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THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF A MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT:

MIGRATION AND POPULATION ABSORPTION PROJECTIONS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP

Farid Abolfathi
Bertram I. Spector

Final Report
Under Contract No. AID/NE-C-1553

Submitted to:

Bureau of Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs
Office of Regional Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Prepared by:

CACI, Inc.-Federal
Policy Sciences Division
1815 North Fort Myer Drive
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The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, or the U.S. Government.

PREFACE

This volume is one of two written for the Department of State under contract Number AID/NE-C-1553 concerning the economic implications of a Middle East peace settlement. One volume presents five year growth prospects for the West Bank and Gaza Strip based on analyses of an economic development model. The other volume projects the propensity of Palestinians to return to the West Bank and Gaza and the capacity of these economies to absorb new migration.

Several members of CACI's professional staff contributed far beyond the call of duty to the successful completion of this effort. Bertram Spector guided the research for both volumes as principal investigator, directed data acquisition, and was the primary author of the economic modeling volume. Farid Abolfathi conceptualized, conducted, and authored the research on migration and absorption projections. Sayeed Kayvan, Gary Keynon, and Constance Corbett-Mejia formulated the economic modeling approach and guided many of the sectoral analyses and forecasts. David McCormick contributed to the formulation of the study's approach, and offered many useful comments on draft chapters.

CACI's research support staff played a highly constructive role in organizing and analyzing data on the economic sectors. William Harvey conducted a thorough examination of public utilities in the West Bank and Gaza. Stephen Harvey and Edward Heyman contributed to the analysis of public services and housing. Joseph Moskowitz, Smadar Rauff, and Paula Hersson-Ringskog assisted in data acquisition and translation.

The study team wishes to thank Henry Engelbrecht, who served as the contract's technical monitor in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. He greatly facilitated efforts to gain key information

and access to government analysts. His attentiveness kept the project on a course most valuable to the Department of State and other government users. Our sincere thanks are also extended to Vivian Bull of Drew University who spent many hours sharing her extensive knowledge and insight of economic conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and commenting on the draft volumes.

Last, but hardly least, CACI's support staff labored extremely long hours over seemingly endless manuscripts and tables to ensure high quality and prompt delivery. James Schlotter's editing added readability and style to our often harshly stated social science findings. Kathy Harris directed the diligent typing staff of Karen Wolfe, Briana Taravella, and Mara Strock through an inordinate number of requests for "just one last change," while still managing to remain understanding of the authors. Again, the study team expresses its sincere thanks.

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CHAPTER I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE PROPENSITY TO RETURN

The total number of Palestinians currently living outside of the West Bank and Gaza Strip who are likely to return to these territories by 1985 is estimated at 104,000. This number of immigrants may expand to 217,000 under extreme conditions, if Palestinians are forceably expelled in large numbers by the nations in which they reside or the economies of the West Bank and Gaza receive very large subsidies from foreign sources to support capital investment, develop infrastructure, and expand required public services.

The vast majority of migrants, 85 per cent, is likely to return to the West Bank (between 88,400-184,450 through 1985). Only a small proportion, 15 percent, is likely to return to Gaza (between 15,600-32,550). The most likely rate of return is 12,600 per year to the West Bank and 2,200 annually to Gaza.

ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP ECONOMIES

Given projections of reasonable rates of economic growth in the two areas, the level of annual immigration that is likely to be absorbed successfully by the West Bank economy is about 12,600 and by the Gaza economy, about 2,200. Thus, it is estimated that the economies will be capable of absorbing immigrant flows at the low end of the projected range (104,000 immigrants between 1979 and 1985). However, if there is a high immigrant flow into the territories (approaching 217,000 Palestinians over 7 years), estimates indicate that they will be absorbed successfully only if there is very high foreign capital inflow, and then only if such aid and investment can be channelled efficiently

toward providing relief assistance and basic services to arriving immigrants; developing required infrastructure, housing, and employment; and retraining immigrants with needed skills.

DISCUSSION

Push and Pull Factors Affecting Migration

The propensity to return to the West Bank and Gaza Strip depends on several key factors that make life in the current location unattractive (push factors) and other locations more attractive (pull factors). Among the push factors relevant to potential Palestinian migration are:

- Negative attitudes and legal/economic restrictions in the host country toward resident Palestinians.
- Constrained economic and employment opportunities for resident Palestinians.
- The likelihood of future expulsion of Palestinians.

Among the relevant pull factors motivating immigration are:

- Positive attitudes of the indigenous West Bank and Gaza population toward skilled immigrants.
- Restoration of family ties.
- Perceived economic prospects for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
- Potential political stability in the area.
- Nationalistic identity with the territories.
- Familiarity with the area.
- The short distances involved in migrating.

Policy decisions affecting economic growth and political stability in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will have major impacts on motivating potential immigrants to return.

Immigration and Emigration Projections

The most probable population scenarios through 1985 involve low immigration and high emigration rates for the West Bank and Gaza, assuming economy-wide growth rates of 8 percent in real terms. This is equivalent to a continuation of current economic trends in the two territories. Given this rather static economic growth environment and the pull of booming economies in surrounding states, the rate of emigration among both the indigenous population and the immigrants is projected to be higher than the rate of immigration between 1979 and 1985.

For the West Bank, annual emigration is estimated at 20,000 while projected annual immigration totals 12,600, a net loss of 7,400 annually. For Gaza, annual emigration is projected at 15,000 annually, while annual immigration is estimated at 2,200, a net loss of 12,800 per year. Taking into account natural increase as well as these immigration and emigration rates, the total projected population of the West Bank and Gaza by 1985 is estimated at 748,400 and 445,900, respectively.

Policy Options to Improve Absorptive Capacity

Crucial policy decisions can attempt to reverse or stop this projected movement of Palestinians away from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and improve the territories' capacity to absorb new immigrants. These decisions include:

- Improve the economic prospects of the West Bank and Gaza relative to other economies by providing incentives for domestic and foreign investment and assistance. Establish economic development plans for the areas.

- Provide an attractive and secure social and political environment that will present a viable alternative to Palestinians.

- Provide short-term relief and long-term assistance to ensure the societal integration of the immigrants.

Projections of the socioeconomic profiles of the populations of the West Bank and Gaza identify the key targets for policy attention. It is estimated that the population structure will continue to be skewed toward younger age groups. This is likely to:

- Strain demands for housing. Investment in public and private housing and required construction machinery and equipment should be a major priority over the next five years.

- Strain demands on the educational system. Especially if UNRWA facilities are cut back or interrupted, extensive funding will be required to obtain and train teachers and build adequate classroom facilities for the indigenous refugee population as well as for the new immigrants.

- Reduce labor force participation. Over the short term, this will reduce the prospects for economic growth in the territories. Over the long term, the improved education and skill levels of those entering the labor force are likely to cause demand for improved employment opportunities and more diversified and technologically-based economic activity. The infrastructure for such a future economy must be on the current agenda for development to meet these future needs.

Overall, it is estimated that requirements for foreign capital inflow are likely to be extensive and concentrated during the initial years of projected immigration. These funds will be needed to provide required relief services and develop immediately needed housing, jobs, and infrastructure to facilitate immigrant absorption and stem the flow of potential emigration from the West Bank and Gaza.

CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

The propensity for Palestinians to return to the West Bank and Gaza Strip is likely to have a major impact on future prospects for economic growth in the area. There are many conflicting estimates of the number of Palestinians worldwide -- and how many are likely to return to the West Bank or Gaza under varying conditions. A large in-migration of Palestinian professionals, entrepreneurs, and skilled workers, for instance, would have the effect of improving the quality of human resources available to provide needed services, to take entrepreneurial risks, to make investments, and to increase productivity and output. On the other hand, if the majority of returnees are unskilled workers, there may be inadequate employment opportunities and the new migrants may either leave the area or become a drain on the economy by joining the welfare rolls. Thus, not only the number, but the socioeconomic characteristics of the returning Palestinians, constitute the salient issues involved in estimating the impact of population change on the area economies.

OBJECTIVES

The major objectives of the study are twofold. First, the analysis estimates the probable numbers and economic profiles of Palestinians that are likely to return to the West Bank or Gaza within the next five years. No explicit assumptions are made concerning the specific political parameters of a peace settlement. The analysis, however, assumes that significant numbers of Palestinians will be permitted repatriation to the West Bank and Gaza Strip following some negotiated settlement. Second, given the nature and number of projected Palestinian migration and the estimated constraints and opportunities for growth in the West Bank and

Gaza Strip economies (CACI, 1978)[1], the study focuses on the capacity of these economies to absorb the immigrant flow. Thus, the ability to provide employment, housing, education, and other essential services to the returning population are analyzed.

These issues are addressed by first attempting to establish a consistent data series on Palestinian population inside and outside of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The current number of Palestinians and their socio-economic profiles are then estimated (summarized in this chapter). Second, the propensity of Palestinians residing elsewhere to return to the West Bank and Gaza, assuming repatriation opportunities, is examined (see Chapters 3 and 4). The economic and environmental incentives and disincentives to migrate are postulated and migration projections are estimated. Third, estimates of future economic conditions are brought to bear on these population levels and economic profiles to determine the extent to which emigration is likely to continue and the in-migration flow is likely to be absorbed into the economies (see Chapters 5 and 6).

ESTIMATES OF TOTAL WORLDWIDE PALESTINIAN POPULATION

Population estimates of Palestinians -- defined as persons who were considered residents of former mandated Palestine and their net natural increase since 1947 -- range from 2 to 6 million depending upon which source is consulted. In general, Arab sources tend to exaggerate the numbers and Israeli sources tend to deflate them. The problem is compounded by the absence of a reliable recent census and the dispersed nature of the population. Nevertheless, any discussion of future Palestinian population movements requires a reasonable estimate of their current number.

The 1931 Census of Palestine -- conducted under the British mandate -- was the last and only comprehensive enumeration of the population of

[1] Refer to the bibliography for full citations. Citations in the text, such as (CACI, 1978: 31), refer to author, date of publication, and page number respectively.

Palestine prior to partition. Extrapolation of these 1931 figures through March 1947 by Government of Palestine statisticians serve in this study as the basis for estimating total Palestinian population through 1978 from a more objective standpoint than previous estimates.[2] To project the population of Palestinians beyond 1947, a set of relatively conservative assumptions were made:

- Constant population growth rates of 3.0, 2.0, and 2.7 percent per year for the Moslem, Christian, and other non-Jewish population groups, respectively. These growth rates represent the 1936-1947 average annual growth rates for these groups at a time when rates were increasing.
- Official population statistics of March 1947 as the base year.
- No significant loss of population due to war or war-related famine and epidemic.
- Nomadic Bedouins are not included due to widely divergent and inconsistent estimates by the British that cannot be reconciled.

The population estimates derived from this analysis can be used as a baseline against which other estimates of refugees and total population inside and outside of the West Bank and Gaza Strip can be evaluated.

ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF 1948 REFUGEES.

Estimates of total Palestinian population at the end of 1948 and several estimates of the number of Palestinian refugees as a result of partition are presented below:

CACI estimate of total population (December 1948)	1,386,867

[2] See Appendix A for a complete discussion of the population estimation methods used in this study and the final results.

CACI estimate of total population (December 1950)	1,468,210
Refugee population (1948) estimated by Abu-Lughod (1971)	770-780,000
Refugee population (1948) estimated by U.N. Conciliation Commission (1949)	751,000
U.N. registered refugees (1950)	960,021

In comparison to CACI's total population estimate for 1950, the count of U.N. registered refugees appears high. It is also inconsistent with other estimates (Abu-Lughod, 1971) of the number of Palestinians who resided outside of the territory that became Israeli, and thus, would not be considered refugees. Abu-Lughod's estimate of 770-780,000 refugees in 1948 is the most reasonable if one considers the non-Jewish population remaining in Israel (between 120-130,000), the population residing in parts of Palestine other than Israel (between 890-904,200), and CACI's total population estimate for the end of 1948.

ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF 1967 REFUGEES.

Estimating the number of refugees resulting from the 1967 Arab-Israeli war is complicated by the fact that no accurate estimate of the populations of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is available prior to Israeli occupation of these territories. Estimates of the number of people who left the West Bank and Gaza range from 200-400,000 but most researchers conclude that between 250-300,000 people left (Van Arkadie, 1977). Some of these Palestinians may have been refugees for the second time.

ESTIMATE OF TOTAL PALESTINIAN POPULATION.

Using the estimation assumptions described above, the total non-Jewish Palestinian population for 1978 is estimated to be 3,262,990. This total may be considered a conservative projection of Palestinians worldwide. Given considerable evidence to indicate that the health,

education, and economic situation of even those Palestinians who remained in refugee camps have improved since 1967, it is conceivable that the rate of natural increase among Palestinians has surpassed those which are at the basis of CACI's population projections.

If one assumes higher population growth rates, such as those achieved by Israeli Arabs (averaging 3.7 percent annually from 1949 to 1960) or by non-Jews in Palestine between 1941-1945 (averaging 3.22 percent annually for Moslems), includes the population estimates and natural increase of the original nomadic Bedouins of Palestine, and includes estimates of pre-1947 emigrants from Palestine, it would be reasonable to expect a higher total population figure by 1978. Given these conditions, an estimate of 4,200,000 could be considered a reasonable upper limit for total Palestinians worldwide.

PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP

The population structure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip underwent major alterations as a result of the 1948-49 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars (see Appendix B). These shifts are clearly illustrated below (in thousands):

	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Total
1946	387	30	417
1952	686	295	981
1961	729	370	1,099
1967 (Sept.)	596	347	943
1968	584	326	910
1978	700	420	1,120

Between 1946 and 1952, the population of the West Bank nearly doubled and the population of Gaza increased almost ten-fold due to the large inflow of refugees from Israeli areas of former Palestine. In comparison, the population losses of 1967-1968 were moderate. Estimates of West Bank refugees from the 1967 war range between 250,000 and 300,000 (Van Arkadie,

1977: 159 and 161). Those who left the Gaza Strip are estimated to number 30-50,000.

Emigration from the territories continued at a high rate during the first few years of Israeli administration, although the outflow greatly declined by 1970. Since 1971, the movement of population in and out of the territories has reflected, in part, the economic situation of the territories and Israel relative to the rest of the world. For instance, the boom of the first three quarters of 1973 resulted in a large positive flow of people into the two territories. However, the 1974 and 1976-77 recessions sparked a high outflow of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza.

WEST BANK.

The following demographic patterns in the West Bank have been discerned:

- Israeli estimates of 1977 population total 682,000 and preliminary estimates for 1978 indicate a population of about 700,000.
- The 1967-68 population losses led to a substantial underrepresentation of 15-24 and 25-49 age groups. By 1976, the 15-24 age group recovered its normal proportion, but it is estimated that it will take another 15 years before the 25-49 group recovers its normal proportion in the age structure.
- The labor force participation rate is low (35 percent in 1976) and declining, due partly to low female participation, recent population shifts to the East Bank, and the recent recession in the Israeli economy.
- School enrollments in the West Bank have increased by an average annual rate of 4-5 percent. This may yield further short-term declines in the labor force participation rate.

GAZA STRIP.

In the Gaza Strip the following population trends were indicated:

- The Gazan population for 1977 is estimated at 441,600.
- By 1976, the 15-24 age group approximately regained its pre-1967 proportion of the total population, but the 25-49 group was still underrepresented, due largely to the refugees that emigrated in 1967-68.
- The labor force participation rate is relatively low (33 percent in 1976) due to low female participation. In 1976, about 36 percent of all employed Gazans (27,800 workers) worked in Israel.
- Between 1968 and 1976 growth in the total student population did not keep pace with the rate of growth in the potential student age population. The major constraints are limited UNRWA funding and limited alternative school systems.

PALESTINIAN COMMUNITIES OUTSIDE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP

Earlier in this chapter, the total Palestinian population for 1978 was estimated at 3.3-4.2 million, depending on whether conservative or moderate assumptions of population growth were employed. Since approximately 1.2 million Palestinians live in the West Bank and Gaza in 1978, there must be between 2.1-3.0 million residing in other countries. This is the potential source of immigration into the two territories if significant repatriation is permitted.

DISTRIBUTION OF PALESTINIANS.

Table 1 estimates the number of Palestinians by country of residence at the end of 1978. After the West Bank and Gaza, the largest concentrations are in Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, where most of the 1948-49 refugees are located. The Palestinians in the Persian Gulf

TABLE 1

Estimated Number of Palestinians
by Country of Residence, 1978
(thousands)

Country or Region	Number of Palestinians Minimum	Maximum
Occupied Territories		
West Bank	690	706
Gaza Strip	442	460
Subtotal	1,132	1,166
Other Countries		
Jordan	1,180	1,220
Israel[a]	590	602
Syria	200	260
Lebanon	416	450
Kuwait[b]	305	390
Saudi Arabia	110	135
Qatar	20	28
United Arab Emirates	39	69
Oman	--	1
Bahrain	2	5
Iraq	60	95
Libya	5	11
Algeria	10	14
Tunisia	--	1
Morocco	--	1
North Yemen	--	1
South Yemen	--	1
Sudan	1	2
Egypt	60	75
Cyprus[c]	1	2
Turkey	--	1
Iran	--	1
Pakistan	--	1
United States[cd]	50	70
West Germany	14	17
France	1	2
Britain	1	3
Canada[d]	2	4
Latin America	7	10
Other Europe	5	9
Other Asia[f]	3	6
Other Africa[g]	2	3
Oceania	1	1
Subtotal	3,085	3,491
Total	4,217	4,657

continued

Table 1
Number of Palestinians by Country
Continued

[a] Israeli non-Jews.

[b] Including Kuwaiti citizens of Palestinian origin and their dependents.

[c] Includes refugees from Lebanon.

[d] Excluding U.S. citizens more than three generations removed from their immigrant ancestors.

[e] Includes English and French speaking countries of South and Central America and the Caribbean.

[f] Mainly in East and Southeast Asia.

[g] Mainly in West Africa.

[h] Mainly in Australia.

-- None or negligible

Sources: Compiled and estimated by CACI from various unpublished sources, Americans for Middle East Understanding (1978), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (1978), Collard and Wilson (1977), Farah (1977), The Middle East (February 22, 1977: 14), Zahlan and Zahlan (1977), Haroian and Zahlan (1974), Abu-Lughod (1973), Shaata (1972), and Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (various publications).

region contribute to the rapid economic growth of the oil exporting nations there. In North Africa, Palestinians have generally integrated into their societies and have lost Palestinian identity.

If these country-by-country estimates are summed, the grand total suggests a range between 4.2 and 4.66 million Palestinians.[3] The lower end of this range (4.2 million) coincides with the earlier estimates of total Palestinians using moderate assumptions of population growth.

REFUGEE POPULATION.

The total number of refugees and their descendents has grown rapidly and they have become a mobile source of skilled manpower in the Middle East. The largest concentration of registered refugees is in Gaza (354,000), but the largest number of refugees is on the East Bank (683,000). The West Bank hosts over 310,000 refugees, and Lebanon and Syria each have about 200,000 registered refugees.

Among the registered refugee groups in these five areas, those in Jordan have most successfully integrated into the indigenous society. Only 11 percent of the total registered population are still living in refugee camps. On the other hand, the refugee population in Lebanon is least integrated with the indigenous society. Indeed, Lebanon is the only Arab country where the explusion of refugees has been discussed seriously by a large segment of society.

NON-JEWS IN ISRAEL.

Several demographic trends concerning the non-Jewish population in Israel are:

- Between 1961 and 1977, the non-Jewish population (including Moslems, Christians, Druze, and others)

[3] These estimates are probably more reliable on a country-by-country

doubled to 555,000 which represents an average annual growth rate of 3.4 percent. Their high birth rates and low and declining death rates have led to one of the highest rates of natural increase in the world.

- The age structure of the non-Jewish population indicates extreme overrepresentation of the under 15 age group.

- Compared to most Arab populations, the Israeli non-Jews have a relatively high labor force participation rate (39 percent in 1976). They are not concentrated in agriculture, but rather are distributed among low skill job categories in construction, industry, and service sectors.

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basis than in total, due to the wide variation in methods of estimating Palestinians in each country.

CHAPTER 3. THE PROPENSITY TO RETURN

BACKGROUND

Most Palestinian refugees who currently reside outside of the West Bank and Gaza Strip did not leave from these two territories in 1948-49. In fact, the indigenous populations of the West Bank and Gaza Strip remained mainly intact until 1967. Most 1948-49 refugees were displaced from areas that, from 1949, became territories of the State of Israel. Therefore, the idea of return to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, if interpreted literally, would apply mainly to the small number of Palestinians who had left those specific territories. The subject of this chapter, however, is the much broader "return" of any Palestinians who would want to go to the West Bank and Gaza in order to live there, and their likelihood to remain for more than one year.

DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION

The determinants of migration have spawned a huge literature that can be divided into four areas of study:

1. Internal migration (within countries or smaller geographic units).

2. International movements (across political boundaries and continents).

3. Movements of people as a result of disasters such as wars, famines, or droughts.

4. Migration of highly educated talent from generally less developed countries to industrialized countries (brain drain) and blue collar workers from labor surplus countries to full employment economies (guest workers).

All four sets of literature agree that the major motivations to leave one location for another can best be analyzed by dividing the variables into two sets of push and pull factors. For any location, the push factors are those that make life unattractive such as wars, natural disasters, high unemployment, insecurity of property, and political instability. On the other hand, the pull factors are those that make a location attractive, such as security, high income, and familiarity with the culture.

According to the migration literature, the push and pull factors interact with a third set of variables or conditions that can be broadly labeled "difficulty of travel." These factors include distance, cost, difficulty of crossing international borders, and dangers involved. Finally, most of the literature emphasizes the role of information in the dynamics of migration. Without availability of information, the pull factors of a location will not attract a person from a distant location. In a more general sense, information also contributes to the degree of uncertainty involved in migration. If uncertainty of finding a reasonable job in a new location is too high, migrants are less likely to risk the costs involved in moving from their present location to the new one.

APPLICATION OF MIGRATION THEORY CONCEPTS TO PALESTINIANS

Among the relevant push factors involved in Palestinian migration, the following variables will be considered:

1. The attitude of the host country's government and people toward the Palestinians.
2. The economic status of Palestinians and their employment opportunities.
3. The likelihood of future explusion of Palestinians.

Among the pull factors, the following will be considered:

1. The attitude of present residents of the West Bank and Gaza towards immigrant Palestinians.

2. The economic prospects of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Two pull factors will not be considered in this study: (a) the political and administrative organization of the West Bank and Gaza Strip under a future peace agreement, and (b) nationalism. As for the first, it has been assumed that there will be relative political stability in the two territories and no movement restrictions of potential immigrants into the territory. However, no other assumptions are made concerning the political status of the West Bank or Gaza. A qualification made with regards to the potential number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine in 1946 is so appropriate that we present it below with only the minor alteration of replacing "Jews" with "Palestinians":

> How many (Palestinians) now outside of Palestine wish to go to live there? How many (Palestinians) now in Palestine wish to go elsewhere? The answers to these questions are of the first importance, yet any answers that can be given now are necessarily vague. They may suffice for current policy determinations, but they defy long-term forecasting.
>
> The very questions have a false precision. Speculative questions receive only speculative answers. For (Palestinians) to have precise ideas on whether they want to go to Palestine they must be confronted with realistic opportunities for going there. Are (Palestinians) being asked whether they wish to go to Palestine in some indefinite future? Must they arrange all their affairs in precarious balance between migrating and not migrating, waiting, waiting for the moment when Palestine is ready to receive them? Should all (Palestinians) who are not ready to live such precarious lives be classed with those who are not interested in going to Palestine?
>
> Moreover, (Palestinians') determinations with respect to migrating to Palestine are influenced profoundly by

> the outlook with respect to Palestine's future immigration policy (Nathan *et al.*, 1946: 373).[1]

What was true with respect to Jewish immigration to Palestine in the 1940's will be equally true with respect to Palestinian immigration to the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the 1980's: Palestinians' decisions to migrate to the West Bank and Gaza Strip will be profoundly influenced by the political outlook and immigration policies of the two territories. However, in the current study, we are restricted from making any such political assumptions about the future status of the West Bank or Gaza.

The other pull factor, not analyzed in detail in this report, is the sense of nationalism and identity that might draw refugees to the West Bank and Gaza. While this sense of identity may provide a strong motive to return, the literature on migration suggests that the socio-economic push and pull factors presented above play a more pervasive role in the propensity to migrate.[2]

PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN.

Palestinian presence in Jordan predates the British Mandate period (Hagopian and Zahlan, 1974: 57). As early as the 1870's, Palestinian peasants were establishing agricultural settlements on the East Bank of the Jordan. During the British Mandate period, the movement of people was probably primarily westward, but most of the immigrants from the East Bank were of Palestinian background rather than Bedouin tribes. During the 1948-49 war, 100-120,000 Palestinians escaped to the East Bank of the Jordan. Another 200-400,000 Palestinians escaped to East

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[1] This study in many ways is similar to the present study except that then the question was how many Jews can or will go to Palestine whereas now the problem is how many Palestinians can or will go to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

[2] Other important pull factors include family ties, short distances, and familiarity with the area.

East Jordan during and after the 1967 war. By 1978, the number of Palestinians in Jordan had swelled to about 1.2 million, of whom about 683,000 are UNRWA-registered refugees and 221,000 are in refugee camps.

