

<b>1. SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION</b>	<b>A. PRIMARY</b>	Development and economics	DC00-0000-0000
	<b>B. SECONDARY</b>	Development assistance	

**2. TITLE AND SUBJECT**  
 The rule of popular participation in development

**3. AUTHOR(S)** (100) Millikan, M.F.; Pye, L.W.; Haggood, David  
 (101) Conf. of the Implementation of Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act, MIT, 1968

<b>4. DOCUMENT DATE</b> 1968	<b>5. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 234p, 244p	<b>6. ARC NUMBER</b> ARC
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**7. REFERENCE ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS**  
 MIT

**8. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES** (Sponsoring Organization, Publishers, Availability)

**9. ABSTRACT**

<b>10. CONTROL NUMBER</b> PN-AAP-132	<b>11. PRICE OF DOCUMENT</b>
<b>12. DESCRIPTORS</b> AID Foreign aid Legislation  Meetings Participation	<b>13. PROJECT NUMBER</b>
	<b>14. CONTRACT NUMBER</b> AID/TA
	<b>15. TYPE OF DOCUMENT</b>

**THE ROLE OF POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT**

**Report of a Conference on the Implementation of Title IX  
of the Foreign Assistance Act, held at the  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Endicott House,  
Dedham, Massachusetts, June 24 to August 2, 1968**

**Max F. Millikan, Conference Chairman**

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**November 1968**

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## PREFACE

During the summer of 1968 the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology sponsored, at the request of the U.S. Agency for International Development, a six-week summer study on the provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 known as Title IX. This Title calls upon the A.I.D. agency to place emphasis on "assuring maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions." Since the passage of this Title and of various provisions amending it in subsequent legislation there has been some uncertainty within the agency and elsewhere both as to how broad an interpretation to place on this provision of the legislation and as to how, given whatever interpretation was decided upon as appropriate, the provision was to be implemented in the actual operations of the agency.

Accordingly the agency decided in the fall of 1967 to ask the M.I.T. Center for International Studies to organize and carry out an intensive examination of this subject during the summer of 1968. Professors Max Millikan and Lucian Pye agreed jointly to direct the study and a steering committee was appointed to lay plans for it consisting of the two co-directors, Professor Everett Hagen of M.I.T., Professor John Montgomery of Harvard, Professor Howard Wriggins of Columbia University and Messrs. John Schott, Eric Thorbecke and

John Cool of A.I.D. The steering committee met several times during the fall of 1967 and the winter and spring of 1968 to select the participants, plan the agenda, and assemble materials for consideration by the study group.

The study group was in continuous session from June 24 until August 2 at Endicott House, an estate belonging to M.I.T. in Dedham, Massachusetts. The regular participants, who are listed on page 111, were about half drawn from the community of academic experts on political, social, and economic conditions in the contemporary underdeveloped world and the other half from responsible operational posts in A.I.D. both in the field missions and in Washington. In addition there were two participants with extensive field experience from the State Department. The group was selected so as to include persons with training and experience in most of the relevant academic disciplines including political science, economics, anthropology, sociology, and law. It was also selected to include persons with extensive field experience in all the major regions of the underdeveloped world. In addition, consultants were brought in from time to time from both the scholarly world and the government to assist the group with its consideration of specific topics on the agenda.

The conference conducted its business as follows: During most of the first two weeks the conference met for the most part in plenary sessions devoted to the discussion of the major functional issues posed by the problem the conference was asked to address and to a more detailed examination of the application of those issues in particular countries and geographic regions. While these discussions were led for the most

part by regular members of the conference with particular qualifications on each topic, there were some presentations during this period by outside consultants. The conference was particularly fortunate in persuading two of the Congressional authors of Title IX, Rep. Donald Fraser and Rep. Bradford Morse, together with Marion Czarnecki of the staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to spend a day with us at the end of the first week, giving us their views of the intent of the Congress in including Title IX in the Foreign Assistance Act.

During the second week the conference devoted a good deal of time to discussing how it could most fruitfully divide the subject with which it was dealing into pieces which could be dealt with by a number of smaller working groups. It was recognized early in our deliberations that the interconnections between the various parts of the problem were so intimate that no clean and logical division of it into pieces was possible. Nonetheless it was agreed that the group would split into five functional working groups to deal respectively with 1) the concept of Title IX and the measurement and evaluation of progress in implementing it, 2) the assumptions to be made about the foreign policy context in which American aid would be operating over the next decade, 3) the classification of the variety of host country situations in which Title IX would have to be applied and the design of appropriate strategy for each, 4) the analysis of the instruments available to the A.I.D. agency for carrying out the purposes of Title IX and the ways they could be employed to this end, and finally 5) the roles of agencies other than A.I.D. in the implementation of Title IX including both other agencies of

the U.S. government and nongovernmental organizations. Toward the end of the conference a sixth working group was established to consider the implications of the conference's conclusions for the organization of the A.I.D. agency and for its training and research activities.

During the third week these functional working groups prepared preliminary reports of how they thought the conference should deal with the problems in their respective areas. During the fourth week the conference reorganized itself quite differently. Five new working groups were established, each of which included members from each of the five functional working groups, to examine the application of Title IX concepts in each of five geographic regions. These working groups addressed themselves respectively to the application of Title IX to A.I.D. programs in Indonesia, India, Turkey, Brazil, and two African countries, Liberia and Tanzania. At the end of the fourth week these country working groups reported their conclusions to the conference as a whole.

During the fifth week the original functional working groups reconvened to revise their conclusions in the light of the country studies conducted during the fourth week. The final week was devoted to completing the written reports of the functional working groups, discussing the overall conclusions of the conference, and on the last two days briefing a group of officials from A.I.D. and the State Department on the results of our deliberations.

The report which follows is based upon the reports of the six functional working groups of the conference and the work of a drafting

committee which drew up the conference's final recommendations during the last week. Chapter One and Chapter Six of this report are based on the report of the first working group, on concepts and evaluation chaired by Donor Lion. Chapter Two grows out of the report of the second group, on foreign policy chaired by Paul Seabury. The third functional group chaired by Howard Wiggins on host country situations and appropriate strategies prepared the original version of Chapter Three and the fourth functional group chaired jointly by John Montgomery and Princeton Lyman on A.I.D. instruments produced the report on which Chapter Four is based. The fifth group which examined the role of agencies other than A.I.D., discussed in Chapter Five, was chaired by John Plank, and the problems of organization, training, and research covered in Chapter Seven were dealt with by the sixth group under the leadership of John Cool. The summary of this report is based on recommendations drafted by a committee consisting of all the above.

The original reports have been very extensively edited, condensed to eliminate duplication, and rearranged to improve the logic of presentation by the conference editor, David Hapgood, with the advice and counsel of the co-directors of the project. While the intent of the editor and the two co-directors has been to retain unchanged the content of the conclusions of the conference and of the documents prepared by its committees, time has not permitted submitting this version of our report back to the participants for their comments. While we hope no participant will find anything in this document to which he would take violent exception, the present version is solely the responsibility of

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the editor and the two co-directors and should not be assumed necessarily to reflect either the substantive views or the preferred mode of their expression of any of the others listed as participants in the conference.

The participants came to the conference with a wide range of views about both the meaning and the importance of Title IX. There were some deeply committed to the populist ideology reflected in this provision of the legislation and others very skeptical as to whether in a complex real world much of practical utility could be based on this title of the act. In our view this divergence was greatly reduced by our deliberations at the conference. While the enthusiasts acquired a deeper understanding of the institutional development necessary to channel increased participation in constructive rather than disruptive directions, the skeptics were all convinced by the close of the conference that interpreted with some sophistication this could and should add a major and important dimension to our aid philosophy.

In conclusion the co-directors would like to say that however the substantive contributions of the conference are appraised we believe that all the participants found it an enormously rewarding experiment in communication between persons with operational responsibilities and members of the academic community, that the scholars gained new respect for the intellectual quality of at least this group of bureaucrats, and that the operators may have found the professors more willing and able to deal with the muddy problems of the real world than they had expected.

Max F. Millikan

Lucian W. Pye

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## TITLE IX UTILIZATION OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN DEVELOPMENT

Sec. 281. (a) In carrying out programs authorized in this chapter, emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions.

(b) In order to carry out the purposes of this title, programs under this chapter shall--

(1) recognize the differing needs, desires, and capacities of the people of the respective developing countries and areas;

(2) use the intellectual resources of such countries and areas in conjunction with assistance provided under this Act so as to encourage the development of indigenous institutions that meet their particular requirements for sustained economic and social progress; and

(3) support civic education and training in skills required for effective participation in governmental and political processes essential to self-government.

(c) In the allocation of funds for research under this chapter, emphasis shall be given to research designed to examine the political, social, and related obstacles to development in countries receiving assistance under part I of this Act. In particular, emphasis should be given to research designed to increase understanding of the ways in which development assistance can support democratic social and political trends in recipient countries.

(d) Emphasis shall also be given to the evaluation of relevant past and current programs under part I of this Act and to applying this experience so as to strengthen their effectiveness in implementing the objectives of this title.

(e) In order to carry out the purposes of this title, the agency primarily responsible for administering part I of this Act shall develop systematic programs of inservice training to familiarize its personnel with the objectives of this title and to increase their knowledge of the political and social aspects of development. In addition to other funds available for such purposes, not to exceed 1 per centum of the funds authorized to be appropriated for grant assistance under this chapter may be used for carrying out the objectives of this subsection.

## SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

Popular participation, which is the goal of Title IX, should be set alongside economic development to form the twin pillars of the foreign assistance program. Such a new aid policy, representing a widened view of the developmental process, might bring a new freshness and appeal to the idea of foreign assistance.

To date Title IX has had limited effect. Although it has been on the books for two years, it has not influenced the actions of A.I.D. in major ways, nor has it been adequately supported by the rest of the foreign affairs community. If Title IX is to mean anything--if, that is, the U.S. Government is to act differently as a result of Title IX--considerable change is needed in the way A.I.D. defines and carries out its mission. Only a vigorous and continuing commitment on the part of the leadership of the aid agency can give meaning to Title IX.

### The Concept of Title IX

The goal of "popular participation," discussed in Chapter One, cannot be as neatly defined or measured as economic growth. Still, the concept embodied in the legislation is clear enough. Most simply stated, it means that the people of the less developed nations should participate more than they do in decisions that affect their lives. It also means that they should participate in the implementation of

development and in the fruits of economic growth. The central concept, that of participating in the making of decisions, covers more than the political right to vote in elections. It includes, for example, the right of people to speak to a bureaucracy that is responsive, and the ability to form voluntary associations to pursue group interests.

As a corollary, the goal of participation also requires the development of a wide variety of institutions at all social and political levels from the local community to the national center. The purposes of these institutions are, first, to enable people to articulate their demands effectively and, second, to enable government to respond effectively to those demands.

Setting up the promotion of participation as a pillar of aid policy does not in any sense imply a devaluation of the goal of economic growth. First, it would be tragic for the U.S. to lessen its economic effort at a time when the gap between rich and poor nations is still widening. Second, participation and growth are complementary not competing goals: no either-or choice is involved. Indeed, our study both of the problem in general and of particular country situations led us to conclude that in the absence of vigorous economic growth, increases in participation will not be possible. Congress wrote Title IX because it was unhappy with economic growth as the only target of development assistance. But, as the Congressional mandate makes clear, the two goals are viewed as mutually reinforcing. More participation leads, through popular pressure, to improved governmental performance and to more equitable and useful distribution of resources. More

economic growth provides both resources to make participation possible and a growing variety of institutions and organizations through which it can be practiced. Finally, the mandate of Title IX is not so much to create new programs as it is to apply a new dimension to existing kinds of programs. This means that Title IX can be put into effect even during a time of shrinking budgets.

