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9. ABSTRACT

Aid options for the U.S. should not be studied or conceived, much less implemented, without reference to the political context and to the overall goals of the United States in southern Africa. This project concerns U.S. interests in Southern Africa and the desirable goals for U.S. policy, especially aid policy. It is assumed that it is in the national interest of the U.S. to strongly support majority rule in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. The objectives of economic assistance as such should be to help ease the transition to majority rule and to help the African majorities achieve full self-determination. This study focuses on short-term conditions in the two transitions which may be susceptible to economic assistance. It attempts to anticipate what adverse conditions may arise in the administrative, economic, and human resource sectors of the two countries. The analysis may suggest ways to alleviate short-term problems or crises, but the main objective is to avert or alleviate possible problems and to help put the new African governments in the best position to deal with underlying problems of underdevelopment in the future. The report provides an initial assessment of the likely consequences of transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia, and of the likely consequences in the political/administrative, social, economic, and human welfare sectors of the two countries. It should be of help in developing a basic U.S. aid posture, in developing specific programs of aid, and in identifying areas for further study. The possible consequences of transition, outlined in this study, concern not only foreign aid but also foreign investment, international banking, and finance. A.I.D. type assistance must be conceived in a broad framework.

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FINAL REPORT

POLITICS IN ZIMBABWE

by

Joseph N. Short

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NOTE:

The papers included herein by Joseph N. Short are four in number. These are:

- 1) Introduction/Adams Report
- 2) Summary Observations: The Political Sector (Zimbabwe)
- 3) Political Factors in Zimbabwe Development
- 4) Political Factors in Namibia Development

Numbers 1-3 are included in Volume I - Zimbabwe under #5 SHORT PAPER, Politics

Number 4 is included in Volume III - Namibia under #3 SHORT PAPER, Politics

*It should be further noted that the Short papers were written in the form of drafts.

Table of Contents
Draft #1
Introduction/Adams Report
Prepared by: Joe Short
Date: October 1, 1976

	<u>Page</u>
Setting of Study	1
Political Context, U.S. Interests and Goals	3
Political Context	3
Assumptions about Trends in Southern Africa	4
Assumptions about U.S. National Interests in Southern Africa	7
Assumptions about U.S. Policy and Aid Objectives	9
Need for Study	12
Purpose of Study	14
Definitions of Major Terms and Concepts	16
Majority rule	16
Transition	17
Consequences	19
Crises	20
Longer-Term Development Problems	20
Organization and Mode of Analy- sis of Report	21
Mode of Analysis	22
Organization of Report	24

INTRODUCTION

Adams Report

Setting of Study

Majority rule is imminent in Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) and Namibia (Southwest Africa). Or, at least, the possibility of this is so clear and present as to justify and even require a study such as this.

For twenty years decolonization has moved inexorably across sub-Saharan Africa and southward to the remaining white redoubts in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Southwest Africa. Until the recent collapse of Portuguese rule in Mozambique (1975) and Angola (1976), it was possible for U.S. national security managers to believe that the advance of decolonization would be halted, or decidedly stalled on the northern frontiers of those two colonies and of Zimbabwe. In the period of 1969 - 1975, the Nixon-Ford administration conceived U.S. policies towards southern Africa on the assumption that "The whites are here to stay and....There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence."*

*Option 2 (Premise), NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa, Study in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 39: Southern Africa. (1969).

Revolutionary change in Angola, bringing to power an African government which the United States opposed politically and militarily (through proxies) has obviously propelled a dramatic, if not pervasive change of U.S. assumptions about the southern African situation. The Angolan experience and nationalist guerrilla operations from Mozambique, Zambia and Angola into Zimbabwe and Namibia, respectively, obviously have undercut the policy assumptions that whites are permanently ensconced in power in southern Africa and that African nationalists can achieve no political gains by resorting to violence. They should not, of course, encourage the opposite delusion that minority white hegemony can necessarily be eliminated, and quickly, especially in South Africa.

Doubtless, Secretary of State Kissinger's statement in Lusaka (4/76) concerning an agenda for cooperation in dealing with the problems of southern Africa signalled a new and more realistic awareness of American interests in the evolving situations of countries of that region. His shuttle diplomacy (9/76) to negotiate for majority rule in Zimbabwe within two years raised hopes that the United States would help facilitate a surprisingly early and peaceful transfer of power.

There are deep suspicions in Africa and the United States concerning Secretary Kissinger's motives and goals, and especially concerning possible concessions to South Africa he might make to secure Prime Minister Vorster's

cooperation in assuring majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia. The outcome of negotiations over Zimbabwe, not to mention Namibia, is still quite uncertain. The Rhodesian Front government of Ian Smith has conceded to majority rule within two years but so far on conditions which neither Zimbabwe nationalists nor the frontline Presidents (Mozambique, Tanzania, Botswana, Angola and Zambia) will accept. (10/1/76) Continuing negotiations over terms for an interim government are likely.

Political Context, U.S. Interests and Goals

Aid options for the U.S. should not be studied or conceived, much less implemented, without reference to political context and to the overall goals of the United States in southern Africa. This Project of the African-American Scholars Council has the responsibility of expressing its conception of U.S. interests in the southern Africa and of the desirable goals for U.S. policy, and specifically for aid policy.

Political Context. This study has been conducted at a time of mounting political tension and activity---in the United States as various groups (public and private) try to influence U.S. policies in southern Africa; among various states inside and outside of Africa attempting to influence the course of events; between Africa nationalists of the two countries and the Smith and Windhoek governments, respec-

tively; among the African nationalist groups competing for predominance; and so on.

Under such conditions, a study such as this will inescapably be perceived as having political implications. And since it might very well have political consequences, if taken seriously and if it helps to frame U.S. aid options, it is imperative for the Project to make clear from what point of view, concerning overall U.S. policy in southern Africa, it develops this analysis. We do this by stating briefly our guiding assumptions concerning: trends in southern Africa; what U.S. interests are in the area; what U.S. policy goals ought to be (subsuming goals of assistance).

Assumptions about Trends in Southern Africa

1. Zimbabwe and Namibia will pass to majority rule in the relatively near future.

2. The longer the transition periods for both countries the greater degree to which nationalist guerrilla operations will determine the nature, timing and course of transitions. This is surely the case in Zimbabwe and quite possibly the case in Namibia.

3. The longer the transition periods in Zimbabwe and Namibia, and especially the greater the guerrilla/military confrontation, the greater the likelihood of superpower involvement and/or confrontation in the region, especially over Zimbabwe.

4. South Africa will not pass to majority rule in the near future, but the Vorster government will have to resort to greater repression and/or greater concessions to contain continuing African unrest. South Africa has the will and the resources to contain that unrest for the indefinite future, assuming no dramatic rise in pressures from major western powers. South Africa is probably working towards a nuclear capability with which to deter outside interference.

5. South Africa reluctantly seeks a negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe, and an African government in Salisbury with the least inclination and capacity to challenge South Africa itself. It has comparable intentions and greater capacities in shaping a Namibian settlement.

6. South Africa has the means and will to shape the kinds of transition that occur in Zimbabwe and Namibia. But there are distinct limits to its capacity to control events, especially in Zimbabwe.

7. South Africa has the capacity to substantially affect the kinds of transitional consequences (political, economic, etc.) which African nationalists and then governments will have to face in both countries.

8. African nationalist groups and states will tacitly accept a South African role in establishing majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia, under appropriate conditions; but they will continue to strenuously oppose the South African apartheid system.

9. Most of the African frontline countries seek an immediate, negotiated settlement in the two countries. They will continue to give substantial support, however, to longer-term guerrilla warfare, if that is necessary. There are some differences in what each country is able and ready to do in this respect.

10. The Zimbabwe nationalist groups are unified in overall purpose, but there are serious divisions among them over leadership, over the means by which to achieve majority rule and possibly over how to organize the future political system and economy. The nature of transition will likely affect this division, but in ways that are hard to predict. Certainly the nature of transition is likely to substantially shape the internal and external predispositions of the new government, e.g., with respect to attitudes and policies towards the United States.

In Namibia, SWAPO is the ascendant African nationalist group, and any acceptable settlement will have to accord it the primary leadership role.

11. African nationalists with the assistance of the frontline states, are effectively gaining the upperhand in Zimbabwe so that outside states can at most influence, but no longer control the course of events. Outside states can still exercise greater influence over the Namibian future.

Assumptions about U.S. National Interests in Southern Africa. This Project can agree that the United States has a variety of political, economic, strategic/military and scientific interests in the southern African region, even if they may not be "vital interests."

What has too often been missing from the privately held views of U.S. national security managers, and the policies which have followed from these, is a sufficiently broad view of U.S. national interests. The controversial Study in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 39: Southern Africa (1969), for instance, notes how U.S. relationships "with the white regimes" may affect its standing with non-white governments and peoples. It also worries that

If violence in the area escalates, US interest (sic) will be increasingly threatened. In these circumstances the US would find it increasingly difficult without sacrificing interests to find a middle ground in the UN on questions of insurgent violence and counter-violence in the region and to resist demands for more positive actions against the white regimes.*

With the preoccupation to find "middle ground" and with "international political ramifications" (important as the latter are), study/NSSM 39 does not so much as mention the possibility that strong alignment with the aspirations the

*Ibid.

African majorities within the area (more than just rhetorically) could be in the national interest. Never mind the argument on grounds of principle "that the success of the liberation movements might bring tangible benefits to the African people in their movement for growth and self-development."*

This Project assumes that it is in the national interest of the United States to strongly support majority rule in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Indeed other national interests depend upon how effective we are in pursuing majority rule. Secretary of State Kissinger's recent statements and diplomatic efforts seem to indicate that he has now embraced this conception of national interest, at least for Zimbabwe and Namibia.

While we know very well that white power in South Africa is much more capable of resisting majority rule than the Smith government is---raising serious questions about exactly how the United States should pursue its national interest in having majority rule---it is all the more important to state that the U.S. should vigorously seek majority rule in South Africa, as well.

There should be no concessions to the South African apartheid system, even to achieve majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia (this should not necessarily preclude all negotiations with South Africa).

* Edgar Lockwood, "National Security Study Memorandum" 39 and the Future of United States Policy Toward Southern Africa," Issue, IV, 3 (fall, 1974).

It is not too late, but daily it becomes less likely, for the United States to be perceived as a sincere and reliable ally of the emergent majorities in southern Africa. It is not inevitable that new African governments in southern Africa will be "anti-American" or that they will consistently take positions perceived by us to be contrary to U.S. national interests. Some major U.S. policy-makers act as if it were inevitable.

By firmly supporting majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia now it is probable that majority governments will emerge with which the U.S. can have quite amicable relations.

Assumptions about U.S. Policy and Aid Objectives. Until the early seventies, at least, the United States appears not to have viewed majority rule as one of the "several broad objectives of US policy toward southern Africa." The secret Study in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 39 (1969) can be assumed to be the definitive statement of what U.S. national security managers believed U.S. objectives to be in the early seventies. The following is the full statement (verbatim) of that Study's views, which we take to be what guided our policy-makers, at least, to the time of Portuguese collapse in Angola:

US Objectives

There are several broad objectives of US policy toward southern Africa. Arranged without intent to imply priority, they are:

- To improve the US standing in black Africa and internationally on the racial issue.

- To minimize the likelihood of escalation of violence in the area and the risk of US involvement.
- To minimize the opportunities for the USSR and Communist China to exploit the racial issue in the region for propaganda advantage and to gain political influence with black governments and liberation movements.
- To encourage moderation of the current rigid racial and colonial policies of the white regimes.
- To protect economic, scientific and strategic interests and opportunities in the region, including the orderly marketing of South Africa's gold production.

These objectives are to a degree contradictory - pursuit of one may make difficult the successful pursuit of one or more of the others. Moreover, views as to the relative priority among these objectives vary widely, depending primarily upon the perception of the nature of the problems in the area and US interest there (see II(B)).*

Notably majority rule is completely missing from this list of objectives. We assume that it is now a guiding objective, at least for Zimbabwe and Namibia, and we believe it should be for South Africa, as well. For the two countries considered in this report---Zimbabwe and Namibia---there should be no question but that it is the objective of highest priority; tempered only by the related objective of seeking change by means which will minimize violence, human suffering, and societal dislocation.

It is assumed that the United States, Great Britain, the frontline African states, and African nationalist move-

*NSSM 39(1969), op.cit.

ments, have the diplomatic and economic resources to assure a relatively violence-free end to minority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia. If this proves not to be the case, the United States should do nothing to obstruct the efforts of liberation movements to achieve majority rule by means of their own choice. The United States should, in all cases, avoid direct military involvement in the area and giving military support to any of the parties to guerrilla-military confrontation.

Within this broad policy framework, the objectives of economic assistance as such should be to help ease the transition to majority rule (under all assumptions of how this may occur the new African governments will bear heavy burdens) and to help the African majorities achieve full self-determination.

This study focuses on short-term conditions in the two transitions which may be susceptible to economic assistance. More specifically, it attempts to anticipate what adverse conditions may arise in the administrative, economic and human resource sectors of the two countries. This analysis may or may not suggest to others opportunities for assistance to meet those conditions. It may suggest ways of alleviating short-term problems or even crises. The overarching objective, however, is to avert and/or alleviate possible problems and to help put the new African governments

in the best position to deal with underlying problems of underdevelopment in the future.