The Attitude of Jordan

Jordan is the only country with a large Palestinian population to grant citizenship to all Palestinians upon request. Palestinians have been able to achieve high status in most sectors of Jordanian society except the military. After the 1970 Jordanian civil war, some government positions were closed to Palestinians, but the influence of Palestinians has by no means diminished.

The Jordanian government's attitude towards Palestinians is much more complex than that of other countries with large Palestinian populations. It views Palestinians as an economic asset without whom the Jordanian economy would have remained stagnant. But, it fears that the Palestinians, if not watched and politically restrained, will replace the current system of absolute monarchy backed by the military with some other system. As long as Palestinians do not disturb the political status quo, however, they are left alone.

Economic Status

The economic status of Palestinians in Jordan generally is indistinguishable from that of non-Palestinians. The only major exceptions are the 221,000 camp dwellers who have remained in a state of destitution. However, even the camp refugees are able to find jobs in the booming Jordanian economy. The income levels in Jordan appear to be higher than in the West Bank and Gaza and job opportunities appear to be far greater. Given the bright economic future of Jordan, the East Bank economy is likely to continue to grow more rapidly than the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Therefore, the economic status of Palestinians in Jordan should continue to rise for the foreseeable future.

The Likelihood of Expulsion

Given the bright economic prospect of Jordan and the relatively successful assimilation of Palestinians, it is difficult to imagine any circumstance under which even limited numbers of Palestinians would be expelled. During the 1970-71 civil war between the Jordanian army and Palestinian elements, many Palestinians were killed ruthlessly by the military, but the question of their explusion never arose and is unlikely to do so in the future.

Potential for Emigration

The movement of Palestinians between the West Bank and the East Bank is so common that it is difficult to imagine them as two separate countries. In many ways they are part of the same society and can easily become part of the same economy once again. However, at least 200,000 1967 West Bank residents now live on the East Bank in a precarious economic situation and may perceive return to the West Bank as an attractive proposition even though the job market in Jordan looks more promising.

Whether such a large number would return if they were actually given the option is doubtful. The long-term prospects of the Jordanian economy are considerably better than that of the West Bank. The only economic sector of the West Bank that could boom and absorb large number of workers is construction, but at best this will require 10-20,000 workers, which will support only about 50-100,000 people.

PALESTINIANS IN SYRIA.

About 80-100,000 Palestinians moved to Syria during the 1948-49 war. By 1978 their number was estimated at 200-260,000.[3] The number of UNRWA-registered refugees and people in refugee camps is over 198,000 and

[3] Some estimates of Palestinians in Syria are as high as 300,000.

58,000, respectively, but the number of persons officially registered in the established refugee camps is less than 32,000.

The Attitude of Syria

There is no major hostility toward Palestinians in Syria. The Palestinians are not viewed with the contempt that they are by some segments of the Lebanese society. Most Palestinians are indistinguishable from Syrians and many have relatives who are Syrian citizens. Government attitudes toward Palestinians have fluctuated with the regime and political situation, but mutual suspicion has always been present. The Syrian government closely monitors Palestinian activities. Their movements in and out of the country are tightly controlled. No opportunity for citizenship has been provided and they are not allowed into any sensitive administrative or military occupations. They have the same opportunities as Syrians for most government and civilian jobs, however.

Economic Status

Because of equal job opportunity and the rapid economic development of the Syrian economy during the 1950's, Palestinian integration into the economy was far smoother than was originally expected. In the early 1960's, however, the Syrian economy did not perform as well and the economic situation of many Palestinians languished. During this period a significant number of Palestinians left for the oil fields of the Persian Gulf and a smaller number tried to get jobs in the booming Lebanese economy.

During the late 1960's and the 1970's, the prospects of the Syrian economy improved with the expansion of mineral exports such as phosphates and petroleum. The GNP per capita of Syria is about U.S. $800 which, compares well with that of neighboring Jordan ($700) and Egypt ($300), but is low compared to Israel ($4,000), Lebanon ($950), and Turkey

($1,000). The average income of Palestinians in Syria probably is not much below that of Syrian citizens, but the income and job opportunities there cannot compete with those of the Persian Gulf. Consequently, unless Syria begins to receive far larger amounts of foreign aid or investment from the Persian Gulf, it will continue to lose its technically trained Palestinians to the oil producing countries of the Persian Gulf.

Likelihood of Expulsion

Palestinian communities have coexisted with Syrians without any significant tension for more than 30 years. From time to time there have been minor disputes over the role of Syrian-trained guerrilla forces but the Palestinians have generally remained aloof from Syrian politics and have, in turn, been left alone by the Syrian government to pursue their economic achievements. This trend is likely to continue even if the Palestinians were given a viable homeland to return to. The Palestinians are not conspicuous enough either to attract resentment for their economic success or become scapegoats for national ills.

Potential for Emigration

Out of an estimated 200-260,000 Palestinians in Syria, only about 10-20,000 camp dwellers are likely to wish to emigrate to the West Bank or (less likely) the Gaza Strip. The rest of the Palestinians in Syria are integrated into the indigenous society and are not likely to leave voluntarily. Since they are needed to fill useful roles in the rapidly growing economy of Syria, which is experiencing a skilled labor shortage, they are unlikely to be encouraged to leave by the Syrians.

PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON.

During 1948-50, 110-140,000 Palestinians moved to Lebanon. Through natural increase and additions from Palestinians in other countries their

number has increased to 416-450,000 in 1978. There are about 212,000 UNRWA-registered Palestinians and 13 established UNRWA camps. There are nearly 100,000 people living in the camps of whom over 95 percent are officially registered refugees.

The Attitude of Lebanon

From the very beginning, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were treated with suspicion and contempt by a large segment of the Christian community and government officials in Lebanon. They were feared mainly because the majority were Moslems and, if integrated, might upset the balance of political power in Lebanon in favor of the Lebanese Moslems, whose number was increasing rapidly through their own natural increase.[4] The Palestinians were harassed and often humiliated by petty officials. They were not allowed to share in the distribution of services whenever such distinctions could be made.

Their work opportunities were severely limited. In the late 1960's and the 1970's the Lebanese Moslems tried to use the Palestinians as a tool in their political power struggle to win equality with the Christians and seemed to be succeeding until the 1975 civil war destroyed the Lebanese political system. During the civil war at least 10,000 Palestinians were killed by the Christian militia and over 1,000 by the Syrian forces. After the 1975-76 phase of the fighting, the Palestinians found themselves in a country even more hostile to them than before. The right-wing Christian elements that had always used the Palestinians as a scapegoat for their problems, were greatly strengthened by the civil war whereas the Palestinians seemed exhausted. The presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon since 1976 has prevented another full scale war between the Christian militia and the Palestinians, but the 1978 Israeli invasion may have caused more problems by creating conflict within the Moslem community over the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. As long as Israeli military

[4] A large number of Palestinian refugees who were Christians were allowed to become Lebanese citizens by the Christian-dominated government.

forces continue to violate Lebanese sovereignty to hit at Palestinian camps, even some of the Moslem Lebanese are likely to view the Palestinians as a liability.

Economic Status

Until 1975 Lebanon was among the most affluent countries in the Middle East and in theory should have had the least problems in absorbing its Palestinian refugees economically. Politically motivated restrictions, however, were placed on Palestinians that reduced their employment opportunities and earning capacity.[5] Nevertheless, large numbers of Palestinians were able to gain well-paying jobs in the booming Lebanese economy particularly during the 1960's and early 1970's. By 1974, the average income of Palestinians in Lebanon was probably much higher than that of Palestinians in Syria or Jordan, but the income inequality was also greater. Some of the refugee camps in Lebanon were in extremely primitive conditions. The Lebanese government did not show any interest in improving these camps and left this responsibility to UNRWA. The 1975-76 phase of the Lebanese civil war reduced Lebanon's GNP to less than half its 1974 level. It destroyed the commercial dynamism of Beirut and greatly reduced the employment opportunities of most Palestinians as well as Lebanese. The 1978 Israeli invasion further aggravated Lebanese unemployment problems. Since the Syrian intervention stopped most of the fighting in 1976, some economic activities in Beirut have been gradually returning to normal. If peace is restored and business confidence returns, Lebanon is likely to experience a huge construction boom that will require the full participation of Palestinian labor. Palestinians may not be welcomed by many Lebanese, but their labor will be needed if the economy is to regain any of its former stature.

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[5] For a detailed discussion of the economic conditions in a Palestinian camp see Sayigh (1978: 101-119).

The Likelihood of Expulsion

Of all Palestinian refugees, those in Lebanon face the most danger of being expelled from the country at some time in the future. The 1975-76 civil war showed that the Christian militia is capable of committing large-scale atrocities against the Palestinians. If they had the capability, they would have destroyed more refugee camps than they actually did in 1976. The Christian militia generally are not restrained by either Christian or Moslem public opinion. If their power increases, as it may in case of more direct Israeli military assistance, they may attempt to attack Palestinians once again in order to drive them out of the country. However, even under ideal military circumstances, they may not succeed, since the Palestinians have shown that they can fight hard when their backs are to the wall. Moreover, a large number of Palestinians are indistinguishable from the Lebanese with whom they have assimilated. Finally, the economic role of many Palestinians in Lebanon is substantial enough to make their explusion impractical.

The groups that are likely to be the most direct recipients of explusion threats are the military and political officers of various Palestinian organizations and the 96,000 refugee camp dwellers. It is possible that a multinational agreement for peace in Lebanon will include some provisions for transferring these people out of the country, but it will require far more than an agreement on paper to implement such a policy.

Potential for Emigration

Out of the 416-450,000 Palestinians, it is possible that 20-60,000 will voluntarily leave for a viable national homeland. Another 20-40,000 may leave if the economic prospects of the homeland are bright. However, despite the civil war, the current economy of Lebanon does not compare badly with the primitive economies of the West Bank or Gaza Strip. The total number of emigrants could be as high as 100,000 if the civil war erupts again and the fighting balance tips in favor of the Christian militia.

PALESTINIANS IN ISRAEL.

The 590-602,000 non-Jews in Israel represent one of the largest Palestinian communities. This community has grown rapidly in the last 30 years under Israeli rule. Although its income per capita has increased swiftly as a result of Israel's rapid economic growth, its birth rate has remained very high and it has one of the world's highest rates of natural population increase.

Israeli Government Attitude Towards Non-Jews

The Israeli government granted Palestinian citizenship to all Arabs remaining in Israel after the 1948-49 war and made available to them most public services available to Jews. They were exempted from military service but were mostly placed under military administration until the 1960's. The Israeli government considers itself mainly a government of Jewish people and Israel is viewed as a Jewish country. The role of about 600,000 Arabs in this society has never been clearly resolved. Much of their land was confiscated during the early years of military administration and many were driven out of farming by a discriminatory water distribution system.

Any political activity by Israeli Arabs not within the established Jewish institutions is viewed with suspicion by the government and may provoke harassment. However, Israeli Arabs have probably wider political and civil rights than the citizens of most Arab countries. The Israeli government and officials, however, do not trust the Israeli Arabs and consequently have done little to help them assimilate. The Arabs' interests have generally been put secondary to Jewish interests. Until recently, the government showed a disinterest in upgrading higher education among Israeli Arabs. Arabs continue to be conspicuously underrepresented in most government jobs and totally absent from higher level administrative positions. In spite of all the liberal and democratic symbolism of the

Israeli society, the State of Israel consists of two societies one Jewish and one non-Jewish. The Jews and non-Jews in Israel are socially segregated and are as much apart as blacks and whites were two decades ago in the United States.

Economic Status

The economic status of non-Jews in Israel compares well with that of Arabs in most neighboring countries but they continue to be economically second class to the Jewish community. Most non-Jews are involved in low paying jobs in construction, industry, and public service. Until recently, non-Jewish participation in advanced education was negligible. Obviously this lack of higher education barred most of them from the better jobs in the Israeli economy. Although in recent years the government has attempted to correct this imbalance, its efforts have been inadequate compared to the scale of the problem.

Likelihood of Explusion

The Israeli government continues to consider the loyalty of Israeli Arabs to the State of Israel suspect. Some Israelis are also fearful of high Arab birth rates. Finally, Israelis have shown apprehension over the increasing radicalism of Arab voters and the activism of Arab youth. These concerns have at times led to irrational over-reaction by some Israeli groups and individuals.[6] However, the democratic institutions of Israel and liberal values of its culture tend to point toward gradual accommodation to Arab aspirations by the Jewish state. Arab citizens of Israel are not likely to be expelled.

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[6] The most well known recent manifestation of such a reaction was the infamous "Koenig Report" that was leaked to the press in 1977.

Number of Emigrants

Israeli Arabs are generally far more interested in advancing their economic and political status in Israel than leaving for a Palestinian national homeland in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As far as Israeli Arabs are concerned, they feel that they have been and are in Palestine. They see little attractiveness in either the West Bank or Gaza Strip as an alternative homeland. Therefore, only a small fraction of 5-7,000, out of a population of 600,000, is likely to elect to leave Israel for the West Bank or (less likely) the Gaza Strip.

PALESTINIANS IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

There are about 536-723,000 Palestinians in the Persian Gulf countries among whom as many as 200,000 are from the West Bank.[7] As shown in Table 1, these people live in countries with very high incomes compared to the income levels in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (800-900 U.S. dollars per capita). Therefore, for the Palestinians in the Persian Gulf area the prospect of immigrating to the Gaza Strip or the West Bank is not attractive economically.

Given the important role of these people in the economies of the Persian Gulf, the danger of their explusion is nonexistent. The only significant factors that may play a role in pulling Palestinians from the Persian Gulf to the West Bank and (less likely) Gaza Strip are their feelings of homesickness, or nationalism, and the miserable summer weather characteristic of the Persian Gulf. However, it is likely that only 10-15,000 will be willing to abandon their jobs or businesses in the rich economies of the Persian Gulf and seek alternate opportunities in the less dynamic economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

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[7] The number from Gaza Strip may not be greater than 15,000.

TABLE 1

Persian Gulf Countries' Gross National Product
Per Capita, 1976

	Population (millions)	GNP per Capita (U.S. dollars)
Kuwait	1.06	15,480
UAE	0.70	13,990
Qatar	0.21	11,400
Saudi Arabia	5.60[a]	6,875
Oman	0.80	2,680
Bahrain	0.28	2,410
Iran	34.30	1,930
Iraq	11.48	1,390

[a] Some estimates of the population of Saudi Arabia are as high as 9-10 million.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from IBRD (1977).

PALESTINIANS IN NORTH AFRICA.

There are about 75-102,000 Palestinians in North Africa of which 60-75,000 are in Egypt. These communities are small compared to indigenous populations and generally are assimilated. Hence, at most they will contribute 5-10,000 immigrants to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Most Palestinian immigrants from North Africa are likely to come from Egypt, site of the lowest income per capita in the region (see Table 2).

SUMMARY

Out of the total Palestinian population of 3.09-3.49 million residing in countries outside of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, only a small portion is likely to "return" to the West Bank and Gaza Strip over the short term. The estimated range of immigrants by country of present location is as follows:

Jordan	50-100,000
Lebanon	20-60,000
Syria	10-20,000
Persian Gulf	10-15,000
North Africa	5-10,000
Israel	5-7,000
Others	4-5,000

Thus, the total number of immigrants will be between 104-217,000 of which the vast majority is likely to go to the West Bank and only a small number to the Gaza Strip.

TABLE 2

North African Countries' Gross National Product Per Capita

	Population (millions)	GNP per Capita (U.S. dollars)
Libya	2.44	6,310
Algeria	16.24[a]	990
Tunisia	5.73	840
Morocco	17.20	540
Egypt	38.09	280

[a] Excluding over 700,000 Algerians working in France.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from IBRD (1977).

CHAPTER 4. PROJECTIONS OF POPULATION IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP TO 1985.

BACKGROUND

The future economic viability of the West Bank and Gaza Strip will depend greatly on the level and composition of their populations, as well as limiting factors such as land, water, natural resources, capital, and technology. The economies will not be able to sustain rapid growth if some of the best trained workers and best educated youths continue to leave in large numbers as has been the case over the last 10 years. Thus, a thorough assessment of the economies of the two territories will require an in-depth analysis of the future supply of manpower.

This chapter forecasts the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to 1985. These estimates are based on natural increase of current population in the two territories, their net natural increase, and increases due to immigration of Palestinians currently residing in other countries. Emigration from the territories is assumed to be nonexistent in this chapter, but will be reconsidered in Chapter 6, where it will be analyzed in conjunction with the issue of immigrant absorptive capacity.

ASSUMPTIONS

The assumptions made in projecting the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to 1985 are that:

- The net annual rate of natural increase of the West Bank population increases from 3.15 percent in 1978 to 3.50 percent in 1985, while that of the Gaza Strip increases from 3.65 percent to 4.00 percent in those years.

- In the absence of any migration, the age structure of both territories' population by 1985 is assumed to approach that of Israeli Arabs in the mid-1960's.[1]

- The labor force participation rate for age 15 and above is assumed to increase because of rising female participation.

The assumptions made in estimating the distribution of 104-217,000 Palestinian immigrants (see Table 1) are as follows:

- 85 percent of the immigrants select the West Bank as their destination, and 15 percent select the Gaza Strip.

- The annual number of immigrants remains constant during the 1979-1985 period.

- The rate of natural increase of all immigrants is 3 percent per annum and remains constant over the 1979-1985 period.

- The rates of emigration from the West Bank and Gaza Strip are equal to zero (this assumption will be relaxed in Chapter 5).[2]

WEST BANK

POPULATION GROWTH.

The rate of natural increase of the West Bank population is expected to continue its upward climb from 3.15 percent per annum in 1978 to 3.50 percent per annum in 1985. In the absence of any change due to migration, the total population of the West Bank will reach 811,700 in 1982 and 898,600 in 1985 (see Table 2).

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[1] As a result of large out-migration of working age males, the 25-49 age group is presently severely underrepresented in the male age structure.

[2] In addition, further assumptions and estimates concerning labor supply and age distribution in the immigrant population will be made in Chapter 5 as they relate to absorption issues.

TABLE 1

Total Number of Potential Immigrants to
The West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1979-1985

Country of Origin	Number (thousands) Low	High
Jordan	50	100
Lebanon	20	60
Syria	10	20
Persian Gulf	10	15
North Africa	5	10
Israel	5	7
Others[a]	4	5
Total	104	217

[a] Mainly Europe and the Americas.

Source: Compiled and estimated by CACI from Chapter 3.

TABLE 2

The West Bank -- Population Growth Projections, 1978-1985

	Natural Increase		Population (thousands)		
	Rate Per Thousand	Thousands	At Year-End	At Beginning of the Year	Yearly Rate of Increase (percent)
1979	32.0	22.8	736.3	713.5	3.2
1980	32.5	23.9	760.3	736.3	3.3
1981	33.0	25.1	785.3	760.3	3.3
1982	33.5	26.3	811.7	785.3	3.4
1983	34.0	27.6	839.2	811.7	3.4
1984	34.5	29.0	868.2	839.2	3.5
1985	35.0	30.4	898.6	868.2	3.5

Sources: Compiled and estimated by CACI from Israel, Quarterly Statistics of the Administered Territories, various issues, and Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

AGE STRUCTURE.

As shown in Tables 3 and 4, the age structure of the population is projected to continue to be young. The major change in age structure will consist of increases in the proportion of age 25-49 males. This age group has been greatly underrepresented because of annual losses of significant numbers of working age men to jobs in other countries.

LABOR SUPPLY.

Labor force participation in the West Bank is low in comparison to participation among Israeli Jews and non-Jews. In recent years, it has been increasing as a result of greater female participation and increases in the number of younger workers. As shown in Table 5, total labor force participation is projected to climb from 36 percent in 1978 to about 38 percent in 1982 and 41 percent in 1985.[3] The number of participants in the labor force will climb from 134,000 in 1978 to 157,000 in 1982 and 185,000 in 1985. The labor force participation rate for West Bank women may be underestimated since data on women workers in rural areas are deficient. Informal observation indicates that many rural women and their daughters have filled some of the jobs that were formerly held by men -- many of whom have found work in Israel, Jordan, and the oil exporting countries.

STUDENT POPULATION.

The West Bank has nearly universal education through the first nine grades. As shown in Table 6, the population aged 5-14 is projected to increase by about 55,000 over the 1978 level by 1985. Since nearly all of this group will attend school, there will be a need for an additional 55,000 places.

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[3] Labor force participation for males could increase more slowly if the secondary education system absorbs a larger percentage of the 15-24 age group than expected.

TABLE 3

The West Bank -- Male Population by Age Groups[a], 1978-1985
(thousands)

Year	Age Groups						
	0-4	5-14	15-24	25-49	50-64	65+	All Ages[b]
1978	67.8	110.6	71.4	71.4	21.4	14.3	356.8
1979	69.9	114.1	73.6	73.6	22.1	14.7	368.2
1980	76.0	117.8	68.4	79.8	22.8	15.2	380.2
1981	80.1	124.2	72.1	84.1	24.0	16.0	400.5
1982	82.8	128.3	74.5	86.9	24.8	16.6	414.0
1983	86.0	129.0	77.4	94.6	25.8	17.2	430.0
1984	88.6	132.8	79.7	97.4	26.6	17.7	442.8
1985	91.7	137.5	82.5	100.8	27.5	18.3	458.3

[a] Projected by CACI on the basis of trends in population growth, assuming zero net immigration.

[b] Total may not add precisely due to rounding.

TABLE 4

The West Bank -- Female Population by Age Groups[a], 1978-1985
(thousands)

Year	Age Groups						
	0-4	5-14	15-24	25-49	50-64	65+	All Ages[b]
1978	64.2	99.9	67.8	89.2	21.4	14.3	356.8
1979	66.3	103.1	69.9	92.0	22.1	14.7	368.2
1980	68.4	110.2	72.2	91.2	22.8	15.2	380.2
1981	73.1	111.6	69.3	92.4	23.1	15.4	384.8
1982	75.6	115.3	71.6	91.5	27.8	15.9	397.7
1983	78.1	119.2	74.0	94.6	28.8	16.4	411.2
1984	85.1	123.4	72.3	97.8	29.8	17.0	425.4
1985	88.1	127.7	74.9	101.3	30.8	17.5	440.3

[a] Projected by CACI on the basis of recent trends in population growth, assuming zero net immigration.

[b] Totals may not add precisely due to rounding.

TABLE 5

The West Bank -- Labor Force
Potential and Participation, 1978-1985

Year	Male Labor Force			Female Labor Force			Total Labor Force		
	Working-age Population[a] (1000's)	Participation[b] (1000's)	Participation Rate[c] (percent)	Working-age Population[a] (1000's)	Participation[b] (1000's)	Participation Rate[c] (percent)	Working-age Population[a] (1000's)	Participation[b] (1000's)	Participation Rate[c] (percent)
1978	178.4	110.6	62	192.7	23.1	12	371.1	133.7	36.0
1979	184.2	114.2	62	198.8	25.8	13	383.0	140.0	36.6
1980	186.4	117.4	63	201.6	26.2	13	388.0	143.6	37.0
1981	196.2	123.6	63	200.1	28.0	14	396.3	151.6	38.3
1982	202.9	127.8	63	206.8	29.0	14	409.7	156.8	38.3
1983	215.0	137.6	64	213.9	32.1	15	428.9	169.7	39.6
1984	221.4	141.7	64	216.9	34.7	16	438.3	176.4	40.2
1985	229.1	146.6	64	224.5	38.2	17	453.6	184.6	40.7

[a] Population age 15 and over.

[b] Participation by population age 15 and over in the labor force.

[c] Percent labor force of population age 15 and over. Projected on the basis of recent trends.

Source: CACI projection.

TABLE 6

The West Bank -- Student Age Population, 1978-1985
(thousands)

	Primary and Lower Levels[a]			Secondary and Higher Levels[b]		
Year	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1978	110.6	99.9	210.5	71.4	67.8	139.2
1979	114.1	103.1	217.2	73.6	69.9	143.5
1980	117.8	110.2	228.0	68.4	72.2	140.6
1981	124.2	111.6	235.8	72.1	69.3	141.4
1982	128.3	115.3	243.6	74.5	71.6	146.1
1983	129.0	119.2	248.2	77.4	74.0	151.4
1984	132.8	123.4	256.2	79.7	72.3	152.0
1985	137.5	127.7	265.2	82.5	74.9	157.4

[a] Population age 5-14.

[b] Population age 15-24.

Source: CACI projections.

On the other hand, at the secondary and higher levels only about 20 percent of the eligible age group attends school. Therefore, expansion of secondary and higher education should be a priority of any government that administers the West Bank.[4]

IMMIGRATION.

The West Bank is likely to be the recipient of more immigrants than the Gaza Strip because of its better climate, less hostile environment, and more sophisticated cultural setting. Immigrants are more likely to have relatives in the West Bank than the Gaza Strip. Moreover, although the West Bank is a less urbanized region, its economy is more complex and provides a wider range of job opportunities. Finally, the West Bank has close economic and social ties with the East Bank of Jordan -- a major advantage for those who would like to maintain close contact with the rest of the Arab world. It is therefore quite reasonable to assume that 85 percent of all immigrants will move to the West Bank.

Table 7 presents the distribution of immigrants over the 1979-1985 period. It is assumed that the annual number of immigrants will remain constant at 12,600-26,400. Of course, the total contributio of immigrants to the West Bank population will also include their natural increase over time. Thus, the cumulative number of immigrants during 1979-1985 will be about 97-202,000 which is greater than the sum of their annual numbers (88-185,000).

