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9. ABSTRACT
This occasional paper gives an overview of Rhodesia as it prepares to change to majority rule, and it covers history, geography, ethnicity and sectionalism, the administration of Africans, and the administrative reservoir, it also covers the neighboring countries and foreign relations, industrial and consumer markets, transportation, politics, and the liberation struggle. From a political viewpoint, the major problems of Zimbabwean independence will be: how to prevent deferred civil war; how to prevent conflict by minimizing ethnic or sectional conflict over appointments to the central bureaucracy and the security forces; and how to eliminate this ethnic-organized envy by minimizing conflict over developmental decisions which will be seen as favoring one group or another: Problems also include: how to integrate the peoples of Zimbabwe; how to give control of the white directed government and economy to blacks; how to minimize the shortrun flight of whites; and, how to maintain existing levels of agricultural and industrial productivity in the face of instability.

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FINAL REPORT

RHODESIA

by

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1. The Bounty of the Land

Zimbabwe is blessed with a beneficial combination of soils and climate. Together with modern farming practices, this combination has made Zimbabwe an exporter of food staples, such as maize, and-- in good times--high earning cash crops such as tobacco and sugar. Under independent African rule Zimbabwe could continue to feed its own population and earn foreign exchange from export sales if today's sound farming practices are continued and the country's excellent infrastructure is maintained.

At present white-farmed land, comprising 50 percent of the aggregate land mass of the territory (and by far the most arable land) produces about 75% of the maize crop and 95% of the cash crops.

Nearly 90% of white-owned land in 1965 was concentrated in Mashonaland North and South, two of the seven Rhodesian provinces. Most of these provinces consist of highveld (a 4000 to 5000-foot high plateau) extending from Bulawayo 400 miles northeastwards to Salisbury and Marandellas. In precolonial times this was savanna grassland occasionally interrupted by rocky hills or kopjes. This is the region of the mineral-rich Great Dyke, an extrusion of ancient lava. It has a comfortable tropical climate without extremes and enjoys 24 to 32 inches of rainfall. Given reasonably abundant use of fertilizer, this amount of rainfall has permitted the cultivation of maize, tobacco, beans, and vegetables in what is otherwise a soil of only moderate fertility. Well-fed cattle also graze on unfertilized

sections of this region.

A more fertile area exists in the northeast, where the highlands rise to more than 8000 feet. Cooler and wetter (40-70 inches per year) than the highveld, this area is suited to specialized farming and the cultivation of hardwood timber. Most of the accessible areas of this region are in white hands.

The middleveld rises to about 3000 to 4000 feet above sea level. Most of it lies to the west of the highveld and is primarily in African hands. Its annual rainfall is about 16 to 24 inches, too little to sustain intensive cropping without irrigation and large increments of fertilizer.

The lowveld (less than 3000 feet above sea level) comprises land on the northern and southeastern peripheries of Zimbabwe. Here rainfall is less than 16 inches per annum, temperatures are torrid in summer, and there are extremely high rates of evaporation. About 20 percent of Zimbabwe is classified as lowveld. Most is nominally in African occupation. Only expensive irrigation (from the Sabi or Limpopo rivers) permits dependable farming; sugar and cotton have been grown commercially in this region on white-owned estates.

White farmers number only about 6000. In contrast, about 600,000 Africans grow maize and Turkish sun-dried tobacco, and graze undernourished cattle on the poorly watered, overworked Tribal Trust Lands. Only about ten percent of the production of these farmers is in the cash sector.

Nearly 9000 Africans have freehold farms in the African Purchase

areas. They produce about a third of all the crops--maize, millet, sorgum, peanuts, rice, and beans--grown for cash in the African sector. The practices of this sector can be adapted after independence to the presently white-held areas.

In 1969 less than 65 percent of all Africans lived in the African farming areas. Only 3 percent lived in the Purchase areas.

2. Ethnicity and Sectionalism

Traditional Zimbabwean ethnic cleavages have been exacerbated by colonial/settler rule and the fratricidal conflict of recent years. However, when a new black government is arrived at in Geneva or on the battlefield, these ethnic realities will hinder the easy articulation and implementation of a national policy of development.

