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**SOME INSIGHTS INTO THE ECONOMIC  
DEVELOPMENT OF EAST PAKISTAN FROM THE SHORT  
PERSPECTIVE OF 1964 TO 1968 AND A POSSIBLE COURSE FOR THE FUTURE\***

by

**J. Tomas Hexner**

**Presented at the 6th Annual Conference on Bengal, at Oakland University,  
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**SOME INSIGHTS INTO THE ECONOMIC  
DEVELOPMENT OF EAST PAKISTAN FROM THE SHORT  
PERSPECTIVE OF 1964 TO 1968 AND A POSSIBLE COURSE FOR THE FUTURE**

**Introduction**

My insights into the economic development of East Pakistan emerge from a four year stint as an economic advisor to the Government of Pakistan and to the Government of East Pakistan from the Harvard University Development Advisory Service. This paper is an attempt to record some part of that experience in a subjective and somewhat systematic manner. The views expressed are entirely my own; they are naturally neither the views of Harvard University nor the Government of Pakistan.

What is the Harvard Development Advisory Service and what is it doing in Pakistan? The Development Advisory Service is part of the Center of International Affairs at Harvard University and was organized some 16 years ago for two purposes:

- 1) to advise developing nations on economic development and
- 2) to impart some of the real world experience of economic development into the academic mainstream.

The Development Advisory Service began its work in Pakistan in 1954 at the request of the Government of Pakistan with the support of the Ford Foundation. The focus of the advice was and is the Government of Pakistan Planning Commission - the institution broadly responsible for charting the course of the nation's economic development. During this 16 year period the Planning Commission has grown into a world-respected and sophisticated organization, and, as might be expected, the nature of the work of the Harvard advisors has changed accordingly.

My own personal perspective was that of the senior economic advisor to the Planning Department of the Government of East Pakistan. The role of the provincial planning departments must be explained. The planning commission is a central government institution complemented by two provincial planning departments with two main roles:

- 1) to plan the development of the province and
- 2) to convince the planning commission and the central government that resources should be made available for this development.

Focusing specifically on East Pakistan one finds that the planning department is at the pinnacle of the governmental pyramid. In essence all matters of economic significance have to be cleared through the planning department. All communications with the central government must flow through the planning department. My perspective then was that of an advisor to the operating head of the planning department - very fortunately a view from the top.

Furthermore, my perspective is and was that of an employee of the Government of East Pakistan. A shortcut transliteration of my perspective is that from 1964 to 1968 when I said "We", I meant East Pakistan. However, I must emphasize that I was an expatriate advisor to the Government of Pakistan. I could never, and never did, pretend to be a Bengali. First, real Bengalis must be born in Bengal. As a poor second, they must at least be able to speak Bengali. I am not endowed with either of these attributes.

This paper will be presented in three sections. The first and main portion of the paper will devote itself to slices of the process of economic development which seem significant from my experience during the 1964-1968 period.

The second portion of the paper will deal with some possible reasons for the 1969/70 uprisings. The main purpose for including the uprisings and the reasons for their occurrence is that any sensible future economic policy cannot ignore the causes of the uprisings.

The third section of the paper will formulate some elements of a middle-of-the-road economic policy which might feasibly work in the 1970 to 1980 period. Some elements of this policy would probably be acceptable to the entire gamut of political parties. In any event the intention is a realistic set of policies - mainly short-run - which strike the significant issues and which would be beneficial to the social, political and economic development of the province.

This paper will not give a comprehensive history of the economic development of the province; it will not provide a complete analysis of the 1968-1969 uprisings, and it will not present an integrated economic program for the future. The paper is written from a very short perspective of 1964. This short perspective acts as a mild counterbalance to the multitude who analyze East Pakistan from their experiences in the 40's or 50's and even before. East Pakistan and the East Pakistan economy is a very fast moving intimate experience. Historical perspective and depth of experience can often be useful; they can also be dangerous. East Pakistan has been victimized too often by expert analysis with built-in obsolescence. There are sufficient reasons to explain the economic development and non-development from these brief four years. It may be academically satisfying to make an analysis based on the past, but put in the frankest terms I believe that such analysis leads to the same unfair treatment which has plagued poverty areas and groups over the years - e.g., Quebec, the Blacks in the U.S., etc. It seems crassly inappropriate that scholars, aid givers, and development economists are still looking for the answer to why the Bengalis did not have the "get-up-and-go" in the hazy past rather than looking for the reasons that made more rapid economic development in the post 1964 period impossible and doing something about altering that environment.

This paper is intended as a current picture for a multi-disciplinary audience whose common denominator is an intimate knowledge of Bengal. The cubistic approach of the paper has been taken in the hope

that at least some sides of the cube will be of interest and use to the specialists of the various disciplines.

As a backdrop a tale told by a Punjabi who had spent his entire career in Bengal is worth recounting. At the height of the monsoon and floods a deputy commissioner fell into the surging Brahmaputra. He was given up for dead, but in two days he returned - in fact, looking well. "How did he survive," he was asked. His classic reply, "In Bengal one floats; one doesn't swim." This adage for survival unfortunately is not a very sound grounding for economic development.

#### The 1964 - 1968 Process - Vignettes and Analysis

The economic development of East Pakistan from 1964 to 1968 (and today also) can only be diagnosed in the context of West Pakistan and in the context of a Pakistan with a very strong central government located in West Pakistan. The East Pakistan economy cannot be analyzed in isolation. Why? The major reasons are:

- 1) The Governor of the Province is appointed by the Central Government;
- 2) The top administrative posts were held by civil servants who were responsible to and promoted by the central government;
- 3) The top posts themselves were held by West Pakistanis;
- 4) An extreme scarcity of financial resources following the 17 day war with India;
- 5) All foreign exchange and foreign aid is handled by the central government;

- 6) The economic plans and development budgets are finally approved by the central government and the resources have to be divided between the provinces;
- 7) The disparity in per capita income between the two provinces and the articulated policy of the central government to take definite steps to remove the disparity tends to lead to direct unfair comparisons of economic performance between the two provinces without recognizing the real differences.
- 8) The simple physical fact that the final decision making mechanism for anything of consequence was located in West Pakistan - 1200 miles away;
- 9) Relations of each Province with India.

What did this setting mean for the economic development of East Pakistan? It meant that East Pakistan was by no means the master of its economic fate. It certainly meant, and perhaps still means, that the political issue of separatism was employed as a lever for highly centralized control.