Table 8 predicts the total population growth from natural increase and immigration assuming zero emigration. The West Bank population is projected to increase to about 864-922,000 in 1982 and 995-1,101,000 in 1985. These are very high figures for a territory as small as the West Bank.

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[4] If existing capacity is not expanded by 1985, less than 18 percent of the 15-24 age group will be able to attend schools.

TABLE 7

The West Bank -- Distribution of Immigrants Over Time[a], 1979-1985 (thousands)

Year	Annual Number[b]		Cumulative Number[c]	
	Low	High	Low	High
1979	12.6	26.4	12.6	26.4
1980	12.6	26.4	25.6	53.6
1981	12.6	26.4	39.0	81.6
1982	12.6	26.4	52.7	110.5
1983	12.6	26.4	66.9	140.2
1984	12.6	26.4	81.5	170.8
1985	12.6	26.4	96.6	202.3
Total (1979-85)	88.4	184.5	96.6	202.3

[a] Assuming 85 percent of Palestinian immigrants will go to the West Bank.

[b] Assuming equal distribution over time.

[c] Assuming 3 percent natural increase per annum among the immigrant population.

Source: CACI projections.

TABLE 8

The West Bank -- Total Population, 1979-1985
(thousands)

Year	Increase of West Bank Population[a]	Cumulative Increase Due to Immigration[b]		Total Population[c]	
		Low	High	Low	High
1979	736.3	12.6	26.4	748.9	762.7
1980	760.3	25.6	53.6	785.9	813.9
1981	785.3	39.0	81.6	824.3	866.9
1982	811.7	52.7	110.5	864.4	922.2
1983	839.2	66.9	140.2	906.1	979.4
1984	868.2	81.5	170.8	949.7	1,039.0
1985	898.6	96.6	202.3	995.2	1,100.9

[a] Due to natural increase only.

[b] Cumulative increase of number of immigrants assuming 3 percent natural increase.

[c] Assuming no emigration.

Source: CACI projections.

GAZA STRIP

POPULATION GROWTH.

The population of the Gaza Strip has been increasing much more rapidly than that of the West Bank because of its higher rate of natural increase and lower rate of emigration. In projecting the population data in Table 9, it was assumed that the rate of natural increase of the population will gradually rise from 3.65 percent per year in 1978 to 4.00 in 1985. Based on these rates, the population will increase from 460,700 in 1978 to 600,100 in 1985 assuming no immigration or emigration. These figures represent increases in population density from 1,270 persons per square kilometer in 1978 to 1,653 persons per square kilometer in 1985. It is questionable whether the limited economy and environment of the Gaza Strip will be able to support such a high population density at a reasonable standard of living.

AGE STRUCTURE.

The high rate of population growth in Gaza has resulted in an extremely young age structure. The out-migration of large numbers of working age males has skewed the male age structure even more toward the younger age groups. The projected age structure of the Gaza Strip population is analyzed in Tables 10 and 11. In general, the structures are predicted on the expectation that the population will become more normal, or older, than it is at present. This is not due to any decline in the rate of natural increase, but is a result of the normal aging of large numbers of the younger age groups under the assumption of no emigration/immigration.

LABOR SUPPLY.

The rate of labor force participation of the Gaza Strip's male population rose very rapidly after Israeli occupation in 1967. It reached its

TABLE 9

Gaza Strip and North Sinai -- Population Growth Projections, 1978-1985

	Natural Increase		Population (thousands)		
	Rate Per Thousand	Thousands	At Year-End	At Beginning of the Year	Yearly Rate of Increase (percent)
1978	36.5	16.2	460.7	444.4	3.7
1979	37.0	17.0	477.7	460.7	3.7
1980	37.5	17.9	495.6	477.7	3.75
1981	38.0	18.8	514.5	495.6	3.8
1982	38.5	19.8	534.3	514.5	3.8
1983	39.0	20.8	555.1	534.3	3.9
1984	39.5	21.9	577.0	555.0	3.95
1985	40.0	23.1	600.1	577.0	4.0

Sources: Compiled and estimated by CACI from Israel, Quarterly Statistics of Administered Territories, various issues, and Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

TABLE 10

Gaza Strip -- Male Population by Age Groups[a], 1978-1985
(thousands)

Year	Age Groups						
	0-4	5-14	15-24	25-49	50-64	65+	All Ages[b]
1978	45.1	67.7	47.4	45.1	13.5	6.8	225.7
1979	47.8	71.7	50.2	47.8	14.3	7.2	238.9
1980	49.6	74.3	49.6	52.0	14.9	7.4	247.8
1981	51.5	77.2	48.9	54.0	15.4	10.3	257.3
1982	53.4	80.1	50.8	56.1	16.0	10.7	267.2
1983	56.6	87.9	53.7	59.5	17.0	11.3	283.1
1984	58.9	88.3	53.0	64.7	17.7	11.8	294.3
1985	61.2	91.8	55.1	67.3	18.4	12.2	306.1

[a] Projected on the basis of trends in population, assuming zero net immigration.

[b] Total may not add precisely due to rounding.

Source: CACI projections.

TABLE 11

Gaza Strip -- Female Population by Age Groups[a], 1978-1985
(thousands)

	Age Groups						
	0-4	5-14	15-24	25-49	50-64	65+	All Ages[b]
1978	42.3	68.1	47.0	65.8	7.0	4.7	235.0
1979	43.0	69.3	47.8	64.5	9.6	4.8	238.9
1980	47.0	71.9	47.1	64.4	9.9	7.4	247.8
1981	48.9	74.6	48.9	66.9	10.3	7.7	257.3
1982	50.8	77.5	48.1	69.5	13.4	8.0	267.2
1983	54.4	78.9	49.0	68.0	13.6	8.2	272.0
1984	56.5	82.0	48.1	70.7	14.1	11.3	282.7
1985	58.8	85.3	50.0	70.6	17.6	11.8	294.0

[a] Projected by CACI on the basis of trends in population, assuming zero net immigration.

[b] Total may not add precisely due to rounding.

peak at 67 percent in 1974, which is high for the young age structure of the territory, particularly when one considers the large number of working age males from Gaza employed in other countries. This rate is likely to increase significantly due to the high rate of natural increase within the population and the growth of the education system.

Table 12 projects labor force participation at a rate of 66-67 percent for the male population and 5-7 percent for the female population. The resulting total labor participation rate shows a moderate growth from about 34 percent in 1978 to 37 percent in 1985. The total number of labor force participants is 81,800 for 1978 and 111,500 in 1985.

STUDENT POPULATION.

The number of students in the Gaza Strip was about 137,000 in 1976 of whom only about 10 percent were at secondary and higher levels (Table 13). Thanks to the UNRWA/UNESCO education system, nearly all of the population age 5-14 are going to schools. Because of the limited secondary education in the UNRWA/UNESCO system and the limited capacity of alternative systems, only about 16 percent of the 15-24 age group appears to be receiving subsequent education. The secondary and higher education system of Gaza Strip is far inferior to that of the West Bank and requires more immediate financial assistance.

IMMIGRATION.

The Gaza Strip does not present many attractions to immigrants. It is a small territory with hot and humid weather. It does not have an adequate supply of fresh water and its natural vegetation is sparse. Its 422-460,000 persons live on an area only 363 square kilometers in size (or 1,240 persons per square kilometer). Over 80 percent of the population live in crowded urban quarters and the rest live in villages.[5]

[5] There are about 7 cities of 20,000 or more people, 8 towns of 5,000 or more people, and 12 smaller towns or villages.

TABLE 12

Gaza Strip -- Labor Force
Potential and Participation, 1978-1985

	Male Labor Force			Female Labor Force			Total Labor Force		
Year	Working-age Population[a] (1000's)	Participation[b] (1000's)	Participation Rate[c] (percent)	Working-Age Population[a] (1000's)	Participation[b] (1000's)	Participation Rate[c] (percent)	Working-age Population[a] (1000's)	Participation[b] (1000's)	Participation Rate[c] (percent)
1978	112.9	75.6	67	124.6	6.2	5	237.5	81.8	34.4
1979	119.4	80.0	67	126.6	6.3	5	246.0	86.3	35.1
1980	123.9	81.8	66	128.9	6.4	5	252.8	88.2	34.9
1981	128.6	84.9	66	133.8	6.7	5	262.4	91.6	34.9
1982	133.7	88.2	66	138.9	8.3	6	272.6	96.5	35.4
1983	141.6	93.5	66	138.7	8.3	6	280.3	101.8	36.3
1984	147.1	97.1	66	144.2	8.7	6	291.3	105.8	36.3
1985	153.1	101.0	66	149.9	10.5	7	303.0	111.5	36.8

[a] Population age 15 and over.

[b] Participation by population age 15 and over in the labor force.

[c] Labor force as percent of population age 15 and over. Projected on the basis of recent trends.

Source: CACI Projection.

TABLE 13

Gaza Strip and North Sinai --
Student Age Population, 1978-1985
(thousands)

	Primary and Lower Levels[a]			Secondary and Higher Levels[b]		
Year	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1978	67.7	68.1	135.8	47.4	47.0	94.4
1979	71.7	69.3	141.0	50.2	47.8	98.0
1980	74.3	71.9	146.2	49.6	47.1	96.7
1981	77.2	74.6	151.8	48.9	48.9	97.8
1982	80.1	77.5	157.6	50.8	48.1	98.9
1983	84.9	78.9	163.8	53.7	49.0	102.7
1984	88.3	82.0	170.3	53.0	48.1	101.1
1985	91.8	85.3	177.1	55.1	50.0	105.1

[a] Population age 5-14.

[b] Population age 15-24.

Source: CACI projections.

The largest city, Gaza, has a population of about 120,000 but is one of the poorest cities of this size in the world. Agriculture is the territory's major economic sector and employs highly labor intensive techniques. It has no significant mineral deposits and little manufacturing industry.

Public services are few and of poor quality except for primary education and limited health services provided by the UNRWA and voluntary organizations. Secondary education is available for only a small number and higher education is negligible. Municipal services are primitive and have not been expanded because of the lack of revenue. Nearly half of the population live in extremely cramped quarters in refugee camps. There are hardly any parks or recreation facilities in the whole country. The most promising prospect for young Gazans is to be among the few who have relatives abroad to assist them in moving from Gaza in search of work or educational opportunities elsewhere.

Consequently, the propensity for immigrants to return to the Gaza Strip is much less than to the West Bank. The projections in Table 14 assume that only 15 percent of immigrants will elect to go to the Gaza Strip. Over the 1979-1985 period, the annual number of immigrants is projected to be only 2,200-4,600 while the cumulative number of immigrants plus their natural increase is 17-35,000. Table 15 projects the population growth of Gaza Strip and North Sinai based on natural increase and immigration but assuming zero emigration. Even though the contribution of immigration is relatively small, the population growth will be rapid because of the high rate of natural increase. Total population is projected to increase to 544-555,000 in 1982 and 617-635,000 in 1985. However, these estimates exclude emigration, which could increase if population pressures on the limited resources of the economy continue.

TABLE 14

Gaza Strip -- Distribution of Immigrants Over Time[a], 1979-1985 (thousands)

Year	Annual Number[b]		Cumulative Number[c]	
	Low	High	Low	High
1979	2.2	4.6	2.2	4.6
1980	2.2	4.6	4.5	9.3
1981	2.2	4.6	6.8	14.2
1982	2.2	4.6	9.2	19.2
1983	2.2	4.6	11.7	24.4
1984	2.2	4.6	14.2	29.8
1985	2.2	4.6	16.9	35.3
Total (1979-85)	15.6	32.5	16.9	35.3

[a] Assuming equal distribution of immigrants over time.

[b] Assuming 15 percent of immigrants select Gaza Strip.

[c] Assuming 3 percent natural increase per year among the immigrants.

Source: CACI projections.

TABLE 15

Gaza Strip and North Sinai -- Total Population, 1979-1985
(thousands)

Year	Increase of Gaza Population[a]	Cumulative Increase Due to Immigration[b]		Total Population[c]	
		Low	High	Low	High
1979	477.7	2.2	4.6	479.9	482.3
1980	495.6	4.5	9.3	500.1	504.9
1981	514.5	6.8	14.2	521.3	528.7
1982	534.3	9.2	19.2	543.5	555.3
1983	555.1	11.7	24.4	566.8	579.5
1984	577.0	14.2	29.8	591.2	606.8
1985	600.1	16.9	35.3	617.0	635.4

[a] Due to natural increase only.

[b] Cumulative increase of number of immigrants assuming 3 percent natural increases.

[c] Assuming no emigration.

Source: CACI projection.

CHAPTER 5. PROJECTIONS OF THE ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP ECONOMIES FOR IMMIGRANTS

The absorptive capacity of the West Bank and Gaza Strip can be measured as the rate of net emigration from these territories. Successful absorption implies low emigration rates among both the indigenous and immigrant populations. First, this chapter examines the propensity for emigration from the West Bank and Gaza due to the pull of the Persian Gulf and North African labor markets. Then, the economic prospects and absorptive capacity of the West Bank and Gaza Strip are analyzed.

THE PERSIAN GULF AND NORTH AFRICAN LABOR MARKETS

The rapid growth of oil exporting economies in the Persian Gulf and North Africa during the period since World War II and, more clearly, during the 1970's has had a major spillover effect on the other economies in these regions. The most dramatic impact has been through the movement of the labor force from labor-surplus countries to labor-short areas. The high salaries in oil exporting countries have attracted both skilled and unskilled labor from countries with lower wage levels. This labor movement usually has resulted in a substantial flow of foreign exchange in the opposite direction in the form of wage remittances by immigrant workers to family members left behind. These remittances plus investments and savings accounts of immigrants in their home economies have had substantial beneficial impacts on balances of payments, employment, and economic growth of labor exporting countries.

Estimates of the number of immigrant workers in the Persian Gulf and North Africa are subject to considerable uncertainty because of highly unreliable statistics kept by both labor exporters and importers. Table 1 presents the range of estimates of foreign workers for eight countries in

TABLE 1

Estimates[a] of Number of Immigrant Workers in the Persian Gulf and North Africa by Host Country, 1978

Host Country	Number of Workers (thousands) Low	High
Saudi Arabia	1,000	1,500
Iran	800	1,100
Kuwait	400	500
United Arab Emirates	400	500
Iraq	100	300
Oman	74	100
Qatar	70	90
Bahrain	35	70
Persian Gulf Total	2,879	4,160
Libya	300	450
Algeria	20	50
Egypt	13	17
Morocco	5	10
Tunisia	2	3
North Africa Total	340	530
Total	3,219	4,690

[a] Estimates include both legal and illegal foreign workers. Since the information on illegal workers is very poor the numbers generally are subject to a high degree of uncertainty. Data excludes Palestinians working in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from International Monetary Fund (1978), Middle East Economic Digest, various issues, Middle East Economic Survey, various issues, The Arab Economist, various issues, Arab Press Service, various issues, and The Economist, various issues.

the Persian Gulf and five countries in North Africa. The Persian Gulf with its 2.9-4.2 million foreign workers is by far the larger market for immigrant workers. The small indigenous population and labor supply of most of the countries in this region, particularly when compared to their vast volume of oil financed investments, have resulted in a severe shortage of labor. In contrast, there are only 340-530,000 foreign workers in North Africa most of whom are in sparsely populated Libya.

The highest concentrations of immigrant workers are in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Libya. The number of foreign workers in Iraq is estimated at 100-300,000, but it could increase more rapidly if Iraq is able to expand its oil production rapidly to 5-6 million barrels per day.

Among the oil exporting countries, the highest concentration of Palestinian workers is in Kuwait, where there are about 100-150,000. Most of the others are distributed in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and Egypt. The number of Palestinian workers in Libya, Algeria, and Bahrain are small and in Oman, Morocco, and Tunisia the numbers are negligible.

Table 2 presents the distribution of immigrant workers by the country of origin. The vast majority of workers are from seven countries: North Yemen (500-700,000), Pakistan (450-550,000), Egypt (300-400,000), South Yemen (250-350,000), India (220-300,000), Afghanistan (200-300,000), and Jordan (120-200,000). The Palestinian workers are not clearly identifiable in Table 2. They are included in figures for the West Bank (90-150,000), Gaza Strip (30-60,000), stateless persons (most of 60-10,000), Jordan (most of 120-200,000), and possibly in "statistical discrepancy" (some of 212-471,000). These estimates sum up to 260-430,000 workers excluding statistical discrepancy. Since the Palestinian expatriates have very high rates of labor participation, these estimates of

TABLE 2

Estimates[a] of Number of Immigrant Workers in the Persian Gulf and North Africa by Country of Origin, 1978

Country of Origin	Number of Workers (thousands) Low	High
North Yemen	500	700
Pakistan	450	550
Egypt	300	400
South Yemen	250	350
India	220	300
Afghanistan	200	300
Jordan	120	200
Europe	110	150
West Bank	90	150
Lebanon	80	100
Syria	70	90
Somalia	60	90
North America	60	75
South Korea	60	65
Tunisia	55	90
Sudan	50	70
Bangladesh	50	60
Iran	35	50
Gaza Strip	30	60
Turkey	30	55
Iraq	30	45
Oman	20	27
Sri Lanka	20	25
Morocco	15	40
Cyprus	15	35
Philippines	10	15
Japan	5	7
Indonesia	4	6
Soviet Union	4	6
Oceania and Other Asia	2	3
Latin America	1	3
Other Africa	1	2
Stateless Workers[b]	60	100
Subtotal	3,007	4,219
Statistical Discrepancy[c]	212	471
Total[d]	3,219	4,690

[a] Estimates do not include nonworking dependents of immigrant workers in host countries. Palestinians working in Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon are excluded also.

[b] Mainly Palestinians

[c] Statistical discrepancy may be due to double counting in the total or undercounting in the subtotal. Part of the error could be from the absence of accounting for the Stateless Palestinians.

[d] Based on the data in Table 1.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from International Monetary Fund (1978), Middle East Economic Digest, various issues, Middle East Economic Survey, various issues, The Arab Economist, various issues, Arab Press Service, various issues, and the Economist, various issues.

Palestinian workers are not inconsistant with the estimates of Palestinian population in the Persian Gulf and North Africa -- 611-825,000.[1]

The future demand for foreign workers in the Persian Gulf and North Africa will depend greatly on the capability of these economies to maintain rates of expansion high enough to generate labor demand beyond the capacities of domestic labor markets. During 1973-76, the economies of all oil exporting countries went through a period of unprecedented high rates of growth followed by a considerable slowdown during 1977-78. The 1973-76 period was accompanied by a sudden rise in demand for nearly all consumer goods and high levels of government investment in infrastructure and industry. The high levels of income and investment resulted in severe shortages, high inflation, and feverish speculation in the real estate markets. Unprecedented volumes of imports created bottlenecks at ports and other points of the transport network.

Government cutbacks in spending and emergency measures to relieve bottlenecks and remove shortages had substantially improved the situation by 1977-78. Moreover, since the economic boom was mainly the result of increased demand from a one step increase in oil revenues (during 1972-74) followed by relatively stable oil prices, there was little to sustain the boom after it had run its course. Indeed, by 1978 several oil exporting economies had slowed down to rates of growth comparable to their pre-boom years in the 1960's and early 1970's. In a few economies there were depressed sectors and unemployment.

The future prospects of oil exporter economies with substantial revenue surpluses such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, and Libya will greatly depend on government policy in areas such as:

- Production and export limits on petroleum that, in

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[1] See Chapter 2 for population estimates. The labor participation rate based on the estimates presented above are 43-57 percent for the total population of Palestinian immigrants.

turn, depend on the balance of power between conservationists versus current revenue maximizers.

- Balance of domestic versus foreign investment of revenue.

- Attraction of foreign workers amd maintenance of adequate economic and social incentives for their retention.

Changes in these policies are likely to cause growth cycles that will increase and decrease demand for foreign workers. However, the total demand for immigrant workers will not continue to increase rapidly because most of their economies are operating at or near their maximium oil production capacity and some countries have passed their peak production. In fact, some revenue surplus countries seem to prefer to produce oil at levels much below their capacity in order to preserve their oil for longer periods.

The countries that are generally referred to as revenue deficit, including Iran, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, are not likely to experience growth rates approaching those of the 1973-76 period. During 1979-85, these countries may run into increasing balance of payment difficulties and are likely to restrict domestic credit and force economic slowdowns periodically in order to reduce imports and inflation of prices. The demand for foreign workers is not likely to increase significantly in this group of countries. In some, there will be increasing unemployment and pressure to expel immigrant workers.

To summarize, the market for immigrant workers in the Middle East and North Africa in the future is not likely to grow as rapidly as during the 1973-76 economic boom. The economies with surplus oil revenues -- such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, and Libya -- could experience reasonably high rates of growth in the long run depending on government policies. These countries will continue to maintain their high number of skilled

and semi-skilled foreign workers although they may experience high turnovers due to their suspicion of foreigners or reluctance to allow long-term residency to immigrant workers. The unskilled immigrant workers in these countries are likely to suffer from periodic unemployment that follows the downward phase of real estate market cycles. When unemployment is high, the immigrants (particularly the unskilled and illegal ones) are likely to face the threat of expulsion and harassment.

The economic prospects of the revenue deficit countries generally are more difficult to assess. They are likely to run into increasing balance of payment difficulties and increasing debt burdens that will require government monetary control to reduce imports and consumer demand. Unemployment problems will increase among unskilled and semi-skilled workers and there will be periodic public pressure to expel foreigners.

Since most Palestinians are skilled or at least semi-skilled workers, they are not likely to be among the first groups to face expulsion pressure during periods of economic downturn. Moreover, in terms of culture, they are not conspicuous and their numbers relative to total population are small in all countries except Kuwait. Finally, the Palestinians are mainly concentrated in the revenue surplus economies that are less likely to face high unemployment and popular demand for expulsion of foreigners.

In short, the net results of economic trends in the Persian Gulf and North Africa for Palestinians are:

1. Moderate increases in demand for skilled and semi-skilled Palestinians in the revenue surplus countries.

2. No significant demand for more unskilled Palestinian workers such as those who constitute the majority of refugee camp dwellers.

Despite the projected slow growth of demand for skilled and semi-skilled workers, there could still be a high level of recruitment among Palestinians for two reasons:

1. Palestinians have an established record of being reliable workers.

2. There is a high level of turnover among immigrant workers in the Persian Gulf and North Africa.

It would be reasonable for skilled and semi-skilled Palestinians to expect to find jobs in the Persian Gulf and Libya for the next several years without difficulty. On the other hand, unskilled Palestinians will have to rely on job markets closer to their places of residence such as the construction sectors of Israel, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, and the occupied territories.

THE WEST BANK

THE ECONOMIC PROSPECTS OF THE WEST BANK.

Background

The economy of the West Bank is small and primarily agricultural. In spite of its high rate of growth since 1968, it remains extremely underdeveloped with very little industrialization and a disorganized financial sector. Investment activity has been mainly limited to small scale real estate development and foreign investment has not been forthcoming. The economy of the West Bank was not favored by investors when it was under Jordanian rule from 1949 to 1967 and has been receiving very little investment since 1967 (due to political constraints and uncertainty). Current trends indicate no major change in the foreseeable future, unless political conditions change considerably.

Agriculture. Agriculture is the largest sector in the economy of the West Bank. Because only 5-6 percent of cultivated land is irrigated, the sector depends heavily on the availability of rainfall. CACI (1978: Chapter 6) indicates that even without expansion of irrigation, the output of this sector could increase by as much as 6 percent per annum mainly due to improvements in techniques and increased use of factor inputs such as fertilizer and pesticides. CACI (1978) also suggests that with increased irrigation at the rate of 1 percent per annum, its rate of growth could reach 10 percent per annum. These 6-10 percent growth rates are well within the range of those achieved by Jordan and Israel during selected periods.

However, the survey of the agriculture sector indicates dismal employment prospects. At best, agricultural employment will remain constant. It appears more likely that it will decline as marginal lands are withdrawn from cultivation and the process of mechanization proceeds. In sum, the agricultural sector may increase the national product and income but it is not likely to employ significant numbers of immigrants. In fact, it may aggravate the problem of immigrant employment by increasing the number of unskilled unemployed workers.

Industry. In terms of both output and employment, the industry of the West Bank is small if not insignificant. Most industrial activities involve processing of agricultural products. The manufacturing sector (mainly small, light industries and mineral extraction) is largely limited to the production of construction materials. Domestic investors are reluctant to invest in industry under the present uncertain political conditions. For the forseeable future, the prospects for this sector are poor due to the lack of infrastructure, entrepreneurial skill, and skilled labor. Industry will not be able to absorb large numbers of immigrants nor become a more significant contributor to national income.

Construction. This sector has grown so rapidly in the 1970's that it now ranks as the second largest in terms of output. Since it represents one

of the few areas of economic activity to attract domestic investors its prospects are relatively good. In CACI (1978: Chapter 8), using very conservative assumptions that linked construction activity only to population growth and depreciation of stocks (rather than income and investment patterns), it was found that this sector will require 10-12,000 workers by 1983. Thus, the prospects of generating substantial employment opportunities in this sector appear dismal. However, construction activities are among the easiest sectors to expand in developing countries. In the case of the West Bank, foreign aid could easily be directed into development of infrastructure: roads, bridges, municipal services, communication facilities, reservoirs, irrigation channels, and numerous other projects. These investments can easily expand the employment in construction to far more than the levels projected in this study.