It may be suspected that the United States has some self-interest in promoting through assistance, and by other means, a peaceful, rapid, and non-destructive transition to majority rule in the two countries. That, in fact, is how we define U.S. self-interest, and most African nationalists appear to believe this definition is compatible with their interests. What worries them is that U.S. or other outside aid may be used to influence political and economic developments within the two countries, both during the transition and for the longer-term. We believe that they themselves should and will decide whether outside assistance is politically acceptable. From a U.S. standpoint, however, the guiding objective for U.S. aid policy should be assistance which enhances majority rule and political and economic self-determination.

Need for Study

If present negotiations lead to agreement on the transfer of power to the African majority in Zimbabwe, the United States will immediately be confronted by questions of whether or not, and of how it might provide economic and other assistance to facilitate this transfer and to deal with the fundamental inequities of Rhodesian economic development. Indeed Secretary Kissinger's Lusaka statement and the terms of negotiation with

the Smith government suggest that it is the intention of the United States and other countries to provide substantial economic support for a negotiated settlement. The negotiations for majority rule and independence for Namibia are momentarily less active, but it is plausible that a similar negotiated settlement, with external economic assistance, could be achieved.

If a negotiated settlement is not achieved soon in either country it is probable that a mixed pattern of continued negotiation and stepped up guerrilla warfare will follow, especially in Zimbabwe.

Under scenarios of either negotiated settlement or of resolution by warfare and then negotiated settlement, it is assumed that this report is both timely and useful, if for no other reason than it suggests the limited potential for U.S. assistance under certain conditions. There is a good chance that this report can be much more useful.

The most immediate and evident need for this study is to increase American knowledge and awareness of how the polity, economy, and social/human welfare in Zimbabwe and Namibia may be affected in the transition to majority rule. In similar circumstances elsewhere in Africa, notably in the Congo (Zaire), serious problems of transition were largely unanticipated. It is desirable and possible to anticipate at least some of the developmental problems and needs which may be encountered by African nationalists and governments in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

If these problems and needs are susceptible to U.S. assistance (public or private) or to amelioration through other national or international policies, then the expectation is that U.S.A.I.D. and other organizations will have some lead-time in which to plan and execute responses. While fully conscious of the political implications of aid given in any political context, it is still assumed that African nationalist and governments of the two countries may find it advantageous, i.e., in the interests of their own people, to welcome the aid which may be preferred by the United States and the international community.

In broader terms, this report will hopefully be a wise contribution to the increasing governmental and private discussion of what are desirable policies for the United States in southern Africa. Once again our country is faced with the all too familiar issues of decolonization, racial conflict, and potentially, big power confrontation--all interrelated in a context in which institutional violence against Africans exist and in which guerrilla warfare is increasing.

Purpose of Study

This report provides an initial assessment of the likely consequences of transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia, i.e., of likely consequences in the political/administrative, social, economic and human welfare sectors of the

two countries. The projection of consequences in the transition, however, must be developed on the basis of an understanding of the present state of affairs in those sectors, including of the state of unequal development (between European and African sectors of society, between urban and rural sectors, etc.), and of other fundamental, long-term problems of development.

For the Agency for International Development, which has funded this project of the Council, this report should be of help in developing a basic United States aid posture, in developing specific programs of aid and in identifying areas for further study. But it should also be useful to a wider audience.

As can readily be seen, the possible consequences of transition, outlined in this study, are not only of concern to AID, as the funding agency. Nor are the possible developmental needs that arise from these consequences only susceptible, if at all, to foreign aid, such as is administered by AID. The envisaged consequences link to issues of trade, foreign investment, international banking and finance, sanctions removal and to other relationships which will affect whether or not there can be appropriate and effective responses to the needs of Zimbabwe and Namibia in transition. Effective assistance, in the broadest sense, may have to come from a broad range of individuals and institutions (national, private and multilateral). Indeed AID-type assistance must be conceived

in a broad framework; and it must assume appropriate and complementary actions on other fronts.

Hopefully, the report will contribute to the enlightened public discussion of how the United States, citizens groups and others should and can respond to the developing situation in southern Africa.

Finally, while the focus of the report is the transitional problems of Zimbabwe and Namibia, it has been necessary to address the interrelationships between those two countries and adjacent countries of the region. What happens in Zimbabwe during transition, for instance, may affect the economy of Zambia (e.g., the closure of the Kariba power station would affect production on the Zambian copperbelt). Obviously, the policies of the front-line countries may have political, economic and other consequences in the Zimbabwe-Namibia transition. Specifically, another purpose of this study and report has been to anticipate regional consequences of these transitions.

Definitions of Major Terms and Concepts

It is desirable, for purposes of analysis and communication, to indicate how several terms and concepts will be used in this report.

"Majority rule," an elusive concept meaning different things to different people, will be used to indicate a condition

in which black Africans predominate in the governments (in effective control) of Zimbabwe and Namibia. The theoretical question of whether proper democratic constitutional procedures (of any conception) are followed is disregarded. It is hoped, of course, that majority rule will sooner or later be based upon constitutional arrangements for majoritarian voting on a one person-one vote basis. It is assumed that Europeans may also be elected to the new governments.

"Transition" is an even more elusive concept; but it is analytically important to have an agreed usage, however arbitrary. Transition will suggest a process, beginning now and extending forward in indefinite time, in which black Africans come to predominate in government (majority rule) and establish governments in effective control of the two countries. Since we are trying to anticipate the consequences for these countries which may arise in the period of transition (and similarly anticipate appropriate aid responses), it is analytically useful to imagine at least three possible phases of transition:

Phase I: Beginning now and running up to the point at which black Africans predominate in the political situation. This phase could include ongoing negotiations for transfer of power and/or varying levels of guerrilla/military confrontations, etc.

Phase II: From point of black African predominance, through a possible period of indecisive, intra-African conflict over who should control the government, up to the point at which a black African government establishes effective control over most of the country.

Phase III: From point of black African government in effective control of country forward (majority rule). In this phase the focus of analysis shifts gradually from short term consequences of the first two phases to longer term problems of development.

The reason for phasing the transition conceptually is that certain kinds of events (and their consequences) are likely to occur in different phases. More importantly, the kinds of aid options open to outsiders will vary considerably in each phase. For example, if one imagines a protracted Phase I, it is probable that types of aid possibilities would be limited (unless the parties should agree to the Kissinger-type proposals for a shared transfer of power, coupled with substantial economic aid.) Assuming a conflictful Phase I, consequences for the polity and economy could well be severe and pervasive while corresponding aid options might be drastically limited,

and surely under such conditions aid programs would have to be conducted outside the two countries.

It should be emphasized that Phase II is only a plausible possibility (extrapolated from present competitive behavior among nationalist groups in Zimbabwe and less pronounced ethnic - party divisions in Namibia; also there are conceivable analogs of conflict in the Congo (Zaire) and Angola transitions). Hopefully, the actual transition will be from Phase I directly to Phase III in both countries; nevertheless, using the conceptual category of Phase II in the meantime enables greater clarity of analysis and contingency planning.

"Consequences" will be a frequently used word and concept to denote the particular conditions which may result, assuming different developments in the phase of transition to majority rule. For greater specificity first-order and second-order consequences are envisaged, and in some instances, further orders of consequence. For example:

Guerrilla warfare in Phase I of transition → Disruption of Kariba Dam power source (1st order consequence) → Industry disruptions (2nd order) → and so on.

A major objective of this study and report has been to catalog most likely consequences in transition for the polity (e.g., disruption of the civil service), for the economy (e.g., collapse of new light industry in Zimbabwe after exposure to sanction-free outside competition), for society (e.g., white

exodus), for human welfare (e.g., food shortages or disruption of health services).

"Crises" as a term and concept will denote the likely consequences which are expected to be of greatest gravity and urgency.

Finally, "longer-term development problems" signifies the underlying problems of underdevelopment and unequal development in the two countries which exist and will exist for an indefinite period, regardless of the nature and timing of transition. Future African governments will have to confront these problems just as present African governments are doing.

This report, however, tries to make clear that there are some likely consequences in transition which might be relatively fixed in time, place and effect. For example, a short-term interruption of the Kariba power supply, a resulting temporary shut-down of industry reliant on that source (before a start-up of the emergency source), without major ramifying effects. Nevertheless, there are other consequences which might be immediately serious in and of themselves but which might also have ramifying effects upon longer-term development problems. One such consequence might be the large-scale and immediate departure of the most educated, skilled and experienced Europeans.

In brief, the primary focus of this report is on the relatively short-term consequences, but in relationship to longer-term developmental problems.

Organization and Mode of Analysis of Report

The organizing purpose of this study is to catalog the consequences of events which may occur during the transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia, in relation to the longer-term development problems of the two countries.

The study, which stresses cataloging, has looked for consequences in four main areas of the two societies:

- (1) Political/administrative/legal;
- (2) Social/ethnic/racial;
- (3) Economic; and
- (4) Human welfare (health, food supply, etc.)

It has posited degrees of probability for these consequences: either "likely consequences" (strong probability) or "possible consequences" (less probable but quite plausible).

It distinguishes those consequences which could conceivably be of "crisis" proportions (immediate, urgent, severe) from those which may be equally significant but of longer-term character.

This study has not attempted to "predict" either events or their consequences, in the strict sense. We have used modes of conditional, probability and extrapolative thinking. It is true that this study has been handicapped by not having in-country opportunities for information gathering, by lack of access to many African nationalist leaders, and by the sheer unpredictability of fast-moving events. Within these limits, however, we have tried to ask the right questions,

in the right order, and to suggest---on the basis of much evidence which is available---what might be right frameworks for answers.

Mode of Analysis. This study has used the following general mode of analysis in projecting possible and likely consequences(aid-relevant) in the Zimbabwean and Namibian transitions:

1. Catalog of present characteristics and conditions in four sectors of the two countries: (a) Political/social/legal; (b) Social/ethnic/racial; (c) Economic; and (4) Human welfare(health, food supply, etc.). It is necessary to know present conditions in order to project the consequences of various transitional scenarios.

2. Project simple and general scenarios for Phase I(see pp. 17-18) of two country transitions. These scenarios suggest only the kind of transition, specifying at least these variables: (a) Negotiated/peaceful or guerrilla/military or mixed; (b) If guerrilla/military, geographical loci of conflict(parts of countr(N,W,S,E) or urban/rural, etc.); (c) If guerrilla/military, functional loci of conflict(at transportation points, communications points, power sources, industrial centers, population concentrations, etc.); and (d) Relevant time variables(e.g., guerrilla/military for specified periods of time).

3. Project simple and general scenarios for Phase II

(see pp. 17-18) of the two country transitions, specifying same variables as 2, above. For variable 2(a) specify kinds of intra-African competition/conflict(Negotiated/peaceful; civil war; mixed).

These general scenarios(2,3) are primarily useful in positing what are termed "first order consequences." The latter, rather than the general scenarios, are most useful in suggesting what other consequences (2d, 3d...order) might be susceptible to economic and other kinds of outside assistance. To be otherwise useful the general scenarios would require greater information inputs that we have and greater capacities that we have to trace through all the causal relationships which exist in such a complex situation.

These scenarios are most relevant in estimating degrees of probability for different consequences. Without such scenarios this is not possible.

Much simpler modes of analysis, and in some ways more useful modes, are implicit in other parts of the of the outline below.

4. Catalog the most salient first-order consequences of the scenarios above. These are the discrete consequences which are likely to have ramifying effects(other consequences) in the sectors under study. The cataloging of these consequences, in other words, is the link between the essentially political analysis of the scenario-building

and the projection of other consequences in the polity, society, and economy of the two countries. Surely one of the second-order consequences, under any set of assumptions, will be white emigration. In this analysis, however, we have to specify what volume of emigration and from what sectors of the white population, given different scenarios.

5. Catalog the third-order (and beyond) consequences of transition in the four sectors under study. This is the most important part of the report. It flows from the analysis above but also, so to speak, from the "bottom upwards." In the latter connection, it has been possible and necessary to develop useful insights by making some vastly simplifying assumptions about what could happen to sectors of the two countries in transition. For example, under most assumptions, it makes sense to leap to the conclusion that there will be general African manpower shortages in critical parts of the civil service, industry and social service sectors of the two countries.

The five approaches above inform the report organized as follows.

Organization of the Report. Part I of the report deals with Zimbabwe and Part II with Namibia, following the same section sub-divisions.

Section I of each Part provides a narrative overview of major characteristics and conditions in the present polity, economy and society of each country. This will constitute points of reference for subsequent analysis. It examines

such conditions as: (1) maldistribution of power, wealth, and social services as between Europeans and Africans; (2) the dual economy in which development coexists with underdevelopment; (3) contrasts between stages of development between rural and urban areas and so on. This section is not an exhaustive treatment of all conditions, and it is designed to fit the analytical needs of this study.

Section II projects two sets of scenarios covering Phases I and II of the transition to majority rule. Each scenario is accompanied by a sufficient amount of evidence and analysis to indicate that that scenario could be useful for anticipating consequences.

Section III identifies ___(number) "first-order" consequences of transition (assuming one or more scenarios) which are most likely to occur under posited conditions. These are consequences which are most likely to have the ramifying consequences discussed in the next section.