#### The Foreign Policy Context

Can the aid agency implement Title IX in the present world situation? We believe the prospects for Title IX policy are better now than they would have been some years ago. (The foreign policy context of aid is described in Chapter Two.) The world has changed in recent years--we all agree on that, though we differ on the extent and implications of those changes. It seems clear, however, that the U.S. can now take a bolder and more imaginative approach to the goals set forth by Title IX. Because the world is less bipolar than it was, because new military technology makes bases less valuable than they once were, the Cold War posture of individual nations of the Third World no longer seems as critically important to the national security as it once did. Whether the current leadership of third-world nations, particularly the smaller ones, is leaning toward the Soviet Union or toward us no longer seems so strategically significant. This change opens up new options for the U.S. In the past, the U.S. has considered itself forced for short-run cold-war reasons to support governments that were repugnant in American eyes (and whose policies were contrary to Title IX). Now,

frees at least to some degree from those once imperative short-run goals, the U.S. is also freer to pursue longer-term goals like those of Title IX even at the risk of losing friendly but distasteful regimes.

We should emphasize that to say that third-world nations are less strategically important does not imply that the Third World as a whole is any less important to the U.S. This region still contains the majority of the world's population. Nor is it easy to imagine that the U.S. could long remain tranquil and affluent in the midst of poverty and, perhaps, chaos.

Another possible constraint is that Title IX activities might be interpreted, abroad and perhaps at home, as an attempt by the U.S. to impose its political values on other societies. Whether this danger materializes will depend on the attitude the U.S. foreign policy community brings to the implementation of Title IX. The approach to host countries should be both straightforward and low-keyed. Title IX programs should be offered rather than "sold." Usually the host country that expresses an interest will already be committed in some degree to the goals of Title IX. In general the U.S. should seek the chance to support host country initiatives rather than offer American-designed programs. Nor should the U.S. be sensitive to the point of paralysis about host countries' reactions to U.S. involvement in their social and political development: this point is discussed in Chapter Three. The impression prevails in the Third World that the U.S. in allocating aid makes value judgments about the recipients' political systems. And, while Title IX goals are not pursued throughout the Third World, it is

also true that popular participation is a stated value among most of the region's regimes.

Assuming, then, that the foreign policy climate is favorable and that Title IX is not seen as a mandate for intervention, there remains the question: is the U.S. capable of carrying out the Title IX mandate? Is the state of our art such that we can offer our services to other societies with any confidence? Certainly we do not know as much about the causes and consequences of popular participation as we do about economic growth. This argues for a degree of modesty in our approach to Title IX projects. It also argues, as we say in more detail later on, for a considerable research effort. But our relative ignorance does not provide grounds for abandoning Title IX till that distant day when we fully understand all the dimensions of the problem. Enough is already known to enable aid programmers to sort out those programs that promote popular participation from those that do not: that in itself would result in a considerable change in the allocation of aid resources.

#### The Implications for Aid Strategy.

What difference would applying Title IX make in the way resources are allocated? Foreign assistance strategy should focus on countries, and programs within countries, where U.S. resources are likely to make a significant contribution to both Title IX objectives and economic growth. Applying this principle should result in more than the relabeling of present programs.

Recipient countries differ so markedly in: (1) U.S. interests in their domestic and foreign behavior, (2) the interests of the host

country leadership in broadening participation, (3) the receptivity of the leadership to U.S. assistance, (4) the capabilities of the recipient government to implement agreed programs, (5) the constraints posed by the history, culture, and ideology of the country on available courses of action,--that no universally applicable strategy for Title IX can be designed. Even more than with economic development strategies, Title IX strategies must be custom tailored to fit each country situation. We indicate in Chapter Three some ways of approaching the design of strategies for individual countries.

Title IX requires a change in the standards under which aid is terminated or continued. A nation due to be phased out of substantial capital assistance because it has achieved self-sustaining economic growth may want and need help toward Title IX objectives. In that case other forms of aid, especially technical assistance, might be continued. Such countries may in fact offer the most attractive Title IX opportunities. (Turkey is an example.) On the other hand, aid might be terminated on Title IX grounds even though self-sustaining growth has not been achieved. This might mean ending all aid to a country ruled by an oligarchy that refuses to allow any popular participation in either decision-making or the benefits of growth. Or it might mean terminating a program that tends to inhibit participation without, however, ending all aid in that country. (Liberia is an example of a country which might be reconsidered from this point of view.)

Applying Title IX criteria would also result in different decisions concerning new programs. In a choice between two programs

that both have economic growth as their primary objective, the decision would go to the one that tended to promote participation. Similarly, preference would be given to a public administration program that tended to make bureaucracy more responsive to popular desires over one that simply promoted central control.

In those cases where the U.S. is assisting a country for urgent strategic reasons, every effort should be made to infuse Title IX objectives in the selection of projects. These countries, where the U.S. reputation is heavily engaged, may well be both the most important and the most difficult from the Title IX point of view. The risks of undertaking Title IX projects in such countries must be weighed against the risk of doing nothing: of continued association with an unpopular and perhaps doomed regime.

The designing of a few token Title IX projects will, however, accomplish little or nothing if the total balance of U.S. activities in that country weighs heavily against the growth of popular participation. In some cases, of course, control over most U.S. governmental programs is in the hands of agencies other than A.I.D.

The larger nations of the Third World would continue to be important to the U.S. under Title IX, if only because their collapse would endanger world peace. Among the smaller unstrategic countries, however, aid would be restricted to those that have demonstrated a strong commitment to the goal of popular participation.

The Use of Aid Instruments to Implement Title IX.

If these broad principles are to be put into effect, foreign aid programming must include new analytical dimensions. This analysis must be applied to all aid instruments, for all have Title IX potential. Most of all it must be applied to host country programs to determine which are relevant to Title IX. (A.I.D. instruments are the subject of Chapter Four.)

Most government activities that could encourage citizen participation are in the developmental sectors: agriculture, education, industry, public health, etc. These are important "contact points" for Title IX. In providing assistance to administration in these fields, the U.S. should place less emphasis on the traditional values of efficiency and technical sophistication, in order to give greater importance to the relationship between government and its citizens. Every effort should be made to promote two-way communication between people and bureaucracy. While this communication is generally desirable under Title IX, in some fields, notably agriculture, it is essential just on the narrow grounds of technical efficiency. Specialists should be added to A.I.D. missions for the purpose of helping the technicians add these Title IX dimensions to their programs.

American support of civil and military administration may have the effect of giving those administrations excessive power simply because they become the most efficient units in the society. When that happens, the U.S. has an obligation under Title IX to redress the balance by strengthening other, countervailing forces. This might

take the form of aiding legislative bodies or the judiciary, or providing assistance to popular interest groups.

While decentralization is generally desirable under Title IX, there is the danger that indiscriminate decentralization may actually harm local government by prematurely overloading it with responsibilities it cannot meet. The capacities of local government should be carefully examined before any decentralization scheme is undertaken. Similarly, support to autonomous institutions and voluntary associations does not necessarily promote participation: whether it does depends on the actual functions of those institutions and associations.

Among the kinds of projects that have particular value to Title IX goals are the following. Involvement of local government representatives in national planning, which serves the ends of better planning as well as broader participation. Economic policies that bring cash incentives to the subsistence sector; such policies will produce more sustained growth, as well as more participation, than policies which concentrate benefits in a small modern enclave. Price incentives for small producers and savings-for-investment incentives for the wealthy; these are powerful instruments for distributive justice as well as productivity.

Participatory enterprises like community development, cooperatives and credit unions must be examined to determine whether they do in fact serve Title IX purposes. If they provide meaningful opportunities rather than ritual, if they provide people with access to the nation's political and administrative power structures, then they are worth supporting. If not, they are likely to divert attention from major

national issues.

Urban programs that involve locally organized participation should receive much more attention. The fact that the U.S. has been unable to resolve its own city problems should not lead Americans to stay out of this area in the Third World. Quite the contrary, for it offers a unique opportunity. In most fields of endeavor, the undoubted technological superiority of Americans has a stifling and discouraging effect on their host country counterparts. In the area of urban problems, however, we have a rare chance to share ideas and information on a basis of equality. Two attractive kinds of exchange are possible. First, the U.S. and host countries could exchange people who have worked in the cities. Second, the U.S. could recruit for overseas urban projects people who have worked in our domestic Title IX-type programs in American cities, including indigenous leaders who could work directly with indigenous urban leaders in the Third World. A.I.D. should make a particular effort to realize these possibilities, offbeat as they may seem, for such exchanges could inject fresh energy and fresh insights into urban operations both overseas and at home.

#### The Role of Non-A.I.D. Agencies.

Programs of the aid agency are not the only instruments that can be applied to the goals of Title IX. (These other instruments are discussed in Chapter Five.) Among the wide variety of American private organizations that operate abroad, many undertake, or could undertake, projects relevant to Title IX. A.I.D. should use whatever means are

available for bringing the activities of these organizations to bear on Title IX goals. One way would be to extend incentive grants for partial funding of private assistance programs.

Other government agencies operate programs or make decisions that affect the goals of Title IX. These agencies include the State Department, Defense Department, CIA, USIA and Peace Corps. Their activities may either promote or inhibit popular participation; in the latter case, an A.I.D. mission promoting Title IX will be out of tune with the Country Team. In some cases, these agencies might take on Title IX projects after A.I.D. has phased out its economic aid.

Since Title IX leads A.I.D. out of the clearly marked channel of economic growth into waters where other agencies also operate, it is clear that a much greater degree of inter-agency coordination is needed. Although Title IX appears only in the Foreign Assistance Act, other agencies can largely nullify it if they are hostile or indifferent to its goals. It is essential therefore that steps taken to promote the understanding of Title IX within A.I.D. be paralleled by similar steps within other agencies. One step would be to introduce a Title IX component in the inter-agency training courses of the Foreign Service Institute.

Most important among the other agencies is of course the Department of State. Title IX cannot possibly be put into effect without the wholehearted cooperation of State. This is particularly true overseas, where the Ambassador, as chief of the Country Team, can make or break any Title IX initiatives. But it is also true in Washington, where the

resources of INR could be invaluable in Title IX planning. In both cases, State has information-gathering resources that could be, but now are not, put to use for the social-political analysis needed for Title IX planning. In Chapter Seven we make detailed recommendations aimed at closer liaison between State and A.I.D.

#### The Organization of Aid.

Within the aid agency itself, we do not find that implementing Title IX calls for any major structural change. The organizational changes we do propose, in Chapter Seven, are not nearly as important as the attitude that the A.I.D. leadership takes toward the purposes of Title IX. If that leadership understands Title IX and takes an active interest in putting it into effect, that word will soon reach the missions via the agency's informal communication network. If, on the other hand, interest at the top is minimal, that word will spread equally fast.

There are two bureaucratic pressure points at which the A.I.D. leadership can demonstrate its concern with Title IX. One is the revision of program guidelines to require analysis of the social and political implications of each project. Adding these Title IX criteria to the program guidelines is particularly important because missions have shown themselves to be more responsive to the guidelines than to "fad" cables and airgrams of special pleading.

The second pressure point is the personnel evaluation system. Inclusion in the Performance Evaluation Report of questions designed to

assess the employee's performance in areas related to Title IX goals would have the double effect of making both the employee and his supervisor focus on those goals.

Washington should also ask the Chief of Mission to report annually, as part of his program submission, on changes in those indicators which are deemed to be important to the Title IX analysis of his country. In Chapter Six we discuss possible indicators of Title IX progress.

It is essential for Title IX that A.I.D. maintain the principle of country-centered programming. Each country is a unique mix of political hazards and possibilities. Title IX experience is less transferrable than policies concerning economic growth. For both these reasons, Washington should allow the fullest programming autonomy to the missions.

Both in programming and in evaluation, A.I.D. will have to allow its missions great flexibility as regards time. No one as yet knows how long one should expect to wait before seeing the results of a Title IX effort, nor indeed how to measure those results when they do appear.

Two more issues concerning organization are: whether the functions now concentrated in A.I.D. should be distributed among several agencies, and whether U.S. development assistance programs should be turned over to multilateral international agencies. We have considered both questions only from the perspective of Title IX.

