

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523
BIBLIOGRAPHIC INPUT SHEET

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Batch 98

1. SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION	A. PRIMARY Development and economics	DC00-0000-G210
	B. SECONDARY Development assistance--Mauritania	
2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Evaluation of the emergency relief operation in Mauritania in 1978		
3. AUTHOR(S) Golding, R.M.		
4. DOCUMENT DATE 1978	5. NUMBER OF PAGES 20p.	6. ARC NUMBER ARC
7. REFERENCE ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Golding		
8. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES (Sponsoring Organization, Publisher, Availability)		
9. ABSTRACT		

10. CONTROL NUMBER PN-AAG-335	11. PRICE OF DOCUMENT
12. DESCRIPTORS Disaster Emergency relief Food aid	13. PROJECT NUMBER
	14. CONTRACT NUMBER AID/afr-C-1479
	15. TYPE OF DOCUMENT
Mauritania Project evaluation	

EVALUATION OF
THE EMERGENCY RELIEF OPERATION
IN MAURITANIA IN 1978

BY

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Contract AID/afr-C-1479
November, 1978

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Introduction

1977 rains in Mauritania were below normal and insufficient for crop requirements in most dryland areas. The rains were so poor that even pastures suffered. Furthermore, flood levels of the Senegal river, the annual recession of which affords cropping on adjacent lands, were so low as to almost preclude cultivation during the November 1977 to March 1978 season.

In October 1977 the Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania (GIRM) fielded a study mission which travelled throughout the country. The return to Nouakchott of that mission coincided with the arrival of the FAO-led Multi-donor Mission (MDM) which concerned itself with the food supply situation and overall agropastoral conditions. As there was no other data, the MDM took the GIRM Mission's findings as the base for its recommendations and suggestions. The MDM recommended food aid of 57,000 metric tons to cover the deficit in consumption requirements, and signalled among other things, the need for assistance in transport of food aid and provision of feed and water for animals.

AID pledged 10,000 MT of food aid on a bilateral basis almost immediately, and in November 1977 the Agency began to explore the possibility of providing assistance with transport of food aid and for the emergency requirements for animals.

The response of the Office of the AID Representative, Mauritania, (OAR/Mauritania) to the need for food transport was measured and timely. On March 16, 1978 a grant agreement between the OAR and the GIRM was concluded to subsidize transport of US-provided food. The grant was for \$500,000. AID agreed to pay private transporters' bills certified by the Plan d'Urgence, the GIRM focal point for drought relief activities.

Eight months passed from the October 1977 MDM until the first supplies of food arrived in Mauritania. As the situation developed, by July when the feed arrived, it was too late. The herds for which the supplies were intended had moved to pastures in other areas or in Senegal. As the rains were good in July-August 1978 and pasture was growing, there was no need for feed for animals which began the homeward trek at that time. It was a risky situation, nonetheless, for had rains not come in June and July the commodities would have been needed. There can be no fail-safe mechanism in such cases as drought in Mauritania, fraught as they are with uncertainties. Supply orders, therefore, could not be safely cancelled or diverted the pipeline had to be left open. As it turned out the drought situation had less severe effects on animal mortality than expected. The GIRM estimated that losses were about five per cent higher than usual so that, taking births into account the net result was that herd size, rather than increasing about 2.8%, remained about the same as the previous year.

One of the reasons for the delay of the food project is the assessment process, required to determine need and specific project proposals, which consumed almost six months until the \$2.68 million grant agreement with FAO/OSRO for project implementation was signed on April 17, 1978. The other primary reason for delay was that contrary to expectations, it was not possible to procure feed in Senegal for Mauritania, and the orders had to be placed overseas.

Also funded by AID through the Grant Agreement with FAO/OSRO was provision of water for animals in areas having pasture but lacking water. This activity was carried out for about five weeks during July and August of 1978. It was a timely, simple, and relatively inexpensive subcontracted project which had an important impact on a small number of herders and their animals.

As mentioned, the food transport subsidy was the subject of a grant agreement between the Mauritanian and American governments. The other activities--feed and water supply--were carried out by the April 17, 1978 Letter of Agreement between AID and FAO's Office of Special Relief Operations (FAO/OSRO). That grant covered \$2.68 million for Mauritania as well as \$1 million for a similar emergency animal feed project in Senegal, totalling \$3.68 million for AID emergency livestock assistance in the Mauritania-Senegal region in 1978 through FAO/OSRO. Finally, AID/W allocated another \$100,000 for operational costs for a special Emergency Relief Office, (ERO) at OAR/Nouakchott.

As of the end of October 1978, FAO/OSRO estimated that its total expenditures were about \$2.18 million of the \$2.68 million granted for Mauritania. Total allocated by AID for Mauritania emergency relief operations in 1978, including the \$500,000 transport grant, \$2.68 million through FAO/OSRO and \$100,000 for the ERO, was \$3.68 million.

Information on the water transport operation will be detailed by FAO/OSRO in their final report. However, information on other activities is incomplete. As of end October 1978, the GIRM was not able to provide information on feed distributed and in stock, or funds generated from feed sales. Similarly, information on funds generated by food aid sales were not provided by the GIRM. Not all transport bills for truck rentals had been forwarded to the OAR, so accounting on that operation is incomplete. Nevertheless, the accomplishments and problems of these operations are known, and October 1978 was considered an appropriate time to evaluate the emergency relief operation in Mauritania. Attachment I to this report is the Statement of Duties of the contract which funded this evaluation.

Accordingly, I consulted with AID personnel in Washington and I spent October 4-28 in Mauritania. I travelled to Tidjikja, Kiffa, Kaedi and Aleg and consulted with the responsible GIRM officers, the AID Representative and his staff and other donor agencies. I also consulted with the AID Livestock Advisor in Dakar and had interviews with FAO/OSRO in Rome before returning to Washington.

The food aid provided to Mauritania is not evaluated in this report. It is of interest as agriculture, food supply and animal husbandry are inter-related in Mauritania's society and economy. AID subsidized transport of food aid, and that activity is evaluated here.

Background

Self-sufficiency in food is a long-term goal of the Mauritanian government. The GIRM intends to devote three-fourths of its development expenditures to foodgrain production to accelerate its increase. Meanwhile, crop output will not only lag behind consumption needs, it might well diminish. A factor which constrains production increases is that the country has suffered severely from the cumulative effects of drought with 1975 the only normal year since the Great Drought of 1972-3. As a result of short-fall of rain and low river flooding, overall erosion and desertification have increased and maybe even accelerated. GIRM officials say that pastures are blowing away and low lying areas are sanding up.

It is generally agreed that the animal-to-land ratio in Mauritania is excessive, even though the herd has not been reconstituted since the great losses of 1972-73. Owners permit unchecked growth of herds as a hedge against bad times. This practice contributes to erosion, not only in Mauritania but, as transhumance is to Mali and Senegal, in those countries as well.