A brief elaboration of each item on the above list provides some of the flavor of the East Pakistan economic development process and should provide the insights from the 1964-1968 period on the pace of the development of the province. The list is obviously not exhaustive and obviously interrelated. The reader may give his individual weights to the various factors in weaving the interrelationships.

### Political Impotence of the People

Of primary importance is that the President appoints the Governor of the Province, meaning that the Governor is not a real political representative of the people. The Governor during this entire period was Abdul Monem Khan, a 65 to 75 year old pleader from the Mymensingh district. (As an aside I would strongly recommend that some scholar of Bengal write a biography of this Governor). From his deeds and words the height of Monem Khan's ambition was achieved when he became Governor and his principal aim in life was to remain Governor. His mania to hold his post is illustrated by a possibly true story. After the 1969-1970 uprisings rose to such a height that even Monem Khan felt he would be removed, he was walking about the Governor's mansion. During this stroll he pointed to flowers and walls and said, "my predecessor will tear up those flowers and tear down those walls." My predecessor ... etc., my predecessor ..... etc." The Governor was incapable of uttering the word "successor".

What means did the Governor use to stay in office? Basically he paid obeisance to President Ayub Khan and he kept the Province quiet. It must be inferred that in the absence of a free press President Ayub Khan correlated a quiet Province with a satisfied one. The 1967-1970 uprisings showed how wrong the President's analysis was.

From the point of view of provincial economic development the Province suffered fantastically by not having a Governor who was responsible to the people and who dictated the affairs of the Province by setting his antennae to satisfy the whims of the President.

Even under this system of a presidentially appointed governor, the sincerity of President Ayub Khan's efforts to help East Pakistan must be questioned because of Governor Abdul Monem Khan, since under no set of circumstances would he have been the right man to "overcome disparity". Yet this man ruled the Province with an ever tightening grip until just one day before the declaration of martial law. This is not to say that some key sound economic planning and policy formulation did not go on, but, particularly after 1966, these policies had to suit the ever-changing disposition of the Governor to be implemented. Governor Abdul Monem Khan was a shrewd small-time politician interested only in his own survival and not in the development of rational economic policy. Yet he headed the Government, and during this reign the economic policy was largely responsive to his moods - not a conducive climate for rapid growth and not a conducive climate for social progress.

Administrative Impotence - The Civil Service of Pakistan and the West Pakistan Influence.

Under the guidance of President Ayub Khan the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) ran the country. The civil service itself is a central government institution and every ambitious CSP aspired to be a central government secretary - from 1964 to 1968 the most powerful post in the Government. During this period not a single Bengali held the post of a central government secretary, meaning that a fight for East Pakistan struck no natural sympathetic cord in the upper echelon of this exclusive fraternity. Furthermore, until 1967 the three top posts in the Government of East Pakistan were held by non-Bengalis. Some of these

non-Bengali officers fought desperately for East Pakistan and risked their careers. Others adopted the Eichman approach and followed orders, the course of least resistance. They floated; not swam, and survived.

This exposition should not be interpreted as an indictment of the Civil Service of Pakistan. That dead horse has been beaten sufficiently, and I personally refuse to join in that abuse. On the whole, in the absence of the normal popular controls of the political process and a free press, the CSP's did a superb job of managing the country and the economy. The fact still remains that East Pakistan was essentially in a battle of resources with West Pakistan and fighting for East Pakistan implied fighting the senior members of the establishment, and risking personal advancement. Again one finds a more conducive environment to succumbing, rather than overcoming, economic disparity.

The political atmosphere accentuated this deadening of incentive and stifled organizational and administrative changes which might have speeded economic development. Following President Ayub Khan's visit to East Pakistan in the spring of 1966 and the President's highlighting of Sheik Mujibur Rahman's six point program, "provincial autonomy" became almost synonymous with separatism and treason. Carried to its extreme this meant that any suggestions of delegation of authority by the Central Government - even to Central Government officers in the Province - was held suspect. Many administrators claimed to be afraid to indulge in the resource battle. Whether this perception of the political environment was correct is immaterial, since it provided a convenient excuse for inaction to many who might otherwise have been chastised for their administrative "prowess."

### Over-centralization of Authority

The final voice for all major policies concerning economic development rested with the central government. Furthermore, the implementation of projects and programs depended on the central government. This total control was over both the public and private sector.

What was the scope of this control? The central government determined the size of the public sector budgets, determined the distribution among East Pakistan, West Pakistan, and the Center, and even determined the amounts to be invested in each sector - e.g., transport, industry, agriculture, education, etc. This was not a unilateral process, since it was done in consultation with the Provincial Government, but the ultimate authority rested with the central government.

All foreign exchange and foreign aid matters were handled by the Central Government. Concurrently, the aid givers had centralized their authority to parallel the Government of Pakistan. The aid givers lived in West Pakistan and visiting dignitaries often never visited East Pakistan - particularly before the opening of the Dacca Intercontinental. The end result of this configuration was that the aid givers did not really understand East Pakistan and tended to acquire many of the prejudices and negative impressions of East Pakistan held by many of the West Pakistanis. In realistic terms what could East Pakistan really expect when West Pakistani administrators were negotiating with foreign donors living in West Pakistan who were looking for the best possible investments and projects and not looking for the complications implicit in the natural environment of East Pakistan, which were made even more

complex by the very impotence of the Provincial Government in dealing with foreign exchange, aid givers, etc. Two major generalizations can be drawn. The aid givers in the 1964 to 1968 period had better opportunities in West Pakistan, and their advances were courted and not discouraged by the West Pakistan policy makers. Second, the aid givers on occasion would undertake projects in East Pakistan, because a twinge of conscience would make them think that they "should be doing more for East Pakistan." This guilt feeling resulted in premature loans for projects which were in fact not ready for implementation, and accordingly, the loans and projects lagged behind the fictitious implementation schedule. This configuration of events upheld the feeling that East Pakistan did not have the "absorbative or implementing capacity," and the aid givers should follow the policies of the past and do business in West Pakistan.

