/99 as quoted in van der Wiel (p. 13):

"Though for its size and population Basotholand produces a comparatively enormous amount of grain, it has an industry of great economic value to South Africa, the output of native labor. It supplies the sinews of agriculture in the Orange Free State; to a large extent it keeps going railway works, coal mining, the diamond mines at Jagersfontein and Kimberly, the gold mines of the Transvaal, and furnishes, in addition, a large amount of domestic services in the surrounding territories. The number of men who received passes for labor during the year under review amounted to 37,371. These facts are the best rejoinders to those who argue that Basotholand is a useless native reserve. To others who urge higher education of the natives, it may be pointed out that to educate them above labor would be a great mistake. Primarily the native labor industry supplies a dominion want, and secondly, it tends to fertilize native territories with cash which is at once diffused for English goods."

In addition to this deliberate policy of underdevelopment of the indigenous economy, Lesotho has suffered severe periods of drought, increasing population pressure on arable land and the attendant growth of soil erosion and overstocking of livestock. The deterioration of the land has continued to the point that, as Monyake and van der Wiel (p. 58) have noted, if every Basotho in the farm population aged 15-59 years were to work on the land available for cultivation, each person

in that group could work for about 19 days a year. The result has been that large numbers of Basotho men and women are forced to migrate to South Africa to earn a living.

In addition to the estimated 140,000 Basotho employed in the mines, van der Wiel (p. 16, p. 22) notes that there are approximately 40,000 migrants who were "between contracts," 20,000 Basotho working in South African industry and manufacturing, and 30,000 Basotho in agriculture and working as domestics. This total of 230,000 Basotho depending on salaries earned in South Africa represents almost one-fifth of the population of Lesotho. Other sources quote different estimates but it is clear that minimally there are 180-200,000 Basotho who depend on employment in South Africa for their livelihood.

The effect of this absentee population is most noticeable in the rural economy. With a majority of the male workforce between the ages of 18 and 45 normally absent from the country and working in South Africa, the active rural labor force in contemporary Lesotho is disproportionately comprised of women, children, and old people. Whereas 34% of Lesotho households are headed by women, 68% are managed by them.

Agricultural and livestock production have been particularly hampered by labor migration. Williams (p. 160) notes that the more than 22% of livestock owners working in South Africa contribute practically nothing to proper animal husbandry practices. He also shows that the number of Basotho working in the mines during the ploughing and planting months of November and December was only seven thousand below the average number absent for the entire year. This figure suggests that much-needed male labor was unavailable during the two critical months. The fact that much of the labor relating to livestock and crops is performed by migrants' children perpetuates the existence of a disadvantaged rural population. These children are not able to attend school regularly due to the work at home, they have acquired little formal knowledge or skill in crop and animal husbandry by the age of 18 or 19, and quite naturally see migration as the only way to earn a living.

Migration to the mines has nevertheless been the only economic opportunity for many Basotho males, particularly in light of the country's limited natural wealth and agricultural potential. Forty percent of the migrants are estimated to be

stockless. They have traditionally represented the least-educated sector of the population (although higher wages in the mines are drawing more migrants with secondary school educations). A majority (70%) of the migrants have a wife and children to support, and are usually responsible for a larger group of people (a "household") who live together and share the migrant's income. The migrants themselves have few opportunities open to them to earn any wages in Lesotho, let alone those at the level of the mines. Of a group of 109 migrants interviewed as they returned home for holidays, 96 stated they had no employment prospects in Lesotho and therefore had no intention of resettling in their home country.

The proximity of many of the mines to Lesotho has also "pulled" many workers as migrants. The Basotho do not have as far to travel to work in the mines as those from most other countries and are, therefore, not as subject to the long separations from family and home which other migrants face. They are also less separated from their home environment because of the presence of many thousands of ethnic Basotho who are South Africans.

Income from mine labor has become an important part of Lesotho's economy. The total 1976 contribution from miners in the form of deferred pay, family remittances, and repatriated earnings amounted to R100 million, or about one and one-half times the total recurrent budget of Lesotho. Van der Wiel (p. 87) reports that migrant earnings accounted for about 70% of the average rural household income in 1976. These funds and jobs are of such importance to the Government of Lesotho that the current Five-Year Development Plan projects an increase of 30,000 migrants between 1975 and 1980, representing fifty percent of all wage sector jobs to be created over the Plan period. Expansion does not, however, appear to be probable and government is concerned about the return of the migrants to an employment situation which is unable to meet their needs.

C. Malawi

The current Malawi migrant labor force, estimated by the February 15, 1978 Africa Research Bulletin at 17,000, is made up entirely of experienced laborers. There is no longer any recruitment of novices. As the current group of migrants retires from mine labor there may be a progressive phasing out of labor migration

from Malawi. Given the relatively small number of miners in comparison to the population of Malawi, the government does not anticipate great difficulty in finding productive employment for these workers.

However, Malawi, like Mozambique, has recently gone through the experience of absorbing a large number of laborers who no longer migrate to the mines. In April 1974 a chartered plane carrying migrants back to South Africa from holiday leave crashed in Botswana, killing all aboard. After the disaster Malawi terminated the recruitment of its nationals for employment in South Africa and over the subsequent twenty months more than 100,000 Malawian nationals returned to their home country. The ban on recruitment remained in effect when TEBA again began to recruit in Malawi.

In discussions with the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Labor, a number of specific questions were asked with regard to the reabsorption of this population into the Malawi economy and the possible need for special programs to facilitate this process. The Malawi Government stated that the bulk of migrant workers returned either to small-holder agriculture or to wage employment in construction.

and on agricultural estate--primarily tea and tobacco. The government stated that no studies or reports have been prepared either to assess the impact of the return of migrant laborers upon the economy and society of Malawi or to facilitate their reintegration.

The rather abrupt return of 100,000+ people could be expected to have negative implications for a developing economy; however, Malawi has many strengths which may have permitted it to reabsorb this number of people more easily than a country like Lesotho. First, with roughly the same number of migrant workers in South Africa at peak level as Lesotho, Malawi has five times the population into which the migrant population can be reabsorbed. Secondly, Malawi has a relatively rich, diversified agricultural sector and ample quantities of fertile land. Although it cannot be statistically demonstrated, it is likely that the return of able-bodied males in this magnitude would have had some positive impact on agricultural production both in the small-holder areas and on the estates which occasionally in the past suffered from labor shortages as a result of the overall level of migration.^{1/}

^{1/} In fact, there was a significant increase in agricultural production in 1976; however, there is no way to prove a cause-effect relationship with the return of migrant labor, given the unavailability of sufficient data and the number of variables.

It was asserted by several people in Malawi that one negative consequence of the return of migrant laborers was an increase in the crime rate, particularly in the larger urban centers. This may reflect the fact that not all laborers were reintegrated into Malawi society as easily as the government would have liked and there were instances of returned migrants remaining in the urban centers often without any visible source of income; however, it is also true that Malawi has been able to sustain its position for four years while admitting only a limited return to the labor migration pattern. The return of migrants to Malawi resulted in a significant loss in terms of foreign exchange ^{1/} for the country on the macro level and also represented a loss of income for many individual families. The average mine wage in 1974 of approximately R565 was considerably above whatever income the returned migrant was able to earn in Malawi. The current average mine wage of an estimated

1/ Foreign reserves were reported to have decreased from K68 million in June 1975 to K28 million in June 1976, representing less than two months imports. In addition to the loss of remittances from migrant workers, this has also been caused by rapidly rising costs of imports and the effect of Mozambique's closure of its border with Southern Rhodesia which required the identification of alternative markets for 12% of exports and 7% of imports. The decline in remittances alone are reported to have totaled about K25 million from 1975 to 1976.

R140 per month (R70 per month starting wage for underground work as of July 1978) is roughly equivalent to three years wages for unskilled labor in Malawi. There can be no doubt that laborers were uneasy at the thought of experiencing such a reduction in earnings, even with new jobs in agriculture or construction.

An analysis of the social and economic impact of the return of migrants and the areas of activity in which they find themselves at present would provide instructive information for any government contemplating labor withdrawal from South Africa; however, at present, Malawi does not plan such a study.

D. Mozambique

Mozambique was for many years the principal supplier of migrant labor to the South African mines. The colonial authorities were more than willing to provide the mines with as many laborers as could be absorbed, since the Portuguese made enormous profits from the system of deferred pay which was part of the Mozambique Convention. Under this system approximately 25% of the miners' wages were paid by the South African Government to the

colonial authorities in the form of gold valued at \$42 per ounce. The Portuguese were then able to sell the gold in the world market at the current rate, thereby realizing handsome profits.

The character of the new government in Maputo prompted the authorities in South Africa to hasten the reduction in the flow of migrants, particularly since some migrants from independent Mozambique reflected the political leanings of their new government. The Mozambique Convention was compromised by transferring the responsibility for the gold payments mentioned above to the mining houses, whereby causing the Mozambican laborers to become much more expensive to the industry. As a result, on April 11, 1978 the Mozambique Convention came to an end. These events resulted in a drop from more than 100,000 migrants employed^{1/} in 1975 to one-third that figure recruited in 1976, with only those applicants who had worked a minimum of forty-five weeks in the mines accepted. The numbers have continued to decline since then to a 1977

^{1/} Statistics vary according to source: Wilson quotes S.A. House of Assembly debates where the figure 127,000 was used for 1973, Burgess (New Africa) claims "about 130,000 in 1975" and Stahl claims 100,000 in 1973. See also Table III.

TABLE III

MOZAMBIQUE

LABOUR SUPPLY TRENDS 1970-77 RECRUITMENT FIGURES FOR ALL AGENCIES (000 WORKERS)

	<u>TEFA</u>	<u>Other Agencies</u>	<u>Total</u>
1970	94	21	115
1971	75	17	92
1972	74	16	90
1973	75	--	--
1974	87	20	107
1975	115	13	128
1976	33	10	43
1977	37	5 (until June)	

Source : This set of figures is reported by the Center of African Studies, Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo and the Ministry of Labor of Mozambique.

total of 41,000, representing only 9% of total foreign migrant labor for that year, compared to about 22-27% for 1975.

In his paper on Swaziland de Vletter (I, p. 28) discusses the motivation behind the large migration patterns in the past from Mozambique. He describes the very poor as having no alternative, the poor as seeing migration as a way to build up the farm through the purchase of implements and other capital requirements, and those with some income base at home as interested in maintaining the comparatively highly-paid positions already held in the mines. This analysis probably helps to explain how, in the case of some Mozambicans in particular, migration to South Africa may well have been an example of "target employment" in which wages were sought for specific uses.

The integration of over eighty thousand migrants into the post-independence economy has almost surely been one of the greatest challenges facing the new government of Mozambique, particularly in light of the loss of revenue resulting from the termination of the Mozambique Convention. This loss appears to have amounted in 1977 to a 50-75% drop in the amount paid in 1977 compared to 1975. In addition, further depletion

of reserves has occurred as a consequence of the border closure with S. Rhodesia and the exodus of Portuguese nationals. Reabsorption of the miners is also complicated by the fact that the Mozambican migrants historically were required to complete twelve-month contracts, thus effectively excluding them from the agricultural cycle. When the scale of land alienation during the colonial period for the establishment of expatriate-controlled agricultural estates is realized, the difficulty of reabsorbing these migrants in a short period into the new Mozambique becomes obvious. Government appears to have two options at its disposal with regard to the sizeable ex-migrant population: their re-establishment in the communal villages, or their absorption on the plantations which have now become state sector farms. As in the case of Malawi, estate agriculture workers are required in significant numbers; however, it is not known what number have been reabsorbed in this way. There may be other alternatives which could better utilize the limited skills which may have been acquired by some Mozambican workers in South Africa, and these could have a favorable impact on Mozambique if properly utilized.

E. Namibia

Statistics in all sectors for Namibia have been difficult to obtain as they have been grouped into totals for South Africa. It must be assumed that external labor migration has never played an important role in Namibia's economy. The majority of the labor force lives along the northern border and the migration which has taken place has been primarily to mines within the country. In 1972 the South African Government did enter into agreements with the authorities of the Namibian "homelands" which resulted in the employment of approximately 2,500 miners by the Chamber of Mines in April 1977. It is highly unlikely that external labor migration to South Africa will ever have a significant impact upon Namibia's economy, given the small population and the shortage of workers in relation to the development potential of the country.

F. Swaziland

The number of laborers migrating to South Africa has risen in recent years but has never represented the high percentage of the total labor force found in other supplier states. Doran (p. 2) cites figures between 7,000-9,000 p.a. for recruitment

in the gold, platinum, and coal mines in the period 1966-74. The numbers did show a dramatic increase beginning in 1975 as a result of the higher wages paid in the mines, but according to the TEBA representative in Swaziland, the numbers have declined to approximately 9,300 in the first half of 1978, of which 10% are novices.

Swaziland is somewhat unique among the supplier states in that the principal "pull factor" behind labor migration and high wages in South Africa is not matched by an equally strong "push factor" operating within the country. The issue is less the lack of jobs in Swaziland than the fact that available wage employment in agriculture (particularly cutting sugar cane) is seen by many Swazis as being too difficult for the low wages involved. In fact, Swaziland has periodically depended on foreign migrants from Mozambique to supply some of this labor, particularly in the 1974-76 period. Even before mine labor became a financially appealing alternative, however, Swaziland's agricultural production was hampered by the predominant role of cattle, the stifling of agricultural initiative by

conservative agrarian attitudes and the expropriation of much of the best land by foreigners. Government is aware of the debilitating effects of overgrazing; however, the use of cattle as a form of savings with dividends accruing in the form of progeny is a basis of Swazi culture and the traditional "Swazi Nation" government appears reluctant to take major initiatives in the absence of alternatives which provide and are seen to provide greater economic security for many Swazi citizens. Increased wages in the mines have exacerbated this situation by making more cash available for the purchase of cattle, while decreasing the availability of farm labor.

Low (p. 5) reports that in 1977 only 23% of the farm labor force aged 16-60 was male, whereas those aged 9-15 constituted 37%, and women aged 16-60 was 28%. Doran (p. 29) shows that as real mine wages, as adjusted by the annual cost of living index for Swaziland, rose from an average of E176 per annum in 1970 to E613 in 1976, the per capita rural income remained at E32 per year and the average per hectare maize production of Swazi Nation land dropped from 1155 kg. to

1058 kg. Thus on the aggregate level there appear to be some negative consequences from the absence of working-age males on one-third of the rural homesteads; however, due to the brevity of contracts (6 months on average) and their phasing, a considerable level of migration appears possible without a marked effect on future crop production.

The Swazi migrant appears to perceive wage employment in South Africa primarily as a means to supplement his rural activities with an outside source of income. De Vletter (I, p. 42) has characterized the Swazi migrant as an "income maximizer retaining rural links," and sees little hope of altering the migration pattern without the promotion, *inter alia*, of high-income, labor-intensive cash crops. This view is shared by Low, who outlines a program for increased maize production (Swaziland currently imports 20,000 tons a year from South Africa) combined with intensive cotton and tobacco production.

Although Swazi migration is less characterized by factors operating in other supplier states and there is perhaps less "pressure" built up in an absolute sense which forces migration, de Vletter (I, p. 27) nevertheless

points out that 80% of an interviewed group of returning migrants would rather return to the mines than be employed full time in Swaciland, given the wage differentials. In the same survey half of those non-migrants queried cited home and/or family commitments as the principal reason for staying home. Family and homestead obligations thus remain a significant factor in the decisionmaking of the individual worker, despite the fact that Swazi migrants are able to return more frequently to their agricultural holdings than workers from other supplier states.

Government recognizes that there may be a lessening dependence on Swazi labor in the mines, despite their proven abilities at semi-skilled jobs such as machine workers; however, there is no thought of any abrupt end to migration. This is not only impractical (given the long open border), but an end to recruitment in Swaziland would deny the government the income from the miners' remittances. Government also recognizes that there is the potential for Swaziland to profit from the increased awareness of production maximization,

safety consciousness, and team work which the migrants acquire as part of work in the mines.

G. Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

S. Rhodesia/Zimbabwe has been both an importer and exporter of labor migrants. The somewhat complex history of this labor migration is best understood in the context of recent history in the country. Recruitment for the mines in South Africa ceased in 1912 and did not begin again until 1975. During this period the economy of S. Rhodesia experienced a boom and there was a need to import labor from the neighboring states. By 1956 foreign African workers (principally from Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique) represented over 50% of the total workforce. Migration to S. Rhodesia began to decline in 1958 and by 1975 foreigners made up only 23% of the workforce.

At the same time that immigration was slowing down emigration to South Africa started again. In addition to a decline in economic growth, the country has experienced a population growth of over 3% since the 1930s and agricultural wages have not kept pace with inflation. The 1972 agricultural wages were

lower in real terms than those paid in 1948. The migrants to South Africa in 1975 earned R2.20 per shift compared to an average of 31 cents^{1/} for a day's work in S. Rhodesia. The economic picture in S. Rhodesia has been further affected by the growing drain of the war and the white emigration, estimated for 1977 to have been almost 4% of the total white population.

It is difficult to obtain precise figures on the number of S. Rhodesians working in South Africa for two reasons: first, the term "tropical" has traditionally been used to provide one set of figures for both S. Rhodesia and Malawi; and second, as of September 1977 the monthly recruitment figures for S. Rhodesia have become classified information. Clarke (I, p. 13) estimated the August 1977 level in South Africa to be 26,000 migrants, whereas the TEBA quota for 1977 was 25,000. The majority of these had no previous employment, which demonstrates controls the S. Rhodesian mining and agricultural sectors have been able to exert on the recruitment of gainfully employed workers within their sectors of the economy.

^{1/} As reported by Clarke. The official statistics of the S. Rhodesian Ministry of Finance show a slightly higher figure of about 58 cents per day for six days a week.