Section IV catalogs the aid-relevant consequences of second-order (and beyond) nature. It denotes which of these are "likely" (L) or "possible" (P). It also denotes which are of potential "crisis" nature (C) or which are of "longer term" nature (LT). The format for presentation of each consequence is as follows:

1. Description of consequences in a sentence or two.

2. Denotation of probability(L or P); and of immediacy(C or LT).
3. Statement of assumptions(drawn from scenarios, first-order consequences, other sources) which lead one to expect this consequence.
4. Supporting data and analysis concerning sectoral context in which this consequence might arise. As detailed as possible and as relevant.

The consequences are grouped under four headings: (1) Political/legal/social; (2) Social/ethnic/racial; (4) Human Welfare.

Section V repeats this line a analysis, in abbreviated form, exploring possible consequences of Zimbabwean and Namibian transitions for adjacent African countries.

SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS: THE POLITICAL SECTOR

In each of the Summary sections that follow, the analysis focuses on three points: (1) the major transition consequences for Zimbabwe, (2) the identification of human needs, and (3) the possible programs or proposals for reducing human trauma that could ensue in the transition period. The particular character of that transition situation has major implications for the above three points, for different political or transition situations are possible. For example, there will be different consequences (affecting, in turn, human needs and programs needed) if there is: (1) a negotiated settlement with an interim, shared power (white and black) government; (2) a negotiated settlement and immediate majority black rule; (3) a breakdown of negotiations, continued guerrilla warfare and a subsequent victory by the guerrillas; or (4) a civil war, an internal conflict polarizing African groups, a possibility that could result from any of the preceding three situations.

In terms of consequences, were there either an interim shares rule or a majority rule government, the flight of whites is less likely (dependent, of course, on policies followed by that government) than were there guerrilla warfare or a civil war. The latter two situations would, as has happened in other transition situations in African countries, prompt the flight of both whites and capital. The impact of that on the political and economic situations as well as human resource needs would be vastly different than were there a negotiated settlement of some form. Thus these different political situations must be considered in this analysis for they clearly have major implications for U.S. policy decisions.

Briefly, four different types of political situations can be distinguished. Each could possibly occur. The implications of each are spelled out in terms of how they affect policy choices. The four possible situations include:

1. Negotiated Settlement/Interim Shares Power (White and Black)
2. Negotiated Settlement Immediate Black Majority Rule
3. Guerrilla Conquest
4. Civil War (resulting from any one of the above three)

A brief description of each of these is essential:

1. Negotiated settlement/interim shared power (white and black). This is essentially a negotiated transition situation in which both blacks and whites share power, possibly for a period of two years. That two-year period would be for transition purposes of training and/or incorporating Africans within political, economic and social sectors. During that period a new constitution is worked out, after which whites simply become one of the minority groups within the society. Major efforts would be directed at maintaining stability while bringing about transformations, including Africanization within political, economic and social sectors. Those transformations would occur as rapidly as possible, but with a relatively high percentage of white remaining, their technical skills and expertise utilized for maintaining stability in the transition period.

2. Negotiated settlement, but with virtually immediate black majority rule. Whether this occurs immediately or within a couple of months (some form of interim government being established only for that brief period), the result would be an immediate takeover of government and its functions by a black government. While there might be the emigration of some whites, a major effort would be directed toward retaining both capital and those whites whose technical expertise are needed for maintaining the system. There is, though, the possibility of a flight of capital and whites, dependent especially on the new government's policies. Were the flight to occur, that would necessitate a quicker response from the outside world (in terms of development programs). Otherwise there could be a breakdown especially within economic, social and human resource sectors. In either this or the preceding situation it must be anticipated that there will be disruptions caused by the exodus of whites, and it is that factor that must be considered in terms of development programs.

3. Guerrilla conquest. The breakdown of negotiations, or the refusal of guerrillas to negotiate, could result in this situation. Its consequence most likely would be a prolonged guerrilla war that would result in the massive exodus of most whites and the total disruption of the society. That would necessitate vastly different types of development programs, and the Congo (Zaire), Mozambique and Angola are major examples of the types of development problems that would occur.

4. Civil war. This could evolve out of any of the above situations, exacerbated especially by various tribal, ethnic or political rivalries within Zimbabwe, leading possibly toward a Congo (Zaire) or Angola type situation and presenting problems similar to those confronted by both countries.

One additional factor needs to be mentioned in terms of the above types of transition situations. Whether under a negotiated/interim or negotiated/majority rule government in Zimbabwe, there is the possibility of either a relatively peaceful transition or of a conflict-type situation resulting. Ultimately, it is possible that civil disorder, conflict or civil war could occur. Conflict-type situations need not be the consequence of hostility or animosity, be it between black and white or between diverse black groups. For, it is possible that all groups, black and white alike, may desire to work out an amicable and stable transition. However, given both the character and structure of the customary economic, legal, and administrative system that has prevailed (i.e., of a white dominance system) and the patterns of relations (including role expectations) that have existed between white and black as well as various black groups, it is possible that those factors, and not racial, ethnic or tribal animosities could create or exacerbate situations or problems that lead to the breakdown of the system. Thus, the inability of people to break out of their present patterns of behavior could precipitate disagreements, animosities and even conflicts that precipitate a breakdown in amicable group relations. That could then lead to political and economic instability, chaos and, at an extreme, the disintegration of the society or even civil war. People's attitudes and behavior are a fundamental factor in determining whether or not the society is able to hold itself together.

Given the fundamental changes that must occur in Zimbabwe under either or both types of changes in power (from white to black rule) and development, disagreements and conflict of diverse forms, if experiences from other African countries undergoing similar changes in the past or at present are relevant, they indicate that such conflict conditions must be anticipated. This factor must therefore be taken into consideration in the types of development programs the U.S. undertakes. The prevasiveness of the aforementioned factors is likely to become all the more real when the development emphasis is on achievement of economic growth targets and the maximization of returns on investment.'

Thus, what must be taken into consideration in terms of transition consequences within Zimbabwe is the possibility that any one of the above four types of situations could develop. There are clearly differences that each of these situations has for development programs and U.S. policy, but in one sense the consequences can all be spelled out under a number of specific headings, or areas, all of which will be affected by the character of that transition, be it some form of negotiated settlement, guerrilla warfare or civil war. It is that issue that is addressed below:

I. Major Transition Consequences for Zimbabwe

The major political consequences for Zimbabwe, whatever the character of that transition situation, can be spelled out briefly under ten specific headings. These characteristics, in turn, determine the identification of human needs as well as specific programs that can be proposed in terms of policy alternatives for the U.S. Whichever of the above four possible transition situations occurs, the following political concerns or issues must be addressed. They include:

1. The emigration or exodus of whites.
2. Possible political instability resulting from the transfer of power.
3. Possible disruptions in the civil service.
4. Possible disruptions in public order.
5. Intra-African rivalry and conflict.
6. African demands for equal access to or replacement of whites in job opportunities and in other spheres.
7. African demands for control of the economy.
8. Disruptions and problems in local administrations.
9. Social, economic and political dislocations caused by population movements.
10. Political conflicts over national development and integration policies.

The consequence of each of these situations, should they occur in the transition period, are spelled out below.

1. The emigration or exodus of whites. Whites presently occupy the commanding posts and positions in government, industry, agriculture and, indeed, in all other sectors. A precipitate departure of whites from any sector could create immediate crises and have a damaging impact upon developmental prospects for Zimbabwe under majority rule. Obviously, some whites are more instrumental to African development than others, given either their present roles, expertise and experience or their positive attitudes towards African development.

If there is a negotiated settlement (Situation 1), a substantial white presence and role can be presupposed. There could be a relatively stable transition, especially if those whites with needed technical skills remained and gave the situation a chance. Their presence affords the opportunity for dramatic changes of policy and economy without serious, much less disruptive effects upon the developmental prospects of the country. If there is a negotiated settlement/immediate black rule (Situation 2), a more rapid rate of white emigration can be anticipated, thereby creating greater problems. Moreover, the last two situations (guerrilla war, civil war) would lead to a rapid flight of whites; and large-scale disruptions and dislocations, as occurred in Zaire, Mozambique and Angola, could be anticipated in all sectors of society.

2. Possible political instability resulting from the transfer of power. Under a negotiated/interim settlement, the modus vivendi between black and white members of ministerial bodies can be relatively amicable or marked by dissension, depending on: (a) the allocation of powers among them; (b) the predispositions and personalities of key members; and (c) the commitment of those individuals to a peaceful and gradual transition of power. There is a good possibility that African inter-group rivalries could lead to political instability, a point that is discussed below.

Factors favoring stability would be a wise and effective constitutional agreement. Coalition governments and racially shared power have worked elsewhere. Consensus-type leadership can be found among both whites and blacks. Most of the frontline states have a strong interest in a peaceful transition to majority rule. Africans have much to gain by preserving the economy while sharing fully in it for the first time and gaining political control.

Instability, dissension and breakdown are also possible. There will inevitably be some mutual distrust and fear in a condition of shared power. African factionalism continues. An interim arrangement, could intensify those rivalries leading even to civil war (Situation 3).

U.S. and international aid/programs options are most promising if interim arrangements remain stable. If this is the case, a central question is how can international assistance be used to encourage cohesion between whites and also among blacks?

3. Possible disruptions in civil service. The central Civil Service administers and performs an extensive array of vital functions in the health, education, welfare, transportation, industrial, trade, information and other fields. Clearly the performance of the Civil Service is one major linchpin of the country policy.

Crucial political consequences could arise as the Civil Service is Africanized in transition. In the early seventies there were approximately 48,000 central government employees, of whom 13,000 held tenured positions. The latter number included some 3,300 teachers and 1,900 medical personnel. Significantly, only some 829 of the tenured positions were held by Africans in 1972. Of the 829 only three Africans held positions of senior rank. It is easy to see the implications of white emigration for the performance of basic government functions. Similarly, one can see the scale of need for Africanization and for concomitant administrative and other specialized training.

Under a negotiated/interim settlement, and assuming relative stability at the center and modest white emigration, the structure and functions of the civil service will remain relatively stable, at least in the short run. White political/administrative manpower will help ease the transition, but African demands for jobs will exacerbate tensions and lead to a white exodus. That exodus, under majority rule or guerrilla or civil war, will increase, leading to massive disruption of functions of the civil service, with radiating effects across the society and the economy.

4. Possible disruptions in public order. If there is a negotiated interim arrangement and general political stability, the Zimbabwe military and police will remain cohesive and under relatively firm political direction and control

Control of the armed forces, however, will be a major stake in the evolving political situation. Any agreement about shared power between Africans and Europeans will likely hinge on the allocation of army and police power. Similarly, stability of the interim arrangement will depend upon how the army and police are directed and controlled. Whites and Africans will be mutually vigilant, if not suspicious of one another in regard to the administration of armed forces. Among Africans themselves, control of the armed forces and police could also be a partisan matter and a source of dissension and even of breakdown in command.

Another element of the public order area is the future disposition of the guerrilla forces which are presently in the field and which may be in the future. Important consequences will hinge upon how, and with what success, guerrilla forces are demobilized and/or absorbed into the armed forces or the work force.

Probably demobilization and/or absorption into the armed service would be a concomitant of the negotiated interim transfer of power. If so, there would still be difficult and delicate tasks of returning these men to civilian pursuits (farming, education, whatever). Politically, much would depend upon the nature of that demobilization and/or recruitment to the armed services. Both whites and various African groups would be concerned about how those efforts might affect the delicate balance of forces among them. For example, what might be the implications if the large contingent of Karanga guerrillas were incorporated into the military forces where Karangas already constitute a large percentage of African troops?

5. Intra-African rivalry and conflict. A negotiated interim arrangement presupposes a sufficient amount of cohesion and unity among Africans to bring the agreement into effect and sustain it. A quite plausible consequence of this type of transition, however, is an early breakdown of African consensus, for there is a long history of competition and conflict among African leaders and parties.

Fissures along one or more planes could create dissension, upset African consensus, and break up any negotiated settlement, leading even to civil war. It would be misleading, however, to take African dissension, much less outright conflict, as inevitable. There will be factors favoring conciliation and consensus, especially during the early period of majority rule.

6. African demands for access to jobs and opportunities.

Under either form of negotiated settlement there will be pressures on government from Africans to abolish all discriminatory legislation and remove the inequalities that have existed. This could lead to demands for ousting whites from jobs or from what are seen as their positions of privilege in society, thereby exacerbating a white exodus. Among the major sectors in which these demands will be heard are: (1) the demand for land reallocation and reform; (2) the demand for Africanization of jobs; (3) the demand for equitable distribution of social benefits and services, education, health services, housing, etc.; and (4) the demand for expulsion of whites. Any or all of these issues could create dissension and, indeed, tear apart the political system or create fundamental conflicts among black groups, leading even to civil war.

7. African demands for control of the economy. Different types of transition situations have different consequences in terms of how Africans wish to control their own economy. If there is a negotiated/interim settlement, business and industry, will most likely remain in white hands. Thus, there could be demands from the African population for black control of business, for nationalization, or for the expulsion of foreign companies. Thus government policy and African demands could have a major impact, leading to a possible exodus of foreign investors and firms. This could also frighten away other potential sources of needed development funding. This view assumes that outside sources are essential for funding and development, but Zimbabwe could move in other directions. Even so, Zimbabwe would need other sources of development funding and capital. In the interim the flight of whites, white-controlled businesses and industries, and of white capital, could have devastating consequences upon the total economy.

