

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523 <b>BIBLIOGRAPHIC INPUT SHEET</b>		<b>FOR AID USE ONLY</b> BATCH 79 ARDA	
1. SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION	A. PRIMARY Social sciences		SD00-0000-G170
	B. SECONDARY Political science--Namibia		
2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Namibia, anticipation of economic and humanitarian needs: Politics in Namibia			
3. AUTHOR(S) Short, J.N.			
4. DOCUMENT DATE 1977	5. NUMBER OF PAGES 37p.	6. ARC NUMBER ARC WA330.9688.A217a	
7. REFERENCE ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS AASC			
8. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES (Sponsoring Organization, Publisher, Availability) (In Transition Problems in a Developing Nation; consultant [occasional] paper no.3)			
9. ABSTRACT <p>In Namibia today, political and economic underdevelopment coexists with a relatively high degree of development which benefits whites. Racial inequality is pervasive and has been imposed in a deliberate and systematic fashion. The Africans of Namibia are dependent on a white-dominated political and economic system. In the period since World War II, South African administration has been characterized by efforts to consolidate, rationalize, and institutionalize racial dominance and discrimination and by efforts to thwart nationalist opposition. Nationalism in Namibia, which wants one nation as a unified state, is the antithesis of South African plans to divide Namibia into a group of self-governing and ultimately independent homelands. The South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO), organized in 1960 is the foremost nationalist party. It claims the largest membership and is recognized by the UN and the Organization of African Unity as the representative of the Namibian nation. SWAPO has mounted guerrilla operation against the South African regime since 1966. There have been no major successes so far, but it has provoked an anxious and large-scale military build-up by South Africa in the northern part of the country. Despite the assertion of UN authority and the appointment of a "Commissioner" for Namibia, South Africa has effectively denied any role or territorial presence for the UN. Thus, Namibia is unique in its international status. Virtually all governments in the world recognize that South Africa's occupation of Namibia is illegal and many would countenance or support strong enforcement measures to expel South Africa from the territory. The Turnhalle constitutional talks in Windhoek may have a large role in determining the final political and administrative legacy of</p>			
10. CONTROL NUMBER <b>PN-AAF-257</b>		11. PRICE OF DOCUMENT	
12. DESCRIPTORS Colonialism Demography Economic development Government policies		Namibia Nationalization Southern Africa	
		13. PROJECT NUMBER	
		14. CONTRACT NUMBER <b>AID/afr-C-1254 GTS</b>	
		15. TYPE OF DOCUMENT	

South Africa in Namibia. The 156 delegates to the conference represent the 11 ethnic groups within the homelands political system. Nationalist parties have been barred from the talks.

AID/AFR-C-1254 GTS  
AASC PN-AAF-257

OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 3

FINAL REPORT

**POLITICS IN NAMIBIA**

by

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January 20, 1977  
Subcontract AID/afrc-1254 for African-  
American Scholars Council, Inc.  
and the Agency for International  
Development

POLITICAL FACTORS IN NAMIBIA DEVELOPMENT

As in Zimbabwe, political and social characteristics of contemporary Namibia will affect development prospects of the country in the near and longer term future. In Namibia today political and economic underdevelopment, among Africans, coexists with a relatively high degree of development mainly enjoyed by whites. The degree of African underdevelopment is perhaps greater in some respects than in Zimbabwe; and the extent of development not so substantial. Racial inequality is as pervasive in Namibia, and if anything it has been imposed in more deliberate and systematic fashion. It follows that Africans of Namibia are highly dependent on a white-dominated political and economic system. And Namibia, as a political entity, is presently so dependent (or integrated into) South Africa that it is effectively though not legally South Africa's "fifth province."

Political History

Several strands of Namibia's history converge today with particular significance for the analysis of the country's development prospects under majority rule:

— One strand begins with early African occupation of the present day territory of Namibia over several centuries; within the last century occupation by whites has resulted in widespread displacement of many Africans from their original settlements. At the time of the German annexation in 1884-1890 Africans lived in all the habitable areas of Namibia with four main areas of

settlement: the Nama and related groups occupied the south and central plateau area, the Herero the central and western regions, the Damara the central region and the Ovambo the northern area stretching into Angola and the Okavango delta.

White occupation and German and South African colonial practices have ultimately dispossessed Africans of much of the land endowed with mineral resources and which is suitable for farming or grazing. The white takeover of the plateau Hardveld in the center and south of the country decimated the Herero and Namas and relocated their survivors. As the map on page \_\_\_ indicates, however, Africans have generally been supplanted at the center of the country and removed to the peripheries, especially of the north.

— A related historical strand has been the harsh and often brutal colonization of the country. White protestant missionaries first appeared in Namibia in the 1830's; by the 1840's traders had established links between the Hereros and Namas and the British Cape colony. In the 1870's Trek-Boers from the Cape began to migrate into the area in significant numbers. In 1883 the German explorer, Luderitz, acquired the Bay of Angra Penquenya and named it after himself. Thereafter German penetration into the hinterland, annexation, and colonization proceeded rapidly. The Berlin Conference recognized German hegemony in what was to become in 1892 the German colony of South West Africa.

The Germans established a particularly brutal administration over Africans in the southern two-thirds of the country, the so-called "Police Zone." An early governor, General von Trotha, met the resistance of the Hereros by calling for the extermination of every Herero man, woman and child.

Sixty-five thousand of 80,000 Hereros were massacred; similarly two-thirds of the Nama population was eliminated. The survivors of both groups were dispossessed of cattle and moved off the plateau Hardveld to make way for an increasing influx of German settlers.

From these early times, and the legacy has been altered but not broken, a pattern of white dominance and racial discrimination against Africans was firmly established.