A good example of this phenomenon was the Chandpur flood control and irrigation project, which was evaluated and financed by the IDA of the World Bank in 1964. This project was little more than a "gleam in the eye" when the loan was made. The foreign engineering consultants required by the loan left much to be desired and the costs of the project more than doubled before any real engineering work had begun (shades of the U.S. Defense Department.) Also before any formal engineering had begun, the World Bank and the Government of Pakistan decided that the World Bank would only finance the flood control portion of the project. Work on the project was held up since the economics of the project came under question. The project was reviewed and re-reviewed by both the Government and the World Bank, new consultants were appointed,

and finally in May, 1970 the World Bank has again agreed to finance the project, but now a well conceived one which differs tremendously from the original 1964 loan.

The central government also controlled absolutely all non-project foreign exchange which is crucial in the smooth running of an economy. Three examples should suffice. First, the imports of fertilizer and pesticides never went smoothly. The central government would refuse to recognize the very long leadtimes actually required for bringing these inputs into the Province. Often the central government would not believe the projections of demands. Such intransigence and bickerings led to shortages in the key area of agriculture. The damage from such controversy in the other sectors was far worse.

Second, foodgrains in the 1964 to 1968 period were not imported smoothly or promptly, and this led to a greater than necessary increase in prices, which probably was one of the important causes of the 1968-1969 uprisings. One rather odd but possible explanation for the constraints in the import of foodgrain is political. The Government of Pakistan had to show some growth in the East Pakistan economy both to those who worried about disparity and to the aid givers. The timing of the inquiries of the aid givers was normally in January and February, which meant that only estimates of the rice crop could be made. These projections during the 1964 to 1968 period may have been overestimated (every year) by 10 to 15%, which meant that the Government could not promptly schedule foodgrain imports for East Pakistan. By 1968, foodgrain imports from West Pakistan were also a possibility, but only after martial law in 1969 did these exports (imports) take place in any quantities.

Third, a steel mill runs most economically on a three shift basis. Yet the public sector steel mill faced a consistent shortage of raw materials which hampered production and profits severely. Reams of correspondence and explanations exist on this, but these explanations do not produce steel.

An analysis of the foreign exchange situation would show that the real difficulty came from the absolute 100% control by the central government. A decentralization of perhaps 5% of the foreign exchange would probably have resulted in a completely different picture. The Province could have taken care of the small problems, and the central government could then have been in a position to act more quickly and intelligently on the significant cases. This paper is not trying to show that East Pakistan was discriminated against; it is trying to show that overcentralization slowed development. This raises the question of the rapid development of West Pakistan. The first response is that the Government of West Pakistan could telephone the central government with ease and that the two were much closer physically (and culturally).

The central government control was not just confined to foreign exchange. The release of Rupees which are needed to support the foreign exchange was also tightly held by the central government. The timely release of Rupees was a problem area - particularly with construction projects where the weather conditions require funds in the winter months before the rainy season. Delays did occur, but in dealing with Rupees the provincial government could have employed more initiative and imagination, although the initiative and imagination would have required the

stretching or the breaking of rules, and it may be recalled that the system did not provide the civil servant an incentive to trade off more rapid economic development for the breaking of rules.

#### Overcentralization and the Private Sector.

The dormancy of the East Pakistan private sector has received close attention from innumerable government committees and from many scholars of many disciplines. For the 1964 to 1968 period the dormancy was inflicted by the circumstances - over-centralization and very scarce resources. New business required foreign exchange and the foreign exchange was allocated by the head offices of the development banks in Karachi. Real opportunities for entering business occurred three times in this period. One was a joint venture opportunity with EPIDC to start a 250 loom jute mill. The response to this opportunity was excellent. The second opportunity was a scheme which used the network of the commercial banks to make long term loans of \$1 million. This opportunity was oversubscribed. The third opportunity was the disinvestment of two EPIDC projects in 1968, and these were sold.

This is not to say that there was no life in the private sector, but what existed was scarce. It should be remembered that this is a subjective analysis. PICIC - an extremely successful development bank which made loans no smaller than \$150,000 in foreign exchange, implying a \$450,000 project - made several loans in East Pakistan, but these were to the large industrialists, who were not Bengalis.

The other development bank - the IDBP responsible for the medium-sized industry - was not so effective. One example shows that one of the most credit worthy institutions in East Pakistan wanted to put up a second cold storage plant - the first was operating at a profit, and it took eighteen months for the loan to be approved. No decisions could be made in Dacca. The bank forms were complex, and even when filled out by experts, questions would arise, and the forms would travel back from Karachi.

This section is simply written to point out that in the 1964 to 1968 period it was practically impossible for a new entrepreneur to enter business in East Pakistan. Only established entrepreneurs could afford the lobbyist required principally in Karachi but also in Dacca to gain the foreign exchange. East Pakistanis responded well to the few real opportunities, even though the 1964-1968 period was one of uncertainty and not the most conducive one for new investments.

**Damage Resulting from not Recognizing  
the Real Differences Between East and West Pakistan**

Scholars of Bengal would consider it ludicrous not to highlight the very great physical, cultural, and economic differences between East and West Pakistan. Unfortunately, many of the policy makers, aid givers, and politicians consistently overlooked these real differences. This blindness had two main results: first, economic performance in East Pakistan was considered to be poor, and second, policies which had worked in West Pakistan but which were inapplicable in the East were tried.

It would be worthwhile to point out the major differences between the Provinces and then take several examples of how the non-recognition

of these differences damaged East Pakistan. West Pakistan is basically a desert. West Pakistan has landlords with large holdings. The province had over 100 years experience with irrigation, and a fairly reasonable system of roads.

The real landmark of success in West Pakistan was the construction of the Mangla Dam as part of the Indus Basin Works. In psychic terms the construction of this project may have done as much harm to East Pakistan as good to West Pakistan. Foreigners, West Pakistanis, and East Pakistanis (particularly Governor Abdul Monem Khan and many engineers) wondered why something similar could not happen in the East, which was often translated into "done by East Pakistanis." Mangla stimulated the phobia of East Pakistani politicians and administrators for large unrealistic and uneconomic projects and diverted their attention and analysis from the planning and implementation of sensible projects, which would have given results.

Could something similar happen in East Pakistan? It could, but only if sufficient resources - financial and human - were applied to the task. It is often forgotten that the Mangla Dam was constructed on a turn-key basis by a non-Pakistani firm. The central government and the Government of West Pakistan provided the administrative umbrella, but much of the execution - both planning and construction - was done by non-Pakistanis. Two other factors are not often considered. The World Bank played a very important role in supervising the Indus Basin Fund, and financial resources were never a constraint to progress. Second,

Mangla was not a new idea; engineers had been considering something of this nature since at least the early 1940's.