The future of S. Rhodesian migration is as cloudy as the rest of the country's prospects. An early test of independent Zimbabwe's economy could come from the return of many of the S. Rhodesians who now live and work outside the mining sector on a semi-permanent basis in South Africa. Since 1976 these S. Rhodesians, estimated to number between 25,000 and 80,000, have been subject to much stricter controls and supervision. Illegal workers caught entering the Republic have been prosecuted and repatriated. A deferred pay plan, similar to the program in effect for miner migrants, was begun by the South African Government. This plan, which is more severe in its requirements than the scheme for mines, has meant that only single S. Rhodesians can afford to remain in South Africa, and then for only short periods. This program has also served to ensure that occupational mobility is restricted to low-wage or designed sectors in which foreigners may work and makes the TEBA contract agreement the most prominent form of labor supply agreement between the two countries.

A second test of the future Zimbabwe economy will come from the considerable number of foreign

African workers in the country. Clarke (I, p. 22) estimates the 1975 figure at approximately 214,000, out of a total African wage employment population of 934,000. S. Rhodesia therefore has the highest proportion of foreign workers on the sub-continent. (The percentage of foreigners in the workforce has nevertheless been on the decline - See the Table below.) The presence of this large group of foreign workers has had a direct effect on the salaries paid in the S. Rhodesian wage sector and, therefore, on the number of migrants who go to South Africa in search of better paying jobs.

The agricultural sector, which employs over one-third of all foreigners, has been allowed to retain its foreign workers during a period of general displacement of foreign African labor and growing unemployment. These agricultural interests have been able to maintain a low-wage policy, thereby ensuring greater profits, because the foreign workers represent, as Clarke (I, p. 23) calls them, a "captive labor supply." The working conditions for these foreigners are almost unilaterally controlled by S. Rhodesian

TABLE IV

SOUTHERN RHODESIA: AFRICAN WORKERS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
FOR 1972 TO 1975

YEAR (March)	ZIMBABWE		-----OTHER COUNTRIES-----					TOTAL FOREIGN		TOTAL EMPLOYED			
	Total	% of Total	Total	% of Total	Total	% of Total	Total	% of Total	Total	% of Total	Total		
1972	580,052	73%	106,463	13%	87,944	10%	20,411	3%	6,970	1%	221,788	27%	801,840
1973	632,536	74%	106,173	11%	89,218	10%	19,956	2%	5,101	1%	220,448	26%	852,984
1974	671,677	76%	105,199	11%	87,826	10%	19,595	2%	5,134	1%	217,754	24%	889,431
1975	714,619	77%	102,892	11%	86,140	9%	20,304	2%	4,685	1%	214,021	23%	928,640

Source: C.S.O., African Employees by Country of Origin, DL/978/15, Salisbury, December 1975, (mimeo).

authorities with no involvement by governments of the supplier states. The workers either endure the wages and conditions in S. Rhodesia or they enter (or re-enter) the employment market in their home country in the lowest-wage sectors.

The foreign migrant population in S. Rhodesia has, to use Clarke's term, "internalized"; that is, the numbers immigrating and emigrating have become approximately the same. Many have actually settled in S. Rhodesia and would be difficult to repatriate. The post-independence government will nevertheless face the fact that some of these foreign laborers occupy positions which some returning Zimbabweans, including thousands of refugees, may be able to fill. Malawi and Mozambique may then be faced not only with the return of migrants from South Africa but also the absorption of sizeable contingents from Zimbabwe.

IV. CONDITIONS FOR FOREIGN MIGRANT WORKERS PARTICULARLY IN MINING IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE EFFECT UPON THE INDIVIDUAL WORKER

A. Introduction

Any assessment of living and working conditions will contain elements of both subjectivity and relativity which will result in strikingly different perspectives on the part of mine workers, mine owners, government officials, and independent observers. The objective conditions (nature of recruitment, wages, benefits and legal constraints imposed by Apartheid) are examined below; however, the subjective interpretation of these conditions must be considered first in order to understand the context of the debate regarding them and the implications of this debate for a subsequent examination of supplier state options to labor migration.

An exceptionally useful insight into the perspective of the South African Government was obtained from a recent confidential report of a government commission of inquiry (the McKay Commission) into the causes of rioting and unrest among mine workers. The report sought to identify the "underlying causes" of repeated mine disturbances, propose measures to reduce violence by workers in the future, and assess

the relationship of the mining houses to black workers generally.

The McKay Commission concluded that most riots were the result of ethnic hostilities and stated that:

"Despite the influence of the White man, civilisation, religion and Western standards, the tendency to become violent, where tribal differences are involved, is practically spontaneous. The ethnologist and Bantu expert, Dr. Van Warmelo, stated inter alia, that the southern Bantu tribes (Xhosa, Basotho, etc.) are particularly inclined to become violent and that they even regard fighting as a form of recreation." (p. 7)

The "crux of the problem," the report continues, "is tribal man's belief in insidious forces of evil." (p. 13) Later the McKay Commission also identifies political events in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, the consumption of alcoholic beverages, the absence of press censorship to prevent news of unrest from spreading to different mines and an "indulgent attitude on the part of mine management" towards mine workers as contributing to the problem. Having identified the "causes" of difficulties on the mines, the Commission then provided the following assessment of the role played by the mine owners:

"...the Committee is convinced that in general mining authorities are now doing everything they can to make life as comfortable as possible in the hostels and compounds...Mining authorities constantly busy themselves in improving housing and conveniences and we are satisfied that they fulfill the needs of Black workers wherever they possibly can." (p. 14)

The most illuminating section of the report deals with measures to address the "causes" of riots mentioned above but implicitly reveals conditions which are in fact the real causes of unrest and serves to reinforce the views of more independent observers and those of a recent Anglo-American Corporation report with respect to conditions at the mines. Among the McKay Commission recommendations were the following:

1. the end of "exploitative store owners at mines" to be accomplished by legislation to permit mine-controlled stores at regulated prices;
2. more careful selection of personnel supervisors to ensure they are interested in the welfare of laborers;
3. more contact by white supervisors with their black workers "to learn the customs of the Bantu";
4. machinery should be created to air workers' grievances since they have no effective channel of communication, however, "they are not ripe (sic) for a statutory committee system" (p. 26);
5. more police raids on "Shebeens" to reduce liquor consumption;

6. the mines should establish their own security forces which should train with the South African police and should purchase ample quantities of batons, attack dogs, tear gas and armored carriers to permit them to control their workers adequately;
7. smaller hostels should be built with no more than ten men to a room and showers should be located more closely to the hostels; and finally
8. the report urged the management to encourage singing to keep workers' minds off other issues!

In comparison, the Anglo-American Corporation recently produced a report on conditions which was partly based on findings of a research project conducted by African university students who were recruited for the mines, interviewed workers, and noted problems. The report stated that ethnically-segregated hostels foster hostilities which tend to break down in the common working environment and blamed poor and frequently humiliating conditions for most of the social problems on the mines.

A key finding of the report was the frustration encountered by black miners who have no recourse to injustices and insults from white miners. "The white miner's insistence on respect due to his white skin and his demand that blacks jump unquestioningly to his every command necessarily increases tension underground." The black miners generally believe that

although they are paid much less, they are required to do most of the hard physical labor. The mine management is seen by them to side automatically with white miners in any dispute and whites, in any event, have a powerful union to protect them. As a consequence, black workers see the management as either "distant or totally despotic."

South African blacks with whom the Mission discussed conditions on the mines reiterated the problems of exploitation and discrimination which are the two pillars of South African employment policies for blacks. The Anglo-American Corporation has a few black employees who have recently been promoted to junior management positions; however, the pervasive legal restrictions on black advancement which characterize the Apartheid system place an artificial limit on career possibilities which serves to stifle initiative while compromising the individual trapped between a suspicious working class and an--at best--paternalistic white management.

One of the more shocking aspects of the almost wholly inconsistent views of the nature of conditions and causes of dissatisfaction in the

mines is the fact that the air of unreality which attaches to the government view appears to extend to the entire society, thus embracing non-mine foreign migrant workers as well.

B. Recruitment

The recruitment of foreign migrants by South African employers is in accordance with each supplier state's labor legislation and the conditions outlined in the written agreement between the two governments. The majority of laborers are recruited through The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA) which is the recruitment arm of the Chamber of Mines. According to figures from mid-1977 South African House of Assembly debates, TEBA recruited approximately 73% of all foreign miners and 60% of all foreign African laborers in South Africa.

Upon receipt of a statement from the South African District Labor Bureau that domestic labor is not available, TEBA or another recruiter deals directly in the supplier state under the terms of recruiting licenses which are issued by the Labor Commissioner in each country. In theory the issuance of these licenses is made in light of the following conditions:

- a) an understanding of the possible effects on the supplier state from withdrawal of large numbers of adult males (this in fact is not usually considered often due to understaffing);
- b) provision of measures to safeguard the health and welfare of recruits;
- c) verification of the recruiter's ability to fulfill the required legal obligations.

The recruiters are required to keep proper records of their operations and to provide relevant statistics to the Labor Commissioner on a regular basis. They must also pay a licensing fee which varies from country to country. The recruiting agencies give daily postings of mines which have vacancies and an applicant can often choose his assignment, although certain companies prefer certain nationalities. The Labor Commissioner is expected to ensure that the recruiters satisfy the requirements of the licensing laws and validate the terms of the contract. This service is paid for by the recruiter in the form of an attestation fee which ranges from R5 per miner in Swaziland up to R15 in Lesotho.

During the recruitment and processing period the applicants are kept at the recruitment center for up to three days. Among other things discussed at the recruiting station are terms of

the contract, the deferred payment scheme, provisions for cash bonuses and re-employment guarantees, stipulations regarding the length of the contract and accident/death benefits. In addition to processing, enrollment, and contract signing the recruit faces the first of three medical exams. These exams are seen by the recruits quoted by Alverson, de Vletter, the Anglo-American Report and others as being both perfunctory and insulting. In some instances the doctor checks the heartbeat and nothing else while workers are forced to stand naked for long periods. Wallis (p. 10) describes a situation in the recruiting center in Lesotho where, in the absence of a doctor, the labor officials administered the exam. This initial exam is seen as the first step of an induction process into the life in the mines.

C. Wages

As shown in the following Table, perhaps the most dramatic change in the mines over the past five years has been the increase in wages in the mines, partially as a result of the increase in gold prices.

TABLE V
ANNUAL AVERAGE CASH EARNINGS IN GOLD MINES
1969 - 75

Year	Average Earnings Rand		Earnings Rand		Index of Real Earnings (1970=100)	
	White	Black	Diff.	Ratio	White	Black
1969	4,006	199	3,807	20,1:1	97	100
1970	4,329	208	4,121	20,8:1	100	100
1971	4,633	221	4,412	21,0:1	101	100
1972	4,936	257	4,679	19,2:1	101	110
1973	5,881	350	5,531	16,8:1	109	136
1974	6,974	565	6,409	12,3:1	117	197
1975	7,929	948	6,982	8,4:1	118	294

Source: Chamber of Mines, Annual Reports.

Between 1973 and 1976 the average annual cash mine earnings for Basotho laborers in particular in current terms rose from R315 to R1056 and the June 1975 minimum wage of R2.20 per shift was over five times higher than the figure had been three years previously.

Salaries have continued to rise above the '75/76 levels. The mid-1977 average salary was just over R103 per month and the June 30, 1978 Johannesburg Star reported that a boost of over 11% for novice wages would bring the beginning underground wage to R17.70 per week and the starting surface salary to R11.70 per week (both plus room and board). However, with inflation in South Africa over 10% this represents virtually no gain in real terms. It should also be pointed out that while the

wage gap between white and black miners has changed from 1:21 in 1971 to 1:8 in 1977, the absolute gap for yearly earnings (currently about R9,000) continues to increase. Higher wages have meant that the mining companies have had fewer problems finding sufficient labor and have been able to be more selective in whom they hire.

Many African workers also began to see mine labor in a different light. Whereas the workers had been earning at a rate which was sufficient to finance only a specific project or purchase (the so-called "target worker"), the increased earnings allowed the worker to finance more long-range projects and to participate to a greater extent in the deferred-pay scheme.

Under the deferred pay plan for most countries a percentage of a miner's salary (in most cases 60%) is paid directly to a common account in the home country. This program, which is obligatory for all miners, can be expanded by the individual miner to cover up to 90% of his salary. The deferred pay earns interest and may be reclaimed by the migrant upon his return home.

Workers are also eligible for cash bonuses and re-engagement guarantees which are linked to a specific minimum length of service and a return to work within a stipulated time period spent on home leave. The length of the contract, which has varied from approximately six months for Swazis to almost two years for Malawi workers, now more frequently averages 9-12 months as a result of the industry's stabilization program.

D. Benefits

The accident and death benefits paid to a miner or his survivors obviously vary depending on the circumstances. As explained by Mr. M. J. Christie of the TEBA office in Siteki, Swaziland, the death benefits consist of a lump sum of R300 paid to the family, plus a pension which is based on the earnings, the assets, and the physical state of the dependents. There is also a "long-service award" of R100 for each year worked in some circumstances of involuntary separation from the mines. Accident benefits are determined by a medical board at the mine. An example cited by Mr. Christie was a 60% disability case which paid an initial lump sum of R500 and a pension of approximately R55 per month for life.

E. Housing

As with most other aspects of South African life, the availability and quality of housing depends upon race and the political and economic decisions made by the all-white minority government. One recommendation of the McKay Commission was to provide more quarters for married miners and increase the provision for regular visits to the compounds by wives.

Despite this, it is currently illegal for foreign migrant workers to bring their families to the mines and government will permit a maximum of only three percent of domestic migrant laborers to live in married facilities. For the moment workers from the supposedly independent "homeland" of Transkei are categorized as "domestic"; however, this could alter if the policy with respect to possible trade unionism for blacks is followed.^{1/}

^{1/} The Wiehan Commission is expected to make a recommendation to the government in October 1978 on the question of trade unions for blacks. It is widely expected that the recommendation will be favorable; however, by defining "citizens of the homelands" as "foreigners" there will technically be very few black South Africans left to join them.

Even the question of such limited facilities is largely academic, however, since the most progressive firm (Anglo-American) has managed to house less than one percent of its workers together with their families. The Mission learned from Anglo's spokesman that the "ultimate goal" of the corporation is to house 10% even while admitting that "probably fifty percent would desire family housing."

The hope for foreign migrant workers, therefore, appears to be to obtain a shorter contract in a mine as close to home as possible with greater provisions for weekend or short-term visits. Questions of this sort could usefully be the subject of negotiations between the labor representatives of the supplier states and the mining houses.

F. Work at the Mines

The recruits are transported by road or rail to a processing center near the mines. A second medical exam, similar to the first, takes place, x-rays are made, and aptitude tests determine which miners are placed in more responsible or demanding positions. The recruits who are medically qualified then go to the mine, where a third medical exam is taken.

In addition, the recruits receive instruction in accident prevention, are taught the mine lingua franca, "Fanakalo," and are introduced to the rules and regulations of the mine.

The recruits selected for the better-paying--but more dangerous--undergrounds jobs then go through a process of acclimatisation to the extreme working conditions they will face. This process is particularly hated by the workers, partially because of its rigorous nature and partially because only the blacks working underground are forced to go through it. For three to four hours during a four- to nine-day period the recruits perform certain menial exercises in a special building where temperatures are raised to 35°C., approximating the conditions they will face in the mine. Each day upon completion of this acclimatisation the miners engage in work on the surface. Once "acclimated" the miners are ready to go underground.

The ratio of underground African laborers to surface African laborers is 3 to 1; therefore the following comments concerning the laborers, both foreign and domestic, apply to the majority of African miners. Despite recent

changes in working conditions for blacks, the type of employment underground is strictly controlled by white union regulations. In 1970, the ECA stated that 97.3% of all foreign migrant workers in South Africa were classified as unskilled and treated as an undifferentiated mass of interchangeable workers. More recently the estimated December 1976 skill distribution of Basotho underground workers in gold mines, which is probably representative of other black mine workers, was presented by van der Wiel (p. 24):

Unskilled (general shaft personnel)	35%
Semi-skilled (drill operators, engine drivers)	53%
Supervisory	9%
In Training	3%

Any mobility from this structure is impeded by (a) the legal requirement of obtaining a "blaster's certificate" or a "certificate of competency," which can be obtained only from white mining schools; and (b) the closed-shop agreements awarded to recognized trade unions (which are all white). Not only are the black laborers locked into job categories and classifications, they are more susceptible to accidents (because of their work assignments) and

to disease (in part due to their physical state upon arrival and the less-than-thorough medical screening process). Van der Wiel reports that of a group of Basotho who were interviewed to learn why they had returned to Lesotho from the mines, 42% listed "health problems" as the cause.

Using the accident and death rates available at the time, and taking into account the variation in rates from mine to mine, McDowell (p. 17) estimated that within a year of the recruitment of the more than 101,000 Lesotho miners in 1972, approximately:

- 160-380 would die at the mine;
- 2,900 would be repatriated as a result of accidents
- 4,300 would be repatriated as a result of occupational diseases

The figures for repatriation do not include the many accidents and illnesses treated at the mines. The most common diseases acquired or exacerbated underground, as listed by Alverson (p. 95) are silicosis, heat stroke, miner's cramp, heat rashes and boils, lung infections, and tuberculosis. Alverson (p. 94) also presents the four most striking and painful aspects of underground work as heat, physical strain, dust, and noise. He notes that

the jackhammers deliver between 1,720 and 2,200 blows per minute.

G. Life at the Mine

Life on the mining compounds is partly a function of the compound design. The closed compounds found at most gold mine sites are modeled after the compounds originally used in Kimberly to prevent diamond theft and the installations erected to house indentured Chinese brought in to mine gold. Miners do have the option of living off the compound, but housing is difficult to find, may be some distance from the mine, and most of the men therefore take advantage of the compound's free room and board.