The GIRM Livestock Service reports an annual rate of 20% sedentarization of the human population which, apart from its dire implication for nomadic and semi-nomadic people, means that there will be pressures on farmlands, urban centers, and the range of social services. There will be need for additional foodgrain production to meet increased food consumption requirements.

Mauritania has been fighting a guerilla war against the Polisario Front over control of the former Spanish Sahara. This has been a severe strain on the Government's financial resources. The prolonged conflict has accelerated the deterioration of the national truck fleet, which has reduced in size from over 300 to about sixty vehicles.

Mauritania's civil service is thin at the high levels, and lower echelon personnel are not used to their full potentials. Consequently, the civil service is generally slow moving and unable to meet its commitments.

Mauritanian government officials are cordial and pleasant but it is frustrating to deal with them as they are unable to meet commitments on a timely basis.

Mauritania is a hard country. Distances are enormous and except for a few recently-built major roads, transport is arduous and time-consuming. Furthermore, telecommunications are slow, erratic and generally unreliable.

The slow pace of development in Mauritania is understandable, considering the paucity of resources which can be brought to bear to overcome such enormous environmental handicaps and socio-economic disparities among Mauritania's ethnic groups. With so much current ecological and economic deterioration, Mauritania is more vulnerable than ever to the aggregating effects of disaster. Not surprisingly, the weakest, poorest people suffer most and it was appropriate that attempts were made to help relieve their distress in 1978. Given the increasing fragility of Mauritania's overall situation, recurrence of such conditions is not improbable. With application of the lessons learned from the 1978 emergency relief operation AID should consider it feasible and imperative to act in relief of any future ecological disasters.

Planning and Preparations

There were three distinct planning periods of the 1978 emergency relief operation in Mauritania. During October-December 1977 the GIRM field survey Mission, the MDM, an OAR field trip and the FAO/OSRO livestock assessment Mission were undertaken. AID/W indicated its support as early as October 31, 1977 when the first message was sent to Nouakchott acknowledging the situation and offering TDY personnel and the possibility of funding. Through mid-December additional cables were exchanged but a technical assessment on which to base an action proposal was lacking. It was decided that a TDY officer would review the situation in January.

Most of the second planning period, January through mid-March 1978, was spent waiting for and accomplishing the technical assessment. The officer sent to Mauritania in January proposed assignment to the OAR of a logistics officer who would keep the livestock situation under review until the March deadline for ordering livestock feed from Senegal. The proposal for personnel assistance was ultimately realized in the form of the ERO. It wasn't until early March 1978 that the AID Livestock Advisor from Senegal was able to make the technical assessment. On March 10, the OAR proposed that feed and water be provided for animals. AID/W approved the proposal on April 8 and the AID Regional Development Officer, the RDO, in Rome signed the Letter of Agreement with FAO/OSRO on April 17.

Meanwhile, planning for support of food transport proceeded. The bilateral Grant Agreement was signed March 16. A variety of solutions were under consideration for provision of water for animals during the same period, and that review extended until an exchange of amending letters between AID/Rome and FAO/OSRO of May 22 and 31. As it took over a month to fabricate troughs, actual implementation began July 13.

From the outset AID had been concerned with the question of aflatoxin content in the feed concentrate which was to be procured in Senegal. The question was sufficiently difficult to delay deliberations. Most researchers believe that the fungus aflatoxin is transmitted by cattle and other ruminants by meat and milk. In high concentrations aflatoxin is carcinogenic. Non ruminant, single stomach animals such as turkeys and pigs are severely affected by aflatoxin, suffering weakness, emaciation, digestive malfunctions, and decreased growth of young animals. In mature ruminant animals microaerophilic action is able to break down the fungus and deleterious effects do not appear. However, since aflatoxin can lodge in meat and milk, be transmitted to humans and cause cancer, the U.S. government could not be a party to distributing commodities contaminated by it.

The issue came to be moot since supplies were not available in Senegal and had to be ordered from Europe where the feed contained no aflatoxin, but the decision to implement a good share of the relief program through FAO/OSRO rather than bilaterally was taken partly in order to avoid the question of aflatoxin. As it was a main reason for providing assistance through FAO/OSRO which was advantageous in operational terms, it was a positive factor.

There is a difference of opinion on the degree to which the issue of aflatoxin delayed the project. AID/W officials state that deliberations were overly anguishing and lengthy. This evaluation report holds that the field assessment process extended until March, and the question of aflatoxin was but one of several delaying factors.

The third planning period was April-June 1978. By late March/early April it was too late to execute the animal feed project as it was initially conceived. As the feed mixing capacity in Senegal was fully utilized for a similar livestock project in that country, supplies had to be ordered from Europe. This need to change the supply source became known in late April, after the AID-FAO/OSRO Letter of Agreement was signed. Orders were placed in early May and the first shipment arrived Nouakchott from Italy at the end of June.

In late April the ERO officers arrived in Nouakchott to oversee emergency relief operations at the OAR. Their TDY's ended in late July.

In late May the FAO/OSRO Representative arrived in Nouakchott. He submitted the feed project Operational Plan to Rome in early June. It was approved

in late June when AID/Rome released the grant funds to FAO/OSRO. As FAO/OSRO had ordered supplies from its own funds in May, there was no further delay caused by the withholding of funds by the ERO.

To summarize the planning and preparation period, five months passed between identification of need for food transport assistance until approval, and implementation began on the sixth month. The livestock feed project was also approved five months after having been identified and field implementation began on the eighth month. The water project was approved seven months after identification of need and it was implemented on the eighth month. Emergency planning and preparations, therefore, consumed five to eight months of lead time.

The October to December 1977 planning period was lost for want of a detailed assessment on which to base project proposals.

The January-February period was not fully utilized for planning as the AID/Dakar Livestock advisor was the only person considered for the technical assessment, and due to other commitments he was not available until March 1.

The delays seriously compromised the livestock feed program as the supplies arrived too late. The water supply project was diminished in size. The food transport assistance project was not delayed.

For the most part planning was carried out by AID personnel. From Dakar the AID Livestock Advisor firmed up the animal feed proposal, taking into consideration the FAO/OSRO Report. An AID engineer from the regional office (REDSO) in Abidjan consulted on the water transport proposal. On all aspects, OAR personnel, including the AID Representative (the Director) himself, were very much involved in the details of planning, and did so while carrying on their regular work.

