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PN-AAG-905

report

CR-A-220

Evaluation of AID Development Program and Support Grants to Africare

Submitted to:

AFR/DR
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C.

Prepared by:

Isabel P. Dalsimer
Ralph H. Faulkingham
William H. Rusch

Under contract:

AID/afr-C-1142, W.O. 70

Development Information Center
Bureau for Development Support
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523

August 1978

**GENERAL
RESEARCH**



CORPORATION

7655 Old Springhouse Road, McLean, Virginia 22101

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INTRODUCTION

Under the terms of the work order the American Technical Assistance Center (ATAC) was required to evaluate the impact of AID's Development Program Grant to Africare (AID/pha-G-1076) of November 1974 in the total amount, as amended in May 1978, of \$608,701. In conversations with AID, ATAC personnel established that this should also include the results of a supplementary support grant for the same purposes of May 13, 1977, in the amount of \$502,000, as amended in March 1978.

More specifically, ATAC was charged with assessing the following.

1. The development of Africare's professional staff; its capability to plan, design, implement and evaluate development programs.
2. The quality of the resource information center created by Africare; its usage by Africare and other organizations and the value of the center to these organizations.
3. The use made of the development models created under the AID grant.
4. The ability of Africare to transfer development concepts, methodologies and practices to host countries and other organizations.
5. The overall impact of the AID grant on the growth of Africare.

Additionally, AID requested that ATAC give particular attention to Africare's ability to continue to operate without AID support and indicated that this would require ATAC to evaluate the impact upon Africare of all AID grants (both development and operational program grants) as well as the degree of Africare's success in attempting to institutionalize its increased operating capacity.

The evaluation was conducted during the period July 21 through August 24. The first week was spent in Washington interviewing Africare officials and staff, reviewing appropriate documents, examining Africare's resource information center, and in meetings with AID/W. This was followed by a three week field trip, divided approximately equally between Niger and Upper Volta. These are the countries in which Africare is operating or about to operate its principal projects including those financed through AID operational program grants, as well as a representative selection of smaller entirely non-AID funded projects. The period from August 16 to end of project was spent in final discussions with Africare and preparation of this report.

Dr. Faulkingham and Mr. Rusch participated in all phases of the evaluation; Ms. Dalsimer participated for two weeks in the Washington phase of the work, with primary responsibility for review of the resource information center.

Mr. Rusch, a member of the permanent staff of ATAC, is a development economist specializing in rural development. Dr. Faulkingham is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Massachusetts with specialized expertise in the Sahel area. Ms. Dalsimer is an international economist and documentation expert who has participated in several ATAC projects.

Section I
SUMMARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY FINDINGS

1. Africare is a well-organized private voluntary agency with capable management and staff dedicated to the purposes of the organization in contributing to African development. It is well regarded in the field (Niger and Upper Volta) by USAID Missions, other development organizations and the host governments.

2. Africare has utilized funds provided under AID Development Program and General Support grants for the purposes specified in such grants. In particular it has strengthened its professional staff through the addition of qualified personnel to constitute the development program team contemplated by the Development Program Grant.

3. In our view the outputs expected from the Development Program Grant as set forth in the PROP were over ambitious and did not take into account the difficulties and time requirements of planning, designing, funding and implementing integrated rural development projects in the Sahelian countries. By realistic standards Africare's accomplishments have been praiseworthy. As compared with a projected output of three integrated development projects designed, funded and advanced to the implementation stage, Africare has brought two projects to the implementation stage, of which one (a small pilot project in Seguenga, Upper Volta) has been carried to successful completion and a second (Tara in Niger) is well advanced. A third project (a full-scale project for Seguenega) has been thoroughly planned and submitted to AID for funding. A program submission to AID for a fourth integrated rural development project (Banamba, Mali) is now being prepared.

4. In the course of its development work generally, and in integrated rural development in particular, Africare has shown an ability to profit from experience and progressively to improve its techniques.

5. The basic rural development model/strategy developed by Africare is essentially a statement of philosophy and methodology rather than the fully articulated model that was contemplated in the Development Program PROP. Nonetheless, it has served the basic purpose of providing a point of departure for the conduct of workshops and joint planning in the design of integrated rural development projects. Africare's performance has been exceptional in the degree to which it has patiently and successfully involved Africans in extended processes of program design.

6. The Africare proposal for a major integrated rural development project in Seguenega, Upper Volta, developed with full participation of Voltaics in the Seguenega area, merits recognition as a carefully conceived and developed project design excellent both in its own right and in terms of fidelity to the methodologies contemplated in the Development Program Grant. If funded by AID and successfully implemented by Africare, it offers promising possibilities for replication in other areas of Upper Volta and, with suitable adaptation, probably in other countries.

7. Africare has done a good job in training African personnel in particular geographical project areas in the design and organization of integrated rural development programs. This experience will increase the capacity of these personnel to plan new projects in the same and adjacent areas. The goal of institutionalizing the system of project design through training/workshops throughout the host countries has not been achieved on any broad scale. This was, however, an unrealistic goal as the procedures and policies of national governments in planning their programs are not susceptible to rapid transformation by any external agency. The procedures advocated by Africare are likely to be considered by national governments over time, together with the procedures advocated by other technical assistance agencies and donors; to the extent that national officials are convinced of their relevance and efficacy, they will be incorporated into indigenous practice.

8. Africare has made considerable progress in the development of a Resource Information Center and Personnel Data Bank. The methodologies of obtaining and classifying the information require considerable improvement. Additionally, insufficient attention has been given to obtaining and analyzing information on success and failures of rural integration projects as contemplated under the Development Grant Program.

9. Africare has done a creditable job in the organization and partial implementation of a major AID-financed health project in Niger and is well regarded as a contractor in this field both by the AID Mission and the Government of Niger. The principal shortfall has been tardiness, not entirely the fault of Africare, in deploying technical assistance personnel.

10. Africare has developed and overseen a significant number of creditable small projects throughout the Sahel countries financed with funds from private sources. The pressure of work in developing larger projects for financing by AID appears, however, to have had a somewhat adverse effect on Africare's development of such projects and sustained efforts in seeking funding for them.

11. The AID Development Program and Support grants have been fully successful in enabling Africare to expand into a viable and effective organization capable of developing and presenting good projects. It has, however, had no discernible effect in improving Africare's ability to raise private funds or to operate without AID support except insofar as improved capability to present viable projects for operating program financing contribute to that objective.

12. The fundamental problem of Africare as an organization remains as it has been from the beginning -- the lack of a broad and substantial base of private support and the lack of sufficient unrestricted funds to be able to mount a large-scale appeal for funds. The Development Program Grant did not address this problem.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Africare should make a major effort to obtain more substantial non-governmental support in the form of both unrestricted and program funds.
2. Africare should continue to emphasize its smaller development projects and should attempt to continue to secure private funding for these efforts.
3. Africare should consider expanding or restructuring its Board of Directors to include representatives who are known on a national basis, rather than being so heavily dependent on local Washington figures.
4. A study should be made of the procedures and problems involved in replacing the basic overhead support now received by Africare from the Development Program Grant with other sources of financing, particularly the higher overhead that would presumably be allowable (in the absence of a DPG) in connection with AID operating program grants.
5. AID should approve and fund the Seguenega Integrated Rural Development Project as submitted to it by Africare on July 28, 1978.
6. Africare should improve its procedures for operating its Resource Information Center and Personnel Data Bank along the lines suggested in Section IV of this evaluation.
7. Africare should give attention to developing a working relationship with the Pan-African Development Institute's TPDM program, particularly in view of its opening of a branch facility in Ouagadougou. AID should serve as an intermediary in the fostering of such a relationship in view of its financial support to both organizations.
8. Africare should give more attention to the acquisition and study of literature on integrated rural development projects and analysis of relative success and failure. In view of the potential benefits of such analysis not only to Africare but also to other development agencies, AID may wish to consider providing specific support for such a project.
9. AID and Africare may wish to explore the possibilities of developing a more comprehensive long-term program of collaboration between Africare and one or two major Black universities in order to broaden the opportunities

for, and to enhance the impact of, Black American involvement with African development in general, particularly with Francophone countries.

10. Africare should improve the methodology and objectivity of its internal project evaluation procedures.

Section II BACKGROUND

A. ORIGINS AND OBJECTIVES OF AFRICARE

The concept of Africare originated in Niger, where an American Peace Corps physician from Hawaii (William Kirker) had organized a health project in the remote Diffa region of that country. The financial needs of that project gave birth to the broader idea of mobilizing financial support for Diffa and other African development projects through an organization that would tap the interest and financial resources of the Black community in the United States. In 1971 Niger's President, Diori Hamani, approached C. Payne Lucas, who had previously been Peace Corps Director in Niger, to organize and administer such an effort. Later that year Africare was incorporated with Kirker, Lucas, Joseph C. Kennedy (also a former Peace Corps official) and Oumarou Youssoufou (at that time First Secretary of the Niger Embassy in Washington) as the nucleus team.

In 1972, Africare was formally launched in the United States at a large rally in Atlanta attended by 30 African ambassadors. This rally was intended to carry the message to the American people of the development needs of Africans. The project in Diffa to provide paramedical training and upgrading of nursing skills at a hospital became the first project to receive Africare support. There was also undertaken with AID financing a study of the health needs of the Diffa region.

At this early date, Africare also was evolving a preliminary philosophy or set of objectives. These were:

1. To develop in rural Africa programs which would integrated water resources, agricultural production, and rural health services.

2. To develop in the United States an awareness and concern about Africa, especially among Black Americans, and to take them beyond identification with Africa's problems to involvement as contributors to development.

In 1973, Africare was one of the first organizations to bring the Sahelian drought to the attention of the American public. Between \$300,000 and \$450,000 was raised. Africare estimates that 65 percent of this came from Black Americans. The funds were distributed among six Sahelian countries, partially in checks of \$10,000 for each country. Other funds were provided in the form of financing for small specific projects for well construction and other immediate needs of the drought-stricken people of the region.

In 1973, the Lilly Foundation donated \$250,000 to Africare for a water resources development program. This program, which opened wells in Chad, Mali and Niger, was designed primarily to provide water for nomads and villagers whose water supplies had deteriorated.

As the drought diminished, Africare began reshaping its program away from emergency relief toward developing activities of long term impact. In its planning of such activities, Africare gave emphasis to its concept of "integrated rural development," in which there would be rational and harmonious development of agricultural production, water resources, health, education, etc., which would respond to the interrelated needs of the people of a given area.

In 1974, Africare negotiated with AID the Development Program Grant, which had as its primary objective the creation within Africare of an institutional capability to carry out projects of integrated rural development. At about the same time Africare was provided with an opportunity to take over its first large project of integrated rural development (Tara irrigated rice project in Niger) through an arrangement with Lilly Endowment, which agreed to provide major financing.

During its subsequent history, Africare's major thrust has been to improve its capability in designing and organizing projects of integrated rural development. At the same time it has continued in the field of health, with the support of a large AID operational grant for a new and larger program in Diffa, which includes also technical assistance on some

health projects of national scale. Africare has also continued its activities in developing smaller projects that it can present for financing to churches and other groups in the United States.

B. GOALS AND PURPOSES OF AID'S DEVELOPMENT AND GENERAL SUPPORT GRANTS

The focus of AID's Development Program Grant was the development of Africare's capability in the field of integrated rural development.

The project goals and purposes as set forth in the logical framework were as follows:

Goal: Begin a process resulting in improved income, health and education of lowest-income persons in rural areas of drought-afflicted Francophone-Sahel countries, through assistance by Africare to host governments in planning and obtaining funding of integrated rural development projects designed at local as well as central Ministry levels.

Purpose: Institutionalization (both technical and financial) within Africare of the ability to professionally plan, design, manage and evaluate at the local level integrated rural development programs and to train other country organizations in these capabilities, in order to (1) begin institutionalizing these capabilities within host governments, and (2) involve U.S. resource organizations, particularly Black institutions, more fully in Sahel development efforts.

Achievement of the purposes of the grant was to be measured through the following objective verifiable indicators:

1. Three significant (either in size, as low-cost demonstration models for replication, or both) integrated rural development projects will have been developed, funded, and in process of implementation, primarily as a result of Africare's assistance.

2. Africare will have broadened its private financial support to the extent necessary to enable it to carry on its training process without further AID support after two years.

3. Evidence of progress in the assisted countries of movement toward institutionalization of improved integrated rural development planning, management and evaluation capability.

4. Evidence of greater financial support from and involvement of personnel from Black U.S. organizations in Sahel development projects and programs.

The expected project outputs were stated as follows:

Outputs

1. Acquisition of additional professional staff by Africare.
2. Development at Africare headquarters of a Resource Information Center.
3. Preparation of rural development models and strategies for the Sahel.
4. Training of local government officials and selected U.S. private resource organizations in identification, planning, management and evaluation of integrated rural development projects and programs.
5. Design, funding and initial implementation of actual projects.

Output Indicators

1. Hiring of five professionals as detailed in the staffing pattern in Section 5 below.
2. Resource material in Center and extent of utilization.
3. One process model and three drought models developed.
4. Nine workshops held in the Sahel, three seminars in the U.S. Broad participation by appropriate Sahel governments and U.S. organizations.
5. Three such projects launched.

Some comments are appropriate as to the realism of the purposes and expected outputs set forth for this project.

