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9. ABSTRACT <p>This report describes the manner in which the African population was brought under European rule. It describes elements of the traditional system of indigenous government, the manner in which these indigenous political arrangements were incorporated into the Southern Rhodesian system of direct rule by European colonial officers, and the subsequent restoration of authority and power to pseudo-traditional African authorities. Though direct rule has continued to serve as the principal orienting approach to African local government, chieftaincy has gradually regained its significance in local administration and chiefs have regained their powers as traditional rulers and as the agents of the European central government. It is the chiefs who represent the African population in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament. The prospects for local government and community development cannot be considered without reference to the inter and intra factional cleavages in the independence movement represented in the leadership of Joshua Nkomo and Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole, and Robert Mugabe, as well as the third force and its leaders. Each faction of the independence movement which these men represent has its own pool of human resources, its own external and internal constituencies, and its own body of general directives. The civil service, anchored in the European middle class, may well serve as the basis for a working coalition with the more conservative sections of the African middle classes of the urban areas. There is the potential for alliances and coalitions to be formed on the basis of common economic and political interests which transcend historical, racial, ethnic, and linguistic cleavages against the threat of a radical reordering of society.</p>			
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FINAL REPORT

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

AND

POLITICAL INTEGRATION

by

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Local Government and Political Integration

Zimbabwe, a country which covers an area of some 150,300 square miles and has a population of about 6.2 million of whom 5.8 million are Africans, 274,000 Europeans, and 30,000 are Coloured and Asians, is rapidly moving toward acquiring independence under African majority rule. It is not an uncommon feature for African countries to enter into self-government without a systematic appraisal, and much less a detailed program, of the manner in which the national African leadership intends to implement a uniform system of local rule, which would provide the basis for administrative and political integration. For the leaders of independence movements the principal and most pressing goal is most often to gain independence for their country and not the working out of plans and procedures for reshaping and then, restaffing new structures of local government. In many African countries, the former colonial institutions and structures of local government were used during and even after the assumption of African rule without the intention of making immediate, basic changes or considering the practical problems of governing rural populations. One may suggest that though many leaders of African independent movements have national development

goals, they do not always consider the types of structures through which these goals may be achieved. The type of local government useful for the preservation of colonial rule or the exercise of authority by a small European settler population may prove to be inappropriate for the rapid economic and social development of a basically rural population. It should be remembered that though the urban populations of Africa are growing rapidly, nonetheless most Africans live in the countryside and many African urban workers look to it as a source of security, a refuge from wage unemployment. Though one million Africans live in the fourteen major cities of Southern Rhodesia, three quarters of the population still live in the countryside and are subsistence cultivators. Moreover, given the high rate of circular labour migration a large section of the African urban population ends up in the countryside as peasant farmers. Put differently, the nature of local government may affect both the rural and urban population, their productivity and the type of political alliances which may develop between them. Be this as it may, constraints such as finances and trained and experienced personnel as well as practical political considerations limit rapid changes in the established or pre-existing institutions of local government. The recognized "traditional authorities" (chiefs, sub-chiefs and headmen), councils and district officers often remain as the operational basis of local administration, though rapid changes may occur at the national level. The short run preservation of existing colonial structures and indigenous "traditional" authorities provides for persistence and continuity, at the same time that authority is being transferred from

European colonial rulers to African nationalist leaders and the distribution of power is being worked out. This observation may however describe more accurately the experience of Zambia and Malawi than the prospects of Zimbabwe.

