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DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION:

BACKGROUND, TERMS, CONCEPTS, THEORIES, AND A NEW APPROACH

**Design of a Training Module
for the Development Studies Program**

E.I.D.
Reference Center
Room 1656 NS

**Richard W. Gable
February, 1975**

"THE FINAL TRADITION WE WILL HAVE TO UNLEARN
THEREFORE IS THAT 'THERE MUST BE ONE FINAL ANSWER.'
THE RIGHT ANSWER IS WHATEVER STRUCTURE ENABLES
PEOPLE TO PERFORM AND TO CONTRIBUTE. FOR LIBERATION
AND MOBILIZATION OF HUMAN ENERGIES - RATHER THAN
SYMMETRY OR HARMONY - IS THE PURPOSE OF ORGANIZATION.
HUMAN PERFORMANCE IS ITS GOAL AND ITS TEST."

Peter F. Drucker

Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices
1973

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Introduction

The design for a training module in development administration should be based on an awareness of the practical and academic background out of which development administration emerged, an understanding of the fundamental terms, concepts, and theories, and an appreciation of the basic literature in the field. Part I traces the development of the concepts and practice out of the U. S. experience with technical assistance and the scholarly interest in comparative administration over two decades ago. Because of problems which are encountered in the current concepts and theories, we suggest a change to the concept of change. This presentation requires a brief excursion into the literature, ideas, issues, and problems dealing with social change, which is undertaken in Part II. The investigation leads into an analysis of the processes of development and modernization and an exposition of the theoretical stance which underlies the strategy for administrative change. The concluding Part highlights a proposed approach to development administration which includes the elements of a training module. A break with the past is suggested, the role of management, both within the development process and within development assistance is identified, and the learning philosophy for utilizing this approach is outlined.

I. The Development of Development:

Coming to Terms with Terms

Comparative Administration

The comparative study of governments is as old as political science itself, having antecedents which can be traced to Aristotle. What is new in the past twenty years is the development of more sophisticated methodological approaches and theories, signaled by a shift to a new term -- "comparative politics" instead of "comparative government"¹ -- and a broadening of scope to include the non-Western countries as subject of research by Western scholars. By contrast, the comparative study of public administration, one sub-field of political science, is of very recent origin. The call to study public administration itself was given within the last century (Wilson, 1887) and it was only twenty-five years ago that Dahl (1947) argued for the need to study the field comparatively.² Occasional efforts at comparative study were made prior to that time, but they were usually descriptive, non-comparative (in the same sense that comparative government was really not comparative), and concerned with Western countries, except for some reports on colonial administration or post-war occupation.

The significant growth of teaching and research in comparative administration did not begin until the 1950s, and is related to three developments.³ The first grew out of the United States' post-war foreign aid program. What began as relief and rehabilitation led initially to economic assistance and then to technical assistance.

Technical assistance in health, education, and agriculture was soon broadened to include public administration. Beginning in 1954 and for more than a decade thereafter, political scientists and public administrationists served as direct-hire employees of the U. S. Agency for International Development (and its predecessor agencies), or more frequently on university teams under contract to AID, to provide technical assistance in public administration to governments and universities in Asia, Latin America, and, in fewer cases, Africa. The challenge of transferring, or adapting, American administrative know-how to remote and exotic administrative systems provided confirmation for Dahl's argument of a few years before. Dahl had pointed out that when their activities were confined to the United States, practitioners and scholars were oblivious to the significance of the political and social setting. Overseas experience led many (not all) public administrationists to recognize the importance of the environment within which an administrative system operates and the fallacy of the assumption (already disproved by Simon in 1947) that there are principles of public administration which are universal guides to action. If more valid generalizations were to emerge, they must be based on empirical research; if the generalizations were to have cross-national validity, the research must be comparative. Technical assistance assignments around the world provided the opportunity to launch comparative investigations. Most of the early literature, with few exceptions, was produced by persons who served abroad on these university-contract teams.

A second development began in 1952⁴ when a Conference on Comparative Administration was held at Princeton University under the auspices of the Public Administration Clearing House. It advanced proposals to promote the systematic study of comparative administration and, as a result, a subcommittee of the Committee on Public Administration (American Political Science Association) was formed, under the chairmanship of Professor Walter Sharp, to (1) review and assess the existing state of knowledge of the field, (2) identify major research needs, (3) suggest means of stimulating new types of studies, and (4) develop criteria of relevance and prepare a general research guide for such studies. The following year the subcommittee, with Fred W. Riggs serving as secretary, published its report and working papers, including the now-famous Sayre-Kaufman "Outline of a Suggested Method of Study of Comparative Administration," which had been prepared by Sayre and Kaufman for the Princeton conference. A working group (consisting of Sharp, Sayre, Kaufman, and Riggs) was instructed to spell out the proposal for a research design, which it did in January, 1954 (CAG, "The Sayre-Kaufman Outline," 1966). The effort was abortive but leadership for a "movement" emerged.

The third development was a direct outgrowth of the other two. Interest in the field was real and expanding. The first book, which served as a standard text for a number of years, appeared in 1957 (Siffin, 1957a). Because the proposal for developing the field through the American Political Science Association had failed for

lack of funding, interested persons turned to the American Society for Public Administration where a Comparative Administration Group was taking shape under the leadership of Rowland Egger. In 1959, Riggs assumed the chairmanship of CAG. Two Ford Foundation grants (totaling \$500,000) were negotiated to support the activities of CAG. Commencing in 1962 and supplemented in 1965, these grants made it possible for the field to grow, as Waldo (1964: 6) put it, ". . . from tentative beginnings in the early post-War years into a contemporary 'movement' of considerable size, complexity and intensity."⁵ During the first decade of activities and research, the focus had been on comparative administration. The award of the grant represented a shift in focus because it was for the purpose of preparing ". . . teaching materials and research designs in the crucial areas of development administration" (CAG Newsletter, 1962; italics added).

Development Administration

The term "development administration" gained widespread currency since the early 1960s. Unquestionably, the concept has been useful. It has helped direct attention to the critical role of administration in achieving the development goals of modernizing societies. It has served as a rallying point for scholars and practitioners concerned about public administration in developing countries. It has had the highly salutary effect of alerting both researchers and administrators that the accepted doctrines of

American administration are not directly transferable to nations pursuing development goals in different cultural settings, because goals and environment make a difference. Yet, beyond giving an identity and focus to a movement, the concept has serious shortcomings.

Concepts are fundamental building blocks for both theory and research. They are not only the basic elements of a theoretical system but also they are the tools for fact-gathering, in the apt words of Sartori (1970), "data containers." According to Sartori, the field of comparative politics (and we may add, comparative administration) suffers from "conceptual stretching" or "conceptual straining." This phenomenon has resulted from the expansion of our research horizons to encompass the world and be comparative, but it produced indefiniteness and undelimited and undefined conceptualizations. Sartori (1970: 1035) asserts, "We do need, ultimately, 'universal' categories -- concepts which are applicable to any time and place. But nothing is gained if our universals turn out to be 'no difference' categories leading to pseudo-equivalences." Development administration, and the related concept of administrative development, have become badly stretched and strained. In the effort to make these concepts travel and have world-wide applicability, we have formulated them at a high level of abstraction, encompassing whole systems as units of analysis, with the result that they have lost theoretical meaning and are impossible to operationalize. Thus, as Sartori (1970: 1053) concludes, ". . . the very purpose of comparing--control--is defeated, and we are left to swim in a sea of

empirical and theoretical messiness."

Definitions. Development administration has been defined countless times, first and most definitively by Weidner (1962: 98): "Development administration in government refers to the processes of guiding an organization toward the achievement of progressive political, economic, and social objectives that are authoritatively determined in one manner or another."

Illustrative of numerous efforts at definition are the following, arranged in chronological order:

"Strengthening Development Administration," a memorandum submitted by CAG for a joint meeting with the Ford Foundation, after the Ford grant to CAG (Nov. 15-16, 1963): ". . . public administration when it became an instrument in the hands of governments 'everywhere' who were 'struggling to improve the lot of men.'"

Weidner again (1964: 200): "Development administration is the process of guiding an organization toward the achievement of development objectives. It is action oriented, and it places administration at the center in facilitating the attainment of development objectives."

Gant (1966: 200): "'Development administration' is that aspect of public administration in which the focus of attention is on organizing and administering public agencies in such a way as to stimulate and facilitate defined programs of social and economic progress."

Montgomery (1966: 259): "Development administration is therefore defined as carrying out planned change in the economy (in agriculture or industry, or the capital infrastructure supporting either of these) and, to a lesser extent, in the social services of the state (especially education and public health). It is not usually associated with efforts to improve political capabilities."

Paige (1967: 1-2; italics in original): ". . . managed change toward desired goals on a societal scale. This implied that there was a point of departure (a basis from which change would occur), goals (pre-programmed and constantly emerging, proximate and distant), instrumentalities for goal attainment

(either in being or capable of creation), an interacting and partially overlapping human and nonhuman environment that would surround developmental efforts (the ecological perspective), and a process (politics) in which these elements would be combined and recombined into patterned, yet changeable, strategies of advancement."

Riggs (1971b: 73): ". . . development administration refers to organized efforts to carry out programs or projects thought by those involved to serve developmental objectives. The phrase arises by simple analogy with such expressions as agricultural administration, educational administration, and social welfare administration, . . ." Furthermore, (1971b: 74-5) ". . . if we want a government to carry out programs designed to increase agricultural and industrial production, to expand school facilities, create a network of roads and communications, and the like, we may find that these tasks are scarcely feasible unless the ability of that government to govern is simultaneously enhanced. In other words, what has come to be known as 'political development' and 'administrative development' may well be a necessary condition for success in the administration of development projects."

Katz (1971: 120): "'Development administration' is generally similar to the traditional 'public administration' in its concern with how a government implements its rules, policies, and norms. It differs, however, in its objectives, scope, and complexity. Development administration is innovative, since it is concerned with the societal changes involved in achieving developmental objectives." Then, in spite of his first sentence, he adds: "It follows . . . that the administrative functions of decision, specification, communication, and control may take different forms in development administration as compared with traditional public administration."

Esman (1972: 1): ". . . its central core is the role of governmental administration in inducing, guiding, and managing the interrelated processes of nation building, economic growth, and societal change."

Critique of definitions. With minor variations in manner of expression, most definitions are similar. The key is the existence of national development goals which have been authoritatively promulgated. As Weidner (1962: 98) put it: "If there are no developmental goals, there is no development administration."

At the same time, a single term, and concept, has never been agreed upon for administration in the absence of a policy commitment to development to identify from what development administration is distinguished. It is never called "non-development administration." It has sometimes been called "maintenance," or more commonly, "law and order administration," a reference to one of the major concerns of colonial administration in Asia and Africa prior to World War II. It has also been referred to as "traditional," or by similar terms which are the opposite end of the dichotomous continuum from "modern."

Assuming that we are able to identify the presence of development goals, the distinguishing trait of development administration, we should be able to analyze the process, explaining how and why the goals are achieved. In actual practice, the accomplishment of development goals is a long-term process and, at specific time periods, it may be unclear whether the goals will be successfully achieved. Thus it may be difficult to identify whether administration is directed toward, contributing to, or perhaps hindering the accomplishment of as-yet unrealized objectives. Even when development goals -- ultimate or intermediate -- have been reached, it is extremely difficult to identify whether administration was the only, or one among several, contributing factors, or whether the goals were achieved in spite of administration. We tend to assume that administration is contributing to the accomplishment of development goals when we label it development administration, whereas that contribution (or obstruction) is a question of fact to be determined.

A series of questions arises: May administrative be characterized as development administration if development goals were achieved in spite of the administration system? What if the same administrative system continued relatively unchanged in its traditional pattern but for other reasons development goals were achieved? Does "traditional" public administration thereby qualify as development administration? Is a "modern" administrative system development administration if a nation fails to achieve its development goals for reasons unrelated to administrative character and performance? Or, if a nation has achieved its development objectives and begins to pursue non-development goals (perhaps, growth rather than developmental change), does what once had been development administration now become non-development administration? Certainly, such administration could no longer appropriately be referred to as "traditional" public administration. Admittedly, although we may conceptualize a nation shifting from development goals to non-development goals, we find it difficult to believe that such a shift would happen in reality. On the other hand, if all contemporary nations, the modern and the recently-modernizing, are pursuing development goals, then administration in every nation, from Yemen to the United States, is development administration when viewed at the systems level.

Having assigned a new title to a process, we have come to assume that the process is different from other kinds of administration, although the nature of that difference has not been conceptually

or operationally defined so that the study and practice are identifiably different. Riggs (1971c: 3), perhaps the most prolific writer in the field and initial leader of the comparative administration "movement," introduces the volume he edited in the CAG-Duke University Press series on development administration with the statement: "How does the study of development administration differ from the study of public administration in general, or even from the study of comparative administration? No clear answer to this question can be given, which perhaps justifies the choice of a word like 'frontiers' for the title of this book. One can scarcely point to a paradigm, to an established and widely accepted framework, for the study of development administration, . . ."

An extensive literature attempting to define, analyze and explain development administration has been produced in the past decade. Scholars have acquired a vested interest in the field, because they have found something worth studying and they are building a literature (perhaps of more interest to them than to the practitioner). Practitioners of development, more often persons aiding the process rather than the practicing administrator in development countries, have also become attached to the term which scholars have conceived, because their task is to achieve developmental goals, whether that task necessarily makes them behave differently or not. The fact that they may be called something other than public administrators conveys the impression that they do behave differently. Thus, the term and concept serves academic and practical preferences more than analytical purposes.⁶

If development administration is to be a useful analytical concept, it must be conceptually defined so that it can be made into an operational data container. If it is to have utility for the practitioner, who is supposed to achieve development goals, or for the A.I.D. development officer, who is prepared to assist the development process, the analysis must be less abstract and more realistic and relevant to concrete development programs in specific developing countries. Thus far, the concept does not have great distinguishing power. Viewed simply as the administration of development goals, it lacks specificity. Qualified as administration which has the capacity to utilize available resources to achieve successfully development goals, it is indistinguishable in its various specifications from what has been called "good," "effective," "efficient," "program-oriented," "problem-solving," "client-centered," "participatory," "goal-oriented" public administration. We will return to this issue below.