For centuries before the mid-nineteenth century, Shona-speaking Africans of diverse clan backgrounds practiced settled agriculture and some minimal stock raising on the high and medium veld of Zimbabwe. As an offshoot of the Nguni Mfecane, Sindebele-speaking Africans invaded Zimbabwe from the south and, with their short stabbing spears, modern ideas of warfare, hierarchical forms of organization, and wealth of cattle, dominated the Shona. Today, however, the warrior Ndebele number only 16 percent of all Africans, and about half of the 16 percent are Sindebele-speakers of Shona extraction (like Joshua Nkomo and George Silundika). They live for the most part in the southwest, around their traditional capital of Bulawayo.

Of the 6 million Africans in today's Zimbabwe, 70 percent speak Cishona. The largest of the groups which comprise the Shona population

is the Karanga, about 40 percent of the total. The Karanga live in an 80-mile radius of Fort Victoria in the south. The Zezeru, of the central Mashonaland area (Salisbury and Sinoia) number 35 percent, the Manyika of the highlands in the east about 12 percent, the Ndau of the southeast about 6 percent, the KoreKore of the Zambezi River Valley about 3 percent, and the Kalanga near Gwelo about 2 percent.

In colonial times the Zezeru, Manyika, and the Ndau received more attention from missionaries and the settler government. They-- and especially the Zezeru--therefore were more closely associated with modern life. Many were educated and acculturated and today dominate the intellectual African elite. The Karanga, on the other hand, received proportionally less attention from settlers and fewer of the colonial benefits. Part of today's ethnic antagonism among Shona reflects this past leadership of Shona by Zezeru, Manyika, and Ndau. Karanga seek a status reversal beneficial more to themselves than to other Shona.

In precolonial times the Shona shared the same cultural and religious bonds but lacked strong political ties. The chiefdoms were locally based and held together by kinship rather than by notions of a centralizing hierarchy. The power of the chiefs was limited and dependent upon their popularity with their constituents. Today the chiefs are all government nominees--minor officials of the white administration of the tribal trust lands. Under each are six to twelve ward headmen and, within each ward, kraal headmen each in charge of several kraals numbering upwards to 200 people. This colonially-

ordained administrative apparatus (directed by white district commissioners or magistrates) will have little carryover into the independent period. Most officeholders are discredited by their association with the settler government, and the legitimate nature of African chieftaincy has long been eroded. Only a few chiefs resisted the settler government and either fled into exile or were deposed.

This conclusion is also valid for the Ndebele and the other indigenous peoples. Even the descendants of the Ndebele paramountcy--the lineal descendants of Mzilikazi and Lobengula--will have no separate authenticity in the independent era, especially in a government dominated by Shona.

Other linguistic groups are unimportant in the Zimbabwean equation. The Sena and the Chikunda fled from Mozambique during the Portuguese period and live in the northern portion of Zimbabwe. Along the Zambezi River are Tonga related to the acephalous Tonga of Zambia. The Venda, of the Transvaal, live in southern Matabeleland together with the Lemba, their clients. Along the Botswana border, again in southern Matabeleland, are Tswana-speaking peoples. In the southeast live Thonga and Hlengwe from southern Mozambique. In 1969, 337,000 Africans (7 percent) had been born outside Rhodesia, in Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. Most were farm laborers. In recent months the recruitment of Malawians for work on the isolated farms of the east and northeast has, for security reasons, intensified.

The white population of Rhodesia numbers about 250,000. In

recent years it has increased primarily because of the immigration of whites from Portuguese Angola and Mozambique. Between 1969 and 1972 there was a net immigration of 30,000 whites. In 1974-1975, 20,000 Portuguese arrived. And 30% of all whites arrived between 1966 and 1972, approximating nearly 50% since UDI. But in the first six months of 1976, there was a net outflow of 2280.

In 1969 about 70,000 whites held foreign passports. In the 1970s it was estimated that 20 percent of all white Rhodesians spoke Afrikaans. Possibly another 20 percent came originally from South Africa. Twenty-two percent had been born in Britain and 41 percent in Rhodesia.

