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9. ABSTRACT Examines some aspects of the relation between Namibia's major ethnic groups insofar as they are differentially integrated in the socio-economic and political systems. The report is organized into five main sections: "Introduction;" "Historical Overview;" "Ethnicity and the Socio-Economic Structure;" "Ethnic Factor in Political Parties and Political Leadership;" and, "Summary." Major considerations are given to the character of historical and political factors that have linked and divided Namibian ethnic groups in the past and do so at present and also to the probable effect of interethnic relations on political processes involved in the transition to majority rule. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the mere presence of diverse ethnic groups within the boundaries of African Nation-States need not inevitably give rise to ethnic strife. Political coups in Africa generally represent power struggles between political elites rather than inter-ethnic conflict. Whether or not interethnic rivalry will surface and disrupt the process of smooth transition to majority rule in Namibia is problematic. Realignment of the occupational structure to bring about greater equity among the differential positions occupied by ethnic groups will lessen the possibility of inter-ethnic strife over competition for skilled and semi-skilled employment opportunities. The long range prospects for national integration appear to rest upon the capacity of the new government to redistribute scarce resources.

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
FINAL REPORT

THE MULTI-ETHNIC
FACTOR IN NAMIBIA

by

William A. Shack

January 20, 1977
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Topographical Survey, 1963
 T.S.O. Map 2113

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CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW	3
III. ETHNICITY AND THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE . .	9
IV. ETHNIC FACTOR IN POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP	26
V. SUMMARY	31
NOTES	42
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CITED AND CONSULTED . . .	47

TABLE

I. AFRICAN POPULATIONS IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA: 1921	7
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APPENDICIES

I. TABLES

1. Identification and Composition of Reference Groups	
2. Population Growth	
3. Industrial Distribution of Economically Active Population: 1951 and 1960	
4. Native Male Labour Force, According to Ethnic Group and Industry, 1966	
5. Native Male Labour Force, According to Ethnic Group and Certain Types of Work, 1966 . . .	
6. Trading Licences Issued to Natives, 1965 and 1966	
7. Africans by Population Group	

8. Population Groups in Urban and Rural and Home Areas, 1960

I. MAPS

Frontispiece: Namibia (South West Africa)

A. South West Africa before the Herero Revolt (1902)

B. European Settlement and African Territories in 1911

C. Population Redistribution: 1900--Odendaal Plan

D. The Present-Day Land Position in South West Africa

III. CHART

1. Political Parties and Tribal Groups in Namibia, 1975

INTRODUCTION

Namibia is a large territory, approximately 318,261 square miles in size. It is sparsely populated. Census reports estimate the population to be about 855,000 souls, who constitute at least a dozen "ethnically distinct" groups, further divisible into some 63¹ sub-groups varying greatly in strength of identification. This report examines some aspects of the relations between Namibia's major ethnic groups insofar as they are differentially integrated in the socio-economic and political systems. Major considerations are given first, to the character of historical and political factors that have linked and divided Namibian ethnic groups in the past and do so at present; secondly, to the probable effects of inter-ethnic relations on political processes involved in the transition to majority rule.

The following section (II) of this report presents an historical overview of the patterns of migration, settlement, and ensuing conflicts between indigenous Namibian African ethnic groups, the period of German rule over the territory during which took place the relocation of non-whites to restricted areas, and the relations between Namibians, whites, and non-whites, with South Africa in the period after World War I. Section III examines the ethnic factor in the socio-

economic structure of Namibia, with attention focused on the differential positions occupied by the three major categories of ethnic groups--Africans, Coloureds and Whites--in the agricultural, mining and manufacturing sectors of the economy, and as well on the unequal distribution of ethnic groups in skilled and non-skilled occupations.

A number of cultural and national links exist between some Namibian ethnically related groups living outside the country itself. The significance of this extra-territorial factor in the context of ethnicity is reviewed, especially as it relates to the Owambo, the largest of the African Namibian ethnic groups, who are also found in neighboring Angola, and the ties Namibian whites have maintained with Germany and South Africa. The final substantive section of the report (IV) focuses on the ethnic factor in Namibian political parties and the scramble for political leadership, the ethnic overtones of which have surfaced as Namibia approaches the period of transition to majority rule. The Summary, section V, attempts to restate as problems of analysis the critical issues raised in the general discussion that prompt questions, the answers to which require more factual data than are available at the time of preparation of this report.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

It is generally agreed that the Bushmen constitute the oldest group now residing in the territory. The first Portuguese expeditions can be traced to the close of the 15th century, at much the same time as the Nama and Dama were settling among the indigenous Bushman (San).³ During the 16th and 17th centuries the bulk of the Owambo and Okavango migrations from central Africa arrived, and in the 18th century the Herero moved in from Angola. The Khoisan peoples who speak "click" languages included culturally incompatible nomadic hunters (Bushmen and Dama) and roaming pastoralists (Nama). But the first Bantu groups were all sedentary agriculturalists who kept cattle and settled in unoccupied--except by the Bushmen whose claims no group respected--Owamboland, the Okavango and the Eastern Caprivi. The inhabitants of this latter area, though of Bantu stock, are ethnically linked to groups in Zambia and Botswana rather than Namibia. The Herero, however, were nomadic pastoralists. The only Bantu people who entered the country through the Kaokoveld, they penetrated into the more arid southern regions leading to their protracted struggles with the Dama and Nama People. Here, it should be noted that coincident with the migration and resettlement of diverse African ethnic groups was the movement into Namibia of the Trek-Boers from South Africa. More will be

said about the Trek-Boers later.

By the end of the 18th century, then, peoples with at least three basic lifestyles may be distinguished: the nomadic hunters and gatherers (Bushmen and Dama), the nomadic herdsmen (Nama and Herero), and the sedentary peoples (Owambo and Okavango) --agriculturalists and herdsmen. These more settled northern peoples, the Owambo and Okavango, apparently had minimal relations with the rest of the groups in the territory until the establishment of the South African Administration in 1915. It was in the South that inter-group conflict began, competition between Nama and Herero over scarce grazing land being particularly bitter.

The 19th century saw the arrival of other groups with yet different lifestyles: the Oorlams, Basters and Whites. The first hailed from the turbulent northern Cape of the 1820's to 1840's, and were organized in nomadic, militarized factions. A mixture of Khoi and white stock, they owned horses and fire arms and spoke a Dutch dialect. They soon came to dominate Namaqualand and in 1840 they and the Nama repulsed the southern moving Herero. A long and debilitating war followed throughout the 1860's; indeed the weakening of the antagonists made for renewed instability and power passed from one Oorlam faction to another. In the late 1860's the Basters, another mixed white-Khoi group, crossed the Orange River and in 1870 established themselves at Rehoboth.

These power shifts made the area around Windhoek (then and now the only 'urban' area in Namibia) a centre of inter-group rivalry for it lay midway between Herero and Nama grazing lands. Tension was increased by the presence of Trek-Boers to the east of Windhoek throughout the 1870's, though European influence had long been on the rise. Various Protestant missions had been active since the 1830's, and by 1890, eighteen mission stations had been established among the Herero alone. By the 1840's economic links with the Cape had developed into a regular trading system: ostrich feathers were the main export, and cattle, ivory, guano from the off-shore islands and some copper from Namaqualand. Cattle, ivory and feathers came largely from Herero territory but to reach the Cape had to pass through Oorlams dominated--but unstable--Namaqualand. Consequently both missions and traders agitated for outside intervention to stabilize the area so as to continue their operations.⁴ In 1878, Walvis Bay was annexed by Great Britain--and passed to the Cape Colony.

Further Nama campaigns in the 1880's cut off the Cape trade route. As a result British and South African interests had less incentive to oppose German colonial enthusiasm, and in 1884 the German flag was hoisted at Angra Pequena (Luderitz Bay).

The Germans played off the Nama and the Herero against

one another--and were in turn used by each group. But by not unfamiliar methods--concession companies, superior technology, confiscation of land and cattle as debt payment, the contrived appointment of sympathetic local leaders, the levying of taxes to generate a labour force, and the resort to the massive use of force--a tight rein was eventually established over the central Herero and Nama (Hottentot) regions, still known as the "Police Zone." In 1893, the Germans subdued the Nama, and in 1904 decimated the Herero. The survivors fled to what is now Botswana.

By the middle of 1892, the first German settlers arrived, and by 1907 the territory's white population numbered 8,200. Massive German immigration during the next two years raised the total white population to 14,000 of whom just over 10,000 were Germans.⁵ In 1915 the Germans surrendered to South African forces and some settlers and traders soon followed. After the war, South Africa repatriated the military, police and administrative personnel of the German community but permitted the farmers and traders to remain. By April 1919, half of the 12,000 Germans had been deported, though some property owners were later permitted to return to their farms. The 1921 census lists the white population at 19,432, of whom 7,855 were German. Growth may be attributed largely to generous incentive schemes for white South African settlers. Other groups were

estimated by the 1921 census as follows:⁶

TABLE I

Owambo	90,000
Herero	32,000
Damaras	21,000
Namas	21,000
Whites	19,500
East Caprivians	18,000
Kavangos	10,500
Kaokolanders	10,200
Bushmen	4,000

Source: J.H. Wellington, South West Africa and Its Human Issues, p. 275.