— The harshness of South African colonialism in Namibia has differed from that of Germany's, if it has differed at all, only in degree and to some extent in kind. After occupying German South West Africa in World War I, South Africa was granted administering authority over the country under the League of Nations mandate system. It had hoped to annex SWA outright. In the early years South African administration was very much like Germany's in both intent and method, despite its mandate responsibility for the "well-being and development" of the African people. Control of the territory was extended north into the Ovambo area and a border with Portuguese Angola demarcated clearly (dividing the Ovambo people between the countries). The process of displacing Africans from their land for increased white settlement continued and for this and other reasons military actions had to be taken against the Ovambos, the Bondleswart Namas and the Rehoboth Basters, among others. Laws to force Africans to work for whites were enacted and the German system of discriminatory laws was generally extended.

In the period since World War II South African administration has been characterized by efforts to consolidate, rationalize and institutionalize racial dominance and discrimination and increasingly by efforts to thwart nationalist opposition. The implementation of the Odendaal Report (Commission

of Inquiry into South West African Affairs) of 1964 is perhaps the apotheosis of South African administration of Namibia in recent years. The South African objective has been to establish eleven non-white "homelands" (comparable to SA bantustans), for the separate "peoples" of South West Africa, each of which is to be "self-governing" (within distinct limits). This requires the resettlement of the small remaining African reserves on the plateau Hardveld out to the desert margins. The Odendaal Plan signified the beginning of a sustained effort to apply the apartheid system in Namibia. (x-"Issue on Namibia," Decolonization, United Nations: Department of Political Affairs (Trusteeship and Decolonization), Vol. 1, No. 3, December, 1974, p.6). Implementation of the Odendaal separate development scheme began in earnest with the passage of two acts: Development of Self-Government for Native Nations Act, 1968; and the South West Africa Affairs Act (1969). It is not clear whether or not South Africa is prepared to abandon separate development should it be able to engineer otherwise acceptable constitutional arrangements for independence in the present Turnhalle talks.

— A fourth important strand in Namibian history is the rise of African nationalism. Although African resistance to German and South African colonization is as old as colonization itself, modern nationalist party activity is relatively recent. Nationalism in Namibia, expressing the idea of one nation in a unitary state, is the very antithesis of South African plans to divide Namibia into a congeries of self-governing and ultimately independent homelands, or for that matter, to any constitutional arrangement which might compromise internal unity or external independence of a future Namibia. Although there have been and are several organizations (e.g., the South West Africa National Union-SWANU) which are nationalist in character, the South West Africa Peoples

Organization (SWAPO), established in 1960, is surely the foremost nationalist party. It claims the largest membership and is recognized by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity as the representative of the Namibian nation. Since 1966 SWAPO has mounted guerrilla operations against the South African regime in Namibia, without major successes thus far, but with enough effectiveness to provoke an anxious and large-scale military build-up by South Africa in the northern part of the country. SWAPO has leaders and organization both inside and outside Namibia.

— The history of Namibia's "international" status has implications for its future development prospects. Between the world wars South West Africa was a Class C mandate under the League of Nations mandate system. Although the expectation after World War II was that South Africa would place South West Africa under the new United Nations trusteeship system, as other League mandatory powers were prepared to do for their respective colonies, South Africa instead expressed its desire to annex the territory. When this course of action was opposed by the United Nations, South Africa pledged to continue to administer the territory, according to its obligations as a mandatory power. South Africa had been criticized repeatedly by the League Mandates Commission for its administration of South West Africa. In over three decades since World War II United Nations criticism of and political action against South Africa's administration of the territory has mounted. In several advisory opinions the International Court of Justice has affirmed Namibia's international status. Most recently (1971) the ICJ declared, inter alia, that the continued presence of South Africa was illegal and that therefore South Africa was under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately. (x-International Court of Justice Reports, 1971).

The several ICJ opinions have been rendered in the course of evolving political action by the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations. In 1966 the General Assembly decided (Resolution 2145-(XXI)) to terminate South Africa's mandate over South West Africa. In 1967 it established (Resolution 2248(S-V)) the United Nations Council for South West Africa (later Namibia) to exercise interim administrative and legislative powers for the territory. Despite this assertion of U.N. authority and subsequently the appointment of a "Commissioner" (Sean McBride) for Namibia, South Africa has effectively denied any role or territorial presence for the U.N. In 1968 the General Assembly proclaimed (Resolution 2372(XXII)) that in accordance with the desire of the people of the territory "South West Africa" would henceforth be known as "Namibia." (x-Name drawn from the Namib desert which is a distinctive physical feature of the territory). The Council for Namibia was also charged to undertake a variety of economic and technical assistance measures for the Namibian people. Subsequently, the Security Council has adopted a series of resolutions supporting the determinations of the General Assembly and declaring the illegality and invalidity of South African administration of Namibia since the termination of the mandate in 1966. Some members of the Security Council have been prepared to support strong enforcement measures against South Africa, for example, under Chapter VII of the Charter, but the United States and other permanent members have not been willing to go much beyond recognizing the illegality of South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia.

Thus, Namibia is unique in its international status. Virtually all governments in the world recognize that South Africa's occupation of Namibia is illegal.

A majority acknowledge the U.N. Council for Namibia's de jure administrative and legislative primacy in the territory until majority rule can be instituted by U.N. supervised elections. Many would countenance or support strong enforcement measures to expel South Africa from the territory.

— Finally, Namibia's history is intertwined with the recent history of southern Africa. Until the early seventies it seemed possible that the winds of change might at least temporarily exhaust themselves on the resistance of the white redoubt in southern Africa. That is, the white minority governments of the area might successfully thwart nationalism and majority rule for the indefinite future. The collapse of Portuguese rule in both Mozambique and Angola, however, dramatically changed the regional context in which the other minority governments would have to function. Significantly, South Africa-controlled SWA lost their Portuguese buffer states in Mozambique and Angola respectively. The new African governments in those two countries are providing guerrilla bases for the Zimbabwean and Namibian nationalists and thus increasing the pressure on the minority regimes in Rhodesia and SWA. Already that pressure has been a major factor in the Rhodesian government's willingness to enter negotiations for majority rule. The changing geopolitical situation in Southern Africa has also pressured South Africa to accelerate efforts to develop new constitutional arrangements for South West Africa to offset SWAPO's growing political influence and corresponding potential to wage more effective guerrilla war.