8. Disruptions and problems in local administration.

Presently, local government, including the rural (Tribal Trust Land) and urban areas, comes under white control and the civil service. Disruptions in the civil service could lead to a total breakdown in local administration. That could lead to problems of public disorder as well as the demise of the social and human services presently offered.

9. Population movements and dislocations. Population movements that could create considerable disorganization or problems include, among others, the problem of returning refugees and the accommodation of their needs. There is also the need for incorporating within political, economic

and social structures the numerous exiles returning, many of whom, in terms of their political attitudes, may form an articulate group that supports or opposes the political program of leaders. A third migration problem could result, as it has in other African countries in transition, where rural Africans converge upon cities. There are few jobs available and, living in shanty towns under poverty conditions, these people often become sources of social problems.

10. Political conflicts over integration and development. It is here that political conflict in particular is possible. Whatever the form of government that evolves, it must make major decisions concerning development and integration. Unless there is equal access and opportunity for all groups within society, especially in the political system for jobs, education and incorporation within political, economic and social structures, group rivalries could ensue. That could lead to group (be it on tribal, ethnic or other grounds) conflicts and, indeed, civil war. Moreover, decisions concerning economic development (whether it is to be a market, controlled or mixed economy) and political development (whether the government is to be controlled by an elite or there is to be widespread political mobilization, for instance) will engender controversy and conflict, as it has in other African states.

Consequently, the type of political structure that is established, whatever the form of negotiated settlement, is especially crucial. If that structure prevents the peaceful resolution of group differences, the legitimacy and efficacy of the system will be rejected. That could lead to civil war as groups contested for power by other means rather than through the political system.

II. Identification of Human Needs

If there is to be a relatively stable transition period, i.e., one in which majority rule is achieved and the government has the support, capabilities and power essential for bringing about major changes that are needed for development, the following human needs are basic for the realization of such goals. All the following are essential:

1. Africans need assurances that there will be rapid negotiations and immediate advancement to majority rule. Without that, political discontent and black hostility toward whites will escalate and whatever form of interim

government is established will find it difficult to maintain even a degree of public order within society.

2. Africans need to feel--and their perceptions of this must be based on observable changes--that political and economic self-determination is not going to be snatched away even as they achieve some measure of and move toward majority rule.

3. Various significant groupings (e.g., leadership, ethnic, tribal, racial, party, rural, urban) will need constitutional and other assurances that they have a promising future in the Zimbabwe nation. At the least, they will need assurances that they will not be distinctly disadvantaged, but will have equal access and opportunity to jobs, power and opportunities within society. There is an imperative interest, both black-white and black-black.

4. Africans must have immediate relief from the broad range of discriminatory practices and policies that have pervaded the system. Many of the injustices may take while to correct fully, but it is mandatory that legislation be enacted immediately that proclaims the termination of all discriminatory measures and practices.

5. Both blacks and whites will need tangible as well as symbolic inducements to accept the kinds of cooperative political arrangements that are conducive to majority rule, self-determination and national development. All must envision themselves as playing crucial roles in the development of a new society.

6. Zimbabweans, black and white, will need the security of person which can only come if there is public order. That will necessitate a well-trained, disciplined and responsive military/police force that is loyal to the government.

7. Zimbabweans will need every assistance possible in promoting, through programs, political and economic stability and equality. Outside parties, as a consequence, must avoid policies, practices and development assistance programs that could exacerbate divisions within Zimbabwean policy.

8. The needs for development are particularly acute in rural areas, and secondarily in African urban areas. Consequently, a development-oriented local government system is essential, and even housing, social welfare, community

organizational and public health programs must be devised for promoting self-management and self-sufficiency, politically and economically, within the population. The programs in all these areas should have as one of their basic goals the identification and training of potential new political leadership for the society.

9. The Zimbabwe public service must be rapidly Africanized at all levels, with many Africans moving immediately into senior positions, even where that necessitates new types of crash programs that will train them for the positions while they are already assuming the responsibilities of those positions.

10. Under extreme conditions it is possible that scores of white civil service personnel will leave, leading to a breakdown or deterioration of services. For the interim, and as Africans are being trained, programs should be established for recruiting personnel from other countries, preferably African. Personnel from other African states, given their own periods of developmental problems, could be especially helpful in devising training programs and in contributing to the stabilization of the civil service during this transition period.

11. Where needed, and as a last resort, white personnel should be recruited from other countries to work in the civil service, but these can only be brought in after all sources have been exhausted and only if those personnel have the approval of the new government.

12. Refugees already in Mozambique and elsewhere have survival needs which are not being adequately met, and the government should move immediately, working through the UN and other refugee groups, to assist in the repatriation of these people and to provide interim assistance.

13. Zimbabweans presently exiled who are working on studying elsewhere need assistance in preparing for leadership positions, be the training for that within or outside of Zimbabwe. Thus development programs should be devised for training these people, including possibly internships or comparable programs in other African states where those Zimbabweans can learn about the development problems they will encounter by learning of the experiences of other African states that have had similar problems.

III. Program Proposals

1. Immediately organize and establish "crisis teams" of specialized personnel, either to be on the scene or available upon call from the Zimbabwean government, to assist in advisory capacities for dealing with diverse types of problems that will occur. These individuals should be specialists in various fields (e.g., specialists in administrative organization, education, development problems, economists, engineers, industrial and agricultural specialists, etc.)
2. Immediately organize emergency teams of doctors, hospital administrators, sewage disposal experts, public health experts and others who can be called upon for coping with emergency problems in these sectors.
3. Establish immediately crash programs, both in Zimbabwe and in other African nations where the people can serve in internships training them as civil servants and high-level executives for government service. Here especially, assistance should be channeled through international agencies as well as African states.
4. Establish programs for integrating and upgrading the armed services and the police, including the incorporation of guerrilla forces into those services or providing them with opportunities for crash training programs and education in areas of their own choosing. Crash programs, too, are needed for training African officers for these security forces.
5. Provide assistance or support programs for training programs (administrative, technical, vocational) for Africans for all sectors of the economy. These programs could be sponsored or assisted by international agencies, African or other governments, multinational corporations and others (the participation of any or all of these is dependent upon the Zimbabwean government's approval).
6. Develop programs that can serve as vehicles for promoting intergroup (including black-white) cooperation and harmony. There are numerous areas where such programs are possible: (a) agricultural development programs, (b) entrepreneurial, business and industrial programs for training personnel, (c) co-op programs, and (d) programs for new institutional development (schools, agriculture, executive leadership training, etc.).

7. Develop arrangements in which African third parties can help broker harmony between whites and blacks in dismantling discriminatory policies and situations, e.g., in land reallocation, education, use of hospitals, and other social amenities, labor unions, employment. Such programs would bring whites and blacks together in nation-building efforts.

8. Immediately commission an in-depth study of transition experiences in other African countries. The focus should be what applicability their experiences have to Zimbabwe. Such a program could bring to Zimbabwe experts from other African states who can advise or assist with Zimbabwe's development problems. Zimbabweans could also be sent to those other countries for training or internships. Coming from these studies, exchanges and experiences, could be a manual or book on development, based on African experiences, that can be utilized by Zimbabweans in assessing possible solutions to their development problems.

9. Based on the character of the particular transition situation, as spelled out in Section I of this Summary, other programs are also possible, especially when the character of the situation is evaluated in terms of the identification of human needs set out in Section II immediately preceding this Section. Thus, what should be remembered is that the character of that transition situation will determine how those basic needs can be implemented in a pragmatic and programmatic fashion.

POLITICAL FACTORS IN ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENT

To understand the preconditions for development in Zimbabwe under majority rule it is necessary to understand the "political" and "social" characteristics of Rhodesia today. Political analysis should help explain:

-- How most Africans have remained in conditions of underdevelopment in a society which in many ways is highly developed (underdevelopment).

-- How Africans have been systematically denied political power and rights, and as a result, have received a disproportionately small share of national resources and public benefits (racial inequality).

-- How Africans have remained in an extreme condition of dependence upon a white dominated political system (dependence).

-- What political capacities (decisional, organizational, and administrative) Zimbabwe will inherit and what factors will affect its ability to sustain or increase those capacities.

"Political" development is as crucial as "social" or "economic" development and in important respects is a precondition of the latter.

A new Zimbabwe political system will need the capacities to maintain the territorial integrity of the country; to sustain and spread existing governmental services; to begin urgently to eradicate African underdevelopment, racial inequality and dependence;

to keep public order; and to assure effective participation in the political system by the African majority. These capacities will depend partly upon the inheritance of political/administrative organization and expertise - both black and white - and heavily upon how that will be developed by the new African leadership. In this section a major concern is the political resources and handicaps with which a new majority Zimbabwe government will begin.

-- What types of transitional situations are quite plausible or probable as Zimbabwe comes under majority rule and how these might affect the political, administrative, social and organizational conditions and capacities which will be discussed under the headings above.

Profile: The People of Zimbabwe

Certain characteristics of the population of Zimbabwe are particularly significant for understanding the politics of development: size of population; racial/ethnic composition; territorial distribution; and distribution within the political economy.

Size and Growth of Population. The size and growth of population to some degree determine the scale of national politics and determine the demand load on the political, administrative and economic systems. It is generally known that the development prospects for any country are related to the interactions between demographic and other resource factors.

-- In 1975 the population of Zimbabwe was 6.5 million persons. Africans constituted about 95% of the total population (6,220,000). Whites ("Europeans") were an exceedingly small minority (277,000). And the Asian (10,000) and Coloured (21,400) populations were even smaller. [x-Rhodesia, Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Statistics, September, 1976, Salisbury, p. 1.]

Politically, it is remarkable that so small a white minority has controlled for so long a large non-white majority. Asians and Coloureds, who are even smaller minorities, have not been and will probably not be very influential in deciding the political future of the country.

-- Population growth, especially among Africans, has become a discrete factor in politics and development. In this century total population has increased thirteen-fold, from 500,000 persons to approximately 6.5 million. Since 1901, the white population has increased from about 11,000 to 277,000; the African population has burgeoned from 500,000 to 6.2 million persons (x-Ibid.; also Harold D. Nelson et al., Area Handbook for Southern Rhodesia, Prepared by American University (FAS), Washington:GPO, DA PAM 550-171, 1975, p. 61.]

One should avoid simplistic interpretations of what this dramatic growth of population may mean for Zimbabwe politics and development, especially since there are no truly definitive and comprehensive studies of the capacity of the economy and the land to support

existing or even larger populations, under different political and economic arrangements.

Common sense, however, suggests several concerns. First, there is a high and rising African birth rate which certainly affects the general development of the economy and the efforts to raise the standard of living of the African people. Assuming the present rate of natural increase in the tribal population (3.6% per annum), the national population will double to 14 million persons within two decades.

Further, the question of population growth cannot be separated completely from the questions of distribution and density. A new African government will, of course, be keenly sensitive to this point and understandably address the problems of African crowding in the relatively poorer Tribal Trust Lands of the country, while choice lands are only sparsely populated by whites.

Racial and Ethnic Composition. It is impossible to understand the politics and development prospects of Zimbabwe, without recognizing the central role "race" in Rhodesian political history. The foremost fact is that a small white minority has dominated a much larger African majority.

The ethnic composition of the African population needs also to be recognized, although the salience of that is much less clear in

development terms than is the white-black dichotomy in the population. At least some understanding of African ethnicity is imperative in order to counter the facile and misleading notions about African "tribalism" which could distort analysis and ultimately U.S. policy-making.

-- A first and particularly notable fact about the white population in Rhodesia is that a substantial majority of it feels Rhodesia is its home. These are not "colonials" in the sense that they have another home in a colonial metropole to which they would ultimately like to return. Many were born in or have lived in the country for a long time; some have been preceded in the country by several generations of family.

Yet the assertion that whites have deep roots in the country can be overstated as well. Unfortunately the most recent national census (1969) cannot reflect perhaps significant changes in the white population within the last decade. Between 1951 and 1969 the percentage of whites who were Rhodesian-born increased from 32.7 percent to 41.2 percent. The proportion of South African-born declined (but remained substantial) from 30.5 percent to 21.3 percent. United Kingdom-born declined from 28.8 percent to 23.9 percent. The number of persons born in yet other countries increased in this period, from 8.0 percent to 13.6 percent.

This distribution of whites by origin may have changed considerably in the last decade, which was only partially covered by the 1969 census.

According to the International Commission of Jurists, as much as 40 percent of the white population has immigrated to Rhodesia since UDI (1965). Several thousand Portuguese have entered the country from Mozambique and Angola since 1973. [International Commission of Jurists, footnote, p. 10.] The indication is that the white population is now less rooted and perhaps less homogeneous than it was as recently as the 1969 census.

-- There is so much ignorance of and confusion about African ethnicity that it is worth quoting at length from George Kay's authoritative Rhodesia: A Human Geography concerning this subject:

[There are] about 40 tribes in Rhodesia. These, however, may be grouped on ethnic or cultural grounds or both, and most of them fall into one or another of two large groups. The larger and more widespread consists of patrilineal, Shona-speaking peoples who are long-established inhabitants of the country. The Shona tribes comprise a loose federation, and a sevenfold division of the constituent tribes has been noted. Each division has its own dialect or variant of the Shona language and some of these are mutually unintelligible. Each division can be identified by ethnic, cultural and historical differences and, with one exception, each occupies a geographically distinct homeland. The Kalanga are found in western parts of the country; the Karanga around Fort Victoria; the Zezeru around Salisbury; the Korekore in the Zambezi basin downstream of Kariba; and the Manyika and Ndeu occupy the east and south-east borderlands. The Rozwi have no marked regional distribution and are to be found in various localities throughout northern and eastern parts of Rhodesia. Despite differences between these seven divisions and between the individual tribes, the Shona-speaking peoples do comprise an ethnic and cultural group.

