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
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9. ABSTRACT

Assesses new and chronic refugee problems in Southern, Central, and Eastern Africa and reviews American relief programs in order to develop a broad assistance strategy for helping refugees and host countries. The team conducted its field survey from August 8 to September 24, 1977. Visits were made to Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zambia, Zaire, Kenya, Sudan and Djibouti. In each refugee country the team met with local officials, UN representatives, international, American, and local volunteer agencies, diplomatic officers, and U.S. embassy/A.I.D. officials. Wherever possible, they inspected refugee camps and concentrations. This document is intended to build on previous surveys and to support their recommended programs where pertinent. Great diversity is found in the composition of refugee groups coming out of the trouble spots of Africa. Equal diversity is found among host countries with reference to the way in which they treat refugees. To generalize, it could be said that most refugees are receiving basic minimum life-support type of care. Fair numbers are receiving excellent support, particularly when compared to the bare subsistence level of existence experienced by large sectors of the populace in many African countries. The first priority for refugee requirements obviously must go to the continuance and augmentation of life support programs. A.I.U. can also be helpful to refugees by providing management, operational and administrative support to host governments, refugee agencies and organizations. A detailed report is included on each country visited.

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I. INTRODUCTION

New, as well as chronic refugee problems in Southern, Central and Eastern Africa have resulted in increasingly urgent appeals to the United States for bilateral and multi-lateral assistance and relief efforts. While America has regularly contributed to UN and other relief agencies, the growing numbers of dislocated persons and the increasing complexity of their problems have placed increased demands on our resources. In order to meet current appeals and to anticipate future requirements, the White House asked the Department of State and AID to assess the situation, review American relief programs and develop a broad assistance strategy for helping needy refugees and host countries.¹

The Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs in State (HA/ORM) has conducted a field assessment of relief activities carried out by UN and international organizations to which the United States makes regular contributions. AID has just completed its field survey, reviewing present and future refugee requirements within the range of AID capabilities. At the same time AID has explored ways to strengthen the institutional and physical infrastructure of the affected countries in order to permit them to carry a share of the refugee burden. Not only have the two field assessments been complementary, but hopefully, resulting recommendations, projects and programs will blend in forming a uniform, integrated refugee assistance strategy.

1. See Department messages at conclusion of this chapter.

The AID assessment team consisting of G. Edward Clark (Ambassador, Retired), Jesse L. Snyder (AID General Development Officer) and Karl C. Kohler (Transport Engineer) conducted its field survey from August 8 to September 24. During this time the team visited Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zambia, Zaire, Kenya, Sudan and Djibouti (maps attached to country reports). The team leader also consulted UN and Red Cross officials in Geneva. In each refugee country the team met with local authorities, UN representatives, international, American and local volunteer agencies, diplomatic officers of other donor countries, and, of course, U.S. embassy/AID officials (Contact List, Appendix B). Wherever possible, they inspected refugee camps and concentrations.

While brief descriptions of refugee situations and host government responses are included in this report for general readership, an effort is made to avoid duplication of basic refugee information contained in such documents as: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) "Farah" Commission reports on Southern Africa, the Van Egmond report on Refugees, the "Transition in Southern Africa" series, and HA/ORM memoranda.¹

Indeed this document is intended to build on previous surveys, and to support their recommended programs where pertinent. This report will, however, update data when necessary, indicate gaps in coverage and concentrate on action-oriented recommendations for AID's role in dealing with present and potential refugee requirements.

1. Precise titles: Report of the UN Secretary General, prepared by Assistant Secretary General ABDULRAHIM ABBY FARAH, "Emergency Assistance for South African Student Refugees," April 20, 1977; and related reports. "Report on the Status of Refugees in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland" by ALAN VAN EGMOND for AID, April 20, 1977. "Transition in Southern Africa - A Framework for U.S. Assistance," AID Southern Africa Task Force, March 1977, State Department, Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs memoranda, August 1977.

In addition to general sector reviews of education, manpower training and health delivery systems, more detailed studies were made in the fields of transport and grain storage. These latter reports will be transmitted separately to AID, although their main points are, of course, included in this report along with more general observations and recommendations pertaining to other sectors.

The team wishes to express deep appreciation for the support of Embassy/AID mission staffs throughout the assessment trip, where Country Teams appeared deeply concerned about refugee problems and anxious to help in their solution.

Excerpts from State Department Message of July 23 and Subsequent Telegrams -- Subject: Refugee Assessment

OFFICE OF VICE PRESIDENT WISHES TO DEVELOP BROAD REFUGEE ASSISTANCE STRATEGY FOR KENYA, ZAMBIA, BOTSWANA, LESOTHO, SWAZILAND, MOZAMBIQUE, ZAIRE, SUDAN AND DJIBOUTI. ACCORDINGLY, STATE AND AID ORGANIZING STUDY TO BUTTRESS EXISTING PROGRAMS, AND ENDEAVOR ANTICIPATE FUTURE REQUIREMENTS IN REFUGEE FIELD. STUDY DESIGNED TO ASSESS NOT ONLY DIRECT DEMANDS FOR REFUGEE ASSISTANCE, BUT EXPLORE WAYS TO STRENGTHEN INSTITUTIONAL AND PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF AFFECTED COUNTRIES IN ORDER PERMIT THEM TO CARRY NECESSARY SHARE OF REFUGEE BURDEN.

AID TEAM CONSULTING WITH D/HA/ORM IN ORDER SYNCHRONIZE APPROACHES TO TWO ELEMENTS OF REFUGEE PROBLEM. D/HA/ORM OF COURSE CONCENTRATING ON LIFE MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS CHANNIELED THROUGH UNHCR AND FUNDED THROUGH STATE REFUGEE AND MIGRATION ASSISTANCE APPROPRIATIONS. AID CONCERNED WITH BROADER COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT NEEDS, PLUS SPECIFIC REFUGEE REQUIREMENTS INCLUDING COMMODITY TRANSPORT, FOOD STORAGE FACILITIES, HEALTH CARE DELIVERY, AND EDUCATION FACILITIES.

II. OVERVIEW (SUMMARY)

Political, civil and tribal strife in certain troubled countries of Southern, Central and Eastern Africa has, in recent years, caused hundreds of thousands of Africans to seek refuge in neighboring countries. Breeding spots include South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Uganda and Ethiopia. Havens include Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zambia, Zaire, Kenya, Sudan and Djibouti.

Estimates of the total magnitude of the refugee population in this part of the continent range from a quarter to a full million persons. This spread in statistics results from the application of different criteria and definitions as to who indeed is a "refugee." The UN defines a refugee as any person who has been forced to flee his country because of race, religion or political belief. There are those, however, who exclude Liberation Movement members who have chosen to go abroad for training as "Freedom Fighters." Others add "educational refugees" who leave (but may return to) South Africa because they prefer non-apartheid curricula in neighboring countries; potential "domestic refugees" such as 200,000 Lesotho miners who may lose their jobs in South African mines and become social burdens in their own society; and "instant" refugees like 700 ethnic Swazi who are residents in South Africa but study in Swazi schools. Statistics on refugee populations in each country are referred to in Section III and summarized in Appendix C of this report.

Great diversity is found in the composition of refugee groups coming out of the trouble spots of Africa. Since the

Sharpsville massacre of 1961. South Africa has spawned succeeding generations of sophisticated PAC and ANC officials, banned NUSAs leaders and rebellious Soweto students. Urban, sophisticated Ugandan civil servants and professionals have fled from Idi Amin; Ethiopian and Eritrean intellectuals have become refugees since the fall of Haile Selassie. On the other end of the scale, there are thousands of uneducated, rural Cabindan and poor nomadic residents of the Ogaden who have fled in the face of factional strife or open warfare. Between, there are growing numbers of Zimbabweans and Namibians who, voluntarily or through recruitment, are moving out for guerilla training in the ranks of political parties which hope one day to assume power in the countries of their birth.

Equal diversity is found among host countries with reference to the way in which they treat refugees. Botswana, Lesotho, and Kenya favor "natural" solutions to refugee problems, preferring absorption and assimilation rather than isolation in camps. However, as the numbers of refugees grow, these countries are increasingly aware that refugees compete for jobs, politicize and place capital/social diverting burdens on their own societies. They view refugee care as partly their own responsibility and partly that of the international community.

Swaziland, fearing controversy with South Africa, tends to isolate refugees to a certain extent from society. This is officially (and perhaps realistically) rationalized as a necessary measure to protect the refugees from abduction by South African security agents across the nearby frontier. The Government of Swaziland (GOS) is ambivalent in regard to refugee support, providing some limited facilities but looking to international donors for most assistance.

Mozambique and Zambia, for political and security reasons, isolate most refugees, permitting some to group for military training and others to gather in genuine refugee camps. Although providing safe havens on the basis of liberation movement "solidarity," neither government offers much material support to refugees beyond immediate basic transportation/camp requirements.

Zaire has encouraged refugee assimilation in Shaba and Kivu provinces, permits some in the Bas-Zaire area, and has provided basic camp facilities to Angolan/Cabindan refugees in the latter area. The Government of Zaire (GOZ) permits the UNHCR to coordinate limited support efforts from international sources in Bas-Zaire and a few other places, although UNHCR itself has not been very effective in Zaire.

Sudan provides maximum accomodation to and for Ethiopian refugees, both in camps and through absorption. Ugandan refugees in the south are tolerated but politically unrecognized because of delicate relations with Uganda.

Djibouti offers maximum initial assistance to Ethiopian, Somali and Danakil/Issa war victims in border camps. Families are permitted to remain in the camp, while the men forage in the countryside or town for jobs and sustenance, as was allowed before fighting in Ethiopia produced the recent wave of refugees.

To generalize, it could be said that most refugees are receiving basic, minimum life-support type of care. Fair numbers, as indicated above, are receiving excellent support, particularly when compared to the bare subsistence level of existence experienced by large sectors of the populace in many African countries.

Urgent, potential needs do exist among some of the Cabindan refugees in Zaire, Zimbabweans in Mozambique, Ugandans in Sudan, and possibly among refugees in Djibouti if the cholera epidemic in the Middle East crosses the Red Sea. Black/White war or post-independence fractional strife in Zimbabwe, increased paranoia in Uganda, deterioration of race relations in South Africa, continuing war in Ethiopia or protracted negotiations in Namibia, furthermore, could trigger mass refugee migrations of even greater proportions than those presently arriving in or being accommodated by the countries surveyed.

The first priority for refugee requirements obviously must go to the continuance and in some cases augmentation of life support programs. While UNHCR will remain the primary channel for this assistance, AID should consider supplementary support through alternate delivery systems including the ICRC, Private Volunteer Agencies (PVOs) and bilateral infusions to organizations, agencies or governments whose resources are strained by present demands of the broad spectrum of displaced persons who need help. At the same time efforts must be made to coordinate the activities of all donors -- official and private -- the USG, other governments and international organizations.

AID can also be helpful to refugees by providing management, operational and administrative support to host governments, refugee agencies and organizations. There are a number of useful dual purpose projects and a few infrastructure proposals which can be helpful to refugees and locals alike (Sections III and IV), but AID assistance in delivering services would appear to be more important than the provision of actual relief supplies. Help in broad education/manpower training fields is a major priority. Almost equally important is the provision of counselling and placement services to utilize skills and talents already in refugee communities.

AID should also develop a flexible, rapid relief instrument by which field missions can respond to types of refugee emergencies beyond the mandate of UNHCR or the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). Finally, AID must continue to seek clarification in regard to definitions of "refugees", policies pertaining to assistance to liberation movements and limitations on UNHCR help to non-Patriotic Front Zimbabwean groups in order to define precisely its unique refugee relief role.

III. SITUATIONS BY COUNTRY

A. Botswana

Surrounded almost completely by repressive white regimes, Botswana (map attached) has long provided a haven for small numbers of political refugees from South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. However, polarization of the conflict in Zimbabwe and increasing repression in South Africa have dramatically increased the flow in the past few years. The majority of these recent refugees are Zimbabweans in transit to Zambia, many for military training. They are being accommodated at a well-equipped modern camp at Selebe-Pikwe and an older, delapidated installation at Francistown. As of Aug. 24, there were 1,036 in the former and 543 in the latter, but there may be as many as 3,000 at any one time in these locations. Around Gaborone, there are about 400 registered South Africans, not in camps and in more or less permanent status, and possibly an additional 440 South Africans, Angolan, Namibian, Basothan, Malawian and Mozambican refugees living in the area (See Appendix C).

Botswana, before disruptions caused by recent events in Zimbabwe and South Africa, was almost a model of a new developing state--democratic, stable, free-enterprise oriented and viable. Now, it is in a delicate position politically, vulnerable economically, and is being drained of hard-earned reserves by refugee demands and border threats. So far, Botswana is coping commendably with the problems and pressures caused by its neighbors, but a number of factors could shatter the fragility of the moment.

- . If the vitally important rail system (run by Rhodesia) were disrupted abruptly, the country would face staggering losses.
- . If fighting between Zimbabwean factions were to develop in a post-settlement period, sharp increases in refugees might occur or Botswana might even become militarily involved.