#### Profile: The People of Namibia

The history of Namibia will condition its future political and economic development under majority rule. So will certain demographic factors, which as in the case

of Zimbabwe, are discussed below under several headings: size and growth of population; racial/ethnic composition; territorial distribution; and distribution within the political economy.

Size and Growth of Population. According to the last official census in 1970, the total population of Namibia was 746,328 persons. (x-Table 2, in United Nations, Food and Agricultural Organization, "A Preliminary Note Towards a Country Development Brief: Namibia," Internal Working Document, \_\_\_, p.5. Population of Walvis Bay not included). Africans constituted about 84 percent of the population (627,395). (x-Nama and Rehoboth Baster were included among "Africans.") Whites were a distinctly small minority (90,658). And the "coloureds" an even smaller minority. (28,275).

According to unofficial estimates, the population of Namibia may be substantially larger. The opposition United South West Africa party's newspaper, Die Suidwes-Afrikaner, has estimated the national population to be 917,000 and likely to reach 1 million by 1978. About 792,900 of this estimate are Africans. (x-Die Suidwes-Afrikaner, October 7, 1975). The U.N. Council for Namibia estimates that the population is already as large as 1.2 million persons. (x-Sean McBride, U.N. Commissioner for Namibia, Lecture, Washington, D.C., November 23, 1976). Upwards to 1 million of this number would presumably be Africans.

— Population growth is becoming a significant demographic factor. Between the two official censuses of 1960 and 1970 total population increased by 30 percent, with African increase accounting for most of that. The African population alone increased from 428,575 persons to 627,395 persons in that decade. If the estimates of the Council for Namibia are correct, suggesting that the African population is now approaching 1 million, it may be inferred that the African population has nearly doubled in the period between 1960 and 1976.

Such dramatic increase of the African population is especially important when one considers that the South African Odendaal Plan, now being implemented, assigns Africans (and Rehoboth Basters) only 40 percent of the land. Most of this land is in the northern one-third of the country where "gross overpopulation" already exists. And that is precisely where most of the rapid increase of African population is occurring. Parenthetically, the Ovambos account for roughly 46 percent of the national population, and by inference for much of the natural increase. For a number of years the Ovambo have been major participants in the contract labor system for white industry to the south in order to escape the population pressure on the economic resources of Ovamboland, (x-Sholto Cross and David Gibbon, "A Short Evaluation of the Agricultural Resources of Namibia," Action for Development, FH 14/5 AF/A.10 (restricted), 1975).

Racial and Ethnic Composition. Ethnicity has been a central factor in Namibian history in at least three respects. First, as in Zimbabwe a small white minority within the country (with German and then South African support) has controlled a non-white majority many times larger. Second, the African population itself is quite heterogenous. Before and in the initial stages of colonial rule there was a certain degree of conflict among African groups, as among the Herero and the Nama over grazing lands in the central and southern parts of the territory. German and especially South African colonial rule largely ended inter-group conflict but had the intended effect of freezing and reinforcing traditional non-white ethnic groupings. Third, South African policy and practice have elevated ethnicity into a principle of administration. The Odendaal Plan, of course, is the ultimate

design in this respect, providing for separate "homelands," separate development, and putatively separate "independence" for the various "peoples" of Namibia.

Even more than in the case of Zimbabwe (where "apartheid"-like trends have become increasingly apparent under the Rhodesian Front government). Namibia under majority rule will have to overcome an unfortunate colonial legacy which has stressed ethnic division rather than national unity.

— The White population is made up of three main groups, according to the 1970 census:

	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>% of Total Population</u>
Afrikaans speaking	61,600	8.2
German speaking	20,000	2.6
English speaking	7,258	1.0
Other	<u>1,800</u>	<u>0.2</u>
	90,658	100.0

(x-Peter Fraenkel, The Namibians of  
South West Africa Minority Rights Group,  
No. 19, London, 1974, p. 7.)

Nearly half of the 90,000 whites are not "Southwesters" at all but, more properly, South Africans working within Namibia for the government, public services, or business. They might or might not wish to stay in a new Namibia. The other 45,000 or 50,000 whites include 20,000 German-speaking descendants of the early twentieth century German settlers. Ten thousand still hold German passports. With their own newspapers and their own culture they are less well integrated into South Africa than might be supposed. Many are in

business, but about two-thirds have extensive stock raising operations in central and southern Namibia. English-speaking whites number only about 7,000, and include more missionaries than settlers. The remainder of the whites essentially speak Afrikaans, and identify with the ruling party in South Africa.

— The non-white population of Namibia is quite heterogeneous. The Ovambo are the largest African group (with seven sub-groups) numbering well over 342,455 (1970) and constituting at least 46 percent of the total national population. They are a Bantu-speaking people who practice settled agriculture and cattle grazing in an area along the north central border of the country. Thousands of their kinsmen live in south central Angola.

The Damara, over 65,000 in number, account for 9 percent of total population. They are of uncertain origin but apparently were hunters and gatherers before becoming "serfs" and laborers to both African and white groups. Their assigned "homeland" is to the northwest of Windhoek but most are scattered throughout the country.

The Herero, very numerous before warring against the Germans between 1904 and 1908, number over 50,000 or 7 percent of the total population. Traditionally cattleraisers, they now live northeast of Windhoek and in enclaves to the east and south of the capital. The Kavango, who live along the southern bank of the Okavango River, are as numerous as the Herero. They speak a Bantu language and practice settled agriculture as well as stockraising. The Nama, the Coloureds, the East Caprivians, and the Bushmen each number between 25,000 and 33,000. The Basters (of Hottentot and Dutch origin) are about 20,000 strong, and several minor groups are in the 10,000 range.