The Nguni-speaking people in western Rhodesia are known as the Ndebele or, more popularly, as the Matabele. They are relatively recent immigrants to their present homeland and their history as a distinctive group is very short. [The Ndebele migrated across the Limpopo River in 1837 and by force of arms and superior military organization established ascendancy over the more numerous Shona] ...By 1868...the Ndebele were a formidable military

power and had developed the rudiments of a nation. Unlike the Shona, the Ndbele may be divided into castes classes rather than tribes.

Early European activities in Rhodesia were much affected by relationships between the powerful, military Ndbele and the more numerous subservient tribes in the surrounding areas and particularly those to the east. Consequently the two main groups were readily recognized and Matabele (for Ndbele) and Mashona (Ndbele) have become English words in everyday use in Rhodesia. More subtle divisions of the African population have generally been obscured by recent history and ignorance, and the significance of the variety of African tribes is not recognized by the man in the street. The minor tribes who occupy the peripheral areas of Rhodesia are not well known. [x-Kay, 26-28.]

Another source provides numerical information about African ethnicity according to language groupings, beginning with the caveat that "the ethnic origin of individual Africans are difficult to ascertain because of the assimilation and blending that began with Ndbele invasion in 1838 and continued under European rule and the development of the cash economy." [x-Nelson, op. cit., 74.] Assuming a great deal of actual assimilation between Nbeles and Shonas, therefore, the 1969 Census identified African groupings by language. It established that 71 percent of the African population (3,433,960) identified themselves as speaking "Shona" and/or one or another of the Shona dialects. Twenty-six percent of these identified themselves as simply "Shona" speakers without reference to dialects; 15.5 percent as Karanga speakers; 13.4 percent as Zezeru speakers; 7.2 percent as Manyika speakers; and so on.

About 16 percent of the African population identified themselves as Ndbele or Nguni speakers (764,190). Another five percent spoke

other indigenous languages, and eight percent spoke languages of neighboring countries. [x-Ibid., 74-75.]

The role of African ethnicity in the future politics and development of Zimbabwe is likely to be a matter of continuing concern. Zimbabwe nationalists resent the tendencies of outsiders to define their politics primarily, if not solely, in terms of "tribalism." Pragmatically, they are aware that the nation-building tasks ahead for them require the integration of diverse sub-national groups, some of which are traditional and ethnic. But they are also resistant to the familiar efforts of the white government in Rhodesia and of some outsiders, especially since the late sixties, to reinforce traditional and ethnic groupings at the expense of a Zimbabwean national consciousness. It is to them the familiar colonialist tactic of "divide and rule." In this connection, the International Commission of Jurists has observed: "The 1969 [Rhodesian] Constitution, by "formalizing" tribalism, emphasizing the differences between various tribal communities, had the effect of permanently impeding the development of African consciousness." [x-International Commission of Jurists, 98.]

There are, in fact, some grounds for worry that ethnic competition or even conflict could be a problem in the equitable development of Zimbabwe, just as it has been in the United States. There has been open inter-ethnic conflict in the African townships from time to time; some such conflict has been reported of the guerrilla forces in Mozambique and party politics inside and especially

outside the country. And one assumes there could be ethnic competition as the Zimbabwe government and economy are Africanized. And yet the picture is too unclear to warrant any certainty about the future role of African ethnicity in Zimbabwe.

For outsiders contemplating the development prospects of Zimbabwe it is perhaps wise to adopt the circumspection that appears in two observations about the role of ethnicity in present Zimbabwean politics.

Professor George Bond has written:

In Angola each of the principal ethno-linguistic groupings produced an independence movement; for example, the initial and basic support of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) was amongst the six to seven hundred thousand Bakongo community of Northern Angola, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) among the two million Ovimbundu of the central Benguela plateau, and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) among the 1.3 million Mbandu peoples (Marcum 1976, pp. 410-411). Thus, the principal constituencies of the independence movements reflected ethno-linguistic cleavages and Angola was fragmented along regional lines.

In Southern Rhodesia the leadership and popular support of the different factions is less clearly defined and more heterogeneous in its social characteristics. From their inception the independence movements in the form of the National Democratic Party (NDP), which was founded in 1960, and its successor, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) consisted of a cross section of the African population. [x-George Bond, Unpublished Consultant Report, African-American Scholars Council, 1976.]

Similarly, the Zimbabwe social scientist Leonard Kapungu, has written:

At no time in Zimbabwe has the split of the political movement been on the basis of ideology, since the various groups in the struggle have not had an ideology

until very recently [reference to early seventies]. Furthermore, although the Shona and Ndbele tribes have historically had their differences, tribalism has never been predominant in Zimbabwe. ZANU and ZAPU were never split on a tribal basis until the polarization of both parties in 1970, when it can be said that tribalism became a factor. Joshua Nkomo, the national leader of ZAPU, is a Kalanga [Shona group in western Rhodesia] and identifies himself with the Ndbele; yet the majority of his executive council and of his followers were Shona. Ndabaningi Sithole, the national leader of ZANU, speaks Ndbele more fluently than he speaks Shona and on his executive council there were men, like Enos Nkala, who were not Shonas. Here and there a few individuals with frustrated hopes have appealed to tribal feelings, even dividing the Shona tribe into its dialectic composition as a basis of political organization. They have tried to establish tribal bureaucracies to promote their personal interest. (Kapungu, 161-62.)

The conclusion may well be that while there is a potential in Zimbabwe for ethnic-oriented competition and conflict in politics and development, it would be a serious mistake to take for granted that disruptive ethnic conflict is inevitable.

-- A relatively large number of foreign Africans have resided in Rhodesia for many years and have constituted an impressively large proportion of the total African workforce. According to the 1969 census, there were nearly 300,000 foreign Africans in Rhodesia, including 163,440 from Malawi and 109,110 from Mozambique. In that year they constituted 34 percent of the total African workforce. [x-International Defense and Aid Fund, Zimbabwe Quiz 28.]

In recent years African immigration to Rhodesia has fallen off markedly, from 100,970 in 1955 to 6,320 in 1975. In the decade of 1965-75 the net African migration was out of the country in all but two of the years. [x-Rhodesia, CSO, op. cit., p. 4:]

According to another estimate, for mid-1972, 174,000 persons or 20 percent of the 870,000 Africans in paid employment were foreign. [x-Nelson, p. 74.] This percentage may be slightly higher.

As majority rule comes it is quite possible that the new government will be confronted by the issue of foreign labor competing with indigenous labor. This is all the more likely if there is unemployment, and because white Rhodesians have often shown a marked preference for foreign African workers for farming, domestic work and contract industrial labor.

-- Asians and Coloureds from distinct minorities. They have been subject to racial discrimination but they have higher social and economic status than Africans, which in the fact of African is a source of worry to them. Their political situation is not unlike that which comparable groups have experienced in transition periods elsewhere in Africa. It is difficult to anticipate how they will be affected by majority rule; but it is reasonable to assume that as groups they will not affect political outcomes very much.

Territorial Distribution of Population. The distribution of population has both political and developmental implications:

-- In 1975 an estimated 82 percent of all whites (228,600) lived in urban areas; and a majority (186,700) lived in either Salisbury or Bulawayo. [x-Table 2 in Rhodesia, CSO, op. cit., p. 1.] The white populations of the other twelve "main" towns range between Bindura with 1,200 whites and Umtali with 9,800 whites. Most of

the white population, urban as well as rural, lives along the highveld axis (northeast to southwest) or in bordering areas. The main concentration of white rural and small town population is in northeastern Rhodesia along a line from Karoi via Salisbury to Umtali near the Mozambique border. This includes much of the choicest area of the country bioclimatically for intensive or semi-intensive farming. Except for the irrigated areas around Chiredzi in the south, there have been widespread reductions in the white rural population in recent years.

The largest single concentration of white urban and rural population, therefore, extending from Salisbury and eastwards into the most productive farmlands, lies relatively close to the growing guerrilla activity originating in Mozambique.

The present distribution of whites results from a diverse set of factors. [x-Kay, 71-74.] Among these are such historical factors as the nature of the occupation and the search for security against Ndbele and Shona resistance; and the early concentration of white population around gold prospecting and mining areas such as Salisbury. Among preferential factors were white predilections for the most healthful and comfortable areas of the highveld. Economic factors have always loomed large and especially as the modern sector of the economy has developed: at first white population concentrated around supposedly promising gold mining areas; then farming in the most productive lands of the highveld attracted farmers and related commerce; and finally industrial

development and base metal and coal mining expanded original settlements and started new ones; the development of the early railroad system to some extent determined patterns of population distribution and so on.

Politically, it is essential to understand that the minority white population is concentrated in the urban areas and in the most productive farm and mineral resource areas. This reflects the fact that, in relation to Africans, whites command a disproportionately large share of total national resources. Also from earliest times whites established control over the basic economic resources of the country and could use these to sustain political control over the African majority.

-- In 1975 an estimated 16.5 percent (1,009,000) of the African population lived in urban areas. Of the total population of Salisbury (569,000) approximately 430,000 were African. Within the last six years the number of Africans in Salisbury has increased dramatically by 150,000 persons (1969). [Rhodesia, CSO, op. cit. P.1] The rapid influx of Africans into Salisbury and other cities has been of major concern to the Rhodesian government. It may be supposed from the experiences of other African countries that migration to the towns and cities will be an immediate and growing challenge for a new Zimbabwe government. Majority rule may indeed accelerate migration to urban areas.

Under a succession of land apportionment and urban areas acts Africans have been thoroughly if not completely segregated

into "townships" and "locations" adjacent to the cities. In 1973 the Municipality of Salisbury listed twelve such townships and locations in Salisbury, ranging in distance from city centre between 5 miles (Harare) and 18 miles (Tafara). [x-Cubit, 18.] African life in these townships and especially migration to and from them is closely regulated. Urban areas and registration acts control even more closely the Africans residing in white residential areas as servants.

The other roughly five million Africans live in rural areas of the country. About 350,000 Africans live and work in white rural areas even after a period of rapid decline in the numbers employed there. Most live in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTL's), constituting about 42 percent of the total area of Rhodesia. Somewhat more than 100,000 Africans live in the African Purchase Lands (APL's) where private rather than common land-holding is practiced. [x-Hughes, pp. 12-13.]

The TTL's are scattered but most are clustered together in the outer reaches of the country off the highveld. They tend to be "remote" in the sense of having poor communications and of being distant from major urban areas. Two-fifths of all Tribal Trust Land is over 80 kilometers from a railway, and three-fifths of all of TTL and APL land combined is over 80 kilometers from any large town. [x-Hughes, 12.]

Importantly, "it must be accepted that a large proportion of the tribal areas are situated in less favoured agro-ecological regions of the country." [x-Ibid.]

The distribution of African population within rural and urban areas has been shaped by pre-European migrations, by colonial settler practices and policies, and by economic forces. Africans were drawn to the cities by economic and other attractions of the modern economy; their residential distribution within urban areas has been closely and politically controlled by the white government. The distribution of the rural African population is due to pre-European land occupation by different African groups, to patterns of white land settlement and to official policies of land apportionment over many years.

The present distribution of Africans is extremely important politically, as it is closely linked to the issues of land and other resource allocation in a future Zimbabwe. For instance, some proposals for rural development will inevitably include measures for redistributing the African population on more favorable agricultural lands presently held by white. A new Zimbabwe government will also face difficult developmental issues concerning relative priorities between urban and rural development, respectively. Distribution of the African population as between rural and urban areas will be at issue, and the present system of residential segregation within cities will be subject to challenge immediately.

In the period of transition and as a new Zimbabwe government seeks development, a central political fact is that over one million Africans are urban dwellers. Many more Africans now in rural areas have experienced or will experience urban living. These persons are more or less removed from traditional life, values, controls and organization. In many respects they have urban and "modern" values, and generally higher aspirations than their rural counterparts. They are more politicized. The politics of transition and of development will have to incorporate them effectively or adverse political consequences are probable, and likely to appear rather quickly.

Distribution within the Political Economy. The distribution of persons within the economy has political and developmental implications in several respects: that distribution indicates something about the effectiveness of existing political system in providing (or denying) equitable economic opportunity; it indicates some of the parameters of developmental need; and it indicates the human economic base from which capacities for political and other development must be drawn.

-- Most of the population of Rhodesia is divided between the "wage" and "residual" sectors of the economy, respectively. All whites are in the wage (or cash) sector of the economy. About one million Africans are employed in the wage sector, the largest groups in 1975 being in agriculture and forestry, domestic work and manufacturing. Approximately two million Africans

of working age remain in the residual sector where undoubtedly subsistence agriculture is their primary or exclusive support. [x-Estimate deduced from Whitsun Foundation projections, Ibid.] The TTL's form the bulk of the residual economy. A large amount of the TTL land is of marginal or sub-marginal quality for agriculture. Traditional shifting cropping patterns have been halted and the rapidly rising person-to-land ratio is not being offset by compensating advances in land and technological usages.

Something over four million persons (including families of working age group), therefore, reside in a residual economy which is already poor and likely to become moreso unless appropriate development measures are taken. The unemployed in the wage sector, in addition, often have to fall back on the residual sector. An overlapping phenomenon is the ciruclation of Africans between urban and rural areas, or more broadly, between wage and residual economies.