On the first, we do not believe the purposes of Title IX could be accomplished if the aid agency is broken up into several pieces.

The achievement of Title IX goals requires both a central policy focus and the coordination and systematic use of diverse aid instruments. Coordinating the use of aid instruments with other agencies is, as we have said earlier, a knotty enough problem under existing circumstances; more dispersion of those instruments might well make the task impossible.

On the second question, we believe it would be a serious error if all U.S. programs with Title IX implications were turned over to multi-lateral administration. The existing agencies are not well equipped to handle Title IX concepts. Such a transfer might also be damaging to the U.S. image abroad, for it would put the humanitarian programs into the hands of others, leaving the U.S. with the Realpolitik programs that cannot be placed in multilateral agencies. The aid program in general would then risk the loss of the liberal constituency that is essential to sustaining the spirit of its personnel and its public support. Nonetheless, we should seek to stimulate discussion of Title IX objectives in multilateral agencies in the hope that they may eventually generate Title IX programs of their own.

#### Training Requirements.

The new priorities set forth in Title IX can only be implemented by people. Since those priorities are new, the people who man A.I.D. will have to acquire new skills and attitudes. Since we do not anticipate that A.I.D. will create an entirely separate "Title IX staff," A.I.D. employees as a group will have to acquire a Title IX capability. In recruiting new employees, the agency should seek out

people who, in addition to their technical skills, display cultural sensitivity and tolerance for ambiguity. Title IX programming cannot be accomplished with technical skills alone, for these are programs that take one into delicate areas and whose results do not lend themselves easily to quantification.

Obviously the prime resource of A.I.D. is its present personnel. They, and new recruits, need special training in the subject matter of Title IX. Orientation should include clusters of case studies that illuminate all the dimensions of the programming process; if possible, these should be narrated by someone who is personally familiar with the case. The Senior and Mid-Career Inter-Departmental Seminars should be converted from counter-insurgency to courses on Title IX. "T-group" or "sensitivity" training should be made a part of training for new recruits, at least pending more evidence on its long-run benefits. Training in Title IX should be offered overseas to the Country Team as a means toward better inter-agency coordination.

#### The Need for Research.

We pointed out earlier that far too little is known about the subject addressed by Title IX. We know little about deliberately induced social-political change. We know little, also, about time rates of change. We do not know how long it should be before a Title IX project shows discernable effects, or how long it takes for it to become self-sustaining. We know little about sequential change. When, for example, a rural community development program is initiated, it is assumed that

its effect will spread beyond the immediate project. But we do not know how or when this happens. Faced with such broad areas of ignorance, the research possibilities are almost infinite. In Chapter Seven, we list some high priority questions to be investigated. Among these are the possible Title IX indicators listed in Chapter Six.

With limited resources, it is essential to organize research for maximum productivity. In the case of out-of-house research, A.I.D. should be careful to avoid "art for art's sake" studies that have no policy value. Much research is presented in a form and language that makes it hard for operational people to use. A.I.D. could, at little cost, get more mileage from such research by having on its staff some skilled people to "translate" the material into operationally usable form.

We cannot urge too strongly that research results be unclassified. Everyone should be familiar with the rise in sensitivity about U.S. research in many countries, especially on the subjects relevant to Title IX. Classification adds a (usually unnecessary) conspiratorial cast to research. Publication in the host country as well as the U.S. is also desirable.

Whenever possible, A.I.D. should try to use host-country researchers. They often will provide evaluations based on an awareness of local culture that the U.S. researcher rarely possesses. When research is done under local auspices, the receptivity to, and understanding of, Title IX by host country officials may be increased. In seeking out local researchers, A.I.D. might well look beyond the usual social-science categories. Encouraging such groups as labor and peasants to gather

information has, in addition to the information gathered, the useful result of developing civic skills--in itself a Title IX payoff.



## CHAPTER ONE

### THE MEANING OF TITLE IX

Popular participation, the concept central to Title IX and related provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act, is an ideal that is deeply rooted in the American culture. In its application to foreign aid, it reflects the altered view, born of experience, that Americans have of the process of development. It is against these two backgrounds--American tradition and recent aid experience--that Title IX can best be interpreted.

The American dream of the good society has always been more populist than elitist. In that good society, people make the decisions concerning their fate, rather than, as in the Platonic vision, relying on the decisions of a wise elite. That basic faith, always endemic in Americans, has been revitalized in recent years as Americans have sought to reshape their own society. It is no coincidence that Title IX was written into the Foreign Assistance Act at a time when Americans were trying to increase popular participation within the United States itself.

American thinking about the development process has evolved along somewhat similar lines in the two decades that this country has been extending aid to the nations of the Third World. In the early years the stress was on technical assistance (the Point Four program). Then it shifted to capital transfers. In the reassessment of foreign aid

that took place in 1960, economic growth was set forth as the primary goal; systematic country programming was introduced at the same time.

Aid has seemed in recent years to be addressed to growth to the virtual exclusion of other goals. But in the implementation of aid projects, aid practitioners--including Congressional committees--have come increasingly to see that economic growth does not by itself constitute development. Those involved have come to believe that development is "round": it includes human and institutional change as well as economic growth. This more complex view of development is expressed in the case of Latin America in the Charter of Punta del Este and the Alliance for Progress. The intent of Title IX is to extend that rounded view of development to all the operations of the foreign assistance agency.

The rationale of Title IX was succinctly expressed by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs:

. . . it has become increasingly clear that failure to engage all of the available human resources in the task of development not only acts as a brake on economic growth but also does little to cure the basic causes of social and political instability which pose a constant threat to the gains being achieved on economic fronts.

Engaging human resources means the promotion of popular participation in economic development and in civic and governmental processes. An explanation of Title IX, therefore, begins with the definition of participation and proceeds to explore the implications of pursuing that goal.

A prerequisite of effective popular participation is the existence of institutions for organizing participation and governmental agencies sensitive to popular concerns. A doctrine that merely calls for expanded popular participation in the Third World without concern for building the necessary institutions would be irresponsible. To translate the ideals of popular participation into day-to-day activities calls for hard headed planning and systematic programs of institutional development.

The goal of participation calls for a wide variety of institutions at all social and political levels. Although local community development efforts may seem to be the most important, in actual practice a great deal of attention in most countries will have to be given to the strengthening and reorientation of central institutions of government. Participation without such structures can only produce ineffectiveness or anarchy. At the same time the development of governmental institutions that lack respect for popular sentiments can produce only authoritarian rule or the pseudo participation of totalitarian mobilist regimes.

In the remainder of this chapter we shall examine primarily the meaning of participation for general national development. In subsequent chapters we shall return to the problem of developing the appropriate institutions for participation. It is, therefore, important to keep in mind that in stressing the values of participation we are not romanticizing an ideal but rather we are concerned that this ideal should include the development of the most basic institutions of a modern society.

### Popular Participation

The notion of popular participation appeared in the 1966 act only once, and four times in almost identical language in the 1967 and 1968 acts. It is accorded greater applicability in the current act by being included (along with the self-help concept) as the first of seven principles in the statement of policy. It appears a second time in a statement of the purposes of development assistance, and a third time as the third of seven "self-help" criteria. The fourth and principal appearance of the doctrine of participation is in the expansion of the text of Title IX proper.

In political and philosophical terms, interest in participation largely derives from concern for enhancement of human dignity and the human spirit, from the concept of popular sovereignty and from the belief that diffusion of power is essential to democratic development. These are the ultimate purposes of economic development and socio-political modernization. The participation dimension of aid has also been described in the following terms:

The U.S. foreign aid program should place new emphasis on the need for the growth of popular participation in the development programs of the developing countries.

. . . Unless the people benefit from development efforts, no meaningful progress can result from foreign aid. It is equally true that unless the people contribute to development efforts, no meaningful progress can result from foreign aid. . . .\*

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\* Excerpts from the statement of 25 Republican Congressmen, Congressional Record, March 15, 1966.

Responding to the desire of individuals to participate in their society, at one or more levels and in various ways, is obviously much more than a matter of rhetoric. Realistic opportunities and institutional channels must be created and sustained, primarily but not exclusively at the local level. Individuals must perceive their participation as meaningful, by being able to influence and benefit from the institutions through which participation is exercised. For institutions to perform fully, not just in making participation effective, but in integrating individuals, groups and communities into national life, operating links between participation and institutions at the local community level must be forged with institutions at the provincial and national levels.

#### Elements of Participation

The concept of popular participation can be divided into three elements which are analytically separate, although in practice they often appear together.

Participation in decision-making is participation in the process by which priorities are selected and programs affecting growth, or the people, or both, are designed. While Title IX itself specifically calls attention to governmental decisions on a local or community level, the concept of participation at higher levels of government is not inconsistent with the language of Title IX and is, in fact, called for by other provisions in the law. This form of participation

is not limited to participation in the decisions of official public governments--that is, the government of the national state and its subdivisions, component states, and local governments. Title IX specifically includes participation in decisions that might be considered to be outside the sphere of official public governments. Marketing decisions, which might be made through a cooperative, and decisions on the management of labor, which might be affected through labor union activity, are examples of participation in decision-making outside the official government structure. Thus, broadened participation in decision-making can be fostered in several ways, including (1) encouragement of democratic institutions and processes; (2) forms of decentralization; and, (3) increased number and effectiveness of voluntary organizations.

Participation in the benefits of growth--material, cultural, civic, and psychic--is a matter of clear concern in development as conceived in the Foreign Assistance Act. Participation of this kind does not necessarily mean an immediate redistribution of returns among the entire populace, but participation is absent if there are overwhelming inequities, and if structural obstacles exist to the elimination of these inequities. Although the evidence does not indicate a clear connection, one might assume a relation between participation in decision-making and participation in benefits; that is, effective participation in decision-making will lead to a share of benefits growing out of those decisions. However, participation in economic and social progress--"distributive justice"--should not await the

perfection of instruments and institutions which assure effective participation in decision-making. Economic policies and national legislation will generally be required--agriculture prices and incentives, tax and monetary policy, governmental expenditure programs, trade and commercial policy, minimum wage and welfare laws, for example--to achieve a desirable measure of "distributive justice" when decision-making participation is lacking. Other central decisions, for example, on matters relating to economic decentralization and location of infrastructure, will also have important "distributive justice" effects. Depending upon how a society is organized, more equitable participation in public services and in education may also require executive action at the local or national level.

Participation in implementation is the third kind of participation. That is, participation in the work of development, through acquiring and putting to use the skills that characterize modern man. It should be clear that this does not mean the furnishing of slave or forced labor. If, however, people have the opportunity to be involved in carrying out the decisions they participate in making, with a reasonable hope of obtaining a just share of the benefit, then this form of participation is clearly desirable. Psychologically, this is very important, for the mastery of modern skills gives people the self-confidence that comes from understanding the increasingly technological world in which they live.

### Participation and Economic Growth

The theory behind Title IX views economic growth and participation as complementary objectives. The report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs found that:

Over the years, in exercising legislative oversight with respect to the administration of the Foreign Assistance Program, the Committee has observed that there is a close relationship between popular participation in the process of development, and the effectiveness of that process.

The Committee also noted that:

The great potential for planning and implementation of development activities, contained in the mass of the people of the developing countries is still largely untapped, which slows down the achievement of the objectives of the foreign assistance program.

The assumption is that expanded participation will enhance growth. Broad economic policy thrusts which amplify participation by expanding opportunities and widening incentives will inevitably stimulate growth. The goal of expanded markets, which in turn make possible the economies of scale, may require conscious policies aimed at extending the benefits of participation through income redistribution and employment creation. Economic growth will also often have a favorable effect on participation by enlarging the opportunities and incentives for participation.

Participation may also improve the allocation of resources by bringing popular pressure to bear on the society's decision-makers. Resources may be devoted to development that otherwise would be lost in

prestige projects, excessive elite incomes, etc. This does not mean that participation will produce the optimum in resource allocation, only that on the average a participatory society will make more productive allocations than a non-participating one.