In general, Rhodesia can claim only a minor proportion of adults who know no home other than Rhodesia. If 50 percent are post-UDI immigrants, another 25 to 30 percent are post-1950 immigrants. Only 6000 heads of household farm. Under conditions of turmoil, a white exodus could be sudden and widespread.

In 1969 Rhodesia had only 9000 Asians, 70 percent of whom were born in Rhodesia and 9 percent elsewhere in Africa. They still hold a monopoly of retail trade in the African townships. Of the 18,000 coloureds, 91% were born in Rhodesia. Some claim descent from the Pioneers of the 1890s; they are predominantly in manufacturing, trade, and service occupations.

Zimbabwe is less heavily urbanized than Zambia, only 17 percent of all Africans living (in segregated circumstances) in the eleven major cities and towns. The Shona are more heavily urbanized than others. About 19 percent of all Africans live in the white-dominated

rural areas, so a total of 40 percent of all Africans live (and have lived for a long time) in areas which until today have been designated "white."

If an independent Zimbabwe is dominated by Karanga-speaking Shona, there may be a shift in developmental emphasis from the north and southwest to the south, and, perhaps, a concentration on agricultural improvement in the middleveld, as well as with the substitution of Africans for whites on the large holdings of the highveld. The competition of the 1970s for ethnic preeminence is not apt to abate. Developmental priorities are likely to have a sectional bias and, in the short run, to tend to run counter to strict notions of efficient employment of investment capital and direction of developmental resources.

3. The Administration of Africans

The administration of Africans has concentrated more on the maintenance of law and order than upon development. It has devoted little attention to the training of African administrators, and has relied largely upon a class of untutored chiefs and white supervisors. Except for the continued control of the rural areas, the traditional and currently prevailing systems of administration for Africans should thus have a limited relevance in the post-independence period.

Early in this century a Native Affairs Department was established by the administering British South Africa Company. Powers belonging

to chiefs were transferred to Native Commissioners. They controlled the movement of Africans into and out of the reserves which had been created for Africans in 1898. In 1910 the Native Commissioners gained civil and criminal jural jurisdiction over Africans. The powers of chiefs were effectively reduced to the level of minor civil servants. In 1927 the African Affairs Act made tribes administrative units. The governor of the colony was given the power to appoint or remove chiefs, and to pay them salaries and allowances as determined by the government. At about this time, too, the Native Affairs Department was made responsible for technical services to Africans.

The separation of African and white spheres was made more complete in 1931, when the settler parliament passed a Land Apportionment Act. It prohibited Africans from purchasing land and ratified the existing division of land within the colony. Fifty percent was declared a white area, about 30 percent an African area (22 percent in the reserves and 8 percent in the newly created African Purchase areas), 18 percent became Crown land, and 1 percent forest. Africans were subsequently removed from white rural areas.

An amendment, in 1941, extended the Land Apportionment Act to the urban areas. Separate African townships were established under the aegis of the white municipalities. Special arrangements had to be made in the late 1950s for the first African barristers and physicians to rent offices on the fringes of the white municipalities.

On the eve of UDI, throughout the period of Rhodesian Front government, the system of Native Administration was modernized in

terms of nomenclature and atmosphere without, however, altering the basic system of African subservience. Native Commissioners became District Commissioners and the Department of Native Administration became the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Reserves were renamed the Tribal Trust Lands. The white government also tried to step back from its long direct rule so as to give more stature to chiefs. The new district commissioners were also charged with community development responsibilities. But they were instructed to work through and preside over local community development councils on which chiefs and elected Africans were expected to sit. (Many elections were, however, boycotted; the commissioners appointed Africans to fill the seats reserved for elected Africans.)

The district commissioners still run all of these councils. There are few responsible Africans involved, and African staff are involved at the lower levels of policy-making only.

Underneath the approximately 100 community development councils are about 265 community development boards, some of which may develop into fully-fledged councils.

In today's Rhodesia, chiefs occupy the lowest rungs on the white-arranged administrative ladder. Because the Rhodesian Front has wanted to counter the effective attraction of the African nationalists, chiefs can now, despite their lowly positions, again allocate land and hear civil and criminal cases. Ten chiefs also sit in the Rhodesian Senate or upper house (of 23 members) and eight in the lower.