Administrative Development

Administrative development is seen as an aspect of development administration,⁷ but like development administration it has not been operationally defined, empirically investigated, or the process explained.

Definitions. Riggs (1966) calls administrative development an "elusive concept" when he undertakes to analyze it in the first CAG-published volume (Montgomery and Siffin, 1966). As a result of an involved analysis which cannot be briefly recapitulated he arrives at

the conclusion that "To determine whether a given system is likely to undergo developmental change, one would have to measure not only its current degree of structural differentiation and the level of performance it had attained, but also measure in some fashion the resources available to the system from its environment, and the extent of the challenges it had to meet" (254). No guidance is provided for making these measurements. Indeed, at a crucial point in the analysis, having defined development (or "diffraction") as differentiation plus performance, he says: "Assuming that we can determine the degree of structural differentiation and the level of performance of any system, we can then determine the degree to which it is diffracted or prismatic utilizing the Pythagorean formula for the length of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle" (240). The assumption that the degree of structural differentiation and the level of performance of any system can be precisely measured is unfounded and how the Pythagorean formula can be operationalized for this purpose is not explained sufficiently, so administrative development remains an "elusive concept."⁸

Several authors have developed dichotomous models or multiple-stage models of administrative development.⁹ Thompson (1969) included an appendix in Bureaucracy and Innovation which consisted simply of a list of fifty-one characteristics of industrial and pre-industrial cultures which were relevant to administration, such as ritualization-routinization, clientele alienation-clientele involvement, position orientation-policy orientation, shame culture-guilt culture, static-innovative, and the Parsonian pattern variables.¹⁰

Weidner (1964: 235ff.) outlined three stages of administrative development: period of take-over, period of experimentation, and period of program control. These stages identified changes which occur in administration as nations achieve independence and proceed to govern and administer themselves. Ilchman (1971: 24-5), with apologies to W. W. Rostow, derived from the literature five clusters of attributes representing five stages of administrative "growth": traditional administrative system (non-feudal patrimonial), pre-conditions for rationalization, takeoff into rational administrative, drive to full rationalization, and postrationalization administrative system. He identifies the assumption underlying this outline of history as ". . . the cultural heritage of those who go abroad as technical assistants to encourage increased productivity by modifying organizational forms" (26). (All of these models are subject to the infirmities which are discussed in note #9.)

Turning to the volumes produced with the support of the Ford Foundation grant, when the interests of CAG shifted to development administration, surprisingly, only one indexes the term "administrative development" (Weidner, 1970). Within that collection, Abueva (1970: 132) briefly defines administrative development as ". . . the increasing ability of the political system or polity of any country to implement its collective decision." And, Lee (1970b: 108) sees it as ". . . the growing capability of the administrative system to cope continuously with the problems created by social change toward the goal of achieving political, economic, and social progress. The key concepts are change, growth, and continuity."

A volume published in the same series, although not financed by the grant, was edited by Braibanti (1969b) and is titled Political and Administrative Development. Yet, except for one article by Pye (1969), when administrative development is discussed, it is referred to as administrative, or bureaucratic, reform, (see Kariel, Montgomery, Riggs, 1969) and in the lead article Braibanti (1969: 3-106) does not distinguish analytically between administrative development and political development, preferring to discuss "political-administrative development."¹¹

Literature review. Pye identifies bureaucratic development with institutionalization. Noting the transition in the social sciences from chronological to institutional and then to behavioral approaches, he proceeds to examine the psychology of institutionalization. Quite different psychological considerations are involved in the process of institutionalization in colonial and postcolonial periods. In the former period, it is based on ritual--one of detail and anxiety about words and law--and in the postcolonial period it is based upon adversary relations and the manipulation of controlled aggression. The thrust of Pye's analysis is not to explain what administrative development is or how it takes place but to elucidate the difficulty of achieving it, whatever it may be. In the colonial services there was a more direct match between personal, psychological motivation, and the logic of the administrative system than is the case today in most modernizing societies. The organizational patterns of today call for conflict, adversary confrontation, adaptation, and going beyond all rule books. For the administrator who lacks a high

degree of basic ego security, this situation is threatening and may have the effect of stifling creativity and inducing him to pass all decision-making to higher levels of authority. The civil servants of modernizing governments are still looking for the direct hierarchical forms of authority of the colonial system.

Thus, administrative development is explained in terms of psychological changes and becomes a matter of human motivation: ". . . what must occur is for more people to discover how to combine effectively psychic satisfaction from mastering some forms of technical skills and the satisfactions of competitive game situations. When this is done the necessary psychological basis for achieving the subtle combinations of technical and political skills which are the hallmark of the skilled modern administrator can exist. When more people in the new administrative services begin to find that they achieve great personal satisfaction from this combination of skills we can at last expect to see the institutionalization of truly modern administrative systems" (426). By combining personality theory at the micro-level of analysis with cultural analysis at the macro-level Pye provides a novel insight into the process of administrative development, but no explanation is offered of how this greater satisfaction is achieved or what can be done to promote it.

The use of the term "reform," rather than "development," by the authors in this volume who discuss administrative change is striking because it is a term which has normative and prescriptive connotations in the traditional literature of public administration.¹²

Indeed, Karfel (1969: 143-165) addresses himself, not to the process of administrative reform, but to its goals and the ends of human development.

By contrast, Montgomery is concerned with the sources of bureaucratic reform. He (1969: 427) views administrative reform as a ". . . political process in that it must adjust the relationships between a bureaucracy and other elements in a society, or within the bureaucracy itself, in order to change the behavior of the public service." He finds the sources of reform in the actions of three groups: the rules and policy-makers; other elements in the social order, external to government; and the bureaucracy itself-- an all-encompassing classification. Montgomery (1969: 471) concludes that ". . . the behavioral sources of administrative reform cannot be seen as standardized faults in a bureaucracy or as the caprice of a ruling group. . . . Inappropriate behavior becomes so only in terms of political requirements of a society's leadership. Thus the conventional wisdom of Western public administration often fails to provide adequate standards for prescribing reform in the new states."

Riggs examines the diverse contexts of bureaucracy in order to build a model of political change and administrative reform in transitional societies. He argues that administrative reform requires as a necessary condition the establishment of a constitutive system (his term for the political system, consisting of political parties, popular elections, and elected assemblies) capable of exercising substantial power and of imposing effective controls over the bureaucracy. This argument is an extension of a view which Riggs

has expressed in a series of articles (1963b, 1967, 1968, 1971a) that bureaucratic development may prevent, or delay, the development of an effective political system. Riggs (1969: 220-324) proceeds to clarify contemporary political systems according to a typology of structural criteria and concludes (1969: 321) that administrative reform ". . . is likely to be improved if it takes into account the governmental context of reform, and a structurally based classification of political systems seems to be necessary for this purpose." It may be true that effective reform should be built on research, but it is doubtful that political or administrative reformers would undertake such a classification of political systems or rely on such a typology. Furthermore, Landau (1969: 332) criticizes the classification scheme itself for lacking a clear set of concepts and a clear statement of their interrelationships. It consists of a long list of names, "And names do not provide any basis for research."

Imbalance thesis. Even more fundamental than the issue of the typology's value is the question of sequence and balance in development. Riggs is not alone in pointing to the problems of imbalance between political and administrative development in modernizing nations. Pye (1966: 19) has referred to the tendency of administrative development to outrun political development as ". . . the great problem today in nation-building." (See also, LaPalombara, 1963b, 1966; Lofchie, 1967: 39-40; Heady, 1966: 64-65). The argument is that a relatively high level of bureaucratic development in modernizing countries fosters overparticipation by the

bureaucracy in the conduct of government and, as a result, the development of viable representative institutions (i.e., the constitutive system) is hampered. A logical conclusion from the imbalance thesis is that suppression of bureaucratic development will promote the development of the constitutive system. Indeed, since the patronage system provided the rewards which emerging political parties needed to establish themselves, the developing nations with functioning merit systems might be advised to return to the spoils system to stimulate the growth of parties. Riggs (1963b: 129) asserts that "the career, merit bureaucracy in a developing country not only fails to accomplish the administrative goals set for it but also stands in the way of political growth." By sharp contrast, Braibanti (1969: 3) begins his analysis of bureaucratic improvement with the assertion that "the strengthening of administration must proceed irrespective of the rate of maturation of the political process."

Riggs' argument is entirely deductive and he concludes: "It is certainly too early to say--before much more substantive research has been done--that any of the suggestions offered here ought to be made the basis for action" (1963b: 167). Sigelman (1971) put the imbalance thesis to an empirical test by means of an "evolutionary scalogram" analysis of selected environmental and political variables from the Banks and Textor (1963) Cross-Polity Survey. He finds that in the absence of a developed system of administration not a single nation has attained a "developed" level of newspaper circulation, economic development, or political development.

Therefore, he concludes that bureaucratic development is a necessary condition for further societal modernization.¹³

However, it does not follow that an adequate system of administration leads inexorably to further modernization, ". . . bureaucratic development is more a permissive than a causative influence" (1971: 47; italics in original).

Subsequently, Sigelman (1972) tested the contention that bureaucratic overparticipation is the product of modern bureaucracy. Using data from Banks and Textor again as well as from Coleman (1960) he correlated a dichotomized level of bureaucratic development with dichotomized level of political overparticipation and governmental overparticipation. His findings are the opposite of the imbalance thesis enunciated by Riggs and others: the bulk of the relatively developed bureaucracies do not overparticipate, whereas the vast majority of the underdeveloped bureaucracies do overparticipate. Admittedly the data on which these findings are based are judgmental in character. What is assumed by Banks and Textor in their definitions of levels of bureaucratic development is precisely what should be measured. The practices that add up to being effective, responsible, rational and efficient need to be identified and compared and what works well in one administrative system may not in another. (See Blank, 1965: 7.) Furthermore, the Coleman data was based on the 1950s, shortly after many nations had gained independence when it was more likely to find bureaucratic overparticipation. Nonetheless, the Sigelman analysis does challenge some of the accepted wisdom with empirical

evidence, however questionable. Instead of assuming that a developed hureaucracy hinders political development, it is possible (and we should be willing to test the thesis), that a relatively modern bureaucracy facilitates political development, because it does not overparticipate.¹⁴

Conclusion. The term "administrative development" has an initial appeal. It is parallel to the term "economic development" conceptualizing the process by which, as typically defined, the real per capita income of a nation increases over a long period of time. Economic development is an analytically distinguishable process. Although there appears to be increasing disagreement among economists about the elements of the process (Should distribution be included? Are there limits to desirable growth?), yet there has been a reasonable degree of consensus about the basic elements of the process and the means of measuring them. By contrast, the parallel term in political science, "political development," has attracted wide-spread research interest, but there is virtually no agreement about its characteristics and how to measure them. (See Finkle and Gable, 1971.) Huntington, for example, who once conceptualized it as "institutionalization" (1965), has more recently questioned the usefulness of the concept because it lacks aggregating or distinguishing power and proposes a shift to the study of political change (1971). Our conclusion, as a result of this survey of the literature, is that administrative development, as currently conceptualized, has limited utility.

Differentiation is often the central component of the concept, just as it is in some conceptualizations of social and political development, but there are insuperable problems, both in conceptually defining it as well as operationalizing it. Riggs was unable to operationalize his model of differentiation and performance. Milne (1969: 229), after reviewing the literature on differentiation, reached the conclusion that ". . . its proper place is in describing the process of administrative change and in formulating hypotheses about them, not as a definition, or quasi-definition of administrative development; in that context it has a spurious appearance of being operational, which is not justified by its performance."

The psychological approach to institutionalization as an alternative view of administrative development also lacks operational guidance. The search for sources of administrative reform in the political requirements of a society's leadership is at such a high level of analysis and abstraction it does not provide a useable data container. Finally, the model of the balanced polity is based on assumptions which have been subjected to serious question and is impossible to operationalize.

I. Notes

1. Traditional comparative government consisted of country by country description of the structure and processes of government with no effort being made to explain systematically the reasons for observed similarities and differences; the categories used for description were sometimes explicit, often implicit, but always Western-based.

2. Dahl (1947: 11) insisted: "Generalizations derived from the operation of public administration in the environment of one nation-state cannot be universalized and applied to public administration in a different environment. . . . There can be no truly universal generalizations about public administration without a profound study of varying national and social characteristics impinging on public administration, to determine what aspects of public administration, if any, are truly independent of the national and social setting."

3. Although some of the persons who participated in the comparative administration movement were also involved in the study of comparative politics, the attention given to comparative administration by political scientists betrayed a bias which the discipline generally has displayed toward public administration throughout its history. Most textbooks, in political science as well as in comparative government and comparative politics specifically, devote relatively little space to the administrative process. An analysis of the subject matter of articles in eleven years of publications of the American Political Science Review and four regional political

science journals reveals that fifty-three percent of the total deal with public opinion, voting behavior and elections, political parties, pressure groups, legislative behavior, and the behavior of chief executives, while only eighteen percent concern bureaucratic politics and policy analysis, as well as judicial behavior, and constitutional law, urban and metropolitan problems, regional government, and federalism (Walker, 1972).