White rule was extended to the territory of the Owambo only during World War I. Armies from Portugal and South Africa raided the area and the two countries agreed to divide Owamboland between Angola and South West Africa, dividing the Owambo under different colonial administrations. The new administration failed to bring tranquility to the southern portion of the territory. The Basters toned down their demands for independence only when confronted by insuperable forces. And the Bondelswart Nama rebellion was but the most dramatic manifestation of general southern indignation at the administration's failure to

restore lands lost to the Germans, at the continued efforts to drive people into the wage economy and at restrictions on freedom of movement.

In 1925 a measure of self-government was granted the Whites. By 1928 they numbered almost 28,000, 11,600 urban and 16,300 rural. The non-whites in the Police Zone numbered 107,000: 20,000 in the reserves, 24,000 urban and 63,000 rural workers outside of the reserves.

New tensions between Germans and South Africans were created by the rise of Hitler and the Afrikaner-dominated legislative assembly seeking incorporation in the Union of South Africa. The commission of inquiry into the question found no objection to this, but the South African government thought the raising of the issue inopportune. However in 1948 the Nationalist Party Government permitted the South West African white electorate to send six members to the Union's House of Assembly. It was a later commission's findings, the "Odendaal Report,"⁷ which were to have considerably more impact. One of the central proposals was the extension of the Republic's "homeland" policy to South West Africa.⁸ Another was that almost all administration of the territory should now be conducted from Pretoria.

The most recent population statistics are presented in Table 2, (Appendix 1).⁹

ETHNICITY AND THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

Recent socio-economic statistics are largely lacking because South Africa has for some ten years merged Namibia's socio-economic statistics with those of the Republic. Apart from the "Odendaal Report" published twelve years ago, the South West Africa Survey, 1967 provides the fullest data.¹⁰ It is difficult to assess to what extent the implementation of the homelands policy in Namibia will affect the basic occupation structure. The now "self-governing areas" of Owambo, Davango and Eastern Caprivi no doubt provide some opportunities for non-white inhabitants to participate in a broader range of modern sector activities than before,¹¹ but it is certainly debatable to what extent this is likely to filter down to the mass of the population in these areas.

It is similarly debatable to what degree these changes are likely to affect the underlying socio-economic pattern. This appears to be the hardly untypical "dual economy" of so many settler-dominated territories: the whites control the relatively wealthy modern sector; the non-whites constitute the labour pool on which the modern sector depends and their earnings may be viewed as a supplement to the subsistence economies of the areas to which they have been assigned.

The picture differs between non-whites in the Police Zone and those in the northern areas. Interestingly, these northern, more populous areas which were first given "independence," are those areas least drawn into the modern sector.¹² Per capita income varies significantly not only between white and non-white, but between non-whites in the Police Zone and those in the northern sector:

Total population	R360	per capita
Whites only	R1602	" "
Non-whites, Police Zone	R229	" "
Non-whites, northern sector	R61	" "

Source: South West Africa Survey, 1967, p. 61.

The South West Africa Survey, 1974, cites 49.7% of all male inhabitants as "economically active" in 1970. This differs markedly from the figure for 1960 of 60.7% of all non-white males cited in the 1967 Survey. It is difficult to know what precise conclusions are to be drawn from this comparison, though it is worth pointing out that the population increased from 526,000 in 1960 to 762,000 in 1970.

The actual number of economically active persons (both male and female) increased by some 58,000 between 1960-1970, but only 28,000 of these were non-whites. So, it would seem, some 30,000 jobs were taken over by the white group, which

during this period increased by some 27,000 people.¹³

Of those 28,000 jobs, 3,000 went to agriculture and 25,000 to other sectors.¹⁴ The 1974 Survey indicates that agricultural employment in the "southern part of the Territory" (no longer called the Police Zone) has declined thus:

1970 -- 36.6%

1960 -- 40.9%

1954 -- 54.6%

Manufacturing and construction in the south increased:

1951 -- 7.8%

1960 -- 13.8%

1970 -- 17.7%

The same source points to a trebling in the northern areas of Black (substituted for the term "non-White") opportunities outside of agriculture--from 5317 in 1960 to 17,119 in 1970. The Survey omits converting these figures into percentiles, though Appendix 1, Table 3 indicates that in 1960 6.8% of the economically active population of the northern sector was engaged in non-agricultural activities. However, there is little doubt that recent investment in manufacturing and mining in the northern homelands has increased non-agricultural employment. And it will be pointed out below that the table under consideration would not seem to refer to northerners working in the southern sector.

Labour

In a publication entitled Owambo published in 1971 by South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs, it is said that "At present somewhat more than half of the 40,000 migrant workers in the central and southern parts of South West Africa come from Owambo and Kavango. The rest come from beyond the borders of South West Africa."¹⁵ This would seem to suggest that non-Whites resident in the southern sector are not migrant labourers. Whilst true that the contract labour system applies largely to residents of the northern sector, were the Odendaal Plan to be fully implemented, almost all of the African "homelands" would be a considerable distance from the white territory, and would presumably, as Owambo does today, regulate their own "international" labour relations. At the present time, though, it appears as if the Northern groups suffer considerably more social dislocation than do the southerners. The 1971/72 migrant workers strike consisted largely of Owambos. However, it is the southern peoples who face large-scale population relocation in terms of the Odendaal plan.¹⁶ And the likelihood of the proportion of migrant workers rising seems highly probable.

The United Nations suggests a figure of 50,000 migrant workers in 1973.¹⁷ Fraenkel (1974) opts for 43,000 in 1971.¹⁸ Kane-Berman (1972) as cited by Fraenkel, breaks down these migrants by sector as follows:

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Work-force</u>	<u>Percentage of total</u>
Farming	10,900	25
Domestic Service	2,700	6
Mining	12,800	30
Fishing	3,000	7
Government, Commerce and Industry	<u>14,000</u>	<u>32</u>
TOTAL	43,000	100

Almost all the 13,500 striking Owambos (perhaps half though more likely a quarter of the Owambo labour force) in 1971/72 were repatriated. However, substitute labourers could not be found and new agreements were drawn up for the strikers' return. This suggests a tight labour market in the southern sector, and/or a particular willingness of the Owambo vis-a-vis other non-white ethnic groups to participate in the cash economy. However, there is considerable land-hunger in Owamboland; local food production is inadequate, and one has to pay one's taxes. United Nations sources¹⁹ indicate that whilst Owamboland contains close to half the country's population, it covers only 8% of its area and contains no known natural resources.

Land Distribution

There is no doubt that the whites own the best agricultural land and control the mineral producing areas. Except for the Baster Gebiet and a few isolated "home area" pockets,

comprising in all some 10,000 square miles, the whole of the plateau hardveld, about 140,000 square miles, is white farmland. In a country where drought is the perennial enemy, white farms are where there is water. According to Wellington's calculations,²⁰ in 1960 land per capita was available thus:

Land <u>per capita</u> :	rural white population	2,008 ha.
	total white population	531 ha.
	Africans in reserves	68 ha.
	total non-white population	50 ha.

He indicates further that only about half of the non-white areas has water adequate for pastoral purposes, and that the increased territory proposed by the Odendaal plan does little to alleviate this. Not only do the whites control considerably more land than the other groups combined, but their land is far better and they are far fewer in number.²¹ Further, with few exceptions, it is in the white areas that the diamond fields, the copper and other mines, and the fishing ports are located.

Patterns of Employment and Income Distribution

The cost of living is highest in the northern areas because of transport costs--almost all manufactured goods are railed from the Republic--and because of the trading monopoly

exercised by the Bantu Investment Corporation.²² Reference has been made to the difference in per capita remuneration between whites, southern non-whites and northern non-whites (see page 10 above). What the figures fail to reveal is to which non-white category the migrant workers from the north who work in the south are assigned. In other words, is the northerner discriminated against not only because he is a non-white but also because he is a northerner?

It is virtually impossible to give anything but the crudest indication of the stake each ethnic group has in the present day economy. Little can be gleaned from the available figures as to which of the non-white groups are competing for scarce resources, be these jobs or access to travel documents, entrepreneurial opportunities, water, land or whatever. It need hardly be said that the whites stand to lose the most should the constitutional order be radically altered. Whilst non-white earnings have been rising rapidly in recent years so have those of the whites and the former remain extremely low. The 1967 South West Africa Survey compares Whites, Coloureds and northern and southern "indigenous inhabitants" in terms of activity in various economic sectors in 1960.²³ One can only guess, given the magnitude of the figures, that "Coloureds" refers to the Coloured population as such and probably the Basters, but excludes the Nama. The percentage

distribution figures speak largely for themselves. Bearing in mind that these figures are sixteen years old, we see a familiar African pattern emerging: the Whites occupy the modern, technology-utilizing sector; the Blacks geographically and culturally the most remote from the white centres are least involved in the modern sector; in the middle fall the half-castes, those closest culturally, and then the locals who are geographically closest.

The "Coloureds proper" of whom many hail from the Cape, are almost completely absorbed in the industries and small businesses of Windhoek, Walvis Bay and Luderitz--particularly the construction industry and lower-ranking civil service jobs. One suspects that the high percentage of persons engaged in agriculture consists largely of the Behoboth (Baster) Gebiet (see Appendix I, Table 3).

According to the table the northern territory appears almost untouched by modern sector activity. However, the discussion of migrant labourers above suggests that their economic role is misplaced within, if not excluded from the calculations.²⁴ Nonetheless, it seems plausible to suggest that the northern groups are gaining least from the present economic system, and life chances for those who stay at home are very limited. The Republic's Department of Foreign Affairs estimates that "5.7 million is remitted by Owambo workers to their country annually."²⁵ This is not much compensation for

the social dislocation of at least 20,000 families (and perhaps closer to twice that many), and hardly goes very far amongst a population of between 350,000 and 400,000. The recent Owambo strikes expressed this dissatisfaction.