The GIRM also had a role in planning. The Plan d'Urgence was moved from the National Cereals Office (OMC), to the office of the Minister of Rural Development. There it coordinated government and donor activities for emergency assistance, including food aid and other projects. It was decided that all government units and entities would act on behalf of the Plan d'Urgence in relief activities. The OMC handled food and reported to Plan d'Urgence at the national level and the provincial administration in the regions and prefectures. Similarly, the Livestock Service was subordinated to the Plan d'Urgence as well as the Delegates (governors) and Prefects in an effort to coordinate activities.

The GIRM solicited assistance from the donor community and made special arrangements with the Government of Senegal for extraordinary cattle

movements to that country. The Livestock Service advised FAO/OSRO to some extent on preparation of the Operational Plan.

Assistance to Transport of Food Aid -- Truck Rental

The MDM Report pointed out that the OMC truck fleet, which usually transported food aid, was no longer adequate for the task. The GIRM requested donors to provide trucks to the OMC. AID/W representatives visiting Mauritania confirmed the need for assistance in the transport sector, and it was decided that it was appropriate for the USG to provide it. In view of the availability of the large private transport fleet in Mauritania and the insufficiency of GIRM funds to hire it, AID considered truck rental a wiser alternative than the time-consuming and problematic prospect of truck purchases. Accordingly, the GIRM and AID signed the March 16, 1978 Grant Agreement for \$500,000 under which AID would pay bills presented by private transporters to and certified by the Plan d'Urgence.

The concessional ("social") OMC sales price of food aid was 4 Ougiyas (\$.087) per kilogram and the transport cost, according to the MDM was 6 Ougiyas (\$.13) per kg. Total cost to reforward the 10,000 MT US food aid to interior points was estimated at \$1,300,000 while expected sales revenues (10% free distribution, 90% sold at 4 Ougiyas/kg or \$87/MT) from 9,000 MT was \$783,000. There was thus a projected shortfall at \$517,000 on which the \$500,000 grant was based.

The US food aid was evacuated from Rosso at satisfactory rate, once transport got underway. First arrivals were in early March. According to the terms of the Transfer Agreement, transport could not begin until the GIRM prepared a distribution plan, so movement of food began only in late April. Peak transport periods were April-May, June and August. Of the 10,000 MT provided, according to OMC records, all but 346 MT had been evacuated by the end of October 1978.

On March 30 it was announced that the National Council raised the social price of the donated grain from 4 Ouguiyas/kg to 6 Ouguiyas/kg (\$.13). The increase effectively removed the fund shortfall originally estimated for truck transport. The announcement of the National Council's decision provided no explanation for the increase.

Coupled with the fact that the MDM transport cost estimate was high, the presumed result of the price increase was that rather than meeting a funding shortfall the grant would provide additional funds to the special account in the Mauritanian treasury. Since accounting is not available, it is not possible to confirm the existence of such additional funds. These remarks are made in light of the bills received for reimbursement to private transporters as well as the FAO/OSRO accounts for feed transport. The actual average per metric ton cost of transport of food and feed is \$68-75 rather than \$130. Sales receipts for 9,000 MT at 6 UM (\$.13) per kg would be \$1,170,000 while transport cost at \$75 per ton for 10,000 MT would be \$750,000, a difference of \$420,000, not including the \$500,000 of the grant agreement.

There were other problems with the food transport project. U S. commodities arrive at and are bagged in Dakar; each bag is filled with 45.6 kilograms (100 pounds) of sorghum for a gross weight of 46 kgs. All other food commodities are transported in 50 kg. bags. The OMC invoiced the US commodities loaded on trucks at 50 kgs rather than 46 kgs, 4 kgs per bag over the actual weight. Bills provided by private transporters to the Plan d'Urgence reflected the 50 kg weight. Since there was no weighing by OMC at Rosso or destination points, it was simply assumed that the bags, did, in fact, weigh 50 kgs. each. Most of the commodities arrived at destination points in good condition (exceptions were noted and adjustments made in a few cases) and were receipted at 50 kgs per bag.

In June, the OAR brought this discrepancy to the attention of the OMC representatives at Rosso and followed up with requests to the Plan d'Urgence in Nouakchott. Nevertheless, the practice continued, and the OAR requested reimbursement for overcharges. The OAR was also in the process, at the time of this evaluation, of discussing the apparent corollary problem of underdelivery of these same commodities.

The Animal Feed Project

The earliest reports of an approaching animal nutrition problem were provided by the OAR at about the time of the MDM. The MDM drew largely from the earlier GIRM Mission's findings and, among other things, supported the GIRM's request for 36,000 MT of cattle feed; it was recommended that the GIRM prepare a more detailed project for donor consideration.

AID/W immediately acknowledged the situation and informed OAR/Nouakchott of the establishment of a Mauritania Working Group and that its Drought Management Officer would devote nearly full time to the matter.

Cables on strategies to cope with the situation passed between Nouakchott and Washington during November 1977. It became increasingly clear that additional technical assessment was required.

The results of the FAO/OSRO assessment, begun in early December, were provided in early January, 1978 to the OAR in Nouakchott and to the RDO in Rome. The Report offered alternative approaches to save animals, based on purchases of feed in Senegal. As mentioned earlier, the OFDA officer in Mauritania on TDY at the time recommended the assignment of a logistics officer to monitor the situation. The OFDA Director, also in the area during January, expressed support for a relief project.

The FAO/OSRO Report was not a project document. Rather, it was another step in the assessment process begun with the GIRM Mission and the MDM. The next step--a proposal including more detailed information and evaluation--still needed to be carried out. Finally, in early March the

Livestock Advisor from AID/Dakar carried out the technical assessment which was the basis for the OAR proposal of March 16 to provide feed and water to help keep herds in the interior of the country during the difficult April to June period.

As explained by the Mauritanian Livestock Service, annual herd movements in the country normally begin in November and December. The traditional communications network in which people share information is the source of information throughout the region. Herders come to know where they might go and which other herds might be coming to their home areas. Generally, there is a southward transhumance with most herds moving to northern Mali. There is an annual exodus to Senegal as well, and there are movements to other regions and within them. For the most part, the herds move in southerly and return in northerly directions. They do not travel in circuits. The earliest exoduses are made when herders perceive that others will begin their movements due to depletion of pasture in their own areas and eventually displace them. There is, so to speak, a traditional early warning system the indicators of which are the previous season's rains, the state of the pasture, the water table, and animal prices, and the price of straw, where it is sold. From their assessment of these factors and, indeed, on the basis of other, perhaps undefinable impressions, herders move back to known havens through areas they passed at the beginning of the rainy season. The above indicators, pace of movements and concentrations of herds at critical points are the gauges of the relative severity of the situation. Usually, except for the pre-rain "bad times" --April to July--there is enough grass and water for the animals. The Livestock Service could not provide more precise information on transhumance than that. A map showing commercial animal movements included in a 1976 CILSS Report is attached to this report.