The conception and implementation of projects of integrated rural development in developing countries has an extended history. Considerable efforts have been mounted by all major international development agencies, including AID, to design and implement "integrated" rural development projects. The concept of integrated development, moreover, is an elastic one which can mean anything from an omnibus program with a variety of activities in the same area pursued more or less independently to the rarer detailed efforts to bring a package of carefully interrelated services to bear on a population in such fashion that they are mutually reinforcing at the level of specific communities and families. Whatever the concept, there are few if any models of integrated rural development that have a demonstrated record of success such that they are widely acclaimed as models for replication. Indeed, there is considerable opinion that integrated projects, at least in the sense of attempting to pursue a wide variety of interrelated development objectives in the same place over a short span of time, rarely offer a preferred development alternative.

The purpose of these remarks is not to espouse or to argue against any particular theory or methodology of rural development. The point we do make is that the development of an integrated rural development approach as contemplated in this project involves a venture into a complex and uncertain field. As the PROP itself states, there is an "absence of collective knowledge of programs and projects similar in thrust" and "the real successes and failures of these programs is even more vaguely known." In our view, therefore, the bounds of realistic probability were exceeded in expecting a young organization such as Africare over a period of two years with a fund of \$500,000 to recruit a modest staff, develop well-researched integrated rural development models, organize three such projects, obtain funding for them, begin to implement them, and finally to progress toward institutionalizing the process in the host governments. Even were this possible within the time frame and resources available, one must necessarily question the concept of institutionalizing such a process before it can be tested for even one year in any setting.

A second problem we have with the project design is that its emphasis was on the development of a specific Africare capability (integrated rural development) more or less to the exclusion of the central problem of assisting Africare to develop as a strong well-rounded institution. Too little attention was given to Africare's fundamental need to develop its constituency and fund-raising capability. While presumably it would be inappropriate for AID to provide funds directly for such purposes, consideration might have been given to Africare's development of capabilities (e.g., for the identification and preparation for funding of a greater range of projects, including those of smaller size) that might have broadened its fund raising appeal. The logical framework's inclusion, as an objectively verifiable indicator that "Africare will have broadened its private financial support to enable it to carry on its training process without further AID support after two years" does not logically follow from the project purpose; properly speaking, this was an assumption based on anticipated results of Africare activities outside the project.

C. ORGANIZATION OF AFRICARE

The organization of Africare consists of a Board of Trustees, National Advisory Board, local chapters of Africare, and an Executive Director and staff.

There are twenty-one members of the Board of Directors; eleven of these are Black leaders drawn principally from the fields of education, politics and religion. Another five are whites from essentially the same fields. Two are representatives of Upper Volta and Niger and two are the Executive Director and the Director of International Development. Numerically, the group tends to be dominated by Washington residents, which narrows representation though facilitating the conduct of business. The African representatives, however, are out of the country.

While the quality of the Board members is good, most are not widely known nationally nor in a strong position to contribute to policy development or the publicizing of Africare, and in terms of the all-important need for fund-raising the Board lacks punch. There is a notable absence of representatives from major Black organizations and religious groups in the country that command large memberships and loyalties among the rank and file of Black citizens.

The National Advisory Board consists of about six individuals drawn from essentially the same fields as the Board of Directors, plus the presidents of Africare's local chapters. The National Advisory Board is essentially honorific and does not appear to function in any substantive way, except that some individual members have helped Africare materially from time to time in securing publicity and funds.

There are now thirteen local Africare chapters. These are voluntary groups organized primarily to create interest in Africare and for fund-raising, mainly in principal cities such as Atlanta, Chicago, Washington, New York, and Boston. In the past, there were another five chapters that by now have ceased to exist. At one time Africare had a special field representative to organize such groups, but it was decided that fund-raising results were not sufficient to warrant this cost. Africare believes the local chapters have been very helpful in creating awareness of and appreciation of Africare and its program. This is doubtless true up to a point. However, it is evident that they are not reaching people

in large numbers, certainly not with the depth and effectiveness that results in a substantial raising of funds. As voluntary organizations with limited programs, the chapters do not provide a strong base for grass roots support.

Executive Director and Staff: The Executive Director from the beginning has been C. Payne Lucas. Originally the staff was very small owing to limited availability of funds. It now consists of thirty-six employees divided as follows:

- Eight members of administrative staff including Executive Director, controller, fund raising advisor, officer manager, accountant, and three clerical. The equivalent of three of these positions is financed by AID.

- Fourteen members of program staff at headquarters in Washington, of which six professional and two clerical are supported by AID support grant, and one professional is supported by AID operating program grant for the Niger Health Project. The balance includes a professional financed by USDA, another professional financed from private sources, two interns from local universities, and a volunteer librarian.

- Three overseas permanent representatives (Mali, Niger, and Upper Volta), one partially financed by the AID support grant, but basically financed from Africare general funds. The Mali representative also covers Senegal, Mauritania and Gambia, while the Upper Volta representative also covers Chad.

- Eight overseas project staff, seven financed by AID Niger Health Project and one by AID contribution to the Niger integrated rural development project at Tara.

- Three overseas local employees.

In total slightly more than half of the Africare staff is financed out of AID grants.

As these figures show, Africare (with AID support) is in a good position with respect to program staff, which is large enough and has the necessary professional training to provide appropriate expertise in development planning, rural economics, health and agriculture necessary for the development and supervision of particular projects. With respect to AID-financed projects, Africare also has the means to recruit and/or to provide necessary project technicians as additional AID grants (e.g.,

for the Seguenega integrated rural development project in Upper Volta) are approved.

The principal problem is obviously a lack of staff to mount any considerable efforts for fund raising and the conduct of related publicity campaigns. These functions have essentially been performed by the Executive Director and The Director of International Development as a part-time undertaking.

D. AFRICARE'S INCOME AND INCOME SOURCES

Table II-1 contains a statement of Africare's income, by sources, in fiscal years 1972 to 1978.¹

From this table we can derive the following data on the relative importance of the various sources of financing by fiscal year ending April 30, as follows:

Table II-2
AFRICARE REVENUE SOURCES EXPRESSED AS PERCENT OF ANNUAL REVENUE

| Source | 1978 | 1977 | 1976 | 1975 | 1974 |
|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Agency for International Development: | | | | | |
| General Support and Development Program Grants | 15.0 | 27.4 | 8.7 | 41.5 | - |
| Project Funds | 36.9 | 14.4 | - | 2.2 | 17.7 |
| Lilly Endowment | 35.5 | 43.0 | 66.7 | 15.2 | 44.3 |
| Kansas West Conference (Methodist) | 8.3 | - | - | - | - |
| Other contributions | 3.9 | 14.8 | 24.5 | 40.1 | 37.0 |
| Memberships | .4 | .4 | .1 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

These data show that during its early years, when the Sahel drought was in the news and commanded public sympathy, Africare was able to raise substantial sums by appeals to the public and church groups. Africare estimates that about 65 percent of this support came from Black Americans.² Africare has not, however, been able to increase its support over time from the general public. Indeed, beginning in 1975 there has been a steady decline.

The point needs to be made that the aggregate amounts of support through public contributions are not the only indicator of their importance. The Black community is not a wealthy one, and the number of contributors

¹The amounts shown on Table II-1 differ somewhat from total income shown on Africare financial statements owing to the omission of modest donations in kind, interest and other income, etc.

²Our own visual inspection of the names of individual and group donors leads us to the conclusion that Africare's estimate is correct.

Table II-1

CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFRICARE - MAY 1, 1972 TO APRIL 30, 1978
(Fiscal Year Ending April 30)

| | 1978* | 1977 | 1976 | 1975 | 1974 | 1973 | 1972 |
|---|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|
| AID Grants | | | | | | | |
| Family Health Services - Diffa | | | | | \$109,203 | | |
| Famine Relief Fund | | | | \$9,045 | \$31,525 | | |
| Development Program Grant | \$78,596 | \$211,358 | \$151,747 | \$167,000 | | | |
| Niger Health | \$704,383 | \$110,688 | | | | | |
| General Support Grant | \$227,713 | | | | | | |
| Tara | \$91,897 | | | | | | |
| Southern Africa Refugee | \$35,579 | | | | | | |
| Non-U.S. Government Over \$100,000 | | | | | | | |
| Lilly Endowment | | | | | | | |
| Famine Relief/Water Resources | | | | | \$250,000 | | |
| Ranch Study | | | | | \$56,379 | | |
| Cloud Seeding Project - Niger | | | | | \$46,000 | | |
| Tara | \$725,000 | \$190,000 | \$1,025,000 | | | | |
| Other Lilly Funds | | \$140,545 | \$135,000 | \$61,055 | | | |
| Kansas West Conference | \$170,000 | | | | | | |
| Non-U.S. Government Less Than \$100,000** | \$79,337 | \$113,769 | \$424,175 | \$161,647 | \$294,066 | \$39,000 | \$30,000 |
| Number of Contributions Each Year | 181,235 | 53,424 | 165,387 | 60,456 | 36,969 | 527 | 100 |
| Memberships | \$9,121 | \$2,982 | \$2,471 | \$3,836 | \$8,058 | \$6,600 | \$9,550 |
| Number of Memberships Each Year | 431 | 1,178 | 1,344 | 921 | 309 | 359 | |
| Total Dollars | \$2,043,030 | \$769,342 | \$1,738,393 | \$402,583 | \$795,231 | \$45,600 | \$39,550 |

* Unaudited.

** Included among the non-U.S. Government contributions less than \$100,000 are large sums from church bodies, fraternalities and other large groups which constitute individual contributions of several thousand each year 1973 through 1978.

Source: Africare controller.

can be impressive even if the amounts are comparatively modest. In this respect the number of contributions stated in Table II-1 represents Africare's estimate of the approximate number of people who may have made contributions individually or through organizations of which they are members. Many contributions come from church groups and fraternal organizations. Estimates of the number of contributors are of course very tenuous as the number of members of an organization and the number who may specifically contribute to Africare (or know that they are contributing indirectly) may differ substantially. In any case, the number of Africare contributors cannot be greater than a fraction of one percent of the Black population of the United States. This is too small a proportion to give Africare strong credentials as an expression of interest by Black Americans in the development of Africa. It must be recognized, however, that Black Americans have not traditionally been involved in African development and that Africare did succeed in establishing within the Black community a nucleus of a previously nonexistent constituency.

From 1974 to 1978 the support from the Lilly Endowment was decisive in enabling Africare to maintain itself as a predominantly privately supported organization. Lilly has, however, recently retrenched its philanthropic program and, in the process, eliminated all support for overseas activities. This means, in effect, that Africare is rapidly becoming an organization that receives the bulk of its support from AID. This is contrary to the desires of Africare management, which is anxious to maintain Africare's posture as a privately supported organization. This issue is discussed in detail below in Section VI-B.

E. AFRICARE'S EXPENDITURES

When we turn to Africare's expenditures over the past three years, we see the development of an increasing amount of attention in program activities given to integrated rural development, as contrasted with the earlier relief and water projects undertaken by Africare in the Sahel (see Table II-3).

The rising costs of "management and general" reflect primarily expenditure on and by the development program staff in identifying and designing new projects.

While the amounts devoted to fund-raising have increased, they remain at a level insufficient to mount a substantial effort.

Table II-3
AFRICARE'S EXPENDITURES, BY AMOUNT AND PROPORTION, 1975-1977

| | 1978 | | 1977 | | 1976 | | 1975 | |
|--------------------------------|-----------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|
| | Dollars | % | Dollars | % | Dollars | % | Dollars | % |
| <u>Program Services</u> | | | | | | | | |
| Relief and restoration | 39,329 | 1.0 | 12,156 | 1.6 | 75,804 | 10.1 | 71,707 | 15.9 |
| Health planning | 499,449 | 17.0 | 80,405 | 10.6 | 2,219 | .3 | 2,072 | .4 |
| Water resources development | 77,686 | 3.0 | 27,375 | 3.6 | 138,250 | 18.4 | 130,186 | 29.0 |
| Rural development | 2,007,226 | 68.5 | 373,719 | 49.5 | 342,218 | 45.7 | 67,758 | 15.1 |
| Rural management - agriculture | - | - | - | - | - | - | 29,897 | 6.6 |
| Sub-total | 2,623,690 | 89.5 | 493,655 | 65.3 | 558,491 | 74.5 | 301,620 | 67.0 |
| <u>Supporting Services</u> | | | | | | | | |
| Management and general | 293,591 | 10.0 | 223,815 | 29.6 | 160,490 | 21.4 | 144,867 | 32.2 |
| Fund raising | 12,123 | .5 | 38,838 | 5.1 | 30,600 | 4.1 | 3,462 | .8 |
| Sub-total | 305,714 | 10.5 | 262,653 | 34.7 | 191,090 | 25.5 | 148,329 | 33.0 |
| Total expenditures | 2,929,404 | 100.0 | 756,308 | 100.0 | 749,581 | 100.0 | 449,949 | 100.0 |

Section III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICARE'S PROGRAMMING CAPACITY

A. BEFORE AID'S DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM GRANT (DPG)

From Africare's incorporation in 1971 until its receipt of a DPG three years later, it funded eighteen development projects and seven specific relief activities, in addition to providing general drought relief assistance in the Sahelian states of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta (see Appendix 1). At its founding, Africare had postured itself in the United States and in Africa as a broker with two principal tasks. First, it sought to educate Americans, particularly Black Americans, about modern Africa and about development issues there. Secondly, it worked to convey financial resources from American private and public sources to projects conceptualized, designed, and implemented by various units of government within the Sahelian states.