There are limited facilities for recreation and training in literacy and languages in some mines but the majority of miners are reported to be too tired after work to do more than relax and drink. The quality of food seems to vary greatly and, in the newer compounds the miners have the option of buying food with an allowance and preparing it themselves. Miners are also able to leave the compound for one- or two-day periods under special circumstances, but there is a severe

sanction for failure to return at the appointed time. There are few opportunities for the black miners to escape from the constant pressures of the closed environment of the compound.

The Apartheid concept described earlier in relation to work also carries over to social interaction between the two races. As quoted in Another Blanket (p. 15), part of the introduction to the rules and regulations of the compound includes the rule that "under no circumstances should a black miner fight a white miner. If the white miner seems ready to fight one should run away." Compound life also affords very few social outlets, with the result that homosexuality has become part of everyday life in the compound. Reports on compound life show that homosexuality among the miners is not solely the result of heterosexual deprivation or sexual preference. As described by Wilson, de Vletter, and others, homosexuality is ingrained in the power structure of the mines and has become a "social and professional requirement."

The miners have contact with black authority figure ("indunas") in the mine

hierarchy who are often seen as imposed puppets who are paid to "eat and inform." Some also have contact with the Labor Representative. The Labor Representative (for migrants from Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland only) is the official delegate in South Africa who is charged with tax collection and quasi-consular activities concerning the general welfare of the migrants. The position does not seem to be taken seriously and there seems little for the person to do since all records and official statistics are maintained by either the mine officials or the recruitment station in the home country. Industrial relations and personnel counseling appear to be seen as low priorities by the Labor Representatives, many of whom are poorly trained for the assignment.

The overall impression one gains from reading about work and life at the mines is best summed up by an ex-miner interviewed by Alverson, who characterized the entire experience as "rough," and who said that men who would act differently in a different setting became part of the somewhat de-humanized and de-humanizing environment of no

privacy, rough language, forced homosexuality, and confrontation which is similar to the prevailing conditions of many prisons.

V. THE IMPACT ON AND STRATEGY OF SOUTH AFRICA WITH RESPECT TO LABOR MIGRATION

A. The Impact of Foreign Labor Migration on South Africa

The long-term presence of substantial numbers of foreign workers in South Africa has contributed to three problems which have been of central concern to the majority black South African population. First, the ability of employers to draw upon a regional labor pool has created less favorable conditions in which to make effective demands for improved wages, working conditions, and the right to unionize. In a tighter national labor market with fewer linguistic and cultural differences and a workforce more familiar with local conditions, South African blacks would be better able to exercise leverage and organize informally to advance their interests. Second, despite legal restrictions on foreign migrants being employed in certain sectors of the economy, the general impact of the presence of foreign migrants, especially outside the mining sector, has been to depress wages for domestic workers, particularly on "white" farms and for household workers. Finally, the level of unemployment among South African blacks (see Table below) has been adversely affected by competition from

TABLE VI

UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1960-76
(thousands)

Date	Labour supply	Employment	Unemployment (No.)	(%)
1960	6 733	5 601	1 132	16.8
1961	6 844	5 729	1 115	16.3
1962	7 039	5 843	1 196	17.0
1963	7 208	6 015	1 193	16.6
1964	7 384	6 250	1 134	15.4
1965	7 576	6 420	1 156	15.3
1966	7 772	6 693	1 079	13.9
1967	7 974	6 934	1 040	13.0
1968	8 181	6 947	1 234	15.1
1969	8 398	7 275	1 123	13.4
1970	8 614	7 363	1 251	14.5
1971	8 820	7 614	1 206	13.7
1972	9 066	7 733	1 333	14.7
1973	9 319	8 008	1 311	14.1
1974	9 563	8 233	1 330	13.9
1975	9 782	8 406	1 476	14.1
1976	10 033	8 573	1 460	14.6

Source: Charles Simkins, *Measuring and Predicting Unemployment in South Africa, 1960-77*, in C. Simkins and D. G. Clarke, Structural Unemployment in South Africa, Natal University Press, Pietermaritzburg, 1977.

foreign workers. While this has been less true historically in the mines (an area shunned by South African blacks until 1973-4 in favor of better paying positions in other sectors), manufacturing agriculture, and services have been affected for some time.

The converse of the above can be seen in the benefits accruing to the minority white population--cheap labor for homes, farms and industries, labor without dependents to house, and a wage structure appealing to international capital seeking to maximize profits through foreign investments.

The economy has profited enormously from the availability of cheap labor, which has increased the imbalance between the South African center and the peripheral economies of the supplier states. The rate of capital accumulation has even been stimulated by the expenditures of the foreign workers themselves, since a considerable portion of cash earned in the mines is spent in South Africa. Basotho miners spent 28% in cash plus 15% on goods in South Africa directly, while the average Motswana miner spends 40% in cash and an additional 14% on goods to take home at the end of each contract. In addition, of course, most of the consumer items available in the supplier states, particularly in those states which are members of the Southern Africa Customs Union, are imported from South Africa. This fact tends to act as a disincentive to the development of import substitution activities and further conditions

consumers to "buy South African," thereby benefitting the South African economy.

The economic linkages are, of course, complex and it is not the purpose of this report to examine benefits to South Africa in detail. Despite the argument that there is a circular effect in which foreign wages spent in South Africa also affect the economy to the benefit of black South Africans by stimulating employment creation and output, on balance the more direct impact appears to be negative in terms of the overall economic interests of South African blacks.

B. South African Mine Labor Strategy for the Future

The link between South African labor strategy and the discussion in Part VI regarding options for the supplier states cannot be overemphasized. Indeed, a key finding of the Mission is that the initiative on the overall question of levels and sources of foreign migrant labor, at present, lies to a greater extent with South Africa than with the supplier states. The importance of this section of the report, therefore, flows from the key objective of the next: to identify options and build scenarios which will serve to increase the control of the supplier states over their own

economies and, consequently, over their own development and the welfare of their citizens.

The labor strategy of the mining houses and the South African Government is not, to the Mission's knowledge, set out in any single document or master plan. Their responses to events occurring over the past few years constitute a record of reactions and initiatives which, when viewed together, reveal a pattern of decisionmaking with a core of common motives and approaches. Most of these actions seem designed, to use an old diplomatic axiom, to maximize alternatives and minimize risks. They can be grouped under the following headings: localization, stabilization, mechanization, multiple supply sources, limited elite formation and co-optation, and institutionalized racial discrimination and repression.

Before examining each of these strategy elements in turn, the economic and geopolitical context which has promoted them should be summarized:

1. The Context of the Strategy

The following factors have had or may have a direct impact on the employment of foreign migrant labor in South Africa:

- a. The success of nationalist movements in Portugal's African colonies precipitated a coup d'état in Portugal in 1974 which led to independence for, among others, Mozambique and Angola. Suddenly Mozambique, the source of supply for a quarter of all mine workers in South Africa, was governed by a militant black government hostile to South Africa's race policies and economic system.
- b. In April 1974 Malawi banned recruitment of its nationals for employment in South Africa and over 100,000 workers (nearly 30% of all mine employees) were repatriated at the end of their contracts over a 20-month period.
- c. More frequent and bloodier uprisings in the mining compounds began in 1973 and resulted in at least 132 dead over the subsequent 18 months, causing production losses and increased recruiting problems.

- d. Global economic trends had both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, the price of gold rose from R25.8 per fine ounce in 1970 to R107.4 in 1974 and as of July 25, 1978 stood at R182.20 (US\$209.50). On the other hand, the rise in oil prices was costly to a country which has so far failed to locate major deposits of its own and uses a great deal of energy to extract gold in particular from deep-level mines. Since the majority of foreign migrants work in the mines and most of those are on the gold mines, the impact of this on wages and the demand for labor is obvious.
- e. The impending transition to independence in Namibia may affect a relatively minor source of workers (2,500) and the conflict in Southern Rhodesia makes that country an uncertain future source of supply (26,000 in August 1977).
- f. The recent ECA/ILO Conference in Lusaka (mentioned in Part II) and the follow-up meeting of government officials on September 11, 1978 may result in greater

coordination among supplier states and a more united approach on labor migration questions. This may serve to increase the level of uncertainty regarding sources of supply and conditions for recruitment.

- g. Unemployment among South African blacks rose to 2.3 million in 1977, according to the Johannesburg Star of June 30, 1978 and has made mine employment a more attractive alternative.
- h. The mining houses had decided to increase the share of domestic workers as early as 1973 as part of a stabilization program to lessen costs caused by the high turnover rate and consequent need for more training. This initiative was proved correct as many of the other above events unfolded and the mines later increased the pace of localization.

2. The Components of the Strategy

a. Localization

The share of domestic mine labor as a proportion of total mine employment rose from 20.42% in 1973 to 44.69% in

1976. and to over fifty percent in 1977. Between 1974 and 1977 the total number of South Africans increased from 112,013 to 366,200, or by 226%. These figures alone, however, as depicted in the following Table, may be misleading without emphasizing that one of the incentives to South African blacks was the offer of shorter contracts which reduced the average time spent on the mines by each worker from more than ten months in 1973 to about seven in 1977.

The effect of shorter contracts is demonstrated in Column (C) by the growing gap between the intake of South Africans and the average number actually employed on 31 December of each year. Therefore, by examining the second column of the Table the total increase in manpower over the 1974-1977 period is closer to 145%.

TABLE VII

TOTAL SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR INTAKE (RECRUITS AND NON-RECRUITS); NUMBER OF SOUTH AFRICANS EMPLOYED ON 31 DECEMBER, AND AVERAGE ANNUAL EARNINGS, 1972-1976

Year	Total Intake (000)	Employment at 31 December (000)	Ratio (A)/(B)	Average Annual Earnings (Rands)
	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)
1972	91.3	87.2	1.05	257
1973	101.1	86.8	1.16	350
1974	112.5	87.4	1.29	565
1975	205.0	121.9	1.68	947
1976	311.2	158.5	1.96	1,103
1977	366.2	214.2	1.71	1,100 ¹

¹ Estimate

Source: Mine Labour Organisation, Annual Reports, 1972-1977.

Localization as a conscious policy has come about for several reasons in addition to those mentioned under B.1 above. South Africa will be in a stronger position to determine the number and origins of migrant labor when it employs a greater percentage of its own citizens, even if they are defined as "foreigners" living in artificial entities ("homelands") created by South Africa as labor reserves. Maximum control reduces the risk of outbreaks of unrest while the "homelands" existence facilitates

the use of the expatriation option for anyone perceived by the mines or the state as a "troublemaker."

The "homelands" are also a convenient adjunct to the localization policy because on the one hand reduced recruitment from other countries lessens the necessity to deal with independent African governments who may be less than totally cooperative or dependable as sources of supply while, on the other hand, South Africa can define "homelands" as independent countries supplying "guest workers" to South Africa, which absolves the minority government from any responsibility for the education or welfare of the dependents of its "foreign" workers. Just as South Africa could not be held responsible for social services for dependents of migrant workers from Botswana or Mozambique living in those countries, the "logic" of the Republic would thereby abjure similar responsibility for

dependents of workers from Transkei,^{1/} Bophuthatswana and other "homelands" as they "achieve independence." Many of the "citizens" of these entities have never been to these "countries" and refuse to give up their South African nationality, but some may be coerced into this in exchange for mine employment since they will be required to carry a "passport." South Africa will then be able to complete its Apartheid program by generously providing "foreign aid" to "developing countries" whose existence is primarily a figment of the government's imagination.

The tiny white opposition party (PFP) and the relatively enlightened Anglo-American Corporation tend to support localization, but primarily for economic reasons and out of concern over rising unemployment among South African blacks. They would not support the Apartheid policy of balkanization and disenfranchisement from a claim to a share of South

^{1/} In 1975 eighty percent of all males aged 15-45 and defined as "Transkei citizens" were reported to be engaged in contract labor on the mines.

Africa's wealth as outlined above; however, the decision is the same regardless of motives and the outcome will be within the context of the Apartheid system.

b. Stabilization

Linked to localization of mine workers in terms of the overall sources of supply is the policy designed to create a more stable workforce with individuals working longer contracts, more contracts, being more closely identified with a single mine and perceiving mining as a career with greater opportunities for advancement and more differentiated tasks.

A sophisticated computer program has been designed to ensure that although a laborer may change mines, he will continue to utilize his skills upon his return from leave because he will be properly programmed into a job for which he is already qualified. In this way the industry can reduce the time required for a miner to adjust to a new location, thereby increasing productivity.

The miner is also permitted to indicate his preference for a particular mine. Statistics indicate that the majority choose to return to a mine with which they are already familiar.

Another technique to promote stabilization is the issuance of a Valid Reengagement Certificate (VRG) which guarantees the worker a job on the same mine at the same wage if he returns promptly at the end of his holidays (calculated at the rate of one week's leave for each month worked). This provides job security for the worker and facilitates manpower planning within the industry.

A more local labor force also promotes a more stable one because workers are able to return to their homes more frequently. In an interview with a representative of the Anglo-American Corporation, it was stated that they expected that many Basotho, for example, would be able to return home three times a year with one long and two short breaks which would provide greater year round continuity of service. It would

also make the restricted compound life slightly more bearable.

Prior to 1973 Africans were legally prohibited from receiving skill training in the major industrial centers. As a result of continuing serious shortages of skilled whites in specific sectors of the South African economy, the government and white trade unions have permitted limited advancement for Africans in certain areas. This open the prospect for limited "career advancement" which should promote a more stable workforce. In those instances where whites and blacks end up doing the same job, the job title can simply be changed to ensure that whites continue to be paid higher salaries.

c. Mechanization

Increased mechanization and capital-intensive development is a stated goal of the mining houses and has also

been recommended by government officials on occasion. The former claim that the goal of mechanization is increased efficiency, better working conditions below ground and a need for fewer men to do the most dangerous work. As unskilled, difficult jobs are phased out underground more men will be needed at greater skill levels above ground to operate the machines, and this will necessitate training more African workers for more skilled, better paying jobs. Newspaper accounts of the remarks of some government officials, however, point out the government's desire to see a lessened dependence on African labor, particularly from outside the Republic.

There are limits to which mechanization can be used given the great depth (up to 13,000 feet) of the gold shafts; however, it would seem logical that at least some jobs will be eliminated as new technology is developed.

More generally, mechanization in agriculture offers more promise as a

strategy to reduce foreign migrants since most of the technology is available. The replacement of very low paid agricultural workers by machines is, however, uneconomic for many of the less productive white farms and this would probably require a government subsidy. The important point here is that it could probably be done relatively rapidly if it appeared to be necessary.

d. Multiple Supply Sources

Throughout this discussion of foreign migration and South African strategy, the emphasis has been on reduction and not elimination of foreign labor.

Indeed, to be consistent with a strategy of option maximization, it is obvious that South Africa would want to maintain several supply sources and prevent coordination among them. The critical question for the supplier states is the particular level and sources of foreign labor desired by South Africa at any given period and the likely optimal level of localization planned.

It appears to the Mission that South Africa is interested in keeping all sources of supply open in order to be prepared for any contingencies; however, the more favored sources of supply seem to be Lesotho, Swaziland, and, to a much lesser extent, Botswana. Other states are either less dependent generally on South Africa, or their future status is unclear. The number of recruits may decline from the BLS states (and indeed they are); however, it is unlikely that South Africa would halt all recruitment under present political circumstances.

To ensure multiple quotas, specific quotas are set by the Chamber of Mines and these are communicated to TEBA and adjusted in accordance with fluctuations in labor demand. The Chamber's Head Office in Johannesburg denied that these were fixed quotas but several other sources--including some within TEBA--corroborated the fact that these do exist and are the principal means of regulating the sources and levels of labor flow.

e. Elite Formation and Co-optation

A further element of South African strategy is, through limited training to create a small black elite which will be dependent on the white-only power structure and can be used to supervise, control, and inform on other blacks. This structure extends from the "indunas" who exercise supposedly "traditional" authority over their fellow ethnics (as defined by the white system) in the mining compounds to the "white collar" employees, some of whom sense that they are being used to serve white interests.

In most other societies where only a small percentage of the general population or of a particular sub-group has received adequate education and training this can be ascribed to general conditions of poverty or historical factors; however, South Africa is the only country which legally excludes the majority of its population for racial reasons from most opportunities for advancement. The few

who are permitted to hold more responsible positions seem to be expected to function primarily as black tokens in a wholly-white-controlled system. There is no guarantee, of course, that those blacks selected for this role will abide by the rules established for them; however, this appears to be an element of the strategy for continued white control, particularly in the mines.

f. Race Discrimination

A final element in the overall strategy to ensure a continued supply of docile labor is a combination of discrimination and repression. Without repeating the above discussion of the role of the "homelands" or the recommendations of the McKay Commission regarding the strengthening of independent mine security forces^{1/} (See Part IV), the following provide examples of the prevailing conditions in this regard:

^{1/} Anglo-American Corporation mentioned that this recommendation had been followed.

- 1) White workers have powerful unions but blacks are legally prohibited from forming or joining unions. The Wiehan Commission may recommend that government permit their establishment in its report due in October; however, as shown above, when the "homelands" become independent those classified as "citizens" of "homelands" will be defined as "foreigners," thereby again being ineligible for union membership.
- 2) Black workers can be "expatriated" to their "homelands" if government or the mining companies choose to send them there; however, no "homelands" have been created for white ethnic groups (English and Afrikaaners) who together control 87% of the land. White workers are simply fired and are then free to seek other employment.
- 3) Children of white miners receive free and compulsory education, while children of foreign migrant workers must be educated in their own countries and domestic black workers must pay for school fees and books from their salaries which average one-eighth those of white miners.
- 4) Foreign and domestic African workers are not parties to Industrial Council Agreements which are negotiated between registered unions for Asian, Coloured, and white workers and employers' organizations and set minimum wages, yet they are bound by their provisions. Wages for African miners are determined entirely by the Chamber of Mines and neither African workers nor the supplier states participate in determining the wage rates. Further, foreign migrant workers employed on farms or as domestic servants are not covered by any minimum wage regulations.