The basic idea was to help those herders who had not crossed and could not cross to Senegal or those who had to seek pasture within Mauritania. Target herds were those owned by nomads and semi-nomadic persons, from 250,000 to 625,000 animals in the western regions and 400,000 animals units in the eastern regions -- it was projected that up to 1,025,000 could be expected to perish if assistance was not provided. The animals in the west required feed to make the trek to other areas; those in the east required feed concentrate and mineral salt licks to supplement the sparse pasture found in those areas. The procurement source for the feed was to be Senegal. Water was also required.

At the same time AID/Senegal was preparing an emergency cattle feed project as similar conditions existed in the northern regions of that country. It was believed by the Livestock Service that the cattle feed operation in Senegal had effects on the one in Mauritania; they were not thoroughly examined in connection with this evaluation.

At that point--in March 1978--the question of aflatoxin content in the Senegalese groundnut cake was an important issue in AID/W. Partly because provision of feed concentrate with possibly high aflatoxin levels to vulnerable populations might be misunderstood by U.S. and other public opinion, AID/W began arrangements to make a grant to FAO/OSRO to implement the cattle feed portions of both Senegal and Mauritanian relief programs.

There was also about five years successful drought relief collaboration between AID and FAO/OSRO and it was established practice for the two agencies to consult on such problems, and they did. Nevertheless, joint AID-FAO/OSRO planning for livestock feed was limited until the Letter of Agreement was signed on April 17.

All technical questions had been resolved by that time and on April 8 AID/W cabled the OAR that a \$2.68 million grant to FAO/OSRO was approved "to coordinate the purchase, transport, distribution and end-use checking through the GIRM and AID/Mauritania". AID/W also underlined the need to "maximize the impact of the grant and expedite the flow of assistance through the GIRM and AID/Mauritania". Washington assumed that "AID/Mauritania and the GIRM...had substantially worked out a program for transport and distribution of the livestock feed" and requested that the OAR/ERO provide all assistance possible to FAO/OSRO to ensure that the program would be effectively implemented and executed through the GIRM. These messages were confusing or at least imprecise and led to misunderstandings which persisted throughout the project. The OAR allowed that it was capable of implementing the project, that it didn't need FAO/OSRO and, in fact, had already done most of the planning. It was reported that the GIRM preferred that the project be implemented bilaterally rather than through FAO. During the project, the GIRM, fully aware that the benefactor was AID, considered its relationship with the OAR more important than that with the FAO/OSRO representative who was often accorded but slight recognition in official meetings. This was never corrected. The OAR, although cordial with the FAO/OSRO Representative, was not supportive of him either by deferring to his role as equal partner or by actually monitoring at the field level. The ERO defined its role in the operation rather strictly, apparently considering that coordination was taking place. The ERO monitored the overall situation and food transport and spent much time and energy trying to determine the most feasible means of getting water to needy areas. However, no end-use checking in the usual sense of that term was carried out, by the ERO, by FAO/OSRO or by the GIRM.

Immediately after signature of the AID-FAO/OSRO Letter of Agreement the FAO/OSRO Director visited Nouakchott and Dakar. His consultation represented the first actual planning steps taken by FAO/OSRO in the undertaking, by then almost four months after having first raised the question with AID. It was then that it was learned that procurement in Senegal for Mauritania was not possible and supplies would have to be shipped in from overseas.

FAO/OSRO placed the first orders in early May. By then it could not have been expected that the supplies would arrive much before the rainy season, but due to the inherent uncertainty in such drought situations it was decided to carry through with the project. If rains were insufficient the supplies would still be needed. Other orders were placed in early May and June 9. As it turned out AID financed 5,000 MT and OSRO 1,000 MT of animal feed.

Rains began during the second half of June 1978, a bit earlier than is normal. They appeared to be good and by early July raised hopes to the extent that most herders who were then returning home believed that pasture would be good and water sources replenished. Nevertheless, in order to safeguard against possible sudden halting of the rain, it was considered prudent to proceed with the shipments already ordered. The first shipments arrived at Nouakchott wharf on June 29, the second on July 6 and the last on August 7.

In March and April the EEC granted the GIRM approximately \$1.6 millions for purchase of cattle feed. It was agreed that the EEC would pay GIRM-contracted merchants for deliveries of feed to Mauritania and that the feed would be sold to herders at 6 Ougiyas per kg, the same price as food-grains for humans. The approximately 3,500 MT feed was purchased in Senegal for the most part, some of it from traders in the northern part of that country. EEC supplies arrived in Mauritania during April-June.

The EEC project established procedures which the AID-FAO/OSRO project continued. The effects of the EEC project on the AID-funded one were not examined in this evaluation. No information on distribution was provided by either the GIRM or the EEC.

The first shipment of the AID-supported project included 1,500 MT of feed concentrate of which 1,000 MT was from FAO/OSRO funds. It arrived from Italy on the "Farouz" on June 29, and was discharged and forwarded to distribution points by July 8.

On July 6, 2,500 MT alfalfa arrived Nouakchott aboard the "Vounitso" from France. By the ninth, 900 MT had been discharged and reforwarded. By July 18 the balance had been discharged, meaning that 4,000 MT of AID-funded animal feed had arrived and been forwarded to distribution points.

The "Viking Bank" arrived August 7 from the Federal Republic of Germany and was discharged and reforwarded by August 22.

Once reforwarded from the Nouakchott wharf the feed and feed concentrates were not distributed at a satisfactory rate. Most supplies stayed in

warehouses in July and August. Apart from it not really being needed by then, people were reported reluctant to pay the same price for animal feed that they paid for human feed, 6 Ougiyas/kg. The August reduction to 3 Ougiyas/kg. was intended to increase distribution as was the increase of free distributions from 10% to 30%.

The mineral-salt licking stones, also not available in Dakar, had to be ordered from Europe. These stones are compounded by order, and contain a variety of minerals to supplement feed.

The dealer in Dakar had no mixing capacity and ordered the stones from France. The arrival rate, beginning in September 1978, is 50 MT per month. The order is expected to be filled by the end of the year.

By the time the third and last feed shipment, 2000 MT of concentrates, arrived at Nouakchott wharf on August 7, it was clear that the rains had been adequate for pastures. The shipment was definitely not required in Mauritania. There was reported need for animal feed in Cape Verde. All concerned agreed that pastures were satisfactory for the usual July-August return of the herds from Senegal and also beyond that period. Nevertheless, the FAO/OSRO Director, visiting the area at the time, and the OAR considered that since the event of the July coup d'etat was a force majeure and effected the distribution of the supplies as well as overall government operations, the GIRM should be given a chance to demonstrate its capacity to utilize the supplies. Also, there was still some uncertainty at the time that rains were adequate for grasses to hold. The group decided that commodities could be discharged on condition that the selling price of the feed be lowered, the amount of free distributions be increased and that distributions be accelerated.

