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9. ABSTRACT

Describes and analyses how Namibia is organized politically and socially and how it came to be that way. Namibia is sparsely populated, ecologically fragile, and agriculturally limited. It lacks an industrial base and a good administrative system. It is, however, mineral rich and enjoys the advantages of an Atlantic coastline. If the populations of Namibia remain in rural areas, they will continue to be widely dispersed. Raising rural standards of living will be difficult. The Ovambo represent 57% of the indigenous population and supply about 65% of the unskilled labor. The historic rivals of the Ovambo are the Herero, who comprise only 9% of the population. Due to Ovambo preeminence, the Herero will find themselves in an essentially powerless position after independence. Traditional rule depends on South African derived legitimation, not indigenous attributes. This legitimation will quickly wither under assault from modern Namibians. Blacks occupy half of the posts in the national civil service, but they are confined to the lower grades. Programs for training and upgrading black civil service staff will be necessary. Since whites are so small in absolute number and so divided in terms of self-interest, integration of whites into a new Namibia should present no insuperable problem. It will be necessary to retain the services of white managers and civil servants if the present highly developed South African infrastructure is to be used for the benefit of all Namibians. Namibia is a potentially wealthy country, if there are ample supplies of ground water for mining and agriculture, if today's excellent infrastructure is maintained and if an extended communications and transportation network continues to be developed.

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FINAL REPORT

NAMIBIA: POLITICS ECOLOGY,  
AND SOCIETY

by

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## NAMIBIA

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"The most important part of (the) report should be a description and analysis of how Namibia is organized politically and socially and how it came to be that way."

-Mailgram from Samuel Adams, 28 Oct 76

## NAMIBIA: POLITICS, ECOLOGY, & SOCIETY

Unlike Zimbabwe, Namibia is sparsely populated, ecologically fragile, lacking an industrial base, agriculturally limited, and, in purely African terms, administratively primitive. However, it is mineral rich, enjoys the advantages of an Atlantic coastline, and has a black/white ratio twice as balanced as Zimbabwe. Significant, too, is Namibia's lack of a profitable colonial heritage.

### I. THE ECOLOGICAL DEFICIT

Namibia is far less blessed ecologically, environmentally, and climatically than Zimbabwe. Moreover, its population is widely scattered and, reflecting an environment which, in strictly local terms, is comparatively favorable, for the most part lives distant from the present center of government, commerce, and national activity. Namibia is a country by accident rather than design, and still betrays its origins in ways more economically and politically limiting than elsewhere in black Africa.

An examination of a rainfall map of Namibia quickly indicates the harsh limits of economic reality and some of the parameters of future foreign assistance. Only the swampy easternmost portion of the Caprivi Strip and a small section of northern Namibia (west of the Strip) receive, on the average, more than 600 mm (24 inches) of rain a year. Moreover, the rain, when it comes, falls in short, sharp bursts during the summer months. Britain usually survives on 600 mm distributed evenly over twelve months. Namibians, like most of the African peoples

affected by the southern intertropical convergence, see their best rain wasted because of its usual concentration in fierce, brief storms during three of four months. Since it falls in the summer, too, rates of evaporation are high and much is lost. The hard or sandy soils of Namibia also encourage runoff rather than penetration.

Namibia's rainfall pattern extends in five bands from the 600 mm level in 100 mm intervals steadily southwestwards across the territory. Most of Ovamboland, in the north, receives an average of 500 to 600 mm a year. A thick band of terrain, mostly in the country of the Herero, receives 400 to 500 mm of rain, and Windhoek and its surround is in the 300 to 400 mm band. Proceeding south and west, through the lands of the Damara and the Basters toward South Africa, the rainfall gradually becomes nonexistent. The western coast of Namibia, like much of the Somali coast, is a desolate, totally arid anomaly. It constitutes about a fifth of Namibia, and boasts (of only tourist developmental interest) the highest desert dunes in the world.

Of the 318,261 square miles of Namibia (equal to Texas and Louisiana combined, two-thirds of South Africa, four United Kingdoms, four Liberias, or nine Netherlands) only about a third - mostly in the north - is at all hospitable to settled agriculture. Only on the extreme northern and southern borders of the country, for example, are there perennial rivers and streams. Between this region and the Namib desert on the coast, from which the country takes its name, is a crumpled, elevated plateau between 1000 and 2000 meters high (4000 and 8000 feet). Mostly semi-arid, this central region also includes lands which are overlaid with thick layers of terrestrial sand and limestone of the westward-creeping Kalahari desert. In much of this central region there is only very limited surface water.

Much of the well-watered region of the eastern Caprivi Strip is waterlogged swamp. To its immediate west is inhospitable desert and, moving westward still, there is Ovamboland with what, in good years, are rains which turn a flat sandy country intersected by a network of broad, shallow watercourses into a series of submerged flood plains (in the manner of Zambia's Buluzi). When dry, these flood plains provide good grazing for cattle and sheep.

The few substantial towns of the territory are either ports on the coast or those near Windhoek, in the center, or Keetmanshoop in the south. Their existence and location broadly reflects the artifact of colonization, which came from the direction of the white south in the nineteenth century, and the salubrious climate of the high central plateau. The location of the towns bears no relation to indigenous centers of population, which are mostly in the north, or to the territory's agricultural capability, which is also concentrated in the north. However, only 1 percent of Namibia is suitable for continuous dry-land cropping. Another 30 percent is suitable for grazing, but because of the low carrying capacity of the soils and their characteristic moisture deficit, the grazing lands of Namibia must be used in an extensive fashion if they are to survive. Beef cattle ranching is concentrated in the northern and central sections of the interior and Karakul sheep are grazed in the central south and south. There are 5000 white commercial farms or ranches which exported beef cattle and canned beef to South Africa (worth \$80 million in 1973) and Karakul (Persian lamb) wool (worth \$51 million in 1973). Blacks and other indigenous nonwhite groups own about 25 percent of the territory's 10 million domestic cattle and sheep. Africans grow millet, sorghum, beans, pumpkins, watermelons, gourds, and peanuts in Ovamboland, and in the higher potential Kavango and eastern Caprivi areas, also maize.

## II DEMOGRAPHY: LIMITATIONS AND CHARACTER

The dispersed character of Namibia is seen best on a population density map. Because of the harsh climate and limiting ecology, villages are usually small (there is nothing in Namibia akin to the large Tswana settlements in Botswana) the overall density average being 2 persons per square mile. Despite 2000 miles of paved highway, 1453 miles of rail lines (from the coast to Windhoek and from Windhoek to South Africa), the center of population in the ex-reserves (now homelands) is poorly served by most of the white-oriented communication and transportation networks.

Because of the availability of ground water, better agricultural conditions, and the area's comparative remoteness from the central thrust of both the German and South African control in the early twentieth century, 60 percent of the population of Namibia lives in the north. The largest group, the Ovambo, straddle the Angolan/Namibian border and comprise 47 percent (nearly 400,000 in 1976) of the territory's population and 57 percent of its nonwhite numbers. They are a Bantu-speaking, matrilineal people who practice settled agriculture and keep stock.

The Damara, 80,000 in number (9 percent of the population) mostly live outside a poorly watered so-called homeland northwest of Windhoek and partially in the towns and throughout the remainder of the territory. The Damara do not speak a Bantu language and have for many decades constituted a serf, now a laboring, class in white as well as black eyes.

The Herero, very numerous before warring against the Germans between 1904 and 1908, now number only 60,000 or 6 percent of the total population. Traditionally cattleraisers, they now live northeast of Windhoek and in enclaves to the east and south of the capital. The Kavango, who live along the southern bank of the Okavango River, are as numerous as the Herero. They speak a Bantu language and practice settled agriculture as well as stockraising. The Nama, the Coloureds, the East Caprivians, and the Bushmen each number between 25,000 and 33,000. The Basters (of Hottentot and Dutch origin) are about 20,000 strong, and several minor groups are in the 10,000 range.

Namibia is neither homogenous ethnically nor well-balanced. It resembles Kenya and Karanga-dominated Zimbabwe more than it does the ethnically fragmented Tanzania or quadripartite balanced Zambia. Linguistically there are few compatibilities within Namibia. Without the huge overhang of Ovambo, confident predictions of ethnic peace and national integration, and of the future irrelevance of ethnicity, could be made. But given the historical importance of the Herero and their present numerical inotence, the huge Ovambo plurality, the presence of non-Bantu-speaking and non-African black groups, as well as Coloureds, predictions of transtribal and crosscultural cooperation can be eschewed.

Because the Ovambo are by far the largest ethnic group within Namibia, and because the leadership of SWAPO, and SWAPO's guerilla membership, is predominantly Ovambo, they must play a leading role in the future of the territory. Like the Kikuyu, however, the Ovambo are less

a cohesive polity than a loose congeries of linguistically and culturally associated subethnic groupings which today live together under a South African-imposed local governmental arrangement but which, in the past, refused to acknowledge a single, all-tribal, hierarchy.

Seven subethnic groups occupy Namibian Ovamboland and consider themselves Ovambo. Of the seven two, the Ondanga and the Ukuanyama, comprise two-thirds of the Ovambo population. The others are all small or tiny in population and of little importance politically. In pre-colonial and colonial times conflict between the subethnicities was common, arms being introduced into the arena in the late nineteenth century by an Ondonga chief and subsequently being used throughout Ovamboland to settle disputes over water or grazing rights.

Echoes of these antagonisms remain, as does a heritage of authoritarian rule which was common to all of the Ovambo and which is today a feature of homeland government in Ovamboland.

Historically, the Ovambo were the least well integrated into Namibia of all the peoples of the territory. Their ethnic cohesion, size, and physical isolation all contributed to this social and economic distance. So did their concentration upon agricultural pursuits different from the rest of the territory.

In the early years, few missionary stations and governmental outposts were established there. All of these factors contributed to a relative impoverishment of the Ovambo which, in turn, encouraged an exodus of migrants from Ovamboland to South Africa or to Windhoek and Walvis Bay in Namibia. In recent years about 30,000 Ovambo have worked as contract laborers away from Ovamboland, where there are few opportunities

for nonsubsistence earnings. Indeed, without the Ovambo the machinery of industry, mining, and the ports would never have functioned well, nor would cattle or sheep have been tended. This was demonstrated in 1972, when a massive "spontaneous" strike of 13,000 contract workers (90% of the total industrial and agricultural work force of Namibia) paralyzed Windhoek and Walvis Bay. The Ovambo (and Kavango) demanded better working conditions, higher pay, and improvements in their contractual arrangements. They received them to a degree, but, more importantly, demonstrated the political potency of nonviolent industrial action. Their action also led in time to a removal of some of the legislated instruments of apartheid throughout Namibia.

The Herero rival the Ovambo for territorial primacy only by heritage. When the Herero went to war against the Germans in 1904 they numbered about 80,000. At the end of the war, after a succession of massacres, the Herero were reduced to 15,000, from which number they have gradually grown to their present size as the third largest of the indigenous Namibian ethnic groups. Although predominantly pastoralists who now occupy 11 sections of the Herero homeland, the Herero early were influenced by Coloured and Afrikaners influence and then by settlement from South Africa. German missionaries also established stations in Hereroland from 1845, and, especially after their losses to the Germans, the Herero became extensively Christianized and thus sympathetic to many of the main trends of modernization. After the arrival of the Germans in 1884, and particularly the period from 1894 to 1903 when the Germans developed central Namibia on an intensive basis, the Herero found themselves dispossessed. Since their massive defeat by the Germans the Herero have returned to stock raising and herding, but only about half

of the adult males live at home. The others fill the lower ranks of the teaching and civil services, are in commerce, or form a part of the local and South African migratory labor forces.

Although there are two main Herero branches, in modern times Herero have recognized a line of paramountcy which has provided for a centralized government and the kind of autocratic rule which was previously unknown. Chief Clemens Kapuuo today is unquestionably the header of the Herero; he has played a major role in the Turnhall deliberations and has emerged as the spokesman of the indigenous people involved in those negotiations.

Kapuuo, a teacher turned storekeeper near Windhoek, was born in 1923 in the Okahandja district. Educated locally by Anglicans, he was trained to be a teacher in Johannesburg. He became president of the Southwest Africa Teachers' Association in 1950 and held that post until 1953. During this period he served as a member of the Herero Chief's Council, and interpreted for Chief Hosea Kutako, one of the first Namibian petitioners at the United Nations. Kapuuo, whose opposition to South African dominance of the territory was widely known as early as 1955, became paramount chief of the Herero in 1970, upon the death of Kutako. Since 1974 he has led the African delegations to the Turnhalle conference, some observers touting him as a putative resident of a new Namibia. However, although in the late 1950s and 1960s a supporter of the groups which formed SWAPO, in recent years he has been critical of exiled politicians, and especially of those with Marxist sympathies.

The other indigenous groups are of lesser importance politically, largely because of their size, although the Coloured, Nama, and Baster populations have always sought to defend the claims of intermediate status and relative benefit accorded to part-whites in the evolving South African and Southwest African context. The Coloureds are mainly composed of immigrants from the Cape Province. They are active - as in the Republic - in construction throughout Namibia and fill the lower ranks of the civil service. Many Coloureds teach school, some fish commercially, and small numbers trade or farm. Although Coloureds who live in African areas must carry passes, they can own land. The Baster community, technically (in the South African sense) Coloured because of their origins on the Cape frontier early in the nineteenth century, are almost exclusively raisers of cattle and sheep. They still hold title to freehold farms and are remarkably cohesive. If larger, their political impact could be important. Associated with both the Basters and the Coloureds, but generally being engaged in occupations lower on the social scale than either group are the Nama, ethnically Khoisan (Hottentot) and not Bantu-speaking. Given their subordinate status since colonial times, and their numerical paucity, as well as the scattered nature of the occupations, the Nama have limited political salience.

Such a conclusion is appropriate, too, for the other less-Westernized ethnic groups who complete the Namibian amalgam. The Damara have a homeland and a colonial-given administration along the inhospitable western coast. Only 10 percent of the Damara live there, however. Traditionally, they lived in a decentralized fashion and offered largely unskilled labor services to the Ovambo, the Herero, and the

Afrikaners and Germans when they arrived. The Kavango, occupying perhaps the most favored portion of the northern reaches of the territory, farm, fish, and hunt with success. Few have been involved in the process of migratory labor and, as a result, comparatively few Kavango are in fact engaged in the kinds of bargaining which are now such a central focus of the national political arena. The Kaokovelders, who occupy a homeland in the arid coastal northwest, are similarly isolated from modern Namibia. They number only 15,000 and are exclusively herdsmen. The people of the eastern Caprivi strip, although Bantu-speaking, and settled agriculturalists, are isolated from the remainder of Namibia by an arm of heavy Kalahari sand. Ethnically, they are related to the peoples of southwestern Zambia. They share the dominant language, Silozi, with its Zulu origins, and have been politicized in recent years only because of the guerilla activity and police reprisals in the eastern Caprivi region. Their wage earning involvement is restricted to the Caprivi and does not extend to Namibia proper.

Part of the reason why the Namibian Turnhalle discussions have proceeded with as much surprising success as they have, and why the whites agreed to a date of independence in 1978, is that the total number of whites is so limited compared to Zimbabwe. They are less cohesive, too, than the whites in Zimbabwe, for nearly half of the 90,000 whites are not Southwesterners at all but, more properly, South Africans working within Namibia for the government, public services, or business. They might or might not wish to stay in a new Namibia. The other 45,000 or 50,000 whites include 20,000 German-speaking

descendants of the early twentieth century German settlers. Ten thousand still hold German passports. With their own newspapers and their own culture they are less well integrated into South Africa than might be supposed. Many are in business, but about two-thirds have extensive stock raising operations in central and southern Namibia. English-speaking whites number only about 7,000, and include missionaries more than settlers. The remainder of the whites essentially speak Afrikaans, and identify with the ruling party in South Africa.

Another anomaly is that Windhoek is one of the few cities in southern Africa where whites actually still outnumber blacks. Swakopmund, much smaller, is, for whites, an almost exclusively German town, with few non-German speakers.

From the white point of view, and from an outside point of view in terms of maintaining existing profitable ranching operations, the question of land is certain to be a paramount consideration of those whites who consider themselves Southwesterners. Nearly all own farms or have relatives who graze cattle or sheep. Yet the land which whites own has historic claims to it by Herero and Nama, and any new government is certain to be faced with massive claims for land redistribution. These claims would be less justified and less acute if the white-owned land were not far better watered and far better covered with grass than nearly all indigenous-owned land. Here too, unlike South Africa, the Southwesterners can claim no century-old land purchase rights. The Herero and the Nama were both moved off their lands by Germans, and later by the South African government.

### III INDIGENOUS ADMINISTRATION & LOCAL POLITICS

In late 1976 the government altered its plans for the creation of Transkei-like independent black homelands in Namibia. Prime Minister Vorster indicated that one result of the Turnhalle deliberations would be the abandonment of the homeland option; since the delegates to the Turnhalle conference so wished, Namibia would become independent as an integrated amalgam of peoples. Although politically significant, this decision, and Vorster's acceptance of it, for the time being does not alter the way in which the indigenous peoples of Namibia are governed. In practice, the homeland mechanism has not been dismantled and Africans have political representational rights only through and in their homeland legislative bodies.

The homelands conform, of course, to the territorial bounds of the post-colonial reserves as supplemented in the 1970s by the transfer to the homelands of comparatively large stretches of, for the most part, arid and almost useless terrain. As a result of the report of the Odendaal Commission (1964), which tried to do for Southwest Africa what the Tomlinson Commission tried to do for the Africans of South Africa, the administration of Southwest Africa began to grant measures of autonomy, leading to self-government, to the indigenous peoples of the territory. The first to be granted the status of a proto-homeland was Ovamboland, which inaugurated a legislative council in 1968 at Oshakati, the homeland capital. The first council was composed of 22 tribal chiefs from the seven subethnic Ovambo groups and 20 commoners. (This followed the South African homeland pattern pioneered by the Transkei in

1963 and later by Bophuthatswana, and finally KwaZulu). An executive council, with one member from each subethnic Ovambo group, administered the homeland and elected a chief councillor. It created cabinet-like departments and received a variety of governmental functions as they were transferred from the government of Southwest Africa. In 1973 this transfer had reached a point of devolution sufficient for Ovambo-land to become self governing. The legislative council was enlarged to 56 members, five chiefs from each of seven tribal authorities and three elected from each of the same ethnic divisions. The resultant council elected a chief minister who in turn appointed six cabinet ministers.

The elections of 1973 were the first test of popular opinion in indigenous Namibia. SWAPO and DEMCOP (the Democratic Cooperative Party) were not allowed to campaign, however, leaving Chief Filemon Elifas's Ovambo Independence Party (OIP) as the only contending organization. As a result SWAPO and DEMCOP proclaimed a boycott. Only 2.5 percent of the Ovambo voted and Elifas became Chief Minister on the basis of a tiny poll.

Humiliated, the central government granted a new constitution in 1974. It provided for 35 nominated and 42 elected members. South Africa agreed to permit SWAPO to campaign, but because of the continued existence of emergency regulations dating from 1966, SWAPO again urged a boycott. Chief Elifas's government had meanwhile declared its intention to join with the 120,000 Ovambo in southern Angola to form an independent Ovambo nation. In early 1975, with a 55 percent poll, the OIP again triumphed and Chief Elifas was reelected as chief minister despite

the warnings of outside observers that the support of traditionalism exclusively (and the effective local intimidation of SWAPO and DEMCOP organizers in the weeks preceding the election) would prove a source of future instability. During the next few months, assisted by a local embryonic civil service largely white and South African, Elifas acted more and more autocratically - in the manner of Ovambo chiefs - and tried through imprisonings and floggings to eliminate the power of SWAPO within the homeland. He also continued to make preparations for a separate Ovamboland. In August, 1975, however, bullets from a passing car killed him, presumably at the behest of SWAPO. The Rev. Cornelius Njoba succeeded him and has steered a far more moderate course.

The second self-governing homeland - Kavango - came about in an analogous fashion. Following the official recognition of five tribal authorities (the subethnic groups of Kavangoland) in 1970, a legislative council and an executive committee were established, Chief Linus Shashipoppo becoming chief executive councillor. In 1973 Kavango was given self government, with a capital at Rundu and a Legislative Council consisting of 15 chiefs (chiefs of the five tribes and two persons nominated by each of the five tribal authorities) and 15 commoners elected on the basis of three from each tribe. The Executive Council is composed of five ministers elected from each of the five tribes by those tribal caucuses within the Legislative Council. The executive council elects a chief minister.

In contrast to Ovamboland, politics in Kavango is still in its infancy. In the local election of 1973, 66 percent of all eligible Kavango went to the polls. There were no political parties and a commoner, Alfons Majavero, emerged as chief minister. He has continued to reject the notions of internal independence espoused until his death by Elifas.

On the other hand, the Kavango have agreed, like the Transkei, to develop a local defence force - a mini army. Majavero, in common with homeland leaders in Namibia and South Africa, depends for technical assistance, parliamentary direction, and budgetary aid on the territorial and ultimately, on the government of the Republic.

In the eastern Caprivi, at Ngweze near Katima Mulilo, in 1972 the two dominant Lozi-speaking peoples of the area were amalgamated into a non-self governing territorial authority with a 28-member appointed assembly, a small Executive Council, and a chief councillor - Naiba Moraliswami. Four departments were created to be run, in effect, by seconded white officials from Southwest Africa and the Republic.

In 1975 this region was elevated to the status of a self governing homeland with the same arrangements as Ovambo and Kavango. In addition to the chiefs, twelve members of the Legislative Council were elected.

The other indigenous peoples of Namibia have more traditional forms of home rule. The Damara, lacking historically-legitimated chiefs and notions of Damara hierarchy, have hardly advanced beyond ward councils. There are 11 within the Damara homeland; together these eleven headmen form the Damara Advisory Council under Senior Headman Justus Garoeb. The Advisory Council has no governmental authority and Damaraland is administered from outside by outsiders. The Advisory Council has, however, often expressed itself truculently against racial discrimination and in favor of U.I. supervision.

Outside the homeland the authority of the Advisory Council has long been rejected, a rival Damara Tribal Executive being formed. Even more radical are two political groups, the Namibia National Convention and the Voice of the People (which has some Nama support also).

Within the nascent Nama leadership, hitherto of eight headmen without an advisory council, in 1975 there was a struggle for primacy. Three of the headmen supported SWAPO and refused to accept any kind of ethnically-based arrangement. The other five disagreed and, in mid-1975, the central government created a Nama Council, subordinate tribal authorities, and a variety of village management boards. The council consists of all chiefs or headmen of the tribal authorities, a chairman chosen by them and six councillors appointed by the Minister of Coloured Affairs.

The Bastards of Rehoboth have since the early colonial period enjoyed a form of self-rule. Now it is an Advisory Council (which dates from 1928) of seven members elected according to the Bastards' own notions of patriarchal respect and affiliation. For long this Council espoused home rule within a multiracial Namibia. Such separatist sentiment evoked a political split in 1975, however, when five of seven members of the Council publicly supported SWAPO. In subsequent elections the pro-separatist Liberation Party/Baster Association alliance won all of the contested seats.

The Coloureds have had an Advisory Council since 1961. It is now composed of six elected members and five governmental nominees under Chairman A.J.F. Kloppers. In the elections of 1974 the Federal Coloured People's party, led by Kloppers, won three seats, the Southern Group, led by A. Hartung, won two, and an independent was elected to

the sixth seat. Like the Nama Council, the activities of the Coloured Council, and therefore the activities of the Coloureds and Nama themselves, are supervised by a white Minister of Coloured Affairs (this is the same pattern as in the Republic). The Bastards, however, refused to be supervised by a ministry of coloured affairs and a separate ministry of Rehoboth Affairs, together with a Rehoboth Investment and Development Corporation (on the Xhosa Development Corporation model) were formed in 1973. (In the African areas the Bantu Investment Corporation is - as it is in the Republic - the developmental body). Although there are thus two ministries responsible for these three populations, in practice the Minister of Rehoboth Affairs is the same man as the Minister of Coloured Affairs.

Not until 1975 did the people of Kaokoland fall under the homeland rubric devised by the central government. In that year, the territory of the ex-reserve was divided into 28 wards, each with a headman and a council.

In Hereroland, despite the advanced quality of its people and its long tradition of following Western models, there has been no acceptance of the homeland model. In 1975 there were two community authorities and seven headmen functioning with traditional councils, as before.

In general, only the personnel in the Ovambo and Kavango homelands have any significant measure of indigenous administrative experience. In those areas, whites still control most of the day to day administrative (as distinct from policy) decisions. Three of the peoples are directly run by a coloured affairs bureaucracy, the others are run

or advised by personnel seconded by Southwest African or Republican departments. This is the practice in the Republic, too, where all of the major subcabinet positions are in white hands. There has been too little time for local Africans to gain experience and the rigid qualification-threshold maintained in both the Republic and Southwest Africa against African advancement has limited promotion into the higher administrative grades. Politics in the homelands is far more in black hands than is administration, and this generalization is more thoroughly true in the technical as opposed to the "purely" administrative services. For example, the Department of Water Affairs, so critical to the future of Namibia, is an exclusively white service--even in the so-called homelands. Advancement of Africans as accountants has been limited, most noticeably in Ovamboland.

#### IV THE MECHANISMS OF SOUTH AFRICAN CONTROL

There is no need to dwell here upon South Africa's abuse of her mandatory responsibilities. Suffice it to say that South Africa managed in the 1920s to accomplish what the Germans had failed to do: it alienated all of the best African-held grazing land and gave it to whites. It erected social and economic barriers to black advancement. It enacted laws which made those barriers irksome. It compelled African laborers to become migrants and thus disrupted indigenous life. On the first point there is reason to quote Wellington's judgment as a base point: "The crux of the matter is that the mandatory, having been directed to make the welfare of the Natives its chief concern, and having been given the power to carry out this policy effectively, seized the best land for its own (White) subjects, relegating its wards, who were 'not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world,' to areas too small for their sustenance, or else, as in the case of the Herero, to land far worse than they were accustomed to." (307-308) On the other points the mandatory made vagrancy an offence and punished offenders (those who wandered away from their homelands) with enforced labor for whites. A Masters and Servants Proclamation of 1920 made it illegal for Africans to leave white employment under most conditions. Pass laws were introduced in 1922: Africans could not enter or leave Namibia or their areas without permits. Curfews were enacted and enforced and the apparatus of what later became known as apartheid

was erected. Meanwhile, paltry sums were being expended on educational and medical care, and on the agricultural development of the African areas. Efforts and funds were directed to the betterment of white welfare.

Until 1969, despite the protestations of the League of Nations and the United Nations, South Africa maintained its mandatory control over Namibia. But it did so through a fictitiously separate administration of the territory. Although the 27,000 whites of the territory gained autonomy for their own affairs and a legislative assembly of 18 in 1925, the South African-appointed administrator could veto legislation and retained legal control of all non-whites. In 1949 the whites gained representation (six seats) in the South African House of Assembly. In the same year many of the rights vested in the Governor-General of South Africa (and of Namibia) were vested in the South African parliament. In 1955 "native affairs" were transferred completely away from Southwest Africa and into the hands of the new Minister of Bantu Administration and Development of South Africa. Finally, in 1969, the Southwest Africa Affairs Act abolished the autonomy of the Southwest African legislative assembly and transferred its power to Pretoria.

This was the high water mark of South African imperialism. Subsequently, in response to pressure from the United Nations and the gradual shift in the direction of pragmatism within the government of South Africa, the integration of Southwest Africa into the Republic

lessened and Africans began very slowly to regain a portion--if still to date a tiny portion--of their premandatory and precolonial rights, dignity, and self-esteem. The Development of Native Nations Act of 1968 authorized the creation of homelands and the transfer to them of enumerated powers of taxation, control over education, welfare services, and so on.

Much more recently, following the creation of the homelands, the granting of autonomy to three, and the establishment of new advisory councils, the central government took another drastic tack. In 1974 it invited representatives of all of the ethnic groups to a conference in Windhoek (subsequently known as Turnhalle, because of its venue) and began to dismantle the processes of homelandization. It also took steps, to some degree cosmetic but to some degree beneficial to Africans, to make the impact of apartheid less onerous in Namibia than in South Africa. In 1975, for example, some social contact between black and white was legalized. People of all colors were allowed into hotels and bars, and even discotheques for the first time. "Not for non-white" signs were removed from public buildings and separate entrances (to post offices, etc.) were eliminated. The pass laws, since the Ovambo strike of 1972, have been enforced less strictly than before. The Masters and Servants Proclamation of 1920 was repealed.

Nevertheless, in 1976, even after South Africa's declaration to permit Namibia to move toward independence as a single multiracial

entity in 1978, the fundamental nature of South African control over the future of Namibia remains unchanged. The major decisions of consequence for the future of the territory are being made in Pretoria, not in Windhoek. There is no significant autonomy, even for whites, in Windhoek. Nearly all of the leading policymakers are nonSouthwest Africans. The important posts in the civil service are not only filled by whites, they are filled by nonlocal whites whose first loyalty is to Pretoria, not Windhoek. (Africans--about 11,000 of 20,000 workers in the civil service--occupy the lower ranks, none having reached the middle levels. There thus is a great administrative deficit on the black side.)

It should not be forgotten that Namibia is in the South African Rand monetary union and the South African customs union. There are excellent arguments, given the weakness of the Rand and the South African economy, for the removal of an independent Namibia from the monetary union. There are excellent arguments, too, in favor of extricating an independent Namibia from the customs union when and if Walvis Bay is transferred. But there are also technical arguments against such a shift. Without prejudging the outcome (Botswana has recently opted for its own currency, but will remain within the customs union) of this debate, it is important that the nature of South African control over the Namibian economy by these means be identified before, rather than after, the hand-over of power.

Even the towns of the territory, all of which have substantial black populations, are run by white Municipal Councils or Village

Management Boards. The membership of these councils or boards (according to 1949 legislation) is confined to whites and a white electorate. These boards and councils are in turn subordinate to the minister of local government. The separately run company towns like Tsumeb and Oranjemund are run by the corporations concerned under the same ministry.

Justice for blacks in Namibia is administered in two forms. In the north the chiefs and councils of headmen hold full civil and criminal jurisdiction in accord with tradition. Serious crimes (murder, rape, treason) are dealt with in the South African courts. In the north the indigenous jural system consists of District courts, a Tribal Court, and a Court of Appeal advised by a Bantu Commissioner. In the south Bantu Affairs Commissioner's courts hold concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of magistrates (both run by whites) and hear civil disputes in accord with black customs and with the assistance of black assessors. Ultimately, Roman-Dutch common law (as in South Africa) prevails. This judicial feature will be significant in arranging the kinds of external assistance which could become helpful after independence.

South African control over Namibia is and since 1915 has been maintained by armed might. At the lowest level are the tribal police, some of which are now armed and trained by South Africa. There is a national police force in the white areas and, as a result of SWAPO insurgency, a buildup of regular military troops in the north to a

total of at least 15,000. New bases have been established along the Kunene River, near Ondangwa in Ovamboland, near Dwambwata along the Okavango River, and at Ohopoha in the Okavango region. Earlier there were airforce and army bases near Windhoek, Gobabis, Keetmanshoop, Grootfontein, Katimo Mulilo, and Walvis Bay.

As far as can be ascertained there is only one African contingent of a few thousand men in the ranks of the Army in Namibia.

## V THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

Namibia's future lies less with its plateau grazinglands-- although the success of Botswana's beef belies this assertion--and little with its long and supposedly strategic if craggy and inhospitable South Atlantic coastline. Namibia is mineral rich. Today the total value of all mining output is about \$350 million; that total is but a fraction of the territory's potential. About half of the present total, by value, is in gem diamonds. The deposits at Oranjemund in the extreme and arid southwest are the largest in the world. They are mined from vast open-cast alluvial deposits by Consolidated Diamond Mines, a company wholly owned by the South African De Beers Company. Production has been about 1.6 million carats each year for the last several. It provided about \$96 million or 53 percent of the total profits of De Beers in 1974.

The Tsumeb Corporation accounts for 80 percent of all base metal production in Namibia. Owned by American Metals Climax (AMAX), Newmont Mining (an American company), Selection Trust (British), and the Union Corporation (South African), Tsumeb has three mines on the borders of Ovamboland which produce cadmium, copper, lead, and zinc. Tsumeb's profit in 1974 was \$17 million.

By 1977 the Rossing uranium mine north of Walvis Bay is expected to be on stream. It should be the largest single uranium producer in the world with a projected 5,000 metric tons a year. Rio Tinto Zinc (British) holds 54 percent of the equity; the remainder is held by

South Africa's Industrial Development Corporation, the Total Oil Company of France, and the German Urangesellschaft.

Falconbridge Nickel of Canada owns 75 percent of a new copper mine at Oamites; General Mining Company of South Africa owns a copper mine at Klein Aub; ISCOR, the state-owned South African Iron & Steel Company, mines zinc, lead, and tin at Rosh Pinah and Uis, and a company controlled by Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa mines lead, zinc, vanadium, tin, and wolfram at Brandberg and Berg Aukas. It is the second largest vanadium producer in the world.

In other sectors, although Caltex (California Standard and Texaco) has a substantial marketing operation, all American-owned petroleum companies have withdrawn from prospecting arrangements off the Namibian coast.

One of the most delicate questions facing a new government of Namibia will be how to deal with mineral producers and mineral and oil prospectors. Botswana has employed full-time resident foreign advisors to assist it in negotiating with foreign companies, has regulated existing producers, and has established non-confiscatory royalty arrangements of benefit to the state. It has thus far succeeded in this endeavor to a degree which is envied by others, especially Zambia, and Namibia will want urgently to investigate Botswana's various safeguards. Since the diamond mines in both countries are controlled by the same producer, with roughly the same stake in the economy of each, there may be some reason to assume that analogous

treatment and practices will be appropriate and easily facilitated. But in other areas, especially those benefiting from large-scale South African investment and dependent upon a South African-run infrastructure; altering current arrangements may prove far more complex. Whatever occurs, it is evident that foreign assistance of a technical nature will be necessary and critical.

Even more immediate, and possibly more delicate, is the question of Walvis Bay. A refusal by South Africa to give Walvis Bay to a new Namibia would have severe economic and therefore political repercussions; doing so would give Pretoria a stranglehold over the future of Namibia. This odd situation comes about because, juridically, Walvis Bay was never a part of the Mandate. In 1878 Britain, which then governed the Cape Colony, annexed Walvis Bay and 374 square miles of desert around the bay. Six years later, Britain gave the enclave to the Cape Colony. Subsequent to the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, Walvis Bay naturally became a part of the Cape Province and therefore of the Union. However, since 1922 Walvis Bay has been administered by law as if it were a part of the Mandate. The administration of the town has always been controlled by a council responsible to the Administrator in Windhoek, not Cape Town, and the area elects a member in the Southwest African as well as South African parliament.

Walvis Bay is now the second largest town in Namibia. Outside its bounds is a major South African military base. It is the principal port used for the shipping and landing of cargo; nearly all of Namibia's minerals and its fish and livestock products sail from Walvis Bay. The territory's oil requirements are met by tankers

calling there from the Middle East. In fact, Walvis Bay is the fifth largest port in South Africa in terms of cargo tonnage handled. In 1973/74, 1.5 million metric tons of cargo, including 630,000 of exports, were handled. Moreover, Walvis Bay is the center of Namibia's lucrative offshore fishing industry (second in value to minerals). Fishmeal and fish oil are processed and pilchards are canned for export.

Luderitz is the territory's only other port. It is wholly Namibian. But important though it was in the nineteenth century, when the Germans used it as their port of entry, today it has little significance. Loading facilities and communications are inferior compared to Walvis Bay, the port patently being unable to handle Namibia's current level of international trade. The town itself has declined economically, and the harbor has been allowed to silt up. In January 1976 it handled 1 percent of the metric ton total of cargo handled during the same month at Walvis Bay. In that month five ships called at Luderitz and 97 at Walvis Bay.

If South Africa converted Walvis Bay into a free port, or tried to maintain South African control, the immediate consequences would be that Namibia would lose customs revenue and South Africa would derive substantial foreign exchange earnings which would otherwise accrue to Namibia. As a free port Walvis Bay would attract foreign capital from overseas, but the development of Namibia might suffer commensurately in terms of opportunities lost. Most of all, if Walvis Bay were not included in the new Namibia there would be little prospect of the territory gaining economic independence and what could loosely be called viability. Certainly, these goals could

not be attained on Namibian terms. A task of the final negotiations will obviously be to bring about an integrated Namibia, including Walvis Bay.

## VI NAMIBIA AND ITS INTERRELATED NEIGHBORS

Although Zimbabwe's relations with its neighbors are critical and worthy of sophisticated analysis, Namibia's are susceptible of a far more straightforward description and analysis. Namibia's ties to and future involvement with South Africa far overshadow her links to Botswana and Angola, with which countries she shares long land borders, and to Zambia, where the border is far shorter. By rail and air Namibia is tied to the well-developed South African transportation network. Since Walvis Bay is, technically, a South African enclave, Namibia - from the point of view of good harbors and economic outlets - is largely landlocked. Sixty percent of Namibian exports and imports is, in any event destined for South Africa, especially 99 percent of all beef sales and 70 percent of all wool. And South African Railways and Harbors control all of the rolling stock. The postal, telephone, and telegraph system are run by South Africa.

The electricity supply system is controlled by and integrated with the South African grid. The generation of power from local sources on the northern borders of the territory, especially along the Kunene River, will provide a source of separate national hydroelectricity. But the main dam, at the Ruacana Falls, lies within Angolan territory and its use will be a subject of negotiation between Angola and Namibia.

According to a 1969 agreement between South Africa and Portugal for the development of the Kunene's hydroelectric potential, South Africa agreed to finance the project in return for control over the

dam and such others - 14 were projected - which might be built. The total capacity of the first stage of the scheme, the Ruacana Dam now being finished, was 240 MW, costing roughly \$250 million. Generation is supposed to begin in May, 1977, with power (according to earlier plans which may be subject to renegotiation) being channelled south to the mines and towns of Namibia. When this occurs the shortage of cheap power which now hinders the development of mining in Namibia will (or should be) eliminated. At present power is generated from coal imported from South Africa to three stations at Walvis, Bay, Windhoek, and Tsumeb.

Because Namibia has for so long been treated as a province of South Africa, it lacks even the rudimentary separate technical services or tradition of local individualism which characterized poor African countries at the times of their independence. Fundamental decisions are made in Pretoria, not Windhoek, personnel owe their loyalties to the Republic, and any future division would be difficult and painful. However, the high quality and thorough coverage of the infrastructure (Namibia has the second highest number of telephones per person in Africa in the modern sector, for instance) holds out the hope - given a reasonably satisfactory transitional arrangement - that Namibia could attain independence with the kind of efficient, well-run transportation and communications system which is essential for the modernization of the entire country and all of its people. This assumes, too, that Walvis Bay would become Namibian.

Clearly the expertise of the existing technical staff will be needed for some time; Africans help run the railways and the airway, and provide the muscle (especially the Ovambo) for the main port at Walvis Bay, but because of South African practices their advancement into positions of responsibility has been limited. Under favorable circumstances, the handover of power from South Africa to Namibia will be accompanied by a fair division of South African Railways and Harbors staff and maintenance facilities (as well as rolling stock and aircraft); likewise the staff of technical services like water resources, and of the postal and telephone system, will be divided and transferred. From such a base could come the kind of expansion needed to integrate Ovamboland and northern Namibia with the white-dominated plateau. Yet, under less than optimal circumstances, Namibia could find itself the inheritor of a splendid railway and one or more harbors, landing fields, airbases, hydroelectric transmission lines, etc., with limited human means to run or maintain such a splendid gift. Outside assistance would, in this latter case, prove essential.

As Namibia's present and future is inextricably intertwined with South Africa, so its involvement with its other neighbors is of the future far more than the present. With Zambia there would be virtually no dealings were it not for the accident of the Caprivi Strip (which Chancellor Georg von Caprivi presumed would give Germany navigational access to the Zambezi River) and for the way in which SWAPO guerillas based in Zambia have used that terrain as the locale for attacks upon South African control of Namibia, and as a land route into Ovamboland and the white-dominated plateau. There are a

dozen SWAPO bases in western Zambia; SWAPO militants now move freely from western and southwestern Barotseland (Zambia) across Angola and into Namibia (when and if they can penetrate the South African patrolled border).

If independence comes with SWAPO and/or Zambian concurrence and agreement, guerilla activities will presumably cease. At that point, given the underdeveloped quality of western Zambia and the isolation of the eastern Caprivi Strip from most of the economic activities of Namibia, relations between Namibia and Zambia will - at any other than the macropolitical or diplomatic level - become unimportant to both countries. At the macropolitical level they will be important, and the presidents of both countries will doubtless maintain the support relations which are now common between Botswana and Zambia and others. As far as intrinsic national interest or economic involvement, however, it will become of micro- not macro-concern. Only the Lozi-speaking population of the eastern Caprivi will retain, and possibly strengthen its ties to nearby Zambia. If sensible border realignments were thinkable in Africa, which they are not, Namibia would probably wish to cede this area to Zambia.

Botswana and Namibia share a long land border. Bushmen (San), Herero, and numerically small groups of Tswana straddle the border, which is merely another colonial artifact. Nevertheless, with Botswana's independence and the general impoverishment of western Botswana, the border area has never developed strategic or significant economic importance. If Botswana constructs an east-west railway, about which there have been a number of discussions and some planning,

and if copper and nickel deposits are exploited south of Lake Ngami along the border, then the at present limited involvement of Botswana and Namibia could alter radically. If the railway is in fact constructed, Botswana will want to continue the line to Windhoek in order to connect to the existing line to Walvis Bay. Such a decision would give Zimbabwe its longdreamed of westward outlet to the Atlantic, and would also assist Zambia's transportation problems. Without the railway, however, Botswana has too little of common interest with Namibia for relations between them to be of more than diplomatic importance in the short term.

Angola and Namibia have much more in common. They share the hydroelectric potential of the Kunene River and the essentially unresolved problem of the Ruacana dam. Probably of equal significance is the fact that the Ovambo straddle the border, at least 120,000 of whom live in Angola and - at present - are among the peoples most antagonistic to the Neto government in Angola. The government of Angola also permits SWAPO guerillas to transit Angolan territory en route to Namibia. If there is an independence settlement which meets SWAPO and Angolan approval, then this kind of antagonism will presumably cease. What will remain is delicate negotiations over electric power and, given the likelihood of the Ovambo to be prominent in a black Namibian administration, over any residual irredentism among the Angolan Ovambo. There is no reason why Marxist and non-Marxist governments cannot cooperate when they share a common border; the South Africans and the Mozambiquans do so very well, as do the Zambians and the Mozambiquans. But answers to these kinds of explicit and implicit questions can only be given after the final

.form of the new government of Namibia is known.

## VII THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

The Byzantine origins of nationalism in Namibia are of less importance today than is the extent to which the animosities of those early years imply ethnic and sectional conflict which will swiftly emerge with the anticipated further negotiations over independence and the subsequent assumptions of control by a transitional and then an independent black government.

The charge that SWAPO is no more than an Ovambo organization reflects its beginnings, the backgrounds of some but not all of its leaders, the numerical superiority within externally-based SWAPO, especially the guerillas, of Ovambo, and the antagonism to and fear of Ovambo domination that is natural among the Herero and the other less populous black groups of the territory. But this charge is also an inescapable result of the sheer mass of Ovambo within Namibia now and in the future. Since more than half of all blacks and Coloureds are Ovambo, and since it has for geographical reasons always been easier to recruit Ovambo guerillas, it would be extraordinary if Namibia's main nationalist organization were not closely aligned to the ethnic group which dominates Namibia. Further, the charge must to some important degree also reflect the animosity and distrust which traditionally ascribed rulers who have stayed home and worked for reform within the oppressive system must instinctively feel for exiles who have chosen the path of violence and who espouse the kind of rapid change which cannot help but be anathema to any indigenous ruling class.

At first, in the 1950s, there was a healthy cooperation between younger and older, more traditionally-based opponents of South African control of Namibia. In Tanganyika petitioners before the Trusteeship Council included chiefs and educated commoners; so was it in Namibia, where an Anglican missionary, South African educated university graduates, and aged, mostly Herero, chiefs were the initial petitioners. Out of this alliance developed first a South West African Student Body (1952) and then the South West African Progressive Association, the early leaders of which were educated Herero. The Herero initiative became encapsulated into the South West African National Union (SWANU) which, although the territory's most well known nationalist organization in the early 1960s, rapidly became a New York- and Swedish-based body with receding ties to Namibia and very little external economic support. By the 1970s it had become insignificant.

SWAPO emerged in 1959 as the Ovamboland Peoples' Organization (OPO) with Sam Nujoma and Jacob Kuàngua as the founders. Both had meanwhile been elected members of the SWANU executive council and, at first, OPO was a constituent organization. Within a year, however, conflict within the Herero leadership of SWANU, not Ovambo-Herero rivalry, led to the establishment in New York of SWAPO, with Mburumba Kerina, a Herero, as chairman and Nujoma as president. The Herero Chief's Council backed SWAPO, probably because they assumed that SWAPO would prove a less radical political vehicle than SWANU, an assumption which at first was correct. (Later, however, Kerina turned

against SWAPO and made "tribalistic" charges, and Herero support fell away).

SWAPO began training guerillas (with outside assistance primarily in Algeria and the Soviet Union) in 1962 and inaugurated its first attacks in 1966. Since that time SWAPO successes have been intermittent, with much of its activity being confined to the eastern Caprivi areas that, from a South African point of view, are expendable. From a strategic point of view, SWAPO's military operations are guided by Nujoma and a military commission who together issue orders to cadre leaders in Zambia, Angola, and Namibia. (At one point, SWAPO claimed temporary operational bases within Namibia, but no longer.)

Politically, the military commission has its counterpart (and in part an interlocking directorate) in the SWAPO national executive and central committee, both organs of which nominally operate under the guidance of a National Congress. The National Executive is composed of sixteen members elected from the ranks of the Central Committee. The Central Committee contains 35 members. A Women's League, led by Libertina Appollus, a physician, is responsible for the political education of women. In practice, however, decisions today are made by Nujoma and his few closest associates.

Nujoma is the son of an Ovamban farm-worker who lived in Ongandjera, a village 60 miles south of the Angolan border. Schooled at the local Finnish Protestant Mission (as were so many Ovambo leaders), he lived with a relative in Walvis Bay during World War II and in 1949,

moved to Windhoek, where he began to learn English in an Anglican mission. Until 1957 he worked for the South African railway system in Namibia. First as a sweeper and then as a "semi-clerk and tea-boy" he saw service throughout the territory. After leaving the railways he was employed as a clerk in the municipal offices in Windhoek and as a clerk in a wholesale store. His political awakening took place about this time, and in a pantribal, not a strictly Ovambo setting. In 1959 Hujoma was an organizer of bus boycotts in Windhoek; he and others, including Chief Clemens Kapuuu, protested the Sophiatown-like movement of Africans from a freehold shantytown within Windhoek to the purpose-built township of Katutura outside of the capital. Hujoma was arrested in the aftermath of the killings and riots which followed these protests. A few months later, in 1960, he left Namibia for the United Nations, and, except for a bizarre return to Windhoek in 1966, for the continuous life of an exile leader.

Another Ovambo leader of SWAPO, Herman Toivo ja Toivo, has been held at Robben Island since 1968 after being convicted of treason. A teacher, he is the son of a Finnish mission catechist at Odanga. Later he was educated by the Anglicans. He worked in Cape Town, joined a militant youth organization, and in 1958 he was deported to Ovamboland to live in restriction. If released from prison it is obvious that Toivo would have a major impact on the governance of Namibia. But as a hero of the people's struggle he, even more than Hujoma, is suspected by Herero and others of being an ethnic rather than

a transtribal nationalist. Nujoma, however, has maintained contacts during his years in exile with SWAPO adherents and with Namibians of diverse backgrounds. He and his leadership cadre have also seen the debilitating consequences of the lack of nationalistic unity in Angola and Zimbabwe.

David Merero, a Herero and SWAPO chairman since 1964, functioned within Namibia until 1975, when he fled to Lusaka. A businessman who is considerably older than Nujoma or Toivo, he lived in Windhoek. He was born in Keetmanshoop, however, in Nama territory, and was educated there and later by Anglicans in Windhoek.

Another non-Ovamba is the SWAPO vice-president, the young radical Mishek Muyongo. He is from the eastern Caprivi, was educated in Zambia by the Roman Catholic Capuchin fathers, an Irish order, and then in the leading Roman Catholic secondary school in Rhodesia. He returned to the Caprivi Strip to teach, and then went to Mafeking in South Africa for a teacher training course. Upon his return he helped to launch the Caprivi African National Union (1964) with Breden Simbaye. Fleeing to Zambia after Simbaye's arrest he merged the Caprivi Union with SWAPO in Dar es Salaam.

The SWAPO representative in Europe and its secretary for economic and legal affairs is Peter Katjavivi, a Herero and the son of a clerk who lived in Okahandja. Educated there by Lutherans, he later worked in Windhoek as a clerk in a law firm until winning a scholarship to an American university. First he had to leave Namibia for the United States, however, and to do so meant escaping

through Botswana. In Rhodesia he was captured and extradited back to Namibia; reprieved en route by the action of the British Resident Commissioner of Botswana (through which country the extradition party had to pass), he eventually reached Dar es Salaam too late to take up his American scholarship. So he went to a small college in Enguu, Nigeria, returning to Dar es Salaam after two years to work with SWAPO.

Andreas Shipanga, an Ovambo, is another long-time SWAPO leader. A school teacher from a rural district north of Tsumeb, he helped Toivo found the Ovambo People's Congress, the forerunner of the OPO, in Capetown in 1958. After becoming a branch chairman in Cape Town and a field organizer in Namibia (after OPO had become SWAPO) he became Secretary for Information of SWAPO. In 1976, after rumors of difficulty for a year or more, Shipanga became the focus of an anti-Nujoma movement within SWAPO. Expressed earlier in 1976 by guerillas based at camps in western Zambia, the complaints were of inefficiency and corruption by the military and political leadership of SWAPO. The guerillas, and later the Shipanga faction, further argued that a national congress would have to be held to discuss the question of SWAPO's leadership. None had been held since 1969 despite a constitutional provision for such a meeting every four years. The charges of corruption were supported by detailed lists of arms, ammunition, and medical supplies which first the guerillas and later the Shipanga faction alleged were being appropriated by local commanders responsible to Nujoma. This materiel, destined for war, was instead

sold for private gain; the war could not be prosecuted properly and the wounded received inadequate medical attention.

Whatever the merits of the charges, Hujoma and the police of Zambia arrested Shipanga in April. Also arrested were Solomon Mifima, secretary for labor, Sakaria Shikomba, a research official, Aemmenuel Engombe, a member of the executive council, Shangula Sheeli, secretary general of the organization's youth wing, and Taneni Martin, a leading guerilla. These men are Ovambo.

A habeas corpus case was brought in the Zambia High Court for the release of this group; before it could be heard the detainees - numbering about 75 - were flown to a detention camp near Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, where they remain. Another 1000 guerillas are said to be under preventive detention in Zambia because of their opposition to Hujoma. They accuse Hujoma of being insufficiently Marxist, as well as corrupt and inefficient.

Whatever the truth of the charges and countercharges, the arrest of Shipanga and others has revived fears of ethnic cleavage within SWAPO. Often, however, ethnic and sectional disputes mask deeper-rooted personal and stylistic antagonisms. The present disaffection may easily reflect the kind of jockeying for power - when power is so much closer than it has been in years - that betrays no underlying ethnic cleavage. Either way, SWAPO's capacity to negotiate with South Africa as a united body, and its capacity to assume a governing role in Namibia in the future, will be undercut by further

schisms or the rallying to Shipanga of guerillas in greater number than at present. And any division in SWAPO serves to legitimate the decisions of the Turnhalle conference and to discredit SWAPO.

As a military force SWAPO can but be hindered by disaffections among the guerillas. If the report of 1000 antagonists - now confined near Kabwe - is true, then the SWAPO military force - which numbers only about 3000-5000, has been crippled. Even more telling would be a way of assessing the validity of the accusations of corruption and inefficiency. If true they say something about SWAPO capability and much about the inability of Soviet advisors to control SWAPO's military endeavor. Most of all, firm information would help answer the question about the extent to which SWAPO has gained the kind of Frelimo-like experience in the field which would permit a rapid takeover (if that day came) of the upper echelons of a Namibian government. From what data is available, an answer to this question would have to be pessimistic, if not flatly negative. SWAPO will need major outside assistance if it is to govern. There seems to be no cadre of officials molded and hardened by the crucible of and frontline conduct of a full-scale war.

## FINDINGS

- 1) Unlike Zimbabwe, which is climatically and ecologically well-endowed with both reasonable rainfalls and soils, and growing seasons suitable for maize, tobacco and sugar, Namibia is environmentally ill-suited to anything more intensive than ranching, lacks water, and is drought-prone.
  
- 2) This harsh and fragile setting bodes ill for national integration and easy economic development. Insofar as the populations of Namibia remain rural they will continue to be widely dispersed. Raising rural standards of living will be difficult and demanding of ingenuity, especially given decades of South African neglect.
  
- 3) The Ovambo represent 57 percent of the indigenous population and supply about 65 percent of the unskilled labour of Namibia. They are comparatively under-represented in the civil service and proportionally represented in the SWAPO army of liberation.
  
- 4) The Ovambo had lacked status compared to the Herero, who fought the Germans and died in thousands. Independence will provide an opportunity for status reversal for the Ovambo as much as for Namibia as a whole.

- 5) The historic rivals of the Ovambo are the Herero, who number only 9 percent of the indigenous population. They will smart under Ovambo preeminence and find themselves in an essentially powerless position after independence. (Their position may be compared to KADU vs KANU in the 1960s in Kenya).
- 6) Aside from the Ovambo and Herero, the other black ethnic groups have little political salience.
- 7) The Ovambo are not a monolithic group, but their internal rivalries will only be aroused if SWAPO or future constitutional arrangements throw the two strongest Ovambo groups into a situation of bidding and counterbidding.
- 8) Traditional rule, now strong throughout Namibia, has shallow roots. As presently constituted, it depends on South African derived legitimation, not indigenous attributes. Under assault from modern Namibians, this legitimation will quickly wither.
- 9) Blacks occupy half of the posts in the national civil service but are confined to the lower grades. Crash programs for training and upgrading black civil service staff will be necessary.
- 10) The dismantling of apartheid in Namibia will be comparatively easy if and when an independent settlement is finally arranged.

- 11) Whites are so small in absolute number, and so divided in terms of self-interest (half are South Africans on secondment) that the integration of whites into a new Namibia presents no insuperable or complex problem.
- 12) South African influence in Namibia is all-pervasive. A relatively long period of transition will be necessary to phase South Africa out and Africans in. However, South Africa has created a highly developed infrastructure. The object of negotiations and assistance will be to see that the infrastructure is transferred intact to Namibia.
- 13) Retaining the services of white managers and civil servants, especially in the technical branches, will be imperative if the large infrastructure is to be used for the benefit of all Namibians.
- 14) In the short term, given an obvious desire to bring the benefits of modern life to all Namibians as rapidly as possible, conditions favorable to outside investor confidence will prove beneficial.
- 15) Walvis Bay is a part of South Africa. But Namibia cannot function without Walvis Bay. An object of negotiations will be to achieve a transfer of Walvis Bay without onerous conditions.
- 16) SWANU is no longer a potent political force.

17) SWAPO is more divided than ever before. If 1,000 guerillas are really being detained in Zambia, then one-third to one-quarter of the trained guerillas may be immobilised. The imprisonment of Shipanga and other dissidents may represent a major SWAPO cleavage.

It may also limit Nujoma's wide appeal in Namibia.

18) As a result, SWAPO's capacity for ruling a united Namibia has been limited. To what precise extent SWAPO's legitimacy and effectiveness has been vitiated is not known. But the events in 1976 cannot be ignored.

19) SWAPO's relationship with the Soviet Union, and the possibility of the Soviet Union encouraging a Cuban invasion of Namibia on behalf of SWAPO, cannot be ignored. But the frontline African states are not now encouraging either Soviet or Cuban adventurism. Only if South Africa refuses to negotiate with SWAPO, and - should it occur - the Turnhalle deliberations lead to independence without SWAPO involvement, will the Cuban threat become real.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS AND NOT YET INCLUDED

- 1) On the role of the church and religious groups in Namibia.
- 2) On the internal politics of the Turnhalle alternative.

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**Note:**

This report supplements and in some instances corrects the much longer description and analysis prepared on 5 November 1976 entitled Namibia: Politics, Ecology, and Society. The present report must be read with that report, and the material therein, as background.

## Namibia

In politico-economic terms, discussions of and planning for the development of Namibia is primarily constrained by its present status as a virtual fifth province of South Africa, with all that such integration implies. The following report also supplements the earlier Namibia: Politics, Ecology, and Society by providing conclusions about the development of an agricultural base, the question of national or sectional development, ethnicity and sectionalism, and the current political realities and capacities to rule. A visit to Namibia last week confirmed earlier impressions that these are the most salient factors to be considered in any analysis of the future of Namibia.

### 1. The Fifth Province Syndrome

Although from 1921 Southwest Africa became essentially a part of South Africa, in 1969 this integration became complete and the administration of the territory was transferred in nearly every respect to Pretoria. Today there are no statistics available in Windhoek, the territorial capital, pertaining to Namibia alone. To obtain rudimentary factual data means a visit to Pretoria and then a disentangling of Southwest Africa from national data bases. For many categories of inquiry, this is impossible because the facts and figures have been gathered on a national basis only. Thus some of the questions which concern us: what is the size and composition of the civil service and security force? what is the level of training

of civil servants? how many of the whites consider themselves Namibians and how many will revert to South Africa? are unanswerable except in impressionistic terms.

In Southwest Africa today we cannot even talk of an administration. The white administrator is a symbolic figure who has little (despite the name) administrative responsibilities except for and to whites. There is a white legislative assembly, too, but it can only pass laws (and only on a few subjects) relevant to exclusively white activities. There is an administrator for the Indigerous Peoples of Southwest Africa. His office is not in Windhoek, and his office deals largely with the supervision of the autonomous homeland government of Ovambo, Kavango, and Caprivi. The Minister of Coloured Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, with offices in Pretoria, regulates the affairs of the Rehoboth Basters, the Coloureds, and the Nama peoples of Southwest Africa. There is no coordinating body.

Moreover, the most important technical as well as supervisory functions of government are all directed from Pretoria. Possibly the most important branches of the South African government within Southwest Africa are the army and police. Next in order of significance is the South African Railways, on which the territory now depends to move virtually all of its exports out and imports in. The Railways run at a large deficit, primarily because cattle are shipped out live to the Republic and completely different rolling stock must be used to import consumer goods. The Railway administration also runs

Walvis Bay, the territory's only important harbor. Technically Walvis Bay is South African, not Namibian territory; lest there be any ambiguity, next month South Africa intends to pass legislation returning Walvis Bay to the Republic, presumably for use as a bargaining counter in any ultimate negotiations over the future of Namibia.

Water is critical in Namibia. A South African department deals with problems of borehole drilling and the supply of water. All electric power is generated locally, and the coal and diesel-fired plants are not part of the South African grid. Yet a subsidiary of the South African electrical supply commission provides power throughout Namibia. It is also responsible for completing the dam and power installation on the Kunene River in Angola. There is some question about Angolan willingness to see that project completed.

Roads are built and maintained by South Africa. Aside from a very small (two-craft) fleet of two-engine turboprops which flies from the Eros airport near Windhoek, Namibia now depends for public air transport, and for the maintenance of its airstrips (there is much private flying) on South African Airways.

Even in the homelands the South African presence is pervasive. All the leading civil servants in the homelands are South Africans. The training of blacks has not gone very far either in the homelands or in the urban administration. Where there are nonwhites in

administrative and technical positions they are usually Coloured or Nama. For example, of the 111 physicians now resident in Namibia, only four are not white. All four are Basters. It was impossible to obtain figures as precise for either the technical or the administrative cadres, but the impression of most observers consulted is that no blacks have attained medium- or high-level positions in any portion of the civil or technical services. In that sense Southwest Africa has been an integral part of South Africa. From this perspective alone Namibia must not be considered a colonial possession being freed. The colonial powers usually provided more enriched manpower expertise.

The indigenous labor force is concentrated at the unskilled, menial labor levels throughout the territory. No one has precise figures. The best estimate I could obtain indicates that the entire labor force of the territory, including that engaged in subsistence agriculture, numbers about 300,000. Of the total, 60,000 to 75,000 are Ovambo contract laborers, the majority of whom work on the mines. Indeed, the Ovambo dominate the mine labor force everywhere in the territory except at Rossing, where they comprise only half of the total, the other half being Damara. About 20,000 Ovambo work as contract laborers on farms and ranches. About 3,000 man the fishing factories on the Atlantic Coast. Another 5,000 are in domestic service. Since the Herero are pastoralists, only the tiny black and coloured elite can be said to have gained significant experience

in the managerial portion of the commercial or governmental sectors of the Namibian economy.

Namibia is a potentially wealthy country, given ample supplies of ground water for mining as well as agriculture, maintenance of today's excellent infrastructure, and continued managerial oversight of an extended communications and transportation network. The GNP was estimated for me by the secretary of the chamber of commerce and a leading mining industry official at about R650 million, excluding the uranium mine, which is not yet producing. Of that total, R230 million (150 million from diamonds) is attributed to mining, R100 million to fishing, R100 million to cattle and karakul sheep, and R200 million to local commerce and industry. Of the total, there is a heavy dependence upon indigenous labor. But the newer mines are heavily mechanized and only ranching and farming, with comparatively few African employees, are overwhelmingly dependent upon migratory or contract labor. All, with the possible exception of the diamond mine at Oranjemund, require conditions of stability and the continued availability of South African supplied communications and transportation networks. If war broke out in Namibia, if there were an internal revolution, or if there were a wholesale exodus of whites (possibly even including the 21,000 Germans who consider themselves belonging only to Southwest Africa), the economy would instantly suffer. Indigenous resources are not yet available to substitute either for South African or local white expertise.

There is little doubt that any discussion of the reconstruction of post-independence Namibia must begin with the reality of South African economic and administrative involvement. Clearly with independence South Africa's all-pervasive domination (through integration) of the economy of the territory will have to cease. But the process of disentanglement will not be easy; nor will the mere substitution of foreign technocrats for South Africans prove sufficient unless and until a new government wishes to begin afresh or to decree a radical restructuring of the economic basis of the territory. As presently organized for growth (and Namibia stands ready to absorb investment from outside), a new Namibia's first problem is how to transfer South African infrastructural organization and administration into local hands without disrupting a well-run economy. How to replace South African subsidies (especially on the railway and airways accounts) to Namibia will also be a crucial question.

Crash programs for administrators and technocrats will be in order. (A small project is already underway with SWAPO cooperation in Windhoek, where a mini-Namibia Institute has been founded.) So will a careful analysis of the economic options for the new territory.

## 2. The Development of an Agricultural Base

It is a truism that the peoples of Namibia are widely scattered and that development has hitherto failed to be directed toward the largest centers of African population in the north. If Namibia is ever to become self-sufficient agriculturally, it will be due to

the development of Ovamboland and Kavangoland. Compared to the arid remainder of the country, both are well-watered and capable of producing quantities of foodstuffs. At the moment Ovamboland produces millet and sorghum for local consumption and beans and melons, some of which are cashcropped. Irrigation would increase the agricultural potential of the area and those of adjacent peoples. But both the Okavango and Kunene headwaters are in Angola and at present there is no infrastructure or expertise on which to base an irrigational plan.

### 3. National or Sectional Development?

Of equal, if not greater, importance, the nature of the political solution to Namibia will determine the extent to which northern Namibia is developed. A SWAPO-led government will, of course, be based ethnically on Ovamboland and will naturally attempt to bring economic opportunities as well as benefits to the Ovambo and their neighbors. Should the Turnhalle mechanism become a viable government, however, the traditional developmental pattern of the territory is unlikely to be altered. Indeed, agriculture could continue to be neglected if a government dominated by pastoralists (the Herero) allied to whites (again largely pastoralists) comes to effective power. At present the Turnhalle expects to provide the basis for an interim government leading to a Turnhalle-based independent regime. It will probably (the debates in the Turnhalle end this week) be based upon a three-tier form of government, with this week's argument centering

around the amount of power to be afforded to the central government, or first tier. Even if a decision is made to have a strong central government elected directly, there will still be comparatively powerful second-tier regional governments; economic development efforts could well continue to be channelled through these second-tier governments with outside assistance (as at present) parcelled out according to local priorities. Doing so would maintain the divided, ethnic basis of the current arrangements. It would continue South African control through economic means and defeat any other external attempts to develop a rational, integrated economy.

Inferences derived from discussions last week lead me to think that this continued division of the territory will only prove a temporary expedient, and that it will be possible to envisage an independent Namibia (however arrived at) which is concerned about developing its underdeveloped north and shifting from a pastoral based agricultural sector to a cash-crop based agricultural sector. This would not mean that fishing and mining would be neglected or devalued; rather, attention to agricultural self-sufficiency would be an objective equal in value to the expansion of mining and, perhaps, the development of local industry to service the mining and agricultural needs of Namibia.

#### 4. Ethnicity and Sectionalism

A further point should be made about ethnicity and sectionalism. It would be false to assume that a SWAPO victory would unite the

Ovambo against the Herero and other nonwhite groups. Nor is it correct to assume that the Turnhalle exercise is an anti-Ovambo machination.

Of the seven constituent tribes of Ovambo, the Kwanyama and the Ndonga are the largest, together comprising about 60 percent of all Ovambo. The Kwanyama language is closer to Herero than to some of the other Ovambo languages. The leaders of the Ovambo delegation to the Turnhalle are predominantly Kwanyama. Although Herman Toivo ya Toivo, the imprisoned SWAPO leader, is an Ndonga, Sam Nujoma, SWAPO's current leader, is from the small Njera tribe. Many of his followers are also from the less populous Ovambo groups. He can also count upon a large Herero, Nama, and Baster following within the country, as well as some (and growing) white support. Therefore, it is just as likely that a SWAPO victory would encourage ethnic rivalry among the Ovambo and foster new alliances as it is that success for the Turnhalle conference (and a Turnhalle dominated independent government) would lead to a development of strong political bonds between Kwanyama and Herero, and others.

##### 5. The Political Realities and Capacities to Rule

Namibia's internal political situation is very fluid. Support is probably (based on impressions and the impressions of others) divided fairly evenly between SWAPO and the Turnhalle. If the Turnhalle can transform itself into a government with any distance from Pretoria and gain legitimacy, then it may be viable as a

multiracial experiment with or without SWAPO. Otherwise--and this equation depends largely upon South Africa's own awareness of its political needs as well as international realities--Namibia will prove unable to function without SWAPO, and thus without somehow (a big somehow) bringing SWAPO into a Namibian government. Given SWAPO's significant support inside Namibia, this latter alternative may well follow increasing levels of internal violence which, in developmental terms, could postpone or make much more difficult any outside economic assistance.

It was earlier stated that SWAPO's capacity to rule a united Namibia may well be limited. Given the small size (around 5,000) of the external SWAPO military force, its current state of disunity (the Shipanga and other faction-fights) and the lack of training of the military cadres for civilian tasks, external SWAPO cannot be assumed to have a capacity to rule today's Namibia (with an economy and an infrastructure far more sophisticated than that of Mozambique) without assistance. If the internal SWAPO groups (assisted by the Lutheran church) had obtained an opportunity to demonstrate their effectiveness, we could be more confident about SWAPO's capacity to assume the direction of Namibia, and to implement policy decisions effectively, given a conjunction of political or military circumstances favorable to SWAPO.

This is not to imply that the Turnhalle groups, as presently constituted, have any greater capacity to govern without continued

South African assistance. Indeed, since Turnhalle is essentially a creation of South Africa, it is assumed that the Turnhalle groups and the government which they form will depend at first massively upon the maintenance of current arrangements (if a lessening of prevailing economic integration) with South Africa. This may even mean the return to Namibia of numerous categories of officials transferred to Pretoria in 1969, and the resumption of certain governmental attributes by Namibia well before nominal independence is granted. If we wished to be cynical, the fastest way in which to train black administrators for Namibia would be to encourage the Turnhalle formula to run its full course; to do so properly and legitimately in international terms would presume the rapid training by South Africa (at its expense) of indigenous, mostly black, administrators and managers. Given the rapid reversal of racial attitudes in Namibia, with social apartheid on the verge of complete elimination (whites, especially the Germans, last month agitated in the streets for the integration of a theater and resort swimming pools; the hated Immorality Act is openly flouted and not enforced), this kind of transfer of bureaucratic initiative to blacks could occur without too many dislocations.

Unless there is substantial internal violence or externally-directed successful attacks upon Namibia, the stage appears set for a comparatively rapid devolution of power from South Africa to a South African-backed multiracial government led as much by blacks

as whites and coloureds. This government would, in the first instance, be seen as and in fact be a government completely beholden to South Africa and therefore in no way truly independent. But the force of international as well as local events cannot be arrested at this stage. And once power has begun to be transferred to blacks, the momentum is surely going to carry such an interim government into the attempt to legitimate its status by accommodating or preempting the SWAPO appeal. No one individual at present seems imaginative enough to overcome the attraction of SWAPO's leadership, but we should not completely rule out such a surprising development.

The above presumes the lack of significant control of events by SWAPO. Clearly, any internal Turnhalle successes will redouble the efforts of SWAPO to intervene and detract from the credibility of the Turnhalle initiative. Whether it now has the power and the ability to do so, absent Soviet or Cuban intervention, is a question for the near future.