

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523 <b>BIBLIOGRAPHIC INPUT SHEET</b>	FOR AID USE ONLY <i>Batch 85</i>
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1. SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION	A. PRIMARY	Social sciences	SD00-0000-G132
	B. SECONDARY	Political science--East Africa	

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
 Bringing home the pork; legislator behavior, rural development and political change in East Africa

3. AUTHOR(S)  
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4. DOCUMENT DATE 1975	5. NUMBER OF PAGES 43p, 450,	6. ARC NUMBER ARC
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7. REFERENCE ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS  
 Iowa


8. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES (Sponsoring Organization, Publisher, Availability)  
 (In Comparative Legislative Research Ctr. occasional paper no. 9)  
 (Prepared for Conf. on Legislatures and Development, Carmel, Calif., 1975)

9. ABSTRACT


10. CONTROL NUMBER <i>PN-AAF-628</i>	11. PRICE OF DOCUMENT
12. DESCRIPTORS Development East Africa Kenya Legislation  Legislatures Linkages Rural areas Tanzania	13. PROJECT NUMBER
	14. CONTRACT NUMBER CSD-3294 211(d)
	15. TYPE OF DOCUMENT

CSD-3294 211(6)  
IOWd  
PN-AAF-628

# Comparative Legislative Research Center



**Occasional Paper Series**



**The University of Iowa  
Iowa City, Iowa**

BRINGING HOME THE PORK:  
LEGISLATOR BEHAVIOR, RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND  
POLITICAL CHANGE IN EAST AFRICA

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Occasional Paper No. 9

August, 1975

## Introduction

Given that most people in developing societies are farmers in the rural areas it goes without saying that no discussion of the role of the legislature in the developmental process can ignore the question of whether and how legislatures contribute to rural development. Indeed, rural development, or the lack of it, constitutes the hard core of the crisis of underdevelopment which plagues most third-world states: Despite the green revolution, it is the rural areas, particularly in Africa, which have experienced the lowest, and often negative rates of economic growth during the last decade.<sup>1</sup> It is the rural areas which have suffered the most from famine, population growth, and disease. It is the rural areas which have received the least in terms of income distribution<sup>2</sup> and government services. And, not surprisingly, it is the rural areas where the seeds of revolt and revolution have found the most fertile soil in which to grow.<sup>3</sup>

The problems of rural development consequently constitute a serious challenge and a great opportunity for legislatures of third-world countries, for it is in respect to these problems that the significance of the legislature in the developmental equation and its utility as an institution will ultimately be assessed. Legislatures which contribute to the struggle of overcoming the obstacles to rural development, or at least mitigate the hardship of underdevelopment are likely to become valued institutions. Legislatures which fail in this task may cease to exist -- through disuse, military coup, revolution, or some combination of the three.

That the future of legislatures in the less developed countries (LDCs) is tied to the rate of rural development is a function of three conditions which are the subjects of this paper. First, and most obvious, legislatures by definition, are representative institutions, the members of which are elected to serve not only the national interest; but the interests of sub-national constituencies whether defined in terms of territorial or group needs. Legislatures may make decisions collectively, but the positions taken by individual legislators, especially in developing countries, are invariably perceived in terms of whether they advance the interests of the constituents they represent.

Second, most citizens in the rural sector of the LDCs are not politically inert, nor significantly less interested in matters of public policy than their brethren in the urban and "modern" sectors of society though they perceive and evaluate these issues in more parochial terms. Put most bluntly, peasants may not be sophisticated cosmopolitans, but neither are they dumb provincials incapable of determining where their self-interest lies. Indeed, data recently gathered by this researcher in rural Kenya suggests that most peasants do not lie beyond the boundaries of the national political system as is often supposed, but are very much insiders. They have a reasonably clear idea of what they want from government, and the institutions, procedures, and officials through which they can best obtain it. They are also prepared and capable of holding those decision-makers accountable who do not respond to their demands.

inira, because of the nature of their activities, the source of their authority and the role expectations which most residents of the rural areas ascribe to their jobs, legislators are in a position to contribute to the process of rural development in a way that civil servants and party officials cannot. As representatives of the rural population, legislators are not primarily concerned with extending central government authority and programs into the periphery of the political system, but rather are interested in articulating the demands of the people they represent at the center.

As such, legislators can play a unique and often critical role in the process of rural development -- a role which on the one hand may increase the rate of development in the rural areas, but which may also frustrate the prospects of managed and coordinated change, at least from the perspective of central government planners, from taking place. Similarly, the contribution legislators make to rural development is likely to raise the level of public support for national, *i.e.*, central government, institutions, and the legislature in particular in the short run, but may also lead to increased political instability over the long term.

#### Perspectives of Legislative Behavior Research in the LDCs

Before exploring these conditions, several preliminary remarks are in order about the assumptions underlying the nature of the inquiry to assess the relationship between legislative behavior and development, and the perspective investigators of this relationship might take to maximize the prospects of their enterprise bearing fruit. What follows

is thus a brief exposition of the guidelines followed by the author during the Kenya field study reported below, and by colleagues at the University of Iowa engaged in parallel investigations in Korea and Turkey.<sup>4</sup> This description is offered not only for the purpose of explaining the background to our efforts at Iowa, but to fulfill one of the objectives set forth by our co-hosts to this gathering, namely that we speak to each other's papers -- in this case their own.

The essay by Smith and Musolf, "Some Observations of Legislatures and Development," is illustrative of three related perspectives of the relationship between legislative behavior and development which have dominated the literature on this problem, but which may need some modification if our inquiry is to achieve its stated goal: First, an emphasis on the collective and institutional role of the legislature rather than a concern with the activities of individual legislators. Second, a relatively narrow conception of the legislative process which emphasizes how legislatures contribute to the making of public policy -- either through the actual passage of legislation and/or the modification or ratification of executive decisions, rather than the other activities and functions their members perform. Third, an interest in how legislatures contribute to central government attempts to manage the developmental process through collective decisions which allocate resources, rather than through individual efforts to distribute resources already allocated to various sectors of society.