A primary purpose of this paper then is to describe elements of the "traditional" system of indigenous government, the manner in which these indigenous political arrangements were incorporated into the Southern Rhodesian system of "direct" rule by European colonial officers, and the subsequent restoration of authority and power to "pseudo-traditional" African authorities. The final section of the paper will consider the prospects for forms of local government in light of comparative experiences. The principal question which remains unanswered is whether African majority rule will be the outcome of the use of violent military means, or through the gradual and peaceful transfer of authority, or a combination of peaceful transfer and at the same time, factional conflict based on the use of sustained organized military violence, sporadic disruptive force or a combination of the two. If protracted military effort forms the basis for establishing African majority rule through the gradual conquest and extension of control of territory, the pattern of local rule will emerge and root itself in both ideological principals and pragmatic necessities derived from the politico-military organization. If however the transfer is peaceful, a different set of considerations arise; the pattern of local rule may more closely approximate that of Zambia, Malawi or Tanzania. Though the initial phase of transferring authority and power may be peaceful, factional interests within the African independence movement may spill over into the larger society.

The opposing factions may seek to gain control of local areas and the nature of local government may reflect this competition for control. The competition or conflict may follow the lines of established cleavages. But it is also possible that some degree of mediation may stem from three sources, the prosperous landholding African farmer or shopkeeper of the rural areas, the middle class and the new class of Africans who will staff the bureaucratic structures of the central and local government. The potential for alliances and cleavages will also be suggested in the final section through the use of comparative materials.

Local Government Through Time

In 1923 Southern Rhodesia became a "self-governing" British colony and two separate governmental structures were established. Enfranchised colonists were provided with internal self-government while a second system, based on that developed by the British South Africa Company, was set up to handle African Affairs. The Native Affairs Department was made independent of the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly, being directly responsible to the British Government. The type of rule imposed over the Africans in Southern Rhodesia is termed "Direct Rule" in contrast to the "indirect rule" which was established in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Under the system of "indirect rule", "traditional" chiefs were incorporated into the administrative hierarchy and were given powers to issue administrative orders, and to make by-laws. They also presided over officially recognized native courts. In Southern Rhodesia,

the system which prevailed was that originally modelled on the Natal practice of considering chiefs nothing more than "constables" to assist the European Native Commissioner. In theory at least, chiefs in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and in Nyasaland (now Malawi) wielded far more power than their counterparts in Southern Rhodesia, although the Howman Report (1953) considered that it was in fact the District Commissioners in the "Indirect Rule" territories who were responsible for most decision making (Howman 1953 p. 11). In fact, in Howman's view (as a doubtless biased Southern Rhodesian native commissioner) the Africans in Southern Rhodesia were ruled more "indirectly" than those in the north (Howman 1953, Part II, p. 47), since the Native Commissioners in Southern Rhodesia had less control over Africans. Be that as it may, the fact remains that in both Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) Africans were an integral part of the administrative framework. Whereas in Southern Rhodesia in 1953 there was an average of one Native Commissioner for 47,450 Africans, there was an average of one District Commissioner for every 115,926 in Nyasaland (Howman, 1953, p. 3), a difference which would be consistent with the difference in administrative structure.

The African population in Southern Rhodesia belonged to two major groupings, the Shona and the Ndebele. About four-fifths of the 864,000 Africans in 1923 were Shona-speaking peoples, concentrated mainly in Mashonaland and the eastern district, while the other major grouping, the Ndebele, were concentrated in Matabeleland in the west of Southern Rhodesia. The two groupings had strongly contrasting traditional political

systems, and the differences between them remain significant for an understanding of African political movements in Southern Rhodesia today. The Shona-speaking people were traditionally organized into numerous autonomous chiefdoms, most of which were divided into wards under sub-chiefs. The chiefs had only limited authority, and were not considered by their subjects to possess any supernatural powers. An adelphic pattern of succession to chieftainship militated against stability, since competing royals would frequently break away to form new chiefdoms. There was no scarcity of land and political dissatisfaction led to constant segmentation, there being no one central authority to act as a unifying force.

The Ndebele, on the other hand, had belonged to a centralised kingdom, divided into provinces and then into regiments, a hierarchical system of government in which central control was maintained over the local level, backed up by military force. The subordinate rulers, the indunas, had power delegated to them from the King; and were more powerful than the Shona chiefs.