VI. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO LABOR MIGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The foregoing analysis has provided a background which will permit the reader to decide whether options to the pattern of foreign labor migration are required. The Mission has concluded that they are required and that most supplier states would like to examine the range of options in some detail. The previous parts of this report also provide a framework from which to proceed to an examination of the present options available to the supplier states and to a discussion of the likely evolution of labor migration patterns in the future which may serve to broaden or constrict those options over the remainder of the century. Although the probable levels and sources of foreign migrant labor to be employed in South Africa over the next twenty years is assessed above from several perspectives, it is worth reiterating that the political uncertainties in the region are profound and growing. Any one of several possible events or combinations of events could have the most dire consequences for the fragile supplier economies irrespective of the options selected or policies developed from the possibilities discussed below.

A substantial body of literature has been developed over the past few years which considers a number of possible alternatives for the supplier states in the Southern African region. These have been developed

through the World Employment Program Research Section at the International Labour Organisation in Geneva as a result of the recent ECA/ILO Conference in Lusaka, Zambia and through research conducted by a number of academics. Virtually the entire range of conceivable options has been discussed and debated by numerous interested parties. A brief summary of the options for the region is essential for any consideration of country specific initiatives which might be taken to alter the labor migration pattern with South Africa.

- A. An obvious means of strengthening the position of the supplier states would be for them to act jointly when dealing with South Africa on matters of common interest with respect to labor migration. The establishment of a supplier labor cartel has been suggested by several authors; however, most observers appear to conclude that this is not a workable alternative. First, it would be difficult to get five independent African countries, each of which supplies varying amounts of labor to South Africa, to agree on specific proposals, given the differences in their political character and in their economic relationships with South Africa. Secondly, a cartel could not control the total labor supply, since there is a labor

surplus situation, there are numerous sources of labor within South Africa, and labor is also obtainable from the not-yet-independent Zimbabwe. When in April 1974 Malawi began to withdraw more than 100,000 workers over a 20-month period, the mines were able to recruit sufficient numbers of South African blacks to make up the difference, increasing the share of domestic black mineworkers by 1977 to about fifty percent of the total. Further recruitment campaigns within South Africa (particularly within the so-called "homelands"), together with plans for mechanization and a general leveling off in the number of workers required for the mines over the next twenty years, will make it highly unlikely that a labor monopoly on the suppliers' side would be able to function effectively. The power of a supplier cartel, assuming that it could be organized, would lie in its credible threat to withhold labor were certain conditions not met; however, it is clear that withdrawal tactics have been preempted by South Africa which is continuing a

gradual phasing down of foreign migrant laborers. Despite the fact that a cartel probably is not workable and that some countries would find this approach distasteful since it implies treating labor as a commodity and suggests collaboration with South Africa rather than an attempt to reduce such employment dependency relationships, active cooperation among the supplier states is not precluded either in trying to improve the conditions of their workers in South Africa in the short term or in agreeing upon a common medium- or longer-term strategy which will be to the mutual benefit of all supplier states.

- B. A second major regional approach would be the development of strategies in the supplier states which would stimulate a pace of economic development sufficient to permit alternative employment opportunities to provide an economic incentive for migrant laborers to work in their home countries. This involves the integration of a gradual labor withdrawal plan into overall development priorities

and strategy. More specifically, it requires a detailed examination of development approaches in each supplier state to identify projects and programs which would specifically create employment for migrant laborers.

- C. A third area for action would be the stimulation of regional economic integration and regional trade among the supplier states. The ECA recently announced that a number of East and Southern African countries had agreed in principle to the creation of a preferential trading area among these states.
- D. A fourth possibility, recommended by the June 1976 JASPA report on Swaziland (p. 174), is for supplier states to establish their own national recruiting organizations to replace TEBA and similar South African groups. The advantage of this approach would be to place the machinery that controls recruitment in the hands of the supplier states. In this way, in theory government could ensure the full observance of its laws on employment, maintain its own accounts for deferred pay and remittances, keep its own statistical records,

and regulate the level and nature of migration according to the manpower requirements of the supplier state.

There are a number of difficulties with this recommendation, and the Mission does not support its early adoption for several reasons:

1. The personnel requirements to administer labor recruitment and processing are considerable and a number of supplier states already experience a critical shortage of trained nationals and a surfeit of expatriate advisers. Adequate training and institution building must precede any assumption of these tasks if the level of efficiency is not to be greatly reduced and consequent economic and social difficulties created.
2. The statistics required by supplier states are readily provided by TEBA. Before accepting responsibility for maintaining data of this sort, the existing Central Statistics Offices need to be strengthened to cope with the existing workload.

3. The concern expressed by representatives of each of the supplier states at the ECA/ILO Conference in Lusaka was to avoid "collaboration" and entrenchment of the system and to search for options. Rather than create a national apparatus which would perpetuate the pattern of migrant labor, institutions might be devised which could assist in the systematic indentification of employment options in the respective supplier states. In the case of Swaziland, for example, this could be a function of an expanded National Employment Service.
4. Supplier states have other means to ensure that their laws are respected by recruiting organizations. It would be simpler and less expensive for now to monitor their activities rather than to attempt to carry them out on a national basis. Similarly, supplier states can pass new laws or adopt regulations to ensure that recruiting organizations employ some people rather than others

according to the relative need for their labor in their home countries.

5. Finally, a U.N. Fund might be established* to which states could contribute specifically to facilitate the withdrawal of migrant labor from South Africa. This would expand the options of the supplier states by allowing those who wished to partially or completely withdraw their labor over a specified period of time to draw on resources which had already been made available for this purpose from the international community. It would represent a limited form of economic "insurance" against the more adverse consequences which might follow from a decision to seek greater independence from South African economic hegemony and would represent a special commitment to those states most seriously affected by the distorted economic pattern of the region which migrant labor has historically helped to create.

*This has been considered by African states at the ECA/ILO Conference in Lesotho in April, 1978 and further refinement of the concept is anticipated in a follow-up ECA/ILO meeting later in 1978.

Many talented individuals have been searching for ideas which would permit the rapid withdrawal of labor from South Africa in order to increase pressure from the international community against Apartheid and lessen the dependence of the supplier states on South Africa. Essentially, however, there is no substitute for the careful, diligent, planned expansion of employment opportunities in the sending states. To the extent possible, the cost of such expansion should be borne by those who have benefitted most from the use of cheap black labor for nearly a century in South Africa.

A February 1978 World Bank report on migration from Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland states:

"Perhaps the greatest potential for constructive negotiations between sending countries and South Africa is that of harnessing resources accruing, at present, to the center in such a way as to generate income and employment in the peripheral countries. The basis for negotiating a different growth pattern of the South African economy and enhancing the benefits for labor exporting countries arises not only from the existing capital accumulation which South Africa derives from imported labor, but also from the historic benefits derived from oscillating migration in previous decades."

The report then goes on to calculate that over the thirty years from 1946 to 1975 black miners worked approximately 10.7 million man years in South Africa. In the gold mines alone, the totals were 10.4 million black man years and only 1.3 million white man years (See Table XIX) A convincing argument could be made in economic terms which would obligate South Africa to reimburse the supplier states for at least a portion of the wealth generated by foreign migrant labor in South Africa. Further, there is no question that South Africa could afford to pay some form of levy calculated in these terms since, for example, again according to the World Bank study, in 1974 the combined GNP of the BLS states was about \$550 million while in 1974/75 the income tax paid by the gold mines was approximately \$800 million and gold mining leases accounted for an additional \$260 million in RSA Government income.

The South African Chamber of Mines Annual Reports reveal that the working profits per ton in the gold mines averaged 15 Rand over the period 1974-1976, while

the number of tons mined per African employee averaged approximately 218 tons. The profit margin per African employee accruing to the mines, therefore, can be calculated at approximately 3,270 Rand per year, with the total working profit averaging over 1 billion Rand per annum. As shown in Table VIII, the 1977 profit per ton increased to R16, while profit per African employee averaged R2,757. This is about three times the level of profit before the rise in the price of gold, and this has been generated in spite of the rapid increases in wages for African miners. Given the enormous profitability for South Africa of mine labor, it would appear that the supplier states have a substantial claim to a share of these tremendous resources.

Given these very preliminary calculations, the Mission recommends minimally that a labor economist be employed specifically to work with the supplier states, the ECA, the World Bank, ILO personnel and other interested parties to draw up a detailed and statistically comprehensive negotiating

TABLE VIII
AFRICAN EMPLOYEE - PROFIT RATIOS 1966-1977

Year	Tons Milled/ African Employee ¹	Working Profit/ Ton (Rand)	Profit/African Employee ²	Total Working Profit ('000) (D)
	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)
1966	202.3	4.51	912.37	338,044
1971	207.4	4.48	929.15	352,353
1972	199.0	7.46	1,484.54	546,296
1973	197.1	13.42	2,645.08	1,020,970
1974	211.6	21.52	4,556.63	1,636,874
1975	225.3	17.74	3,996.82	1,332,600
1976	218.1	12.23	2,667.36	952,528
1977	171.3	16.09	2,756.97	1,199,349

1 Separate figures on tons milled, average number of African employees and average annual earnings obtained from source below.

2 Calculated by multiplying (A) x (B)

Source: Calculated from South African Chamber of Mines Annual Reports.

position that the supplier states may be able to use as a basis for negotiating this point with South Africa. Since it is unlikely that the South African Government or the mining companies could be persuaded to make compensatory payments to the supplier states to finance activities which would lead to a reduction in the availability of foreign migrant labor for the mines, the report of the labor economist should also indicate specific actions which the United States and the international community generally could take to encourage South Africa to share a portion of the enormous wealth which it has obtained through long-standing practices of labor exploitation in the region.

The proven recalcitrance of the South African regime in the face of repeated worldwide condemnation of its discriminatory policies makes it essential, simultaneously, also to seek other sources of finance to permit a more rapid expansion of the economies in question and to hasten the day when migrant laborers can work in their own countries and contribute to

their own economies and societies rather than expend their efforts to the benefit of a small minority in the Republic of South Africa.

These resources could come from the U.N. Fund mentioned above which, rather than supporting the withdrawal of labor primarily for political reasons, which consequently may provoke retaliatory action by South Africa against the supplier states, would be a more broadly based development fund designed with the economic benefit of the supplier states in mind. This would probably elicit greater sympathy and support from most Western donor states and would also be a more manageable context in which the supplier states could work in view of their geographic proximity to South Africa.

In short, there appear to be two actions which represent alternatives for all states of the region in the present pattern of labor migration: (1) to create a joint consultative committee for the regular exchange of information and development of a common policy among the

supplier states, and (2) to adopt a long-term plan for the withdrawal of labor and the simultaneous creation of alternative employment opportunities in the supplier states with substantial external financial assistance.

An underlying premise of the following analyses for each country therefore is that all governments wish to minimize their economic vulnerabilities to political events and would be prepared to take concrete steps to reduce those vulnerabilities where it can be demonstrated that options exist which would achieve those results at an acceptable cost.

In the long term, even a majority-ruled Republic of Azania will not necessarily solve the region's employment and migrant labor difficulties, since a democratic South Africa will presumably seek to employ its own citizens before turning to foreign labor. The particular onus attached to the migrant labor system in Southern Africa would be removed once the Apartheid system has been abolished, and the phenomenon would then more closely

resemble the labor migration patterns in Europe and elsewhere; however, the underlying center-periphery economic relationships would remain for the foreseeable future. It is, therefore, the economic structures and relationships which have been built over the past century, largely upon cheap black labor, which must be modified, both within what is now South Africa and between South Africa and the supplier states. In the struggle to achieve such a transformation toward non-racist and more equitable forms of economic organization, there will be both economic and political costs. It is imperative that the supplier states seek to minimize these costs by maximizing their own productive capacity, particularly in sectors which will generate the greatest outputs in terms of goods and additional job creation.^{1/}

It is in the interest of the United States to support activities designed to

^{1/} In this sense, a job or employment is defined as any activity which generates a surplus either in the form of wages or through raised rural productivity sufficient to produce a saleable surplus.

achieve these objectives, since this will be a concrete contribution to development in the region and will promote a more equitable and stable political and economic environment. The precise means through which these goals might be achieved and the nature and extent of possible U.S. assistance in their achievement is the subject of the remainder of this report.

A. Botswana

The context within which Botswana must seek to address the question of labor migration is well defined by the following statistics:

TABLE IX

BOTSWANA PROFILE - 1976

Population	691,000
Population Growth Rate	3.2%
Population Aged 15-64	343,000 *
Wage Sector Employment in Botswana	65,756 **
Average Annual Growth of Wage Sector Employment	3,000
Number of Migrant Laborers in RSA Mines	31,835 ***
Estimated Total Number of Botswana Employed Outside Botswana (mines+agriculture+other)	46,000
Estimated Population Aged 15-64 in Botswana but Outside Wage Sector	277,214
Percent of Land Available for Rural Freehold (represents fertile areas)	6.0% ****

- * Estimate for 1996 is 703,000 (de jure)
- ** of whom 4,000 are non-citizens
- *** as of June 30, 1977
- **** half is owned by non-citizens

Sources: CSO, Gaborone; World Bank; and the 1976-81 Botswana National Development Plan.

Essentially, it appears that Botswana has four basic options with respect to labor migration:

1. It could eliminate migrant labor at once by forbidding further recruitment of its nationals inside Botswana and by prohibiting Botswana from seeking employment individually outside the country.
2. It could announce a national policy designed to reduce the numbers of migrant laborers over a fixed time period, together with a comprehensive plan for their phased re-integration into the Botswana domestic economy.
3. It could continue to permit labor migration at current levels, but place a ceiling on the number to ensure that there is no new increase. This could possibly be incorporated into a written agreement with the recruiting organizations and would stipulate that twelve months notice would be given if total recruitment is expected to fall below 95% of the ceiling. This would also allow Botswana to activate contingency plans which should, in any event, be developed.
4. It could allow TEBA and others to recruit at will and try to secure improved living

and working conditions in South Africa for the migrants, while concentrating development efforts in Botswana on the non-migrant population. This option would assume that economic and political conditions in South Africa will assure continued and gradually expanding employment opportunities in the mines and possibly in other sectors as well.

The first option has a certain political appeal, since it would protect Botswana migrants from the indignities of Apartheid and would serve to reunite thousands of families and ease the workload carried by women in the rural areas; however, it would have serious adverse economic and possibly political consequences for Botswana. Economically, it would represent the loss of wage income to the miners and their families and it would affect the poorest segment of the population disproportionately. It would also represent a serious financial loss on the national level, since deferred pay for miners is still an important element of Botswana's national income. Politically, a unilateral action of this magnitude might invite retaliation from South Africa on some other issues. Unless a well

coordinated and fully financed plan which could ensure the economic and social reintegration of the migrants into Botswana were poised for implementation at the moment such a decision was taken, such an approach could cause major disruption to the Botswana economy and society.

The second option would have the political advantage for Botswana of not being directed against South Africa. Rather, a planned and phased withdrawal could be discussed with the South African Chamber of Mines and the South African Government as part of a development goal of Botswana which wishes to use the most active element of its labor force in the development of its own country. Longer-range planning of this sort would actually reduce the level of risk for Botswana, whose government may then have at least some guarantees against a sudden-- and therefore unplanned--reduction in the number of migrant workers by South Africa. The return of migrant laborers can be viewed positively on a developmental level, where they might act as a magnet for international assistance for countries interested in helping Botswana alter its relationship with South Africa by financing programs which will create alternative employment opportunities within Botswana and which

might not otherwise have been funded; and on an economic level where schemes designed to absorb migrant laborers would also be likely to result in greater agricultural production, improved infrastructure, and an increased output of manufactures. The reduction of migrant labor could be built into the forthcoming Six-Year National Development Plan, with fixed targets and budgets for projects and more general projections for 20-30 years. This would only become operational once long-term assistance was guaranteed.

The adoption of the third option would leave the initiative on the labor migration question in the hands of South Africa, would represent a less comprehensive planning approach on the part of Botswana, and would make the assumption that current recruitment levels were likely to remain the same or that there may be greater recruitment in the future. In fact, most evidence indicates that there is already a decline in the recruitment of foreign migrant workers and that no significant increase in the number of foreign migrant laborers is expected over the next twenty years.^{1/} Further, it is unlikely that

^{1/} See Bromberger (p. 92). The author points out that projections from Anglo-American Corporation indicate that gold output is expected "to rise somewhat from 713 tons (the current level) to around 800 tons by 1985, and will decline thereafter to about half its current level by the end of the century." Given the uncertainties of any projection

South Africa would be prepared to give any guarantees of employment for specific numbers of migrant laborers over a period which would be lengthy enough to ensure that Botswana would have adequate time to activate contingency plans once the country became aware of the possible need for a return of a significant proportion of the migrant laborers.

The fourth option is essentially the one that Botswana has followed in the past. The assumption that conditions in South Africa will most likely assure continued and expanding employment opportunities--while valid for the period from Botswana's independence to 1976--as mentioned above, does not appear to be a tenable conclusion under present circumstances. It may therefore be necessary for Botswana to synthesize the other goals of its present policy--improved living and working conditions for its laborers in South Africa plus expanded development activities in Botswana itself for

of this sort, it would seem safe minimally to project no increase in employment in gold mining. This is of central importance since the vast majority of foreign migrant miners are employed in gold mines. (Botswana in June 1977 had 86% of those recruited by TEBA in gold mines.) In addition, diamond mining and commercial farm labor employment in South Africa are also expected to decline.


its de facto population--with the general framework of the second option.

The following Table depicts graphically the magnitude of Botswana's problem. It also permits the construction of Table XI which attempts to create the framework within which one could project how many activities, of what nature, and on what scale, would be required over what time period in order to reabsorb migrant laborers into the Botswana economy without sacrificing other development goals, and indeed using the return of migrant laborers to achieve additional goals. The Table suggests the longer-term planning which may be essential to minimize the risk to Botswana's future economic growth presented by the possible forced return of large numbers of migrant laborers over a relatively short period. Table XII shows the current decline in mine employment for Botswana nationals and presents various hypothetical rates of return which should be compared to the program framework for job creation presented in Table XI.