Meanwhile, the Viking Bank, was unable to discharge at the wharf itself due to rough waters; when it moved out of the berthing area, it had lost its place in line for lighterage. The captain refused to do anything about it, and the ship was delayed for two weeks. FAO/OSRO refused to pay demurrage.

The ship was discharged and the GIRM eventually lowered the price and increased the amount of feed for free distributions. But these decisions were not connected. The Viking Bank was discharged for political reasons. The American Ambassador considered it important to show confidence in the new government in Nouakchott and not permitting discharge, he thought, would show the reverse. The Ambassador had been asked for advice by the Acting AID Representative. The Ambassador took the decision and prevailed over the FAO/OSRO Representative who recommended that the commodities not be offloaded.

It was about end June/early July that the Plan d'Urgence and Live-stock Service perceived that the emergency supplies could serve a good purpose as livestock feed security for sedentary persons owning animals.

That was a correct appraisal, sound from the political point of view. The government could provide the donated feed at subsidized prices to sedentary people who could use it for their livestock. Nomadic and quasi nomadic herders would manage their situations under near normal conditions.

There was little distribution of feed during August. In late September the rate accelerated and in October it appeared that the warehouses would soon be empty. The Delegates and Prefets advised that they were making distributions to the broad spectrum of the population. It did appear, nevertheless, that not unlike the overall regional allocations made by the Plan d'Urgence, local distributions were made to the more favored rather than the most needy. Although the GIRM claimed that distributions were equitable, it was indicated in interviews and reports that salaried persons who own animals and contract their management to caste herdsmen were the main recipients of the feed.

As sedentarization increases fewer people own more animals and there is less concern by the owners for the environment and, as a result, there is increased degradation of it. Such persons--civil servants, merchants, truckers, better-off farmers--are influential and enterprising, and they benefitted most from the feed distributions.

Had the Livestock Service more to say about eligibility, distributions might have been more equitable. But the Livestock Service, if it played a role at all in distributions, played a very minor one indeed. Neither did the Livestock Service provide technical service. The officers have no transport, and none special was provided for them.

Despite the late April visit to Mauritania of the FAO/OSRO Director, there was little understanding achieved among the parties concerned -- the GIRM, the OAR and FAO/OSRO -- on the way to actually operate the project. The Letter of Agreement contained the same language as the aforementioned April 8 cable from Washington*. It became increasingly clear over time that this arrangement resulted in detachment on the part of the actors rather than more active involvement in day-to-day operational questions. All assumed that the technical input was to be provided by the GIRM, but there was no explicit agreement to this effect and no input was provided. Purchase and transport were all that OSRO concerned itself with. Distribution was expected to be OMC's role. And, as mentioned, end-use checking was to be done by everyone but wasn't done by anyone except in the most superficial manner.

There were no disagreements. At the national level the OMC's role was strictly one of handling supplies on behalf of the Plan d'Urgence to which it was subordinate, so there was virtually no consultation with the Cereals Office. The OAR had no relationship with the OMC headquarters in Nouakchott during the emergency period (this is now being corrected). Livestock officials, OAR/ERO personnel and the FAO/OSRO Representative frequently travelled

*See third paragraph page 10.

together. The FAO/OSRO man is a pilot and took along the others as passengers, an important convenience to all concerned. Despite these good relationships, follow-up actions to their field surveys were taken up only very slowly by the GIRM. It was only weeks after agreeing to increase free distributions and lower the price from that the Plan d'Urgence did anything about it. Even the very sales of supplies, done at the insistence of the GIRM, was not formalized until the September 9 Letter of Agreement signed by the three parties. This was an indication of the slow pace of emergency project operations in Mauritania. The GIRM stated that it would have preferred a direct grant to the FAO/OSRO mechanism which also partly explains the slow pace of the feed emergency projects.

The first installment of concentrate, arrived June 29 from Italy, was received in powder rather than pellet form. It had apparently disintegrated during shipment. FAO/OSRO is checking into the matter. Livestock Service officials said that this made consumption difficult.

There were complaints about the unfamiliar odor of the European concentrate. Senegalese products would have been more preferable, according to Livestock Service and provincial administrative officers.

Transport of Water for Animals

Several means of transport of water for animals were considered before AID/W and the OAR finally decided on trucking it in tankers from Lake Konkossa and a pond and a well in N'Taka. From January well into April the OAR considered pumping and piping water more than 300 kilometers from the Senegal River to affected areas in the 3rd and 10th Regions. During the same time the OAR looked at the possibility of boring wells for animal water supply.

The proposal to pump water from the Senegal River was unfeasible for technical and economic reasons. The wells proposal was dropped due to failure of a similar FED project and lack of interest on the part of the GIRM and timing. The OAR reverted to proposing tanker transport of water, and this was implemented by May 22 and 31 exchange of letters between FAO/OSRO and AID/Rome which amended the Grant Agreement.

Based on the request of the government which in May called for engagement of ten tanker trucks to provide water for returning animals in the Konkossa/Selibaby/Hadad triangle during a 50-day period, FAO/OSRO ordered 30 portable water troughs to be made in Nouakchott. By late June the situation had changed so that the requirements were limited to the area surrounding Konkossa by 25-30 kilometers where pasture was good but water scarce.

FAO/OSRO also purchased four pumps and had them installed on the four rented water truck tankers, two of which were 12,000 liter capacity and two 10,000

liter capacity. FAO/OSRO paid salaries of two four-man teams, two persons for filling the trucks and two for pump maintenance.

The tankers made an average of three rotations daily to the ten sites where the troughs were placed. It was estimated that 1200 animals drank every other day at each site which then provided water for 24,000 animals as well as their herders, during July 13 to August 17. The preliminary estimate of expenditures was \$148,000, half the amount allocated. The troughs are there to be used. The water supply project functioned excellently. By all accounts, it saved 24,000 animals from death.

The FAO/OSRO Representative stated that there were three reasons for the success of the project. First, fabrication of the troughs was done by one person. Tanker rental was also contracted to a single person. These arrangements were negotiated by tough marketplace bargaining. Secondly, one Livestock Service official supervised the operation in the field, and did an excellent job. Finally, the FAO/OSRO Representative said that luck played an important part in the smooth running of the project. Given road conditions, lack of maintenance facilities and the ever present possibility of mishaps, there was surprisingly little down time.

The Emergency Relief Office (ERO)

The OAR did not have the administrative capacity to manage both the regular program and a demanding relief operation. Thus AID/W allocated \$100,000 for the operation of the Emergency Relief Office established at Nouakchott. The allocation was for travel expenses (including aircraft and Landrover rental), per diem and office expenses, rent and personnel. The provisional estimate was that \$60,000 was expended, and \$40,000 deallocated.