More recently, in 1973, the Rhodesian government began to create

something akin to homelands (on the South African model). Whites planned to divide all of Rhodesia into three provinces, two of which would be black-controlled. Africans in towns would belong to either the Ndebele or the Shona province (with equal territory) and half of all land would go to the whites. Each province would be self-governing, with an overall, Federal government. Because of the weakening hand of white control, this plan has never been implemented.

In the African Purchase areas, elected farmers' committees and councils run their areas free from the interference of chiefs, but under the supervision of whites.

In the urban areas, there are elected township boards, but they are for the most part advisory. Only a few have been given responsibility for welfare and recreational services.

The way in which the Rhodesian government has administered Africans promises little continuity for the future or, at least, hardly more than the nominal use of the existing chiefly hierarchies for the dissemination of information and the control of rural Africans after independence. The government over the years has made chiefs irrelevant. Moreover, because of their collaboration with the government, chiefs as a class can expect little by way of support from a new black government.

4. The Administrative Reservoir

Although one has long had the impression that an independent Zimbabwe could begin governing with the assistance of large numbers of well-trained indigenous civil servants, the actual figures question that assumption. Zimbabweans may be well-trained, but their numbers (inside the country) may be proportionally greater in the upper echelons of the teaching rather than the civil service ranks.

In Rhodesia the central government is the largest single employer of whites. In 1972 there were 24,000 white and 24,000 black employees. (Together with their spouses, the white group constitutes about a third of the entire white electorate.) This figure excludes whites in the employ of municipalities, the army, and the police.

Of the 48,000 civil service positions, 35,000 are so-called untenured, or non-executive positions. The majority--23,000--were filled by Africans in 1972. Of the 13,000 tenured or executive positions, only 829 were held by Africans. And of the 829, only three were considered truly senior posts.

In respect of these proportions, the Rhodesian civil service is no more Africanized than it was in 1953, on the eve of the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In respect of the authority and autonomy given Africans in the civil service, the extent of Africanization may also have been reduced, especially in relation to the numbers of available trained Africans. Clearly, graduates of the multiracial University of Rhodesia have not been absorbed

into traditional positions in the civil service.

These figures for African bureaucratic employment do not include local governmental employment, the army, or the police. But none of the seven white municipalities (each governed by a mayor and a council elected by white property owners), the four town management boards, or the twenty-one white rural councils employ Africans in other than menial capacities. The exceptions are in Salisbury and Bulawayo where Africans are employed by the municipalities (which have jurisdiction over the adjacent African townships) as social workers and administrators for the townships.

The African military and police establishments number about 10,000. In 1973 there was one 1,000-man African battalion with white officers. Now there are two. Of the colony's 8000 police in 1974, 6,000 were Africans. Again all officers were white.

5. Zimbabwe and Her Neighbors

Given her landlocked position, Zimbabwe must obviously depend upon access to the sea through Botswana and South Africa (on which countries she now relies exclusively) and Mozambique (her traditional route of imports and exports). These practical ties will limit Zimbabwe's freedom of diplomatic and internal political maneuver and may make Zimbabwe more a hostage of her powerful neighbors than has been true hitherto. However, Zimbabwe will also be able to exert an influence on Zambia, the exports and imports of which formerly

flowed conveniently through Rhodesia.

From a political point of view, the ethnic affinities of Zimbabweans to peoples in neighboring territories are unimportant. In Namibia the Ovambo straddle the northern border; in Zimbabwe no significant group is bifurcated by colonial accident and irredentism or other adventurism will prove unimportant.

Of greater salience are the modern ties of industrial and consumer markets, hydroelectricity, and transportation. Together with Zambia the colony of Rhodesia has shared (if not equally) the flow of the Zambezi River, and therefore the hydroelectric power and tourist potential of the Kariba scheme. Ideally, with the independence of Zimbabwe, the Central African Power Corporation or a successor could operate in such a way as to reintegrate the power supply of the various Zambian and Zimbabwean schemes for the benefit of the mines, industries, and consumers of both. Reopening scheduled air traffic between Zambia and Zimbabwe, as well as making road transport easier, would also end Zambian and Zairese isolation from the south and contribute to commercial development in the northern as well as the southern portions of Central and Southern Africa. Most of all, Zambia (and to a lesser extent Zaire) requires access to Mozambiquan ports, especially for the export of copper. In the medium term this is no small matter for Zambia; the use by Zambia of the Zimbabwe railways will also be critical in terms of foreign exchange and other earnings for Zimbabwe. The opening of the Tazara Railway and the likely reopening of the Benguela Railway in no way supersede the importance

attached by Zambians to their traditionally least expensive export and import route via Beira or Port Elizabeth.