It is in precisely this area that United States assistance might be useful. A longer-term funding level for Botswana should be

TABLE X

ECONOMICALLY
ACTIVE POPU-
LATION ('000s.)



The key question here is how to maintain the upward progression of line E while anticipating the downward sloping of line A under conditions of a constantly rising line F. Table XI proposes a series of activities to help to achieve this while also addressing the problems of the group between lines E and F (subsistence sector and proposing a longer planning horizon for a coordinated approach to employment (1) for Botswana generally, and (2) for a special subsidiary program for labor migrants.

TABLE XI

BOTSWANA: PLANNING SCHEME FOR TOTAL EMPLOYMENT CREATION PACKAGE WITH ALLOWANCE FOR PHASED REINTEGRATION OF MIGRANT LABOR AS A SUBSIDIARY COMPONENT

PROJECT PROPOSALS FROM BOTSWANA NDFs AND DISCUSSIONS WITH SADAP MISSIONS	Implementation Date (Duration)	Total Number Jobs Created P/A	Estimated Wage Bill Cash & (Kind) Where Relevant	Estimated Total Project Cost	Number of Migrant Laborers to be Employed by Project	Percent Absorbed by Project P/A of Available Migrant Labor	Likely Additional Jobs for Non-Migrant Population	Likely Spin-off Projects & Other Off-Job Creation	Possible Negative Consequences for Economy	Education & Training Requirements to Support Project	Potential Use of Botswana Resources
CROF AGRICULTURE SCHEME I											
CROF AGRICULTURE SCHEME II											
AGRICULTURAL TRAINING SUPPORT SCHEME											
PATHWAY LOCALIZATION TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION PROJECT											
LOBAT-LECHANE ROAD UPGRADING SCHEME											
PATHWAY TO GOBABE OR GOROBE FOR THE "TRAIL-KALAHARI"											
JAMBOJA AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING SCHEME											
ANTI-DESERTIFICATION SCHEME I: ECOSYSTEM STABILIZATION											
ANTI-DESERTIFICATION SCHEME II AFFORESTATION & MIXED USE PLANNING											
CROF AGRICULTURE SCHEME III											
LIVESTOCK MANAGEMENT AND PROCESSING DEVELOPMENT											
GQAZANA WATER DEVELOPMENT SCHEME											
LIVESTOCK HEALTH PARTICIPATION SCHEME											

Specific recommendations will be forthcoming from other SADAP missions in the sectors of agriculture, transport, industry, etc. The recommendation of the labor migration appraisal team is that these be assessed in particular with regard to (A) their employment creation potential, (B) capacity to absorb migrant laborers, and (C) likely relationship to one another and to other ongoing activities to obtain an overall picture of their impact on the Botswana economy and manpower situation. Given skilled manpower and other constraints, some projects' implementation should deliberately be delayed and so phased as to guarantee a certain minimal number of jobs sustained over time which will absorb a planned number of returning migrants annually. The use of labor-intensive techniques should be explored as an option for at least portions of infrastructure and agriculture projects. Other SADAP analyses will no doubt expand both the horizontal and vertical columns and for each project recommended where a technical feasibility study is required, the above considerations should feature prominently in the Terms of Reference. Two complementary approaches to be implemented simultaneously are recommended: (a) a special program clearly identified as supplementary to other development efforts should be created to provide employment for returning migrants, and (b) this should be part of a total effort to assess development activities from an employment-creation perspective and to orient them in this direction in order to address the growing employment problems of the non-migrant population.

TABLE XII

BOTSWANA: CURRENT RECRUITMENT TRENDS AND ALTERNATIVE RATES OF PLANNED LABOR MIGRATION WITHDRAWAL

I. CURRENT DECLINING LABOR RECRUITMENT PROFILE FOR SOUTH AFRICAN MINES:

	Total Number of Employees *	Number of New Recruits	Number of Novice Recruits and (%)
30 June 1976	32,048	8,482	1,165 (22%)
30 June 1977	31,835	9,065	1,306 (13%)**
31 March 1978	24,500	7,100	0 (0%)***

II. ALTERNATE SCHEDULES FOR PLANNED WITHDRAWAL OR VARYING RATES AT WHICH NEW EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES WOULD HAVE TO BE CREATED:

Estimated Total Number of Botswana Employed Outside Botswana 1977	A	B	C	D	E
	10-Year Option	15-Year Option	20-Year Option	25-Year Option	30-Year Option
	----- (P/A Withdrawal Rate) -----				
46,000 ****	4,600	3,450	2,300	1,840	1,533

III. ADDITIONAL EMPLOYMENT CREATION NEEDED TO KEEP PACE WITH NATURAL POPULATION INCREASE OF 3.2% P/A. PLUS DEAL WITH UNEMPLOYED AND UNDEREMPLOYED SUBSISTENCE SECTOR POPULATION (For discussion of these areas see current Botswana National Development Plan).

- * Contracts for Botswana average nine months
- ** For 31 March 1977
- *** Botswana Central Statistics Office states NO NOVICES recruited February-June 1978 or April-September/October 1977, with a small number taken November/December 1977
- **** Some estimates of Botswana employed in South Africa are as high as 65,000, since there is some difficulty in identifying Botswana nationals due to ethnic similarities and the varying length of time some have lived in South Africa. In addition to workers recruited by TEMA and other mine recruiters, some people cross informally to work as domestics or on farms. The working figure here would therefore have to be decided by the GOB.

considered in the context of other recent proposals for aid to nearby states. The proposal for a Zimbabwe Development Fund contained in the Anglo-American Plan for a transition to an internationally-recognized independent Zimbabwe suggested a figure of \$U.S. 1.--1.5 billion over five years and the U.S. Congress passed a "sense of the Congress" resolution in 1977 which stated American readiness to contribute \$500 million of this sum over a 5 year period. More recently, a Donor Conference meeting in Paris in late June 1978 to consider the plight of the Zambian economy has pledged \$1.0 billion to that country in order to provide economic relief and a stimulus to recovery and development. Rather than continuing to suggest levels of assistance to different countries in the region in a piecemeal fashion, the effectiveness of development assistance enhanced if it was rationalized and better coordinated to embrace the entire region. If about \$2.0 to \$2.5 billion can be envisaged for the 11 million people in Zambia and Zimbabwe over the next five years, the 30 million people of the Southern Africa

region^{1/} coming under the Mission's Terms of Reference and affected by the same economic milieu may require three times this level of funds for each quinquennium may need to be guaranteed by some form of international consortium over a period of perhaps twenty years if Botswana, for one, were to feel confident that its proportional share of these monies together with its own resources would have the effect of creating a planning horizon sufficiently lengthy to create adequate jobs for the country's present and growing population, while simultaneously creating adequate numbers of jobs for returning migrant laborers.^{2/}

The projects listed in Table XI were suggested by various representatives of the Botswana Government or, on occasion, by technical advisers to the government financed by bilateral and multilateral donor organizations. These proposals are consistent with the Botswana National Development Plan and represent a variety of priority needs in Botswana. Until now most developing countries have been satisfied with five-year development

^{1/} Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Mozambique

^{2/} The volume of such assistance would also depend in part upon whether South Africa could be persuaded to pay more to the supplier states for their labor as discussed above.

plans and more short-term targets. In the case of Botswana the pivotal nature of the labor migration question and its possible adverse consequences for economic development indicate that longer-term planning may be critically important in order to sustain the growth rate that has been achieved thus far while gradually resolving the migrant labor problem to the country's benefit. The projects in question could then be so scheduled that they would be implemented over a 20-30 year period. Some projects could be deliberately delayed into the late '80s or the 1990s or beyond in order to ensure that there were adequate numbers of labor-intensive activities planned and funded over a long enough period to ensure that labor migrants could be returned on a phased basis. Their initial jobs would, over time, be expected to stimulate the economy so that additional jobs would be created through the momentum of the activities which would have been carried out earlier. The brevity of the Mission's field work and the Terms of Reference which stress an overall analysis of the problem obviously do not permit the detailed articulation of

projects in this report, particularly since many of them require technical feasibility studies of some depth before their impact on employment creation or national development generally can be fully known.^{1/} In Botswana's case, therefore, the Mission recommends the following:

1. that projects be examined particularly for their employment creation impact and that their possible effect on returning migrant laborers seeking jobs in Botswana also be assessed; and
2. that the projects suggested in Table XI be examined together with the forthcoming proposals of the SADAP Sector Surveys in order to produce a series of projects requiring technical feasibility studies which would permit the optimal articulation of new projects with an employment-creating effect.

^{1/} Botswana has just begun a comprehensive and detailed two-year study of the effects of labor migration on its economy. The study is expected to produce recommendations and it would be most useful if the strategy suggested above and recommendations listed below could be carefully considered by the team resident in Gaborone which is carrying out the analysis in addition to being reviewed by the GOB.

3. An expanded Table XI based upon GOB priorities and the completed SADAP analyses might then be prepared. Projects with the greatest employment creation potential can then be identified and a single list of projects presented in descending order of priority with the specific goal of employment in mind. This would not preclude other lists of priority projects with different goals, but would simply serve to demonstrate the comparative potential for employment creation of different projects and of different approaches to the same projects.
4. The experimental Labor-Intensive Construction Unit (LICU) in Lesotho, which has benefitted from bilateral contributions from the British Overseas Development Ministry (ODM) and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), has now been functioning for about one year and preliminary calculations of comparative costs for road upgrading schemes using labor-intensive methods have been produced. The information provided to the

Mission from this project in Lesotho would indicate that it may now be possible to mount a similar program in Botswana as a pilot scheme geared directly to the particular needs of Botswana. This project could carry out pilot experiments in road construction and in the agriculture and afforestation areas in order to provide background data for the articulation of other sector-specific projects which may be able to adapt the techniques developed by a Botswana Labor-Intensive Construction Unit.

5. Upon completion of the feasibility studies for the projects in question support should be given to the creation of a special U.N. Fund for projects designed specifically to lessen the dependence of Southern African states upon the South African economy. The U.N. Fund might serve to attract additional resources to be put at the disposition of Botswana and other majority-ruled supplier states which would otherwise not have been available. These projects would focus on alternative forms of employment for both the population

of the supplier states generally and for the migrant labor population in particular. Such an approach would be consistent with the findings of the ECA/ILO Lusaka Conference of Supplier States. By being multilateral in character it would also serve to insulate a development program of this sort from political considerations and the corresponding possibility of fluctuations in the level of future contributions.

6. In order to implement the projects being suggested, monitor the rate of return of migrant laborers and ensure their productive employment, four government areas are particularly vital.

a. The Office of the Labour Commissioner would require strengthening in order to maintain accurate records, negotiate the terms of phased withdrawal with South Africa and monitor the proper implementation of government policy.

b. The Central Statistics Office may require expansion, although there appear to be a reasonable number of capable

individuals providing essential statistics to permit national decisionmaking. An additional program of this magnitude may make it necessary to strengthen the CSO further in order to have at least one person devote full time to the compilation of data relevant to the program.

- c. The Immigration and Passport Division would require strengthening since passports would have to be issued so that the Government of Botswana could more effectively control illegal migration and the length of time that legal migrants were permitted to work in South Africa.
- d. The Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) would require additional planners and economists to ensure a coordinated implementation and monitoring role for itself and to be able to feed pertinent data to the decisionmaking apparatus of the country. Numerous assistance schemes have been designed and implemented over the past several years,

particularly to strengthen the MFDP; however, British, U.N., and other sources of assistance could be supplemented with an expanded team, were the Government of Botswana to accept the proposals outlined.

Additional training for Botswana nationals would also be essential in order to permit the citizens of Botswana to make their own decisions with regard to the establishment of priorities among the many projects being suggested and to ensure that project output is consistent with Botswana's best interests. The SADAP background paper being written on institutional capacities and constraints in each of the Southern African countries could usefully take this point into consideration when examining methods of strengthening such capacities in Botswana.

B. Lesotho

Being an arid enclave state inside South Africa with virtually no natural resources, Lesotho is the most difficult country in Southern Africa for which to design alternatives to labor migration. The magnitude of the dependency relationship with South Africa can be quickly understood with

reference to Table XIII which reveals that Lesotho has the highest relative involvement in and dependency upon external labor migration of any country on earth. The only "solution" to Lesotho's labor migration problems is a change of government in South Africa which would result in the abolition of Apartheid and the restructuring of Lesotho's relationships with the country which surrounds it on terms more favorable to Lesotho's future development. With the abolition of Apartheid, the need and desire to repatriate many Basotho workers from South Africa would be greatly lessened; however, even were this to occur in the near future, the problem of severe underdevelopment in Lesotho itself would remain.

The depth of concern of the Government of Lesotho with respect to future patterns of labor migration can, therefore, be readily appreciated. In the Lesotho National Development Plan for the period 1975-1980 the government's announced goal was to "lower the rate of increase of migrant labor to 4 percent per annum." Thus, of 60,000 new jobs needed during the five-year period, 30,000 were expected to come from migrant labor, 18,500 from the

TABLE XIII

Lesotho Profile - 1976/7

1.	<u>Total Number Foreign African Migrant Workers in RSA</u>	
	a) Official RSA government figure (30 June 1977).....	357,000
	b) Probable total including illegal, non-circulatory and those with contracts over two years in duration*	400,000+
2.	<u>Of Whom Total Number of Basotho Employed in RSA</u>	
	a) Probable total including non-tabulated categories as above*.....	200,000
3.	<u>Lesotho Population and (Growth Rate) 1976</u>	1,191,000 (2.2%)**
4.	<u>Percent of Labor Force Classified as Migrant</u>	
	a) Percent of overall workforce.....	60%
	b) Percent of 25-35 year age group.....	80%
5.	<u>Percent of Household Income Derived from Migrant Wages</u>	70-75%
6.	<u>Percent of Migrant Workers Who are Male</u>	90%
7.	<u>Distribution of Male Workforce Aged 18-60 in 1976</u>	
	a) Employment in agriculture.....	28%
	b) Employment in Lesotho wage sector.....	07%
	c) Unproductive.....	05%
	d) Employment in South Africa.....	60%
8.	<u>Wage Sector Employment in Lesotho (1975)</u> (of which government equals 33%)	27,500

* Source: ILO and A. van der Wiel

** Source: IBRD Atlas 1976

modern sector in Lesotho, and 11,500 from handicrafts and agriculture.

By August 1977 the Lesotho Government felt compelled to issue a circular to government departments informing them of a trend toward the reduction of the number of Basotho migrants recruited for the South African mines. The government believes that this might be related to its difficulties with South Africa over the closure of its southern border with that part of South Africa known as Transkei. It was the government's observation that the Chamber of Mines was probably being pressured by the South African Government to reduce foreign migrant labor from Lesotho despite the Chamber's preference for continued labor recruitment at roughly the same level as before. A representative of the Planning Section in the Ministry of Finance stated that the quota for Basotho workers had been reduced since the reengagement of Malawi miners in mid-1977. The Chamber of Mines has stated that the total number of working hours of Basotho has remained relatively constant, although the number of workers has been reduced (This is possible through the extension of contracts for existing

workers.); however, Lesotho still believes that there has been a drop in total numbers.^{1/}

Most sources also indicate a similar decline in the number of Basotho working in South African agriculture. The peak employment level in agriculture seems to have been reached in the late 1960s. Since 1970 there has been greater mechanization and more local South African blacks taking these jobs. One report pointed out that monocropping and the effective use of weed killer could cut labor demand by two-thirds in a relatively short period of time if South Africa were required to do so.

The foregoing discussion points up two difficulties--uncertainty with regard to precisely how many workers are actually in South Africa at a given time, and a similar uncertainty with regard to the precise intentions of the South African Government and the Chamber of Mines within the context of the discussion in V.B. above. As a consequence, Lesotho appears to have two basic options:

^{1/} The Mission is unable to verify the precise number of Basotho employed in South Africa due to the various categories of workers and the incomplete employment histories for some elements of the total workforce.

1. It can continue to permit labor migration at current levels and at future levels determined largely by the South African economy, while concentrating its development efforts on behalf of those Basotho living in Lesotho. At the same time it could seek to negotiate--perhaps with external assistance--for better conditions for Basotho miners in South Africa. This is essentially the current policy of the Government of Lesotho.
2. It could announce a national policy calling for the phased reintegration of some migrant workers into the Lesotho economy over a period of, say, twenty years. At the end of that time period Lesotho would expect to have reduced its total migrant population by perhaps 40%. This would represent 80,000 returnees over twenty years, or 4,000 people per annum. As in the case of Botswana, Lesotho could then appeal to the international community and request assistance through a U.N. Fund to support this policy decision and to identify projects which could absorb this number of people each year which would be in addition to all projects currently

anticipated for the normal development of the country.

The second option would ensure that no job creation efforts designed to assist those who are in Lesotho and who are currently unemployed or underemployed would be adversely affected. International donors interested in providing technical cooperation to those countries identified by the U.N. as being among the least developed and in reducing the dependence of the majority-ruled Southern African states on the Republic of South Africa would then have a specific reason to provide additional assistance to Lesotho. The rate of return of migrants could perhaps be negotiated with TEBA and the South African Government to ensure that the risk of retaliatory action by South Africa would be minimized.

This approach need not be presented in terms which South Africa would find inflammatory, but can be expressed in terms which would stress the benefits which would accrue to Lesotho were a proportion of its most able-bodied

males population to return to that country and work in productive activities. All indications are that the South African mining companies intend to continue to use a significant--if declining--number of Basotho miners for the indefinite future.^{1/} There are therefore good reasons to believe that the South African reaction would not necessarily be a hostile one in which all recruitment from Lesotho would be stopped. On the contrary, South Africa too is dependent--dependent upon 350,000 to 400,000 foreign migrant laborers. Despite efforts to expand the policy of localization of manpower in South Africa by drawing ever-larger numbers from the so-called "homelands" and urban centers such as Soweto, the fact remains that South Africa continues to need foreign migrant labor and would also benefit from a planned approach to the gradual replacement of foreign migrant labor by domestic labor.

