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9. ABSTRACT
 This report catalogs the policy options available to the U.S. Congress toward southern Africa. The potential policies are grouped under five political choices: to support the evolution of South Africa through economic development; to disengage western nations in symbolic ways; to encourage parliamentary and nonviolent opposition to continued white rule; to persuade press or coerce the Vorster and Smith governments to accept substantive institutional change; and to encourage and assist black African opposition efforts. Forty to forty-five possibilities are covered in 25 essays. Each option is treated as a separate issue. The essays provide some initial factual data, explore the assumptions underlying each option, and suggest aspects that may need more detailed research. A sketch of the legislative history is added to some, and problems of committee jurisdiction and legislative strategy are touched on. A bibliography is appended. This is a preliminary survey of a rapidly changing situation. The length of an essay does not indicate the importance of the topic; it indicates the availability of materials.

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FINAL REPORT

ANTICIPATED U.S. LEGISLATIVE
REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE
U.S. RESPONSE TO A
ZIMBABWE TRANSITION SITUATION

by

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PREFACE

This report attempts to catalog every policy option available to the Congress of the United States toward southern Africa that has been raised in the recent past or could now be considered. Many options are included that are largely the prerogative of the Executive branch, but, as the House resolution on not recognizing the Transkei shows, the dividing line is quite indistinct. The potential policies are grouped under five overall political choices.

- A) Support the evolution of South Africa through economic development (Oppenheimer thesis)
- B) Disengage Western nations in predominantly symbolic ways
- C) Encourage and bolster parliamentary and nonviolent opposition to continued white rule
- D) Persuade/press/coerce the Vorster and Smith governments to accept substantive institutional change
- E) Encourage and assist black African opposition efforts.

Under these categories some 40-45 possibilities have been merged into 25 discrete essays.

Each option is treated as a separate issue. The basic goal is to lay out some initial factual data, begin exploration of the assumptions underlying such an option, and suggest aspects that may need more detailed research. Where apropos

a sketch of the legislative history is added and problems of committee jurisdiction and legislative strategy are touched on. A bit of relevant bibliography is appended. The principal goal of each essay was not to make a judgment of the option's merits but to answer the questions of what one needs to know and what analytical suppositions ought to be explored prior to making the particular policy choice. Such an exercise unavoidably enters multiple philosophical and ideological camps; the reader cannot expect to be uniformly comfortable as the topics bridge and indeed go beyond the normative values and linguistic boundaries of conventional politics.

This paper should be considered as a preliminary survey of a very rapidly changing situation. Indeed many options that seemed conceivable even a year ago now appear largely superceded by events. Correspondingly several possible courses of action have not yet seen wide recognition or acceptance on this side of the Atlantic. The size of treatment for some topics (option A, for example) represents not a measure of importance but of availability of materials to the writer. Imminent publication of certain congressional hearings will add more.

This author is left with a very sad conclusion about the potential of whatever policy emerges. Most past and present indications suggest that the intellectual frameworks and methodological approaches in vogue will lead to a tragedy not on the scale of but certainly of the type we met in

Vietnam. Until public policy begins to move beyond rhetoric and code words to understand historical processes at work, to balance the quest for data with an equal quest for meaning, and to go outside of our own culture and see how words, actions, symbols, and values have different meaning to other societies, the gap between our policy and our ideals will continue to impede human progress toward a just world order.

A brief bibliography of sources of use overall

- Mohamed El. Khawas and Francis Ornegay American-Southern African Relations - Bibliographic Essays (Westport: Greenwood, 1975).
- Barbara Rogers White Wealth and Black Power (Westport: Greenwood, 1976).
- Tony Lake, Tar Baby Option (New York: Columbia UP, 1976).
- SFRC, U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, hearings June-July 1975.
- HIRC, U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa, hearings 1971-1973, 3 volumes.
- .Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia (London: African Publications Trust, 1974-5), 5 volumes - cited separately within.
- George Shepherd, "New Directions for American Relations with Southern Africa," September 1976 (Graduate School of International Studies, Univ. of Denver)

* * * * *

acronyms frequently used

- | | |
|-------------|---|
| SA | - South Africa |
| MNC | - multinational corporation |
| SFRC | - Senate Foreign Relations Committee |
| HIRC | - House International Relations Committee |
| <u>C.R.</u> | - <u>Congressional Record</u> |
| <u>AID</u> | - <u>Agency for International Development</u> |
| <u>NYT</u> | - <u>New York Times</u> |
| <u>WP</u> | - <u>Washington Post</u> |

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A. Support the evolution of Southern Africa through economic development (Oppenheimer thesis)

- A1) a) Maintain strategic perspectives and intelligence links and open up appropos defense ties
- b) End arms embargo
- c) End disincentives to economic ties
- d) Recognize Transkei and other Bantustans
- e) Provide economic aid to Transkei and encourage investment
- f) Rejuvenate South Africa's international image via public education of relevant parallels in the history of modernization

These policy options are linked to a single essay largely because relatively little legislative action would be in order to implement the major elements of this world view. In many ways it is very close to what is now prevailing. The Transkei is the major exception; Congress is not about to provide aid to the Transkei. Indeed on September 2 the HIRC reported out H. RES. 1509 (and H. REPT. 94-1463) urging the President not to extend diplomatic or other recognition to the Transkei territory. The arms embargo and economic disincentives toward South Africa could be lifted by Executive Order; at least I see no specific part of the Foreign Military Sales legislation wherein SA is specifically excluded.

Focusing on South Africa for which the evolution through economic development is seriously argued and not on Namibia and Zimbabwe where historical events are overtaking such a thesis, one does not have to look far for an articulate defense of the position: John Chettle of the SA Foundation before the SFRC on 9/8/76. In summary his and comparable arguments run in this fashion.

South Africa admittedly has income disparities but they are not significantly different from those in the United States and Great Britain at comparable periods in their history. Change will occur but it is more important to maintain democratic institutions and practices so that the result is one of democracy. Race relations are evolving in SA in a fashion much like that of the US in the 50's and 60's. Most blacks support the present government and system as polls indicate; like the US there is no profound racial antagonism. Blacks in SA are better off economically than in the rest of Southern Africa as a million immigrant workers would testify. Foreign investment in SA would speed the economic development providing jobs and liberalizing economic influence. Expanded trade provides jobs for all societies. A militarily strong ever more democratic and prosperous NATO ally merits support against dictatorial, communist inspired or led aggressors. The US and the West needs this defense link and continued access to SA's key strategic materials. The US in addition needs the trade surplus SA provides for its balance of payments.

Beneath this position are certain basic capitalist assumptions about the nature of material and human progress, largely borrowed from Rostow's (1960) model. Joel Stern of Chase Manhattan Bank (before the SFRC, 9/9/76) laid them out as adequate natural resources, rewards to savers, a stable monetary system and

"The population subscribes to a work ethic based on "fair" compensation, where fair refers to rates of return, commensurate with risks perceived. That is factors of production are permitted to negotiate and fulfill on contracts in a stable political and social environment in which the key principle is individual freedom."

Stern finds such conditions largely true of recent SA history, save "certain interferences with competitive markets, including division of the population along historical and racial lines."

For this author, who wrote his doctoral dissertation on capitalist modernization in a colonial society, such assumptions and arguments suggest the need for considerate homework. A reasonable place to begin is with Barrington Moore; Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon, 1966) and two modest alternative hypotheses (1) The basic polarity is not freedom versus tyranny but instead freedom versus social responsibility (2) The core ethical teaching of human civilization suggests that the most just society

results when people seek a reasonable balance between freedom and social responsibility. John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard, 1975) lays out the fundamental philosophical issues at stake.

The gap between reasoned analysis and political reality is, in sum, insuperable. A minority of Congressmen led by Sen. Allen and Sen. Byrd will articulate the South African position every time southern African issues come up. Because of their stamina and legislative skill they have a political impact far beyond the votes they represent. In a dialogue with someone like Sen. Clark, it is a matter of two unrelated world models talking past each other with little real communication. The political and technical issues are reduced to simple mathematics - who has 51% on a given vote. In the present Congress, further movement toward this policy option is not a practical political possibility.

some initial bibliography

hearings before SFRC African Subcommittee, 9/8 and 9/9/76.
ed. R.R. James, The Policy Debate (London: Africa Publications Trust, 1975).

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SFRC, US Policy Toward Southern Africa, hearings 6-7/75.

Ian Mackler, Pattern for Profit in Southern Africa (New York: Atheneum, 1975).

Pierre Van den Berghe, South Africa: A Study in Conflict

(Berkeley: U Calif., 1967).

William Barclay et. al. eds. Racial Conflict, Discrimination

and Power (New York: AMS, 1976).

B) Disengage Western nations in predominately symbolic ways

B1) Encourage State Dept. articulation of specific overall objectives and concrete methods for achievement

Encourage Executive branch to coordinate all agencies to pursue a single policy

End Dept. of Agriculture activity to encourage trade

It has long been apparent to serious students of government that foreign policy has become the prerogative of many agencies which frequently work at cross purposes. Southern Africa has proved no exception. The traditional division has pitted elements of the State Department (led by the Bureau of African Affairs) against NASA, Commerce, Defense, Treasury and the National Security Council. The result, according to critics, has been an amorphous, status quo policy in practice that belies the public rhetoric against apartheid. The State Department's position is that "we neither encourage nor discourage private American investment." It does not carry out a full range of trade promotion activities, but does maintain an overall policy of communication without acceptance.

If a policy option is taken to go beyond the arms embargo, port denials, and Eximbank limits to further cuts of linkage, the topics that have been recently raised in hearings are of comparably less magnitude. Interested parties can get from the Dept. of Commerce various assessments of commercial programs and industrial outlooks. One could also get such material from the SA embassy. The February, 1976 American Commercial Newsletter for Southern Africa (published by whom? with a US bicentennial logo) shows 6 USG commercial offices with 16 personnel in SA. Its 24 pages give SA businessmen multiple entrées into the US business world and current activity.