However, the rather indistinct picture which the data suggest is not simply one of the continued immiseration and "enslavement" of the northern peoples. It is rather the picture of a group learning to deal with new ways and likely to find sources of strength in their new skills. The Owambo labour force is indispensable to the southern economy comprising more than half of the non-white total in 1966.²⁶ Nor are the Owambo confined to the ranks of the "unskilled."²⁷ Of the 1966 "native male labour force"²⁸ in the administration, the police, mines, commerce, industry and the railways, Owambos constitute 63.3% of those classed as semi-skilled, and most of the (few) clerical workers.²⁹ At this time the Owambo constituted some 44.4% of the total population, and 55.8% of the "native" population. It may also be significant that far more trading licenses have recently been issued to "natives" in the northern territories than elsewhere.³⁰

The Owambo it would seem, then, are finding entry into the modern sector necessary, if not attractive, and are more than holding their own within the truncated mobility range. Despite the gastarbeiter system within which they operate their

stake in the southern economy seems large. Whether this is cramping the mobility of the various southern peoples is difficult to gauge. The Owambo do occupy a greater proportion of the higher ranking jobs than their proportion of the "native" population--at least in terms of the figures presented in Table 5 (Appendix 1). The Damaras, the next largest native group, 10.4% in 1966, occupied 15.2% of the skilled positions and 11.1% of the semi-skilled. The Herero, 8.2% of the native population, occupied 10.5% of the skilled jobs and 5.3% of the semi-skilled. The Nama, 8.1% of the native population, has 7.3% of the skilled jobs, and 5.6% of the semi-skilled. The remainder of the native population, 17.4%, perform very poorly relative to the others. Together they notch up a mere 3.8% of the semi-skilled. Given this admittedly poor basis for comparison, it is these people--Okavango, East Caprivians, Bushmen, Kaokovelders, Tswana and others--who are doing least well in the "modernity stakes."

The above findings may be presented in table form thus:

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Proportion of 1966 "Native Populace"</u>	<u>Proportion of Skilled Jobs</u>	<u>Proportion of Semi-Skilled Jobs</u>
Owambo	55.8	63.3	75.5
Damara	10.4	15.2	11.1
Herero	8.2	10.5	5.3
Nama	8.1	7.3	5.6
Okavango			
East Caprivians			
Bushmen	17.4	3.8	2.5
Kaokovelders			
Tswana & Others			

The basic pattern is apparently clear. The smaller groups are underrepresented in the modern sector.³¹ A second, natural pattern would appear to be: groups geographically farthest from the modern centre are underrepresented in the modern sphere of activity. The migratory Owambo, of course, are excepted. The central question demanding further research is what disposes the Owambo to seek work in the modern sphere? And equally important is what inhibits the minority and periphery peoples from the same? Some clues have already been suggested. The Owambo population has more than quadrupled in the last hundred years³² whilst its territorial base has remained static. Yet the Kavango people have increased more than five-fold since 1921 without--so far as can be determined, given the above lumping together of the five disadvantaged groups--anything like a concomitant increase in modern sector participation. However, Wellington for one indicates that their territory has abundant natural food--fish, game, wild fruits--and is perhaps able to feed its swelling numbers. The northern peoples did not suffer the debilitating colonial wars, which decimated the southerners, the Herero in particular. There is little doubt that Owamboland is unable to support its burgeoning population, and equally little doubt that among the northerners it is the Owambo who do the migrating.³³ One suspects that this is primarily due to over-crowding for the sedentary Owambo are even

less likely, on cultural grounds, to be tolerant of a migratory employment pattern than are the various nomadic southern groups.

It was the South Africans who instituted large-scale Owambo migratory labour. The reason, it would seem, was that there was not enough labour in the Police Zone to man the rapidly growing modern economic sector, including agriculture. To quote Ruth First:

The first official incursion into the northern areas was that of the South African Army in 1915. The mission of the Commanding Officer was clear: 'to notify the Chiefs of South African occupation of South West Africa, and to invite them to co-operate in encouraging their people to come out for employment on the railways and elsewhere.'

Mention has already been made of the dislocation and demoralization of the southern groups at this time, and the Owambo were being groomed to fill the breach.

What then of the minority and periphery peoples? The Bushmen's style of life--comparable with that of the Australian aborigines--would make adaptation to modern social forms very difficult and their rating in the above table is relatively easy to understand. A fascinating question however lies in the high position of the Kamara people whose lifestyle was rather like that of the Bushmen. A similar puzzle lies in the different rating between the Herero and the Kaokovelders for the latter are in fact Herero who decided not to continue

south during the 18th century migration. Geographical isolation best explains the East Caprivians' ranking for their territory is cut off from the rest of the country by large swamp areas.

The above discussion has left out the role of the Whites, the Coloureds and the Basters. The latter form a largely self-contained community and in 1966 numbered some 13,700 or 2.2% of the total population. "The Basters' language is predominantly Afrikaans and their way of life is similar to that of the Whites. In the Rehoboth Gebiet animal husbandry is the chief occupation, although a diversified economy has developed in the township of Rehoboth."³⁴ The Basters and the Coloureds appear to be the southern groups least subject to relocation under the Odendaal plan; indeed, the Baster Gebiet is to be enlarged.

The Coloured community has grown remarkably, from 12,700 in 1960 to 32,000 in 1974, many coming from the Cape.³⁵ Though figures are scanty, it seems likely that the Coloureds are the most active of the non-white participants in the modern sector. In 1960 perhaps 5,000 Coloureds were active in non-agricultural employment.³⁶ This ratio is even higher than that of all (including agricultural) white workers vis-a-vis 1960 population, and is probably far higher than any other non-white group. Of course, the fact that Coloureds are largely urban wage earners does not imply that they are happy with the status quo. Comparisons between Coloured and other non-white earnings are unavailable, though if South Africa is any model, they are likely

to be slightly higher for Coloureds. In many circles--including the South African Government³⁷--the Nama, as well as the Coloureds and Basters, are included under the "Coloured" rubric. Whether this is likely to mean Nama "advancement" in terms of modern sector participation remains a fit subject for speculation. As for the Basters, they seem to have retained some of the autonomy they have always valued, and for that reason find the homelands project less of an affront than the other groups. The Coloureds, it is probably fair to say, are in a slightly sheltered position vis-a-vis the other non-white groups. After all, their immigration to the territory was approved if not encouraged by the South African authorities and they do share a cultural heritage with the Whites exemplified in their speaking of Afrikaans. It is likely that, as in the Republic, they are permitted to rise higher up the occupational hierarchy than the Black inhabitants. If so, their privilege will not have gone unnoticed.

Ethnicity and Extra-Territorial Factors

There are a number of links between some groups of Namibians and ethnically related groups in neighboring countries which one can do little else but mention. This is so either because contact is minimal--as in the case of the Bushmen³⁸ in Namibia and Botswana--or because information is so sparse, as it is on the relation between the Tswana people of Namibia and

Botswana. Other instances of this latter problem are first, the relationship between the Herero and a farther splinter group in addition to the Kaokovelders--the "Mbanderu faction" which fled to Botswana after the Herero-German War. Secondly, links between the Nama and other Khoi or Hottentot people in the north and south of the Republic's Cape province. Thirdly, ethnic ties between various east Caprivian groups and inhabitants of South Africa, Zambia and Botswana.

The African group with the most significant extra-territorial ethnic link is the Owambo. A fair number of Owambo, the exact number being unknown, live across from the Angolan border--precisely the area from which SWAPO guerrillas have been operating. What this link may mean to a future independent Namibia is impossible even to guess. Attempts at border revisions seem unlikely but it is significant that the largest Namibian group has sympathizers next door.

Links between the Coloureds and the Coloureds in the Cape are bound to be fairly strong particularly as so many of those in Namibia are recent immigrants. As with the history of migrant groups in Africa and elsewhere, it is not unlikely that kin ties link together a fair number of Coloureds in the Cape with those in Namibia, especially the most recent immigrants. Also, all Coloured affairs are handled by the same South African ministry, as, indeed, are those of the Nama. Coloured people,

naturally, are found in all parts of southern Africa and those in Namibia could, unlikely as the need may be, re-establish themselves almost anywhere.

The White population is made up of three main groups. Based on the 1970 census reported by Fraenkel, the breakdown was:

Afrikaans speaking	61,600
German speaking	20,000
English speaking	7,250
Other	1,800

The Afrikaners' attitudes with South Africa and Rhodesia need no spelling out. Ties with these same countries apply to the English speakers; links with other English-speaking countries--Great Britain in particular--may also be found. These links extend beyond a joint cultural heritage and blood ties; they include economic, religious and educational connections. This is also the case with the German community and many attend university in the Federal Republic. There are some 10,000 holders of German passports resident in the territory,³⁹ a figure that possibly excludes women and children.

The Whites, then, seem particularly dependent on external support for the maintenance of their position. Without the South African administration and foreign multi-national

economic activity the ruling groups would soon cease to remain so. Were South African support to be withdrawn, there would be scanty means whereby the whites could maintain dominance. And the fact of their close external ethnic affiliations would facilitate their relatively easy retreat from the centre of the Namibian stage.