This is not in any way to discredit the marvelous accomplishments of all those involved in the Mangla project. It is truly a monument of brilliant administration, planning, and execution. The very enormity of the brilliance exaggerates the idiocy of even the most idle wondering of why something similar has not happened in East Pakistan, when nowhere near the similar resources (in a more difficult territory where more resources would actually be required) have been applied. It does raise questions about the judgements of those East Pakistanis who believe that an instant Mangla could be conceived. There is a definite place for even vaster projects in East Pakistan when one looks at the river systems. However, these must be real projects, and in the 1964 to 1968 period East Pakistan just did not have any projects of this size ready for execution nor even in good shape for planning. However, the unsystematic searching and pushing for such projects turned scarce human and financial resources from the less dramatic projects which could have paid off.

West Pakistan also succeeded brilliantly in small-scale tubewell irrigation. Why was East Pakistan behind? East Pakistan succeeded in small-scale irrigation only after the small landholdings were taken into account in the thana irrigation program. Because of the larger land holdings the landlords could afford private tubewells. Furthermore, farmers with large landholdings could obtain credit. In short, the advantages of scale which are necessary in modern agriculture applied

in West Pakistan and not in East Pakistan. Imaginative policy was required in East Pakistan and this came only after the realization that neither the standard bureaucratic approach nor the private sector approach could work in East Pakistan.

Road construction is another area where West Pakistan has surpassed the East. Why? First, it is obviously easier to lay concrete in a desert than in a delta. Second, it is much easier to acquire land in a land-rich than in a land-scarce area. (However, in land acquisition East Pakistan has had a dismal record, and it is one area to which serious attention rather than ad-hoc committees will have to be devoted.)

Many also wondered why the miracle rice - IRRI 8 - worked so well in the West and not in the East. The answer is obviously the climatic conditions. Yet East Pakistan felt guilty about not doing as well with IRRI 8.

#### The Extreme Scarcity of Financial Resources Following the 17 day War with India

Following the 17 day war with India - September 23, 1965 - there was an extreme scarcity of financial resources - both foreign exchange and Rupees. One principal explanation for this situation was the increased defense spending (made even higher by the disadvantageous terms which faced Pakistan because it had to buy U.S. items through third country sources) can be attributed directly to the war. The second major reason for the scarcity of resources was unrelated to the war and that was the absolute decrease in the U.S. foreign aid allocations in a period of absolutely increasing demands not only for East

Pakistan and Pakistan but the entire world.

What did this financial squeeze mean for East Pakistan.

Fundamentally it smoldered the sparks of healthy economic development which had just begun to ignite in the brief period of 1963 to 1965. This is not to say that there was no economic progress in the 1964-1968 period. Some very encouraging events - such as the Thana Irrigation Program - took place. Yet, in essence, the financially tight environment made the province poorer. Why? For the traditional reasons associated with scarcities.

When the pie is large enough and one is completely satiated, one does not really worry how large a slice the other fellow takes. However, when people fundamentally (superficially) dislike and distrust one another, when they have enormous appetites, when they expect generous portions, and when then they are confronted with a few crumbly slices (one person could gobble it all up), then the individuals around the table watch the distribution of every last crumb, spend an inordinate amount of counterproductive time counting crumbs, and, equally counterproductive, spend time devising and revising data to show why they should have more and why the other fellow (fellows) have in the past not been able to finish their portions.

The above somewhat simplified and heavy-handed scenario describes the 1965 Pakistan situation. To a large part the logical conclusion to this chain of events was the 1969-70 uprising.

July 1, 1965 marked the beginning of Pakistan's Third Five Year Plan. This Plan was drawn up on a rather generous scale. Even though

two pieces of sophistry (Indus Basin Works appropriations not counted as a plan expenditure and an impossible target for private investment in East Pakistan of Rs. crores 3800) made the Plan on paper seem more generous to the East than it really was. Still, the actual investment of the Plan allocations would have kept East Pakistan productive and busy, although not happy since it was unlikely that the disparity in per capita incomes would have diminished. Even before the Plan began in April 1964 - the Rann of Kutch conflict occurred in West Pakistan, the United States summarily suspended foreign aid to Pakistan and India, and the Third Five Year Plan was already in question. The Rann of Kutch is far removed from East Pakistan; the repercussions were not. The September War was just the frosting on the cake (block that metaphor).

Following the seventeen day war a new atmosphere prevailed. The surge of economic activity - construction and some industry - depended on sufficient resources for both provinces. The cut back on foreign aid and the increase in defense spending changed the focus of economic development for the nation to completion of on-going projects and to concentration of quick pay-off endeavors like agriculture. This environment favored West Pakistan. West Pakistan had more on-going projects to be completed and agricultural research in and for West Pakistan had just reached pay - dirt - Mexi-Pak wheat and IRRI 8 rice.

Thus in East Pakistan an atmosphere of optimism and bouyancy in 1964 changed into one of struggle and frustration for those engaged in economic development. However, the politicians and the press would not

admit this change of atmosphere which meant that the government officials and the thinking community were confronted with a hypocritical environment, in which the central government engaged largely in a numbers game to make it seem that an attempt was being made to overcome the disparity in income between the two Provinces while, in fact, this disparity was widening.

#### Relations with India

Geopolitically one would expect that the tension between Pakistan and India would have a different effect on each Province. Following the 1965 war several distortions cropped up in the East Pakistan economy because the stoppage in trade between the two countries. Coal, limestone, and cement previously imported from India were the most important. The stoppage of the river traffic from Asam also meant some loss in revenue to East Pakistan. Traditionally, of course, East Pakistan and India have much more reasons for trade, although this balance is changing with the possibility of exporting surplus West Pakistan foodgrain to India.

The author merely points to this potentially incendiary issue to avoid the criticism of having omitted it. However, the author will go no further and leave this issue to the political scientists and politically oriented economists.

Summary:

East Pakistan did make some economic progress in the 1964 to 1968 period. Perhaps the most concrete measure is that public expenditures increased from Rs. 1.48 billion in the fiscal year 1965 to 2.96 billion in fiscal 1968. However, the pace could have been much faster even with the same allocation of resources if the province had had a leader oriented to real economic development or one responsive to the demands of the people, if the central government had loosened some of the excessive overcentralization, if the central government had tried to face, if the foreign aid givers had considered the inherent differences between East and West Pakistan, and if many of the East Pakistani administrators and politicians had also realized those differences and concentrated on fundamental economic projects rather than "pie in the sky" imitations of the large projects in West Pakistan.

