AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523
BIBLIOGRAPHIC INPUT SHEET

FOR AID USE ONLY
Batch 81
ARDA

1. SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION
A. PRIMARY: Food production and nutrition — AE10-0000-G536
B. SECONDARY: Agricultural economics--Venezuela

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Venezuela's agrarian reform at mid-1977

3. AUTHOR(S)
Cox, Paul

4. DOCUMENT DATE	5. NUMBER OF PAGES	6. ARC NUMBER
1977	78p. 77p.	ARC

7. REFERENCE ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

Wis.

8. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES (Sponsoring Organization, Publishers, Availability)

(In Land Tenure Center research paper no.71)

9. ABSTRACT

This paper is a preliminary assessment of the agrarian reform that began with the return of democratic government in Venezuela in 1958 and was formalized in the 1960 Agrarian Reform Law. Attention is focused on drawing conclusions from published statistical material, and care has been taken to compile data from the most recent and most authoritative sources. The paper describes adjustments to capital policy and land policy since 1974, the adverse effects of regulated prices for beneficiaries, technical assistance and campesino organization, recent labor policy, income distribution, and provision of land through the reform. The latifundia system has been replaced. Most agricultural holdings are now operated by resident owners engaged in commercial agriculture. Sharecropping and tenancy have been almost eliminated. Growth in national agricultural production has not occurred by way of a just system of property, tenure, and land utilization which all ensure the adequate provision of credit and technical assistance. Growth in national agricultural production has been achieved by small numbers of medium and large commercial farmers. The agrarian reform has been instrumental in the rise of a capitalist agriculture which enjoys the benefits of law and order in the countryside as well as massive, public infrastructural investments. The agrarian reform subsector has become less vital relative to other subsectors of Venezuelan agriculture. The author feels that the agrarian reform campesinos are becoming marginalized to the point of obscurity. Only a fundamental change in economic, social, and political conditions would contribute to an outcome in accord with campesino interests.

10. CONTROL NUMBER
PN-AAF-470

11. PRICE OF DOCUMENT

12. DESCRIPTORS
Assessments
Data
Government policies
Land reform
Venezuela

13. PROJECT NUMBER

14. CONTRACT NUMBER
CSD-2263 211(d)

15. TYPE OF DOCUMENT

AID 590-1 (4-74)

CSD-2263 211(d)
Wis. PN-AAF-470

A RESEARCH PAPER

Number 71
February 1978

VENEZUELA'S AGRARIAN REFORM AT MID-1977

by
PAUL COX

LAND TENURE CENTER

AN INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH AND EDUCATION ON SOCIAL STRUCTURE, RURAL INSTITUTIONS, RESOURCE USE AND DEVELOPMENT

U.S. ISSN 0084-0815

LAND TENURE CENTER
1525 OBSERVATORY DRIVE
310 KING HALL
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON
MADISON, WISCONSIN 53706

ARDA

February 1978

R.P. No. 71
U.S. ISSN 0084-0815

VENEZUELA'S AGRARIAN REFORM AT MID-1977

by

Paul Cox

Land Tenure Center
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin 53706

June 1977

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
List of Figures	ii
List of Tables	ii-iv
Abbreviations	v
INTRODUCTION	1
DIMENSIONS OF THE REFORM	1
THE NATIONAL CONTEXT OF CHANGE	13
PROVISION OF LAND THROUGH THE REFORM	18
ADJUSTMENTS TO LAND POLICY SINCE 1974	25
PROVISION OF CAPITAL THROUGH THE REFORM	27
CONSTRAINTS ON SELECTION OF AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY BY BENEFICIARIES	29
ADVERSE EFFECTS OF REGULATED PRICES FOR BENEFICIARIES	39
ADJUSTMENTS TO CAPITAL POLICY SINCE 1974	40
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CAMPESINO ORGANIZATION	43
OUTLINES OF RECENT LABOR POLICY	49
INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFICIARIES	50
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	52
CONCLUSIONS	54
NOTES	56
REFERENCES	63

Page

List of Figures

1. Lorenz Curves Showing the Distribution of National Land in Agricultural Holdings, 1950, 1961, 1971 5

List of Tables

1. Distribution of National Agricultural Land, by Number of Holdings and Area, 1950 3

2. Distribution of National Agricultural Land, by Number of Holdings and Area, 1961 3-4

3. Distribution of National Agricultural Land, by Number of Holdings and Area, 1971 4

4. Summaries of Data on Distribution of Agricultural Land by Number of Holdings, National: 1950, 1961, 1971; Agrarian Reform Subsector: 1966, 1976 6

5. Private and Public Lands Transferred to IAN, Annually 1959-75 7

6. Families Soliciting and Benefiting from Transfers of IAN Lands, Annually 1959-76 8-9

7. Organizations Having Official Responsibility for the Agrarian Reform, Together with Programs and Objectives, 1975 10

8. Budgetary Allocations to Principal Organizations with Official Responsibility for the Agrarian Reform, Annually 1960-75 11

9. Staff of Principal Organizations with Official Responsibility for the Agrarian Reform, by Type of Training, 31 December 1974 12

10. Contribution of Agriculture, Crop Production, and Animal Production to the Gross Domestic Product, Annually 1960-75 13-14

11. Agricultural Exports and Imports, By Value, Annually 1970-75 15

12. Percentage Contribution of Imports to the Supply of Agricultural Products, by Product Category in Terms of Value, Annually 1971-75 16

13. National, Urban, and Rural Population, 1950, 1961, 1971 17

14. National Economically Active Population, by Activity, 1950, 1961, 1971 17

		Page
15.	Means Utilized by IAN in Acquiring Private Lands, Annually 1960-65	18
16.	IAN Expenditures for Private Lands and Unexhausted Improvements, Annually 1964-76	19
17.	Funds Expended by IAN for Agrarian Reform, Annually 1964-75	21
18.	Consolidation Activity Undertaken by IAN on Asentamientos Campesinos, Total 1960-75 and 1975	22
19.	National Land Use, Agrarian Reform Lands and their Utilization, Various Years	22-23
20.	Tenure Situation of Families Benefiting from the Transfer of IAN Lands, 1967, 1969, 1974, 1976	24
21.	Tenure Situation of National Agricultural Land, by Number of Holdings and Area, 1950, 1961, 1971	26
22.	Government Agricultural Credits (BAP, Ordinary Program) to Small and Medium Farmers, Total 1959-69, Total 1970-73	28
23.	Percentage of Government Agricultural Credits (BAP, Ordinary Program) Reaching Small Farmers, by Value, Annually 1959-73	30
24.	Average Size of Government Agricultural Credits (BAP, Ordinary and Special Programs) Conceded to Small and Medium Farmers, Total 1964-69, Total 1970-73	30-31
25.	Allocation of Government Agricultural Credits (BAP, Ordinary and Special Programs) Paid to Small and Medium Farmers, by Product Categories, 1973	32
26.	Harvested Area and Value of Crop and Animal Production of the Agrarian Reform Subsector, Annually 1967-76	33
27.	Percentages of National Crop and Animal Production Accounted for by Agrarian Reform Subsector, by Value, 1967-75	33
28.	Value of Crop and Animal Production by Product Categories of the Agrarian Reform Subsector, Annually 1969-75	34
29.	Value of Crop Production by Product Categories of the Agrarian Reform Subsector as Percentages of the Crop Production of the Agrarian Reform Subsector, Annually 1969-75	35

Page

30. Value of Production of the Agrarian Reform Subsector by Product Categories as Percentages of National Crop and Animal Production, Annually 1969-75 35

31. Percentage Contribution of Intermediate and Final Consumption to the Utilization of Agricultural Products, by Value, Annually 1971-75 36

32. Percentage Contribution of Intermediate and Final Consumption to the Utilization of Agricultural Products, by Product Categories in Terms of Value, 1975 37

33. Percentages of Beneficiaries Interviewed in 1976 who Specified One of the Following as their Principal Crop 38

34. Percentages of National Area Harvested, Production, and Yield Accounted for by the Agrarian Reform Subsector, Average 1974-75 39

35. Disbursement of Agricultural Credits from the Fondo de Crédito Agropecuario to 20 November 1975, by Number and Size of Credits and by Disbursing Institutions 41

36. Basic Data on Uniones de Prestatarios, Annually 1964-76 45

37. Basic Data on Empresas Campesinas, Annually 1973-76 45

38. Average Size and Credit Changes Among Uniones de Prestatarios and Empresas Campesinas, Annually 1973-76 46

39. Distribution According to Monthly Family Income: Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries, 1966, 1975; National Urban Population, 1970 48

40. Distribution of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Reporting Gross Monthly Family Income, by Source, 1975 51

41. Summarized Distributions of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Reporting Gross Monthly Family Income, by Source, 1966, 1975 51-52

Abbreviations

AD	Acción Democrática
BANDAGRO	Banco de Desarrollo Agropecuario
BAP	Banco Agrícola y Pecuario (later ICAP)
BCV	Banco Central de Venezuela
CENDES	Centro de Estudios de Desarrollo (de la Universidad Central de Venezuela)
CIARA	Fundación para la Capacitación e Investigación Aplicada a la Reforma Agraria
CIDA	Comité Inter-Americano de Desarrollo Agrícola
CIEI	Comisión Investigadora contra el Enriquecimiento Ilícito
CMA	Corporación de Mercadeo Agrícola
COPEI	Partido Social Cristiano
CORPOMERCADEO	Corporación de Mercadeo Agrícola
FCV	Federación Campesina de Venezuela
FEDEAGRO	Federación Nacional de Asociaciones de Productores Agropecuarios
FEDECAMARAS	Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y de Producción
FEDENAGA	Federación Nacional de Ganaderos
Fomento-DGECN	Ministerio de Fomento, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales
FUDECO	Fundación para el Desarrollo de la Región Centro-Occidental de Venezuela
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IAN	Instituto Agrario Nacional
ICAP	Instituto de Crédito Agrícola y Pecuario
IICA	Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agrícolas
INCE	Instituto Nacional de Capacitación Educativa
MAC	Ministerio de Agricultura y Cría
MARNR	Ministerio del Ambiente y de los Recursos Naturales Renovables
MOP	Ministerio de Obras Públicas (until 1 January 1977; later MARNR)
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
SAS	Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia Social
URD	Unión Republicana Democrática
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

VENEZUELA'S AGRARIAN REFORM AT MID-1977

by Paul Cox

INTRODUCTION

Venezuela's agrarian reform, that began with the return of democratic government in 1958 and was formalized in the 1960 Agrarian Reform Law, was described in 1971 as being massive, nonviolent, and undisruptive of agricultural production.[1] Its characteristics as a centrally controlled, economically motivated de jure agrarian reform have been contrasted with those of the tumultuous, politically motivated de facto reform of 1945-48.[2] It has been compared with other instances of agrarian transformation in Latin America and categorized as "partial change through parcelization and colonization"[3] or "conventional, neocapitalist agrarian reform of the first degree."[4] Now, seventeen years after the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Law,[5] and two years after the termination of the reform as projected by the Presidential Commission that prepared the legislation,[6] it is both possible and desirable to assess what happened. Unfortunately, much of the recent writing on the Venezuelan agrarian reform has sacrificed scholarly detachment for the sake of political campaigning. In the brief account that follows, attention is focused on drawing conclusions from published statistical materials. Care has been taken to compile data from the most recent and most authoritative sources; nevertheless, the quality of some data is questionable and emphasis should be given to the analysis of trends and differences in orders of magnitude. This paper is intended only as a preliminary assessment of the reform; it is recognized that a more thorough treatment is needed to fully examine issues that have been raised or neglected by the assembled data.

DIMENSIONS OF THE REFORM

The agrarian structure prior to Venezuela's de jure reform had been radically changed during the "democratic revolution" led by the populist party Acción Democrática (AD) in 1945-48. In this brief period, the entrenched military and landowning elites were replaced to some extent within the national power structure. Latifundismo was attacked as a backward institution inimical to the rise of a Western-style democracy and the reduction of widespread rural poverty. Campesino land invasions, confiscation and parcelization of latifundia, rural infrastructural and colonization programs, provision of agricultural credit and technical assistance, and the establishment of production cooperatives (comunidades agrarias) were all begun in earnest--only to be halted by the repressive military dictatorship that took power in 1948. Many of the 75,000 campesino members of newly formed sindicatos agrícolas, who had been assigned approximately 150,000 hectares of formerly private lands by the AD government, were dispossessed as estates were returned to their former owners.[7]

The coup d'état that returned Venezuela to a democratic political system in 1958-59 signaled the recurrence of campesino land invasions, especially on those estates restored to their previous owners under the dictatorship. These invasions received the help of local campesino political organizations--sindicatos (AD), ligas (Partido Social Christiano [COPEI]), and asociaciones locales (Unión Republicana Democrática [URD]), coordinated by the Federación Campesina de Venezuela (FCV)--and lasted until 1961-62. The approval of the Agrarian Reform Law in 1960 was preceded not only by intense public discussion and the nomination of a broadly based Presidential Commission to prepare the legislation, but also by an intensified land settlement program carried out by the Instituto Agrario Nacional (IAN) based on the agrarian statute of 1949.[8] Much of the initial activity under the Agrarian Reform Law was geared toward dealing with invasions; 60-70 percent of all farms and 40 percent of the land area acquired by IAN in 1959-61 had been invaded by campesinos.[9]

The aims explicit in the Agrarian Reform Law are:

> . . . the transformation of the country's agrarian structure and the incorporation of its rural population in the economic, social and political development of the nation. This was to be done by means of substituting the latifundia system by a just system of property, tenure and utilization of land, based on the equitable distribution of land and the adequate provision of credit and integral assistance to agricultural producers. In this way the land would constitute, for the man who works it, the basis of his economic stability, the foundation of his progressive social wellbeing, and the guarantee of his liberty and dignity.[10]

The conceptualization involved here is not so much social justice or political expediency, but a plan to complete the demise of latifundismo and to provide supporting measures for the growth of commercial agriculture.

As might be expected in a traditional Latin American agrarian structure characterized by a minifundia-latifundia complex, census data indicate a high degree of land concentration among the nation's agricultural holdings (Tables 1, 2, 3). Ten hectares with irrigation or adequate rainfall was deemed to be the minimum size for a family farm by the Presidential Commission on Agrarian Reform.[11] Table 1 indicates a concentration index of 0.942 in 1950; 3,422 farms of over 1,000 hectares accounted for 78.7 percent of all land in agricultural holdings, while 168,004 farms of under ten hectares accounted for a corresponding 2.3 percent. This situation has changed only slightly in the subsequent censuses of 1961 and 1971, in which data show concentration indexes of 0.928 and 0.909, respectively (Tables 2, 3). Lorenz curves for 1950, 1961, and 1971 (Figure 1) suggest a very slight egalitarian trend in the distribution of land in agricultural holdings--and a minimal impact of the agrarian reform.

Table 4 presents a summary of national census data alongside data for the agrarian reform subsector for 1966 and 1976. Of special note are the 74.4 percent (1966) and 72.5 percent (1976) of agrarian reform holdings falling within size categories below 10 hectares. In the absence of data

Table 1

Distribution of National Agricultural Land, by Number of Holdings and Area, 1950

Size Intervals (has.)	Holdings	%	% Cumulative	Area (has.)	%	% Cumulative
0-0.9	14,274	6.1	6.1	7,001	0.0	0.0
1-4.9	111,716	47.6	53.7	260,249	1.1	1.1
5-9.9	42,014	17.9	71.6	276,344	1.2	2.3
(0-9.9 has. subtotal)	168,004					
10-19.9	27,551	11.7	83.3	362,618	1.6	3.9
20-49.9	18,900	8.1	91.4	548,495	2.5	6.4
50-99.9	7,123	3.0	94.4	463,679	2.1	8.5
100-499.9	7,866	3.4	97.8	1,584,182	7.2	15.7
500-999.9	1,864	0.7	98.5	1,220,952	5.6	21.3
Over 1,000	3,422	1.5	100.0	17,403,120	78.7	100.0
TOTAL	234,730	100.0	---	22,126,640	100.0	---

Note: The concentration index, calculated in conjunction with the Lorenz Curve reproduced in Figure 1, is 0.942.

SOURCE: Fomento-DGECN, Censo Agropecuario 1950.

Table 2

Distribution of National Agricultural Land, by Number of Holdings and Area, 1961

Size Intervals (has.)	Holdings	%	% Cumulative	Area (has.)	%	% Cumulative
0-0.9	17,734	5.6	5.6	9,441	0.0	0.0
1-4.9	137,883	43.7	49.3	348,416	1.3	1.3
5-9.9	57,802	18.3	67.6	395,432	1.5	2.8
(0-9.9 has. subtotal)	213,419					
10-19.9	41,387	13.1	80.7	507,154	2.0	4.8
20-49.9	28,600	9.1	89.8	816,752	3.2	8.0
50-99.9	11,567	3.7	93.5	719,241	2.8	10.8
100-499.9	13,479	4.3	97.8	2,708,960	10.4	21.2
500-999.9	2,802	0.9	98.7	1,844,246	7.1	28.3
Over 1,000	4,223	1.3	100.0	18,655,220	71.7	100.0
TOTAL	315,477	100.0	---	26,004,862	100.0	---

(Table 2 cont. on p. 4)

(Table 2 cont.)

Notes: (1) Holdings having no land area are excluded.
(2) The concentration index, calculated in conjunction with the Lorenz Curve reproduced in Figure 1, is 0.928.

SOURCE: Fomento-DGECN, Censo Agropecuario 1961.

Table 3

Distribution of National Agricultural Land, by Number of Holdings and Area, 1971

Size Intervals (has.)	Holdings	%	% Cumulative	Area (has.)	%	% Cumulative
0-0.9	13,120	4.6	4.6	6,277	0.0	0.0
1-4.9	108,461	38.3	42.9	265,858	1.0	1.0
5-9.9	49,263	17.4	60.3	314,639	1.2	2.2
(0-9.9 has. subtotal)	170,844					
10-19.9	41,243	14.5	74.8	510,369	1.9	4.1
20-49.9	32,335	11.4	86.2	914,747	3.4	7.5
50-99.9	14,251	5.0	91.2	915,903	3.5	11.0
100-499.9	16,171	5.7	96.9	3,324,876	12.5	23.5
500-999.9	3,867	1.4	98.3	2,517,149	9.5	33.0
Over 1,000	4,905	1.7	100.0	17,756,637	67.0	100.0
TOTAL	283,616	100.0	---	26,526,455	100.0	---

Notes: (1) Holdings having no land area are excluded.
(2) The concentration index, calculated in conjunction with the Lorenz Curve reproduced in Figure 1, is 0.909.