The Dept. of Agriculture has extended about \$80 million in CCC credits to facilitate export credit sales to SA between 1966 and 1976. Virtually all of it was for rice. Total credits extended by the CCC program in its 20 year life (3/30/56 - 7/31/76) come to \$4.464 billion. Firms trading with Russia received \$400 million (for wheat 1972-74) and Poland, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia have also been assisted. USDA's cooperative promotional activities for SA during FY76 involved some 6 groups with a USCA outlay on only one of \$134,550.

Two approaches are made to this kind of activity. One is to say its insignificant, and termination would be at best petty harrassment. The other is to say that many small actions have a cumulative effect. Since we follow neither

policy coherently, it is not possible to collect data to make a judgment. Worse still it is analytically unsound to correlate the kinds of causes and effects being implied. It is relatively unclear that external events of most sorts (excluding the gold price movements → inflation → political unrest possibility) are actually major causative factors for any internal change. A considerably more rigorous analytic effort is called for; John Chettle's 9/8/76 testimony before SFRC raises a lot of points that deflate some current approaches.

It is worth noting that, if this policy option is pursued, it may be fairly easy to bring commercial attaches home, but legislating a policy for the CCC corporation is quite another matter. The Commodity Credit Corporation is legislatively unique. Its money does not come primarily through a normal authorization/appropriation process, but largely by a revolving fund earned by lending and repayments. Congress treats it annually in an Agricultural Appropriations Bill when it replenishes the Food for Peace element of CCC activities. On appropriation's bills, amendments affect only money in that bill; one could not end CCC credits to SA on such a bill. Only an overall revision of CCC authorization would be appropriate. That happened last year and will not happen again soon.

How many symbolic gestures equals success? remains unanswered. Given the nature of large institutions competing

for parts of a finite pie, this writer is not persuaded that a functional answer to that question could lead in practice to a coherent and coordinated policy in any case.

no specific published bibliography

B2) Lift the Byrd Amendment (and end imports of chrome and other strategic minerals from Rhodesia)

SEC 503 of PL 92-156 (approved 11/17/71) reads in part that "the President may not prohibit or regulate the importation into the United States of any material determined to be strategic and critical...." With this amendment, attached to the FY72 Military Procurement Authorization Bill, Sen. Byrd opened the way to the importation of chrome, ferrochrome, and nickel from Rhodesia and simultaneously cut a gaping hole, both symbolically and practically, in the international sanction effort against that country. Five years and many legislative battles later the Byrd amendment is still on the books. It is now considered the principal symbolic indication of US policy toward Africa both here and in Africa.

The legislative history is enormous and beyond simple summary. The easiest review is Tony Lake's Tar Baby Option (1976); that can be supplemented by short HIRC hearings The Rhodesian Sanctions Bill (2, 3 and 6/75) and the House floor debate of September 25, 1975 H.R., 9/25/75, H9104 - H9156) wherein by a 209-187 vote the House failed again to repeal the Byrd Amendment.

Reconsideration of the issue will not articulate the symbolic messages, for they are outside consensus discussion topics. It will instead involve analysis of the considerations raised by the SEC 503's supporters. Byrd argued that

chrome was critical to national security; DOD has testified since that one year's war needs are 2.3% of current inventory (which DOD seeks to reduce). Byrd argued that absence of Rhodesian imports left us dangerously dependant on Russian imports; government figures show high dependence on Russia since 1964 (before Rhodesian independence) and that the degree of dependence did not change appreciably; figures for 1972 and 1973 show less chromite imported from Turkey and SA, Russia supplying 59% and 53%, and Rhodesia 10% and 11%. Byrd also argued that sanctions from '68 to '71 had permitted Russia to raise the world chrome prices; in retrospect the price rises seem largely tied to world inflation, and many other factors cloud any discrete causal links. Byrd also argued that others were violating the sanctions (obviously so) and that this would put US steel at a competitive disadvantage; because of overall higher costs US industry has been losing ground for years - this particular element remains hard to measure or put in perspective. Byrd's other major argument was that American ferrochrome and steel worker jobs were imperiled by the sanction; the record shows that Rhodesian imports in 1972-73 caused the shut down of 2 US ferrochrome plants and the loss of 750 jobs. In the stainless steel industry chrome imports helped but so did other factors.

When the technical issues are cleared away the political choice is visible to the world: fulfilling an international

legal obligation OR avoiding the possibility of some (not easily calculable) pressure to raise prices in the stainless steel industry. As it sits now each side of the Congress is waiting for the other to move. An amendment could be attached to quite a number of legislative vehicles, though products of the foreign relations committees would survive for better. The pending Export Administration Act is one possibility. The array of forces has not shifted much in 5 years nor has the cast of characters. It appears that the Executive Branch would now support repeal in a far more active fashion than in times past.

It is this writer's conclusion, that if the repeal option were chosen, the political odds in the Congress are far better than generally conceived. Properly orchestrated an effort to repeal the Byrd amendment could succeed right now. General Congressional perceptions are less optimistic and the major hindrance to another effort.

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SFRC, hearings, 1971, 1973, 1975.

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the bibliographic essay by Nyang (p32-46) in El. Khawas and
Kornegay American-Southern African Relations (Westport:
Greenwood, 1975).

House Armed Services Comm., Hearings on H.R. 1287, (HASC 94-21), July 1975.

Harry Strack, "The Influence of Transnational Actors on the Enforcement of Sanctions Against Rhodesia", paper presented, ISA meeting, Toronto 2/25-9/76 (Dept. of Poli. Science, Villanova Univ.).

- B3) End intelligence links, tracking stations
End trade in light aircraft, helicopters, computers,
and any item with conceivable military use

Available discussion of these options falls entirely within conventional strategic thinking which for many reasons is dominated by DOD and comparable voices. The argument for the continuation of SA as an integral defense link is part of a strategic world view of immutable antagonistic polarities dovetailing neatly with bureaucratic imperatives. Those political forces, like Cong. Diggs, who have opposed that particular portion of the world order that embraces SA and have managed to curtail open arms trade and slow the transfer of some kinds of military technology, do not always seem to understand that in the American political system attack on one part of a holy grail translates into repudiation of the faith - which is a political impossibility. The Rhodesian chrome issue, decided on grounds of national security, should have been educative. If one accepts mainstream usages of "national security" and comparable language, the arguments to maintain bases and other ties are not new. They run like this. The Suez Canal is vulnerable and the route around the Cape must be secure. The Soviet Union has established bases in Somalia and Guinea and keeps a considerably larger naval force in the Indian Ocean than does the United States. A variety of further speculations follow as to SA's utility

in various hostile scenarios. They are discussed at length in the following bibliography. One must accept the assumption that a conventional war with Russia is still a conceivable possibility.

The basic problem with B3) as a policy option of disengagement is that it is politically unrealistic. It has proven nigh unto impossible (Vietnam excepted) to get US bases overseas closed and troops home. Witness political inability to squash the Diego Garcia base venture. The Pentagon has far more resources to pursue its position in the political arena than any other or opposing force. Even such a mild symbolic gesture as moving the NASA tracking station (one focus of Cong. Diggs 1971-3 effort) would mean a most improbable action by the two most conservative committees on the hill.

Ending trade in quasi military items would first require a number of arbitrary assertions. Of \$1.3 billion in 1975 exports to SA some \$125 million look to have possible applications at first glance. But a modern military force uses nearly all kinds of material items. The problems of terminating all trade are manifold (discussed under overall policy D).

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Major Wesley Groesbeck, "The Transkei - Key to US Naval Strategy in the Indian Ocean", Military Review, June 1976, p.18-24.

Patrick Wall, "The Vulnerability of the West in the Southern Hemisphere", Strategic Review, Winter 1976.

testimony of John Chettle before the SFRC, 9/8/76 NSM-39.

a classic statement, Comm. Beth Coy, "An Evaluation of US interests, objects, and course of action in the Indian Ocean in light of Soviet activity", Naval War College, 1970 and a critic, testimony of Ms. Jennifer Davis before SFRC published in US Policy Toward Southern Africa, P.371-384.

B4) End all aspects of nuclear trade and collaboration

South Africa (including Namibia) is the world's 4th ranking producer of uranium; from 1971 to 1974 it provided the US with about 15% of our imports of concentrates (Canada provided 83%). The price of uranium has risen from \$6 a pound in January, 1972 to about \$40 today; on August 30 the Washington Post reported that the Justice Department has documents purportedly showing an international price fixing conspiracy stretching back to 1972. Namibia's Rossing deposits are now about to enter the world market. The operation is multinational (Britain, France, Canada, Germany) with South Africa in control. Namibian uranium is critical to SA's future uranium industry both as a substantial portion of future production and for its technological and foreign policy implications.

South Africa's own atomic industry grew primarily through foreign assistance. In 1961 the US Atoms for Peace program permitted acquisition of a research reactor from Allis-Chalmers. International assistance (largely West German) has provided technological aid allowing the development of an enrichment process. Large scale production of enriched uranium (without adequate safeguards) is now feasible. Despite formal denials of such activity, SA has both the means and the motive to build a bomb and has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Faced with such a multi-dimensional series of problems, itself only one of many subsets in the world energy problem Congress has had no coherent response. Even if a few knew for sure what direction to lead, the divided legislative jurisdiction would almost certainly stall substantive change. If one makes the assumption that nuclear power is a sane and feasible avenue to pursue as an energy source, then a logical path of decision making would involve:

- 1) Assess the logic and feasibility of nuclear power for societies at different stages of modernization
- 2) Assess the uranium resources and their availability under potential scenarios of political change
- 3) Decide how to balance claims of Namibian people against MNC investors and how to implement balance amidst multi country interests
- 4) Penetrate S. African secrecy and determine degree of nuclear military activity and willingness to use such a weapon under what circumstances
- 5) Legislate end to all SA lending, investment, technology transfer, nuclear education, trade and press OECD countries to do likewise OR, conversely, drop the present half-hindrances and proceed as private investors and parastatals desire, OR....