While it had identified three major sectors of funding activity (health, water resource development, and food production), it did not at the start of this period have on its payroll the professional staff to design, plan, and implement projects in these sectors. Further, with the exception of a \$114,000 grant from AID in 1973 for a maternal/child health feasibility study in eastern Niger, all of Africare's projects were small in scope and budget. However, with the onset of the Sahelian drought and the subsequent outpouring of American public and private relief funds, Africare's broker role became both more substantial and more specific.

The AID grant and the \$525,000 in project and relief funds contributed by the Lilly Endowment stimulated an expansion of Africare's professional programming staff, including the placement of country representatives in

Mali, Niger, and Upper Volta as well as a Nigérien correspondent in Niger. By and large, these changes served to improve Africare's ability to identify fundable projects in the Sahel and to bring these to the attention of prospective donors.

Thus, before the DPG, Africare possessed little in-house capacity to design, plan, implement, or evaluate development projects, nor was it in a position to make thorough studies of the feasibility of many of the projects proposed by the Sahelian states for Africare funding.

B. THE IMPACT OF THE DPG ON AFRICARE AS A DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION

While Africare before the DPG had a very limited capability as a development organization, the joint occurrence of the DPG award, the Lilly Endowment support of the Tara project, and an increase in private contributions from late 1974 to 1976, greatly increased Africare's programming experience and abilities. The support features of the DPG that have had the most salient effect on Africare's maturation have been the recruitment and deployment of the development team, and the project design workshops held in Mali, Upper Volta, and Niger.

The DPG provided for the recruitment of five professional staff members to form the core of the development team:

1. Director of International Development
2. Rural Economist/Sociologist/Resource Programming Specialist
3. Agricultural Production Specialist
4. Rural Health Specialist
5. Training/Workshop Coordinator

By March 1975, all of these positions had been filled. In recruiting individuals for these positions, Africare emphasized relevant field experience over scholastic accomplishments. Accordingly, the development team at the end of 1975 had collectively one doctorate and three master's degrees; nonetheless, every member had served overseas in the Peace Corps and had there worked extensively on project design and management.

With the exception of the Training/Workshop Coordinator, the individuals recruited to fill these positions have adhered rather closely to their task descriptions as set forth in the initial grant agreement. Further, Africare's development team has shown far less staff turnover than comparable PVOs or AID itself.

The Training/Workshop Coordinator was posted to Niger, where he was to "assist in the development of the workshops and have major responsibility for providing the follow up and continuity between workshop/training sessions." However, he gradually assumed the role of Africare's Niger representative; he, his successor, and the Africare representatives in Mali and Upper Volta have within the context of their own host countries undertaken this role of workshop development and continuity, albeit in less grandiose terms than the original DPG agreement envisioned.

Nonetheless, the Training/Workshop Coordinator was to have made "a special point of coordinating and utilizing as applicable the training workshop designs, materials, and counsel of the AID-supported Training in Project Design and Management (TPDM) project being operated from the Pan-African Development Institute in Douala, Cameroon." To date, this has not been accomplished. We learned that at least two of the heads of services in Upper Volta's Yatenga ORD (a region where Africare has some important projects) have received training at the TPDM/PAID. If Africare is to insure that its models and strategies for rural development will be informed, both in a formal sense and in the processual sense of being related to the thinking of African development planners, then it should work to fulfill this objective. In Ouagadougou, we learned that PAID was about to open a branch there; here lies a fortuitous opportunity for Africare to develop a working relationship with PAID, and we encourage it to do so.

In addition to the five positions identified in the DPG award, Africare added a sixth position to its development team to act as a translator and as an administrative assistant to the director.

During the initial two years of the DPG, the development team formulated its programmatic objectives and procedures, worked on specific projects and proposals, and traveled to Africa four times. First, in the Spring of 1975, the team visited Niger, Upper Volta, and Mali; in each country, they met with appropriate officials and technical personnel, discussed Africare's interest in participating in development, sought out national development objectives, and identified within each country an area for subsequent Africare development assistance.

Second, in November 1975, the development team participated in brief, intensive project planning sessions in the Agadez Department in Niger, then in the Yatenga ORD in Upper Volta. Third, in the Spring of 1976, they traveled to Mali for a week-long workshop to plan a project for the Banamba District; then they moved on to Upper Volta where they held a sixteen-day planning meeting in Ouahigouya for a large scale project for the Seguenega Sector. Finally, in September and Early October 1976, the development team visited these three states again, to participate in

project planning for the Tara irrigated rice scheme in Niger, and to consult with officials and technicians in Mali and Upper Volta on pending project matters. Altogether, the development team spent about seven of the first twenty-four months under the DPG in Africa.

Apart from professional staff recruitment, the DPG supported Africare's (1) development of models and strategies for rural development, (2) sponsorship of training workshops in the Sahel, and (3) the development of specific projects and proposals. While these form discrete segments of the DPG award, Africare's development team operationalized all three elements in processes of project design in Mali, Niger, and Upper Volta. The participation of the development team, the members of which represented discrete sectors of technical service, in the project design process represented a transformation of Africare's broker role. While Africare had early on adopted a position of providing assistance for projects developed by Africans, the DPG facilitated a shift in methodology: away from only providing funds and toward active involvement in the design process.

Before Africare's first project design workshop in Niger in the fall of 1975, the development team had formulated the broad outline of its own conceptualization of how rural development projects ought to take place. Through participation in several project design workshops, the outline became elaborated. This outline, termed by Africare a "model/strategy for integrated rural development" (see Appendix 2), has many of the same features of IRD models developed by others in the late 1960's and early 1970's; that is (1) that development assistance must be targeted to the poorest of the poor, (2) that all critical sectors ought to be coordinated in a single project package, and (3) that local participation in planning and implementation is a basic requisite for project success. Fortunately for Africare, the governments of Mali, Niger, and Upper Volta had committed themselves at the highest policy levels to this approach.

Each workshop Africare held (at the District level in Mali, the Department level in Niger, and the ORD level in Upper Volta) represented a forum for operationalizing these policy and model features in a coherent plan of work. These were not academic exercises; in each case, Africare held the promise of monies to be committed to the implementation of the project

designed in the workshop session (see Table III-1). Thus there was sufficient incentive for the host country workshop participants to take the activity seriously.

Table III-1
AFRICARE'S PROJECT DESIGN WORKSHOPS

| Country | Dates | Objective |
|-------------|------------------------|---|
| Niger | November 3-5, 1975 | To plan ways to spend \$100,000 of privately donated funds in the Irhazer Valley near Agadez. |
| Upper Volta | November 17-21, 1975 | To plan a project for the Seguenega Sector of the Yatenga ORD to spend \$42,000 donated by the Lilly Endowment. |
| Niger | January 1976 | To design at Dosso the Tara Irrigated Rice Project with funds from Lilly Endowment and other donors. |
| Mali | March 28-April 1, 1976 | To design a project for the Banamba District, utilizing \$45,000 committed by the Lilly Endowment. |
| Upper Volta | April 20-May 5, 1976 | To design a large scale project for the Seguenega Sector, with funds to be sought from USAID. |
| Niger | September 1976 | To elaborate at Gaya a design for the Tara Irrigated Rice Project. |

Each project design workshop included plenary consideration of how to realize the objective of sector integration, before the workshop divided into functional committees to draft the project components. The development team strove to cultivate an atmosphere of inter-service collaboration and an abiding sensitivity and commitment to the features of the IRD philosophy. While Africare's IRD model is indeed more a philosophy than a specific project blueprint, the workshops appear to have generated personal bases for cooperation and collaboration, both among the representatives of the various in-country technical services, and between Africare representatives and their host country counterparts.

Thus, while the DPG agreement calls for Africare to develop low cost replicable models for integrated rural development, Africare has in a

formal way fallen short of this objective; but it is doubtful whether the expectation was reasonable in the first place. What has been significant, particularly in Upper Volta, is the design process whereby Africare has provided the basis for African project design and thereby assured a higher level of commitment to implementation than had Africare developed its own in-house designs. In a sense also, Africare's Seguenega project paper can be regarded as a fully articulated model -- probably more useful because of its concreteness than as an elaborate theoretical model. In any case, a theoretical model could easily be abstracted from it.

While the workshops have been used as the basis for project designs, there is little evidence that their initial conceptualization as a training forum has been realized. The initial DPG agreement envisioned a more active training component in the workshops. Among other things, the workshops were to:

Pull together people, data, and methodologies which will provide a common sharing of ideas, success and failures, and provide a current appraisal and updating of what is transpiring in the Sahel and other regions relevant to the Sahel and Sahelian rural development problems.... Train key African personnel who in turn continue to set up training/workshops.

With the singular focus on specific project design, Africare has not met these broader objectives. In our view, it is important that project designers be informed of relevant project experience elsewhere; and we recommend that Africare seek appropriate ways of insuring that its own development team and the Africans the team works with will benefit from this exposure. These ways might include, for example, subsidies for sabbaticals for study, whether under the auspices of PAID, UN ECA, or some other appropriate forum; or the financing by Africare of a PAID-organized training seminar for the participants of a project design workshop.

C. MOBILIZING AMERICAN RESOURCE INSTITUTIONS

Africare has aimed its constituency appeal primarily to Blacks in the United States, seeking to educate them about modern Africa and to elicit support -- moral, financial, and intellectual -- for the objectives of rural development in Africa. Accordingly, Africare has collaborated with three predominantly Black universities (Prarie View A&M College, Alabama A&M College, and North Carolina A&T State University) to further its general constituency objectives and to assist these institutions in upgrading their faculty's knowledge of and experience in Africa. These three were selected after a conscientious process of canvassing a larger number of institutions.

To these ends, Africare negotiated with these universities for the posting on a short-term basis of eight professors for orientation workshops in Washington and then participation in various project design workshops in the Sahel. While these professors possessed the relevant technical competencies to have been useful participants in the Sahelian workshops, their impact was lessened by their lack of French. In our view, the general objectives that Africare has constructed here are laudable, but the results are insufficient. We recommend that Africare seek to develop a partnership with a single Black university (or perhaps one each with respect to health and agriculture), cultivating a continuing long-term relationship of the university to Africa, and receiving in return appropriate technical advice for project design and management. Such targeting will build the university's capacity to act as a contractor in its own right, and Africare's constituency will be much better informed.

D. FIELD OFFICE OPERATIONS

In our field tour, we visited and assessed the operations of the Africare field offices in Niger and Upper Volta. We did not have an opportunity to visit the third Africare field office in Mali. Each office is organized on similar bases, largely developed by Africare headquarters. The field office is directed by an Africare permanent country representative, whose responsibilities principally relate to the expenditure and reporting of project funds. Africare's country representative is the individual who develops and signs project accords with appropriate units of the host governments. Thereafter, the country representative receives project funds from Washington and dispenses them on the basis of the terms of the accord.

Further, the country representative makes visits to project sites, both as a means of insuring continuity between design and implementation and as a basis for reporting project progress to Washington. Also, the representative is expected and encouraged to identify and to develop new project possibilities. Finally, the Africare representative is required to submit an end-of-each month report, accounting for time and all Africare expenditures.

In Niger, the Africare office is located in a house that has been made available on a rent-free basis to Africare by the national government. The office quarters are well located and ample. The staff consists of the field representative, an administrative assistant (most of whose responsibilities are devoted to the Niger health project), a local-hire secretary, and a guardian. Apart from the general duties outlined above, the Niger representative has assumed responsibility for finding accommodations and making other arrangements for Africare project staff. While, in our judgment, the Niger Africare office appears to be well-managed, we would encourage the field director to devote more of his effort to identifying and developing small scale projects. In our view, given Africare's substantial familiarity with the Dosso Department, the government personnel there, and its reasonable proximity to Niamey, this area would seem to represent the best prospects for small project development.

In Upper Volta, the Africare office is located near the perimeter of the closely settled area of Ouagadougou, and while it has electricity and water, it is beyond the limits of city telephone service, a serious impediment to more expeditious operations. The office, located in the field representative's house, consists of a small room. The field representative's land cruiser (in which he travels on Africare business) is in serious need of major repair or replacement. Notwithstanding these limitations, the field representative has been extraordinarily successful in conducting Africare's business in Upper Volta, forging both formal and informal ties among Voltaics and between Voltaics and the Africare development team members. The success of many small projects and the good prospects for the success of the large scale Seguenega project are due in no small measure to the continuity, encouragement, and friendship the Africare representative has provided to the Voltaics. We would recommend that Africare provide its representative both with office space more centrally located and with the means to repair or replace his vehicle.

E. PERSONNEL ISSUES

In our month-long assessment of the Africare staff and its programs and projects, we have found among all personnel a high level of dedication to the organization. At this point in its maturation, the Africare staff size is relatively small, and this by itself affords a general air of informality and egalitarianism. At the same time, the staff appears to be professionally competent and productive. Areas of responsibility and lines of accountability are reasonably clear; the fundamental objectives and problems of the organization are well known to each employee. It is evident that a large proportion of this institutional élan has been stimulated and maintained by the Executive Director.

In our view, while Africare has been successful in developing these work environment features, both in Washington and in the field, they are difficult to sustain for the long haul in any organization. At some points, personal commitments need to be buttressed with tangible, external evidences of professional accomplishments; these include salary and fringe benefits commensurate with those of individuals similarly placed in other development organizations.

F. AFRICARE'S STATURE AS A PVO

In our tour to assess the field operations of Africare in Niger and Upper Volta, we sought to compare Africare's activities in each country with those of other PVOs operating there. Accordingly in Niamey, we discussed project and program activities with representatives of CARE and of Church World Service; in Ouagadougou we talked with representatives of Foster Parents Plan and of Save the Children Fund.