Botswana already is having to build up a Defense Force for protection against Rhodesian incursions, placing further drains on reserves.

Increased demands by refugees for education and housing could exacerbate potential internal political and social problems.

As Acting President Masire told the team, it is ironic that it took political crises in Southern Africa and a flood of refugees to focus world attention on Botswana's general developmental needs. The United States, like many other countries, is trying to catch up after years of such limited attention. Refugee relief and general assistance is now coming from many quarters.

Refugee relief activities are coordinated by a Joint Council for Refugees (JCR) (chart attached). The UNHCR, Botswana Christian Council (BCC) and PVOs such as the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) and the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF) contribute and help operate various elements of the refugee programs. UNHCR has devoted considerable attention to the Zimbabwean transit centers in the north and to the educational needs of South Africans in the south. The United States, in addition to its general contribution to UNHCR for life maintenance programs, has contributed \$6,000,000 required for construction of the secondary schools in Gaborone recommended by the Farah commission, as well as some help for the University as suggested by Van Egmond. Refugees still require continuation of UNHCR life support activities; better medical care in some areas; increased educational opportunities, counseling and low cost housing for those not in transit. Should the situation in South Africa or Zimbabwe further deteriorate, they might require emergency assistance.

In terms of general development, the Government of Botswana (GOB) has given top priority to rural development, and secondary priority to skilled manpower training to fill critical shortages in professional and technical fields. It requires broad supporting assistance (resource transfer), plus a number of projects, which could satisfy both refugee and infrastructure requirements. Examples of the latter include rural road improvement - to which the Norwegians are making large contributions - and the construction of 5 to 6,000 metric tons reserve grain storage facilities, on which AID plans to help.

Recommendations

Strictly Refugee

1. Since the United States has not responded to a UNHCR appeal for funds for current operating expenses in Botswana for the remainder of 1977, the United States should contribute \$400,000 as recommended by HA.
2. The United States should provide support for refugee counseling services in relation to education, jobs and housing, possibly at a small, modest reception center.
3. In order to help the mission meet refugee emergencies, the USG should establish an "Ambassador's Refugee Contingency Fund".

Dual Purpose - Refugee/Developmental

4. The United States should provide continued support to the multi-purpose secondary schools and university hostel

1. See Farah Botswana report, para. 119.

programs. Additionally, the United States should increase the number of scholarships for South Africans at the University of Botswana and Swaziland, and Botswana Agricultural College, other African universities or possibly in American institutions. The University could use help in topping off faculty salaries, money for library books and lab equipment. Technical assistance should be provided in expanding both academic and vocational extension courses.¹

5. AID might consider giving assistance to Francistown Hospital, which provides medical care for seriously ill in-transit Zimbabweans.

6. AID should consider support of a low-cost integrated housing program, to serve both refugees and locals.

7. If the GOB proceeds with small resettlement projects for rural Namibians and Angolan refugees, AID might help with tools, wells and irrigation.

8. AID should continue with plans to help finance an increase of 5,000 tons in grain storage within the next two years.

9. An annual Self Help Fund allocation should be restored.

Developmental - Refugee Related

10. In light of the present and potential refugee drain on Botswana's own developmental resources, the United States should continue to examine feasible means to accelerate AID's whole assistance portfolio, consistent with the country's absorptive capacity.

1. For cost estimates of various educational projects, see Van Egmond report.

11. Based on appropriate study, the United States should consider joint assistance to Botswana in a contemplated donor consortium to help develop, as quickly as possible, self-sufficiency in the critical railway sector.





Chart A. Refugee Assistance Coordination -- Botswana*



- - - Coordinated

— Direct relationship.

* Approximate representation

B. Lesotho

Lesotho has been a traditional haven of refuge. It was settled between the 16th and 19th century by people fleeing from tribal wars in surrounding regions. With this heritage, the Basotho¹ people are relatively tolerant of today's refugees from South Africa (map attached).

However, the Basotho also inherited a poor mountainous redoubt with resources barely sufficient to provide basic subsistence for its people, let alone relief for newcomers. To make matters worse, Lesotho is surrounded by, and heavily dependent on, South Africa, which could, if it chose, apply intolerable economic and political pressures. Therefore, its potential problems are even more serious than its chronic ones, be they related to the general economy or specific refugee needs.

There are only about 150 registered political refugees in Lesotho (see Appendix C), but an additional 1-2,000 so-called "educational" refugees choose to study there rather than in the Bantu education system of the Republic of South Africa. An even more serious threat looms on the horizon: press rumors indicate that South Africa may prohibit the use of Lesotho labor in its mines. If implemented, the ban would mean that more than 200,000 Lesotho mine workers and their dependents (totaling one-quarter of Lesotho's population) would be thrown on the local economy and in effect become "domestic" refugees.

1. Citizens of Lesotho, in mass, are called Basothans. As individuals, they are called Masothan.

With considerable outside assistance, Lesotho is coping well with its current refugee population. Under the Minister of Interior, a National Refugee Commission has been formed to coordinate refugee relief, utilizing as its principle operating agency, the Lesotho Christian Council (LCC) (Chart attached). UNHCR helps, but is less involved than elsewhere, while the United Nations Emergency Training Program for South Africa (UNETPSA) is more active than in many other places. The United States indirectly helps refugee students through the Peace Corps' Teaching English as a Foreign Language (TEFL) program.

In terms of general assistance, AID is implementing or has under design, a number of useful projects and programs (including PL 480) related to rural development, agriculture, nutrition, health, African manpower development, an Instructional Material Resource Center, a School's Examination Council, etc. AID has agreed to construct a 260 km. sector of a four donor road project designed to establish perimeter and internal roads in the southern part of the country. Lesotho, actually, has become a favorite of international donors, although many place severe restrictions on the terms of their assistance. While Lesotho's present and future need to achieve economic independence from South Africa is tremendous, very real limitations are imposed by the absorptive capacity of the Government of Lesotho (GOL).

Lesotho's major current needs pertaining to refugee care involve primarily a range of educational projects, some in the form, as Farah states, "of capital investment for the extension of existing educational facilities." The team particularly notes the need for additional staffing, programs and accommodations, at all levels from primary and secondary schools, through the Teachers Training College and the

University of Lesotho (UL). Refugees also require vocational training, help in locating jobs and subsidies to start small shops or trades. A need also exists for low-cost housing.

Recommendations

Strictly Refugee

1. An Ambassador's Refugee Contingency Fund should be established.

Dual Purpose

2. The United States should consider assisting the GOL to provide additional educational facilities at the primary and secondary levels for the benefit of both the local population (especially rural) and the student refugees. The Minister of Education has expressed a desire to have more Peace Corps' Teaching English as a Foreign Language (TEFL) instructors and more Fulbright teachers.

3. The United States should help the University of Lesotho to establish a Maseru campus, primarily for the development of extension courses and vocationally related training for refugees.

4. Upon receipt of a decision by the Cabinet on a shelter sector analysis for AID's Housing Investment Guaranty Program, AID should proceed (if indicated) with short- and long-term technical assistance in developing GOL housing policies and programs for low cost housing. Since such housing may serve not only refugee but local needs, consideration might be given to funding portions of construction under SSA.

5. Self-Help Funds should be restored to the U.S. mission.

6. AID should accelerate review and consideration of the list of projects presently in the design stage, particularly those in the field of education, such as the Schools Examination Council, and in grain storage.

Developmental - Refugee Related

7. AID should expedite feasibility studies and compress other preliminary steps related to construction of its important section of the southern perimeter road.

8. The United States should continue to work with other donors in considering and developing broad assistance programs to increase Lesotho's viability and decrease its dependence on South Africa.





Chart B. Refugee Assistance Coordination -- Lesotho*



--- Coordination
 — Direct relationship

* Approximate representation
 1. Joint Committee, National
 Refugee Commission

C. Swaziland

Swaziland is more fortunate and better endowed than the two other former British High Commission Territories, Botswana and Lesotho. The country is relatively prosperous with an abundance of natural resources. It is also not quite as vulnerable to political and economic pressures from unfriendly neighbors, in part because its eastern border adjoins the now independent black state of Mozambique (map attached).

Swaziland also differs in its handling and support of refugees. Unlike the two previous states, the Government of Swaziland (GOS) does not generally follow a policy of assimilation or absorption; neither is it quite as generous in contributing from its own resources to refugee care.

In terms of numbers, Swaziland identifies 91 "new" (post-Soweto) refugees and 30-40 families who had arrived prior to last year's rioting in the Republic of South Africa (see Appendix C). However, there are around 700 ethnic Swazi from homes in South Africa studying in Swaziland, who could become "instant" refugees if relations with the Republic deteriorated. Additionally, the PAC and ANC arrange for the transit of perhaps a dozen refugees a month enroute to Mozambique and other destinations.

The GOS separates and, to a degree, isolates registered political refugees, dividing women and men into two camps, the latter some 40 kilometers from Mbabane; and both are closed to public access. Students are bussed under supervision to schools in the capital. Such restrictive procedures are necessary, Swazi officials assert, in order to protect

the refugees from abduction by South African security forces. Church leaders and refugee agency representatives have tried unsuccessfully to persuade the government to permit more absorption and integration.

Because of its relative prosperity, Swaziland could afford to provide more for its relatively few refugees out of its own resources, rather than making constant appeals for foreign assistance. The government hates to admit to the existence of a refugee problem and the presence of its victims. At the same time, the GOS seeks world support for their care. The GOS is, in fact, currently attempting to redefine the status of the 700 ethnic students so that they might qualify for refugee support. Further complications occur, even when UNHCR, for example, has received funds to implement elements of the Farah mission recommendations. UN officials experience great difficulties persuading GOS officials to submit official requests or even to sign prepared documents. This may be partly because of local bureaucratic procedures and partly because of unwillingness to accept responsibility for refugee related decisions.

Conditions in the two refugee camps are relatively good in a physical sense, but the inmates suffer from isolation and boredom. With minimum outlay and consideration, these conditions could be alleviated by the Swazis themselves for the less than 100 registered refugees. The team had the impression that neither GOS nor UN officials visit either camp very often.

The UNCHR does contribute to refugee care and maintenance, working primarily through the Swaziland Refugee Relief Committee (SRRC) (chart attached). United Nations Childrens Emergency Fund (UNICEF), International Student Exchange Fund

(IUEF), UNETPSA, African American Institute (AAI), the Red Cross, the Mennonite Church and the Conference of Swaziland Churches (CSC) all provide minor amounts of life maintenance or educational assistance. AID is promoting a department of extra-mural services at UBS; has developed a regional testing center in Mbabane; originated a Swazi capability in educational measurement and career counseling; and is developing a Health Manpower Training program.

Beyond what is already being furnished through the UN, volunteer agencies, USAID and other donors, Swaziland should not require a great deal of additional outside assistance because of the presence of refugees. The construction of a combined school/shelter/reception center possibly can be justified. The need also exists for counseling, particularly of a psycho-social sort. Of a more general nature, Swaziland's present as well as future refugees would benefit from augmented educational facilities and staffs at all levels and improved rural health care. Farah, indeed, on a return visit in September did ask the United States and United Kingdom for support of additional projects, including a 200-student integrated high school and additional student hostel facilities.

Recommendations

Strictly Refugee

1. The United States should consider contributing to the construction of the school/shelter/reception center recommended in the April Farah report. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has already pledged \$150,000 toward the estimated \$433,000 construction costs.

2. Because refugees have special psycho-social problems caused by loneliness, dislocation and isolation, the United States should respond to a special World Health Organization (WHO) appeal to help provide trained social/psychiatric workers to deal with their unique problems.

3. The United States should, of course, continue support of ongoing UNHCR programs, bearing in mind that Swaziland does have limits in terms of absorptive capacity, particularly in terms of limited administrative and organizational skills on the part of many GOS officials.


Dual Purpose - Refugee/Developmental

4. Beyond the AID educational projects mentioned above, the United States might consider assignment of a few Fulbright teachers to raise the quality of Swazi education.

5. State's Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs (CE) and AID might consider supporting a few scholarships at U.S. and/or other African schools. Particular attention should be given to vocational training.

6. If Faran is able to persuade the Swazis to accept the concept of an additional integrated secondary school, the United States might consider contributing to its construction.

Chart C. Refugee Assistance Coordination -- Swaziland



- - - Coordination
 — Direct relationship

• Approximate representation

D. Mozambique

While Mozambique has a relatively large number of Zimbabwean refugees, foreign assistance related to their needs has been hampered by government and Liberation Movement policies which isolate concentrations of refugees in relatively remote areas and which deny or limit access to them by donors who wish to help. Mozambique, of course, is the main haven for Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) (Mugabe) refugees, part of whom are receiving military training and part simply waiting out the storm (map attached).

Since independence in June 1975, the government under the domination of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) has transformed the country's political and economic structure according to Marxist-oriented philosophy. Up to the present, this posture has restricted cooperation with outside countries, especially those of the West. This, plus the departure of most Portuguese, has caused steady economic decline and loss of administrative efficiency. In turn, the country's ability to deal with such emergencies as refugee influx is affected. Added to this is the Government of Mozambique (GOM) desire as a "frontline" state to cooperate with ZANU in assisting the latter in Patriotic Front efforts to oust the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia and to assume control of an independent Zimbabwe.