SOURCE: Fomento-DGECN, Censo Agropecuario 1971.

on the agricultural potential of holdings over 10 hectares in size, one cannot be sure how many units--in addition to those just mentioned--are insufficient to support a farm family. The Presidential Commission on Agrarian Reform recommended holdings of 30 hectares for nonirrigated arable farming with insufficient rainfall, and 150 hectares for livestock and mixed farming.[12] Taking into account that the Agrarian Reform Law provided no program for consolidating existing minifundia, it is appropriate to conclude that the agrarian reform has served to create a new generation of minifundia.

The agrarian reform subsector does include a small number of individual holdings that are both of high agricultural potential and considerably

Figure 1

Lorenz Curves Showing the Distribution of National Land in Agricultural Holdings, 1950, 1961, 1971



Key



Note: The diagonal line represents a completely egalitarian distribution.

SOURCE: Comisión de Evaluación y Reestructuración, Informe Final, p. 50.

Table 4

Summaries of Data on Distribution of Agricultural Land by Number of Holdings, National: 1950, 1961, 1971; Agrarian Reform Subsector: 1966, 1976

Size Intervals (has.)	National 1950 %	National 1961 %	National 1971 %		Agrarian Reform Subsector 1966 %		Agrarian Reform Subsector 1976 %
0-4.9	53.7	49.3	42.9		48.4		47.5
5-9.9	17.9	18.3	17.4	sub-total	26.0	sub-total	25.0
					74.4		72.5
10-19.9	11.7	13.1	14.5		18.3		14.4
20+	16.7	19.3	25.2		7.3		13.1
	100.0	100.0	100.0		100.0		100.0

Notes: (1) 1966 data are drawn from 1,893 beneficiaries.
(2) 1976 data are based on responses from 111,618 beneficiaries. See footnote 16.

SOURCES: 1950, 1961, 1971--own calculations from Tables 1, 2, 3.
1966--CENDES-CIDA, Datos Económicos de los Beneficiarios, Table I-68.
1976--IAN, Inventario Nacional de Tierras, vol. 3, Table II-17.

larger than ten hectares. Although the distinction between small-scale, subsistence-oriented campesino agriculture and larger-scale commercial agriculture can be traced back to the beginnings of government agricultural policy in the 1930s, it has been used persistently to describe the post-1958 agrarian structure. Even within the agrarian reform subsector, farmers are designated for credit purposes as either campesinos (after 1969, pequeños agricultores) or medianos productores (a post-1969 reference, clearly distinguished from large-scale commercial farmers or empresarios). Later in this paper, it will be argued that throughout the reform larger holdings have received disproportionately more assistance from government agencies than smaller ones.[13] This, in turn, has led to classic dualistic trends in agricultural development--the campesinos becoming increasingly marginalized to the extent that many perceive wage-labor on larger farms or migration to the cities as necessary for survival, and the medianos productores and empresarios becoming increasingly well-endowed for the task of meeting increasing national demand for agricultural products.

The amount of land transferred to IAN for agrarian reform purposes is shown in Table 5. The cumulative total at the end of 1975 was 8,711,410 hectares or approximately 9.7 percent of the total national land area.[14] But the potential land area administered by IAN is much larger. Decree 192 (3 November 1964, and modified by Decree 277 of 23 February 1965), which provoked considerable criticism from private landowning interests, transferred

Table 5

Private and Public Lands Transferred to IAN, Annually 1959-75

	Private (has.)	Public (has.)	Total (has.)	Total Cumulative Hectares
1959	185,309	275,460	460,769	460,769
1960	460,034	440,789	900,823	1,361,592
1961	115,027	65,866	180,893	1,542,485
1962	214,314	47,178	261,492	1,803,977
1963	29,375	141,628	171,003	1,974,980
1964	106,653	96,210	202,863	2,177,843
1965	383,709	400,541	784,250	2,962,093
1966	134,993	310,459	445,457	3,407,550
1967	102,895	277,105	380,000	3,787,550
1968	67,669	640,536	708,205	4,495,755
1969	37,000	123,833	160,833	4,656,588
1970	119,973	288,631	408,604	5,065,192
1971	150,247	533,026	683,273	5,748,465
1972	25,551	2,273,442	2,298,993	8,047,458
1973	152,475	422,644	575,119	8,622,577
1974	34,799	10,876	45,675	8,668,252
1975	43,158	0	43,158	8,711,410
TOTAL	2,363,186	6,348,224	8,711,410	---

SOURCES: 1959-74--IAN, Un Nuevo Perfil, p. 69.
1975--MAC, Anuario Estadístico Agropecuario 1975.

essentially all national lands (tierras baldías) to IAN. Even now, cadastral surveys are incomplete and the total extent and location of these areas are not known.[15] Until 1964, transfers of private lands were greater than those of public lands (certain tierras baldías and municipal lands or ejidos); after that time public lands transfers predominated. At the end of 1975, private lands contributed 27.1 percent and public lands 72.9 percent of the cumulative total. Probably no more than 6,000,000 hectares of IAN lands are currently designated agrarian reform lands (asentamientos campesinos),[16] and little over half of this is utilized. The Presidential Commission on Agrarian Reform recommended the transfer of 12,500,000 hectares of agricultural land during the course of the reform[17]--three or four times the lands that have actually been transferred to campesinos.

The Agrarian Reform Law generally places the burden of initiating reform proceedings on those who wish to benefit. The procedure usually involves establishment of a campesino committee (comité de tierras) and the submission of a petition by this committee to the local IAN representative (delegado agrario). In the early years of the reform, vigorous campesino political organizations assisted in this procedure. Small numbers of

individuals also applied for transfers of IAN lands, particularly in the llanos, Guayana and south of Lake Maracaibo. The number of petitioners through the end of 1967 is given in Table 6. With the recent paralysis of land transfers, it is perhaps understandable that IAN has not published statistics on unattended petitions. A high-ranking government official and FCV leader, Juan Crespo, has indicated that in Lara State alone there are now 356 comités de tierra awaiting the results of their petitions.[18]

Table 6

Families Soliciting and Benefiting from Transfers of IAN Lands, Annually 1959-76

	Families Soliciting IAN for Transfers	Families Benefiting from Transfers by IAN	Cumulative (from Empirical Studies)	Families Interviewed in 1976 Acknowledge Receiving Transfers in the Following Years
1959	18,259	5,874		
1960	42,299	25,221		
1961	29,941	11,074		33,053
1962	29,866	14,603		
1963	6,523	9,656		2,620
1964	11,804	11,527		3,422
1965	11,568	40,782		3,381
1966	9,840	34,748		5,149
1967	9,821	14,100	96,273	4,203
1968	N.A.	16,791		7,343
1969	N.A.	3,041	95,320	6,149
1970	N.A.	12,204		9,257
1971	N.A.	11,050		7,418
1972	N.A.	12,215		9,508
1973	N.A.	9,182		10,411
1974	N.A.	519		7,948
1975	N.A.	0		8,625
1976	N.A.	N.A.	150,574	3,860
				122,347

SOURCES: Families soliciting IAN:
CENDES-CIDA, El Proceso de Dotación de Tierras, vol. 2, Table II-4.
Families benefiting:
MAC, Anuario Estadístico Agropecuario, various years.
Families benefiting (cumulative figures):
1967--CENDES-CIDA, El Proceso de Dotación de Tierras, vol. 2, Table II-5.
1969--IAN, Resultados del Programa de Investigación de la Tenencia de la Tierra.
1976--IAN, Inventario Nacional de Tierras, vol. 3, p. 6.

(Table 6 cont. on following page)

(Table 6 cont.)

SOURCES: Families interviewed:
IAN, Inventario Nacional de Tierras, vol. 3, Tables II-4, II-5.
The 1976 figure is January-May only. No information was obtained for 28,227 beneficiaries.

Families benefiting from land transfers under the agrarian reform are also enumerated in Table 6. Yearly estimates made from IAN's archives have been supplemented by cumulative totals taken from empirical studies in 1967, 1969, and 1976. The most recent entry provides an estimate of 150,574 families, which gives an annual average of 8,857 families per year for the period following the 1960 Agrarian Reform Law. Without even considering natural population growth, this is much fewer than the 350,000 campesino families specified by the Presidential Commission in 1959.[19] In spite of the achievements of the reform and high rural-urban migration, former president of IAN, Dr. Luis La Corte, was recently reported as saying that 150,000 eligible campesino families are still waiting to be included in the reform.[20]

The fact that the empirical studies of 1967 and 1969 both discovered fewer beneficiaries in the countryside than expected from IAN's archival data indicates--not over-reporting of beneficiaries by IAN field personnel --but that many beneficiaries abandoned their holdings soon after being included in the reform. Legally, agrarian reform beneficiaries may not dispose of their land without the consent of IAN; however, appreciable numbers of nonauthorized transfers to third parties have occurred. In the 1976 study, beneficiaries were asked to state the year in which they received title to their land (in the case of titulares) or began their occupation of the land (in the case of ocupantes). These data presented in Table 6 show that a relatively high percentage of current beneficiaries received their land transfers in the 1970s; earlier years are poorly represented except for the period of intense activity between 1959 and 1963. While transfers among beneficiaries should be expected, due to inheritance following retirement or death of a beneficiary, they have been excessive and largely unauthorized.

The Presidential Commission's estimate of government funds needed to carry out a reform of the recommended dimensions (12,500,000 utilizable hectares; 350,000 campesino families) was Bs. 23,110 million[21] not including agency operating expenses. Total expenditures to the end of 1974, disregarding problems encountered when adding amounts calculated in current prices, reached Bs. 8,600 million--just over one-third of the Bs. 23,110 million estimate.[22] While the estimate of the Presidential Commission required expenditures of about Bs. 66,000 per beneficiary family, actual expenditures came to Bs. 38,200 per family in the first seven years of the reform.[23]

The official organizational chart for the implementation of the reform shows seven areas of activity and objectives, and more than twenty implementing agencies (Table 7). The more significant of these programs and agencies will be examined in the course of this paper. Information on the

Table 7

Organizations Having Official Responsibility for the Agrarian Reform, Together with Programs and Objectives, 1975

Programs	Objectives	Agencies Having Responsibility
Land	Acquisition	IAN
	Transfers to beneficiaries	IAN
	Consolidation works	IAN, MOP, SAS, state governments, CADAFE, PRIDA
Credit	Integral and supervised financing	BAP (ICAP), Fondo de Crédito Agropecuario, Cenazuca
Technical assistance	Socio-economic promotion	IAN, MAC
	Integral training	INCE (campesinos) CIARA (agricultural professionals)
	Research	MAC, CIARA, universities, CBR
	Extension	MAC, IAN, BAP (ICAP)
Agroindustry	Vertical integration	IAN, Fomento, FCI, Corpoindustria, CVF, IMPRO
Commercialization	Minimum prices, transportation, storage, etc.	MAC - CORPOMERCADEO
Cadaster	Inventory of lands and waters, registration of rural property, land taxation	MAC
Zoning	Territorial regulation, determination of zones appropriate for crop, livestock, and forestry uses	MAC

SOURCE: Own translation from data in Comisión de Evaluación y Reestructuración, Informe Final, Table 3, p. 37.

annual expenditures of these agencies on activity directly related to the agrarian reform is not available, but government allocations to the Ministerio de Agricultura y Cría (MAC), IAN (whose sole function is agrarian reform), and the Banco Agrícola y Pecuario (BAP) are presented in Table 8. BAP was replaced in 1975 by the Instituto de Crédito Agrícola y Pecuario (ICAP), and since 1970 BAP-ICAP has concerned itself exclusively with credit needs of small and medium farmers. Government funding of MAC (which due to ministerial jurisdiction includes funding of IAN and BAP-ICAP) has scarcely changed relative to other ministries since 1960. The funds directed to IAN, however, decreased in relative terms throughout the period

Table 8

Budgetary Allocations to Principal Organizations with Official Responsibility for the Agrarian Reform, Annually 1960-75

	Total Central Government Expenditures Bs. million	Allocations to MAC Bs. million	% of Total Government Expenditures %	Allocations to IAN Bs. million	% of Total Allocations to MAC %	Allocations to BAP-ICAP Bs. million	% of Total Allocations to MAC %
1960	6,157	468	8.1	279	30.0	202	18.8
1961	7,075	606					
1962	6,258	416	6.6	139	33.4	63	15.1
1963	6,590	372	5.6	108	29.0	50	13.4
1964	7,100	486	6.8	151	31.1	130	26.7
1965	7,400	584	7.9	151	25.9	150	25.7
1966	7,924	528	6.7	169	32.0	100	18.9
1967	8,605	621	7.2	182	29.3	135	21.7
1968	9,051	662	7.3	172	26.0	182	27.5
1969	9,656	661	6.8	179	27.1	192	29.0
1970	10,292	767	7.5	203	26.5	227	29.6
1971	11,915	838	7.0	145	17.3	203	24.2
1972	12,482	736	5.9	171	23.2	179	24.3
1973	15,042	1,207	8.0	172	14.3	178	14.7
1974	40,059	3,377	8.4	169	5.0	197	5.8
1975	40,370	3,587	8.9	280	7.8	424	11.8

Notes: (1) IAN and BAP-ICAP allocations are included in those of MAC.
(2) Total government expenditures on agriculture are larger than those shown above, due to agriculturally related work of other agencies, such as MOP.

SOURCES: Total Central Government Expenditures, MAC allocations: 1960-70--Fomento-DGECN, Anuario Estadístico de Venezuela 1970, p. 309. 1971-75--BCV, Informe Económico 1975, p. A221. IAN and BAP-ICAP allocations: 1960-69--Comisión de Evaluación y Reestructuración, Informe Final, p. 236. 1970-75 --IAN, Un Nuevo Perfil, pp. 47ff.

and although funds directed to BAP-ICAP grew steadily until 1969, a marked decrease occurred after that date. One must conclude that agrarian reform has received a lower priority in the assignment of government funds in recent years. This is in fact cited by a recent IAN report[24] defending the agency's low level of achievement during the three-year period, 1974-76. In contrast to the staff resources of MAC, those of IAN and BAP-ICAP (the agencies responsible for the most significant programs in reform implementation) are small and probably inadequate (Table 9).

Table 9

Staff of Principal Organizations with Official Responsibility for the Agrarian Reform, by Type of Training, 31 December 1974

	MAC	IAN	BAP
Agricultural engineers	454	147	22
Forestry engineers	97	15	-
Other engineers	15	59	-
Veterinarians	348	31	1
Animal technologists	55	6	-
Economists	51	26	22
Sociologists	10	24	-
Biologists	26	-	-
Accountants and administrators	59	12	20
Lawyers	25	77	23
Anthropologists	-	8	-
Other professionals	50	41	7
Subtotal, university level	1,190	446	95
Home demonstrators	399	99	55
Agricultural technicians	835	297	367
Forestry technicians	226	32	-
Fishery technicians	54	2	-
Coffee technicians	161	4	190
Cacao technicians	91	16	8
Topographers	72	181	-
Other technicians	10	371	-
Subtotal, middle level	1,848	1,002	620
Administrative and blue-collar personnel	1,876	3,082	1,359
Subtotal	1,876	3,082	1,359
TOTAL	4,914	4,530	2,074

Note: MAC data do not include IAN and BAP personnel.

SOURCE: Comisión de Evaluación y Reestructuración, Informe Final, Table 15, p. 230.

THE NATIONAL CONTEXT OF CHANGE

Since 1960, distinctive changes have occurred within the Venezuelan economy, society, and polity. Already considerably lower than that of many nonindustrialized countries, the contribution of agricultural production to Venezuela's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has decreased from about 7 percent in 1960 to about 4 percent in 1975 (Table 10). This decline in its relative

Table 10

Contribution of Agriculture, Crop Production, and Animal Production to the Gross Domestic Product, Annually 1960-75

	GDP (Bs. mil.)	Total Agricultural Production (Bs. mil.)	% of GDP	Crop Production (Bs. mil.)	Animal Production (Bs. mil.)	Animal as % of Crop Production
1960	N.A.	1,954	7.14	1,162	675	58.1
1961	N.A.	2,020	6.83	1,106	794	71.8
1962	N.A.	2,109	6.59	1,148	836	72.8
1963	N.A.	2,282	6.51	1,259	889	70.6
1964	N.A.	2,620	6.40	1,449	1,006	69.4
1965	N.A.	2,785	6.42	1,520	1,087	71.5
1966	N.A.	2,967	6.54	1,542	1,237	80.2
1967	N.A.	3,101	6.63	1,634	1,265	77.4
1968	71,833	4,255	5.92	1,756	1,651	94.0
1969	78,117	4,842	6.20	1,937	1,868	96.4
1970	85,051	4,777	5.62	2,062	1,928	93.5
1971	94,256	4,940	5.24	2,057	2,131	103.6
1972	104,073	5,119	4.92	1,984	2,294	115.6
1973	124,595	5,926	4.76	2,422	2,592	107.0
1974	195,970	7,297	3.72	2,938	3,397	115.6
1975	207,000	9,025	4.36	3,909	4,046	103.5

Notes: (1) All amounts are in current prices at the level of the producer. GDP data following this definition could not be found for 1960-67, hence the use of percentage figures in column 4 derived from 1957 prices, presumably at the level of the market. It is not clear to what degree these data are incompatible with the 1968-75 data in column 4.

(2) Total Agricultural Production includes crop and animal production, forestry, fishing, and other minor categories.

SOURCES: Agricultural Production as % of GDP for 1960-67--Comisión de Evaluación y Reestructuración, Informe Final, Annex 5, p. 273. GDP and Total Agricultural Production for 1968-75--BCV, Informe Económico, 1975, 1974, 1973 (tables numbered A-IV-2); 1972 (Table A-VII-2). Total Agricultural Production 1960-67--BCV, Informe Económico 1969, Table A-VII-49. Crop Production and Animal Production:

(Table 10 cont. on following page)

SOURCES: 1960-67--BCV, Informe Económico 1969, Table A-VII-49; 1968-75--BCV, Informe Económico, 1975 (Tables A-IV-25/29), 1974 (Table A-IV-24), 1973 (Table A-IV-20), 1972 (Table A-VII-46).

importance began with the economic recession in 1929 and the subsequent rise of the petroleum industry. Even with governments disposed to assisting agriculture, as in the periods 1945-48 and 1959-63, there has been only slight recovery. The economy has become increasingly reliant on government revenues from petroleum exploitation for its development expenditures, no longer depending on capital "squeeze" from agriculture.