For Botswana, the continued control of Rhodesia Railways by Rhodesia or a Zimbabwean successor is helpful. The Rhodesian Railway administration not only provides Botswana's only major import and export route. It also subsidizes passenger traffic within Botswana by keeping fares at an artificially low level. Overall, it also maintains and runs what would, in purely Botswanan terms, be an operation of great cost for Botswana alone. Therefore, independence for Zimbabwe may well include a painful reassessment of railway arrangements between black governments with different national objectives.

Mozambique would welcome the resumption of Zimbabwean (and Zambian) railway, road, and air traffic to Beira, now vastly underused, and Maputo. For Mozambique the independence of Zimbabwe would permit the renewal of relations and thus the reopening of the border. Although it is likely that Mozambique will work with any black government, it may well exact more concessions of economic detriment to Zimbabwe from a moderate black government than from one with which the revolutionary government of Mozambique could feel secure.

Developments along this line could compel a moderate black government to rely more than presently contemplated upon ties to South Africa. Indeed, whatever black government comes to power in Zimbabwe may find it economically expedient to maintain existing close relationships with a South Africa which now supplies most of Rhodesia's military, industrial, and consumer imports. Certainly South Africa will try

to encourage any new government to take advantage of South Africa's industrial and infrastructural capacity; with continued weakness in the South African economy, there may even be economic advantages for Zimbabwe in continuing some of the current arrangements, especially if there is excess capacity available in the South African ports. Obviously, the extent to which Zimbabwe feels it can deal politically with South Africa will lessen its dependence upon Mozambique and Botswana, and--conceivably--contribute to the influence it can exert upon a South Africa which may hunger after good relations with a new black neighbor. Potential for political leverage exists on all sides, and is bound to have an impact upon purely economic considerations.

6. The Liberation Struggle

Whether by negotiation or by warfare, or by a combination of both, the long struggle for black control of Zimbabwe is coming to a conclusion. The outcome of the struggle will have a profound impact on the economic as well as the political development of Zimbabwe, and possibly of all of southern Africa. A negotiated settlement between white and black in Geneva leading to an interim government and black rule could well provide a stable atmosphere conducive to rapid modernization of the black half of the Rhodesian economy; or it could prove but a prelude to civil war and prolonged strife. The failure of negotiations in Geneva would presage escalated guerrilla incursions, urban attacks, chaos, white flight, and the eventual emergence of an

African government capable of providing stability to the Zimbabwe that remained.

Since the Geneva talks are still proceeding, it is prudent to assume that the five African groups and the Rhodesian whites--despite noises to the contrary--wish the talks to continue until some kind of plausible result ensues. Since the black groups are not united, except cosmetically through the Patriotic Front, it is still difficult to discern clear objectives. Nevertheless, there are two parallel battles in process simultaneously in Geneva. The Smith government wants a black government to emerge which will have a place, if not a dominant place, for right-wing whites. At present Smith might therefore be comfortable with a Muzorewa-led government. Conceivably, too, Smith is hoping to resurrect the notion that Joshua Nkomo and Bishop Abel Muzorewa can work together and thus make a more radical government dominated by Robert Mugabe and the guerrillas of the Zimbabwe Peoples Independent Army (ZIPA) unlikely.

At present, however, Nkomo is more concerned to ensure that Muzorewa's evident personal popularity in Central Mashonaland does not undercut his own electoral potential in the same region (without which his own organizational base in Matabeleland would prove insufficient). Nkomo's alliance with Mugabe is therefore based on the cynical assumption that only together can they eliminate electoral successes by Muzorewa. They both are willing to defer rivalry between themselves until such time as Muzorewa is outmaneuvered. All three parties assume (and rightly) that the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole commands

no large number of followers. They also seem to be assuming that the first political confrontation will be fought on the basis of national elections with objectively delimited constituencies and a campaign and balloting under international supervision.