In Niger, it was evident that other PVOs have been more successful than Africare in stimulating small project development; further, they were more active in participating in an umbrella organization of all PVOs operating in Niger, both in representing PVO concerns to the Government of Niger in formal ways and in sharing among PVOs specific project issues. Representatives of CARE and Church World Service, however, had high praise and respect for Africare's demonstrated ability to work well and closely with Nigerian officials and project staff. This view was echoed by members of the AID/Niamey staff who without exception lauded Africare's very good working relationships with the Niger government officials and technicians; further, the AID mission personnel gave Africare high marks for its pioneering the way for AID itself in negotiating a project with the Ministry of Health.

In Upper Volta, Africare is clearly regarded as first among equals in the general organization of PVOs operating in the country. Not only has Africare played an important leadership role in that organization, it has also developed closer working relations with the national and regional development officials. From the perspective of the AID/Ouagadougou staff that we talked with, Africare in general, and its country representative in particular, merited favorable comment both for the fruitful collaborations Africare has carried out with Voltaic officials, and for the excellent project design work that Africare has put into its Seguenega project proposed to AID.

Section IV

RESOURCE INFORMATION CENTER AND PERSONNEL DATA BANK

A. RESOURCE INFORMATION CENTER

The Resource Information Center authorized under the DPG of November 1974 became operational in March 1975. As originally established, the Center has five objectives:

1. Maintain bibliographies of materials available through other documentation centers which deal with the Sahel.
2. Obtain whatever material was necessary for frequent reference in-house with relation to developing models and strategies, conducting workshops and training and developing projects.
3. Attempt to compile a list and brief description of other projects which had been tried with an analysis of why they succeeded or failed.
4. Develop a personnel data bank containing names and backgrounds of both individuals and organizations with experience, potential, desire and resources to participate in Sahelian development.
5. Develop a methodology for data recording, collection, storage and retrieval which would make information available to organizations or individuals with special interest in Sahelian development.

1. Organization of the Resource Information Center

The Resource Information Center was originally organized by a volunteer with a background in traditional library science. The system was geared specifically to the Sahel and cannot interface with either the Library of Congress or the FAO network, as used by the Sahel Documentation Center. Catalog designations are based on geographic and topical codes, plus a list of 103 subject headings. In addition, author identification codes were developed through use of the "Cutter table," a method of substituting numbers for letters.

Specific geographic designations were made only for Chad (H), Ethiopia (J), The Gambia (L), Mali (N), Mauritania (P), Niger (R), Senegal (T), and Upper Volta (V). One letter (F) was assigned to the Sahel, if the publication dealt with two or more countries; one (D) to non-Sahelian Africa; and one (A) to information pertaining to all other areas of the world. The original topical codes numbered 25 and were developed from examining the contents of the first one hundred documents received in the Center.

A Resource Information Associate was appointed in 1977 to have overall responsibility for the administration of the Center. Prior to this time an Administrative Assistant had been in charge. This personnel shift reflected Africare's increased informational requirements as the organization's program commitments expanded. The Resource Information Associate is assisted by work study interns, part of whose salary is paid by the Federal government and part by Africare. They are responsible for preparing documents, stamping in periodicals, cataloging and checking for pertinent material.

In the early days of the Center's existence, its interest was focused mainly on maintaining bibliographic material which could be related to those small projects, such as well digging, which were Africare's main endeavors. In addition, material was collected whenever possible when Africare personnel traveled or when documents were made available through other organizations. Since, at this period, Africare was associated with the Sahelian drought, it became a repository for publications, maps, and audio-visual aids which related directly to this geographic phenomenon.

2. Philosophy of the Resource Information Center

As Africare expanded and moved from relief programs to developmental programs, the philosophy of the Resource Information Center changed and a more formal system of acquisitions was instituted. Members of the Development Team were now concentrating more on projects which would be of greater magnitude and of more long-term significance than early undertakings. At this point, Africare began to regard the Center as "a specialized collection of materials dealing with the Sahel region of West Africa..." and planned to make it "a focal point for research and development in the Sahel."

It was realized that Africare must deepen and broaden its associations with organizations and other documentation centers with experience in the field of development, not just in the Sahel but in the third world generally. Furthermore, there were increasing requirements for materials to be present in-house for use by the Development Team. At the beginning of 1976, for example, the Center contained approximately 850 documents; by mid-1977 it could claim over 2000 documents, and subscriptions to 90 periodicals and to five African daily newspapers. During this period it also expanded its list of contacts with overseas and domestic organizations from around 75 to 200. Approximately 25 percent of its documents have been donated. Many more have been picked up in the field by representatives during project assignments.

With regard to Africare's general commitment to integrated rural development, only those materials gathered for the planning of Seguenega could be evaluated. These include not only general background materials relative to the subject, but specific studies on migration, hydrology and the culture and language of the Mossi people. Many are obscure reports published by BERGEAC, GERES, ORSTOM, BARA, and some found in the Upper Volta archives which pertained specifically to the Yatenga ORD. Africare representatives have shown an amazing amount of persistence in obtaining information. As is common throughout West Africa, a frequent answer to request for materials is that there is only one copy available. In cases like these, Africare representatives either hand-copied significant elements of reports or persuaded authorities to permit them to bring the document back to the States for xeroxing and return. The quality and pertinence of the Seguenega collection are laudable and show Africare's versatility in using both conventional and unconventional methods of obtaining what is needed.

Africare to date has not complied with its mandate of analyzing why other projects succeeded or failed. According to the staff, this again has been due to the fact that Seguenega is the first real, large-scale project on which Africare has been involved from the very beginning. It keeps, however, a current account of the progress of the Eastern ORD in Upper Volta to identify possible problems inherent in the country and maintains a variety of evaluations of other projects located not only

in Africa but also in Asia and Latin America. These reports are generally made available through AID, the World Bank or U.N. agencies.

3. The Problems of the Resource Information Center

The overriding problem of the Resource Information Center stems directly from its unique cataloging system. As has been stated, it is so slanted toward the Sahel that, as the collection has grown and become more diverse in nature, the system has become not only unwieldy but imprecise. This trend will become even more pronounced if Africare expands its interests into Southern Africa. The situation now is that a staff member with personal experience and familiarity with individual volumes and their classification can locate materials with little difficulty. A person unfamiliar with the Center would have a great deal of difficulty. An example of this would be the identification of development projects in other parts of the world which might be relevant to the Sahel. It would be difficult for someone unfamiliar with a specific project to identify it from the Africare classification scheme.

Cataloging is generally done by the two work study interns. They must first learn a system which is unnecessarily complicated in addition to being extremely time consuming. They are, therefore, unable to devote adequate time to studying publications for appropriate bibliographic references.

In order to make the system workable, it is suggested that it be completely overhauled. Rather, however, than make it compatible with a traditional library system, it would be preferable to link it into the FAO system. This is the system used in all major African documentation centers, and its thesaurus was scheduled to be revised in 1977 to reflect terms which are uniquely African. The system of accessing by chronological order of cataloging and of keywording would save a great deal of time and result in speedier retrieval. It is felt that such action must be undertaken immediately before any expansion of the Center is contemplated. Provided competent supervisory staff is available, it is believed that the interns could carry out the recataloging in a relatively short time frame.

One problem which has arisen is that Africare has neither computer facilities nor microfiche equipment. While the former is not considered a serious handicap, the lack of the latter could present problems. Most of the functional documentation centers on the FAO network can provide computer printouts of holdings and acquisitions; however, document gift or exchange is only practical by use of microfiche, due to costs of international mail. It has recently been reported that the Sahel Documentation Center also intends to convert to use of microfiche, which would limit the Resource Information Center's ability to carry on its present policy of exchanging Xeroxed documents. It is therefore recommended that a microfiche reader be purchased for use in the Resource Information Center.

It should also be noted that collection of documents in the field has apparently been done conscientiously but not always consistently and that those who have been responsible may not have been totally aware of those resource centers, which have developed only recently in Africa in an effort to overcome the problems of records being lost or otherwise unavailable. It is, for example, entirely possible that an institution, such as the CNDST in Dakar, might have available a microfiche of a document which Africare had paid to have sent to the States for Xeroxing. It is believed that Africare could save time and money and at the same time avoid duplication if investigation of resource availability could be conducted as a primary reason for a staff visit to the field rather than as an adjunct reason to project planning and negotiations. It must be realized that the whole theory of information systems science is relatively new, but that a cadre of dedicated professionals exists in Africa and elsewhere who may have little knowledge of Africare and its work but who are committed to achieving the same sort of program success through the dissemination of information.

B. THE PERSONNEL DATA BANK

What has evolved into the Personnel Data Bank was originally authorized in the DPG as the identification and building of a roster of personnel with experience in "rural development in Francophone Africa" and the identification of "African and American institutions and organizations which had the potential, desire and resources to assist in Sahelian development." While the bank has attempted to meet these requirements, its emphasis has become changed to some degree, as per the statement the Africare data bank philosophy that "various international agencies, including AID, look to the Data Bank as a supplement to their own recruiting procedures and will ask that we forward to them names of potential candidates for positions they are seeking to fill." The data bank also serves as a resource whereby people looking for employment, including minority groups, are able to enjoy the benefit of increased exposure to the job market by virtue of the fact that their resumes are included among those in the Africare Data Bank.

The rather narrow original mandate for the Personnel Data Bank has resulted in its usefulness being somewhat limited, especially in the light of its purpose having been expanded to one more general in nature while, at the same time, staff resources have not been assigned to its management, updating, and expansion. For example, it would appear that the data bank was considered an important part of the original DPG and its development was projected as a prime responsibility of an Economist/Sociologist/Resource Specialist. It is now maintained on a part-time basis by an Administrative Assistant, who is currently updating the roster of available, qualified personnel.

1. Organization of the Data Bank

The bank consists of a card file organized by 16 categories of professional specialization. These are listed in Table IV-1 along with the number of resumes available in each field. Complete resumes are filed in alphabetical order, according to name rather than discipline.

Cards are also coded by overseas experience as follows: Sahel, Other Francophone West Africa, Anglophone West Africa, East Africa, Central Africa, North Africa, Southern Africa, Europe, Latin America

Table IV-1

CURRENT ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION OF THE PERSONNEL DATA BANK

| Data Bank Categories | Number of Resumes |
|--|-------------------|
| Agriculture | 61 |
| Communications | 9 |
| Administration | 63 |
| Development - General | 79 |
| Development - Senior Level | 46 |
| Economic Development | 24 |
| Education and Cultural Exchange | 55 |
| Human Resources | 22 |
| Hydrology-Geology | 11 |
| Public Affairs | 14 |
| Public Health | 109 |
| Range Management and Forestry | 8 |
| Translation and Interpretation | 16 |
| Miscellaneous, Technical (Mechanics, Construction) | 13 |
| Miscellaneous | 7 |
| Generalists | 78 |
| In the Categorization Process | <u>54</u> |
| Total | 669 |

and the Caribbean and Middle East, Far East, and South East Asia, and by language as follows: French, Arabic, Portuguese, African languages, Other.

Yellow tabs are attached to cards for people with Sahelian experience and blue tabs for those who speak fair or better French.

2. Maintenance of the Data Bank

In spotchecking the information provided on cards over the past three years, it is clear that they have been maintained somewhat inconsistently, no doubt because of changes in personnel. Therefore, information contained on some cards is much more complete than it is on others. As with the Resource Information Center, the cards and their corresponding cross-tabulated resume file were set up when Africare was much smaller than it is today. For example, the categories of expertise are extremely broad. This means that, when extra information is not provided on a card or the yellow or blue tabs have fallen off cards, the identification of personnel can only be achieved by a tedious search of the files. With close to 700 names on record at the present time, the process is already becoming difficult. If the system is to grow much further, a conscious effort will have to be made to identify more clearly the specific qualifications of individuals. There are already 79 resumes in General Development, 109 in public health-nutrition and 78 categorized as "generalists."

In order to make the data bank a more viable instrument it will, therefore, be necessary not only to maintain it but to reorganize it, since it can be expected that more and more individuals will gather African experience and the number of resumes forwarded to Africare will increase. This will be especially true if Africare broadens its efforts into Southern Africa.

3. Reorganization of the Data Bank

The data bank should first immediately be updated and should determine if all those currently included in it are still available. The card file should contain a place where the level of availability can be noted, since certain individuals might wish to be considered only for permanent assignments or short- or long-term consulting missions.

A careful look should be given to the kinds of professional categories listed, and subcategories should perhaps be added in order to provide for faster, more accurate identification. It might be wise to establish a whole new system of categorizing experience. At present, there is no differentiation between an individual who has taken a two-week trip to the Sahel and one with five years of experience in the Sahel. In addition, it would be helpful to divide the types of pertinent experience which an individual has had: e.g., Peace Corps volunteer, research experience, other field experience, applicable domestic experience only.

4. Future of the Data Bank

As Africare moves into Southern Africa, a complete reorganization of the data bank will no doubt be necessary with resumes sorted out into different geographic and professional areas of expertise. French language becomes of only secondary importance in the Southern Africa context, but experience with refugee programs whether in Africa or elsewhere might be of primary importance. It is felt that, when Africare reorganizes the system, those responsible should pay particular attention that the new system is more universally applicable than the old. That is, the new system should not confine itself to being directed only towards the Sahel and Southern Africa, but should serve an efficient quick-response need in any part of the continent.