In contrast to the traditional economy dominated by subsistence food production and the commercial production of cacao, coffee, livestock, and hides for export, the economy of the 1970s has relegated agriculture to a relatively minor role. Agricultural production, for the most part commercialized and technologically modernized, is as incapable of meeting current domestic demand as it was in the late 1930s. Agricultural exports have declined steadily in relative importance, and imports of agricultural products now stand at more than three times the value of agricultural exports (Table 11). In terms of value, imports account for over one-third of all nonanimal[25] agricultural products consumed in Venezuela (Table 12).

Government revenues from petroleum[26] have increased dramatically since the OPEC actions of late 1973 and nationalization of the petroleum industry by the Venezuelan government on 1 January 1976. Government spending as well as private and corporate capital accumulation has resulted in increased manufacturing, service, and governmental activity which in turn has led to increased personal incomes for a substantial segment of the population. Due to the income elasticity of the food demand, increased personal incomes have caused a much faster rise in demand for agricultural products than that implied by a 3.5 percent[27] annual population growth rate. Rather than attempting long-term adjustments within the agricultural sector to meet this demand, however, government policy has been to selectively appease organized commercial farmers and ranchers, increase agricultural imports, and continue its rhetoric on the virtues of import substitution.

Demographic change has been massive. Urbanization has resulted in the contrast between 52.1 percent of Venezuelans living in population centers of less than 2,500 inhabitants in 1950, and a corresponding 26.9 percent in 1971 (Table 13). Net rural-to-urban migration has been calculated to be 792,000 and 975,000 in the respective intercensal periods, 1950-61 and 1961-71.[28] Despite high natural growth rates, population in centers of less than 2,500 registered an absolute loss of 186,682 between the censuses of 1961 and 1971. Similarly, the percentage of the economically active population involved in agriculture dropped from 44.1 percent in 1950 to 21 percent in 1971, actual numbers of economically active population in agriculture declining from 704,700 in 1950 to 655,000 in 1971 (Table 14). Though the attraction of urban employment opportunities and higher personal incomes has surely been present for the rural population, especially in manufacturing and services, it is clear that a more thorough and egalitarian agrarian reform would have provided many campesinos with enough attractive income potential to remain on the land.[29]

Table 11

Agricultural Exports and Imports, by Value, Annually 1970-75

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Exports (Bs. million)						
Food products	208.9	201.9	306.2	218.4	347.9	356.3
--coffee	57.1	66.1	69.0	58.1	71.3	81.9
--cacao	30.3	29.2	28.6	41.4	64.7	70.7
--others	121.5	106.6	208.6	118.9	211.9	203.7
Beverages and tobacco	1.8	0.3	1.4	8.0	29.9	8.8
Fats and oils	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.3
Total agr.-related exports	210.7	202.2	307.6	226.6	378.0	365.4
Petroleum and derivatives	10,962.0	13,479.1	15,089.6	22,305.4	61,609.0	44,666.2
Total exports	12,124.5	14,558.6	16,272.6	23,718.1	63,844.5	46,704.2
Agr.-related as % of total exports	1.74	1.39	1.89	0.96	0.59	0.78
Imports (Bs. million)						
Food products	608.2	601.8	672.8	1,063.5	1,473.8	1,892.1
Beverages and tobacco	74.5	76.3	111.9	79.2	157.0	263.3
Fats and oils	48.0	71.9	62.5	133.6	148.8	356.2
Total agr.-related imports	730.7	750.0	847.2	1,276.3	1,779.6	2,511.6
Total imports	7,382.0	8,252.2	9,471.0	10,855.3	16,249.1	22,827.2
Agr.-related as % of total imports	9.90	9.09	8.90	11.76	10.95	11.00

Notes: (1) All amounts are in current prices.
(2) Classification system is SITC.

SOURCES: BCV, Informe Económico, 1974, 1975 (tables numbered A-VI-26).

Table 12

Percentage Contribution of Imports to the Supply of Agricultural Products, by Product Category in Terms of Value, Annually 1971-75

	1971 (%)	1972 (%)	1973 (%)	1974 (%)	1975 (%)
Total					
Crops	22.9	34.1	42.2	41.2	37.0
Cereals	53.2	71.2	74.4	71.8	64.4
Legumes	43.8	58.5	50.5	45.1	47.5
Roots and tubers	3.2	2.6	4.0	2.7	5.8
Fibers and oils	13.8	27.6	64.5	53.5	51.4
Fruits	13.0	14.7	10.0	13.8	14.7
Vegetables	3.2	3.3	7.1	7.9	3.7
Coffee, cacao, tobacco, and sugar	3.2	5.1	4.5	4.7	4.5
Total					
Livestock and Dairy	6.2	6.6	7.1	3.8	5.9
Milk	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0
Meat including poultry	10.5	11.5	11.3	6.0	9.4
Eggs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Notes: (1) Imports include value C.I.F. and import taxes.
(2) Domestic production is calculated at producer prices.
(3) Supply of agricultural products is sum of imports and domestic production.
(4) All amounts are calculated in current prices.

SOURCE: Own calculations from data in BCV, Informe Económico 1975, Tables A-IV-19/23.

The political significance of demographic changes for the implementation of agrarian reform has been emphasized by Powell.[30] The de facto reform of 1945-48 was undertaken by a government convinced that the majority of the population supported agrarian reform, but governments after 1958 increasingly identified their interests with those of urban voters. Although the rural vote of campesinos affiliated with the FCV continued to be important throughout the 1960s, urban labor, business, and service groups became increasingly well-organized and public politics became more and more dominated by single-interest pressure groups. The post-1958 agrarian reform was distinguished therefore by compromises in the face of opposing pressure groups as well as by attempts to placate intense campesino pressures and respond to land invasions. The reformers drafting the Agrarian Reform Law had to rationalize the reform, not in terms of providing employment and support for poverty-stricken campesinos, but as a program of commercial

Table 13

National, Urban, and Rural Population, 1950, 1961, 1971

	1950	1961	1971
(1) Total population	5,034,838	7,523,999	10,721,522
(2) Urban population (centers over 2,500)	2,411,811	4,703,626	7,834,008
(3) (2) as % of (1)	47.9	62.5	73.1
(4) Intermediate population (centers 1,000-2,499)	297,533	370,219	442,652
(5) (4) as % of (1)	5.9	4.9	4.1
(6) Rural population (centers under 1,000)	2,325,494	2,450,154	2,444,862
(7) (6) as % of (1)	46.2	32.6	22.8
(8) Intermediate + rural population, i.e., (4) + (6)	2,623,027	2,820,373	2,887,514
(9) (8) as % of (1)	52.1	37.5	26.9

SOURCES: Fomento-DGECN, X Censo de Población 1971, Resumen General, p. 16. Own calculations of percentages.

Table 14

National Economically Active Population, by Activity, 1950, 1961, 1971

		1950	1961	1971
Agriculture	Number (thousands)	704.7	721.2	655.0
	% of total	44.1	35.3	21.0
Petroleum and mining	Number (thousands)	49.3	45.6	55.0
	% of total	3.1	2.2	1.8
Manufacturing	Number (thousands)	167.7	246.9	573.0
	% of total	10.5	12.1	18.4
Construction	Number (thousands)	91.1	81.5	186.0
	% of total	5.7	4.0	6.0
Services	Number (thousands)	586.5	947.3	1,646.0
	% of total	36.6	46.4	52.8
Total	Number (thousands)	1,599.3	2,042.5	3,115.0

SOURCE: Comisión de Evaluación y Reestructuración, Informe Final, Annex 13, originally from population censuses of the years indicated.

agricultural development--in order to secure the support of existing commercial farmers, agroindustry, and related interest groups.

The approach used by the Agrarian Reform Law illustrates this kind of rationalization particularly well. Private holdings which can be shown to fulfill the "social function" of property generally are not eligible for expropriation under the law. Requirements for proof of social function include efficient utilization of available factors of production; personal control of farm operations by the owner; compliance with legislation regarding conservation practices, labor, and contracts; and registration of the holding in the national cadaster.[31] By emphasizing the social function of property without the establishment of a maximum permissible size of holding, the Agrarian Reform Law threatens only those large landowners not willing to intensify and modernize their operations.[32]

PROVISION OF LAND THROUGH THE REFORM

Lands transferred to IAN for agrarian reform have mainly been public lands. Only 27.1 percent of the total are of private origin, and over half of those were transferred in the period, 1960-65 (Table 5). Table 15 indicates that a very large proportion of those properties was purchased following direct negotiation between IAN and the landowner, in contrast to

Table 15

Means Utilized by IAN in Acquiring Private Lands, Annually 1960-65

	Hectares Acquired		Properties Acquired	
	Total	Invaded	Total	Invaded
By purchase (direct negotiation)	874,205	144,413	414	103
By expropriation	170,451	107,912	47	20
By donation	234,801	857	14	3
By confiscation	306,315	32,372	26	8
TOTAL	1,585,772	285,554	501	134

SOURCE: CENDES-CIDA, El Proceso de Adquisición de Tierras, p. 89.

the small number of cases involving expropriation and confiscation.[33] Nearly half of all properties expropriated, and more than half of the land area expropriated, had been subject to campesino land invasions. This suggests that the powers of expropriation embodied in the Agrarian Reform Law were used primarily to diffuse situations of intense campesino pressure. Such a conclusion is likey to apply to the period since 1965 as well since isolated land invasions have continued to occur and, although the amount of private lands acquired by IAN is not extensive, the cumulative number of

expropriated holdings has increased.[34] Recently, however, campesino land invasions have been denounced at the highest levels of government and brought to a swift conclusion by the nation's armed forces.[35]

IAN's expenditures for acquiring private land and unexhausted improvements[36] have been considerable. In the thirteen-year period, 1964-76, Bs. 507.7 million was disbursed for this purpose, at an average of Bs. 350 per hectare (Table 16), which is higher than the average Bs. 86 per hectare envisioned by the Presidential Commission. The Commission also apparently

Table 16

IAN Expenditures for Private Lands and Unexhausted Improvements, Annually 1964-76

	Private Lands Acquired (has.)	Total Cost of Land and Improvements (Bs. million)	Total Cost per Hectare (Bs.)
1964	106,653	30.4	285
1965	383,709	94.9	247
1966	134,998	44.6	330
1967	102,895	38.5	374
1968	67,669	40.0	591
1969	37,000	36.3	981
1970	119,972	21.6	180
1971	150,247	32.9	219
1972	25,551	35.6	1,393
1973	152,475	41.7	273
1974	34,800	12.6	362
1975	43,158	27.0	626
1976	93,410	51.6	552
TOTAL	1,452,537	TOTAL 507.7	AVERAGE 350

Notes: Data on the breakdown between land and improvements are not generally available. However, in 1973 costs were Bs. 29.8 millions for land and Bs. 11.9 millions for improvements. In 1975, costs were Bs. 19.2 millions for land and Bs. 7.9 millions for improvements. See also footnote 36.

SOURCES: Own calculations from: 1964-68--MAC, Memoria y Cuenta 1968, p. 13; 1969-76--IAN, Un Nuevo Perfil, p. 104.

intended that all lands obtained for the agrarian reform be of private origin.[37] However, by emphasizing acquisition through direct negotiation, IAN permitted the vagaries of the land market to influence the amounts of private land acquired. The agency's budgetary allocations were never excessive

(Table 8), hence, three of the smallest annual acquisitions of private land occurred in 1968, 1969, and 1972, when prices were considerably above average.

Adequate time-series data are not available to discern whether cash or bonds were the method of payment used by IAN;[38] however, the possibility that certain private landowners profited from dealing with IAN appears to have been great. If this could be proved, it might show these individuals reinvesting in highly capitalized commercial farms or key urban industries, such as construction, which would be welcomed by government. In fact, the importance ascribed land transfers to IAN by private landowners is indicated by the intensity of the national debate over a proposed land tax as an encouragement to agricultural production. A former Minister of Agriculture, Alejandro Osorio, has pointed out that since the tax would be progressive and ad valorem, the value of the holding declared by the owner for tax purposes would provide a more reliable figure than market value for possible subsequent negotiations with IAN or other public agencies.[39] The apparent cause for alarm among private landowners is therefore not simply that effective implementation of the land tax would require regular payments to government. Large-scale land speculation would be made increasingly difficult once tax-assessed land values became public knowledge.

IAN's expenditures for acquiring private lands have declined relative to its consolidation activity on asentamientos campesinos. Considering just these two expenditure categories, private lands accounted for 44.1 percent and consolidation activity 55.9 percent of funds disbursed during the period, 1964-75 (Table 17). Available figures show operational expenses (including technical assistance) to have been high, averaging 45 percent of all IAN expenditures for the period, 1964-68. The breakdown of expenditures on consolidation activity is presented in Table 18. Preparation of asentamiento lands for agricultural use (e.g., deforestation, leveling) and the provision of both access and on-farm roads accounted for 65.6 percent of consolidation expenditures in the period, 1960-75. The predominance of consolidation of these most basic types over such a lengthy period suggests that much asentamiento land has required special public investment to enable agrarian reform beneficiaries to utilize it. It is noteworthy that Table 18 does not include substantial infrastructural investments by other public agencies such as the Ministerio de Obras Públicas (MOP). Such heavy investments in the most basic types of infrastructure and consolidation activity lend credence to the characterization of the agrarian reform as being oriented toward colonization.

This brings us to the quality of land in asentamiento campesinos. Of private lands acquired by IAN up to the end of 1965, 1.5 percent were irrigated, 37 percent were rain-fed flatlands utilizable for farming, 33.9 percent were suitable for extensive use, and 27.6 percent were classified as unutilizable.[40] Of all IAN land in asentamientos in 1976, there were 4,700,694 hectares of utilizable land, some 22.7 percent of the national total of potential agricultural land (Table 19). However, in 1975 Dr. Luis La Corte, then president of IAN, declared that the lands already transferred to about 100,000 campesino families were the worst in the country and without hope of meeting conditions necessary for successful exploitation.[41] Of the utilizable land in IAN's asentamientos, only 65 percent was

Table 17

Funds Expended by IAN for Agrarian Reform, Annually 1964-75

	Private Lands and Improvements Acquired (Bs. million)	Consolidation Activity Undertaken on Asentamientos (Bs. million)	Operational Expenses (Bs. million)	Total (Bs. million)
1964	30.4	22.7	72.2	125.3
1965	94.9	44.1	76.6	215.6
1966	44.6	76.0	81.2	201.8
1967	38.5	61.1	86.2	185.8
1968	40.0	54.3	91.5	185.8
1969	36.3	49.8	N.A.	N.A.
1970	21.6	40.0	N.A.	N.A.
1971	32.9	42.2	N.A.	N.A.
1972	35.6	38.6	N.A.	N.A.
1973	41.7	52.5	N.A.	N.A.
1974	12.6	38.4	N.A.	N.A.
1975	27.0	59.1	N.A.	N.A.

% of Total Expenses Other Than Operational Expenses:

Private Lands and Improvements Acquired	%		%	Consolidation Activity Undertaken on Asentamientos	%		%
1964	57.3	1970	35.1	1964	42.7	1970	64.9
1965	68.3	1971	43.8	1965	31.7	1971	56.2
1966	37.0	1972	48.0	1966	63.0	1972	52.0
1967	38.7	1973	44.3	1967	61.3	1973	55.7
1968	42.4	1974	24.7	1968	57.6	1974	75.3
1969	42.1	1975	31.4	1969	57.9	1975	68.6
1964-75 AVERAGE	44.1			1964-75 AVERAGE	55.9		

Note: All amounts are calculated in current prices.

SOURCES: Own calculations from: 1964-68--MAC, Memoria y Cuenta 1968, p. 13; 1969-76--MAC, Anuario Estadístico Agropecuario, various years.

actually used for agricultural production in 1976 (Table 19). Over half of this land was used primarily for livestock; the primary use for the remaining area was crops. Only 0.04 percent of utilized asentamiento land was under irrigation in 1976.

If all utilizable asentamiento lands (4,700,694 hectares) were divided equally among all agrarian reform beneficiaries (150,574 families), each beneficiary in 1976 would have had about 31 hectares. But Table 4 illustrated that the distribution of agrarian reform land has been most unequal--

Table 18

Consolidation Activity Undertaken by IAN
on Asentamientos Campesinos, Total 1960-75 and 1975

	Total Expenditure 1960-75		Expenditure in 1975
	Bs. million	%	%
Basic preparation of lands	231.1	29.6	24.5
Buildings	77.4	9.9	25.4
Aquaducts and complementary works	28.3	3.6	2.7
Access and on-farm roads	281.2	36.0	26.3
Irrigation and drainage	36.2	4.6	10.7
Technical studies	33.7	4.3	3.0
Installations	10.6	1.4	0.8
Urban works	4.0	0.5	1.4
Other investments	7.8	1.0	1.8
Investments through IDB loan	50.8	6.5	0.0
Other	20.7	2.6	3.4
TOTAL	781.8	100.0	100.0

Note: Calculated in current prices.

SOURCE: Own calculations from MAC, Anuario Estadístico Agropecuario 1975.

Table 19

National Land Use, Agrarian Reform Lands
and their Utilization, Various Years

(1) Total national land area	89,868,500	has.
(2) Total area in agricultural holdings (1971 census)	26,526,365	has.
(3) (2) as % of (1)	29.5	%
(4) Total land area utilizable for agriculture (1961 census)	20,712,133	has.
(5) (4) as % of (1)	23.1	%
(6) Potential IAN land area	unknown	
(7) Actual IAN land area (1977)	8,711,410	has.
(8) (7) as % of (1)	9.6	%
(9) IAN lands in asentamientos campesinos (1976)	5,329,562*	has.
(10) (9) as % of (7)	61.2*	%
(11) Asentamiento lands utilizable for agriculture	4,700,694*	has.
(12) (11) as % of (4)	22.7*	%
(13) (11) as % of (9)	88.2*	%

(Table 19 cont. on p. 23)

(Table 19 cont.)

(14) Asentamiento lands legally divided into holdings	1,468,129*	has.
(15) (14) as % of (9)	27.6*	%
(16) (14) as % of (11)	31.2*	%
(17) (14) as % of (16)	48.0*	%
(18) Asentamiento lands used for agriculture	3,055,600*	has.
(19) (18) as % of (9)	57.3*	%
(20) (18) as % of (11)	65.0*	%
(21) Asentamiento lands where dominant agricultural use is crops	1,372,925*	has.
(22) (21) as % of (18)	44.9*	%
(23) Asentamiento lands where dominant agricultural use is livestock	1,682,675*	has.
(24) (23) as % of (18)	55.1*	%
(25) Asentamiento lands under irrigation	119,149*	has.
(26) (25) as % of (18)	0.04*	%

SOURCES: (1)--MAC Comisión de Reforma Agraria, Informe de la Subcomisión de Economía, p. 343. (6),(7)--IAN, Un Nuevo Perfil, p. 67. (4)--Fomento-DGECN, Censo Agropecuario 1961. (2)--Fomento-DGECN, Censo Agropecuario 1971.
All other data marked *--IAN, Inventario Nacional de Tierras, vol. 3, p. 31, Tables IV-10, IV-11. These data have been adjusted upwards by a factor of 1.1255 to take into account asentamientos for which incomplete information was obtained. Even so, these figures are still underestimates since the inventory covered only 93.1 percent of all asentamientos. See footnote 16.

with 72.5 percent of beneficiaries in 1976 reporting holdings of less than the minimum 10 hectares recommended by the Presidential Commission on Agrarian Reform.

