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NATIONAL POLITICS AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

OR WHOSE GAP IS SHOWING?

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National Politics and Agricultural Development
or Whose Gap Is Showing?

by Douglas E. Ashford
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Political science is not well prepared to answer questions about the political impact of rapid agricultural change, especially if these questions are posed at the national or macro-level. There are a number of less general questions that might be related to the inevitable effects of rapid agricultural change, but it is at the level of the system as a whole that I would like to concentrate, and where, judging from the turbulence of the past twenty years, our ability to anticipate events is woefully inadequate. Until the Biafran bloodbath Nigeria was widely regarded as the shining example of a constructive, federal government on a continent fragmented by colonial penetration. For nearly a decade Pakistan followed the very best of Western advice to foster economic growth, and Ayub was widely touted as the moderate but firm professional who would lead his country out of chaos. Turkey and Japan, who had the good fortune to grow before a political scientist said they might, have found their electoral processes strained and violence erupting in unforeseen situations. The cycle of hope and despair surrounding events in Argentina, Chile, Brazil and most of Latin America is enough to produce emotional exhaustion.

If academic capabilities for anticipating macro-level political change are deficient, it is no less the case for practitioners of world

politics, who sometimes argue that their intuitive knowledge and intimacy with third world elites offer more reliable ways of predicting change. The Soviet adventure in the U.A.R. has been costly and it remains doubtful if the U.A.R. has developed political institutions that can survive without immense external threat. Taiwan has survived, but has never made a significant change of leadership and, of course, has the Pacific fleet as its symbol of legitimacy. The United States' god-child, the Philippines, has an elaborate set of formal political institutions, but they appear unable to bring about widespread change in the country, nor have they curbed the capricious behavior of political leadership. I am increasingly drawn to the conclusion that the developing countries with significant macro-level innovation and with some degree of internal political viability are the countries that have avoided the major powers and that have carefully examined foreign political advice, such as Tanzania and India. I feel this conclusion stands the test of common sense, which is not entirely at odds with academic findings, that the best way to withstand and absorb change is to set it in motion yourself.

In surveying the future in order to anticipate the impact of rapid agricultural change, then, we are faced with a rather unhappy choice between the educated guesses of diplomats, aid experts and the military, and the still highly abstract models evolved in the literature of political development. Watching the toll of human waste and sufferings often associated with our intervention makes me feel that there is still a justification for inquiry to find better ways of conceptualizing and theorizing about large scale political interaction. Bentley did not solve the issues surrounding the National Rifle Association, or even foresee it, but he

provided a context for the analysis of groups that still underlies academic and practical thinking about groups in political life. Weber does not tell us much about how to train administrators or whether they can perform specific tasks, but he provides an essential element in theory that enables us to fit bureaucratic behavior into the context of a political system. Marx was surprisingly unconcerned about nationalized industry and minimum wage laws, but his penetration into the basic dilemmas of authority in the liberal state is unequalled in political thought. Thus, to consider the macro-level means, I fear, that general statements are badly needed if we hope to understand authority, legitimacy and political institutions. One could treat these theoretical excursions lightly if they did not shape our thinking on a wide range of more specific, concrete questions, and perhaps even influence the course of events in independent ways.

Macro-theory, then, is not going to tell us how many grain silos to build, how to maintain stable grain prices, or even how to train new administrators and experts to manage the growing crops. Macro-theory of politics is essentially about the exchange of authority and influence among a large population in a given area of land. Authority is the use of the nationally structured power by an apparatus called "government," while influence is all the remaining power that might be exercised in the society, which may or may not affect authority. Almond has suggested that we demarcate authority further by associating it with the coercive authority of the state, and this, of course, has a long and respectable tradition in political thought. My own feeling is that this creates a dichotomous notion of how people influence one another in society and also implies at least that members of the society not acting as agents of authority have no coercion,

which is patently false. Whether you observe an Indian peasant scrubbing a buffalo or an American driver stopping at traffic lights, it seems to me that coercion has much less to do with the structuring of power in society than most political scientists think. Indeed, the widespread and frequent use of coercion in either the governmentally or non-governmentally defined realm of political interaction is very sensibly regarded as failure. Governments, businesses and thugs can use coercion to achieve their aims, but most of us would not consider this a very interesting political relationship, nor one that calls for very refined theory in order to be understood.

If the rudiments of a macro-theory of political systems involve the interaction of authority and influence, then attaching meanings to these terms should enable political scientists to devise various schemes to anticipate how power will be used at the national level. While there have been some important advances in this direction, most notably the work of Easton,[2] there is no macro-theory of national level politics that compares, for example, with the well articulated macro-theory of economics or even the elaborate, if somewhat controversial, theories of social stratification. It may help in understanding this "gap" in political theory to specify a bit more clearly why the concept of power has not proved as amenable to theoretical elaboration as the concepts of social class or production. The basic reason was, I think, spelled out by Simon some years ago[3] in his discussion of the assymetrical quality of power. The difficult problem of macro-theory is not methodological, that is, assigning a value to a given political interaction. If this were the case we would have long ago adopted some of the useful theories that already exist in other disciplines. But

operationalizing the concept of power or various sub-types such as authority or influence will be of little use until we have a better way of specifying the amount of power in a system and the possible transformations of power that are possible with any given combination of types of power. Because political relationships clearly seem to be non-zero sum games, this has proved difficult indeed to do for entire systems.

Our difficulty in providing a truly systematic analysis of the macro-level impact of agricultural change may be clearer if I note the three kinds of problems that require solutions if these very abstract ideas are to become useful theories. In the absence of a reasonably workable notion of specifying how much power a system contains, one cannot make even nominal comparisons among systems, or among variations in kinds of power within the system. To put it simply, we cannot say in any very useful way that a political system is becoming larger or smaller, more diverse or less diverse, or higher capability or lower capability.[4] The problem of devising nominal comparisons is largely typological, and it is, therefore, not surprising that political scientists still engage in the Aristotelian pastime of classifying entire systems. I'm not sure if 2000 years later we have made significant progress! A second problem is that we have no good way of speaking about power at the system level in distributive terms, though there is a good deal of interesting work being done on exchange theories of politics.[5] The economists devised the marketplace to handle this problem and sociologists have the notion of social mobility to theorize about exchanging social class characteristics. The possibility of treating political systems as some version of an input-output matrix might, at least in

its initial stages, avoid the problem of attaching nominal differences to kinds of power

A third problem, which seems to me to mark the critical development of most theories of social action, is that we have no very precise way transforming political variables, at least at the system level. This is what has been called the "macro-micro" question in politics and lies at the core of understanding structural change in political systems.[6] Political science is, of course, overflowing with structural theories, but most of these have very limited application. Nearly all institutionally specified theories about the Presidency, parliamentary mandates, pressure groups, representation, and such, are structural theories, but of a very low level of generality and, hence, not very helpful outside the circumstances used to explain the political interaction to which they are directed. It has become almost professional etiquette in political science to claim that one hopes only to devise an "intermediate theory" of the typological, exchange or structural sort, but I tend to discount this as false modesty. There a bit of the Keynes or Marx lurking in the mind of every scholar, and I suspect that we all would like very much to make some fundamental contribution to one of the three problems that are basic to more useful theorizing about political systems.

ie "green revolution" will surely have changed its color before these questions are resolved, but it may help to see some illustrations of intermediate theories about macro-level change might be applied to rapid agricultural change. From the typological perspective, the growth of agricultural resources and the radical transformation of rural work habits, etc., imply a sudden, and possibly dislocating, shift between authority and

influence. I think we have finally learned that all revolutions of a political nature do not originate in Moscow or Peking. Clearly, a number of developing countries with fragile governments are going to be hard-pressed to relate the growing influence of the farmer to the authority of the state. From the exchange perspective, there are some intriguing questions about how the new influence of the countryside will be converted into policies involving both the demands and the benefits of government. One can take as his base line either the vastly over-represented Kansas farmer or the unruly Algerian peasant, and it is clear that farmers are quite skillful in bargaining for power. Agricultural products are a political resource, and one need only glance at the turbulent relations between East and West Pakistan to see how dislocations of this kind can disrupt a political system. From the structural perspective, the problems are endless. Educational systems will be re-oriented, administrations will be re-directed, and leadership will expand. Many of these problems have already been encountered in developmental projects of the past two decades, though we still lack a framework by which to relate this experience to the massive change in agriculture that has been set in motion.