If the system is to be expanded further, Africare could become more active in seeking out qualified candidates. Africare must consider if it wishes to concentrate on current Peace Corps emphasis in the recruitment process or whether it wishes to generalize its minority constituency by publicizing the data bank in primarily Black educational institutions. Depending on the future focus of programs, it might also, for example, wish to contact individuals listed in such publications as Black Engineers in the United States.

It would appear that, given the proper amount of attention and careful scrutiny of resumes, cross-tabulation of disciplines (i.e., an environmental engineer might be listed in both public health and hydraulics), and a methodology of more refined categorization and indication of availability and capabilities, that the Personnel Data

Bank could become a very useful tool which would serve not only Africare but a wide variety of organizations whose needs coincide. Unlike the Resource Information Center, the Personnel Data Bank would appear to have the potential of serving a unique purpose well beyond the scope of Africare's efforts. This, however, is a policy decision. Reorganization of the present system is immediately required if the data bank is to serve Africare alone adequately.

C. FUTURE OF THE RESOURCE INFORMATION CENTER

With regards to the Personnel Data Bank and the Resource Information Center, it should be noted that, as originally planned, they would be linked philosophically and, by implication, administratively. The situation as it exists, however, is that they are now physically and functionally separated and are both run by staff members who have other demands on their time.

If the Resource Information Center and the Data Bank are to become more useful and active, it might well be advisable to centralize supervisory responsibilities for both in the same person, who would be part of the Development Team. Since Africare does have access to work study interns, much of the clerical work could be carried out by them under the supervision of a permanent staff member who would be familiar with both programs and could assign priorities and duties.

The Resource Information Center has within the past year instituted a policy of mailing acquisitions list to approximately 200 organizations. This fact alone means there will be increased public awareness of the Center's existence and materials and, consequently, there will probably be more visitors and requests for information. It is felt, however, that the Center at present should focus its efforts on modernizing its system in order to make it more efficient and responsive to the needs of the Africare Development Team.

Section V
SPECIFIC PROJECT DEVELOPMENT

Having discussed Africare's history, reviewed the impact of the DPG on Africare's programming ability, and evaluated its Resource Information Center, we turn now to examine how Africare has planned, designed, implemented and evaluated particular projects.

A. SMALL PROJECTS (UNDER \$100,000)

Before and since the award of the DPG, Africare has placed emphasis on the development of small scale projects in the Sahel. These projects offer private donor groups a tangible focus for their support, and are therefore more attractive to them than minority participation in larger projects. With scores of small projects, the donor constituency of individuals who sense their direct involvement in development is quite substantial. A brief summary of Africare's projects, all but five of which are small, may be found in Appendix 1.

In general, the model for small project development in each country is the same. At the outset, a project idea is developed at a regional or local level by Africans. After appropriate approvals by government officials, the project proposal is conveyed to the Africare country representative, who in periodic tours of particular rural areas has encouraged this process. The country representative then transmits the project proposal to the development team in Washington, supplying pertinent background information where necessary or requested.

Upon its receipt in Washington, the proposal is sent initially to the development team member whose expertise is most relevant for the proposed project. After his/her detailed review, the proposal then goes to a review by the development team as a whole. If approved, the proposal is sent back

to the country representative who in turn invites a formal governmental request for project funding. This formal request is transmitted back to Africare, which then seeks out an appropriate funding source. Once funding arrives, a formal accord is signed between the Africare country representative and the relevant units of government, detailing the plan of work, accounting procedures, and the funding schedule. At this point, work on the project -- by units of government and the local populace -- commences, and the representative conducts periodic inspections and conveys funding in installments. The representative in monthly reports keeps the development team informed of project progress, and the team in turn makes its report to the original donor.

In our field tour to the Sahel, we did not visit any of Africare's small projects in Niger, because of their remoteness and inaccessibility during the current rainy season. However, we did visit the following Africare-funded small projects in Upper Volta: the Gourcy Nutritional Recuperation Center, the Ouahigouya and Tikaré tree nurseries, the vegetable garden at Ramsa, and the Sittigo reforestation plot. With the exception of the Tikaré nursery, the projects were on-going, independent now of Africare financial support, and meeting their original objectives. The Tikaré nursery had been struck with a recent flood, which washed away some seedlings and buried others in silt. Local efforts are now under way to relocate the nursery to a less hazardous area.

Altogether, Africare has financed 15 small projects in Upper Volta since 1974, only five of which cost over \$15,000. In large measure, this record is due to the strong efforts of Africare's Upper Volta representative in identifying projects, in cultivating good working relationships with Voltaics who have facilitated project development, and in helping to raise funds for these projects both in the United States from private sources and in Upper Volta through the AID-financed U.S. Ambassador's Self-Help Fund.

In Niger, we found but one small project already in place (vegetable production in Diffa), and one other project proposed pending. To a degree the existence currently of but two small projects in Niger has been the consequence both of Africare's concentration on larger scale projects, and of somewhat greater administrative demands in Niger in developing approved projects.

While institutionally such small projects provide few short-term returns to Africare, particularly because they do not come with sufficient overhead to justify extensive development team attention, there are several longer term advantages to Africare in expanding its small projects program:

1. The small projects create a constituency of donors in the United States whose direct involvement in modest scale projects that are successful augurs well for subsequent donations to Africare. Without these small projects, Africare in our judgment will have increasing difficulties in raising private funds.

2. The successful implementation of small scale projects, particularly those which raise local expectations and competence in project implementation, is an important forerunner of larger scale projects (e.g., Seguenega). The process of small project implementation is an important bellweather of how larger projects would fare in the same area.

3. The collaboration of the Africare representative and his African counterparts in project development and management is an important project outcome in training terms.

We therefore strongly encourage Africare to increase its small project development throughout the Sahel. To this end, we would recommend that Africare charge more of its small project expenses to direct project costs, rather than at present, where many project costs are charged to overhead (now 20 percent on the small projects). This will increase the institutional incentive to encourage small projects. Secondly, Africare should arrange periodic (e.g., semiannual) conferences of its country representatives to share small project ideas and facilitate the collaboration of the Africare representatives with other PVOs for the same purpose. Third, as the cultivation of the private donor community is not only in Africare's interest but also in AID's -- because it expands the political constituency of supporters for AID's overseas objectives, the Agency should seek ways to assist Africare in small project development.

B. LARGE SCALE PROJECTS

Aside from numerous small scale projects, Africare has developed three major projects.¹ In Niger, as an outgrowth of an earlier AID-financed feasibility study, Africare planned, designed, and is now implementing the Niger Basic Health Services Delivery Project with a \$2.8 million grant from AID. Also in Niger, Africare assumed the direction of an ongoing project for irrigated rice development at Tara, in the Dosso Department. This project of about \$4 million in funding has been supported principally by the Lilly Endowment, and AID has obligated about \$1 million to its implementation. The third major project in the Seguenega Sector of the Yatenga ORD in Upper Volta has been planned and designed, but has not yet been funded. This project has a budget of just over \$5 million; Africare has asked for AID's financial support of this project.

1. The Niger Basic Health Services Delivery Project

This project represents an outgrowth of a 1973 feasibility study in the Diffa Department that Africare conducted for the Ministry of Health with AID assistance. After negotiations among Africare, the Ministry of Health, and AID from 1974 to 1976, Africare formulated a health project with particular reference to the Diffa Department, and AID developed a village health project with a national scope, relying heavily on Africare's earlier experience in Diffa and Africare's good working relationships with Ministry of Health personnel. In these negotiations, the Ministry of Health played a clearly dominant role in determining both the general purposes as well as the implementation features of both projects. Further, the Ministry has both reserved and exercised the right to make modifications where necessary in the implementation of each project.

The overall purpose of Africare's project is to "assist the Government of Niger in designing, implementing, and evaluating a low-cost comprehensive basic health services delivery system of preventative, educative as well as curative care which incorporates local community participation of the urban and rural population, particularly in Diffa Department." This general

¹A fourth is being developed in Mali-Banamba integrated rural development project. The team did not visit Mali, but work on this project appears to be patterned closely along the lines of development of the Seguenega project.

objective has four distinct components; two are national in scope, while the others are limited primarily to Diffa:

- a. Increase the level of adequate and accessible basic health services in Diffa Department over a three-year period (1977-1979).
- b. Increase the capability within the Ministry of Health to deliver health services to the rural population, especially in Diffa Department.
- c. Institutionalize public health training, in-service education and field supervision within the teaching/training institutions in Niger.
- d. Create within the Ministry of Health a systematized approach to data collection, reporting and analysis for improving the quality and quantity of health services.

In our review of various project documents and reports, and in our discussions with Africare project staff, Ministry of Health officials, and AID/Niamey personnel, we can make the following observations:

- The Ministry of Health is very satisfied with Africare's project performance to date; likewise the AID/Niamey officials with responsibility for health matters, Dr. George Jones, expressed a highly favorable opinion of Africare's project efforts.

- We have found particularly strong appreciation for epidemiologist Dr. Erich Hemphill's substantial record in advancing objectives c. and d. indicated above, as well as his completing other non-project-specified assignments given to him within the Ministry of Health. Apart from meeting his many specific assignments, Dr. Hemphill has to a large degree come to be perceived by Nigériens as part of the Ministry's policy-making staff.

- While physician Dr. Dorian Shillingford's assignments as project director, with particular emphases on items a. and b. above, provide fewer directly measurable indications of progress toward project goals, he shares the same level of confidence by Nigériens and the AID staff that Dr. Hemphill enjoys.

Regrettably, both Dr. Hemphill's and Dr. Shillingford's contracts expire soon. We encourage Africare to consider the desire of the Nigériens and AID staff that it seek to retain in Niger the services of these individuals. Should this effort be unsuccessful, we would hope that Africare would be prepared to replace them immediately, without permitting weeks and possibly months to elapse while recruiting replacements.

• While the project's general objectives within the Ministry of Health (c. and d. above) appear within grasp and reasonably on schedule, the goals for the project in the Diffa Department either have not been met at all or are seriously behind schedule. While the provision of adequate housing and facilities for the Africare project staff has been a problem, this appears now to have been overcome. Nonetheless, no Africare project staff member has yet spent any significant length of time in Diffa, and the three-year project is now nearly two years old. This represents a serious project shortcoming. The surgeon that Africare initially recruited for the Diffa post resigned shortly after arriving in Niger, and their maintenance mechanic had an accident which called for a medical evacuation. The recruitment process has improved and several technicians have recently arrived in Niger.

2. Tara Hydro-Agricultural Project

Africare's first integrated development project of substantial size is based in the village of Tara, located along the Niger River about 300 kilometers southeast of Niamey, Niger. Tara is a village of some 1700 people, whose economy is based on the rainfed farming of cereals. Between the village fields and the river lies a tract of annually flooded alluvium historically used by Fulani pastoralists as grazing lands for their herds during the dry season.

In the early 1970's, a project to irrigate and to grow rice in this river bottom land was initiated through the joint efforts of the Government of Niger, World Vision and the Lilly Endowment. An airstrip and various buildings were constructed, a considerable amount of equipment was bought, and a "temporary dike" built. However, the project experienced difficulties in its management, which necessitated a new approach.

Lilly Endowment turned to Africare to take over the management of the foreign assistance component of the project. This Africare did and this appears to have been a reasonable decision in light of assurances of continuing Lilly financial support and a collateral reorganization of the project by the Government of Niger.

It is important to be aware of this background in order to understand that Africare's involvement with Tara was fortuitous and not the outgrowth

of a planned search for an integrated rural development project. The fact that the heart of the project is irrigation construction for rice production precludes it from being a "low cost" model as contemplated in the Development Program Grant. Nonetheless, Tara provided Africare with an opportunity to test out its system of integrated rural development. Many features (aside from engineering work and irrigated rice cultivation) would be equally applicable to lower cost rainfed farming projects.

Africare has proceeded with the development of the Tara project generally along the lines of its integrated rural development model/strategy. It has held workshops in the area to discuss the needs of Tara and how the project would be organized and coordinated. This has not been a one-way process as Africare itself has taken the initiative to press for actions which it felt important -- notably the appointment by the Government of Niger of a full-time project manager. There is good evidence that the organization and content of the program is generally well-accepted by Niger officials at both national and local levels and by the people of the village of Tara, who will be the beneficiaries.

The main components of the Tara project, as set forth by Africare in its original project paper (and later in a project paper prepared to secure an AID contribution to the project), were as follows:

- a. Construction of irrigation works to place 200 hectares in irrigation for rice cultivation (to be shared by about 400 families with about one-half hectare each).
- b. Program for credit and agricultural technical assistance/training through UNCC (Niger Credit and Cooperative Union) with a local cooperative branch to be organized at Tara. The credit was to be used primarily to enable farmers to buy oxen and equipment for animal traction for use in both rice fields and rainfed farming (principally millet and other cereals).
- c. Adult education.
- d. Health program including construction and organization of a dispensary.
- e. Poultry project, with a particular emphasis on improving the economic well-being of women.
- f. Agricultural research on rice, crop rotation, etc., on the irrigated land.

- g. Improvement of road from Tara to main highway.
- h. Fishery project.
- i. Forestry project.
- j. Supportive socio-economic research.

All of these activities were to be undertaken by Niger Government agencies and to be coordinated by a Niger Program Director. The role of Africare was conceived as that of broker with respect to external funds, with moderate guidance and support through Africare staff and, where necessary, outside consultants. The engineering work was to be performed by Genie Rural, the Government rural engineering organization, especially with respect to the irrigation works and road construction.