Public Services. Under Israeli administration, the West Bank government services have expanded very slowly relative to national income. Compared to any developing or developed economy, the government services of the West Bank are limited and government expenditures are very small. In particular, there is very little defense and security related expenditure and practically no development spending. Most expenditures are for municipal services, health, education, and welfare. Spending for infrastructure is small and, for development of industry and agriculture, nonexistent.

Nevertheless, government spending is likely to increase in order to maintain basic services as the economy expands and becomes more complex, and the population increases and becomes more urban. It was not possible in this study to consider all facets of potential growth in the service sector. In particular, it was not possible to consider changes in the pattern of public service consumption resulting from increases in income levels. Instead, public services were related to increases in population and the achievement of minimum adequate standards of service per capita. This approach is inherently conservative for any less-developed

economy with a moderate or better rate of growth. Therefore, the result should be viewed cautiously.

The projections for the public service sector are presented in CACI (1978: Chapter 5). Output is projected to grow at 7 percent per annum, which is in line with the overall rate of growth of the economy. Employment is projected to grow only by 4,000-5,000 during the 1978-1983 period. However, it should be remembered that these projections are extremely conservative and public services are relatively easy to expand in scope and level of activity. The major constraints usually are not demand but revenue. Therefore, if government revenue is increased through either taxation or foreign aid, public services, such as education, health, and utilities, could easily expand and absorb far greater numbers of workers.

Trade, Transport, and Other Services. This category of economic activities is not really a single sector but several sectors as well as all residual activity unaccounted for by the other sectors. It is difficult to analyze the components of these activities since there is very little information on their scope and level on an individual basis. The following analysis is therefore tentative. Trade activity has greatly expanded during the 1970's as a result of increased incomes of West Bank residents. This category is likely to continue its growth parallel to the overall economic growth.

The transport sector of the West Bank is very small and its growth has been restricted by Israeli Government policies and inadequate service facilities. However, the number of passenger vehicles has accelerated as income levels have risen. On the whole, the transportation sector of the West Bank is well below the requirements of the economy and it is likely to expand extremely rapidly with a little support from the government.

Two service activities that suffered severely from the 1967 war and have never recovered are tourism and financial services. Both of these sectors are considered potential growth industries that could expand extremely rapidly in a short period of time. However, neither is likely to experience any significant growth in the forseeable future.

Total Output. Output of the West Bank economy, as measured by gross domestic product (GDP), is expected to increase from about 470 million U.S. dollars in 1978 to about 745 million in 1983.[2] The bulk of the increase will occur during the first few years as a result of the jump in public sector spending and construction activity. This is partly due to immigration requirements and partly due to improvement in availability of housing and services.

Total Employment. Employment prospects in the West Bank are not adequate to meet the requirements of high immigration. Agriculture and industry are not likely to become major sources of new employment and the additional requirements of the construction sector will be only about 5-6,000 through 1983. The main remaining sources of employment are public and private services whose estimates of employment requirements are subject to great uncertainty because of the heterogenous nature of their activities. Assuming conservative growth rates, total employment is projected to grow from about 100,000 workers in 1978 to 127,000 in 1983. This 27 percent growth, however, is mainly due to increases in the private services sector employment (from 50,000 to 67,300) which is the least well known manpower sector.[3] Clearly, a more detailed analysis of the labor demand by services is required before we can take these labor projections as an indication of their capacity to absorb immigrant workers. Certainly, foreign aid may help to broaden employment prospects.

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[2] This projection is based on the low immigration population estimates which is the most likely case.

[3] These projections are from CACI (1978).

Attitudes Towards the Immigrants in the West Bank

The attitudes of the West Bank residents and government towards Palestinian immigrants is likely to be a major determinant of the level and type of assistance the newcomers will receive in establishing themselves in their new homeland. It is difficult to present a coherent picture of such attitudes because they involve many different, often conflicting, values among West Bank residents. Rather than attempt to present an integrated picture of these attitudes, we shall list three of them in order to bring attention to their scope.

These attitudes include:

1. Apprehension among the West Bank leaders about the number and background of potential immigrants. Unskilled, radicalized immigrants from poverty stricken Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan are not likely to be welcomed, whereas skilled workers would be. Immigrants with family sponsors in the West Bank are likely to be integrated more quickly as well.

2. Apprenhension about the political intentions of immigrants. It is unlikely that the current political leadership of the West Bank will willingly allow politically organized groups of Palestinian immigrants to come in and take over governmental functions in the West Bank.

3. Apprehension about the origin of immigrants. Most Palestinian refugees and nonrefugees in Lebanon and Syria trace their origin to parts of former Palestine that are now Israel. Many of these Palestinians are not likely to feel at home by "returning" to the West Bank.

Absorption of Immigrants

Absorption of immigrants can be viewed as a two stage process. The first stage involves providing relief assistance and basic services such as

food, temporary housing, and clothing to new arrivals. It may also involve placing them in temporary jobs until they can be placed in more suitable ones. Family ties will certainly facilitate immediate absorption of some immigrants. The second stage involves the process of integrating the immigrants more fully into the society by providing permanent jobs and housing. This stage may involve retraining of immigrants for new skills and substantial investment in housing and infrastructure. These very requirements may provide additional jobs in the economy that can employ some of the immigrants. Historically, the addition of immigrants to a labor force has been beneficial for the economic growth of nations. Immigrants not only add to the labor force but increase the demand for goods and services and thereby stimulate economic growth.

In the case of the West Bank, there are a number of obstacles that could prevent the successful absorption of immigrants. First, there are no institutions that have the capacity to receive immigrants, provide them with relief, and help their resettlement in a new society. UNRWA's capabilities in this area are constrained both by its charter and lack of funds. Other local institutions are too small and specialized to be able to perform the necessary functions for large numbers of immigrants.

Obviously the problem will be less serious if the number of immigrants are small or if they are not poor. Wealthy immigrants are not likely to require much assistance in their resettlement. The requirements of small numbers of immigrants may be within the organizational capability of even the small municipal governments of the West Bank, but they will require financial and technical assistance from outside.

The West Bank economy has a number of problems that may prevent successful economic absorption of new immigrants on a permanent basis. New immigrants may add to the labor force and increase demand for goods and services, but there will be a need for investors and entrepreneurs to expand production and technical skills to operate new industries. These

constraints have been responsible for the sluggish growth of industry and services in the past. They will have to be overcome if the economy of the West Bank is to absorb large numbers of immigrants.

Ability to Absorb Immigrants. Successful absorption of immigrants requires low rates of emigration from the West Bank among immigrants and the indigenous population. Tables 3 through 7 project population growth under low and high emigration scenarios. The low emigration case is only practical if the West Bank sets up new and efficient institutions to assist immigrants and the economy receives substantial foreign aid to invest in expansion of services and infrastructure, and begin the development of industry.

If current trends continue, the high emigration case is more likely in the foreseeable future. The existing local governments of the West Bank are not likely to organize institutions necessary for the successful integration of immigrants given existing political restrictions and the current lack of coordination among units. The economy appears to be growing mainly because of the wage remittances of Palestinians working in other countries. Its productive sectors are not receiving investments necessary for future expansion. There has been a serious, growing dependence on imports for both income and consumption.

Therefore, unless current conditions are altered by external events and foreign aid, the economy of the West Bank will continue to lose large numbers of workers from among its indigenous population as well as any potential immigrants. The loss is likely to be most severe among the working age and skilled male population, who are the most productive segment of the labor force. Their loss decreases the future growth potential of the West Bank economy, demoralizes the nation, and leaves behind a disproportionate number of unskilled and unproductive groups in the population.

TABLE 3

The West Bank: The Impact of Low and High Emigration[a] on Indigenous Population Assuming No Immigration, 1978-1985 (thousands)

	Beginning Year Population		Rate of Natural Increase (percent)		Natural Increase		Decrease Due to Emigration		End of Year Population	
	Low	High	Low[b]	High[c]	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
1978	691.7	691.7	3.09	2.68	21.4	18.5	5.0	20.0	708.1	690.2
1979	708.1	690.2	3.14	2.72	22.2	18.8	5.0	20.0	725.3	689.0
1980	725.3	689.0	3.19	2.76	23.1	19.0	5.0	20.0	743.4	688.0
1981	743.4	688.0	3.23	2.80	24.0	19.3	5.0	20.0	762.5	687.3
1982	762.5	687.3	3.28	2.85	25.0	19.6	5.0	20.0	782.5	686.9
1983	782.5	686.9	3.33	2.89	26.1	19.9	5.0	20.0	803.5	686.7
1984	803.5	686.7	3.38	2.93	27.2	20.1	5.0	20.0	825.7	686.9
1985	825.7	686.9	3.43	2.98	28.3	20.5	5.0	20.0	849.0	687.3
Total (1978-85)	825.7	686.[illegible]			197.3	155.7	40.0	160.0	849.0	687.3

[a] Note that in this table "low" and "high" refer only to degree of emigration and not the level of population or the immigration.

[b] For the low emigration case, the rate of natural increase is 2 percent less than the case with no emigration.

[c] For the high emigration case, the rate of natural increase is 15 percent less than the case with no emigration.

TABLE 4

The West Bank: The Impact of Low Emigration[a] on Immigrant Population, 1979-1985 (thousands)

	Annual Number of Immigrants[b]		Beginning Year Immigrant Population		Natural Increase of Immigrants[c]		Emigration Among Immigrants[a]		End of Year Immigrant Population	
	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
1979	12.6	26.4	12.6	26.4	0.38	0.79	2.5	5.3	10.5	21.9
1980	12.6	26.4	23.1	48.3	0.69	1.49	2.5	5.3	21.3	44.4
1981	12.6	26.4	33.9	70.8	1.02	2.12	2.5	5.3	32.4	67.7
1982	12.6	26.4	45.0	94.1	1.35	2.82	2.5	5.3	43.8	91.6
1983	12.6	26.4	56.4	118.0	1.69	3.54	2.5	5.3	55.6	116.2
1984	12.6	26.4	68.2	142.6	2.05	4.28	2.5	5.3	67.8	141.6
1985	12.6	26.4	80.4	168.0	2.41	5.04	2.5	5.3	80.3	167.8
Total (1979-85)	88.4	184.5	80.4	168.0	9.39	20.08	17.5	37.1	80.3	167.8

[a] Assuming that the annual number of emigrants is equal to 20 percent of the annual number of immigrants.

[b] Assuming constant annual rate of immigration.

[c] Assuming 3 percent net natural increase among the immigrant community in the West Bank.

TABLE 5

The West Bank: The Impact of High Emigration[a] on Immigrant Population, 1979-1985 (thousands)

	Annual Number of Immigrants[b]		Beginning Year Immigrant Population		Natural Increase of Immigrants[c]		Emigration Among Immigrants		End of Year Immigrant Population	
	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
1979	12.6	26.4	12.6	26.4	0.38	0.79	5.0	10.6	8.0	16.6
1980	12.6	26.4	20.6	43.0	0.62	1.29	5.0	10.6	16.2	33.7
1981	12.6	26.4	28.8	60.1	0.86	1.80	5.0	10.6	24.7	51.3
1982	12.6	26.4	37.3	77.7	1.12	2.33	5.0	10.6	33.4	69.4
1983	12.6	26.4	46.0	95.8	1.38	2.87	5.0	10.6	42.4	85.2
1984	12.6	26.4	55.0	111.6	1.65	3.35	5.0	10.6	51.6	104.4
1985	12.6	26.4	64.2	130.8	1.93	3.92	5.0	10.6	61.1	124.1
Total (1979-85)	88.4	184.5	64.2	130.8	7.94	16.35	35.0	74.2	61.1	124.1

[a] Assuming that the annual number of emigrants is equal to 40 percent of the annual number of immigrants.

[b] Assuming constant annual rate of immigration.

[c] Assuming 3 percent net natural increase among the immigrant community in the West Bank.

TABLE 5

The West Bank: Population Growth With Immigration and Emigration, 1978-1979
(thousands)

	Indigenous Population Growth[a] (end of year)		Cumulative Growth of Immigrant Population[a]				Total Net Population Growth[b]			
			With Low Emigration		With High Emigration		With Low Emigration		With High Emigration	
	With Low Emigration	With High Emigration	Low Immigration	High Immigration	Low Immigration	High Immigration	Low Immigration	High Immigration	Low Immigration	High Immigration
1978	708.1	690.2	--	--	--	--	708.1	708.1	690.2	690.2
1979	725.3	689.0	10.5	21.9	8.0	16.6	735.8	747.2	697.0	705.6
1980	743.4	688.0	21.3	44.4	16.2	33.7	764.7	787.8	704.2	721.7
1981	762.5	687.3	32.4	67.7	24.7	51.3	794.9	830.2	712.0	738.6
1982	782.5	686.9	43.8	91.6	33.4	69.4	826.3	874.1	720.3	756.3
1983	803.5	686.7	55.6	116.2	42.4	85.2	859.1	919.7	729.1	771.9
1984	825.7	686.9	67.8	141.6	51.6	104.4	893.5	967.3	738.5	791.[illegible]
1985	849.0	687.3	80.3	167.8	61.1	124.1	929.3	1,016.8	748.4	811.4

[a] Projections are from the preceding three tables.

[b] Projections are based on the summation of appropriate population and immigration projections among the columns on the left hand side of this table.

TABLE 7

The West Bank: Population Projections Under Alternative Scenarios, 1978-1985
(thousands)

	Population With No Immigration and Emigration[a] (natural increase only)	Population With Immigration But No Emigration[a]		Population With Emigration But No Immigration[b]		Population With Immigration and Low Emigration[b]		Population With Immigration and High Emigration[b]	
		Low Immigration	High Immigration	Low Emigration	High Emigration	Low Immigration	High Immigration	Low Immigration	High Immigration
1978	713.5	713.5	713.5	708.1	690.2	708.1	708.1	690.2	690.2
1979	736.3	748.9	762.7	725.3	689.0	735.8	747.2	697.0	705.6
1980	760.3	785.9	813.9	743.4	688.0	764.7	787.8	704.2	721.7
1981	785.3	824.3	866.9	762.5	687.3	794.9	830.2	712.0	738.6
1982	811.7	864.4	922.2	782.5	686.9	826.3	874.1	720.3	756.3
1983	839.2	906.1	979.4	803.5	686.7	859.1	919.7	729.1	771.9
1984	868.2	979.7	1,039.0	825.7	686.9	893.5	967.3	738.5	791.3
1985	898.6	995.2	1,100.9	849.0	687.3	929.3	1,016.8	748.4	811.4

[a] Projections are from Chapter 4.

[b] Projections are from the preceding Table.

The emigration of skilled workers will be augmented by the growth of the labor market in the revenue surplus oil exporting countries of the Persian Gulf and North Africa. The emigration of unskilled workers generally will be more difficult because the supply sources of such labor are more plentiful (see Table 1). However, if the construction activity in Israel, Syria, and Lebanon increases rapidly, many unskilled workers will probably find jobs in those countries.[4]

Output Per Capita. Given the poor prospects of the West Bank industrial sector and the limited opportunities for expansion projected above, it is not surprising that when the projections are summed the resulting total gross domestic product (GDP) appears sluggish. Total GDP is projected to jump in the first year of immigration by nearly 27 percent (due to the expansion of public services and construction), but at less than 6 percent thereafter (see projections in CACI, 1978). This will be barely enough to maintain the present West Bank standard of living at a low level of immigration. It will not be adequate for high immigration. Under the high immigration/low emigration scenario, GDP per capita will decline from about 800 U.S. dollars in 1979 to about 733 U.S. dollars in 1983 (at 1976 prices and exchange rates).[5] In practice, such a drop in standard of living will act as a brake on immigration and encourage emigration. Therefore, in the foreseeable future, the economy appears to be unable to absorb large numbers of immigrants. However, present economic and noneconomic conditions may change in the future (including increased investment and foreign assistance) with the effect of expanding output per capita.

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[4] In the case of all these countries except Israel, Palestinian emigrants may not ever return to the West Bank. Palestinians working in Israel are likely to remain day workers.

[5] It should be noted that higher immigration rates should lead to higher income levels than the estimates presented here based on the low immigration rate. However, the total output does not increase rapidly enough from immigration to compensate for the increased number of people.

GAZA STRIP

ECONOMIC PROSPECTS OF GAZA STRIP.

The Gazan economy is in a much worse predicament than that of the West Bank. It has a very small land area, extremely limited water resources, insignificant mineral resources, very little skilled manpower, practically no industry, very little infrastructure, and no system of higher education. Moreover, unlike the West Bank, Gaza Strip residents do not enjoy a high degree of interaction with the outside world. The economic growth of the Gaza Strip was minimal under Egyptian rule from 1949 to 1967. Poverty and unemployment were high and workers were restricted from working outside the territory.

Since 1967 the average rate of growth has been very high (well over 10 percent per year) and unemployment has been negligible. This has been partly due to agricultural improvements, however the main cause of growth has been the employment of 30-40,000 residents in Israel's economy. The economic growth from agriculture and employment in Israel[6] appears to be tapering off. Future growth potential will have to be found in other sectors of the economy.

Agriculture. Gaza agriculture is dominated by the citrus industry that uses irrigation rather than rainfall as its main source of water. Groundwater supplies appear to be a limiting factor. Seventy percent of all water usage is drawn from wells that apparently are being overexploited by too much pumping. Potential alternative sources of water are the Israeli water system (which is highly limited) and desalination of seawater, both of which appear to be too costly for irrigation purposes.

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[6] In the last few years, the number of Gazans who have been working in countries other than Israel has been increasing.

The survey of the agriculture sector in CACI (1978: Chapter 6) indicates that the potential growth rates for agricultural output would fall within a range of 2-6 percent. Within that range, a 4-5 percent growth rate appears most likely. Increases in employment are expected to be at best one-third of the rate of increase of output. Thus, agriculture is not likely to provide employment for many immigrants.

Industry. Industrial activities in the Gaza Strip are limited to those related to the citrus industry, a few very light manufacturing concerns, small workshops, and some vehicle repair facilities. The mineral industry is insignificant and there are no modern manufacturing plants. In the foreseeable future, no significant change can be expected. Most of the future growth in industry is likely to come from small scale subcontracting with Israeli firms and marginal activities related to agriculture and service sectors. These activities will not be insignificant compared to the current Gazan industrial sector, but they will not develop the structure of industry. The population is mainly urban and could provide the manpower for a variety of export-oriented, light manufacturing industries.[7] Gaza, however, lacks direct access to export markets (for instance, a port and storage facilities), investment capital, and entrepreneurs willing to take risks on a larger scale than small shops. As long as current conditions remain, it is not likely that the industrial sector will develop. This will remain true even if the sector continues to experience the high rates of growth characteristic of the early 1970's. However, if investment and foreign aid are forthcoming; industry may expand in real terms.

The survey of industry in CACI (1978: Chapter 7) projects a likely rate of growth of 8 percent per annum. This rate will be the highest among

[7] A number of observers have noted the similarities between the Gaza Strip and other small countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Cyprus, Lebanon, and Bahrain. While Gaza may not have all the advantages of these countries, it also does not have all their disadvantages. This line of analysis, therefore, is worth pursuing.

all the economic sectors of the Gaza Strip, but will not be enough to compensate for the expected sluggish growth of agriculture (which is the only currently significant productive sector).

The marginal nature of industrial activity makes it difficult to project the growth of its labor requirements. The projections presented in CACI (1978) are based on constant labor-output ratios and cannot take into account structural changes in industrial activities. The projections indicate a modest growth in industrial labor requirements from about 10,000 in 1979 to 14,000 in 1983, or a net increase of 4,000 workers.

Construction. This sector potentially could experience rapid growth because of the concentrated nature of Gazan settlement patterns. At present it appears to be far smaller than the population size and density of the territory warrants. Based on population growth and increased standards of housing adequacy, CACI (1978: Chapter 8) projects that the output of the construction sector will increase from about 35 million U.S. dollars in 1978 to about 86 million in 1983 (at 1976 prices). However, this is based on currently low levels of infrastructure construction activity.

Given adequate foreign aid, a single major construction project, such as a deep water port, could greatly expand the output and employment of the construction sector. In the foreseeable future, however, the likely labor requirements of the construction sector are expected to increase by only a few thousand.

Public Services. Public and community services have been among the most sluggish sectors of the economy. This could partly be a result of tight control of UNRWA's budgets by its major financial contributors and Israel's control of budgets of local municipal governments. The survey of public services presented in CACI (1978: Chapter 5) projects the growth of this sector from 37 million U.S. dollars in 1978 to 96 million

in 1983 (at 1976 prices). Most of the projected growth occurs during the first few years because of immigration and increased adequacy standards. This sector could easily expand more rapidly, if central and local government spending were increased in scope and quantity. It should be noted that at present the only central government agencies are controlled by Israel and their activities are minimal. Many of the services provided by central governments in other countries are absent or provided at very low levels.

Trade, Transport, and Other Services. This sector includes many heterogeneous activities on which there is little information. Moreover, the national accounts do not separate the errors and omissions categories from actual sectoral data. To the extent that there is information on this sector, it appears to be very small with little prospect for rapid growth. The projection in CACI (1978: Chapter 9) indicates a rate of growth of only about 2 percent per annum which is far too small to have a significant impact on national income and employment. These projections are based on the historical growth of this sector and prospects for future growth. However, private services usually grow at least as fast as national income, which has been growing rapidly in the Gaza Strip. Therefore, there may be room for more rapid growth.

Total Output. Total gross domestic product (GDP) of the Gaza Strip is projected to increase from 210 million U.S. dollars in 1978 to 292 million in 1979.[8] This increase is largely a result of the jump in outputs of public services and construction both of which are tied to population growth and increased adequacy standards in housing and services. Thereafter, GDP will increase at rates lower than 5 percent and reach 350 million U.S. dollars in 1983.

The slow growth is mainly due to the sluggish expansion of the agriculture and services sectors. By 1983, construction is projected to overtake

[8] All currency units are at 1976 prices and exchange rates.

agriculture, and public and private services are projected to contribute over 40 percent of total output, followed by construction and agriculture (each with less than 25 percent of total output) and industry (about 9 percent)

Total Employment. The total Gazan labor requirement is projected to increase from 48,000 in 1978 to 62,000 in 1983. This represents an additional labor requirement of only 14,000 of which 8,000 will be for the services sectors and 6,000 for agriculture, industry, and construction. This will not be adequate to absorb the increases in labor force over the 6-year period. In fact, the economy is likely to lose large numbers of workers to other countries through emigration.

Attitudes Towards Immigrants

The attitudes of Gazan residents and government towards potential Palestinian immigrants are similar to those in the West Bank. An additional factor is the cultural and family background differences of Gazans from the rest of Palestinians. Despite their high rate of urbanization, Gazans are in many ways conservative and still adhere to many of their traditional Bedouin cultural and social values. Even the poorer Palestinians from the West Bank, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel consider themselves culturally superior to the average residents of Gaza Strip.

The level of education among Gazans is comparable to other Palestinians below secondary levels. However, the educational level at higher social levels is far lower than is common among other Palestinian groups. The Gaza Strip has very little highly trained manpower and technically skilled workers represent only a small percentage of the work force.

These factors could combine to create tension between residents and future immigrants who are likely to be of non-Bedouin origins. The indigenous Gaza Strip population is not likely to look kindly upon immigrants

who consider themselves superior because of cultural differences or better education. However, the small size of the expected immigrant population is likely to keep such tension at manageable levels.

Absorption of Immigrants

Although the rates of immigration into the Gaza Strip are expected to be less than 5,000 per year, there are no existing institutions for handling their absorption. Existing institutions for refugee aid have been trying for years to assist refugees in the Gaza Strip to establish themselves in permanent homes and become productive contributors to their society. Despite their considerable successes, after nearly 30 years, many Gazans still deserve the label of refugee. Therefore, even if they had the necessary financial resources, the refugee aid agencies are not capable of assisting extensive absorption of new immigrants. New organizations are required for this task with more ambitious goals, the capability to offer technical training, and financial resources to generate temporary jobs through investment in selected construction projects and service oriented jobs.

It is likely that Gazan immigrants will have generally lower education and skill levels than West Bank immigrants. This is in part because of the low attraction of the Gaza Strip as a homeland for most Palestinians. Those who end up in the Gaza Strip in some cases may be the least desirable immigrants: the generally unskilled and sometimes uneducated refugee camp dwellers. Since the territory already has too many unskilled people, an extensive vocational training program will be needed to improve the skill levels of both the indigenous work force as well as the immigrants.

Ability to Absorb Immigrants. In the last few years, the number of workers leaving Gaza for other countries has been rising markedly. Since it is usually the skilled workers who can find jobs elsewhere, this manpower loss has negative implications for the future prospects of the

economy. If conditions are bad enough to force emigration of the indigenous population, they are likely to defeat any plan for absorption of immigrants from other countries.

Tables 8 through 12 project population growth for the Gaza Strip under various emigration scenarios. The low emigration cases are only practical if the necessary institutions are set up to assist immigrants and the economy receives substantial foreign aid for investment in expansion of services and infrastructure[9] to begin the development of industry. If current trends continue, the high emigration cases are more likely. The economy of the Gaza Strip is projected to grow very slowly and new employment opportunities over the next seven years are estimated to number less than 15,000. Far from absorbing new immigrants, this level of new employment will not be adequate even for the increases in indigenous work force.