While highly relevant to the study of legislative behavior in countries where the legislature is already an institutionalized part of

the political system, these perspectives may lead us up several blind alleys when investigating legislative behavior in the LDCs. This is particularly true in respect to the role played by African legislators in the process of rural development. Where they continue to function, African legislatures are extremely weak institutions vis à vis the executive branch. MPs are invariably members of the ruling party with the result that even where party discipline is low, and parliamentary debate sharp, as in Kenya, legislators do not challenge the Government over fundamental policy decisions, but rather over the implementation of these decisions. Conflicts between MPs, and between the Government and backbenchers are thus rarely a function of ideological differences, or differences in the overall conception of how development ought to proceed, or which sectors should be given priority in the developmental equation. Nor are they usually a function of major group and corporate interests, because such interests are either insignificant or where present concentrate their efforts on the executive branch. Because African legislators are essentially representatives of rural populations, who have similar needs, conflict within the legislature tends to be of a highly personal nature, and drawn along sectional and ethnic lines. Such divisions, are consequently highly fluid with the result that one cannot view the legislative process either as a process of bargaining between relatively stable and identifiable groups for the purpose of making public policy, or in terms of systematic debate between advocates of alternative conceptions of what development should entail. When narrowly defined in terms of the collective activity which transpires within the legislative chamber, the

legislative process in this context consists of little more than a sounding board for public opinion, and an instrument for questioning and overseeing the operations of the executive branch.

Important as these activities may be, conceptions of the legislative process which orients research towards such collective activity, are likely to yield fewer insights into the role and significance of legislative behavior in Sub-Sahara Africa, and its significance for the process of development than a broader perspective which encompasses the activities of legislators which occur outside the legislative chamber, and which are normally carried out on an individual basis. These activities, which consist mainly of various forms of constituency service, are of great importance, because they constitute the substance of one of the few linkages that exist between the largely rural and sedentary populations of these societies, and the central government. They are thus activities through which these populations are integrated into the political system, integration which is in turn a precondition (though obviously not a guarantee) for both public support for central government institutions, and government policies designed to foster development in the rural areas. These activities are not usually regarded as the corpus of legislative behavior in the strict sense, but as they are not performed by actors other than "legislators" (or more appropriately, political brokers whose legal status and authority are derived from membership in a national representative assembly), it seems reasonable to regard them as such for the purpose of our discussion.

### Linkage Behavior and Rural Development

The contribution made by African legislators to the process of rural development is almost totally a function of their attempts to establish linkages between their constituencies and agencies of the central government rather than their efforts at law-making or parliamentary debate. These linkages, which we shall define simply as stable and valued networks for communication and the exchange of resources between the center and periphery of the political system, are critical to both the political and economic development of the rural areas on the one hand, and the development of viable and valued national political institutions on the other. As first discussed by Boeke<sup>5</sup> and Shils<sup>6</sup> and subsequently others,<sup>7</sup> developing countries are dual societies consisting of a core of national and "modern" institutions located in one or two central cities, and an underdeveloped hinterland. These two sectors are distinct not only in terms of the activities and values of their respective residents, but also in terms of their spatial relationship to one another. Given the dualistic nature of these societies, political and economic integration is dependent on agents from the center penetrating and interacting with people on the periphery, and/or agents from the periphery interacting with those at the center.

One of the characteristics of developing societies, however, is that these agents and the linkages they create are few in number. In Sub-Saharan Africa the most numerous by far are those civil servants of the central administration posted to the rural areas. It is for this reason that much of the recent literature on rural development in Africa

has focused exclusively on this group, a concentration which has resulted in widespread neglect of legislators and what they do. Civil servants are charged with penetrating the periphery. The same is true of party officials, but as party organizations have declined in most African countries still under civilian rule to the point that they are usually referred to as "non-party" states, the role of the party cadre as linker is to be found in only a handful of states. Even where party organizations are strong, moreover, as in Tanzania, party cadres at the periphery are more often than not members of the local milieu rather than agents from the center.<sup>8</sup>

In contrast, legislators constitute the only group of political actors whose explicit task, both formally and informally, is to link the periphery and center together by representing the periphery at the center, and by mediating the respective demands of each. While civil servants posted to the rural areas provide substantial feedback to the center on the needs of these areas, the primary purpose of such feedback is not, obviously, to facilitate demands by the periphery on the center, but to enhance the success of central government programs and central control at the local level. As a result of administrative policy not to post civil servants to their home areas, and because of periodic transfers, civil servants are also invariably strangers in the areas they serve. By contrast, legislators are permanent or semi-permanent members of the local community. They are thus in a position to create not only different and autonomous linkages between center and periphery, but may also be more successful in the linkages they forge. As agents of the periphery they

are linkers who are likely to be accorded a higher tenet of trust by the residents of the rural areas than that accorded civil servants, and others trying to penetrate these areas from the outside.

That legislators are important because of their potential for creating linkages from the periphery to the center also underscores a salient feature of developing societies that is too often neglected by political scientists concerned with the development of national political institutions and macro-economic change, namely that politics in these societies is often a highly decentralized phenomenon. As noted at the outset, and explored further below, residents of the rural areas are not politically inert. For most of these people, however, the arena of political action is not at the center, but on the periphery, and it is consequently on the periphery where the most significant contestants at the center must develop their political base. This is particularly true in Africa where party organizations have atrophied, and do not offer national or regional aspiring politicians a mechanism through which to advance their fortunes. In the absence of party organizations, political brokers must concentrate their efforts on the electoral unit, in most cases the parliamentary constituency. National politics in most African countries still under civilian rule is consequently a contest between local political bosses from the periphery operating in their capacity as linkers to the center where they compete for "the national cake." To understand the role of legislators in the process of rural development, one must therefore examine the activity of legislators at the periphery, and from the "bottom up" as well as from the "top" of the political system down.

Viewed in this manner, the role of legislators in the process of rural development in sub-Saharan Africa is basically that of an entrepreneur whose dual functions are to mobilize the resources of his constituency for community development projects on the one hand, and extract resources from the central government for these projects on the other. Projects of this type are usually small to medium in scale, costing between \$50,000 and \$100,000. Organized on the principle of self-help, they run the gamut from schools, health centers, cattle dips, and irrigation works to feeder roads, crop and settlement schemes, and various forms of cottage industries. Despite their limited size, projects of this type have a tangible effect on the lives of the rural population, are highly visible, and constitute the substance of most demands made by the people for government assistance to their development efforts.