Partly responsible is the cumbersome procedure for dividing asentamientos into individual parcels and supplying beneficiaries with titles to those holdings. Hence asentamiento lands divided into parcels were only one-third of utilizable asentamiento lands and one-half of used asentamiento lands (Table 19). The majority of agrarian reform beneficiaries, 78.4 percent in 1976, do not have title (i.e., they are ocupantes) and amongst them it is likely that the early-comers and the strong have superior parcels to those of late-comers and the weak. The remainder of all beneficiaries are titleholders with either an individual title over a parcela or a collective title over a lote (i.e., titulares); titles are subject to the dubious distinction of being either "possessory" or "definitive" (Table 20). Although ocupantes may have authorization from IAN to occupy asentamiento lands, 51.9 percent of those interviewed in 1976 did not have authorization.[42] Unfortunately, the chaos surrounding tenure arrangements makes statistics on reform beneficiaries, as in Table 6, of questionable value. Nor have conditions improved over time, as can be seen from separate studies in 1967, 1969, 1974,

Table 20

Tenure Situation of Families Benefiting from the Transfer of IAN Lands, 1967, 1969, 1974, 1976

	1967		1969		1974		1976	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
With title (titulares)	22,689	23.6	18,816	19.7	54,403	33.8	26,799	21.6
--Individual	22,277	23.1	17,011	17.8	44,702	31.9	22,261	17.9
--Collective	412	0.5	1,805	1.9	9,701	6.9	4,538	3.7
Without title (ocupantes)	73,584	76.4	76,504	80.3	85,886	61.2	97,161	78.4
--Individual	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	90,240	72.8
--Collective	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	6,921	5.6
TOTAL	96,273	100.0	95,320	100.0	140,289	100.0	123,960	100.0

Notes: (1) 1967 data refer to holders of "titulos definitivos" only.
(2) 1976 data exclude 1,094 interviewees who gave no response, and another 25,520 beneficiaries who were not interviewed.
(3) IAN began distribution of individual titles in 1962 and collective titles in 1967.

SOURCES: 1967--CENDES-CIDA, El Proceso de Dotación de Tierras, p. 171. 1969--IAN, Resultados del Programa de Investigación de la Tenencia de la Tierra, vol. 1 (reprinted in Oscar David Soto, La Empresa y la Reforma Agraria, p. 94). 1974--Comisión de Evaluación y Reestructuración, Informe Final, Table 14, p. 67. 1976--IAN, Inventario Nacional de Tierras, vol. 3, Table II-9.

and 1976 (Table 20). There are adverse implications of this situation for beneficiary access to credit facilities and technical assistance. However, it should be noted that, at least since 1974, possession of a property title has not been recognized by BAP-ICAP as proof of status when offered in an application for credit by an agrarian reform beneficiary. Utilization by BAP-ICAP of prendas agrarias as proof of status will be discussed in a later section.

In contrast to the majority of beneficiaries are those approximately 3 percent in 1976[43] who pay for the land transferred to them. They receive without delay a so-called "onerous" title with which to begin applying for agricultural credit and technical assistance. IAN has even operated special land transfer programs for these medianos productores, granting in the period, 1969-73, 1,146 possessory and 340 definitive titles to 1,486 families for a total of 629,978 hectares.[44] The average farm size for this small minority of agrarian reform beneficiaries is 424 hectares, which would suggest an intention on the part of IAN to encourage the creation of a dualistic agrarian structure using agrarian reform resources. In terms of the "numbers game," these privileged beneficiaries serve to boost certain

overall performance criteria for the agrarian reform, thereby inflating agricultural production statistics.

A noteworthy achievement of the transfer of lands through agrarian reform has been the reduction of tenancy (arrendamiento) and sharecropping (aparcería) arrangements[45] (Table 21). Of all farm units recorded in the national censuses of 1950 and 1971, the numbers of those under tenancy and sharecropping dropped from 21.6 percent to 5.6 percent. It is not clear to what extent generalized dominance-dependency relationships exist among agrarian reform beneficiaries, especially since a detailed study of unauthorized transfers of IAN lands remains to be done. It is also possible that new forms of dominance-dependency relationships could arise through the agrarian reform.[46]

ADJUSTMENTS TO LAND POLICY SINCE 1974

Public debate over agriculture reached a high point in 1973. Many considered the situation to be a national agricultural crisis. The AD government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez, that began its five-year term of office in early 1974, has undertaken a number of adjustments in policies and programs regarding the reform.

The response to the illegal occupation of IAN lands by individuals unable to qualify as beneficiaries under the Agrarian Reform Law was Decree 350 (20 August 1974). It required IAN to complete a mapping survey of its lands which would determine use and tenure conditions, and remove illegal occupants within a two-year period. If these occupants could qualify as beneficiaries their tenure would be legalized; if not, they would lose use rights to IAN land and would receive compensation for unexhausted improvements. Apart from the survey, however, achievements in the implementation of the decree were limited. The tenure of some occupants was legalized, but only a few individuals were threatened with the loss of use rights. Martel (1976) has noted that these were mostly small and medium occupants, and that large-scale, illegal occupants of IAN land remained untouched.[47] The total amount of recoupable land is not known. Although IAN has published the figure of 436,196 hectares, the FCV has declared the amount to be 1,200,000 hectares.[48] Even so, political pressures and bureaucratic uncertainty have managed to slow down the operation of the decree to the extent that, by December 1975, IAN had not effectively recovered a single hectare.[49]

Another governmental action relating to land was Decree 349 (20 September 1974). It provided the legal sanction for agricultural professionals (agrotécnicos) to qualify as agrarian reform beneficiaries and began in earnest in 1976 in spite of opposition from the FCV.[50]

There is also a trend toward implementing the Agrarian Reform Law among indigenous groups (indígenas) in the largely unoccupied southern area of Venezuela.[51] IAN data for 1974 show 233 families receiving 65,800 hectares of public lands in Territorio Federal Amazonas,[52] compared with the overall total of 519 new beneficiary families in 1974 (Table 6). In 1976, IAN spent Bs. 4.3 million on consolidation works in organizaciones agrarias

Table 21

Tenure Situation of National Agricultural Land,
by Number of Holdings and Area, 1950, 1961, 1971

	1950				1961				1971			
	Holdings		Area		Holdings		Area		Holdings		Area	
	Number (000)	%	Number (000)	%	Number (000)	%	Number (000)	%	Number (000)	%	Number (000)	%
Owner-occupiers (propietarios)	97,598	41.6	17,823	80.5	125,627	39.8	21,188	81.3	179,340	62.4	22,070	83.2
Renters (arrendatarios)	35,633	15.2	676	3.1	25,966	8.2	495	1.9	16,044	5.6	548	2.0
Sharecroppers (aparceros)	14,954	6.4	411	1.9	15,223	4.8	118	0.5				
Occupants (ocupantes)	80,487	34.2	2,422	10.9	124,119	39.4	2,832	11.0	82,773	28.8	3,281	12.4
Mixed	6,058	2.6	795	3.6	24,542	7.8	1,371	5.3	9,099	3.2	627	2.4
TOTAL	234,730	100.0	22,127	100.0	315,477	100.0	26,004	100.0	287,256	100.0	26,526	100.0

Notes: (1) Holdings having no land area are apparently excluded for 1961 and included for 1971.
(2) For the 1971 census, a category of "Other Forms" has been included in "Owner-occupiers."

SOURCE: Fomento-DGECN, Censos Agropecuarios 1950, 1961, 1971.

indígenas, organizations of indigenous reform beneficiaries not unlike empresas campesinas (to be described later).[53] A positive aspect of IAN's efforts with indígenas is that these groups now have greater recourse to protection in the event of hostile action by newly arrived groups seeking to exploit agricultural, forestry, or mineral resources. A recent case of extensive fire-raising in the highland forests of western Zulia State was shown by Arnaldo Gabaldón, head of the Ministerio del Ambiente y de los Recursos Naturales Renovables (MARNR), to have been a deliberate, "almost genocidal" attempt by unscrupulous ranchers to extend their pastures by displacing local indigenous groups.[54]

In recognition of both the increased complexity of legislation affecting agriculture and the inoperability of Decree 350, a law (the Ley Orgánica de Tribunales y Procedimientos Agrarios) was passed on 21 June 1976 establishing agrarian judges for each state. The new law promises more efficient adjudication of cases falling within the Agrarian Reform Law, the conservationist Ley Forestal de Suelos y Aguas, and others. A key provision contained in Article 35 calls for a 180-day period in which persons desiring adjudication under the terms of Decree 350 (whether it results in legalization or expropriation) may appeal to the newly installed agrarian judge of their state (known as a Juzgado de Tierras, Bosques y Aguas).[55]

A final policy change has been the acceptance of area planning within agrarian reform operations. This is included in the Fifth National Plan (1976-80) as áreas de desarrollo de la Reforma Agraria,[56] presumably recognizing both the difficulties of working with widely dispersed lands and beneficiaries, and the availability of sufficient personnel trained in integrated area development. IAN has thus far selected seventeen areas in which to concentrate its future activity.[57] Existing conditions such as high agricultural potential, a large number of "consolidated" asentamientos, access roads, reservoirs for irrigation, and agro-industrial facilities have been factors considered when selecting the areas. Many programs (e.g., a national cadastral survey, major irrigation and colonization schemes, attempts to introduce modern farm technology, and the provision of infrastructure, housing and social services) may already be operating in these areas. The large number of government agencies in so limited an area makes it a major task to coordinate agency activities and avoid unwarranted friction with local authorities and pressure groups, but the advantages are expected to outweigh the difficulties. The Fifth National Plan foresees these areas benefiting not just new beneficiaries (50,000 new beneficiaries are projected in the five-year period, 1976-80) and existing beneficiaries in each area, but also campesinos who, having had land tenure difficulties elsewhere, express a desire to be incorporated into the new development areas.[58]

PROVISION OF CAPITAL THROUGH THE REFORM

Until 1969, government-provided agricultural credit was supplied exclusively by the Banco Agrícola y Pecuario (BAP), the oldest agriculture-related government agency (established 1928). After passage of the Agrarian Reform Law, BAP's capacities were overwhelmed by an unprecedented demand for campesino loans. With inadequate administrative structure and experience, loans were given with few limitations (i.e., inadequate, even

nonexistent records being kept; without consideration of the borrower's existing credit record; without study of the likelihood of repayment; and no attempt to foreclose on the loan should the borrower not repay within the agreed upon period) so that by the mid-1960s the bank was close to bankruptcy, and many campesinos were deeply in debt (which in later years excluded them from the bank's services).[59] A separate, semipublic bank for medium and large farmers, the Banco de Desarrollo Agropecuario (BANDAGRO), was founded in 1967 and became fully operational in 1970. The remaining activities of BAP, now clearly associated with small and medium farmers, were transferred to the newly created ICAP in 1975.

Table 22 summarizes BAP's agricultural credit programs as divided between small farmers and medium farmers (empresarios are included until 1969). The distinction between small and medium farmer categories has been based on a farmer's gross annual income; at the present time, the division occurs

Table 22

Government Agricultural Credits (BAP, Ordinary Program) to Small and Medium Farmers, Total 1959-69, Total 1970-73

	Amount Demanded Bs. million	Amount Conceded Bs. million	Amount Paid Bs. million	Amount Recouped Bs. million	Recouped as Percent of Paid %
Small Farmers					
1959-69 Total	1,555.0 (1962-69 only)	1,039.8	825.0	442.6	53.65
1959-69 Average	194.4 (1962-69 only)	94.5	75.0	40.2	-
1970-73 Total	1,010.0	465.5	361.6	172.4	47.67
1970-73 Average	252.5	116.4	90.4	43.1	-
Medium Farmers					
1959-69 Total	1,635.6 (1962-69 only)	1,219.1	1,050.2	928.3	88.40
1959-69 Average	204.5 (1962-69 only)	110.8	95.5	84.4	-
1970-73 Total	424.4	219.4	211.7	151.5	71.56
1970-73 Average	106.1	54.9	52.9	37.9	-

SOURCES: Own calculations from Comisión de Evaluación y Reestructuración, Informe Final, Annexes 16 and 17, pp. 284-85.

at the substantial amount of Bs. 80,000. It is not clear what percentage of BAP-ICAP credits is destined for agrarian reform beneficiaries.

As BANDAGRO and private financial institutions became increasingly attractive credit sources for medium and large farmers, the proportion of BAP-ICAP's clients who are beneficiaries has risen, especially since 1969. Generally speaking, BAP-ICAP is currently the only institutional source of credit to which beneficiaries can turn. In addition to the ordinary program credit specified in Table 22, which was unrelated to technical assistance, BAP also (1) began a program of directed credit for members of uniones de prestatarios in 1966 (discussed later); (2) provided credit for irrigation works; and (3) undertook with USAID assistance a program of supervised credit.[60] All of these special programs were aimed at agrarian reform beneficiaries.

The level of recoupment on ordinary credit (i.e., loan repayment) is appreciably lower for campesinos--around one-half and declining--than the corresponding level for medium farmers (Table 22). Prior to 1970, medium farmers demanded more credit, were granted more, were paid more, and they repaid more than campesinos. Percentages of demands conceded, of conceded credits paid out, and of paid credits recovered were higher for medium farmers than campesinos. Following the end of 1969, the absolute amounts granted to medium farmers decreased, but the same relative patterns remained.

When tens of thousands of small farmers (the great majority of agrarian reform beneficiaries) demanded credit from the only institution they were eligible to turn to, BAP granted them only 46 percent and paid them only 44 percent of all its credits in 1959-69 (Table 23). After BANDAGRO had become fully operational, these percentages rose to only 68 percent and 63.1 percent, respectively, in 1970-73. In the light of annual figures for government-provided agricultural credit, the decline in attention given to small farmers seems to have begun following the intense reform activity of 1959-63.

The size of conceded agricultural credits varied remarkably between small and medium farmers in the periods, 1964-69 and 1970-73 (Table 24). Considering ordinary and special credit programs, medium farmers were on the average conceded credits nearly six times the size of those granted to small farmers from 1964 to 1969. The declining participation of medium farmers in BAP-ICAP credit since 1969 has been explained above, but the number of small farmers also appears to have dropped--from 42,984 per year (assuming one credit per farmer) in 1964-69 to 32,317 per year in 1970-73--although the average amount per credit more than doubled. This could be an indication of increased ineligibility amongst small farmers through indebtedness, as well as abandonment of holdings and concentration of land and assets among beneficiaries.

CONSTRAINTS ON SELECTION OF AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY BY BENEFICIARIES

An analysis of BAP's credit programs according to agricultural activity (Table 25) illustrates the contrasting production patterns of small and medium farmers. One difference is the minimal involvement of small producers

Table 23

Percentage of Government Agricultural Credits (BAP, Ordinary Program) Reaching Small Farmers, by Value, Annually 1959-73

	Total Value of Credits Conceded %	Total Value of Credits Paid %
1959	25.5	34.7
1960	69.6	58.2
1961	57.9	55.6
1962	55.7	47.5
1963	55.6	50.4
1964	49.5	44.7
1965	46.3	44.7
1966	44.7	44.4
1967	39.9	38.8
1968	40.1	37.0
1969	33.8	35.9
Average 1959-69	46.0	44.0
1970	67.7	58.0
1971	61.8	63.9
1972	71.5	68.0
1973	68.8	63.1
Average 1970-73	68.0	63.1

SOURCES: Own calculations from Comisión de Evaluación y Reestructuración, Informe Final, Annexes 16 and 17, pp. 284-85.

Table 24

Average Size of Government Agricultural Credits (BAP, Ordinary and Special Programs) Conceded to Small and Medium Farmers Total 1964-69, Total 1970-73

	Amount Conceded Bs. thousand	Total Number of Credits Conceded	Average Number of Credits Conceded per Year	Average Amount per Credit Bs.
Small Farmers				
1964-69	904,259	257,904	42,984	3,506
1970-73	993,172	129,269	32,317	7,683
Medium Farmers				
1964-69	772,205	37,748	6,291	20,457
1970-73	244,831	17,647	4,412	13,874

(Table 24 continued on p. 31)

(Table 24 cont.)

Notes: (1) This table reflects ordinary credit plus special credit programs including directed credit and credit for irrigation systems, but not supervised credit. The breakdown of amount conceded is as follows (in Bs. mil.):

	Total Programs	Ordinary	Special
Small Farmers			
1964-69	904.3	569.6	334.7
1970-73	993.2	465.5	527.7
Medium Farmers			
1964-69	772.2	764.9	7.3
1970-73	244.8	219.4	25.4

(Source: Own calculations of difference between BAP Informe Anual 1973, p. 218 data and data specified as source in Table 22.)

(2) For comparison, large farmers serviced by BANDAGRO in 1973, with government funds, received an average of Bs. 77,935 per credit. See MAC, Anuario Estadístico Agropecuario 1975, p. 431.

SOURCE: Own calculations from BAP, Informe Anual 1973, p. 218.

in animal agriculture. The level of livestock and dairy production among agrarian reform beneficiaries has been stagnant or declining (Table 26). In fact, IAN had determined by 1973 that the amounts involved were so small that animal production data would no longer need to be collected and presented alongside that of crop production.[61] This suggests either an attempt to concentrate agrarian reform beneficiaries in crop production, or an admission that animal agriculture on 55.1 percent of utilized asentamiento lands (Table 19) is a commercial disaster. In any case, the trend against livestock and dairy farming in the reform subsector is contrary to the national trend--in which the value of production has risen from slightly over half to more than the value of crop production (Table 10).

Careful analysis of data from 1967 to 1975 shows that the decline in participation by the agrarian reform subsector in national production is not only evident in animal production. Data for crop production show a similar decline in participation from 32-33 percent in 1967-68 to 20 percent in 1975 (Table 27). This is important evidence of the increasing economic marginalization suffered by agrarian reform beneficiaries.