The Ndebele chiefdom and its component provinces and regiments were destroyed by the British South Africa company which in the 1890s imposed a new political and administrative system. The Shona were absorbed more slowly, but eventually both they and the Ndebele were subject to a uniform administrative system, at first under the British South Africa Company and then, after 1923, under the Native Affairs Department of Southern Rhodesia. The main concern of the administrative system in the rural areas was to maintain law and order, to collect taxes

and to help to recruit rural Africans for urban employment. The Native Affairs Department was organised on a territorial basis, and in 1923 there were two provinces, Mashonaland and Matabeleland, subdivided into 32 districts each under the charge of a native commissioner, who was European. Each district was divided into chiefdoms, headed by African chiefs selected according to "local custom." Below the chiefs were sub-chiefs and below them, village headmen. The chiefs were viewed by the European administration as performing the role of "constables" with very little discretionary power. Although the Shona and the Ndebele had had different political systems, the administration imposed a uniform system on them, one which had different consequences for each group. For the Shona it meant an end to the proliferation of chiefdoms and the use of fission to resolve conflict; however, the Shona had traditionally had numerous chiefs and many of them were recognized by the administration. In that respect the new order was not so disruptive. As far as the Ndebele were concerned, the new system represented a greater break with tradition, in that no paramount ruler was recognised. Some of the old regimental and provincial chiefs were appointed government chiefs (Garbett, 1966, p. 116). The position of chiefs amongst the Ndebele is usually hereditary, (Hughes and van Velsen, 1955, p. 68) from father to son, whereas amongst the Shona succession is collateral.

Councils

In 1931, in response to growing political awareness amongst the Africans, "Native Boards" were established in order to allow for the "united expression of native opinion" (C.N.C., 1930, p. 2). The chiefs and headmen were made ex-officio members, while provision was also made for elected representatives. However, these Boards were given no powers, other than to make recommendations, and in 1937 they were renamed "Native Councils" and given more clearly defined powers to advise the government on any matter concerning African welfare. The councils had no direct power to make laws, or to tax. Moreover, the council members were appointed by the native commissioners who were the ex-officio chairmen, and it was impossible for much to be achieved without their backing. Theoretically, the councils could build roads and bridges, and make by-laws, but the Governor's approval was required, and before 1944 the councils had no financial power. In 1944 the councils were empowered to impose taxation, but loan funds were not made available to them and they thus could achieve very little. Administration continued to be authoritarian, with the chiefs and headmen being used as agents to impose governmental policy on the Africans.

In 1953 the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was established. Subsequently, governmental policy towards the Africans underwent some changes, largely as a result of the widespread discontent with the Land Husbandry Act. This act, which was passed in 1951 but not implemented

until 1956, was designed to introduce efficient farming methods on a peasant-farmer basis and to establish the Native Reserves as areas of agricultural production (Murray 1970, p. 306). The Act was intended to stabilize the rural and urban proletariats by forbidding urban residents to own land in the rural areas. Since many urban Africans still retained strong ties with their villages, this attempt to stabilize the population failed. The chiefs disliked the provisions of the act, since they were deprived of their power to grant land. Murray points out the inconsistencies inherent in the government's using the chiefs to enforce an act which removed from them one of their few remaining powers. Many chiefs were united with their people in opposing the Act, and the widespread discontent gave fuel to the rising African nationalist movement. In an attempt to deal with the unrest, a New Councils Act was passed in 1957, the year which also saw the founding of the African National Congress (A.N.C.). The passing of the Act marked the beginning of an attempt to move away from the former, authoritarian treatment of rural Africans to allow for greater self government at the local level.