Prior to undertaking the project, Africare, through its development team and outside consultants, prepared an extensive report, which was used as a basis for project planning and determining the financial requirements, which were estimated at \$3,117,082. Initially, it was contemplated that Africare would bear most of the costs through funds secured from Lilly and other sources, but that the Niger Government would contribute personnel and other necessary inputs.

In May 1977, Africare made a project submission to AID for additional financial support for Tara. This was done in part because AID had indicated to Africare that it was prepared to consider applications from PVOs for rural development projects and in part a realization by Africare that rising costs made an additional financing source desirable for the fuller achievement of project objectives.

The financial plan established by Africare in its submission to AID contemplated financing as follows:

| | | |
|--|--------------------------|-------------|
| Africare (Lilly Endowment and other sources) | \$2,025,251 | 52.4% |
| USAID | 938,290 | 24.3 |
| Host country | <u>897,142</u> | <u>23.3</u> |
| | \$3,860,683 ¹ | 100.0 |

¹This figure and the \$3,117,000 estimate stated above are each exclusive of value of land contributed by the Government of Niger, which Africare estimated to have a value of \$500,000.

Since this time, costs have continued to rise owing to a variety of factors, including inflation, declining value of the dollar, and revised engineering estimates.

From the standpoint of AID, it is significant that there will be no apparent need to return to AID for additional financial support. Africare itself has already committed in excess of the \$2,025,000 stated above. In addition, the Government of Niger has agreed to absorb any engineering costs (the major risk) in excess of \$1,500,000.

In its original documents (including the submission to AID), Africare calculated an internal economic rate of return for the project of 4.8 percent, which, in the AID submission, was revised to 6.9 percent. We believe this calculation was made in accordance with the norms of AID and other international development agencies.¹ The calculation was made using strictly agricultural outputs as benefits and using as costs only those costs directly related to the agricultural production. Thus both costs and benefits of such elements as health care were excluded.

There was one assumption made in the calculation of internal return that would be open to question -- namely, that the land to be irrigated is unproductive without the project and hence should be valued at zero. As noted above, the land had earlier been used for grazing cattle destined for market. Further, once the land was banned to the Fulani, it could have been put to alternative agricultural use not entailing major engineering construction.

Since Africare's institution of the Tara project, the major change made in the project was to reduce the amount of land to be endiked for irrigation from 200 hectares to 120 hectares. The area taken by irrigation ditches and research parcels will reduce further the amount available to farm families to around 100 hectares. There has been no corresponding reduction in engineering costs. Thus there can be little question that a recalculation of internal economic rate of return would produce a negative result.

¹That is to say, there is an implicit assumption that the project will proceed according to plan, that calculated feasible production levels will be achieved through use throughout the project of the technology and inputs provided, that there will be substantially complete recuperation of credit, etc.

The decision to reduce the area to be irrigated, taken for technical reasons, was apparently made at some time between Africare's submission of the Tara project to AID in May 1977 and the commencement of engineering work in the last months of that year. The project documentation, including the submission to AID, had included rather brief discussion of the irrigation works (the major cost item) and no reference to any professional opinion as to engineering feasibility. We believe all of the parties concerned (Africare, Government of Niger, and AID) would do well to place more emphasis on securing an evaluating engineering study prior to commitment of substantial funds for engineering projects.

The agricultural program for Tara is now proceeding on the basis that approximately 200 families will receive plots for rice production of around one-half hectare each. This will in effect permit the participation in the project of the entire population of Tara of about 1700. The original intention of benefiting still additional families that would immigrate from less productive agricultural areas, however, has been substantially dropped.

The overall cost of the Tara project, if we put it at about \$4,000,000 (exclusive of value of land and costs incurred prior to Africare's takeover), will then be approximately \$2350 per capita or (assuming an average household size of eight and one-half) \$20,000 per household.

The evaluators want to make clear that they do not believe that rural development projects should be judged against any single arbitrary economic criterion, nor are they lacking in appreciation of the necessity of social costs where benefits cannot be measured in economic terms. A project with a good economic internal rate of return might well be a development priority despite high per capita cost. Conversely a project with negative internal rate of return might well be of exceptional worth if the cost per capita were modest and the associated social benefits substantial. There is, however, no way in which a development project in rural Africa -- considered in isolation -- can be characterized as cost-effective when the internal rate of return is negative and the per family cost is \$20,000.

Tara's principal value as a project thus lies in another direction -- namely in what can be learned from it by Africare, AID and the Government of Niger. In purely agricultural terms it will afford an opportunity to

test the feasibility of rice growing along the stretch of the Niger River south of Niamey. There is a great deal of land in this stretch that could be irrigated, hopefully at lower per hectare cost. There is an excellent internal and external market for rice, which over the long run Riger should exploit if development costs can be held within tolerable limits. Hence, Tara should be ultimately useful in providing data to determine the feasibility of considerably larger projects.

More important, in terms of Africare, it is an opportunity for testing and improving its techniques in working on projects of integrated rural development.

Thus far we believe that Africare's experience in Tara has had a very positive effect in enabling Africare to develop a practical and balanced method of working in partnership with local nationals. It has done an excellent job of bringing host nationals together to identify needs, develop a program, and work together at a local level with a common sense of purpose. At the same time it has recognized that its own technical input must be more substantial and continuing than it had earlier considered necessary. Its decision to appoint a full-time project manager, in addition to the support provided by its country director and visits by members of the Africare development team, is very important both in the effective provision of its inputs and in guiding and encouraging the Nigérien project team. As an integrated rural development project, Tara is a multi-faceted operation which requires constant attention to keep all of its aspects moving forward. The project records show that the African project manager has been an effective force in solving problems and generating momentum.

In its present state of evolution the Tara project manifests both the opportunities and problems of an integrated rural development project.

In anticipation of the availability of irrigated land for rice production (expected in the coming season), the project has proceeded to organize farmers into cooperatives, to begin the process of enabling farmers to secure credit funds to obtain work animals, to begin to train them in the use of their work animals, and to begin adult literary programs that will have, in part, an agricultural focus.

The project will become increasingly interesting as it moves from the preparatory stage into the new agricultural pattern that has been planned. This involves guiding farmers to use their new animals, both in the irrigated rice lands and in dry farming. Some of the problems are already beginning to show. There is a constraint on purchasing enough animals. Some of the animals already purchased have died. Credit for animal feed was distributed in cash rather than kind as originally planned, the consequences of which to animal feeding and credit collection have not been established. Farmers find that, not having planted rainfed cereal crops in neat rows, the use of animals has led to their trampling down a part of the crop. Consequently, many farmers have abandoned using oxen during the current planting season. Then too there is the whole process of rice production to be learned from preparation of land to final harvest, together with all the hazards if something goes wrong in controlling the water.

There are also the other problem aspects to be pulled together. The poultry, fishing, forestry, and artisan projects are all scheduled to begin in the coming year. The socio-economic study was abandoned shortly after it began, yet there is optimism that the recent government-sponsored census will provide the hoped-for outputs from the originally planned study.

Aside from the rice production process, which will make heavy demands on the farmers to expand their present activities and to adapt to new ways, the project has other challenges to project management. Road construction is scheduled soon to begin along with the construction of buildings for varied sub-projects; this conceivably could pose some problems of competing labor demand during the growing season.

Since Tara's size is under the population minimum of 2000 normally required for a dispensary under Nigérien health planning policies, the question of the extent to which health services should be provided locally has been raised. How does one rationalize on equity or other grounds integrated rural development at the village level with the regional requirements of government services?

All of these aspects should make progress of the Tara project exciting to follow. Will it be possible to grow and market a bountiful crop of rice, while at the same time making substantial progress in many or all of the

other aspects of integrated development? Or will it appear by hindsight to have been more prudent to have begun with a few things to which other sub-projects might be added over time (as has been a design feature of Seguenga to be discussed below). Whatever the result, Africare and Tara will have a lot to teach.

In order to put Tara in perspective it should be observed that AID is now about to launch a multimillion dollar integrated rural development project in Niger. This project involves many more elements than Africare is involved in at Tara and extends over a farm population (Niamey Department) of over 300,000.¹ How will all of these activities integrate and be kept moving apace? How many of the activities will truly work together and reach the same farmers or communities in the appropriate proportions to produce synergized results? The AID project is explicitly designed as an experiment, a part of the learning process, to determine how a larger definitive integrated development project might be fashioned in the future. Can one learn more by testing integrated rural development in a department of over 300,000 people than in a village of 1700, or might there conceivably be value at some point in drawing on the combined experience of both approaches?

Given the present state of the art -- that is to say of knowledge of how most effectively to promote rural development in the Sahelian countries -- there are no universally acknowledged experts or proved models. Tara will be a valuable exercise in proportion as it contributes to the state of the art new evidence of the feasibility or non-feasibility of various approaches and to the extent also that it contributes to Africare's own insights and internal capabilities to fashion and implement improved project techniques and designs.

3. Seguenga Integrated Rural Development Project

On July 26, 1978, Africare submitted a proposal to AID for a five-year integrated rural development project in the Seguenga region of Upper

¹Many of the assumptions of this project (e.g., efficient administration of credit with substantially complete recuperation) are the same as implicit assumptions of the Africare project.

Volta in the amount of \$5,894,000 (exclusive of \$1.5 million estimated Voltaic contribution and \$750,000 from other donors). We have reviewed this project document. We have visited the Seguenega sector, looked at the land and communities involved, and talked with various Voltaics who will be involved in support and implementation of the project. We have also visited the sites of precursor activities undertaken by Africare in the area. Finally, we have had an opportunity in the course of this evaluation and other work to obtain an understanding of approaches being taken in other rural development projects in Upper Volta by AID, other governmental donors, and private non-voluntary organizations.

In our opinion the preparatory work for this project has been thorough and workmanlike, the project design is good and is appropriate to the locale, and there exists a constructive working relationship between Africare and the Voltaics involved that augurs well for successful implementation. The project is as free as practicable of the problems that we feel have limited or may limit the success of Africare's earlier project at Tara in Niger. The project on a per capita basis is relatively low cost; if the project is successful in implementation, it should afford a model for replication in other sectors of Upper Volta. It should leave behind a complement of Voltaics who are not only trained but also positioned to develop and implement further projects. It thus conforms in all material respects to the type of project contemplated by the Development Program Grant.

The project will be implemented through the Yatenga ORD (regional development organization) in the Seguenega sector of that region. This sector has a population of about 110,000. Thus the project will involve a cost of about \$10 per year per capita over a five-year period. This is modest both in absolute terms and in relation to the very large development funds that are going into Upper Volta from many donors. Additionally, elements of the project involve strengthening the ORD, which covers a region of over 500,000 inhabitants, and it is planned that some of the resources utilized at Seguenega will be devoted to further development work in other sectors after phases of the Seguenega project are completed.

The existence of the ORD structure in Upper Volta offers a promising framework for success in a project of integrated rural development, and the Yatenga ORD appears to be among the better organized in the country. The ORD's autonomy and depth of staffing dovetail nicely with Africare's concept of local decision-making and project direction. Further, the selection of the Seguenega sector for intensive action appears to be a good one. The sector is a low-income area needing assistance; at the same time the population is receptive to change and there is a good potential for economic development. Additionally, Africare has had successful experience in the area with a smaller predecessor project.

Africare's experience with the Yatenga ORD dates from 1975, when its development team visited Upper Volta. The team began with conversations at the national level, particularly with the Ministry of Rural Development, which suggested that Africare look at the Yatenga and one other ORD. After deciding on the Yatenga ORD, Africare indicated to the ORD that it had \$42,000 to develop a program. A decision was reached to proceed, and the Seguenega sector was selected as the project locale. Workshops were held at the Yatenga ORD to design the program.

The small program that was then developed involved the construction of small earthen dams, vegetable production plots, livestock, general health needs and reforestation. All of these sub-projects appear to have been well executed and cost effective. Reported results of the vegetable production activity indicate that substantial yields were achieved and market opportunities far in excess of production were available. Likewise, the crossing of local with imported sheep appears to have had good results. It is obviously too early to view the benefits from the tree nursery and planting activity. As the trees mature, however, they are expected to provide multiple benefits as windbreak for crops, protection from encroachment of the desert, and provision of much needed firewood. A plan has also been conceived to establish a new market in the area shaded by one of the plantings.

The new and much larger Seguenega project now being proposed by Africare has been worked out over two years. The project was developed in collaboration with the Voltaics through extended workshop sessions. Both the Voltaics and Africare made inputs into the selection of sub-projects.

Some sub-projects were eliminated on Africare's recommendation that they would be ineligible for funding. The Africare country representative and development team have worked diligently to refine the project and to put it into its present form. Throughout, they have kept the Voltaics in the region informed of developments and have distributed copies of the proposal in French to all of the key Voltaics concerned.

The activities included in the project are the following:

Social Services: Village development committees

Placement and support of resident ORD extension agency

Special credits, grant funds and village technician training

Village-based health services

Functional adult literacy

Young farmer training

Production: Vegetable production

Development of low-lying areas (bas fonds) and related rice production

Livestock and poultry production

Support Services: Well construction

Rural access road improvement

Revegetation/soil conservation

Central management and support by the Yatenga ORD to the villages

Financial and management support to the ORD by Africare and other agencies

The internal economic rate of return calculated for the production activities is 14.1 percent. Since the production activities are based on experience with successful pilot projects supported by Africare and others, this calculation inspires more confidence than most such calculations in proposed rural development projects. The emphasis of the project on vegetable production is also well supported by availability of market opportunities, as well as the ORD-sponsored experience in trucking production to Ouagadougou and Lomé. Support is also being provided by Oxfam in the provision of cold storage facilities.