ETHNIC FACTOR IN POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

The forerunner of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)--the Owambo and People's Congress (later, Organization)--was founded among Owambo labourers in Cape Town in 1958.⁴⁰ Today SWAPO considers itself a political party, which represents all the people of Namibia. It is not at all clear to what extent this is the case.⁴¹ No account of the ethnic composition of the organization is available;⁴² the fact that its leader, Sam Nujama is an Owambo may or may not be significant. Of course, even a "representative" organization would be heavily manned by Owambos. Hamutenga and Geingob inform us that in late 1964 "a regional organization in the Caprivi Zipfel, known as the Caprivi African National Union (CANU) formed early that year... relinquished its independent status and joined SWAPO."⁴³ Other circumstantial evidence which one may consider as bolstering SWAPO's claim is that the organization refuses to participate in any talks organized on ethnic lines and that it is recognized as "representative" by both the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. But there is evidence of the same calibre--or lack of it--the other way. A myriad of political groups are active within, and without, the territory. Many of these are clearly organized along ethnic lines, and some espouse much the same vision of a multiethnic, united Namibia as does SWAPO, e.g. the headmen of the Berseba Reserve and the Rehobeth Volkspartei.⁴⁴ One's

programme, then, is no guide to the composition of one's group, and the multitude of groups itself may give one pause before thinking that ethnic factors can be downplayed should constitutional change come about.

Reuter correspondent Paul Shurthwaite reports from the recent Windhoek (Turnhalle) constitutional conference as follows: 45

To his dismay, Chief Kapuuo [leader of the Herero delegation] and his 140 colleagues [of all ethnic groups] at the constitutional talks are widely seen as stooges handpicked by South Africans to fix a phony independence settlement.

'What basis do these people have at the UN and in SWAPO for saying we are stooges?' he asked. 'We want to get rid of South Africa, just as they do. The difference is that we want a peaceful solution.'

'Judging by the mistakes which have been made in other African countries, especially where there are different ethnic groups, it is absolutely necessary to make adequate preparations before independence,' he continued.

'It is understandable for the UN to put pressure on South Africa to withdraw from South West, but why have they selected one minority group, SWAPO, as the sole representative?... There are 11 main ethnic groups in this country and SWAPO represents a section of one of these groups, the Owambos.'

He described as 'nonsense' SWAPO's claim to have the support of 70% of the territory's 800,000 inhabitants.

But he said he would like to see SWAPO involved in the constitutional talks 'because they are South-Westerns.'

Chief Kapuuo also heads the National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO)--which is not unlikely to share the above views and to have a large Herero membership. According to South African sources,⁴⁶ NUDO came to be established after a split in the South West African National Union (SWANU)--founded as the original political organization of the Herero--over the "question of group loyalty." What this means is unclear, but there has long been dissension among the Herero (and other groups, like the Basters⁴⁷) over how widely to define "self-determination." Indeed, many ethnic groups are split in their attitude towards the "homeland" policy on a number of counts.

Those running the already independent homelands of Owambo and Kavango echo the South African Administration's nostrum that separate development will retain one's group's cherished ethnic identity and prevent dissension--because there will be no forum within which to disagree! Opposition to the Homeland governments is widespread. And if SWAPO is right the fact of "homeland rule" indicates little beyond "collaboration" between certain conservative chiefs and the

South African administration. However, both the Owambo and Kavango delegations who met with Secretary-General Waldheim in 1972 envisaged a future federation of these separate political entities.⁴⁸ On the same occasion the Damara delegation supported self-determination for each ethnic group within an independent Namibia and bitterly opposed the continuation of the white preserve. The Federal Coloured People's Party of South West Africa feared that a united Namibia could only lead to Owambo domination and therefore favored separate development.⁴⁹ Separate self-determination was also supported by those Herero behind a rival to chief Kapuuo and by the Rehoboth Baster Vereniging.

Ten opposition groups formed a national convention in 1970. These included SWAPO, NUDO, SWANU, and Rehoboth Volkspartei, the South West African United National Independence Organization (SWAUNIO), the headmen of three Nama Reserves--Berseba, Gibeon and Hoachanas, the Voice of the People, and the Damara headmen of the Otjimbingue Reserve. The National Convention opts for a unitary government for the whole of Namibia. The Damara, then, are not united on this question. According to the Council for Namibia,⁵⁰ the "'Voice of the People' later inclined towards the illegal South African regime in Namibia and left the National Convention." No details as to this organizations's membership or platform have been found. Fraenkel⁵¹ also mentions two other organizations which now participate in the National Convention: the Namib African People's Democratic Organization, and DEMKOP--

a worker's party founded in Ovamboland. The National Convention's executives, Fraenkel continues, "include representatives of all the African and 'coloured' political oppositions movements."⁵²

Political activity in Namibia, then, is extremely lively. Various groups are organized on ethnic lines, others are catch-alls of ethnic groups. Some ethnic groups are divided as to the unit of their political affiliation--the ethnic group "proper" or a larger Namibian identity. It is unclear in many cases whether this concern with a larger identity is simply an ad hoc mode of strengthening a fragmented opposition or the precursor of an enlarged patriotism. It is also not to be assumed that apparent support of the homelands programme necessarily indicates ethnocentrism or xenophobia. The weak may well seek to first strengthen their position by co-operating with the strong and then seek to change the rules of the game. Certainly any future government will have to face up to the realities of a heterogeneous population, lopsidedly developed economy, the likelihood of re-emerging rivalries, e.g., between the Nama and the Herero, the certainty of conflicting land claims, the recriminations of co-operation with the colonizer, and the spectre if not the reality of Owambo domination.

SUMMARY

Against the background of the social structural position of ethnic groups in Namibia presented in the preceding sections, several questions can be raised under the broad heading of the major consequences of ethnicity on the transition to majority rule, and post-independence government. At the onset, however, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the mere presence of diverse ethnic groups within the boundaries of African Nation-States, however much these groups may be integrated unequally in the socio-economic and political system, need not inevitably give rise to ethnic strife. For example, more distinct ethnic groups of varying population size exist in Tanzania than in Namibia, yet in the former nation inter-ethnic conflict in the post-independence era has been minimal. Indeed, in the main, and contrary to public opinion, African nations have been remarkably untroubled by inter-ethnic conflict of such magnitude as to disrupt the functionings of government. The civil wars in Nigeria, Zaire, Burundi and the Sudan have been exceptions to the rule. Political coups in Africa, which have been all too numerous, represent struggles for power between political élites, the outcome of which has barely altered the character of day-to-day interaction between ordinary citizens of different ethnic background

in the rural hinterlands. That said, whether or not inter-ethnic rivalry will surface and disrupt the process of smooth transition to majority rule in Namibia is problematic. In large measure, the answer hinges upon several interrelated socio-economic and political factors that are set forth below. In the context of ethnicity, these factors concern such issues as the basic human condition of Namibians, problems of social and economic growth and realignment of the occupational structure, the ethnic factor in party politics, the consequences of the withdrawal of South African control over Namibian internal and external affairs, and the position of whites under majority rule. It is convenient to pose these issues as problems of analysis which require further investigation than what is permitted here and accumulation of more pertinent data than what presently is at hand.

1. After the imposition of white rule over Namibia, inter-ethnic strife between non-white groups was brought to a halt. But in the ensuing years non-white groups formerly at enmity with one another formed a common front in opposition to racially white colonial policies that mandated relocation to segregated restricted areas (e.g., the "Homelands" and "Police Zone"), taxation, and forced employment in the agricultural, manufacturing, and mining sectors of the economy. Policies related to employment favored some ethnic groups

(e.g., Basters and Owambo) to the disadvantage of others (e.g., Herero and Bushmen). Thus the withdrawal of white rule has the potential of providing fertile ground for inter-ethnic strife, especially between the Herero and Owambo, the latter being more numerous and occupying the largest proportion of skilled and semi-skilled jobs. Closely related to the numerical size of the Owambo viz. other non-white ethnic groups is the factor of population pressure on the land in Owambo territory. There is little doubt that the Owambo will press demands for relocation of large numbers of its members from the Caprivi strip to more desirable settlement areas elsewhere in Namibia. Relocation will be at the expense either of land presently occupied by other non-white Namibians, or of territory now reserved for whites exclusively. Coloured Namibians have less of a stake in the scramble for land than Africans and whites and thus may not become intricately involved in the competition for redistribution of this scarce resource. But Coloureds do occupy major roles in the civil service and non-agricultural sectors of the economy and they can be expected to protect vigorously the quasi-privileged economic position they have enjoyed viz. Africans under white rule. Political pressure exerted by Africans to oust Coloureds from these positions, in order to provide greater employment opportunities heretofore denied to Africans, may well coalesce various segments of the Coloured population into forming a united opposition against black majority rule.