The Causes of the Uprisings  
A Second Hand Impression

The uprisings in 1968 and 1969 occurred after the author's departure. In hindsight the uprisings seem predictable, but yet they were not predicted. The author does not have the competence to go deeply into the causes of the uprisings - not being in East Pakistan, not speaking Bengali, etc. The paper is more interested in what the implications of the uprising will be for future economic policy.

One of the major causes of the uprisings was the failure to remove Governor Abdul Monem Khan. The Governor was reputed to be corrupt and he was employing more and more thug-like tactics to silence the opposition and to keep law and order. The concensus was that he was hated universally, and much of the dissatisfaction which erupted was directed at the Governor.

A corollary of the first reason is that the army was the only institution which could really maintain the law and order, and the army leaders did not want to shoot to keep any of the political triumvirate - the President, the Governor of West Pakistan, or the Governor of East Pakistan - in power, because of their corruption or that of their families. Knowledgeable analysts have asserted that the removal of Governor Abdul Monem Khan as late as December 1968 might have averted the uprisings.

A major political irritant was the "Agartala Conspiracy Trial". The trial was openly held, and its effects seem to have been to unite the East Pakistanis behind Sheik Mujibur Rahman, who was already in jail. The reasons behind this trial should certainly be studied and analyzed.

Four other factors were important. The publicity campaign proclaiming the "decade of progress" under President Ayub Khan was simply an affront to the intelligence of the East Pakistanis, and yet the celebration of this decade was being carried out with an intensity not to be believed. This offensive publicity campaign added fuel to the frustration of the articulate East Pakistan political mass; whose views were being not only disregarded but also suppressed.

The behaviour and corruption of some of the civil servants is cited by some as an important factor. It would be difficult to determine how important this was, but it certainly played a role since the civil servants were generally disliked by the intellectuals and even more so because of the close relationship and even obeisance of some of the officers

to the Governor. Examples of arrogance and favoritism by government officers (not only CSP's) could not be claimed an exception. This package presented a target to the many who felt that they had been politically emasculated.

Within the civil service syndrome one would have to mention the disillusionment that many officers and citizens suffered at the disingenuousness of the Central Government. Neither the public sector nor the private sector could get to first base. The ground rules were constantly shifting. Thus, some influential government servants and citizens who might have attempted to pull or ameliorate the uprisings became sympathetic toward this type of action since it seemed to be the last and only recourse for change.

Lastly - and hardly ever mentioned - an election was in the offing and the campaigning and organizing preceding an election campaign certainly fanned the fires of discontent. It really seems that the uprising was one that was finally sparked off by the democratic process of an election, although the logs had been well stacked over the 1964 to 1968 period.

It is best to leave such analysis to history or at least to the instant historians - neither one of the author's pigeon holes.

#### The Implications of the Uprisings on Economic Policy

The implications of the uprisings seem clear. East Pakistan learned the power of popular action. It seems very likely that the people may again resort to such action unless some of the more obvious demands for a decent life are satisfied.

Basically this means that the political leadership will have to respond to the demands of the people, and for improved economic performance this will mean considerable delegation of authority to the provincial capitals or to the provincial governments. The extent and nature of this delegation will depend on the result of the constitutional assembly and the election. Even if the election should not take place and martial law continues, then sensible martial law administrators will have to delegate authority or be prepared to face another uprising resulting from the inevitable bottlenecks of overcentralization.

The battle for resources with West Pakistan will also sharpen. East Pakistan will want more than its current share of the available resources to compensate for the past. With the abandonment of one unit, the various provinces of West Pakistan will also be clamoring for resources. Thus, the East Pakistan Government - politicians and administrators - will be under real pressure to perform or to face popular revolt. The proposed economic policy attempts to highlight those programs which would satisfy the most people in the short run and prepare the economy for development in the long run.

### An Economic Policy for East Pakistan

There is one fundamental assumption underlying the proposed economic policy for East Pakistan; namely that the Government of East Pakistan will have considerable real control over the allocation of resources; foreign exchange, local currency, human, etc. That control over allocation of resources does not imply separatism, degrees of autonomy, or so many other things which many with a fixed gestalt would like to read into "control over resources." Rather control over the allocation of resources implies that the people of East Pakistan through their government will have a strong voice in the economic program for that Province. If the economic program does not satisfy the people, then the people may well rise up against the Government - Provincial, Central, or what have you. It may, however, be literally impossible to construct an economic policy which will satisfy the people. Perhaps even after the introduction of an optimum economic policy, the people of East Pakistan will be dissatisfied and rise up because the resource base - financial, natural, and human - is just not there - a very dreary thought but regrettably not a far-fetched one.

What set of policies and projects will lead to the satisfaction of the people. At least two clarifications are necessary at the outset. First, satisfaction in the context of this paper refers mainly to economic satisfaction, but not entirely. It is assumed that the articulate political mass of East Pakistan will not tolerate a repeat of the "robber barron" experience and that more gradual economic growth will be chosen over more

rapid growth with small consideration for a somewhat equitable (not equal) distribution of income. Second, "people" in this paper refers to all of the people in East Pakistan as opposed to the articulate political mass generally educated and urban.

A sensible economic policy must be custom-tailored to the environment. This paper does not present a fully integrated economic policy. It simply hits the high points and is very much geared to the short-run. What are the really salient characteristics of East Pakistan:

- 1) dense population (extreme poverty),
- 2) 85 to 90% rural population (little industry),
- 3) low agricultural productivity,
- 4) rich soil, jute, and natural gas only  
bright spots in otherwise barren natural resource base,
- 5) high degree of illiteracy,
- 6) subject to literally fantastic natural calamities -  
hurricanes and floods - on an almost regular basis.

What programs and policies suit these conditions and what phasing and emphasis can be used? An examination of the measures and counter measures to the above list is summarized in Table 1 (below)

Table 1

Salient Characteristics of East  
Pakistan and Relevant Remedy or Policy.