-- Within the wage sector the largest single grouping of Africans is in agriculture and forestry (353,000). About 136,000 Africans are employed as domestics, mostly by whites. And the third largest grouping is in manufacturing (136,000). It can be safely assumed that the vast majority of the workers in these categories are unskilled or modestly skilled laborers. [x-Rhodesia, CSO, op. cit.]

-- The distribution of Africans within the income spectrum suggests significant political and developmental data. The following observations from the Directorate of the Whitsun

Foundation are perhaps as well founded as any, but they also indicate the complexities of income distribution analysis.

(a) The low level of imputed incomes in the residual sector, where average income per working age member of the population appears to be in the range \$45-55 per annum (using data for 1972-74).

(b) The level of African earnings within the wage sector, relative to estimated Poverty Datum Line criteria. There is in fact no accurate or unique way of showing the income distribution relative to PDL criteria because of the lack of data on family size and structure. PDL surveys themselves, moreover, tend to be controversial as to both fact and assumption, so the comparisons are made here on a purely notional basis. Nevertheless, the comparisons are striking. The average earnings of Africans in wage sector employment in 1974, excluding agriculture, were about \$556 a year. The University of Rhodesia's 1974 PDL Survey suggests that the PDL for an urban family of four was in the range \$660-670 a year.² According to the CSO data on wage distribution,³ less than 15% of all non-agricultural African wage earners had earnings higher than this in 1974. Some workers in the wage sector; of course, are single so their minimum requirements are overstated by this PDL figure. However, this should be seen against the fact that the national average family size is between 6 and 7. For urban families of this size the PDL suggested is over \$800 a year. Considering also the evidence that the principal income earner in urban areas appears to earn over 90% of the family's total urban income,⁴ it seems that these levels of earnings (apart from the other factors involved) would tend to perpetuate the need for supplementary income from the residual sector to sustain the average family.

(c) The marked differential, which has apparently widened in recent years, between the average earnings of white and black wage and salary earners. In 1974 average white earnings were \$4,333 per annum, i.e., 10.8 times that in the black wage sector (in 1965 they were \$2,850, or 10.3 times greater).⁵ [x-Directorate, Whitsun Foundation, op. cit. Also see chart, "Structure of African Employment and Income," in Appendix _____.]

Even allowing for the weaknesses in this kind of income distribution analysis, it appears abundantly clear that most Africans are

extremely poor by white Rhodesian standards. A new Zimbabwe government will confront pervasive poverty among Africans but have to deal with that in a political context in which gross inequality of income between whites and Africans is present. No doubt, African expectations of rapid economic improvement for themselves will be high.

-- Nearly 120,000 whites (figure includes modest numbers of Asians and Coloureds) were employed in the wage sector in 1975. The largest categories of employment were "manufacturing" (23,830) and "Distribution, Restaurants and Hotels" (20,530). Some 4,850 persons were employed in the agricultural/forestry sector. [x-Rhodesia, CSO, op. cit., 12.]

Whites constituted 12 percent of those employed in 1973, but took home 59 percent of all wage sector earnings. In 1974 average white earnings were \$4,333 per annum. Whites are spread across the industrial sectors of employment, but dominate the employment categories from skilled upwards to management level posts in government and the private sector. Elsewhere in this report there is consideration of the implications of white departure from various sectors of the economy. The general point, however, of political and developmental interest, is that whites are totally concentrated in the upper ranges of the modern sector of the economy.

Political Inheritance and Underdevelopment

The new Zimbabwe leadership will begin with a political and administrative system partly of its own making but one which was primarily developed by and for whites. An understanding of the inherited political and administrative system is a first step towards considering what political capacities the new Zimbabwe will need, and have, to make decisions, to organize, to administer and to inspire national action for Zimbabwe development. That understanding will also suggest some of the most pressing political problems to be faced by Zimbabwe.

The Rhodesian political and administrative system has been quite effective in incorporating the white population into a political process which for whites is generally democratic in the western mold. That system has also been effective in fostering an impressively modern, technologically advanced, and wealthy economy, albeit one which benefits whites primarily and which coexists with a residual and underdeveloped economy populated by the majority of Africans. That system has shown resilience in meeting the challenge of international sanctions for over a decade and in confronting mounting nationalist guerrilla operations. Above all, the white political and administrative system has been effective in controlling the African majority -- in regulating African land occupation and residential patterns according to white preferences; in thwarting African nationalism which has

otherwise swept the continent; and in generally assuring an allocation of national resources more favorable to whites than to Africans.

So far as Africans are concerned, the political and administrative system can be said to be "undeveloped." Africans have been denied full participation and rights in the political and administrative system. Most are completely outside the system although subject to it. Although many Africans - many more than in Zaire at the time of its independence - have developed modern political and administrative skills and values in nationalist politics, union organizing, education, policy-making and administration, and so on, the vast majority of Africans have not had opportunities to develop politically. In major respects, too, the traditional cultures of rural Zimbabwe are not conducive to political modernization in the sense of decisional and organizational capacities sufficient to develop the entire nation.

The inherited political and administrative system is also underdeveloped in the sense that it is primarily directed to the needs of the white minority and to those of the modern sector of the economy. If the needs of all people of the Zimbabwe nation, including the rural majority, are to be of concern, then one must imagine a major revamping of the political and administrative system to decide and work towards truly national development goals. It is not a foregone conclusion that the new Zimbabwe leadership will seek

an egalitarian society and equitable national development -- elsewhere it has frequently happened that a "new class" simply takes over the privileges of the ancien regime - but if it does, it follows that the country must be developed politically and administratively, just as in material and other respects.

Governmental System. Since 1890 Rhodesia has evolved from rule by the chartered British South Africa Company, through a period of qualified self-government as a British colony beginning in 1923, and finally to a period of de facto independence which since Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI - 1965) has remained unrecognized by Great Britain and other countries. In nearly 68 years of self-government white Rhodesians gradually eliminated the already tenuous British control and then severed relations altogether.

-- Today Rhodesia is governed by a "republican" constitution (1969) which came into effect in 1970. This constitution formalizes "independence," but it departs substantially from the 1961 constitution (recognized as presently operative by the British) in strengthening racialist and anti-civil libertarian features present to varying degrees in the past.

-- The 1969 constitution provides for a bicameral legislature. The Senate, or upper house, consists of 23 members. Ten of these are designated for Africans, importantly, to be elected by members of the tribal Council of Chiefs. Further underlining the racialist and ethnic orientation of the 1969 constitution, five of the ten

African seats are reserved for Ndbeles, who constitute about 16 percent of the African population; the other five for Shonas who constitute 71 percent.

The House of Assembly, the lower house, has 66 members, of whom 50 are white members elected by the white electorate. Eight Africans are elected by eight tribal electoral colleges and eight by registered African voters.

Ordinary legislation is passed by both houses, but the House of Assembly initiates legislation and has the power to reverse any veto of a bill by the Senate.

The 1969 constitution nullifies any possibility of majority rule. It provides that the number of African MP's could be increased as the African population contributes a greater share of the taxes, but even then only to a point of parity with white membership. One estimate is that the achievement of parity alone would take about 1,000 years. [x-International Defense and Aid Fund, Zimbabwe Quiz, p. 7.]

Hence, a new Zimbabwe leadership will inherit a parliamentary system, but one that has largely excluded or subordinated Africans and which recently has elevated the role of traditional leaders to offset mounting nationalist influence among the Africa population.

-- Primary measures of African participation in the political system are franchise qualifications and African voter registration and turnout. The 1969 constitution, as others before, set African franchise qualifications (based upon income, property ownership and education) which are simply beyond most Africans for the long-term future. Under the 1965 franchise, which is similar to the 1969 franchise, it is estimated that something more than 150,000 Africans were eligible to vote; but fewer than 5,000 were actually registered on the voter rolls in 1969. [x-International Commission of Jurists, p. 32.] Relatively few Africans can qualify to vote, but even fewer have chosen to register under a system so clearly rigged against major African participation, much more "one person--one vote." In the 1974 general election only 2,362 Africans voted. [x-IDAF, Zimbabwe Quiz, p. 8.]

From these few facts it can be inferred that a Zimbabwe leadership will have a monumental task in developing the African franchise. From two to three million Africans would presumably be of voting age and yet only a few thousand of them have had any experience of voting.

-- Most executive authority is vested in a parliamentary type cabinet (and an executive council of roughly same membership) led by the Prime Minister (now Ian Smith). The number of cabinet members is not determined by law, but usually there have been fourteen ministers, each responsible for one or more departments

of government. Each minister has as his first assistant a ranking civil servant with the title of ministerial secretary (permanent secretary in British parlance). These secretaries have enjoyed considerable autonomous power in the past but the Rhodesian Front government has moved in recent years to curtail that.

In transition to majority rule the Africanization of the central political leadership will undoubtedly be a first priority.

In the fall of 1976 Prime Minister Smith appointed three or four African junior ministers from the traditional African leadership, but few Africans have had ministerial experience and certainly the leading nationalists have had none. To promote political development the new Zimbabwe leaders will have to make a range of decisions concerning relationships between executive and legislative power, between parties and representation, and so on. If no gradual transition is negotiated, some profound changes will be made abruptly. In those circumstances, it is quite possible that the system, as well as the leadership group, could be changed dramatically.

-- National administration and civil service are potentially primary agencies for development in Zimbabwe. The Rhodesian government, through an array of ministries and the civil service, has a central role in providing services (including education and health), in directing and supporting the economy and in regulating the society. Unfortunately, there are no comprehensive studies of the present national administrative system which could indicate precisely what types of administrative change might be

recommended, assuming some radially different goals for development. [x-See Table of "Central Government Budget Account Expenditure by Votes" in Appendix ___ to get some impression of present administrative functions and priorities.]

What is known is that white civil servants constitute a formidable group in the wage sector of the economy and a substantial political bloc. In the early seventies there were some 24,000 whites in central government service, who with their spouses were one-third of the white electorate. They and the members and families of the military and police were a majority of the white electorate.

[x-Area Handbook, p. 156.]

Importantly, Africans have been systematically excluded from the middle and higher ranks of the civil service. The Government List of 1967 indicated that only one African held senior rank. [x-International Commission of Jurists, op. cit., p. 99.] In 1972, by another estimate, only 829 Africans held one or another of 13,000 tenured positions. Only three of these could be considered of senior rank. [x-Area Handbook, op. cit., p. 156.]

It is clear that Zimbabwe leaders will face demanding tasks of reordering the priorities of government and national administration but also difficult tasks of Africanizing civil administration.

-- Assuring defense and public order is a primary responsibility of any government under the most optimal circumstances. The Rhodesian governmental system has had to commit relatively large and increasing sums to its national security forces to control the African population inside the country and increasingly to counter mounting guerrilla intrusions from outside the country. In the decade 1965-1975 governmental expenditures on security (defense and police) quadrupled from about Rh\$20 million to Rh\$80 million. [x-IDAF, Zimbabwe Quiz, p. 33.]

The British South African Police (BSA), still bearing its nineteenth century name, is a paramilitary force of about 8,000 men and some 60,000 reservists. It has conventional police functions, but also the more onerous responsibility of enforcing strict laws to control the African population. Two-thirds of the regular BSAP force is African; all reservists are white. All officers are white.

The defense forces include a regular army force of about 3,500 officers and men. Among these is a white-officered battalion of 1,000 Africans in the Rhodesian African Rifles. The Rhodesian Air Force has 1,200 regulars. Africans are only permitted to serve as ground personnel.

In the Geneva negotiations control of the security forces is an issue of great moment for all parties. Whatever the nature of

the transition to majority rule, a critical factor for the new Zimbabwe will be whether stable police and military forces survive. The political control and loyalties of the forces will be critical matters, as will Africanization of the officer ranks.

It is naturally difficult for outsiders to learn much about the present composition of the forces or especially about the nature of the African component. There are occasional reports of declining African morale and "dependability" - in 1966 there was an attempted mutiny and since there have been occasional trials of allegedly rebellious African soldiers - but generally the African troops have continued to accept the leadership and discipline of the white Rhodesian command. Paradoxically, a high percentage of the Rhodesian troops being killed by guerrillas consists of Africans.

Reportedly, the Karanga or the Shona group are present in disproportionately large numbers in both the Rhodesian African Rifles and the Mozambique-based guerrilla force. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), most of the Rhodesian African Rifles are Karanga. [x-Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Southern Africa: The Escalation of Conflict, New York: Praeger, 1976, p. 151.] If that is true, and if African ethnicity should become a major factor in Zimbabwe politics, it may be important that so many Karange have military training and experience.

In any event, the new Zimbabwe leadership will have a major challenge in assuring that there are loyal and disciplined security forces. Already the guerrilla force has become an independent factor in the negotiations over transition. If political change is achieved primarily by force of arms, one must assume that the guerrillas themselves would become prominent in both government and the national security forces; in any case, present guerrillas would presumably have to be incorporated into the security forces or demobilized. Already there are an estimated 10,000 guerrillas who will need to be reintegrated into a free Zimbabwe; understandably, they will tend to have high expectations for their own places in the future of the country.