What Congress has actually done is hold hearings (including the SFRC on May 25-27) on the international nuclear

trade and report out the last week of August the Export Reorganization Act of 1976 (S.1439 and S. REPT. 94-1193 from the SFRC, H.R. 15377 and H. REPT. 94-1469 from the HIRC). It is intended "to insure effective control by the US of nuclear exports" and is opposed by the Executive and ACDA. Also this summer individual Congressmen put pressure on Eximbank not to guarantee loans to General Electric for nuclear reactors. They were successful. But the sale of nuclear fuel for other than reactors is apparently not forbidden. A SA application is pending. Recent news reports on nuclear spread (NYT, 8/31/76 on Pakistan, South Korea, Argentina and WP, 8/30/76 on Taiwan) will probably assist congressional passage of the Export Reorganization Act despite opposition of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. South Africa does not now meet several provisions of the new bill and would presumably be barred from (all?) US nuclear exports.

I'm left with the feeling that this is one of those issues that demonstrates the historical obsolescence of the nation state. A policy choice to pursue this option must meet the arguments laid out by John Chettle of the SA Foundation before the SFRC on September 8 about the overall futility of leverage actions.

a more nuclear related bibliography

Barbara Rogers, "Namibia's Uranium - Implications for the South African Occupation Regime", (100 pages), June 1975, the UN Council for Namibia.

unprinted SFRC hearings, May 25-27, 1976.

Richard J. Barber, Assoc. "LDC Nuclear Power Prospects, 1975-1990: Commercial, Economic, and Security Implications' (ERDA - RPT #52), 1975a critically important work.

E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful (Harper & Row).

Barry Commoner, Poverty of Power (New York: Knopf, 1976).

Far Eastern Economic Review, 9/10/76, p.38-41.

Ronald Walters, "Apartheid and the Atom: The United States and South Africa's Military Potential", Africa Today, V23 #3, July-Sept. '76.

B5) Legislate clear policy to discourage new investment or trade expansion

Disallow tax credits to an MNC for taxes paid to a government (Namibia) determined by international courts to be illegal and clarify Treasury's authority to do so.

Current Executive branch policy toward Namibia officially discourages investment there. Eximbank guarantees are denied and USG protection not extended to any venture begun after 1966. It is hard to measure what effect verbal warnings and these other actions have had on Tsumeb and 15-20 other much smaller American operations. In Namibia some 88 foreign firms have contributed 53% of total known capital investment (a 1974 survey). Over 60% of this investment is in mining which is dominated by De Beers Consolidated and Tsumeb. US dollar investment (\$45 million in 1971, more since) is small by US standards, large in a Namibian context.

Official policy toward investment in SA is one of neutrality. Direct Eximbank loans are specifically prohibited. US investment and trade grow steadily. End '74 figures of the Department of Commerce showed \$1.457 billion in US investments in SA; that figure probably includes Namibia. Estimates of a current level are about \$1.7 billion. It is critical to note that such figures are generated from MNC's on highly questionable valuation criteria. They also hide the reality that about 80% of such a sum is the reinvestment

of local profit not capital flowing from the US. These issues must become central concerns if compensations to MNC's in SA ever comes up for consideration.

Against proven comparative profitability vis a vis other LDC investments, opponents of growing US investment have not fared well. On August 26, 1976 Attorney Goler Butcher, longtime aide to Cong. Diggs and probably the most articulate critic and student of these issues, laid out before a HIRC subcommittee hearing a fairly complete catalog of the policy proposals that have appeared in hearings (and occasionally as bills which went nowhere) over the last several years. In summary form they involve actions at the UN (rather beyond Congressional purview), jawboning MNC's by the Executive, and denial of tax credits for companies in Namibia paying taxes also to SA (a Mondale/Diggs proposal).

The symbolic effect of the last action or of further tax disincentives may be of some consequence. But the practical effect, given some realistic research, would be less. If it were politically feasible to put such amendments on a product of the Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, it is possible to make the authority and obligations of Treasury and the IRS legally clear. Investigation and subpoenas could uncover the amount of money Treasury thinks is under consideration. However, in the real world of international business activity most MNC's keep at least 5 sets of books showing different valuations on internal and

external exchanges. If Tsumeb were disallowed 4 million dollars of tax credit by IRS, a complex bookkeeping exercise would follow so that such a loss would a) be passed on to the consumer and b) be anticipated in future tax representations. Most African leaders know this, and thus the symbolic value of such Congressional initiatives is probably less than proponents might hope.

What all such proposals assume is that some quantity and quality of symbolic actions can and will have an effect on the evolution of societies in Southern Africa. Such an assumption is challenged by John Chettle of the South Africa Foundation before the SFRC on September 8. It is also challenged by the historical evidence of Rhodesian developments from 1966 to 1976. Considerable further analytic effort is called for before this policy option of symbolic action is pursued.

Comparable and more severe options for practical purposes are considered under overall policy D of this catalog.

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Roger Murray et al, The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia, (London: Africa Publications Trust, 1974).

US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Revised Data Series on U.S. Direct Investment Abroad 1966-1974, (late 1975).

B6) Bring pressure on Great Britain, West Germany, Japan, etc. to begin comparable symbolic breaks.

An initial scan of the literature did not turn up any recent interest by the legislative or executive branch to pursue a coordinated disengagement effort toward South Africa by symbolic means. Beyond the sanctions on direct trade, relatively little practical or symbolic pressure has been brought by Western nations against Rhodesia either. Exclusion from the Olympics has been one exception. Whether and how the Congress, undercut by its failure to lift the Byrd amendment, could persuade - through the Executive - foreign governments to force foreign multinationals to follow different policies is open to question. Practical problems are obvious.

Nevertheless most of the items under policy option B could be jointly undertaken by those countries which are major lenders, investors, and traders in the region. A summit conference of involved nations, led by 2 - 3 charismatic diplomats who know how and where to lead, would be an ideal starting point. The US could provide moral and political suasion mixed perhaps with more tangible incentives. Political will and historic vision have not been in evidence lately, however.

It is unlikely that Congress will embark seriously on this path, knowing that little more than a Congressional

Resolution with uncertain result will be the legislative fruit. But research on the region's interdependence with the rest of the world suggest that concrete policy options at a symbolic level are quite possible. The Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia, coordinated by the African Publications Trust in London, is one recent example. If the U.S., Britain, Germany, Belgium, Italy, etc. could settle on a clear and open policy of at least discouraging investment and trade expansion, other options would be opened. A united posture in IBRD and IMF dealings with Gabon for example could force that country to cease being such a willing waystation of Rhodesian trade.

The diplomatic institutions and options are there if political will is so inclined. It seems that Congress is likely to seek other avenues.

Initial Research beings with:

IMF, Direction of Trade Annual 10 (1970-74) and current monthly issues.

1974 and 1975 publications of the Africa Publications Trust and many items in the general bibliography. See also D4.

B7) Resurrect sugar quota system and or exclude South Africa imports by Executive ruling.

The 1975-76 world production of sugar was an estimated 81.3 million metric tons of which South Africa grew 1.8 million. In 1974 around 20 million tons entered international trade of which the United States imported about one fifth. Over the last several years South Africa has provided 60-75,000 tons of our total 3.5-4.5 million metric ton import. Within the South African export picture the US sugar market is about 5% of the total; SA is, by 1974 statistics, the 6th ranking world exporter. But at least 15 countries export more than 200,000 tons a year.

The US Sugar Act expired in 1974. It had served as a de facto international arrangement of quotas on US imports, legislated by the Congress and supported by foreign interests because US prices traditionally stayed above free market world prices. The termination of this Act and of the 1968 International Sugar Agreement (which controlled most of the rest of the world) did not appreciably affect trading patterns. Prevailing US policy is now first come first bought up to a 7,000,000 ton yearly limit which has never been approached.

The House Committee on Agriculture held hearings in July 1975 to review the world market situation. The South African Sugar Association testified. No legislation has come

forth and none appears likely. The predilection of the Executive is for free market activity to whatever extent is possible, and a return to any fixed quota system seems improbable. Since the 1974-5 price hike (and subsequent fall) world sugar prices have been relatively stable. There is little reason to believe that sanctions against SA by either committee on Agriculture is politically feasible.

The South African Sugar Association (SASA), conscious of this potential form of harassment, points to \$14½ million in investments since 1973 in a small growers Financial Aid Fund. Its purpose is to assist Indian and Black small cane growers to become financially independent and competitive additions to the growing export market. More than 400 loans have been made. The implication is that a sanction would hurt small farmers as well. Given the overall market size, it is difficult to see how a US sanction would have any significant affect on anyone.

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B8) Investigate and legislate ways in which world use of and gold could be diminished.

South Africa produces about 60% of the world's output in gold; in 1975 it was 22.60 million troy ounces of at total 38.71 million. SA has 800 of the 1350 million in known reserves. Over the last 5 years SA's output of gold has earned it \$1291 million (1971), \$1625 million, \$2477 million, \$3591 million, and \$3556 million last year - figures that supported 30-40% of its current account balance. Despite the abandonment of a fixed-note gold exchange standard in the international payment system in 1971, the price of gold climbed from \$41 an ounce to \$196 in late 1975. Since then it has plummeted; on 8/27 the NYT reported it at \$105.

SA's current economic woes predate this price fall. They began with failure, given a rising gold price, to appreciate the rand after 1971. This led to enormous foreign exchange reserves, an exploding money supply, and growing inflation from 1972-1975. The cost of imports doubled from 1973 to 1975 leaving a current account deficit in 1974 of \$1.2 billion, \$2.3 billion last year, and a projected \$1.6 billion this year.

The 1975-1976 fall in the price of gold represents only part of the current deficit. The fall itself seems to be largely a function of IMF sales and the actions of

government central banks to cover balance of payments deficits. SA has continued to produce and sell; a recent report indicates a \$600 million loan (against future gold production) from Iran is under negotiation (NYT 8/27) as part of a solution to SA's balance of payment problems. Meantime European bankers are upset at the US. One Swiss declared "the United States wants gold to disappear altogether as a reserve medium and is backing policies that will depress the price of gold." (NYT 827) Whether or not this is true, it is not publicly evident that Executive branch gold policy is aimed at SA. Given the major gold holdings of the central banks in most OECD nations, it seems unlikely that the price will be permitted to fall much farther, even if conscious forces are at work.