^{1/} This was affirmed in interviews with the Anglo-American Corporation and the Chamber of Mines. In addition, Bromberger's projections do not see an elimination but a reduction in response to changing labor requirements caused by changing patterns of mineral production.

A gradual withdrawal of labor, therefore, would reduce an element of the unknown in South African/Lesotho relations and permit Lesotho to develop its own economy with the use of its own labor on a continuing basis.

Those who see migrant workers primarily as a pressure point in the fight against Apartheid may not fully appreciate the present depth of dependence of Lesotho and the economic necessity for that country to cooperate with South Africa, however distasteful that might be. The essential question is how to stimulate optimal development within Lesotho and permit the return of Lesotho workers to their own country in a manner which is politically feasible and economically possible for Lesotho. Removing 200,000 Basotho from the South African labor market at once would improve neither their lot nor the lot of Lesotho. There is also no evidence that the behavior of the South African regime would thereby be modified.

Again, there is no substitute for the diligent, long-term expansion of carefully planned and well integrated development activities which will create economic opportunities in Lesotho for increasing numbers of its citizens.

It is here that donors can make a contribution, and the following project ideas appear to offer employment creation potential. Most of these require a feasibility study since, particularly in the case of Lesotho, there has been a relatively high rate of development project failure.

- a. Expansion of wool and mohair production and export. Prior to the Mission's arrival in Lesotho, the suggestion was made that a tariff preference might be given to Lesotho for export to the U.S. of its handicrafts, wool and mohair products; however, the constraint on the export of these products does not seem to be due to tariffs since the EEC permits an unlimited supply of Basotho goods of this sort into

the Community duty-free. The problem is primarily one of production, quality control, further processing, and, above all, marketing. A U.S. initiative in concert with other donors interested in this field designed to overcome these constraints would appear to be welcome.

- b. The Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Mines specifically urged the Mission to recommend the financing of industrial areas infrastructure in order to provide an incentive for private investment. U.S. companies investing in Lesotho would have the benefit of access to the larger South African market through the Southern African Customs Union, while at the same time demonstrating a sensitivity to the political dynamics of the region by stimulating job creation in the majority-ruled states of the region.
- c. Afforestation was mentioned repeatedly, and it is an obvious area for assistance. SIDA is beginning a

fairly comprehensive study of this problem in September 1978 and the Mission recommends that USAID discuss with SIDA the possibility of a U.S. forestry expert being attached to the study team in order to ensure a detailed U.S. understanding of the problem once the study is completed. This would then be a prime area for Swedish/American donor cooperation in Lesotho.

- d. The pilot Labor-Intensive Construction Unit (LICU) has been in operation since February 1977, and the first project to construct a 31 km. road began in September 1977. It is expected that 500 workers will be employed by 1980. Assistance is provided by the ODM and SIDA through July 1979. Funds for the continuation of this encouraging^{1/} pilot project are not at present available beyond that date. The Mission recommends that financing be provided

^{1/} Preliminary results indicate that the upgrading of the 31 km. gravel road using labor-intensive techniques resulted in a cost of Rand 7,000 per km. for direct costs (labor, materials, small equipment and tools) which compares favorably with conventional upgrading approaches when existing road alignments are followed.

for the continuation and expansion of this scheme in order to establish additional comparative costings for different types of activities which can be carried out through labor-intensive methods. This approach is particularly useful in areas which are capable of generating productive activities such as the construction of fish ponds, afforestation, and soil conservation.

- e. The Mission further recommends that donors encourage close cooperation between the LICU and the World Food Program Project Number 352/4 which is a Food For Work program primarily for the construction of access and feeder roads. In the report of the Secretary General of the U.N. to the Economic and Social Council on Assistance to Lesotho dated June 5, 1978 projects to stimulate employment and provide improved access to the more isolated areas of southern and southeastern Lesotho were recommended. The U.N. Mission stated that

it, "considers that the construction of roads should be given the highest priority and is the best way of creating immediate employment opportunities in the southern and southeastern sections." The U.N. Mission recommended two access roads and two feeder roads for immediate improvement as follows:

- (1) Access Roads
 - (a) from Myanyane to Sixondo via Dilly Dilly
 - (b) from Tosing to Madile
- (2) Feeder Roads
 - (a) from Seaka to Nohana
 - (b) from Sekakes to Mohlanapeng via Tebellong

The U.N. Mission placed priority on the access roads and suggested that WFP Project 352/4 could be expanded and that the present "mechanical food aid unit" working in the area could be employed on these. To construct roads rapidly, the U.N. Mission recommended that an additional heavy road construction unit should be provided; however, in light of the positive experience of the Labor-Intensive Construction Unit it would seem that if employment creation is at least

as important as the actual construction of the roads, it may be preferable to take slightly longer to complete the improvement of these roads if this would mean employing more people over a greater period. The SADAP Mission therefore recommends that USAID in Lesotho assess the U.N. proposals in detail with the UNDP Resident Representative in Maseru, together with the Chief Civil Engineer on the LICU, in order to work out comparative costings and comparative estimates of workers needed to complete the construction of these roads using different levels of labor-intensive activity. The findings of these analyses could then be reviewed with the U.N. and the Government of Lesotho to determine the preferred mix of labor- and capital-intensive approaches to this particular series of projects. A decision on U.S. financing of these could then be taken

their eventual and phased repatriation to Lesotho. To stress the importance of labor, the Labor Department might be elevated to ministerial level. Technical assistance in the form of personnel and training would seem to be essential if the Labor Department is to meet the needs of Lesotho in this area.^{1/} Among other things, the Labor Department is responsible for and needs to develop a comprehensive labor policy together with a realistic labor code. A comprehensive staff training program needs to be established and improvements made in the Department's administration and support services. Of crucial importance is the development of a comprehensive wages policy for the country which would try to reduce the "brain drain" by taking into account the fact that a number of its citizens are earning relatively higher wages abroad while opportunities within Lesotho remain relatively

^{1/} This has been recommended by several other observers, yet international assistance in this area has been meager.

restricted. The Mission recommends that USAID discuss with the Government of Lesotho and other interested donors the possibility of establishing a project which would have three objectives:

- (1) the provision of personnel to assist in the preparation of detailed policy options with respect to the entire range of labor policy questions;
- (2) the development of a comprehensive Staff Development Plan and the provision of adequate scholarship money for the training of personnel for the strengthening of the Department; and
- (3) the strengthening of administrative, secretarial and clerical support services by providing financing for additional training in these skills.

g. A study by UNIDO which is due in August 1978 will suggest uses for sandstone and semi-precious stone deposits in Lesotho and propose the development of artisan centers over the next two years. A discussion of small-scale industry potential will appear under the manufacturing sector of the SADAP analysis; however, this is an obvious area for employment creation, and the UNIDO study may suggest projects with which the U.S.

may wish to cooperate. Lesotho's geographic position makes it logical to seek to identify high value/low bulk goods for production, processing or finishing which can then be exported. To achieve this, however, requires a skilled workforce producing a high-quality product. With the proper identification of products of this nature, retraining programs could then be envisaged for returning migrant laborers. A pilot project of this sort could be established for those returning migrants who have retired or become disabled as a result of mine work. This would allow some period of experimentation with various products and various approaches to retraining of this particular group of people.

- h. The ILO-JASPA Project (Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa), which is headquartered in Addis-Ababa, will send a mission to Lesotho to do a comprehensive analysis of employment creation

possibilities in the near future. There will no doubt be additional ideas from this mission with regard to possible employment creation opportunities in Lesotho. This report should be carefully reviewed by AID and the JASPA mission's recommendations assessed for possible projects which the U.S. may wish to support.

- i. Finally, it should be noted that the lengthy history of Basotho migration to the mines has generated several studies which have produced recommendations. Many of these have not yet been implemented. The Mission, therefore, recommends that the Government of Lesotho, perhaps with the assistance of the university, prepare a comprehensive bibliography of these reports and a summary of their recommendations together with a table showing the current status of these recommendations under the following headings:

Report (Title/Date)	Source of Report	Major Recom- mendations	Action Taken on Recommendations or Reasons for Lack of Follow-up	Results Achieved
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C. Malawi

In the case of Malawi the most relevant question to be asked does not concern the alternatives to migrant labor, since, as noted in Part III, most of the migrants have already returned to Malawi and have been reabsorbed into their own society. The remaining question for this section of the report, therefore, concerns the possible need for assistance in facilitating the reintegration of these migrants into Malawi society in such a way that they can make an optimal contribution to the economic life of their country. Secondly, if Malawi again decides to terminate all foreign migrant employment in South Africa this would represent an additional influx of between 17,000 and 20,000 persons. Considering the fact that Malawi was able to reabsorb over 100,000 people without outside assistance during 1974-75, it is unlikely that problems would arise with the much smaller number who might return at some point in the future.

Despite this, it is a subject for which Malawi may wish to make some plans to ensure that this labor is used in the best way possible.

The preferred approach may be one in which any assistance related to labor migration would relate to employment creation and productive activities in the rural sector in particular.

One type of survey of former migrant workers which the Malawi Government might welcome would be an inventory of skills and aptitudes which some workers may have brought with them from the mines which may be applied more usefully in Malawi if the nature and extent of these skills were known and could be harnessed to particular development objectives. The Mission recommends that a survey of this nature be proposed to Malawi and that the results be linked to the government's plans for a UNDP-funded project to establish a training center in basic trades and entrepreneurship, with particular reference to training and retraining returned migrants.

The former migrant laborers may represent a particularly attractive source of trainees for the envisaged programs, since their work experiences in the mines and their contact with the somewhat more urbanized environment around the mines has most likely resulted in the generation of work habits more suited for industrial endeavors.

In addition, the U.S. could consider funding the construction of a hostel for women, since the absence of this is given as the reason why the scheme will be restricted to males.

At present Malawi receives the lowest per capita level of development assistance of any country visited by the Mission, yet it has made impressive strides in raising its level of agricultural output and, according to a recent World Bank study, has one of the best ratios of capital invested to jobs created in Africa. The country is now beginning to concentrate more fully on small-holder agriculture rather than continue to develop estate agriculture as a first priority. Given this changed emphasis, there may well be new opportunities to develop multi-purpose projects which could address themselves to the closely-related questions of employment creation and agricultural productivity.

D. Mozambique

In addition to the problems presented by the flight of skilled Portuguese manpower, the adverse economic consequences of Mozambique's enforcement of U.N. sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and attacks by S. Rhodesian security forces which have displaced over 50,000 people,

repeated floods, and the general problems of underdevelopment left by centuries of Portuguese neglect, the government has had to contend with the rapid return of over 80,000 workers from South Africa. Since the Mission did not visit Mozambique no firsthand information regarding the government's thinking with respect to possible schemes to facilitate their reabsorption was obtained. It is likely, however, that the Mozambique Government is attempting to reintegrate most mine workers into their home communities within the framework of their agricultural development program. A centerpiece of the strategy of this program is the establishment of communal villages to serve as focal points for the development of rural areas. The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization produced a document for the Mozambique Government in 1976 outlining a comprehensive agricultural development program, recommending over 40 projects. A number of these projects are now under implementation, however, the Mozambique Government requires additional assistance in a broad range of areas in order to overcome the severe problems of its economy. Much assistance of this general nature would, consequently, have a positive impact on returned migrants who are

unlikely to be distinguished from the general population. Any program which would address the reintegration of migrant workers into Mozambique in specific terms therefore would have to be part of the overall strategy of the government.

A program to be financed which included assistance to returned migrants in particular, would probably be most favorably received were it to be suggested as part of a more comprehensive program of multilateral assistance for the rural development and industrial expansion of the country.

Projects which could be discussed with the Government of Mozambique as part of a larger package should include the following:

1. Skills Survey--Records held by the Chamber of Mines would reveal some of the training received by Mozambican nationals for mine employment. An analysis of this data together with interviews with returned migrants possessing specific skills might provide a foundation for a training scheme in Mozambique designed to build upon and deploy rationally those individuals who have already acquired useful skills and modern sector work habits.

2. Preventive Health Care--As discussed in Part IV, miners have occupation-related health problems. A program to include consideration of this in an overall health plan would reduce the risk of these diseases going untreated. The SADAP health team might consider this problem further.

E. Namibia

With a population approaching 1 million, substantial natural resources including mineral wealth, and a total of only about 2,500 Namibians employed as migrant laborers in South Africa as of April 1977, Namibia has some fairly obvious alternatives for the independence period. Once independence is achieved, there will be numerous international donors eager to assist Namibia achieve its development objectives. The U.N. Namibia Nationhood Program has already received project proposals from the U.N. family and has accepted a document which lists 126 different projects, classified under the three categories of pre-independence, transitional, and post-independence projects. In addition, numerous bilateral donors, some of whom have been supporters of Namibian independence and have provided tangible assistance to SWAPO (the U.N.-recognized liberation movement for Namibia), will no doubt

also be preparing substantial bilateral programs. Sweden and the Netherlands, among others, are likely to be in the forefront of this development effort. A future recognized Namibian government may welcome discussions with the United States with respect to bilateral and multilateral channels of assistance from U.S. resources as well.

Since Namibia is legally administered by the United Nations Council for Namibia which has had responsibility for the development of the Namibia Nationhood papers, the Mission recommends that the U.S. should initially provide assistance to Namibia with respect to migration problems through the United Nations so that pre-independence and transition projects now being formulated, and those outlined in the Nationhood papers and accepted by SWAPO, can be implemented as soon as possible. The U.S. could consider possible bilateral assistance to supplement multilateral aid once independence has been achieved.

Channeling U.S. assistance through the U.N. would also have the advantage of ensuring that U.S. funds were part of a common pool of resources

which can be drawn upon in a systematic and organized manner for the welfare of Namibia. Specific projects in the Nationhood papers which would relate to the reabsorption of the small number of Namibian migrant laborers working in South Africa include:

1. The establishment of a statistical unit for Namibia.
2. The establishment of an advisory service on legislative and other changes required to eliminate discrimination in labor matters, and to promote conformity with international labor standards in an independent Namibia.
3. Social security legislation.
4. Induction training of junior-level labor administrators.

The final decision with respect to the implementation of post-independence projects will of course await the installation of an independent Namibian Government; however, the Mission recommends that donors begin discussions with the Council and Institute for Namibia and the UNDP with regard to the precise mechanisms through which funding is anticipated for these various projects. . .

The reabsorption of labor from South Africa into Namibia is likely to be a secondary priority of the new Namibian Government, since it will be faced first with the establishment of a civil administration. Therefore, it is likely to be

simply one subsidiary consideration of those engaged in overall planning for the Namibian economy. These Namibians do, however, represent a semi-skilled workforce who have had experience in mining. Given the mining potential of Namibia and the expected expansion of this sector, their skills may well be needed in the country and might be absorbed relatively easily.

The question of domestic migration within the supplier states is not part of the Terms of Reference of this Mission; however, in the case of Namibia which has a significant mining sector, greater numbers of Namibians migrate from their home areas to the mines within their own country than migrate across the border into South Africa. Gordon in his book on life in a Namibian mine compound points out that people generally move from less to more developed areas in search of employment. For this reason the Ovamboland and the Kavango areas of Namibia are becoming more significant supplier areas as the internal migration rates appear to show a continual increase. As of 1970-71, the latest year for which statistics are available, 40,508 people from Ovamboland and 3,392 from Kavango, for a total of 43,890, were recruited from the northern areas of Namibia for Namibian mines. Nearly every male in these supply

areas has engaged in contract labor, and most believe this to be an inevitable situation due to the lack of alternative employment opportunities in the sending areas. The sending areas within Namibia which supply migrant workers for domestic mines, therefore, can be considered to be suffering from problems similar to those of independent supplier states since historically Namibian workers have also had to work under the racially discriminatory laws of South Africa. Although Apartheid will be abolished once Namibia obtains independence and Namibian workers will then be able to be employed in a country over which they have some say, the pernicious effects of Apartheid and labor exploitation on the sending areas may call for particular attention and the development of a program to begin to reduce and reverse the negative consequences of the illegal South African occupation of Namibia.

The problem for Namibia then will not be to stop labor migration, but to eliminate the harmful consequences of Apartheid on the migrants. These include the forced separation of workers from their families and restrictions of movement. In this effort the United States may be able to be of assistance in such fields as family housing, health care, and the expansion of education facilities for the children of migrant workers.

To facilitate the improvement of conditions for internal and external migrant workers, the Mission recommends that U.S. assistance be provided to the U.N. Institute for Namibia sufficient to permit the Institute to employ a labor economist and a sociologist of their choice to carry out an analysis during the transition to independence which would identify corrective measures which could be taken in the sending areas and at the mines to lessen the economic and social problems resulting from past exploitation. The recommendations of the team could then be presented to the independent Namibian Government for review.

F. Swaziland

In any discussion of alternatives to labor migration and decisionmaking in Swaziland the unique nature of the Swaziland Government should be noted. The modern bureaucratic government functions in a manner similar to that of many other governments; however, in addition the traditional Swazi Nation, represents a complementary institution which has a significant role in setting national priorities. Although both wings of the government^{1/} in Swaziland desire economic

^{1/} The suspension of the Constitution in 1973 and later repeal paved the way for the merger of at least the top leadership of the country; however, it appears that this has not yet been fully realized.

development, the nature and pace at which development should occur appears to be differently perceived by these entities. Outside observers sometimes do not fully comprehend this because they meet with members of the modern government without realizing the important role of traditional institutions.