A second aspect of differing production patterns concerns crop specialization, e.g., cereals such as maize by small farmers and fibers and oils such as peanuts by medium farmers. The prominent crop category for the agrarian reform subsector, in terms of absolute value, is cereals. Its value, like that of most other categories, increased appreciably after 1973 (Table 28). In relative terms, cereals accounted for between one-third and one-half of agrarian reform crop production, by value, during the 1969-75 period. In 1975 cereals were followed in importance by the coffee-cacao-tobacco-sugar category, then by fruits, then by roots and tubers (Table 29). It appears, however, that relative to national production, cereal production

Table 25

Allocation of Government Agricultural Credits (BAP, Ordinary and Special Programs) Paid to Small and Medium Farmers, by Product Categories, 1973

	Small Farmer Bs. thousand	% of Total Crops and Livestock	Medium Farmer Bs. thousand	% of Total Crops and Livestock
Total Crop Production	174,962	81.0	43,575	67.7
Cereals	89,104	41.2	11,841	18.4
Legumes	20,481	9.5	1,293	2.0
Roots and tubers	7,635	3.5	3,048	4.7
Fibers and oils	19,062	8.8	19,312	30.0
Fruits	3,763	1.7	422	0.7
Vegetables	2,818	1.3	957	1.5
Coffee, cacao, tobacco, and sugar	32,099	14.9	6,702	10.4
Total Animal Production	41,122	19.0	20,755	32.3
Total Agricultural Production	216,084	100.0	64,330	100.0
Other Farm Investments	12,060	-	7,065	-
TOTAL	228,144	-	71,395	-

Note: For approximate relative significance of ordinary and special credit programs, see note to Table 24.

SOURCE: Own calculations from BAP, Informe Anual 1973, p. 193.

in the agrarian reform subsector has diminished, while legumes are now the most important category (Table 30). Percentage gains have been registered in roots and tubers, fruits, and coffee etc., but there were losses in fibers and oils, and vegetables.

To fully understand the opportunities and constraints responsible for these changes, it is necessary to comment on product utilization figures. Since 1960, Venezuela's agroindustries have grown considerably. By 1971, only 10.3 percent of animal products went directly to consumption at home (final consumption) while 83.7 percent now went to processing industries (intermediate consumption) (Table 31). The shift in crop production to intermediate consumption was still visible during the 1971-75 period. Intermediate consumption rose from 60.2 to 71.6 percent while final consumption dropped from 34.7 to 27.2 percent.

Table 26

Harvested Area and Value of Crop and Animal Production of the Agrarian Reform Subsector, Annually 1967-76

	Harvested Area Has.	Value of Crop Production Bs. thousand	Crop Value per Harvested Ha.	Value of Animal Production Bs. thousand
1967	517,716	523,062	1,010	76,484
1968	532,566	582,783	1,094	88,788
1969	470,425	460,460	979	85,122
1970	386,133	325,724	844	76,618
1971	394,803	346,114	877	75,600
1972	377,893	351,370	930	78,700
1973	346,198	409,813	1,184	N.A.
1974	367,609	568,545	1,547	N.A.
1975	486,836	780,187	1,603	N.A.
1976	527,858	930,836	1,763	N.A.

SOURCES: 1967-75--MAC, Anuario Estadístico Agropecuario, various years.
1976--IAN, Un Nuevo Perfil, Annex 15, p. 69.

Table 27

Percentages of National Crop and Animal Production Accounted for by Agrarian Reform Subsector, by Value, 1967-75

	Crop Production %	Animal Production %
1967	32.0	6.0
1968	33.2	5.4
1969	24.0	4.6
1970	16.1	4.0
1971	16.8	3.5
1972	17.7	3.4
1973	16.9	N.A.
1974	19.4	N.A.
1975	20.0	N.A.

Note: This table agrees in large measure with percentages given in Table 30, but the correspondence is not exact. The advantage of the above calculations is their longer time period, permitting clearer examination of trends.

SOURCE: Own calculations from data in Tables 10 and 26.

Table 28

Value of Crop and Animal Production by Product Categories of the Agrarian Reform Subsector, Annually 1969-75

	Bs. million						
	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Total Crop Production	460	326	336	372	391	521	915
Cereals	173	155	155	165	144	194	304
Legumes	9	6	9	8	9	35	67
Roots and tubers	66	18	15	31	33	52	128
Fibers and oils	63	45	41	35	41	47	64
Fruits	49	32	31	62	79	78	155
Vegetables	62	9	8	12	20	15	25
Coffee, cacao, tobacco, and sugar	38	61	77	59	65	100	172
Total Animal Production	85	76	77	79	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Milk	19	35	36	45	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Cattle	29	14	15	13	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Pigs	9	6	8	7	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Poultry	7	4	3	4	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Eggs	19	13	11	4	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Cheese and butter	2	4	4	6	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Total Agricultural Production	545	402	413	451	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

Note: Calculated in current prices at the level of the producer. Data for total crops and total livestock/dairy should agree with those in Table 26, but there are discrepancies. Notably, crop production totals for 1971-73 in the BCV, Informe Económico 1975, do not equal the sum of their constituent parts.

SOURCE: BCV, Informe Económico 1973, 1974, Tables numbered A-IV-15; 1975, Table A-IV-16.

Most small farmers lack the advanced technology and financial resources to purchase all the necessary inputs. Thus they usually cannot supply products to agroindustry for intermediate consumption; if they attempt to do so, they may fail both to meet production standards or to provide large enough shipments. Besides lacking any historical experience with livestock, most small farmers are, by virtue of their geographic dispersal, more likely to concentrate on crops since a greater proportion of crop production passes directly to consumers than occurs with animal production.

A more detailed examination of crop and animal categories for 1975 is presented in Table 32. Among animal product categories, only eggs are produced for final consumption. Among crop categories, legumes, roots and tubers, fruits, and vegetables are produced for final consumption at home.

Table 29

Value of Crop Production by Product Categories of the Agrarian Reform Subsector as Percentages of the Crop Production of the Agrarian Reform Subsector, Annually 1969-75

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Total Crop Production	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Cereals	37.6	47.5	46.1	44.4	36.8	37.2	33.2
Legumes	2.0	1.8	2.7	2.2	2.3	6.7	7.3
Roots and tubers	14.3	5.5	4.5	8.3	8.4	10.0	14.0
Fibers and oils	13.7	13.8	12.2	9.4	10.5	9.0	7.0
Fruits	10.7	9.8	9.2	16.7	20.2	15.0	16.9
Vegetables	13.5	2.8	2.4	3.2	5.1	2.9	2.7
Coffee, cacao, tobacco, and sugar	8.3	18.7	22.9	15.9	16.6	19.2	18.8

SOURCE: Own calculations from Table 28.

Table 30

Value of Production of the Agrarian Reform Subsector by Product Categories as Percentages of National Crop and Animal Production, Annually 1969-75

	Percentages						
	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Total Crop Production	23.8	15.8	17.1	18.0	16.7	17.7	23.4
Cereals	43.0	37.5	44.0	46.5	40.8	35.4	36.1
Legumes	16.7	10.9	16.1	17.8	18.8	35.0	58.3
Roots and tubers	23.4	7.9	6.2	11.7	10.7	15.9	26.4
Fibers and oils	31.2	17.3	17.2	16.4	16.8	12.6	14.7
Fruits	14.1	8.9	7.9	15.7	16.5	14.3	24.1
Vegetables	56.9	6.3	8.0	7.7	13.0	7.1	10.6
Coffee, cacao, tobacco, and sugar	7.0	10.1	12.3	10.4	7.9	11.9	14.9
Total Animal Production	4.6	3.9	3.8	3.5	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Milk	3.8	6.1	6.0	6.5	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Cattle	4.5	2.2	2.4	1.8	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Pigs	3.8	2.5	3.2	2.8	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Poultry	3.3	1.7	1.2	1.3	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Eggs	7.7	5.7	3.7	1.3	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Cheese and butter	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

Note: Calculated in current prices at the level of the producer, with agrarian reform production as in Table 28.

SOURCE: BCV, Informe Económico 1973, 1974, Tables numbered A-IV-15; 1975, Table A-IV-16.

Table 31

Percentage Contribution of Intermediate and Final Consumption to the Utilization of Agricultural Products, by Value, Annually 1971-75

	Intermediate Consumption %	Final Consumption %	On-Farm Subsistence Consumption %	Gross Capital Formation and Exports %
Total Crop Products				
1971	60.2	34.7	0.9	4.2
1972	61.0	34.9	0.8	3.3
1973	71.7	26.1	0.6	1.6
1974	67.8	27.8	0.7	3.7
1975	71.6	27.2	0.6	0.6
Total Animal Products				
1971	83.7	10.3	2.8	3.2
1972	82.3	9.4	2.9	5.4
1973	86.6	8.2	2.9	2.3
1974	75.9	12.5	2.8	8.8
1975	82.4	7.8	2.8	7.0

Notes: (1) All amounts are calculated in current prices at the level of producer.

(2) The absolute figures for "total utilization" in this table are equal to the absolute figures for supply of agricultural products in Table 12.

SOURCE: Own calculations from BCV, Informe Económico 1975, Tables A-IV-19/23.

Fibers and oils are utilized exclusively for intermediate consumption, as are most of the coffee, etc., category. Though the agrarian reform subsector has been shown to include small numbers of medium farmers as well as small farmers, it is instructive to compare Table 32 with 1975 data in Table 30. Legumes appear to be the dominant crop category for the agrarian reform subsector. Besides their suitability to final consumption, legumes (notably caraotas and frijoles) are also the major protein source in the traditional campesino diet. Roots and tubers (especially cassava) and fruits (especially plantain) follow a similar production pattern, and not surprisingly cassava and plantain are the two carbohydrate sources most widely consumed by campesinos.

Vegetables, previously a major specialization of the agrarian reform subsector, have recently attracted the attention of certain nonreform medium farmers having access to irrigation facilities and market connections

Table 32

Percentage Contribution of Intermediate and Final Consumption to the Utilization of Agricultur l Products, by Product Categories in Terms of Value, 1975

	Intermediate Consumption %	Final Household Consumption %	On-Farm Subsistence Consumption %	Gross Capital Formation and Exports %
Total Crop Products	71.6	27.2	0.6	0.6
Cereals	97.8	0	0.5	1.7
Legumes	3.7	87.7	8.2	0.4
Roots and tubers	11.7	87.5	0.6	0.2
Fibers and oils	101.9	0	0	-1.9
Fruits	7.2	90.5	0.5	1.8
Vegetables	1.2	95.9	0	2.9
Coffee, cacao, tobacco, and sugar	90.1	10.4	0.1	-0.6
Total Animal Products	82.4	7.8	2.8	7.0
Milk	97.9	0	2.0	0.1
Meat and poultry	84.8	1.4	2.8	11.0
Eggs	24.5	71.0	4.3	0.2

Notes: (1) All amounts are calculated in current prices at the level of producer.

(2) This table provides a more detailed understanding of the 1975 data in Table 31.

SOURCE: Own calculations from BCV, Informe Económico 1975, Table A-IV-23.

that permit the operation of restrictive practices.[62] Vegetable production in the reform subsector, however, has not again reached the high level it held in 1969. Within the coffee, etc., category, the agrarian reform subsector produces the greatest amount--relative to other subsectors--in sugar cane and the least in tobacco; coffee and cacao remain traditional crops for many small agrarian reform beneficiaries, though their participation in the market has decreased. Although they remain quite suitable for small-farm production and local, low-technology processing, all four of these crops have become attractive to larger farmers due to the installation of centralized and sophisticated processing plants by the increasingly concentrated agroindustries. With the rapid adoption by many medium farmers of improved seed varieties, their accompanying agricultural investments, plus agroindustry involvement in the rapidly growing preparation and usage of maize in animal feed concentrates, the agrarian reform subsector has taken a backseat in national cereal production, though it continues to be the principal income-earning activity of agrarian reform beneficiaries. Except in specific campesino economic organizations (discussed later), small farmer

beneficiaries generally do not have access to this new technology. Most agrarian reform farmers in national cereal production participate in maize production and a somewhat smaller number raise rice and sorghum.

Selection of specific crops by agrarian reform beneficiaries is determined--among other things--by tradition, adequate growing conditions, credit facilities, access to appropriate input and product markets, and prices in those markets. Beneficiaries interviewed in 1976 declared their principal crops to be among the following, in order of overall importance: maize, cassava, caraota, frijol, coffee, ocumo (a root), plantain, banana, cacao, and rice (Table 33). The number of items on this list that serve, or can serve,

Table 33

Percentages of Beneficiaries Interviewed in 1976
Who Specified One of the Following as Their Principal Crop

	%		%
Maize	45.1	Ocumo	6.9
Cassava	17.2	Plantain	6.5
Caraota	10.5	Banana	5.8
Frijol	8.3	Cacao	4.9
Coffee	7.4	Rice	4.2

SOURCE: IAN, Inventario Nacional de Tierras, vol. 3, Table III-15, p. 29.

subsistence purposes is large, suggesting that traditional, subsistence-oriented production patterns may not have changed for many agrarian reform beneficiaries. Estimates of the relation between agrarian reform and national production of these crops, averaged over 1974 and 1975, show that agrarian reform subsector participation was less than 50 percent except in frijol and caraota (Table 34). For the seven most important crops in Table 33, agrarian reform beneficiaries tended to achieve higher yields per harvested hectare than the national average. This implies the generalized use within the agrarian reform subsector of a land- and labor-intensive technology.

Credit facilities partially determine selection of agricultural activity by agrarian reform beneficiaries. This takes place at the time credit is solicited from BAP-ICAP (or IAN, in the case of campesino economic organizations after 1976), since credits are made available only for certain crop and livestock activities, depending on demand-supply estimates worked out within MAC.

Table 34

Percentages of National Area Harvested, Production, and Yield Accounted for by the Agrarian Reform Subsector, Average 1974-75

	Area Harvested %	Production %	Yield %
Maize	37.5	44.4	118.9
Cassava	38.3	39.0	102.1
Caraota	33.2	53.4	157.2
Frijol	64.0	66.6	104.1
Coffee	9.3	11.6	125.7
Ocumo	31.0	39.0	125.9
Plantain	25.4	31.2	122.3
Banana	26.9	11.0	40.8
Cacao	19.1	14.9	77.8
Rice	34.6	24.5	70.9

SOURCES: Own calculations from: national data--MAC, Anuario Estadístico Agropecuario 1975; agrarian reform subsector--IAN, Memoria y Cuenta, 1974, 1975.

ADVERSE EFFECTS OF REGULATED PRICES FOR BENEFICIARIES

Since early 1974, there has appeared to be no correlation between relative increases in producer prices and whether or not crop production is dominated by medium and large farmers or by small farmers. There may be other variables not examined here--such as comparisons between absolute producer price levels and input costs--which would show medium and large farmers dominating production of the most profitable crops. Nevertheless, some important conclusions can be drawn from recent government programs regulating agricultural prices.

Supposedly with the aim of assisting small farmers, the government has fixed minimum producer prices for nineteen crop and four animal products, mainly since June 1974. Of the ten most common agrarian reform crops (Table 33), only cassava and ocumo remain without minimum producer prices. Due to the poor credit situation (and perhaps habit) of many agrarian reform beneficiaries, harvests are sometimes sold to intermediaries at lower than minimum prices in exchange for credit.[63] A small farmer trying to sell at more than the minimum price (or even at the minimum price in situations dominated by intermediaries) can be undersold by other small farmers more desperate to secure credit. In this way a fixed minimum price takes on the function of a maximum price.

This occurs also with certain agrarian reform beneficiaries who have received favorable public agency credit. Rather than deliver their produce to the Corporación de Mercadeo Agrícola (CMA) which is a condition of their loans--and receive fixed minimum prices from which their loans are repaid--

these individuals sell at lower prices to intermediaries and then report to the credit agency that their harvests were ruined. Aside from evading the responsibility for repaying credit, this action may be caused by a need for immediate cash income and a corresponding unwillingness to wait one or two months before the CMA has completed its paperwork.

The government also set maximum consumer prices for a number of basic agricultural products in September 1974. Designed to meet the needs of urban workers, and by extension urban industrialists, these prices fix cost-price margins for many agricultural products.[64] This means that, under normal supply conditions, no marketing outlet or agroindustry using good economic sense would buy these products from farmers who sell at prices above the official minimum producer prices.

While all farmers would doubtless be pleased to receive higher prices for their products, capital-intensive large and medium farmers are least affected. Unlike labor-intensive small farmers (the majority of agrarian reform beneficiaries), they are able to partly compensate the effect of these prices on income by producing more in absolute terms and pursuing economies of scale. In contrast to labor-intensive small farmers, therefore, capital-intensive large and medium farmers benefit from these government interventions. This situation is now compounded by the massive operations of CMA, the government marketing agency. Moreover, given the preponderance within Venezuela's political system of single-interest pressure groups, these measures have become the principal focus of dozens of producers' associations that wish to raise the regulated producer and consumer prices affecting their commodities.[65]

A temporary but major change in pricing policy occurred with the introduction of Decree 2126 on 18 April 1977, which permitted for a maximum of ninety days the duty-free importation of twenty-seven basic food products to overcome widespread shortages at the retail level. With minor changes, this was extended for two subsequent ninety-day periods. Critics charged that this constituted an admission of failure in the government's entire agricultural program, which had been based on the orthodox objective of import substitution. The government has responded by pointing to the inability of agriculture to cope with a phenomenal rise in effective demand per capita, a situation which at the same time signifies a measure of success in the nation's overall development program.[66] Agricultural producers, including agrarian reform farmers, are promised minimum producer prices for whatever quantities of the affected products they can deliver to the CMA--but this in turn reinforces the adverse effects of minimum producer prices for most agrarian reform beneficiaries. Both fixed pricing and the temporary suspension of duties on key agricultural imports demonstrate that the government is more interested in meeting urban and industrial demands to control the cost of living than in providing price incentives to domestic agricultural production.

ADJUSTMENTS TO CAPITAL POLICY SINCE 1974

Perhaps the most spectacular action affecting agriculture thus far taken by the government of President Pérez was the creation of the Fondo

de Crédito Agropecuario by Decree 128 of 3 June 1974. Stressing the importance of agriculture on national development and the unprecedented inflow to the national treasury of petroleum revenues--also politically appropriate after the widely acknowledged agricultural crisis under the preceding COPEI government of President Rafael Caldera--the new government set up a fund of Bs. 2,000 million for agricultural credit, to be administered by BAP-ICAP, BANDAGRO, and private financial institutions. No single credit was to exceed Bs. 1 million, and no less than half of the fund could be granted in credits of less than Bs. 0.5 million per agricultural operation.