But it must be noted that increased participation as a goal may at times be in conflict with the goal of economic growth. Even in those instances where increased participation is inimical to economic growth, however, the "trade-offs" in political and social terms may give the preference to participation. Moreover, the possible conflict between participation and growth may very well be only a short-run one, with the short-run cost to growth being at least offset by higher levels in growth in the long term than would otherwise have been achieved (because a healthier polity is more conducive to growth).

Two sources of possible conflict between economic growth and participation deserve mention.

One is that emphasis on growth has tended to cause disregard of unemployment--which may, depending on the circumstances, be judged to be a priority Title IX target. The United States has hailed the rate of growth of aggregate and per capita income in countries in which open or disguised unemployment remained static at 10 per cent or more of the labor force, and in which the development program of the country contemplates no reduction in the rate of unemployment. Minimum regard for the Title IX directive would seem to dictate a change in this attitude and an exploration of programs which reduce unemployment at least without resulting in "excessive" cost in growth terms.

Another possible conflict is this: economic development will occur because innovative entrepreneurs perceive and execute ways of making goods with fewer inputs per unit of output. They make the same goods with less cost, or make superior goods which attract buyers. In either case, they widen profit margins. The distribution of incomes becomes more unequal. In the absence of governmental intervention, the degree of inequality will tend to continue to increase until the number of innovators becomes so great that their competition for customers' expenditures counterbalances the profit-widening effect of successful innovation.

The point here is that the increased inequality of income is often a necessary concomitant of development (or at least of a stage of development) and therefore desirable. To prevent it would inhibit development. The short-run Title IX interest should not, perhaps, be weighed as equal to the longer-run growth interest. Prudent government actors may moderate the effects. If the innovation creates unemployment, for example, the government should probably create employment.

### Democratic Institutions

The House report states that:

the development of an infrastructure of self-sustaining viable institutions on the local, provincial, and national levels is necessary to achieve popular participation in development and to enhance the success of development undertakings.

The widespread participation of the people in the decision-making process can only be achieved through the channel of institutions. This relationship between participation and an institutional framework within which it can be channeled is clearly recognized in Title IX. Existing governmental institutions can be improved as means through which the popular will is made known and expressed. Other means of expressing constructively the popular will, including private and voluntary groups, can also be effectively used.

The Congress and A.I.D. explicitly reject any insistence upon the establishment of carbon copies of American or Western institutions. However, programs and activities aimed at fostering democratic public and private institutions, at the local, provincial and national level, should work toward results along these lines:

Encourage and facilitate the involvement and civic consciousness of the people;

Increase the capacity of government at all levels to perform, to accommodate change and to administer development;

Help establish among their members and those they serve, a sense of common purpose, in which all share, to which all can contribute, and through which all can benefit;

Provide in a reasonably competent and sustained fashion, valued goods and services;

Provide linkages of participants to their local, provincial and national environments; and,

Influence other public and private institutions which have power to decide on matters affecting their members' interests.

Institutions should be established and strengthened which are open to the citizens they serve, receptive to influence from below, sensitive to requirements and aspirations, and which, in sum, lead to a broadened base of decision-making and reflect a democratic organization of popular efforts.

Institutions will be effective if they respond to change, maintain a reasonable balance between their own and the wider public interest by sensibly mediating between their clients and other elements of the power structure (including the legislative and executive branches), and if they provide an operating, credible structure for channeling and making productive the wide range of participatory activities which the citizens are moved to undertake.

With respect to non-government institutions, government, particularly at the national level, has a responsibility to create an environment which encourages the effective functioning of these institutions in the nation's economic and civic processes.

In short, institutional capability places a ceiling on the effectiveness or fruitfulness of popular participation and on the capacity of a society for peaceful change. In this connection, it is the rule of law which provides the environmental framework for uniting viable institutions, personal liberty, and popular participation. The concept of the rule of law, which is set forth several times in the Foreign Assistance Act, complements and undergirds the objectives of Title IX. The rule of law protects against arbitrariness and whim in political rule. To be effective the rule of law must permeate all

actions of government, both judicial and administrative; and its exercise must match expansion in popular participation.

It should be kept in mind that bringing public pressure to bear on institutions can carry certain risks. To broaden participation indiscriminately without regard for improving the apparatus which already exists or without being able to increase resource availabilities to respond to the pressures of increased participation may very well bring to the system more instability than it can support. This risk is said to exist in those highly politicized, low-income countries whose economies and socio-political structure would be unable to meet the demands which broadened participation could generate.

Decentralization is often espoused as one way of achieving increased participation, by bringing institutions within the effective reach of the people. Though often desirable, decentralization also has its risks. If the capacity to govern (or, bureaucratic competence) is itself essential to growth, stability and perhaps even, ultimately, to participation, then hasty decentralization achieved via unstructured participation may sacrifice higher priorities, by eroding and weakening the capacity to govern. The central authorities may not be able to perform their functions.

### National Integration

Several of Title IX's explicit and implicit targets relate to national integration, in the sense of making it possible for people to participate in their nation's life productively and justly.

A whole host of programs, activities, and projects come to mind as desirable ways of fostering national integration. The appropriate combination of policy and action which would effectively promote national integration obviously depends upon many considerations, including size, topography, political traditions and experience, structure of the economy and level of development. It is clear, however, that what has been determined to be Title IX's major program thrust--popular participation, with its consequent emphasis on the instrumentality of institutions--provides a key program framework within which national integration can be effectively promoted--by reducing economic, political and social disparities between geographic areas, ethnic and religious groups, and modern/urban and rural/traditional sectors; by fostering a sense of sharing in and benefiting from national purpose, identity and community; and, by stimulating attitudes of individuals, groups and institutions which value and seek cooperation and unity in public and private performance. In addition, of course, national integration may be promoted in other ways that are not necessarily "pure" Title IX imperatives: for example, roads, power and other elements of physical infrastructure; actions leading to a more competitive economy, increased social mobility as well as mobility of the factors of production.

#### Title IX as 'Program Dimension'

Title IX does not call for a set of new projects bearing that label. It is not intended to constitute a separate, self-sufficient

basis for international assistance. It does broaden the basis upon which foreign policy and assistance strategy are determined; it does add to the criteria used in evaluating the results of our assistance; it does influence the ordering of priorities.

In March 1968, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gaud put it as follows:

Title IX is an important stimulus to our efforts to get more people involved in the development process. It is moving us from reliance on instinct and experience to more explicit consideration of the problems and opportunities we have to deal with. In our view, the objectives of Title IX must be at the core of our development assistance. We have not tried to design a specific package of projects labeled Title IX. Instead we are trying to build Title IX objectives into the design and implementation process of the A.I.D. program. We want Title IX considerations to be weighed--

When we decide on the overall composition of a country program;

When we decide on a particular capital assistance project;

When we undertake and evaluate technical assistance activities;

When we support the development efforts of private institutions.

It would be nicely convenient if the pursuit of Title IX objectives or programs were always consistent with, complementary to, or supportive of, other goals. This is not always the case, as we have already noted.

It should be clearly recognized, therefore, that the Title IX injunction, say with respect to popular participation in the task of development, does not over-ride all other objectives, just as economic growth or the attainment of specific savings or export performance should not supercede all other goals.

Simplistic or exclusive and inflexible priority-ordering is usually unrealistic. All out achievements on one front can exact too high a price on others. To assemble the optimum set of public policies, to prepare that "balanced" development strategy which best responds to a society's values and the obstacles to their realization, requires a constant assessment and determining of "trade-offs" among objectives. The entry, as explicit U.S. policy, of Title IX considerations does not alter the facts of life with respect to limited resources and unlimited requirements.

#### Meaning of Title IX for the Agency for International Development.

The foregoing discussion does not provide the hard answers which foreign assistance planners, programmers and operators would like to have to such questions as:

Given Title IX, what, exactly, are the weights or priorities to be assigned to economic as opposed to social and political objectives? Are they equal?

To what extent, and how, should A.I.D.: (1) alter its country strategies, and resource allocations among and within countries; (2) redesign, if necessary, its style,

posture and assistance relationships, including the themes and points of emphasis of its bilateral dialogue with low-income countries around the world; and (3) its organization, research programs and its approach to the training and recruitment of personnel?

Even if there is full agreement that A.I.D. has been instructed by the Congress to become a whole development agency--fostering democratic change in the social and political orders of the developing countries as well as economic growth--detailed, precise answers are still impossible to formulate.

But Title IX does call for changes in the Agency and its operations. The required alterations cannot be set forth in every detail but we believe that, on the doctrinal side, they can be summarized as follows:

1) Economic growth should not be considered the only or ultimate objective of foreign assistance. But while adding, as objectives, and as criteria of the effectiveness of assistance, democratic social and political growth, economic development remains a major agency priority.

2) Designing economic development programs that also stimulate social and political development should be assigned higher priority than in the past. This stems from their desirability, per se, as well as from the need for the underdeveloped nations to develop socio-political structures which can handle, equitably and peacefully, inevitable shortfalls in economic progress. The prospect is that the gap between rich and poor nations is not likely to diminish for many years and that the gaps between material aspirations and actual economic performance

in the Third World are not likely to be significantly closed for some time.

3) Progress in the creation of democratic social and political systems and the programs required to achieve it should become important determinants of assistance strategy, policy and resource allocations. Although it will probably be true that economic, social and political growth policies will generally reinforce and complement each other, the importance of democratic social and political development growth, in its own right, will sometimes require a shift in assistance strategy and programs from those which purely economic growth criteria would have called for.

4) Termination criteria will be altered by Title IX. Title IX objectives may suggest that it is in the U.S. interest to continue other forms of assistance even after the need for concessionary aid has disappeared. Title IX considerations may also cause the United States to withdraw or terminate its assistance, if the host country is not seriously "self-helping" in the Title IX sense, and has no apparent intention to do so, prior to the time when strictly self-sustaining growth criteria would have required the cut-off.

More explicit and precise guidelines will probably have to await further agency experience with Title IX, as well as the evolution of U.S. foreign policy and, perhaps, additional elaboration of the Congressional injunction.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXT OF U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

For a variety of reasons, Congressional and public support for U.S. foreign assistance programs has declined in recent years. A growing American concern with urgent domestic problems is one explanation for this. But the decline can be traced to other causes as well: a fading public perception of immediate critical threats to the national security; the discouragements and intractabilities of the Vietnam war; the balance-of-payments problem; and budgetary constraints arising from an overheated national economy.

But new questions also are being raised about the consequences of foreign assistance as an instrument of foreign policy. Many Americans lately have expressed concern that foreign aid programs may engender commitments which, in present circumstances, might embroil the nation unnecessarily or frivolously in areas of little direct importance to U.S. national interests. Finally, in some quarters, there is a growing distaste for giving aid to governments whose domestic policies are harshly dissonant with American civic values.

It was not the task of the conference to engage in forecasting of U.S. foreign policy, or public attitudes toward it. Still, there can be certain purposive assumptions in our foreign policy keyed to past and future foreign aid programs. One key assumption underlying the

following assessment of foreign aid and foreign policy, is that the current concerns that inhibit public support for foreign aid are attributable to temporary urgencies. In one way or another, the United States, if only because of its immense and growing resources, will be in the business of foreign assistance for a very long time to come.

The magnitude and the priorities of foreign aid programs are matters of future public choice; but the problems to which these programs are addressed, are now matters of legislative directives. A central directive, embodied in statutes, is that of Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Program Act, which embodies a major new thrust for America's future aid programs. This new departure in national purpose should be explored in two distinct ways: how it "fits" into the continuities of U.S. foreign policy, as expressed in foreign assistance; and the new policy implications which it suggests, in terms of American relations with the Third World.