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Action</u>
1) Dense Population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Family Planning</li><li>- Education</li><li>- Greater control over environment - floods, disease, etc.</li></ul>
2) 85% to 90% rural population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- improve agricultural production through use of modern inputs - better seeds, pesticides, fertilizer, irrigation, credit;</li></ul>
3) low agricultural productivity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- give farmers incentive to grow by sensible price policies, accessibility to markets (village roads</li><li>- emphasize fisheries - inland + ocean;</li><li>- improve village life through reasonable diet at reasonable prices:</li><li>- education;</li><li>- greater control over nature;</li><li>- rural electrification;</li><li>- physical comforts<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- housing</li><li>- drainage</li><li>- rural electrification</li></ul></li><li>- reduce rural population<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- family planning</li><li>- industrialization.</li></ul></li></ul>
4) rich soil, jute, and natural gas only real natural resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- raise agriculture productivity</li><li>- give the highest priority to every phase of jute from new products to new markets to analysis of status quo and implementable course for altering status quo.</li><li>- exploit natural gas now through large scale petro chemical complex and concomitant fertilizer plants, etc.</li></ul>

- 5) high degree of illiteracy
    - educational TV
    - better pay for teachers, local control of schools
    - teacher training
    - family planning
  
  - 6) natural calamities
    - exploit all feasible short-run techniques
    - pure and applied research for long-run solutions.
- 

What can be made of this melange? In such a critical situation everything should begin at once. In fact, it should have all been begun years ago, but in the reality of financial and human resources how should East Pakistan apportion its efforts today. Five areas deserve the bulk of the attention, and this paper will devote itself only to them:

- 1) family planning
- 2) improving agricultural productivity through modern inputs
- 3) large scale petro-chemical complex
- 4) educational TV
- 5) a strategy for approaching hurricanes and floods.

To many of the administrators and citizens of East Pakistan, and even advisors to East Pakistan, this seems like a list without sex appeal. The reaction to this list is that it will not permit the making of sufficient investments to overcome the disparity of income with West Pakistan. This conditioned reflex must now be suppressed and sublimated to a new approach of how can East Pakistan get the best results from the resources it has at its disposal and how can East Pakistan increase its resource base?

The conditioned response for monumental projects must go, and in its place must come an attitude of doing the most with what the Province has. This approach does not imply any sort of Morgenthau Plan for East Pakistan. Rather this approach demands a structuring of priorities and a high premium to the rapid execution of projects and a high penalty against premature action with equal penalty points being assessed against inaction and delay when a project is ready to go.

This point in the East Pakistan context deserves belaboring. The fundamental assumption of this economic policy is control over resource allocation and resource mobilization and along with control comes the responsibility for results. Rapid results do not mean only small projects with short gestation periods. Rapid results come from the recognition of gestation periods, of human resources, of financial resources, of eventual benefits to the economy, etc., and this typical set of criteria in times of scarce resources plays against the huge bridges and the major works which East Pakistan needs, but which East Pakistan cannot now afford.

Thus a second caveat can be inserted into an economic policy for East Pakistan - namely that with control comes responsibility for results. Focusing again on the East Pakistan setting this means that a successful economic policy must produce results in the rural areas. In effect, then a very large part of the problem is the successful implementation of programs in the rural areas and this requires a

government sympathetic with, and understanding of, the rural areas along with an effort at organizing the rural population as much as possible to be receptive to what the government is offering. The conceptual framework required for successful programs will be dealt with in the discussion of the specific programs, but a third caveat emerges; namely in considering the administration of programs in the rural areas the government should err on the side of decentralization, local authority, and local initiative. Concentration of power in the capital of East Pakistan can be as counter-productive as concentration of power in Islamabad or Karachi.

Concentration of power can also become a problem if the public sector becomes too dominant (whatever that means). The general political sentiment of the sub-continent tends toward socialism, but a somewhat passé socialism in terms of economic effectiveness. The economy of East Pakistan is too poor to afford the luxury of a political ideology which uses resources ineffectively. This is not to say that resources must yield maximum growth or that public sector activity must be minimized. Rather an economic policy must assess the human resources and the institutional settings along with a political philosophy. An assessment of this sort leads to the obvious conclusion that public sector effectiveness must be strengthened and private sector activity encouraged in those areas in which the private sector belongs. The potential ills of wide gaps in the distribution of income can be handled indirectly without snuffing out the benefits of private sector initiative. The physical constraints of East Pakistan are such that the current role of the public sector is already overburdening. Any expansion of public sector should be undertaken with the

knowledge that the probability of failure will be high because of the already existing over-extension of the public sector

### Family Planning

Family planning heads the list of priorities for any policy in East Pakistan for the obvious reason that it is more difficult to make progress when one goes against the tide and an increasing population on a tiny land mass such as East Pakistan represents a tidal wave. No specific proposal on how family planning can be rapidly introduced is discussed in this paper, since this is a subject far outside the competence of the author. However, the following general strategy is crucial, and, even trite. The best people within and without the government should devote themselves to this program. Any outside assistance required should be arranged. The program should be fully funded and under constant scrutiny to see that it is bearing fruit (pun unintended but too delightful to eradicate). It will probably be fruitful to explain this rather heavy-handed articulation of the "motherhood is good" variety in terms of the author's advisory experience. The problem of family planning is so crucial that it tends to be subsumed and almost forgotten in even the undramatic atmosphere of constructing a concrete strategy for increasing agricultural production. Family planning will probably have a long gestation period. However, this is the crucial program and whatever can be done to expedite its effectiveness should be done. Much already has been done. A good economic policy should integrate that past experience and expose it to the best minds to attempt to do even better and better faster.

### Agricultural Productivity

The same rush for progress must be made on increasing agricultural productivity and production, but more attention and certainly more paper has been devoted to this sector than to family planning. A small insight into economic planning would be useful at this point. Economic planning should result in making the best (any definition) choice among alternatives. Planning is almost always carried out in an atmosphere of constraints. One of the major constraints in East Pakistan has been a financial one and it is assumed that this constraint will continue for some time to come, and, in fact, it could very well worsen. The following statement should be considered in the perspective of the above background in planning. With regard to increasing the agricultural production the government should see that the financial constraint does not interfere with the maximum dissemination of pesticide, fertilizer, improved seed, low-lift pumps, and tubewells. This is not to say that all these inputs should be provided free of charge to the cultivator. Rather these inputs should be readily available and they should be priced in such a way that it is very much in the farmer's economic interest to use them. The economists can specify the prices for the inputs and determine the total funds involved. The point is that over the next few years the payback from using these inputs will be so great to the economy, while the absolute sums involved can be readily accommodated even within the very limited resources of the Province. In the instance of these inputs the government should again err on the side of overinvestment rather than finetuning the projections of demands, etc. and risking shortages.