A concept of "community development" was developed during the fifties and was adopted by both the Whitehead and the Smith regimes. Programmes of community development, as a means of stimulating economic and social development at the grass-roots level, were being adopted in many developing countries, and between 1952 and 1962 the United States provided more than fifty million dollars in aid to such programmes (Passmore 1971, p. 69). The reports of the Mangwende Commission (1961) and the Robinson Commission (1961) both recommended the implementation of a policy of community development, and in the late 50's an A.I.D. community development expert

had already been secured by the Native Department in order to help with planning local community development. Since community development and local government were viewed as inter-dependent, a viable system of local self government was intended to be an outcome of these development programmes. It was generally recognized that the African Councils Act of 1957 had failed to establish a working system of local government, and the Mangwende Report illustrated flaws in the existing system. It was felt that the previous technically oriented policy of emphasizing economic advance had neglected the social effects upon rural Africans (Passmore 1971, p. 9). "Community development" as it was envisaged by the Rhodesian governments of the United Federal Party and the Rhodesian Front differed from that found in many other developing countries in that it was essentially a programme imposed upon a majority population by a white minority, and as such it was viewed by both white liberals and African nationalists with suspicion. It was seen by many as "apartheid in disguise" (Mlambo 1972, p. 56) and the fact that "community development" was enthusiastically adopted by the Rhodesian Front, and even made a plank of their 1962 election platform, (Holleman 1969, p. 274) did nothing to ensure its acceptance amongst Africans. The government strongly denied that its aim was to produce South African type Bantustans, and in 1970 the Director of Community Development Training maintained that "the goal is different, not the separation of races -- but the development of people" (Rhodesia Herald, 22 May, 1970). However, suspicion of the motives behind "community development" were strong enough for the United States A.I.D. to withdraw aid to the Southern Rhodesian programme after 1962.

Rhodesian politics, is that the Ndebele appear to have been favored by the government. Even though the Ndebele are a minority in the country, comprising at the most one-fifth of the total African population, in 1963 one-third (8/26) of the chiefs on the chiefs' council were Ndebele. Moreover, 24% (8/33) of all Ndebele chiefs were on the council, while only 10% (18/176) of the non-Ndebele chiefs were (Garbett 1966, p. 125-126). The new constitution of 1969 gave 16 of the 66 seats in the House of Assembly to Africans, the 16 being divided equally between Ndebele and Shona (Weinrich 1973, p. 13).

Garbett suggests that the reason for the favored treatment of the Ndebele is not simply that the Ndebele chiefs are, on the whole, younger (because of the system of succession) and better educated than the Shona chiefs, but that the Ndebele chiefs have derived their position from government and are therefore more "pro-government" in outlook (Garbett 1966, p. 126). However Mlambo (1972, p. 46) makes the point that the appointment of chiefs is an easier task for the District Commissioners in Mashonaland than in Matabeleland, because of the collateral system of succession prevailing in the former area. According to Mlambo, the greater numbers of contenders for chieftainship make it easier for the District Commissioner to select the most "pro-government" candidate. Amongst the Ndebele, primogeniture is followed, and if an heir is unsympathetic to government it is a harder task to remove him.

Another factor which is possible is that the government has favoured the Ndebele simply because they are a minority group, and it has been in the government interests to encourage, or at least,

not to prevent, ethnic divisiveness amongst the African population. It may be significant that some of the most radical politicians in the liberation movements in Rhodesia appear to come from Karanga, a densely populated Shona area bordering on land inhabited by the Ndebele. It may be that the divisiveness amongst the African politicians from Rhodesia is more understandable when the ethnographic history of the country is considered. The Shona system of succession militates against chieftainship passing into the hands of younger, better educated men, and with their ambitions for political advancement within the system thwarted, the younger element could be expected to be more radical. Amongst the Ndebele, however, the succession pattern allows younger men to become chiefs and thus to be incorporated into the system

Though ethnicity may seem to provide a suitable explanation, it may in fact obscure the more fundamental basis of cleavages stemming from divergent political and economic interests and positions in the local structures of authority and power. Put differently, both Ndebele and Shona may support, belong to, and hold positions of leadership in the main factions of the independence movement. Moreover, the Ndebele and Ngoni political-military systems, allowed for the absorption and assimilation of other populations (see Barnes, 1954). Or, as Williams observes of the relation of the Ndebele and Shona, "tribal lines have been very much blurred at the edges and, although this tribal antipathy has deep historical origins, too firm an assessment of the tribal pattern of organizations could be misleading" (Williams 1976, p. 10).

That there were Shona who could claim to be Ndebele suggests the possibility of factors other than ethnicity as the basis for political allegiance, coalitions and alliances. The prominence of the Karanga as leaders may well be due to the presence of a number of mission schools and landholding peasants who could afford to educate their sons.

Both Van Velsen (1964, p. 156) and Mlambo (1972, p. 236) emphasize that tribal differences are not of great significance in the nationalist movements in Rhodesia. Mlambo points out that the most severe clashes between Z.A.N.U. and Z.A.P.U. were confined to largely Shona Salisbury, while Bulawayo, a city with a mixed Shona and Ndebele population, had fewer disturbances (Mlambo 1972, p. 236).

Rhodesian Society -- an analytic overview

An interesting analysis of Rhodesian history has been made by the Marxist economist G. Arrighi. According to his view, the Rhodesian Front represents a coalition between the two classes in Rhodesia who have most to lose by African economic advancement -- the national, agrarian white "bourgeoisie" and the white wage earners. The agrarian white bourgeoisie requires impoverished Africans to provide cheap labour, while the white wage earners would lose materially if Africans were allowed to compete with them for jobs. The interests of the white manufacturing classes, however, would best be served by freer interracial competition which would lower wages and, by raising the standards of living of the Africans, would provide a market for the products of industry. The manufacturing classes, according to Arrighi, would be best served by stabilisation

of the African proletariat and the creation of an African middle class. He sees a "striking coincidence of class interests" between the African middle class and bourgeoisie on the one hand, and manufacturing capitalism on the other. It remains to be seen whether this "coincidence of class interests" will lead to the retention of a capitalist economy after independence and the extent to which the continuation of this particular type of economic system will affect the structuring of political relations and the distribution of power.

Preliminary Summary and Prospects

The previous section has attempted to provide a description of the manner in which the African population was brought under European rule. In the initial phases of European rule the African population was subjected to a system of "direct rule" under which chiefs and other "traditional" authorities were divested of their authority and powers and made subordinate to European government officers. Though "direct rule" has continued to serve as the principal orienting approach to African local government, chieftaincy has gradually regained its significance in local administration and chiefs their powers both as "traditional rulers" and as the agents of the European central government. Moreover, as the African independence movement grew in strength, chiefs have been accorded special recognition not only at the local level but also at the provincial and the national one. It is they who represent the African population in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament. They occupy the ten African seats in the senate, and eight of the 16 seats in the legislative council are "tribally" elected.

Moreover, they have been accorded special powers for dealing with their subjects who hold anti-government views (Nyangoni, 1976, p. 19).

The recognition of chiefs and councils as providing the basis of local administration and the primary means of "community development" presents the central government with problems. If Nyangoni is correct, it would appear that chieftaincy persists even for Africans as a valued institution (Nyangoni, 1976, p. 20). He asserts that "chieftaincy in Rhodesia has to be re-established according to tradition." He further observes that "the tribal succession laws must be observed and the power of the chiefs must be limited to their own people." If Nyangoni's sentiments are at all shared by the leaders of African independent movements local government may well be constructed on a precarious base, at least amongst the Shona. Weinrich has observed that "the intensity with which succession disputes are at present fought among the Karanga is due to European settlement in Rhodesia, a factor that prevents tribal migrations. Instead of splitting into two groups, Karanga chiefdoms have to settle their leadership problems through internal compromise" (Weinrich, 1969, p. 108). Factional disputes are then an intimate aspect of Shona chieftaincy.

The political system of the Shona is not an unusual type and with minor variations, is found in other parts of Central and East Africa. The Soga of Uganda had a very similar "traditional" system, one marked by conflict amongst royal collateral branches and the rapid proliferation of chiefdoms (Fallers, 1965). Under British rule government chiefs were appointed on the basis of their qualifications, a procedure not pursued in

Southern Rhodesia. Thus, many Southern Rhodesian Chiefs are poorly educated, conservative and unable to cope with the demands of rapid social, political and economic development. They may stand against a new, more educated elite which owes its position to education and its own economic achievements. From another perspective, the basic cleavages within the chieftdom may be represented on the councils of local government. The more progressive elected members may stand against the chief who may view them as an actual or potential threat to his authority; thus, he allies himself with the European District Commissioner and the policies of the central government. In their turn, the new elite by opposing the chief, also stands against the District Commissioner. Though there are chiefs who support the central government, there are also those who stand out against it and suffer the consequences for doing so. (Holleman, 1969 and Weinrich, 1969). Thus, one may expect neither the African populace nor the leaders of African nationalist movements to hold a uniform opinion concerning the continuation of chieftainship as a recognized institution of local government after independence.

For three reasons Zambia's experience may serve as the most ready basis for comparison with the transfer of power in Zimbabwe. The first reason is the historical and social connections and proximity of the two countries. The second is the support of President Kaunda for Joshua Nkomo and a peaceful transition to African rule. And finally, Zambia's policies toward local government may serve as a guide for the leaders of Zimbabwe. However, the comparison is appropriate only if the transfer of power is a peaceful one and one takes into account the differences which mark the two countries.

The system of local government in Northern and Southern Rhodesia was substantially the same, headmen were subordinate to chiefs, chiefs to European district commissioners and the last to provincial commissioners. The difference lay in the extent of authority delegated to African chiefs, headmen and councils. However, as indicated above the authority of Southern Rhodesian chiefs has gradually increased and placed them on a par with the chiefs of Northern Rhodesia. A basic difference in the two countries as they moved toward majority rule is that while Zambia had a highly organized mass party in the United National Independence Party (UNIP), the African independence movement in Southern Rhodesia is fragmented and divided into actively competing factions. Moreover, Zimbabwe political movements have not been allowed to build up internal political organizations, which could, if necessary, assume the burden and responsibility of local government.

The implications of this situation are that the existing structure of local government based on chiefs will be preserved and made use of in the short run. Moreover, because of the factional conflict within the independence movement, it is highly likely that European government officers will be retained and used to make the transition. Africanization of the civil service may be a gradual process intimately connected to the building, maintenance and extension of political support.

One may suggest then that a principal feature of the transitional period from European to African majority rule, whether peaceful or not, will involve a concerted effort on the part of the competing factions to attempt to consolidate political power. One aspect of the struggle will

entail competing to gain control of the regulatory organs of government such as the military and the police while at the same time, positioning personnel in both national and local governing bodies such as the civil service and the local councils and committees. The inter and intra cleavages of the principal political factions in Rhodesia are not conducive to a smooth and orderly transfer of powers and thus, the period of transition may be marked by temporary coalitions as different factions attempt to consolidate their powers. It is however unlikely that this process will take on an ethnic and regional expression, as was the case in Angola. In Angola each of the principal ethno-linguistic groupings produced an independence movement; for example, the initial and basic support of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) was amongst the six to seven hundred thousand Bakongo community of Northern Angola, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) among the two million Ovimbundu of the central Benguela plateau, and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) among the 1.3 million Mbandu peoples (Marcum 1976, pp. 410-411). Thus, the principal constituencies of the independence movements reflected ethno-linguistic cleavages and Angola was fragmented along regional lines.