The history of U.S. foreign aid since the late 1940's has been complex, even with respect to the purposes and motives which entered into it. Humanitarian and political motives in nearly all instances were intermixed; Realpolitik has, sometimes, masqueraded as humanitarianism, and, perhaps as frequently, humanitarianism has masqueraded as Realpolitik. But whether we ascribe the characteristics of aid programs chiefly to one or the other motive, a more useful way to reconcile these seemingly antithetical elements, would be to see

both of them as displaying an American concern about the quality of the world environment in which the American people would live.

There has been a continuous mix of American environmental concerns, and it is inevitable that these will continue. Strategic policies have reflected a national desire for a "safe" world. Political policies aimed at a "free" world of open societies reflect a desire for a world environment reasonably compatible with American democratic values. Humane considerations, for a world without vast discrepancies between poor and rich, starving and well fed, reflect a desire for a more equitable world.

Because there has been such a mixture of motivations, it would be extremely difficult to assign even rough weighting to each of them. Without any doubt, however, all of them were heavily freighted by the Cold War. Very likely, whatever their respective weights were, among the practitioners of assistance (many of whom could well be described as "operational idealists"), the magnitude of U.S. resources put into aid programs was determined chiefly by security considerations.

While some U.S. economic assistance programs long antedated the onset of the Cold War,\* it is obvious that the assumptions of U.S. aid programs from 1950 on, as a priority of U.S. foreign policy, were highly affected by the bi-polar struggle between the United States and Russia.

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\* In Latin America, for instance, significant U.S.-sponsored public assistance already was underway in the early 1940's.

Not only were "country" and regional priorities of aid allocation in some measure determined by the changing characteristics of this global struggle, but also the annual magnitude of aid in large measure was seen, in Congress and Administration alike, as dependent upon the current level of perceived antagonism in a wide range of interlocked Cold War issues. Finally, the ideological nature of the contest tended to influence American judgments about the ways in which developmental processes and strategies would shape the future balance of world forces between "closed" systems of socialism, or state capitalism, and "open" liberal market economies.

The fact that the Communists offered a distinct, coherent development theory encouraged an understandable American impulse to articulate counter-theories of change compatible with our own national values. The interaction between competing ideological conceptions of development generated, through the early 1960's, an overwhelming impulse to measure "gains and losses" in aid programs simply in terms of their effect upon the recipient's own posture between the Soviet Union (and, later, China) and the United States. This competitive approach to aid did not go unnoticed among the recipients or possible recipients of economic assistance, who were aware of the part they could play in the game.

The waning of the classic Cold War has seen a decartelization of the familiar alliance systems which it engendered, and also the development of significant tensions and conflicts within the Communist world. Whatever other effects this decline in the immediacy of the Cold War may have had in world politics, one immediate effect has been

upon the political context within which Third World political and economic development takes place. In many areas, where Communist and "free world" development programs once engaged in overt competition, Soviet and American aid programs coexist, pursuing their purposes in parallel fashion. At the same time, as the practice of foreign assistance becomes more conventional and widely-dispersed among the other developed countries and in the United Nations, so its "routinization" has stripped foreign aid of its more dramatic and combative rationalizations.

While the general philosophic formulations of U.S. aid programs in the past have stressed a universalistic theme equally applicable in all underdeveloped countries, it is quite clear, from a look at a map drawn to a budgetary projection, that the prime Third World beneficiaries have been nations close to the Communist world. This proximity, however uncomfortable, has marked them in the past for prodigious allocations of American resources.

In the public rhetoric of succeeding administrations, the security aspect of aid programs usually has been encapsulated in a broad humanitarian frame of reference. Yet in practice, the reverse has been the case. Not only has foreign assistance principally been coordinated with other military and diplomatic aspects of "perimeter containment" of the Communist world--Korea, Southeast Asia, India and Pakistan--but aid elsewhere, in many instances, such as the Alliance for Progress, has been launched in response to clearly perceived threats like the Castro revolution. In essence, the policy conclusion drawn from the

tightly bi-polar picture of the world in the 1950's was that any and every shift of alignment even by weak, less developed states might affect the military or psychological balance between the super powers and thus the United States had to become involved through threat obligations and assistance in every part of the globe.

Such rationales for U.S. involvement in development assistance are now far less credible than they were a few years ago. This is not to say that the United States has no strategic-security interests in the Third World. Rather, it is the case that, however these interests may be defined in the immediate future, they no longer will be derived from a situation in which "Communist" power is directed against American interests. The plurality of interests and antagonisms within the Communist world is far too great to expect any return to the conditions of the early 1960's; in fact, the Communist world seems on the verge of even greater diversity and internal change. The noisy fragmentation of the Communist world and the increasingly independent policies pursued by important members of the Western bloc already have sharply reduced the prestige-implications or psychic disturbances which occur in consequence of a realignment of most underdeveloped countries (i.e., "going Communist"). Changes in military technology have also reduced the importance of bases in the Third World.

For these reasons, most of the underdeveloped countries now have only a marginal relationship to the balance of power between the two great industrial societies.

We can afford few illusions about the future course of events.

in the Third World, even though the classic bi-polar conflict has disappeared from most of it. Civil and interstate wars may very likely be even more frequent, and more destructive of human life, than in previous years. Political turbulence may break out with far worse intensity than heretofore. It would, therefore, be risky to ignore the poor three-quarters of the world simply because today it is poor, and lacking in resources. Local third world conflicts--if only because of the nature of our domestic society--might draw America into direct engagement; here, the dangers would seem to lie in the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Southern Africa. While it is by no means true that economic progress necessarily produces progress towards peace, it still is worth believing that the encouragement of peaceful, yet challenging and rewarding, tasks of social development can deflect attention away from international conflict.

But given these uncertainties, it is still clear that the humanitarianism of foreign assistance may be essential to domestic tranquility. Recent developments within our own society have shown that significant numbers of affluent Americans simply will not find psychic or spiritual satisfaction as affluent consumers in a surrounding world of poverty. A significant number of younger Americans do not seek just safety for their nation and security for themselves. They seek a congenial world in which to live. There may be much disagreement as to how such congeniality might be defined, but none could possibly perceive it as abject poverty and stagnation, in times when American affluence soars upward and outward year after year.

These remarks preface one conclusion which arises from our conference. In much of the underdeveloped world today, the United States now can well afford, through its public and private resources, to take greater risks in supporting self-help programs of social development along the lines suggested by Title IX. Such risks, if seen as "social risk capital," may be essential if significant progress is to be made in improving the quality of civic life in many of these countries. The constrictions and constraints which all-too-frequently served to channel U.S. assistance to strategic areas in the Third World, and which inhibited more purposeful encouragement of social change, need be far less than once they were. In instances where U.S. assistance has gone to "friendly" regimes which (despite "friendliness") did little to foster growth in social or political terms, short-run payoffs of friendship with current leadership may have mortgaged future affinities. In such areas, the United States need not worry unduly about radical insurgencies, Communist neighbors, or the safety of military installations. These areas today include large parts of the underdeveloped world.

Because risks can be afforded, and margins of "error" increased, it well may be that the United States can now respect the wishes of peoples in the underdeveloped nations more than it has, in many instances, before. The United States can afford to see greatly widened political and social participation stimulated, in part by American participation in the process. In some instances, very likely, the result may be the establishment of governments which may distrust America, or even in

some instances align themselves against the United States on important issues.

The guiding assumption should be that gradual democratization can be pursued in most countries without the high risk of radical anti-American regimes coming to power. But also, it should be recognized that higher risks of extremist totalitarian movements exist where American interests are strongly identified with status-quo forces opposed to widened participation. In any event, the important point is that in the evolving world climate the U.S. can afford to take those risks even when they clearly exist.

Another consideration here is that a Title IX-oriented policy can have value to American foreign relations that is greater than the specific projects that it generates. Americans are often seen in the Third World as being preoccupied with narrow military or purely economic concerns; the United States then appears to be unconcerned with (or irrelevant to) the turbulent social and political questions that are uppermost in many of those nations. A Title IX orientation would create a dialogue about those questions between Americans and their host country counterparts. This would improve the U.S. image in the Third World, even in cases where the U.S. did not in fact find it possible to mount Title IX programs.

A view of American foreign policy in its larger outlines, as seen from an A.I.D. perspective, might show four essential, interlocking elements in U.S. national purposes as these relate to the Third World.

The first U.S. interest to be discussed concerns the short and

long run environment of U.S. foreign policy.

1. Underdeveloped nations affect the short and long run environment of U.S. foreign policy.

As the number of countries relevant to urgent U.S. military concerns diminishes, we have an opportunity--and a need--to examine the character of the long-run international environment as it bears upon our own future development. An open, relatively free, pluralistic world order, where increasing numbers of the world's peoples are able to pursue their own peaceful purposes within open and responsive governments, is more congenial to American interests than a world community of authoritarian, closed and mutually hostile states. In what ways may Title IX be relevant to such a generalized foreign policy purpose?

As a beginning, we can distinguish two types of underdeveloped nations: the few large ones and the many medium-sized and small.

(a) The influence of large nations on the world environment:

Size itself is one of the factors which helps define the relevance of a particular state's characteristics and of its success or failure to the world environment. The future politico-social evolution of such countries as India, Pakistan, Brazil, Indonesia, and possibly the UAR, are important simply by virtue of their size, and the effect that the nature of their domestic development has upon their regional neighbors and upon the larger international environment. Their economic growth may have implications to U.S. commercial and trading interests.

The development, integration and political success or failure of a large nation will also effect the structure of power in its region and may have a potential role in U.S. military security considerations, particularly if it appears likely to develop the capacity to build and deliver nuclear weapons.

In considering these large states, part of the American interest may be security, in the narrow military sense as in the case of India and Indonesia. But their longer run significance goes beyond these military considerations and leads to concern with the quality of their development in the politico-social realm. And Title IX considerations in these countries vary, depending upon the imbalances we and they perceive in their own socio-political development.

If the nation in question is already promoting the participation aspect of Title IX, it may be desirable to push economic development, national integration and capacity to govern, as in India. In Indonesia, just recovering from a disastrous demagogic regime and suffering acute economic and national disintegration symptoms, it may be inappropriate to press for greater participation at present; its oligarchic regime must first have time to improve its ability to govern and promote economic growth. On the other hand, as in Brazil, it may be timely to press hard for greater participation, on the assumption that growing resentments may lead to political eruption and that economic energies are there to be released if only the regime will give greater scope to the expression of demands which are likely to be promptly translated into greater economic activity. (The basis for these strategies is

considered in detail in the following chapter.)

It is difficult--but important--to assess just how much influence the United States can have on the politico-social evolution of these countries under Title IX. In general, the larger the country, the less influence the United States has. Even in cases where the United States makes substantial inputs of economic, military or diplomatic support, the size and complexity of these countries sets limits to the ability to influence them. There may be historic moments, when leaders are nearly desperate and cannot do without the United States. But even then, because we have to consider longer run relationships beyond the crisis, the United States may not in fact possess the leverage the immediate crisis would appear to yield, particularly on foreign policy behavior or matters affecting political processes and institutions. Moreover, sometimes the tasks facing the large regimes are so complex and their capability to effect desired changes so limited that even with the best will in the world, they are unable to effect innovations they themselves would like to introduce. No amount of leverage can bring the results the United States may want in such a situation, as is the case in contemporary Indonesia and to a considerable extent in India.

(b) Numerous middle level and small countries together also affect the international environment:

There are many medium-sized and small countries which do not meet any of the specific interests mentioned above. No one is large enough to materially affect the international environment by itself, yet

together their cumulative experience may well do so. Although committed to defending their sovereignty against all comers, they are not so insulated from one another that they are not affected by what happens in the others. A deterioration of any one will not affect the others directly. But if a number experience, say, the disruption of public order or coups d'état, the chances improve that some of the others will also experience these difficulties. Conversely, improved economic performance or demonstrated capacity for democratic government in several countries will strengthen the hand of those committed to development or to more democratic practices in others. We do not--and probably never can--know the critical negative or positive thresholds for such developments. But these demonstration effects are significant, and contribute to the foreign policy environment of the United States.