Perhaps the first question to which we should address ourselves is whether or not dramatic increases in food production will increase or decrease the authority of the state. Such a question is difficult to answer in the abstract, but some rough conclusions can be drawn, I think, from the past two decades of experience with agricultural development. Power is much more concentrated in a less developed country than in a complex society with a viable economy. There is, of course, a good deal of diffused power which supports and orients local and family affairs of the population un-

touched by development, and except for a few basic state functions, remote from the political relationships bearing on government. But I am putting aside those political relations that are incapable of being engaged in the on-going political system. This means that in fact many governments in developing countries have great authority over a very limited range of activity and a relatively small proportion of the population. If we take power to mean influencing another's behavior,[7] and national power to mean how this is done with the network of political relationships affecting national government, then we might pause to ask if many developing countries have national political systems. Despite the large number of Cadillac limousines in front of the United Nations, political systems vary immensely in the extent to which their pattern of political relationships at the macro-level can influence citizens, and vice versa.

Compared to the industrial nations, then, less developed countries have fairly limited authority in relation to the entire population, but very great authority over those who have entered into national politics. In a sense, to be politicized in a less developed country often means accepting authority more than acquiring influence. Agricultural development, like other forms of socio-economic change, poses very serious threats to such a system. The resources, products and social activity generated by miracle rice may suddenly, perhaps fatally, dislocate the compressed, relatively effective pattern of authority of those fortunate enough to be involved in national politics. The early reactions of many developing countries bear out this conclusion. Thus, Pakistan first tried to extend agricultural services and credit through giant Agricultural Development Corporations which could, it was thought, be more easily controlled by the military-

administrative elite of the country. More recently, Tanzania has nationalized a number of enterprises, and Nyerere now finds himself more engaged in controlling his officials than his people. An interesting history of Philippine development could be written around the number of agencies funded to assist developmental activities, and which declined into a state of atrophy once the authorities siphoned off the funds. My feeling is that we are too quick to attribute these events to the motives of elites even though political leaders may be dishonest or short-sighted. The Office of Economic Opportunity has had a few problems, too! A much more satisfactory answer to me is that concentrated, exclusive patterns of power resist change.

One doesn't need to spend too much time in an Indian village or African shamba to discover why political leaders prefer a Madison Avenue existence, but their attitudes toward power are hardly unique to less developed countries. Thus, even a few general statements about the pattern of power in less developed countries suggests to me that agricultural development on a large scale and with huge returns will place great strain on these governments, even if the farmers were complacent and virtually detached from the national political system. The political systems of most developing countries, and here I would include governments as diverse as the Moroccan monarchy and the Mexican one-party system, are capable of handling relatively small "amounts" of power. The first impuse of the elite sharing authority is to compress the new power into the old system rather than to perform radical surgery on the system. I would argue this is a major problem <u>even if</u> leaders were paragons of public virtue and political relationships within the small scale system were stable, democratic or otherwise promising. The most important thing about understanding macro-

level change is that power must expand along with the economy and the society, but that it seldom can do so in the existing structures of authority and influence.

The growth now contemplated in the agricultural development of most developing countries means that the amount of power within the national system will dramatically increase, that the ratio between authority and influence among those engaged in the system will be radically altered, and that the structural requirements are probably far in excess of what most less developed countries can themselves provide. In each of the three meanings I have attached to power at the macro-level, the new countries are in trouble. First, the scale of political relationships will alter and many nations that have been so in name only will now be increasingly nationalized as the amount of power enlarges the system. Second, the exchange problem between authority and influence will become bewilderingly complex with new markets, richer farmers, more worried landlords, dispersed agro-businesses, growing market towns, and the rest. And third, the structural problems will proliferate. One of the most interesting events to follow will be to see if the small pool of leadership and administrative expertise can effectively allocate its services to a geographically and substantively far more dispersed activity than they have given attention to in the past.

Why Are Political Systems Comparable?

If macro-theory is something less than useful, it may be more profitable to look briefly at the general characteristics of the research that has been done on political development in search of clues concerning the possible effects of rapid agricultural change. I think it is important to first

recognize that this is a relatively new field, growing rapidly with the liberation of Africa and Asia from colonial rule and with the emergence of national awareness in Latin America. Theory leads the way in the emergence of a discipline, and most politicaly theory prior to World War II had little or no bearing on the Third World. The early efforts since the war have been to try to make some overall sense out of the full range of less developed countries, and not too surprisingly this began with an interest in how democratic regimes seem to originate. It was also influenced by the availability of data, and by the available concepts to organize data, many of them borrowed from sociology and economics. With these preliminary statements, let us look at the two major areas of comparative inquiry now established, cross-national comparison using aggregate data and elite studies.

The aggregate analysis of political development stems from early work of Deutsch and Lipset nearly a decade ago. Both felt that the pattern of social differentiation, reflected in aggregate social and economic indicators, could be related to political change. However, the theoretical justification advanced by each was quite different. Lipset was interested in extremism in political behavior, and his general proposition was that as socio-economic differences increased, a political system would become less stable. In addition, as levels of development improved, political stability and political democracy would be enhanced.[8] A bit later Deutsch advanced a more complex theory involving the interdependence of mobilization and differentiation across nations. In its formulation, if not its application, Deutsch's theory avoided the linearity of the Lipset view by allowing for the possibility that a changing society might be either over-mobilized or

over-differentiated.[9] The general conclusion, based on a massive correlation matrix, was that some form of balance needed to be kept between social mobilizing forces such as literacy, education, urbanization, etc., and the pace of economic change.

There have been a number of attempts to improve on the very general conclusions possible from these early forays into aggregate data. Coleman produced a more explicit comparison with stages of political development, using nominal classification of political systems.[10] Cutwright then produced a more intricate correlation trying to devise measures of the complexity of political institutions in order to have interval measures of politics.[11] The data from a number of these studies has been combined in an attempt to compare the various measures of political development, but the conclusions remain ambiguous.[12] It remains in doubt whether forms of social or economic change produce any characteristic kind of political change, which of these has greater bearing on politics, or whether we can in any valid fashion talk about the differentiation of political systems in comparing nations. There are a number of very good critiques of the aggregate approach to understanding political development.[13] The basic problem has not, in my opinion, been clearly specified and that is that correlational methods, even when problems of data, procedures and classification are perfected, do not bear very directly on the historic and common-sense issues of political systems. More than any other sub-system of society, political systems depend on hierarchical structures that can modify themselves, and on the maintenance of the elusive but essential quality of legitimacy or general support. Political systems differ substantially from other subsystems because they carry out two conflicting aims: creating binding judg-

ments and laying the groundwork for the next cycle of judgments. The evidence that it is easier to perform these functions in a rich or industrial nation, i.e., a highly differentiation society, than in a poor or agricultural nation remains inconclusive.