Perhaps the bias results from a greater disciplinary interest in inputs over outputs, the "fallacy of inputism," as Sartori (1970: 1034) puts it, or, possibly, public administration is viewed as too applied to deserve the attention of university scholars. Other indicators of the bias are the fewer numbers of public administrationists who have been selected as presidents or other officers of the Association or have served on the board of editors of APSR, especially in the post World War II era. An effect has been that fewer funds have been provided for research in comparative administration, as contrasted with comparative politics, and, for this and other reasons, less data has been available. For example, few studies employing aggregate data break down into component variables the elements of administrative development as is done in studies of economic and political development. The Banks and Textor Cross-Polity Survey (1963) includes only one variable of fifty-seven which dealt with administration. Only one volume in the series "Studies in Political Development," sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council is devoted to bureaucracy (LaPalombara, 1963a).

Political science tends to ignore public administration, in spite of the fact that no political system can function without it. Administrative agencies constitute the bulk of government, they spend most public funds, they are the largest single sector of employment in any nation, and they touch the lives of more citizens than any other part of government. In the words of Walker (1972: 421), ". . . our discipline still seems to operate as if bureaucracies and courts were someone else's business."

4. In the same year the Social Science Research Council convened a conference of political scientists at Northwestern University which stimulated the reorientation of comparative studies in the discipline. Recognizing that few studies had been conducted outside the Western world, that such studies as were undertaken were formal, institutional, and non-comparative, not considering the setting or the dynamic aspects of government, the conferees proposed guidelines for future comparative studies ("Research in Comparative Politics," 1953). Four possible approaches to comparative politics were suggested: international relations, area, problem, and decision making. What was wanted, Neumann (1957: 383) later wrote was "an emphasis on dynamic processes, coupled with a rediscovery of the discipline's forgotten responsibility for policy decisions: a desire for integration of the social sciences, dictated by a prevailing multi-causal approach to an entangled, intricate, reality; and a new summons to a theoretical reorientation of the whole field."

5. It is not our intention to undertake here what has been done elsewhere, that is, (1) review the movement (see Riggs, Final Report to Ford Foundation, 1972), (2) relate it to other intellectual movements, such as behavioralism and comparative politics (see Waldo, 1964; Diamant, 1960; Holt, 1971), or (3) analyze and evaluate an extensive body of comparative administration literature (see Siffin, 1957b: 1-22; Heady, 1960, 1962; Riggs, 1962; Milne, 1962; Shor, 1962; Weidner, 1963; Waldo, 1964; Caldwell, 1965; Heaphey, 1968; Henderson, 1969; Schaffer, 1971; Ilchman, 1971). However, there are some striking and disappointing gaps in and between relevant bodies of literature which should be noted in passing.

The term "comparative management" is used to refer to cross-national studies of administration in private business and industry. Judging by footnotes, bibliographies, and literature reviews, there is a mutual lack of awareness between comparative administration and comparative management. A methodological review of cross-cultural management research by Nath (1968) covered fifty-seven studies, only one of which was from the field of comparative administration, and his bibliography of 108 items listed only one work in comparative politics. Udy (1965) undertook a general survey of recently published empirical literature concerning comparative analysis of organizations without once referring to the field of comparative administration. Another survey (Ajiferuke and Boddewyn, 1970) of thirty-three comparative management studies included only

one about a public bureaucracy. The gap becomes most evident when the authors of one of the basic books in comparative management (Farmer and Richman, 1965: 2) write: "Unfortunately, the role of management in economic growth has been either ignored or underestimated by most economists, political scientists, legal experts, behavioral scientists, educators, and other scholars concerned with economic progress." Conversely, none of the reviews of comparative administration refer to comparative management, except for a general treatment by Waldo (1964).

Schaffer (1971: 333) has pointed out that, except for some of the work on national planning, there has been little contact between comparative administration and development economics. Waldo (1964: 20) noted the lack of interaction between those interested in comparative administration and theory of organizations. The CAG series was to include a work edited by Landau on organizational theory but that volume was never published. There is another gap between the literature on social change and administration. Kaplan (1968: fn. 4, 473) observes: "The literature on social change pays little attention to the problem of bureaucratic design for the management of socioeconomic change." The fact is that much of the theory and research on social change (including the processes modernization, economic development, political development, etc.) proceeds without much reference to comparison. Conversely, a lot of the comparative literature is comparative statics rather than comparative change.

Another kind of gap should also be noted--between the academic and the practitioner concerned with comparative and development administration. Eighty percent of the CAG membership recorded teaching or research as their predominant activity, as contrasted with twelve percent who listed administration. Consequently, Schaffer (1971: 330) needed: CAG members ". . . had their conferences and wrote their papers, but the practitioners did not seem to take much notice and changes in developing countries did not seem to be directly affected."

6. Interestingly, development administration is a term which is not parallel to a comparable term in economics and it has no parallel in political science. Whereas development administration refers to the practice of achieving development goals (and therefore an object of study for scholars), development economics is a sub-field of the discipline of economics which applies economic knowledge and reasoning for the purpose of understanding the process of economic development. This knowledge may assist the practice of economic development, but development economics is primarily a sub-field of economics rather than a practice. Because it involves the specialized application of general economic knowledge to the study of a specific process, some economists argue that it is really not a sub-field of economics any more than American government or British government are sub-fields of political science. Development economics connotes the same thing as economics of development. Political scientists may occasionally investigate the politics of development (e.g., Apter, 1965,

1970, 1971), but they are more inclined to study the politics in developing nations. However, in political science the term development politics is almost never used (for one example, see Weidner, 1962: 97).

7. Esman (1972: 1) sees development administration as having a twin focus: ". . . to develop administrative institutions and capabilities which would improve the managing of change processes, and to administer--shape and implement--development programs in all sectors of public policy." Riggs (1971b: 75) also characterizes development administration as referring ". . . not only to a government's efforts to carry out programs designed to reshape its physical, human, and cultural environment, but also to the struggle to enlarge a government's capacity to engage in such programs. . . . administrative development along with administration of development projects make up development administration."

8. The CAG Occasional Paper in which this article was first published (Riggs, 1963a) was accompanied by another article (the "KEF-PRI" model) which suggested that it might be possible to discover indices which would measure particular organizations in terms of levels of performance, refraction and integration, the purpose being to bring this essay down ". . . from the upper atmosphere to a ground level of realism and relevance" (39). However, it was cast in a ". . . purely hypothetical and heuristic mood" which Riggs (73) admitted was ". . . still far from operational."

To the best of our knowledge, no one else has succeeded in operationalizing this statement of administrative development.

9. Dichotomous models have been widely used to study social change, administrative development being a specialized kind of social change. Polar models of society can be found in works by Tönnies (Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft), Maine (status-contract), Spencer (military-industrial), Durkheim (mechanical-organic), Morgan (societas-civitas), Levi-Bruhl (prelogical-logical), Sorokin and Zimmerman (rural-urban), Becker (sacred-secular), Redfield (folk-urban), Sutton (agricultural-industrial), and Riggs (Agraria-Industria). Dichotomies are primitive forms of classification and are often a necessary first step in concept formation. They are useful primarily for descriptive and exploratory research. However, the purpose for studying social change is to explain how, why, at what rate, through what sequence, and in which direction it occurs. For this purpose dichotomous classification is not useful because it is conceptually static, providing little guidance in explaining the continuum which links the polar extremes. Some dichotomous models assume evolutionary movement, often using a biological analogy for which there is no basis (society being very different from a living organism), so they are unable to explain how change originates and why it occurs.

Although polar models are designed as simple approximations of reality for heuristic purposes, they can be seriously misleading. Conceptualization of some earlier beginning-state

(e.g., traditional society) and some end-state (e.g., modernity) which are joined together by a sequence of phenomena representing the process of social change leads to the perspective that change is linear, connecting two states in time. In reality, the process of social change in the diverse nations of the world may be non-linear, even episodic and disjunctive. Moreover, reliance on dichotomous models may lead to the expectation that change is unilinear because only one sequence is likely to occur between the designated beginning-state and the end-state. Although some dichotomous models may conceptualize multilinear movements, because of the unitary character of the terminus the various sequences are often assumed to converge so that diversity is lost.

An inevitable correlate of the assumption of linearity is the assumption that movement down the linear path is unidirectional, going only from "there" to "here." The Nineteenth Century romantic notion of progress persists and coupled with reliance on the evolutionary analogy the expectation of one-way movements is reinforced. Yet, any observer of the world scene in the past two decades notes regressions, breakdowns, reversions, and decay. Indeed, many societies are not moving in the direction of the conceptualized end-state, but an alternative resultant condition is seldom conceptualized, other than the meaningless "Third World." Furthermore, some nations which are on the path toward modernity may never arrive there. For those societies that do, we ask: "What next?" Is modernity ". . . the terminal station at which the passengers to modernization can finally get out and stretch their legs" (O'Brien, 1972: 356)?

A fundamental problem in the effort to simplify societies at the polar extremes is that the similarity of concrete societies at each end of the continuum may be greatly exaggerated. All societies, however they are modelled (traditional-modern, folk-urban, fused-diffracted, etc.) are heterogeneous in structure, diverse in values, and relatively complex. Even if the diversity of pre-modern societies is conceded, the conception of a single, uniform destination (modernity, or some similar designation) is contrary to reality. Britain is significantly different than the United States, and both than Japan. Moreover, the new does not necessarily replace the old. Elements from the past persist and influence the present. Tradition and modernity, however defined, are not mutually exclusive conditions; they frequently co-exist and are mutually reinforcing (Gusfield, 1967; Moore, 1967: 24).

Efforts to identify an intermediate point along the continuum--transitional, Transitia, feudal, prismatic (as initially formulated by Riggs in 1964, but not as "revisited" in 1973)--are logically correct but are subject to the same problems identified in regard to dichotomous models. They usually assume evolutionary movement that is unilinear and unidirectional, or the transitional stage will be by-passed. Little assistance is provided to explain how and why change takes place, although transitional models often do appear to reflect a greater reality of many contemporary societies in ways that the dichotomies failed. A troublesome problem is that the boundaries between the extreme-states and the middle-states are very imprecise.

Once the step is taken toward trichotomous models, the number of stages which might be conceptualized becomes endless. Black (1966) posits four stages, or phases: the challenge of modernity, the consolidation of modernizing leadership, economic and social transformation, and the integration of society. W. W. Rostow (1956) initially conceptualized three stages of economic development--preconditions for take-off, the take-off, and sustained economic progress--and subsequently (1959) elaborated his analysis by adding the stage of traditional society before the preconditions stage and dividing the period of sustained economic progress into the drive to maturity and the age of high mass consumption.

Regardless of the number of stages which might be conceptualized, the fundamental problem in studying social change in terms of some resultant condition is to identify the end-state. Calling a society "modern" and an economy or polity "developed" is of little assistance if agreement is lacking about the definition of that condition. At one time there appeared to be consensus among economists that economic growth; wealth and affluence were the end-state. Recently these objectives have come under severe attack. Goulet (1969, 1971), for example, argues that the goal for the developing countries should be the elimination of poverty and misery and that goal can be achieved only if developed countries accept voluntary austerity rather than pursue wealth. The new thrusts toward social equity, income distribution, assistance to the rural poor are further evidences.

10. Thompson (1964), in an earlier and widely-referenced article, discussed the administrative objectives of a development administration: creating an innovative and cosmopolitan atmosphere, operationalizing and wide sharing of planning goals, combining planning with action, diffusing influence, increasing toleration of interdependence, and avoiding bureaupathology. The process of achieving these objectives requires administrative development, or change, but the analysis tends to be static. To the extent that movement is implied, there is an assumed dichotomy of end-states and a unilinear movement from non-development administration to development administration, with no explanation of the source, sequence, or rate of change, or what happens after these objectives are achieved.

11. Braibanti (1969a: 3-10b) examines four characteristics of political development: (1) architectonics--a "consensus of sentiment"--which calls attention to the need for suffusing the administrative system with the values of the society, (2) involvement of the entire population in political life, which must be articulated with a rising institutional capability, (3) stimulation of institutional development, and (4) innovative capacity of the system, particularly of the bureaucracy. The strategy he proposes concentrates on institutional strengthening, "thus seeking to improve the quality rather than increase the quantity of civic participation. . . . A central theme is the manipulation of institutions in a manner facilitating innovation yet preserving a measure of autonomy in each" (105-6).

12. Many examples could be given which distinguish administrative reform from administrative development, on the basis that reform is directed, or conscious. See Dror (1970-71): reform is ". . . directed change of the main features of an administrative system." Caiden (1969: 65): reform is ". . . the artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance," whereas administrative change is a self-adjusting ". . . organizational response to fluctuating conditions." Lee (1970a: 7; emphasis added): reform is an ". . . effort to apply new ideas and combination of ideas to administrative systems with a conscious view to improving the system for positive goals of national development."

13. Cf. the study by Forward (1967), also based on the Banks and Textor variables. Using correlational analysis, he finds that effective bureaucracy is the precondition for representative and stable government, rather than vice versa. Effective bureaucracy is seen to be highly dependent on a relatively advanced level of economic development, literacy, urbanization and communication capacity, all of which are more highly correlated with a "modern" or "semi-modern" bureaucracy than many of the direct indicators of representative government.

14. Sigelman notes that Riggs (1970: 579), in a recent paper, concludes ". . . that a dominant bureaucracy will necessarily sacrifice administrative to political considerations, thereby impairing administrative performance." Thus, Riggs now holds that bureaucratic overparticipation may be correlated with both bureaucratic development and bureaucratic decay, a position which is difficult to refute.

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II. The Change to Change

We have devoted extensive space to terminological and conceptual issues because we feel that this analysis is fundamental to our approach. In addressing himself to another terminological issue Lerner (1964: 8) explained that "The root of our understanding of the modernization process is embedded in just this terminological terrain."