As noted above, our general interests will usually be served if other political societies are more open, if there is more freedom of movement and economic activity and cultural and intellectual exchange across frontiers. But we should recognize that increased political "participation" may subject regimes to domestic political pressures which lead them to adopt policies counter to long-run U.S. interests. More democratic practices may facilitate the rise to power of groups which feel U.S. foreign policy or private economic activity abroad is opposed to their own best interests. Promoting Title IX "participation" in other countries will not free the United States from criticism, nor eliminate all its difficulties.

In continental terms, the United States is concerned to see that

the Latin American governments, closely associated with us for many decades and generally within the American economic ambit, make progress in the direction of greater popular participation over the long run. Indeed, in some respects, the Alliance for Progress was a forerunner of Title IX.

Most nations in Africa seem less likely to affect those aspects of the world environment relevant to the United States, in part because they are already generally within the ambit of European countries and because they have not yet come far enough along the road to modernization to have much effect on the world environment.

In the Middle East, the overriding relationship with Israel makes it very difficult, at least for the present, to deal fruitfully with the Arab States. In Asia, the small and scattered states derive their relevance in substantial part from residual security interests or by virtue of the role in international affairs of their larger neighbors.

In regard to levels of U.S. influence, it is equally difficult to generalize. One can say that where the United States is not supplying substantial economic or diplomatic inputs, we are likely to have little direct influence to press Title IX objectives the regime itself does not already wish to pursue. If the inputs are large, the United States may or may not be able to press them to accept Title IX purposes, depending upon Americans' own readiness to bargain hard or, even, to withdraw assistance if they are not prepared to adopt Title IX measures.

## 2. Dampen local conflict.

It is a U.S. interest to have local conflicts dampened down, for this will reduce the chances that the United States will be drawn into such conflicts.

Most intra-regional conflicts in the Third World appear to derive from deep, long-standing issues such as (a) religious, historic or ethnic quarrels; (b) jealousies over frontiers; and (c) mutual fears. Title IX programs are unlikely to have any important influence over those deep-seated issues in the short run.

When, however, a conflict arises out of domestic politics-- Sukarno's confrontation with Malaysia is an example--Title IX activities are likely to be relevant. As pluralistic societies develop, individual groups who see their own interests threatened by conflict have greater scope for influencing public policy. With greater participation, leadership finds it necessary to meet internal questions with greater pragmatism and less ideology and this may translate itself to the international stage.

## 3. Immediate and longer term "security" interests.

A number of countries remain important to the United States by virtue of their presumed relevance to the security interests of the United States. There are three types of "security" considerations:

### (a) Countries under direct and immediate conventional military threat:

Regimes under direct and immediate military threat from Communist powers (Syngman Rhee's South Korea in 1950), and whose independence and

integrity the United States deems it important to sustain, are not likely to be able to face immediately an opening up of their political system to greater "participation." The dilemma here is now familiar. To back an authoritarian regime which is repressing its citizens damages our reputation at home and abroad. If it misreads its own domestic situation the regime may alienate support it might otherwise gain among its citizens if it were more open. Indeed, it can be argued that when a regime is under imminent threat, national sentiment is likely to be at its height, and increasing popular participation may at such times be a source of strength to a hard-pressed regime.

Yet it is not necessarily true that external pressures can be translated into increasing political solidarity and sense of mutual identity. It may appear too risky for the United States to withdraw support in the midst of a conflict, when the succession or the effectiveness of successors are both unpredictable. The experience of western democracies suggests that in time of national crisis, democratic liberties are often curtailed, even there. Accordingly, we should not expect much loosening of a system under imminent threat.

On the other hand, we should expect such governments to be interested in promoting their "ability to govern" and their "national integration." So these concerns are likely Title IX objectives when a foreign threat is imminent.

Potential American influence is likely to be great if a regime is really hard pressed and the United States is providing substantial economic, military or diplomatic support. However, under such circumstances,

the United States is likely to hold off focussing all its potential leverage in order to sustain short run military interests and not to over-complicate the task of a regime in such an immediate crisis. The chances are good, therefore, that the United States would not press a regime too hard to revise its political practices in time of imminent conventional military threat.

These propositions are in contrast to a second security situation, where,

(b) A direct external threat persists over a long period of time:

A regime that is hard pressed for a long time (South Korea since the later years of Rhee), may be in a better position to absorb innovation. Moreover, it may have to take special measures to arouse and sustain public support if it is to cope effectively with the demands of a protracted state of readiness. Increasing "participation" under such circumstances could improve its "security" position.

As to the U.S. interest, if the relationship is to be close because of the protracted threat, and we are thereby intimately associated with that regime for a long time, our own reputation abroad as a spokesman for democratic values and the image of our foreign policy at home may make it desirable for that regime to make some progress toward greater "participation."

Accordingly, in countries with which the United States is closely associated and which face protracted security threats, both for domestic reasons within that country and for reasons of our international

reputation, it may be in our own--and their--immediate and longer run "security" interests to press for more "participation" as a Title IX innovation.

Similarly, in the case of protracted insurgency supported from outside (e.g., Vietnam) earlier efforts to promote greater participation by the Vietnamese might have helped to enlist greater popular support and hence have contributed directly to the "security" of the Diem or succeeding regimes. But even in this instance, we should be wary of assuming that people in all cultures are equally anxious to participate in public decision-making and the choice of those who rule them.

The extent of American influence will depend in part upon how well the regime can stand up to external or internal pressure. Paradoxically, the more precarious a regime, the less likely is the United States to be willing to press for substantial "participation" changes, since we are not likely to be able to assess accurately how much such innovation the regime can absorb without unleashing domestic forces it cannot contain. A better established regime can absorb more innovation. U.S. influence will also depend upon the extent of its economic, military and diplomatic support. Hence, an accurate assessment of useful leverage is difficult at best and will leave much room for disagreement.

(c) Bases, communications and other facilities:

Where these exist the United States has a direct interest in reliable access. The intensity of that interest will depend upon our dependence on the base or facility, our assessment of the likelihood

of having to use it and the evolving technology which may make its use obsolete in, say, two, five, or ten years. These facilities may be vulnerable to public passions or so isolated and inconspicuous that the populace is hardly aware of their existence.

The interest of reliable access will usually be served by the persistence in power of the regime which originally granted these rights in the first place. And if the host country political leaders, both in and out of power, see their country's national interest served by our continuing presence, we can appropriately encourage socio-political changes. But if the political process brings to the threshold of power groups which are ideologically or for other reasons opposed to our continued presence, normally the United States should not encourage change. However, if the regime is highly oligarchic, and vigorous sustained political opposition appears to be rising, in some instances the United States might want to press for increased "participation" in order to open more opportunities for the "outs" to gain access to the exercise of power. Pushing a regime too hard for such reforms, however, may result in losing the base or facility, for new leadership is not likely to reopen access once a public issue has been made of it. In such cases, therefore, leverage is admittedly limited, unless the prospective leaders are assured of succeeding to power and are deemed both reliable and closely committed to renewing American access. However, since the strategic value of most facilities is declining, we can anticipate that the importance of these "access cases" will also continue to decline.

Such a cautious approach to Title IX in these instances is not rewarding to Title IX enthusiasts, particularly if the regime is such that it adversely affects our reputation in other countries or liberal support at home. The actual decision, therefore, will necessarily hinge on a complex analysis of all U.S. interests considered relevant in such cases.

4. Raw materials and other direct economic interests.

A number of countries are important by virtue of large U.S. investments and the raw materials they make available to the United States and to close allies.

Title IX can be important there, particularly if the regimes in such countries are very oligarchical and if growing popular pressures for wider participation are ignored for such a long period of time that political explosion appears likely in the near future. Many of them are oligarchic in part because the wealth of raw materials exports is channelled into the hands of the few.

However, in such cases U.S. influence is often limited by U.S. economic interests which will not want us to "rock the boat," unless State/A.I.D. and these interests come to a consensus regarding the long run implications to these interests if politico-social conditions remain the same. Even if they do agree, the threat of nationalization will mean we cannot push very hard on behalf of Title IX objectives the regime itself does not want.

Yet, if we are really concerned about the international environment

of U.S. foreign policy and the promotion of increased "participation" in the Third World, the Congress may want to review the effect on both these questions of U.S. investments abroad.

In conclusion, we would point out that, although in many areas Title IX programs must continue to work in complementary fashion with large programs of economic development assistance, the criteria and goals of Title IX should not necessarily be seen as locked together with economic modernization programs. For foreign policy reasons, it might be useful or even necessary to continue or encourage Title IX activities long after a recipient country might have ceased to qualify for strictly economic assistance. Massive capital transfers would not be continued beyond normal termination; they would be replaced by far less costly efforts, like technical assistance, some of which might be partly under private auspices. In fact, the payoffs of Title IX programs might in some instances be most dramatic in such societies. If a central purpose of Title IX is the improvement in the quality of the civic life of any nation, one feature of that life might well be the degree of its "openness" to other dynamic parts of the world society: its capacity to live on terms of equality with us, and other developed nations.\*

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\* Turkey is one clear instance of this. While economic criteria now suggest the phasing out of A.I.D. programs by 1972, Title IX criteria would clearly suggest that assistance in the development of Turkish administrative, municipal, managerial and other civic skills could be of great value in Turkey's emergence as an equal partner among the European nations with which she seeks to identify.



### CHAPTER THREE

#### HOST COUNTRY SITUATIONS AND STRATEGIES

Within the context of the overall foreign policy of the United States, and the definitions of Title IX which have been given in Chapter One, the programmer in a particular country is faced with the task of seeking to determine the specific strategy which should be applied towards achieving Title IX objectives in the situation with which he must deal.

In the broadest sense, the programmer must consider how Title IX may affect the quality of his dialogue with his host-country counterparts. Some people fear that efforts to implement Title IX will increase sensitivities in the host country and therefore make the dialogue more difficult. We, on the other hand, believe that raising Title IX issues can lead to a healthier and more frank discussion between Americans and third-world leaders. Our belief grows out of our view of the experience of A.I.D.

The intellectual ferment that accompanied the establishment of A.I.D. in 1962 was inspired in large measure by the view that:

(1) sustained economic growth would set in motion social and political development, (2) most underdeveloped countries were anxious to realize economic growth and, therefore, (3) it would be appropriate to employ academic theories of economics as the bases for the criteria for giving aid. The assumption was that by placing aid on essentially economic terms it would be possible to "de-politicize" the activity, reduce

friction between donor and recipient, and allow the sovereign rationality of economics to discipline governments in the direction of responsibility.

Eight years of experience has raised doubts about the possibility that economic theory can de-politicize the aid-negotiating process. It is true that in the concentration countries the emphasis upon macro-economic considerations have been of inestimable value in bringing coherence and purpose to the aid program. More importantly, the by-now-well-understood A.I.D. stress on economic criteria has provided a very useful basis for negotiating self-help measures.

Yet we must be careful not to assume that all people are prepared to accept economic theories as neutral and objective knowledge. Leaders in the Third World are just as sensitive to economic matters as to any others, for they rarely make the sharp distinction between "economics" and "politics" that seems so natural to Americans and particularly those trained in economics.

The essential point is that those leaders are naturally sensitive about matters of national sovereignty. They are likely to sense threats to their sovereignty whenever they must deal with a superpower like the U.S. and it makes little difference whether aid is presented as being "purely economic" or not. There has, however, been significant change over time in the nature and degree of those sensitivities. As the traditions of development have become better established, there is a more widespread acceptance of certain patterns in the relations between donors and recipients. Also, as the cold war declines there is less anxiety about foreign policy interference or the use of "strings" for

gaining ideological commitments.

At the same time concern for development is becoming more widespread and the leaders of the underdeveloped nations themselves are increasingly taking a broader view of the goals of national development. Hence one finds a declining interest in narrow economic development goals and a greater concern for broader gauged approaches. Narrow three- or five-year economic development plans are going out of fashion and are being replaced by general development policies that cover all areas of life.