Given the present scenario, one markedly different than 5 years ago when the idea was first raised, it seems highly impractical for Congress to try to affect the price of gold to pressure SA - no matter what the wisdom of such a policy. Legislation would have to go through the Banking committees which do not appear politically so disposed. It would have to run counter to the spirit of the legislation Congress enacted (P.L 93-373, effective 12/31/74) to permit private ownership of gold.

On September 15 the IMF held a third auction, 780,000 ounces, and the price stayed above \$100. The sheer complexity of the world wide market, multiplicity of buyers and uses,

custom and tradition, and continued world wide inflation will work to raise the price. Even with enormous further research, this does not appear to be a practical policy option for the Congress.

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Joint Economic Committee, Gold and the Central Bank Swap Network, hearings Sept. '72.

NYT, August 5, 1976 on current conditions in SA gold mines.

- B9) Terminate all cultural and sports exchanges
Discourage tourism
Enact Policy that CAB and US airline routes to the
the region.

Symbolic issues have a way of growing to proportions that seem important because there are no conscious criteria for measurement. Forces opposed to apartheid have sought to harass by isolation the current governments in South Africa and Rhodesia. The topics above are typical of the non-economic initiatives discussed. The most notable successes have been in the area of sport where, ironically, much integration has taken place (cause and effect it is argued). South African was excluded from the Olympics in 1975; a pre-Olympic rugby match between SA and New Zealand caused a major walkout at the 1976 Olympics. Rhodesian tennis players got into the US and into a tournament recently only by dint of SA passports. Despite these episodes much US-SA sport contact goes on.

At a purely practical level one must measure carefully the limitation of a one nation boycott. How are the costs and benefits assessed if less or no US tourists, athletes or musical groups go to SA? Who measures the cross cultural processes and for whom is there an accounting? How do you think about such questions; I suspect neither side has a really persuasive answer. An additional practical matter

is that the St. Department would appear to need additional legal authority to add Rhodesia and SA to the category now shared by Vietnam and Cuba; Sen. Eastland would bottle such legislation up in the Senate Judiciary Committee.

At a more hardheaded analytic level it is difficult to see what the forms of antagonism intended will actually accomplish. People who want to go will find other airlines and meet no problems at the border; entering Rhodesia now you do not need a visa nor does your passport need to be stamped. Unless investment and trade are simultaneously curtailed, the amount of tourism may not dip appreciably in any case.

One suspects that all participants and neighboring on-lookers have long since seen through the kinds of symbolic contests these policy options represent. Some would argue, indeed, that to pursue them is simply a dilatory subterfuge to avoid demonstrating that the overall policy is a charade without substance. Given the economic success of Rhodesia in a state of semi-isolation (and comparable historic cases like Vietnam from 1941 to 1945 and, to a lesser extent Latin America during the Depression), there is much tangible evidence to ponder and refute, if isolation in and of itself is to be chosen as a defensible policy against SA.

Symbolic acts have a finite life span and do not feed the appetite in any substantive way.

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saw nothing specifically appropcs of any length

B10) End Rhodesian Information Office activity

Curtail/end all or some types of foreign lobbying

In May 1973 the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa held hearings on the activities of the Rhodesian Information Office (RIO) in Washington. Cong. Diggs was exploring potential violations of US law and UN sanctions resolutions by inter alia: RIO's promotion of trade by supporting the passage of the Byrd Amendment and by publishing material on Rhodesian exports; RIO's de facto diplomatic and consular activities; and the debatable visa state of RIO's employees. Tony Lake in The Tar Baby Option (1976) reviews the evidence gathered and the questions of fact and interpretation, concluding that, were the Executive Branch motivated, a case could be made on either issue and on a third - the activities of US firms supplying RIO needs.

Leaving aside related questions of US MNC activity which may also be said to facilitate trade (like TWA), one can conclude by the record since 1973, that little tangible has changed in RIO's activities. The visa status of one of its officials, long an issue for certain Congressmen, remains in a legal limbo where it can stay in perpetuity. RIO, in the person of Ken Towsey, remains active in the congressional arena. On May 19 Towsey sent a long letter to a number of Senators (placed in the Congressional

Record on June 11, PS9056-7 by Sen. Allen) arguing Rhodesia's case for an outcome other than "political, economic, and cultural suicide." It is an able brief.

RIO's activities raise a complex series of issues which merit considerable analytic thought before a policy choice is made on this option. Termination of RIO involves constitutional amendments concerning freedom of speech. Does its provision of information outweigh its possible misinformation? I would suspect that any researcher working on the current problem would think so. Is it wiser that RIO and all other groups who want to act in the public arena, do so in plain view rather than be forced into clandestine activities. One could well argue that the interested witnesses would benefit more. Finally thought should go to the practical difficulties and potential practical results. Members of Congress who so desire would still get information and arguments. An overall framework and criteria to measure degrees of effectiveness seem to be in order before one begins this genre of policy option.

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B11) Compensatory economic aid to Zambia

In the late spring of 1976 AID brought to Congress an FY77 Security Supporting Assistance request of \$30 million for Zambia "to help that country maintain its political and economic stability and achieve its development potential." Excluding Eximbank loans, total prior US aid programs to Zambia from FY62 to FY76 total less than \$7 million. AID's FY77 request required an explanation of how and why the present form of stability is in the interest of the majority of Zambians and can or should be sustained by external aid. That in turn requires considerable research into the historical development and current nature of the economy, in part to determine how much Zambia's current crises relates to closing the Rhodesian Border, to the price of copper, and to long term processes at work.

Zambia's economy is profoundly asymmetrical, the result of long term external orientation and control. Some 90% of total export earnings and 50% of the government's total revenue depend on the export of copper. About 65% of the people live in the countryside, but agriculture accounts for less than 8% of the GNP.

"Rural real incomes are perhaps one-quarter of the urban level and rural social amenities are markedly poorer than in the cities..... at present there is no coherent strategy for rectifying this situation. In particular the gap between rural and urban incomes has widened rather than narrowed, and in spite of some increases in production, the goal of self sufficiency in foods and agricultural raw materials is further away than a decade ago."
(1975, international observer)

The same source was also pessimistic about future growth of the mineral sector and the results of rural-urban migration.

AID's request for Zambia entered the normal congressional process for foreign aid too late to be included in the House committee bill. On June 2 the requested \$30 million for Zambia was added on the House floor by an amendment of Cong. Rangel. Discussion was minimal. The SFRC bill included \$30 million for Zambia with no comment. On the floor Sen. Allen succeeded in reducing it to \$25 million and barring military use thereof; his argument was that the US should not allocate money for "the aid of guerrilla and subversive activities armed against Rhodesia." No specific discussion of Zambia occurred. Conferees split the difference and the FY77 authorization level for Zambia is \$27,500,000.

With no explanation the House Appropriations Comm. deleted the Zambia funds. That action was sustained on the House floor and again by the Senate Appropriations Comm. Sen. Inouye's report (S.REPT 94-1009, p.70-71) recognized Zambia's objective need. It suggested that the situation called for a multilateral consortium as no one country could meet the several hundred million dollar overall Zambian deficit. But, with a curious nonsequitur, it appropriated no funding. When the bill reached the floor, however, Sen. Inouye added \$20 million for Zambia; House-Senate conferees will now decide. In addition, wording

of the prevailing legislation does NOT prevent the Executive from using for Zambia some of the \$90.5 million (currently) being appropriated under Security Supporting Assistance not specifically tied to any country at all. Judging by the W.Post article on August 25, the diplomatic community does not understand that such a choice will ultimately be up to the Executive.

Zambia's problems are representative of the complexities of the development process that education, values, institutions, and processes in Washington are only beginning to contemplate. The draft SFRC report on Southern Africa of late August advances significantly the understanding of the legislative branch; but the concluding caveat, "of basic structural and managerial problems are recognized and treated seriously", underlines the futility of present models and activities, a futility borne out by the kind of international data cited before. Congress would need to apply much more human resources, time, and energy and even then there is little reason for optimism. A starting point, however, would be the reevaluation of words like "stability" and "security," and a basic reexamination of the concept of "security supporting assistance". Are Israel and Zambia really comparable in any analytical sense?

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B12) COMPENSATORY ECONOMIC AID TO MOZAMBIQUE

The People's Republic of Mozambique came into existence on June 25, 1975 with an economy and government unprepared to meet the basic needs of its citizens. Most of the 9 - 10,000,000 people belong to 10 different Bantu groups and practice "subsistence" agriculture; an indication of the level of subsistence has been the steady and continuing flow of labor south to work in South African mines, a process that was adding c\$40 Million a year to the Portuguese treasury in the early '70's. The other part of the dual colonial economy was the modern, predominantly white and urban sector. Human services, physical infrastructure, the structure of trade, and financial investment were concentrated to benefit the c200,000 whites.

Independence and the promise of a more egalitarian society led to a mass exodus of whites. There are now less than 30,000 and the machinery of government and commerce has suffered. Pres. Machel closed Mozambique's border to Rhodesian goods in March, 1976; in April the UNDP estimated the lost income for Mozambique to be \$139-165 million the first year, and in August an SFRC report arrived at a figure of \$108-134 million. This revenue loss, combined with a 1976 trade deficit of c\$275 million and severe production drops across the commercial sector, compounded the failures of new leadership and shortage of trained manpower.

President Machel has pursued relatively pragmatic socialist policies and the international community - both east and west - has responded to appeals for assistance. In a speech at Lusaka on April 27, 1976 (NYT, April 28), Secretary Kissinger proposed that the United States would - "in accordance with the recent UN Security Council resolution" - help to meet the "great additional hardship" brought by imposing the sanctions against Rhodesia."