There are hopeful signs that the GOM is relaxing its attitude toward western cooperation. Along with ZANU, it is more openly seeking western assistance in dealing with broad developmental problems, as well as such specific demands as those imposed by refugees. A \$10,000,000 PL 480 (Title II) grant this summer did much to prove the genuineness of the U.S. desire to help the country and the refugees. The GOM

has now organized a National Directorate for Refugee Services, to coordinate appeals and administration of refugee programs (chart attached). Its new Director broke precedent during the team's visit to Mozambique by arranging an inspection visit to Doroi camp, some 850 kilometers north of Maputo - the first permitted to representatives of any diplomatic mission in Mozambique. The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) has been allowed to open an office in Maputo and may soon be given access to the camps. CARITAS is also active in the area. Considerable refugee support, of course, comes directly from Patriotic Front (ZANU) sources. Other foreign governments have also given, including the Swedes and Dutch.

As of Sept. 3, there were approximately 35,000 refugees in the noncombatant camps, with 17,200 located in the largest, Doroi (see Appendix VI C). There are an estimated 18,000 additional refugees scattered throughout the country, many presumably receiving military training. It is obvious that the inhabitants of Doroi, where the team arrived unannounced, are not receiving military training although the camp internally is relatively well organized and administered. Some were survivors of an older camp at Nyazonia which had been raided by Rhodesian forces. These survivors were still exhibiting shock, and often, wounds from that experience.

If Doroi is an example of the refugee camps - and it may be the worst in Mozambique - then many refugees are in serious straits. Basic needs are provided by the GOM and UNHCR - some shelter, one feeding per day of "mealies" (maize meal), rudimentary medical care and limited education. However, far more is required to make prolonged stays bearable. All three camps are located in relatively fertile areas, so possibilities exist to increase self-sufficiency. Motivation

and some skills are present among the Zimbabweans, but they need equipment, tools, and supplies to help themselves. Refugees have actually already cleared 200 hectares of land by their own efforts in the past year.

Despite the organization of a Refugee Directorate, the GOM has some way to go to provide adequate logistic support for its refugees in recognized camps. A gap exists between the input of a wide range of donors, much of it backlogged or stockpiled at ports, and the amount of supplies which appear to reach individuals in camps. Complex relations with neighboring countries - all contribute to the refugee problem.

Recommendations

Strictly Refugee

1. Specifically for non-military refugees in camps, the USG should continue or increase its contributions for life-support programs, either through UNHCR or PVOs, such as the Lutheran World Federation. The UNHCR has requested \$2,000,000 to meet recommendations of the Farah Commission, and HA is recommending the allocation of \$400,000. Refugees must be supplied with more and better food, clothing, blankets, sanitation and medical care. However, the degree of our direct support should be linked to the right of access to the camps by UN or other qualified observers in order to oversee distribution and utilization of supplies.

2. The USG should endeavor through the U.N. system or PVOs to help provide better educational equipment for the refugees. Structures and facilities are not needed at present (although they may be later), but there is an almost total lack of paper, pencils, black-boards, reference books,

etc. Trained Zimbabwean teachers who are capable of carrying the teaching load are among the refugees. At some time in the future of this fluid situation, consideration might be given to the provision of scholarships for certain Zimbabwean students or advanced training for teachers.

Dual Purpose - Refugee/Developmental

3. To the extent possible, given current direct assistance constraints, the USG could possibly and usefully help the GOM, with ZANU cooperation, develop some camp sites into potential resettlement areas. They should be designed to serve local needs after the refugees have departed. Required for such programs would be land clearing equipment, tools, fertilizers, and irrigation systems.

4. Title II food assistance will continue to be essential and effective in bilateral relations, both for specific refugee needs as well as general Mozambican supplementary requirements. The USG should plan to contribute at least \$10,000,000 this coming year, if not double that amount.

5. While broad developmental assistance and resource transfers will doubtless be requested of the USG in such fields as agriculture, rural road improvement, ports, railways, education, and health care, the Embassy has not yet had sufficient time to discuss requirements adequately or formulate specific recommendations. Although a delicate subject, the GOM could benefit from U.S. training in the fields of public administration and other fields where trained manpower is currently lacking. Although present congressional restrictions on assistance to the GOM are recognized, Mozambique appears to be turning more to the West and the USG should do as much as possible to help them developmentally, at the same time better serving the needs of refugees.





Chart D. Refugee Assistance Coordination -- Mozambique*



--- Coordination
 — Direct relationship

* Approximate representation
 1. Formed August 20, 1977

E. Zambia

Its central geographical location has caused Zambia to become a haven for refugees (or Freedom Fighters) from nearly all the trouble spots in Southern Africa (map attached). Its role is not passive, however, for as one of the "front-line" states, Zambia, in the name of African solidarity, actively supports many of the parties and factions training and working to achieve the liberation of their respective homelands. Its President, Kenneth Kaunda, has been eminently successful in dramatizing his country's role in the liberation struggle, and, at the same time, in collecting world-wide support and assistance for Zambia's own development.

Zambia, partly in compliance with wishes of various liberation parties, tends to segregate and, to a degree, isolate various refugee groups. Access to camps, especially where military training is conducted, has been strictly limited even for refugee donor organizations or countries, although there are some signs of relaxation in these restrictions. In Zambia as of September 5, there were an estimated 22,000 persons who could be defined as refugees. These included some 13,200 Angolians, 2,450 Namibians, 5,000 ZAPU Zimbabweans, 300-400 ZANU (Mugabe) Zimbabweans, 200 Zanu (Sithole) Zimbabweans, 100 South Africans, 200 Malawians, 200 Ugandans, and 100 miscellaneous individuals. The majority are in camps; about a thousand are resettled; about 500 are in Lusaka and largely self-sufficient; and 300 are receiving individual care in locations near Lusaka (see Appendix C). There are also as many as 15,000 Freedom Fighters in training throughout the country and 2,600 children (possibly of Freedom Fighters) in schools in Lusaka.

Those who claim to be the most neglected are unaffiliated individuals or those belonging to parties other than SWAPO or the Patriotic Front (in other words ZANU Sithole and Muzorewa supporters). In actuality these people do receive help from UNHC, but on an individual basis rather than through party organizations which is the pattern for most of the rest. Non-combatant members of ZAPU also receive less attention than those in military training. The Patriotic Front and SWAPO, incidently, would like to see contributions made directly to the parties, rather than through UN bodies. In actuality, practically all refugees in Zambia are receiving reasonable care and support with very few in dire straits. If the conflict in Rhodesia intensifies or if post-Ian Smith factional fighting develops, certain categories of refugees may increase or the lot of others change.

The Government of Zambia (GOZ) has a Commissioner for Refugees whose role is largely coordination (chart attached). Actual relief flows either from UNHCR through operating agencies such as the Zambian Christian Refugee Council (ZCRS) or from African sources directly to the liberation party organizations. The UN operates one special facility, the Namibian Institute where 200 (eventually 300) students are studying public administration in preparation for eventual assumption of authority in their own country. UNHCR and ZCRS operations do appear to be effective, especially in the handling of individuals and at a settlement at Maheba. As a part of its general contributions through UNHCR, the United States provided an initial grant to renovate an old camp at Makeni near Lusaka to be used as a refugee reception center.

As for general economic help, Zambia is almost deluged with eager donors. There are at least 17 foreign countries providing capital and developmental assistance, plus

the assistance from the UN, World Bank and other international organizations. The Canadians, for example, have major projects for improving grain storage capacity, access road improvements and railroad extensions. The European Economic Community (EEC) and the Swedes are also particularly active. The United States, a relatively modest donor, saw last year's program loan of \$20 million, which could have been used for emergency assistance, actually go for import support of primarily agricultural items. US PL 480 assistance has been effective. Zambia, however, does face a limit on absorptive capacity. The GOZ simply does not have the administrative structure at the moment to handle much more technical assistance.

Prognostications pertaining to the refugee situation are difficult. The Namibians probably will be going home in the foreseeable future. Many rural Angolans may remain, regardless of what happens in Angola. Zimbabwean and South African refugees could continue to increase, even dramatically, depending on developments in Rhodesia and the Republic.

Recommendations

Strictly Refugee

1. The United States should continue its present level of contribution to the UNHCR, which efficiently utilizes its resources for refugee care in Zambia, plus \$450,000 for the remainder of 1977 in respect to a special appeal to upgrade educational facilities for 3,000 Zimbabwean students refugees under 16.

2. The United States should also consider the desirability of grants to such volunteer agencies as Lutheran World Relief, perhaps channeled through UNHCR.

3. If access is permitted to some of the presently closed camps (containing SWAPU and ZAPU refugees), the United States should consider making further contributions to program development, particularly educational assistance.

4. The United States should continue support of the Namibian Institute, even though per-student cost is high, because this is the training ground for the future administrators of Namibia. A great need will exist to provide graduates with practical experience, and the United States could be helpful in arranging internships in West African countries or America. U.S. scholarships in highly specialized fields will continue to be useful, not only to Namibians, but Zimbabweans as well.

5. Since medical and maternity care in some camps is said to be inadequate, the United States may assist further in this sector, perhaps through PVOs, if an American, UN or some mutually accepted official is permitted access to the camp to assess requirements on the ground.

6. In light of the unpredictability of future refugee flows from Zimbabwe and South Africa, an Ambassador's Refugee Contingency Fund should be established and Self-Help funds restored.

Dual Purpose - Refugee/Developmental

7. Since education appears to be the main area of refugee need, the United States could also be helpful by strengthening existing institutions like N'Kumba College.

Developmental-Refugee Related

8. As for general assistance to Zambia, the United States should move very slowly in building any long-range AID developmental relationship.

9. The GOZ has requested U.S. help on one specific project - improvement of a road across the Southeast finger of Shaba province in Zaire. This is only remotely refugee-oriented and poses a political conundrum. However, Zaire and Zambia have discussed the project in the past, and it might be viable (and acceptable to Zaire) if it were developed as a toll road.





Chart E. Refugee Assistance Coordination -- Zambia*



- - - Coordinated
 _____ Direct relationship

* Approximate representation
 1. ACC supported
 2. IMF field office

F. Zaire

Although the total UNHCR country estimate for "actual" refugees in Zaire is some 532,000 (see Appendix C), the vast majority have been reasonably assimilated within their respective areas of refuge in the country, including Shaba and Kivu Provinces (map attached). These refugees require little or no assistance beyond access to Zairian markets and public services, private or religious medical care, and supplementary cash and food allowances in some circumstances. The refugee requirements are generally in consonance with the needs of the Zairis.

Those recent refugees requiring some support number perhaps 100,000 Angolans, Cabindans and Burundians. Of these about 4,800 (out of a total of 35,000) Cabindans in Bas-Zaire (Tshela and Lukula Zones) represent the only group now seriously threatened and in need of full life-support measures.

With the exception of a reportedly highly effective legal processing of refugees and establishment/documentation of refugee status within the UNHCR guidelines, the Government of Zaire (GOZ) provides little perceptible assistance to refugees presently beyond the provision of land and settlement. GOZ does not greatly assist in the coordination of UN, bilateral or private assistance (chart attached), and the burden of short-term assistance and impact falls upon these groups.

It is not clear whether refugees have had any significant negative impact on the country. Some earlier refugees produced and marketed food surpluses and even now stimulate the permanent augmentation of private service facilities, including Catholic Mission hospitals and schools. Therefore, the refugees impact on Zaire may even have been positive.

The principal problem affecting some refugees in Zaire, is exemplified by the Cabindan experience in Bas-Zaire. Here, there is weak or non-existent UNHCR and GOZ leadership in the coordination and support of overall assistance efforts, especially those directly contracted for by UNHCR. In brief, the Cabindan refugee situation currently consists of a threat to the approximately 4,800 women and children, located in two relief camps near the zone capitals of Tshela and Lukula in the Bas-Zaire region. Both camps are directly on excellent, all-weather, hard surfaced roads, less than 40 kilometers from the main tarmac road which cuts through the capital town and bisects the region, leading directly to both of Zaire's seaports, Boma and Matadi. The tarmac road is paralleled by a narrow gauge parastatal plantation railroad the entire distance. Both relief shelters are located less than an hour's drive from a 300-bed Catholic Mission hospital staffed by at least one physician. The entire area is served by commercial trucking. There is abundant water and fertile land immediately within the relief camp areas. The refugees receive and have been receiving support from UNHCR (via its contractor, AIDR), IRC, Caritas, CRS, CWS (Eglise du Christ au Zaire), Germans (Shaba), Belgians and the EEC. Despite these most favorable conditions:

- . The Kwashiorkor rate among children in these centers is 4-5 times the rate in the surrounding Zairois population;
- . The calculated food delivery for the months of June and July was approximately 30 percent of the minimum daily food requirement;
- . There is a shortage of every type of medicine required by the refugees;
- . Food must be purchased and transported from a distance of 1,000 miles in the interior of Zaire;
- . There is a marked shortage of clothing and few blankets.