Output Per Capita. The total GDP of the Gaza Strip is projected to rise very slowly after 1979. Obviously this implies an even slower rise in GDP per capita unless there is high emigration and very little or no immigration. For instance, if there is no movement of population in or out of the country, GDP per capita will increase from 611 U.S. dollars in 1979 to 630 in 1983 (at 1976 prices). This represents an increase of only 19 dollars over a 5-year period. The level of output per capita will rise more rapidly, however, from 659 dollars in 1979 to 787 dollars in 1983 if there is high emigration and low immigration. Thus, the sluggish economy is likely to encourage high emigration and discourage high immigration. High emigration is a relatively recent phenomenon in Gaza, but it appears to have accelerated substantially during the last few years. Its rate may increase further as the recent waves of immigrant workers take their families to join them and assist relatives who are potential emigrants to find jobs abroad.

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[9] Such as the construction of a port and improvement of municipal services.

TABLE 8

Gaza Strip: The Impact of Low and High Emigration[a] on Indigenous Population, 1978-1985 (thousands)

	Beginning Year Population		Rate of Natural Increase (percent)		Natural Increase (thousands)		Decrease Due to Emigration		End of Year Population	
	Low	High	Low[b]	High[c]	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
1978	444.4	444.4	3.54	3.03	15.73	13.47	4.0	15.0	456.1	442.9
1979	456.1	442.9	3.59	3.07	16.37	13.60	4.0	15.0	468.5	441.5
1980	468.5	441.5	3.64	3.11	17.05	13.73	4.0	15.0	481.6	440.2
1981	481.6	440.2	3.69	3.15	17.77	13.87	4.0	15.0	495.3	439.1
1982	495.3	439.1	3.73	3.20	18.47	14.05	4.0	15.0	509.8	438.1
1983	509.8	438.1	3.59	3.07	18.30	13.45	4.0	15.0	524.1	436.6
1984	524.1	436.6	3.83	3.28	20.07	14.32	4.0	15.0	540.2	435.9
1985	540.2	435.9	3.88	3.32	20.96	14.47	4.0	15.0	557.1	435.3
Total (1978-85)	540.2	435.9					32.0	120.0	557.1	435.3

[a] Note that in this table "low" and "high" refer only to degree of emigration and not the level of population or immigration.

[b] For the low emigration case, the rate of natural increase is 3 percent less than the case with no emigration.

[c] For the high emigration case, the rate of natural increase is 17 percent less than the case with no emigration.

TABLE 9

Gaza Strip: The Impact of Low Emigration[a] on Immigrant Population, 1979-1985 (thousands)

	Annual Number of Immigrants[b]		Beginning Year Immigrant Population		Natural Increase of Immigrant Population[c]		Emigration Among Immigrants		End of Year Immigrant Population	
	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
1979	2.2	4.6	2.20	4.60	.07	.14	0.44	0.92	1.83	3.82
1980	2.2	4.6	4.03	8.42	.12	.25	0.44	0.92	3.71	7.75
1981	2.2	4.6	5.91	12.35	.18	.37	0.44	0.92	5.64	11.80
1982	2.2	4.6	7.84	16.40	.24	.49	0.44	0.92	7.65	15.97
1983	2.2	4.6	9.84	20.57	.30	.62	0.44	0.92	9.69	20.27
1984	2.2	4.6	11.89	24.87	.36	.75	0.44	0.92	11.81	24.70
1985	2.2	4.6	14.01	29.30	.42	.88	0.44	0.92	13.99	29.26
Total (1979-85)	15.6	32.5	14.01	29.30	.42	.88	3.08	6.44	13.99	29.26

[a] Assuming that the annual number of emigrants is equal to 20 percent of the annual number of immigrants.

[b] Assuming constant annual rate of immigration.

[c] Assuming 3 percent net natural increase among the immigrant community in the Gaza Strip.

TABLE 10

Gaza Strip: The Impact of High Emigration[a] on Immigrant Population, 1979-1985 (thousands)

	Annual Number of Immigrants[b]		Beginning Year Immigrant Population		Natural Increase of Immigrant Population[c]		Emigration Among Immigrants[a]		End of Year Immigrant Population	
	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
1979	2.2	4.6	2.20	4.60	.07	.14	0.88	1.84	1.39	2.90
1980	2.2	4.6	3.59	7.50	.11	.23	0.88	1.84	2.81	5.88
1981	2.2	4.6	5.01	10.48	.15	.31	0.88	1.84	4.28	8.96
1982	2.2	4.6	6.48	13.56	.19	.41	0.88	1.84	5.80	12.12
1983	2.2	4.6	8.00	16.72	.24	.50	0.88	1.84	7.36	15.39
1984	2.2	4.6	9.56	19.99	.29	.60	0.88	1.84	8.97	18.75
1985	2.2	4.6	11.17	23.35	.34	.70	0.88	1.84	10.62	22.21
Total (1979-85)	15.6	32.5	11.17	23.35	.34	.70	6.16	12.88	10.62	22.21

[a] Assuming that the annual number of emigrants is equal to 40 percent of the annual number of immigrants.

[b] Assuming constant annual rate of immigration.

[c] Assuming 3 percent net natural increase among the immigrant community in the Gaza Strip.

TABLE 11

Gaza Strip: Population Growth With Immigration and Emigration, 1978-1985
(thousands)

	Indigenous Population Growth[a] (end of year)		Cumulative Growth of Immigrant Population[a]				Total Net Population Growth[b]			
			With Low Emigration		With High Emigration		With Low Emigration		With High Emigration	
	With Low Emigration	With High Emigration	Low Immigration	High Immigration	Low Immigration	High Immigration	Low Immigration	High Immigration	Low Immigration	High Immigration
1978	456.1	442.9	--	--	--	--	456.1	456.1	442.9	442.9
1979	468.5	441.5	1.8	3.8	1.4	2.9	470.3	472.3	442.9	444.4
1980	481.6	440.2	3.7	7.8	2.8	5.9	485.3	489.4	443.0	446.1
1981	495.3	439.1	5.6	11.8	4.3	9.0	500.9	507.1	443.4	448.1
1982	509.8	438.1	7.6	16.0	5.8	12.1	517.4	525.8	443.9	450.2
1983	524.1	436.6	9.7	20.3	7.4	15.4	533.8	544.4	444.0	452.0
1984	540.2	435.9	11.8	24.7	9.0	18.8	552.0	564.9	444.9	454.7
1985	557.1	435.3	14.0	29.3	10.6	22.2	571.1	586.4	445.9	457.5

[a] Projections are from the preceding three tables.

[b] Projections are based on the summation of appropriate population and immigration projections among the columns on the left hand side of this table.

TABLE 12

Gaza Strip: Population Projections Under Alternative Scenarios, 1978-1985
(thousands)

	Population With No Immigration and Emigration[a] (natural increase only)	Population With Immigration But No Emigration[a]		Population With Emigration But No Immigration[b]		Population With Immigration and Low Emigration[b]		Population With Immigration and High Emigration[b]	
		Low Immigration	High Immigration	Low Emigration	High Emigration	Low Immigration	High Immigration	Low Immigration	High Immigration
1978	460.7	460.7	460.7	456.1	442.9	456.1	456.1	442.9	442.9
1979	477.7	479.9	482.3	468.5	441.5	470.3	472.3	442.9	444.4
1980	495.6	500.1	504.9	481.6	440.2	485.3	489.4	443.0	446.1
1981	514.5	521.3	528.7	495.3	439.1	500.9	507.1	443.4	448.1
1982	534.3	543.5	555.3	509.8	438.1	517.4	525.8	443.9	450.2
1983	555.1	566.8	579.5	524.1	436.6	533.8	544.4	444.0	452.0
1984	577.0	591.2	606.8	540.2	435.9	552.0	564.9	444.9	454.7
1985	600.1	617.0	635.4	557.1	435.3	571.1	586.4	445.9	457.5

[a] Projections are from Chapter 4.

[b] Projections are from the preceding table.

Therefore, under foreseeable conditions, Gaza is likely to continue losing large numbers of its working age population, and under these same conditions, will not be able to absorb even a small number of immigrants. Developments brought about by foreign financial and technical assistance or other changes beyond the control of existing institutions could alter these dismal prospects for the better. Given increased investment and external aid, jobs, housing, and education may be able to expand, reducing the flow of emigrants and facilitating absorption of new immigrants.

APPENDIX A. ESTIMATES OF TOTAL PALESTINIAN POPULATION

Population estimates of Palestinians -- defined as persons who were considered residents of former mandated Palestine and their net natural increase since its partition -- range from 2 to 6 million depending on which source is consulted. For political reasons, Arab sources tend to exaggerate the numbers and Israeli sources tend to deflate them. The problem is compounded by the absence of a reliable recent census and the dispersed nature of the population. Nevertheless, any discussion of future Palestinian population movements requires a reasonable estimate of their current number. That is the objective of this appendix.

POPULATION OF PALESTINE TO THE END OF THE BRITISH MANDATE

BACKGROUND.

The only reasonably objective estimates of total Palestinian population are those of the official publications of the Government of Palestine and cover the period from 1922 to 1947. The data are based on only two enumerations -- 1922 and 1931 -- of which only one (the 1931 census) was comprehensive and could be called reliable by British standards. The only sources of data for the period prior to 1922 are a 1914 Turkish census and rough estimates. The 1932-1947 data are estimates based on the 1931 census, recorded natural increase, and recorded net immigration.

Because the only reliable census of population was carried out in 1931 and the only other fairly reliable population enumeration was carried out in 1922, the other estimates in Table 1 should be treated cautiously. With this reservation in mind, the statistics on the non-Jewish population of Palestine prior to partition reveal a growth of only 42 percent during the 97 years prior to the 1922 census. In contrast, during the

TABLE 1

Population of Palestine Prior to Partition
(thousands)

	Moslems	Christians	Other Non-Jews	Total Non-Jews	Jews	Total
1825[a]	...	...	...	475	25	500
1850[a]	400	50	20	470	30	500
1900[a]	...	...	...	500	50	550
1914[b]	...	...	...	631	58	689
1920[c]	...	...	...	623	50	673
1921[d]	...	...	...	692	70	762
1922[e]	591	73	10	673	84	757
1931[f]	760	91	11	862	174	1,036
1942[g]	929	127	13	1,070	484	1,554
1947[h]	1,157	146	16	1,319	589	1,909

[a] Population data are rough estimates and highly unreliable.

[b] Turkish census, reliability unknown; some sources estimate a population of 100,000 Jews for 1914.

[c] British estimate, reliability unknown.

[d] British estimate, fairly reliable.

[e] British census, fairly reliable.

[f] British census: This census is the most reliable source of population statistics on pre-partition Palestine.

[g] British estimate for December 31, 1942 based on natural increase and net immigration; settled population only.

[h] Last official British estimate for March 31, 1947; settled population only.

... Not available.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Mills (1933); Barton (1923); Government of Palestine (1939, 1946, 1947a and 1947b); Abu-Lughod (1971); Parkes (1970) and Singerman (1975).

next nine years the population of non-Jews grew by 28 percent. The rapid acceleration of non-Jewish population growth was mainly due to improvements in health and hygiene, economic development, and the elimination of conscription (Mills, 1933).

The 1922 and 1931 Census of Palestine

The 1947 partition and subsequent wars in 1948 and 1967 caused massive movements of non-Jewish population that dispersed the Arabs of Palestine across many countries. Consequently, all estimates of total Palestinian population and the population of Palestinians outside Israel and the occupied areas are based on projections of the 1931 census of population, the last comprehensive enumeration prior to partition.

Although some very young children were likely omitted, the accuracy of the census for the urban non-Jewish population is unchallengable.[1] The accuracy of the census for the settled rural population is likely to have been fairly good although some under-counting in rural areas probably was unavoidable.[2] The nomadic population of Palestine was estimated without proper enumeration and its accuracy is highly doubtful, but their number could not have been higher than 100,000, which is small compared to the total population of over one million for the whole country. Therefore, for the settled non-Jewish population of Palestine, the 1931 census appears to be a fairly accurate minimum estimate (see Table 2).

Although the 1922 population census is not considered to be as reliable as that of 1931, Mills (1933: 44) considered the aggregate population

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[1] Some Jews opposed the census on political grounds and others avoided it because they were illegal immigrants.

[2] See Abu-Lughod (1971: 142). The rural areas in the West Bank of Jordan were probably underestimated most severely because many settlements were isolated and communication was poor.

TABLE 2

Population of Palestine
According to the 1931 Census

	Number	Percent
Moslems	759,712	73
Christians	91,398	9
Other Non-Jews	10,101	1
Total Non-Jews	861,211	83
Jews	174,610	17
Total Population	1,035,821	100
Settled Population	969,268	94
Nomadic Population[a]	66,553	6

[a] These represented a largely Moslem Arab population whose numbers were estimated on a *de jure* basis and are of highly questionable accuracy.

Source: Compiled and estimated from Mills (1933: 18 and 96).

figures to be accurate enough to justify comparative analysis between the two. As shown in Table 3, high confidence in the results of the two enumerations is supported by their low statistical discrepancy after accounting for the various sources of population movement. This finding adds greater confidence to the 1931 figures used later in this appendix. However, it seems unlikely that the aggregate population figures of the 1922 census were as accurate as Mills indicates. It is even less likely that the population changes estimated between the two enumerations are highly reliable. The rates of natural increase were mainly estimates and the net number of immigrants were never established accurately. Nevertheless, the British official estimates are the only reasonably unbiased estimates we have available and they have stood up well against numerous attempts to discredit them.

The rapid growth of total population between 1921 and 1931 was mainly the result of two developments (see Table 4):

- A rapid increase in Jewish population mainly through immigration.
- A gradual increase in the rate of increase of non-Jewish population due to declining death rates.

The actual rates of increase of non-Jews between 1922-1931 may, in fact, be lower than those indicated in Table 4 because of probable high undercounting in the 1922 census. The rates estimated from the two census records for the Moslem and Christian populations (2.8 and 2.5 percent, respectively) appear to be very high relative to estimates for other countries during the same period. But these rates have been surpassed by many developing countries during the post-World War II period, and since 1951, the Arab population of Israel has had far higher rates of natural increase.

TABLE 3

Official Estimates of Sources of Population Growth, 1922-1931

Source	Number	Remarks
1922 Population	757,000	Census
Births less deaths	196,000	Estimate
Territorial adjustment	10,000	1923 estimate
Net Immigration[a]	57,000	Recorded figure
British armed forces	3,000	Excludes Palestine nationals
Illegal immigrants[b]	9,000	Rough estimate for 1931
Statistical discrepancy[c]	4,000	
1931 Population	1,036,000	Census

[a] Mainly Jews from East Europe.

[b] Mainly Jews from East Europe.

[c] Not Known.

Source: Compiled and estimated from Mills (1933: 45).

TABLE 4

Change in Population of
Palestine by Population Group, 1922-1931

	1922 Census	1931 Census	Percent Annual Increase
Moslems	590,890	759,712	2.83
Christians	73,024	91,398	2.53
Other Non-Jews	9,474	10,101	0.71
Total Non-Jews	673,388	861,211	2.77
Jews	83,794	174,610	8.50
Total Population	757,182	1,035,821	3.54
Settled Population	690,629	969,268	3.84
Nomadic Population	66,553[a]	66,553	--[b]

[a] Mills (1933: 45) states that the number of nomads at the time of the 1922 census may have been less than 45,000.

[b] Actual growth of nomadic population may have been negligible but their natural increase must have been significant.

-- None or negligible.

Source: Compiled and estimated from Mills (1933: 18, 45, and 50).

Population Estimates, 1931-47

Population figures for Palestine during the 1931-47 period were estimated by government statisticians by adding the recorded natural increase and the recorded excess of arrivals over departures to the 1931 census figures. In general, members of the British military forces, except for those who were Palestinian nationals, were excluded from most population figures. Because the government statisticians had no estimates of size and rate of increase of the nomadic Bedouin population, a very rough estimate of this population at the time of the 1931 Census, 66,553, was brought forward on an annual basis with the implied assumption of no natural increase. In most cases, official estimates of "total" population included this ever-constant number of Bedouins, whereas estimates of the "settled" population excluded them. Tables 5 and 6 present statistics of natural increase and net migratory increase, which constitute the components of population increase, and Table 7 presents the estimated de facto population of Palestine from the 1931 census to March 31, 1947 which was the last official estimate of the mandatory government.

ESTIMATING PALESTINIAN POPULATION SINCE 1947

With the 1947 partition of Palestine and the withdrawal of the mandatory government, the population of Palestine was dispersed among many different countries. This process can be separated into several phases:

1. 1948-1951: A period of large-scale movement of Palestinans out of the territory that became Israel.

2. 1951-1967: A period of stabilization of population groups in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, neighboring Arab countries, and Israel, and growth of Palestinian population in other countries, particularly in the Persian Gulf region.

3. 1967-1968: The second period of large-scale population movement, as a result of Israeli occupation, but this time largely confined to a shift from the West Bank to the East Bank of Jordan.

TABLE 5

Rate of Natural Increase of Population,[a] 1922-1945
(Number per 1,000 of Settled Population)

	Non-Jewish Population				
	Moslems	Christians	Other Non-Jews	Jews	Total
1922	24.95	19.16	24.81	16.71	23.25
1923	21.53	19.88	21.50	21.76	21.38
1924	24.72	23.47	20.33	25.51	24.65
1925	21.87	18.12	26.33	17.76	20.88
1926	29.09	21.63	18.45	23.58	27.26
1927	21.07	18.48	22.08	21.34	20.88
1928	23.47	21.07	23.80	23.03	23.17
1929	23.48	19.66	16.31	22.03	22.80
1930	28.81	22.16	24.72	23.52	27.21
1931	27.44	22.82	33.52	22.62	26.21
1932	22.66	20.53	21.32	19.46	21.86
1933	25.78	22.11	29.44	19.81	24.27
1934	19.88	17.25	10.80	20.56	19.71
1935	29.11	21.52	21.82	22.11	26.50
1936	33.15	23.62	30.97	20.86	28.74
1937	24.96	19.70	21.28	18.75	22.66
1938	28.54	21.83	25.55	18.15	24.87
1939	29.00	19.80	...	15.40	24.10
1940	22.68	18.90	32.62	15.54	20.23
1941	27.82	17.97	23.17	12.78	22.26
1942	25.31	15.66	16.59	14.13	20.96
1943	33.36	20.98	35.86	21.32	28.82
1944	36.36	20.93	27.15	23.08	30.87
1945	37.88	22.79	32.08	23.61	32.10

[a] Registered births minus registered deaths for the settled population.

... Not available.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Government of Palestine (1939: 21 and 1946: VII).

TABLE 6

Net Population Increase by Migration:
Excess of Arrivals Over Departures, 1932-1945

	Non-Jews				
	Moslems	Christians	Total Non-Jews[a]	Jews	Grand Total[a]
1932	918	1,524	2,442	13,463	15,908
1933	1,064	2,171	3,235	38,656	41,891
1934	1,151	3,899	5,050	42,757	47,807
1935	214	590	804	65,063	65,867
1936	123	746	869	21,183	22,052
1937	546	207	753	4,464	5,237
1938	-6,785	-1,321	-8,106	8,085	-126
1939	2,244	2,716	4,960	16,442	21,433
1940	902	1,380	2,282	5,093	7,382
1941	-305	2,559	2,254	4,148	6,426
1942	-1,101	-209	-1,310	2,199	912
1943	1,831	1,380	3,211	7,944	11,216
1944	-3,151	1,468	-1,683	13,862	12,237
1945	1,838	604	2,442	12,459	15,194

[a] Includes other non-Jews.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Government of Palestine (1939: 18), (1946: VII).

TABLE 7

Estimated[a] Settled[b] Population of Palestine[c], 1931-1947 (Thousands)

	Non-Jews					
	Moslems	Christians	Other Non-Jews	Total Non-Jews	Jews	Grand Total
1931	695	89	10	794	175	970
1932	712	92	10	814	192	1,007
1933	732	97	11	840	235	1,074
1934	748	102	11	861	283	1,144
1935	770	105	11	886	355	1,241
1936	796	109	11	916	384	1,300
1937	817	111	12	940	396	1,335
1938	834	112	12	958	411	1,369
1939	861	117	12	990	445	1,435
1940	881	121	13	1,015	463	1,478
1941	907	125	13	1,045	474	1,519
1942	929	127	13	1,069	484	1,553
1943	962	131	14	1,107	503	1,610
1944	995	135	14	1,144	529	1,673
1945	1,035	139	15	1,189	554	1,743
1946[d]	1,077	145	15	1,237	608	1,845
1947[e]	1,157	146	16	1,319	589	1,909

[a] Estimates are based on 1931 census, natural increase, and net migratory increase; unless otherwise stated, data are for the end of each calendar year.

[b] Excludes 2-3 thousand members of British armed forces and nomadic Bedouins estimated at roughly 66,553 at the time of the 1931 census, and 103,000 at the time of the 1922 census.

[c] 1931-1938 data are from Government of Palestine (1939: 18); 1939-1945 data are from Government of Palestine (1946: VII and 15-16); 1946 data are from Royal Institute of International Affairs (1951: 275); and 1947 data are from Abu-Lughod (1971: 155).

[d] Original source for 1946 data is Government of Palestine (1948) reported in Royal Institute of International Affairs (1951: 275).

[e] Data are for the end of March 1947. Original source is Government of Palestine (1947b) reported in Abu-Lughod (1971: 155). According to Abu-Lughod this is the last official estimate of population published by the Government of Palestine.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Government of Palestine (1939 and 1946) Royal Institute of International Affairs (1951), and Abu-Lughod (1971).

4. 1968-1978: A period of increasing nationalism and assertiveness by all Palestinian population groups and development of more dynamic social and political organization among them.

Since 1947 there has been no official estimate of the total non-Jewish population of Palestine -- that is, those people who constituted the non-Jewish population of Palestine in 1947 and their net natural increase. The quality of information on the number of Palestinians[3] in various countries varies greatly, from excellent for those in Israel to very poor for those in industrialized countries. Difficulties in estimating the total number of Palestinians are further compounded by controversy over the definition of "Palestinian refugees" and more generally "Palestinians".[4]

In order to estimate the number of Palestinians since 1947, the following analysis uses the last official population estimate made by the former Government of Palestine for the three non-Jewish population groups and selects growth rates based on their historical trend of natural increase to project each group beyond 1947.

THE LAST OFFICIAL POPULATION ESTIMATE.

According to Abu-Lughod (1971: 155), the last official estimates of the population of Palestine were published by the Government of Palestine (1947b: 686) in December 1947. These estimates were for the settled population as of March 31, 1947 (see Table 7). According to these

[3] For the remainder of this report the term Palestinian will refer solely to the non-Jewish people of former Palestine. In general, the discussion accepts the official population statistics of the former government of non-Jewish Palestine.

[4] Israeli sources often accuse the Government of Palestine of inflating the number of non-Jews. They also claim that a large portion of the non-Jewish population of Palestine consisted of immigrants from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

statistics, the total settled population of mandated Palestine[5] was estimated at 1.91 million,[6] of which 1.32 million were non-Jewish groups including Moslems, Christians, and others who were nearly all Arab-speaking people. These numbers do not include an estimated 66,553 nomadic Bedouins whose number was never accurately enumerated. The Bedouin population was first estimated to be 103,000 in the 1922 Census. In the 1931 Census, they were estimated to be 66,553, but with a qualifying footnote that the 1922 estimate should have been about 45,000. As late as 1947, official publications were still estimating the Bedouins at 66,553. Thus, it makes little sense to include this obviously unreliable data in the total population figures. It is quite possible that the number of people who maintained a nomadic Bedouin way of life remained constant due to loss of population to settled areas. But it is unreasonable to argue that their natural increase was negligible. In fact, with better control of epidemics in settled areas and the greater security and prosperity of the country under the British mandate, the rate of natural increase of Bedouins must have risen even though they did not benefit directly from these developments.

WHAT WOULD BE REASONABLE GROWTH RATES?.

To project the population of Palestinians beyond 1947, the most reasonable approach would be to select a set of relatively conservative growth rates for each of the three non-Jewish population groups and project each group separately. Since the only accurate information on the changes in population growth rates of Palestinians are available for the relatively small number that remained in or returned to Israel, it will not be practical to allow for a variable population growth rate across different subgroups or in different countries in the estimation. This makes the

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[5] The Jewish Agency estimate was significantly greater. According to Abu-Lughod (1971: 155), the Jewish Agency's estimate of the Jewish population always tended to be higher than official government estimates.

[6] Excludes nomadic Bedouins estimated at 66,553 as of 1931.

selection of the growth rates more critical and calls for a careful examination of historical data.

Table 8 presents the rates of net natural increase of the non-Jewish settled population of Palestine. For the three non-Jewish population groups, the 1936-45 period is the last decade for which fairly consistent vital statistics are available. These rates ranged from about 2.03 percent for the Christians to 3.00 percent for the more rapidly growing Moslem population.

Some Israeli sources have questioned the accuracy of these statistics and have claimed the data may have been inflated for political reasons by officials of the Palestine Government.[7] Arab sources, on the other hand, generally accept the Palestine Government statistics and attribute the high rate of natural increase of Palestinians to improved health services, control of malaria, abolition of conscription, and rapid economic growth under British mandatory government. Some pro-Arab, as well as pro-Israeli, sources admit that the vital statistics published by the Government of Palestine had several problems, such as undercounting Moslem birth rates, underreporting deaths, and not enumerating the nomadic Bedouins whose estimated population ranged from 45,000-150,000. On the whole, however, most objective analyses have come to the conclusion that the rates were not unreasonable when compared to other developing countries under similar economic and social conditions. Moreover, the rates have been surpassed by Israeli Arabs and Arabs under Israeli administrative rule in the areas occupied during the 1967 war.