The government must take an entirely different outlook on inputs. The question to be asked is "enough" and not "too much". The development of a higher yielding rice seed is imminent for East Pakistan (the successful and highly publicized IRRI 8 is unsuitable for the Aman season and not ideal for any season in East Pakistan). Nothing should stand in its way. The normal bureaucratic barriers should be totally ignored. This attitude toward research should continue even after the improved seeds are developed. The miracle variety seeds demand pesticide, fertilizer, and water. Not enough attention has been focused on pesticide. Actually, pesticide presents a rather interesting case. In 1968 it was said that pesticide in East Pakistan is free but unavailable, and this situation still persists. The pesticide was free of charge to the farmer but it had to be sprayed on by a Department of Agriculture employee, and he was rarely to be found. Furthermore, the Government itself was often in short supply. To remedy this would be difficult, but it would not be difficult to switch to a pellet type pesticide which the farmer could obtain (buy) along with his fertilizer and which like fertilizer he could apply himself. Similarly the right types of fertilizer should be available to the farmer. Similarly the demand for low-lift pump irrigation and tubewells should be satisfied and, in fact, maximum publicity and effort should be given to encouraging the expansion of the use of these inputs. As it becomes economic - and it probably already is - these principal inputs should be manufactured locally. However, they should be available regardless of source.

### Exploitation of Fish Potential

Not enough has been done about the exploitation of the fish potential of the Province. The rivers, the tanks, and the ocean are rich sources. It seems really as if fisheries have to a large extent been overlooked. Like family planning fisheries emerges high on every priority list, but then not enough is done about it (it should be repeated that Pakistan and East Pakistan have had a very successful family planning program in relative terms, but in absolute terms - e.g., getting a man to the moon, the atomic bomb, or even Mangla dam -, very much more could have been done).

What should be done about it? Fisheries should receive at least the same amount of research effort as rice. A specific program to stock the tanks of East Pakistan should be implemented immediately and monitored by a top flight administrator. The feasibility of the optimum storage system - perhaps freeze drying - should be examined to reduce the seasonal fluctuations in the price of fish and to permit the fish to be transported throughout the Province. Also a program should be developed to introduce those ocean fish which are religiously acceptable to the Muslims into the regular diet. An export policy for the non-acceptable could also be explored. One possible export arrangement would be a barter deal with neighboring Burma.

The above is obviously not an economic policy for fish production. It is not intended to be. Rather it is intended to flag the increasing of the exploitation of the fisheries potential as one of the highest priority programs - falling between second and fourth place -, which cannot be overlooked any longer in a Province which is scarce in land and rich in water.

### Large Scale Petro-Chemical Complex

Immediate work must commence on a large-scale petro-chemical complex to provide East Pakistan with another indigenous raw material which will form the industrial base for the Province's economic development. This concept deserves clarification. East Pakistan must convert its natural gas into raw materials and products which feasibly could be exported and which can be substituted for items which are now imported. More specifically petro-chemicals should be used to produce PVC roofing which will be substituted for the g.i. steel which is now used. PVC pipe should replace steel pipe. Plastic frames could be used for bicycles rather than steel. To return to the general, imaginative use must be used of the output from the petro-chemical complex to compensate for the scarcity of natural resources so that East Pakistan can produce goods and satisfy the increased demand resulting from the greater income to the cultivators from his increased agricultural production.

The reason that work must commence immediately is that construction of large-scale petro-chemical complexes have relatively long gestation periods and the output from such a complex could be used today. This complex must be in the public sector since it will be a monopoly. However, this public sector project will feed both public and private sector industries.

A large-scale petro-chemical complex will force development. It is assumed that foreign exchange will be very scarce in the near term and that foreign exchange will continue to be under the control of the government be it central or provincial. With government control over foreign exchange many entrepreneurs or potential entrepreneurs shy away from going into industry which require imported raw materials, spares, or machinery, because the

Government can - sometimes arbitrarily - affect their production and profits by raising tariffs, altering the exchange rates, banning imports, etc. This uncertainty seems to affect the untried entrepreneur more than the experienced industrialist, who has the wherewithal to deal with the government and to absorb short-term losses. The large scale petro-chemical complex with a sensible price policy - and at the outset with excess productive capacity - will give the untried industrialist a sure flow of local raw materials and the scarcity of foreign exchange will provide the industrialist with a generally protected market.

#### Optimize Jute Production

Raw and manufactured jute have earned much of the foreign exchange which has financed Pakistan's development. Jute will have to continue to carry a heavy burden; therefore the most should be made out of it.

Jute policy has received sufficient academic attention.<sup>1</sup> This paper does not intend to formulate still another one. Rather this paper will set out the aims of a rational jute policy. A jute policy should aim for

1. a price incentive to the farmer to grow jute;
2. a relatively stable price for raw jute on the world market;
3. a rationalization of the existing jute mills and an improvement in their ability to export manufactured jute - including new markets;
4. a research program for new products to be made from jute;
5. a research program to improve the per acre yield of jute.

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<sup>1</sup> Repetto, Robert, "Optimal Export Taxes in the Short and Long-run: Pakistan's Policies Toward Raw Jute Exports." To be presented at the DAS Conference, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, June 1970.

Profits of gloom have been burying jute since 1952. They have been proven wrong, but the Government of Pakistan must recognize that the threat is growing and the repercussions that would result from the loss of these export earnings. This implies that the Government must be willing to invest resources in price stabilization and research programs. On the new product research the Government should probably have the research done abroad; so that jute can be integrated into the forefront of fibre technology.

#### Combatting Natural Calamities

The ultimate aim of any rational economic policy must be the combatting of the natural calamities - hurricanes and floods - so that the people of East Pakistan can live a life somewhat similar to others throughout the world. The fantastic annihilation which results on a fairly regular basis is known to scholars of Bengal, but not really appreciated by the world at large.

This paper will draw attention to hurricanes, but not deal with them in detail. However, hurricanes must be studied with at least as much gusto as floods. A logical approach would be the development of the most reliable possible early warning system (note should be taken of the accuracy of weather forecasts in the developed world), an effective system of communications with the danger areas, an area of protection or escape for the people (and animals if possible) and ultimately a reliable protection against the vast tidal bores, which accompany the hurricanes.