In mid May the House International Relations Committee version of the FY76 and FY77 Security Assistance authorization bill (H.R. 13680, H.REPT. 94-1144) was reported out. It contained no specific authorization. During House floor debate on June 2 Cong. Rangel added by amendment \$85,000,000 (30 Zaire, 30 Zambia, 25 other) for the region, but Cong. Crane's amendment excluded Mozambique as a recipient. The Senate committee version soon after (S.3439, S REPT. 94-876) provided the same \$85,000,000 to meet the pledges made by Kissinger at Lusaka (SEC 532(b), p.81) and specifically excluded use for military or paramilitary activities by a recipient government. The \$25 million "other" category was debated on the Senate floor on June 11, 1976 (C.R., S9020 and S9052 - S9059). There it was attacked by Sen. Allen as supporting countries that are "carrying on guerrilla activities against the government of Rhodesia." Sen. Allen prevailed on a voice vote and the \$25,000,000 was dropped. However, when the House-Senate conferees met,

the House position prevailed. \$20,000,000 (denoted as "other" on p.57 of the conference report) was reinserted and ultimately prevailed as THE FY77 authorization level, despite further attacks by Sen. Allen (C.R., 6/25, S10623-29).

In June the House Appropriations committee marked up Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 1977 (H.R. 14260, H REPT 94-1228) with nothing for Zaire, Zambia or the region. On the floor Cong. Crane made the tenor of conservative opposition to Mozambique very clear

...we find ourselves in the bizarre and embarrassing situation of providing taxpayer assistance to a Soviet-backed dictatorship in Mozambique to offset lost revenues so that they can wage a so-called liberation war, using armed guerrillas, against the friendly country of Rhodesia (C.R., 6/25/76, p H6719)

Cong. Crane again prevailed on a voice vote in specifically preventing any money in the bill from going to Mozambique. The Senate Appropriations Comm. (in S. REPT. 94-1009) ruled out the package \$85 million for southern Africa (p.70-71 of its June 29 report) for multiple reasons but did not mention Mozambique. The bill came to the floor on June 30 where it was stalled by San. Allen. Debate continued on September 9. Sen. Inouye reversed his position and added an amendment providing \$20 million for Zaire, \$20 million for Zambia, \$10 million for Botswana, and \$4 million for regional activities - none of it for Mozambique. Sen. Allen had worn

out the Senate's patience and prevailed. No FY77 funds will go to Mozambique, but the Executive can probably reprogram prior year monies.

The debate this summer seems to have progressed with no reference to prior legislative action. However, in SEC50 of the F.A.A. of 1974, Congress urged AID to: "Be ready to cooperate with the future governments (of Portugal's former African territories) in providing the kind of assistance that will make their independence viable." Under SEC 496 \$10 million was so appropriated. In the fall of 1975 AID gave \$850,000 to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees for refugee relief and resettlement in Mozambique. During the period 7/76 - 9/76 AID had budgeted \$1.5 million in loan funds to Mozambique for agriculture sector support. Some \$2 million is requested for FY77, legislation not yet acted upon by Congress. The PL480 program and AAI's training program for Portuguese speaking Africans are other avenues open to Mozambique.

Before the Congress moves beyond primarily symbolic funding, it would seem wise to do substantive research on at least the following issues:

- 1) Has independence brought a new set of bureaucratic and commercial parasites or is the dual economy and polity being tangibly resolved?
- 2) Are trade and financial flow patterns perpetuating dependence or moving toward self-directed growth?

- 3) Are rural and urban needs being equitably balanced in demonstrable ways?
- 4) Are modern sector salaries above the productive possibilities of the society (leading to unpayable import bills, foreign debt, etc.)?

By the end of 1976 or early 1977 enough data should be available to make informed assessments which will suggest whether and how a bilateral program might be in order.

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B13) Conduct further hearings and dramatizations/Improve legislative process to heighten effectiveness

Political change through shock and scandal or through long term education are very basic weapons for the legislative branch. Thus investigative congressional hearings, like the series held by Cong. Diggs from 1971-1973 and the ongoing series of Sen. Clark, can accomplish as much or more than the passage of legislation. The initial successes registered have been to get much important material into the public domain and raise the consciousness of the legislative branch vis-a-vis southern Africa. At the same these sets of hearings have raised a congerie of institutional blockages that appear generic to the Congress as it now operates. A major Senate reform effort will issue its first report in mid-September, and changes are expected to be voted on in January.

Among these institutional blockages are many that bear on ability to affect South Africa. Inter Alia:

1) Given multiple committees and activities, the Senator or House member cannot allocate the time (even if willing) to do the homework necessary for issues beyond a certain level of complexity. Witnesses are invariably specialists and it is an uneven dialogue. Can complex problems be solved?

2) Antagonistic witnesses are never permitted to debate each other...a process which could occasionally be very educational.

3) Committee staff are rarely permitted the time or given encouragement to do the level of research called for. Assignments are often in practice partisan making the already tenuous balance between the professional/scholarly and the political even more difficult to maintain. No employer likes to hear bad news, and few are open to contemplation of a very wide range of alternatives.

4) Like our other institutions, Congress hires people largely by their value systems in order to insure that the range of choices presented stays within prevailing consensus. People must protect their political positions and records (and jobs). Unfortunately problem solving requires the maximum possible diversity of frameworks and ideas. Of course, solving a problem could put an institution out of work, and the prime imperative of every institution is to endure...a good reason why problems like S. Africa go on and on.

5) Few people hire people more or differently educated than they are. Most Congressmen and most staff have traditional legal or social science educations. Overall grasp of history as discernible processes at work and of the multi-discipline and comparative methodology of area studies (both largely products of the 1960's) are very little present.

Many of the options under policy D and policy E of this paper thus remain beyond the bounds of conventional discussion.

6) The limits of Congressional subpoena power have not yet been established due largely to absence of political will. Several contests are pending. The United Church of Christ publication, The Oil Conspiracy (June, 1976) presents data sufficient for a clear legal contest if, for example, the SFRC chose to pursue internal Mobil Oil documentation vigorously.

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the forthcoming Senate reform report.

- C) Encourage and bolster parliamentary and nonviolent opposition to continued white rule

- C1) Offer financial guarantees against expropriation (which implies a mutually acceptable definition of "fair and just" compensation - one that is culturally and historically neutral)

Secretary Kissinger has proposed an American-British plan to provide up to \$1.5 - 2 billion in financial guarantees to Rhodesian's as an incentive to negotiate. WP described it (9/3) as a "safety net" and inducement for the white minority to surrender power to the black majority. No practical details have been released. Little comment has yet come from the US press or the Congress. But a series of sceptical comments have come from abroad. Ian Smith is said to be suspicious. One foreign analyst noted the basic uncertainty: "It could pull the whites out from under Smith or it could encourage them to stay on and fight even harder." (WP9/13). Zimbabwe spokesmen have been acerbic. Such an offer represents intolerable "guarantees of privilege", predicated on the racist notion that whites and blacks cannot live together. But their basic point is that since no one is talking about compensating blacks for decades of white exploitation, it is an inappropriate gesture.

Before this policy option moves tangibly into the legislative arena, at least two kinds of practical issues are in order: what exactly is to be compensated and how and by whom is it to be valued. Both are profoundly complex and go to the heart of unspoken ideological conflicts.

The most concrete property in an LDC is land. By a 1969 survey of Rhodesia Africans held 43.6 million acres and Europeans 38.7 million with another 14.2 million unassigned. A 1962 survey found 6,300+ European farms using about 3% of all European land for crops; at least half and perhaps much more was used not at all. Those farm families actually working the land (not the absentee landlords) can present a claim of one sort if expropriated. But an urban dweller who arrived after WWII and has a job and a house only because he is white presents a rather different claim. A NYT times piece (3/17/76) said it well: "For \$6,000 a year you can have five servants, a swimming pool and the lot"; some 278,000 whites live at levels from US middle class suburbia on up. Much thought must go into creating some defensible criteria and a typology of categories.

The notion of "fair and just" compensation is an American accretion to that fundamentally Western corpus termed international law. There is a Foreign Claims Settlement Commission in this country. For its handling of the Cuban claims Congress mandated consideration of four bases of valuation:" (1) fair market value (2) book value,

(3) going concern value, and (4) cost of replacement." Analytic neutrality would suggest that other possibilities exist. In the settlement with Alcan aluminum the Guyana government used depreciated book value which is historical investment less amounts written off against tax depreciation. Another option is the simple sale of the material assets; without government permission of use, land and mineral resources are of minimal value. The perceptions of MNC's in sum, conflict with the logic of sovereign right to nationalize.

"To put it another way, a forced sale value is no more unfair to the company than the capitalized market value is unfair to the government. Both methods attach to either one of the parties: the one the sovereignty of the nation; the other, the sanctity of private property. If we speak of the standard of compensation for Third World Governments, then, we speak of the forced sale value; anything more amounts to a concession involving the relaxation of the sovereignty principle." (Girvan, 197)

The recent example of Peru surrendering principle and paying MNC compensation in order to secure loans from a consortium of New York bankers is a good example of the gap between theory and the practical politics of comparative economic power.

South Africa apparently requires MNC's who want to repatriate profits to first invest in SA national bonds for 5 years. A new Namibian or Zimbabwe government might contemplate that precedent both for MNC's and for departing citizens.

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C2) Internal change through education processes

- a) Allocate money to publicize positively liberalization steps
- b) Provide scholarships for black southern Africans to study in the US
- c) Assist Amnesty International and internal SA groups in publicization of political repression and economic disparities

Multiple facilities exist or could be created to encourage overall international education toward a world of knowledgeable and active citizens. Governments and other large interest groups don't want such citizens so comparatively little of such work goes on. South Africa (events in Namibia and Zimbabwe have rendered this approach inappropos) does interact with the US through at least one federally funded program - the Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange. Recent allocations are below.

	FY75 ACTUAL	FY76 ESTIMATED	FY77 PROPOSED
SOUTH AFRICA	\$396,000	313,000	308,000
NAMIBIA	19,000	40,000	41,000
S. RHODESIA	121,000	105,000	171,000

Further search will turn up others and as well as number of private or foreign origin like the South Africa Foundation, operating in several political directions.