In reviewing the beginnings of the comparative administration movement we have noted the shift of interest to development administration, including administrative development. The former concept cannot be distinguished from public administration and the latter lacks conceptual and operational definition, at least thus far. Eventually, after more empirical research has been done on administrative change in modernizing societies, a theory of administrative development may be designed. Therefore, rather than assume that administrative development involves a specific kind or direction of movement, as is inherent in all conceptualizations of administrative development, we feel it is necessary to identify what changes occur in the administrative systems of countries which are experiencing modernization, identifying whether they contribute to or impede development, and then attempt to explain why these changes occurred within their specific contexts. This analysis requires a comparative approach to search for similarities and differences within and between countries so that we can characterize the various configuration of administrative changes being experienced.

We propose that the shift to administrative change is a more productive focus for eventual empirical research than is the investigation of development administration or administrative development. This concept will permit us to emphasize the dynamic aspects of administrative structures and behavior within modernizing societies, whereas development administration tends to be static, concerned with the end-state of the change process, that is, administering development goals. The contrast is between "becoming" and "being." Although administrative development appears to be a more useful and dynamic concept, its application, like development administration, has always been at a high level of abstraction so that definition and operationalization are difficult. Like Weidner (1962: 112), we feel that "Closely related to the assumption that there is one kind of bureaucracy is the equally dangerous assumption that there is one kind of bureaucracy that will maximize development everywhere and under any conditions." Administrative structures and functions may have certain similarities within nations and between nations, but they may have important differences also. The extent and reasons for the differences are empirical questions which must be addressed.

The shift in focus to change requires another excursion into the literature, a detour into the vast subject of social change. Perhaps the only unchanging condition in the world is constant and never-ending change. The physical and the social world undergo continuous alteration. Man adapts to many changes, is the cause of some, and guides and directs others. Yet, in the United States, in

spite of the fact that ours is probably the most rapidly changing society the world has ever known, social scientists have devoted remarkably little attention to the subject. Indeed, they have usually been preoccupied with social stability rather than social change (LaPiere, 1965: 33). A review of the approach of three social science disciplines to social change is enlightening.

The Social Sciences and Social Change

Political Science. The disregard of social change has been particularly strong in political science. Easton (1953: 42) points out: "Over the last seventy-five years political research has confined itself largely to the study of given conditions to the neglect of political change." Huntington (1971: 284-5), in an article noting a recent "change to change" explains why political scientists have disregarded social change. Modern political science, a product of the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, came into being in the relatively stable political systems of Western Europe and North America. Change did not seem to be a serious problem in the states being studied and was disregarded. Radical change, when it occurred, was viewed as a temporary or extraordinary deviation within the political system. Moreover, although born out of the history of law, the effort to establish a separate discipline led many political scientists to turn to other social sciences for ideas, concepts, and methods and these fields, particularly sociology, as we will describe below, were often preoccupied with static models and equilibrium theory. Furthermore, Huntington suggests, political change

tended to be ignored because the study of comparative politics, which attracted us to the more changeable non-Western nations, tended to be disregarded, at least until the 1950s.

In the post-World War II era, rapid political changes captured the attention of a new generation of political scientists and attracted many scholars to the study of comparative politics. Such a study requires comparisons of similarities and differences, the study of diverse political systems being comparative over space and the study of change being comparative over time. What began as an effort to understand the non-Western "traditional" states as compared to the "modern" Western nations in the 1950s became an attempt to understand the process of political development.¹

Comparative public administration, a sub-field of political science, experienced a similar growth of interest which was described above. Early studies, although called "comparative," were often of single nations. Those that attempted to compare several administrative systems were cross-sectional comparative, looking at them at a single point in time. Eventually, like the field of comparative politics, comparative administration turned to a study of change and development, both usually by means of model building at the whole systems level rather than empirical investigation and theory testing. Waldo (1964), in a survey of the field in the early 1960s, suggested that a shift of focus to development would strengthen it and help clarify methodological problems, especially in regard to the charge that the equilibrium models, borrowed from sociology, are static and/or conservative in their consequences for

research and action. By contrast, when Caldwell (1965: 240) surveyed the field, he concluded that the purview of comparative administration would cease to be comparative if it shifted to development to the exclusion of all else. He reasoned that the use of comparative methods would become secondary and it would thereafter have no more relevance than it would have for the study of any process or behavior that was found in a cross-cultural context. Such an interpretation fails to distinguish between comparison, as a method, and the subject studied. The comparative method, if properly used, would be as valuable for the study of administrative change as the study of administrative statics.

Sociology. As compared with the political scientists, it would seem that the work of sociologists in examining group dynamics, planned change, organizational change, and the nature of innovation indicates they are more change oriented. Yet, such an eminent sociologist as LaPiere (1965: 34) insists that preoccupation with structure and maintenance processes, with static models and equilibrium theory, and with research into what exists today and may be gone tomorrow has dominated American sociology. Of the hundreds of sociology books published in the decade preceding 1965, only nine dealt specifically with social change. He noted that one of the most influential American sociologists, Talcott Parsons, asserted in 1951: "A general theory of the processes of change of social systems is not possible in the present state of knowledge" (486).

LaPiere's explanation of sociologists' disregard for social change is found in their fundamental misconception about its nature.² False conceptions can easily check advances in theory and empirical investigation. For example, the surge theory of the motion of blood in the body misdirected the work of medical researchers and delayed for a century the discovery of the circulation of blood. Nineteenth Century sociologists, unlike their predecessors who put their faith in progress through rational means (e.g., Locke, Condorcet, Saint-Simon), assumed that social change comes about through the working of some process that is built into society, some inherent social process. They often endeavored to specify this process and reduce it to a unitary law of change, as Marx did when he used the conflict of classes to explain the movement of society along its predetermined path. Others, such as Comte and Ward, saw the continuing accumulation of knowledge to be the mechanism by which society improves itself. Still others, like Spencer, believed that cosmic law as embodied in the social system controls the destiny of man. All of these theories, no matter how varied the explanations of change, viewed the forces of history as originating from within human society itself. Change was seen as a societal phenomena, usually an evolutionary process that implied linear ascent, or progress.

The few Twentieth-Century sociologists who proposed theories of social change also assigned to society the cause of its own modification. Ogburn, for example, wrote as though society produces innovations and the inventor acts only as an agent of societal forces.

The most frequently used approach to change in contemporary sociology, the differentiation model identified with Parsons and his followers, has been widely criticized for its static bias. Its influence has extended into political science where the model-builders in comparative politics and comparative administration (e.g., Riggs, 1957, 1964, 1973) have made extensive use of it. The differentiation model assumes that the "simple" or "primitive" social unit has an undifferentiated structure in which all the various functions fulfilled by the unit are fused together, that is, are all carried out by the same unit. In the process of development the various functions acquire structural units of their own. For example, production and socialization, once carried out within the family, become vested in differentiated structures, viz., the factory and the school. At the beginning of the process, the system is assumed to be in a state of equilibrium. As change takes place over time, because differentiation requires integration and new institutions evolve to perform this function (e.g., the vocational school might bridge between the family and the factory or government might regulate business engaged in cut-throat competition), a new equilibrium may be established.

Like most social science models, the equilibrium approach stimulates some questions and inhibits others. It has been more useful for understanding the persistent order in social systems than in predicting modifications in that order. Questions about the sources of change tend to be foreclosed, or if discordant internal elements are brought into the analysis, the model will predict one

direction of change, and only one--change that restores the system to a steady state. (Moore, 1963: 10).

Economics. Economists neglected the central problems of economic growth and development and ignored the economics of the newly developing countries for almost as many years as did the political scientists and sociologists, an explanation for which perhaps lies more in the sociology of economics (Seers, 1967: 2). However, especially since World War II economists have plunged into the study of economic development while many have served as advisors, either to the governments of developing countries or to the United States government when it assisted these nations.

Economics have always tended to be a more applied discipline than the other social sciences and now economists were called upon to apply their knowledge to problems of economic change in the newly developing countries. The process of economic development appears to be, at least to the non-economists, a process more susceptible to theoretical analysis and explanation than the other changes being experienced in modernization. Certainly, it is better understood than the process of political development and economists seemed to be better able to explain and assist economic development than were political scientists when, for example, in 1966, Congress added Title IX to the Foreign Assistance Act authorizing the use of foreign aid to assist political development.

Nonetheless, some economists are very critical of their contribution to understanding and assisting economic development.

Dudley Seers (1967: 27) argues that the organized material on changes in economic structure is very thin and what does exist is due largely to three people--Clark, Kuznets, and Chenery--and to the United Nations. He also insists "that economists are very little use working on the problems of under-developed countries, until they have done so for some years, and then only if they are unusually adaptable" (1967: 4). He continues: ". . . habituation, hour after hour, year after year, to static models, assuming given institutions and neglecting the determinants of human capacity, makes a student gradually unfitted to understand, let alone solve, the problems of non-industrial societies" (1967: 9-10).

A recent survey of the economic literature of the "decade of development" (the 1960s) by Enke (1969: 1127) concludes that "no integrated, explicit, and unique theory of development exists as of today. The nature of the subject may preclude any such abstract and complete analysis." In spite of this self-criticism, the fact remains that practical and theoretical advances are being made in economics. None of the social sciences have yet devised a general theory of social change. Yet, even without a general theory economists, working at the micro-level, have developed consumer theory to explain the demand for goods in utility maximization. By focusing on individual and unit behavior they have taken an important step toward a theory of social change. The explanation is sought, not in the social system itself, but in the character and activities of individual members and economic units. LaPiere suggests (1965: 38)

that the reason economists may have been able to make a contribution toward a theory of social change is because they were not hampered by the blocking preconceptions which diverted the sociologists and political scientists.

Another reason for the apparent, if not the real, achievement of economists in dealing with social change is that they seem to be better able to measure success. As compared to other social scientists, economists are more able to rely on quantitative measures and they achieved, if not universal consensus, widespread agreement that an operational indicator of success in economic development is per capita Gross National Product. Per capita GNP is a surrogate for a general process that cannot be represented by a single indicator. However, the reliance on indicators built out of aggregate data can be deceptive. Economic development is ultimately accomplished through the actions of many individuals, firms, and governmental units. Although micro-economic theory about individual and unit behavior is deductively strong, the only data available to test the theory is aggregate data. Aggregation involves the loss of much information. Orcutt, et al (1968: 786) suggests that the reliance on aggregated data may be "why economic hypotheses and theories are almost never rejected on the basis of empirical evidence."³

Pre-theoretical Approaches to Social Change

The investigation of such a massive and complex phenomenon as social change requires both pre-theory and theory. Many of the formulations to study society or nations are termed "theory" (systems

theory, structural-functionalism, equilibrium theory, etc.), but properly understood they are actually "pre-theory". Various authors term them "grand theory," "global theory," "systemic theory," "macro-theory," "quasi-theory," "non-theory," or "analytical conceptual schemata". As approximations of reality, they are models, or most simply put, approaches or perspectives to general phenomena. Often they are formulated in the imagery of another "hard" discipline, such as biology (organic model, equilibrium model) or physics (input-output model) and are elaborate analogies or metaphors. They may be useful in orienting and sensitizing the researcher to his subject matter. They may aid the conduct of exploratory studies and the preparation of rough descriptive maps of reality at a high level of generalization and abstraction by providing categories, classifications, typologies and taxonomies as data containers. However, they have not been susceptible to operationalization at a level of generalization low enough and discriminating enough to encompass and explain concrete social phenomena, events, and relations. They tend to be broad and all-inclusive, encompassing the greatest number of cases (and therefore manifest many deviances which are not accounted for); highly abstract, being formulated at a high level of generalization; and deal with the highest possible unit of analysis, usually society, system, nation, or culture.

Although we do not have, and may never be able to formulate, the all-embracing, unified theory of social change, we have, or can construct, many specific theories of particular kinds of carefully delimited social change in partial systems under specified conditions.

In this sense, briefly defined, theory means a set of logically interconnected propositions, or generalizations, useful in explaining (and, eventually predicting) empirical relations and uniformities. The generalizations must be susceptible to operationalization and close enough (that is, concrete enough) to observable data that they may be subjected to empirical testing and confirmed or rejected. Hence, the formulation of theory implies the design of appropriate research methods and techniques.

Social change as process. In simplest terms, social change consists of all the transformations that occur in and affect human society. It may be approached in one of two ways. It may be viewed as process--the continuous operation of forces in an interconnected and causal fashion--or as the goals, or results, of the change process. The process view identifies an underlying movement--an endless becoming--and relates every event or phenomenon in the system to that movement rather than to some resultant condition. The goal approach identifies the end-state of a system and seeks the sequence of changes by which the final stage is reached. For conceptual purposes, both process and resultant condition should be included in any definition of social change. However, for the purpose of studying specific social changes, we prefer to focus on process.

That choice does not lead us to ignore goals and resultant conditions. Indeed, our present state of knowledge requires that we view social change as transformation to successive states, which are never end-states, because further movement follows each of these

states. They are actually intermediate stages. Goals and objectives may characterize, or be identified with, these successive states but only because our analytical techniques to comprehend social change depend on a kind of intellectual stop-action photography to record fleeting moments in an unending, dynamic process. Furthermore, we recognize that goals may stimulate and guide social change. If non-democracy and non-bureaucracy preceded democracy and bureaucracy, focus on end-state may tell us something about social change from preceding states.

We are keenly aware that the decision to focus on process primarily rather than end-state requires a determination of what is changing. A decision must be made about the movements, the specific sequences of events and phenomena, which will be examined in the study of social change. That decision by the researcher is clearly a normative one. Although change may be inevitable, there is nothing inevitable about the nature, rate and direction of social change which will be experienced by specific societies. A given society may, or may not, experience sequences of change like those in the West and even when the movements appear similar they may not result in making the society "more like us". Thus, by deciding to study such processes as national integration, democratization, industrialization, urbanization, or bureaucratization we, as social scientists, should affirm that we do not view them as necessary processes of social change which will, or should, be experienced by all nations.