2. Only in situational contexts have whites in Namibia--Germans, Afrikaners and English-speaking South Africans--constituted a single ethnic group. Historically, those situations arose when Africans threatened white political ambitions, often resorting to the use of armed force. At other times, different white ethnic groups competed against one another in the same way as Africans and Coloureds. But in the period of transition to majority rule, or in the post-independence period, whites--treated as a single ethnic category--would be less of a threat to political stability than Africans and coloureds. Two principal reasons allow for advancing this assumption. First, because whites are few in number (see Table 2); secondly, and of most importance, since 1921 the white presence in Namibia has been, in the main, supported externally, that is by South Africa and multinational corporations with vested interests in Namibian economy. In this sense, Namibian whites are 'strangers' with loyalties divided between Namibia, Germany and South Africa. Apart from losing certain privileged social and political advantages in consequence of majority rule, e.g., racial segregation in public accommodations, housing, schooling, employment, and legislative power, whites can still be expected to occupy essential skilled positions in the mining and manufacturing sectors of the economy in particular, let alone in modern agriculture and animal husbandry. The transition to majority rule will affect

the most productive sectors of the economy precisely because the economy is controlled by South African and multinational enterprises, and Africanization of the economy will not be achieved in the short run. Like strangers elsewhere in Africa, whites as strangers in an independent Namibia can have a secure economic future even if they opt not to retain citizenship in the new nation. Doubtless that many whites perceive the situation differently. But for the sociological reasons stated above, I do not foresee a mass exodus of whites from Namibia, an experience contrary to that of white settlers in Zimbabwe.

3. Realignment of the occupational structure to bring about greater equity among the differential positions occupied by ethnic groups will lessen the possibility of inter-ethnic strife over competition for skilled and semi-skilled employment opportunities. The large number of Owambo who have migrated to South Africa for wage labour, and presumably have acquired valuable technical skills, can be expected to demand from a new government profitable employment opportunities. Masses of unemployed Namibians in Windhoek and the peri-urban areas can become a potential source of strife which most likely will express itself along ethnic divisions. To what extent new employment opportunities can be made available in the mining and manufacturing sectors of the economy is beyond the scope of this report. But plainly agricultural productivity

will always lag behind other economic activities because arable land is extremely scarce and unsuitable for large-scale multi-crop agriculture. Alternative employment opportunities need to be developed for Namibians living in districts where the land is unsuitable for improved agricultural techniques. Unless these measures are taken, economically marginal Namibians are likely to conceive of themselves as being no less disadvantaged under black majority rule as they were under white domination. In this arena of problem issues, the potential for inter-ethnic conflict looms large.

4. The role of ethnicity in party politics is puzzling. This is especially so with respect to SWAPO, the party recognized internationally as the sole legitimate political spokesman for all of Namibia. But as late as 1975, there were no less than 39 political parties in Namibia, the majority of whom recruited membership on ethnic allegiances (see Appendix III). The largest, SWAPO, claims to be "multi-national" though its membership is predominantly Owambo; the smallest, the Bushmen, is represented by two members at the Constitutional Conference. Leaving aside the three white political parties (Nationalist Party, Federal Party, Herstigte Nasionale Party), not only is there political rivalry between African ethnic groups, but conflict over political issues has caused divisions

within single ethnic groups. For example, the Owambo Independence Party's position favouring the South African Homelands Policy is opposed by the Democratic Co-operative Party which holds one seat in the Owambo Legislative Council. Of the nine recognized Nama political parties, six oppose participation in the Constitutional Conference. The four political parties of the Hereros are divided unequally, disputing the claim of Clemens Kapuu, who founded the Herero National Unity Democratic Organization, to Herero chieftanship. Only one of four Damara political groups (Damara United Front) has participated in the Constitutional Conference. Neither the Coloureds nor the Rehoboth Basters represent a united front. The former are divided between the Labour and Independence parties; the Rehoboth Baster Association favours Baster self-rule whereas the Rehoboth Liberation Party has joined in the talks at the Constitutional Conference. And so it is with the Karangos, East Caprivians, Tswanas and Kaokulanders. SWAPO's claims to be a "multi-national party" are echoed by SWAHU, which is predominantly Herero, and the Voice of the People with predominantly Damara and Nama membership.

What, then, of SWAPO? Why is it a puzzle? As to the first, there is no evidence that the 36 non-white ethnically based political parties in Namibia, let alone the white political parties, have acknowledged SWAPO's claim as being

the sole legitimate political spokesman for Namibia and ultimate heir to the transitional government. On the contrary, there is just enough evidence to suggest that opposition to SWAPO is of considerable magnitude. This is partly because of uneasiness about the extensive international recognition and support SWAPO has gained in the wider community of African and European nations. As to the second puzzle, on the basis of the information at hand, it remains unanswerable why SWAPO was escalated into the position of quasi-political leadership for a future independent Namibia. In other words, why SWAPO and not other Namibian political groups, or a coalition of political groups, since all share the same vested interest--majority rule? SWAPO's assertion that the party, although admittedly predominantly Owambo, is truly representative of all non-white Namibians, and that ethnic considerations are unimportant, is weakened by the party's leaders' refusal to discuss ethnic composition of its membership and administrative officers. What cannot go unnoticed is the strong backing SWAPO has received from Western European governments in the form of financial aid, logistic support to facilitate its overseas operations in major European capital cities and access to various propaganda media. And it is precisely these countries which favor SWAPO that have already strong vested economic interests in the mining and manufacturing sectors of Namibia.

The above factors may well shed light on the dogmatic refusal by South Africa to participate in constitutional talks with SWAPO at Turnhalle. Recognition of SWAPO at the talks would ipso facto bestow upon the party a stamp of legitimacy as the only authentic representative of the people of Namibia, a recognition that a significant number of other Namibian political parties apparently have questioned. Thus, it was unnecessary, as SWAPO propaganda claims, for Pretoria to impose an ethnic framework on the Turnhalle constitutional conference as a Machiavellian device to forestall negotiations, because historically ethnicity has informed the character of competition between Namibian peoples. An equitable share of the political resources of a new government is no less of a scarce commodity over which ethnic competition will likely arise than arable land and employment opportunities.

5. What, then, are the prospects for national integration in an independent Namibia? Plainly, the long range prospects for national integration rest upon the capacity of the new government to redistribute scarce resources and thereby reduce the potential for inter-ethnic conflict. Doubtless that the Owambo, given their numerical superiority in the native population (about 44.4%) and their active role in the liberation struggle, will attempt to dominate the new government, insofar as allocation of administrative positions and seats in the legislative assembly. The so-called "disadvantaged"

peoples--Okarango, East Caprivians, Bushmen, Kaokovelders, Tswana and others--, who are underrepresented in the modern sector of the economy, have a potentially strategic role to play in forcing the issue of equitable integration at the national level. They can tip the scale by aligning with the Herero, Namas and Damaras viz. the Owambo, that is, assuming the transitional government will be dominated by the latter.

In the main, equitable integration of Namibia's various ethnic groups in the transition period to majority rule will be a function of the 'safeguards for democracy' that one should expect to be part of the structural framework of a new constitution. Splinter groups within ethnically based political parties, for example the Rehoboth Basters Association, which at present favour Baster self-rule, are likely to acquiesce in their push for separation if presented with a viable alternative guaranteeing proportionate representation in the new legislature.

Mention has already been made above of the rather unique social structural position of whites in Namibia; strangers with national loyalties and cultural ties divided between their native home land and their adoptive land of settlement, Namibia. Census data are unclear as to the number of whites who occupy the legal status of "citizens" of Namibia, but plainly a significant percentage of whites consist of recent immigrants from South Africa. Doubtless

that this category of whites would opt for Namibian citizenship since they can remain strangers and continue to enjoy the same economic privileges, but not political, under majority rule as well-paid employees of externally-owned corporations. The white Nationalist Party which occupies all 18 seats in the Legislative Assembly in Windhoek conceivably will continue to play a significant role in a new government though to a far lesser extent than today. The Nationalists may well assume the role of political spokesman for the Federal Party, which has no representation in the Assembly, and the Herstigte Nasionale Party of right-wing Afrikaners. The Federal and Herstigte parties, mainly drawing their constituents from among white strangers, would appear to have no political future as organizations in an independent Namibia.

In sum, because of multiple historical factors, restrictive ecological conditions, radical differences in cultural life styles, and the scale of the population relative to that of the territory, ethnic cleavages have become more sharply defined in Namibia than, say, in Zimbabwe. And though both countries will soon reach the stage of transition to majority rule, on the basis of the scanty evidence reviewed in this report it can be suggested that the potential for inter-ethnic conflict outside the context of rivalry between political parties is less of a serious threat in Zimbabwe than in Namibia.

NOTES

1. See Appendix I, Table 1, Identification and Composition of Ethnic Groups in Namibia.

2. The predictor in this instance has to contend not only with the future's usual cussedness, but with a regime which has been providing less and less data in recent years.

3. Many writers refuse even to hazard a guess as to the origin of the Nama, contenting themselves with the observation that they are the darkest in hue of Africa's black people.

4. The relations between the ethnic groups during this period provide fodder for propaganda both in favour of and against the continuation of the South African Administration. The former position might point to the peace and civilization the whites brought to war-mongering tribes while the latter sometimes holds that the peoples of Namibia lived in peace and harmony until the disruptive arrival of the whites. A modification suggests that though warfare was rife, it constituted a civilized non-zero-sum balance of power system. Compared to the German excesses, this certainly seems apt.

5. See Appendix II, maps A and B.

6. See Appendix I, Table 2, Population Growth.

7. Republic of South Africa. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South West African Affairs, 1962-1963 (R.P. No. 12/1964).

8. See Appendix II, map C and map D.

9. Compare these figures for 1960 and 1966-Appendix I, Table 2.

10. The 1974 edition of the survey provides relatively little information. Most statistical tables have been eliminated and a pictorial survey comprises almost half the publication.

11. For example, the Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for the Period 1 April 1973 to 31 March 1974 reports the establishment of locally managed Trading and Licensing Boards in Kavango and Owambo and the

training of policemen in Eastern Caprivi and Owambo.