While the specific deficiencies highlighted above are finally receiving some attention, neither the GOZ nor UNHCR are organized to deal with such requirements on a timely basis in Zaire. The former has a political stake in the issue and the latter a political reluctance to act.

Although there is, as has been pointed out by the embassy and prior survey missions, a sufficiently high level GOZ officer and department responsible for refugee affairs, it seems to do little more than assure legal accomodation and statistics gathering.

- . It does not (or cannot) provide or encourage coordination among international, bilateral or PVOs donors.
- . It is unable or unwilling to assume GOZ bureaucratic accomodation to donor assistance requirements such as: customs clearance; transportation support; administrative faciliation; and the like.
- . Beyond assigning additional responsibilities to local officers, it does not provide any additional administrative personnel to assure/facilitate effective assistance delivery and management.
- . There is no visible major coordination among GOZ departments, such as transport, health, education and the like in regard to refugee matters.

- It has not (or cannot) assist donors/PVOs with private contract disputes and other agreement compliance.

While much of the UNHCR's ineffectiveness of assistance effort is attributable to GOZ disinterest, lack of coordination and non-support or simply to conditions - social and economic - in Zaire, UNHCR has not done much in the past to stimulate GOZ action or to develop alternatives.

UNHCR/Kinshasa has had excellent social relations with the responsible GOZ refugee officer and good access to appropriate departments and levels. The GOZ Commissioner for Refugees accompanies the UNHCR representative on field visits. However, the essential areas of difficulty seemed to have been:

- UNHCR/Kinshasa has not believed significant refugee problems beyond legal accommodation and some minor life-support supplementation, existed in Zaire, or, has not been greatly interested in such problems;
- UNHCR does not seem to have developed or encouraged any assistance coordination within the UN family, donor/PVO community or the GOZ;
- UNHCR has clearly not supported its principle private contractor (AIDR) adequately, either with sufficient resources, staff or with backup coordination/clearance on vital GOZ and other issues affecting assistance delivery;
- UNHCR does not appear to have stimulated any apparent GOZ organizational development or interest in non-legal refugee requirements.

The Cabindan refugee situation is compounded by another problem which neither UNHCR nor GOZ seem able to resolve. UNCHR policy provides relief to refugees only at camps on

locations 20 km behind the frontier, theoretically to minimize involvement in frontier political disputes. Minimal facilities are provided beyond the 20 km limit to attract refugees. The strategy is not completely effective, since many Cabindans choose to stay close to the border. For them, only PVOs, particularly the IRC, CRS and ECZ, are providing help.

The present emergency assistance situation in Zaire -- Cabindans in Bas-Zaïre -- will be resolved in part through PVO and foreign donor efforts. However, little effective future relief or longer term effort with respect to refugees can be possible unless there is a major improvement in the present GOZ and UNHCR donor mechanisms responsible for problem identification and assistance. Inherent social and economic problems are sufficiently constraining in Zaire without the added problems presented by inept management.

As for general assistance, Zaire has received a tremendous amount of foreign support since independence in 1960. Belgium, of course, continued to help its former colony, while UN agencies and foreign donors contributed in all sectors. The United States has also been a major contributor in an effort to promote economic and political stability. In the late 60s and early 70s, the United States was able to reduce the level of its support as Zaire became more capable of financing its own development through high earnings from mineral exports. AID then turned its attention to improving the quality of life for the majority poor of the country. The recent worldwide recession and a dramatic fall in the price of copper, however, has prompted the United States and other donors to resume balance-of-payments support programs. Although such steps seem necessary, for the moment at least, USAID hopes to focus on longer term development assistance designed for improvements in the agricultural, health/nutrition/population and human resources sectors. Specifically in agriculture, there is a shortage of grain production and satisfactory grain storage in Zaire.

Recommendations

Strictly Refugee

1. The United States should be carefully selective in supporting specific relief requirements identified through UNHCR, consulting wherever possible with AIDR, and the PVOs in Zaire. To the extent feasible, such assistance should be in-kind, consigned to the recipient agency and including transport funding to final destination.

2. In regard to PVOs, the team believes that special attention should be given to IRC and CRS for their work with refugees between the frontier and the 20 km zone. In fact, if UNHCR does not improve its performance in other parts of Bas Zaire, the United States might consider shifting some support from UNHCR to PVOs.

3. To meet refugee emergencies, the mission should be allocated as "Ambassador's Refugee Contingency Fund".

Dual Purpose - Refugee/Developmental

4. Should the Cabindan refugee situation stabilize, AID might consider providing technical support for refugee resettlement projects.

5. AID should approve the Grain Marketing Project now pending in Washington, as a measure beneficial not only to the general economy but to potential refugee needs in particular because of the storage facilities it would provide.

Developmental - Refugee related

6. AID should continue with long-range assistance programs in the fields of agriculture, health/nutrition/population and human resources.





Chart F. Refugee Assistance Coordination -- Zaire*



G. Kenya

During the past 10 years there have been small and sporadic flows of refugees into Kenya from surrounding and nearby countries (map attached). At first largely from Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique and, recently, from Uganda and Ethiopia, these few thousand early refugees, assisted by Kenyan church and volunteer organizations, have generally made a smooth, unobtrusive transition, either successfully assimilating or, in time, moving on or returning to their own countries. The presence of these refugees has had limited impact on Kenyan society.

Within the past two years, additional turmoil in Uganda and the revolution in Ethiopia have increased significantly the nationals from those two countries who turn to Kenya for refuge. These now number perhaps as many as 5,000 "official" and possibly as many as 10-15,000 "unofficial" (see Appendix C) refugees. These later arrivals have tended to be students or educated professionals and, more recently, business class or shopkeepers and the ordinary urban citizens. Despite their increasing numbers, (estimated by UNHCR at 10 new official cases per day), most have been able, for the moment, to cope with immediate subsistence needs without extraordinary assistance. There has been, however, a mounting strain on refugee and Kenyan resources and growing difficulties arising from refugee competition for employment, land, schools and social services. The refugee, of course, bears the most difficult part of the strain.

Because of Kenya's extensive national infrastructure and long time flexibility in absorbing Ugandans within the old East African community, the impact of the growing refugee burden has not been viewed by the Government

of Kenya (GOK) as severe until this year. Even now it is not considered insupportable, except in Nairobi. Because of UNHCR/GOK registration and assistance policies, refugees are required to come to Nairobi. They invariably remain there and add to an already overcrowded and inadequate urban infrastructure where their presence and competition meet increasing antipathy and frequent hostility.

This impact has recently led the Government of Kenya, at the urging of UNHCR/Nairobi, to form an inter-ministerial committee on refugees within the office of the President, charged specifically with problem identification, planning and coordination of short- and long-term assistance within the GOK and among the multiplicity of private organizations dealing with refugees (Chart attached).

During the past 3 months additional useful actions have been taken by the GOK and refugee agencies:

- Assignment of a full-time GOK Refugee Officer, in the Office of the President;
- Addition of an Employment Counsellor and a Education Counsellor to UNHCR Staff;
- Initiation of planning for a Reception/Screening Transit Center outside of the immediate Nairobi town area.

The average refugee in Kenya, including the Ugandan refugee, arrives in generally good health and with relatively few nutritional problems or demands. Food, medical assistance, and personal care materials are all available at a cost in Kenya, so life maintenance becomes a matter of subsistence allowances or the hope of finding jobs. The former

are currently inadequate and the latter extremely rare. Inflation has exacerbated the problems.

The three principal refugee priorities are shelter, employment and education. It is clear that Nairobi cannot provide these needs adequately for its own citizens, let alone for refugees, and requires outside assistance.

The UNHCR, the Joint Refugee Service Committee (JRSC), and the GOK believe that, if the refugee population were diverted from Nairobi and dispersed more evenly throughout the country's less crowded towns and rural areas, sufficient and adequate shelter, employment and school capacity is available in Kenya. What these agencies, which are now handling a case load of 4,000 refugees, lack to accomplish these objectives, as well to provide basic services, are facilities and sufficient staff. This pertains to Kenya's emergency response infrastructure, notably the Kenya Red Cross, ICRC representation as well as the GOK Interministerial Committee on Refugees and church organization, such as the All African Council of Churches (AACCC). At the same time of course, these agencies require directly or through UNHCR cash, supplementary food and medicine.

This assessment does not consider the problems and demands which massive numbers of Somali or Ethiopian nomads could cause if they become victims of the civil strife in Ethiopia or further upheavals in Uganda. It is clear that should such situations develop, specific disaster measures, to include the provision of the full range of temporary shelter, feeding support, on-site medical aid, water and sanitation control would be required on an emergency basis.

As for general developmental assistance, Kenya has received fair attention by international donors. The United States is presently concentrating on rural development, health and nutrition. In light of refugee pressures, consideration perhaps should be also given to expanding educational facilities.

Recommendation

Strictly Refugee


1. The United States should continue to respond to specific UNHCR appeals for short-term support of immediate relief requirements.
2. The United States should be prepared to join with the GOK, and other donors in support of the proposed Transit/Reception Center in Kenya.
3. The United States should consider the provisions of proportionate funding support of JRSK, either directly or through UNHCR, to permit expansion of JRSK administration and the addition of at least 6 additional counsellors in education, employment/social services and business/settlement development.
4. If openings are not available in Kenyan institutions for qualified refugee students, scholarships should be provided for study elsewhere in Africa or for exceptional cases in the United States.

Dual Purpose - Refugee/Developmental

5. The USG should consider specific support for refugee education in Kenya to include staff, and class/dorm facilities at the University of Kenya; N.I.T.C., and


elementary/secondary facilities as may be proposed.

6. AID might wish to consider participation in an interministerial plan, now under study, to develop one or two small resettlement projects for rural Ugandans in order to help relieve concentrations in Nairobi. AID could be particularly helpful in planning, financing and constructing irrigation works.



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Chart G. Refugee Assistance Coordination -- Kenya



- - - Coordination
 ——— Direct relationship

• Approximate representation

1. Includes: Immigration, Police, Health, Housing and Social Services
2. Includes: Kenya Red Cross, Kenya Christian Council, YWCA, G.O.K., Food for Hungry, IEP, UNHCR, Catholic Secretariat, et. al. (Formed 1968)

H. Sudan

Aside from specific liberation movement circumstances in southern Africa and Angola, Sudan currently has the largest refugee problem in Africa. Surrounded by eight other African nations, Sudan also has a great potential for continued refugee problems.

Officially, it is estimated that there are now 160,000 refugees in the Sudan (see Appendix C); all but 6,300 require some form of life-support or other extended assistance to include settlement and education.

With the exception of approximately 2,000 recently arrived Ugandans, who are not recognized as refugees by the Sudan Government (by reason of political sensitivities) who require some limited settlement assistance, and 4,500 from Zaire, all the refugees are Ethiopian, predominantly from Eritrea. The bulk are located in the Kassala area, due west of Khartoum (map attached), near the Eritrean border, and at several sites in an area immediately southwest of Kassala (Wad el Hileiwu).

Historically, Ethiopian refugees have entered the Sudan intermittently between 1967 and 1974. There has always been some traditional employment movement between western Eritrea and the Kassala area. The fall of Haile Selassie in 1974, the breakdown in negotiations between the Eritrean liberation movements and the Ethiopian military government in early 1975, and the subsequent intensification of fighting in Eritrea, increased the number of refugees to the Sudan dramatically. Still further Ethiopians have sought refuge in the Sudan between late 1976 and early this year as clashes occurred in the Ketema and Humera areas of Ethiopia adjacent to the border.

The government, international and private assistance infrastructure in the Sudan is well formed, relative to most countries in Africa, and considerably experienced in dealing with immediate relief requirements (chart attached). Given additional staff and funding, it should be reasonably capable of responding to possible future contingencies. While the component organizations now require additional administrative, management and counselling staff and resources to handle both continuing relief and nascent settlement efforts, the principal common problem hampering effective assistance effort in the country is transport from Port Sudan to Kassala, Khartoum and southward to Juba. Physical limitations, seasonal closures of both roads and rail, plus the costs and vagaries of trucking, contribute substantially to the problem. Such closures have resulted in thousands of tons of food, medical supplies and general support equipment for refugees, mainly consigned to WFP, SUDANAID, CWS AND SCC, to be backlogged in Port Sudan. With the end of the rainy season and higher priority attention by the Government of Sudan (GOS), these supplies have now begun to move, but blockage could occur again.

In general, however, transport and grain storage gaps are now receiving attention with specific physical actions on key parts of the system. The all-weather Port Sudan - Khartoum road will be completed in 1978. The oil pipeline paralleling the road will be opened shortly freeing rail wagon space (30 percent of rail capacity is now used for oil movement). New locomotives and wagons, are to be financed by IBRD. A major double tracking effort from Port Sudan to Khartoum, to be financed by IBRD and Saudi Arabia, is now in the planning stage.