The disbursement of these funds--equivalent to the credit received by small farmers for the entire period, 1964-73 (Table 24)--was handled fairly rapidly; data as of 20 November 1975 are presented in Table 35. The states

Table 35

Disbursement of Agricultural Credits from the Fondo de Crédito Agropecuario to 20 November 1975, by Number and Size of Credits and by Disbursing Institutions

	Number of Credits	%	Amount of Credits Bs. thousand	%
Credits of less than Bs. 500,000	3,094	75	856,238	51
Credits of more than Bs. 500,000	1,056	25	820,286	49
Total	4,150	100	1,676,524	100
Public Institutions	2,052	49	660,355	39
--BANDAGRO	1,243	30	549,354	33
--BAP	809	19	111,001	6
Private Institutions	2,098	51	1,016,169	61
Total	4,150	100	1,676,524	100

SOURCE: Fondo de Crédito Agropecuario, Relación de Créditos Aprobados, Acta No. 105 de 20 de Noviembre de 1975. Reprinted in Armando Martel, La Agricultura, pp. 29, 30.

of Zulia, Barinas, and Portuguesa were especially favored, as was animal agriculture which received approximately 70 percent of the credits compared to 30 percent for crops.[67] Only Bs. 660 million was handled by state

agencies,[68] and only Bs. 111 million by BAP-ICAP, the agency oriented to small and medium farmers; the remainder was disbursed through private financial institutions. Small farmers and virtually the entire agrarian reform sector were completely omitted, as credits were made available with neither investment norms nor planning for regional or sectoral distribution.[69]

Similar results almost certainly occurred after Decree 1242 (29 October 1975)--which required private commercial banks to set 20 percent of their portfolio at the service of agriculture in a four-stage process to be completed by 31 March 1977. Evidently, the government saw this as a means of maintaining the flow of credit funds to existing recipients of the Fondo de Crédito Agropecuario without further treasury disbursements. Martel has noted that Decree 1242 is devoid of guidelines as to sector, product, or regional distribution--and that it makes almost complete the transfer of agricultural credit facilities to private or semiprivate institutions which automatically favor service and agroindustries, large commercial farmers, and farming operations of their own subsidiaries.[70]

In response to the indebtedness of many agrarian reform beneficiaries, and their subsequent ineligibility for agricultural credit, the Ley de Remisión, Reconversión y Consolidación de la Deuda de los Productores Agropecuarios (29 June 1974) was enacted with the intent of canceling outstanding campesino debts through public and semipublic agencies. This was specified to include debts of all small- and medium-scale farmers (defined as having a gross annual income of under Bs. 150,000) whether functioning as individual producers or as members of cooperative organizations or campesino economic organizations. In addition, the law provided for campesino debts with individuals or private agencies to be assumed by the State, as represented by IAN. Also, debts of large farmers (defined as having a gross annual income of over Bs. 150,000) with public and semipublic agencies could be consolidated under favorable terms. By the end of 1975, Bs. 299.1 million of campesino private debts had been transferred to IAN and Bs. 214.2 million of debts had been consolidated.[71]

The total amount of campesino debts canceled by the end of 1975 was Bs. 1,677.1 million. This enabled many agrarian reform beneficiaries to borrow once again.[72] The effects of the law were short-lived, however, and campesinos soon returned to a state of indebtedness. A rethinking of agricultural credit policy took place when BAP was replaced by its successor agency ICAP on 13 May 1975. A system followed which furnished credit to agrarian reform beneficiaries along with technical assistance. Organized beneficiary groups, such as uniones de prestatarios which had come into existence since 1964 and had been under directed credit programs since 1966, became the focus of activity. Increasing interaction between IAN and ICAP regarding integrated credit was formalized in Decree 1426 (3 March 1976), resulting in IAN's processing and supervising credit applications from campesino economic organizations in ICAP's behalf for a trial period of two years.

In addition, BAP-ICAP has begun to require that agrarian reform beneficiaries produce a chattel mortgage (prenda agraria) when applying for credit. This document provides for movable goods belonging to the individual or collective to be used as a guarantee of loan repayment, and

coincidentally confirms the property rights of that individual or collective. Ironically, in view of the chaos accompanying possession of property titles, the distribution of short-, medium-, and long-term prendas agrarias has been characterized by government sources as a new means of benefiting campesinos, equal in effectiveness to the now-paralyzed distribution of land.[73] According to IAN's statistics,[74] however, 45,798 families (less than one-third of all reform beneficiaries) received prendas agrarias in 1975. There is evidence that beneficiaries with medium-sized holdings have been favored: data for two years ending May 1976 indicate that individuals receiving short- and medium-term authorizations had an average holding size of 9.7 hectares, yet those receiving long-term authorizations had 48.6 hectares.[75] From a search of public documents and from interviews with IAN and ICAP personnel in Lara State, this writer has not encountered a single case in which the movable goods specified in a prenda agraria were embargoed following loan delinquency. As a bureaucratic procedure designed to improve BAP-ICAP's loan recoupment rate--thereby promoting efficient utilization of credit by beneficiaries--the prenda agraria fails and manages to obscure still further official channels for assisting agrarian reform campesinos.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CAMPESINO ORGANIZATION

This research uncovered little evaluative data on technical assistance or campesino organization. Several institutions besides IAN are involved in the overall program (see Table 7), at least seven companies or foundations (e.g., FUDECO in Lara State), with a total of 152 technical personnel having contracts with IAN for providing technical assistance in specific geographical areas.[76] Attention is presently focused on those agrarian reform beneficiaries who have formed campesino economic organizations (organizaciones económicas campesinas), although prior to 1974, individual participants in certain crop-oriented programs such as coffee, sugar cane, cotton, and tree-fruits may have benefited equally. Moreover, certain special credit programs for irrigation works and supervised credit programs previously included technical assistance, and MAC technicians have generally attended to disease and environmental problems as in the widespread destruction caused by the rice rat in 1976.

The intent of the Agrarian Reform Law, to provide technical assistance to every beneficiary, has not been honored, however, since the Law was passed. Of the beneficiaries interviewed in an IAN study in 1976, only 18.6 percent indicated having received technical assistance from IAN, 9.3 percent from other government agencies, and 1.3 percent privately; 85,716 or 70.8 percent declared that they had received no technical assistance.[77]

Some reasons for this situation have been presented above: lack of sufficient government funds for IAN and other agencies; poor coordination of technical assistance with agricultural credit; slow and inadequate titling procedures; and instability of illegally occupied asentamientos. In the early years of the reform, lack of trained manpower was a factor as well, but recently agricultural professionals have left government service to work directly for large commercial operations or to become commercial

farmers themselves (some of them as agrarian reform beneficiaries). Those professionals employed by MAC, IAN, and BAP at the end of 1974 are enumerated in Table 9.

Most IAN field staff are now assigned to campesino economic organizations, which include uniones de prestatarios and empresas campesinas. Other organizational forms which focused on production--uniones de usuarios, uniones de productores, unidades de producción, cooperativas de productores, unidades de servicio, centros de mecanización, and centros agrarios[78]--never were widespread and have faded into near obscurity. The centro agrario, the major organizational unit specified in the Agrarian Reform Law, was intended to be all-embracing, to serve beneficiaries of each asentamiento, and promote their integrated development. But it proved too legalistic and confusing to beneficiaries, and was largely abandoned by 1974.

A look at the formative years of the two prevailing organizations reveals that most early uniones de prestatarios were organized in connection with BAP's program of directed credit beginning in 1966. Empresas campesinas may have begun with the reform in 1960 but were generally considered exceptions to the rule. The 100 or more empresas campesinas established in the first decade of the reform tended to be located on asentamientos where land use was dominated by coffee, cacao, or sugar cane--crops traditionally grown on an extensive land area with large manpower requirements and on-farm processing facilities.[79] Credit was supplied under BAP's ordinary program, hence the lack of early time-series data on these organizations; in addition, a very small number of empresas campesinas may have been ideologically oriented, placing a higher value on noneconomic than economic goals.

Uniones de prestatarios and empresas campesinas together numbered 1,124 organizations with 40,759 member families and a total of 510,113 hectares in 1976. This means that 27 percent of all agrarian reform beneficiaries were involved in campesino economic organizations in that year. Basic data for these organizations are presented in Tables 36 and 37. Although both empresas campesinas and uniones de prestatarios receive their agricultural credit and technical assistance (if any) collectively, most other agricultural operations are performed collectively in the former and individually in the latter. In most cases, the members of empresas campesinas (i.e., socios) hold a collective title to their land, while prestatarios maintain titles to their individual parcels, although occasionally prestatarios begin to function, receiving credit and technical assistance before IAN has acquired the lands and distributed titles.

Credits granted to all campesino economic organizations in 1976 amounted to Bs. 683.9 million, about three times the corresponding amount for 1974 and four times that for 1973. When the Fondo de Crédito Agropecuario was created in 1974, campesino economic organizations received Bs. 194.3 million--indicating a possible ratio of ten to one between the total value of large and medium farmer credit on the one hand and small farmer credit on the other. New credit programs and funding sources since 1973 make further comparison, either within the agrarian reform subsector or between subsectors, difficult and beyond the scope of this paper.

Table 36

Basic Data on Uniones de Prestatarios, Annually 1964-76

	Number of Uniones de Prestatarios	Number of Prestatarios	Total Hectares Involved	Total Programmed Credit Bs. thousand
1964	1	77	474	181
1965	2	176	599	420
1966	40	2,261	12,373	5,924
1967	109	5,249	39,775	18,579
1968	134	6,919	45,615	31,200
1969	160	7,959	66,112	37,698
1970	257	13,172	124,789	80,482
1971	369	18,576	216,447	117,477
1972	451	20,869	215,748	124,225
1973	463	19,327	213,267	157,425
1974	554	21,502	247,577	174,937
1975	708	27,752	325,096	339,165
1976	801	32,656	398,282	522,233

SOURCE: IAN, Organizaciones Económicas Campesinas Programación Creditícia 1976-77, vol. 1, pp. 1-2.

Table 37

Basic Data on Empresas Campesinas, Annually 1973-76

	Number of Empresas Campesinas	Number of Socios	Total Hectares Involved	Total Programmed Credit Bs. thousand
1973	99	2,477	22,537	13,368
1974	121	3,317	33,011	19,333
1975	162	4,683	59,289	60,844
1976	323	8,103	111,831	161,688

SOURCE: IAN-CIARA, El Minifundio en Venezuela, Annex 6.

Although uniones de prestatarios had traditionally been favored by IAN and BAP-ICAP, a shift in emphasis occurred in 1974. The rates of growth in number of empresas campesinas and number of socios have recently risen more rapidly than corresponding figures for uniones de prestatarios. Empresas campesinas have become relatively larger physical units (though in absolute terms uniones de prestatarios are still bigger), with a larger number of cultivated hectares per member (Table 38). They have also received a

Table 38

Average Size and Credit Changes
Among Uniones de Prestatarios and Empresas Campesinas, Annually 1973-76

Averages	Unión de Prestatarios				Empresa Campesina				Total			
	73	74	75	76	73	74	75	76	73	74	75	76
Members per organization	41.7	38.8	39.2	40.8	25.0	27.4	28.9	25.1	38.8	36.8	37.3	36.3
Cultivated hectares per organization	460.6	446.9	459.2	497.2	227.6	272.8	366.0	346.2	419.6	415.7	441.8	453.8
Cultivated hectares per member	11.0	11.5	11.7	12.2	9.1	10.0	12.7	13.8	10.8	11.3	11.9	12.5
Credit per organization (Bs. thousand)	340.0	315.8	479.0	652.0	135.0	159.8	375.6	500.5	303.9	287.8	459.8	608.5
Amount of credit per member (Bs. thousand)	8.1	8.1	12.2	16.0	5.4	5.8	13.0	20.0	7.8	7.8	12.3	16.8

SOURCE: Own calculations from Tables 36, 37.

greater amount of credit per member (though in absolute terms uniones de prestatarios still receive more). New empresas campesinas have tended to be organized by IAN promotion personnel, with efforts being undertaken to persuade members of uniones de prestatarios to convert their organizations into empresas campesinas. IAN has become convinced that, more than any other organizational form, empresas campesinas are capable of providing beneficiaries with annual family incomes of between Bs. 15,000 and Bs. 25,000, the equivalent of income earned by unskilled and semiskilled urban workers.[80] Converted into monthly amounts, family incomes of between Bs. 1,250 and Bs. 2,083 rank highly among incomes of all agrarian reform beneficiaries (see Table 39).

This shift in emphasis toward empresas campesinas stands in contrast to the principal thrust of the reform to date. Schuster[81] has indicated that IAN, the principal agrarian reform agency, expected the Agrarian Reform Law to gradually convert traditional, subsistence-oriented campesinos into commercial, independent producers. To Franco García[82] the agrarian reform embodied the ideal of maintaining and strengthening family property, and was identified with the needs of a representative, democratic political system. But like production cooperatives or group farms in practically every country where agriculture is characterized by independent, individual producers, Venezuela's empresas campesinas suffer many shortcomings.

In 1974 IAN and the FCV initiated a program of mixed, public-private service and agroindustrial companies intended to assist beneficiaries in certain designated areas with modern agricultural technology. This program provides that the public sector contribute more than 50 percent of needed capital, but that both public and private sector involvement be temporary--until campesinos have been trained to take over. Twenty-five mixed service companies (empresas mixtas de servicio), concentrating on (1) agricultural mechanization, (2) supply of agricultural inputs, and (3) storage and transportation of agricultural products, were operational by February 1977.[83] Mixed agroindustrial companies (empresas mixtas de producción agroindustrial), of which there were nineteen by February 1977, are intended to provide vertical integration between peasant producers and intermediate or final consumers, often in some particular commodity. The Fifth National Plan (1976-80) foresees these organizations--together with the campesino economic organizations--as the basis of larger campesino-oriented economic units known as grandes complejos productivos, agropecuarios, agroindustriales y de servicios.[84]

The great need for concerted action in reaching agrarian reform beneficiaries with modern technology is evident from a 1976 study by IAN.[85] Only 26.3 percent of beneficiaries reported using agricultural machinery,[86] 28.5 percent certified seed, 27.9 percent insecticides, 23.1 percent fertilizers, 18.8 percent herbicides, 18.1 percent fungicides, and 5 percent irrigation; 51.4 percent or 64,200 beneficiaries declared they used none of these inputs.

Table 39

Distribution According to Monthly Family Income:
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries, 1966, 1975; National Urban Population, 1970

1966 Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries: Net Family Income		1975 Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries: Gross Family Income		1970 National Urban Population: Gross Family Income	
Size Intervals Bs.	% Families	Size Intervals Bs.	% Families	Size Intervals Bs.	% Families
Below -83	3.54	0	11.94	0-300	10.7
-84 to -1	3.70	1-100	10.98	301-500	12.4
0	0.16	101-200	11.31	501-1000	30.4
1 to 83	18.44	201-300	10.57	1001-1500	17.1
84 to 166	22.35	301-500	16.55	1501-2000	9.6
167 to 250	15.90	501-1000	20.47	2001-2500	6.1
251 to 333	9.61	1001-2000	10.59	2501-3000	3.4
334 to 416	6.92	Over 2000	7.59	3001-4000	4.7
417 to 833	12.73		100.00	4001-5000	2.4
Over 833	5.65			Over 5000	3.2
	99.00				100.0

Notes: (1) 1966 data, drawn from 1,893 beneficiaries, include gross off-farm income, the market value of subsistence production, and the net income of marketed agricultural production.
(2) 1975 data, drawn from 124,416 beneficiaries, refer to gross family income from all sources.

SOURCES: 1966--CENDES-CIDA, Datos Económicos de los Beneficiarios, Table I-24. 1975--IAN, Inventario Nacional de Tierras, vol. 3, Table III-12. 1970--Banco Nacional de Ahorro y Préstamo, MERCAVI 70, summarized in Hector Valecillos T., "Consideraciones en Torno," p. 9.

OUTLINES OF RECENT LABOR POLICY

A universal minimum wage of Bs. 15 per day was set by Decrees 122 and 123 of 4 June 1974 and has remained unchanged since that time. On 1 February 1974, the COPEI government of President Caldera passed labor legislation, the Reglamento de la Ley de Trabajo, which bestowed on rural workers the same rights as enjoyed by their urban counterparts: fringe benefits, vacations, overtime pay, and disability compensation. Yet the new regulations continued to exclude the great majority of farm workers who work for less than one month, or even less than one week, for the same employer.[87] Among these farm workers are campesinos thus far unaffected by the agrarian reform, illegal Colombian migrant workers, and agrarian reform beneficiaries seeking off-farm employment. Efforts by the FCV to have the legislation extended to these groups have so far met with no success. A similar struggle is taking place regarding social security; government action is being sought by the FCV in response to the recommendations of a Presidential Commission in January 1977 that social security be made available to all agricultural workers.[88]

Agrarian reform beneficiaries include both employers and employees. In response to a question regarding labor use on their parcels, some 40.9 percent of beneficiaries interviewed in 1976 reported regular use of wage-laborers on their holdings; 20 percent reported regularly employing four or more wage-laborers.[89] These percentages are higher than one would expect from previous comments about beneficiaries. Interviewees may have included family members in their definition of wage-laborer. It is not known to what extent either campesinos thus far unaffected by the reform or beneficiaries (i.e., family heads) themselves might contribute to this supply of wage-labor. Nor is it known to what extent agrarian reform beneficiaries obtain full-time, off-farm employment and hire wage-laborers to work their holdings.

One hypothesis that cannot be tested with available data is that the agrarian reform has acted to provide an ideal labor supply for the small but growing subsectors of medium and large commercial farming. By the mid-1960s, the reform had sufficiently removed the immediate source of campesino unrest and violence to restore peace in the countryside. Even in 1977, campesino families eligible but untouched by the reform still number 150,000 --enough, with those families of beneficiaries forced by lack of resources to seek off-farm employment, to meet most labor needs of large and medium commercial farmers. Supplemented where necessary by legal and illegal Colombian migrant workers, the agricultural labor supply always tends to be in excess of demand, enabling large and medium commercial farmers to employ temporary wage-labor (jornaleros) rather than a permanent skilled or semiskilled labor force of obreros agrícolas. Where circumstances have permitted these farmers to capitalize more thoroughly their operations, wage-laborers can be expected to seek work on other farms, migrate to the cities, or revert to a subsistence livelihood on agrarian reform minifundia or illegally occupied marginal lands. It is also rumored that medium and large commercial farmers attempt to influence government agencies to neglect key improvements to asentamientos campesinos so as to perpetuate the need for local campesinos to seek off-farm employment.[90]

INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFICIARIES

Perhaps nothing reveals the marginalization of most agrarian reform beneficiaries better than the available income distribution statistics.