With the accumulation of better data, the possibility exists of course that we can control for some key factors in political development and begin to deal more effectively with some structural problems of political change. For example, one of the central experiences of rapid change is urbanization. However, the early findings suggest that we may have exaggerated the effects of urbanization. A study of urbanization in Latin America indicates that as a psychological experience it may not be nearly as dislocating as once assumed.[14] Studies drawing more heavily on the European experience raise questions over whether or not it is urbanization or industrialization that affect participation.[15] Others have found that the concentration of population may as readily decrease as increase political participation.[16] Reviewing the literature on urbanization placed in the framework of aggregate analysis suggests that the political effects associated with urbanization, and indirectly with urban growth that might be anticipated from agricultural development, are not striking. From a theoretical perspective, it remains uncertain in the light of aggregate analysis how either urbanization or industrialization relate to an on-going political process.

The second major area of interest has been in elite studies, in part stimulated by the work of Laswell and Lerner before the war. One of the things that political systems are unmistakably involved in is leadership, and the early writing on political development spoke at length about the

ambiguity of political roles, the need to recruit leaders, the co-optation of positions, etc., in less developed countries. If the aggregate view erred in becoming almost epiphenomenal, the students of elitists erred by becoming unmanagably concrete. Nearly every country monograph on the Third World dealt in detail with the existing leadership, its origins and power. Some enormous blunders were made by trying to build theories that fit a scholar's country rather than theories that made sense. More than one Africanist would like to forget Nkrumah, Obote or Ben Bella!

Some of the more detailed elite studies have revealed important characteristics of national systems, which might be kept in mind as we watch what might be changed in the leadership of countries under pressure for change. For example, the Frey study of Turkey over thirty years shows that the military elite did much less to reduce military influence than the generally accepted view of Turkey's political transformation suggests.[17] Leadership is tied to generational change, and leaders are reluctant to give up power. More important, elite analysis requires a theoretical framework to acquire significance for a political system. An interesting example is a recent essay of the Needlemans' outlining four theories about the Mexican Presidency, any one of which would lead to very different conclusions about the effects of rapid change in that country.[18] Is the Mexican president omnipotent from a purely elitist view; a focus of competing interests and often a stalemated figure; a critical central figure in a complex bureaucratic process; or the ascendant leader propelled by a popular, mobilizing party? Answers to these questions can help immensely in anticipating how pressures from agricultural change may affect specific problems

of government, but they do less to help us understand more clearly the differential impact of the agricultural change on the political system.

Though it is an exaggeration, I feel that the shortcoming of much of the above work on developing countries has been the failure to deal with the interdependence of policy or goal definition and the systemic or support needs of a government. This relates to my earlier argument about the difficulties of theorizing about power, and more specifically to the structural requirements of a political system. In the absence of an agreed basis for reciprocity (1) in the exercise of power, (2) the exchange of power or (3) the modification of the structures aggregating and articulating power in the system, neither the elite nor differentiation approach can produce very useful findings. The analyst of elites believes that goal determination is the essential ingredient of a working political system, while the implicit theory of the aggregate analyst has been that sufficient differentiation tends to produce the integrative mechanisms needed to adjust to a new authority-influence relationship in the political system. It is not so much that the concrete findings of either framework are useless or, worse, misleading, but that neither can have very clear meaning unless one makes important assumptions about the other.

Aggregate analysis, and its highly abstract counterpart in systems theory, has difficulty in telling us how leaders achieve power, make decisions and exercise authority. Elite studies say little about how sufficient tolerance of government emerges to provide the respect and minimal observance necessary to legitimacy. The issue is not just methodological, but conceptual. Inferences can be drawn from findings about the general socio-economic structure of a political system only by assuming that the leaders will be there tomorrow, an error we have made in a number of de-

veloping countries. Inferences can be drawn from findings about elites only by assuming that the general pattern of social and economic change in the society is indeed being taken into account in their calculations and effectively related to central authority. Problems such as rapid agricultural change present situations where both elites and settings will be transformed, and we have no way of dealing with these problems with any degree of useful specificity. If we want to anticipate the impact of the "green revolution" on national governments, it seems necessary to consider both the authoritative reactions of elites and the less direct effects of a radically changed environment in a much wider field of influence brought to bear on government.

The shortcomings of confining our analysis of the impact of the massive changes expected from the "green revolution," at either the removed level of elite interaction or the general level of the social system, suggest to me that we need to consider more carefully several intermediate structural relationships. In the next section I will illustrate how I would apply such an approach using the Tunisian experience. I would pose three basic structural problems in trying to assess the effects of agricultural at the national level: the allocation of rewards and benefits, the altered structure for the mobilization of political support, and problems arising from institutional and organizational proliferation. Political analysis at the national level would be much easier if these effects could somehow be treated in equivalent terms, e.g., a given degree of new benefits was "worth" so many units of support. As I have argued above, I think we are unable to do this. A second simplification, that is quite unrealistic, would be to assume that modifications of any one of the structural problems left others

unaffected. Obviously this is not the case in actuality because increasing regular farm employment, for example, means making institutional changes in banking, the monetary system, social security and welfare activities, to name only a few.

In addition, any one of these structural changes can be seen to occur in a field where authority and influence do not remain in some constant relationship, assuming, of course, that comparative theory were able to specify such a relationship in useful terms. It is extremely difficult to predict if enlarging governmental authority, for example, by initiating a number of agricultural support agencies will be accompanied by some roughly proportional, not to mention favorable, increase in political support. If we could answer such a question precisely, we would have a measure of centralization, that is, if authority were increasing more rapidly than influence a system would become more centralized. As I suggested above, my feeling is that technological change involving large amounts of capital, increased foreign dependence, and greater need for coordination tends to have a centralizing effect on national politics. On the other hand, if we could get even a rough measure of how the influence structure was increasing, we would have a crude idea of potential destabilizing effects on authority. Surely the increased productivity of millions of farmers, the release from the threat of famine, the more complex marketing structure will, in turn, make it possible for more diverse and probably less predictable forms of influence to be brought to bear on the authoritative structure of the political system. These problems might be summarized in a paradigm as follows:

National Political System



While I have no desire to make excessive claims for the paradigm, I think it does indicate a variety of changes that often are not associated with increasing centralization of authority and in fact may work out to be such. In estimating the effects of agricultural change we might begin to assess the extent to which proposed or anticipated structural changes enhance or diminish the authoritative structure of government. In some situations, which I consider essentially correct in the Tunisian case, the extension of participatory mechanisms and the mobilization of support for agricultural change has been highly subordinated to central authority. While the system as a whole looked at in aggregate terms became more diverse, organizationally and institutionally, most of these changes have been closely linked to the central government. Likewise, the distribution of new economic rewards and benefits, while having some equalizing effects and based on an equalitarian ideology, has probably meant proportional or even greater rewards for those aligned with the central authority of government. Each of these dimensions of change could, of course, be roughly estimated for any political system. I would argue that much of the everyday assessment and evaluation ordinarily done in a country undertaking massive projects like

the conversion of the agricultural system can be looked at in this perspective.[19] Let me repeat, the issue in understanding national level change where major social and political reorganization is underway is not methodological, but one of theory and concept.

Of what use is the centralization-decentralization concept in assessing national-level change? Very simply, I think that it tells us whether a system is moving so completely toward an authoritative government that the political system may become dependent on coercion, or whether at the other extreme influence is being so widely dispersed in a society that the political system is bordering on chaos. The predominance of coercion or the deterioration into chaos are, in my view, equally destructive to the political system, and there are numerous examples of each. The Pre-Castro Cuban regime was so heavily dependent on coercion, and related forms of police rule and manipulation, that the leadership was unable to deal effectively with any of the major structural problems of the society. The disintegration of Sukarno's Indonesia appears to be an example of a system so dependent on one personality and so unable to institutionalize reforms, albeit in an unhospitable environment for institutional change, that the severe social dislocation took hundreds of thousands of lives before authority could be restored. So long as macro-theory concentrates on the two limiting conditions of a working political system, I doubt that we can begin to make the assessments needed to foresee, for example, the impact of rapid agricultural change.