It was difficult to recruit personnel for the ERO. A Regional Food for Peace Officer had been on extended TDY elsewhere in Africa and could not accept the assignment. A Deputy Program Officer from another mission declined the request to take the assignment for personal reasons. Another officer declined the offer more than once. Finally, an officer from another mission and an IDI waiting assignment accepted and took up work in Nouakchott in April 20 and 27 respectively.

The ERO's scope of work was listed in a February cable from Nouakchott: coordination with donors; assistance to AID/Dakar when food arrived; liaison with the Swiss Logistics officer posted to Mauritania by WFP; field assessment trips; monitoring human food and cattle feed; assistance to the GIRM with various administrative requirements; and advice on need for assistance of experts.

The Chief of the ERO and his deputy were joined by the OAR's Food for Peace monitor. The ERO filled an important need at the time. Unfortunately, it was closed half way through the operation and there was loss of continuity.

The TDY personnel simply had to return to their regular or other assignments in July. The food transport operation by then was well underway but both the feed and water supply projects were barely begun. Consideration to continue the ERO floundered and the responsibility for relief operations was given to the Program Officer who supervised the FFP Monitor. The separate office was closed.

The ERO's monitoring was not detailed and was done on an ad hoc basis. Only the Deputy Chief and the FFP Monitor travelled and that was limited, for the most part, to brief air trips. Although such trips are valuable for gaining an overview, unless combined with land travel and extended in time, they often result in less than satisfactory information gathering. To be sure, air travel in a country as vast as Mauritania is efficient, especially for surveying crop and pasture conditions and also, to some extent, determining herd movements; but monitoring should be considered an operational function of management and requires more intensive work than air trips of limited duration afford.

Had more intensive monitoring been done, more would have been known about actual field problems. There would have been more information on which to base consideration of alternative measures to implement the program. Only lowering of the price and increase of free distributions were suggested as project changes. There was no probing of utilization of supplies that had been distributed. No specific area-by-area situation analysis was done. Records were not checked. No attempts were made to have field involvement of the Livestock Service to help herders or to anticipate developments. As far as is known few, if any, herders were interviewed.

This is not to understate the work done by the ERO. The files generated by the team indicated that the office touched all administrative bases and fulfilled documentation requirements on a variety of administrative matters. The staff spent much time researching the water project, but the office apparently did not schedule its work or establish monitoring procedures.

The FFP Monitor is an excellent man, and a good resource person for the OAR; but he was given no specific direction as a monitor. He did not make extended trips as monitors do in other Sahelian countries. During the time of the ERO, following instructions, he did not have contact with the OMC in Nouakchott.

The Swiss Logistics Officers were not of help as they might have been. The first one filled in for the vacationing WFP Advisor. The other Swiss officer might have monitored Rosso to the extent that U.S. personnel could have devoted their attention to other areas. But this did not happen and to a certain extent and by default here was a duplication of effort in Rosso.

Intensive monitoring and end-use checking are valuable as management tools, both for current operations and to determine future developments. Monitors can

identify weak points, bottlenecks and other problems and work out corrective measures on the spot. At the same time, if trained, they can monitor human and animal nutrition status, market conditions, the state of environment and crop conditions. They can collate information and impressions of officials and experts in the field. To do this requires either experience or training, and, perhaps most importantly, prolonged, disciplined field travel.

It is suggested that national monitors be engaged in emergency relief programs. They and their American colleagues should be trained, given guidelines and expected to perform.

The Mauritanian nationals would carry on the same function at the Plan d'Urgence or other relief coordinating unit after an initial period of working with the OAR.

The ERO was constrained by the same coordination clause in the AID-FAO/OSRO Letter of Agreement*, a situation which never became clarified to the satisfaction of the parties in the field.

Accountability

The absence of accountability of supplies and generated funds is a most important problem which, although under review, will take long to resolve. Despite unremitting efforts by the OAR and the FAO/OSRO Representative, the GIRM, even in October, was slow in providing information. The provincial administration, the OMC and the Livestock Service did not know or did not provide distribution accounts. The Plan d'Urgence did not report on accrual of funds from food and feed sales, contrary to Transfer Agreement and Grant Agreement terms. As the Livestock Service's field role was pre-empted by the provincial administration acting for the Plan d'Urgence, the makeup of beneficiaries is not clearly known, and it is too late to correct reported distribution inequities. Monitoring by the Livestock Service, the ERO and FAO/OSRO would have been useful in this respect.

Should The Emergency Feed Project Have Been Done?

There are differing points of view on whether an area overpopulated with animals should receive help when threatened by lack of pasture or other feed, or water. A traditional balance has been kept by occasional droughts which reduced herds whenever their numbers exceeded the capacity of the land and water to support them. With human and animal population estimated to be growing annually at 2.7% and 2.8% respectively, overgrazing, desertification, and general ecological deterioration are observable. Range management is the only way to safeguard a good quality herd and only just steps have been taken in this respect. Herds are not controlled and are provided few services, and herders permit over-breeding and tolerate large losses of animals in bad times. The problems

*See third paragraph page 10.

then worsen and the best course would appear to be to permit herd reduction. The most competent herders will survive and emerge as most likely innovators in rational programs.

An opposing point of view, argues the wisdom of having feed emergency projects. Herders do indeed permit overbreeding but they do so out of necessity. Once a supply of feed is available in any event that supply, rather than overly large herds, would represent assurance of herders' continued livelihood, and they would then be amenable to innovations in animal husbandry. A drought relief program is a temporary stopgap measure until regular animal husbandry and range management programs provide protection at all times against ecological calamity. Mauritania's animal sector supplies Mali and Senegal to some extent and to permit a significant reduction in herd size is an unnecessary economic and nutritional risk.

Another important element of protection of the Mauritanian herd is socio-economic in nature. As mentioned, fewer and fewer people own increasing numbers of animals. With sedentarization of the country, the way of life of ethnic nomads and quasi nomads is severely threatened. They go about their business as efficiently as possible under the circumstances, and use otherwise idle resources. They are not putting pressure on the land and causing its deterioration as much as are the more recent sedentary herd owners -- the government officials, other salaried and otherwise better off people -- whose practices are less dependent on animals for their livelihood and therefore exercise less control.

In the GIRM's plans to invest 75% of development expenditures in agricultural production, despite the obvious imperative to mixed farming, there is plenty of space and natural resource for the traditional herdsman. Thus there is a potential for modernization of the livestock sector in Mauritania.

There is also the humanitarian consideration that such ethnic groups as nomadic herdsman are inherently valuable and should not be allowed to disappear. Their welfare is an important concern.