The choice of sequences for study should be consciously made and explicitly stated, based on criteria of research usefulness rather than some inarticulate value premise or preconception about the change process. We suggest the following criteria of research (relying upon and expanding those proposed by Verba, 1971: 290). The sequences of change selected for study should be (1) susceptible to operationalization and to correlation with other movements, (2) important movements, both in terms of their interest to the researcher and his discipline and the extent to which they differentiate units being analyzed, and (3) movements occurring in all units being studied.

Origins of social change. Much of the literature of social change is an effort to construct a general theory to explain the origin of social change. While we insist on the importance of attempting to understand social change, we do not think that a general theory to explain its origin is possible at the present time. Our approach--our pre-theory--holds that social change may originate endogenously, from within the social system, or exogenously, from outside it. In reality, it would be rare for a basic change in any society to be solely the product of either internal innovations or the impact of external forces. We agree with Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961: 43) that "basic change is usually, if not always, the result of the interplay of internal variations and external forces which are themselves variable." Social change may be an infrequent occurrence or it may be a common one. It may be unintended or it may be intended,

that is, induced, guided, directed, or planned. Action to induce, guide, direct, or plan social change (or alternatively, to suppress, prevent, or obstruct it) is purposeful action.

As we indicated in the discussion of sociological studies of social change, most approaches view social change as being the product of society. The specific aspects of society which precipitates social change vary with the approach. Some looked for spiritual origins, cosmic forces, or ideas; others seek material explanations, economic factors, and the like. Approaches that explain social change predominantly by environmental factors (e.g., climate), biological factors (e.g., race), or supernatural forces have all been discredited (Etzioni, 1964: 6). There are the problems which inhere in the assumption that social change emerges directly out of the society that is thereby changed. This view may have been the cause for the slight attention which has been given to the process of social change (LaPiere, 1965: 39). An alternative approach, proposed by LaPiere (38-39), may be more realistic and useful. The changes that occur in society originate from the efforts of individuals--functioning in various capacities as innovators, advocates, or adopters--rather than arising out of society or some societal process. Thus, social change is non-societal. (LaPiere uses the term "asocial". We accept his approach but prefer another term). He explains that social changes

"are not in any sense a product of the society per se or a consequence of some universal and unvarying law of social life. Social change is not comparable to the changes that invariably occur through time in a

living organism, to the normal changes that are involved in growth, maturity, and decline. The changes that may occur in a society are, on the contrary, far more comparable to those violations of the normal organic processes that follow when, for reasons yet unknown, a cell goes wild--when it breaks from the 'laws' that control its growth and reproduction and, multiplying, disturbs the functioning of the entire organism. The forces that make for social change are, if the organic analogy be pursued, abnormal--a violation of the normal process by which the social system is transmitted from generation to generation of members. A change in society comes, even as does a tumor in an organism, as a foreign and unwanted agent, not necessarily of destruction, but always of disturbance to the established and organizationally preferred structures and processes of life."

The persons whose behavior and activity cause social change (for us, administrative development) are different from those who do not cause change or, at least, we make that initial assumption (McClelland 1961; Hagen, 1962). They may have been somehow freed from the conventionalizing effects of social patterns, norms, and attitudes or released from the constraining influence of organizational membership. It is important to investigate the kind of social circumstances that are favorable to change-behavior of such individuals and groups and the kinds of forces that bring those circumstances about.

Systems-functionalism. We accept for limited and carefully qualified use, a systems-functional approach as another element of the pre-theory which may guide and orient the study of administrative change. We are keenly aware of the many methodological criticisms which have been directed at systems theory and structural-functionalism (e.g., Davis, 1959; Hempel, 1965; Dowse, 1966; Landau, 1968; Gregor, 1968; LaPalombara, 1968, 1970; Groth, 1970; Eckstein, 1971; McGlen and

Rabushka, 1971; Benjamin, 1972).⁴ We do not intend to engage in or prolong that debate. Indeed, if some of the time and intellectual effort which that debate attracted were directed toward empirical research social science research might be more advanced.

Systems theory and structural-functionalism have been repudiated because their concepts are so general and abstract that they are remote from concrete phenomena and cannot be operationalized. Hence, these approaches are unable to explain total systems. However, by limiting these approaches to middle level generalizations and employing them for the study of partial systems they have some advantages. The systems approach is useful as pre-theory because of its comprehensiveness and its ability to alert us to the complexity of social systems and the interdependence of their parts. Functionalism, by focusing on systems-relevant consequences of change, provide an essential complement to this approach.

The systems approach helps us view the administrative system of any nation as an integral aspect of the political system, inseparable from its institutions, processes, and guiding values and norms, except for analytical purposes. The administrative system is functionally related to the components of the political system, just as the political system itself is imbedded in the larger social system of the nation, and it is functionally related to the nonpolitical elements of the society as well. The administrative system, in turn, is seen as a sub-system of the political and social system, consisting of interdependent institutions, processes, values, and norms which are also functionally interrelated.

In assuming complexity and interdependency, we make no assumption about the direction or sequence of the relationship among specific variables, that is, which is dependent and which is independent. While we see the danger of a "nonpolitical approach to politics" as a result of the failure to assume direction of relationship (see Paige, 1971: 152; also, 1966), there is the alternative possibility of a political approach to nonpolitics, so that no phenomena is excluded from the purview of political science. At the same time we do not want to accept the assumption of LaPalombara (1971: 175) that

". . . changes in the economic, social and psychological sectors may and probably do affect political change, but I do not consider that these phenomena are absolutely interdependent and much less that what emerges in the political sphere is abjectly dependent on what happens in other sectors of society. Indeed, I assume that political (and therefore administrative) development is in part a discrete or independent phenomena which can and often has and does influence change in other sectors."

The assumption may be valid in many cases, but we do not want to begin with an assumption about a relationship that should be confirmed or disconfirmed in the process of empirical research. Systems theory is a guide, not an explanation, in the search for sources of change and sequential relations in interactions among the variables.

Guidance also is provided by structural functionalism, an approach which underlies most work in comparative administration and has been the most influential perspective in sociology over the past two decades. By focusing on systems-relevant consequences, it increases

the utility of the systems approach. Merton (1957: 46-47) explains that "The central orientation of functionalism is expressed in the practice of interpreting data by establishing their consequences for the larger structures in which they are implicated."

In accepting the usefulness of functionalism we reject the assumption of equilibrium, evolutionism, and differentiation which pervade some functional analysis. The equilibrium concept is a prejudgement about the consequences of a systems change and can misdirect research. It is a sophisticated elaboration of Nineteenth Century social evolutionism, which believed that every change that occurs in society is a refinement and improvement upon what preceded it and that a society moves constantly towards social perfection. The evolutionists recognized the relativity of functions of social structures, but the idea of progress persisted. LaPiere (1965: 73) suggests that the idea of change usually occurring when disequilibriums have arisen may be valid, but the implication that resulting changes lead inevitably and directly to greater functional equilibrium runs counter to much historical and good contemporary evidence. So conceived, functionalism has a conservative bias which emphasizes the status quo and seeks to explain stability rather than change.

The differentiation model is another refinement of evolutionism. It assumes that the undifferentiated, or fused, social unit contains, in embryonic form, all the basic social functions that later become structurally differentiated. Although the evolution of differentiated social units may follow different patterns, it is

assumed that no new social functions or new modes of interaction will emerge. Every social unit, if it is to survive, even as a primitive tribe, must fulfill a given set of functional requisites, such as, in the Parson's model, adaptation, goal-attainment, integration, and pattern-maintenance. At the individual level, evolution from infancy to maturity can be analyzed as differentiation of the personality. At the societal level, the movement from traditional to modern society is similarly seen as a differentiation process. Societal functions become structurally differentiated by gaining personnel, social units, and organizational structures of their own.

By assuming that all requisite social functions exist in all social systems that survive, the only changes which can occur are within the system as structures gradually become differentiated. The changes are in the system but not of the system. Etzioni (1964: 482-3) proposes a supplemental approach. Borrowing from the terminology of biology (another instance of pre-theory being formulated by analogy) he terms his approach the accumulation model, or "epigenesis," in contrast to the "preformism" of the differentiation model. Preformism is an old theory that every germ cell contains the organism of its kind fully formed. Development consists of growth of that miniature plant, but nothing is changed or added in the process. By contrast, epigenesis holds that the adult units emerge through a process in which parts that carry out new functions are added to existing one, until the entire unit is assembled. Earlier parts do not necessarily include the representation of later ones.

There are admitted dangers in social models which are biological analogies. Evolutionism in the social sciences is the unfortunate consequence of metaphorical reasoning. Nonetheless, the borrowed term--epigenesis--helps us label another approach that holds that the developing social unit may emerge through a process of change in which parts that carry out new functions are added to existing ones. Thus, as we will elaborate in our discussion below, from this perspective the process is not linear and the various modernizing nations do not necessarily arrive at the same form of modernity. Each has its own possibility for fulfilling its own aspirations and achieving its own modernity. The mature "plant" does not necessarily look like other so-called modern nations.

To summarize this discussion and highlight the pre-theory which orients our research, we (1) prefer to focus on social change as a process rather than a resultant condition, (2) rely on the systems approach to alert us to the complexity of social systems and the interdependence of their parts, (3) reject the idea that change arises out of society or as a consequence of some universal law of social life, preferring to view it as originating from the efforts of individuals, and (4) utilize functionalism, because it emphasizes system-relevant consequences, but we reject the assumptions of equilibrium and evolutionism and supplement the preformism of the differentiation approach with the epigenesis approach to be attentive to the possibility that some changes may be disjunctive and that

something new may be created which was not contained in the old. Our concern is with the process of administrative development, "becoming" an administrative system capable of achieving the development goals which have been authoritatively identified for the specific society rather than "being" a developed administrative system. We assume that increased administrative capability is both a cause, as well as a consequence, of other kinds of social change and may contribute to systems viability.

Growth and Development

The range of possibilities in the general process of social change has infinite variety. Our specific concern is with two types of social change: growth and development, especially the latter.

Both growth and development are social changes which occur over time. They cannot be thought about without the concept of time. Growth is a process of producing more of the same, whatever it may be--GNP, population, literacy, kilometers of roads, newspaper circulation, etc. Growth involves nothing more than a quantitative change, or expansion. Development, as we conceptualize it, is a much more complex kind of social change.

A common definition, which we find unacceptable, is to identify it simply as desired, or valued, change. Thus Katz (1971: 110) defines development as "societal change from one state of national being to another, more valued, state," Montgomery (1966: 259) as "an aspect of change that is desirable," and Riggs (1966: 5) sees

some authors defining it as "any change process toward which we are favorably inclined . . . any basic change of which we approve." Development may be, usually or always, valued by policy makers and particular people in a society, but the fact that certain change is desired and the degree it is valued should be determined by empirical research and not be an element of a conceptual definition. To operationalize such a definition, the researcher would first have to determine what is valued or, what is worse, make an assumption about what it is. Presumably, change to what is not desired is "non-development," but change could result in unanticipated consequences which are not valued and yet the change could still be development. The most serious difficulty with this kind of definition is that it does not help us distinguish development, as a process, from growth. Growth is often achieved and may be highly valued, but it may not require development.

As a given point in time, the result of growth and development might appear the same. For example, both might result in more rice or wheat being produced. This example is another reason for our preferring to define social change, including development, as a process and not as purpose achieved or results accomplished. When the same seeds are used and the same tools and farming techniques are employed, the agricultural production process is obviously the same, even though agricultural output has expanded because of, let us say, a growing rural population cultivating more land. On the other hand, when new demands have been placed on the agricultural system and it is

able to respond with a new capability (i.e., the system has been transformed, say by the creation of a new infrastructure which is able to introduce new inputs and the farmers are motivated to use them) development has occurred, regardless of the level of output at a given point in time. Indeed, if the change involves an alteration of the social, economic, and political role of the farmer in the society, for a short time there may be little rise in output or the increase may temporarily reach a plateau.

The two processes of growth and development may be, but are not necessarily, linked. Growth is usually easier to accomplish and is, therefore, often more desired. Because development is more difficult to achieve, growth without development, is common. When development is expected but only growth occurs, the result may eventually be disastrous. Pakistan was moving toward higher and sustained rates of economic growth without accomplishing developmental changes. Inequities in the distribution of benefits and control of resources by region and class within the economy coupled with notorious corruption in the political system undermined the legitimacy of the regime and contributed to the downfall of the Ayub government in 1969 (see Esman, 1972: 41). Even when developmental changes do occur, because they may involve the introduction of new relationships, processes, and techniques, disruption may follow in established patterns. Consequently, there may be a period in which little or no growth takes place. Eventually, growth usually accompanies development.

Development defined. In brief, development is a process of social change in which basic structural and functional transformations are made in the social system so that peoples' freedom of action is increased, their alternatives are multiplied, and their ability to control their physical, social, and cultural environment is expanded. The changes are essentially qualitative although quantitative changes may ensue. They may occur in any aspect of human society--social relations, institutions, values, technological processes, informal or formal modes of association, socialization processes and other means of social control, etc. Development is a complex multi-dimensional process that is interrelated to other change processes. In keeping with our approach to the general process of social change, we hold a non-deterministic view of how development takes place. Regardless of the system or sub-system in which it is occurring, it does not proceed at a specific rate and it does not necessarily go through any evolutionary sequence or stages. Indeed, it may be disjunctive, breaking radically from the past, although elements of the old often persist with the new. There is nothing inevitable about whether it will occur or that it will continue. Indeed, it may not.

Development does not result from any natural process in society but from the acts of people. Conceivably, it could be unintended, but the normal and most likely case is that it results from the conscious and deliberate decisions of individuals to change social patterns and relations, in which case we refer to it as planned, guided,

or directed. As Weidner (1970: 400) put it: "Development means directional change." Only in this sense do we agree that development is change to something valued or desired, but it is not the state of being desired that is the distinguishing element of development. Rather, it is the process of qualitative change in structures and functions consequent to being desired that constitutes development. For the social scientist, the crucial question is whether basic structural and functional transformations have occurred so that society has increased capacity to control its destiny and to sustain the changes it has wrought. The nature and degree of valuation which may attach to the objective pursued is a social fact which should be investigated to explain the reasons for and consequences of, the observed dynamics. The goals of development may be viewed as progress, national salvation, economic self-sufficiency, or "catching up with the West" by the policy makers who formulated them. In those cases the valuation is imputed by the persons who formulated the objectives and becomes data for the researcher.

Since we think it is more important to focus on process rather than on purpose, and because the process of development is so complex, the act of measurement is much more complicated and difficult. It is far simpler to count units of output which have resulted from growth than it is to measure the qualitative changes which characterize the dynamic processes of development. In some cases, the new inputs may be quantifiable, as in the case of high-yield variety seed and fertilizer when studying agricultural change.

In more instances the changes are not easily quantifiable or the consequences of new ideas, policies, practices, and structures are not easily identified.

Use of indicators. When some phenomenon, event, or process itself cannot be measured (quantified) directly, indicators are used as proxies, or surrogates. Another reason for their use is that the state of our theory does not provide us complete explanations of the consequences of social change. In the first instance, i.e., using surrogates for phenomena which cannot be measured, the indicator should tell us something about what it is supposed to be indicating. If one indicator is proved invalid, another must be tried. If per capita GNP is not a satisfactory indicator of economic development, energy consumption or percent of the labor force engaged in non-agricultural activities may be more valid indicators.

The second instance when indicators are used, i.e., as process-explainers, needs more explanation. The process of social change involves the operation of numerous, complex interconnected forces. However, because of the undeveloped and incomplete state of social science theory, we do not have the ability to explain these forces and their consequences. Thus, agricultural development may involve government action which alters land owning and tenancy patterns, industrialization which draws surplus labor to urban areas, extension programs which train farmers, research activities which develop new seeds, farmer co-operatives which provide credit, and so forth. In addition to having to rely on indicators because many

social science concepts cannot be measured directly, we have the problem of not knowing exactly what the indicator is telling us about the process we are attempting to explain. Lacking the theory which will help explain causal relations and not being able to identify the many other sources and consequences of social change, we tend to rely on indicators.

Although there appears to be greater acceptance in the field of economics of a series of surrogates for economic development, economists still insist that they, too, have not yet succeeded in defining completely and acceptably the entire process of economic development so that the use of indicators in the second sense is necessary. In political science, there is very little agreement about the indicators which are proper for political development, either as surrogates or as process-explainers. The problem is only partly one of identifying appropriate proxies. The larger problem is gaining agreement on what constitutes political development for which, then, indicators may be designed.

In the study of administrative development, we may investigate, by means of appropriate indicators, such constructs as differentiation, specialization, participation, and institutionalization. Because our theory is so abstract we find it difficult to link the indicators to some of our concepts and because the theory is incomplete, we have conceptual gaps -- the concepts are not logically linked together.

This discussion of indicators points to two basic needs in social science research. On one hand, indicators are used because we are unable to operationalize and measure certain variables. Thus, our research methods must be improved. Even more crucial is the need to strengthen our theory, refine our concepts and definitions, and strengthen the explanation of conceptual relations. As our theory matures the need to rely on indicators in the second sense lessens.

Modernization

We use the term "modernization" to refer to the sumtotal of the growth and developmental changes being experienced by nations around the world.⁵ No one term is adequate and satisfactory, nor is there consensus for a term to denote the numerous, complex, and interconnected developmental changes by which the way of life for people in these societies is being transformed. It is clearly better than "Westernization", which connotes a specific kind of social change--"becoming more like us." Modernization⁶ is a term which simply expresses the transformation in all or many aspects of human society which make it possible for new demands to be recognized and a responsive capability generated to sustain effective solutions so that people can control, rather than be controlled by, their environment. Modernization does not convey a specific kind of transformation nor does it imply that any one people are moving from a specific pattern of traditional society toward a certain new pattern of modern society. Modernization may result from efforts to emulate other

countries (i.e., exogenous modernization) or from efforts which are completely independent from foreign stimuli (i.e., endogenous modernization), if such independently initiated developmental change is any longer possible in this increasingly interconnected world society.

Characteristics. Numerous attempts have been made to specify the content, or characteristics, of the process of modernization. The more specific the definition, the greater the likelihood that it cannot serve as a universal generalization. On the other hand, the more general and abstract the definition, the less useful it is in examining concrete instances of modernization, although it may have more utility than no approach at all.

Huntington (1971: 288-291) summarizes a number of writers to arrive at a list of nine characteristics:

- 1) It is a revolutionary process, involving a radical and total change in patterns of human life.
- 2) It is a complex process, involving changes in virtually all areas of human thought and behavior.
- 3) It is a systematic process so that changes in one factor are related to and affect changes in other factors.
- 4) It is a world-wide phenomenon; all societies are now either modern or in the process of becoming modern.
- 5) It is a lengthy process which can only be worked out over time.

- 6) It is a phased process; all societies will move through essentially the same stages.
- 7) It is a homogenizing process producing tendencies toward convergence among societies.
- 8) It is an irreversible process. There may be temporary breakdowns and the rates of change may vary, but the direction of change will not.
- 9) It is a progressive process. Not only is it inevitable in the long run, it is also desirable.

As a review of the literature, this list has value.

Specifically, characterizing modernization as a revolutionary, complex, systemic process is in keeping with our pre-theoretical approach. However, along with much literature on this difficult topic, the other characteristics have deficiencies. Identifying it as a world-wide and lengthy process provides no guidance in studying it. Characterizing it as phased, homogenizing, and progressive makes assumptions about the nature and direction of modernization which should rather be determined by empirical study. These characteristics, along with the assumption that the direction of modernization will not change although the rates of change may, reflect the bias of Nineteenth Century evolutionism which held there is a law of historical necessity which moves all societies down the same path, or through the same stages, to modernity with the result that all societies will become more or less the same. If some societies do happen to become the same in some ways, we believe that

the possibility of similarity should not be assumed but must be established by empirical research and the reasons for the similarities explained. There is a serious danger in undertaking research if we make assumptions about outcomes before events occur. Mannheim (1967: 189) observes: "Whoever believes that he knows in advance . . . exactly what structure society will tend to adopt, weakens from the very beginning his capacity for empirical observation of newly emergent changes, and treats a structure in the process of becoming as though it had already taken its final shape."

Possibility model. By contrast, in keeping with our pre-theoretical approach to social change, we view modernization as consisting of multiple processes, each of which may be non-linear and even disjunctive rather than linear and continuous. Moreover, they do not arrive at a single, resultant condition. In the words of Guerreiro-Ramos (1970: 23) "modernity is not located in any specific part of the world." Every nation, whatever its contemporary configuration, "has its own possibilities of modernization, the implementation of which can be disturbed by the superimposition of a frozen, normative model, extrinsic to those possibilities."

The possibility model, as Guerreiro-Ramos refers to this approach, is not empty of substantive content and does not entail a wholly indeterministic perspective. Indeed, he persuasively argues, determinism is essential to social science and it can be saved by a recognition that determinism and freedom are not opposites. If human choices and freedom to decide are excluded, the result is fatalism,

not determinism. All social processes have objective determinants. If these are denied, the result is to deny the possibility of social science and to imply the meaninglessness of society as a whole, that is, nihilism. "Determinism is unthinkable without freedom, and freedom is unthinkable without objective limitations, i.e., determinism. Determinism or freedom is a false dilemma. In the historical and social process there is always determinism and freedom" (26)

The balance between determinism and freedom is never fixed in a dynamic world and it can never be expressed by a single formula for all people. However, the reality of the recently modernizing nations is that choice is severely limited by the social and natural environment. The process of modernization is one of achieving greater control over that environment. Riggs (1966) refers to development (which here we call modernization) as "the increasing capacity of a social system to manipulate its environment so as to enhance the ability of the system to make free choices among alternative courses of action." It is defined (1970: 27, 72) in terms of rising levels of autonomy or discretion, in the sense of ability to choose among alternatives. Rustow (1967: 33) discusses the "rapidly widening control over nature through closer cooperation among men." Inayatullah (1967: 101), a Pakistani, criticizes most definitions of modernization as ethnocentric because they presume all history is moving in a unilinear fashion toward the same destiny, same goals, and same values as Western man has. Therefore, he proposes a culture-free, non-Western definition which is similar: "it is a process

through which a society achieves increased control over environment, increased control over its own political destiny, and enables its component individuals to gain increased control over themselves."

Modernization in a concrete society is a holistic process, but because of the difficulty of comprehending such a complex and far-reaching process and especially because our training in separate social science disciplines leads us to investigate growth and developmental change in analytical constructs, such as the economy, the polity, and the culture, we abstract aspects of the change process from total reality. These methodological constructs may be referred to as sub-systems in society, such as the economic sub-system, the political sub-system, and so forth. Developmental change in each of these sub-systems, which may or may not be accompanied by growth, are referred to simply as development. Thus, there is economic development, political development, social development, agricultural development, educational development, community development, etc. Our concern is with administrative development, the growth and developmental changes occurring in the administrative sub-system of a developing polity within a recently modernizing society. No nation is developing equally in each of its sub-systems. A country may be more developed in certain sub-systems than in others. The development in all sub-systems is still in process and the rates of growth and developmental change vary over time so that these relationships do not remain constant. Furthermore, growth and developmental change in each sub-system consists of many different elements as evidenced by the

many measures and indicators used to identify and record economic development, political development, etc.

Any effort to conceptualize the total society transformation being experienced by people all over the world inevitably oversimplifies the process, misses many changes which occur, and fails to capture the reality and the meaning of these changes for the individual. The processes and consequences of modernization are more than the summation of sub-system developments, because our ability to comprehend all developmental changes is limited. Even more important is the fact that the totality of societal transformations is much more real for the individual than is just economic development, political development, etc. For the peasant in Asia his way of life and his well-being, along with that of his family and his community, are the only reality and our efforts to dissect, measure, and construct theories about his reality are pitifully feeble, crude, and impersonal. Our theories and constructs may be not only incomplete and partially inaccurate. To him, if understandable, they may be highly synthetic, remote, and vacuous.

Recapitulation

To recapitulation our theoretical stance preliminary to a discussion of strategies for accomplishing administrative change, we have argued:

****Ultimately, we need universal categories in our field of concern, applicable to any time, any place, any system.**

At present, the universal categories we have are at such

level of abstraction they are either not operational or amount to no difference categories leading, in the effort to compare, to pseudo-equivalences.

****Specifically, development administration has no distinguishing power; as a concept it is too abstract, too remote from reality, and irrelevant to concrete processes. Similarly, the useful concept of administrative development has not been operationally conceptualized so the process can be described and explained.**

****Therefore, we see advantage in the change to change: we need to identify what changes are occurring in the administrative systems of modernizing countries, identify whether they contribute to or impede development (as we have defined it), and then attempt to explain why these changes occurred within their specific contexts.**

****Change is conceived as originating in the efforts of individuals, not out of societal phenomena.**

****Relying on systems theory we may be alerted to the complexity of social systems and the interdependence of their parts.**

****Using functionalism we may focus on systems relevant consequences of change.**

****This approach has the advantage of being dynamic, focusing on process rather than end-state, and helping**

us determine the movements (or sequences) which interest us.

****The objective is to identify those consequences which improve administrative capabilities so that ultimately purposive action may be taken to produce this change.**

****However, every society has its own possibility for modernization and administrative development.**

II. Notes

1. For a blistering attack on American political science in the 1960s and a contradictory assertion that there is a "change to change" see O'Brien (1972). He argues that the studies of modernization over the last decade show a shift in teleological emphasis so that democracy as a goal for developing polities has been gradually displaced by another idea, that of institutional order and stability. He feels the American political scientists, preoccupied with problems of political order at home and abroad, have looked to authoritarian solutions and found merit in the achievements of totalitarian regimes which can build and maintain stable political institutions. Pye, Huntington, Weldner, LaPalombara, Ward, Janowitz, Apter, Zolberg are all criticized on the basis that "American political science has treated the problem in a characteristic manner, which has at least as much to do with the international objectives of the United States Government as with the predicament of underdevelopment. The official advisory role of so many political scientists, the close links between American universities and government departments, and the generally shared commitment to a national ideology, are among the frequently mentioned explanations for this scholarly perspective." (363).

2. He notes other possible explanations, but finds them less satisfactory: the failure of Nineteenth Century evolutionists to produce testable concepts of social change; the newness of the

United States predisposing researcher to a present-time view; and the heroic, if largely unsuccessful, effort of American sociologists to avoid an ideological commitment (36).

3. Political science, by contrast to economics, is in a worse position even though it too relies on aggregate data for some of its studies of political development. It has no indicator of political development, non-quantitative or quantitative, which enjoys consensus.

4. Briefly, we take note of Benjamin's assertion (1971: 8) that the "fatal weakness" of structural-functional analysis is the lack of explicit measurement language. Gregor (1968: 437) insists that "the claim that the functionalist schema offers testable hypothesis is singularly unconvincing." Hempel (1965: 329) regards functionalism, not as a body of doctrine or theory advancing tremendously general principles, but rather as "a program for research guided by certain heuristic maxims or 'working hypotheses.'" Dismissing functionalists as representatives of a "new scholasticism," LaPalombara (1968: 128) repeats Barrington Moore's derisive comment that they "are forever packing their bags for a voyage they never intend to take." Eckstein (1971: 12) points out a major difficulty: since functional analysis is concerned with viability, that is, complete failure or mere survival of polities, it can be tested only in the most extreme cases of malfunctioning and cannot even account for considerable changes in their structure. The same consideration that restricts testability to the most extreme cases also implies that

"performance can be evaluated only in the most minimal sense."

Groth (1970) summarizes the problems as terminological ambiguity, indeterminacy of relationships among things political, and confusions of facts with values.