For a "liberalizing" effort to work at any appreciable pace, it must be larger, with more dimensions and overall coherence. This raises a political question/assumption which plagues much discussion of international matters: the issue of interference in the internal affairs of another society. The issue is now raised selectively all across the political spectrum to support just the argument at hand. In 3½ years I have not seen any effort to go below the surface of the concept or treat it with any measure of analytic rigor. Logic suggests that any two bodies on the planet interact to some extent, no matter how remote or complex; consider the aerosol cans, under discussion for possible damage to the ozone layer which could raise the possibility of skin cancer. The worry should be instead whether UV rays will change an element of the biosphere like algae in the sea that would leave the planet lifeless. In other words, an overall systems analysis of idea-spread must be done with justifiable criteria underlying the patterns evolved.

Once that it is done institutions can be harnessed rationally: US multinational corporations are one possibility. On August 1 Vernon Jordan at the annual National Urban League Conference made a series of recommen-

dations for MNC's to engage in political action/education: declare a moratorium on new investment until apartheid policies change, refuse to invest in "homelands", publicly oppose apartheid and its laws, demand and institutionalize equal pay, health, education and housing rights. (NYT 8/2). Major corporations investing in SA have board members in the Urban League.

That represents a conventional, semi-acceptable path. There are also satellites and equivalents of Radio Free Europe. White dissidents, all but decimated by a series of arrests, detention, and trials, need support, covert and overt. The currently surviving group is Okhela; its reaching out to the United Church of Christ which published "The Oil Conspiracy," creates one model. Overt world education could be escalated the same way it was done for Vietnam; but national governments and media could give research groups and their products more support and attention. The momentum of black riots will probably affect the pace of change more, but education is necessary in any case. Citizens will be needed after change as well as during.

Congress could assist in providing publicity and resources. One possibility is the rejuvenation of foreign area studies in this country. Federal funding in the '60's permitted the beginning of African studies in the US. But only a beginning; NDFL title VI money dried up in the Nixon-Ford years. Some major centers are left but the

broad expansion and the real specialization have been stunted. The US had no professional Asian specialist of Vietnam in the early '60's; the results have been painful. All universities and most secondary schools need nonwestern area studies if we are to have functional citizens in the last ¼ of this century.

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- D) Persuade/press/coerce the Vorster and Smith governments to accept substantive institutional change

- D1) Legislate basic standards of MNC behaviour to be met in South African operations; penalty for failure loss of USG contracts and of import-export licenses

This policy option emerged as one of the core proposals from Cong. Diggs 1971-3 hearings. It seems to have been partially a commentary of the lack of response by 250 American firms to his questionnaire of summer 1971, partially a vehicle to focus more public scrutiny on business, and partially as a means of compulsion. The operative sentence from the legislative proposal read as follows:

"no U.S. person (a) having a major investment in an enterprise in the Republic of South Africa or (b) affiliated with an entity doing business in South Africa, shall be eligible to enter into any contract with any agency of the United States Government unless such United States person is doing business in South Africa in accordance with fair employment practices and is listed on the roster to be established under this joint resolution."

Administration would be by the USG office handling non-discrimination by government contractors. That Administrator, aided by a broadly representative advisory board selected by the President would review companies and find them eligible or ineligible. Appeal and national security waiver provisions were included.

Cong. Diggs introduced this option as a piece of legislation a number of times in 1972 and 1973 (and perhaps thereafter). One of the last versions, H.J. Res. 522 (4/19/73) with multiple co-sponsors is reprinted (p.538-47) in US Business Involvement in Southern Africa, V3. This and comparable measures were referred to the House Judiciary Committee. A subcommittee chaired by Cong. Don Edwards held some hearings in 1974 which I was told centered on this issue. The hearings were never published, and the matter died legislatively; House Judiciary had another task that summer.

The State Department responded to the growing public interest generated by Cong. Diggs efforts with a publication in February 1973 called Employment Practices of US Firms in South Africa. It selected January, 1971 as a starting point when US businesses began to recognize the issues and take some steps. Written from an upbeat perspective, it chronicled the steps from 1971 to 1973 as progress. The US Labor Movement has also been interested in this issue, partly because non-competitive labor overseas means the export of US jobs. Its choice has been to use the courts and, as a point of contention, section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 regulating the importation of goods produced by convict or forced labor. Presumably the definition of "forced" could be broadened to include migrant labor compelled by sheer deprivation of viable alternatives by deliberately designed

laws. Research is in order to see where such a legal effort now sits and how and whether Congress can assist by legislating a broader definition of "forced."

Underneath this policy option are some assumptions about social and economic processes and the words we use to describe them that bear serious thought. Fair means fair to whom? in what framework? Such dialogues are prone to quickly shift from an equity model to an interest model. Fair then becomes a balance of two competing interests - African worker and US corporation in this instance. Are they equivalent interests? Is the decision to be made entirely within the cosmos created by their interaction or within the framework of society's interest as a whole? Does one accept the prevailing average standard as fair or adopt some arbitrary ideal. And, ultimately, what one is asking is this: (1) does the market solution produce an equitable solution, under SA standards or any other? (2) is reality the perceived or the abstract and ideal (3) how far can or should society permit the disparity between the two to become and (4) what is the practical or operational response?

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D2) Legislate termination or change in MFN status for
South Africa and Namibia

Force termination of most or all US trade in a finite
period unless substantive structural change occurs
in South Africa.

Arms sanctions against South Africa were imposed by
the United States some time ago. Their effect was modest
because other Western nations have not cooperated and
because paramilitary material remains ill-defined and flows
freely. Some assistance in building a nuclear capacity for
SA continues, some has been stifled. Most Eximbank services,
but not all, have been curtailed. But, despite the very
tangible historic example and legal precedents set by the
Rhodesian sanction effort, overall sanctions against South
Africa has not emerged into the realm of reasonable political
discussion and action.

The Rhodesian precedent is instructive. Its legal
implementation - UN Security Council Resolutions and Execu-
tive Orders could be repeated. The effects both pro and con
might be comparable. Rhodesia survived for a decade because
companies and governments (notably South Africa) broke the
sanctions. Partial isolation strengthened the economy in
some ways. But from a larger historical perspective,
Rhodesia grew ever more vulnerable to its internal conflicts
which, as are now visible, are unfolding and will force the

basic structural transformations that the vast majority perceive as just. Comparable isolation for SA would not immediately topple the white rule but it would accelerate the processes (now visible in Soweto, etc.) toward completion one to five years hence rather than five to ten.

Working with that set of assumptions Congress could pressure for the UN sanction route and or combine it with attacks based on adjustments of the prevailing germane laws:

"The authority under which the executive controls US business in southern Africa stems from the UN Participation Act, as implemented by Executive Order Nos. 11322 and 11419 regarding Rhodesian sanctions; the Export Administration Act of 1969; the Trading with the Enemy Act and Executive Order No. 11387 establishing foreign direct investment controls; section 414 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended; and section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 regulating the importation of goods produced by convict or forced labor." (U.S. Business Involvement in South Africa, V3, p.38.)

If a significant international consensus develops, even modification of GATT might be possible. Congress would find the legislation above, however, far easier to amend.

Beyond choice of vehicle are the practical problems of entering the world wide contest of MNC's versus multiple non government organizations for control of national governments on this issue. The experience of Mobil Oil versus United Church of Christ is illustrative. In June the latter published "The Oil Conspiracy" which reprinted internal

Mobil Oil documents showing how Mobil's SA subsidiary has broken the sanctions for years to supply Rhodesia's oil. On 8/2 the NYT ran a long article reviewing the charges. Supposedly the UN Committee on Sanctions, 3 congressional committees, and the Treasury Department are all looking into the charges. In June Mobil denied the charges in a long press release that was largely an ideological diatribe against the People's Bicentennial Commission, an organization which had helped UCC hold its news conference. On 8/5 the WP reported that an internal Mobil investigation had found no evidence but was blocked by SA's Official Secret's Act. On 8/28 the NYT reported that Mobil had written to the UCC that its investigation was essentially stymied by SA. The Congress held a hearing last week, but Mobil has largely weathered the storm. The oil continues to flow, at least until the liberation movement moves to cut the railroad, the logic and elegance of which solution must be apparent.

The lesson of this episode (thus far) is that the implementation of effective sanctions takes a magnitude and persistence of political will and an overall investigative competence beyond the ability of either the executive or the legislative branch. The pushes and pulls of outside forces and the inherent conservatism and self interest of large institutions weigh too heavily.

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D3) Legislate end to legality of US private investment or lending in South Africa

Legislate MNC disclosure of wages, taxes, profits, investment, costs of operation in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.

These legislative options are the logical next step beyond sanctions. That they are so far beyond the pale of "responsible" political discussion is a tribute to the MNC's ability to mold the parameters of that discussion. Indeed for Congress to really come to grips with basic issues of international economics such as these, it must have a fundamentally different institutional structure that ends the jurisdictional fragmentation that forbids rational discussion.

Within these issues are assumptions about the limits to the extension of the sanctity of private property over the public good. A corporation and its supporters would argue that it has inalienable right to invest, grow, and prosper within the borders of any national government that permits it to whatever extent is legally and economically possible. If a government changes its mind, it must pay "fair and just" compensation for expropriation (that raises another set of issues covered under option C1). Posit world-wide knowledge that a Luxembourg MNC had a factory in San Marino producing hand carried heat seeking missiles that

could knock down F104's and B52's. Certain foreign governments would suddenly find it in their interest and actively limit the national sovereignty of these two countries. The greater and more immediate the threat is to a perceived national interest, the more flexible some unspoken assumptions become. It is just as logically permissible to say that, if a society does not meet measurable standards of social responsibility to its citizens (human rights, overall political and economic equity, etc.), our country should not permit its citizens to lend or invest in that country. For in such a political economy; the market system may be so distorted and oligopolistic that external investors are unavoidably serving, when all factors are included, to make the inequities greater in most respects.