12. Consider Appendix I, Table 3, Industrial Distribution of Economically Active Population: 1951 and 1960.

13. See Appendix I, Table 2, Population Growth for 1960 figure, and p.11 of the text for the 1970 figure.

14. 1974 Survey, p. 58.

15. Owambu, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, 1971, p. 20. But compare Appendix I, Table 4 (Native Male Labour Force, According to Ethnic Group and Industry: 1966) where well over 30,000 Owambo males are cited as working in the south, and almost 40,000 if one counts "public sectors."

16. See Appendix II, Map C, Fraenkel's map IV.

17. United Nations General Assembly. Official Records, 27th session, supplement no. 23 (A/9023/Rev. 1). Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to the Colonial Countries and Peoples, Vol. II, para. 78. Figure cited is that reported in the (Manchester) Guardian, May 1973. And in the General Assembly Official Records, 29th session, supplement 24 (19/9624), Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Vol. I, para. 128, it is claimed that 80% of the labour force consists of migrants on contract, with the bulk coming from Owamboland.

18. After John Kane-Berman, Contract Labour in South West Africa, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, May 1972. This figure is close to the one suggested in Appendix I, Table 4, between 1966 and 1971.

19. See paragraph 127 of the second United Nations citation in fn. 17.

20. Wellington [1967], p. 415. Figures are derived from the Odendaal Report and the 1959-1960 Agricultural Census.

21. Fraenkel [1974], pp. 31-32 has an interesting analysis of white/black land distribution.

22. See fn. 11 for signs of change in this regard.

23. See Appendix I, Table 3.

24. Consider Appendix 1, Table 4, where Owambo activity in the southern sector is indicated. Whether Table 3 includes northern migrants in the southern sector figures is unclear. But, if so this would shed some light on the surprisingly large income difference between residents of the two sectors.

25. South Africa [1971], p. 21.

26. See Appendix 1, Table 4 (and fn. 17).

27. See Appendix 1, Table 5.

28. I have interpreted this as the total population with the exclusion of the Whites, Coloureds and Basters.

29. Of course, a "skilled" non-white would not rate very highly were the whites included in the comparison.

30. See Appendix 1, Table 6.

31. For 1966 population figures, see Appendix 1, Table 2, Population Growth.

32. Op. cit. for growth rates.

33. See Appendix 1, Table 7.

34. First, op. cit., p. 39.

35. South West Africa Survey 1967, op. cit., p. 23.

36. See Appendix 1, Table 3. The figure is derived by attributing-somewhat unrealistically--all agricultural and some 800 non-agricultural workers with the Coloureds column to the Baster Gebiet.

37. The South African "Department of Coloured Affairs" was redesignated as the "Department of Coloured, Rehoboth and Nama Relations" as from 1 November 1974.

38. There is never much contact between roving Bushmen bands and in any event few would identify themselves in terms of a nation-state. Of course, many Bushmen no longer live as nomadic hunters. Quite a few are herdsmen.

39. See fn. 37.

40. United Nations General Assembly, Official Records,

29th session, supplement 24 (A/9624). Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Vol. 11, p. 26.

41. Though geographically isolated, Owamboland's migrant workers appear to have been rapidly politicized, with profound consequences for their home region.

42. This applies also to the SWAPO Youth League and to its armed wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN).

43. Hidipo L. Hamutenya and Gottfried H. Geingob, "African Nationalism in Namibia" in Southern Africa in Perspective, Essays in Regional Politics (eds.) Christian P. Potholm and Richard Dale, p. 91.

44. For the location of these areas, see Appendix I, Map C, no. 111. It is unclear from reports whether the Volkspartei is simply opposed to South African interference in the Rehoboth Gebiet's development or whether they seek to merge the region's identity with that of a larger unified Namibia. Of course, the party may be split over this issue or simply divide and change its position. The Volkspartei is not to be confused with the Rehoboth Baster Vereniging (Association), established in 1971, which allegedly is not prepared to negotiate on Baster self-rule for fear of loss of the community's identity.

45. The Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 8, 1976, p. 12.

46. Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, South West Africa, South Africa's Reply to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Security Council Resolution 269 of 1969). Government Printer, Pretoria and Cape Town, Sept. 1969, p. 48.

47. See fn. 39.

48. "A Visit to Namibia," Report by the Secretary-General, in Objective: Justice, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1972, p. 7.

49. As in South Africa, the Coloureds seem caught between the reality of domination by the white minority and the fear of domination by the Black majority. It is not implausible that this fear of Owambo domination is fairly widespread. Further, one assumes political divisions among Coloureds in South Africa are duplicated in Namibia and that the anti-apartheid Labour Party also has some following.

50. As reported in Objective: Justice, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1975, p. 29.

51. Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 16.

52. Ibid., p. 21.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I Table I.

Identification and Composition of Reference Groups

BANTU: Collective name for dark negroid peoples speaking languages belonging to the same language family. Pastoralists and agriculturalists. Composed of the following clusters and tribes:

<i>Capri:</i>	Malive	Musubia	Mayyi
	Mathe	Matotela	
<i>Hetero:</i>	Hetero	Mbanderu	
<i>Kaokoveld:</i>	Chimba	Himba	
<i>Olanango:</i>	Bunja	Hambukushu	Shambiu
	Djiriku	Kwangari	
<i>Otambo:</i>	Eunda	Kwanyama	Ngandjera
	Kwatuudhi	Mbalantu	Nkokombathi
	Kwambi	Ndonga	

BASTERS: Designation of the People of the Rehoboth Gebiet. Descendants of people stemming from mixed unions between White fathers and Khoi or Hottentot mothers in the north-western Cape. Crossed the Orange River during second half of 19th century and settled in the Rehoboth Gebiet in 1870. Mainly Afrikaans speaking.

BUSHMANS: Collective term for short yellowish-brown hunters and foodgatherers. Also called San. Early inhabitants of Territory. Speak a language with click sounds and composed of the following sections:

//Aikwe	!Klung
/Garin (extinct)	Koma-san (extinct)
/Garin (extinct)	Mharakwengo (also Kgu)
Heikum	Naron
//Haunin (extinct)	//Nusan
Kgu (also Mharakwengo)	//Obanen (extinct)

COLOUREDS: People deriving from miscegenation between Whites and any indigenous people and their descendants. Most of them hail from South Africa and live dispersed mainly in urban centres. Speak Afrikaans or English.

DAMA: Also called Bergdama, Kliptafers, Heuningkassers, Chou-dam and Nu-Khoi. An extremely dark negroid people not related to the Bantu and whose origin is a mystery. Have no own language but speak the Nama tongue. Originally composed of the following factions:

Aninun	Dauna-daman	!Omen
Aub://ain	/Gero-dam	Oumin
Ao-guwun	/Gowa nin	Tsoa-gou-daman
Aro-dam	/Ogan	

NAMA: Section of the Khoi or Hottentot peoples. Yellowish-brown pastoralists speaking a language different from Bushmen but also having clicks. Composed of the following factions:

Gaminum	or Bondelwarts
//Hawoken	or Veldskoendraers
//Karas	
//Kari-goan	or Swartbois
Lari-gai-khoi	or Simon-Koper-Leute
//Khauben	or Red Nation
Naranin	or Topmaars
//Ogin	or Groot Doden

OURLANS: People of Khoi or Hottentot stock with a White admixture who crossed the Orange River into South West Africa from the beginning of the 19th century. Organised in marauding bands who subjugated and ultimately merged with the Nama. Spoke a form of Cape Dutch and the Hottentot language. Composed of the following factions:

//aicha//ain	or Afrikaanders
!Aman	or Bethanie People
Gri-khauan	or Amraals
Kari-Khauan	or Betsiba People
Khowesin	or Witbois

WHITES: People of Caucasoid stock who entered the Territory as explorers, traders, missionaries and settlers and their descendants. Mainly Afrikaans, German and English speaking.

Source: J. P. Van S. Bruwver, South West Africa: The Disputed Land. (Nasionale Boekhandel Beperk, 1966) pp. 146-147

POPULATION GROWTH

All earlier population figures for the indigenous groups were based on estimates and they cannot be relied upon with any measure of exactitude. Nevertheless, the general trends of those that are available reflect the catastrophic effects of the pre-Mandate violence and bloodshed amongst the groups in the central and southern areas, *vis-à-vis* the relatively settled conditions in the north. Thus the following figures show fairly sustained growth on the part of the Ovambo in the North:

1876 ¹	98,000
1925 ²	147,600
1960 ³	239,363
1966 ⁴	270,900

¹ Report of W. Coates Palgrave, Esq., Special Commissioner to the Tribes North of the Orange River, of his Mission to Damaraaland and Great Namaqualand in 1876. (G. 50—1877), pp. 48—49.

² Census referred to by Hahn, *The Native Tribes of South West Africa*, (1928), p. 2.

³ 1960 Official Census.

⁴ Bureau of Statistics: Estimated figures.

To this may be contrasted the following table concerning the Herero, Dama and Nama groups in the South:

Group	1874/1876	1912 ¹	1960 ²	1966 ³
Herero ..	90,000 ⁴ (1874)	19,721	35,354	40,000
Dama ..	20,000 ⁴ (1874)	19,581	44,353	50,200
Nama ..	16,850 ⁴ (1876)	14,320	34,806	39,400

Since the inception of the Mandate, all population groups have shown sustained growth, as a result of the favourable conditions established. The general trend will already be apparent from the above figures in respect of the Ovambo, the Herero, the Nama and the Dama. Again figures available for 1921 are not considered reliable in respect of all groups. But the general trend is confirmed by reliable official figures as from 1951 onwards, based partly on census enumerations and partly on official estimates by modern methods. These show the following average annual rates of growth:

Group	1951-1960: % growth per annum	1960-1966: % growth per annum ¹
White Group	4.2	4.2
Coloured Group	3.6	3.2
All Indigenous Groups ..	1.8	2.0

Table(s) 2 Con't.