It is this persistent demand for projects that comprises the challenge and opportunity rural development poses for the "legislative" process. MPs who are capable of responding to the challenge, and who are permitted to do so -- an opportunity which varies considerably across the continent -- obtain considerable political payoffs while serving the rural population. When organized adroitly, community development projects provide a natural base for developing extensive constituency machines and patronage systems. Energetic MPs, or would-be MPs for that matter, are thus in a position to use these projects as personal vehicles for their own advancement; sometimes by organizing projects on their own, and sometimes by simply persuading and organizing existing local organizations such as clan welfare societies, school associations, churches, or

cooperatives to embark on new ventures. When this entrepreneurial activity transpires in a constituency free from party organization, and particularly central party control, some MPs are capable of tying together a series of projects into such an elaborate network of patron/client relationships that they become the undisputed boss of the constituency in question.

In Kenya, MPs who are particularly successful at developing such networks often attempt to extend their machines both downward into the constituency for the purpose of backing associates in local town and county council elections, and laterally by supporting promising parliamentary candidates in neighboring districts. MPs who are successful in the latter are invariably recognized as national leaders at the center, a status which is often formally confirmed by the MP's elevation to a ministerial post.

In addition to providing legislators with the basis for a local political machine, their efforts at initiating community development projects is one of the most important activities, indeed often the most important activity, on which they are judged by their constituents on election day. As we shall see below, peasant evaluations of MP performance at obtaining resources from the center for community development, correlates highly with the vote they receive when standing for re-election. More important, such evaluations are excellent predictors of the number of candidates who seek to challenge the incumbent. Legislators with good track records in community development ventures obtain a higher percentage of the vote and are confronted by fewer challengers than those who do not

It is no wonder, therefore, that both MPs and other local notables who consider challenging them for their seats devote substantial time and resources to organizing such projects, and other forms of service to individual constituents.

When given the opportunity, voters in rural Africa are highly rational. All things being equal, i.e. the tribal and/or clan background of the contestants, rural populations will judge the performance of their MP, and vote their self-interest -- perhaps more than voters in industrialized societies where party identification limits the extent to which the electorate will switch allegiance from a candidate they have previously supported to an alternative. As a result, most parliamentary elections in Africa are essentially referenda on the incumbent legislator's performance on the rural development issue.<sup>9</sup>

That MPs are expected to play an active role in the rural development of their constituencies, and that these expectations and the political payoffs which accrue are recognized by most African legislators is amply confirmed by our Kenyan data. The opportunities for meeting these expectations, however, varies considerably as a result of four factors which we can but mention at this time: (1) The availability of resources at the center for distribution to the periphery, and/or the existence of alternative resources on which legislators can draw. (2) The role of the national political party, the extent and nature of its organization, and the ideological goals to which it is committed. (3) The posture of the civil service towards legislators. (4) The nature of the electoral process.

Given the limited resources African governments have that are not earmarked for recurrent budget expenditure or tied to major development schemes (as in the case of projects being assisted by foreign aid), it is not surprising that a substantial gap exists between the pleas for assistance to MP initiated community development projects, and what is available for them to obtain. However, because most projects are relatively small in scale, at least in terms of the capital required to get them off the ground as distinct from recurrent expenditure, the challenge to the MP in his effort to link such projects to the center is not so much the existence of resources, but access to them.

Such access is a function of the rules of the game, and, of course, the MP's standing with those senior decision-makers, usually Ministers, who are in a position to release the available funds to the claimants. In respect to the former, it matters much whether the national leadership and official ideology encourage and permit MPs to organize community development projects and seek government aid to bring them to fruition. Thus in Kenya where these activities have the official and well publicized blessing of President Jomo Kenyatta, an increasingly specific and semi-codified set of procedures has evolved over the last decade by which legislators initiate projects, and then obtain a variety of matching grants from the government to sustain them. In this instance, positive sanctions are accorded to the explicitly entrepreneurial roles MPs play on the periphery. Considerable latitude is given to individuals operating on the periphery on the assumption that their success will produce both benefits for the rural population, and

increased support for the regime, all, it might be added, at a relatively low cost to the center.

Under this system, MPs make direct claims on the Ministers and Assistant-Ministers in charge of these ministries most relevant to the projects with which they are concerned. The result, of course, is that the ministers use a significant portion of their budgets as patronage, and end up playing a role vis a vis individual MPs that is similar to the role which the MPs themselves play vis a vis the residents of their districts. Where implemented, especially if done on a regular basis, such exchanges of resources for support establish viable links between center and periphery. The legislator as linker has fulfilled his mission, and no doubt furthered his career. Moreover he does this by never entering the legislature or engaging in conventional collective "legislative" activity with fellow MPs.

MPs also seek resources by approaching prominent civil servants, both at the center where they seek to establish working relationships with Permanent Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, etc., and on the periphery by working with Provincial and District Commissioners, the district heads of central ministries' field staffs, and provincial and district development councils and planning bodies where they exist. As might be expected, legislators who are successful in obtaining administrative backing at the district level stand a better chance of getting what they want when they lobby at the center.

Finally, like political entrepreneurs the world over, African legislators are not unaware of the principle that "money is the mothers'

milk of politics," for as a class they invariably seek to accumulate sufficient personal resources to finance, or at least provide seed money for the projects in which they are involved. Opportunities for accumulation by individual legislators and legislators as a group, however, vary markedly from one country to the next. In Kenya where legislator initiated efforts at community development are actively encouraged, and where the national political party has ceased to function, legislators are permitted to freely engage in private business ventures, and are more often than not favored over their fellow citizens when it comes to obtaining bank loans for their schemes. Many Kenyan MPs, also sit on government regulatory boards from which they derive a second salary. By contrast, Tanzanian, and to a lesser extent Zambian legislators, are subject to strict party control, and are forbidden by their nations' leadership codes from receiving any income over and above their official emoluments for their legislative duties.