MNC's have also successfully resisted efforts by congressional committees to talk about wages, taxes, etc. A few US MNC's in South Africa have presented self-selected data about wages and profits. But no corporation has ever opened up its multiple sets of books. Information is power. The more information the more power, and power is the key to competitiveness. For institutional and ideological interests every corporation would oppose such a precedent even in a case as extreme as South Africa.

But what assumption has been made? It is the assumption that the good of the corporation is more important and overrides consideration of the social good, no

matter how defined. That means that one portion of society, that particular portion, necessarily knows what is best for society as a whole and, without informing the other citizens (so they can make an informed judgment to agree or disagree), can and does inflict its will. This is the antithesis of democracy. It reflects a critical imbalance among the balance of powers in this society.

In sum, once one looks beneath that layer of scepticism implanted by our present culture, the assumptions that support conventional opinion collapse. The practical problems that ensue (necessary D2) are another matter. But so much about the SA case is so inflammatory, that it represents an ideal case to undertake such political education and explore the possibility of setting such precedents.

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D4) Create incentives and provide alternatives for Japan, Great Britain, West Germany, etc. to end trade and investment in SA

Provide Israel incentives to end SA ties

Given Rhodesia's reputed \$400-500 million a year in exports and imports, there are obviously gaps between international resolutions and international practices. That does not mean that organizations, including the Legislative branch could not put pressure on national governments to meet in public or private, at the UN or elsewhere to discuss the assumptions and principles of and organize the implementation of sanctions against South Africa. The United States does not have to wait for the impetus to come from Britain (which has the most to lose).

Several levels of research seem called for to pursue this option - one begins with IMF's Direction of Trade Annual 1970-74 to uncover SA's major trading partners. For 1974 SA exported \$4.9 billion (75% from the Industrial countries) and imported \$7.2 billion (85% from the Industrial countries). There are not a large number of countries involved, or who would buy or sell what white South Africans want. For 1974 the 14 major countries were:

	SA EXPORT	SA IMPORT (FOB)
BRITAIN	\$1413.4 MIL.	\$1209.7 MIL.
USA	352.1	1193.3
JAPAN	520.5	883.4
W GERMANY	468	1362.1
ITALY	131.4	300.2
NETHERLANDS	103.1	192.5
FRANCE	99.4	292.5
SWITZERLAND	123.4	162.5
CANADA	127.2	101.8
IRELAND	50.4	13.8
HONG KONG	77.6	59.2
AUSTRALIA	47.2	127.6
SWEDEN	22.4	131.6
BELGIUM	<u>213.6</u>	<u>144.7</u>
	\$3,749.7 (76%)	\$6,083.9 (84%)

These countries are politically and economically aligned with the United States and greatly influenced by international capital flows emanating from the US. Such an effort at multinational coordination does not, however have to operate by antagonisms and fiats. With mutual assistance to find alternate markets and sources, it could set and meet goals to reduce interaction with SA by 10% or 20% per year. Two to four years of that and concomitant SA government attempts to pass the costs on would quicken the pace

of internal change appreciably. Careful planning would be needed against possible extreme reactions by SA; but who else would buy its minerals and how would it survive without selling them?

Israel presents, as usual, a special case. On the one hand are the growing military links which are occasionally chronicled in the West. The NYT on 8/18 reported these disclosures: a report of Israel building 2-6 long-range gun boats at \$18 million per and training of 50 SA naval personnel, unconfirmed reports of the sale of up to 24 Kfir jets, reports that SA raw materials will be exchanged for advanced military electronic equipment. The United States has many kinds of influence over Israel, and it would seem quite likely that members of Congress could speak to this issue.

But hidden from public IMF trade statistics is Israel's real vulnerability to SA, if the latter is willing to pay the penalties involved in halting the international diamond trade. Israel's economy is largely geared to processing raw goods into finished products. Diamonds have become a significant percentage of both imports and exports. While they remained about 10% of total merchandise imports from 1970 to 1974, as a percentage of exports in that period they rose from 25% to 36%. If no raw diamonds entered European markets, Israel's balance of payments trend, now (WP 9/6) reported improving, would again deteriorate.

In sum a number of assumptions about probable economic results would have to be researched and a number of practical problems overcome. If one makes the assumptions of the overall policy (D), this could be medium swift approach to forcing SA's internal evolution.

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- E) Encourage and assist black African opposition efforts

- E1) Expand aid to health, education and welfare needs of refugees from SA, Namibia and Zimbabwe.
Expand training cadre for new Namibia and Zimbabwe governments

The institutionalization of international concern with the refugee situation in southern African began in the early 1960's with UN sponsored special training programs: for Namibians set up in 1961, for Africans from Portuguese territories in 1962, and for South Africans abroad in 1964. In 1965 a UN Trust Fund was established to provide legal assistance, relief for dependents of political victims, education of prisoners, and general refugee relief. Both PVO's and area national governments have been involved ever since.

US assistance to these efforts come in several forms. Contributions to UN High Commissioner for Refugees was one - some \$400,000 in FY67 for example. Another \$50,000 went to the Red Cross that year. In the decade of the 1960's more than \$50 million in PL480 commodities went to feed refugees; African refugees received at least \$10 million of that in the mid 1960's. In the field of education USG support began in 1961; in 1967, for example, \$3 million went to the African-American Institute for two programs, school support in African and scholarships for 479 refugees to study in the US.

These programs waned in the Nixon years and have grown again since apparently 1974; dearth of easily available literature suggests a narrative history of all international aid programs in the region from 1955-1976 would be in order. In 1974 the USG gave \$50,000 to the UN Fund for Namibia, and in 1975 \$50,000 went to the UN Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa (UNETPSA). Grants have also gone to US PVO's. The African-American Institute continues to work on several fronts. Educational training for students from Portuguese Africa is one; 103 students were selected in 1975 and another 100 this year as funding rose from \$399,000 in FY75 to \$1,030,000 in FY76. For FY77 \$1.5 million is proposed and \$7.25 million in years thereafter. AAI has also been training Rhodesians in American universities under two other programs (ASPAU and AFGRAD). Assistance to Namibian educational needs seems to be going primarily to the UN Institute for Namibia now in formation.

This chronology needs to be more complete, but even without that level of data, several kinds of further research seem necessary.

(1) There is an obvious and considerable disparity between the human needs of the situation and the resources available. Congress seems disposed to legislate far more funds for humanitarian purposes if approached. To what extent can the infrastructure use more resources effectively given the inherent

bureaucratic imperative to justify growth. By whom and how is "effectively" defined?

(2) Up until now it has been the ANC which chose the particular Nimbabweans for overseas training programs. AAI accepted this because the OAU recognized the ANC; but ZANU forces have long and bitterly complained of discrimination. SWAPO is the recognized Namibian group; non SWAPO Namibians have also complained. Perhaps some more apolitical and educational criteria should be applied. The acrimony suggests investigation and new thinking.

(3) Most important is the content of the education. What is appropriate education? Given the extreme and complex human, institutional and analytical problems facing fledgling bureaucrats, is an American university appropos? What kind of short-term curriculum can overcome such obstacles; are mainstream American social science and our forms of capital intensive technology relevant? Congress may will ask such questions of AID very soon.

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E2) Possible international initiatives to work toward unity of elements of the Zimbabwe liberation movement - example, an international aid consortium

Given the pace of events, the multiplicity of actors, the coldwar overtones in the rhetoric of the great powers, and the considerable mistrust of Sec. Kissingers among leaders in the Zimbabwe liberation movement, it does not appear propitious for the United States to pursue its historic ideals alone. But if Congress were willing to approve \$10 to \$25 million for fundamentally novel forms of international education in humanist values, several interesting scenarios might take place.

The Executive branch could be instructed to allocate these funds to one of several sorts of international supervisory consortiums. One could be under UN auspices, the High Commissioner on Refugees or some other agency. Another could be the OAU, if it were willing. A third could be that troika of neighboring states - Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania - which are most interested in the present events in Zimbabwe and have the most influence on the various factions using those countries as bases.

Funds would be granted to educational processes in the broadest sense of the word which kept as their most basic theme THE basic responsibility of societal leadership throughout time: how to balance freedom against social responsibility.

how to nurture creativity and initiative on the one hand and mold a just and equitable society on the other, how, in sum to ensure peace, human rights, human welfare, and ecological quality.

Such abstract ideals may not be very practical for guerillas concerned with the next battle, rival leaders, supplies, recruitment, training and the weather. But there is no reason not to think that the various segments would not like to broaden their ability to communicate with each other, enlarge their technical and practical knowledge of governing, and develop a series of shared perspectives about sharing power and dealing with human problems in a new society.

Toward those ends, I offer the beginning of a list of possible activities

- (1) provision of more modern communication systems and more steady access to printed public writings on their (and kindred) situations around the world
- (2) leadership seminars on diverse issues beyond immediate military strategy
- (3) large gatherings of middle level cadre and when possible local leadership inside Zimbabwe where practical problems and longer term perspectives can be addressed.

(4) if interested, day or week long educational programs on practical governmental problems, development alternatives, etcetera ...taught by people agreed upon by Zimbabweans and or sponsoring consortium.

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E3) Put economic and political pressure on Zambia to release jailed Zimbabweans and cease manipulating the liberation movements.

Up until late May the government of Kenneth Kaunda had consistently demonstrated to the various groups of the Zimbabwe liberation movement that Zambia preferred the least militant transition solution feasible. Part of his policy had been to deny Zambia as a base for guerrilla activity and part to support Nkomo and the so called old guard. In recent years Nkomo (and his group ZAPU) received much international attention and support from both east and west; support at home was much weaker. The more militant ZANU, now seemingly led by Robert Mugabe has three times (c5000 to c1500) the military force. With the collapse of the ANC in early September events are accelerating; Kaunda, disgusted at being unable to negotiate Nkomo into power, now may be supporting a military solution and by implication, ZANU.