-- The Rhodesian legal system is based on Roman-Dutch common law although much of the applied law is statutory law. At the apex of the national court structure is a High Court, with two divisions, both presided over by a chief justice. The Appellate Division of the High Court is the court of final review; the General Division has original and appellate jurisdiction. Magistrate courts hear most criminal and civil cases involving whites under original jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals for African Civil Cases is at the top of a partially separate but interlocking structure of African courts. This court only considers appeals from District Commissioner's courts. District Commissioners, although primarily administrative officers, have their respective courts to consider African civil

cases of specified types. These courts may retry cases heard in the 59 chiefs' courts which hear civil cases within chiefdoms. The Rhodesian Front has been seeking to devolve more authority on tribal leadership and this has included legislating modest criminal jurisdiction for the chiefs' courts.

Recent developments in the Rhodesian legal system will at least affect how the new Zimbabwe leaders perceive their legal inheritance. First, the High Court has given the UDI regime de jure recognition. Second, the 1969 Constitution removed the prerogative of the High Court to challenge the constitutionality of legislation further denuding the Court's capacity to challenge discriminatory legislation. Third, the court system has been in any case an integral part of a larger political system which has enacted and applied an extensive array of racially discriminatory and restrictive laws. Increasingly the court system is being compromised by its direct involvement with methods to control the African population which completely deny personal rights and due process of law. For example, the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations empower the Minister of Law and Order to detain any person indefinitely. Within three months of detention a person may apply for review by a "Review Tribunal." The President appoints a tribunal of three persons, the chairman of which must be a present or former High Court judge, or a person qualified for appointment as a High Court judge. [x-Regulation 29, R.G.N. 689 of 1974.]

While Zimbabweans will probably begin with deep misgivings about a legal system which in so many ways has treated them unjustly and extra-legally, they will still face questions concerning the constitutional role of courts and law. These will be particularly difficult in a situation in which a pervasive system of legal discrimination and inequality must be dismantled.

-- Local government and administration seem somewhat remote from the heady prospects of Zimbabweans taking the reins of central power and government. Yet the type of local government useful for the preservation of colonial rule or the exercise " of authority by the minority white government will surely prove inadequate for the rapid economic and social development of a predominantly rural population, not to mention the unmet development needs of urban Africans.

Local government for urban areas and for all white rural areas has been under the aegis of the Ministry of Local Government and Housing. There is a system of elected local government bodies (mayors and councils) for municipalities in the larger towns; Town Management Boards in the smaller towns and Local Boards in rural areas. Municipalities are self-supporting and have considerable powers to tax property. They manage urban public services, excepting education and health services provided by the central government. They also manage through superintendants the adjoining African townships and locations.

African urban areas, the townships and locations which adjoin white urban areas and accommodate most of the one million urban Africans, are administered by municipal white governing bodies. Africans have no voting rights there and are generally deemed to be in the urban areas on the sufferance of white employers and white local government. The Rhodesian Front government has tightened the regulation of African residence in and movement to and from urban areas. The despised pass system has been invigorated. Although there are evident urban amenities in some of the townships and decent housing is scattered among them, the general scene is one of relatively poor services and of delapidated and crowded housing. The scene is not exceptional by the standards of city living in third world cities or in the South Bronx of New York City. And yet the residents are frequently reminded of the dramatically higher living standards being enjoyed by whites in neighboring residential areas.

Local government for over 5 million Africans who live in rural areas is under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (formerly African Affairs). The 165 separate areas classified as Tribal Trust Lands are grouped together into some 51 geographical districts under the administration of white District Commissioners. The DC's still have considerable powers. Just under the district level are 252 separate chiefdoms under chiefs, about 1,000 wards under headmen, and an indefinite number of kraals ("villages"). Individual family homesteads are the constituent units of the kraal.

The present role of chiefs in Rhodesia is a complex and controversial, partly because the Rhodesian front government has chosen to increase their powers as a counter-weight to nationalist influence. Beyond this there are differences of viewpoint over whether traditional leaders command enough allegiance and have enough ability and education to be effective agents of local rural development. The chiefs are responsible for tax collection, crime prevention and the maintenance of order.

Since 1957 a system of representative councils has been developed to complement the leadership of the chiefs. They include chiefs and elected members. In 1974 there were 188 councils and others planned. In 1972-73 all councils had a total income of Rh\$8,622,500 from tax collections and central government grants. The largest amount of revenue received by a single council was Rh\$378,776. The smallest was \$5,552. [x-Hughes, 138-138A.]

The plan has been that councils should assume as many governmental functions as possible in their respective areas. Thus far, Council functions have stressed the provision of services: management of African primary schools, the provision of facilities for correspondence study groups, the control of cattle dipping services, numerous health services and the provision of water supplies.

[x-Ibid., 138.]

The development of councils and related "community development" programs has met with considerable opposition, to some extent from chiefs, but also from those who see an "apartheidist" orientation in government policies which base local administration and development on ethnic and traditional institutions. The very phrase "community development" arouses suspicion.

This superficial and incomplete discussion is meant only to suggest that the new Zimbabwe leaders will face monumental tasks in organizing and administering political and economic development at the local level, especially if they intend to "mobilize" the nation for development. As in many other African countries, the relationship between nationalist and modernist elites, on the one hand, and traditional leaders, on the other, will be at issue. And all the more because the Rhodesian Front government has elevated the role of chiefs in local rural administration, as well as in national affairs. One may expect neither the African populace nor the leaders of African nationalist movements to hold a uniform opinion concerning the continuation of chieftanship as a recognized institution of local government after administration.

In urban areas Africans are relatively modernist and politicized. High aspirations and pent-up grievances over residential segregation and township living standards will place great stress on municipal administration. To compound the possible difficulties Africans have been denied experience in policy-making and administration for local government.

Political Capacities and Development

The central idea of the preceding pages was that the inherited Rhodesian political and administrative system is "underdeveloped" for the purposes of the future Zimbabwe. The system has not been directed to the needs of the whole society; Africans have been denied full political participation and opportunities to gain administrative experience and expertise; and the administrative capacities of the country are to a great extent misdirected and presently insufficient for equitable national development.

The theme of political underdevelopment, however, can be easily overstated. The new Zimbabwe will have political and administrative resources at its disposal which are very promising by the standards of other nations passing to majority rule. There is an extensive political/administrative infrastructure already, even if much of it must be changed radically to include all Zimbabweans and serve their needs. There are substantial economic resources to fortify the political and administrative system. There is an odds-on chance that the political system can be opened and the administrative system expanded and democratized without serious lapse during the process of Africanization. Many whites may choose to carry over and redirect their political skills and administrative expertise. There is an extensive transportation and communications system which can be more effectively utilized to meet national needs. There is no apparent danger of regional separatism or irredentism that has plagued other African countries

after independence. Despite the severe limits on African education, thousands of Africans have completed all or part of a secondary education; and over one thousand, hold baccalaureate and/or advanced university degrees. There are, in short, political and administrative assets which will be at the disposal of the new Zimbabwe leaders.

---Zimbabweans have gained their political education and experience primarily through a succession of/modern nationalist political parties beginning with the African National Congress in 1957. The history of African nationalist parties is long and intricate.(X-For a good account of the evolution of African nationalism and parties see Eshmael Mlambo, Rhodesia: The Struggle for a Birthright, London: C. Hurst and Company, 1972.) For more than twenty years hundreds of Zimbabweans have gained experience in organizing and recruiting for modern parties; many thousands more have participated in or have been politicized by the activities of the parties. It would be easy to underestimate the extent to which this experience has contributed to the political development of Zimbabweans, in a time in which they have been largely excluded from the Rhodesian political system.

Between 1957 and 1964 five African political parties were formed and subsequently banned by the Rhodesian government: African National Congress of Southern Rhodesia (formed 1957; banned 1959); National Democratic Party (formed 1960; banned 1961); Zimbabwe African People's Union-ZAPU (formed 1961; banned 1962); Zimbabwe African National Union-ZANU (formed 1963; banned 1964); and the People's Caretaker Council-PCC (formed 1963; banned 1964). Through most of the sixties and early seventies ZAPU and ZANU functioned as parties in

in exile, with headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia. Their respective leaders, Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole, languished in Rhodesian prisons or restriction areas between 1964 and 1974.

In 1971 members of both ZAPU and ZANU joined together in the African National Council (ANC), under the leadership of Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa, to oppose successfully the Home-Smith settlement proposals which provided for recognized Rhodesian independence. Following talks in Lusaka in 1974, ZAPU, ZANU and FROLIZI merged into a reconstituted ANC headed by Muzorewa, with Sithole, Nkomo and others on the executive council. Subsequently ANC has broken down into Nkomo (internal) and Muzorewa (external) groupings. Sithole has been supplanted in leadership of ZANU (a large segment of the party never accepted the ANC) by Robert Mugabe, originally the secretary general of the party.

From 1966 ZAPU and ZANU mounted guerrilla incursions from Zambia into Rhodesia, often in competition with one another. By 1972 the guerrillas themselves were growing dissatisfied with their political leadership. After revolts in guerrilla camps in Zambia and Tanzania, Sithole and Muzorewa tried to reassert political control by the establishment of a 21-member Liberation Council (ZLC). Nevertheless, most of the guerrillas did not accept the ZLC and proceeded instead in November, 1975, to establish the Zimbabwe Peoples Army (ZIPA). ZIPA incorporates both ZANU and ZAPU cadres, although the former are apparently more numerous, under a combined High Command ("Third Force"). ZIPA, based in newly independent Mozambique, is reportedly under the leadership of Rex Nhongo, an experienced ZANU guerrilla leader.

The Third Force was formed partly out of disenchantment with the Zimbabwean Political leadership and has become a separate political factor in its own right. If any political leader has substantial influence on the ZIPA High Command, it is apparently Robert Mugabe of ZANU. (X-For a discussion of the emergence of ZIPA and its relationships to the Zimbabwe political leadership, see Africa, August 1976, pp. 10-11.) Estimates of ZIPA force levels range as high as 10-20,000. Intensified engagements with the Rhodesian army across the Mozambique border are in progress, and Rhodesia has made reprisal ground and air strikes against ZIPA and refugee camps in Mozambique.

Several generalizations may suggest how the evolution of the nationalist movement may affect the development prospects of Zimbabwe. First, it has been suggested that party politics, especially in the face of systematic repression by white Rhodesian governments, has been a difficult testing ground for the development of African leadership, policy-making and organizational skills. Such skills and related political values will be readily transposable to development tasks in Zimbabwe.

Second, the nationalist movement has been radicalized in clearly perceptible stages. As early as the 1920's, proto-nationalist groups, the Rhodesian Native Association (RNA) and the Rhodesia Bantu Voters' Association, essentially worked within the white controlled system to advance the interests of educated Africans. The first modern African party, the African National Congress (1957) was preoccupied with ending racial discrimination rather than with

majority rule. As late as 1960, according to Zimbabwe social scientist, Eshmael Mlambo, "the educated Africans in Southern Rhodesia did not ally themselves with nationalism as in other parts of Africa. Those in the professions joined the white-led parties or, in some cases, sat on the fence." (x-Ibid., 144.) The parties of the 1960's, however, proclaimed majority rule as the goal of nationalsit politics. Increasing numbers of African professionals recognized the futility of reformist, multi-racial political strategies. Under the repression of the Rhodesian Front and in the difficulties of exile politics the parties became increasingly radical in viewpoint and method during the sixties. From 1966 nationalist parties initiated guerrilla warfare; in 1976, if the Geneva talks fail, it is quite possible that the guerrilla leadership will supplant the older political leadership altogether. Even assuming an early political settlement it must be supposed that the incorporation of the guerrilla leadership and forces will be a real test for the new Zimbabwe political system. If guerrilla warfare is the arbiter of political settlement, the leaders and views of the High Command will obviously become significant in Zimbabwe under majority rule.

The influence of the guerrilla force appears to be, to use inadequate terms, "leftish" and "radical," in the spectrum of American political orientations. If Zimbabwean parties have been non-ideological at least until recently---Leonard Kapungu has written of a "Revolution without Ideology" (x- Kapungu, op.cit., 133ff.)---this seems to be changing under the pressure of experience

and especially of guerrilla war, primarily supported by socialist countries, including the guerrilla base country, Mozambique.

Third, it is impossible to predict what ideological orientation a new Zimbabwe will have. Much depends on which set of current leaders or parties prevail. The ZANU (led by Mugabe) and Third Force leaders seem most ideological, and if their rhetoric is taken at face value, they must be presumed to be socialist (in what precise mold it is difficult to say). Ndabaningi Sithole, the first head of ZANU, appears to be losing his influence, but he has articulated a popular preference for African Socialism (like that in Tanzania presumably) as an alternative to both "doctrinaire socialism" and "laissez-faire capitalism". (x-Ndabaningi Sithole, African Nationalism, 196.) Bishop Muzorewa and certainly Joshua Nkomo have been less specific about their vision of the future Zimbabwe, that is, beyond majority rule without racism.

The ideology (or lack thereof) of the new leadership will determine the broad outlines of development strategy concerning such issues as where to focus development efforts (rural, urban, otherwise); how to organize the political system (multi-party or single party, mobilizational or more non-directive political methods, etc.); how to organize the economy (state or private ownership of major ownership, etc.); how to deal with specific issues (land reform); how to deal with foreign investment and even foreign aid; and so on. Until recent years one might have expected the Zimbabwe leaders, had they come to power, to have been reformist, and non-ideological in their approach to government and economy. Today

many have already moved to more radical views of how to transform Zimbabwe society; and others are in rapid transition to that point of view.