The nature of land tenure and land distribution, the continuing overwhelming importance of cattle, the nature of the relationship with South Africa, the attitude toward refugees and the degree to which Swaziland is willing to cooperate with other states in the region on a variety of issues is to a great extent colored by the thinking of the Swazi Nation. Before alternatives to labor migration can be discussed seriously with respect to Swaziland, therefore, the government would appear to need to consider whether it wants to have a policy in this regard and if so, whether that policy will be planned and directed at reducing the numbers of migrant laborers or in absorbing those laborers who find themselves without employment as a result of reductions initiated by South Africa. In comparison with official statements which have been made by some government officials of other supplier states regarding their situations, it appears to the Mission that Swaziland may be less inclined to

alter its present relationship with South Africa on this question and wishes to focus instead on other problems which it sees as more pressing within its own country.

The suggestion of a scheme or schemes specifically to promote the reduction in the number of migrant laborers may not be a priority of the government; however, a similar program designed to assist those who have lost their jobs or chosen to retire for other reasons may be welcomed. This represents a relatively small number of people, particularly when compared with the problems existing in other countries. Nevertheless, this is likely to become an increasing problem for Swaziland in the future and is one which government may be required to address if social difficulties, particularly in the urban centers, are to be avoided.

Consistent with the general trend of labor recruitment from the economies peripheral to South Africa, the number of Swazi citizens employed in the Republic appears to have reached its peak around 1973 and is now declining. As mentioned in Part III, about 9,300 men have actually been at work on the mines in any given month during the first half of 1978 and the number of novices recruited has declined from about 40% in 1976 to

TABLE XIV

SWAZILAND PROFILE: 1975-1976

1. <u>Population (June 1975)</u> *				
	<u>Sex</u>	<u>Resident</u>	<u>Absentees</u>	<u>Total</u>
	(a) Males	227,466	24,856	252,322
	(b) Females	249,557	8,333	257,890
	(c) TOTAL	477,023	33,189	510,212
2. <u>Population Aged 15-64 (June 1975)</u> *				
	(a) Males	129,436		
	(b) Females	132,818		
	(c) TOTAL	262,252		
3. <u>Population Growth Rate</u> **			3.1%	
4. <u>Total Wage Sector Employment (1976)</u> ***				
	(a) Private Sector	60,399		
	(b) Public Sector	16,543		
	(c) TOTAL	76,942		
5. <u>Traditional Sector Employment (1976)</u> ***				
	(a) Total Farm Population		462,113	
	(b) of whom Economically Active		182,678	
	(c) of whom Salaried		3,787	
6. <u>Annual Growth Rate of Labor Force</u>			3.0%	
7. <u>Percentage of Swazi Citizens Employed by Skill Level</u> ***				
	<u>Level</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
	Professional	63.9%	61.0%	53.5%
	Administrative	42.0%	40.6%	46.1%
	Skilled	58.0%	57.4%	62.7%
	Unskilled	98.8%	98.6%	99.0%
8. <u>Migrant Workers in South Africa</u> ****				
	(a) Total Absentees (6/1975)		33,189	
	(b) Mine Recruits (7/75-6/76)		19,810	
	(c) Mine Recruits (7/76-6/77)		17,355	
	(d) Novices as a Percent of Total Mine Recruits:			
	(1) 1976		40%	
	(2) 1978 (Jan-Jun)		10%	
9. <u>Percent of Land Owned by Non-Citizens</u>			52%-60%	
(estimates vary according to source)				

Sources:

- * Annual Statistical Bulletin for Swaziland, 1976 (latest ed.)
- ** World Bank Atlas 1976
- *** "Employment and Wages 1976" CSO Swaziland
- **** "Wages in Swaziland" Federation of Swaziland Employees, 1977 and interview with TEBA representative in Siteki, Swaziland, July 1978.

Note: There are as many figures as there are sources for the above statistics. The CSO population figure for total absentees in mid-1975 is 33,189, yet unofficial results from the 1976 census shows a total of only 25,385. Similarly, mine recruits seem to be fewer in the 1976 census (9,670 males and 112 females) than the above figures show.

In an interview with TEBA, the representative stated that an average of 9,300 were actually working on the mines in any given month for the period Jan-Jun 1978. To this must be added those recruited elsewhere; however, this would still tend to indicate that the total number of mine recruits is less than the figures above or that the drop in numbers has been more precipitous than is generally believed.

10% during the current year. Within five years the Chamber of Mines anticipates that most requests for Swazi mine workers will be for those with specific skills, thus eliminating the category of novice altogether. Once recruitment has been limited to those with experience in the mines, the natural process of attrition through recruitment will result in a continual and gradual decline in numbers.

While some agricultural employment opportunities in South Africa will remain, this is an area in which Swaziland can--and in the future probably will be obliged to--compete. In a recent report of the Federation of Swazi Employers, the following point was made:

"It is a common fallacy to believe that Swazis can simply cross the border to find employment in high wage sectors. Admittedly, there are many Swazis employed in surrounding areas such as Pongola, Piet Retief, and Malelane, but they work in agriculture or agriculture-based industries because of tradition and geographic convenience rather than higher wages. High unemployment rates, stricter enforcement of pass laws, and the political pressure on the South African Government to reduce the dependence of foreign workers, will make it more and more difficult for Swazis to find either legal or illegal employment in South Africa. Furthermore, influx controls generally restrict the legal employment of Swazis to the mining sector alone."

Comparisons of wage structures in Swaziland and South Africa reveal that most Swazis do not leave a particular form of employment in Swaziland to take up the same form of employment in South Africa, but rather choose to supplement all forms of employment in Swaziland with mining employment in South Africa, when it is available. This is obviously a direct result of the significant wage differential.

With a gradual decline in the number of employment opportunities for Swazis in the South African mining sector, other sectors of the Swazi economy may become more attractive to this labor pool. Additionally, those working in agriculture in South Africa might be encouraged to work in agriculture in Swaziland. Creating opportunities in this sector which are competitive with the low wages paid in South Africa should be considerably easier than trying to lure mine workers out of mining and into agriculture. The question of geographic convenience can be altered through an improvement in the transport infrastructure, thereby weakening the tradition of agricultural labor migration. The strengthening of an agricultural extension service should also help those Swazis, particularly those from the Shiselweni and Hho-Hho districts, to be

reintegrated into their own country. The importance of migrant farm labor should not, however, be overemphasized since the unofficial results of the population census of 1976 indicate that of the total absentees, only 1,835 are so engaged.

The largest category of absentees is actually referred to by the census as "other" and records an absentee population of 13,871, compared to 9,670 for mining. The bulk of this category represents domestic services, followed by manufacturing. Again, the salary levels in South Africa for these jobs are not high enough to rule out the creation of alternative employment opportunities in Swaziland at a level which would not distort the Swazi economy in other sectors or stimulate inflation.

The primary area for job creation which could represent an alternative to labor migration is that of rural development; however, as Low points out, the impact of a rural development strategy will be determined by its content. Several studies have indicated that agricultural development strategies centered primarily on increased production of food crops, as opposed to export crops, are likely to have negligible or negative effects on migration. The usual reason given

for this likely outcome is that an increase in the production of food crops will lead to a worsening in the agricultural terms of trade and a consequent decline in agricultural incomes. Low argues, however, that this decline does not apply to Swaziland, since the price of basic foodstuffs is determined by the South African market. Despite this, Low's analysis has shown that the introduction of improved maize would have less of an impact on migration than would the introduction of cash crops, particularly tobacco and cotton. In short, the relative labor requirements and returns to labor inputs that can be expected are greater for cash crops than for maize.^{1/}

Swaziland is also interested in increasing its manufacturing outputs. From discussions with government officials, however, it appears that the constraints imposed on Swaziland by its membership in the Southern African Customs Union and its proximity to South Africa generally have served to limit opportunities in this sector. There have been instances where Swaziland has been able to develop products which were competitive with similar products produced in South Africa;

^{1/} For a further discussion of hypothetical labor requirements for different crops, see A.R.C. Low, "Migration and Agricultural Development in Swaziland: A Micro-Economic Analysis," World Employment Program Research Working Paper No. 13, August, 1977.

however, a combination of pressures from South African business and the South African Government served to undermine these initiatives. The difficulty for Swaziland is that, were it to withdraw from the Customs Union, it would lose the revenues gained through membership; however, if it continues membership, the opportunities for independent development of this sector appear to depend overwhelmingly on an acceptance by the South Africans of the initiatives proposed by the Swazis for their own country's development. In order to minimize this problem and still create a manufacturing base which will stimulate job creation, the Swaziland Government has recently been examining policies to stimulate indigenous small-scale enterprises. A recent report by Technoserve Incorporated to AID has addressed this issue and its recommendations should be assessed in terms of their potential job creation impact and effect on migrant workers.

Should the Government of Swaziland decide that there is an alternative to migrant labor (and this Mission believes that there is) and that it wishes to exercise this alternative, a combination of activities could be envisaged which could be

targeted to increase production, stimulate employment creation, and absorb migrant workers into the domestic economy. This would consist of a package of projects bridging several sectors and targeted in those geographic areas which supply the largest number of migrant workers. Such an approach might initially be tried in Shiselweni District, since this is the least developed of the four districts and its absentee rate of over 8% is almost twice the national average. The following projects and ideas require further investigation, but all of them have been suggested as possible ingredients of such a program:

1. The National Industrial Development Corporation (NIDC), which is designed to promote medium-scale industries, and the Small-Scale Development Corporation (SSDC), which deals with smaller industries, have recently received a loan for \$5.0 million from the World Bank to promote their activities. In addition, SEDCO, Swaziland Enterprises Development Corporation, also deals with small-scale enterprise. Initiatives by these organizations and the results of the Technoserve study might be targeted to those rural areas

where migrants have returned with an investable surplus obtained as a result of the deferred pay scheme. The willingness of workers to be employed in manufacturing throughout the year will have to be surveyed, since most are accustomed to dividing their time between the mines and rural activities. This may be a problem if industrial enterprises continue to be clustered in the Mbabane-Manzini corridor necessitating some internal migration.

2. The Ministry of Agriculture has indicated that rural development areas are increasingly able to obtain a more stable worker through incentives. The problem of short-term labor is likely to decline as the number of unemployed increases and agricultural estates improve their wage and benefits structures. For example, the sugar industry requires most of its labor from May to December, while May to October is a relatively idle period for most rural areas. During this period labor is somewhat easier to recruit; however, in August competition from cotton

farmers attracts some labor, while during the first rains labor returns to traditional rural agricultural activities. The domestic sugar industry has responded by increasing its mechanization, which although increasing the cost per unit, has reduced the uncertainty of the labor supply.

This problem, plus Swaziland's overwhelming dependence on the export of sugar^{1/} outside the Customs Union, when added to the global problem of the oversupply of sugar, would indicate that the replication of the small-holder sugar schemes in Swaziland may not be advisable unless Swaziland can obtain a guaranteed market for its sugar exports. Were this to occur, additional small-scale schemes might make sense and the sugar estates might be able to stabilize their labor supply further through the

^{1/} About 90% of production is exported, of which 60% is sold to the EEC, while the South African sugar industry is able to sell about 50% of its production to the domestic South African market.

provision of better wages and housing for families. ^{1/}

The Mission consequently recommends that the question of Swaziland's export of sugar to the U.S. be reviewed jointly by USAID, the Department of Commerce, and other relevant institutions to determine whether encouraging the free importation of Swazi sugar could form part of a total package for the region designed to reduce the level of labor migration.

3. As in most developing countries in the region, in order to plan effectively for the reintegration of labor or indeed for any other development goal, the Central Statistics Office greatly needs strengthening. The latest statistics for Swaziland which have been processed by the CSO are for 1976 and the office urged the Mission

^{1/} For a comprehensive discussion of this question, see Fion de Vletter, Wages in Swaziland, Federation of Swaziland Employers, Manzini. 1977. This document discusses the wage structure of most agricultural estates and industries in Swaziland with respect to their impact on migrant labor. The comparative wage structures presented in this document provide a useful guide to the identification of activities in Swaziland which may be able to stimulate the reabsorption of migrant labor. In an interview with Mr. de Vletter, he stated that replication of a small-holder sugar scheme now in operation held considerable promise.

to recommend financing for the provision of additional staff. Given the uncertainty of even those limited figures which are available and the difficulty this Mission has had in attempting to assemble any meaningful profile of Swaziland's current position as a result of this, it would seem logical that this is a fundamental problem which would be solved relatively easily through the provision of personnel and training for Swazi nationals in this field. In addition, the need for a rural expenditures survey was repeatedly mentioned as a basic working tool for development planners. Such a survey would assist in planning any proposed reintegration of migrant workers in particular, since it would reveal the breakdown of household income and expenditures and permit a more detailed identification of items which could be produced in Swaziland and which would have the greatest import substitution effect.

4. A standard area for job creation among unskilled workers has been the production

of handicrafts. As is true for wool and mohair products in Lesotho, the problem appears to be one of marketing and quality control. The Mission recommends that a review be undertaken of previous marketing development and quality control efforts of selected products produced particularly using labor-intensive techniques to determine the present optimal combination of personnel and training which could be provided by AID. This might be done on a regional level and involve the states which supply the greatest number of migrant laborers.

G. Southern Rhodesia

Given the present political uncertainties in S. Rhodesia and the inability of the Mission to visit the country or speak to representatives of nationalist movements outside Zimbabwe, it should not be surprising that the observations made below are speculative and risk belaboring the obvious.

The Mission's Terms of Reference were to appraise the labor migration situation in the context of two scenarios:

- (a) Transition to an internationally-recognized independent government with an end to sanctions and a start at efforts to reduce dependency on South Africa; and
- (b) Maintenance of the status quo, including continued sanctions and gradually escalating conflict.

Each will be examined in turn.

1. Transition to Internationally-Recognized Independence

In the event of a transition to a recognized African government, it is likely that its priorities will focus on the development of a civil service which is responsive to the new government leaders and capable of addressing such priority questions as land redistribution, indigenization of the bureaucracy and security forces, the elimination of racially discriminatory legislation and encouraging the return of skilled manpower currently in exile. The majority of S. Rhodesians employed in South Africa in mines are unskilled or marginally skilled workers. Given this fact and their relatively small number when compared to the total domestic S. Rhodesian workforce, it is unlikely that their early repatriation from South Africa will be a priority concern of the new government.

If the new government is relatively militant and has a socialist or Marxist character, the removal of workers from South Africa may take on added importance to that government or to the South African Government. In the case of Mozambique, the numbers employed in South Africa declined rapidly after independence, primarily as a result of South African initiatives and a manipulation of the Mozambique Convention which made Mozambique workers relatively more expensive for the mining houses. On the other hand, Mozambique currently has over 30,000 of its nationals employed in mining in South Africa, a figure which is slightly greater than the total current number for S. Rhodesia. In short, the likely policy of either South Africa or a future Zimbabwe Government on this issue simply cannot be predicted, since it depends upon the relative extent of ideological and economic considerations which each government will wish to stress.

Any genuinely independent Zimbabwe Government, however, is likely to be interested in cooperating with other

supplier states in examining this question. The miners may also represent a target group for assistance under any land redistribution scheme, since most mine workers come from the poorer strata of S. Rhodesian society. This group could possibly be incorporated into overall plans for such land redistribution and reintegrated into Zimbabwe society during the more fluid immediate post-independence period.

A future government may also wish to examine the role of the foreign migrant worker population in Zimbabwe from Malawi and Mozambique, since some jobs held in Zimbabwe by foreign nationals may be those which could be occupied by Zimbabweans currently in RSA mines. About one-third of labor imported into Zimbabwe is employed in the agricultural sector. These jobs would not be appealing to mine workers who earn considerably higher salaries in South Africa; however, under an independent Zimbabwe the wage structure, salary levels, and opportunities for small-holder farmers may change significantly with alterations in land distribution.

The mining and quarrying sector in S. Rhodesia is also not an attractive alternative under current circumstances for miners who have migrated to South African mines (assuming there were enough jobs), since the average mine earnings for Africans in 1975 in S. Rhodesia were R\$504 (Rand 689), compared to the South African average wage of R948 for the same period. The following Table shows the discrepancy between white and black wages in S. Rhodesia and black and black wages between S. Rhodesia and South Africa.

TABLE XV

AVERAGE EARNINGS 1972 - 1976
(Rand)

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
White (S.R.)	6,607	7,113	8,180	9,330	?
Black (S.R.)	484	516	586	689	?
Black (RSA)	257	350	565	948	1,236

Source: Composed from Chamber of Mines Annual Reports and S. Rhodesian Ministry of Finance Economic Survey for 1975.

In 1975 there were 60,300 Africans and 3,820 Europeans employed in mining and quarrying in S. Rhodesia with total earnings of R\$30.4 million for the former and R\$26.6 million for the latter group. This was slightly above the average

earnings for all sectors in 1975 (black R\$461 and white R\$5,048); however, this sector was lower for Africans than any others, except agriculture and private domestic services.

Given the above conditions, an independent Zimbabwe Government should (a) eliminate wage differentials caused purely by racial discrimination at once, (b) survey the skills of Zimbabwean miners employed in South Africa in order to identify those who could be trained for jobs in mining in Zimbabwe; and (c) consider policy options for the longer term and adopt a plan to implement the preferred options after consultations with other supplier states and technical specialists at ILO and elsewhere. At the same time, the skills of Zimbabweans employed in mining in their own country should be surveyed to facilitate the total upgrading of manpower in this sector and its optimal deployment.

2. Maintenance of the Status Quo

In the event that genuine independence is thwarted and the "Internal Settlement" reached between Smith and a limited number of Zimbabwe leaders is able to endure, it is likely that there will be no change in policy from the one promulgated by the illegal Smith regime. It is probable that Zimbabwean workers would continue to be permitted to enter and work in South Africa. Zimbabwe would not be faced with the possible reintegration of this population into its own society, and it is unlikely to represent a government concern.