The centralization-decentralization dimension as conceived here provides a rough guide to the <u>changing</u> interdependence of authority and influence in a political system. This has been one of the basic points of Eisenstadt's work on comparative institutional change, where he argues that the

development of a political system, as contrasted with simply the expansion of the system, involves the re-ordering of relationships among institutions, rewards and support.[20] A political system can become "larger" without changing, and it is important to see that these changes in scale may or may not involve change in the system. The entire history of industrialization, increased participation, and institutional proliferation in modern states indicates that it is virtually impossible to sustain a similar balance between authority and influence as the society changes. To use a slightly overdrawn illustration, if the United States were today as centralized as most governments of Africa and Asia, political interaction would be virtually paralyzed. This may seem paradoxical, but is, I think, correct if we look candidly at the actual extension of the <u>national</u> political system. At this point, I would remind you of my earlier argument that the national political system of most less developed countries is more dependent on authority than that of most highly developed countries.

In most developing countries influence is largely disconnected from government, operating through traditional, village or kinship structures that are difficult, if not impossible, to bring to bear on authority at the national level. The authority of government is generally concentrated in capitals and major urban centers. Only recently has the rural sector been considered an important area for the extension of governmental authority, and this largely under the influence of peasant revolutionary movements and major social crises, whose ultimate effect, like famine or food imports, cripples the central authority. Thus, the structural changes I have outlined as part of the process of nationalizing the political system tend to mean <u>both</u> the extension of authority and the dispersion of influence, but

also entail relatively more expansion of the structures of influence. Where major social and political changes are contemplated, neither increasing authority or influence alone may be enough. The first tends to increase reliance on coercion, thereby inhibiting change, while the second in the absence of linkage to national politics encourages the frustrations and failures that lead to social revolution.

The centralization-decentralization concept, then, can be fully understood only by taking into account both problems of scale, i.e., nationalizing the political system, and of proportion, i.e., changing the relationship between authority and influence. The agricultural revolution anticipated by recent technological innovations, and already underway in some countries, will involve both transformations. As the system grows, i.e., changes in scale, it may not develop, or do so only as firmly challenged by those with increased influence. Farmers, as I have noted, have very special ways of nationalizing their influence for they can withhold or destroy crops very easily. The answer is by no means the same for every country, but I would doubt how much widespread change can occur in a political system by altering scale only. Most developing countries have, in my opinion, done precisely this and then have faced major crises as new centers of influence arise unrelated to government or even seek to displace governments. In some cases they have found it necessary to reduce the complexity of the structural links to authority by holding back or vastly simplifying their developmental plans. This appears to have been the Tunisian experience which is, I think, an intriguing example of a popular and innovative government that has found it very difficult to nationalize the political system in the rural sector.

Political Effects of Agricultural Change in Tunisia

Tunisia is an instructive illustration of the issues raised above for a number of reasons. First, under an energetic nationalist leader, Bourguiba, the country developed an active nationalist party, the Neo-Destour, in the 1930's and nationalist protest continued until independence was granted in 1956. To a much greater extent than most developing countries, Tunisia has developed a network of national organizations and national self-awareness. Thus, Tunisia meets an important criteria in judging the effects of rapid agricultural change in the present context, it is unmistakably a national political system.[21] When one looks at the effect at the national level of recent agricultural reforms in Tunisia, one can safely assume that the resultant stresses and strains were effectively linked into national politics, a situation which I doubt extends much beyond the national elite in a number of developing countries.

Second, Tunisia set out under the Plan Décennale to alter the society in dramatic, structural ways. The intent of Bourguiba and his ministers was to redistribute income, create employment and to restructure agriculture radically.[22] The Tunisian experiment was no half-hearted, cautious move to placate a restive peasantry, nor did it espouse typically Western views on agricultural reform. The plan was avowedly socialist in its purposes, received the full support of the President and the single party leadership, and was accompanied by major governmental re-organization to achieve its ends. This is extremely important in the light of my earlier comments. The Tunisian government made no attempt to conceal the structural effects of redistributing rewards and benefits, of finding new avenues of participation, and of creating the organizational structure for these changes. Despite the

troubles that later descended on the Tunisian government, which I will argue stem largely from the national system rather than from the reforms themselves. Tunisia represents one of the most wholehearted and thorough experiments in major agricultural change that we have.

Third, the Tunisian rural economy, while not blessed by the recent technological achievements of special interest at the moment, was by no means a backward, peasant agrarian society.[23] Tunisia is a small country, and even in remote areas there are major towns linking the rural sector into markets and the political-administrative structure of the country. Though not on the scale of the other North African nations, Tunisia was occupied by over 200,000 foreigners who left behind substantial technological experience and infrastructure. Some 5000 foreign settlers were engaged in agriculture, although by the time of land nationalization in 1964 this number had been reduced to under 2000. The settlers were concentrated on wheat lands in the northern regions where they had farmed large areas with modern methods. In addition, the importance of various kinds of fruit and vegetable production had encouraged the Tunisian farm population, roughly two-thirds of the national population of 4.5 million, to develop the skills and methods of more advanced farmers. Until recently Tunisia lacked miracle wheat, but the country did have a comparatively advanced, modernized agricultural sector.

Hence, as we consider the national impact of rapid agricultural change, I think it is appropriate to examine more closely a country that has a number of political advantages absent in much of Africa and Asia. Where countries have less in the way of a working, national political system, one can, I feel, expect even greater dislocations than those that transpired in

Tunisia. As I have noted, if macro-theory could tell us more specifically how national system is, these calculations could be more exact, but it is not difficult to make rough comparisons. Early in her independence Tunisia produced a constitution and a national assembly, both subservient to the wishes of the dynamic President and the powerful Neo-Destour. Built much like a city-state, Tunis provided a natural capital for the sizeable middle class which was prepared to administer the affairs of state. The Neo-Destour had its difference with Nasserist critics and a more militantly socialist clique in the cities, but installed itself as the unchallenged political power across the country. Bourguiba has been masterful in absorbing the blows from pro-French, pro-Nasser, pro-Algerian groups within the party, successively smothering them with his own nationalist fervor and luring them into important government posts.[24]

In relation to the scheme outlined above, Tunisia was clearly centralizing the political system over roughly the first decade of independence. In addition to the essential nation-building activities already mentioned, the labor unions, the party organization, and the Presidency itself became increasingly exclusive and centrally controlled. Traditional Muslim institutions were quickly dismantled. In 1958 the partial dispersion of power through local selection of provincial party committees was eliminated, and centrally appointed delegates were instituted. At the level of the province political and administrative power was merged in the office of Governor, and little was done to generate any countervailing force with stronger local government or pressure groups. In fact, one can fairly conclude, however important this phase was in Tunisia's political transformation, that by 1961 the country was so thoroughly centralized that the implementation and execu-

tion of an ambitious national plan was jeopardized. There was no question about where authority lay in Tunisia, but the residual field of activity, called influence above, hardly existed in the tightly centralized, and on the whole well administered, political system.

My basic argument concerning the agricultural revolution that never transpired in Tunisia is that there was too much authority and not enough influence. Essentially, the Tunisian elite hoped, or inadvertently assumed, that the closely coordinated, highly predictable authority relationships that kept a party organization of privileged, educated citizens in order could be transferred intact and unmodified to the agricultural sector, indeed to the entire economy and society of Tunisia. Their strategy was to make a change in scale in the Tunisian political system, but not to make any changes in proportions. Remember, I am not arguing that the specific agricultural programs were necessarily well conceived or economically viable, which is itself a question depending on the authorities' judgment. I am interested only in analyzing what happened to a political system that intentionally set out to absorb the full impact of a radical re-organization of the agricultural sector. Perhaps the Tunisian elite tried to do too much, but if this is the case it will multiply so in countries with more fragile political systems, less human resources, and only minimal recognition of full complexity of the national repercussions of agrarian transformations.