Related to the preceding point is that in 1978 it was the poorest and weakest segments of the population which required assistance, and it was the better off people who received it. The weak and poor have few assets. It seems safe to assume that their physical reserves are not impressive even though it might be argued that they have managed survival over time, will continue to do so and, in any case, have few needs except in the most severe times. However, as the country continues its development, the situation in Mauritania is hardly a secure one for the least endowed people. As much as the landscape is deteriorating so are the resources of the poorest people depleting. If that condition persists, the socioeconomic burden on Mauritanian society and the government will be enormous. From the point of view of U.S. society, since we are friends of Mauritania and attempt to participate in its over-all development, it is appropriate that we assist in relieving problems which

set back the very development stages we are supporting. As a society we do not by choice sit by when others suffer.

The next point is that even had the supplies arrived on time, they would not have helped very much. The undertaking was not properly organized. The government was not sufficiently cooperative. It will take long to clear up overall accountability. Nevertheless, it is submitted that these problems could be avoided in the future event of a similar set of circumstances and projects.

Another important question rests. If animal mortality -- net losses -- was negligible, or five percent at most, was there no serious risk in the first place? Why was the project done at all?

The need to provide feed and water for animals was identified by the GIRM, the OAR, the MDM, FAO, the EEC and the AID Livestock Advisor in Senegal. This was not an orchestration of opinions. All involved are professionals. The general judgment was that in 1978 pasture was generally insufficient for needs in southern Mauritania and northern Senegal. All the above agencies supported the government's request to provide assistance. The EEC and FAO as well as AID did provide assistance to both countries.

In the situation explained above where statistics are lacking and information is unreliable, ranges of magnitude are wide and there must be expectations of varying opinions. There would surely be some difference of opinion, especially in retrospect, over the severity of the problem. Things were serious but apparently less serious than thought in the beginning. There was more transhumance to Senegal than supposed, despite frontier controls and requests by the Government of Senegal that Mauritanian herds be repatriated. The Mauritanian herds successfully evaded Senegalese authorities. Rains came and pastures grew. Feed was no longer needed in July and August.

Then there is the matter of the people themselves coping with their own problems which is primarily what happens in drought situations. In Mauritania in 1978 the herders themselves coped by finding pasture and water in Senegal and elsewhere in Mauritania. To some extent it could be said that they confounded the experts.

The cattle feed project turned out to be different from expected. It was not wrong. It was correct to have responded to the GIRM's request for assistance.

Should The Animal Feed Project Have Been Executed By FAO/OSRO?

The emergency relief operation in Mauritania in 1978, late in execution and awkward as it was by the confusing language of the Grant Agreement, did not provide a good case on which to judge the relative benefits of bilateral implementation and use of the grant mechanism with FAO/OSRO. Run bilaterally,

the GIRM might give more political credit to AID, but the Agency is well known as a loyal friend to Mauritania. On the bilateral basis the OAR might have more control of the project. But emergency projects are hard to run and project management of any kind is difficult in Mauritania.

By granting funds to FAO/OSRO, AID would still receive credit for the project. The OAR could devote all its time to regular programs and not be diverted by emergency operations; the matter of being overly identified as a relief-provider could also be avoided. FAO/OSRO could, under the terms of the Grant Agreement, run the operation and consult frequently with the OAR. The latter would have to decline any GIRM requests for intervention in operations. FAO/OSRO would be held accountable.

It was difficult for AID to send the Livestock Expert early enough to Mauritania for the assessment. The OAR was not capable, with its existing staff, of running the emergency relief operations, and AID had considerable difficulty finding personnel to do so. The ERO personnel were not able to extend their TDYs in Mauritania.

FAO/OSRO is experienced in relief distribution programs. They were able to attend to project planning as soon as they signed the Grant Agreement. They have a roster of experts with experience in West Africa and could presumably field technicians rapidly. FAO has established special procurement procedures for OSRO to expedite emergency operations.

FAO/OSRO suggests that in any future undertakings joint planning be undertaken at the outset for any project it and AID would be able to eventually support, assuming its feasibility. Joint assessment could be undertaken by an AID relief specialist and an FAO technician. Such a team would determine needs and feasibility and prepare project proposals for headquarters consideration. After field work they could travel together to Rome and Washington and present their findings and proposals in order to expedite the approval process.

The new Food for Peace Officer will be the OAR disaster relief officer. His duties will extend beyond management of the Food for Peace Program. He would need assistance in any future relief operations. Since the 1978 program was not a fair test of either AID's or FAO/OSRO's prowess and the latter seems more readily prepared than AID to undertake emergency relief projects of this nature, it would seem prudent to engage them again should there be a need for such assistance.

It is important that joint efforts be based on thorough straightforward understandings, formalized by Agreements. Otherwise, responsibilities become vague, accountability is difficult and some of those involved tend to hesitate or withdraw from action, while others act precipitously. Without sound agreements and a collaborative atmosphere, misunderstandings are inevitable.

The Involvement of the GIRM

Donors have been providing emergency food aid to Mauritania since 1973. The practice has created expectations on the part of the GIRM that donor response to their requests will continue indefinitely despite the fact that little is known about the use of the food aid. The GIRM is also aware that Mauritania is correctly perceived as a country in chronic food deficit which drought affects marginally. For example, apart from rice and wheat imports, Mauritania might still have an annual grain deficit and thus import requirement of 30,000 tons. Perhaps, if agroclimatic conditions are poor, there would be need for an additional 20,000 tons. Drought and its severity should simply determine how much of total imports should be food aid.

Another element of food aid, perhaps the most important one, is that in Mauritania by pricing food aid below market levels (6 Ougiyas versus 18-20 Ouguiyas) local food production is discouraged. The best incentive to agricultural production would be to change the price policy. Such a set of circumstances is not peculiar to Mauritania alone it also obtains in other Sahelian countries.

Over the years since 1973 donors have responded to Mauritania's requests for food aid out of humanitarian concerns with the exception of the EEC whose food aid is intended for budgetary support purposes. The Federal Republic of Germany has provided food aid for food security stocks. Other donors have made food allocations for want of knowing what else to do. Not long ago Mauritania had sufficient earnings from iron ore mining to purchase food on the world market. The war changed that. Now food aid fills chronic deficits not filled by commercial imports.

The GIRM would wish to have an annual assured supply of foodgrains, irrespective of agroclimatic conditions. It is as weary as donors are of the annual exercise of emergency declaration, MDM, exhortations to donors, negotiations on reporting, etc. This is not to say that drought disasters have ceased to strike or that crop output is not affected by poor rains or pestilence. But basically, as mentioned, the food supply problem is chronic, solutions are price changes as well as the successful implementation of development projects. Meanwhile, food aid on a regular basis is called for.