TABLE XVI

SOURCES OF AFRICAN LABOUR BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

(expressed as a percentage of the total number employed at 31 December)

	1906	1911	1916	1921	1926	1931	1936	1941	1946	1951	1956	1961	1966	1971	1973	1976 (July)	1977 (April)
South Africa	22.80	40.32	44.32	38.69	41.22	49.80	52.18	48.17	41.26	35.29	34.71	36.46	34.04	22.40	20.42	44.69	51.6
Botswana	0.40	0.49	1.68	1.11	1.01	1.49	2.25	2.51	2.30	2.69	3.10	3.19	4.95	4.14	3.98	5.73	5.9
Lesotho	2.60	3.82	7.63	10.56	10.93	13.62	14.46	13.10	12.49	11.67	11.93	13.02	16.77	17.78	20.66	22.05	23.8
Swaziland	0.70	2.07	2.05	2.28	2.12	2.24	2.21	1.93	1.81	1.84	1.61	1.57	1.13	1.25	1.07	3.32	2.8
Mozambique	70.79	51.59	43.73	47.08	47.54	32.71	27.83	27.00	31.54	34.45	30.78	24.22	28.43	26.52	23.55	18.29	9.1
Tropicals (North of Lat. 22°S.)	2.47	1.66	0.58	0.27	0.17	0.14	1.07	7.29	10.60	13.45	17.87	21.54	14.68	27.91	30.32(a)	5.92(b)	6.8
Foreign African Total (c)	76.96	59.63	55.67	61.30	61.77	50.20	47.82	51.83	58.74	64.10	65.29	63.54	65.96	77.60	79.58	55.31	49.2
Total Number Employed ('000)	81	174	191	188	203	226	318	372	305	306	334	414	383	379	422	395	420

Notes: (a) Estimated for Southern Rhodesia at 4.41% and for Malawi at 1.51%.

(b) Estimated for Southern Rhodesia at 5.5% and for Malawi at 1.3%.

(c) Namibian migrants included in totals for South Africa.

Sources: South African Chamber of Mines, Annual Reports; Mine Labour Organisations (WFMELA), Annual Reports; Mine Labour Organisations (N.R.C.), Annual Reports. Figures for 1977 obtained from World Bank.

TABLE XVII

GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS, BY AREA OF ORIGIN, OF BLACK WORKERS
EMPLOYED¹ ON MINES AFFILIATED² TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN CHAMBER
OF MINES,³ 1946-1977

Date	No. (in '000s) coming from						Total
	S. Africa	Lesotho	Botswana	Swaziland	Mozambique	Tropical ⁴	
1946	126,0	38,2	7,0	5,5	96,3	32,4	305,4
47	113,9	33,8	8,8	6,3	97,1	39,8	299,7
48	100,0	31,3	7,8	6,1	94,4	41,1	280,7
49	118,8	43,0	9,7	6,3	102,4	42,5	322,7
1950	114,0	32,0	9,8	6,1	94,7	38,9	295,6
51	108,0	35,7	9,1	5,6	106,5	41,2	306,1
52	108,6	33,4	9,5	5,7	98,0	37,3	292,5
53	110,1	32,8	9,1	5,9	96,4	44,4	298,6
54	114,3	33,9	10,3	6,2	106,2	50,9	321,8
55	110,9	34,3	10,5	5,5	96,8	55,4	323,4
56	116,1	39,9	10,4	5,4	102,9	59,8	334,5
57	108,1	40,1	11,5	5,4	99,3	61,0	325,4
58	125,7	49,1	12,8	5,9	99,6	68,5	361,4
59	135,7	52,7	14,5	5,7	100,7	76,2	385,4
1960	145,4	51,4	16,0	5,6	95,5	82,8	396,7
61	150,9	53,9	13,2	6,5	100,2	89,1	413,9
62	157,3	58,5	15,1	7,1	99,1	68,5	405,6
63	153,8	56,5	15,3	5,8	88,7	74,2	394,3
64	139,4	58,5	16,0	5,5	97,5	71,9	388,8
65	135,7	61,3	20,5	4,5	102,2	68,1	392,4
66	130,5	64,3	19,0	4,3	109,0	56,3	383,3
67	126,2	59,7	16,0	3,8	105,7	56,9	368,4
68	129,9	65,1	15,6	4,5	105,8	61,7	382,6
69	116,5	65,0	14,8	5,0	99,8	69,9	371,1
1970	96,9	71,1	16,3	5,4	113,3	98,2	401,2
71	86,5	68,7	16,0	4,8	102,4	107,8	386,2
72	87,2	78,5	17,5	4,3	97,7	129,2	414,3
73	86,2	87,2	16,8	4,5	99,4	128,0	422,2
74	90,1	78,3	14,7	5,5	101,8	73,1	363,5
75	121,8	85,5	16,6	7,2	118,0	15,5	364,7
76(July)	174,6	88,3	25,9	12,0	68,4	22,0	391,2
77(Apr)	217,1	100,0	24,8	11,8	38,2	28,7	420,5

¹ As at 31 December, each year.

² Affiliated mines include all large gold mines, the coal mines of the Transvaal and one or two others (e.g. Western Platinum).

³ In 1954 the Transvaal Chamber of Mines became the Transvaal and OFS Chamber of Mines. In 1968 it broadened its constitution to include all types of mines in all four provinces. Labor recruitment by the Mine Labor Organizations (Wenela and NRC) is still done primarily for the gold and coal mines through the single agency, TEBA.

⁴ Tropical areas are defined by the mining industry as those parts of the African subcontinent lying north of latitude 22°S. above which recruiting was prohibited between 1913 and the mid-1930s. Until 1974 mostly from Malawi and from 1975 mostly Southern Rhodesia.

Sources: Mine Labor Organizations (Wenela) Annual Reports.

TABLE XVIII

EMPLOYMENT IN MINING, BY MINERAL, 1966 AND 1975
(000)

Mineral	<u>1966</u>	<u>1966%</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1975%</u>
Gold	425.5	63	377.9	55
Coal	82.2	12	76.9	11
Quarries	24.1	4	21.2	3
Asbestos	23.7	3	20.1	3
Diamonds	21.1	3	19.8	3
Other*	<u>99.2</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>175.9</u>	<u>25</u>
Totals	675.8	100.0	691.8	100.0

* Principally chrome, copper, and platinum

Source: Dept. of Mines; Mining Statistics, Pretoria, 1966,
and 1975.

TABLE XIX

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MAN YEARS (BLACK WORKERS ONLY)
INVESTED IN MINES WHICH ARE MEMBERS OF THE CHAMBER OF
MINES, 1946-1975

<u>Area of Origin</u>	<u>No. of Man Years</u> (million)	<u>%</u>
South Africa (mainly Ciskei and Transkei)	3.6	34
Mozambique	3.0	28
"Tropical" (mainly Malawi)	1.9	19
Lesotho	1.6	15
Botswana	0.4	4
Swaziland	0.2	2
TOTALS	10.7	100

Notes: 1. Discrepancies due to rounding.

2. These figures refer to all large gold mines, coal mines of the Transvaal and to one or two others (e.g. Lohnro Platinum) but not to most other mines such as diamonds and copper.

3. Numbers are of those employed at the 31st December each year. For the purposes of this table, we assume these to be constant throughout the year.

Source: Mine Labour Organizations (WENELA), as reproduced in World Bank study of labor migration in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.

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CONTACT LIST

Labor Migration/Refugees Sector

I. Washington--April 24-May 26, 1978

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1. VIVIAN ANDERSON, Deputy Director, Office of Southern Africa Affairs, Bureau for Africa
2. CLETA CAPOFERRI, International Cooperation Officer, Office of Southern Africa Affairs, Bureau for Africa
3. MICHAEL FELDSTEIN, Chief, Southern Africa Development Analysis and Planning Taskforce
4. PAUL GUEDET, Chief, South Africa Programs, Office of Development Resources, Bureau for Africa
5. LEONARD POMPA, Desk Officer, Office of Southern Africa Affairs, Bureau for Africa
6. THOMAS QUIMBY, Director, Office of Southern Africa Affairs, Bureau for Africa
7. ROY STACY, Director, Southern Africa Development Analysis and Planning Taskforce
8. ROBERT WRIN, Desk Officer, Office of Southern Africa Affairs, Bureau for Africa

B. Department of State

1. CARL CUNDIFF, Director, Economic Policy Staff, Bureau of African Affairs
2. WILLIAM EATON, Office of Director of Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs
3. DENNIS KEOGH, Deputy Director, Office of Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs
4. LAWRENCE MARINELLI, Office of Refugees and Migration, Humanitarian Affairs Bureau

5. JAMES NACH, Desk Officer, Office of Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs
 6. WILLIAM SWING, Alternate Director, Office of Central African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs
- C. South Africa Development Analysis and Planning (SADAP) Contractors
1. ALAMEDA HARPER, Public Health Specialist, AFRICARE
 2. KEVIN LOWTHER, Special Projects Officer, AFRICARE
 3. LARRY WILLIAMS, Project Director, Health Sector Survey, Family Health Care, Inc.
 4. WILLIAM HOOFNAGLE, Project Director, Agriculture Sector Survey, Department of Agriculture
 5. EDWARD VICKERY, South-East Consortium for International Development
 6. FRANCIS KORNEGAY, Information Specialist, African Bibliographic Center
 7. DAN MATTHEWS, Executive Director, African Bibliographic Center
- D. U.S. Senate
1. DALE DE HAAN, Legislative Assistant to Senator Ted Kennedy, Senate Subcommittee on Immigration
- E. U.S. House of Representatives
1. ALAN VAN EGMOND, Legislative Assistant to Representative Don Bonker
- F. The World Bank
1. QUILL HERMANS, Senior Planning Advisory Officer
 2. ROBERT MAUBOUCHE, Senior Economist, Country Programs, Department II

II. New York--July 7

A. African-American Institute (AAI)

1. WILBUR JONES, Director, Division of Education

B. United Nations Education and Training Programme for South Africa (UNETPSA)

1. ROBERT GOODMAN

III. Sussex, England--May 31

A. Institute for Development Studies (IDS)

1. CHRISTOPHER COLCLOUGH

2. REGINALD GREEN

3. PERCY SELWYN

IV. Uxbridge, England--May 31

A. Brunel University

1. WALTER ELKAN, Department of Economics

V. London, England--May 30-June 1

A. Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM)

1. PETER CARTER, Economist

2. PETER FREEMAN, Area Officer for Zimbabwe

3. CHRISTOPHER JERRARD, Assistant to the Director, Division for Southern and East African Affairs

4. PETER S. MC LEAN, Director, Division for Southern and East African Affairs

VI. Geneva, Switzerland--June 1-June 6

A. United States Mission to the U.N.

1. MS. DENSDALE, Secretary to J. Hill

B. International Labour Organisation (ILO)

1. W. R. BÖHNING, Economist

2. AGE FLUITMAN, Technology and Employment Branch (EMP/TEC)

3. NEVILLE RUBIN, Anti-Apartheid Division

- 4. CHARLES STAHL, Economist
- 5. ROLPH VAN DER HOEVEN, Economist (EMF/ECON)
- C. United Nations Volunteers (UNV)
 - 1. N. DESAI, Acting Coordinator
 - 2. R. KNUTSSON, Chief, Programming Section
 - 3. S. NYAMBI, Area Officer for Africa
- D. International University Exchange Fund (IUEF)
 - 1. PETER C. VAN DER VAART, Scholarship Officer
- E. World University Services (WUS)
 - 1. TAD MITSUI, Associate General Secretary, International
- F. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
 - 1. JEANNE MARIE EGGER, Desk Officer, Division for Southern Africa
- G. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
 - 1. U. G. FREYSCHMIDT
 - 2. A. SIMMANCE
 - 3. R. VON ARNIM
- H. Lutheran World Federation (LWF)
 - 1. BRIAN NELDNER, Secretary for Programme Administration
- I. World Council of Churches (WCC)
 - 1. WALTER MAKHULU, Area Secretary for East Africa and African Refugees
- VII. Johannesburg, South Africa--June 8-9
 - A. Chamber of Mines
 - 1. MR. HOLMES, Assistant Manager

B. Anglo-American Corporation

1. DENNIS ETHERIDGE, Vice President
2. SELLO MONYATSI, Industrial Relations Department
3. DONALD NCUBE, Industrial Relations Department
4. MARSHALL SWANA, Industrial Relations Department

VIII. Cape Town, South Africa--June 9

A. University of Cape Town

1. DUDLEY HORNER, Research Officer, SALDRU,
School of Economics
2. FRANCIS WILSON, Senior Lecturer, School of Economics

IX. Gaborone, Botswana--June 10-June 13

A. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

1. PHILIP BUECHLER, Assistant General Development
Officer
2. JOHN PIELEMEIER, Capital Development Officer

B. Government of Botswana (GOB)

1. CHRISTOPHER ALLISON, Statistician, Central
Statistics Office
2. T. J. MATENGE, Permanent Secretary, Ministry
of Home Affairs
3. K. K. MOTSHIDISI, Acting Labour Commissioner
4. ANDREW SCOTT, Ministry of Finance and Develop-
ment Planning (MFDP)
5. GEOFFREY WEST, Economist, Ministry of Finance
and Development Planning (MFDP)

C. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

1. JONATHAN JENESS, Agriculture and Employment
Creation Adviser to Botswana

- D. Bank of Botswana
 - 1. CHARLES HARVEY, Acting Director
 - 2. DERRICK HUDSON, Specialist on Rural Incomes Policy
- E. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
 - 1. GUIDA HUNTER, Representative in Botswana
- F. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
 - 1. GARY PERKINS, Representative for Southern Africa
- X. Maseru, Lesotho--June 15-June 16; July 6-July 8
 - A. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
 - 1. FRANK CAMPBELL, Operations Officer
 - 2. JOHN FIGUEIRA, Assistant General Development Officer
 - B. Government of Lesotho (GOL)
 - 1. JOHN GAY, Ministry of Agriculture
 - 2. PAM GQOLI, Central Planning Office
 - 3. A. T. KOLOBE, Assistant Labour Commissioner
 - 4. P. MAKELA, Director of Transport
 - 5. PERCY MANGOELA, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Transport and Communications
 - 6. THABO B. MOEKETSI, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of the Interior
 - 7. D. M. MOKHESI, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry
 - 8. MARY MOONYANE, Ministry of Commerce and Industry
 - 9. A. M. NTHOLI (Mrs.), Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Health
 - 10. M. SEJANAMANE, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Planning
 - 11. MOOROSI SEKHESA, Planning Officer, Central Planning Office

- C. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
 - 1. D. S. BOUBACAR, Representative
- D. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
 - 1. J. VAN DRUNEN, Programme Officer
- E. European Economic Community (EEC)
 - 1. DAVID ANDERSON, EEC/EDF Delegate to BLS Countries
- F. University of Lesotho
 - 1. D. MILAZI, Department of Migration Studies

XI. Lilongwe, Malawi--June 18-June 22

- A. United States Embassy
 - 1. GIL SHEINBAUM, Deputy Chief of Mission
- B. Government of Malawi (GOM)
 - 1. B.Y.C. GONDWE, Ministry of Labour
 - 2. A.J.H. JERE, Under Secretary of Education
 - 3. GODFREY KALINGA, Ministry of Economic Planning
 - 4. B. B. MAWINDO, Ministry of Labour
- C. Ministry of Overseas Development Regional Office (ODM)
 - 1. W.T.A. COX, Head of Division, British Development Division in Southern Africa
 - 2. M. W. TODD, Engineering Adviser, British Development Division in Southern Africa
- D. European Cooperative Agency (Affiliated with EEC)
 - 1. MICHAEL HEADEN, Counselor Handling Economic Questions

XII. Lusaka, Zambia--June 23-June 30

- A. United States Embassy
 - 1. JOHN BARKUS, Economic and Commercial Officer
 - 2. R. TIERNEY, Political Affairs Officer

- B. Government of Zambia (GOZ)
 - 1. Y. K. LIBAKENI, Senior Economist, National Commission for Development Training
 - 2. H. MANDONA, Ministry of Economic and Technical Cooperation
 - 3. MR. MBEWE, Ministry of Economic and Technical Cooperation
 - 4. E. H. SIKAZWE, Commissioner for Refugees Office, Ministry of Home Affairs
 - 5. Director, Department of Technical Education and Vocational Training, Ministry of Education
- C. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
 - 1. C. KPENOV, Representative
- D. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
 - 1. JERRY BERKE, Acting Resident Representative
- E. Economic Commission for Africa - Lusaka (ECA)
 - 1. KHAMIS AMEIR, Director
- F. United Nations Commissioner for Namibia
 - 1. BERYL MC GOVERN, Programme Officer
 - 2. HISHAM OMayAD, Regional Representative
- G. Institute for Namibia (U.N.)
 - 1. MARK BOMANI, Deputy Director
 - 2. HIDIPO HAMUTENYA, Assistant Director
 - 3. BILLY MODISE, Lecturer
 - 4. BETHUEL SETAI, Lecturer
- H. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
 - 1. FREDERIC STEINEMANN, Regional Representative
- I. Development Bank of Zambia
 - 1. LEONARD M. LIKULUNGA, Planning Division

XIII. Mbabane, Swaziland--July 3-July 6

- A. Office for Southern Africa Regional Activities (OSARAC)
 - 1. TED MORSE, Chief of Mission
 - 2. HOWARD STERNBERGER, Economist
 - 3. JACK WARNER, Assistant Program Officer
- B. Government of Swaziland (GOS)
 - 1. E. A. ADEWOLE, Government Statistician, CSO
 - 2. ALAN LOW, Economist, Ministry of Agriculture
 - 3. MR. NXUMALO, Acting Labour Commissioner
 - 4. A. R. SHABANGU, Permanent Secretary, Deputy Prime Minister's Office
- C. South African Chamber of Mines Employment Bureau (TEBA)
 - 1. M. J. CHRISTIE, Director
- D. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
 - 1. GODFREY SABITI, Representative
- E. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
 - 1. S. SHAHID HUSAIN, Resident Representative
- F. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
 - 1. THIERRY GERMOND, General Delegate for Africa (Mozambique)
- G. University of Botswana-Swaziland (UBS)
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- H. Mennonite Central Committee-Swaziland
 - 1. JERRY BARKMAN, Team Member