For the purposes of projecting the Palestinian population beyond 1947, it was decided to select the 1936-1945 average annual growth rates (see Table 8). Since these rates represent the averages for a ten year period in which the rates were increasing, they generally tend to be

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[7] See, for instance, Braver (1977: 117). In this case, no evidence is presented to show bias except the high variability of vital statistics from year to year.

TABLE 8

Average Annual Growth[a] of Population of Palestine From Natural Increase, 1922-1945 (Percent Per Year)

Average Annual	Moslems	Christians	Other Non-Jews
1922-1925[b]	2.33	2.02	2.33
1926-1930[b]	2.52	2.06	2.11
1931-1935	2.50	2.09	2.34
1936-1940	2.77	2.08	2.67
1941-1945	3.22	1.97	2.70
1926-1935	2.51	2.08	2.23
1936-1945	3.00	2.03	2.69

[a] Except for the 1922-1925 data, all data are annual averages of five or ten years; 1922-1925 data are averages of four years.

[b] Data reliability is poor.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Government of Palestine (1939 and 1946: 26).

conservative or moderate compared to rates for the last five years for which data could be found or the rates later achieved by Israeli Arabs.

PALESTINIAN POPULATION DURING THE EARLY YEARS OF THEIR DISPERSAL, 1947-1951.

To determine the size of the Palestinian population during the first phase or early years of their dispersal (1947-1951), the population was projected on the basis of their average rate of natural increase for 1936-1945 (see Table 9). The set of assumptions selected in this case for projecting the non-Jewish population beyond 1947 are identified as Set A-1.[8] The total population of non-Jewish Palestinians is estimated to increase from 1.32 million at the end of March 1947, or just before the de facto partition of the country, to 1.51 million at the end of 1951, when the partition of Palestine had become a well-established fact and most Palestinian refugees had settled into camps. According to United Nations sources, Palestinian refugees in the early 1950's were distributed as shown in Table 10. In all countries except Gaza, most refugees settled in permanent dwellings. Only 18 percent still lived in tents, but this portion represented 155 thousand people. Moreover, the housing conditions of those living in wooden or stone structures, in many cases, were not adequate by most standards.

HOW MANY PALESTINE REFUGEES?-I.

During the early years of the Palestinian dispersal a major controversy arose over numerical estimates of refugees. Israeli sources adamantly refused to accept the United Nacions' count of registered refugees as representing the true magnitude of the Palestinian refugee problem. As shown in Table 11, the number of U.N.-registered refugees has been high

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[8] Set A-1 assumptions include: (1) constant population growth rates of 3.0, 2.0 and 2.7 percent per year for the Moslems, Christians, and others, respectively; (2) official population statistics of March 1947 as the base year, (3) no significant loss of population due to war and war-related famine and epidemic, and (4) nomadic Bedouins not included.

TABLE 9

Estimated Non-Jewish Palestinian Population[a]
1947-1951

End of the Month	Moslems[b]	Christians[c]	Others[d]	Total Non-Jews
March 1947	1,157,423	146,162	15,849	1,319,434
December 1947	1,183,369	148,382	16,168	1,347,919
December 1948	1,218,870	151,394	16,603	1,386,867
December 1949	1,255,436	154,467	17,049	1,409,903
December 1950	1,293,099	157,603	17,508	1,468,210
December 1951	1,331,892	160,802	17,979	1,510,673

[a] Population excludes nomadic Bedouins and British army personnel. Projections are based on natural increase and the last official population estimate as of March 31, 1947. No account was taken of deaths due to war and war-related famines and epidemics. Because there was a large scale exodus of Palestinians during 1948-1949, the population refers to de jure Palestinians who were the estimated de facto population of Mandated Palestine as of March 1947 plus their natural increase.

[b] Population projected on the basis of 3.00 percent annual natural increase.

[c] Population projected on the basis of 2.03 percent annual natural increase.

[d] Population projected on the basis of 2.69 percent annual natural increase.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Government of Palestine (1946: 26) and Abu-Lughod (1971: 155).

TABLE 10

Distribution of Palestinian Refugees by Country[a] and Type of Settlement[b] in November 1952 (thousands)

Location	Type of Dwellings: Stone Houses	Wooden Barracks	Tents	Total
West Bank	245	61	58	364
Gaza Strip	79	65	57	201
Lebanon	66	13	22	101
Syria	66	10	7	83
East Bank, Jordan	88	3	11	101
Total	544	152	155	850

[a] Excluding refugees in Israel.

[b] Data includes some inconsistencies.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Hagopian and Zahlan (1974: 51-53).

TABLE 11

Registered Refugees[a], 1950–1978

Year Ending in June	Eligible for All Services and Full-Rations[b]	Infants and Children Registered for Services Only[c]	Registered for Limited Services Only[d]	Grand Total: All Registered Refugees[e]
1950	...	...	...	960,021
1951	826,459	2,174	24,455	904,122
1952	805,593	18,347	32,738	915,411
1953	772,166	34,765	45,013	916,761
1954	820,486	49,232	54,793	941,851
1955	828,531	60,227	63,403	969,389
1956	830,266	75,026	74,059	996,338
1957	830,611	86,212	62,980	1,019,201
1958	836,781	110,600	63,713	1,053,348
1959	843,739	130,092	68,922	1,087,628
1960	849,634	150,170	73,452	1,120,889
1961	854,268	169,730	77,566	1,151,024
1962	862,083	176,772	91,069	1,174,760
1963	866,369	197,914	98,567	1,210,170
1964	863,284	226,494	104,653	1,246,585
1965	859,048	251,131	107,122	1,280,823
1966	845,730	284,025	108,750	1,317,749
1967	845,790	312,649	106,991	1,346,086
1968	824,366	316,166	121,939	1,364,294
1969	806,366	326,185	148,004	1,395,074
1970	804,576	342,009	160,059	1,425,219
1971	821,338	352,143	166,867	1,468,161
1972	821,749	375,224	184,453	1,506,640
1973	820,279	394,449	201,399	1,540,694
1974	820,748	420,267	208,155	1,583,646
1975	818,844	459,197	221,338	1,632,707
1976	819,115	484,673	233,231	1,668,205
1977	821,785	510,706	246,278	1,706,486
1978	822,381	545,189	262,120	1,757,269

[a] These statistics are based on the Agency's registration records, which do not necessarily reflect the actual refugee population owing to factors such as unreported deaths and births, false or duplicate registrations, or absences from the area of UNRWA operations.

Table 11
Continued
Registered Refugees

[b] Before 1954, half rations were issued to Bedouins and infants, as well as to frontier villagers in Jordan. Since then, Bedouins have been regarded as eligible to receive full rations and infants have also been eligible for full rations after their first anniversary if the ration ceiling permits. Half rations are issued only to frontier villagers on the West Bank (9,093). Frontier villagers displaced to east Jordan as a result of the hostilities of June 1967 (3,336) are issued full rations under the normal program and are therefore included in the figure of full ration recipients (column 1). Also included in column 1 are Gaza Poor (920) and Jerusalem Poor (1,330).

[c] This category is composed of several subcategories. For 1978, for instance, it consists of:

(i) 16,375 infants under the age of one year who are eligible for services but not for rations;

(ii) 490,784 children registered for services (CRS) aged one year and over (some of whom are now adults) who are not receiving rations because of ration ceilings; and

(iii) 38,030 displaced children registered for services (CRS) who receive rations donated by the Government of Jordan on an emergency and temporary basis.

[d] This category includes the following, subject to what is said about Gaza refugees in footnote b above:

(i) Refugees who are memebers of families whose absence from the area or the level of whose reported income disqualified all family members for basic rations, general education and health services; or

(ii) Refugees who have themselves received or whose families have received assistance enabling them to become self-supporting.

[e] In addition to the three columns on the left that consists of other members of families who are registered for rations and refugees registered for all services but not rations.

[f] This grand total included refugees receiving relief in Israel who were the responsibility of UNRWA through June 30, 1952.

... Not available

-- None or negligible

Sources: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) (1978: 58-59).

from the start, if compared to the estimates of the non-Jewish population for 1947-1951 presented in Table 9 and estimates for later years presented later in this appendix. The 1950 and 1951 U.N. refugee figures are shown to be over 900,000 compared to estimates of total settled population of 1.47 and 1.51 million for the respective years. The high number of U.N.-counted refugees can be attributed partly to duplicate and false registration, but the extent of this practice has never been determined, and supportive evidence is fragmentary and largely anecdotal.

The potential number of refugees has been calculated by a number of researchers using pre-1948 population statistics. For the most part, such studies have manipulated the information in order to support predetermined conclusions of inflated or deflated figures for refugees. Abu-Lughod's (1971) study is among the most objective of such studies even though her sympathy is clearly with the Palestinians. The strength of her study lies in making conservative assumptions when in doubt, and using only Government of Palestine statistics rather than those of Arabs or the Jewish Agency. Furthermore, her calculations are clearly presented and assumptions are explicit. The results of her study indicate that the minimum-maximum range of non-Jewish Palestinians who would have been residents of Israeli-held Palestine at the end of 1948 (had there been no partition) is 890,200-904,200.[9] This represents 64-65 percent of her estimate of total population -- 1.40 million. Given the fact that Israeli territory included most of the urban and industrial areas, as well as the most productive agricultural regions of the country, it is not unrealistic to accept her conclusion that the territory had contained most of the non-Jewish population. In fact, most evidence points to a steady and rapid rise in the non-Jewish population of Jewish populated areas, such as the coastal plain, throughout the mandate period. This increase in population was, in part, a result of internal migration from areas with relatively stagnant economies, such as Gaza, and many of the towns and villages in the highlands of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank).

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[9] This includes 66,553 nomadic Bedouins.

If one subtracts the number of Arabs still remaining in Israel in 1948,[10] Abu-Lughod's conservative population estimates indicate a potential Arab refugee population of 770,000-780,000. This is the most reasonable estimate. The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (1949), using similarly conservative assumptions and official government Palestine data, came up with a slightly lower estimate of 751,000 refugees. Unfortunately, because this study did not present its calculations in detail, it is not possible to resolve the discrepancy between its estimate and that of Abu-Lughod.

PALESTINIAN POPULATION ESTIMATES, 1951-1967.

After leaving Israel, most Palestinians gradually settled down in other countries as resident aliens. In Jordan, however, large numbers became Jordanian citizens, and in Lebanon, many Christian Palestinians were given the option to become Lebanese citizens. Also, a gradually increasing number began emigrating to the oil producing countries in the Persian Gulf and a smaller number to Western industrialized countries.

Table 12 estimates the total Palestinian population from 1951 to 1967, when the third Arab-Israeli war began another major movement of Palestinians out of the former Palestine territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. During this period, the non-Jewish settled population of former Palestine (now largely spread over a half dozen countries) increased from 1.5 million to 2.4 million.

HOW MANY REFUGEES?-II.

The June 1967 Arab-Israeli war led to rapid occupation of two former Palestinian territories -- the West Bank and Gaza Strip -- as well as the Egyptian Sinai and the Syrian Golan Heights. The conflict and Israeli

[10] According to studies referenced in Abu-Lughod (1971: 160), estimates range from 120,000 to 130,000 non-Jews remaining in Israel as of November 1948.

TABLE 12

Non-Jewish Palestinian Population,[a]
1951-1967 (Based on Assumption Set A-1)

End of the Month	Moslems[b]	Christians[c]	Others[d]	Total Non-Jews
December 1951	1,331,892	160,802	17,979	1,510,673
December 1952	1,371,849	164,067	18,462	1,554,378
December 1953	1,413,004	167,397	18,956	1,599,357
December 1954	1,455,394	170,795	19,469	1,645,658
December 1955	1,499,056	174,262	19,993	1,693,311
December 1956	1,544,028	177,800	20,531	1,742,359
December 1957	1,590,348	181,409	21,083	1,792,840
December 1958	1,638,059	185,092	21,650	1,844,801
December 1959	1,687,201	188,849	22,232	1,898,282
December 1960	1,737,817	192,683	22,830	1,953,330
December 1961	1,789,951	196,594	23,445	2,009,990
December 1962	1,843,650	200,585	24,075	2,068,310
December 1963	1,898,959	204,657	24,723	2,128,339
December 1964	1,955,928	208,812	25,388	2,190,128
December 1965	2,014,606	213,050	26,071	2,253,727
December 1966	2,075,044	217,375	26,772	2,319,191
December 1967	2,137,295	221,788	27,492	2,386,575

[a] See Table 9.

[b] See Table 9.

[c] See Table 9.

[d] See Table 9.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Government of Palestine (1946: 26) and Abu-Lughod (1971: 155).

occupation resulted in another mass movement of Palestinians, many of whom became refugees for the second time. Once again, the number of refugees from the conflict became a subject of wide speculation. The problem has been that there was no accurate estimate of the populations of the West Bank and Gaza Strip prior to Israeli occupation. The last Jordanian census of the West Bank population was taken in 1961 and the 1966 UAR census of the Gaza Strip was totally unreliable.

As soon as the Israelis consolidated their hold over the occupied areas, they took a census of the territories under curfew conditions to increase its reliability. The results showed population figures of 599,400 in the West Bank and 356,300 for the Gaza Strip.

Estimates of the number of people who left the West Bank and Gaza Strip range from 200,000-400,000 with most estimates falling between 250,000-300,000 (Van Arkadie, 1977). There was still substantial movement of population long after the guns fell silent and the West Bank and Gaza Strip continued to lose significant numbers of their populations to other countries at least until 1973.

ESTIMATED POPULATION OF PALESTINIANS, 1967-1978.

The years immediately following the 1967 war were difficult and often violent years for Palestinians in Jordan and the occupied areas. But by the early 1970's, the situation began to change rapidly. By 1971, Jordan's civil war and the Egyptian-Israeli war of attrition had ended and the number of terrorist incidents in the West Bank and Gaza Strip had greatly diminished. The result was a new era of rapid economic growth for Palestinians in Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip, and for the Israeli Arabs. Moreover, the rapid rise in oil revenues of the Persian Gulf countries provided greater employment opportunities for skilled and semi-skilled Palestinian refugees in all countries. There is considerable evidence to indicate that the health, education, and economic situation of even those Palestinians who remained in refugee camps

has considerably improved as a result of wage remittances by those who work in the Persian Gulf and other areas (conversations with Vivian Bull, November 8, 1978).

Given the improved conditions of most Palestinians, it is possible that their rate of natural increase have surpassed those of the 1936-1945 period, which are the basis of our population projections. Therefore, the population estimates for 1967-78, which are presented in Table 13, are conservative projections. They estimate that population has increased from 2.39 million in 1967 to 3.26 million in 1978 (excluding original nomadic Bedouins of Palestine).

If one assumes higher population growth rates, such as those achieved by Israeli Arabs or by non-Jews in Palestine between 1941-1945 (averaging 3.22 percent annually for Moslems), includes population estimates and national increase of the original nomadic Bedouins of Palestine, and includes estimates of pre-1947 emigrants from Palestine, it would be reasonable to expect a higher total population figure by 1978. Given these conditions, an estimate of 4,200,000 could be considered a reasonable upper limit for the total sum of Palestinians worldwide.

TABLE 13

Estimated Non-Jewish Palestinian Population,[a]
1967-1978 (Based on Assumption Set A-1)

End of the Year	Moslems	Christians	Others	Total Non-Jews
1967	2,137,295	221,788	27,492	2,386,575
1968	2,201,414	226,290	28,232	2,455,936
1969	2,267,456	230,884	28,991	2,527,331
1970	2,335,480	235,571	29,771	2,600,822
1971	2,405,545	240,353	30,572	2,676,470
1972	2,477,711	245,232	31,394	2,754,337
1973	2,552,042	250,210	32,239	2,834,491
1974	2,628,604	255,290	33,106	2,917,000
1975	2,707,462	260,472	33,997	3,001,931
1976	2,788,686	265,760	34,911	3,089,357
1977	2,872,346	271,155	35,850	3,179,351
1978	2,958,516	276,659	36,815	3,262,990

[a] See Table 9

[b] See Table 9

[c] See Table 9

[d] See Table 9

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Government of Palestine (1946: 26) and Abu-Lughod (1971: 155).

APPENDIX B. POPULATIONS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP

BACKGROUND

After the 1948-49 war, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel constituted the remaining territories of the former mandated Palestine. As will be shown, the West Bank and Gaza were the residence of over one million Palestinians until the 1967 war, when both were occupied by Israel. This appendix describes the changes that have occurred in the population of these territories and their recent demographic trends.

LONG-TERM POPULATION MOVEMENTS

The populations of the West Bank and Gaza Strip have undergone several major changes since the 1931 census of Palestine determined their population fairly reliably for the first time. The two largest disturbances were caused by the 1948-49 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars. In both cases the population structure of the territories was greatly altered.

During the 1948-1951 period, a large number of Palestinian refugees moved to the West Bank and Gaza Strip from Israeli territories. Although their exact numbers have been a subject of controversy, there is complete consensus on the fact that the refugee population was very large relative to the sizes of the indigenous population in the two territories.

During 1967-1968, the second major movement of Palestinians took place. This time the movement was out of the two territories. The numbers were much smaller but large enough to have a major impact on at least the age structure and natural increase of the remaining population for several years.

The dramatic population shifts that occurred in 1948-1951 and 1967-1968 can be easily discerned from the data in Table 1. The population of the West Bank increased by 299,000 from 1946 to 1952 as a result of the large inflow of refugees from Israeli areas of former Palestine. During the same period the population of the Gaza Strip increased by 265,000 — an increase of nearly 900 percent.

The population decreases of 1967-1968 were moderate by comparison. Unfortunately their exact magnitude cannot be ascertained because reliable population estimates are only available for the 1961 West Bank population. Various estimates of the population that fled the West Bank range from 180,000 to 400,000.[1] Those who left the Gaza Strip are estimated to number 30-50,000.

For the first few years of Israeli occupation, the two territories continued to lose significant numbers of people as a result of a steady flow of the middle classes to other Arab countries. By 1970, the outflow had declined greatly, although it continued to be significant thereafter (see Table 2). Since 1971 the movement of people has reflected, in part, the economic situation of the occupied territories and Israel relative to the rest of the world. When the economy of the territories and Israel have performed well, the outflow of people has diminished and in some cases reversed. For instance, the boom of the first three quarters of 1973 resulted in a large positive flow of people to the territories.[2]

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[1] Hagopian and Zahlan (1974: 61) estimate 400,000 from the West Bank and 50,000 from Gaza Strip. According to the Israel Economic Planning Authority (1967a: 29) 180,000-200,000 left the West Bank of whom 30,000-70,000 had been in refugee camps. Van Arkadie (1977: 159 and 161) mentions 200,000-300,000 as the number of refugees who left the West Bank and footnotes other estimates.

[2] The October 1973 war created a temporary recession in the Israeli economy during the last quarter of that year. But this did not affect Palestinian workers because the Israeli war effort had created a high civilian demand for Arab labor from the territories.

TABLE 1

Population[a] of West Bank and Gaza Strip
(thousands)

Year	West Bank	Gaza Strip[b]	Total
1922	223[c]	18	241
1931	274[c]	17	291
1946	387[c]	30[c]	417
1952	686	295	981
1961	729	370	1,099
1967 (Sept.)	596[d]	347	943
1968[e]	584	326	910
1978[e]	700	420	1,120

[a] Data in this table are estimates from many different sources that may not be consistent among themselves.

[b] Excluding North Sinai population.

[c] Unreliable estimates.

[d] Israeli census of September 1967, excluding population of the refugee camp of Shurafat.

[e] End of the year estimates.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Schmelz (1977: 96), Pielemeier (1975: 8), Israel (1976, 1977, and 1978).

TABLE 2

Net Movement of Residents and Visitors, 1971-1977,
West Bank and Gaza Strip
(thousands of persons)

	Visitors[a]			Residents		
Year	Arrivals	Departures	Balance[b]	Arrivals	Departures	Balance[b]
1971	91.5	88.4	+3.12	81.6	83.5	-1.88
1972	152.5	144.8	+7.67	148.6	164.3	-15.62
1973	111.9	110.2	+1.71	213.0	209.0	+4.02
1974	124.0	121.0	+2.98	243.0	257.8	-14.81
1975	119.6	119.6	-0.05	278.0	280.3	-2.57
1976	119.8	119.3	+0.50	294.5	310.7	-16.25
1977	131.4	126.4	-5.00	304.7	317.0	-11.92

[a] The Central Bureau of Statistics uses both visitor and resident movement to arrive at net in-migration figures. However, it is unclear as to how the visitor data is factored in.

[b] Balance is equal to number of arrivals minus number of departures.

Sources: Israel, Administered Territories Statistics Quarterly, various issues.

On the other hand, the 1974 and 1976-77 recessions sparked a high outflow of Palestinians from the occupied territories.

The Israeli administrators of the occupied territories compile relatively reliable information on the birth rate of the de facto population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but their death rate statistics capture only about 50 percent of actual deaths (the remaining 50 percent is estimated from these official figures). The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics estimates mortality rates of the population of the administered territories on the basis of the 1967 population census and assumed developments since then.[3]

The annual rate and numbers of live births in the West Bank and Gaza Strip/North Sinai for the 1968-1976 period are remarkably close to those estimated for the population of Mandated Palestine during 1922 to 1945 (see Table 3). The rates are also similar to those of Israeli Arabs between 1941 and 1978 and those of Egyptians during 1927-1962,[4] but are far higher than those of Israeli Jews.

In most societies, as the income and education levels of people increase and they become more urban and white collar in their professional structure, their desired number of children declines and their observed birth rate drops. However, the processes appears to be complex and difficult to predict sequentially. Moreover, the time delay in the development of cause and effect are relatively uncertain. The Israeli Arabs, for instance, should have experienced a sharper decline in their birth rates than actually took place due to their rapid economic prosperity. Their

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[3] The mortality statistics are not presented in the Central Bureau of Statistics' two major sources on the occupied areas: Quarterly Statistics of the Administered Territories and Statistical Abstract of Israel. But, they can be estimated from data presented on natural increase and live births.

[4] The Egyptian birth rate has greatly declined since the 1950's. During 1971-1976 it was only about 3.6 percent compared to nearly 5.0 percent for Gaza Strip/North Sinai residents.

TABLE 3

West Bank and Gaza Strip/North Sinai -- Rate and Number of Live Births,[a] 1968-1976

	West Bank		Gaza Strip and North Sinai	
Year	Annual Crude Rate of Birth (per 1,000 of population)	Total Number of Live Births[b]	Annual Crude Rate of Birth (per 1,000 of population)	Total Number of Live Births[b]
1968	44.3	25,650	43.0	15,503
1969	43.0	25,551	46.2	16,727
1970	43.7	26,455	43.4	15,985
1971	45.7	28,263	46.4	17,505
1972	45.6	28,819	47.5	18,342
1973	45.0	29,284	49.0	19,552
1974	45.5	29,868	50.9	21,084
1975	44.9	30,522	50.7	21,626
1976	47.2	31,769	52.6	22,400

[a] Data are based on registration reports of the Sub-District Health Bureau in each region. Since these reports also include births of previous months, a correction is made at the end of each year; thus the new data for the preceding year are based on the month in which births took place and not on the month in which they were registered.

[b] Excluding nomadic Bedouins.

Sources: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Quarterly Statistics of Administered Territories 3/4 (1977) and Statistical Abstract of Israel (1977).

unexpectedly high birth rate has been attributed by some authors to Israel's social-welfare policies. However, another explanation could be the restricted entry of Israeli Arabs to many white collar professional occupations and their generally inferior social status in the Israeli society. As the Israeli Arabs gain entry into higher education institutions and professional occupations, their traditional family and social values can be expected to break down more rapidly; their life-style will become more urban, industrial, and modern, and their birth rate is likely to decline.

Similarly, the birth rate of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are unlikely to decline greatly because of their economic prosperity alone. One reason is that female labor force participation is very low, even in comparison to other developing nations; this may explain, in part, high fertility rates. If the two territories remain mainly agricultural, industrial activity remains marginal, and professional, white collar occupations remain small, then the annual crude birth rates are likely to continue in a range of 45 to 50 births per 1,000 population.

THE WEST BANK

Because of its larger land area and population, the West Bank was able to absorb the 250-350,000 refugees of the 1948-49 war with far less economic disruption than the Gaza Strip. Moreover, under Jordanian rule from 1948 to 1967, Palestinians enjoyed greater freedom than in Gaza under Egyptian authority. Later the Palestinians from the West Bank were given the opportunity to become Jordanian citizens. During the period up to the 1967 war, many Palestinians left the West Bank for the East Bank of Jordan and 60-100,000 left for other parts of the Arab world. Among the latter, the majority found work in the Persian Gulf oil exporting countries, with the largest number in Kuwait.

Between 1967 and 1968 the West Bank population was reduced to about 600,000 through the movement of hundreds of thousands of refugees to

the East Bank and annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel. After economic recovery in the late 1960's, the territory began to experience a more normal pattern of demographic development, but its special geographic and political situations have led to overdependence on both Israel and Jordan. The territory continues to lose population to the rest of the Arab world and a large proportion of its labor force is absorbed by the Israeli economy. At present, wage remittances of West Bankers working in Israel, Jordan, and the Persian Gulf have become the major growth source for the economy.

POPULATION.