Africare's vision of participation by local nationals in integrated rural development projects is a two-step process in which the major role is played by local government officials in the original design and initiation of the project, with the population itself playing an increasing role in further development of the project. Hence the project stresses organization of village development committees, which will provide the villagers with a voice in the development of the project and a mechanism to organize, with project support, self-help activities.

In studying the Seguenega project we have particularly noted the problems encountered in other rural projects in Upper Volta, particularly the AID-supported integrated rural development project in the Eastern ORD. A recent evaluation of the latter project found the objectives over-ambitious and some of the assumptions unrealistic. Particular problems it identified were a lack of sufficient commitment to the project on the part of both Voltaic staff and the farmers and difficulties involved in the introduction of new farm production systems involving animal traction. In our view, the detailed study given to development of the Seguenega project, the extensive involvement of local people in this process, the demonstration of the potential of proposed farm production systems through successfully completed pilot projects, and the better organization of the Yatenga ORD justify optimism that the problems encountered in the Eastern ORD program will be avoided at Seguenega. Furthermore, the risks, often inherent in integrated development programs, of trying to do too many things too fast, appear to be minimized by the phasing of the program over a five-year period and the preparation of a detailed implementation plan outlining the steps to be undertaken in each six-month period.

Experience teaches that it is hazardous to predict the outcome of a rural development program. Insofar, however, as careful planning can offer prospects for success, we consider Seguenega as a project of superior promise. We recommend its financing to AID not only because of its importance to achievement of the purposes of the Development Program Grant in developing Africare's capability to plan and implement integrated rural development projects, but also as a well-conceived project in its own right.

Section VI

FINANCING AND MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS

A. THE LACK OF UNRESTRICTED FUNDS

The key to Africare's problems in managing and financing its activities lies in the fact that it was organized on a shoestring. It had no patron, and it has never had unrestricted funds in sufficient amounts to maintain a comfortable administrative structure and to finance substantial publicity and fund-raising activities.

Especially in raising funds from individuals, church groups and the like, Africare has been conscious of the desire of these contributors that a maximum go to Africa with a minimum to Africare in the form of administrative and overhead charges. Particularly in view of its newness, Africare has been especially anxious to acquire and to maintain a good public image as an organization with lean overhead and a good record of putting its contributors' dollars to work. As a matter of policy it has, with respect to its smaller contributors, dedicated 80 percent of contributions to projects, reserving only 20 percent for overhead.

Because of the continuing pressure to spend money on programs rather than on overhead, Africare has from the beginning followed a very parsimonious policy both in compensation of its personnel and in the conduct of publicity and fund-raising activities. All salaries, including those of the principal officers, are well below those of comparable positions in government and industry. Across the board, based on experience, training and level of performance, Africare is probably low on average by around 30 percent in salaries for Stateside employees. The discrepancy is even greater with respect to overseas employees as they receive neither hardship nor cost of living allowances, which means very low compensation

indeed for Americans resident in the Sahel. Fringe benefits are small; there is no pension plan; and overseas there are only modest housing allowances, no commissary privileges, and no rest and recreation programs. There is no home leave provided additional to annual vacation.

AID grants to Africare have enabled it to increase materially the scope of its substantive programs in Africa. They have not, however, contributed to its ability to develop its constituency and intensify its fund-raising activities. If anything, the demands on the organization to develop projects with AID and to comply with AID requirements have diverted attention that might otherwise have been directed toward strengthening its private sources of support.

Africare's dealings with AID have, moreover, involved it in something of a vicious circle. Because of its parsimonious policy in compensating employees and incurring other overhead expenses, it is able to establish only a low overhead rate. Given a low overhead rate, it is hard pressed to increase expenses. AID missions in both Niger and Upper Volta volunteered expressions of amazement regarding the low overhead involved in their projects with Africare. In the Seguenega integrated rural development project (Upper Volta) submission to AID of July 26, 1978, the best Africare was able to work out with AID in a total project budget of \$5,894,000 was \$498,200 for overhead. As this is a provisional figure, no doubt Africare could receive more for overhead if it spends more by raising administrative salaries, etc. However, it is not easy to spend more unless there are unrestricted funds available for spending. Furthermore, AID will reimburse for overhead only with respect to the proportion attributable to AID projects. Africare must find some other way to cover increased overhead with respect to privately-financed projects, where it is still trying to guarantee that 80 percent of donations will actually reach Africa.

B. FUND RAISING

As indicated in Section II, Africare from 1974 to 1977 had been able to maintain a healthy balance among four sources of revenue: small private contributions, large private contributions, AID's DPG/GSG support, and OPGs from AID. However, while the number of small private contributors to Africare has grown steadily, their donations amounted to only 4 percent of Africare's revenues for the year ending April 30, 1978. Further, with the Lilly Endowment's policy decision to restrict its programs to the Indiana region, Africare finds itself now heavily dependent on AID funding. We would hasten to point out, however, that the lion's share of this AID funding recently has been from AID project grants rather than from the DPG/GSG sources. This fact, indeed, should be taken as evidence of Africare's improved capacity to operate as a development organization.

Africare clearly recognizes the funding crisis posed by the falling off of small private contributions and the loss of Lilly Endowment support. Africare's credibility as an independent, private development organization with a special constituency among Black Americans wears thin as it comes to rely on AID for more of its funding. In our discussions with members of the Africare staff, but particularly with the Executive Director and the Director of International Development, we were made aware that the organization recognizes these independence and credibility issues and has taken some steps to deal with them. Nonetheless, the task is formidable and contains some painful dilemmas.

First, the constituency of Black Americans that Africare seeks to educate about Africa and from whom it seeks funds is neither a wealthy constituency nor is it organized in such a way to facilitate fund raising. There are several other regional and national organizations seeking funds in the same constituency (e.g., NAACP, CORE, SCLC, The Urban League, etc.) and offering programs with greater immediate self-interest for Black Americans than those of Africare.

Second, Africare has not been, nor does it posture itself to be -- either in its staffing or in its constituency appeal -- an exclusively Black organization. We have been impressed with the commitment to and the practice of integration of Blacks and whites throughout Africare. It has

sought and received funds from white constituencies (e.g., Kansas West Conference of the United Methodist Church). Nonetheless, its posture of having a special relationship between Africa and America's Black community would lack credibility if the proportion of its donors and donations becomes significantly more white than Black.

Third, with changes in the federal laws which regulate the operations of private philanthropies, it will be more difficult for Africare to find a replacement for the substantial Lilly Endowment support it has received to date.

Fourth, most of the small private contributions are earmarked for particular projects; and all of the larger contributions and grants contain either implicit or explicit limitations on using monies for fund raising. Thus Africare finds itself with insufficient unrestricted funds that it could commit to the task of raising new private funds. It is this fact that threatens Africare with a Hobson's choice of either becoming a ward of AID or going out of existence.

A number of concrete steps have been taken to deal with the private funding problems. Early on, Africare worked to establish chapters in eighteen cities in the United States. With volunteer labor and with chapter member interest high as a consequence of the Sahelian drought, Africare was able to generate a modest amount of funds, but much less than had been hoped for. Now, some chapters are moribund, and only a handful, and in particular the Washington, D.C. chapter, are presently active sources of Africare support. The dependence of Africare on unpaid chapter volunteers whose motivation was uneven has been in large measure responsible for this shortfall in expectations.

Africare has to a limited degree tapped some of the financial resources of predominantly white church groups, much of this through the personal efforts of an Africare consultant (C. Dean Freudenberger) and Africare's representative in Upper Volta (Peter M. Persell). Africare should have prospects to expand such efforts.

The most promising fund raising efforts may lie within the Black churches. To plan in this direction, Africare has created the post of Senior Fellow, and Mr. Charles Williams, formerly a Vice-President at the Lilly Endowment, now fills it and has already developed a scenario whereby

the formidable resources of seven Black church denominations, with 11,000,000 members, might be mobilized in creating an organization somewhat analogous to Catholic World Relief or Church World Service. From such an organization Africare could be expected to draw substantial support. Nonetheless, we can suppose that the launching of such a venture would require an extended period of planning and organization, and there is no present assurance as to when or whether this would materialize. Consequently, while this project appears worthwhile to pursue as a solution over the longer term, we question whether it obviates the need for stronger efforts over the near term.

As evaluators rather than fund raisers, there are limits to our ability to make constructive suggestions as to the course Africare might follow. There are, however, various aspects of the problem on which our comments may be helpful.

The first is that we are doubtful of the prospects of success through simple continuance of past fund raising strategies or modest revisions thereof without increased fund raising strength in the form of unrestricted funds and increased support from organizations and personalities with fund raising capabilities. What is needed -- if it is at all possible -- is a major new strategy.

The second is that there are two ways of measuring the extent of Africare's private support. One is in terms of the quantum of private resources it can raise. The other is in terms of the breadth of support it can attract in number of individual and group contributors. This is obviously not an "either...or" proposition, but our judgment is that the achievement of breadth of support is the more urgent of the two. If Africare is to fulfill a distinctive role as a PVO, it probably must be in terms of its original conception primarily as an expression of the concern of Black Americans with the development of Africa. In making this point, we do not have an exaggerated view of the quantum of funds that can be raised in the Black community. The average size of contribution that is practicable may not be large. Nor do we think it is necessary or practicable that Africare draw support from a majority or even a large minority of Black Americans. It would be impressive if annual support came from something like 5 to 10 percent, and meaningful even at

something less than this. However, the existence of some significant commitment within the Black community to the cause that Africare represents is very likely to be crucial to the decisions of other potentially sympathetic donors -- foundations, industry, white church groups, etc. as to the support they are willing to provide.

Now either the development of Africa is an important concern that Black Americans are eager to support or it isn't. This is something for the Black community to decide for itself and, if the answer is affirmative, it is also up to the Black community to decide whether Africare should be an instrument for the expression of that concern. The only contribution that we can make on that point as evaluators is our judgment that Africare is a professionally well-administered private voluntary organization with a dedicated staff and, as such, eminently worthy of a constituency if it can find one.

Following this line of reasoning, we would suppose that a major new strategy by Africare would be to put its case in the most forceful manner possible to Black organizations and leaders in the United States (1) to develop a consensus on whether African development should be an important concern of Black Americans and specifically whether Africare should be supported effectively as an expression of that concern and (2) if such a consensus emerges, to set up a task force to develop a specific program for such support.

The elements of such a support program (and our comments are purely suggestive) might include the following:

1. The securing from a number of Black organizations or individual donors of annual basic support contributions of unrestricted funds to Africare in sufficient amount to permit it to mount effective public appeals.

2. The planning of well-conceived annual fund campaigns for Africare. This might be centered around special appeals (an African Sunday?) in religious congregations (principally Black but open also to others) and fund-raising events supported by Black (and sympathetic non-Black) entertainers. The proposal for a Black Church World Service type organization might be linked to this as either an immediate or ultimate goal.

3. The development of a plan to assist Africare to seek out more substantial contributions from individual donors with potential interest in contributing to Black concerns and/or specifically to African development.

It is at this juncture that the role of an active, indeed aggressive, Board of Directors could be critical to Africare, particularly were it to organize itself both to provide a clear policy direction for the Africare staff and to provide the organization with influential fund raising strength.

If an attempt to execute a major new strategy to develop effective Black community support for Africare should be unrealizable, then presumably Africare ought to bide its time and settle down to a longer struggle. This may well mean reducing its sights as to the size of program it may undertake or becoming essentially a contractor to AID or both.

C. AFRICARE RELATIONSHIP TO AID

At the present time Africare's relationship to AID is that of a private voluntary agency that is largely dependent upon AID for:

1. Basic support financing of its professional and program staff.
2. The financing of specific projects through operating program grants.

The success Africare is achieving in obtaining specific project grants from AID should diminish future needs for basic support grants (whether termed "development program grants" or otherwise). Overhead payments generated by the specific projects should gradually replace the need for basic support. This should be particularly true if AID funds Africare's proposed Seguenega project and, thereafter, the integrated rural development project Africare is developing in Mali. There also seems to be a reasonable prospect that USAID/Niamey will over time provide some contracts to Africare in health or other fields. Africare has already begun efforts in Zambia, both to attract private contributions to aid southern African refugees and as an AID contractor. An aggregate volume of what should be something between \$2 and \$3 million of AID contracts annually should permit legitimate expenditure and charge of a considerable amount for overhead.

As pointed out earlier in this evaluation, however, it will require some adroitness in terms of Africare financing and AID contracting procedures to enable Africare to move in some orderly fashion from support financing to financing through operating project overhead. The existence of the AID development program grant is now a major factor in the establishment for Africare of a low overhead rate under the operating grants. The process of establishing a substantially higher overhead rate with AID in timely fashion is one that would doubtless challenge the resourcefulness of any contractor. For Africare it could well be a more hazardous and adventurous journey than its past exploits in looking for water holes in the Sahel.

In any event, a careful study needs to be made of the implications of termination of basic support grants upon the ability of Africare to provide for its own basic support, the extent to which this can be expected to be achieved through payments for overhead under AID operating

grants (and the prospective timing of such payments), and the extent to which other financing would be required (and again the timing of such requirements). Out of such analysis it may appear useful, at least for transitional purposes, for AID to continue some type of basic program support. On the other hand we can suppose that both Africare and AID would prefer to move away from basic support financing as soon as possible.