Territorial Distribution of Population. The distribution of population has both political and development implications.

-- Most whites live in the southern two-thirds of the country, mainly in the capitol, Windhoek, or in the central highlands of the surrounding areas. There are smaller concentrations in mining centers or other urban-economic areas such as Walvis Bay. In 1970 about 35,700 persons of Windhoek's 64,700 persons were white. (x-Table 2, in U.N., FAO, "A Preliminary Note," op. cit., p. 5). White farmers (approximately 8,500) center around Windhoek and other main towns.

Under the Odendaal plan whites, who constitute roughly 12 percent of the national population will control 60 percent of the land (including land owned directly by South Africa). (x-U.N., Decolonization, op. cit., p. 17). This area includes most of modern agricultural and husbandry sector and virtually all of the known mineral resources.

-- The vast majority of Africans live in the northern one-third of the country, in areas approximately where they originally settled or in areas to which they have been relocated by South Africa's "homelands" policies. The highest concentration is in Ovamboland where in 1970 at least 40 percent of the territorial population was crowded on to only seven percent of the territory's land. (x-Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 32).

The maps on page \_\_\_ indicate where South African policy wishes ultimately to locate the African population, excepting those who will be required for contract or other labor in white areas, that is the northern and desert margins of the country. Significantly, however, except for the populations of the Okavango and the Caprivi Strip, a high proportion of Africans do not yet live in the tribally consolidated areas envisaged. By one authoritative estimate, (x-U.N., FAO, "A Preliminary Note," p. 27), about 28 percent of the

non-white population will have to be relocated to meet South African objectives. Over 95 percent of the Namas are presently outside their assigned area; 75 percent of the Herero will have to be moved; and 67 percent of the Bushmen. A large percentage of the Damara live outside their assigned area. Since the early seventies the South Africans have stepped up relocation efforts, even in the face of resistance from such groups as the Herero. The present resettlement of Africans, of course, is only what might be considered the "final solution" to a historical process of subordinating Africans to the economic and political needs of whites. In this dispensation 85 percent of the population will be relegated to only 40 percent of the land, and much of the latter has poor economic potential. It should be noted, however, that some parts of the northern and eastern lands assigned to Africans have high productive potential, which for other reasons has not been fully developed. (x-Cross and Gibbon, op. cit., p.1)

— Many non-whites (though a small percentage) presently reside in the southern tier of the country and a high proportion of those, even by South African design, will remain there. Both the Basters and the Nama have been assigned "homelands" in the southern part of the country. The Rehoboth Basters, descendants of the Cape coloreds, for example, occupy the Rehoboth Gebiet, with some of the prime agricultural land of the country.

Another significant category of non-whites in the southern areas of the territory includes at least 60,000 Africans who serve the white economy in different capacities. (x-Fraenkel, op. cit., 34). An estimated 43,400 of these in 1971 were migrant workers who are allowed to enter white areas only on contract. In 1971 these contract workers labored in the farming, domestic service, mining, fishing, and government-commerce-industrial sectors of the

white economy. (x-J. Kane-Berman, Contract Labour in South West Africa, Johannesburg: South Africa Institute of Race Relations, May, 1972). Well over three quarters of these would presumably have lived in Windhoek, Walvis Bay, mining centers or other small towns.

More than 30,000 Africans live in Windhoek, mainly in the relatively new but regimented township, Katatura, which is separated from the city proper. The majority of these are contract migrants who are assigned housing by ethnic identification.

— Although the white minority is mainly resident in Windhoek and smaller towns, the territory is only very modestly "urbanized." In 1971 only 12 percent of the total population lived in urban areas (up from 8.1 percent in 1960). (x-U.N., FAO, "A Preliminary Note," op. cit., p. 5). In 1970 Windhoek, the largest city, had a mere 64,700 people.

In summary, so far as population distribution is concerned, Namibia is a predominantly rural country. A relatively small absolute population is spread widely over a vast territory, most of which is arid or semi-arid. The uneven distribution of population, specifically in certain areas occupied by Africans, results in serious overpopulation in some high density areas. In part population distribution results from non-political factors; but colonial settlement patterns and South African "bantustan" policies account heavily for much of the present distribution of the African population, which for many has meant relocation to poorer lands. The colonial legacy and present patterns of population distribution, along distinctly white-black and African ethnic lines, will create difficult nation-building tasks for Namibia under majority rule.

Distribution in the Political Economy. The distribution of persons within the economy has political and developmental implications. Namibia has a "dual economy," typical of so many settler-dominated territories: the whites control the relatively wealthy modern sector; the non-whites constitute the labor pool on which the modern sector depends, and their earnings may be viewed as a supplement to the subsistence economies of the areas to which they have been assigned.

— The vast majority of Africans, in larger proportion than even Zimbabwe, reside in the subsistence economy, depending upon traditional farming, grazing, hunting or gathering.

Only slightly more than 100,000 Africans (or about one-tenth) are probably involved in the cash or wage sectors of the economy. A recent "guesstimate" is that in the white areas 36,000 Africans are employed on farms; 33,000 as domestics or in the civil service; 25,000 in the commercial sector; 18,000 in mining and 7,500 in fishing. (x- Francis Wilson, 1975, as found in Namibia '75, p. 84). Over half, but not all of these would be contract laborers. The majority of the latter are Ovambos. A very modest number, in 1966 about 500, are licensed "traders" (hawkers, bakers, butchers, general dealers, restaurateurs, etc.). (x-Table, "Trading Licenses, as found in South West Africa Survey 1967, p. 99).

The South West Africa Survey 1974 indicates that about 17,000 Africans were employed in the northern areas outside subsistence agriculture in 1970. Employment was probably in the modest mining, manufacturing and commercial activities in those areas.

Generally, African employment is in the lowest ranks of the white economy and in the case of contract labor provided under the most degrading conditions.

--About one-third of the white population is in farming. Another one-third or more are civil servants, and the remainder are primarily in mining, manufacturing, commerce and service industries. A high percentage of the non-farming whites are in managerial, administrative and technical professions.

--The distribution of the population within the income spectrum indicates what would be expected, that is, that most Africans live at lowest subsistence levels and that whites as a group enjoy substantially higher income. An official estimate for 1967 was that all whites averaged R 1,602 p.a. ( 801); non-whites in the Police Zone, R310( 155); and non-whites in the northern reserves an imputed income of R61( 30).(x-Fraenkel, op. cit.,p.22.) Of course, even within these averages gross disparities are probable. For example, in 1971 African farm workers in the Police Zone were only being paid R72 p.a. (x-Elizabeth S. Landis, "Human Rights in Namibia," Document prepared for International Conference on Namibia and Human Rights," Dakar, January 5-8, 1976, p. 46) African Ethnicity in Namibian Politics and Development. It is impossible to predict what role African ethnicity will have in the future politics and development of Namibia. Unfortunately, Namibia's colonial legacy is one which has reinforced ethnic differences and particularism rather than "national" affiliations and loyalties.

--A first challenge to nation-building lies simply in territorial separation of various African ethnic groups. That, by the standards of continental Africa, is not uncommon, but nowhere has a colonial government been as assiduous as South Africa in increasing territorial separation and in fortifying and extending traditional forms of social and political organization. For example, at the South African-sponsored Turnhalle constitutional talks the delegates represent different "peoples," i.e., ethnic groups.

--The numerical dominance of the Ovambos in relation to other African and colored groups is undoubtedly an important social and political variable in future national development. How much so it is difficult to say. Ovambos constitute over half of the non-white population and are crowded onto only seven percent of the land. They form a relatively large percentage of the migrant labor force. And they form the majority of the major nationalist party, SWAPO, of its leadership and of its guerrilla arm. It is likely that other ethnic groups are anxious about Ovambo dominance in a Namibia under majority rule (which could translate not only as an African majority, but also as an Ovambo majority). But again there is no way of validly projecting how great or how politically salient these worries are. Then too, as Namibian nationalists are correct to point out, there is empirical evidence that the idea of Namibia as a nation is taking root, which is to say that nationalism is effectively broadening the loyalties of Namibians. For example, two of the four main leaders of SWAPO presently are not Ovambos (Merero and Muyongo). Many non-Ovambo political groupings,

based on other ethnic groups, have either joined the ranks of SWAPO or are working in strategic alliances with it, for example, in the Namibia National Convention.

--South African policies have intentionally accentuated competition and conflict (actual and potential) between traditional African leaders (chiefs and headman), on the one hand, and nationalist leaders, on the other. The logical extension of policies to develop separate homelands has been the policy of supporting and strengthening the traditional leaders against their nationalist challengers. In Ovamboland, for example, it was natural that South Africa should support Chief Filemon Elifas and his ethnically oriented Ovambo Independence Party against SWAPO nationalism. Unfortunately, the "natural" competition between traditionalists and nationalists has, in too many instances, has been aggravated to the point of outright conflict. As in most African countries, the issue of traditionalist-nationalist relationships will be a major issue in Namibian political development. There are so many nuances in existing relationships presently, and too many unknowns, however, to predict what the future relationships will be. Probably the issue will be especially salient in Namibia because of the colonial legacy. Parenthetically, the SWAPO leadership is already anticipating this issue. For example, in its "Discussion Paper on the Constitution of Independent Namibia," released in 1975, SWAPO suggested the possibility of a single-chamber legislature for the country, but added: "...the people might wish to have a second house, a House of Chiefs, without legislative power." (x-SWAPO, "Discussion Paper on the Constitution of Independent Namibia," as found in Namibia '75, p. 42.)

--Finally it is important to keep in mind the nationalist perspective on the possible role African ethnicity in future Namibian politics and development. Two Namibians have expressed views on the subject which are generally representative of the nationalist perspective. (x-Hidipo L. Hamutenya and Gottfried H. Geingob, "African Nationalism in Namibia," in Christian P. Potholm and Richard Dale (eds.), Southern Africa in Perspective, New York: The Free Press, 1972, pp. 85-94. (Geingob presently directs the U.N.'s Namibia Institute in Lusaka, Zambia.) According to Hamutenya and Geingob, South Africa has propagated a "Myth" of "deep-seated ethnic enmities" in Namibia, in order to justify its policy of separate political development for each ethnic group. They contend that a myth of "ethnic determinism" is not supportable by empirical evidence, and that South Africa has chose selectively from historical events to support this myth. Some social and political conflict among Namibians is "inevitable," they contend. But African nationalism "aims at the reconciliation of whatever rival allegiances might exist among ethnic groups of Namibia and thus rejects the South West African administration policy of "tribal homelands."

#### Political Inheritance and Underdevelopment

Measured against the needs of the African majority and of the prerequisites of national unity and independence, Namibia is politically and administratively underdeveloped. Neither a national polity nor an indigenous national administration exists. Even the white-oriented political and administrative system,

within the last decade, has become almost completely subject to direction and control from Pretoria. South West Africa is South Africa's fifth province. Africans do not participate in any way in the major decisions which affect their lives; and inequality and political and economic dependence result. Traditional social and political organization has been, buttressed at the expense of nation-building and national development. And very few Africans, even by comparison with Zimbabwe, have had opportunities to develop political and administrative skills and experience. The inherited political and administrative system is directed primarily to the needs of the white minority in the territory, to those of the modern sector of economy and to those of South Africa itself.

--Under South African administration, beginning with the assignment of the mandate authority at the end of World War I, South West Africa has never had more than limited autonomy. Recent enactments by the South African Parliament, on the recommendation of the Odendaal Commission (1964), have virtually incorporated the territory into South Africa as a fifth province. The South-West African Constitution Act, 1968 (Act No. 39) and the South-West Africa Affairs Act, 1969 (Act No. 25) removed most of the limited legislative, financial and administrative prerogative which the Windhoek government had held and centralized them in Pretoria. The most significant governmental functions are all directed and administered from South Africa, e.g., foreign affairs, defense, police, railways and harbors, mining administration of non-white affairs, posts and telecommunications, and

so on. So now are "matters relating to immorality," matrimonial matters, weights and measures and prevention of cruelty to animals.

It only remains for the SWA Lwgislative Assembly to control white local authorities, health in the white sector, public works, minor tax levies and licensing.

Significantly, the 1969 Act provides that South Africa receive revenues from major levies in the territory, and in return, the SA Parliament appropriates funds back to the territory. Revenues are received through the South Africa Consolidated Revenue Fund and appropriations are made to the territory through the South West Africa Account.

It follows that institutional development within South West Africa has been relatively modest even among indigenous whites. Political and Administrative authority has not been localized as it has been in Rhodesia. Assuming a complete South African pull out, it is possible to imagine the African majority inheriting a virtual insitutional and administrative vacuum. National institutions of government and administration would then have to be built from the ground up.

The present territorial government consists of the "Administrator," the chief executive officer, who is appointed by the South African government, he is assisted by an "Executive Committee" of four persons selected by the South West Africa Legislative Assembly from its own membership.

The Legislative Assembly consists of 18 white members elected for five-year terms by whites only. The Territory is represented in the South African House of Assembly by six delegates, elected by the registered white voters of the territory. Two of its four members in the South African Senate are elected by the SWA Legislative Assembly and two are appointed by the South African Parliament. The white opposition party, the United National South West Africa Party, has not held seats in the SWA Assembly since 1966.

Rhodesian governments have made pretenses, at least, of allowing serious African participation in national elections. It would be a contradiction of its theory and practice however, for South Africa to permit africans to vote at territorial level in SWA. Africans can sit in neither the Territorial Assembly nor the South African Parliament; they are denied the franchise for both legislatures. They are only allowed to vote for the normally small proportion of elected members in their homeland legislative councils (if their homeland has such a council), although the latter have no real power. (x-Landis, op. cit., p.40) Developing a national franchise and other means of popular participation will be one of the major tasks of political development in the new Namibia; the absence of that franchise at this time is one index of the territory's underdevelopment.

Civil administration throughout the territory is exercised by the SWA Administration, the Ovambo Administration, the Kavango Administration and the East Caprivi Administration. Functions

not exercised directly by departments of the South African government through branches and representatives within the Territory. Unfortunately, South Africa is very guarded about the release of information which would impart any clear understanding of the functions organization and staffing of administrative in SWA. According to the South African Department of information, there are about 20,000 officials within SWA who are employed directly by South African departments and agencies. Of these, about 11,000 are non-whites. (x-South Africa, Department of Information, South Africa 1975, Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa, 1975, p. 952). Most of these must hold the lowest level positions (clerks, messengers and so on); and probably few if any hold posts which have substantial decision-making and organizational responsibilities.

Towns in the white sector of the territory are run either by white Municipal Councils (or Village Management Boards) or in certain maining towns, by corporations. Although in such urban areas as Windhoek, Africans form a substantial proportion of the population, they, of course, are not allowed to participate in municipal governance. SWA is a relatively unurbanized country, even by comparison with Zimbabwe; but on a smaller scale, urban administrative problems would confront a new Namibian government. In Windhoek, particularly, the African ghetto of Katatura outside the city is a dhumanizing place. Urban segregation in SWA is just one manifestation of racial discrimination and territorial separation which is practiced on the territorial scale.

Justice for blacks in Namibia is administered in two forms. In the north the chiefs and councils of headmen hold full civil and criminal jurisdiction in accord with tradition. Serious crimes (murder, rape, treason) are dealt within the South African courts. In the north the indigenous jural system consists of District courts, a Tribal Court, and a Court of Appeal advised by a Bantu Commissioner. In the south Bantu Affairs Commissioner's courts hold concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of magistrates (both run by whites) and hear civil disputes in accord with black customs and with the assistance of black assessors. Ultimately, Roman-Dutch common law (as in South Africa) prevails. This judicial feature will be significant in arranging the kinds of external assistance which could become helpful after independence. In this connection, after the passage of the South West Africa Affairs Act, widespread efforts were undertaken to bring laws of the territory completely into line with those in South Africa. According to the International Defence & Aid Fund, "virtually all the repressive legislation of the Republic--and many other laws besides--are today enforced in Namibia just as if it were part of South Africa." (x-International Defence & Aid Fund, "All Options and None: The Constitutional Talks in Namibia," Fact Paper, No. 3, August, 1976 p. 8). For instance, "almost any action displeasing to the South Africans or to the territorial Administration is comprehended under the definition of "terrorism" in Terrorism Act of 1967 (Act. No. 83, as amended), and subjected to severe penalties. Terrorism is so broadly defined, and so freely

applied by the South African courts that virtually anything from forcible resistance to the government to obstructing traffic can be prosecuted as "terrorism." (x-Landis, op. cit., p.4 See her article for an excellent review of the status of human rights in Namibia).

A new Namibia government will inherit at least two important colonial legacies in respect to the development and use of defense and police forces. First, there is no territorial army as such, although whites and non-whites (the latter recently and in modest numbers) are recruited into the South African army. South Africa has maintained army and airforce bases near Windhoek, Gobabis, Keetsmanshoop, Grootfontein, Katimo Mulilo and Walvis Bay. Recently it has established new bases near Ondangwa, Bwambwata and Ohopoha in the north to help pacify the border and to resist SWAPO guerrilla incursions. There is a territorial police force which operates in white areas; in recent years it too has been brought under Pretoria's administration. There is little public information about Namibian participation in either the South African army or in the territorial police. Generally, that participation appears to be quite limited, though in the case of the army growing as discussed below.

Second, South Africa has encouraged the modest development of homeland police forces and "armies," especially in Ovamboland and Kavangoland. This is consonant with the bantustan theory of devolving authority and powers on the homeland governments. Also it is probably correct to say that South Africa is building

up the northern tribal administrations, including their security forces, as part of its defense and foreign policy strategies in relation to independent Angola and to SWAPO guerrilla incursions from there. "An identity of interest has emerged between the South African government and the homelands" traditionalist rulers, the latter intent on consolidating their own tribally-based power in the face of mounting support for SWAPO." (x-IDAF, op. cit., p.10)

The traditional leaders in Ovamboland and Kavangoland are acquiring a reputation for repressive rule (including the frequent use of public floggings), and have direct control of local police forces which they have shown themselves prepared to use against their nationalist opponents. In 1975 an Ovambo became commander of the Ovamboland police; the police have been re-equipped with advanced weapons by the South African government and have received training from them in both Ovamboland and South Africa. They are assuming a major role in controlling movement across the vital boarder with Angola.

The homeland "armies" are relatively new, and really locally recruited units of the South African army. The first Ovambos received South African military training in 1974; an entire battalion has been in training in South Africa during 1976. Ovambo and Kavango units fought along side South African troops on the Angola border in early 1976. Kavango's tribal army is small, numbering about 82 South African-trained troops. Reportedly, however, its first battalion is to be built up to 600 men by 1980. (x-Windhoek Advertiser, February 6 and 20, 1976, as cited

in Ibid., p. 11.)

The development of the homeland police and armies may bode ill for the prospects of Namibia's transition and development. These forces will become increasingly involved in, or at least implicated in, suppression of nationalist activity and guerrilla actions. That can only increase the growing conflict between traditional and nationalist leaders. Generally, the growth of homeland police and "armies"--especially in the absence of an integrated territorial army--will contribute to the centrifugal and fragmenting factors already at work in the territory.

In summary, South African retains tight legislative, administrative and military control of South West Africa. Whites in the territory have a preferred position, but there is no significant indigenous white power such as in Rhodesia. Territorial Institutional development has been generally limited both in terms of goals and organization. African political participation at territorial level administrative positions, voting or the like--has been negligible.

--Probably the most adverse political inheritance which Namibia will receive from South Africa is summed up in the homelands and separate development policies. South African colonial policy has always stressed ethnic differences; but by this date it has proceeded a long way in fortifying and rigidifying social, political and administrative arrangements much below the territorial level. That policy is the very antithesis of nationalist aspirations for viable nation-state-

hood, territorial integrity, and national development.

Since the beginning of the Turnhalle Conference (Windhoek) in September, 1975, South Africa has shown no signs of abandoning the odendaal plan for devolving authority upon homeland governments. One report is that the process has noticeably accelerated, despite declarations from Prime Minister Vorster and National Party leaders to the effect that the Turnhalle constitutional talks are free to entertain a range of constitutional options, including federal or unitary options. (Ibid., pp. 7-11).

Six "native nations" were established under the Development of Self-Government for Native Nations Act of 1968--- Ovamboland, Damaraland, Hereroland, Kaokoland, Kavangoland, and Eastern Caprivi. Each of these homelands were to have "legislative" and "executive councils" leading to the removal of the "native nations" the jurisdiction of the territorial government. These councils were to have limited legislative powers, but effective powers to control the homelands were retained in the South African office of the State President. The latter's authority included the prerogatives to repeal homelands legislation, to legislate de novo, and even to remove homelands government. In 1973 the State President was empowered to grant "self-government" to any homeland without recourse to the South African parliament.

In March, 1975, Ovamboland and Kavangoland were granted "self-governing" status under the leadership of tribal authorities. The latter have strongly supported South Africa's homelands policy and look forward to independence for their respective territories. Ovamboland has a legislative assembly in which

42 members are elected and 35 nominated by tribal authorities. Again South Africa has retained residual powers to control the councils. In Kavangoland 15 members of its legislative council are elected and 15 nominated. Since the beginning of the Turnhalle talks, there has been more than usual South African activity in devolving authority on to the two homelands (although this authority remains quite limited). A Treasury Department has apparently been added to the Ovambo government; an information office staffed by South African-trained Ovambos and magisterial court districts increased from one to three. In May of 1976 two parastatal investment corporations were established in Kavango and Ovambo under the Promotion of the Economic Development of Bantu Homelands Act (1968)---Ovambo Development Corporation Ltd and Ekuliko Kavango Ltd. As discussed above, there have been recent and vigorous efforts to strengthen the Ovambo and Kavango police forces, as well as to build up army units recruited from the two homelands.

Probably this recent flurry of activity is mainly due to the transition in Angola and to the increasing pressure from SWAPO. South Africa is attempting to fortify the northern border of the territory both politically and militarily. Possibly it has contemplated that Ovambo and Kavango should be self-governing or independent "buffer states." These efforts have also coincided with the Turnhalle talks and could be interpreted as South African measures to increase the legitimacy of ethnic representation at the talks and to improve the chances of conference recommendations which would be

compatible with South African interests and constitutional objectives.

What transpires in Ovambo and Kavango is particularly important because more than half the territorial population resides there, because the political loyalties of those groups will be particularly decisive for the territory, and because the two areas are geopolitically pivotal in the evolving guerilla war. Yet elsewhere there is evidence of recent efforts of South African to step up implementation of of the Odendall plan. In May, 1976, South Africa established the first "homelands" governmental institutions for Namaland, a southerly bantustan set aside under the Namaland Consolidation and Administration Act (1972). A Nama Council with councillors appointed by tribal authorities or a South African minister is the key institution. Tribal Authorities and Village Management Boards are also being established.