If the strain on the transport system has been of concern to the GOS and relief agencies, the impact on public services, particularly medical and educational, has been equally troubling. In the medical field, between 30 - 40 percent of in-patients and 50 percent of out-patients in the concentration areas are refugees. Additionally, the health problems of the refugees tend to be of longer term (such as tuberculosis) and require more intensive utilization of staff and facilities. In the educational sector, the GOS has had to construct nine additional elementary schools of 300 students each over the past three years for refugee children. At the secondary and university level, the problems, because of language and lack of facilities, are even more acute.

In order to assist the refugees toward greater self-sufficiency for their own benefit and to reduce the burden on the Sudanese society and economy, the GOS/UNHCR, with WFP and PVCs' programs, are continuing and intensifying agricultural resettlement. In addition to 5,000 Ethiopian refugees who began farming last year, an additional 10,000 will be relocated by the end of this year, with plans for the settlement of another 15,000 in 1978. In addition to these

programs, efforts are being directed toward vocational training, planning, and cottage industry development. USAID is concentrating its efforts in the fields of rural development and health. A range of foreign donors are helping in other sectors.

In general, it can be said that the GOS and UNHCR assistance, direction, coordination and delivery, and the individual voluntary agency effort are effective but, while increasingly sufficient, are still lacking in resources and staff for the massive requirement -- a requirement which has only recently stabilized. The principal problems, have been well identified however, and solution planning, and resource requirement support detailed.

Recommendations

Strictly Refugee

1. The USG should continue responses to specific UNHCR appeals for short-term support of immediate relief requirements to include augmentation of transport funds and training programs.
2. The USG should consider direct assistance to the GOS or through UNHCR for the Sudan Refugee Counseling Service and support of additional administrative/managerial and counseling staff of other operating agencies.
3. FI-480 regulations should be revised or amended to permit "In-Land Port of Entry" authorization in order to expedite the shipment of food supplies from Port Sudan to Kassala and Juba.

4. An Ambassador's Refugee Contingency Fund would be most helpful in Sudan where the refugee situation is volatile and unexpected needs occur.

Dual Purpose - Refugee/Developmental


5. The USG should consider support of initiatives in education to include additional refugee scholarships at the secondary/university level, funds for construction of additional elementary/secondary classrooms and for employment of refugee teaching administrative staff.

6. The USG should consider funding construction of medical ward expansion and support mobile medical clinic requirements.

7. A portion of PL-480 grants could be well utilized in providing fumigation training for grain storage, where currently there are tremendous losses.

8. AID should explore the desirability of helping the GOS install small grain storage warehouses in certain production areas which could be of direct benefit to refugee concentrations.

Chart II. Refugee Assistance Coordination -- Sudan*



- - - Coordination
 ——— Direct relationship

* Approximate representation

1. Includes: Police, Transport and Communications, Health and Education
2. Includes: Catholic Secretariat, Swedish Church Relief, Eritrean Red Cross, and Red Crescent Society, Eritrean Relief Association, etc.
3. Joint Body of GOS, SCC, SUDMAID, UNHCR/WFP (Formed June 1976)

I. Djibouti

Although a traditional host to Ethiopian and coastal populations in times of previous political stress, and a trade and employment magnet because of the French presence, Djibouti is now faced with potentially serious administrative and economic problems as a result of an inherited and growing refugee burden (map attached).

In addition to about 350 Eritreans and some 750 Afars who came in early 1975 from Ali Mirah's tribal area near Aslata in Ethiopia to the north, Djibouti, on its independence day June 27, 1977, estimated its "refugee" population at between 9-10,000 within Djibouti city itself and about 3,000 other Afars and Issas in the countryside. The Prime Minister now estimates the total at 16,000.

Since May with the intensification of fighting in the Ogaden - especially within the Chercher highlands and along the rail corridor between the Dire Dawa and Djibouti - it is true that the refugee population within the new country has grown by at least an estimated 5,000 additional persons, most of whom are women and children. This new population is concentrated in two relief areas, Dikhil and Ali Sabieh, near the Ethiopian border. It is growing by roughly 100 persons per day. While the GOD may claim some 16,000 refugees, other sources assert that "legitimate" refugees total only about 6,500 (see Appendix C).

Totally dependent on income from port operations, the Addis Ababa to Djibouti railroad, and French military payrolls, the Republic's overall economic viability at independence

was considered marginal, at best. With the halt of all rail traffic in July and consequent reductions in port operations, the country now relies increasingly on budgetary subventions from France. Unemployment is rising daily, and inflation is pegged at 10 percent. The new government's administrative and public services, already strained under the previous French territorial administration, are not prepared for any additional burden -- particularly a large and growing mendicant population.

In addition to the direct overload placed on the country's fragile systems requiring the provision of accommodation and other life support measures for refugees, the fighting in Ethiopia has produced another potentially serious impact on Djibouti. Traditional food and other trading sources along the western and southwestern border have been closed off. An estimated 100,000 Djiboutiennes previously reliant on that mechanism must now develop other means of support. Many turn to Djibouti city's already limited resources.

Despite its seemingly overwhelming difficulties, Djibouti, with UNHCR assistance, has taken its growing refugee problem in stride. In addition to surprisingly good immediate food, health, clothing and shelter assistance, the country has already proceeded to develop longer term settlement possibilities in which refugees may participate.

A special officer for refugee affairs has been appointed and refugee requirements appear to receive a high priority, both in the capitol and in the field (chart attached).

By all accounts, Djibouti's refugee performance to date has been singular and effective. Much of this effort has been accomplished singlehandedly. There has been some church assistance via Caritas and the temporary assignment

of a UNHCR headquarters officer and \$200,000 in emergency funds. AID's Office of Disaster Assistance has sent a team to help Djibouti protect itself from the cholera epidemic in the Middle East. Norway, Sweden and Germany have also made small contributions.

Despite the effectiveness to date, it is clear that the country cannot sustain such support operations for any extended period of time without additional external assistance, not even for itself, let alone for refugees.

Since everything but sand and air needs to be imported into Djibouti, the present and potential gaps in assistance are large. Meeting immediate food and health needs for both refugees and the indigenous population are likely to be the most serious for the near term. However, the lack of corresponding relief management structure will inhibit any assistance delivery. The absence of any local building material, except rock, and total reliance on imports for all materials present serious shelter limitations. Social requirements, including education, are totally dependent on the creation of the entire system. Since the refugee population does not speak French, employment is impossible. (Unemployment in Djibouti is 50 percent and rising.) Settlement prospects are hopeful, but far in the future and in totally untested agricultural areas.

Recommendations

Strictly Refugee

1. The USG should continue to be responsive both directly as well as through ICRC and UNHCR to present Djibouti emergency requests including health, shelter and overall relief requirements.

2. Once again an Embassy Refugee Contingency Fund would be most helpful in dealing with emergency requirements.

Dual Purpose - Refugee/Developmental

3. This Government should also consider proportional emergency PL-480 bilateral grant assistance and supplementary food aid through UNICEF /WFP based on United States, Government of Djibouti and international needs assessment for both protracted refugee and country requirements. Care should be taken here, as elsewhere, that refugees do not receive better treatment than the indigenous population, thereby creating resentment among the locals and attracting even more refugees.

4. The USG should consider immediate initiatives, either through the UN family (i.e.: UNICEF/WFP) or through appropriate voluntary agencies for direct management assistance to the Government of Djibouti, in concert with UNHCR, for relief shelter assistance operations. In addition to shelter, camp management, feeding, logistics and sanitation, such programs could also include initial primary school operations, cottage craft and self-help actions. Such initiatives should be principally guided by UNHCR evaluation and supportive of its recommendations and requirements.

5. In the context of any future decision, the USG should consider the conduct of an appropriate feasibility study with respect to specific grant assistance for agriculture settlement/production in the Petit and Grand Bara areas, as well as such other development programs as may be proposed by the Government of Djibouti.

REPUBLIC OF DJIBOUTI





Chart I. Refugee Assistance Coordination -- Djibouti



--- Coordination
 — Direct relationship

* Approximate representation
 1. Only UN representative, Djibouti
 2. Temporary assignment

IV. CONTINENTAL AND REGIONAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

Although each country and its refugee population in Africa obviously have individual problems for which no "group" solutions exist, certain common measures pertaining to refugee-related assistance suggest themselves. These include: the education field; aspects of employment; expansion of specific kinds of PVO activities in both relief and self-sufficiency development; improvement of governmental and private administrative and staff capacities to increase the effectiveness and management of assistance delivery. In some cases, this could mean a specific follow-up effort by the USG to create or augment particular institutional mechanisms, or the redefinition of an approach or policy.

The following comments are directed toward these possible common areas:

A. Life Support

In all countries visited, UNHCR and other UN agencies are providing various amounts and forms of refugee assistance, with varied degrees of efficiency. Without this assistance the plight of the average refugee would be much worse. Furthermore, these international organizations are logical and experienced channels of assistance.

Recommendation

The United States, of course, should continue its support of the UN programs in keeping with amounts and objectives determined by State EA/ORM (which is currently

seeking at least \$1 million through presidential determination under the United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund). AID should be prepared to backstop and supplement these programs when necessary, particularly in the fields of education, manpower training, health delivery systems, food storage, and supplementary rations. P1-430 Title II provides a ready and flexible instrument for some aspects of supplementary relief as well as medium term refugee related projects.

B. Education

The problem of facilitating refugee education in Africa is growing increasingly more urgent and complex, both because of greater numbers of refugees and because of political and language constraints. The problem is especially serious at the secondary level, but is also serious for the primary grades. Perhaps of equal if not of even greater importance is the need to provide vocational training.

There are mechanisms, some continent-wide, for securing scholarships, finding school space, coordinating specific school and student requirements and the like. None are really more than marginally effective, given the scope of the problem. In some cases, they address only part of even the individual's requirement, let alone providing a coordinated basis for augmenting other areas to include classroom, staff and dormitory needs. Here again vocational training should be regarded as important, and in some cases more so, than academic, in order to fulfill Africa's manpower requirements and turn refugees into productive members of society.

Among the organizations/mechanisms involved in educational assistance noted currently (and this list is only suggestive, it is realized) in Africa are:

- . The OAU's Bureau for Placement and Education of Refugees (BPAER);
- . International University Exchange Fund (IUEF);
- . African-American Institute (AAI);
- . African Student AID Fund (supported by Phelps-Stokes Fund)
- . United Nations Emergency Training Program for South Africa (UNETSPA)
- . United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);
- . All Africa Council of Churches (AACC);
- . African Association of Universities-Ghana (AAU);
- . Individual bilateral donors, including the United States Government;
- . Individual voluntary agencies.

Despite the interest and generally dedicated involvement of these organization, each specific educational assistance requirement is developed largely within the context of an individual refugee, group, or country, in isolation. The coordination of resource and recipient, user and supplier and overall needs of each is haphazard, at best. As a result, anomalies have developed which effectively bar many otherwise qualified refugees from continuing study. These range from school spaces without supporting scholarships or sponsors; scholarships without spaces; schools with spaces but no funds and schools with funds but no spaces. There are other problems, ranging from the ineligibility of a student because his political views are not acceptable, to specialized visa requirements, which might also be susceptible to improved coordination or more enlightened regulation.

Recommendation

In addition to those particular country assistance responses to which the United States Government may contribute in connection with requirements detailed by Van Egmond (AID/afr-c-1134; 5/20/77), Farah, and others, an overall initiative should be undertaken. The USG, in conjunction with other donors, should begin to study and improve the structure for identifying and coordinating educational assistance to refugees in Africa on a regional or continental basis. This will also help disperse refugees beyond present countries of concentration. Such an initiative should undertake to define or clarify AID policy with respect to infrastructure (i.e., physical construction of school facilities and operational support) and other assistance in relation to an individual country's capacity for absorbing refugee students. Again, particular attention should be given to vocational training. Such initiative should also examine the range of American assistance being provided to African refugees with an eye to improving the availability/effectiveness of that assistance: such examination should also include the U.S. government's student immigration policies and procedures. Consideration should also be given to:

1. Additional means of increasing the availability of American exchange teaching staff; provision of salary supplementation support to continue present teaching staff; and U.S. scholarship support at African institutions.
2. Strengthening existing education institutions in various African countries (including such as Nigeria, Ghana and Liberia), but possibly even the construction of special facilities in certain neutral countries.

3. A continentally coordinated effort to develop an Africa-wide refugee student placement mechanism. Particular attention should be given to potential help from the OAU's BPAER, AAI and IIE.
4. An AID, CU and HA conference of educators to consider this whole problem. The conference should include African and American educators, representatives of African governments with refugee problems, the OAU, PVOs handling refugee educational needs, and representatives of various refugee groups. An effort should be made to help Africans take the lead in suggesting solutions to refugee educational requirements.