In the making of such a study of this transition, Africare can no doubt receive valuable assistance from its auditors (Haskins and Sells). It would also be helpful if AID would provide some assistance in looking at the problem in terms of how Africare could best meet its problems and be helped to meet its problems in conformance with AID contracting and administrative requirements.

We suggest further that Africare ought to engage for a short term consultancy an organization or individual fully familiar with contracting with AID and with the relevant problems of establishing overhead rates. This is important in two respects: first, that Africare not proceed on assumptions with respect to overhead rates that result in unpleasant surprises through AID disallowances; second, that Africare assure that its contracting and accounting procedures do not box it into the establishment of lower overhead rates than it would otherwise be entitled to or into the necessity of defraying through overhead expenses which might properly be charged as direct project expenses.

As to whether AID and/or Africare would wish to expand their relationship for the future, it is not appropriate for us as evaluators to make specific recommendations. Much depends upon the policies that the two organizations wish to pursue. We can suppose that AID's decisions as to the extent of support it may wish to provide to a PVO are in part influenced by evidence of the degree of support the PVO receives from the private sector. In this respect Africare's current position is not strong in terms of the dollar amounts of contributions, although the number of contributions has grown. We would suppose also that competence as a contractor would be a major factor, and particularly decisive when contracting decisions are made essentially by USAID Missions in the field. In this respect Africare appears well postured to secure additional AID contracts.

The basic problem may therefore lie primarily with Africare and its vision of what it is and what it wants to become. We suppose that, if at all possible, Africare would like to maintain an independent posture without excessive dependence on AID. In our view it is not inconsistent with such posture for Africare to continue to seek AID financing for specific projects or to derive the greater part of its project financing from AID. The basic problems rather would appear to be to achieve self-sufficiency without basic support grants and a substantial measure of public support for both basic program and specific projects. To put the matter in another way, the problem of achieving a balance between private and public financing probably ought to be conceived in terms of expanding the private donor support rather than contracting AID operating program support.

We could suppose that from the standpoint of the Black community and other potential donors, it would be more attractive to support an organization with the capability and competence to multiply its program efforts through access to federal funds than one without this capability. In the final analysis, however, the issue turns on what we have said before -- the extent to which the Black community wishes to manifest a commitment to the cause of African development and the extent to which it embraces Africare as a vehicle for the expression of that commitment.

Appendix 1

THE AFRICARE RECORD

THE AFRICARE RECORD

1971 - 1977

| Date | Country | Type of Assistance |
|--------------------|--|---|
| NIGER: | | |
| 1971-72 | Diffa Paramedical Project | Paramedical training/upgrading of nursing skills at Maine-Soroa Hospital |
| 1973-74 | Agadez | Construction of well, purchase of ox and seed for agricultural school |
| 1973-74 | Diffa | Purchase of medicines and supplies for hospitals in Diffa region |
| 1973 | Cloud Seeding | Cloud seeding to save 1973 millet crop |
| 1974 | Ranching/Mixed Agriculture Project | Feasibility study for improved livestock breeding, ag training, irrigated farming, marketing, range management |
| 1973-74 | Lake Chad Basin Maternal Child Care Program | Design of comprehensive MCH program for the Lake Chad Basin |
| 1974 | Irhazer Valley Water Resource Development | Well construction for human and animal consumption and irrigation schemes |
| 1975-77 | Integrated Rural Development: Agadez and Dosso Departments | Model building and planning workshops; participation from host country, Africare and predominantly black U.S. colleges |
| 1977 | Irhazer Valley Livestock Project | Herd reconstitution for nomads in Agadez Department affected by drought |
| 1975-81 | Tara Irrigated Agricultural Program | Integrated program of intensive irrigated farming, cooperatives, farm-to-market road, health and education facilities |
| 1977 | Assaga-Diffa Department | Purchase of Motor Pumps for vegetable production |
| 1976-79 | Niger Rural Public Health Delivery Program | Comprehensive 3-year low cost rural health care delivery system to increase availability and access to health services for majority of population |
| UPPER VOLTA | | |
| 1973-74 | Gourcey Nutrition/Recuperation Center | Construction of well and nutrition recuperation center for malnourished children |
| 1973-74 | Yako | Construction of 5 wells and vegetable garden complexes |
| 1973-74 | Koupela | Purchase of 12 teams of oxen and 12 sets of animal traction equipment for farmers in villages near Koupela |
| 1973-74 | Kaya Dam. | Purchase of tools and cement for reconstruction of 3 agricultural dams Purchase of food for workers |
| 1973-74 | Gomposom Health | Construction of 3-room maternal/child health care center |
| 1973-74 | Bouboulou Health | Construction of 3-room maternal/child health care center |
| 1974 | Ouahigouya Tree Nursery | Nursery to supply trees for ORD of Yatenga |
| 1975-77 | Pouni Wells | Well construction and deepening |
| 1975-76 | Louda Wells | Construction of 19 wells |
| 1976 | Rouko Dispensary | Construction of village dispensary and purchase of medicines |
| 1976 | Centers for Training of Young Farmers/ Ouagadougou Region | Purchase of bulls to teach animal traction techniques and animal care |
| 1975-77 | Integrated Rural Development-ORD of Yatenga | Model building and planning workshops; participation from host country, Africare and predominantly black U.S. colleges |
| 1975-77 | Seguenega Integrated Rural Development | Renovation of dispensary and purchase of medicines and furnishings; well construction, vegetable gardens, forestry and sheep-raising |
| 1976 | Seguenega Forestry | Purchase of materials for irrigation system, tree nursery and vegetable gardens |
| 1976-77 | Tikare Forestry | Forestry nursery-improvements |
| 1976-77 | Markoye Health | Construction and furnishing of 4-room maternity hospital |
| 1976-77 | Kyon Dam | Dam construction to provide water for human and animal consumption and vegetable production |
| 1976 | Sabce | Purchase of medicines for village dispensary |
| MAURITANIA: | | |
| 1973-74 | Drought Relief | Purchase of meat, fish and medicines for refugee camps throughout Mauritania |
| 1974-76 | Kaedi Water Resource Development | Village well construction and repair in the Fourth Region of Kaedi |

| Date | Country | Type of Assistance |
|-------------------------------|---|---|
| CHAD: | | |
| 1973-74 | Drought Relief | Truck rentals for food distribution, purchase of dried fish, peanuts, etc., for the entire country |
| 1973-74 | Drought Relief-Kanem | Purchase of blankets and cloth |
| 1973-74 | Manemadjibe | Purchase of tools for farmland clearance |
| 1973-74 | Ere dyke | Purchase of tools for dyke repair |
| 1973-74 | Batha Region | Purchase of tools for firebreak maintenance |
| 1974-75 | Chari-Baguirmi Water Resource Development Project I | Construction and repair of wells to increase water supply for human and animal consumption and small scale farming |
| 1975-76 | Project II | |
| 1976-77 | Project III | |
| GAMBIA: | | |
| 1975 | Marakissa Agricultural Development Project | Experimental Agricultural Scheme |
| SENEGAL: | | |
| 1974 | Ronkh-Food Production | Purchase of motor pumps and gardening materials for vegetable and rice production cooperative |
| 1975 | Saminth-N'Diakhaye | Purchase of motor pump and gardening materials for village rice production cooperative |
| 1976 | Villages of Fatik, Kaolack, Foundiougne and Gorsas | Purchase of medicines and supplies |
| 1974-75 | Louga Wells | Construction of 19 wells in the Department of Louga |
| ETHIOPIA: | | |
| 1976 | Wabe Shebelle | Purchase of irrigation pump for Wabe Shebelle Settlement Scheme in Ogaden Region |
| MALI: | | |
| 1973-74 | Drought Relief | Purchase of materials for gardening projects in refugee areas |
| 1973-74 | Drought Relief-Gao | Purchase of blankets, clothing and housing materials for refugee camps |
| 1973-74 | Drought Relief Timbuktu/Goundam | Purchase of dried fish, meat, grains and medicine for refugees of the Sixth Region |
| 1973-74 | Third Region-Sikasso | Motor pumps for vegetable irrigation |
| | Timbuktu/Goundam Water Resource Development | Construction and deepening of wells in the Sixth Region |
| 1974-75 | Project I | |
| 1975-76 | Project II | |
| 1976-77 | Project III | |
| 1975 | Tin-Aicha | Construction of well at Tin-Aicha Settlement Scheme |
| 1975-77 | Integrated Rural Development-Circle of Banamba | Model building and planning workshops-participation from host country, Africare and predominantly black U.S. colleges |
| 1975-77 | Banamba Integrated Rural Development Project | Well construction, animal traction, fodder production and storage |
| 1975-77 | Banamba Wells | Village well construction and deepening in the Circle of Banamba |
| 1977 | Kati | Well construction/vegetable production |
| AFRICARE HEADQUARTERS: | | |
| 1975 | Resource Information Center Established | On-going collection of selected materials on African Development with emphasis on the Sahel |
| 1975 | Personnel Data Bank Established | Roster of individuals with expertise in African development |
| 1972-76 | Chapter Development | Establishment of 16 local voluntary Africare chapters |
| 1976 | Chapter Development | First National Africare Conference on Citizen Participation in Development |

Appendix 2

INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT MODELS/STRATEGIES

Integrated Rural Development Models/Strategies

The parameters of the models were initially set as follows: The models were to be designed to "reflect varying geographical, social, economic and political factors of the Sahel; stress specific development priorities within selected areas of the country; reflect an integrated planning approach recognizing the multiplicity and multi-sectoral nature of constraints to development; be applicable to other situations; be "limited area" integrated rural development strategies; and be geared to provide specific ministries, local government units and villages with an increased capacity to plan and implement programs."

After consultation with officials and technicians in Niger, Upper Volta and Mali (during the months March-June 1975), consultation with various specialists in the United States, and intensive research, the Africare Development Team began to formulate approaches to the drawing up of the integrated rural development models/strategies.

Rationale and Assumptions Concerning Model Development

Rural Development is a process which has the two fold goal of improving the economic conditions and the quality of life of people who live in rural areas. The two goals are not synonymous and while economic growth is an essential element in improving the quality of life, it is not and must not be viewed as the sole or critical determinant. Thus, the improvement of

economic conditions and the improvement of quality of life are viewed as highly interrelated but separate entities.

Rural Development is a process designed to transform stagnant, traditional societies into productive, dynamic rural economies. Its central focus is on the masses of people who live in rural areas and on increasing the influence they have over their own lives and destinies.

The integrated approach to rural development embraces the same concepts as rural development but is further based on the premise that a combination of factors in interaction is essential to creating a balanced institutional and physical infrastructure and to bringing about harmonious rural development. The integrated approach requires the development of activities which can be sustained over time and which will lead to the creation of further activities and institutions. This is a dynamic process that assures the interrelationship of all elements of rural life.

Development often has been viewed solely as "economic development." From Africare's point of view, development as a working concept can be divided into four sections.

1. The Essentials--those elements that make up the definition of development. In general the essentials are economic growth, measured by GNP or Per Capita GNP, and improving the quality of life, measured by a variety of formulas.
2. The Conditions--those elements that are required in order for development to occur. In order to have economic growth and improved quality of life, there must be production and distribution.

3. The Ingredients--those inputs that are necessary to obtain the conditions (production and distribution). Production and distribution require inputs. These can be physical, (such as seed or fertilizer), institutional (such as education) or human.
4. The Methods--the way in which the ingredients are developed and employed. This is the project planning, implementation, etc.

Most development planning has looked at the ingredients as the targets of national planning, i.e., a certain amount of capital accumulation, a certain amount of agricultural inputs, etc., and has focused most of the time on the methods of obtaining these inputs.

Under this approach, Rural Development is simply a form of development where "rural" is the condition required to have development occur, and Integrated Rural Development simply means that "integration" is a method that more effectively utilizes the inputs in rural development. At this point, all that has happened is the coining of a new term without effectively changing the theoretical framework that has always been operating.

To move beyond this point and utilize the integrated approach as more than a methodology for employing inputs, as more than the coordinated utilization of services in project planning and implementation, integration itself must become one of the essentials of development. Now, the essentials which define integrated rural development and which must be present in order for integrated rural development to take place are the improvement in the economic conditions of rural people, the improvement of the quality of life of rural people, and the integration of

rural people into the development process. Thus, while integration becomes an objective of development and increased integration an outgrowth, integration itself becomes a necessary part of the whole development process.

The model Africare is preparing in conjunction with the officials and technicians of the Sahel has three major components. First is the rural population, seen not just as the "target" population but as part of the entire process of creating, planning, and implementing development projects. As pointed out, increasing the participation of rural people in this development process becomes a central factor in integrated rural development.

The participation of the rural population in the creation, planning, and implementation of development projects requires the utilization of existing rural institutions but even more likely requires the creation of new rural institutions--rural institutions which can participate in problem solving at the rural levels and can also deal with the national levels of government (regional and central in the African context).

In order to create new rural institutions and strengthen existing ones, the second major component, a support system, must be established. This system must be in constant physical contact with the rural institutions, must carry on a constant dialogue with the rural people, and must have the ability and authority to call forth all of the technical and physical resources available to help the people in their problem solving.

This support system must come from and be established by "the government", that is the National government (regional and central governments).

These two components--the institutions of the rural people and the government support system--through their interaction at the local level give rise to the third major component. This third component, the Process of Planning, will identify and define the needs and goals of the rural people and will lay out the design and implementation procedures.

The integration of these three components makes up the process of integrated rural development and it is the integration of these components which becomes necessary in order to achieve and sustain improvement in the economic conditions and quality of life of the people.

THE PROCESS MODEL FOR INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT

