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9. ABSTRACT
This report discusses the problems and prospects associated with land reform under African majority rule in Zimbabwe. Planning for land reform by a newly independent African government is bound to contain some measures that will be perceived negatively by certain groups, black and white, in Zimbabwe. The central issues are: to describe the inequities in the present system of land allocation between Africans and Europeans in Zimbabwe and to put forward a proposed model of land reapportionment that would bring about an equitable system of land distribution. This would remedy problems in living conditions which Africans have suffered due to land scarcity. There is an urgent need for changes in Zimbabwe's peasant agriculture. Sound programmic planning for land reform, however, requires a more thorough knowledge of the three types of African agricultural settlements: Tribal Trust Lands, Purchase Areas, and Irrigation Schemes. Tribal Trust Lands account for the largest number of African cultivators whose style of life has undergone fewer changes than those in other settlement types. Population density is highest in these settlements, but traditional socio-cultural values hold away and strong resistance to relocation is likely to be expressed. The agriculture here is rudimentary and no substantial agricultural surplus is produced. Purchase areas appear to be receptive to improved farming techniques and economic incentives.

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FINAL REPORT

# LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

by

William A. Shack

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# I

## INTRODUCTION

This report attempts to address some of the more salient problems and prospects associated with land reform under African majority rule in Zimbabwe. The central issue of this report is twofold: 1) to describe the inequities in the present system of land allocation between Africans and Europeans in Zimbabwe, with European settlers being apportioned the greatest shares of arable land; and 2) to put forward a proposed model of land reapportionment that, if adopted, would go far toward bringing about an equitable system of land distribution and thereby remedy problems of the human conditions Africans have suffered in consequence of land scarcity. Inequity in the system of land apportionment has been recognized by colonial governments as early as the turn of this century. They have commissioned numerous studies, prepared reports, and initiated legislative acts to address the problem of land allocation, but always the black majority remained disadvantaged. The most recent of such legislation, the Native Land Husbandry Act which became law in 1951, was launched under a Five Year Plan in 1956. The Act created unforeseen social problems for African farmers,

gave rise to urban squatters, failed to solve the pressing need of Africans for more productive land outside the Native Reserves to which they were confined, and was abandoned, eventually. Land apportionment policies developed by colonial governments were designed to maintain a low level of African peasant agricultural productivity and to create a ready surplus of cheap wage labor.

Despite nearly three-quarters of a century of European rule, detailed ethnographic information on the social systems of indigenous populations south of the Zambezi River is scanty, or if these data are available they have not been placed in the public domain. This situation contrasts sharply with the wealth of social anthropological studies of indigenous peoples north of the Zambezi produced by the former Rhodes-Livingston Institute (now the Institute of African Studies) in Zambia. Among the Zimbabwe populations little is known about their traditional forms of social organization and land-tenure systems, and the extent to which these have been shaped, modified or complicated by colonial rule. Or, indeed, how these systems and their personnel will react to new land reform policies under African majority rule. Similarly, little is known about how Africans have themselves variously reinterpreted the historical events described in this report which shaped their land-tenure systems. Perhaps because of

the paucity of hard ethnographic facts it has become commonplace in the historical and ethnographic literature to treat Zimbabwe Africans categorically as constituting two distinct ethnic divisions--Shona and Ndebele; hence, the geographical divisions between Mashonaland and Matebeleland. These general categories make no allowance for ethnic distinctions between groups within the larger territorial divisions who may or may not hold different ideas and practices relating to land rights and land use. No more can be said about these groups. They are listed in Appendix I.

The first substantive section of this report presents a brief historical overview of the principal factors that underlie the present system of land apportionment in Zimbabwe, and the effects of land segregation policies on the African population. Sections III and IV address the issues of the availability of arable land for redistribution to Africans, land which of necessity must be appropriated from the under-utilized holdings of the white farming population. A related issue is the probable consequences o the nation's agricultural economy that would result from the 'white flight' under black majority rule. What kind of model of land reform an independent Zimbabwe might adopt, though largely an academic question, nonetheless, must be addressed. The proposed model

outlined in Section IV compares the successes and failures of land reform experiments in Kenya and Tanganyika, and underscores those features of the Kenya model which, predictably, led to its failure. In the final section, the problems and prospects of land reform in Zimbabwe are set within the broad framework of suggested areas of field research studies, the results of which can provide baseline data which are essential for planning technical assistance programs that would aid the new Zimbabwe government to formulate sound equitable land reform policies.


RHODESIA
The Three Velds
Low veld (below 3000')
Middle veld (3000'-4000')
High veld (above 4000')
0
100 KM

## II

## LAND APPORTIONMENT IN ZIMBABWE: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The history of land segregation in Rhodesia dates back to 1894 when the first Reserves,[1] the Gwai and the Shangani, were allocated to the defeated Matabele[2] by the British South Africa Company.[3] After the Matabele War of 1893, the British Government issued an Order-in-Council on July 18, 1894, which announced the appointment of a Land Commission to "deal with all questions in relation to the settlement of Africans in Matabeleland." The Commission set aside two Reserves for Ndebele occupation that were later described as "badly watered, sandy and unfit for human settlement."[4] The practice of creating African Reserves in areas where ecological conditions militated against successful agricultural production was to become a pattern in the years that followed. Geographically, the most suitable farming areas in Zimbabwe are on the high veld where altitude ranges between 3000-5000 ft. The areas below the 3000 ft. altitude are generally very unproductive because of adverse environmental conditions. Only in such areas as the Sabi or Chirundu river valleys can successful agricultural production be carried out, but only by recourse to extensive irrigation schemes which African peasants can ill afford.

After the War of 1893, Europeans settled on mass in

Matabeleland alienating most of the arable land. On the migration and settlement of Europeans, Ranger has observed that, "within a few months of European occupation practically all the Ndebele's most valued lands passed into private estates and the commercial property of companies."[5] In 1893 further Southern Rhodesia Order-in-Council made it obligatory upon the Company to assign sufficient land for African occupation,[6] in view of the rapid alienation of land by the European settlers. By the Executive Order-in-Council of 1902, the Reserves were given what was then considered "final form." Native Commissioners were empowered to carve out more land for the collective use of the indigenous peoples. In Matabeleland land allocations were based on the South African Glen Grey Act which allowed nine acres for each African family, while in Mashonaland, fifteen acres were allocated to each family.[7] Almost all of the Reserves were created at great distances from market centers and usually in the humid and uninhabited low veld. By 1902 three quarters of all the land on the high veld had been alienated to European speculators.[8] Palmer reports that three million acres of land were alienated by European settlers in Mashonaland between 1890-1893.[9]

In spite of the extensive tracts of land which European settlers had secured by 1902, they continued to complain that the extent of African land was too large. The average

size of a European farm then was 6,000 acres in Matabeleland and about 3,000 acres in Mashonaland.[10] A Commission known as the Reserve Commission was appointed in 1914 to examine what was thought would be a final delimitation of land. That Commission recommended a final reduction of land in the African Reserves by a total of 1,042,460 acres. This was done in spite of the fact that of the 5,000 surveyed farms owned by Europeans 2,042 were unoccupied. By the Order-in-Council of 1920 the Reserves were given finality and most of the recommendations of the Reserves Commission were adopted. The land divisions then stood as presented in Table I.

The creation of the Reserves was the first major step toward land segregation in Rhodesia. Of the several economic factors that lay behind the adoption of land apportionment policies, two are most relevant to this report. First, land segregation was designed to eliminate African peasants from competition with white settlers. Second, it was designed to stimulate cheap labor. By confining the majority of the African population in Reserves where adverse environmental conditions prevailed, white settlers made it impossible for the majority of the African population to earn a living from farming in the areas of their abode. This made it imperative

TABLE I

LAND APPORTIONMENT IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA: 1920*

| Category | Acres |
|---|---|
| Alienated land | 31,684,095 |
| Native reserves | 21,203,498 |
| Unalienated land | 43,529,880 |
| TOTAL: | |

*Source: R. McGregor, Native Segregation in Southern Rhodesia (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1940), p. 90.


RHODESIA
Land Apportionment
1920
Salisbury
Gatooma
QueQue
Umtali
Gwelo
Fort Victoria
Bulawayo
Native reserves
Center of white settlement
0
100 KM

for Africans to leave the Reserves to sell their only commodity, i e., cheap labor.

The Land Apportionment Act

By 1921 European settlers had purchased a total of 11 million acres of land in Rhodesia while African farmers owned a total of only 40,000 acres.[12] But the settlers regarded these relatively small purchases of land as the beginning of a massive influx of Africans with advanced agricultural knowledge into the European area. The settler community argued that if Africans continued to enjoy the privilege of purchasing land anywhere outside the Reserves as provided under Section 63 of the 1898 Order-in-Council, they would soon pose a serious economic threat to would-be-European farmers who would have to compete with the rising class of African farmers for land. Demands were thus made by the settler community for the complete separation of European and African areas. As a result still another Commission was appointed to look into these issues. This Commission, commonly known as the Morris Carter Commission, but sometimes reffered to as the Lewis Commission, began its work in 1925.[13] In its report the Commission recommended complete land apportionment between the races in Rhodesia so that one race should not be able to purchase land designated for the other. The Land

Apportionment Bill which resulted from the deliberations of the Lands Commission became law as the Land Apportionment Act in 1930. Under the terms of the Act, the rights of Africans to purchase land anywhere were rescinded and restricted to a new category of land to be known as the Native Purchase Area. The Native Purchase Areas were generally placed adjacent to the African Reserves already in existence. Several other categories of land were created as illustrated by Table II.[14]

In 1930 there were some 50,000 Europeans and 1,081,000 Africans in Rhodesia. That Europeans owned and occupied 51% of the land while Africans who numbered twenty times as many were alloted only 29.6% of the land underscores the inequity of the Land Apportionment Act. Thus, while the African population was crowded in uninhabitable Reserves where they experienced increasing land shortage and a rapid deterioration of the soil, European farmers then had (as they do today) such extensive holdings that only slightly more than 3% could be farmed profitably.[15] As late as 1957 a Select Committee reported that out of 31.7 million acres which constituted European farmland then, only 1 million acres were under cultivation.[16] This means that large tracts of land were not being exploited in Rhodesia, making no contribution to the Gross National Product. This situation still prevails in Rhodesia

TABLE II

LAND APPORTIONMENT IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA: 1940*

| Category | Acres |
|---|---|
| European area | 49,149,174 |
| Native Reserves | 21,127,640 |
| Unassigned area | 17,793,300 |
| Native Purchase area | 7,464,566 |
| Undetermined area | 88,540 |
| Forest area | 5,905,500 |
| TOTAL: | 96,213,120 |
| Total for African use: | 28,591,606 |

*Source: Southern Rhodesia, Report of Native Production and Trade Commission (1944), p. 12.

today.

Amendments to the Land Apportionment Act were made in 1936, 1941, 1944, and in 1945. These amendments tended to tighten up its provisions. Between 1945 and 1960 the Act was amended on less than ten times. Perhaps the amendment of 1951 had the most far-reaching consequences on the African population. The endemic food shortages in the African Reserves was, according to Government officials, caused by poor methods of African farming.[17] As a result of the economic hardships experienced in the Reserves many Africans were compelled to supplement their harvests by seeking employment in the urban areas during the summer months and return to the Reserves during the rainy season. Government officials reasoned that the part-time farmer was a "bad" farmer whose prolonged absences reduced his farming skills. It was for this reason that the Government amended the Land Apportionment Act in 1951 by introducing the Native Land Husbandry Act. It was hoped the N.L.H.A. would curtail the mobility of the Africans and that permanency would result in better farming methods and higher yields of produce in the Reserves. Individual allocations of land were made to African families. But there was not enough land to be distributed equitably. Over 111,000 families who were entitled to holdings were denied them.[18] Many of those who were denied land migrated

to urban areas in search of employment. In 1964 it was estimated that in the Highfield African Township in Salisbury, there were 30,000 excess persons who were lodging illegally there.[19] These were job seekers who had migrated from the rural areas as a result of land shortage and soon became 'urban squatters'.

The N.L.H.A. played no small part in generating racial tension during the 1950's and 1960's. Its provisions were suspended in 1962 when violence flared up in both town and country. In 1959-1960 a Commission known as the Select Committee on the Settlement of Natives reviewed the effects of the Land Apportionment Act and recommended its repeal.[20] Indeed, the Act would have been repealed had not the right wing Rhodesian Front come to power in December 1962. The Rhodesian Front upheld the Act and even tightened its provisions by introducing the Land Tenure Act in 1969. Table III shows land distribution under the 1969 Act.[21] It may be observed in the table that 6 million Africans occupied as much land as that allocated to 270,000 whites. Moreover, African land is situated in the lower altitudes were rainfall is sparse (see maps).

## Effects of Land Segregation on the African Population

The redistribution of land must be viewed as one of the top priorities for an independent Government in Zimbabwe. The

TABLE III

LAND APPORTIONMENT IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA: 1969*

| Category | Acres |
|---|---|
| Forest | 1,822,700 |
| Parks and Wildlife land | 4,431,314 |
| European area | 44,948,300 |
| Native Purchase area | 3,669,379 |
| Tribal Trust Land | 39,909,830 |
| Total extent of African land: | 44,949,100 |
| National area | 6,617,400 |

*Land Tenure Act, No. 55 (1969), pp. 533-605.

urgency of this issue gains renewed force when set against the background of the effects of the Land Apportionment Act.

The first and most obvious problem of land apportionment in Zimbabwe today is its inequitable distribution. Land allocated to Europeans exceeds millions of acres, much of which lies unused every year, while Africans are crowded onto the Tribal Trust Lands. Table IV is evidence of this.[22]

The late Dr. Parirenyatwa estimated that some 16 million acres of European farmland were not being placed under production in 1962.[23] Despite this the Land Tenure Act of 1969 increased the extent of European land to about 45 million acres, exacerbating the crowded conditions in African areas. As early as 1945 the Native Production and Trade Commission reported the following overpopulation figures in the Reserves:

9 Reserves were more than 150% overpopulated

10 Reserves were 100-150% overpopulated

19 Reserves were 50-100% overpopulated

21 Reserves were 10-50% overpopulated

3 Reserves were 1-10% overpopulated[24]

In Matabeleland alone there was an excess population of 100,000 people and 111,000 livestock in 1959.[25] It is estimated that overstocking represents 12% on the average in the African areas. In both Mashonaland and Matabeleland overstocking and overpopulation have been a characteristic feature

TABLE IV

EUROPEAN FARMS: ANALYSIS BY SIZE

| Acres | No. of Farms | Total area, acres |
|---|---|---|
| under 51 | 87 | 3,309 |
| 51-100 | 186 | 16,036 |
| 101-250 | 371 | 65,204 |
| 251-500 | 326 | 118,730 |
| 501-1000 | 541 | 429,772 |
| 1001-2500 | 1853 | 3,212,052 |
| 2501-5000 | 1627 | 5,580,606 |
| 5001-7500 | 545 | 3,350,500 |
| 7501-10,000 | 212 | 1,841,827 |
| 10,001-15,000 | 244 | 2,937,016 |
| 15,001-20,000 | 108 | 1,877,620 |
| 20,000 and over | 243 | 13,693,485 |
| TOTAL: | 6337 | TOTAL: 33,162,157 |

[a]Source: Republic of Ghana, A Memorandum in Regard to Southern Rhodesia, Submitted to the Security Council on Aug. 2, 1961, p. 54. Note: Farms on which no agricultural activity was carried out are excluded.

of the Reserves. A study of various African Reserves has revealed that in the Chiwashe Reserve, for example, in 1960-1961 manured fields yielded 4.16 bags per acre while unmanured fields yielded 1.9 bags.[26] An examination of other Reserves shows that this is the trend in all the Tribal Trust lands even today. Grazing land in most Reserves is now between 4 and 5 acres per beast. An Agricultural Officer's Report has estimated that in good rainfall areas 15 acres should be the minimum grazing land per beast.[27]

These figures represent a fair sample of the predicament of African peasants in the Tribal Trust Lands in Zimbabwe. It therefore should come as no surprise that in 1961 the estimated 5 million Africans in Rhodesia contributed only 6.5% to the Gross Domestic Product from agriculture while the few thousand white farmers contributed 14.5%. In 1959 the total value of African agricultural products was estimated at £14,700,000 while that of European farmers was estimated at £52 million.[28]

The Land Apportionment Act not only maintains the African population in a state of serfdom but the Act also retards the economic development of the country by preventing the majority of its citizens from active participation in the exploitation of its most valuable resources. Firstly, land segregation has allocated most of the cultivable land to European farmers

who have received more land than they can utilize. Consequently the unused land in the European area makes no contribution to the G.N.P. Secondly, Africans evicted from what are now classified as European lands have been settled in areas where environmental factors are adverse to agricultural production. They are therefore unable to engage in profitable farming and so contribute almost nothing to the national economy because they lack purchasing power. Furthermore numerous restrictions placed on the marketing of African produce have removed any incentive for Africans to participate in commercial farming. For example, in 1965 the total value of African agricultural produce was only 5% of the gross sales from European agriculture. It therefore cannot be overemphasized that one of the top priorities of the first government to rule independent Zimbabwe must be the redistribution of land. Doubtless that many Africans in independent Zimbabwe will not understand the meaning of "freedom" unless "freedom" is accompanied by adequate land holdings from which they can derive a meaningful existence. Land shortage in the African sector, and its consequent assassination of the economy in that sector, was partly responsible for the dramatic rise of mass nationalism in the late 1950's. For over the years Africans of every class and ethnic group have come to harbor a deep seated grievance over the land question and prompt attention to this issue is

essential if the first African government is to earn credibility among its people in independent Zimbabwe.


RHODESIA
Land Apportionment
1958
16°
20°
Native reserves
Special native area
Native purchase area
Crown land, alienated and unalienated land, forest area
0
100 KM

## III

## PROBLEMS OF LAND REDISTRIBUTION

The statistics cited in Section II above make it abundantly clear that the present system of land distribution allocates to European farmers far more land than they can profitably utilize. As late as 1961, of the 6,337 European farmers in Rhodesia, 1,334 produced no crops at all, but were solely used as cattle ranches. Of the 33 million acres of land which constituted European farmland only 1,002,910 acres were allocated for cash crop production.[29] The average size of a European farm was 5,000 acres. Over 895 European farms exceeded 10,000 acres each, constituting a total of 19 million acres.[30] Therefore the average European farmer was utilizing about 2.7-3% of his land.[31] As has already been mentioned, there were 100 European farms which ranged from 15,000 to 20,000 acres in size in 1963.[32] According to Parirenyatwa's estimates, a total of 16 million acres of European farmland were unused in 1962.[33] Thus the claim that large areas of unused and under-utilized land have always been available in European areas is borne out by the fact that as late as 1965

the Rhodesian Government spent thousands of pounds recruiting and resettling in these areas expatriate white farmers from Kenya.[34] In 1964 a total of 112 European farmers from Kenya were resettled in Rhodesia, and another 1,000 were expected to follow in 1965.[35]

At the time of this writing, land set aside for Europeans exclusively totals about 45 million acres of which less than one-fourth has been developed as urban areas. Assuming that 10 million acres constitute the urban areas, there remains 35 million acres of European farmland. If we allow that 3% of the 35 million acres of European land is actually being utilized, over 33 million acres of unused land which makes up the 97% remain. Even if allowance is made for ranching activities substantial amounts of arable land for agricultural use are available for Africans in a resettlement program.

These statistics cannot take into account the inevitable fact that many white Rhodesians will most likely flee the country when majority rule is ushered in. Social and historical factors suggest that the psychological predisposition of the vast majority of Europeans in Zimbabwe works against the

notion of racial equality with Africans. Moreover, Europeans are not unaware of the racial abuses to which they have subjected Africans ; it is reasonable to assume that many, though not necessarily all, whites fear that under majority rule Africans might seek to settle old scores. Despite economic safeguards, the exodus of whites which has already begun very likely will accelerate, increasing in momentum when power shifts to black majority rule. If so, considerably more arable land in the high veld will be available than presently for African resettlement. The conclusion to be drawn is obvious: even if all whites chose to remain under majority rule, enough arable land is available in the European and Native Purchase Areas for equitable reallocation among the entire African population. What is less obvious and beyond reasonable prediction are the types of land reform policies the new government will seek to implement, and what groups, if any, black or white, will, in consequence, become disadvantaged.

Land reform is a complex socio-political issue, no less so for Zimbabwe than elsewhere in Africa. No African nation that inherited upon independence an entrenched white settler population

has successfully instituted land reform. For example, Tanzania, which had not white settler population, was able to institute Ujama villages without dislocating an entrenched expatriate farming community; Kenya did have such a population, and land reform planning was poorly conceived.

In the latter case, a land resettlement scheme was put into effect in 1963 at independence. However, twelve years later, only 60,000 African families had been resettled on land that was owned by white expatriates.[36]

Land resettlement programs are costly. In the Zimbabwe case there is every likelihood that the international community (under the so-called British-American Plan) will underwrite compensation costs for white farmers who elect not to remain under majority rule; a point to which full discussion is given below. It is not known if the Plan makes financial provisions for the relocation of Africans. Financial costs, let alone the logistics of resettlement of masses of Africans from the Tribal Trust Lands will be formidable. Transporting African families to new settlement areas perhaps will cost as much as the colonial government spent in moving Africans from European areas to the inhospitable

Reserves. Between 1936 and 1959 the compulsory movement of Africans from European areas cost an estimated £ 30 million.[37] Inflationary factors alone suggest that an African government can expect to spend more, not less, to resettle African families. Economics aside, neither can a viable resettlement program be implemented immediately on the eve of independence, nor can it be expected that all Africans in the Tribal Trust Lands will embrace the notion of relocation. Resettlement schemes disrupt social systems. Professor Colson's study of the social consequences of the Kariba resettlement scheme in Zambia is a relevant case in point.

Land redistribution initiated as part of resettlement schemes also has the potential of giving rise to "ethnicity" or "tribalism." The negative consequences of formulating land reform policies based upon ethnic and/or regional considerations, as against national concerns, can be as disastrous as that witnessed in other African countries. The roots of the problem with respect to ethnicity and land resettlement in Zimbabwe are embedded in the historical facts of unequal distribution of land between the Shona and the Ndebele. In 1946 approximately two-thirds of the Native Reserves were in Mashonaland.

Equitable redistribution of arable land will in large measure depend upon the extent to which a new government has broadly based proportional ethnic representation.

## IV

## SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DISORGANIZATION RESULTING FROM THE WHITE FLIGHT

Social and economic disruption will be created inevitably by the "white flight" from Zimbabwe. But the magnitude of chaos has to be measured against the situation of racial oppression presently experienced by Africans under white minority rule. Socially, Africans are racially segregated from whites in housing and residential areas, schooling, employment, public accommodations, etc. Economically, Africans are poverty-stricken and malnourished in a country where millions of acres of arable land remain unused in the European area. Therefore, it can be argued that even if all whites fled from Zimbabwe, the psychological, if not economic, well-being of Africans would be far better than at present under a minority government that is racist in the extreme. Doubtless that the "white flight" will cause unemployment for African laborers on white farms; few, if any, African farms in the Purchase Areas would be able to absorb this labor surplus. Some unemployed African laborers

may choose to migrate to the urban areas, thereby increasing the social problems already associated with urban squatter settlements. Still others may return to the Trust Lands, provided they have retained rights of tenure in the land there.

The British-American Plan which is designed to encourage as many whites to remain in an independent Zimbabwe as possible, and thereby reduce social disruption caused by the "white flight," provide: (a) compensation for whites who may lose property under an African majority government, and (b) economic guarantees and incentives for whites who may wish to stay when majority rule is ushered in. On first glance, the Plan, the exact details of which have yet to be disclosed, appears to be designed to maintain the present black/white land-man ratio, not to alleviate population density in the Tribal Trust Lands. Thus from the African perspective, the plan sacrifices the pressing need to reallocate land equitably to blacks in order to maintain the status of the white landed class; it is a sacrifice Africans are being asked to make for the price of political independence.

Taking land reallocation as a given, following are three interrelated programmatic changes

a new African government might seek to implement that would maintain, and even increase in the long haul the present level of agricultural productivity among African peasants.

A. Agricultural Schools. Mechanized and professional farming techniques are essential for full-scale integration of African peasants in agricultural productivity. This is a long-term process which will not produce benefits quickly because most African farmers need extensive training in modern commercial farming techniques. Training can be provided through agricultural extension programs and research efforts by the Department (or Ministry) of Agriculture and the University of Zimbabwe. It has not been the policy of the white minority government to work extensively to upgrade African farming methods. International aid programs could subsidize the training of African farmers by providing agricultural experts on secondment. A novel approach might be to establish "on-the-job training programs" on some of the more successful white-owned commercial farms, with adequate compensation to the owners involved in teacher-training programs. This could be another effort made to stem the tide of the "white flight."

B. <u>Loans and Subsidies</u>. Economic incentives such as loans and subsidies have long been used to assist and upgrade the white farming community. For example, the present Rhodesian Government spends $20,000,000 per annum to subsidize European farmers for the loss of their tobacco market resulting from economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations.[38] A single farmer can receive as much as $80,000 in loans or borrow as much as $40,000 to develop his water supply alone.[39] Again, when European farmers from Kenya resettled in Rhodesia in the 1960's the Rhodesian Government offered farms on leasehold, and if the new settlers chose to purchase the farms they could obtain as much as £10,000 each in loans.[40] In this regard, African farmers will require even more economic aids and incentives because under the white minority government they have been prohibited from engaging extensively in commercial farming and therefore lack capital resources. Emergency assistance programs for African farmers of the type commonly provided farming communities in the United States will need to be established to offset the risk involved in farming at a level above subsistence production. One of the major risks to African farmers

in Zimbabwe is that of crop failure owing to such natural disasters as hail or drought, which are common occurances in southern Africa. Economic incentives of the kind outined above have the potential of stimulating agricultural production among African peasants and counterbalancing the economic effects of the "white flight."

C. Marketing and Other Incentives. Since the 1930's. the system of marketing of African produce has been geared to discourage Africans from maximizing production efforts and thus eliminate competition with white farmers. For example, because of differential pricing schemes, in 1957 the government prescribed price for a bag of maize was 40 shillings but the net amount received by African faxmers was about 35 shillings.[41] African produce was subjected to more deductions than that of whites. These deductions occured in such categories as the Development Fund Levy, Transport Charges, Handling Charges, etc. As late as 1973 European producers were being charged two pence per bag of marketed grain while Africans were charged 22 pence for the same.[42] In 1959 the total value of African agricultural products was

£14,700,000 but because of the differential marketing practices only £3,400,000 reached the market. On the other hand of the £52,400,000 worth of European agricultural produce, £49,900,000 worth reached the market and only £2,500,000 was retained for domestic consumption.[43] These few facts suggest that new marketing arrangements are required to provide incentives to stimulate African farming production. But it is no easy matter to stimulate agricultural productivity in a country from which expatriates skilled in advanced farming techniques have fled, leaving behind an indigenous population which lacks such knowledge.[44] Major problems such as insecurity of land tenure and lack of sufficient economic incentives can undermine plans to improve agricultural productivity among African farmers.[45] Programmatic planning is crucial to the success of proposed land resettlement schemes that are coupled with agricultural policy.[46]

Other requisite economic incentives for increasing agricultural productivity in the African farming sector include the following: 1) road construction linking all sections of the country with the rail and market centers; 2) marketing legislation for stabilizing prices as is the case in many

countries in East and Central Africa. Price stabilization induces people to expand output and reduces uncertainty.[47]

In Zimbabwe there exist two classes of farming communities. One, the professional farmer, mainly white, produces on a large scale for commercial purposes. The other, the peasant farmer, mainly African, tills small plots of land and produces for subsistence. African peasant farmers need training and incentives of the kind outlined above to produce a surplus the sale of which will provide a modest income and raise their overall standard of living. African peasants constitute the largest segment of the Zimbabwe population and they have the greatest potential to contribute substantially to the national economy. But they also suffer most acutely from land shortage since the overwhelming majority are crowded onto the Tribal Trust Lands.

If the assumption is made that priority will be given to the resettlement of African peasants, they will require technical assistance in the way of agricultural demonstration projects, farm supervisors, fertilizers, seeds, pesticides, etc. Irrigation projects such as in the Sabi, Limpopo and

Zambezi Valleys can be increased in areas where available natural resources remain untapped. Where irrigation projects have been underway, as many as four crops can be grown on one relatively small plot of land per year. Irrigation projects in the Tribal Trust Lands have not been successful in the past because the Rhodesian Government has taxed African farmers who hold plots in irrigable land as much as $70 per year for one acre;[40] by comparison with the earnings of white farmers the taxation of African farmers is excessive. Reduction of taxation on irrigation projects, to be replaced by incentives for greater production, will increase the cash earnings and purchasing power of African farmers and in turn boost the nation's economic growth. Diversification of production to include such cash crops as cotton, sugar cane, tea, coffee, and citrus fruits is possible to achieve in a village cooperative scheme of the type discussed in more detail below. Similar crop diversification schemes have been tried in Tanzania where Ujama co-operative villages have made possible increased agricultural productivity, and facilitated the marketing of agricultural produce, beyond the scale of that reached in the pre-independence

era. Uganda also provides an alternative example of agricultural innovation at the village level. Ugandan African farmers were encouraged by the former colonial protectorate administration to cultivate cotton, contrary to the discriminatory practices proscribing cash crop farming which prevailed in Kenya, and still obtain in Zimbabwe today. In 1934 African agriculture contributed more than £3 million of the £3 3/4 million worth of Uganda's exports.[49] Admittedly, in contrast to Kenya and Zimbabwe, absent in Uganda (as in Tanzania) was a large white settler farming community competing against African peasants. Even so small-scale village farming can be as economically productive in Zimbabwe as it has been in Uganda if supported by proper economic incentives and technical guidance.

## IV

## LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE: A PROPOSED MODEL

Historical evidence suggests that the economic interests of European powers in Africa have been generally incompatible with the political and economic aspirations of the African masses. Foreign interests, West or East, have usually entailed the exploitation of Africans. That said, it would come as no surprise if African political leaders in Zimbabwe reject out of hand any scheme of land reform that is made an article of the constitutional package for majority rule. Land reform planned and executed by an African government once granted the power of rule, not made a precondition of political independence, would strengthen the government's credibility. Political credibility is necessary to legitimate land resettlement schemes, however much they may be viewed unfavorably by certain segments of the population which have vested interests in the old system. A glance at land reform initiated in Kenya at the time of independence will underscore the point raised above.

The Kenya proposal for independence was

accompanied with a program of land reform, the details and timing of which were planned without benefit of consultation with the provisional African government. Land resettlement was promised by the British government in return for moderate European settlers' support of the decision to move Kenya toward independence.[50] The Colonial Office prepared Kenya for independence by ministering to the fears of Europeans who threatened to flee the country, rather than by assisting African leaders to mount social and economic programs to support their nation-building aspirations. This ill-prepared program enabled about 5,000 African farmers who had proven their farming ability and who had sufficient capital to purchase land to participate in this first phase of resettlement.[51] But the resettlement scheme excluded economically all African peasant farmers in the Reserves who had fought in the Mau Mau War for independence. Moreover, the scheme enabled Kenyan whites to buy land on condition that they become Kenyan citizens. With their newly acquired legal status white farmers evicted thousands of African tenants from the purchased lands.[52] This action provoked considerable protest from several African politicians. In a letter to the Government of Mr. Kenyatta, Mr. Kaggia, the then Minister of

Education, wrote: "These inhuman settlers are not only evicting the true sons of the soil from their own soil but are also destroying their crops making our poor brothers beggars in their own country."[53] Both Mr. Oginga Odinga and Mr. Tom Mboya also protested against the Colonial Administration which was making land apportionment policty in an African country that was achieving independence.[54] As is well known, the lack of a viable solution to the land problem in Kenya is still a cause of frustration and discontent among the African masses today. The tragedy of colonial governments attempting to legislate land reform measures in the era of transition to majority rule was also experienced in Algeria where DeGaulle of France initiated the Constantine Plan in 1959 in an effort to take the steam off of nationalist agitation.[55] Precisely as the Kenya resettlement scheme failed to meet the aspirations of the land hungry masses, so did the Constantine Plan which was finally abandoned completely.

These are only a few examples from which an interim and post-independence government in Zimbabwe should draw lessons. If land reform proposals are included as the "constitutional package,"

they are likely to be interpreted by Africans as designed to fulfill "new-colonialist" aspirations while making paupers of the masses of blacks who have been so active in the liberation struggle. And it most likely will be.

## Land Reform Proposals

Land reform proposals in Zimbabwe should take into consideration the two main categories of the African farming population to which reference has been made above: subsistence farmers and professional farmers, the latter engaging in large scale commerical farming. As already pointed out in Section III, the subsistence or peasant farmers are those presently living in the Tribal Trust Lands, who constitute more than 70% of the African population in Zimbabwe.[56] Since peasant farmers make up the overwhelming majority of the African population, it follows that they require the most urgent attention of the new Government in the development of land reform proposals.[57]

Programmatic land reform planning should involve the following: (i) population census conducted either by the government or an international

agency. Estimates of the African population amount to no more than crude approximations; thus, census data would provide reliable estimates of the size of African families living in the Tribal Trust Lands. (ii) Land surveys in each District on the high veld. Survey results can provide guidelines for determining where land is to be set aside for the resettlement of Africans now living in the Tribal Trust Lands. Figures cited in Tables III and IV lead to the obvious conclusion that the vast amounts of under-utilized high veld land in the European area is the principal source of land available for the resettlement of Africans from the Tribal Trust Lands. Since unused arable land is sufficient in most districts, European farmers need not harbor fears of being dispossessed of their lands. (iii) Experimental resettlement schemes may be initiated simultaneously. Two examples of resettlement schemes of which there are several variants, are: a) the allocation of small holdings of about 25 to 30 acres to each family; b) some form of co-operative or village settlements such as the Ujama village scheme in Tanzania.

A. Small farm holdings. In Zimbabwe, the average size of an African family is about 6 members.

Approximately 700,000 families need to be resettled. At the rate of about 25 acres per family about 17,500,000 acres are required to resettle all the African families presently living in the Tribal Trust Lands. This figure does not include grazing lands which must be distributed at the rate of about 12-15 acres per head of cattle. A communal grazing ground could be set aside in each resettlement area; this would require an additional 8 million acres for grazing purposes. Thus of the total of Zimbabwe's 96 million acres about 25 million acres may be used for resettlement of African peasant farmers. This amounts to about one-half of the land now reserved for Europeans exclusively (see Table III). Technological innovations introduced in the Tribal Trust Lands would reduce the pressure to resettle all Africans in what is now the European Area. Moreover, it would make little economic or demographic sense to shift population density from one area and re-create the same problem of density in another.

B. Co-operatives or Village Settlements. Village co-operative schemes have as many advantages as they have problems. Subsistence farmers traditionally accustomed to living in dispersed settlements

with quasi-political autonomy are not likely to be enthusiastic about village co-operative schemes. Coercive measures taken by the Government to force farmers into co-operative villages are doomed to failure. However, the advantages of the co-operative village scheme are that they reduce government costs for providing instruction in agricultural methods and in the use of modern agricultural techniques. Such training methods have been adopted with relative success in the Tanzania model, the essential features of which are described below. In Zimbabwe, the Tanzania model may be applicable in those Tribal Trust Land districts where subsistence farming is the prevailing norm; the model is hardly applicable to the African irrigation scheme areas and the modern commerical farming sector. Moreover, there is no convincing evidence that the Tanzania model has been applied or met with any success in the modern agricultural sector of that country.

## Tanzania Model

1. Rural Settlement Commission. A special Rural Settlement Commission established to control and organize village settlements has two

main tasks: a) to establish a series of pilot co-operative, agricultural village settlements in order to set a pattern for the eventual transformation of social and economic conditions in the rural area; and b) to control and organize other rural settlements.

2. Pilot Village Settlements. a) Size: 250 families of approximately 1,000 people; b) target income: £150 per family per annum net after meeting the cost of food consumed and recurrent expenses; c) land tenure: initially a right of occupancy over each scheme is taken out by the Rural Settlement Commission. After a settlement has been fully developed as a viable economic unit, the right of occupancy is transferred to the village co-operative society which is required to grant subtitles to each farmer.

3. Capital Cost. Approximately £150,000 of which £20,000 is a Government subsidy, the balance to be repaid by the farmers over a period of about 25 years.[50]

Co-operative projects based on the Tanzania model, or some variant thereof, could be introduced on a limited experimental basis in Zimbabwe, as experiments were made with irrigation project schemes

in Mtema and Myanyadzi. Co-operatives have the advantage of facilitating marketing while maximizing agricultural production.

Estimation of the costs involved in transporting families from the Tribal Trust Lands to new settlement areas may be guided by the Kenyan example. In Kenya, £750 was spent on the average to resettle each family.

The size of commercial land holdings should be determined by the extent to which they can be profitably utilized. Some commercial farmers may be able to utilize as much as 200 acres of land especially where such plantation crops as wheat, cotton, coffee and tea are grown. Of the commercial farming class, few will be Africans in present day Zimbabwe.

Government loans should be made available to prospective farmers to be repaid over an extended period of time. Controls and monitors on the system of leasehold should diminish the kinds of abuses which have occured in Kenya[59] and Lesotho.[60] In both cases Africans have resorted to similar methods of exploitation of peasants as Europeans did before them.

State control of agricultural enterprises should be considered. Commercial tea and coffee

estates on the Eastern Highlands, the cattle ranches such as Naunetsi, the cotton plantations in the Sabi Valley and the several tobacco plantations, if abandoned by white owners, could be acquired and managed by the state. By setting standards for minimum wages and working conditions for their employees, and also maintaining high productivity, state farms could serve as models for small estate owners who must rely upon hired laborers.

## VI

## CONCLUSIONS

At the time of preparation of this report, only one social anthropological study comparing African communities in the three types of settlement areas is known to exist. This excellent study, by A.K.H. Weinrich (Sister Mary Aquina), African Farmers in Rhodesia,[61] sets the standard for similar studies to be carried out in the future. Such field studies could be commissioned either by the government in Zimbabwe or by international agencies. The exact location where Weinrich carried out her research is unknown because to protect the anonymity of her informants and the tribal area, she refers to the district as "Karangaland." Most of Weinrich's recommendations for the resettlement of Africans to remedy the problems of population density in the Tribal Trust Lands, and the urgent need for training African peasants in the techniques of modern agriculture, have been incorporated in the proposals for land reform outlined in Section V above. In the absence of socio-economic data obtained from the conduct of micro-level studies in rural communities,

providing firm understanding of the social systems and values associated with the land of the peoples who will be affected by land reform, the proposals put forward in this report may well have no relevance to the actual situation on the ground.

Despite the urgent need for changes in Zimbabwe's peasant agriculture, sound programmatic planning for land reform requires more thorough knowledge than what is at hand of the three basic types of African agricultural settlements: Tribal Trust Lands, Purchase Areas, and Irrigation Schemes. It is impossible to predict how African peasants in these different settlement areas will react to land reform proposals of whatever nature. In sum, all that can be said with any degree of certainty is that these settlement patterns are integrated unequally in the wider agricultural economy of Zimbabwe; and that the differential nature of their integration has a bearing upon the problem of planning for land reform.

1. Tribal Trust Lands. The most important type of peasant agriculture is found in the Tribal Trust Lands; it accounts for the largest number of African cultivators whose style of life has undergone

fewer changes than those in other settlement types. Tribal Trust Lands are modifications of traditional systems which not longer exist except as a nostalgic image of the past. Population density is highest in these settlement areas and deserve to be assigned first priority in any land reform scheme. But precisely because traditional socio-cultural values hold sway and are so firmly entrenched, strongest resistance to relocation is likely to be expressed by Africans in the Trust Lands. As mentioned above, agricultural practices of African peasants in Tribal Trust Lands are rudimentary. The peasant farmers are barely able to maintain their families at the level of subsistence and, in consequence, they produce no substantial agricultural surplus.

2. Purchase Areas. The fortunate few Africans who have bought freehold plots in Purchase Areas represent an incipient "middle class" of African farmers, suggesting acceptance of the concept of individual land tenure and the influence of European values concerning land. Individual freehold contradicts traditional "communal" values associated with land holding and also weakens the position of traditional authority figures whose political power

rests largely upon the right to allocate land. Purchase areas would appear to be ripe for receptiveness to improved farming techniques and economic incentives of the type proposed above, the acceptance of which would enable freeholders to maximize their capital investment and to contribute substantially to the gross national product than what is permitted under present conditions. It is not inconceivable that, in the short haul, African farmers in the Purchase Areas can acquire the economic and technical potential to offset the loss of national income that might occur if the "white flight" reaches the scale of proportion that has been predicted.

3. Irrigation Schemes. This technological innovation introduced in Tribal Trust Lands presupposes European methods of agricultural production. Irrigation schemes may be expected to have influenced the "tribal" values of the plotholders, though there is no baseline data to suggest how widespread this change has occured. Attitudinal changes associated with land that were brought about by the introduction of irrigation schemes in Karangaland, as susggested by Weinrich's study, cannot form the basis for making generalizations about the whole of Zimbabwe.

Land reform is as much a political problem as an economic and social problem, for whatever government that is empowered to rule. Colonial governments encountered few problems in setting aside for exclusive habitation by Africans the least desireable land. Legislation was enacted and put into practice with relative ease, in part because white settlers communities were not integral to the social systems of Africans that were being adversely affected by land apportionment policies. The situation differs in a government of majority rule. Africans thrust into decision-making positions and charged with responsibility for planning land reform policies will, it is fair to say, find the going rough. Mainly the difficulty will arise as a consequence of the breakdown of the categorical distinction formerly used by whites, not only to classify all Africans as "blacks," but also to regulate their behavior accordingly. That being so, it is reasonable to assume that the new government of Zimbabwe may be faced with some, though not necessarily all, of the problematic events associated with land reform outlined below. Equally problematic is the degree to which these events will exacerbate planning for

a viable solution to land reform.

1. Expectations by the African masses for a speedy redress of the problem of land inequity will gain momentum during the period of transition to majority rule; concomitantly, black demands will increase the nagging anxiety held by whites about the uncertainty of their future in Zimbabwe, thus accelerating the "white flight."

2. Failure to remedy the situation with all deliberate speed is likely to weaken the credibility of the interim government, but hasty decisions to pacify growing demands for land reform also will result in disastrous consequences; for example, premature proclamations to "nationalize" all European land might have a salutory effect quelling the African masses, but a deleterious effect on the nations economy, especially the export of agricultural produce.

3. Frailty of government brought about by the above sequence of events can promote regional loyalties, with local groups competing against one another (e.g., Shona vs. Ndebele) for greater shares of redistributable land, though as shown in Section III above land is not a scarce commodity. Predictably,

regional factionalism will evoke local historical referents to justify claims for "ancient" lands.

4. Emergence of regionalism can provide the basis for reassertion of the traditional authority once held by chiefs and headmen which had been sharply curtailed under the long period of colonial rule. The position of Native Commissioners would become increasingly tenuous, especially in mediating land disputes.

5. With a newly acquired power base, perhaps reinforced by allegience to one or another opposition political party, local authority figures will have gained the potential for standing in open defiance of any land reform measures which they may come to view as being not in the economic interest of their constitutents, and as well threatening their own political position.

Since power and authority to enforce decisions deemed to be in the interest of the nation are necessary criteria of government in all complex societies, planning for land reform by a newly independent African government is bound to contain some measures that will be perceived negatively by certain groups, black and white, in Zimbabwe. It

is naïve to assume otherwise. How an African government in Zimbabwe might keep to a minimum the issuance of economically unsound and unpopular decisions with respect to land reform has been the main purpose of this report.

## APPENDIX I

## A NOTE ON THE SHONA AND NDEBELE OF ZIMBABWE[a]

I. **The Shona**: Mainly concentrated in Mashonaland which extends for some 60,344 square miles eastwards of a line stretching roughly from the Kariba Gorge to Gwelo and including Manicaland and Melsetter. In 1946, 23 administrative districts were in Mashonaland and 13 in Matabeleland. Then the area alloted exclusively as Native Reserves was 33,011 square miles (approximately 23% of Zimbabwe's 150,333 square miles), of which 21,309 square miles were in Mashonaland.

a. Ethnic distribution. Following are the principal ethnic groups who make up the larger division known as Shona: i) Karanga; ii) Zezuru; iii) Korekore; iv) Rozvi; v) Ndau; vi) Manyika; vii) Ungwe; viii) Tavara; ix) Hera; x) Tonga (of the Zambesi Valley).

II. **The Ndebele**: Mostly found in Matabeleland, in the western part of Zimbabwe, in a broad, roughly circular strip of country, surrounding the town of Bulawayo, but at distances of 30 to 50 miles from it. North of the Ndebele are various Shona-speaking groups and some matrilineal Tonga. On the east lies the main block of Central Shona peoples. To the south are the Venda, Shona, some Sotho and Malanga, who speak a dialect of Western

Shona. On the west of the Ndebele are Kalanga, Tswana and some Sili Bushmen along the Botswana border.

a. Ethnic distribution. No reliable data exist on the great number of different ethnic groups the original Ndebele absorbed in the process of creating the Ndebele nation.

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[a]Source: H. Kuper, A.J.B. Hughes and J. van Velsen, The Shona and Ndebele of Southern Rhodesia. Ethnographic Survey of Southern Africa, Part IV. London: International African Institute, 1955.

## NOTES

1. Reserves are the equivalent of Native American Reservations in the United States. They are areas into which Africans were driven by European settlers. The name was later changed to "Tribal Trust Lands."

2. The Matebele is one of two major ethnic groups in Zimbabwe. See Appendix I.

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6. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Inquiry, 1910-1911, National Archives, Salisbury, pp. 10-11.

7. Great Britain, Papers Relating to the Southern Rhodesia Native Reserves. CMD 8674, p. 7.

8. H. Moyana, Land Apportionment in Rhodesia (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1973), p. 53.

9. R.H. Palmer, The Making and Implementation of Land Policy in Rhodesia, 1890-1930 (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of London), p. 257.

10. Phillip Mason, The Birth of a Dilemma: The Conquest and Settlement of Rhodesia (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 257.

11. R. McGregor, Native Segregation in Southern Rhodesia (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1940), p. 90.

12. Southern Rhodesia, Chief Native Commissioner's Report (Salisbury, 1918), p. b.

13. Lands Commissions Report, 1925/File No. ZAM/1/1/3 PH, National Archives, Salisbury.

14. Southern Rhodesia, Report of Native Production and Trade Commission, Salisbury, 1944, p. 12.

15. Southern Rhodesia, Assembly Votes and Proceedings, Salisbury, April 23, 1957, Report of the Select Committee on the Development of Unimproved Lands, p. 10.

16. Ibid.

17. A. Pendered and W. Moberty, "The Native Land Husbandry Act," Journal of African Administration, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1955), p. 102.

18. E. Haddon, "Good Ground for Reform," The Central African Examiner, Vol. 5, No. 1 (June 1961), p. 17.

19. The Central African Examiner, Vol. 0, No. 3. (1955), p. 102.

20. Southern Rhodesia, Second Report of the Select Committee on the Resettlement of Natives, Salisbury, 1960, p. 143.

21. See Land Tenure Act, No. 55 (1969), pp. 533-605.

22. Republic of Ghana, A Memorandum in Regard to Southern Rhodesia. Submitted to the Security Council on August 2, 1963.

23. Ibid.

24. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Native Production and Trade Commission, Salisbury, 1945 (N.A.S. File No. S 234/6/74), p. 35.

25. J. Prescott, "Overpopulation in Native Areas," Geographical Journal, Vol. 127 (1961).

26. R.W. H. Johnson, "An Economic Survey of Chiweshe Reserve," Human Problems in Central Africa, Vol. 35 (December 1964), p. 93.

27. See Sister Aquina, "The Social Background of Agriculture in Chuimanzi Reserve," Human Problems in Central Africa, Vol. 56 (December 1964), p. 52.

28. Southern Rhodesia, Legislative Assembly. Second Report of the Select Committee on the Resettlement of Natives, Salisbury, August 16, 1960, p. 84.

29. Haddon, op. cit.

30. M. Yudelman, Africans on the Land (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 79.

31. See Letter from Edwin S. Munger, "Beadle Farm," May 26, 1953 in Central and Southern Africa--American Field Report, Vol. 2, 1953.

32. Republic of Ghana, op. cit., p. 54.

33. Maddox, op. cit., p. 17

34. See The Rhodesia Herald, September 3, 1965.

35. Ibid.

36. Africa, Vol. 41, No. 51, November 1975. In both Lesotho and Kenya, there has emerged a class of wealthy African landlords who could easily monopolise most of the land at the expense of the rest of the population. Such has happened in Lesotho, where years after independence, 40% of the families were virtually landless while a lot of the land was concentrated in the hands of a few families, mainly chiefs and some civil servants; see Africa, No. 41, January 1975. Regarding Kenya, Kyle Ahrold has written:

> "Since Kenya's independence in 1963, the British Government has aided in the release of about 7.5 million acres of Kenya's best land formerly held by White settlers. Although some of this land has been returned to the people the best of it has come into the hands of a select few. Their holdings are centered in two areas--in the rift valley and in Kiambu, home of the Kikuyu from whom Kenyatta came. The President's personal holdings (about 6 farms including 3,500 acres at Gangai in the Rift and a much smaller farm in the Kiambu region) represent to many a comfortable but not improper wealth for the head of state. However, the holdings of others close to him and the means with which these lands have been acquired have caused angry rumblings within the Republic."

Quoted from K. Ahrold, "Kenya's Corrupt Scramble for Wealth," Ebony Magazine, Nov. 3, 1975, p. 17.

37. E. Reddon, op. cit.

38. "Evidence of the Economist for the European Farmers Association in Rhodesia," August, 1973.

39. Ibid.

40. The Rhodesia Herald, September 3, 1976.

41. Southern Rhodesia, Chief Native Commissioner's Report, Salisbury, 1957.

42. Evidence of the Grain Marketing Board (Urtali, 1973), collaborated by the Vice President of the African Farmers Association in Salisbury.

43. Southern Rhodesia, Legislative Assembly, Second Report of the Select Committee on the Resettlement of Natives, Salisbury, 1956, p. 64.

44. Gifford D. Dawee, Ohio University Papers in International Studies No. 6 (1957), p. 15.

45. J. Morris, "The Evaluation of Settlement Schemes Performance: A Sociological Appraisal," in Raymond Apthorpe (ed.), Land Settlement and Rural Development in East Africa (Kampala: Uganda Press Trust, Ltd.), p. 65.

46. See W.A. Lewis, Development Planning: The Essentials of an Economic Policy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 270.

47. M. Yudelman, Africans on the Land (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 177.

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49. B.A. Ogot and J.A. Kieran (eds.), Zamani (New York: Humanities Press, 1968), p. 274.

50. John W. Harbeson, "Land Reforms and Politics in Kenya, 1954-1970," Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 9, No. 2 (1971).

51. Ibid.

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53. See Memorandum quoted in Harberson, op. cit., p. 214, from Mr. Kaggia.

54. Harberson, op. cit.

55. T. Blair, The Land to Those Who Work It (New York: Doubleday, 1969), p. 17.

56. Based on the Annual Reports of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Salisbury, 1963-1975.

57. See the report compiled by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, "The Man in the Middle: Torture, Resettlement and Eviction."

58. S.W. Fraser-Smith, Agricultural Transformation through the Village Settlement," in Agricultural Development in Tanzania, H. Smith (ed.), (Dar-Es-Salaam, Institute of Public Administration, 1965), pp. 33-35.

59. Encore Magazine, Nov. 3, 1975, p. 17.

60. Africa No. 41, January 1975, p. 31.

61. A.K.H. Weinrich, African Farmers in Rhodesia (London: Oxford University Press), 1975).