5. As increasing attention came to be focused on the contemporary social changes occurring around the world diverse terms were used, each with serious shortcomings or disadvantages. Not many decades ago the societies of Asia, Africa, and sometimes Latin America were sometimes referred to by travelers from the West and the few social scientists who studied them, usually anthropologists, as "primitive" or "backward." These terms were eventually dropped as pejorative as well as inaccurate. A more neutral term, but one which identified only a single aspect of the society, was "pre-literate." After World War II, the terminology proliferated. "Non-Western" was a general term which attempted to identify all those other countries which were assumed to be different from us in some unspecified way. The economists used terms to distinguish these societies only according to economic criteria: "agricultural", "pre-industrial", "low income", and simply "poor." Terms related to the process of decolonization-- "new states" and "emergent nations" -- were not appropriate for countries like Iran and Thailand which had not been colonized. Another popular term, with political connotations, was "Third World," which implied, without foundation, that the processes of societal transformation were significantly different according to whether a nation was one

of the so-called democracies, Communist, or "other." Another series of terms was used by social scientists who attempted to conceptualize the nature of these societies with an extreme term that distinguished them from the other people to which they were presumably moving: "Gemeinschaft," "status," "folk," "rural," "agraria," "traditional," "fused," etc. Finally, there is the series of terms which evolved out of a recognition that all these countries are experiencing, or will soon experience, development. Before much change had begun they were termed "undeveloped", a deprecatory term that was too extreme so that it was modified to be "under-developed" and eventually "less developed." "Less developed countries" (LDCs) is still one of the most used terms among the aid-giving organizations and officials. However, because all three terms conveyed a static impression, another widely-used term came into use--"developing"--which did not satisfactorily distinguish between the recently developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the early developing countries of Europe and North America, which are also still "developing." Our preference is for the term "recently developing countries" or, "recently modernizing."

6. Although our intention is not to do so, the term "modernization" may convey to some readers a fixed and specific model of society-wide developmental change. For those persons who resist the term modernization, although it conforms to a usage which is already widely accepted in the literature (see Finkle and Gable,

1971; Weiner, 1966; Apter, 1965, 1968; Harbison et al, 1970; Feldman and Hurn, 1966) we suggest as an alternative another term that is more neutral but very awkward-- "contemporary societal transformation." For a different use of the term "modernization", see Riggs (1966: 1; 1967; see also Eisenstadt, 1966) who defines it as "emulative acculturation" and Levy (1966: 1, 12) who defines it as a condition in which members use "inanimate sources of power and/or use tools to multiply the effect of their efforts." In restricting the term to borrowing and/or adapting institutions and practices from foreign models, Riggs suggests no term for endogenous change other than "development," a term which we prefer to use to apply to certain kinds of change that take place in societal subsystems, and he offers no term to comprehend the total process of both exogenous and endogenous change. We find Levy's definition too specific and restrictive. A better term for what he defines might be "industrialization," or "mechanization." Goulet (1971: 334) proposes yet another term, "contemporaneity," which suggests three related notions: "(a) an attempt by a society to live consciously in its own historical time; (b) the recognition that this time is not fully of its own making and that there is a necessitating character to contemporary history as it affects the Third World; and (c) the will to achieve some measure of control over its own destiny on the presupposition that the same forces which have unleashed the determinism can also be utilized to free men from some of their servitudes. The term 'contemporaneity; implies, therefore, both :

qualified acceptance and a profound rejection of modernity." We accept this definition and incorporate it into ours, but prefer to stay with the more widely used term, "modernization."

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III. A Strategy for Administrative Change:

Toward a "New" Development Administration

With this background we are prepared to consider a strategy which will identify change leading to administrative development. The discussion will (1) review previous experience with technical assistance in public administration to emphasize the need to break with the past, (2) discuss the role of management in the development process of modernizing countries and the importance of understanding that role so that administrative development may be assisted, (3) identify the emerging role of the development officer within the new directions A.I.D. is taking and the significance of management skills to that role, and (4) suggest the appropriate learning philosophy for training to deal with #2 and #3.

The Need to Break with the Past

Although the emphasis has varied in each phase of the U. S. foreign aid program, almost from its inception technical assistance in public administration has figured prominently. It has been urged both by government officials of the developing countries as well as by the U. S. as well as other technical assistance donors. While technical cooperation with Latin America during World War II focused on agriculture, education, and health, an occasional public administration expert was also involved. The Marshall Plan after the war was more administration oriented and

attention to the field was to be found in the aid to China program. Public administration assistance was limited under the Technical Cooperation Administration in Africa, the Near East, and South Asia immediately after President Truman's Point Four address. However, by the end of the Truman administration public administration specialists were active in TCA, the Mutual Security Administration in Europe and the Far East, and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs in Latin America.

When technical assistance was consolidated in 1954 under the Foreign Operations Administration (quickly to become the International Cooperation Administration and then A.I.D.), the ground was laid for a large program in public administration. Two years later a Public Administration Division was established. Added thrust to the movement was provided when Riggs (1956) called attention to public administration as the neglected factor of economic development. He argued persuasively that defective public administration hampers and even prevents the attainment of economic development goals. The universal complaint was that too many persons were employed, their services were not fully utilized, and they frequently were not qualified by training or experience to do the work that needed to be done. The importance of administration has been reasserted countless times. Brown (1964:69-70) aptly put the case when he quoted an anonymous health specialist in a developing nation: "The conduct of a DDT program . . . is 90 percent administration and 10 percent how to spray."

Technical assistance in public administration was at the center of many country programs through the 1960s, but difference of opinions emerged over whether it was desirable to strengthen a bureaucracy by improving its administrative capacity in a political system where it already was dominant. What Heady (1971: 464) calls the standard technical assistance approach looked favorably on the proposition that administration reform is intrinsically a good thing without regard for its political consequences. It rested on the assumption that administrative upgrading was ipso facto desirable and should be carried out wherever possible at the most rapid feasible rate. Under this assumption the great bulk of specific problems attached through public administration assistance fell within the "triple threat" (Weidner, 1964: 19) of personnel, budgeting-finance, and organization and methods. The detailed objectives of most projects were described in traditional terms, rather than by stressing a close relationship of public administration to development. Bureaucratic reform was conceived as the precondition to political and economic development and its advocates had confidence that developed societies in the West had administrative capabilities that were transferable to developing countries.

A second view was in marked contrast to this position. It saw bureaucracies from a sweeping historical and societal perspective and sought to fit the character of the bureaucracy to the state of development through which the society was passing. Since bureaucracy was regarded as a crucial power center, overdevelopment

(imbalance in relation to the political system) was viewed as a danger. The prospect for attaining a desirable mutual interdependence among the competing power centers became more remote and, as the burgeoning bureaucracy gained dominance, it actually retrogressed in its capacity to make productive use of available resources. This imbalance thesis has already been identified above. Its proponents argued for a "balanced social growth" strategy.

A third approach contends the opposite. Arguing for an "unbalanced social growth" strategy, it is much like the first, but its rationale is different. Supporters of this view insisted that development is differential, unbalanced, or asymmetrical. Bureaucracy does often forge ahead of other power centers, but a developing nation needs an effective administrative system so administrative reform should proceed as an autonomous action, irrespective of the rate of maturation of the larger political process.

A variation of this third position attempts to put the matter within the political context of the given country. What ought to be done by way of bureaucratic reform must be related to the specifics of the situation. As Heady (1964: 469) puts the approach: "Since the characteristics of particular bureaucracies depend in part on the impact of political factors, which may either aid or impede the developmental efforts of the bureaucracy, this should be taken into account in making recommendations for improvement." Administrative innovation cannot be encouraged regardless of the political goals of the developing country or the degree of

political freedom they enjoy. To a degree, balance or imbalance is irrelevant. More important is a pragmatic, experimental outlook. No standard formula for administrative improvement is assumed; the consequences of bureaucratic reform are to be determined by testing rather than by deductive reasoning. Needs must be clarified, alternatives identified, and possible outcomes investigated. A choice of strategy should rely on a prior empirical analysis of conditions in the country concerned. Prescription, based on deduction from a model or stereotype, should be avoided. We advocate this fourth approach. Perhaps if this approach had been followed from the beginning, the frustrations, mistakes, failures, and disillusionment in public administration technical assistance might have been avoided. By the end of the 1960s, public administration went into an eclipse within A.I.D. and is beginning to emerge again as "management," a term often identified with business administration rather than public administration when used to refer to the major activity of running a program or an organization. The term is also used to dissociate from the "triple threat" activities of the past.

The Role of Management in the Development Process

The design of a strategy to accomplish the change which will help develop the administrative capabilities of nations undergoing societal modernization requires a break from the narrow, staff-focused, means-oriented, contextually vague conception of public administration which characterized good-intentioned, but often

painfully futile, efforts of the past. A "new look" in development assistance would recognize the significance of management in any program or project, not as a separate activity but as an integral part of the entire effort.

Assumptions. This approach is built on the following assumptions:

- ** Administrative development is a necessary condition for societal modernization and it must proceed irrespective of the rate of political development, not as a theoretical idea but as an expedient strategy. Indeed, well-designed programs which deliver people-services through an improved administrative system can assist development of the political system.**
- ** Planning and implementation (thinking and doing), to be effective, should be conducted as inseparable elements of one continuous activity.**
- ** Program goals cannot be achieved without effective management, but administrative development cannot be promoted apart from the substantive program. The focus needs to be on ends (policy) rather than simply means (administrative processes) to achieve them. Thus, the first need is a soundly designed policy, authoritatively stated, supported by the clients as legitimate, and feasible in the given context.**

- ** An ends-orientation requires attention to impact and outcomes; a program needs to be designed as a delivery system and the entire administrative system must be seen as an integral part of the delivery system.
- ** Since development makes it possible for new demands to be recognized and a responsive capability generated administration should be designed as a process of managing social change; since the change must be sustained, administrative institutions (not transient organizations) must be built.
- ** These institutions need to be client-centered, action-oriented, innovative organizations valued by the society and its power centers, supported by the political system, and effectively linked to complementary institutions.
- ** Desirable as it is for administration to be participative, responsive, and innovative, administration cannot be participative if the political system is essentially non-participative; responsive, if the political leadership and institutions are non-responsive; innovative, if public policy is uncreative.
- ** Public regard for government, administrative, and the public service must be enhanced or there is the strong likelihood that they will be distrusted, avoided,

sabotaged, or corrupted so that desired and approved programs will be doomed to failure.

The administrative system. It is useful to identify the elements of the administrative system in which change will be sought. Administration is commonly defined as planned, cooperative behavior calculated to achieve consciously recognized and agreed upon goals. The administrative system consists of all those complementary and interrelated elements which contribute to the planned, cooperative behavior. In highly simplified form the administrative system:

- ** Clarifies and specifies in operational terms the objectives to be achieved which will accomplish authoritatively - determined policy.
- ** Plans administrative phases of operations, sets operating schedules, identifies measurement techniques to check progress; formulates revised plans where necessary.
- ** Mobilizes essential human, financial, and material resources and assures that they become available at the time needed.
- ** Organizes human efforts, using available resources, to effectuate plans, maintaining linkages with other relevant organizations.
- ** Creates and employs a communication flow within the system, with other relevant system, and with the environment, using this flow to direct and coordinate

efforts, establish norms and standards, and receive feedback.

- ** Designs systems of control to assure adherence to plans, effective utilization of resources, and conformance with laws, rules, and norms.**
- ** Develops a means of evaluating the impact and outcome of public policies.**
- ** Builds new institutions or reconstitutes established institutions which permit innovations to be sustained.**
- ** Extends service to penetrate the society at all levels.**
- ** Provides means for client input and participation, where appropriate, and develops a responsive capability.**
- ** Develops new policy alternatives on the basis of administrative experience and inputs from the environment for submission to policymaking bodies.**
- ** Adjusts the burden on the administrative system, when necessary by decentralizing activities to local authorities, creating autonomous agencies, improving levels and quality of performance, and withdrawing activities from government, possibly committing them to the private sector.**

Administrative profile analysis. The ability of a development office to collaborate on implementation of development plans and the achievement of development goals requires a far deeper and broader

understanding of the administrative system (as outlined above) within the specific country, region of the country, or relevant agencies, than has been obtained in at many times in the past. A soundly designed project should be based on an administrative profile analysis (LaPalombara, 1971) rather than on the stereotyped models and unfounded assumptions which have characterized some assistance projects. The analysis should depict the needs, resources, obstacles, and appropriate role for development assistance through a collaborative arrangement. Such analyses would probably show considerable variation from country to country, even from region to region, or organization to organization within the same country. They would cast doubt on the general applicability of any single strategy for increasing administrative capacity, and would give a better basis for deciding when to stress and when to deemphasize external attempts to bolster a bureaucracy. Here follows a list of questions which illustrate the kind of information which a development officer may need to know to collaborate in the design of an effective project.

(1) Needs --

What demands confront a developing nation? Which are regarded as most urgent?

How widespread are these demands felt? By whom: political leaders, political parties, community leaders, interest groups, etc.

What policy has been authoritatively been formulated to

cope with these demands? How clear and explicit is the policy?

How widespread is its support? By whom?

Is the policy a part of a development plan? Who plans?

With what authority? With what support?

How supportive is the political elite? The bureaucratic elite?

(2) Resources --

What are the physical, human, and organizational resources for meeting the expressed needs and implementing the public policy?

Are the raw materials, materiele, communication and transportation facilities available or procurable?

How well educated, trained, skilled and motivated are the people on whom the project will depend? Harbison (1973) reminds us: "human resources--not capital, nor income, nor material resources--constitute the ultimate basis for the wealth of nations." What facilities are available to educate and train? How can motivation be provided? What are leadership styles?