Having recognized the importance of basic structural reform touching the lives of all citizens, the Tunisian government set out to re-organize the agricultural sector around production, service and consumer cooperatives. These plans, initially formulated in the early 1960's, received additional impulse when negotiations for the re-purchase of settled farmland, about

300,000 hectares of wheatlands in the north, broke down in 1964 and Bourguiba decided to nationalize these farms. Given the aim of basic structural change in agriculture, the alternative of renting these relatively rich farms to wealthy Tunisian farmers was unacceptable, and the possibility of using them wholly as state farms was unworkable in the absence of institutions to continue their cultivation. Thus, what had begun as a fairly limited experiment in production cooperatives gathered momentum, in part from land nationalization and in part from the energetic execution of the national plan under Ben Salah, the minister in charge of a super-ministry including finance, commerce, agriculture and, eventually, education.

The production cooperatives are of primary interest in the present context. They were organized in all regions of the country under a standard law and under a general committee of each provincial Governor, the Union Régional de Cooperatives. I have reviewed the overall scheme elsewhere and will not repeat.[25] Suffice to say that by the end of 1966, roughly the time when the national implications of the scheme were beginning to appear, a total of 779 co-ops of all kinds had been organized including 206 thousand members. At this point one could see that the national impact was becoming clearer, for the program had then affected about ten per cent of the active population. In addition, this ten per cent had by governmental design been placed in a highly influential position, even if at that time they did not realize it. By the beginning of 1966 there were some 246 agricultural production co-ops with nearly 40,000 members, including approximately 280 thousand hectares,[26] nearly half of the cultivable land in Tunisia. If the dispersion of influence along organizational and participatory lines was not visible to the Tunisian elite, there is no excuse for not realizing how

substantial had become their obligation to restructure rewards and benefits in the political system.[27]

The implications of such a massive re-organization of the rural sector was not, nor could it have been, hidden. In this Bourguiba and his now fallen favorite, Ben Salah, were in perfect agreement. Well before the political elite saw the complications of the huge system of cooperatives, the pace of change increased sharply. In 1966-67 the number of agricultural production co-ops increased from 246 to 682, and their acreage also more than doubled to 614 thousand hectares. The governmental reaction at this time was to further centralize the organization. Ben Salah announced plans in 1966 to establish a national office of the provincial unions, which would provide central representation for the growing scheme. Within this superstructure, for which no detailed plans existed to achieve links to the membership of the cooperatives, would be concentrated co-ops for a large share of manufacturing; nearly all exporting and importing; and all supply and marketing of wheat, wine, clothing, fish, dates, olives, handicrafts and textiles. Another step toward centralization was the merger in 1967 of two large rural development projects in the Sousse region into a giant co-operative of over a million hectares. In areas where membership was concentrated, Tunis, Kef and Sfax, central purchasing co-ops were begun, directed against the small, independent merchants from whom Ben Salah had never disguised his distaste. In late 1967 Ben Salah announced plans to launch a major new program of cooperatives in the Nabeul (Cap Bon) region, a stronghold of the small Tunisian farmer and one of the country's most intensely cultivated areas.[28]

The full dimensions of the political impact of this expansion is difficult to estimate. Ben Salah claimed in early 1967 that twenty per cent of the total active population of the country was organized in cooperatives of all kinds, and about three-fourths of cultivable land was in production co-ops. Three circumstances seem reasonably clear. First, the entire program was highly centralized and linked to Ben Salah's superministry. There was relatively little grassroots control and the regional superstructure was also under tight central control. The consequent local problems were known to Ben Salah and substantiated by investigations by Tunisian scholars. Second, communication through this complex organization was very poor and financial accountability almost impossible. The country lacked trained accountants and supervisors, though Ben Salah made a major effort to increase their numbers. An evaluation of the Tunisian Productivity Institute in 1967 stated that the co-ops' "commercial functions are very unevenly exercised" and that the "accounting and statistical functions constitute a bottleneck."[29] Third, at this critical juncture the massive reform still received priority over all other projects. The President continued to express unreserved support for Ben Salah, and even Ladgham, who later became one of the most bitter critics of Ben Salah, joined the party elite to defend the co-ops in the countryside.[30]

The recrimination and exposures that followed the failure of these ambitious plans have not, in my view, done justice to the Tunisian experience because they do not sufficiently take into account the extent to which the scheme became a threat to the authority of the state itself. There will, of course, be institutional variations from country to country as this happens, but I consider this risk virtually unavoidable where the political elite are

unable or unwilling to deal with basic change at the national level. There are a number of reasons why the cooperative venture failed, including some very serious droughts, lack of expertise, coercive methods, and in the final phase some rare revelations of simple dishonesty among Tunisian officials. Analytically speaking, there is a great difference between looking for a necessary condition that was absent, and trying to unravel what are the sufficient conditions for successful prediction. Most of the explanations thus far have been based on the necessary conditions, any one of which would very likely explain why the experiment could not succeed. But these reasons are not very useful at the national level, for it is virtually impossible to complete such a list and they are in actuality affected by the effectiveness of the élite themselves. The best explanation of the failure of the cooperatives is the unforeseen political problem at the national level.

To understand why this occurred we must, I think, return to my earlier arguments about the disjointed character of a political system, which make both the aggregate and elite views incomplete. Bringing authority and influence into a working relationship requires both a process of political socialization through which people learn about the use of influence and a process of succession whereby the elite can determine how they will be replaced, at the moment of death if no shorter period of office is recognized.[31] Tunisia was perhaps unfortunate, though hardly unique among less developed countries, in having crises with both these problems simultaneously. Very little had been done during the 60's to generate a sense of real participation among thousands of Tunisians, both within and without the cooperatives, and virtually nothing had been accomplished toward resolving an obvious crisis of leadership with the aging of the President. The rudimentary

structure of representation at the base of the party was gone, and a number of arbitrary authorities put in its place in the name of the economic growth. The National assembly was a facade, and party approval was needed to run for office. Party congresses were regularly postponed, and when held were geared to momentous national celebrations. The party's Political Bureau and the cabinet were heavily overlapping and co-opted

The succession crisis has been on the minds of every Tunisian, not the least the elite themselves. An elementary law of elite behavior might be that the more concentrated authority becomes, the more difficult it is to select a successor. Under the circumstances neither the participatory mechanisms nor the tolerance among leaders are likely to be developed to transfer authority smoothly. This certainly was the case in Tunisia, where no one dared challenge the President but no one knew how he might be replaced. The constitution provides (art. 51) a weak provision for an interim-president selected by the cabinet and the National Assembly. After the attempt on Bourguiba's life in late 1962, discussions began more seriously and in the 1964 party congress the President himself outlined how a party Central Committee, elected by each party congress, would convene to select a new President. In March 1966 this procedure was modified with the decision to form a Council of the Republic, including the cabinet and the Political Bureau, to provide interim-authority. When Ben Salah fell from favor in late 1969, another initiative was taken by designating Ladgham as Prime Minister, with implicit responsibility for ruling until the National Assembly can act. The legal provisions are not as important, as the indication of indecision and uncertainty at the highest level of authority in the political system, and

implicitly that the elite themselves preferred no solution to one that did not favor their individual views.

With this background to the impending crisis of authority in the Tunisian political system, which I would attribute to its excessive centralization, I would like to return to the erosion of the program for major agricultural change. In January 1969 there was a revolt among small farmers at Ouardenine, a town in the midst of an area where the party had long been popular. At the same time Ben Salah announced a proposed agrarian reform law, which was never publicly released, and organized a new national organization, the Union Nationale des Coopératives, as the capstone to the entire cooperative structure. Ben Salah proposed to make agrarian reform the theme of the party congress, then planned for October 1969, and his new organization of some 500 cooperative representatives would clearly become a new force in national politics.[32] Amid reports of destruction of farm property and telephone lines in the Nabeul region, Ben Salah announced early in the summer that by the end of the year over four million hectares of land would be transferred to cooperatives, probably including a third of the rural adult population.