The implication is that U.S. relations with the Third World can no longer be constricted to purely economic development concerns. In negotiations about aid matters the U.S. has steadily had to broaden the area of dialogue. The time has therefore arrived for the U.S. to make more explicit its interest in broader strategies of development.

Title IX, by providing the basis for this needed updating and broadening of the U.S. aid posture, will shift to some degree the areas of potential sensitivity in A.I.D.'s relations with host countries. Rather than increasing the areas of potential sensitivity, Title IX may in fact work in the opposite direction to increase the openness and the integrity of American relations with at least some underdeveloped nations.

This may in the first instance come about by more frankly admitting the broad concern of the U.S. with all aspects of their development. By acknowledging the hope that they will indeed progress in a democratic direction, the U.S. can be more plausibly honest in its commitment to helping them with their economic problems. More importantly, an expanded

concern for Title IX forms of development can provide a less dogmatic and rigid framework for our relations with host governments. This is because when development is viewed through the lenses of possible political outcomes the viewer gains a greater appreciation of the multiple patterns of historical developments. Emphasis on economic development tends to stress certain presumed universal criteria and permits less capacity for accommodating to local conditions.

The corollary of this proposition is that senior officials in A.I.D., State and the Congress must be prepared to accept the idea that among the underdeveloped nations there will be a multitude of patterns of development and that we cannot expect to urge upon them any single model for their course of political development. In particular, it would be wrong to assume that a Jeffersonian model of democratic development is relevant for all societies. Thus the very lack of a universal quality in political development theory can be turned to advantage by calling for a more relativistic view of the goals for development. This in turn should make for an easier basis for relations with some nations. Americans could honestly respect their integrity by helping them with their unique pattern of national development rather than appearing to force upon them certain abstract economic criteria that seem to come from our ethnocentric views about economics.

Furthermore, as long as our focus is primarily on economic concerns, we will be emphasizing the very things that make us, as a rich nation, different from them, as poor nations. When the emphasis is shifted to an appreciation of the diversity of political systems, then the American

role becomes one of assisting them to achieve their goals while preserving their unique identities.

#### Five Basic Questions

No discussion of the manner in which strategy analysis should be approached can answer all the questions which a programmer must face in considering the particular society in which he is involved. There is, however, an approach to analysis which can provide the programmer with general guidelines to strategy, including the attendant general risks involved in various formulations. This analysis can help him in determining the role which Title IX can and should play in his country, the depth to which Title IX objectives should be pursued, and the general lines of programs which might be mounted. These general guidelines are the subject of this chapter.

We believe there are five basic questions which the U.S. Government must consider in planning the scope and direction of Title IX programs in a particular country. All five are interrelated and the answer to any one tends to condition the others. The questions are posed in the normal sequential order by which analysis would ordinarily be pursued, but at all times it must be recognized that the answer to a subsequent question may in fact affect the impact of answers to earlier questions.

The questions which must be faced in any country under consideration are the following:

The first question concerns the foreign policy context of Title IX. How do Title IX goals relate to that context and to specific U.S.

interests in a given nation? This question is discussed in Part I.

The next two questions concern the receptivity of the nation to Title IX goals. Is that nation receptive to those goals, especially broadened participation? If it is receptive to the goals, is it also receptive to U.S. involvement in pursuing those goals?

In Part II we discuss strategies and risks in dealing with a nation that is unreceptive to Title IX goals.

In Part III we discuss strategies and risks in dealing with a nation that is receptive to Title IX goals but is sensitive about U.S. involvement.

If the nation is receptive both to Title IX goals and to U.S. involvement, what are the limitations on its government's ability to carry out mutually agreed upon programs? In Part IV we discuss strategies and risks in dealing with host government limitations.

Finally, what strategies can be pursued to promote the central goal of increased participation and what are the effects of those strategies on other goals held by the United States or the host country? This question is discussed in Part V.

#### I. What Does the U.S. Government Want To See Accomplished in Title IX Within the Context of Overall U.S. Foreign Policy?

As we pointed out in Chapter Two, Title IX programs can only be approached in the light of an evolving American foreign policy and in the context of specific U.S. interests in a given nation or region.

We saw that there are in the Third World a handful of big nations

whose political and social health has an important effect on their neighbors and on the general world environment. Title IX activities may help to influence the direction these nations take. If they are already moving in Title IX directions, economic assistance may be a requisite for their success and they may require more resources than they are now getting. If their regimes remain so authoritarian as to block development or repress popular demands for more participation, the United States should consider curtailing or ending its assistance.

The numerous small and medium sized nations are less likely in themselves to affect U.S. interests. However, a number of smaller countries may be so geographically located, so ready to move toward Title IX goals or so clearly influential in their region that Title IX progress will contribute to an improved environment of U.S. foreign policy. Then Title IX programs may make sense. Nations that are both unimportant and unreceptive to Title IX goals are poor candidates for any form of aid.

Title IX appears to have little relevance to the U.S. interest in seeing local conflict dampened, although there may be instances when some Title IX progress could affect the foreign policy behavior of a particular state.

Title IX is not likely to affect American interests where international commerce or raw material acquisition is our main concern, except insofar as timely political and social concessions would help a regime to avoid revolutions threatening these interests.


Title IX may have utility, even where short and middle run U.S.

security interests are engaged, (a) if timely reforms will help preserve our access to bases and communications; (b) if a regime, hard pressed by externally supported insurgency, needs to gain more popular support and is likely to obtain it by extending participation or, (c) if a change in regime is the only way of obtaining enough popular support to deal with the nation.

## II. Strategies and Risks Involved in a Country Uninterested in Political Development.


There are several presumptive signs, apart from direct evidence in governmental statements, which indicate lack of receptivity to political change. Is the country authoritarian rather than a promoter of democratic institutions; is it non-modernizing; is little or no change, economic or political, actually underway; are there elite minorities, even in a democratic framework, that resist the broadening of political participation?

Suggested below are several conditions which might exist even within societies resistant to political change and outlines of how strategy might still seek to promote such change. These conditions will be true in varying proportions in different countries. It would be unusual to find only one of these conditions pertaining to a single country and this may lead to a mix of conditions and of possible strategies.



FOUR SCORE AND SEVEN YEARS AGO  
OUR FOREFATHERS FOUNDED ON THIS CONTINENT  
A NEW NATION, CONCEIVED IN LIBERTY AND  
DEDICATED TO THE PROPOSITION THAT ALL  
MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL....

NOW WE ARE GETTING AROUND TO YOU.  
WHEN ARE YOU GOING TO GET SOME CREDIT UNIONS  
GOING ?



AID/TROY



1. While resistant to change, power is diffused or decentralized.

Strategy

If power is diffused or decentralized, the approach might be selective, undertaking Title IX programs with those portions of the political elite or bureaucracy which are receptive to change.

Risk/Limitations/Costs

It is difficult to determine accurately who the modernizers are. Selectivity can readily be viewed as duplicity, that is, that U.S. policy is aimed at setting group against group. This could lead to reduction of influence on overall government policy and threaten other existing U.S. interests.

2. While resistant to political change, there is a commitment to economic growth.

Strategy

If commitment to growth is high, one might seek to shape programs justified on economic growth grounds to provide by-product effects which affect the socio-political system along Title IX lines. In doing so, one must recognize that the possibility of introducing programs which have radical political by-products (taxation for wealth redistribution) are likely to be resisted, and one will probably have to count on programs having longer term effects (transportation, education and the like.)

Risk

The kind of programs open for joint agreement may have by-product effects which are too limited or too distant to justify the costs. Knowledge may also be inadequate to be clear on what political effects might result from various economic inputs.

Using economic instruments without a clear link to socio-political changes may destroy our image with other countries with whom we emphasize Title IX objectives or may alienate the United States from more popular forces.

3. There is a relatively high level of dependency of the regime on some U.S. input (military, economic, diplomatic, simple need for good will, etc.)

Strategy

If dependency is substantial, there is the possibility of making the aid level depend upon the socio-political policies they adopt.

If past aid levels were related to specific quid pro quos and these are diminished in importance, Title IX criterion may become more important as a determinant of aid levels. Clear interagency agreement is needed to assure that all U.S. inputs are orchestrated to support such a strategy.

Risk

This is feasible only so far as the dependency is not two-directional. The value of such use of influence must be clearly weighed against the risk to other U.S. interests, in the country. Application of this strategy always runs the clear risk of leading to a break in aid activities which then ends whatever influence the United States may have had.

4. The resistance to change is a consequence of a fear by the elite of an external threat, or of a loss of power, which if overcome would open the way to greater willingness to change.

Strategy

If fear is based on genuine external threat, one can perhaps afford to wait, providing continued assistance within a rationale of economic growth and not seeking substantial Title IX ends in the short run. If the government fears relative loss of power, one's strategy depends upon whether the existing regime is judged sufficiently capable of seeking in the right circumstances to bring about change (and whether the feared opposition is less likely to bring about such change). In this case, strategy would probably aim at promoting limited political change which is aimed in part at reinforcing the role of the regime vis-à-vis its opposition.

Risk

In waiting, one may be extending the time frame before change starts an unreasonable period of time. The major risk is one of miscalculation and the reinforcement of a regime which becomes increasingly retrograde.

Whatever one's attitude about the opposition, if it proves capable of winning out, in any event, one may be faced with a government of people embittered by U.S. attempts to undermine them during the opposition stage.

III. Strategies and Risks Involved in Countries Interested in Reasonable Amounts of Political Change but Sensitive About U.S. Involvement in the Process.

There are again many presumptive signs indicating a nation's sensitivity to U.S. involvement in the process of internal socio-political change. There may be direct reactions or statements to previous U.S. initiatives. There are such signs as the nation's reaction to U.S. foreign policy statements, its alliances, cooperation or lack of it on world issues, action on U.S. issues and the like. Or there may be situations where nations concur in general terms with the United States on world views but for internal political reasons are reluctant to see the United States (or perhaps any nation) affecting their socio-political affairs as a matter of explicit policy. This will be particularly likely where a domestic political opposition is well developed.

1. Host country is sensitive to appearance of U.S. involvement in domestic policy matters but not necessarily to U.S. involvement in specific program matters. Equally, countries may be sensitive to associating themselves with the United States because of differences on foreign policy on the world stage, but not adverse to receiving assistance for economic development purposes.

Strategy

In such situations, U.S. must be particularly alert to appearances and style, playing down its own role. Dealings must be in specific program terms on the bureaucrat-to-bureaucrat level, avoiding grand statements about involvement in general political development. To extent possible, support should be directed towards providing the government with effective technical means towards overcoming problems in implementing policies which the host country itself has decided upon.

Risk

It is sometimes difficult for Americans to exercise such discretion and modesty in our operating style, particularly when we may be called upon for different rhetoric in the host country and with a U.S. audience.

2. Power is diffused within any layer of government.

Strategy

If government or elite is diffused or decentralized, there are opportunities to deal in Title IX terms with that part of the political elite or bureaucracy which is not oversensitive to U.S. involvement.

Risk

The risk is similar to that given under similar heading in Part II.

3. There is a commitment to economic development.

Strategy

If commitment is high, one may seek Title IX results through by-product effects. This is probably more likely to come about in a country interested in political development (but sensitive to U.S. involvement) than one not interested, since it is possible to get into economic programs which have a higher direct political impact (tax reform, etc.)

Or if one is willing to accept the general line of policy espoused by the government as supporting Title IX objectives, economic aid for overall growth might be provided simply to sustain or accelerate development already underway.

Risk

There remains here as before the need to know more precisely what types of economic programs can have effective political by-products, although this is less urgent in the politically receptive nation since more direct by-product effects can be programmed.

It may well be that on this justification alone, our aid levels will be too low adequately to promote political change.

We always run the risk because of our open society of having the socio-political rationale of economic aid more explicitly discussed and exaggerated than is either accurate or desirable.