C. Voluntary Agency Assistance

After the host country government and the United Nations coordination and effort, it is the private voluntary agency, especially the Christian church organizations, that carry out the bulk of the refugee assistance effort in Africa. In the countries visited, the voluntary organizations are principally:

Botswana

Mennonite Central Committee
 Botswana Christian Council - Joint Council for Refugees
 YWCA
 Botswana Red Cross

Lesotho

CARE
 Catholic Relief Service
 Mennonite Central Committee
 Lesotho Christian Council

Swaziland

Swaziland Christian Council

Mozambique

Lutheran World Relief
CARITAS (CPS International)

Zambia

Lutheran World Relief-Zambian Christian Refugee Service
Zambian Christian Council
International University Exchange Funds

Zaire

Caritas
International Rescue Committee
Church World Service
Medicin Sans Frontieres
Eglise du Christ au Zaire

Kenya

International Rescue Committee
National Christian Council of Kenya-Joint Refugee
Services of Kenya
Food for Hungry
Catholic Relief Service

Sudan

Church World Service
Sudanaid
Caritas
CRS
Lutheran World Federation
OXFAM
Sudan Christian Council-Joint Refugee Committee
Swedish Church Relief
Asme Humanitas (FRG)

Djibouti

CARITAS

In Kenya, Botswana, Lesotho and the Sudan, the immediate refugee assistance program--reception, screening, welfare, educational and settlement aid--is provided by a joint refugee committee comprising the host government, UNHCR and generally other voluntary agencies as noted. In addition, a secretariat is organized and run by the local Christian council with significant funding by the All Africa Council of Churches and the UNHCR. A similar organization exists in Swaziland, but is not now functioning. In Zambia, the Zambia Christian Council's effort is supplemented by the Zambia Christian Refugee Service, a local program of Lutheran World Relief which is providing direct settlement assistance. No similar organizations exist in Mozambique or Zaire, although there are local Catholic and Protestant church councils.

In general, the Joint Refugee Service operations in Botswana, Lesotho and the Sudan are well organized and highly effective, but greatly understaffed in both the administrative and service-outreach portions of their operations.

Beyond the UNHCR coordinated/funded Joint Refugee-Christian Council operations, and those of individual voluntary agencies, refugee assistance efforts are varied. They range from experimental teaching to provision of tools, doctors, medicine, technical expertise and supplies for agricultural settlement, handicrafts and simple distribution of food, blankets and personal care items. There are voluntary agency programs in both urban and rural settlement assistance.

For the most part, local level efforts by voluntary organizations are the result of their own initiatives. They are subject to either the immediate availability of funds

or, more likely, to their ability to raise funds from their countries of origin. As a result, these efforts are frequently underadministered or considerably smaller than the demand requires.

Since it is clear that unless governments, including the United States, are prepared to increase their own project personnel or create new institutions, existing voluntary organizations pose the most feasible alternatives for refugee assistance delivery. It would therefore seem reasonable that efforts to assist and augment voluntary agency initiatives should be considered. AID's role in this regard should concentrate on augmentation and improvement of management, administration, counseling, casework and delivery systems.

Recommendation

The United States should specifically examine the present programs and requirements of PVOs dealing with refugees in Africa with the view to strengthening present assistance delivery - relief, welfare and counselling services, as well as urban and rural resettlement efforts (including foster homes) - and to stimulating expansion and diversification of such activities. In pursuit of this recommendation, this Government might consider:

1. Convening a conference of voluntary agencies involved with refugee assistance in Africa to define specific program/administration needs which USG/other donors should consider and during which USG assistance possibilities could be explored. During this conference PVOs could be requested to submit justified requests for supplemental funding in each country of operation. Their submissions should then be checked with AID missions and Embassy refugee officers to verify their validity. It is assumed that HA would play a major role in convening the conference and insuring American PVO coordination. American PVOs might conceivably wish to form a consortium.

2. Augmenting OPG/DPG funding for refugee assistance programs in Africa and the circulation to posts/missions of specific detail/procedures for local USG initiatives to augment/support voluntary agency efforts.

While UNHCR has traditionally used PVOs as operating mechanisms, the United States (and perhaps particularly AID) might also deal directly with PVOs on a bilateral basis when necessary to cope with problems which UNHCR cannot handle (i.e., non-Patriotic Front refugee groups or some Cabindan refugees). PVOs sometimes offer the quickest method of introducing needed specialists into refugee situations. On the other hand, efforts should be made to restrain certain over-zealous PVOs from inflating refugee statistics in order to raise funds. A distinction might be made in channeling life support funding to PVOs through UNHCR and infrastructure help or management assistance bilaterally via AID.

AID should support the HA initiative to explore with UNHCR the feasibility of establishing training seminars in selected African countries to bolster local capabilities of indigenous volunteer organizations (as well as, if possible, governmental agencies) to administer refugee support programs.

D. Junior Professional Officers - UN

The United Nations system makes provision for the utilization of young professional personnel either as associate experts or junior professional officers (JPOs), as well as volunteers, depending on the specific UN organization.

Recommendation

AID should explore the possibility of helping HA augment the administrative capacity of the UN agencies in Africa dealing with refugees through funding of additional positions for JPOs or similar junior experts to work in relief delivery and counselling assistance positions. A special training program might be organized to produce refugee management specialists.

E. Peace Corps

Peace Corps Volunteers in several countries are working with refugees, for example in the TEF program. Perhaps PCVs could help in a variety of other refugee activities.

Recommendation

An exploratory conversation might be held with the Director of the Peace Corps to examine the feasibility of establishing a special category of refugee support volunteers, along with the provision of a management capability in the field.

F. Self-Help Funds

A specific tool of the USG to provide direct assistance which could be highly useful in the refugee context is the Self-Help Fund, normally available to every Chief of Mission. Funds could be utilized in refugee-initiated "income" projects for individuals and groups or be a device for involvement and contributions to society.

For unclear reasons, the Self-Help Fund was eliminated from those countries in Africa where US programs are being funded under Security Supporting Assistance.

The absence of the Self-Help Fund reduces the capacity and flexibility of the USG in its assistance response to refugee situations.

Recommendation

The United States should immediately restore, or establish, a Self-Help fund in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia and elsewhere in Africa where eliminated.

G. Ambassador's Refugee Contingency Fund

Despite the variety of relief mechanisms available to deal with most requirements, there are occasional exceptional circumstances when a U.S. Ambassador in Africa is requested to respond quickly to emergency refugee requirements. Using normal channels through UNHCR often entails a considerable exchange of traffic and at least several days' deliberation, although Ambassadors should be encouraged to follow this route if time permits.

In the disaster field, not involving refugees, the United States has a highly flexible response capacity which permits the immediate obligation of \$25,000 by the Ambassador on his declaration of a specific disaster circumstance. A similar procedure permitting an effective country-level response in sudden and unexpected migrations in southern Africa and the Horn would add measurably to the overall country contingency assistance availability and the effectiveness of U.S. response.

Recommendation

The United States should consider the establishment of a mechanism to permit the U.S. Ambassador in a country experiencing a serious refugee emergency, on determination of specific conditions (including the possibility that UNHCR cannot respond quickly enough), to make funds or other emergency assistance available to the host country or responsible agencies until regular program assistance is established. A formula invoking \$25,000 for instant obligation, with a reserve of up to \$100,000 per crisis per country, would be reasonable.

H. Refugee Categories

There are groups of displaced persons who fail to qualify for direct assistance because they do not fit specific refugee categories as currently defined by UN organs or because they are in one form or another of transitory state. Among the first group are Sithole and Muzorewa Zimbabweans who cannot receive UNHCR assistance as a group because OAU pressure limits assistance to Patriotic Front Refugees. "Transitional" categories range from Ugandans or

Angolans on their way to local absorption to "educational" refugees in Lesotho and Swaziland. The "transitionals" need continuing help, less if on the way to absorption, but more if their current status as free-moving students becomes untenable because of political developments in their native countries. There are many other "refugees" or displaced persons of undefined status whom the United States would like to assist for humanitarian or other reasons.

Recommendation

Since State HA may have difficulty in earmarking contributions through UNHCR to help some of these groups, AID should utilize the latitude and flexibility now permitted under SSA to fill current gaps and to anticipate future needs of refugees or displaced persons. This may require drafting of broader and more comprehensive guidelines; developing new legislation to identify individuals deserving some form of humanitarian or educational assistance; or highlighting organizations or institutions qualified to receive help in providing facilities for present or future refugee and D.P. requirements.

I. Liberation Movements

SWAPO, ZANU and ZAPU make appeals for direct contributions to their organizations for "refugee" care. The Swedes and Dutch, for example, give bilaterally to parties. Some argue that the parties may utilize funds for assistance to the needy better than host governments, UN organs, or PVOs with limited access to camps. Should the United States choose to make direct contributions, however, it could be accused of favoring certain factions or interfering in the internal affairs of a given country. Various factors should be taken in consideration in assessing such an avenue of

refugee assistance. For example there would be no way of determining if funds so given were used for guns and ammunition, or medicine and blankets for truly needy women and children.

Recommendation

AID and State together should examine the pros and cons of this issue in an effort to determine: (1) U.S. policy in this matter and (2) should there be any agreement that the United States give support directly to liberation movements, what role can and should AID play in such efforts.

J. Refugee Policy and Strategy

The two preceding sections illustrate a major problem in designing an overall strategy (or even specific recommendations) for dealing with refugee problems in Africa. Granted that the situation in each country is different and the needs of various refugee groups diverse, the United States Government as a whole has not established clear-cut overall guidelines or chosen precise objectives. There are differences of views within the executive branch and the legislative branch, as well as between elements of both, as to whether our goals are political or humanitarian or whether we maintain low visibility or a high profile.

Comment

The implementation of refugee programs and selection of refugee related projects would be greatly simplified if the United States determined consistent policies and some order of priority in these matters.

K. Country Support

Certain developmental or infrastructure projects in the countries visited bear direct or indirect relationship to current or potential refugee needs. Examples of these are the Gaborone secondary schools, a section of the Lesotho perimeter highway, the Botswana railway system, etc. Embassy and AID mission directors are sensitive to these needs and are designing or processing appropriate recommendations. Generally speaking, it does not appear advisable to construct permanent facilities for refugee requirements alone, thereby contributing to segregation or a "dependency" attitude. Whenever possible AID should consider support or funding of installations which serve joint purposes either concurrently or sequentially - for instance resettlement projects in Mozambique, Kenya and Djibouti, which either may be used by locals after refugees have returned home or can help refugees assimilate into the community. These would have the virtue of decentralizing refugee concentrations.

Recommendation

AID should be prepared to consider and process field recommendations fitting the foregoing criteria as quickly as possible. It should also demonstrate maximum flexibility in implementing programs which meet dual refugee/country needs.

L. Coordination

The team was struck by the multiplicity of donors and refugee agencies in many countries, and the diversity and complexity of refugee assistance coordination mechanisms in each country. All parties concerned - refugees, host

countries, and donors - would be better served if continental and/or regional standards, procedures and mechanisms could be developed.

Within the USG itself, there is a need for greater coordination. As far as Africa is concerned, State is endeavoring to fulfill something of this function, but lacks staff and authority to plan, synthesize and determine priorities among respective agencies.

Recommendations

The United States should urge UNHCR, or seek an alternate umbrella, to achieve this broad coordination. Perhaps UNHCR funding should be augmented to increase its Geneva management staff. Among other alternatives there might possibly be a role for the OAU, provided it lifted its ban on assistance to non-Patriotic Front groups. The United States might consider convening, or urging UNHCR to convene, a donor/operating agency conference to pursue this coordination objective. The OAU, of course, should be invited to participate.

Within the USG, a special Committee on Refugees might be formed by the Deputy Secretary of State to achieve greater coordination between and among involved US agencies and PVOs.

M. Self-Sufficiency

One "strategy," a principle which AID might be uniquely qualified to adapt and implement, is well defined, actually, by a UNHCR poster which reads in part:

"We do not ask your help to support refugees for ever and ever."

We need your help to make refugees self-supporting."

Recommendation

AID should give particular attention to those projects which accomplish the foregoing objective. This could include education, vocational training, resettlement projects, identification and utilization of skills among refugees for refugee relief programs themselves, or increased "settlement loans" to help craftsmen, tradesmen and small businessmen establish themselves in new environments.

V. CONCLUSION

Without question, several thousand refugees in Africa urgently need life-support assistance. Many thousands more require supplementary help, ranging from education and lodging to "settlement" loans. Even more are now reasonably absorbed (assimilated), but with the shifting tides of African politics, they may again some day require attention (see Appendix C). Regardless of political factors involved in the status of various groups, in each there are large numbers of innocent victims who deserve help on purely humanitarian grounds.

Most host countries in Southern, Central and Eastern Africa require some degree of assistance in dealing with refugee problems. This may range from financial and program support to managerial training and advice. Several countries require broad assistance to strengthen their institutional and physical infrastructure to cope with current national needs, which are being exacerbated by the presence of refugees. Others require additional infusion of foreign assistance to build reserves in anticipation of possible new waves of refugees. Care should be taken, however, that refugee facilities are not developed to such a level of comfort that they, in themselves, attract even more refugees.