When the President, now quite ill, visited his home in Monastir over the summer, old friends declined to visit him and it appears that the full extent of the impending crisis of the cooperatives was realized. In a speech in early August Bourguiba made passing reference to the problems of the cooperatives and noted that popular enthusiasm was essential to their success.[33] A month later Ladgham publicly denied that the party was split over "reactionary and progressive" views on development, and also announced that the agrarian reform law was being reconsidered. Over these weeks the resistance to

Ben Salah must have become overpowering, and on September 8, 1969, the architect of Tunisian development was reduced to a minister of education, Ladgham became "general coordinator of state affairs," and members of the political elite forced from office by Ben Salah were permitted to air their grievances in the controlled press.

One must appreciate the unanimity and profession of singular loyalty that characterize the one-party state to understand the significance of the deluge of abuse and protest subsequently heaped on Ben Salah. Ladgham spoke of the nation narrowly averting "a catastrophe" and Bourguiba himself appeared before the National Assembly to accuse Ben Salah of being an agitator and disloyal.[34] Oddly enough, the fallen minister was permitted to run for election to the National Assembly, but by late November had been ousted from the party and therefore disqualified. In the following months Ben Salah was brought to trial for abusing his power and sentenced to ten years at hard labor. The cooperative program was abruptly halted, and many of the production cooperatives simply seized by the members. There has been a steady stream of announcements from Tunis of the continued dismantling of the cooperatives, most recently the marketing co-ops for dates and olive oil. The most important remnants appear to be the wheat farms of the north, which could hardly be farmed otherwise, and the several large intensive, irrigated projects that pre-date the cooperative venture.

The other key piece to this puzzle is, I feel, the references made by Ladgham and others to Ben Salah's nefarious designs on party.[35] In so centralized a system, the party congress meetings and election of congress representatives is virtually the only direct impact of local and regional influence, of whatever kind, on party policy. Every other channel, the

farmers, the merchants, youth, trade unions, the legislature are part of the subordinated hierarchy open to direct manipulation by the elite. Though not discussed at length, the revelations of Ben Salah's effort to "infiltrate" the base of the party is a telling confession about the unstable and uncertain relationship between authority and influence in the Tunisian political system. No doubt Ben Salah had too much authority, but it is equally true that neither the elite in the use of their authority nor the citizens in the expression of their influence were able to modify a seriously deficient and even destructive policy. Whether the policy was ill-advised is beside the point. The conclusion I arrive at is that the political system was unable to adjust policies, to evaluate their implementation, and to add the institutional devices needed to link authority to influence in the rural sector. Making a policy is not difficult, but carrying it out across the entire range of difference found in even so compact a political system as Tunisia's is a delicate and demanding task. The system could determine goals for development, but the system could not determine goals about itself. The highly centralized political system became in fact a disoriented and undirected system. Further centralization would have been disastrous, and the inadequacy of the influence structure at the national level could not be remedied over the fateful summer of 1969.

Re-structuring National Political Systems

Tunisia is not lacking in the attributes most of the political development literature recommends for "stable" government. There is a strong, popular feeling of national identity, an elaborate and well run national party, a trained and unusually capable elite, and a moderate, ingenious

national leader. No matter how one approaches the disaster of co-operatives in Tunisia, the fault appears to lie deeper in the political system, with what I have called the pattern of influence as opposed to the pattern of authority. If the co-operative venture was ill-advised, how does noe explain that it received unreserved support from the elite for nearly 10 years? If the co-operative adventure was a sound one in concept and planning, then how could it become so seriously dislocated at lower levels in the political system before adjustments were made? My interpretation is that the dimensions of the project, much like a number of "green revolutions" underway, exceeded the capacity of the national political system, and did so in a number of ways.

The overall development under an energetic minister, coupled with not uncommon setbacks, established a variety of new links between the authority of government and the influence exercised by new organizations and newly mobilized citizens. In this respect, it is worth noting that Tunisia is probably a leading example of Huntingdon's model for stable development, which is essentially based on the proliferation of organizational activity tied to a benevolent government.[36] Tunisia manifests the inadequacy of this model because authority continued to be concentrated even as organizations sprung up with more diverse leadership, more specialized goals, and more complex relations with other groups. Ben Salah no doubt has his own political motives, but he was also a product of the system and unable to escape from a political system that is based on explicitly linking all new activity to the authority of the central government. Despite the polemics of his trial, which nearly backfired to reveal the inadequacies of the national

system, he was a victim of a system that failed to sense important changes in Tunisia, however effective it might be in making decisions.

The dislocations at the national level can be assessed in terms of the structural dimensions I noted above. The dedication to national planning and especially income redistribution and employment made the structure of rewards and benefits a national problem. This is almost unavoidable in the highly centralized planning machinery of most developing countries, and given the great difficulties of raising investments abroad. By virtue of embarking on a massive development scheme, agricultural or industrial, the authoritative structure of government takes on substantial obligations and establishes economic goals known to all citizens. Despite the sacrifices made by those who could demand larger salaries and more benefits, the agricultural co-ops never arrived at a point where they had influence over the structure of rewards. The goal was to provide a minimum annual income of 50 dinars per Tunisian, but this goal could be no more than political rhetoric with the concentration of authority in Tunis. Hence, when the government finally recognized the anticipated changes in the rewards structure were unobtainable, the political system had no reserve of power in a grassroots political structure to make the failure understandable and acceptable. Authority promised more, but on condition that authority increase in both absolute and relative terms.

The effect on scale can also be seen in the organizational dimension of the program. The government had little difficulty in creating new agencies, building new headquarters, and allocating authority to officials closely tied to Tunis in the various provincial centers. In addition, the party organization was quickly and effectively mobilized to support national goals, and the custom of overlapping party and administrative offices extended to

new activities. But these organizational achievements were national in a limited sense. They were directed at national goals, but they were not able to transform these goals into meaningful terms, either for groups outside government or citizens outside the structure of authority. The structure of authority expanded much more rapidly than the structure of influence. The failure to devise integrating organizations and links meant that, in time, the new organizations had no alternative but to challenge the centralized hierarchy of authoritative organizations. This is, in my view, precisely what the co-ops were threatening to do in the preparations for a national party congress and in provincial development committees. The more concentrated authority, and the longer this concentration persists into a complex developmental effort, the more acute becomes the conflict.

The same conclusion can be reached reviewing the participatory structure. As noted above, Tunisian citizens were remarkably well along the path of general mobilization and psychological conversion to a national system, a major structural obstacle for a number of less developed countries. Tunisia's advantage in this regard makes it an even more instructive illustration. The decisional framework of the co-operatives, though in principle extending to the co-op members, never effectively reached them. The farm workers in the northern regions still worked very much as day laborers, and the small farm owners in other regions deeply resented the imposition of co-ops. But the elite's demands for predictability and control made delegation of authority difficult. Voluntary recognition of disparate contenders for power in a single-party system eventually jeopardizes the rationale of the system itself.

If massive changes in a country's national political system are inherent in such things as the "green revolution," how are we to detect the

effort to reconstruct rather than simply expand the political system? A number of suggestions have already been made to improve our investigation of the failure to adjust authority to influence, and this, I think, is not our major conceptual problem. Perhaps the most useful suggestions for observing change along the more elusive dimension, the changing relationship between authority and influence, have been made by Eisenstadt. Some years ago Eisenstadt challenged the notion that structural differentiation and organizational proliferation are, in themselves, evidence of a society's capacity to institutionalize change. He wrote, the "attainment of a certain level of 'social mobilization' and of structural differentiation constitutes a necessary condition of modernization, but development of these processes does not constitute a sufficient condition of modernization, in the sense of creating an institutional framework capable of continuous absorption of change."[37] The problems that Eisenstadt sees recurring in society involve the "pre-contractual" conditions of society, which we have learned are as readily challenged in the American ghetto and Northern Ireland as they are in East Pakistan and Nigeria.