Against this background remains the question of Kaunda's continuing detention of more than 50 members of ZANU, which has been going on for more than a year. Some or most of these men are being held as responsible for the assassination of ZANU chairman Herbert Chitepo. It so happens that they also represent some key leaders in what might be called the more progressive (in Kaunda's terms, militant) wing of ZANU. Their imprisonment since the spring of 1975 apparently slowed

the coalescing of political forces within the Zimbabwe movement behind a military strategy. Other events and a new generation of leadership have superceded the effect of their absence, so it is now more a question of human rights and ZANU's perceptions of Zambia and its supporters - such as the US.

Herbert Chitepo, former chairman of ZANU and a major figure in the ANC was killed by a bomb blast in his car on the morning of March 18, 1975. A number of high ZANU officials were arrested soon after by Zambian authorities. A Special International Commission on the Assassination was jointly chosen by Zambia and the OAU. It issued its report on April 9, 1976 naming some of these ZANU members. The report paints a picture of widespread corruption among the leadership and longstanding tribal conflict especially between the Manyika (of which Chitepo was one) and the Karanga. Apparently there was a trial sometime this summer in camera and at least one person was sentenced to death. More recent and detailed information is in order.

Questions can be raised about the April 9 report. Lionel Cliffe has posed a most provocative one. "How can one really believe that split that conveniently occurred on the eve of forced unity and negotiation and that allowed Kaunda to demobilize the armed struggle, was purely tribal?" Cliffe interviewed a number of the witnesses and found that they had been "badly tortured."

Certainly Herbert Chitepo's murderers should be caught and punished. But it is not unreasonable to see that those specifically accused be released on bail or given a speedy public trial. It is also not improper to see that the rest of the 50-60 ZANU figure apparently still in jail are specifically charged and quickly tried. Otherwise, they should be released. Some 16 university students and faculty are also still in jail and apparently qualify as political prisoners. Zambia might well ponder congressional aid restrictions for human rights violations since its economy is dismal and it wants our support.

Zambia is said to be very sensitive about interference in internal affairs, so inquiry would not be easy. But Zimbabweans could very well perceive Zambian action toward these ZANU prisoners as a clear indication of continued antagonism. The US by its inaction and its overall support of Zambia is inevitably linked as an accomplice in this. Research is thus called for to verify the events and the motives. If most or all of the ZANU prisoners prove innocent and the US secures their release through quiet pressure, it can only be viewed as a friendly gesture and lead to a diminution of suspicions by ZANU.

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E4) Articulate clear development models for which Zimbabwe and Namibian governments could expect economic and political support.

Present American policy appears to be one of generalities and code words. If transition happens by "negotiation" and a "moderate" government ensues, the Executive branch would apparently be disposed to provide appropriate economic assistance. The sentiment in Congress is similar. The problem is that the code words do not communicate the same meaning here and in southern Africa. Certain attitudes and values that are assumed subconsciously are not shared. Americans, accustomed only to their own cultural and intellectual frameworks, do not take into consideration exactly what they communicate by the words they project into another culture. Patterns followed agonizingly for a generation toward Vietnam are reappearing here in this part of the world.

Policy toward development represents one core area of mal-communication. Given evolving historic realities in southern Africa, the US has several choices. Each choice, including verbal inaction, will be noted and will affect the thinking of participants. To say we are not and should not "interfere" is thus illogical. Current policy is to project very vague images suggesting the less basic structural changes in the economy and the less whites get

killed the better. But such a vision is so far removed from the empirical realities on the scene that the liberation movements must be hornswoggled. As they see it the purpose of the effort is to make a very different society; political power is simply the means to that end. By deliberately focusing on the political transition and ignoring or seeking to minimize the social engineering to come, the US can only be viewed by the local participants as antagonistic to their efforts - not matter how much rhetoric comes from Washington about a "commitment to black majority rule". If it is in our interest to continue to get the chrome, uranium, etc. at the best possible price for an open ended period, continuing to antagonize future leaders seems inapropos.

Part of the US problem is, of course, the gap between our own experience and expectations with a free marked system in a 19th century temperate zone society well endowed with resources and the experiences of poor 20th century tropical societies with such a system. Official rhetoric maintains stereotypes; like 3rd world governments, AID in the field has become more flexible and pragmatic. But the rhetoric is what conditions the American public and molds our foreign policy into ideological poses that hurt our real interests.

It is not immediately clear that the US should articulate a clear policy on what mixture of public and

private controls Zimbabwe, for example, should follow. Quite a number of assumptions and rhetorical strategies must first be analyzed very thoroughly:

- 1) It is ethnocentric to force onto Africans our ideological assumption that society's material goods should be in private hands? It is in our interest to do so?
- 2) Are we really more concerned with how and for whom material goods are used in a society? Is there a balance between our perceived needs and the needs of a particular society's citizens? How is that balance defined? If a society does not perceive that the market, in its present forms, is an impartial arbiter, what actions is it justified in taking? Who decides what is justified?
- 3) How should our concern for human rights be measured against property rights? To be precise, is it more important to raise the standard of living of the poor majority or is it more important to preserve an abstract principle of property and the concrete market advantage we accept of comparatively less expensive chrome?
- 4) Is the concept of property an ideal wholly devoid of its historical setting and the social and political relations that were an integral part of its origin?

For example, is the property of a white farmer who built a farm with his own toil equivalent to that of an absentee landlord or to an urban white whose house and job are largely a function of a discriminatory legal system?

Such questions are not easy but, if the US wants to communicate with rather than talk at (and by implication threaten) African leaders, they will have to be dealt with. The longer we fail to pursue such an analysis, the longer we fail to see and articulate (not necessarily agree, but at least discuss) the concerns of the liberation efforts, and the longer we fail to show the flexibility and tolerance the situation calls for the more likely we are of being on the losing side again with all the symbolic and economic costs that entails.

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E5) Provide economic and military aid to the liberation movements

No legislative option now facing the Executive and Legislative branches meets greater scepticism than the political solution offered by this option. Such scepticism stems from assumptions which, like the assumptions underlying every policy option, merit analytic inquiry. As a comparative historian I am acutely aware of the way history, invariably chronicled by the winner, imposes an overwhelming prejudice against revolutionary violence in favor of gradual reform. Does the historical record support the superiority of gradualism as the more effective way to advance human freedom and welfare?

The reluctant conclusion of the premier historian of these issues, Barrington Moore was this:

"the evidence from the comparative history of modernization (is that) the costs of moderation have been at least as atrocious as those of revolution, perhaps a great deal more.From the days of Spartacus through Robespierre down to the present day, the use of force by the oppressed against their former masters has been the object of nearly universal condemnation. Meanwhile the day-to-day repression of "normal" society hovers dimly in the background of most history books.This is one argument against the comforting myth of gradualism. There is an even more important one, the costs of going without a revolution."
(Social Origins...p.505-6)

An American policy maker, steeped in history as it was taught in the 30's, 40's or 50's would do well to sample

deeply the less elitist and more balanced scholarship of the 60's and 70's. For if he insists upon the assumptions of the former view of history, he faces an unanswerable paradox. A country that was created by revolutionary violence and which is in the midst of a bicentennial celebration of its historic ideals is at the same time denying even the theoretical propriety of people in another society choosing the same revolutionary option. In the 1770's America welcomed French assistance in its fight for independence; in the 1970's, we cannot conceive of offering such assistance to others in similar circumstances.

Beyond assumptions about the nature and justice of models of historic change, there are other more contemporary and political assessments that relate to this policy option

(1) The US, Great Britain, and the OAU all have a historic memory that they jointly talked about as a serious option, the use of force against Rhodesia in 1965 and 1966. African states remember this and perceive current US policy differently than many, more forgetful sorts, on this side of the Atlantic. Discontinuities do not build healthy ties among nations.

(2) Many African states openly support the use of force against Rhodesia's current government. They are providing token military support as are the Russians and Chinese. No one is seriously suggesting that white

rule will survive in Rhodesia. By failing to provide even token military or economic aid directly to the Zimbabweans, we are jeopardizing future relations with the winners - an activity which seems contrary to our interests.

(3) The current Rhodesian government is unique. Its legal basis is not recognized in the world community and, unlike Namibia, has not been since its inception a decade ago. That situation was one argument for sanctions; could it not also be for other policies including aid to the Zimbabweans.

(4) The US professes standards of maximum international peace. Faced with the prospect of a long war or a short war (assuming negotiations fail), is it logical to lengthen the way by withholding aid.

(5) Anglo-American perceptions of the role of violence in society are not shared by many other cultures. Adda Bozeman in Conflict in Africa demonstrates that political values there differ sharply from our own. By whose standards should our actions be guided in this case? Why? What message will we communicate by a particular choice and what cultural lens will it be received through?

(6) Much of policy is symbolism. What symbolic messages are articulated by a) failing to recognize Angola b) not talking to liberation movement leaders very

frequently c) not trying to talk to blacks imprisoned in SA or, for example, Bishop Lamont of Umtali (facing trial in Rhodesia September 20 d) continuing rhetoric of an African grand design instead of talking with each nation as an important and distinct entity and e) most importantly, negotiating by visiting great powers and ignoring the most interested parties - SWAPO and ZANU. Is it not possible that most southern Africans take all these symbolic messages as antagonistic to what they are about?

There are, in sum, multiple analytic complexities within the policy option of supplying military aid. Most would agree that a hardheaded analysis of minimum US interests is the continuation of trade with the region and an even handed implementation of reasonable standards of human rights. On this policy option we can do nothing, let the war run its (longer) course and appear in the eyes of the Africans as supporting the losing side. Or we can supply token (or more) aid, see a shorter war, and come out comparatively victorious and on good political and economic terms with the winner. Man, of course, has never been very good at learning from history; are aspirations of progress in order?

Such aid, if proposed to Congress, would have to go through the foreign affairs committees. The opposition of conservative hill members (see B12) would have to be sur-

mounted. Technical problems of who to give the aid to would be considerable if ZAPU and ZANU had not merged again. Someone must sign appropriate forms. Allocation could be on a pro ratio basis or some other. A final overall criteria by which to consider this policy option is the historic and symbolic image it would convey to 80 to 100 nonwestern states disenchanted with the last generation of US policy in such situation.

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