The UNHCR, with contributions from the USG and others, is doing a reasonably good job in most countries providing life maintenance and should continue to be solidly supported by the Government. PVOs, for the most part, are effective operating instruments for delivering refugee services. The World Bank, UN and other international organizations are providing assistance and considerable capital to the most needy countries, as are many of the developed countries of Western Europe and North America, including the USG.

Gaps and needs do exist between assistance furnished - whatever the source and whatever the type - and refugee needs, as well as host country requirements. The United States is capable of filling some gaps from its rich reservoir of skills and talents and is morally obligated to share its bounty with the disadvantaged and dislocated of the world.

With three decades of experience in providing help, reconstruction, rehabilitation, and resettlement for victims of wars, civil strife and disasters all over the world, AID is uniquely qualified to assist refugees in certain sectors - especially education, manpower training, and health care delivery. In certain cases it can also improve vital transportation links. There are a variety of ways in which AID can channel its refugee related assistance, but the most logical at the moment appears to be through private volunteer agencies (PVOs). AID field missions in all countries visited are working with pertinent, reasonable assistance portfolios. AID/W should make every effort to implement mission assistance recommendations as expeditiously as possible, and to provide embassies with flexible tools for responding to emergency refugee requirements.

APPENDIX A

Glossary of Abbreviations

AACC	All Africa Council of Churches
AAI	African-American Institute
AAU	African Association of Universities
AID	Agency for International Development
AIDR	International Association for Rural Development (Belgian)
ANC	African National Congress
BCC	Botswana Christian Council
BDF	Botswana Defense Force
BOTZAM	Botswana-Zambia
BPEAR	Bureau of Placement and Educational Assistance for Refugees (OAU)
CARITAS	Catholic Charities, International
CCZ	Christian Council of Zambia
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSC	Council of Swazi Churches
CU	Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs (U.S. State Department)
CWS	Church World Service
ECZ	Eglise du Christ au Saire
EEC	European Economic Community
FLEC	Front for the Liberation of the Cabindan Enclave
FLNA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
GOB	Government of Botswana
GOD	Government of Djibouti
GOK	Government of Kenya
GOL	Government of Lesotho
GOM	Government of Mozambique

GOS	Government of Sudan or Government of Swaziland
GOZ	Government of Zaire or Government of Zambia
HA/CRM	Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs (U.S. State Department)
IBRD	World Bank
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ILO	International Labor Organization (U.N.)
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IUEF	International University Exchange Fund
JRC	Joint Relief Council (Botswana)
JRSK	Joint Refugee Services of Kenya
LCC	Lesotho Christian Council
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MCC	Mennonite Central Committee
MPLA	Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola
NAMIBIA	Southwest Africa
NRC	National Refugee Commission (Lesotho)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (AID)
NCCR	National Christian Council of Kenya
NITC	National Industrial Training Center
PAC	Pan African Congress
PVO	Private Volunteer Agency (also called VOLAG)
REDSO	Regional Economic Development Office (AID)
SA	South Africa (Republic of)
SCC	Sudan Council of Churches
SRRS	Swaziland Refugee Relief Commission
SSA	Security Supporting Assistance
SUDANIAD	Government of Sudan Aid
SWANU	South West Africa Nationalist Union
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization
TELF	Teaching English as a Foreign Language (Peace Corps)
TTC	Teachers Training College (Lesotho)
UBS	University of Botswana and Swaziland
UL	University of Lesotho

UN	United Nations
UNETPSA	United Nations Emergency Training Program for South Africa
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USG	United States Government
WCC	World Council of Churches
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAFU	Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
ZCRS	Zambia Christian Refugee Service
ZIMBABWE	Rhodesia

CONTACT LISTAfrican Refugee Assessment TeamI. Washington, July 15 - August 8, 1977

A. Administration for International Development, AID

1. GOLER T. BUTCHER, Assistant Administrator for Africa
2. W. HAVEN NORTH, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa
3. THOMAS H. E. QUIMBY, Director for Southern African Affairs
4. VIVIAN ANDERSON, Deputy Director for Southern African Affairs
5. LEONARD POMPA, Desk Officer, Southern African Affairs
6. ROBERT WRIN, Desk Officer, Southern African Affairs
7. HARIADENE JOHNSON, Director for East African Affairs
8. THOMAS O'KEEFE, Desk Officer, Kenya
9. ANILEE ROLLINS, Desk Officer, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan
10. DALTON GRIFFITH, Director for Central and Anglophone West African Affairs
11. ANNE MARTINDALE, Coordinator, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
12. CHRISTIAN HOLMES, Deputy Coordinator Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
13. STANLEY GUFF, Disaster Operations Center
14. ROBERT CLARY, Disaster Operations Center
15. PALMER STEARNS, Chief, Engineering Services for Africa

B. Department of State

1. WILLIAM EDMONDSON, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa
2. DAVID BOLEN, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa
3. STEVEN LOW, Ambassador to Zambia
4. WILLIAM LEWIS, Director, Office of Inter-African Affairs
5. SHARON MERCURIO, Office of Inter-African Affairs
6. THOMAS THORNE, Director, Intelligence and Research for Africa
7. CHARLES RUTYON, Legal Advisor, Human Rights
8. FRANK SIEVERTS, Deputy Coordinator, Humanitarian Affairs
9. SHEP LOWMAN, Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs
10. GRAHAM METSON, Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs
11. JAMES RELPH, Director for Africa, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
12. DENNIS KEOGH, Deputy Director, Southern Africa Affairs
13. KEITH McCORMICK, Desk Officer - Botswana, Lesotho Swaziland
14. RICHARD POST, Director, East African Affairs
15. GERALD SCOTT, Desk Officer - Djibouti, Somalia
16. RICHARD BAKER, Desk Officer - Kenya, Uganda
17. THOMPSON BUCHANAN, Director, Central African Affairs
18. EDWARD MARKS, Deputy Director, Central African Affairs

C. U.S. Senate

1. FRANK BALANCE, Counsel, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
2. CONNIE FREEMAN, Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

II. Geneva, August 9-11**A. U.S. Embassy**

1. Ambassador WILLIAM VAN DER HEUVEL
2. Ambassador BEVERLY CARTER, Delegate
3. EDWARD T. BRENNAN, Counselor for Humanitarian Affairs

B. United Nations High Commission for Refugees

1. JACQUES CUENOD, Acting Assistant Division Director (Africa)
2. RAYMOND M'KANDA, Chief, Southern Africa
3. GEORGE IACOBOU, Chief, Eastern Africa
4. J. J. KACIRER, Program Officer, West and Central Africa

C. International Committee of the Red Cross

1. JEAN-PIERRE HOCCKÉ, Director of Operations
2. FRANK SCHMIDT, Delegate General for Africa
3. JANE-MARY EGGES, Deputy Delegate General for Africa

III. Botswana, August 19-25**A. U.S. Embassy**

1. Ambassador DONALD NORLAND
2. RICHARD HOOVER, Political/Economic Officer

A. U.S. Embassy (Continued)

3. LARRY MAPPER, International Relations Officer
4. ROBERT FRIEDLINE, AID Operations Officer
5. DON JONES, Public Affairs Officer
6. PAUL HOOPER, Administrative Officer

B. Government of Botswana

1. Dr. Q. K. J. MASIRE, Vice President (Acting President)
2. CHARLES TIBONE, Administrative Secretary to the President
3. PHILIPPUS L. STEENKAMP, Secretary to the Cabinet
4. DAVID FINLAY, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education
5. STEPHEN R. LEWIS, Economic Consultant, Ministry of Finance
6. L. M. L. J. LEGWAILA, Private Secretary to the President
7. T. D. MOGAMI, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs
8. N. O. H. SETIDISHO, Rector, University of Botswana and Swaziland
9. PHINEAS MAKHURANE, Deputy Rector, University of Botswana and Swaziland
10. C. M. OLIPHANT, Mayor of Gaborone

C. Refugee Services

1. GARY PERKINS, UNHCR Representative
2. JOHN McCALLIN, Deputy UNHCR Representative
3. Rev. P. G. M. NDEBELE, General Secretary, Botswana Christian Council

C. Refugee Services (Continued)

4. Rev. MORRIS NGAKANE, All African Council of Churches
5. IRENE SNYDER, Botswana Council for Refugees
6. LOWELL HINSTAN, International Voluntary Service
7. Rt. Rev. SHANNON MALLORY, Anglican Bishop of Botswana
8. C. A. ERUNAYO, UN Deputy Resident Representative

D. Diplomatic Corps.

1. WILFRED TURNER, British High Commissioner

E. Refugee Nationalist Leaders

1. EASYL MUTOREWA, UANC (Rhodesia)
2. ALFRED DLAMINI, UANC (Rhodesia)
3. E. L. MUSHONGA, UANC (Rhodesia)
4. ISAAC MAKOPO, ANC (South Africa)
5. DANIEL TLOOME, ANC (South Africa)
6. RANDWEZI NENGWEKHULU, BPC (South Africa)

F. Selebs-Pibwe (Refugee Camp)

1. RANKE BEKWA, Assistant District Commissioner
2. DR. GOTSLER, Camp Manager

G. Francistown (Refugee Camp)

1. P. ASALIMA, District Commissioner

IV. Lesotho, August 26-28

A. U.S. Embassy

1. BIRNEY STOKES, Charge' d'Affaires
2. PETER BIELEK, Public Affairs Officer

A. U.S. Embassy (Continued)

3. JOHN KEAN, Regional Director, AID
4. FRANK CAMPBELL, Operations Officer, AID
3. EARL AMBRE, Acting Peace Corps Director
6. CAROL ROSE, International Relations Officer

B. Government of Lesotho

1. DR. LEABUA JONATHAN, Prime Minister
2. E. R. SEKHONYANA, Minister of Finance
3. ALBERT MOHALE, Minister of Education
4. J. KOTSOKOANE, Acting Foreign Minister
5. K. ALEMAYEHU, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works
6. M. T. THABANE, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Interior and Chairman, Lesotho Refugee Committee
7. P. MANGOELA, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Ports and Telecommunications
8. C. NTSANE, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture
9. PHILLIP MABATHOANA, Senior Permanent Secretary to Prime Minister
10. PROF. MUDENGE, University of Lesotho
11. Principal, National Teachers Training College

C. Refugee Services

1. EDUARDO GALINDO, UNDP Representative
2. BRYCE ATKINSON, C.A.R.E.
3. DENNIS O'BRIEN, Catholic Relief Services
4. ALAN JONES, World Food Program
5. KEN HARROP, ILO Regional Labor Advisor

D. Diplomatic Corps

1. REGINALD HOBDEN, British High Commissioner
2. Ambassador TA-JEN LIU, Republic of China

E. Refugee Leaders

1. JOE MOLEFI (South Africa)
2. WILLIAM LESLIE (South Africa)

Plus group meeting of approximately 20 refugees.

F. American Community

1. Group meeting of approximately 30 Americans working in Lesotho.

V. Swaziland, August 29-September 1**A. U.S. Embassy**

1. JAMES WACHOB, Charge' d'Affaires
2. JOHN KEAN, Regional AID Director
3. BYRON BAHL, Regional Programs Officer, AID
4. HOWARD PERLOW, International Relations Officer
5. THOMAS McDONOUGH, Regional Programs Officer, AID

B. Government of Swaziland

1. Dr. ZONKE KHUMALO, Deputy Prime Minister (Acting Prime Minister)
2. STEPHEN MATSEBULA, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
3. S. Z. S. DLAMINI, Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs
4. A. R. SHABANGU, Permanent Secretary to Prime Minister

B. Government of Swaziland (Continued)

5. GILBERT MABILA, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education
6. MBONE DLAMINI, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health
7. Dr. MICHAEL DLAMINI, Director of Public Health
8. A. C. DAWSON, Education Planner, Ministry of Education

C. Refugee Services

1. HANS VEENBAAS, Chargé UNHCR
2. S. S. HUSAIN, UNDP Resident Representative

D. Refugee Camps

1. Women's Camp, Swaziland College of Technology. Cross section of refugees
2. Men's Camp, Mawelaweie, near Malkerns. Cross section of refugees

VI. Mozambique. September 1-4

A. U.S. Embassy

1. Ambassador WILLARD A. DE PREE
2. JOENNIE CARSON, Deputy Chief of Mission
3. JOHN MOODY, Administration Officer
4. J. KOHLER, Economic/Commercial Officer

B. Government of Mozambique

1. SHAFURDINE KHAN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2. Commandant FRANCISCO LANGA, Director, National Directorate for Refugee Services

C. Refugee Services

1. SERGIO VIEIRA' de MELO, Departing Director, UNHCR
2. EBENEZER BLAVO, New Director, UNHCR
3. BJORN JOHANSSON, UNHCR
4. ERIK ZETTERBERG, UNDP
5. YVES PELLE, UNICEF

D. Patriotic Front Headquarters, MAPUTO

1. R. C. HOVE, ZANU Representative

E. Diplomatic Corps

1. P. JONKER, Netherlands Embassy
2. Counselor, British Embassy

F. Doroi Camp

1. FRANCISCO KUPA, Deputy Director, National Directorate for Refugee Services
2. Commandant de Cercle, CHIMOI
3. M. ALLANIS, Camp Leader
4. Cross section of refugees

VII. Zambia, September 5-9**A. U.S. Embassy**

1. Ambassador STEPHEN LOW
2. RICHARD TIERNEY, Political Officer
3. JOHN BARCAS, Economic Officer

B. Government of Zambia

1. A. MPENGULA, Director for American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

B. Government of Zambia (Continued)

2. SEI MPARA, Commissioner for Refugee Affairs,
Ministry of Home Affairs

C. Refugee Services

1. SOREN JESSEN-PETERSEN, Acting Representative,
UNHCR
2. WINSTON R. PRATTLE, Resident Representative,
UNDP
3. JERRY BURKE, Deputy Resident Representative,
UNDP
4. HAGE GEINGUB, Director, Nabibian Institute
5. MARK BOMANI, Deputy Director, Nabibian Institute
6. NILS GUSSING, Zambian Christian Refugee Service
(Lutheran World Federation)
7. HASSIM SAMGURE, International University Exchange
Fund

D. Diplomatic Corps

1. BETHANY ARMSTRONG, Canadian High Commission
2. H. WALLNER, Commission of European Communities
3. L. MOLLANDER, Swedish Embassy

E. Makeni Camp Site

1. VAL DIALLO, O.I.C.
2. S. R. MAYLOR, Commission for Refugees

F. Liberation Organizations

1. DAVID ZAMCHIYE, ZANU (Sithole)
plus six colleagues
2. MOSES GAROEB - SWAPO

F. Liberation Organizations (Continued)

3. MISHAKE MUYONGO, SWAPO
4. NANDI NETUMBO, SWAPO
5. M. K. SIMUMBA, O.A.U. (Not refugee organization, but primarily concerned with the refugee organizations)

VIII. Zaire, September 10-17

A. U.S. Embassy

1. Ambassador WALTER CUTLER
2. ALLEN DAVIS, Deputy Chief of Mission
3. ROBERT REMOLE, Political Counselor
4. RICHARD SULLIVAN, Political Officer
5. ROBERT MOSHER, Political Officer
6. VICTOR MATSUI, Political Officer
7. CLAY NETTLES, Economic Counselor
8. MARY LEE GARRISON, Economic Officer
9. JACOB CRANE, AID Program Officer
10. Dr. JOHN KENNEDY, Public Health Officer
11. JOHN FLIGINGER, Agricultural Attache
12. ROBERT DUMAS, Public Affairs Officer
13. DAVID FREDERICKS, AID Assistant Program Officer

B. Government of Zaire

1. CITOYEN MUKE-KANDONG, Counselor to the President
2. Prof. KASONGO MUIDINGE MALUILO, Secretary-Coordinator (Refugees), Ministry of Territorial Administration

C. Refugee Services

1. ANTOINE NOEL, Representative, UNHCR
2. RON SCHEINMAN, UNHCR
3. GERARDUS TEUNISSEN, Resident Representative, UNDP
4. B. CAVALI, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP
5. NICHOLAS ERJAVEC, International Rescue Committee
6. MBUALUNGI GANUMA, Secretary General, Eglise du Christ au Zaïre
7. JACQUES GAMBANGZI, Assistant to the Director, CARITAS

D. Bas Zaïre Province, Cabindan Refugee Camps

1. MATTHIEU HOUBBIN, Representative, International Association for Rural Development (Belgian) (AID/R) at BOMA
2. Dr. EVELYN JACQZ, Mission Hospital, KIZU, TSHELA
3. Dr. BADOUX, Representative CARITAS, KIUMBA Hospital, TSHELA

IX. Kenya, August 12-19

A. U.S. Embassy

1. Ambassador JOHN LE MELLE
2. CURTIS KAMMAN, Counselor for Political Affairs
3. CARL PENNDORF, Program Economist, AID
4. LOIS RICHARDS, Program Officer, AID
5. CHARLES NELSON, Director, AID
6. ERNEST WILSON, Assistant Director, AID
7. TOM LYONS, Population/Health Officer, AID
8. MIKE RUGH, Program Assistant, AID

A. U.S. Embassy (Continued)

9. LOU COHEN, Director, AID, REDSO/EA
10. ROBERT BELL, Assistant Director, AID, REDSO/EA
11. GENE SWANSON, Agricultural Engineer, AID, REDSO/EA
12. MARTIN BILLINGS, Agricultural Economist, AID, REDSO/EA
13. LOU BONKOWSKI, Engineer, AID, REDSO/EA
14. AL KARIAN, Sr. Engineer, AID, REDSO/EA
15. STAFFORD BAKER, Engineer, AID, REDSO/EA

B. Government of Kenya**Office of the President-Interministerial Committee
on Refugees**

1. P. K. BOIT, Provincial Commissioner for Nairobi
2. JONATHAN NZINGA, Department of Immigration
3. K. ONYONI, Housing and Social Services
4. I. M. WAJENGA, Headquarters, Kenya Police
5. F. J. M. KWINGA, Department of Immigration
(Assistant Immigration Officer)
6. E. K. KIONI, Kenya Police, Special Branch
7. E. A. MWAGERE, Executive Secretary, INT-MIN
Committee
8. L. M. MWATANGI, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
9. MICHAEL J. NJENGA, Principal Immigration Officer

C. Refugee Services

1. USAMAH T. KADRY, Representative, UNHCR
2. JOHANES BLANKENBERG, Education Specialist for
Kenya, UNDP

C. Refugee Services (Continued)

3. ULRICH FREYSCHMIDT, Program Officer, UNHCR
4. LUKIKA SHINGA-VELE, Legal Advisor, UNHCR
5. GERALD MURIUKI, Deputy Secretary, Joint Refugee Service Committee of Kenya
6. BEN MARINGA, Joint Refugee Service Committee of Kenya
7. Dr. MARTIN ALIKER, Founder, St. Francis Fund
8. D. A. KIPLEGAT, Deputy General Secretary, National Christian Council of Kenya
9. JOHN KAMAU, General Secretary, National Christian Council of Kenya
10. AIDA GINDY, Regional Director for East Africa, UNICEF
11. JOHN GEARHEART, Director, Ford Foundation
12. JOHN ROGERS, Director, Food for Hungry/Nairobi
13. ROSEMARY FOLDER, Counselor, Food for Hungry/Nairobi
14. ULRICH G. BEDERT, Regional Delegate for E.A., ICRC/Nairobi
15. JEAN-FRANCOIS BCREL, Assistant Regional Delegate for E.A., ICRC/Nairobi
16. GODFREY SABITI, Projects Director, All-Africa Council of Churches

D. Miscellaneous

1. ERIC R. KRYSSTALL, Project Manager, Programs for Better Family Living
2. PETER DELPH, Harvard Institute for International Development

X. Sudan, September 18-20

A. U.S. Embassy

1. Ambassador DONALD BERGUS

A. U.S. Embassy (Continued)

2. ROGER MERRICK, Acting DCM
3. RICK MACHMER, AID

B. Government of Sudan

1. SAYED MOHAMED OMER ISMAIL, Commissioner of Refugees, Ministry of Interior
2. AHMED KORA DAWI, Assistant Commissioner of Refugees

C. Refugee Services

1. ANTHONY KOZLOWSKI, Representative, UNHCR
2. CHARLES LA MUNIERE, Resident Representative, UNDP
3. J. P. NOBLET, Representative, World Food Program
4. ROGER MIKHALE, Representative, World Food Program
5. DAMAS DENG RVAY, Refugee and Emergency Coordinator, Sudan Council of Churches

XI. Djibouti, September 21-23

A. U.S. Embassy

1. WALTER CLARKE, Charge d'Affaires
2. DAVID HARPER, Political Officer
3. JAMES DERRICK, Acting Administrative Officer
4. PETER STRONG, Food for Peace (TDY from AID, Nairobi)

B. Government of Djibouti

1. AHMED DINI AHMED, Prime Minister and Acting President
2. IDREES FARAH ABANE, Minister of Agriculture

C. Refugee Services

1. KAMEL MORJANE, Representative, UNHCR

D. Western Djibouti, Refugee Camps

1. AHMED OBSIYEH, GOJ Escort Officer
2. M. SALAH, Commandant du Cercle, ALI SABIYEH
3. M. OSMAN, Commandant du Cercle, DIKHIL

APPENDIX C. STATISTICAL SUMMARY, REFUGEE POPULATIONS¹

(Southern, Eastern and Central Africa)

NOTE: It should be understood that despite official written standards for defining refugees, there is great variance in official statistics and estimates not only from country to country, but between each host government and other concerned agencies within the country itself.

The following composite estimates, therefore, while they represent the most considered figures, should be taken as indicative only, subject to specific confirmation depending on the given requirements that might be posed.

Origin/Affiliation	Number	Location	Comment	Rough Country Total (Legitimate refugees)
<u>A. Botswana</u>				
Zimbabwe	1,579	Selobe-Pikwe camp 1,036 Francistown camp 543	As of August 24 Earlier had been 3,000 Not in formal camp Not registered	2-3,000
South Africa	400	Gaborone 400		
Miscellaneous	440	Scattered 440		
<u>B. Lesotho</u>				
South Africa	150	Maseru vicinity	51 are Soweto students; remainder adults Potential "educational" refugees	150
	1-2,000			
<u>C. Swaziland</u>				
South Africa	91	Mbabane camp 13 Mavelawelo camp 45 Scattered	Post Soweto-students	103
	200	Scattered 200		
SA-PAC/ANC	12	Transit 12	30-40 Pre-Soweto families At any one time	103
	700	Scattered 700		
			Potential "instant" or "educational" refugees	

1. As of September 1977.

Continued--

Origin/Affiliation	Number	Location	Comment	Rough Country Total (Legitimate refugees)	
<u>D. Mozambique</u>					
Zimbabwe	35,000	Doroi camp	17,200	As of September 3	
		Tronga camp	12,000		
		Mavudzi camp	4,000		
		Tete transit	1,500		
		Training areas	18,000		
South Africa	60	Gaza camp	60		34,760
<u>E. Zambia</u>					
Angola	13,200	Mahoba camp	12,000	Settled	21,650
Namibia	2,450	Mayakuba camp	1,200	Swapo, settled	
		Nyanga farm	2,100		
		Mahoba camp	350		
Zimbabwe/Zapu	5,000	Scattered	5,000	Receiving UNICR Assistance	
Zimbabwe/Zanu/Mugabe	3-400	Farm near Lusaka	3-400		
Zimbabwe/Zanu/Sithole	200	In Lusaka	200		
South Africa/ANC	100	Transit	100		
Malawi	200	In Lusaka	200		
Uganda	200	In Lusaka	200		
Miscellaneous	100	Scattered	100		
Freedom Fighters	15,000?	Training camp	15,000		
Zapu children	2,600	In Lusaka	2,600		
<u>F. Zaire</u>					
Angola	478,500	Shaba and border	478,500	UNICR estimate is 532,500. However, only about 60,000 Angolans, nearly all 35,000 Cabindans, and some 5,000 Burundians really need some assistance. Of these 4,800 Cabindans in dire need	
Angola (Cabindan)	35,000	Bas Zaire	35,000		100,000
Burundi	18,500	Kivu Province	18,000		

Continued--

Origin/Affiliation	Number	Location	Comment	Rough Country Total (Legitimate refugees)	
<u>G. Kenya</u>					
Uganda	2,030	In Nairobi and near Frontier	2,030	5,030	
Ethiopia	570	Nairobi and North	570		
Mozambique	420	Scattered	420		
Rwanda	517	Scattered	517		
Somalia	22	Scattered	22		
Namibia	76	Scattered	76		
South Africa	73	Scattered	73		
Zimbabwe	24	Scattered	24		
<p>Figures are for registered heads of family. Therefore, "official" refugees may total about 5,000, but "unofficial" may reach 10-15,000, including a possible 4,000 recent Ethiopian war victims. Earlier Ethiopians and other miscellaneous groups are assimilated.</p>					
<u>H. Sudan</u>					
Ethiopia-Eritrea	100,000	Um Gargur Karkora Wad Kabu Qala-en-Nahol and vicinity	100,000	Numbers are increasing	
Ethiopia-elsewhere	50,000?	Gedarff Um Gulja and Kassala area	50,000	INICR and GOS plan to transfer 5,000 in 1978 to Rahad settlement	
Zaire	4,500	Rajaf, near Juba	4,500	Self sufficient	
Uganda	2,000	Southern Region	2,000	All self-sufficient except 200 recent arrivals	
				Total 160,000, minus 6,300 self sufficient	153,700
<u>I. Djibouti</u>					
Ethiopia/Afars		All Sableh Cercle	1,900	Estimates range from: UNICR/G - 4,000 Team observation - 6,500 GOJ 16,000 Refugee population is growing at rate of 100 per day	
Ethiopia/Issa		Dilhil Cercle	4,000		
Mixed Somali Tribal people from Ogaden		Djibouti City	1,000?		
		Floating	9-10,000?		
Eritrean	350	Scattered	350	6,500 to 10,000	