A good deal of coordination is lacking. Until now, donors have simply done their food aid duty. They have pledged food aid and shipped it as soon as they could. They have not wanted to become involved with the question of just what has happened to it, having perceived food aid to be of secondary importance considering that there are enough problems with other projects which will do far more to help Mauritania in the long run than emergency and other food distributions. Besides, donors have not felt that they could do very much about any real or reported irregularities in the food distribution program.

The donors have defaulted coordination for understandable reasons. Besides, they would not want to seem to be ganging up on the GIRM. If there is to be coordination of donors, the GIRM must do it, and the AID Representative is encouraging this. With a Title I or Title III program, coordination would be done more on the basis of mutual respect than it is with the at least partly questionable food emergency relief allocations.

Continuous monitoring is a good tool to improve administration and GIRM involvement in food programming can be encouraged by nationalizing the monitoring function. Middle-level Mauritanian monitors should be engaged by the OAR, and eventually carry out these functions for the GIRM as part of the administrative cadre. They and their U.S. citizen counterparts should be given training in recognizing malnutrition, the state of the environment and crop conditions.

These remarks frankly acknowledge a disorderly food and emergency aid process and a somewhat deceptive ambience. It is also emphasized that GIRM cannot or will not meet its administrative responsibilities without help.

HOW MISSIONS MIGHT PREPARE FOR EMERGENCY NON-FOOD AID ASSISTANCE PROJECTS

AID Missions in Sahelian or other drought-prone areas can prepare for emergencies caused by ecological disasters or imbalances. Probably the most effective way to manage non-food emergency aid is through on-going projects in the regular program. This has the benefits of early warning, and administrative structure and technical assistance ready and in place. It has the risk of change of objectives, or at least identification, away from medium and long term to emergency activities. Such a change can affect expectations on the part of project beneficiaries in that special concessions are usually made in emergency projects and it is difficult to revert to normal practices after the emergency period is over.

For emergency relief activities outside of regular project areas, Missions should prepare contingency plans based on past and possible future projects. Indicators for early warning can be identified and monitored systematically by trained Food for Peace monitors. A data base, probably established with ranges of magnitude when statistics are not reliable, should also be continuously monitored. The data base should be provided to the regional bureau as well as OFDA and Food for Peace with explanations on its validity.

Information on human and animal population, trade flows, regional factors, critical time periods, supply sources, technical inputs and varying operational alternatives should be developed at the earliest signs of a possible problem. Linked to the data base should be minimum project guidelines designed jointly by the host government, the Mission and AID/W for various categories of projects.

Missions should request outside support for technical review of potential emergency relief projects should technicians not be available in the Mission or the region. Persons carrying out such reviews should do so expeditiously and should be given the responsibility to help to design proposals, if feasible.

Missions should also develop short term activities such as accelerated impact projects with drought-proofing objectives. In Mauritania the Livestock Service is preparing a proposal requesting assistance in transport and teaching aids for technicians to "sensibilize" herders on brush fire prevention, soil conservation, collecting straw and other simple practices to lessen effects of drought. Such a project should not require much material aid.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Concerning food supply and emergency situations, the perception of Mauritania as a food deficit country has yet to be translated into appropriate action by the GIRM and donors. In Mauritania, the low fixed price of food aid works as a disincentive of agricultural production. To the GIRM, having an assured annual food supply would be preferable to the need to request donors to respond to perennial emergencies. Consideration of Title I or Title III should be actively encouraged.
2. The requirement for emergency feed supplies should not recur often except under extreme conditions. A way to better anticipate and manage animal feed problems would be to include animal husbandry components in ongoing development assistance activities.
3. Situation assessments must be made as soon as possible after problems are known.
4. The GIRM was not sufficiently involved in planning, coordination, administration or technical assistance (animal husbandry/range management) in the emergency feed project.
5. The main reason that animal loss was contained was that the herders themselves coped with problems by extraordinary movements.
6. The feed project, although it turned out differently from what was intended, was correctly assessed and was the appropriate thing to do.
7. The success of the water project was due to its having been entirely subcontracted. It was simple and there was daily involvement of Livestock Service officers.

8. The Emergency Relief Office lacked guidelines and was established for too short a period. With the assignment to Mauritania of a FFPO, there will be no future need for such as an ERO, but TDY personnel would be still be required.
9. The project was burdened by confusion created by the language of the Letter of Agreement between AID and FAO/OSRO. This would be best avoided by having either party run the project without involvement of the other or by more carefully drafting agreement language.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. AID's strategy for emergency aid to Mauritania should be reviewed. The GIRM wish to have an assured food supply should be examined.
2. In emergency conditions lack of complete information should be accepted as a fact and decisions made on the basis of whatever information is available.
3. Drought assessment should be done immediately after a potential problem has been identified. These assessments can be done jointly with FAO, by a regional OFDA officer, a special Sahel Assessment Team which can be also utilized in other dryland areas in Africa. Such assessments should be done on the basis of minimum guidelines.
4. The process of approval for emergency projects should have a time limit.
5. If such projects are to be done bilaterally, technical support should be provided to the Mission's disaster relief officer.
6. If such projects are to be done by a grant to another agency, there should be clear responsibilities, accountability should be made clear, and AID should be detached from operations.
7. Monitors should be provided training in recognizing nutritional and health status of humans and animals as well as stages of plant growth and the general state of the environment. Host country monitors should be trained and assume the function.
8. All such projects should have a technical assistance component.
9. The OAR/Nouakchott, given the national and regional importance of the sector, should consider greater involvement in animal husbandry and range management.
10. The OAR objective to encourage the GIRM to coordinate donors should be actively supported.

Attachments

STATEMENT OF DUTIES

ATTACHMENT I

1. Evaluating the effectiveness of the following emergency operations: livestock feeding, livestock watering, and food transport and making recommendations for the improvement of future operations of this nature.
2. Assessing the advantages and disadvantages of conducting such an operation through a multi-lateral entity such as FAO, rather than bilaterally.
3. Analyzing the value of the establishment of a special drought unit within the OAR for the management of the emergency relief program.
4. Indicating the degree of need and whether the U.S. response was appropriate in terms of the type of assistance, quantity, and time of arrival.
5. Evaluating the effectiveness of the GIRM in providing information, cooperating and carrying out the implementation of the plan.
6. Indicating what effects, if any, the U.S.G. concerns about aflatoxin content of feed on the operation and if concerns about possible aflatoxin content of feed were well founded.
7. Making recommendations as to how AID Missions might organize themselves in the future to respond to emergencies of this nature.
8. Assisting in the operation of a Mission Final Disaster Summary Report, which will satisfy the requirements of AID Handbook 8, Section II, Chapter 7D(which is to be submitted by the Mission to AID/Washington).

Note: Work on number eight was left at the OAR/Nouakchott.

LES CIRCUITS COMMERCIAUX DU BETAIL MAURITANIEN.

Carte n° 3.1.3