All three of the major contenders thus deprecate the notion that there shall be a Mozambique-like revolutionary takeover by a high command acting on behalf of the masses. They also (despite Mugabe's political ties to the guerrillas) assume that the 5000 largely Karanga guerrillas based in Mozambique and loyal primarily to Josiah Tongogara and Simon Mutuuswa (Rex Nhongo), their Karangan military leaders, can effectively be prevented (by the good offices of Mozambique) from disrupting political settlements arrived at in Geneva which do not immediately lead to an assumption of power by guerrillas. Wittingly or not, they may therefore be setting the stage for deferred civil war unless a mechanism can be found to neutralize or disarm the guerrillas within Mozambique or within some kind of reconstructed Zimbabwean army.

The differences between the political leaders reflect considerations of power which, in turn, depend upon personal, historical, and ethnic cleavages. ZANU emerged out of a dissatisfaction with the ZAPU leadership of Nkomo and his closest lieutenants, nearly all of whom were Ndebele-speaking Kalanga from southwestern Rhodesia. Nkomo was accused of being too willing to compromise with whites, too easy for whites to seduce with promises of a luxurious life, and too non-ideological (in the sense that he had no interest in debates over

socialism, capitalism, and so on). In the 1960s, too, younger militants saw that he accepted advice and gave privileges only to his older associates, most of whom spoke Sindebele. Many of the better-trained younger men were from Shona-speaking sections of Rhodesia. For them his legitimacy had been dissipated by years of easy living, egregious negotiating errors, and a general flabby approach to what they considered the hard questions of nationalistic tactics. His failures in London in 1953 and again in 1961, and his flight to Tanzania in 1963, disappointed them. They wanted someone more ascetic and more willing to accept the argument that only violence could free Rhodesia from white rule. The fact that they could never easily explain away Nkomo's support from the masses failed to interrupt their reverie with a future that excluded Nkomo. Nor did the eventual success of ZANU (and not ZAPU) militants in northeastern Rhodesia from 1972 to 1975. On the contrary, those military successes (successes in the sense that Rhodesian whites became fearful and could no longer ignore black guerrillas) seemed to promise a victory which would specifically exclude Nkomo and others of the "old guard" who had been "too soft" and "too muddled" to follow FRELIMO's model of nationalist assault. After the coup in Portugal they could hope for more rapid progress.

To this long-standing ZAPU-ZANU cleavage has been added the rivalry of Mugabe and Muzorewa, who are ethnically from the same area, the latter, however, having a more moderate-seeming approach than the former. Then there is the rivalry between Mugabe and Sithole, based

as it is on enmities aroused during their long years together in prison. Younger ZANU adherents also feel that Sithole was ineffective as a leader. The new question is the extent to which Mugabe retains the loyalty of the Karanga guerrillas, who recently sent their own delegation to Geneva. Formerly Mugabe was thought to be their political leader. If he is not, then he has virtually no constituency at all in Rhodesia. Moreover, his lieutenants were mostly Karanga, as are the military men. If he has no support among the Karanga he, like Sithole, may now have too small a power base to play a role in the negotiations or in post-independence Zimbabwe. His place in the three-cornered race for control of the future of Zimbabwe will have been taken by ZIPA, which must vie with Nkomo's ZAPU and Musorewa's African National Council.

From a political point of view, the major problems of Zimbabwean independence will be:

- a. How to prevent deferred civil war through eliminating the threat of guerrilla intervention;
- b. How to prevent deferred civil war or other conflict by minimizing ethnic or sectional conflict over appointments to the central bureaucracy and the security forces;
- c. How to eliminate this ethnic-organized envy by minimizing conflict over developmental decisions which will be seen as favoring one or other group;
- d. Ultimately, how to integrate the peoples of Zimbabwe-- how to create a nation.

- e. How to transform a white-directed into a black-run government and economy.
- f. How to minimize shortrun white flight.
- g. How to maintain existing levels of agricultural and industrial productivity in the face of instability and possible white exodus.