After nearly two years of controversy, the Rehoboth Gebiet, embracing some 19,000 persons, appears to be moving to official "self-governing" status. The Rehoboth Basters have had relatively greater social status and more political autonomy than other Namibian groups, including for a long time an elected seven member advisory council. South Africa's proposal of a draft bill for "self-government", however, created a furor among the five Baster Volksparty members of the Council. After their resignataion on the issue, the Rehoboth Vereniging, the opposing party with strong ties to Pretoria, won a majority in disputed

elections (South African pressures were alleged). Through the Vereniging's cooperation the way to "self-government" probably in 1977, has been paved. The Volksparty, (which supports SWAPO) and apparently many other Basters reject this homeland measure at a time when Turnhalle constitutional talks putatively have the full range of options, including the option of rejecting homelands altogether. (Ibid., p.9)

The same trend---South Africa's vigorous implementation of the Odendaal plan even as the Turnhalle talks are in progress ---is evident for other groups as well and suggests at least that the South African legacy of territorial and ethnic differentiation is very much alive. The forces of separatism and fragmentation are being strengthened.

--The Turnhalle constitutional talks (September 5, 1975 and still in progress) in Windhoek may have a large role in determining the final political and administrative legacy of South Africa in Namibia. In the fall of 1974 A.M. Du Plessis leader of the SWA Nationalist Party, announced that a conference would be held to decide the constitutional future of the territory. The conference finally got underway one year hence and is still in progress. The conference has announced that December 31, 1978, is the probable date of independence and reports are that it is about to produce specific constitutional proposals to that end.

The general South African and SWA National Party position is that the conference is to develop an independence constitution which is acceptable to the various "peoples" of Namibia. In keeping with the South African view that constitutional issues should be decided by the various "peoples", the 156 delegates to

the conference represent the 11 ethnic groups recognized within the homelands political and administrative system. Nationalist parties, notably SWAPO have not been allowed to participate (without from their standpoint making unacceptable concessions); and SWAPO has denounced the conference as a "public relations exercise...aimed at the perpetuation of white minority rule under which South African domination would continue." SWAPO has also stated conditions for its participation (the withdrawal of the South African army; the release of political prisoners, the ending of marital law in Ovamboland, the acceptance by South Africa of Namibian national independence and sovereignty and so on).which South African is unwilling to accept. Consequently, constitutional talks are proceeding without the major nationalist party, SWAPO, which by some estimates may have the support of at least 50 percent of the population.

Suspicious of South Africa's motives are widespread among nationalists, U.N. supporters of Namibian nationalism and others. For example, the International Defense & AID Fund on Southern Africa recently expressed the commonly held view that the Turnhalle "plan was but the latest in a long series of ploys to keep the progressive forces in the UN at bay, and provide the Western powers with new pretexts for stalling against action to oust South Africa from Namibia." Thire is, it contends,

no concrete evidence that the South African government is yet prepared to hand over power to anybody else. What it will evidently need before it can appear to comply with its critics' demands is the creation of some coalition of forces in Namibia to which it can transfer power in a formal

act of decolonization, and which it can rely on to look after the interests of the South African government, of the many foreign companies active in the territory, and of the white settlers with their political and economic privileges.

(x-Ibid., P.3.)

If this analysis is valid, and it would be difficult to argue that it is not, it still does not explain away the fact that many non-white Namibians, for doubtless many reasons of conviction or tactics, are participating voluntarily in the Windhoek talks. Very generally speaking, it must be assumed that a substantial number of non-whites from different sectors of society, find the Windhoek framework the most promising alternative in which to achieve their political objectives, at least temporarily. Although participation should hardly be interpreted as rejection of national goals, or even necessarily of SWAPO, it would seem that traditionalist and evolutionist leaders who predominate at the talks, view Turnhalle as the most advantageous recourse for the time being. This is only to suggest that there appears to be enough non-white support for the Turnhalle approach to indicate the strong possibility of that South African may get the desired coalition for establishing an interim government and moving the territory towards independence. Under such circumstances one has to suppose the continued dominance of South Africa and something akin to the familiar ethnic-based pattern of development and administration. It also must be supposed that SWAPO and its supporters would continue to challenge such a system.

Reportedly, Turnhalle constitutional proposals will provide for a three-tiered government: central, regional (corresponding

roughly to present homelands) and local. The amount of power to be assigned the central government is under

If an interim government which incorporates many if not all Namibians does emerge out of the Turnhalle talks, several eventualities may follow. First, it seems improbable that SWAPO could ever reconcile itself to a Transkei-like settlement in Namibia which would thwart the nationalist vision of independency---territorial unity and national development. One cannot estimate the exact number of SWAPO adherents, but if that number is at least half the population (as most observers believe) it is difficult to imagine a settlement disregarding the party altogether, at least not without peril. SWAPO is committed to a nationalist revolution and has been waging guerilla war to that end. It would surely not lose the worldwide recognition and support it has received as the representative of the Namibian people.

Second, assuming a South African-sponsored, multi-racial government excluding SWAPO, it is probable that there would be an escalation of violence--SWAPO resistance countered by government repression.

Third, a Turnhalle multi-racial government would probably be unstable in any event. SWAPO has staked out many of the positions which concern or will come to concern most Africans as nationalism takes wider hold. Increasingly the government would be unable to meet the expectations of the people for development and equality, without confronting South African dominance, white privilege and the foreign-dominated modern sector of the economy. It seems probable that there would

be increasing defections from the Turnhalle government in favor of SWAPO.

Finally, if a Turnhalle interim government is established and especially if South West Africa moves to "independence," that will be an independence which most governments will find it difficult if not impossible to recognize. Governments have not been prepared to recognize Transkei's independence; they will be all the less willing to recognize the independence of South West Africa, if that is of a type which directly flouts Namibia's present international status.