Finally, a possible retardant to political and economic development in independent Zimbabwe may be party strife and conflict among Zimbabwean parties themselves. This is not inevitable by any means, but since the ZANU-ZAPU split in 1963 there have been numerous episodes of inter-party strife and some violence. Most observers have seen the sources of competition more in leadership rivalries than in ideological, ethnic or other differences. There is sufficient evidence, in any case, to indicate the possibility (not the certainty) that party competition will break out of peaceful bounds during transition. There is the related possibility that one-party government will emerge.

---White parties are not likely to survive the transition, at least for very long. The conservative and racist Rhodesia Front has had the strong support of the white community for over a decade. In the 1974 general election it polled 75 percent of the white vote and took all 50 seats in the House of Assembly. The more moderate opposition party, the Rhodesian Party polled 19 percent of the vote, but won no seat. The multi-racial Centre Party elected one MP, who subsequently resigned.

---Africans have also acquired organizational and administrative experience in a wide range of religious, union, welfare, education, business and professional organizations.

The Christian churches, for example, which at the beginning of the century were given primary responsibilities for African education and health services, have had a very large impact upon the lives of Africans -- an impact which many Africans, especially nationalists, view at very least with strong ambivalence. Most educated African adults received some or all of their education in schools sponsored by missions or voluntary groups. Virtually all of the present nationalist leaders are mission graduates. (See biographies of nationalist leaders in Appendix A, in Mlambo, op. cit., 305ff.) Two of the four main nationalist leaders, Muzorewa and Sithole, are Christian ministers.

Thousands of Zimbabweans are currently members of various Christian denominations. In 1971, for example, over 300,000 Africans were Catholic communicants. About 110,000 were Methodists. (x-Kapungu, op. cit., p. 88.) African separatist churches, "Ethiopian" (African churches which break away from white control) and "Zionist" (syncretist churches which fuse Christian and traditional religious beliefs), claim many thousand more members.

The nationalist critique of the Christian churches is severe. Primarily the churches are faulted for participating in and abetting the development of a racialist society. They have failed, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole would say, to teach the lesson of human fellowship and of the oneness of mankind.

(x-Sithole, op. cit., p.5) Or at least to demonstrate that teaching fully. The churches are criticized for not supporting majority rule. (x-Kapungu, op. cit., p. 103).

Many nationalists will probably accept the conclusions of Leonard Kapungu:

It is undeniable that the churches in Rhodesia have been of great help to the African people of Zimbabwe. . . but they will have to change or perish. They will be needed in a Zimbabwe nation only if they are in harmony with the spirit of the nation and the aspirations of the people. (x--Kapungu, op. cit., 104-105)

In some African counties labor unions have fostered nationalism and have been "schools" for political organizers and administrators. In Rhodesia African unionization efforts have been strictly limited by legislation and by the resistance of white workers. Less than 10 percent of the African workforce is organized into unions; agricultural and domestic workers are expressly denied the right to organize by the Masters and Servants Act.

The present umbrella union organization of African labor is the National African Trade Union Congress (NATUC), which claims nine registered unions with a total of 36,418 members. Another 11 unions representing 13,200 workers are not presently registered under NATUC. The three largest of the twenty unions are unions for rail workers (10,000 members), hotel caterers (9,000) and Bulawayo municipal workers (9,000).

Joshua Nkoma began his organizational career in 1947 as organizing secretary for the Rhodesian African Workers' Union.

Without more detailed studies of the links between the unions and African politics, however, it is impossible to assess their role in providing leadership, support and organizational infrastructure for the African nationalist movement. Common-sense suggests, nevertheless, that unions are a resource for political development in the future Zimbabwe. On the other hand, a Zimbabwe government will probably have the challenge of developing an effective relationship with unions which will surely, by the nature of their mission, wish to expand their membership and to make certain claims upon the national economy and individual enterprises. In other African countries governments have felt it necessary to establish tight political controls on unions and to deny wage increase demands, not unlike colonial governments have done.

Another past and potential source of political and administrative expertise is that of the professionals, especially educators. The African education system has been the single major employer of Zimbabwe's most educated Africans. Again many political leaders are former teachers. Of the over 1,000 Zimbabweans in exile many are teachers and researchers, or otherwise professionals with advanced education. This alone, besides the educated already in the country, is an impressive talent pool. The nature of the political settlement and the predispositions of the new government will determine how and to what extent educated Zimbabweans are actually effectively

utilized under majority rule. While in a sense there will be tremendous needs and opportunities for the educated, some political eventualities could more or less limit the utilization of the educated.

Although it appears that most educated exiles would like to return home, whether they do or not will depend on such factors as the political orientation of the new government, the specific professional opportunities which might be available, and so.

An extreme scenario might apply if the guerilla leadership were to predominate in a final political settlement, supplanting most of the older line politicians. Then one could expect leadership and administrative recruitment patterns which might be less favorable to the most educated professionals, especially those abroad who have not participated recently or directly in front-line party or guerilla operations. This extreme is stated more for analytical purposes than to suggest it is a likelihood.

In conclusion, the Rhodesian political and administrative system is highly developed in some respects (mainly, but not exclusively by and for whites), just as parts of the economy are highly developed (again mainly, but not exclusively for whites). At the same time, the political-administrative system is in major respects underdeveloped in regard to incorporating the African majority to providing the decisional and organizational resources to meet African political, economic and

social needs, and to affording all citizens, especially Africans, opportunities to develop political and administrative skills. Political underdevelopment, as has been indicated, is by no means absolute, as through the nationalist movement and other experiences, an African polity is developing. Although it has been more implied than expressly stated, it is also quite probable that major parts of the white controlled political and administrative system can be revamped and redirected to serve truly national development. Under several scenarios of transition, it is likely that substantial numbers of politically and administratively experienced whites could remain to contribute to a system in which Africanization is understood to be a pressing and priority goal. Several prominent white opponents of the Rhodesian Front government (such as Todd, Savoury or Bashford), for instance, might serve in an African majority government.

Racial Discrimination and Inequality in Development

Another revealing way in which to analyze the Rhodesian political system and the prospects for development under majority rule in Zimbabwe is to focus on the racial discrimination and inequality which pervade the polity and economy. While underdevelopment in Rhodesia is by no means solely due to the failings of white rule, it is nonetheless true that discrimination and maldistribution of wealth, resources, practices and opportunities, along clearly racial lines, are to a large degree independent variables in the political and developmental equation of the future Zimbabwe.

Presumably a new Zimbabwe government would move quickly to dismantle the extensive array of discriminatory and repressive laws. It is more difficult to anticipate how and when the government will attack each of the gross income, health, education, housing and other inequalities which result significantly but not exclusively from racial discrimination. More extensive and extreme inequality exists in Rhodesia than existed in, for example, Tanzania at its independence, partly because a highly developed sector of society has so far outdistanced the underdeveloped sector. Whatever the predispositions of a Zimbabwe government, it will find it easier to end racial discrimination per se than it will be to create a more egalitarian society. Understandably Africans will have high expectations for the improvement of their lives relative to the visibly high standards of whites: for higher wages, better housing, more favorable farm land and so on. In the short run, at least, it will be difficult for a government to be both responsive to those expectations and to simultaneously sustain the main productive parts of the economy at present levels.

---Rhodesia's system of discrimination and repression is amply described in the International Commission of Jurists' Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia (1976) (x-ICJ, op. cit.). A sampling of discriminatory laws,

however, suggests that it is difficult to exaggerate the just grievances of the African people.

The 1969 Rhodesian Constitution contains a Declaration of Rights, which enumerates human rights and freedoms which cannot be abridged by "unjust discrimination" (emphasis added). As if "unjust" were not a sufficiently debilitating qualification in itself, the Constitution expressly denies recourse to the courts for alleged violations of rights under the Declaration (x-Ibid, p. 11).

The Land Tenure Act of 1969 supersedes the inequitable and discriminatory Land Apportionment Act (1930). It assigns 45 million acres of land to the small white minority and an equal amount to the vastly larger African majority. Recent studies once again confirm that African lands are poorer for farming and more remote from the transportation infrastructure for marketing. (x-Ibid., pp. 13-14). Under this same act a white employer must obtain official permission from local authorities before allowing an African employee to reside in a white area. (x-Ibid., p. 16).

The Africans (Urban Areas) Accomodation and Registration Act rightly restricts African residency in urban areas. In 1971 for the Salisbury area alone 1,730 Africans were imprisoned for violations of this act. (x-Ibid., p. 16).

The Africans (Registration and Identification) Act requires Africans to carry a registration book, registration certificate or identity card. Failure to produce a pass on demand by the police is punishable by a fine or three months in jail.

The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act of 1960 effectively denies Africans the right of assembly, regulating public meetings and processions. (x-Ibid., p. 36).

The government has almost unlimited powers to ban any organization. The Unlawful Organisations Act No. 55 of 1971 declared ten named organizations to be unlawful, including all the African liberation movements and parties to date. (x-Ibid., p. 37). Under Part II of the Act, several African-oriented periodicals have been banned, e.g., African Daily News, Moto and Mambo Press. The national press (Argus Company) has been rightly limited and censored. (x-Ibid., pp. 38-40).

---Normal criminal procedure allows detention of suspects without warrant for periods up to 48 hours. The Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations allow for the indefinite detention of a person if it appears to the Minister that such detention is "expedient in the interests of public safety or public order." As many as 600 - 1700 persons, mostly Africans, have been detained at any one time over the last decade. (x-Ibid., p. 47). Most African nationalists have been detained or restricted at one time or another. Nkomo and Sithole have each been held arbitrarily for ten years.

---With the rise of guerilla activity, a whole series of "anti-terrorist" laws have been enacted. There are severe

penalties for failing to report terrorists, for assisting them or for possessing arms. Nearly 100,000 Africans, mainly of the eastern sector of the country, have been forcibly moved to other areas of Rhodesia as punishment for collaboration with guerillas, or into "protected villages," or "consolidated villages" to prevent contact with them. (x-Ibid., pp. 54-60; 65-87). Forced relocations have caused extreme hardships and suffering.

---Another set of discriminatory laws are imbedded in the Constitution and electoral laws. Electoral Act No. 56 of 1969, for instance, was only the latest in a long line of electoral laws which set voting qualifications (income and education) so high as to effectively prevent all but a few Africans from voting. (x-Ibid., p. 94).

The foregoing list of discriminatory and repressive laws designed to control and subordinate Africans is only a very partial listing. But it suggests that so far as Africans are concerned the system is "totalitarian" in the strict meaning of that word. Controls pervade every part of African life; and white governments have had the means and will to exert near total control.

---Gross inequalities in living standards and economic and social opportunities within Rhodesia will be inherited by a new Zimbabwe government. To a large degree the grossest inequalities fall along racial lines; but analysis should certainly pay attention to the emergent black middle class (some businessmen,

but many professionals and intellectuals) and to the possibility that that group could assume the privileges of the whites without any thoroughgoing efforts to achieve an egalitarian society for the vast majority of African poor.

A few examples of existing inequalities will suffice. In 1974 average white earnings in the wage sector were \$4,333 per annum, 10.8 times greater than for Africans in the wage sector. In the residual sector of the economy where most Africans reside the imputed average income per working age member of the population was in the range of \$45-55. Average earnings of Africans in wage sector employment in 1974, excluding agriculture, were about \$556. (x-Whitsun Foundation, op. cit.). There are gross income inequalities between whites and blacks, but also between wage sector Africans and those of the residual sector (although employed Africans often help support families in the residual sector. There do not seem to be income stratification studies which would show the distribution of income among Africans. Some African professionals, businessmen, and educators seem to have relatively substantial incomes even by white standards but available data would not support a generalization about their numbers or distribution in the economy.

---Public education in Rhodesia is completely segregated and private education virtually so. In 1975, approximately R\$30 million was spent on educating the children of six million Africans; \$25.74 was spent on the children of 307 thousand whites, Asians and coloureds. Average expenditure for the

African child was one-twelfth what it was for the white child. (x-Ibid., pp. 19-20).

The inequities of land distribution are among the most politically contentious of all issues. As has been indicated, the Land Tenure Act of 1969 divides 90 million acres equally between the small white minority and the great majority of Africans. The African share of land is appreciably poorer.

Even good health and health services are distributed highly unequally in Rhodesia. For example, there were 8,659 cases of trachoma reported for the African population in 1975; none were reported for the white population. (x-James Watson, p. 26). Eighty-nine percent of Rhodesian physicians were located in twelve urban areas, the other 11 percent scattered throughout the country. There was one doctor for every 1,650 urban dwellers and only one for every 45,500 rural inhabitants. (x-Ibid., p. 65). It follows that Africans, most of whom live in rural areas, receive a disproportionately small share of physician services.

This partial enumeration of some of the glaring inequities in Rhodesian society points to the serious challenges which lie ahead for an African government in meeting or at least in managing African expectations of equality under majority rule. Other African countries have come to independence with prevalent inequality; but none, unless perhaps Algeria, has had racial inequality on the scale and to the degree that characterizes Rhodesia. One observer has spoken of a "crisis of expectations" which will demand substantial increases of social expenditure

on housing, schools, hospitals and so on. (x-Africa Confidential, November 19, 1976, p. 7). The highest expectations, at least in the short run, may be expected among urban Africans who have the highest aspirations anyway, who are most politicized, who are members of unions and other organizations which will represent their interests, and who are in a daily position to see inequalities in their baldest forms.