The real first step in dealing with hurricanes will be finding this problem a bureaucratic niche.

Floods seem to be an even more complex problem than hurricanes. Politics have compounded the complexity. The action of India on the upper reaches of the Ganges have added a random unknown to an almost unsolvable problem. The search for an investment program which matches the Indus Basin Works in West Pakistan has stimulated thinking about a flood control plan which has never been simulated against the actual hydrological vicissitudes - which in themselves are only now being systematized - to determine whether the flood control plan would actually work.

How can this problem be approached? An immediate inventory should be made of the Province to see what flood control projects could be implemented immediately and what the cost and benefits of these projects would be (irrigation and drainage must be included in flood control projects if possible). Concurrently, an inventory should be taken of the areas which remain exposed and the data or action required to permit the designing of projects for these areas. Implicit in this second inventory would be the leadtimes necessary for the firming up of data which would be necessary for the engineering of the projects as well as a rough estimate of the cost of this second line of projects.

One can expect that the total costs of such a program will be immense. This means that the Province will have to proceed on this issue in relation to the resources at its command. More concretely it will require three steps. First, the undertaking of those integrated projects which have the highest pay-off. Second, a program of temporary protection and subsequent relief for areas which in the short-run cannot be protected

from flooding. Third, a very heavy investment in research to see whether it is hydrologically possible to protect the whole Province against floods (perhaps 90% of the time?) and then to see what the costs of this solution would be and how the Province can put itself into a posture to afford such a program. The loss of human life and the spreading of disease does not fall comfortably under economic scrutiny. The leaders of the people and the people themselves will have the final say on this issue. In fairness to both, however, the most rational possible approach to this emotionally charged issue should be taken.

Combatting Illiteracy and Preparing for  
Modernization - A Short-run Approach

This section will emphasize educational TV as the prime quick pay-off means of combatting illiteracy and facilitating the modernization - principally agricultural but also industrial - of East Pakistan. The general improvement of the educational system will take some time. It will require extensive decentralization and local participation on school committees. It will require a changing of the image of the teacher, the encouraging of women participating in primary education, the raising of salaries, the improvement of teacher training, and a general adjustment of the curriculum to suit modern Pakistan and the modern world. The education policy proposed by Air Marshal Nur Khan in July, 1969<sup>1</sup> was a good beginning. Heavy emphasis and considerable investments should be made in education, but this investment will take a good ten to fifteen years at a minimum to begin yielding a real return.

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<sup>1</sup>Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education and Scientific Research, Proposals for A New Educational Policy, July 1969.

Educational TV could make a much more rapid impact. The Television Corporation of Pakistan projected that 90% of the Province will be reachable by TV by the end of 1971. This literally means a captive audience of nearly the entire rural population, if sets are available, since there are little alternative opportunities for entertainment in the village. TV would precede electricity to the village. The sets would be placed in every thana and union headquarters.

The investment for such a program to the Government would be minimal. Initially it would mean obtaining 50,000 reliable battery operated sets - one for every union with 10,000 spares to replace disabled sets - plus the extensive training of TV mechanics. Secondly, it would require the obtaining or development of good educational material.

The author does not have in mind an educational TV which is used in the schools. Rather it would go on in the afternoons and during a great deal of the prime time. A Bengali or even the original "Sesame Street" would be the key to the literacy program. Family planning and agricultural practices and simple lessons on machines, electricity use, would be seen during the evening along with a repeat of the literacy program. There is only one channel and this situation should remain so that the alternative to not watching educational TV would be not watching at all for a good part of the time.

One must remember that a tremendous amount of orientation to the modern world is required. People just are not used to automatic devices, and this can be learned from TV. Like others educational TV is a program that will need good administration, but it is a program which is perfectly tailored to the receptivity of the Bengalis to good teaching.

Short-run Improvements in Standard of Livings

The degree to which the standard of living improves depends in the long run on the effectiveness of the economic policy and the effectiveness of its implementation.

However, in the short-run it is imperative to stabilize the price of food at a level which permits at least the maintenance of a subsistence diet - and hopefully an improvement in that diet. The Government of Pakistan must solve this problem or else risk instability which will thwart orderly economic progress. A new approach must be made to this problem. As in the case of investment in fertilizer, investment in family planning, etc., the projections should err on the high rather than the low side. This is not only good politics but good economics. The seasonal variations in price can be smoothed by any over-purchases. Furthermore, the Province requires a stockpile (minimum of three months) of food as an insulation against the variation in the crop that result from the natural conditions. It would seem unrealistic to project enough domestic food production to achieve price stability and a sufficient stockpile before 1974. This means that food must come in from an outside source - namely West Pakistan or the U.S. or possibly Canada.

The above paragraph may strike the reader as both pedestrian and obvious. It is, but the point is that this food (generally food grain) issue has not been faced squarely in the past, and squabbles over statistics, transfer payments between the Provinces, and debt burdens have inflicted an unnecessary and uneconomic injury on the people of East Pakistan, since inevitably measures were taken on an expedient rather than an orderly basis - after the damage was done.

What short-run improvements can be made in village life? The introduction of TV and particularly educational TV should have a dramatic effect, since TV will precede electricity in most areas. The benefits have already been discussed in the section on educational TV. In addition continued investments in labor intensive activities such as road building and drainage will not only increase the incomes but also the accessibility to new markets and new ideas. Actually the improvement in village life should come in the short-run with the improvement in agricultural production and this will mean that the goods which the villager wants to purchase are available at reasonable prices (ergo the high priority of the petro-chemical complex).

Improvement in urban life will take longer. One small but worthwhile investment would be an examination and increase in the investment in urban transportation. Presently the conditions are horrible, and the conditions create a very incendiary atmosphere. In addition there is a tremendous social cost of long trips to work. In absolute terms these investments would not be great while the social payback could be significant.

Conclusion:

The economic policy may seem like a shot-gun approach. To some extent it is, but purposely so because the programs and the nature and timing of investments in this economic policy would differ from an economic policy suggested by Pakistani economists or by the aid giving agencies. This economic policy is more of a "genie" approach. If you could implement five policies for East Pakistan (given the constraint of resources) what would they be.

The policies may seem reasonable to a non-economist. but, particularly to the East Pakistani economist, this program might seem like "more of the same" and raise the question of when are we going to play for real money. The answer is that East Pakistan will probably be playing for real money from now on, and therefore should indulge in those programs which will pay-off in real money.