The existence or absence of viable party organization, particularly at the grass roots is a second major variable affecting the extent to which legislators engage in entrepreneurial activity to promote rural development projects, create personal political machines, and establish linkages from the periphery to the center. Where party organization is well developed, legislators are often restricted in their efforts, because the party is simultaneously an instrument of central control, as in Tanzania or Guinea, and an instrument for broadening the base of political participation on the periphery. Given these functions, parties encroach on the linkage activities of both civil servants and legislators. Because

decision-making within party organs is often a collective activity, legislators, no matter how prominent their position, cannot control the organization to the extent possible where they manage their own personal machines. Moreover, in the few African countries where parties are viable institutions, virtually all resources available for small scale development projects and patronage, are controlled by the party organization, and for party-state development committees. Legislators are not given the opportunity to lobby directly and individually at the center for financial assistance, but must channel such requests up the party hierarchy. The deep commitment to socialist principles by virtually all strong parties in Africa also restricts entrepreneurial activity by individual legislators as noted above.

The third significant variable affecting the opportunities for legislators to promote rural development is the competence and posture of the civil service. Where the civil service, whether via central government ministries, the provincial administration, or parastatal agencies seeks to monopolize all community efforts at developing the rural areas, the opportunities for legislators are obviously limited. This has unfortunately been the historical pattern in most African states, and dates back to the colonial period when the civil service was usually the sole authority charged with and capable of promoting rural development. Given the absence of private institutions, state agencies have always been pre-eminent in this area, and it is only in recent years that legislators and party organizations have begun to challenge their supremacy. Because of its proclaimed expertise and the relatively higher education of its personnel, the civil service has often been reluctant

to share authority for rural development with those playing political roles. Legislators are invariably perceived as opportunistic, unsophisticated and disruptive by civil servants, especially by recent college graduates who man most of the key posts in the rural administration. 10

The latitude and support legislators receive from the administrative state in most African countries, and the extent to which legislators are brought into the local planning and distribution process is thus in large part dependent on the tolerance of civil servants in control of the rural administration, and the general posture set by the national leadership. In a few countries, most notably Kenya, it would appear that such tolerance is on the rise as civil servants and legislators have become increasingly aware of the distinctions between the different linkage roles they respectively play. On the one hand, civil servants have come to realize (as their colonial predecessors did before them) the necessity of working through the local notables of the areas in which they serve if they are to be effective in obtaining the cooperation of the rural population. As noted above, civil servants are invariably strangers in the rural milieu in which they serve. They must make extensive use of chiefs and other grass roots elites to communicate government policy to the general population, and are now beginning to recognize that legislators may also be an asset in this regard. Conversely, despite the general suspicion which legislators have of civil servants because civil servants have often ignored them and attempted to limit their activities, legislators are quick to cooperate with civil servants when given the opportunity to do so, because civil servants can provide them with the resources they need to make their

efforts at promoting community development a success. Put differently, both groups of linkers need each other if they are to be successful in carrying out their respective duties.

The fourth, and perhaps most important determinant of the extent to which African legislators are active in promoting rural development, is the electoral process. Though elections in most African countries have not taken place on a regular basis, their effect on the behavior of individual legislators where they have occurred has been significant. In Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia, incumbent MPs have learned very quickly that they must deliver the goods to their constituents, and make frequent visits back to their districts if they are to maintain public support. Because African elections are almost always one-party affairs, and all candidates are members of the most numerous ethnic group and/or clan in each constituency, ascriptive criteria seem to be a relatively poor predictor of election outcomes even though they are important factors in the voters' mind. Voter loyalty to individual candidates, including incumbents is consequently low. As noted above, parliamentary elections are essentially referenda on the incumbent's performance, a situation which usually results in more than half of the MPs seeking re-election going down to defeat.<sup>11</sup>

The impact of periodic elections on the legislative process in African states has consequently been considerable in the decade and a half since most of these countries gained self-rule. First, the present generation of legislators seem to spend considerably more time in community development work, both in the constituency and in the capital, and less time engaging in legislative debate than their predecessors.

Simply stated, political careers are not built in parliament. Even where the proceedings of the National Assembly are thoroughly reported in the press, and over the radio as in Kenya, the typical rural voter has limited access to the media, especially newspapers where coverage of parliamentary activities is most extensive. Attendance at parliamentary sessions is normally low.<sup>12</sup> Nor are legislators involved with committee work as few exist, and those that do meet irregularly. On the other hand, MPs in the capital city attending parliamentary sessions spent much of their time lobbying at central government ministries on their constituents behalf for it is there where "the action" lies.

Under these circumstances, the electoral process has tended to produce a form of what Scott, discussing the situation in South-East Asia, has termed "inflationary patron-client democracy."<sup>13</sup> With each passing election the demands for development by residents of the rural areas rises. As a result, more aggressive, more educated, and on the whole more competent MPs replace those who are defeated seeking re-election. The ultimate result of this circulation however may be an overload of demands for resources that can either not be provided to the periphery by the central government, or more likely provided at a cost to central government programs and plans for coordinating the developmental process. Escalating demands on legislators, and in turn the escalation of their demands at the center, will also eventually result in more intense conflict between MPs than is presently the case. While such conflict may ultimately give rise to more organized forms of bargaining between MPs, perhaps in the form of collective legislative activity within the legislature itself, it may also

result in zero/sum form of political conflict that will undermine the stability of the entire system. Though it certainly stimulates legislators to greater efforts in promoting rural development in their constituencies, and raises the quality of legislative personnel, the regular holding of parliamentary elections in Africa has a variety of impacts the net significance of which is not yet clear.

In the last few pages we have discussed the broad outline of the roles legislators in African states play as linkers from the periphery to the center, the relationship of this role to the process of rural development, and the major factors which determine the variations this role often takes in African political systems still under civilian rule. Having pursued our discussion at a general level with only limited reference to concrete situations, let us now turn our attention to a more specific analysis of legislator behavior and rural development as it occurs, and does not occur, in Kenya and Tanzania.

#### Legislators and Rural Development in Kenya and Tanzania

Because Kenya and Tanzania differ so markedly in respect to their ideological and organizational approach to the process of development, the two countries present the researcher with an almost pure pair of ideal types for assessing the range of conditions under which African legislators involve themselves in the process of rural development. In each country, however, the popular expectations of what legislators should do is roughly the same. As suggested above, the significance of the legislator in African political systems is to be found in linkage rather than parliamentary activities. It is therefore interesting to note that while most Africans

living in the rural areas do not have a clear notion of what transpires within the National Assembly, they nonetheless have a very clear conception of what the legislator's role should entail. This becomes immediately apparent when considering the findings from our surveys of the adult population in thirteen Kenyan constituencies<sup>14</sup> in Table 1. (See page 22.) When asked to state which of seven activities they felt were most important for Kenyan MPs to engage in, linkage activities, particularly those concerned with articulating local demands at the center and obtaining resources for community development efforts, were repeatedly stressed.

The degree to which MPs are perceived as servants of the locality at the center is further illustrated by the responses to a series of questions as to whose opinions an MP should regard as most important when facing a controversial issue. The responses, which appear in Table 2 (See page 23.) suggest that in the opinion of most Kenyan adults, the MP should be an instructed delegate, sensitive to party ideals, but keeping the wishes of his constituents pre-eminent in his mind -- especially when considering their opinions in conjunction with his own.

Similar conceptions of legislators' roles have been found in Tanzania, though the evidence is of a more fragmentary nature. Jon Moris, reporting the findings from thirty community surveys (as distinct from constituency-wide surveys) conducted prior to the 1970 elections, noted that an overwhelming percentage of respondents expected their MPs to follow their wishes when confronted by a controversial issue in the National Assembly (See Table 3, page 23.).

**Table 1: Most important activities on which Kenyan MPs should spend their time**

	<u>Kilifi South</u>	<u>Embu South</u>	<u>Mbooni</u>	<u>Kirinyaga West</u>	<u>Githunguri</u>	<u>Laikipia West</u>	<u>Kadjiado North</u>
<b><u>Linkage Activities</u></b>							
Explain government policies to constituents:	11%	4%	4%	15%	10%	17%	9%
Tell government what people in district want:	36	45	40	35	27	33	38
Obtain projects and benefits for the district:	31	35	35	40	25	10	19
Visit district frequently:	8	19	7	3	4	25	10
<b><u>Non-Linkage Activities</u></b>							
Take active part in the debates of the National Assembly and pass bills:	9	1	3	4	27	8	4
Help constituents with their personal problems:	3	3	6	3	6	4	15
Help solve conflicts in the community:	3	2	4	1	-	3	6
TOTAL LINKAGE	86%	93%	86%	93%	66%	85%	76%
TOTAL NON-LINKAGE	15	6	13	8	33	15	25
N =	(269)	(126)	(190)	(210)	(49)	(169)	(284)

	<u>Kerichio</u>	<u>Ikolomani</u>	<u>Busia East</u>	<u>Nyakach</u>	<u>Mbita</u>	<u>Kitutu East</u>
<b><u>Linkage Activities</u></b>						
Explain government policies to constituents:	9%	9%	4%	6%	4%	6%
Tell government what people in district want:	19	29	34	25	61	21
Obtain projects and benefits for the district:	32	20	14	34	21	56
Visit district frequently:	23	20	22	13	5	11
<b><u>Non-Linkage Activities</u></b>						
Take active part in the debates of the National Assembly and pass bills:	6	7	6	9	5	3
Help constituents with their personal problems:	5	10	15	10	2	3
Help solve conflicts in the community:	5	4	6	4	2	1
TOTAL LINKAGE	83%	78%	74%	78%	91%	94%
TOTAL NON-LINKAGE	17	21	27	23	9	7
N =	(254)	(277)	(244)	(282)	(242)	(276)

**Table 2: Views Kenyan constituents feel their MPs should regard most important when deciding a controversial issue**

	<u>Constituents</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Civil Servants</u>	<u>Interest Groups</u>	<u>Advisors &amp; Friends</u>	<u>His Own Beliefs</u>
Very Important	83%	52%	42%	45%	27%	30%
Somewhat Important	14	35	42	39	39	36
Not Important	3	13	16	16	34	34
N =	(3,852)	(3,815)	(3,797)	(3,804)	(3,800)	(3,801)
Group whose views are most important:	56%	12%	8%	8%	4%	8%

**Table 3: Public Conceptions of the Role of Tanzanian MPs\***

It can occur that the central Government has a different ideas from that of the people in your constituency. If this should happen to your newly elected MP, what should he do in the National Assembly?	Agree with the Government	17%
	Try to explain the requests of the people in his constituency	79
	D.K.	4
	N =	(1,293)
It can occur that at certain times the MP in the National Assembly may have different ideas from those of his constituents concerning a certain issue. If this happens, what should he do?	Vote according to his own opinion	10%
	Vote according to the requests of the people in his constituency	88
	D.K.	2
	N =	(1,293)

\*Source: J.R. Moris, "The Voters View of the Elections" in Socialism and Participation: Tanzania's 1970 National Elections (Dar es Salaam: Tanzanian Publishing House, 1974), pp. 349-50.


Given these highly parochial conceptions of what the legislative rôle should entail, it is not surprising that most incumbent legislators in both Kenya and Tanzania have adjusted their own rôle expectations to be roughly congruent with those of their constituents. As reported elsewhere, both Jeffrey James and this author<sup>15</sup> have found via separate surveys of Kenyan legislators a preoccupation by MPs with constituency service, and noted that legislators report spending more time seeking to obtain government resources for community development projects than on any other activity.

As to be expected, Kenyan MPs do not define their rôles in delegate terms to the extent of the electorate, for they perceive one of their main tasks as assisting the relatively unsophisticated populations they represent to articulate their needs. Neither, however, do they see themselves as trustees whose first concern is serving the national interest. As a result, few of the legislators interviewed by this writer felt that one of their prime duties was to explain government policies to their constituents, or otherwise serve as agents of the center. Indeed, this task was explicitly viewed, especially by backbenchers, as a duty of civil servants posted to the rural areas. However, because MPs are officially expected to be agents of both the center and the periphery, and because they need to maintain good relations with the national leadership to obtain the resources they and their constituents need, it is not surprising that the intensity of MP feeling on this point is rarely articulated in public. Tanzanian MPs are especially prone to rôle conflict in this regard, because of the supremacy of the Tanganyika African

National Union (TANU), the national party, in Tanzanian political life, and the variety of effective control mechanisms it does not hesitate to bring to bear on legislators seeking to establish an independent base.

That African legislators are consistently oriented towards the periphery by the electoral process has already been noted. The extent to which voter evaluation of MP performance, especially in respect to rural development, determines the outcomes of elections, however, needs to be spelled out in detail, for the strength of the relationship demonstrates convincingly why legislators devote so much time to development efforts. The relationship is presented in Figure 1 (See page 26.) in the form of a causal model explaining the vote received by the eleven Kenyan MPs in our sample of thirteen rural constituencies who stood for re-election in October, 1974. To construct the model the percentage of the vote received by these legislators was regressed on the number of candidates standing in each constituency, and an aggregate evaluation index derived from the surveys in each district. The evaluation index was in turn constructed by scoring the rating which each respondent accorded his MP for that activity which he felt was the most important for the MP to do. Ratings were on a three point scale of "Very Active," "Somewhat Active," and "Not Active." For this model the aggregate evaluation score is the percentage of respondents in the district who rated their MP as "Very Active" on the item they regarded as most important, usually linkage activities, particularly the MPs' efforts at obtaining resources for developmental projects as noted in Table 1.

**Figure 1: Path analysis model explaining vote received by incumbent Kenyan MPs in election of 1974\***



\*Beta weights for model appear without parentheses, while correlation coefficients appear within parentheses.

Effect of voter evaluation on incumbent's vote:

Direct:	.06
Indirect $(-.81 \times -.64)$ :	<u>.51</u>
TOTAL	.57
R Sq.	.325

Upon computing the correlation and particularly the path coefficients for the model, the significance of voter evaluations for the electoral process becomes clear. In brief, low evaluations of MPs' performance by their constituents results in an increased number of

candidates in the election as more and more would-be challengers monitor public opinion, and jump into the race. Virtually all challengers are themselves local notables, and as such are in a position to discern voter sentiment fairly accurately, if unsystematically. The most serious among them, moreover, invariably try to capitalize on the declining support for the incumbent MP by organizing self-help development projects themselves in order to demonstrate their viability as a meaningful alternative.

As the reader will note, the high correlation coefficient for the relationship between the vote received by incumbents, and the evaluation index washes out upon controlling for the number of candidates in the race. This does not alter the significance of voter evaluations for election outcomes given its effect on the size of the election field. It does, however, suggest that in countries like Tanzania where the number of contestants is restricted by party nomination procedures to two, the effect of voter assessments will be direct. In such cases, the number of candidates in the final election will not, of course, be a function of voter sentiment. The number and quality of those seeking nomination, however, may.

Having discussed the parochial orientation of East African legislators, and the ability of their constituents to hold them accountable for their success or failure at promoting community development, it behooves us to briefly describe what some of these projects entail, and how legislators' efforts at initiating projects differ in the two countries in light of the constraints discussed in the previous section.

Though popular expectations of what legislative behavior should entail appear to be similar in the two countries, the actual behavior of MPs is highly dissimilar because of the vastly different nature of the national political parties in each system, and the ideological goals they are committed to achieve. From its inception, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) has been little more than a confederation of local machines with little cohesion at the national level other than that supplied by its leader, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta. The highly factional nature of the party has also increased during the first decade of independence as machines organized along ethnic lines and across administrative districts in the late 1950s and early 1960s have been steadily replaced by a multitude of smaller organizations at the constituency level. Because Kenyatta and his close associates have never been able to establish and control a highly disciplined party organization, they have preferred instead to let the local factions multiply and the national party organization fall into disuse. This situation has been highly conducive to the entrepreneurial instincts of would-be political leaders seeking to establish small bases of power on the periphery. Kenyatta has also encouraged this situation for the purpose of undercutting the base of major ethnic leaders such as Oginga-Odinga, and Paul Ngei who were capable of posing a threat to his rule.

Consistent with these developments has been the repeated blessings Kenyatta, and the national leadership have given to Harambee, the national movement of rural development through self-help under whose banner most

projects are organized. Though Harambee means "pull together" in Swahili, the ethic propounded by the slogan -- which is also Kenya's national motto -- has been entrepreneurial as well as collective in significance. The Harambee ethic has thus officially legitimized the entrepreneurial efforts of legislators and their rivals by bringing them into the fold of collective self-help. What might otherwise be regarded as a manifestation of opportunistic individualism is now perceived by all as an important feature of "building the nation."<sup>17</sup>

In this context, legislators are given a virtual free reign to organize whatever development projects they like, and then seek financial resources from the government once the projects have been deemed viable. A typical project might be the building and organization of a secondary school, or the building of a feeder road. Once planned by the MP together with a critical number of local notables, a public meeting will be held to announce and further discuss the project with the general public, the wananchi. After a round of speeches, a collection will be taken and several hundred dollars raised. Local notables, and especially the MP, are expected to make substantial contributions themselves at these events, and often match the funds donated by the general citizenry.

Once sufficient funds are collected -- often after a series of such meetings over the course of several months -- construction on the school or road will begin, and government assistance sought. The amount and type of assistance varies from project to project depending on the influence of the MP with the Provincial Administration, and at the center, and the project's worth as evaluated by the relevant government ministry.

Over the past decade, about a thousand primary and secondary schools have been built in Kenya through Harambee efforts. Because of the magnitude of this effort, and wide range in the quality of the schools set up, the Ministry of Education has developed an increasingly specific and stringent set of standards which must be met before the government will provide assistance. This has also been done to conserve Ministry funds, and limit the surplus of semi-educated manpower these schools have produced. While Harambee schools provide an excellent example of the extent to which legislators can promote rural development, and reap short-term political benefits, they are also an example of the uncoordinated nature of locally induced change. Projects of this type may not yield lasting benefits to the rural populations, and indeed may give rise to severe dislocations -- both economic and political -- over the long run unless they are initiated within the framework of a national development plan. Such a framework, however, is often ignored, and or forgotten by MPs when embarking on their efforts. For this reason specific guidelines must be laid down by all government agencies that are likely to be approached for assistance to such efforts if the total product is to be of lasting value. As one might expect, however, such guidelines where they have been specified are frequently the subject of political pressure and debate.

It is important to note, moreover, that of the MPs rated highly on the evaluation index, all had achieved significant success on various Harambee efforts. Two are worth mentioning here, both of whom are energetic young men in their mid-thirties who are frequently regarded as rising stars on the Kenyan political scene. The first is the graduate (in

political science!) of a prestigious American college who represents a constituency near Nairobi. This man makes frequent visits to his constituency, holding open meetings three times a week at the District Officer's headquarters to discuss the problems of whomever wishes to see him. On any one day this MP will speak with thirty to fifty constituents, and then return to Nairobi to oversee a fledgling construction business. This man attends parliamentary sessions only sporadically, and when he does, rarely speaks. Because of his high visibility in his constituency, however, he has been highly successful in raising funds for Harambee road projects. He contributes heavily to these projects. Needless to say, his company has won a significant share of the contracts let by the Ministry of Works to build them. In the election of October, 1974, he was re-elected with 77% of the vote, and was subsequently appointed an Assistant Minister.

The second represents a district on hundred miles west of Nairobi that was once a significant area of European settlement. Since independence more than twenty thousand people have migrated into the area in the hope of obtaining land vacated by the departing colonial farmers. These hopes usually go unfulfilled, however, because the farms being sold by their European owners are invariably too large for the typical African farmer to buy. Despite a variety of government programs to purchase such land for small-scale African settlement, most has been bought up by wealthy Africans leaving many people landless. To help alleviate this problem, this legislator has created a private cooperative which over the last few years has purchased 103,000 acres, and then divided the property among

roughly 5,000 families. In the election of 1974 he was re-elected with 58% of the vote in a three man contest. Like our first example, this man rarely speaks in the National Assembly, because, as he puts it, "one can be more effective by not shouting." It is important to note, however, that part of this man's success stems from the fact that he is one of two Assistant Ministers for Lands and Settlement, a post he retained in the reshuffle of the government which followed the election.

While some observers might regard these two examples as involving conflicts of interest, most, having perhaps read Plunkit, would view them as "honest graft." These legislators certainly see themselves as operating clearly within the rules of the game of Kenyan politics, and no doubt are regarded in a similar vein by the general public. Indeed, it is precisely because these MPs have engaged in such activities that they received high marks from their constituents in our surveys, and were re-elected by wide margins in an election which sent 58% of their colleagues down to defeat.

In contrast, Members of the Tanzanian National Assembly are not allowed to engage in such free-wheeling forms of constituency service, and it is perhaps for this reason why these legislators and the National Assembly are of declining importance in that country. As already noted, Tanzanian legislators labor under a stringent leadership code, and must operate within the confines of an extensive party organization that reaches down to the grass roots. Though politics is to a great extent an inherently entrepreneurial activity, Tanzanian MPs are explicitly required to forsake such activity in order to be consistent with TANU's socialist ideology.

and collectivist norms of how public policy ought to be made. Tanzanian legislators thus have few if any independent means of resources to foster rural development in the manner of their Kenyan counterparts. Indeed, their only significant role in the rural development effort is as members of the Regional and District Development Committees.<sup>20</sup>

The role of Tanzanian legislators in these committees, however, is at best marginal. With more than forty members, the committees are chaired respectively by the Regional and District Chairman of the party. The Vice-Chairmen are the Regional and Area Commissioners, the senior civil servants in the rural administration, and the Secretaries are the Regional and District Development Directors, the civil servants charged with overseeing all development efforts in the rural areas. These bodies are basically executive planning and budget request agencies for the rural areas. Their geographic jurisdiction usually encompasses several parliamentary constituencies with the result that the MPs who are members of the committees must focus their attention beyond the areas they represent. The committees consider recommendations from the Divisional and Ward Development Committees which are dominated entirely by party officials, and on which MPs do not sit, and are in turn responsible to Maendeleo, the Ministry of Rural Development, and the President. Under this system, MPs are given virtually no opportunity to initiate programs for their constituencies though obviously they attempt to articulate the needs of the people they represent. Nor do they have the opportunity to significantly modify the national plan for rural development when it is ultimately brought before the National Assembly

at a later date. While it is perhaps possible to conceive of the Regional and District Development Committees as sub-national legislatures, the subordination of the MPs to party personnel and civil servants is such that the impact of the individual MP is difficult to discern.

Given this situation, Tanzanian MPs are not in a position to develop autonomous and institutionalized linkages from the periphery to the center, linkages on which the viability of the National Assembly ultimately depends. Nor, however, are they in a position to frustrate a national approach to the process of rural development as are their counterparts north of the border. The marginal role played by Tanzanian MPs, however, is a function of the fundamental nature of the Tanzanian political system. As a result of the supremacy of TANU -- supremacy which has recently been formally recognized by a constitutional amendment placing it above the National Assembly as the nation's foremost law-making body -- and the party's commitment to socialist development, it is little wonder that questions occasionally arise as to what function the national legislature or its members play. It is perhaps for this reason that the number of parliamentary constituencies will be reduced, and their boundaries made coterminous with the country's administrative districts and party divisions before parliamentary elections are held later this year. Whether this change will breathe new life into the legislative process, or whether it will accelerate the decline of the legislator and the National Assembly remains to be seen.

### Summary and Conclusion

We began this paper with the suggestion that the most fruitful place to consider legislative behavior and rural development was to turn our attention away from the collective activities of the legislature to the individual efforts through which legislators attempt to establish linkages between the periphery and the center. This change in perspective requires a broadening of what constitutes the "legislative process." It is necessary, because while most third world legislatures do not significantly affect the allocation of public resources, their members, given the right conditions can and do, at least in its distributional phase. In conclusion, we might therefore offer the following generalizations regarding the significance of linkage behavior for both rural development, and the overall process of political change. These may be divided in respect to their significance in the short or long term.

#### SHORT TERM EFFECTS

1. Where legislators are free from party control and its attendant ideological constraints to function as individual entrepreneurs, and where elections are held on a regular basis, legislators will spend a substantial amount of their time promoting rural development in their constituencies, because it is in their interest to do so.
2. By engaging in entrepreneurial activities to foster rural development in their constituencies, legislators create linkages between the center and periphery of the political system that are qualitatively different and autonomous from the linkages created by other potential linkers, notably civil servants. The establishment, and particularly the maintenance, and institutionalization of such linkages increase the level of vertical integration in these societies. When this occurs, popular knowledge and expectations of the activities and procedures of central government personnel, and perhaps central government institutions as well -- including the legislature -- rises. In short, third world legislatures might be relatively unimportant institutions, but their members engage in

activities which are essential prerequisites for the growth, influence, and autonomy of those bodies.

3. Where legislators engage in entrepreneurial activities to foster rural development, progress can be achieved. On the one hand, community development efforts raise the social welfare of the populations concerned, or at least mitigate the hardship of underdevelopment. On the other, rural populations become more receptive to other government initiated efforts at changing their condition. The net result is that rural development is likely to proceed at a faster rate than would be the case if guided by civil servants alone.

#### LONG TERM EFFECTS

1. The more vertical integration occurs in third world political systems as a result of legislator initiated attempts at creating linkages between the center and periphery, the higher the level of popular demand for government outputs, and the greater the intensity of conflict between MPs to obtain such outputs for the people they represent. Increased vertical integration may thus be a precursor of increased horizontal disintegration, a possibility which cannot be ignored in plural societies where ethnic and religious cleavages run deep. Legislator initiated change in the rural areas may consequently raise the prospects for political stability in the short term, but lower the prospects over the long haul. Given the fragile nature of many third world political systems, however, particularly in Africa, the luxury of planning for some future crisis may not be feasible, for the future is now.
2. The more effective legislators are in initiating economic development through small-scale autonomous efforts at the grass roots, the less likely that economic change can be effectively coordinated across the entire society. Legislator initiated development is thus likely to be unbalanced development -- development which will probably occur at a more rapid pace than balanced development, but which produces dislocations and serious inequities in the process.

The net desirability of legislator involvement in the process of rural development thus depends in part on where one's values lie. For those who seek more rapid change in the rural areas, and the creation of representative political institutions at the center, the choice is clear.

For those concerned with equity, and managed change, the utility of the legislative process as described herein, is questionable. In short, pork-barrel politics and rural development are not incompatible; indeed, they are highly complementary. Whether one desires to sup at the trough, however, depends on how he likes his meat.



## NOTES

1. Between 1963 and 1972 per capita agricultural production fell in Latin America and the Far East, increased approximately 1% per year in the Middle East, and remained unchanged in Africa. By contrast, industrial production in the Third World increased at a rate of roughly 10% per year while labor productivity in the industrial sector rose by about 4% annually. Source: UN Statistical Yearbook, 1973 (New York: 1974), pp. 24, 28, 44.
2. Upon considering income distribution in 43 developing countries, Adelman and Morris report that on the average the poorest 60% of the population, virtually all of whom reside in the rural areas, receive only 26% of the national income. Income inequality increases, moreover, with a rise in national income as such a rise is almost exclusively a result of growth in the modern, and invariably urban sector. See Irma Adelman and Cynthia T. Morris, Economic Growth and Social Equity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973), chapter 4.
3. One need only be reminded that since the end of World War II, most instances of revolt and revolution in the Third World have been rurally based, e.g. Cambodia, China, Ethiopia, Kenya, Guinea-Bissau, Malaya, Mozambique, The Philippines, Vietnam, Zaire.
4. In 1973 and 1974 members of the Comparative Legislative Research Center at the University of Iowa together with colleagues at the Universities of Dar es Salaam, Istanbul and Seoul conducted three field studies on the nature of the relationships between members of the national legislature and their constituents. In each country a sample of 150-300 adults was surveyed in each of twelve to fourteen parliamentary constituencies to determine mass perceptions of the legislative process, and the level of contact between ordinary citizens and their MP. In addition to the mass surveys, a sample of local elites was interviewed in each constituency. Interviews were also conducted with roughly thirty to one hundred members of the national legislature, including those representing the districts which constituted the research sites for the study. Data from these surveys are now under analysis. A comparative volume on legislative behavior and development in the three countries is planned for late 1976.
5. J. H. Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies (New York: 1963), pp. 3-5.
6. Edward Shils, "Centre and Periphery," The Logic of Personal Knowledge, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961), pp. 117-130.

7. See especially, Joseph LaPalombara, "Penetration" in Binder et al., Crises and Sequences of Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 205-32.
8. Henry Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press), chapter X.
9. Goran Hyden and Colin Leys, "Elections and Politics in Single-Party Systems: The Case of Kenya and Tanzania," British Journal of Political Science, (October, 1972), pp. 389-420.
10. Joel D. Barkan, An African Dilemma (New York and Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 165.
11. In 1969, 54% of the MPs seeking re-election in Kenya were defeated, while 58% lost their seats in 1974. Only 34% of the incumbent MPs were defeated in Tanzania in 1970, but 44% of the incumbents did not seek or were barred from seeking re-election by TANU, the ruling party.
12. In 1974, average attendance in the Kenya National Assembly was between thirty and fifty MPs or no more than one-third of the House. Quorums were frequently not achieved, a situation which led President Kenyatta to publically castigate the Members as "lazy" public servants who were not doing their jobs.
13. James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," American Political Science Review, (March, 1972), pp. 111-112.
14. The Kenyan surveys of adult citizens were conducted in fourteen constituencies of which thirteen were rural in character. Constituencies selected as research sites were chosen on the basis of geographical distribution, ethnicity, and level of development to reflect the country as a whole. Only the findings from the rural constituencies are presented in this paper.
15. See Jeffrey James, "Legislatorial Decision-Making Role Perceptions in Kenya," an unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the African Studies Association, Philadelphia, November, 1972, and Joel D. Barkan and John J. Okumu, "Political Linkage in Kenya," Occasional Paper No. 1 in this series.
16. When testing the model other evaluation indices based on mean scores and weighted mean scores were also employed. Though not as powerful predictors as the index presented herein, the results were essentially the same.
17. For more on how Harambee projects are manipulated to serve political ends, see E. M. Godfrey and G. C. M. Mutiso, "The Political Economy of Self-Help: Kenya's "Harambee" Institutes of Technology," Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1974, pp. 109-33.

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