The figures for the White and Coloured groups were swelled by immigration and are therefore not strictly comparable to those for the indigenous groups. The 1960 and 1966 totals for each group have already been given in the text above, but are for convenience tabulated below:

Ethnic Group	Total		1960-1966: Estimated growth per group of the population
	1960 ^a	1966 ^a	
Ovambos	239,363	270,900	31,537
Whites	73,464	96,000	22,536
Damaras	44,353	50,200	5,847
Hereros	35,354	40,000	4,646
Namas	34,806	39,400	4,594
Okavangos	27,871	31,500	3,629
East Caprivians	15,840	17,900	2,060
Coloureds	12,708	15,400	2,692
Basters	11,257	13,700	2,443
Bushmen	11,762	13,300	1,538
Tswanas and Other	9,992	11,300	1,308
Kaokovelders	9,234	10,500	1,266
TOTAL ALL GROUPS	526,004	610,100	84,096

¹ Official figures published by German authorities: *Die deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee 1912-1913—* *Amptliche Jahresberichte, herausgegeben vom Reichs-Kolonialamt, (1914), Statistischer Teil, pp. 46 and 47.*

² 1960 Official Census.

³ *Bureau of Statistics: Estimated figures.*

⁴ Estimates by Irle, I. *Die Herero: Ein Beitrag zur Landes-, Volks- und Missionskunde, (1906), p. 52.*

⁵ *Report of W. Coates Palgrave, Esq., Special Commissioner to the Tribes North of the Orange River, of his Mission to Damaraland and Great Namaqualand in 1876, (G. 50—1877), p. 94.*

Source: Department at Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, South West Africa Survey 1967. pp.23-24

Appendix 1. Table 3

INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION: 1951 AND 1960

Industry division	1951			1960				Total
	Whites	Colour-eds	Indigenous inhabitants	Whites	Colour-eds	Indigenous inhabitants		
			Southern Sector ¹			Southern Sector	Northern Sector	
A. Actual figures								
Agriculture	6,932	2,470	40,511	6,508	2,847	36,260	73,379	118,994
Mining	1,193	52	7,552	1,696	176	9,814	221	11,907
Manufacturing	1,401	570	2,349	1,803	515	4,271	148	6,737
Construction	1,473	687	3,419	2,756	1,417	7,975	221	12,369
Commerce	2,850	207	1,678	5,899	597	3,973	168	10,637
Transport and Electricity ..	2,018	254	2,980	3,107	134	4,164	50	7,455
Services	3,035	1,300	14,288	5,049	2,156	15,426	1,706	24,337
Unspecified and unemployed	316	378	1,404	501	766	6,765	2,803	10,835
Total	19,218	5,918	74,181	27,319	8,608	88,648	78,696	203,271
B. Percentage distribution								
Agriculture	36.1	41.7	54.6	23.8	33.1	40.9	93.2	58.5
Mining	6.2	0.9	10.2	6.2	2.0	11.1	0.3	5.9
Manufacturing	7.3	9.6	3.2	6.6	6.0	4.8	0.2	3.3
Construction	7.7	11.6	4.6	10.1	16.5	9.0	0.3	6.1
Commerce	14.8	3.5	2.3	21.6	6.9	4.5	0.2	5.2
Transport and Electricity ..	10.5	4.3	4.0	11.4	1.6	4.7	0.2	3.7
Services	15.8	22.0	19.3	18.5	25.0	17.4	2.2	12.0
Unspecified and unemployed	1.6	6.4	1.9	1.8	8.8	7.6	3.6	5.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: South West Africa Survey 1967 - page 88

Appendix 1. Table 4

NATIVE MALE LABOUR FORCE, ACCORDING TO ETHNIC GROUP AND INDUSTRY: 1966

Industry ²	Ovambo	Nama	Herero	Damara	Other or unidentified	Total
Agriculture ¹	9,532	3,033	3,173	4,451	2,884	23,073
Mines, Commerce, Industry ³ ..	20,651	1,516	2,652	2,612	248	27,679
Public services ⁴	6,748	1,362	1,237	2,582	1,683	13,612
Domestic service ³	2,164	762	131	535	87	3,679
Shopkeeper and togwork ⁴	194	562	258	336	163	1,513
Total	39,289	7,235	7,451	10,516	5,065	69,556

¹ South West Africa Administration, South African Railways and Harbours, and South African Police.

² This is the most detailed division that is possible with available data.

³ In southern sector only.

⁴ South West Africa Administration, South African Railways and Harbours, and South African Police, but excluding local authorities.

Source: South West Africa Survey 1967 - Page 90

Appendix 1, Table 5

NATIVE MALE LABOUR FORCE, ACCORDING TO ETHNIC GROUP,
IN CERTAIN TYPES OF WORK: 1966

Ethnic group/Employer	Skilled	Semi- skilled	Unskilled	Clerks	Total
<i>Ovambo</i>					
S.W.A. Administration	1,015	308	3,310	*	4,633
S.A. Railways and Harbours	52	67	1,915	—	2,034
S.A. Police	81	—	—	—	81
Mines, Commerce, Industry	1,040	5,541	13,967	103	20,651
Sub-total	2,188	5,916	19,192	103	27,399
<i>Nama</i>					
S.W.A. Administration	185	80	1,031	*	1,296
S.A. Railways and Harbours	—	1	63	—	64
S.A. Police	2	—	—	—	2
Mines, Commerce, Industry	61	355	1,085	15	1,516
Sub-total	248	436	2,179	15	2,878
<i>Herero</i>					
S.W.A. Administration	202	116	765	*	1,083
S.A. Railways and Harbours	1	3	108	—	112
S.A. Police	42	—	—	—	42
Mines, Commerce, Industry	117	299	2,224	12	2,652
Sub-total	362	418	3,097	12	3,889
<i>Damara</i>					
S.W.A. Administration	331	316	1,607	*	2,254
S.A. Railways and Harbours	7	2	246	—	255
S.A. Police	73	—	—	—	73
Mines, Commerce, Industry	114	553	1,931	14	2,612
Sub-total	525	871	3,784	14	5,194
<i>Other or unidentified</i>					
S.W.A. Administration	55	53	355	*	463
S.A. Railways and Harbours	45	41	1,114	—	1,200
S.A. Police	19	—	—	—	19
Mines, Commerce, Industry	11	102	134	1	248
Sub-total	130	196	1,603	1	1,930
ALL GROUPS TOTAL	3,453	7,837	29,855	145	41,290

¹ South West Africa Administration, South African Railways and Harbours, and South African Police.

* Clerks included under skilled labour.

Source: South West Africa Survey 1967 - Page 01

Appendix 1. Table 6

TRADING LICENCES ISSUED TO NATIVES: 1965 AND 1966

Description of licence	Northern Territories		Reserves in Police Zone		Urban townships		Total	
	1965	1966	1965	1966	1965	1966	1965	1966
General dealer	213	254	30	33	50	48	293	335
Restaurant }	19	26	5	5	39	37	63	68
Tobacco }								
Patent medicine	—	—	10	11	11	14	21	25
Fresh produce	—	—	—	—	5	4	5	4
Mineral water	—	—	—	—	2	2	2	2
Fire wood	—	—	—	—	6	4	6	4
Hawker	19	21	23	25	—	—	42	46
Butcher	—	—	1	1	5	2	6	3
Baker	5	12	1	1	—	—	6	13
Speculator	—	—	2	3	—	—	2	3
Garage	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	1
Hairdresser	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	1
Wholesaler	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	1
Total	256	313	73	80	120	113	449	506
(Total 1950)	0		22		66		88	

Source: South West Africa Survey 1967 - page 99

Appendix I

Table 7

AFRICANS BY POPULATION GROUP

	Total	Number in homelands (not necessarily their own)		Total	Number in homelands (not necessarily their own)
Owambo	342,455	292,210	Hereo	49,203	26,460
Okavango	49,577	47,605	Bushmen	21,909	6,757
East Caprivian	25,009	24,967	Tswana	3,719	844
Kaokovelder	6,467	6,285	Other	<u>14,756</u>	<u>4,342</u>
Damara	64,973	7,736	Total	<u>746,328</u>	<u>420,279</u>

Source: Anti-Apartheid Movement, Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa, p. 143

Appendix 1 - Table 8


POPULATION GROUPS IN URBAN, RURAL AND HOME AREAS
BEVOLKINGSGROEPE IN STEDELIKE, PLATTELANDSE EN TUISGEBIEDE
BEVÖLKERUNGSGRUPPEN IN STÄDTEN, AUF DEM LANDE UND IN HEIMATGEBIETEN
— 1960 —

Population Group	Southern Sector				Northern Home Areas					Grand Total	Percentage of Population
	Urban areas	Rural areas	Home areas	Total	Kaokoveld and Sesfontein	Ovambo-land	Okavango	East Caprivi	Total		
Bushmen	190	8,156	1,138	9,484	—	878	1,400	—	2,278	11,762	2.24
Damara	18,499	20,260	5,285	44,044	309	—	—	—	309	44,353	8.43
Nama	8,998	19,379	6,229	34,606	200	—	—	—	200	34,806	6.62
Basters	2,026	338	8,893	11,257	—	—	—	—	—	11,257	2.14
Coloureds	8,128	3,682	889	12,699	2	1	—	6	9	12,708	2.42
Whites	53,630	19,426	—	73,106	34	195	104	25	358	73,464	13.97
Herero	9,192	10,606	15,556	35,354	—	—	—	—	—	35,354	6.72
Ovatjimba, Ovahimba	—	—	—	—	9,234	—	—	—	9,234	9,234	1.75
Ovambo	8,100	528	176	8,804	—	230,559	—	—	230,559	239,363	45.00
Okavango	85	84	—	169	—	—	27,702	—	27,702	27,871	5.30
East Caprivians	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15,840	15,840	15,840	3.01
Tswana and others	3,855	5,301	482	9,638	354	—	—	—	354	9,992	1.90
Total	112,753	87,760	38,648	239,161	10,133	231,633	29,206	15,871	286,843	526,004	100.00


POPULATION DENSITY — BEVOLKINGSDIGTHEID — BEVÖLKERUNGSDICHTE — 1960 —

	Area in sq. miles	Population	Density per sq. mile
Southern Sector	220,463	239,519	1.09
Northern Home Areas	97,798	286,485	2.93
Total — South West Africa	318,261	526,004	1.65

Source: South West Africa Handbook, 1967





South-West Africa before the Herero revolt (1902)



European Settlements and African territories in 1911

Source: Helmut Bley, South West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914 (Northwestern University Press 1971)


Appendix II Map(s) C.



Df

Source: Peter Fraenkel, The Namibians of South West Africa (Minority Rights Group 1971) Page 30

Appendix II - Map D



The present-day land position in South West Africa.

Source: Ruth First, South West Africa
(Hammondsworth Penguin) 1963, page 115
cf. also Fraenkel, Maps ii and iii

POLITICAL PARTIES AND TRIBAL GROUPS IN NAMIBIA: 1975

POPULATION GROUP / ORGANIZATION	LEADERSHIP	CON	NNC	OKS	SWA NUF	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
<u>OVAMBOS</u>						
						1974 population : 396,000 (estimate)
Ovambo Independence Party (OIP)	Filemon Elifas Cornelius Ndjoba	*				Occupies all seats but one in the Ovambo Legislative Council; strongly in favour of S.A. homeland policies
Democratic Co-operative Party (Demkop)	Johannes Nangutuuala					In opposition to the OIP; holds one seat in the Ovambo Legislative Council
<u>WHITES</u>						
						1974 population: 99,000 (estimate)
Nationalist Party (NP)	A.H. du Plessis Dirk Mudge	*				Occupies all 18 seats in the SWA Legislative Assembly in Windhoek
Federal Party (formerly the United Party)	Brian O'Linn					The main opposition to the NP among the white voters; no representation in the legislative
Herstigste Nasionale Party (HNP)	Sarel Becker Isak Potgieter					Right-wing Afrikaner party; severely defeated in the April 1974 elections
<u>DAMARAS</u>						
						1974 population: 75,000 (estimate)
Damara Advisory Council (DAC)	Justus Garoeb Semson Gobs				*	Elected by the minority of Damaras (20%) living in the Damara homeland

POPULATION GROUP / ORGANIZATION	LEADERSHIP	CON	NNC	OKS	SWA NUF	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Damara Tribal Executive (DTE)	Oscar Kharuchab Josophat Gawanab		*	*		Established by politically active Damaras living outside the Damara homeland
Damara United Front (DUF)	Ernst H. Christy J. Haraseb	*				Splinter group that broke away from the DAC to participate in the Constitutional Summit
Namibian African People's Democratic Organisation (NAPDO)	Alex Gaomab Albertus Naseb		*			A group of young, radical Damaras; include also some Ovambos
<u>HEREROS</u>						1974 population : 63,000 (estimate)
National Unity Democratic Organisation (NUDO)	Clemens Kapuuo Gerson Hoveka	*				A Herero political party founded by Clemens Kapuuo; dominates the Herero Chief's Council
Association for Preservation of Tjamuaha/Maherero Royal House	Jephta Kameerijandja Maharero B. G. Karuaera			*	*	Group disputing the claim of Clemens Kapuuo to the Herero chieftaincy
Mbandero Hereros of the Epukiro Native Reserve	Munjuku Nguvauva II. Menson Tjirimuje			*		Hererogroup in opposition to Clemens Kapuuo; lives in the eastern part near Gobabis
Mbandero Hereros of the Rietfontein block	(Elifas Tjingaete)	*			*	Group opposing Kapuuo's chieftaincy; chief Tjingaete participates in the Constitutional Summit against the wishes of his people
<u>KAVANGOS</u>						1974 population : 56,000 (estimate)
Kavango Legislative Council	Alfons Majavero S. Kamwanga	*				Established in August 1973; composed of 15 elected and 15 nominated members
United Democratic Party	Haufiku					Virtually defunct, pro-SWAPO opposition party

POPULATION GROUP / ORGANIZATION	LEADERSHIP	CON	NNC	OKS	SWA NUF	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
<u>NAMAS</u>						1974 population : 37,000 (estimate)
Bondelswarts of Warmbad (I)	Jan Isaak Jeremias W. Jagger	*				Small fraction led by former headman; in favour of the Constitutional Summit
Bondelswarts of Warmbad (II)	Anna K. Christiaan Joseph Rooi			*	*	Expelled and sued its elected headman Jan Isaak for "illegal participation" in Summit
Witboois of Gibeon	Hendrik S. Witbooi Hendrik Witbooi			*		Nama community opposing the Constitutional Summit
Hoachanas Community (Red Nation)	Anton Nakom Paul Kooper			*		Nama community opposing the Constitutional Summit
Vaalgras Community	Joel Stephanus Daniel Apollus			*		Nama community opposing the Constitutional Summit
Namas of Berseba (I)	David Goliath					Nama group opposing the Constitutional Summit chief Goliath recently joined SWAPO
Namas of Berseba (II)	Dederick Isaaks Ernst Kuhlmann	*				Nama fraction supporting the Constitutional Summit
Blauwes Community	P. Gertze	*				Headman Gertze participates in the Constitutional Summit against the wishes of his people
Namas of the Soromas Reservation	S. Herero	*				Nama group in favour of the Constitutional Summit; lives near Bethanie
Namibia Democratic Party	Samuel Issaks E. Apollus			*	*	Party of Namas opposing the Constitutional Summit; "heir" to the SWANIO (SWA National Independence Organisation)

POPULATION GROUP / ORGANIZATION	LEADERSHIP	CON	NNC	OKS	SWA NUF	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
<u>COLOUREDS</u>						1974 population : 32,000 (estimate)
Labour Party (formerly the Federal People's Party)	Andries J. F. Kloppers L. Barnes	*				Occupies three out of six seats in the Coloured Council
National Independence Party	Charlie A. Hartung A. Krohne	*				Opposition party in the Coloured Council; occupies two out of six seats in that body
<u>EAST CAPRIVIANS</u>						1974 population : 29,000 (estimate)
East Caprivi Legislative Council	M. Mamili M. Moraliswani	*				A so-called "non-self governing" homeland body with 28 appointed members
Caprivi African National Union	Brenden Simbawe (disappeared)					Virtually defunct, pro-SWAPO group opposing the Legislative Council
<u>BUSHMEN</u>						1974 population : 26,000 (estimate)
Bushmen community at Tsumkwe	M. Geelbooi G. Xaesce	*				Community without political organizations; two Bushmen participate in the Constitutional Sum.
<u>REHOBOTH BASTERS</u>						1974 population : 19,000 (estimate)
Rehoboth Baster Association	Benjamin J. Africa A. Cloete	*				Holds the majority in the Baster Advisory Council; favours Baster self-rule
Rehoboth Liberation Party	Hans Diergaardt D.A.B. Isaak	*				Broke away from the Voksparty to join the Constitutional Summit

POPULATION GROUP / ORGANIZATION	LEADERSHIP	CON	NNC	OKS	SWA NUF	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Rehoboth Volksparty	Franz Stellmacher Berta Beukes		*			Lost all seats but one in elections to the Baster Advisory Council
<u>KACKOLAPOJERS</u>						1974 population : 7,000 (estimate)
The Ovahimba tribe The Ovatjimba tribe		*				Members of these two tribes are part of the Herero group at the Constitutional Summit
<u>TSWANAS</u>						1974 population : 5,000 (estimate)
The Rswana Community	D. Mokalabatho P. Tibinyane	*				Small group on the border to Botswana; has 5 participants at the Constitutional Summit
<u>"MULTI-NATIONAL" PARTIES</u>						
South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO)	Immanuel Maxuilili Axel Johannes		*			Political party with members from most population groups; predominantly Ovambo
South West Africa National Union (SWANU)	Gerson H. Veil Gerson S. Kanguishi		*			Political party with members from several population groups; predominantly Herero
Voice of the People	Johannes W. Skrywer Kephes H. Conrad			*	*	An "open" political party with predominantly Damara and Nama membership

Legend: CON = participants in the Constitutional Conference
 NNC = members of the Namibia National Convention
 OKS = participants in the Okahandja Summit
 SWANUF = members of the SWA National United Front

a) Source: Namibia 1975: Hope, Fear and Ambiguity
 Jürgen Lessner (ed.), Lutheran World Federation
 (Geneva, 1976), Appendix A