In Southern Rhodesia the leadership and popular support of the different factions is less clearly defined and more heterogeneous in its social characteristics. From their very inception the independence movements in the form of the National Democratic Party (NDP), which was founded in 1960, and its successor, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) consisted of a cross section of the African population. Though originating

in the urban areas in 1961, ZAPU had widespread rural support. In 1962 it was banned by the government but its most serious challenge arose from the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). In 1963 the founding of ZANU split ZAPU's leadership. Its core consisted of a small but active cluster of intellectuals who were part of the new, highly educated and professional African elite. Many of the men who made up this core represented a dispersed, international community of university trained Zimbabweans. In 1963, the Report of the Secretary for Internal Affairs stated that two-hundred twenty-seven Zimbabweans were known to be studying overseas in higher institutions of education. Of the two-hundred twenty-seven, one was in Uganda, six in Australia, eighteen in India, forty-six in Britain, and one hundred fifty-six in the United States. In addition to the two hundred twenty-seven studying overseas, eighty-seven Africans were enrolled at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Report 1963, p. 19). (In 1976 West Africa estimates the number of university graduates at five thousand) (1976 Oct, p. 1475). Though representative of the new African middle class, ZANU also sought mass support and in 1963, had established sixty-four branches throughout the country (Shamuyarira 1965, p. 30). Thus, it bore a similarity to ZAPU in that it included rural peasants and urban workers but in addition it also included a larger component of university graduates; the leadership consisted of middle class, professional men (Van Velsen 1964, p. 154). A point for further research then is whether this pattern has persisted -- namely, whether ZANU's leadership remains representative of and rooted in the educated, professional elite and thus whether, as a political organization it may have at its disposal a pool of

highly trained and skilled personnel capable of managing the institutions of government. I would suggest further research to investigate the potential of each faction (or factional coalitions) to provide the necessary skills for managing the period of transition at both the national and local levels of government. It would also explore the interrelation of the social composition of parties, the extent to which they are representative of the pattern of African social stratification, and the manner in which they may articulate with the regulatory, governing and development oriented institutions, organizations and agencies of the Zimbabwe government.

From a comparative perspective it is clear that Zimbabwe will enter into majority rule with a larger number of trained graduates than both Malawi and Zambia combined had when they gained their independence. This may create problems in that at present, most government posts are staffed by Europeans who are local to the country. Zambia Africanized local government by gradually replacing European district and provincial officers with Zambians and by creating a new set of political posts at each level. There is a need for research into the manpower demands of both the public and private sectors in Rhodesia, as well as into the economic policies of the independence movements.

Now to conclude. The prospects for local government and community development cannot be considered without reference to the inter and intra factional cleavages in the independence movement represented in the leadership of Joshua Nkomo and Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole and Robert Mugabe, as well as to the "third force" and its leaders. Each faction of the independence movement which these men represent

has its own pool of human resources, its own external and internal constituencies, and its own body of general directives. The prospects of local government should be considered within the context not only of the independence movements but also in its relation to the regulatory and governing apparatus of the central government. The civil service, anchored as it is in the European middle class, may well serve as the basis for a working coalition with the more conservative sections of the African middle classes of the urban areas. There is, in other words, the potential for alliances and coalitions to be formed on the basis of developing common economic and political interests which transcend historical racial, ethnic and linguistic cleavages, against the threat of a radical reordering of society. Many chiefs and their councils and the more progressive farmers of the purchase areas may represent the rooting of the conservative section of the African urban middle class in the countryside. Thus during the period of transition to African majority rule each council may become an arena in which local and national interests are contested and different factions gain or lose support. There may be a gradual and uneasy resolution of differential power through the peaceful contesting of local councils, with occasional violent eruptions. Or, a central government may have to contend with a diffuse military force as each peasant community assesses its own position in relation to external incursions and internal central demands.

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NOTE:

The papers submitted to the Southern Africa Project by Goler T. Butcher Esq. were originally divided into six parts. These parts are:

PART I	:	BACKGROUND ANALYSES AND RELEVANT
PART II	:	FACTS
PART III	:	NAMIBIA
PART IV	:	CONCLUSION
PART V	:	APPENDICES
APPENDIX I	:	UDI AND THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS

The placement of these parts within this compilation of consultant's final reports is thus:

PARTS I, II, and APPENDIX I are located in Volume I - Zimbabwe under #2 BUTCHER PAPER, Policy Choices

PARTS III, IV, and V are located in Volume III Namibia under #1 BUTCHER PAPER Policy Choices