The rate of natural population increase on the West Bank prior to 1967 was estimated to be between 2 and 3 percent. The de facto population increase, however, is estimated to have been only 1.15 percent due to migration to the East Bank and other Arab countries. As shown in Table 4, during the first few years of Israeli occupation the rate of natural increase was relatively low. This was mainly because of the impact of the population reduction on the age structure during 1967-68.

By 1976 the rate of natural increase had increased to about 3 percent per annum. In general, the rates are substantially below that of Israeli Arabs and Gaza Strip residents. The de facto population growth rates are even lower because, despite economic recovery, the West Bank continues to lose large numbers of its residents through emigration. The loss of population has significantly increased during the 1975-77 recession in the Israeli economy, but it is not clear to what extent this may be a transitory development. It is likely that as the economies of Jordan and the Persian Gulf decelerate, the outflow of residents from the West Bank to these areas will also decrease.

The latest official Israeli estimates of the West Bank population (minus East Jerusalem) show a population of 682,000 for 1977 (see Table 5) and preliminary estimates for 1978 indicate a population of about 700,000.

TABLE 4

The West Bank -- Population and Natural Increase, 1967-1977

Year	Population at the Beginning of the Period (thousands)	Annual Rate of Natural Increase (percent)	Annual Rate of Increase *De Facto* Population (percent)
1967	595.9[a]	0.50[b]	-1.7
1968	585.7	2.00[c]	-0.7
1969	581.7	2.11[c]	2.3
1970	595.7	2.30[c]	1.5
1971	603.9	2.63	2.2
1972	617.3	2.72	1.9
1973	629.0	2.69	2.7
1974	646.2	2.80	2.4
1975	661.6	2.81	0.5
1976	665.1	3.05	0.9
1977	670.9	...	...

[a] Based on September 1967 census.

[b] Based on incomplete information.

[c] Low population growth rate is partly due to change in population age structure as a result of the 1967 flight of a large number of West Bank residents to East Bank (Jordan).

Sources: Compiled and Estimated from Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

TABLE 5

The West Bank -- De Facto Population[a]
Estimate, 1967-1977
(thousands)

	New Series[b]		Old Series[b]	
Year	Average	End-year	Average	End-year
1967	...	585.7	...	585.5
1968	...	581.7	579.1	584.1
1969	...	595.2	594.6	599.6
1970	...	603.9	605.5	610.3
1971	...	617.3	619.0	625.6
1972	622.7	629.0	632.0	639.3
1973	639.9	646.2	650.6	657.4
1974	657.4	661.6	669.5	674.5
1975	665.7	665.1	680.4	681.4
1976	672.9	671.2	...	...
1977[c]	685.2	681.8	...	...

[a] Annual de facto population estimate was estimated by the addition of net arrivals and natural population increases to the de facto population at the time of the September 1967 census.

[b] The "new series" is a revision of the "old series," both reported by the Central Bureau of Statistics.

[c] Estimate.

... Not available.

Sources: Israel, Quarterly Statistics of Administered Territories, various issues.

Age Structure

The 1967-68 movement of a large number of adults out of the West Bank after the war led to substantial underrepresentation of 15-24 and 25-49 age groups in the population. As shown in Table 6, by 1976 the 15-24 age group had largely recovered its normal proportion (due to natural aging and slowed rates of emigration), but the 25-49 group remained underrepresented. It will take about one generation (or 15 more years) for this group to recover its normal proportion in the age structure.

Labor Force

Labor force participation on the West Bank is similar to that in most Moslem, rural populations. Participation is very low for women and older male groups. As shown in Table 7, the male participation rate is below those in more developed economies such as Israel (which is about 70 percent) or that of Israeli Arabs who have an even higher rate. The labor participation rate of the West Bank rose rapidly in the early 1970's, but declined between 1974-76. The decline may be due to recent population shifts from the West Bank to the East Bank of Jordan. Further decline is possible if secondary and higher education enrollments expand greatly, but this appears unlikely. A more probable development is an increase of female participation due to shortages of male workers and increased education and economic self-reliance among women.

The recent population shift to the East Bank has been partly due to the 1975-77 recession in the Israeli economy. As shown in Table 8, the recession has also caused a decline in the number of workers in Israel who are from the West Bank. According to official Israeli statistics, their numbers peaked at over 42,000 in 1974. The subsequent decline may have also been due to rapid rises in the demand for semi-skilled labor on the East Bank of Jordan and in the Persian Gulf.

TABLE 6

West Bank -- Population by
Sex and Age,[a] 1967, 1971, and 1976
(percentages)

	Males			Females		
Age Group	1967[b]	1971	1976	1967[b]	1971	1976
0-4	18.8	18.3	18.6	16.9	16.2	17.0
5-14	32.4	33.2	30.7	28.0	29.8	27.8
15-24	14.6	18.1	22.1	15.8	17.8	20.2
25-49	18.7	18.6	18.4	24.6	25.2	25.0
50-64	7.9	6.8	6.2	8.1	6.5	6.5
65 and over	7.0	5.0	4.1	6.2	4.5	3.5
All ages:						
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Thousands	295.6	313.6	336.5	300.4	312.0	334.4

[a] The figures for age structure reportedly were smoothed and rounded by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics because the reports on age ranges within the population are inaccurate and because of the difficulty in collecting change components.

[b] September 1967 census.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

TABLE 7

West Bank -- Labor Force Potential and Participation Rate, 1968-1976

	Males Only		Total Population	
Year	Working-age Population[a] (thousands)	Labor Force Participation[b] (percent)	Working-age Population[a] (thousands)	Labor Force Participation (percent)
1968	144	56	309	30
1969	149	62	314	37
1970	154	61	323	37
1971	158	62	330	36
1972	161	67	337	38
1973	163	67	342	37
1974	171	66	355	39
1975	177	62	367	37
1976	179	60	371	35

[a] Population age 14 and over.

[b] Participation rate in the labor force (that is, those willing to work including unemployed persons).

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

TABLE 8

West Bank -- Employees Working in Israel by Sector, 1970-1977
(thousands)

Year	Total A[a]	Total B[b]	Construction	Agriculture	Industry	Other Sectors
1970	17.9	14.7	8.4	2.6	1.9[c]	1.8
1971	25.6	25.6	14.6	3.3	4.3	3.4
1972	34.9	34.9	19.8	4.3	6.5	4.3
1973	38.6	38.6	21.9	3.4	8.0	5.3
1974	42.6	42.4	23.8	4.5	8.2	5.9
1975	40.0	40.4	22.2	4.4	7.5	6.3
1976	37.1	37.1	18.4	4.5	7.8	6.4
1977	35.5	...	...	...	...	...

[a] According to Administered Territories Statistics Quarterly.

[b] According to Statistical Abstract of Israel.

[c] Data based on estimate.

... Not available.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Israel, Administered Territories Statistics Quarterly, various issues and Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

Student Population

The student population of the West Bank has undergone far more change since 1968 than that of the Gaza Strip. The major difference between the two territories is that on the West Bank, UNRWA's educational role is much less important than alternative private and government systems. Therefore, secondary and higher education is not restricted by UNRWA's limited budget and has seen more growth than is the case in the Gaza Strip. The more dynamic educational system of the West Bank has resulted in a 4-5 percent average annual growth in enrollments. As shown in Table 9, between 1968 and 1975/76 total enrollment increased by 68,000 from 163,000 to 231,000. In 1975/76, 96.1 percent of the relevant school age population attended primary and preparatory schools; only 27.3 percent of the 15-19 year old age group was enrolled in secondary school. Further increases in enrollment as well as quality of education in the West Bank are likely.

GAZA STRIP

Gaza Strip is a small rectangular piece of land 363 square kilometers in area. Its population was estimated at less than 30,000 prior to the 1948-49 war. At that time it reportedly was losing population to central coastal population centers. During 1948-51, its population increased by 200-250,000 most of whom became charges of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

From 1948 to 1967 Gaza Strip was under Egyptian military rule and the people were severely restricted in their civil and economic activities by the Egyptian military administration.[5] During the period of Egyptian occupation, the territory's major industry was provided by the severely limited funds of UNRWA.

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[5] This is supported by both Arab and Israeli sources. See Hagopian and Zahlan (1974: 58), Efrat (1977), and Whartman (1974).

TABLE 9

West Bank -- Number of Pupils by Type of Educational Institution,[a] 1968, 1972/1973, and 1975/1976 (thousands)

	1963	1972/1973	1975/1976
Kindergartens	5.9	8.0	8.0
Primary Schools	113.7	139.7	146.7
Preparatory Schools	27.7	35.0	48.2
Postprimary Schools	13.8	18.2	25.2
Teacher Training Colleges	1.7	1.7	2.6
Totals	162.8	202.6	230.7
of which: Boys	96.7	117.0	132.8

[a] Data were originally collected by the local commanders of the Israel Defense Forces and the Israel Defense Forces Command and processed by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

In June 1967, the Israeli occupation put an end to Egyptian administration and removed some of the former restrictions, but maintained others and added a number of new ones. On the whole, however, the Israeli role, although highly severe and paternal in the administrative and security fields has provided a liberalized economic environment. This has led to a rapid growth in the income of the territory. Agriculture, its main economic sector, has expanded greatly since Israeli occupation and the Israeli economy has become the main source of employment and income for 20-30,000 residents of the Gaza Strip.

POPULATION.

As a result of the efforts of UNRWA and Israeli administrators, Gaza has had relatively low and declining death rate while the birth rate has remained very high (refer to Table 3). As can be observed from Table 10, the result of these developments has been a steadily increasing rate of natural increase which by the mid-1970's was among the highest in the world.

Table 11 presents two sets of population series for the Gaza Strip and North Sinai. The "new series" is a revision of the "old series" both of which were published by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.[6] It should be pointed out that all subsequent Israeli published population statistics continue to be based on the September 1967 census of administered territories which may have undercounted the population. Therefore, the data should be treated cautiously.

Age Structure

The migration of 30-50,000 residents from Gaza and North Sinai in 1967-68 significantly changed the age structure of the population. As shown

[6] Israeli authorities conducted the census under curfew conditions and used it as a mechanism to issue identity cards to the residents. But, it is doubtful that they received full cooperation from the people.

TABLE 10

Gaza Strip and North Sinai -- Population and Natural Increase, 1967-1977

Year	Population at the Beginning of the Period (thousands)	Annual Rate of Natural Increase (percent)	Annual Rate of Increase of De Facto Population (percent)
1967	389.7[a]	0.85[b]	-2.3
1968	380.9	1.94[c]	-6.6
1969	355.9	2.59[c]	1.8
1970	362.2	2.43[c]	1.5
1971	367.7	2.88	2.2
1972	375.9	3.06	2.0
1973	383.5	3.16	3.6
1974	397.2	3.32	2.8
1975	408.5	3.38	2.4
1976	418.5	3.54	2.5
1977	429.0	...	...

[a] Based on September 1967 census.

[b] Based on incomplete data.

[c] Low population growth rate is partly due to change in population age structure as a result of the 1967 flight of a large number of Gaza Strip and North Sinai residents to other countries.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

TABLE 11

Gaza Strip and North Sinai -- *De Facto* Population[a] Estimate,[b] 1967-1977
(thousands)

	New Series		Old Series	
Year	Average	End-period	Average	End-period
1967	...	380.9		
1968	...	355.9	360.8	357.8
1969	...	362.2	361.7	365.5
1970	...	367.7	368.5	372.4
1971	...	375.9	377.4	381.8
1972	379.4	383.5	386.0	390.7
1973	391.4	397.2	399.1	405.4
1974	404.8	408.5	414.1	418.8
1975	415.1	418.5	426.5	430.8
1976	425.6	429.0	...	...
1977[c]	437.0	441.6	...	...
1978	...	...	...	...

[a] Excluding nomadic Bedouin population. In 1967, North Sinai population totalled 33,441 (8.8 percent of the total Gaza and North Sinai population). It has been included in Gaza population estimates since 1968.

[b] Annual *de facto* population was estimated by the addition of net arrivals and natural increase to the *de facto* population at the time of the September 1967 census.

[c] Estimate.

... Not available.

Sources: Israel, *Quarterly Statistics of Administered Territories*, various issues.

in Table 12, the proportion of 15-24 and 25-49 age groups was most affected by the departure. Although by 1976, the 15-24 group had regained approximately its pre-1967 proportion of 20-24 percent, the older 25-49 group was still underrepresented.

Labor Force

Like most Moslem and many traditional societies, the labor force of the Gaza Strip and North Sinai is characterized by very low active female participation. Female participation is higher among some professional urban groups but is very low among both the lower and upper classes in urban areas. In the rural areas, where agriculture is the main occupation, women participate in a variety of agricultural and cottage industries, but their activities are generally unreported in statistics.

As shown in Table 13, the total rate of labor force participation is relatively low because of low female participation. The male labor force participation is about 66 percent for the population age 14 and over, which is not low compared with most less developed countries, but is when compared to Israeli Arabs.

Since the Israelis began to encourage the import of labor from occupied areas in the late 1960's, the number of workers in Israel from Gaza Strip/North Sinai rose rapidly until the 1975 economic recession. At its peak in 1976, there were nearly 28,000 workers from Gaza Strip/North Sinai according to official Israeli statistics (Table 14). The 1976-1978 economic slowdown in Israel has reduced the need for foreign labor but there has not been any significant decline in the officially reported number of workers from Gaza Strip/North Sinai.[7]

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[7] Official statistics do not include an unknown but significant number of unmonitored Arabs working in Israel.

TABLE 12

Gaza Strip and North Sinai -- Population by Sex and Age,[a] 1967, 1971, and 1976 (percentages)

	Males			Females		
Age Groups	1967[b]	1971	1976	1967	1971	1976
0-4	21.0	19.2	20.3	18.0	16.6	18.1
5-14	32.8	33.9	30.2	28.2	29.5	26.8
15-24	15.6	19.6	22.3	17.5	20.5	20.7
25-49	18.6	18.2	18.7	24.8	25.4	26.7
50-64	6.1	5.5	5.7	6.4	5.0	2.4
65 and over	5.1	3.6	2.8	4.3	3.0	2.4
All ages:						
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	189.1	186.4	211.9	200.6	195.5	217.1

[a] The figures for age structure reportedly were smoothed and rounded by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics because the reports on age ranges within the population are inaccurate and because of the difficulty in collecting change components.

[b] September 1967 census.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

TABLE 13

Gaza Strip and North Sinai -- Labor Force Potential and Participation Rate, 1968-1976

	Males Only		Total Population	
Year	Working-age Population[a] (thousands)	Labor Force Participation[b] (percent)	Working-age Population[a] (thousand)	Labor Force Participation[b] (percent)
1968	80	59	183	29
1969	86	62	189	31
1970	90	63	197	32
1971	92	62	201	31
1972	94	64	205	32
1973	98	66	210	33
1974	102	67	219	34
1975	105	65	225	32
1976	108	66	232	33

[a] Population age 14 and over.

[b] Percent labor force of population age 14 and over.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

TABLE 14

Gaza Strip and North Sinai -- Employees Working in Israel by Sector, 1970-1977 (thousands)

Year	Total A[a]	Total B[b]	Construction[b]	Agriculture[b]	Industry[b]	Other Sectors[b]
1970	5.2	5.9	2.8	2.4	0.5[c]	0.2
1971	8.2	8.2	3.1	4.2	0.7[c]	0.2[c]
1972	17.5	17.5	6.3	7.9	2.6	0.8
1973	22.7	22.7	9.8	8.4	3.1	1.4
1974	26.1	26.3	12.2	8.6	3.9	1.6
1975	25.9	25.9	13.8	4.8	4.7	2.6
1976	27.8	27.8	14.4	5.4	5.1	2.8
1977	27.4	...	...	...	...	...

[a] According to the Administered Territories Statistics Quarterly.

[b] According to the Statistical Abstract of Israel.

[c] Data based on estimate.

... Not available.

Sources: Compiled from Israel, Adminstered Territories Statistics Quarterly, various issues and Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

Student Population

The population of Gaza Strip has enjoyed wide access to primary education through the educational activities of UNRWA. However, adequate secondary education has been lacking and higher education negligible. As shown in Table 15, under Israeli occupation preparatory education has significantly expanded but postprimary education has hardly kept pace with population increases. Between 1968 and 1976, the total student population increased from 101,000 to 137,000, which represents a rate of growth below that of the school age population. As of 1975/76, the enrollment rate in primary and preparatory schools was 94.9 percent of the relevant school age population; 33.4 percent of the 15-19 age group was enrolled in secondary school. A major constraint to further quantitative and qualitative improvements are limited UNRWA funding and limited alternative school systems.

TABLE 15

Gaza Strip and North Sinai -- Number of Pupils
by Type of Educational Institution[a], 1968
1972/1973 and 1975/1976
(thousands)

	1968	1972/1973	1975/1976
Kindergartens	0.7	1.7	3.1
Primary schools	64.9	81.3	89.1
Preparatory schools	22.2	23.5	30.0
Postprimary schools	12.5	12.5	14.2
Teacher training colleges	0.2	0.2	0.4
Total	100.5	119.2	136.9
of which: Boys	54.5	65.8	76.3

[a] Data were originally collected by the local commanders of the Israel Defense Forces and the Israel Defense Forces Command and processed by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

APPENDIX C. PALESTINIAN POPULATION OUTSIDE THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP

BACKGROUND

As estimated in Appendix A, the total number of Palestinians at the end of 1978 was between 3.26-4.2 million. Since at most only 1.2 million live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, there must be 2-3 million in other countries. This chapter describes the number and distribution of these remaining Palestinians, who are mostly distributed in Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Persian Gulf region.

NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF PALESTINIANS

A major problem in estimating the number of Palestinians abroad is that a large number of males who have immigrated to other countries have married into the indigenous populations without creating much imbalance in the female to male ratio in the populations of their origin. This means that the birth rates of Palestinian communities that appear to have been losing population have not decreased significantly. However, the increased number of Palestinian immigrant communities across the Middle East and other regions poses a new problem in defining who is a Palestinian. For instance, many Palestinians in the Persian Gulf and Western countries have married into the indigenous population and an increasing number have grandchildren who were born in the country of their residence. How many family members of such a person should be considered Palestinian is open to debate. For the purposes of this appendix, we have assumed that all members of the nuclear family of a male Palestinian immigrant (up to three generations of his male descendents) are Palestinians.

Table 1 estimates the number of Palestinians by country of residence by the end of 1978. It should be noted that these estimates are based on

TABLE 1

Estimated Number of Palestinians
by Country of Residence, 1978
(thousands)

Country or Region	Number of Palestinians	
	Minimum	Maximum
Occupied Territories		
West Bank	690	706
Gaza Strip	442	460
Subtotal	1,132	1,166
Other Countries		
Jordan	1,180	1,220
Israel[a]	590	602
Syria	200	260
Lebanon	416	450
Kuwait[b]	305	390
Saudi Arabia	110	135
Qatar	20	28
United Arab Emirates	39	69
Oman	—	1
Bahrain	2	5
Iraq	60	95
Libya	5	11
Algeria	10	14
Tunisia	—	1
Morocco	—	1
North Yemen	—	1
South Yemen	--	1
Sudan	1	2
Egypt	60	75
Cyprus[c]	1	2
Turkey	—	1
Iran	--	1
Pakistan	—	1
United States[cd]	50	70
West Germany	14	17
France	1	2
Britain	1	3
Canada[d]	2	4
Latin America	7	10
Other Europe	5	9
Other Asia[f]	3	6
Other Africa[g]	2	3
Oceania	1	1
Subtotal	3,085	3,491
Total	4,217	4,657

continued

Table 1
Number of Palestinians by Country
Continued

[a] Israeli non-Jews.

[b] Including Kuwaiti citizens of Palestinian origin and their dependents.

[c] Includes refugees from Lebanon.

[d] Excluding U.S. citizens more than three generations removed from their immigrant ancestors.

[e] Includes English and French speaking countries of South and Central America and the Caribbean.

[f] Mainly in East and Southeast Asia.

[g] Mainly in West Africa.

[h] Mainly in Australia.

-- None or negligible

Sources: Compiled and estimated by CACI from various unpublished sources, Americans for Middle East Understanding (1978), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (1978), Collard and Wilson (1977), Farah (1977), The Middle East (February 22, 1977: 14), Zahlan and Zahlan (1977), Hagopian and Zahlan (1974), Abu-Lughod (1973), Shaath (1972), and Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (various publications).

a wide variety of sources with varying degrees of reliability. Many of the sources were inconsistent. In most cases the official statistics of the governments were outdated and estimates had to rely mainly on unofficial estimates that varied considerably from source to source. The grand total for the estimated populations range from 4.2 to 4.66 million -- considerably greater than the conservative estimate of 3.26 million total settled population from Appendix A, but remarkably close to the 4.2 million estimate using more moderate assumptions.

Out of the estimated 4.2-4.66 million Palestinians, 1.13-1.17 million are in the West Bank/Gaza Strip areas. The population of Palestinians outside these two territories is 3.1-3.5 million. Among the latter, the largest concentration is in Israel and the nearby countries of Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria where most of the refugees who left Palestine during 1948-49 are located.

The next largest concentration of Palestinians is in the Persian Gulf region, where 536-723,000 Palestinians and their dependents have played a major role in the rapid economic growth of most oil exporting countries. The estimated number of Palestinians in North Africa (including Egypt) is 75-102,000, but these groups generally are integrated into the existing society and in many cases have lost their Palestinian identity. The number of Palestinians in Europe is estimated at 21-31,000, most of whom are married into the indigenous population. This group mainly consists of European university educated males but there are also some blue collar workers who went to West Europe in the late 1950's and 1960's. The estimated number of Palestinians in the United States and Canada is 52-74,000.[1] The number of Palestinians in other regions of the world are estimated to be between 15,000 and 24,000.

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[1] Some estimates are much higher. According to the Aramco World Magazine (March/April 1978: 30-33) in 1977 there were 20,000 Palestinian-Americans who belonged to 19 clubs of the American Ramallah Federation, which is formed by the people who claim origin from the single town of Ramallah on the West Bank.

THE REFUGEE POPULATION

As was discussed in Appendix A, conservative estimates of the number of refugees who left Israel in 1948-49 range from 750,000 to over 900,000. The number of these refugees and their descendents has grown rapidly and have become a mobile source of skilled workers in the Middle East. Given the restrictions under which the Palestinian refugees have existed since 1949, the development of their education, skills, and achievements in commercial and academic fields is remarkable. By all accounts, a major portion of the credit for these achievements should be shared by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Given its small budget, the scale and scope of the activities of UNRWA are remarkable. Although the relations of UNRWA with the governments of Arab countries where it operates have not always been smooth, the Agency has been responsible for easing tensions between the refugees and Arab Governments.

According to UNRWA statistics, in 1978 there were 1.76 million registered refugees (see Table 2). The largest single concentration of registered refugees is in the small territory of the Gaza Strip (354,000), but the largest number of refugees are on the East Bank of Jordan (683,000). The relative number of refugees in the West Bank has declined over time as a result of the 1967 war and Israeli occupation, but it still hosts over 310,000 registered refugees. Lebanon and Syria each have about 200,000 registered refugees.

Among the registered refugee groups in the five territories, those in Jordan have most successfully integrated into the indigenous society. Consequently, out of a total registered population of nearly 700,000 in Jordan, only 76,000 are still in refugee camps. On the other hand, the refugee population in Lebanon is least integrated with the indigenous society. This is in part due to the hostility of Lebanese Government officials, particularly the Christian element, to the refugees. Indeed,

TABLE 2

Distribution of Refugee and Refugee Camp Population, June 1978

Place of Registration	Total Registered Population	Number of Camps		Number of Persons Officially Registered in Established Camps	Number of Persons Actually Living in Camps	
		Established	Emergency		Established[b]	Emergency[c]
Jordan	682,561	4	6	75,821	91,221	130,000
West Bank	310,268	20	--	78,235	80,704	--
Gaza Strip	354,103	8	--	198,109	200,278	--
Lebanon	211,902	13	--	95,468	99,544	--
Syria	198,435	6	4	31,994	37,659	20,253
Total	1,757,269	51	10	479,627	509,406	150,473

[a] Persons officially registered in these camps are refugees registered with UNRWA who are shown in UNRWA records as living in camps, irrespective of their category of registration (RSN), although some may have moved to villages, towns, or cities in other parts of the country and their removal has yet to be reported to the Agency. The figures do not include refugees in camps who are not given shelter by UNRWA but benefit from sanitation services.

[b] Of the 509,406 persons actually living in these camps, 501,079 are UNRWA-registered refugees and their unregistered dependents. The balance of 8,327 are not UNRWA-registered refugees and are thus not eligible for UNRWA assistance.

[c] Persons actually living in these camps comprise 112,994 UNRWA-registered refugees and 37,479 other persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 hostilities or subsequent fighting in the Jordan valley in early 1968.

-- None or negligible.

Source: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) (1978: 64).

Lebanon is the only Arab country where the expulsion of refugees has been discussed seriously by a large segment of the society.[2] After the 1975 phase of the Lebanese civil war, the conflict between Palestinians and Lebanese Christians broke into open warfare in which some of the Christian militia may have killed as many as 10,000-20,000 Palestinian refugees.

Palestinian refugees in UNRWA/UNESCO schools have increased from 43,000 in 1951 to 307,000 in 1978. As shown in Table 3, the majority of students are at the elementary level. In addition to students in UNRWA/UNESCO schools, there are over 78,000 students enrolled at alternative schools (see Table 4). Thus, the total number of registered refugees in UNRWA/UNESCO and other school systems is 385,000. Since the UNRWA/UNESCO system does not offer any secondary level education, the only students at that level are those that are enrolled at government and private schools (see Table 5).