Two widely regarded studies provide estimates for the entire Venezuelan population.[91] For the late 1950s and 1960s, Adelman and Morris estimated the amount of national income received by the poorest 40 percent of the population to be 13.4 percent, 39.5 percent by the middle 40 percent, and 47.1 percent by the richest 20 percent. For the late 1960s and early 1970s, Ahluwalia's estimates show that these same income groups received, respectively, 7.9 percent, 27.1 percent, and 65 percent of pretax national income. This concentration of income at the national level suggests that marginalized groups experience considerable deprivation when compared to the majority of the population.

Collection of income distribution data in Venezuela has been infrequent and urban-oriented, and the two studies that refer to agrarian reform beneficiaries utilized different concepts of income and different class intervals for presenting their results. These data are presented in Table 39 with notes encouraging caution in interpretation. Unlike the Adelman-Morris and Ahluwalia data, they report percentages of interviewees declaring annual family income (assuming approximately six persons per familu) within specified class intervals. The overwhelming impression is that most agrarian reform beneficiaries (recorded in 1966 and 1975) earn very little, especially when compared to urban dwellers in the MERCAVI 70 study. This latter study defined monthly family incomes of less than Bs. 500 as economically marginal. Although costs of living are lower in rural areas for certain expenditures such as housing, these are at least partly compensated by heavier expenditures on urban-provided goods and services. Taking into account five years of currency depreciation between the 1970 and 1975 data, the percentage of families earning less than Bs. 500 monthly is 23.1 percent for urban areas and 61.4 percent for agrarian reform beneficiaries.

With the minimum wage still at Bs. 15 per day or about Bs. 375 per month, as many as 11.9 percent of agrarian reform beneficiaries interviewed in 1976 reported receiving no gross family income whatever. In the same study, no less than 25.2 percent of beneficiaries reported gross production at zero and 65.2 percent reported zero gross family income from off-farm sources (Table 40). In the CENDES-CIDA study of 1966, the percentages of beneficiaries declaring zero gross family income from either on-farm or off-farm production were 4.2 percent and 37.7 percent, respectively (Table 41). This indicates a decline in the numbers of beneficiaries gaining income from off-farm activities, and an increase in the numbers of beneficiaries gaining zero income from on-farm agricultural production--a dramatic indicator of increasing marginalization. Small numbers of beneficiaries in 1975 earned what would be classified as "middle" incomes (over Bs. 1,000 per month) in the MERCAVI 70 urban study, and comparisons with the 1966 data show that the number of income earners perhaps doubled as a proportion of all beneficiaries. Income concentration within the agrarian reform subsector is apparently part of the general pattern of marginalization.

Table 40

Distribution of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Reporting Gross Monthly Family Income, by Source, 1975

Size Intervals Bs.	% Families Reporting On-Farm Income	% Families Reporting Off-Farm Income
0	25.18	64.99
1-100	14.94	5.75
101-200	11.77	4.81
201-300	9.36	4.57
301-500	12.47	7.64
501-1000	13.12	8.01
1001-2000	6.96	3.09
Over 2000	6.20	1.14
	100.00	100.00

Note: The percentages are based on 119,311 responses for on-farm production and 123,573 for off-farm production. Although not specified, it is assumed that on-farm income does not include domestic manufacturing activities.

SOURCE: IAN, Inventario Nacional de Tierras, vol. 3, Tables III-10, III-11.

Table 41

Summarized Distributions of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Reporting Gross Monthly Family Income, by Source, 1966, 1975

Size Intervals Bs.	1966 % Families Reporting Income	Size Intervals Bs.	1975 % Families Reporting Income
	ON-FARM INCOME		
0	4.23	0	25.18
1-250	65.65	1-300	36.07
251-833	23.62	301-1000	25.59
Over 833	6.50	Over 1000	13.16
	100.00		100.00
	OFF-FARM INCOME		
0	37.72	0	64.99
1-250	49.07	1-300	15.13
251-833	11.31	301-1000	15.65
Over 833	1.90	Over 1000	4.23
	100.00		100.0

(Table 41 cont. on p. 52)

(Table 41 cont.)

Notes: (1) 1966 data are drawn from 1,893 beneficiaries.
(2) See note to Table 40.

SOURCES: 1966 data--CENDES-CIDA, Datos Económicos de los Beneficiarios, vol. 4, Tables I-30, I-43 (N = 1893). 1975 data--IAN, Inventario Nacional de Tierras, vol. 3, Table III-10.

In the absence of before and after data on the real incomes of agrarian reform beneficiaries, it is not possible to conclude whether reform has brought about absolute changes in their real income. Postreform data for beneficiaries and data for the entire Venezuelan population do, however, suggest a decline in the real income of beneficiaries relative to the rest of society.

Direct indications of social and political marginalization are provided by a 1976 study of agrarian reform beneficiaries.[92] Of those interviewed, 47.1 percent reported they were over forty-five years old, 51 percent declared themselves illiterate, and 59.9 percent declared they lived in ranchos (i.e., inadequate accommodation). Some 51.5 percent of beneficiaries reported that they did not belong to a labor union (sindicato or liga) and 31.1 percent reported not belonging to any campesino organization whatever. These findings do not necessarily characterize any particular group of beneficiaries, yet half or more than half of all beneficiaries are aging, illiterate, living in inadequate housing, and not participating in any organization that aims to promote their welfare.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

1. The total achievements of the agrarian reform--notably lands gained and funds expended--have been appreciably less than those envisioned by the Presidential Commission (The Comisión de Reforma Agraria) established in 1959 to prepare the 1960 Agrarian Reform Law. New lands affected by the reform and new families benefiting have decreased in number reflecting that necessary and fundamental implementation of the Law is virtually paralyzed.

2. Since 1960, massive economic, social, and political changes have occurred within Venezuela--thereby changing the national context of the agrarian reform. While economic and demographic changes have led to a reduction in the political power of the groups that could expect to effectively promote the reform, such changes may in themselves have been inevitable accompaniments of the agrarian change foreseen in the Agrarian Reform Law.

3. IAN, the principal agrarian reform agency, has acquired large amounts of poor quality land, most of it from the public domain and much of the rest from costly negotiation with private landowners. Moreover, the distribution of this land to eligible families has been slow, even when solicited in the manner prescribed by the Law. Maldistribution of holdings and insufficient attention to providing legal titles have led to a new generation

of minifundistas, elevating some beneficiaries to the status of medium-scale, commercial farmers and permanently depriving many other campesino beneficiaries of the ability to earn a living from their own holdings.

4. Land policy adjustments since 1974 have officially acknowledged the disruption caused to reform programs by occupants of IAN lands that are ineligible for benefits and therefore illegal under the Agrarian Reform Law. Attempts to change this situation have not been successful, and it is likely that future agrarian reform activity will be limited to specified areas of the country where public-sector programs of area development can be implemented.

5. Statistics of the major agricultural credit agency show capital transfers to the agrarian reform subsector made to both small farmer (the majority of beneficiaries) and medium farmer (a minority of beneficiaries) categories. Careful comparison of credit programs directed at these two groups, and to large farmers, reveals that agrarian reform beneficiaries have generally received less--and become more easily indebted--than other groups.

6. Allocation of agricultural credit appears to have accentuated trends in the selection of agricultural activity by agrarian reform beneficiaries (notably the small farmers). New production technologies, growth of agro-industry and intermediate consumption, and changed market conditions also influence characteristic production choices. This phenomenon may be found, upon further research, to be contrary to the economic interests of campesino beneficiaries.

7. Direct government intervention in the market since 1974 for many basic agricultural products has probably hindered many agrarian reform beneficiaries in their attempt to earn a living from their own holdings. For small farmers, minimum producer prices are in effect maximum producer prices, especially when combined with maximum consumer prices. Rather than assisting small farmers, such interventions serve to favor larger farmers.

8. New arrangements for agricultural credit--increasingly under the control of private financial institutions--and government cancelation or consolidation of certain debts since 1974 are not likely to have altered the situation noted above in item #5. However, a minority of beneficiaries holding titles to their property who have constituted (or accepted government initiative in constituting) campesino economic organizations are receiving more credit than before under arrangements that increasingly tie credit to technical assistance and use of the harvest as guarantee of repayment.

9. Technical assistance has not been provided to the majority of beneficiaries at any time since the reform began. Recently, campesino economic organizations have received the attention of most available technical personnel. There are two basic types of campesino economic organization--one, preserving individual holdings and titles; the other, establishing collective land, resources and title. The official emphasis on creating independent commercial farmers, and promoting campesino economic organizations for that purpose, has shifted since 1974 in favor of organizations which function as group farms. Mixed public-private companies are being formed to

provide services and agroindustrial linkages for these campesino organizations.

10. Labor legislation did not apply to rural workers before 1974, and social security legislation still does not. New labor legislation continues to exclude most agrarian reform beneficiaries. The continuing plight of most beneficiaries (i.e., campesinos thus far unaffected by the reform and Colombian migrant workers) suggests that a functional relationship may exist between the state of the agrarian reform, the supply of agricultural labor, and the growing subsectors of medium- and large-scale commercial farming.

11. Lack of data precludes any conclusions about absolute changes in the real income of individuals incorporated into the agrarian reform program. However, income distribution data for the entire Venezuelan population, and for beneficiaries during the course of the reform, indicate that most beneficiaries have very low incomes and have experienced a decline in real income relative to the rest of the population. There has also been a tendency for the skewed income distribution of beneficiaries to become more accentuated, with a larger percentage of beneficiaries declaring zero income from on-farm production and a smaller percentage declaring income from off-farm activities. Economic marginalization of beneficiaries corresponds with empirical data on social and political marginalization.

CONCLUSIONS

Unlike many agrarian reforms, there is now available descriptive material of sufficient scope and accuracy for observers to arrive at some more-than-tentative conclusions about Venezuela's post-1958 agrarian reform. It is possible that even those observers who accept most or all of the preceding documentation and analysis could arrive at different overall conclusions regarding the reform.[93] The remaining paragraphs, however, present my conclusions.

That Venezuela's agrarian reform has not fulfilled the quantitative expectations of its designers in terms of land, families, and funds expended, does not necessarily mean that certain of its objectives have not been fulfilled or partly fulfilled.

The latifundia system has been replaced. Even if certain agricultural properties of recent origin have been criticized for being neo-latifundia--such as those of the King Ranch with 230,000 hectares[94]--most agricultural holdings are now operated by resident owners engaged in commercial agriculture. The various forms of sharecropping and tenancy existing before the reform have been largely eliminated. It is probable that campesinos together produce more for the nation's markets (by weight and value) now than before the reform. It is also true that some progressive individuals among campesino beneficiaries have had the opportunity to become small or medium commercial farmers--either as individuals or in campesino economic organizations.

On the other hand, of the campesino families eligible for benefits under the Agrarian Reform Law, most who remain in the countryside are very poor, subsistence-oriented minifundistas. Growth in national agricultural production has not occurred as envisaged in the Law, by way of a just system of property, tenure, and land utilization ensuring adequate provision of credit and technical assistance. Among the 150,000 or so beneficiary families, a large number have not been able to exercise most or all of the 40 rights of beneficiaries identifiable in the Agrarian Reform Law and its amendments, among them the right to a property title and the right to a holding of sufficient size to be economically viable.[95]

Growth in national agricultural production, albeit unable to match domestic demand, has been achieved by small numbers of medium and large commercial farmers. Capital-intensive and land- and labor-extensive, these subsectors constitute a capitalist agriculture which stands in striking contrast to much of campesino agriculture, whether included within the reform or not. The agrarian reform has been instrumental, intentionally or otherwise, in the rise of this capitalist agriculture. Exceptions have been noted in this paper, but some generalized supporting statements are possible. Capitalist agriculture has enjoyed the benefits of law and order in the countryside as well as massive, public infrastructural investments. Many of the nation's credit and technical assistance resources have been diverted into capitalist agriculture, allowing it to dominate animal production and several categories of crop production because these activities were not encouraged among agrarian reform beneficiaries. The reform probably served to provide an adequate supply of cheap, temporary wage-labor to capitalist agriculture and permitted as well the unhindered although illegal use of certain agrarian reform lands.

In contrast to the years before the 1960 Agrarian Reform Law, a new agrarian structure has been created. The classic dualism of campesino and capitalist agricultures took form during the 1960s. With some of its immediate demands met and its members becoming less important a political force, the campesino movement symbolized by the FCV tended to lose its strength. The political clout enjoyed by capitalist agriculture originated in its union with both urban-based and agroindustrial groups known as FEDECAMARAS, presumably due to mutual interest in the steady supply of food and agricultural raw materials. The alliance with agroindustry developed so strongly, however, that secession of both groups' representatives from FEDECAMARAS occurred in 1972. They formed a new organization, FEDEAGRO, currently the most powerful agricultural pressure group.[96] Among its political objectives are higher producer prices and an increase in the margins between these and consumer prices, clearly opposing the desire of urban-based groups for cheap food.

Relative to other subsectors of Venezuelan agriculture, the agrarian reform subsector has become less vital. The thoughtful recommendations of a Presidential Commission, established by Decree 768 of 20 February 1975 in order to evaluate the progress of the reform, have been officially ignored.[97] Though the rhetoric of the Fifth National Plan (1976-80) specifies that this subsector generate part of the country's agricultural development,[98] it is more accurate to say that agrarian reform campesinos are becoming marginalized to the point of obscurity. Techniques which would render the present

reform more efficient would not alter the current situation; only a fundamental change in economic, social, and political conditions would contribute to an outcome in accord with campesino interests.[99] Those with power in Venezuela have opted for an agrarian reform and agrarian structure that have marginalized hundreds of thousands of their fellow citizens and accentuated urban problems, producing a capital- and (most certainly) energy-intensive agriculture that cannot perform well given declining national petroleum production and continuing difficulties of diversifying the Venezuelan economy.

NOTES

1. Jorge F. Schuster, "Rural Problem-Solving Policies in Venezuela," p. 481.

2. John D. Powell, "Los Problemas Agrarios de Venezuela en Perspectiva Comparativa."

3. Oscar Delgado, Reformas Agrarias en la América Latina, pp. 195-202.

4. José María Franco García, "Situación Actual del Sector Agrícola y de la Reforma Agraria en Venezuela," p. 102.

5. Ley de Reforma Agraria, edited version by Armando Hernandez-Breton; Reglamento de la Ley de Reforma Agraria--Decree 746 of 8 February 1967. All new legislation and decrees are published in the Gaceta Oficial de la República de Venezuela.

6. MAC Comisión de Reforma Agraria, Informe de la Subcomisión de Economía, p. 135.

7. Powell, "Los Problemas Agrarios," p. 10. For the story of one such estate, Latifundio Pimental in Carabobo State, see Armando González, Grava de una Misma Cantera, pp. 219-226.

8. Schuster, "Rural Problem-Solving Policies," p. 435.

9. CENDES-CIDA, El Proceso de Adquisicion de Tierras, p. 83. A study of the acquisition by IAN of three farms, La Unión, La Belén, and Las Marías in Carabobo State, for the purpose of creating asentamientos campesinos is described in CENDES-CIDA, Cooperativas Campesinas y Cambio en Venezuela.

10. This writer's translation of Article 1 of the 1960 Agrarian Reform Law, in Hernández-Breton, ed., Ley de Reforma Agraria, p. 3.

11. MAC Comisión de Reforma Agraria, Informe de la Subcomisión de Economía, p. 137.

12. Ibid.

13. Owing to the BAP-ICAP definition of pequeños productores, medianos productores, and empresarios according to gross annual income and not size of holding (number of hectares or irrigated hectare equivalents), it is strictly speaking not possible to conclude that larger landholders receive more BAP-ICAP credit than smaller landholders on a uniform per hectare basis.

14. MAC Comisión, Informe de la Subcomisión de Economía, p. 343, provides the figure of 89,868,500 hectares for the national area.

15. IAN, Un Nuevo Perfil de la Reforma Agraria, p. 67.

16. IAN lands in asentamientos campesinos were reported to be 5,329,562 hectares in IAN, Inventario Nacional de Tierras y Beneficiarios de la Reforma Agraria, vol. 3, p. 31. However, only 2,769 of the estimated national total of 2,975 asentamientos campesinos were included in the inventory, i.e., a 93.1 percent coverage. In subsequent parts of this paper, data for agrarian reform beneficiaries are cited from this 1976 study. 125,054 beneficiaries were interviewed, but coverage of the total population of beneficiaries, estimated at 150,574, tends to vary with each question on the interview schedule when "no declarados" are taken into account. N is often around 110,000. Not based on a statistical sampling procedure, the Bs. 5.5 million IAN study has the characteristics of an incomplete census, giving suboptimal accuracy to the study's findings.

17. MAC Comisión de Reforma Agraria, Informe de la Subcomisión de Economía, p. 137.

18. "Afirma Juan Crespo: Son Corresponsables el IAN," El Impulso, 20 May 1977.

19. MAC Comisión de Reforma Agraria, Informe de la Subcomisión de Economía, p. 132.

20. Román Blanco Ascanio, "Financiamos Programas en el Exterior Mientras," El Universal, 23 January 1977. Dr. Luis LaCorte was replaced as president of IAN in March 1977.

21. MAC Comisión de Reforma Agraria, Informe de la Subcomisión de Economía, p. 142. In early 1977, one bolivar (Bs. 1) was equivalent to approximately 23 U.S. cents.

22. IAN, Un Nuevo Perfil, p. 77.

23. Schuster, "Rural Problem-Solving Policies," p. 465.

24. IAN, Un Nuevo Perfil, pp. 44-47.

25. The term "animal agriculture" will be used in this paper to mean livestock and dairying activities.

26. According to El Nacional of 22 January 1978, the Ministerio de Energía y Minas reported that proven petroleum reserves in Venezuela at the end of 1977 amounted to 17,930 million barrels, c.f., 18,229 million at the end of 1976. The V Plan de la Nación (Gaceta Oficial No. 1,860 Extraordinario, 11 March 1976, p. 3) stated that proven reserves were 18,500 million barrels at the end of 1975 with an expected duration of 21.6 years.

27. Census data indicated the annual growth rate for 1950-61 was 3.99 percent and for 1961-71, 3.59 percent. Official population projections in Ministerio de Fomento, Proyección de la Población de Venezuela, estimate the rate for 1971-76 to have been 3.05 percent.