In regard to administrative organization: how far does it penetrate the country (reach the people wherever they are); what is the relation of central to regional and local offices; what is the distribution of political and administrative authority; how responsive is the administrative system; where are the political and administrative elite in the system; how prestigious is the organization; what is the nature of administrative leadership; what is the formal control system? The informal control systems? Is there corruption? What are its consequences? etc.

Are there private organizations (business, labor unions, voluntary associations) which can contribute to policy implementation? Same questions as above in this regard? Can they be mobilized to contribute to policy implementation?

How do the culture, value system, elite groups, power centers, etc. affect the utilization of these resources? How change oriented is the society and significant groups?

(3) Obstacles --

What elements in the culture, value system, ideology, etc. impede administrative development (see Gable, 1959)?

Are there obstacles in the institutional arrangements, organizational structure, personnel or finance system, behaviors of bureaucrats, etc.?

What is the nature and extent of bureaupathology: close supervision; failure to delegate; heavy emphasis on regulations, quantitative norms, precedents, and the accumulation of paper to prove compliance; cold aloofness; insistence on office protocol; fear of innovation; restriction of communication (Thompson, 1961)?

Is corruption a problem?

Does the political system support the bureaucracy?

Are the above perceived as obstacles?

(4) Development Assistance --

Is there a felt need? Is there a clear and explicit policy objective and authoritative commitment to achieve that goal?

Does U. S. have something to offer which is useful and acceptable--money, skill, knowledge, technology, etc.?

Is there a collaborative relationship that can be mutually development?

Can needed resources be identified and mobilized?

Are relevant data for designing the program known and available?

Can the most serious obstacles be coped with?

Does the program have a potential for multiplication and spread?

Are there prospects that the activity will continue after external assistance terminates?

As a result of gathering and analyzing these data a development officer ought to be able to say, in the words of LaPalombara (1971: 190): For a given country ". . . commitment to a certain set of developmental goals will require certain bureaucratic capability, the creation of which is facilitated by certain identifiable resources and impeded by certain identifiable obstacles."

**Management in Development Assistance:
The Role of the Development Officer**

The Congressional mandates since 1973 and policy changes within A.I.D. before and after 1973 have begun to turn the Agency in new directions. The development officer is emerging as the individual on whom major responsibilities will fall as a result of the new thrust, although there is not yet full understanding and agreement about the specific characteristics of his/her role. A certain amount of ambiguity, vagueness, and uncertainty is inevitable in such situations;

to a degree a certain amount of imprecision is desirable. Rather than cast the role into a firm mould too quickly, flexibility and experimentation will permit and encourage a more appropriate conceptualization.

At this present stage, he is a multiple character, a man for all seasons. A casual survey identifies him as:

Stimulator	Innovator
Motivator	Experimenter
Facilitator	Change agent
Communicator	Team member
Sounding board	Team builder and leader
Critic	Planner
Catalyst	Programmer
Researcher	Problem-solver
Analyst	Decisionmaker
Collaborator	Contract agent
Empathizer	Monitor
Consultant	Evaluator
Counselor	All these, but <u>not a "Doer"</u>
Professional	
Social Scientist	
Generalist (with technical knowledge and/or sensitivity)	

Prior to being called a development officer, this role was referred to as technical generalist, implying the perpetuation and use (where present) of technical skills in three ways in which the

development officer should now function as a generalist:

- (1) within the sector of the individual's specialization (agriculture, population, human resources, etc.);
- (2) in relating that sector to other sectors to understand and assist collaboratively the development process;
- (3) in functioning as a general manager within the Mission and in relation to AID/W.

Because most of the duties and responsibilities of the development officer can be summed up in the term manager, we will hereafter refer to him as a manager to focus on the management process within the development assistance. (Executive would be an equally acceptable term.)

The effective manager must be disabused of the impression that the world of administration is determined, simple, and knowable. In reality, it is just the opposite--uncertain, highly complex, and largely unknowable (because of limited time, money, ability, and interest)--and this is especially true for the manager who is a development officer. Development plans and policies are hypotheses; programs which implement them are experiments to test their validity and to provide feedback for their revision (see next section). The development officer has to learn about the complexity of the internal and external environment in which he works, the pressing social, economic, and political demands which are being placed on the

modernizing society, the diversity and uncertainty of planning goals and the multiplicity of means to achieve them, the nature of human motivation and group behavior in organizations, the varieties of leadership styles that diversity and complexity require, and the numerous (and sometimes conflicting) processes and techniques which may be employed in the management process.

The significance of non-market goals in the governmental arena (in both the public sector of developing nations as well as within A.I.D. itself) must be recognized along with the diversity of decisionmaking procedures (rationalities), such as political rationality, behavioral rationality, administrative rationality, and scientific rationality, all of which function in public agencies around the world. The development officer must learn to cope with complicated interactions involving large aggregates on both sides of the collaborative arrangement when he lacks full and complete information and will never be able to obtain all he should have.

Although he may use economic reasoning, quantitative analysis, information science, and policy analysis to assist him, these techniques may be useless to the development officer when faced with developmental issues within the new mandate. Far more important to him is an appreciation of political rationality, which the naive may call "irrationality." A serious misunderstanding of political rationality can prevent the effective utilization of economic reasoning and quantitative analysis. The political process to which development officers need respond must be understood as fully as possible.

A philosopher, not a political scientist, Paul Diesing wrote:
"Compromise is always irrational; the rational procedure is to determine which proposal is best, and to accept it. In a political decision, on the other hand, action never is based on the merits of a proposal but always on who makes it and who opposes it."

In the development process, the most important calculation is of social and political costs and benefits, not economic calculation. Indeed, the literature of economics usually treats public organizations and institutions as if they were costless entities. A standard economic procedure is to consider rival alternatives (in consideration of price policy or other criteria), calculate difference in cost and achievement among them, and show that one is more or less efficient than another. This typical way of thinking is often misspecified. If the costs of pursuing a policy are strictly economic and can be calculated directly in the marketplace (an assumption that has never been substantiated), then the procedure should work well. But if the costs include getting one or another organization to change its policies or procedures, or changing behavior within society, then these costs must also be taken into account. Perhaps there are legal, psychological, cultural, or other impediments that make it either impossible or difficult for the required changes to be made. Or, the changes may require great effort and result in incurring a variety of other costs, even social disruption. In considering a range of alternatives, we must measure not only efficiency but also the cost of change.

The efficiency criteria, and cost-benefit analysis, are needed and useful. But the focus is on a single value which may be permitted to triumph over other values without explicit consideration being given to these values. That limited focus has often permeated the development assistance in the past.

In meeting these new challenges, the development officer must acquire new skills and the ability to utilize different methodologies while employing a collaborative style. The matter of style is central. It has also been referred to as "collegiality," "professional collegiality," "mutual" or "reciprocal relationship," and "coordinate professional relationship." Collaborative style encompasses a variety of professional working relationships: interacting with host country personnel in the identification of development needs, planning, decisionmaking and goal-setting, implementing, measuring progress, and evaluating projects; developing institutions and training personnel to sustain the effort; understanding and meshing with the development assistance of other donor groups; and team building within the AID Mission while utilizing the advisory services of AID/W. (See Hautaluoma, 1974; Esman and Montgomery, 1969).

An effective collaborative style obviously cannot be a one-way relationship. Even if the development officer is prepared to operate collaboratively and collegially, his efforts are futile if the other parties do not reciprocate. In the case of host country personnel and other donor groups, the problem is significant. A history of relationships which were often not truly collaborative

must be undone. The leverage of military and capital assistance is no longer effective in many countries and, indeed, it is often counter-productive. The alternative sources of bi-lateral and multi-lateral cooperation have expanded. A new understanding must be generated, founded on a trust that was often lacking in the past. Such a shift requires not only a different style on the part of individual development officers but also clear and positive commitments from the political leadership of the U.S. and administrative leadership of AID that the new direction is more than rhetoric and past ineptitudes and expedient programs are not being peddled in a new and fragile wrapping.

Within AID the collaborative style requires a positive and supportive environment. If the Balkanization among bureaus persists, if specialization continues to be a refuge whenever the Agency is threatened, if bureaucratic barriers and rigidities are not replaced by openness, flexibility, and trusting interrelationships, if the value of generalists in the development process is not widely understood and accepted, the heralded collaborative style becomes another futile phrase. The environment must encourage and be receptive to innovation and experimentation; the skills of the various professions and disciplines need to be understood and valued; freedom to test and to risk must be promoted; a laboratory setting should become the model for the Agency. Rewards should be given not only for success but also for the attempt to be creative, even though the result was a valiant failure.

We now know something about inventiveness and innovation (see, e.g., Mohr, 1969). While closely related, the concepts and their determinants are not identical. Inventiveness, the generation of new ideas, seems to be affected by individual creativity and by the degree of hierarchical informality in organization structure. Innovation, the successful introduction into an applied situation of means or ends that are new to that situation, has been linked to size, wealth, environment, ideology, motivation, competence, professionalism, decentralization, opinion leadership, etc. Most important to innovation is motivation, which depends primarily on encouragement from the organization, and the availability of resources, coupled with an organizational willingness to let them be used in high-risk, experimental ventures. There must be "slack" in the organization.

There are other skills the development officer, as manager, should have. He should be able to facilitate group problem-solving and effective team work. The variety of knowledge and skills which must be mobilized to identify and solve problems and implement programs in the development process is so diverse that a person in a directing and controlling role cannot be effective. Thus, skills in team building, listening, coaching, counseling, and communicating must be enhanced. New leadership abilities should be promoted and support given to a willingness to experiment with them.

Finally, beyond knowledge and skills, there is the matter of values, norms, attitudes and beliefs. These are not quickly and easily changed, if at all. However, it is desirable to explore the

values which are appropriate for the development officer. Cross-cultural understanding and ability to empathize have frequently been identified as necessary. A sense of professionalism (in the generalist role, not in the specialty) is also essential. The internationalization of professional standards and guidelines is a requisite to the effective performance in a role which should be relatively autonomous, free from detailed control and hierarchical guidance. A sense of responsibility and responsiveness are inherent values that accompany the collaborative style.

A public service outlook is also a central element of the value structure of a development officer. Although cynics have often argued that the concept is vague and meaningless, its value becomes apparent when we observe the behavior of a person new to the public service who had never before been associated with it. The ethics and morality of public service are different than those in the private service. The problem is intensified when so much of the Agency's business is done under contract with private businesses and institutions. Conflict of interest statutes and rules are not enough. A deeper probing of the meaning of "public service" should be encouraged.

In the transition to the development officer concept and in the introduction and effective utilization of new skills and methodologies, we must anticipate that, even in the presence of a highly supportive environment, there may be "role shock." Just as in the case of culture shock, the new, the different, and the unusual

can be unsettling. The role is, and will be for a time, ill-defined. The individual must bring his/her own creativity to the act of specifying the role. The role, by its nature, is likely to be constantly changing as we learn more about the development process and how it can be assisted collaboratively. By its nature, an experimental role can never be fixed. It is certain to be in conflict with old patterns; tension is inevitable between those committed to the old and those willing to test the new; relations between disciplines and professions have often been strained and there is no reason to assume that a call for multi-disciplinary teams will automatically alter habits and values. As long as a disciplinarian or a professional continues to take his/her principal cues from the discipline or profession, rather to be motivated by the generalist concept, the prospects for effective utilization of the development officer are jeopardized.

Only if there is full recognition of the threatening character of the new expectations is it reasonable to hope for a real and lasting change. As a beginning, a fundamental change should be made in the reward structure of the Agency. Real and psychic income, promotion, recognition, and response must go to those who are willing to perform in the role of the development officer.

Learning Philosophy

The underlying philosophy for training in the entire development studies program, not just the development administration module, should be learner-oriented. We must build on and

skillfully use the experience of the development officers themselves as a base for further learning. The process of training and transition to a new role must be supported by the Agency as well as the faculty, whose task it is to motivate the development officers to identify their learning goals and to stimulate the learning processes they seek.

There are many pitfalls. We must:

- ** Avoid conveying the impression that the development process is simple, unilinear, unidirectional (it is usually complex; there are many roads, not a single path; and often there are breakdowns, reverses, and decay);
- ** Avoid the conception that development administration is a single, identifiable process in all contexts, regardless of policy and program;
- ** Avoid prescription;
- ** Avoid abstractness, global generalizations, and systems level models;
- ** Avoid laying on mid-career people with deep knowledge in a speciality, often "successful" in that field, and with a wide experience in developing countries, a heavy and specific body of knowledge.

An experimental approach, the laboratory model, may help development officers acquire a new methodology, a way of thinking and analyzing, which is appropriate for the diverse work and

experience they will confront. It will help merge theory and practice and will encourage innovation and risk-taking. The experimental model is based on these assumptions:

- ** A development plan is a social prediction;
- ** A social prediction is an hypothesis (or set of hypotheses);
- ** An hypothesis must be put to test, taken into the laboratory, made the subject of a social experiment.

Many plans are designed without a concern for their implementation; thinking and doing are unrelated. Even when joined, the thinker-doer may be unwilling to try new paths, seek alternative solutions to problems; he sticks with the old answers, because he does not want to risk failure. But, failure can be very instructional. The medical researcher who tests drug A and fails to find a cure for a disease has learned what does not work so that he can look to B, C, and D, until he discover X that does work.

It will be helpful if we put the development assistance process (learning the environment and identifying needs; formulating an operational plan; and implementing the plan and assessing outcomes) into the experimental mode. The advantages are:

- ** The social sciences have a methodology which can be used and which we can communicate.
- ** Plans and implementation must be integrated; you cannot stop when you have a hypothesis and research

design; you must put it to the test.

- ** The course of the project must be monitored and outcomes assessed, avoiding the error of not following-up and determining if the assumed causal links do produce the intended outcomes.
- ** If failure results, reasons may be identified.
- ** The failure itself may be seen as a valuable lesson; you learned how not to achieve a desired end in a given set of circumstances and you may have a more accurate social prediction for the next effort.

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