UNRWA's role in university education is limited to annual distribution of a small number of scholarships for study at universities in various Arab countries (see Table 6). Most Palestinians with a university education have received it through direct or indirect financial support from Arab Governments. According to Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (1973), a major reason for the high educational achievement of Palestinians has been open access to universities in most Arab countries.

A major deficiency in the educational system of most Middle Eastern countries is inadequate technical and vocational training. The shortage of skilled labor has long been a major obstacle to regional economic development. As shown in Table 7, there are 4,160 training places in UNRWA/UNESCO facilities. These vocational training facilities have proved to

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[2] The Lebanese Christians, particularly the marginal extreme right wing factions, have continued to fear that the largely Moslem Palestinians will tip the delicate balance of power between the Christians and Moslems of Lebanon in favor of the latter.

TABLE 3

Number of Students in UNRWA/UNESCO Schools, 1951-1978

Year	Elementary	Preparatory	Secondary	All Levels
1951	43,051	61	...	43,112
1952	47,619	164	...	47,783
1953	70,562	1,014	...	71,576
1954	90,748	3,819	22	94,589
1955	98,427	6,242	82	104,751
1956	102,007	9,683	200	111,890
1957	101,504	12,867	334	114,705
1958	102,031	15,410	495	117,936
1959	101,462	18,199	578	120,239
1960	103,632	19,639	612	123,883
1961	104,877	23,026	598	128,501
1962	110,439	25,823	875	137,137
1963	117,030	28,428	...	145,458
1964	123,629	30,932	...	154,561
1965	134,344	33,649	...	167,993
1966	139,826	36,145	...	175,971
1967	147,519	39,448	...	186,967
1968	141,454	38,137	...	179,591
1969	155,633	45,289	...	200,922
1970	168,611	50,767	...	219,378
1971	176,724	55,079	...	231,803
1972	189,051	56,027	...	245,078
1973	199,456	56,528	...	255,984
1974	209,201	59,123	...	268,324
1975	211,788	63,518	...	275,306
1976	216,753	72,140	...	288,893
1977	218,849	77,544	...	296,393
1978[a]	223,501	83,467	...	306,968

[a] Including noneligible children attending UNRWA/UNESCO schools, who now number 39,940, of whom 10,024 are registered children in the Gaza Strip, where all refugee children have always been regarded in practice as eligible for education services. Noneligible may mean either noneligible refugee children or nonrefugee children. It is relevant that in Jordan nonrefugee children in Agency schools are offset against refugee pupils attending government schools, free of charge, including secondary schools; that in the Syrian Arab Republic some refugee pupils attend government elementary and preparatory schools and those who proceed to secondary education attend government schools, in both cases free of charge; that in Gaza some teachers are provided by the Gaza Education Department for Agency schools and refugee children who proceed to secondary education attend government schools, free of charge; and that in Lebanon it has not proved feasible to collect fees from the small number of noneligible refugee children and no arrangements have been made with the Government for offsetting the small number of non-refugee children in Agency schools.

... Not available.

Sources: United Nations (1978: 68).

TABLE 4

Distribution of Refugees at UNRWA/UNESCO and Government/Private Schools, 1978

	UNRWA/UNESCO Schools			Government/Private Schools		Total	
	Number of Schools	Number of Elementary Pupils[a] (thousands)	Number of Preparatory Pupils (thousands)	Number of Schools	Number of Pupils (thousands)	Number of Schools	Number of Pupils (thousands)
Jordan	195	88	32	...	25	...	144
West Bank	100	26	9	...	23	...	59
Gaza	131	52	20	...	9	...	80
Lebanon	81	27	10	...	8	...	46
Syria	110	30	12	...	14	...	56
Total	617	223	83	...	78	...	385

[a] Including noneligible children attending UNRWA/UNESCO schools who now number 40,000 of whom 10,000 are registered children in the Gaza Strip, where all refugee children have always been regarded in practice as eligible for education services.

... Not available.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from United Nations (1978: 68-71).

TABLE 5

Distribution of Refugee Pupils in Government and Private Schools by Country, 1978 (thousands)

Country	Elementary	Preparatory	Secondary	All Levels
Jordan	9	5	10	24
West Bank	13	5	6	23
Gaza	...	...	9	9
Lebanon	3	2	3	8
Syria	8	2	4	14
Total	32	14	32	78

... None or negligible.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from United Nations (1978: 69).

TABLE 6

Palestinians With UNRWA University Scholarships in Arab Countries, 1978

Country	Number[a]
Egypt	114
Jordan	91
Lebanon	29
Syria	93
Iraq	8
Saudia Arabia	4
Total	339

[a] These exclude students without scholarships or scholarships from Arab countries.

Sources: United Nations (1978).

TABLE 7

Number of Vocational Training Places in UNRWA/UNESCO Training Centers, 1978

Trade or Profession	Jordan	West Bank	Gaza	Syria	Lebanon	Total
Vocational and Technical Education						
Metal Trades	312	104	316	212	240	1,184
Electrical Trades	112	48	96	80	80	416
Building Trades	144	64	112	64	48	432
Commercial Courses	192	192	...	...	96	480
Paramedical Courses	20	40	...	56	32	148
Vocational Courses for Girls	60	224	...	...	...	284
Subtotal	840	672	524	412	496	2,944
Preservice Teacher Training	550	550	...	...	116	1,216
Total	1,390	1,222	524	412	612	4,160

... None or negligible

Sources: Compiled and estimated from United Nations (1978: 72).

be extremely successful in training Palestinians. Usually, upon graduation, each student from these facilities can find several job opportunities in Arab oil exporting countries or other countries in the Middle East. In recent years, UNRWA has been constrained from rapid expansion of its vocational training facilities by lack of adequate funds even though the demand for its vocational school graduates had considerably surpassed the capacity of its training centers. This program probably is the most productive one among all UNRWA projects since it develops skilled technical workers for the Middle East labor market as a whole. Such workers are in severely short supply in all of the oil exporting countries as well as in Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. The contribution of these workers to Middle East economies are far greater than their small numbers and inadequately funded training facilities would indicate. It is ironic that while the Middle East oil exporting countries are willing to spend billions of dollars to import high-salaried foreign technicians from as far away as West Europe and Japan, they have not expanded the inadequate UNRWA/UNESCO training facilities, which have produced some of their best workers.

NON-JEWS IN ISRAEL

When the 1948-49 war ended, only about 60-90,000 non-Jews[3] were in Israeli territory out of the (conservatively estimated) 1.41 million non-Jewish occupants[4] of Palestine (see Table 8). Because the first 12 years of Israeli demographic statistics are based on the 1948 registration of *de facto* population, which is not a reliable source for the non-Jewish population, the data should be interpreted cautiously at least until the 1961 census of Israel. During the early years of Israel's independence,

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[3] This was a rough estimate that apparently excluded the nomadic population, roughly estimated to number 60-100,000. Estimates of the non-Jewish population of Israel in the first few years of its independence are extremely inconsistent.

[4] Excluding nomadic population, last estimated at about 66,553 in the 1931 census of Palestine.

TABLE 8

Non-Jewish Population in Israel
(at year-end, in thousands)

Year[a]	Total Non-Jews	Moslems	Christians	Druze and Others
1949	160.0	111.5	34.0	14.5
1950	167.1	116.1	36.0	15.0
1951	173.4	118.9	39.0	15.5
1952	179.3	122.8	40.4	16.1
1953	185.8	127.6	41.4	16.8
1954	191.8	131.8	42.0	18.0
1955	198.6	136.3	43.3	19.0
1956	204.9	141.4	43.7	19.8
1957	213.1	146.8	45.8	20.5
1958	221.5	152.8	47.3	21.4
1959	229.8	159.2	48.3	22.3
1960	239.2	166.3	49.6	23.3
1961	252.5	174.9	51.3	26.3
1962	262.9	183.0	52.6	27.3
1963	274.5	192.2	53.9	28.5
1964	286.4	202.3	55.5	28.6
1965	299.3	212.4	57.1	29.8
1966	312.5	223.0	58.5	31.0
1967	392.7	289.6	71.0	32.1
1968	406.3	300.8	72.2	33.3
1969	422.7	314.5	73.5	34.6
1970	440.0	...	...	...
1971	458.5	343.9	77.3	37.3
1972[b]	461.0	352.0	72.1	36.9
1973	493.2	377.2	76.7	39.3
1974	514.7	395.2	78.7	40.8
1975	533.8	411.4	80.2	42.2
1976	555.0	429.1	82.0	43.9

[a] 1949-1960 based on the 1948 registration (de facto); 1961-1971 based on the 1961 census (de jure); 1972-1976 based on the 1972 census.

[b] Figures for May 1972 taken from census enumeration.

... Not available

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

the non-Jewish population was changing rapidly through continued movement of people across Israeli borders, expulsion of Arabs by Israeli military authorities, and wanderings of the nomadic Bedouins in the desert areas of the Negev, Gaza Strip, and Sinai. Bearing the above qualifications in mind, the Israeli data indicate that the non-Jewish population increased from 160,000 in 1949 to 239,000 in 1960, representing an average annual growth of 3.7 percent.

Population estimates for 1961 are probably more reliable because of the census taken that year. The de jure 1961 population of non-Jews are reported as follows:

Moslems	175,000
Christians	51,000
Other non-Jews	26,000
Total	252,000

This estimate appears to be about 4 percent higher than previous official estimates based on the 1948 enumeration. It is also possible that the 1961 census did not fully account for the nomadic Bedouins who still continued to reside in more than one country.

Between 1961 and 1977 the non-Jewish population of Israel doubled to 555,000, which represents an annual growth rate of 5.4 percent. The major source of growth of the non-Jewish population of Israel has been their high rate of natural increase. As shown in Table 9, their high birth rates and low and declining death rates have led to one of the highest rates of natural increase in the world.

As shown in Table 10, the birth rates of Moslems, among the Israeli non-Jews, are among the highest in the world. The total fertility of Christians is higher than that of the Jews but is less than half that of the Moslems. According to Ben-Porath (1972: 505), this can be attributed

TABLE 9

Vital Statistics of Total Non-Jewish Population in Israel[a]
(period average, per thousand head of population)

Period	Live Births	Deaths	Natural Increase	Infant Deaths
1951-1955	46.3	9.7	36.7	60.1
1956-1960	47.9	8.2	39.7	54.6
1961-1965	50.2	6.6	43.6	45.2
1966-1970	46.3	6.0	40.4	41.2
1971-1975	44.8	5.8	38.9	38.0[b]
1976	43.5	5.1	38.4	...

[a] Prior to 1971, figures reflect exclusion of East Jerusalem. For 1971-1975 and 1976, East Jerusalem is included.

[b] Average of 4 years of data. Data for 1975 not available.

... Not available.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

TABLE 10

Birth Rates Among Non-Jewish Populations in Israel[a]
(number of live births per thousand population)

Year	Moslems	Christians	Other Non-Jews[b]
1960	55.2	35.8	50.0
1965	55.5	34.5	47.1
1966	55.0	31.8	44.1
1967	49.6	29.3	39.9
1968	49.5	29.2	43.1
1969	50.9	30.1	43.4
1970	50.5/50.2[a]	27.7/26.7[a]	43.0
1971	50.4	25.6	42.3
1972	49.5	26.4	42.4
1973	48.7	28.1	44.0
1974	48.7	27.6	42.0
1975	46.3	25.6	40.8
1976	47.0	25.5	43.3

[a] Prior to 1970, figures exclude the population of East Jerusalem. For 1970, the first figure excludes East Jerusalem and the second figure includes it. Thereafter, figures do include East Jerusalem.

[b] Principally the Druze population.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

partly to the Christians' tendency to marry later than Moslems. However, the Christians have a lower infant mortality rate and their age structure is older than among Moslems.[5] Ben Porath's explanation for the large number of children in the Israeli non-Jewish community relative to the Jewish community interrelates several factors. He points out that the Arab and Jewish community are socially segregated with interactions limited to highly functional modes in the economic field. The lack of interaction between Jews and non-Jews has insulated the non-Jews from the demonstration effect of the higher income groups' (which are mainly Jews) life-style or consumption pattern.[6] On the other hand, he speculates that the rising Arab income may have been channeled into having larger families. Ben-Porath indicates that non-Jewish fertility will decline as women gain more education and as they join the labor force in greater number. It can also be inferred that as (or if) the wide social gap between the two societies closes, the non-Jews will become more modern in their consumption pattern through the demonstration effect and their family size will decline.

In a study completed in 1969, Ben-Porath (1972: 538) uses an economic model of fertility to predict alternative numbers of children for Jews and non-Jews through 1981. His data shows a significant decline in the number of children by women aged 40-44 -- from 7.3 in 1961, to 7.1 in 1971, and estimated at 6.1-6.7 in 1981. This results from expected increases in female participation in the labor force and greater education of women.

Despite five decades of declining death rates, the non-Jewish death rates are still high compared to their age structure and standards of

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[5] For a detailed study of Israeli populations' fertility see Ben-Porath (1972).

[6] Consumption pattern here is used in the most general economic sense: any activity that requires income expenditure (such as raising a child) or foregoing income (such as leisure).

health services available to the Jewish population of Israel. As shown in Table 11, the Moslem death rate declined from 7.5 per thousand in 1960 to 4.9 per thousand in 1976. The death rate of other non-Jews also declined in a similar pattern from 8.7 to 4.4 per thousand. By comparison, the Christian death rate remained high because of their older age structure.

As shown in Table 12, the age structure of the non-Jewish population indicates extreme overrepresentation of the under 15 age group. This trend has continued since the British Mandate period, when the rate of natural increase of the Palestinian population began to increase rapidly. It became more extreme after the partition of Palestine and further improvements in health services. The death rate of Moslems and other non-Jews could decline slightly, but it is near its potential level. As the population age structure gradually becomes older, the death rate will approach that of Jews, which is 6-7 per thousand. When this occurs, the rate of natural increase will also slow down.

To summarize, the current extremely high rate of natural increase among non-Jews is a transitory phenomenon. As the population's social and economic characteristics change, the birth rate gradually will decline. Also, the death rate will increase slightly as the population age structure shifts upward.

Compared to most Arab populations, the Israeli non-Jewish population has a relatively higher labor force participation rate of 39 percent (see Table 13). This rate is lower than that of the Jewish population (about 50 percent) because of the low participation of women and the younger age structure of the population. The Arab female participation rate is likely to increase as the number of women with education increases. The decline in labor participation rate for males, however, could continue as the number of years of education for male pupils increases.

TABLE 11

Death Rates Among Non-Jewish Populations in Israel[a]
(number of deaths per thousand population)

Year	Moslems	Christians	Other Non-Jews[b]
1960	7.5	7.2	8.7
1965	6.3	6.1	4.4
1966	6.1	5.7	5.1
1967	6.3	6.3	5.9
1968	6.2	6.1	5.4
1969	5.9	6.1	5.2
1970	5.4/6.5[a]	5.8/7.0[a]	5.5
1971	6.1	7.0	5.5
1972	5.9	7.2	4.9
1973	5.3	7.4	5.6
1974	5.2	6.6	5.0
1975	5.6	6.7	5.1
1976	4.9	6.3	4.4

[a] Prior to 1970, figures exclude the population of East Jerusalem. For 1970, the first figure excludes East Jerusalem and the second figure includes it. Thereafter, figures include East Jerusalem.

[b] Principally the Druze population.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

TABLE 12

Non-Jewish Population in Israel by Sex and Age, 1955, 1968, 1976 (percentage)

	Males			Females		
Age Group	1955[a]	1968	1976	1955[a]	1968	1976
0-4	19.2	20.3	19.6	18.3	20.0	19.2
5-14	27.6	29.9	30.6	26.3	29.2	29.4
15-24	19.0	17.6	19.9	17.9	17.1	19.3
25-49	22.0	22.2	21.8	24.7	23.4	23.0
50-64	7.2	5.5	4.8	7.0	6.4	5.5
65+	5.0	4.5	3.3	5.8	3.9	3.6
All Ages:						
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Thousands	101.67	208.26	282.0	96.88	197.98	272.9

[a] The reliability of data for the period prior to the 1961 census of population is doubtful.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

TABLE 13

Labor Force Potential and Participation Rates Among Non-Jews in Israel, 1965-1976[a]

	Male Non-Jews		Total Non-Jews	
Year	Number in Labor Force (thousands)	Labor Force Participation (percent)	Number in Labor Force (thousands)	Labor Force Participation (percent)
1965	63.6	81.3	71.2	46.0
1966	66.3	82.0	73.8	46.3
1967	66.8	80.1	73.6	44.7
1968	69.5/81.8[a]	79.8/78.0[a]	76.7/90.6[a]	44.7/43.4[a]
1969	82.7	75.7	91.0	42.3
1970	...	74.4	...	41.3
1971	...	75.3	...	41.9
1972	92.7	75.4	104.2	42.9
1973	93.9	73.5	106.0	42.2
1974	93.2	70.0	105.1	39.7
1975	97.3	70.0	108.7	39.2
1976	101.1	69.6	112.7	38.8

[a] For population aged 14 and over. Groups include Moslems, Christians, Druze and others. Figures up to and including 1967 exclude East Jerusalem. For 1968, the first figure excludes East Jerusalem and the second figure includes it. Thereafter, East Jerusalem is included.

... Not available.

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

During the decade following the 1967 war, the number of non-Jews in the Israeli labor force increased from 83,000 in 1968 to 115,000 in 1978. As shown in Table 14, this labor is not concentrated in agriculture, as are most of the labor forces in Arab nations. Most laborers have become daily commuters to relatively low paying jobs in construction, industry, and service sectors. Because most of these workers are in lower skilled job categories, Israeli Arabs do not appear to be a major potential source of skilled labor for a future Palestinian homeland.

TABLE 14

Participation of Israeli Non-Jewish Population[a] in the Israeli Economy, by Economic Branch, 1968-1976 (thousands)

Year	Total Employed	Agriculture[b]	Industry[c]	Construction[d]	Commerce[e]	Public Services	Other Branches[f]
1968	82.8	25.6	13.7	15.5	...	...	...
1969	86.9	23.4	16.8	17.0	...	..	...
1970	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1971	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1972	102.8	19.7	12.9	27.3	14.7	13.8	14.4
1973	104.8	20.4	16.2	25.8	13.6	15.1	13.7
1974	101.9	14.1	18.1	23.0	12.0	16.3	18.4
1975	105.8	16.6	18.3	25.0	10.6	15.3	20.0
1976	108.6	16.5	19.9	23.4	12.1	16.1	20.6

[a] Including Moslems, Christians, Druze and other non-Jews aged 14 and over. Includes East Jerusalem.

[b] Including fishing and forestry.

[c] Mining and manufacturing.

[d] Building and public works.

[e] Including restaurants and hotels.

[f] Including not known.

... Not available

Sources: Compiled and estimated from Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

APPENDIX D. THE ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP: BACKGROUND

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY

For the past three decades the movement of Palestinians has been mainly in one direction -- from Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip to the labor short economies of the Persian Gulf and North Africa and the more developed industrialized economies of West Europe and North America. Emigrant workers usually intend to find better paying jobs, save a large part of their incomes, and then return home after a lapse of several years.[1] In practice, the majority never return. Before long most immigrants take their families to join them and thus severely reduce their ties with the majority of Palestinians. Some of the immigrants join smaller Palestinian communities that have established themselves in various countries. Others gradually lose their Palestinian identity through lack of contact with other Palestinians and integrate into host countries.

The estimated number of immigrants presented in Chapters 3 and 4 was based mainly on the push factors in their countries of current residence, such as Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. In Chapter 5, the emphasis is on pull factors in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and absorption of immigrants. The concept of absorption in this study is measured by the rate of net emigration out of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This conceptualization is based on the idea that, in the present context, successful absorption of immigrants implies a low rate of emigration among both the indigenous population as well as the immigrants.

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[1] In general, it is the skilled, or at least semi-skilled, Palestinians who can immigrate to other countries. The options of unskilled immigrants are severely limited.

At present, the West Bank and Gaza Strip reportedly are losing 20-25,000 people per year through emigration. Under such conditions successful absorption of immigrants is neither likely nor practical. The same reasons that lead people to leave today will discourage immigration and encourage emigration among future immigrants. Therefore, high emigration implies the inability to absorb immigrants and implies high losses among usually the most productive manpower groups -- the skilled.

In the past, the major reasons for the movement of Palestinians away from their residence have been:

1. Explusions from their land since 1948,

2. Harassment by governments and mistreatment by segments of the indigenous populations of countries where they are located (in Arab countries as well as Israel), and

3. Low standards of living in the countries where the majority of Palestinian refugees have lived since 1948 compared to the standards of countries to which they have been immigrating.

In the future, five factors are likely to be major determinants of the number of emigrants leaving the West Bank and Gaza Strip:

1. The economic prospects of the West Bank and Gaza Strip,

2. The attitude of the present residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip towards Palestinian immigrants from other countries,

3. The political and administrative organization of the West Bank and Gaza Strip under a future peace agreement,

4. The ability of West Bank and Gaza Strip governments and other agencies to provide relief assistance for immigrants and provide institutions for their eventual absorption, and

5. The prospects of the Middle East and North African labor markets.

Among the above, only three are likely to be susceptable to policy manipulation. In order to reverse or stop the movement of Palestinians away from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the authorities responsible for the future population policy of the two territories may be able to take steps that will:

1. Improve the economic prospects of the West Bank and Gaza Strip relative to other economies in the Middle East,

2. Provide an attractive social and political environment that will present a viable alternative to Palestinians, and

3. Provide short-term relief and long-term assistance for the societal integration of the immigrants.

The analysis of future absorption of Palestinian immigrants will require examination of both the trends that can be manipulated as well as those which are exogenous and cannot be altered by policy makers. Among the latter trends, the prospects of the Persian Gulf and North African labor markets are likely to be major determinants of the number and skill levels of emigrants from the West Bank and Gaza Strip (see Chapter 5).

The political and administrative organization of the West Bank and Gaza Strip under a future peace agreement will not be considered in this study. This analytical constraint creates uncertainty since it leaves governmental planning as an unknown and the investment climate undefined.[2] Under such analytical conditions, it is difficult to

[2] Most developing countries have a wide range of planning documents that provide a guide to future policy. Neither the West Bank nor Gaza Strip have such documents. Long-range planning for the administration of the two territories has been limited to increasing their dependence on Israel while reducing their dependence on other countries.

project the upper potential of domestic and foreign investment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The other factors influencing emigration shall be treated separately for the West Bank and Gaza Strip (in Chapter 5). Economic prospects of each territory shall be reviewed by sector, as well as in aggregate. Discussion of the attitudes of West Bank and Gaza residents towards the potential Palestinian immigrants from other countries will necessarily be brief, as very little hard information is available on this important topic. Finally, governmental provision of short-term relief to immigrants and institutional mechanisms for their long-term absorption will be related to immigration/emigration rates.

EMIGRATION

The population projections for the West Bank and Gaza Strip in Chapter 2 were based on natural increase alone. In Chapter 3 and 4, immigration was introduced into the projections while assuming that emigration remained at zero. In Chapter 5, the last assumption is relaxed and emigration is incorporated into the projections.

APPROACH

In order to estimate the impact of emigration on population estimates, the calculations involving the indigenous population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were treated separately from those of the immigrant populations. The indigenous populations were projected on the basis of rates of natural increase and a low and high constant rate of emigration over time. The relationship used to calculate the impact of emigration on the indigenous population was:

$$P_{t+1} = P_t (1 + r) - E_{P_t}$$

where, P_t = indigenous population at time t,
P_{t+1} = indigenous population at time t plus one year,

r = rate of natural increase of indigenous population,
E_p = emigration among indigenous population from time t to t+1.

The calculation for P_{t+1} was carried out one year at a time from 1978 to 1985.

Similarly, the impact of emigration among the immigrant population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were calculated using the following relationship:

$$I_{t+1} = I_t (1 + s) - E_{i_t}$$

where, I_t = total number of immigrants since the beginning of of 1979 at time t,

I_{t+1} = number of immigrants at time t plus one year,

s = rate of natural increase among immigrants, and

E_i = rate of emigration among immigrant population (E_i is defined as a fraction of the number of immigrants per year).

After projections of indigenous and immigrant populations under two emigration scenarios, the two sets of estimates were combined to obtain total population estimates.

ASSUMPTIONS

Assumptions used to project the impact of emigration on population estimates for the West Bank and Gaza Strip include:

1. The rate of natural increase of population declines as emigration increases. In the high emigration case, the rates of natural increase for the West Bank and Gaza Strip are assumed to be 15 and 17 percent less than in

the no emigration case, respectively, whereas in the low emigration case, the rates are 2 and 3 percent less, respectively.

2. The annual rates of emigration over time are assumed to be constant. For the West Bank, the low-high rates are 5-20,000 per annum for the indigenous population and 20-40 percent of the annual number of immigrants. For Gaza Strip, the rates are 4-15,000 for the indigenous population and 20-40 percent among the first year immigrants.

In addition, the assumptions used to project the 104-217,000 immigrants are:

- 85 percent of the immigrants select the West Bank as their destination, and 15 percent select the Gaza Strip.
- The annual number of immigrants remains constant during 1979-1985 period.
- The rate of natural increase of all immigrants is 3 percent per annum and remains constant over the 1979-1985 period.

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