In Eisenstadt's view, stratification in a society capable of absorping continuous change will display four characteristics. There will be "mutual openess" of various elites and social groups; an interchangeability of elite tasks; a readiness of traditional elites to accept new subgroups; and a flexible status system. If we reflect on the experience of several of the so-called late modernizers, Turkey and Japan, there is fairly good evidence that these conditions were not met and, in turn, political institutions were eroded or collapsed under subsequent strains. Similar questions have been raised about several Latin American countries.[38] For a few countries there have

been detailed studies indicating that as the society has become more prosperous and more highly differentiated, the elite has tended to close ranks and recruit less widely in the society.[39] Our general knowledge of Tunisia suggests that this has also been the case in that country, where elite positions are reserved for those who are carefully tested in the upper party ranks.

The argument is essentially that increasing the numbers of leaders and experts, or even widening the range of tasks they perform, does not provide the political system with the capacity to absorb such massive changes as those contemplated by the "green revolution." Political systems must deal not only with questions about specific institutions, which Tunisia and a number of relatively well endowed developing countries have done, but that there are also recurring problems about inter-institutional relationships and changing requirements for the effective use of leadership and expertise. These kinds of problems involve what Eisenstadt has called the "pre-contractual" conditions of the system and the redefinition of the most rudimentary symbols of the nation. I consider the questions Eisenstadt has raised very close to my own concern with the changing relationship between authority and influence. The closed status system and less flexible elite represent the attempt to reproduce the existing authority-influence relationship in a number of new institutions, and in general to resist increases in the sphere of influence beyond the authority of government.

Authority is, if you prefer, one of those social relationships for which empirical justification is impossible once a society moves beyond the simple use of coercion or terror, which I would not consider a working polity. Political relationships are basically reciprocal relationships. The pre-

occupations with taxonomies in macro-political theory has no doubt contributed to the view that changes in types of politics can be satisfactorily explained by enlarging the number of participants, multiplying group activity, generating more influence for lower strata, and selecting leaders somewhat differently without allowing for the redefinition of authority itself. Most of the aggregate views of political development make such assumptions, as does Huntingdon's view of organizational proliferation. The linear notion behind most classifications of political systems has, I think, been most effectively repudiated by Nadel and Nettl.[40] In very different ways each challenge the notion that the exercise of power in society can be understood without taking into account the problem of redefining the justification of power itself as institutions and individuals change. Nadel is most interested in a very abstract model of political interaction, making a logical argument for the necessity of reciprocity in politics, and certain other areas of human interaction where values, taste and confidence are essential for a continuing relationship to exist. Nettl argues that social mobilization in society can be considered independently from social differentiation, also implicitly rejecting the linear concept of political development.

I do not wish to conclude on an excessively pessimistic note, but the technological and scientific transformation of societies does not appear to have a very direct bearing on the justice, loyalty or enthusiasm generated for countries, industrial or agricultural. The most elusive ingredient, what Geertz has called a "civic sense,"[41] comes from an acceptance by elites and citizens alike that reciprocity is possible, that the leader of one day may be the follower of tomorrow, that the superior in one situation may be the subordinate in another. The proliferation of influence in society in

this form rapidly extends beyond the control of any centralized pattern of authority, and may correctly be considered the cultural and historical foundation without which any authority may be reduced to coercion and manipulation. Power can remain a zero-sum game over remarkable ranges of social differentiation and economic progress. The changing relationship of authority to influence reflects, I feel, whether a political system is indeed a polity, and, more important, whether a polity has a sense of civility.

Footnotes

1. The problems of restructuring knowledge seem to me closely aligned with the problem of redefining how political systems operate. For a philosopher's view see Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, 1962. The best social science perspective on this kind of question is Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia.

2. A Framework of Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, 1965.

3. "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Power," Journal of Politics 15:500-516, 1953. See also James G. March, "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Power," American Political Science Review, 49:431-451, 1955, and Felix Oppenheim, "An Analysis of Political Control: Actual and Potential," Journal of Politics, 20:515-534, 1958.

4. In the early writing of Gabriel A. Almond, The Politics of Developing Areas, Princeton, 1960, the problem of "parameters" looms very large in the attempt to devise a comparative context. This attempt to devise some absolute standard of comparison has, wisely I think, now been largely abandoned with more interest in exchange and interaction theorie Almond himself shifts to this position in "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," World Politics, 10:183-214, 1965.

5. The other major theoretical advance has been in the application of economics concepts to politics. See R. L. Curry, Jr., and L. L. Wade, A Theory of Political Exchange, Englewood Cliffs, 1968; and its relevance to development in Warren Ilchman and Norman Uphoff, The Political Economy of Change, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969.

6. Some of the most suggestive work has been done by anthropologists. See Marc J. Swartz, Local-Level Politics, Chicago, 1968, and A.S.A. Monographs, Political Systems and the Distribution of Power, London, 1965. Perhaps the best conceptual article describing the problems of generalizing at the macro-level with micro-level phenomena is H. Douglas Price, "Micro- and Macro-Politics: Notes on Research Strategy," in O. Garceau, ed., Political Research and Political Theory, Cambridge, 1968, pp. 124-140.

7. This definition comes from Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science, 2:201-214, 1957, though the general problem of defining power can be traced back to the early writings of Laswell and Merriam. A good critique of the behavioral view of power is Peter Bachrach, A Theory of Democratic Elitism, Boston, 1967.

8. Lipset's general position is contained in Political Man, New York, 1960, pp. 45-96, and an application using aggregate data is "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, 53:69-105, 1959.

9. Nationalism and Social Communication, Cambridge, 1953, and an early empirical application, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, 55:493-514, 1961.

10. Politics of the Developing Areas, op. cit., pp. 532-576.

11. "National Political Development," American Sociological Review, 28:253-268, 1963.

12. See the comparison of several attempts to measure national political development, Marvin E. Olson, "Multivariate Analysis of National Political Development," American Sociological Review, 33:699-711, 1968.

13. Austin Ranney, "The Utility and Limitations of Aggregate Data in the Study of Electoral Behavior," in Ranney, ed., Essays in the Behavioral Study of Politics, Urbana, 1962, pp. 91-102; David Gould, "Some Problems in Generalizing from Aggregate Associations," American Behavioral Scientist, 1964, 16-18; R. H. Retzlaff, "The Uses of Aggregate Data Analysis in Comparative Political Analysis," Journal of Politics, 27: 797-817, 1965.

14. Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., "Urbanization as an Agent in Latin American Political Instability: The Case of Mexico," American Political Science Review, 63:833-857, 1969. Some interesting evidence of the non-linearity of urbanization and political change in the Philippines is found in Thomas Nowak and Kay Snyder, "Urbanization and Clientelist Systems in the Philippines," Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 14:259-275, 1970.

15. Gilbert R. Winham, "Political Development and Lerner's Theory: Further Test of a Causal Model," American Political Science Review, 64:810-819, 1970. There is some evidence of a similar effect in less developed countries, where more widespread participation coupled with effective institutions of participation may direct lower-level leaders' attention to bodies higher in the national political hierarchy. On India see Steve Norris, "Political Mobilization in a Transitional Society," Cornell Ph.D. dissertation, 1969.

16. Norman H. Nie, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships," American Political Science Review, part I, 63:361-378, 1969, and part II, 63:808-832, 1969.