28. Comisión de Evaluación y Reestructuración de los Organismos de la Reforma Agraria, Informe Final, p. 279.

29. Patrick Knight, "Bad Weather Thwarts Plans to Improve Agriculture," The Times, 12 March 1977, presents a common view that ignores "push" factors behind rural-urban migration: ". . . there is probably no alternative to a highly capitalized agriculture in Venezuela. Nobody is really interested in the sort of agricultural reform based on small-scale, low-cost units. In any case, most Venezuelans have shown with their feet that they prefer the cities to the villages . . . ."

30. Powell, "Los Problemas Agrarios," pp. 11, 15, 17.

31. Article 19 of the 1960 Agrarian Reform Law, in Hernandez-Breton, ed., Ley de Reforma Agraria, pp. 14-15.

32. According to Article 29 of the 1960 Agrarian Reform Law, private holdings of 150 or less hectares of first class land or their equivalent (and equivalents have a maximum extension of 5,000 hectares for the poorest quality land) are inexpropriable irrespective of "social function."

33. Confiscation is a process of acquiring without compensation, estates deemed by a special Presidential Commission, the Comisión Investigadora contra el Enriquecimiento Ilícito (CIEI), to have been obtained by illegal means.

34. IAN, Inventario Nacional de Tierras, vol. 3, Table IV-3 shows that by 1976 there were 223 private-origin asentamientos campesinos acquired by expropriation compared to 599 by purchase.

35. "Ganaderos Esperan Acción Inmediata," El Nacional, 28 January 1977. E.g., on 27 January 1977, President Carlos Andrés Pérez ordered the police, national guard, and army to take the necessary steps to terminate campesino invasions of private agricultural properties.

36. The term "bienhechurías" appears to be used by IAN both in the sense of unexhausted improvements and when referring to improvements made on rented public lands. In the second case, IAN would negotiate transfer as if private lands and unexhausted improvements were involved. These transfers are properly differentiated in CENDES-CIDA, El Proceso de Adquisición de Tierras, Table 19 and Annex 1. However, IAN data almost invariably present a single category of "tierras y bienhechurías" which one might mistakenly recognize as exclusively private-origin transfers.

37. MAC Comisión de Reforma Agraria, Informe de la Subcomisión de Economía, p. 138.

38. CENDES-CIDA, El Proceso de Adquisición de Tierras, p. A/53, identifies a greater proportion of disbursements in the form of cash and favorable bonds (Class C) than in unfavorable bonds (Classes A and B) through 1965. Data published for 1972, 1973, and 1975 in IAN, Memoria y Cuenta, suggest a shift from payments in cash and favorable bonds to unfavorable bonds. Since bond payments are supposed to increase in proportion to the size of payments, and since the value of acquisitions in the 1970s has been relatively small, a tentative conclusion would be that private landowners formerly compensated by IAN received very favorable treatment in terms of method of payment.

39. "La Reforma Tributaria: Es Inaceptable," El Nacional, 3 February 1977.

40. The present writer's own calculations from data in CENDES-CIDA, El Proceso de Adquisición de Tierras, pp. 41-42, p. A/6.

41. Dr. Luis La Corte was reported to have said the lands were "las peores que tiene el país" and "lamentablemente no reunen ni siquiera las medianas condiciones para esperar de su explotación . . . grandes éxitos," in El Nacional, 5 June 1975, cited in Armando Martel, La Agricultura entre la Carraplana y el Despelote, p. 37.

42. IAN, Inventario Nacional de Tierras, vol. 3, p. 20.

43. Ibid., p. 19.

44. MAC, Memoria y Cuenta 1973, p. 430. Table entitled: "Programa de Tenencia: Dotaciones Especiales a Medianos Productores."

45. For definitions of these and related terms in the Venezuelan context, see MAC Comisión de Reforma Agraria, Informe de la Subcomisión Social, pp. 203-209.

46. This writer has heard of individual landholders in the Quíbor Valley (Lara State) who at first appear to hire regular wage-labor. Upon closer inspection, however, it is the enterprising wage-laborer (perhaps a newly arrived immigrant), bringing technical (e.g., irrigation) and management skills, who exercises dominance over the landholder. Another variant may be the agrarian reform beneficiary who obtains full-time, off-farm employment and leaves his holding to be worked by wage-laborers. At the moment, there is more evidence for generalized dominance-dependency relationships between public agency officials (especially IAN field technicians) and beneficiaries, and between the directorates (juntas directivas) and remaining members of campesino economic organizations.

47. Martel, La Agricultura, p. 49.

48. IAN, Un Nuevo Perfil, p. 104. FCV estimate is in "Señala el Presidente de la Federación Campesina: De 150 Mil Familias," El Nacional, 14 February 1977.

49. Martel, La Agricultura, p. 48.

50. Ibid., p. 54.

51. The Agrarian Reform Law provides for this under Articles 2(d), 89, and 161(3).

52. IAN, Memoria y Cuenta 1974, cited in Martel, La Agricultura, p. 44.

53. IAN, Un Nuevo Perfil, p. 119.

54. "Los Incendios Devastadores de Seis Mil Hectareas," El Nacional, 27 April 1977.

55. "Una Nueva Ley Orgánica para Revivir," El Impulso, 20 February 1977.

56. Gaceta Oficial No. 1,860 Extraordinario, V Plan de la Nación, p. 26.

57. IAN, Un Nuevo Perfil, p. 90.

58. Gaceta Oficial No. 1,860 Extraordinario, V Plan de la Nación, p. 26.

59. Schuster, "Rural Problem-Solving Policies," p. 452.

60. Comisión de Evaluación y Reestructuración, Informe Final, Annexes 18, 19, indicate that the total amounts conceded for directed credit and irrigation works for the six-year period, 1968-73, were Bs. 337 million and Bs. 143.7 million, respectively. These figures are low compared to BAP's own data; see note to Table 24. Yet another set of data for directed credit is provided by IAN; see Table 36.

61. This decision is reported in Martel, La Agricultura, p. 91, and is substantiated by inspection of data provided by IAN in MAC, Anuario Estadístico Agropecuario.

62. As in other sectors, these groups are known as "roscas."

63. More than 45 percent of beneficiaries interviewed in 1976 said intermediaries were their primary marketing outlet, intermediaries being defined as individuals or firms who buy products for resale to third parties, not consumers. IAN, Inventario Nacional de Tierras, vol. 3, Table III-2.

64. For a table showing both so-called minimum producer prices and maximum consumer prices for certain products, see Dalia Carrasquero de Vetencourt, La Crisis Agrícola en Venezuela, pp. 27-28. For example, in 1975, regular grade coffee had a minimum producer price of Bs. 190 per metric ton and ground coffee a maximum consumer price of Bs. 8 per kg.

65. For example, the Sociedad de Cañicultores de los Distritos Occidentales del Estado Lara (SOCADOL) and the Sociedad de Ganaderos del Estado Lara (SOGALAR), which are coordinated, respectively, on a national level by the Federación Nacional de Asociaciones de Productores Agropecuarios (FEDEAGRO) and the Federación Nacional de Ganaderos (FEDENAGA).

66. "Dijó el Presidente Pérez: El Término Desabastecimiento," El Nacional, 12 May 1977.

67. Martel, La Agricultura, p. 30.

68. "State agencies" here signifies BANDAGRO and BAP-ICAP.

69. Julio Estéves, "El Fondo de Crédito Agropecuario."

70. Martel, La Agricultura, p. 79.

71. Ibid., p. 35.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., p. 47. Suggests that references by President Pérez to prendas agrarias in his second annual message to the nation on 14 May 1976 were of this nature.

74. IAN, Memoria y Cuenta 1975, p. 41.

75. Martel, La Agricultura, p. 48.

76. IAN, Un Nuevo Perfil, Annex 11.

77. IAN, Inventario Nacional de Tierras, vol. 3, Table II-15.

78. Aminta Urdaneta, , "La Organización Campesina en la Reforma Agraria," p. 8, presents a table of 18 organizational forms with varying objectives and sponsoring agencies, that can exist within an asentamiento campesino. Case studies of uniones de prestatarios, empresas campesinas, centros

agrarios, a cooperativa, and an asentamiento campesino are to be found in IAN-CIARA, Estudio Mundial sobre Cambios en la Estructura Agraria: Investigación Venezolana.

79. Oscar David Soto, La Empresa y la Reforma Agraria en la Agricultura Venezolana, p. 202.

80. IAN-CIARA, El Minifundio en Venezuela, p. 17.

81. Schuster, "Rural Problem-Solving Policies," p. 483.

82. José María Franco García, "Prólogo," p. 12, in Soto, La Empresa y la Reforma Agraria.

83. IAN, Un Nuevo Perfil, pp. 132-133.

84. Gaceta Oficial No. 1,860 Extraordinario, V Plan de la Nación, p. 26.

85. IAN, Inventario Nacional de Tierras, vol. 3, Table II-10, p. 21.

86. This is the sum of results from two questions: "own machinery," 4.65 percent; and "rented machinery," 21.62 percent. Because some beneficiaries may have responded positively to both questions, 26.3 percent is a maximum figure for machinery usage.

87. Martel, La Agricultura, pp. 53, 57.

88. "Concluido Estudio: Seguro Social Obligatorio Abarcará al Sector Rural," El Mundo, 21 January 1977.

89. IAN, Inventario Nacional de Tierras, vol. 3, Table III-7.

90. The specific case known to this writer involves noninstallation by a government ministry of a projected irrigation system which would have permitted water utilization from a long completed reservoir situated near agrarian reform beneficiaries.

91. The following data are taken from Clarence Zuvekas, Jr., Income Redistribution in Latin America: A Survey of Recent Research. The original studies are Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, "An Anatomy of Income Distribution Patterns in Developing Countries," p. 27, and Montek S. Ahluwalia, "Income Inequality: Some Dimensions of the Problem," p. 4.

92. IAN, Inventario Nacional de Tierras, vol. 3, Tables I-13, I-20, I-6, I-4. Each percentage is calculated using the total number of beneficiaries that responded to the question; see footnote 16.

93. For instance, orthodox Marxists may argue that marginalization of the peasantry is progressive in the sense that it assists the advance and replacement of capitalism. Certain Western liberals may argue that substantial agrarian change has taken place and that, while not as envisaged by many Venezuelan reformists in 1959, the present situation can be suitably modified by area development programs, more campesino organizations, rural welfare programs, and other adjustments.

94. Martel, La Agricultura, p. 42.

95. Luis Gomez Cermeño, "Los Cuarenta Derechos que Posibilitan el Exito de la Reforma Agraria Venezolana," pp. 53-54.

96. Next to FEDEAGRO would come FEDENAGA, whose strident criticisms of IAN and the agrarian reform are frequently reported in the national press.

97. Comisión de Evaluación y Reestructuración, Informe Final. Though a public document, copies of the Commission's report have an exceedingly limited availability.

98. Gaceta Oficial No. 1,860 Extraordinario, V Plan de la Nación, p. 26, states that both agrarian reform campesinos and medium-sized farmers are to form the basis of the country's agricultural development.

99. The substance of this sentence is taken from Marc Dufumier, "Réforme Agraire au Venezuela," p. 391.

REFERENCES

Adelman, Irma, and Cynthia Taft Morris. "An Anatomy of Income Distribution Patterns in Developing Countries." Development Digest, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 24-37.

"Afirma Juan Crespo: Son Corresponsables el IAN y la Federación de Ganaderos de no Haber Entregado las Tierras Solicitadas por los Campesinos." El Impulso (Barquisimeto), 20 May 1977.

Ahluwalia, Montek S. "Income Inequality: Some Dimensions of the Problem." Finance and Development, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 2-8, 41.

Banco Agrícola y Pecuario. Informe Anual. Caracas, published annually.

Banco Central de Venezuela. Informe Económico. Caracas, published annually.

Blanco Ascanio, Román. "Financiamos Programas en el Exterior Mientras le Negamos Recursos a Nuestra Agricultura." El Universal (Caracas), 23 January 1977.

Carrasquero de Vetencourt, Dalia. La Crisis Agrícola en Venezuela y las Recientes Medidas Extraordinarias Decretadas por el Gobierno Nacional para su Solución. Caracas: Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Sociales, Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1975.

CENDES-CIDA. El Proceso de Adquisición de las Tierras. Vol. 1 of the CENDES series "Reforma Agraria en Venezuela." Caracas, 1967.

_____. El Proceso de Dotación de Tierras. Vol. 2 of the CENDES series "Reforma Agraria en Venezuela." Caracas, 1968.

_____. Datos Económicos de los Beneficiarios. Vol. 4 of the CENDES series "Reforma Agraria en Venezuela." Caracas, 1969.

_____. Cooperativas Campesinas y Cambio en Venezuela. Vol. 9 of the CENDES series "Reforma Agraria en Venezuela." Caracas, 1970.

Comisión de Evaluación y Reestructuración de los Organismos de la Reforma Agraria. Informe Final de la Comisión. (Presidential Commission established by Decree 768 of 20 February 1975) Caracas, 1975.

"Concluido Estudio: Seguro Social Obligatorio Abarcará al Sector Rural." El Mundo (Caracas), 21 January 1977.

Delgado, Oscar. Reformas Agrarias en la América Latina. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1965.

"Dijó el Presidente Pérez: El Término Desabastecimiento no se Corresponde con la Realidad del País." El Nacional (Caracas), 12 May 1977.

Dufumier, Marc. "Réforme Agraire au Venezuela." Thèse de Doctorat de 3ème cycle, Université de Paris I, 1973.

Estéves, Julio. "El Fondo de Crédito Agropecuario." Opinión Agraria (Caracas), no. 7-8, June 1975, pp. 11-13.

Franco García, José María. "Situación Actual del Sector Agrícola y de la Reforma Agraria en Venezuela." Derecho y Reforma Agraria (Mérida), no. 6, 1975, pp. 95-119.

Gaceta Oficial No. 1,860 Extraordinario, 11 March 1976. V Plan de la Nación.

"Ganaderos Esperan Acción Inmediata Contra las Invasiones de Fincas." El Nacional (Caracas), 28 January 1977.

Gomez Cermeño, Luis. "Los Cuarenta Derechos que Posibilitan el Exito de la Reforma Agraria Venezolana." Derecho y Reforma Agraria (Mérida), no. 6, 1975, pp. 53-68.

Gonzalez, Armando. Grava de una Misma Cantera: Temas Agro Sindicales y de Reforma Agraria. Caracas: CIARA, 1977.

Hernandez-Breton, Armando, ed. Ley de Reforma Agraria, con Intitulación y Anotaciones, etc. 11th ed. Caracas: Editorial "La Torre," 1969.

"Los Incendios Devastadores de Seis Mil Hectareas en Perija Fueron Provocados por Ganaderos." El Nacional (Caracas), 27 April 1977.

"Informe Oficial: Afectada la Industria Petrolera Nacional por una Baja en las Reservas Probadas en 1977." El Nacional (Caracas), 22 January 1978.

Instituto Agrario Nacional. Inventario Nacional de Tierras y Beneficiarios de la Reforma Agraria. 3 vols. Caracas, 1976.

_____. Un Nuevo Perfil de la Reforma Agraria 1974-1976. Caracas, 1977.

_____. Resultados del Programa de Investigación de la Tenencia de la Tierra. 3 vols. Caracas: IAN Depto. de Investigación de la Tierra, 1970.

_____. Memoria y Cuenta. Caracas, published annually.

_____. Organizaciones Económicas Campesinas Programmación Creditícia 1976-77. Vol. 1. Caracas: IAN Gerencia Técnica y Gerencia de Finanzas, 1976.

_____--Fundación para la Capacitación e Investigación Aplicada a la Reforma Agraria. Estudio Mundial sobre Cambios en la Estructura Agraria: Investigación Venezolana. Caracas, 1973.

_____--_____. El Minifundio en Venezuela. Report presented at the 6th Agrarian Reform Conference of IICA held in Guatemala City, November 1976.

Knight, Patrick. "Bad Weather Thwarts Plans to Improve Agriculture." The Times (London), 12 March 1977, Supplement on Venezuela, p. 6.

Martel, Armando. La Agricultura entre la Carraplana y el Despelote. Caracas: Editorial Lisbona (Colección Venezuela Contemporanea), 1976.

Ministerio de Agricultura y Cría Comisión de Reforma Agraria. Informe de la Subcomisión de Economía. Vol. 1. Caracas, 1959.

_____. Informe de la Subcomisión Social. Caracas, 1959.

Ministerio de Agricultura y Cría. Memoria y Cuenta. Caracas, published annually.

_____. Anuario Estadístico Agropecuario. Caracas: MAC Dirección de Planificación y Estadística, published annually.

Ministerio de Fomento. Proyección de la Población de Venezuela. 2 vols. Caracas: Fomento, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, 1975.

_____. Censo Agropecuario. Caracas: Fomento, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, 1950, 1961, 1971.

_____. X Censo de Población 1971, Resumen General. Caracas: Fomento, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, 1974.

_____. Anuario Estadístico de Venezuela. Caracas: Fomento, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, published annually.

"Una Nueva Ley Orgánica para Revivir la Marchita Reforma Agraria del País." El Impulso (Barquisimeto), 20 February 1977.

Powell, John D. "Los Problemas Agrarios de Venezuela con Perspectiva Comparativa." LTC No. 70. Madison: Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, 1970.

"La Reforma Tributaria: Es Inaceptable que Haya Tierra Util para la Producción y que Esté Completamente Ociosa." El Nacional (Caracas), 3 February 1977.

Schuster, Jorge F. "Rural Problem-Solving Policies in Venezuela, with Special Reference to the Agrarian Issue." Ph.D. dissertation (Agricultural Economics), University of Wisconsin, 1971.

"Señala el Presidente de la Federación Campesina: De 150 Mil Familias en Asentamientos Campesinos Solo 30 Mil Tienen Acceso a la Maquinaria Agrícola." El Nacional (Caracas), 14 February 1977.

Soto, Oscar David. La Empresa y la Reforma Agraria en la Agricultura Venezolana. Mérida: Instituto Iberoamericano de Derecho Agrario y Reforma Agraria, 1973.

Urdaneta, Aminta. "La Organización Campesina en la Reforma Agraria." Paper presented at the Primera Convención Nacional of the Federación Campesina de Venezuela, 17-20 April 1975.

Valecillos T., Hector. "Consideraciones en Torno a la Distribución de Ingreso en Venezuela y Examen de sus Posibles Cambios Recientes." Cuadernos de la Sociedad Venezolana de Planificación (Caracas), nos. 108-110, Jan.-Mar. 1973, pp. 3-29.

Zuvekas, Clarence, Jr. Income Redistribution in Latin America: A Survey of Recent Research. Essay Series no. 6. Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Center for Latin America, July 1975.