17. The Turkish Political Elite, Cambridge, 1964. Several articles in Robert E. Ward, Political Modernization of Japan, Princeton, 1968, provice similar evidence of elite level retrenchment in the civil service, education, and the military during the Meiji Restoration. Two recent articles raise important questions about the developmental capacity of military governments. See Robert M. Price, "Military Officers and Political Leadership," Comparative Politics, 3:361-380, 1971, and Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States," American Political Science Review, 64:1131-1148, 1970.

18. Carolyn Needleman and Martin Needleman, "Who Rules Mexico?: A Critique of Some Current Views on the Mexican Political Process," Journal of Politics, 31:1011-1034, 1969. There are good reasons, from both a poli and theoretical perspective, to examine more closely macro-level change in presumably stable political systems of this kind. See the revealing analysis of Barry Ames, "Bases of Support for Mexico's Dominant Party," American Political Science Review, 64:153-167, 1970, and also Roger D. Hansen, The Politics of Mexican Development, Baltimore, 1970.

19. Though not the primary theoretical focus, this was reflected in my use of developmental evidence in my book, National Development and Local Reform, Princeton, 1967.

20. See particularly his discussion of the importance of "floating influence" as a stabilizing and integrating force in political systems, "Initial Institutional Patterns of Political Modernization," Civilisation, 12:461-472, 1962. Also "Modernization and Conditions of Sustained Growth," World Politics, 16:576-594, 1964, and Essays in Comparative Institutions, New York, 1965, pp. 3-68.

21. There are two excellent monographs on Tunisia. Lars Rudebeck, Party and People: A Study of Political Change in Tunisia, Stockholm, 1967, and Clement Henry Moore, Tunisia Since Independence: The Dynamics of Pone-Party Government, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965. For more historical background, see Charles A. Micaud, et al., Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization, New York, 1961.

22. Perspectives Décennales de Développement 1962-1971, Tunis, Republic of Tunisia, Secretary of State for Planning and Finance, n.d. (1961), pp. 69-110.

23. See André Tiano, Le Maghreb entre les Mythes, Paris, 1967, pp. 125-290. Also, Samir Amin, L'Economie du Maghreb, Paris, 1966, and for a brief account, the author's "The Politics of Rural Mobilisation in North Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, 7:187-202, 1968. Also John L. Simmons, "Agricultural Cooperatives and Tunisian Development," Middle East Journal, 24:455-465, 1969, and 25:14-26, 1970.

24. The evolution of Tunisian leadership is discussed in Moore, op. cit. pp. 41-104, and in the author's "Neo-Destour Leadership and the 'Confiscated Revolution,'" World Politics, 17:215-231, 1965. In the recent change of leadership, the socialist group that emerged under the plan have been largely displaced, and the early pro-French, liberals represented by the new Prime Minister, Hedi Nouira, and Foreign Minister, Mohamed Masmoudi, have returned to power. See Maghreb, no. 43, 1970, pp. 45-47.

25. For additional background on the cooperative scheme see my article, "Organization of Cooperatives and the Structure of Power in Tunisia," Journal of Developing Areas, 1:317-332, 1967. Many of the criticisms made in this paragraph were made then, and criticized in turn by the

party organ, L'Action, July 31, 1968. The incident suggests to me that elite sensitivity to criticism might well figure in the evaluation of ambitious development projects.

26. Figures provided by Service de Statistique, Ministry of Agriculture, Tunis, and from their Informations Mensuelles, 1968 and 1969.

27. There were in fact a number of good studies being done of just these problems by Tunisians. See Abdelkader Zghal, "Les effects de la modernisation de l'agriculture sur la stratificiation sociale dans les campagnes tunisiennes," Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, 1963, pp. 201-206, and Zghal, "L'elite adminstrative et la paysannerie," Revue Tunisienne de Sciences Sociales, 6:41-52, 1969. Also H. Sethom, "Modification des structures agraires et industrialisation," Revue Tunisienne de Sciences Sociales, 3:43-68, 1966, and Khalil Zamiti, "Les obstacles materiels et idéologiques à l'évolution sociale des campagnes Tunisiennes," ibid., 7:9-55, 1970. Given this kind of research being done during the cooperative program, the later pleas of the elite that they were unaware of the problems of the co-ops seem mildly ridiculous. Much more persuasive is the view that having survived a number of crises that were essentially central in character, e.g., Bizerte, Israel, the Algerian revolution, Nasser, the plan exercise, etc., they incorrectly assumed widely dispersed change could be handled in the same way.

28. These steps toward further centralization take place well before the crisis of the cooperative program. See L'Action, April 7, 1967, September 28, 1967 and January 13, 1968.

29. Andre Samarine and Mongi Othman, Appreciation de la Fonction Commerciale et Constitution de Cadre D'Enquete Statistiques dans le Secteur Cooperatif Tunisien, Tunis, National Institute of Productivity, n.d. (1967).

30. L'Action, April 5, 1967, and February 2, 1967. One could argue, of course, that Ladgham has no alternative, but this is precisely the point made by Eisenstadt and others that there must be come flexibility and interchangeability of elites in order to have institutional development. One-party states have severe difficulties finding such alternatives for leaders who are out of favor or who make mistakes and, thereby, I would argue have a handicap in any complex development project having diffuse and widespread effects.

31. I would also consider this a very good index of institutional viability where complex institutional changes, such as the "green revolution," are contemplated. In a sense, unless authority can manage itself, i.e., find successors without disintegrating, it seems illusory to think that it can handle the less predictable impact of widespread change. An early analysis of the succession problem is Clement More, "La Tunisie après Bourguiba?" Revue Francaise de Science Politique, 17:646-667, 1967. Also Mohamed Ladhari, "La revision de l'article 51 de la Constitution tunisienne du 1èr juin 1959," Revue Juridique et Politique, 2:307-334, 1970.

32. See L'Action, January 28, 1969. Also ibid., October 7, 1968, and March 25, 1969, for other changes discussed in this paragraph.

33. The speech is analyzed in Maghreb, no. 35, 1969, pp. 8-9.

34. Le Monde, September 20, 1969. For an account of the full scale attack on Ben Salah see Le Monde, 12 and 16-17 November, 1969. Also, see an anonymous article, "Ben Salah et le developpement tunisien (1961-1969)." Espirit, no. 11, 1970, pp. 805-817, and for the socialist reaction, Pierre Veron, "Ben Salah et le 'socialisme' en Tunisie," I.T.C. Actualites, no. 8, October 1970, pp. 41-42.

35. Ladgham's series of speeches denouncing Ben Salah are one of the most revealing commentaries I know on the problems of one-party regimes. The threat to the party plays throughout. See L'Action, November 26, 28 and 30, 1969. The tempo of the attack was increased during Ben Salah"s trial, but abruptly reduced when it appeared that the defendant might make a more persuasive case than his accusers.

36. Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, 1968. It is precisely in respect to the assumptions of organizational compatibility and integration that the Huntingdon view breaks down. It is not a question of how many organizations a country develops, or even of their internal characteristics. Organizations, like any other kind of social interaction, operate in a political system and can be enmeshed in the systemic weaknesses of the system.

37. World Politics, op. cit., p. 483.

38. Gilbert B. Siegel, "Diffusion and Centralization of Power in Brazil -- A Sample of Consequences for Development Administration," CAG, Latin American Development Administration Committee, 1970, and William S. Tuohy, "Centralism and Political Elite Behavior in Mexico," ibid.

39. H. D. Evers and T. H. Silcock, "Elites and Selection," in Silcock, ed., Thailand: Social and Economic Studies in Development, Durham, 1967. Similar implications can be found in S. J. Eldersveld, "Bureaucratic Contact with the Public in India," Indian Journal of Public Administration, April-June 1965, pp. 216-235.

40. The Theory of Social Structure, London, 1957, and Political Mobilization, Boston, 1967.

41. "The Integrative Revolution: Primoridial Sentiments and Civic Politics in the New States," in Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States, New York, 1963, pp. 105-157.