**IV. Strategies and Risks in a Nation That is Reasonably Receptive to Title IX Programs, Both in Terms of a Desire for Political Development and an Acceptance of U.S. Participation, but Whose Government's Ability to Pursue Those Goals is Limited.**

Even if a government is prepared to move towards the kind of open society and increase in participation called for in Title IX, there may well be limitations on its own effectiveness and capacity to do so. We discuss here seven primary reasons why a nation might be unable to carry out meaningful Title IX programs. These conditions, or limitations, suggest the need for alternative strategies involving varying risks.

Improving a government's capacity may have unanticipated results, however. More effective governing instruments can be used for purposes contrary to Title IX. Although there is no sure way to guard against having a more efficient government act in increasingly authoritarian ways, when choices must be made in a program to improve government capabilities, they should be made so as to confirm libertarian tendencies to the maximum extent possible.

1. Government's incapacity is due to inability to lead effectively; because of lack of leadership energy; or lack of imagination, innovation and planning ability; or inability to get the bureaucracy to carry out governmental orders; or inability to generate popular enthusiasm for new initiatives (all of these possibilities exist with regimes which receive general popular and possibly electoral support).

### Strategy

Governments might be urged to concentrate attention and energy on only one task or on a group of interrelated tasks, for which reasonable success can be anticipated and which have or will have an impact on popular opinion. Assistance might be provided for problem solving and improved planning, i.e. we would direct energies explicitly to a number of major problems and provide high levels of input to find solutions to them.

One might undertake top leadership training, especially through exposing leadership to new patterns and forms, especially through foreign travel.

### Risk

Following this course may ignore other tasks which must be fulfilled. It may be that the tasks to be met are not directly along Title IX lines and their fulfillment may not necessarily increase capacity to work along Title IX lines. Caution must be exercised to avoid feelings of implied criticism. There is always the problem of loss of face. Unless leadership itself can get actively involved, there is a question of how effective outside advice can be in solving significant national problems.

Travel is likely to be of short duration, which makes learning limited. Wrong lessons can also be drawn from such experiences.

2. Government is constrained by factors which limit scope of its functions or extent and magnitude of its operations, e.g. ideology; countervailing political forces, resource limits.

### Strategy

Scope and strength of government must be expanded in areas where weakness lies. Resource limitations may imply high growth assistance and revised tax policy; ideological limitations might be faced by insisting on pragmatic programs having minimum ideological connotations.

### Risk

Extending capacity of government does not assure it will be used in ways compatible with Title IX.

3. Government is incapacitated by bureaucratic inefficiency stemming from poorly trained personnel, improper organization, inadequate chain of command or formalistic rather than pragmatic bureaucratic norms.

Strategy

Give priority to improving bureaucratic performance. Subtle analysis may be required to determine the precise nature and location of bottlenecks within the bureaucracy.

Risk

Attempting to reform a bureaucracy is delicate. Host Government may not receive cordially the idea of need for such reform. On the other hand, not to achieve reform may mean that substantial resources will be wasted.

4. Government is incapacitated by inadequate communications and infrastructure.

Strategy

Strategy may simply be to give priority to making up this lack, recognizing that there appear to be direct Title IX consequences in such programs.

Risk

Such programs are apt to be costly and place heavy burdens on struggling economies.

5. Legitimacy of leadership is questioned, i.e., national leaders are not respected by the mass of the people.

Strategy

If power is diffused and/or decentralized, it might be possible to work with specific legitimate elements of the ruling elite.

If a new, more legitimate leadership is likely to develop--perhaps because social change is already well in process--then one might continue existing aid levels in order to provide entree, but postpone undertaking particular Title IX initiatives. One might go farther and disassociate oneself from existing government in public utterance and contact, while maintaining aid to keep economic growth and social change going.

One might simply disown existing leaders in all respects, sever aid, and wait for a change.

One might try stepping outside government for administrative vehicles for Title IX efforts, using or building up non-governmental institutions.

Risk


Finding such people may be difficult; one could choose the wrong people. Furthermore, such actions are likely to seem like duplicity, drawing the enmity of others.

Disassociation is difficult to achieve. By giving anything to existing leaders one may be making enemies of their replacements.

If the existing leadership has reformist instincts, but simply lacks legitimacy, one may be throwing out the baby with the bath water.



Moreover, there is the obvious risk that in severing aid one loses influence in safeguarding other U.S. interests.

This policy may threaten relations with host government and may itself be politically destabilizing.



"IT'S A MAN!"  
"IT'S A BIRD!"  
"IT'S OVERHEAD CAPITAL!"

REMEMBER: WE DON'T  
WANT BASES, JUST  
LEVERAGE AND MAXIMUM  
PARTICIPATION.  
PASS IT ON!





6. Legitimacy of public institutions is in question--institutions do not have the habitual respect of the people.

Strategy

Title IX efforts might seek to create new, substitute institutions and processes which are more acceptable and which, by getting around the existing traditions of bureaucracy, do in fact succeed in better serving the people.

One might undertake to renovate existing governmental institutions, through training, foreign travel of personnel, etc.

One might provide resources specifically to ensure that existing governmental institutions succeed in delivering what the people want.

One might try to develop totally new institutions at new levels of government, e.g. municipality, rural districts.

Finally, if viable institutions do exist in the society outside government, they might be utilized for Title IX purposes.

Risk

May result in costly duplication of services and wastage of resources. There is also a very serious question about whether we have the knowledge and skill, let alone access, to create legitimate institutions in foreign countries.

Besides being an uncertain venture, such a policy may increase infighting within government, among the agencies newly favored and those neglected.

If these agencies are seriously tarnished in the public eye, the United States would be associating itself closely with discredited people and institutions.

May arouse the fears of the central government, which then seeks to impose control. The United States is caught in a delicate position.

One risk is that one may reinforce traditional, retrograde institutions. Furthermore, such a program may arouse the hostility of the existing government, which fears it will lose power.

7. National unity is precarious; the threat of national fragmentation is real.

Strategy

One might try to develop Title IX programs which are universally liked, which do not work to redistribute power among national sub-units in the short run; and which in their long-term effects do unify a country: e.g. increased education, development of a common language.

Do things which increase the perceived utility of the central government in the eyes of the people.

Work directly with sub-units to develop modern institutions, processes, and structures that are unifying, i.e. that for their successful operation must transcend regions. Examples are markets, modern interest groups.

Risk

It may be very difficult to find programs which in themselves do not become bones of contention between central government and contending sub-units. Any new program may provide another cause for disunity.

The corresponding risk is that fears of central domination may be enhanced among sub-units.

This is delicate work, depending particularly on the nature of the subdividing loyalty in the country. Working directly with sub-units may make centrifugal tendencies worse. Central government may be hostile to direct contact with sub-units.

## V. Participation and Other Goals.

We turn now to consider, given a U.S. interest in promoting Title IX in a particular country and some feasibility in so doing, the question of what priority should increased participation have in that country?

In working toward balanced development in individual countries, it may be best to regard participation as if it were a means to a set of other goals. Without implying that participation has lower priority or status than other goals, this approach automatically focusses on the question of balance, e.g., on participation in relation to other goals.

Following this approach, we have sought to sketch the country characteristics which determine how and where participation can contribute to other goals.

### Economic Growth and Participation

Among the fundamental determinants of the capacity for economic growth are the existing level of development of human resources, infrastructure, and institutions; natural resources; and the commitment to development on the part of the government and the population. Participation has no impact on natural resources. The importance of broadened participation in accelerating economic growth depends largely, on three characteristics: the country's level of economic development, elite commitment to development, and popular commitment to development.

At the earliest stages of economic development, priority tasks usually include education and training to broaden and deepen the supply

of human resources, special attention to administrative development, and investment in basic infrastructure. These tasks do not call for special emphasis on broadened participation.

As development proceeds, it becomes more important to stimulate broad participation in implementation, in order to modernize agriculture and stimulate indigenous private manufacturing. Improved distribution and a degree of participation in decision-making may be important also. At higher levels of development, groups active in implementation are likely to demand a greater role in decision-making, in part to assure more equitable distribution of the fruits of development.

Thus as the level of development increases all three aspects of participation increase in importance as means to further growth.

Lack of elite support for measures necessary for economic development may reflect: Defense of vested interests on the part of government leadership plus the economic and social "establishment"; or preoccupation with national glory; or impractical ideologies; or over-responsiveness to popular pressures.

These reasons for elite failure to support the measures required for growth should be distinguished from inability to carry out desired programs due to administrative ineffectiveness, popular resistance or apathy or problems of national integration.

Broadened participation in decision-making may stimulate increased commitment to development where vested interests have been the constraining factor. This is particularly true where there is some or substantial interest in development on the part of government leadership, but where

action has been hampered by a conservative "establishment."

Where leadership is preoccupied with other goals, broadened participation in decision-making at local levels and through voluntary organizations may generate increased developmental demands, thereby forcing higher priority for development. But increased participation in national political processes may also become a conduit for whipping up popular support for the leadership's (non-developmental) goals.

Similarly, where leadership is committed to impractical development ideologies, strong pressure for effective action from local levels or voluntary organizations may possibly force more flexible and realistic policies, though this may lead to counteraction through repressive measures.

Where leadership is already too responsive to actual or anticipated popular pressures, broadened participation clearly is inappropriate.

Widespread popular apathy, rural or urban, may be due to isolation and conservative traditions, or to skepticism toward government programs and promises or both. Community development and cooperatives can be effective in overcoming fatalism, conservatism, and skepticism. However, improved communications and more education are also powerful solvents for isolation and conservatism. Direct efforts to broaden participation are not necessarily the most powerful means of overcoming apathy. Efficient and reasonably honest administration is probably the best antidote to skepticism about government promises.

### Administrative Effectiveness and Participation

Ineffective administration may reflect: Inadequate quantity and quality of trained personnel, with reference both to technical skills and to attitudes toward public service; widespread corruption; inadequate funds, causing moonlighting and corruption, and also interfering with implementation of competently planned and honestly administered programs; poor organization and methods; vacillating political leadership; overcentralization; inadequate consultation with and feedback from private groups whose cooperation is important.

Among these problems, broadened participation has a close relationship to overcentralization and to inadequate consultation. At some levels and in some kinds of programs, participation might help control corruption, but other measures are probably more important to this end.

### National Integration and Participation

Cleavage patterns in developing countries can be classified according to the degree of fragmentation, and according to whether the ruling group represents a minority or a majority. Most nations fit one of the following categories:

1. Fragmented nations with several or many major groups or regions, no single group clearly dominant.
2. Fragmented nations with several or many major groups, one group dominant.

3. Countries with two roughly balanced groups.

4. Countries with a dominant minority, coinciding with class divisions.

5. Countries with a dominant majority, and a sizeable and disruptive minority.

6. Countries with a major neglected region which does not have marked ethnic or linguistic differences from the larger polity.

7. Relatively homogeneous population; existing divisions do not threaten unity or substantially influence policy.

Substantial tension not based on class exists in all but the seventh.

The degree of tension is a rough measure of the priority of national integration relative to other goals. Both the degree of tension and the pattern of cleavage are important in determining what kinds of participation, if any, are useful in promoting integration. For example, where a majority dominates one or more minorities, more democratic national political processes may simply reflect intergroup hostilities and lead to increased repression.

The degree to which groups are concentrated regionally or intermingled also affects what forms of participation may be helpful. Increased self-government through decentralization is likely to be useful in the first but not the second situation.

Finally, the attitude of the government should be considered in determining the feasibility of increasing participation as a means to national integration. Governments may be: eager to reduce tensions through conciliation or through careful balancing of interests and

power, or largely indifferent to the problem; or firm, not particularly conciliatory, but not repressive; or repressive.

Broadened participation seems most likely to stimulate increased and constructive attention to integration in those countries where the government has been indifferent to the problem.

### The Rule of Law and Participation

There is probably no other area where our experience with domestic poverty programs can be so readily translated into an A.I.D. program designed to implement the objectives of Title IX. During the last decade we have discovered shocking inequities in our legal institutions and processes; there is no reason to doubt that comparable phenomena can be found in most, if not all, recipients of U.S. assistance.

The first step in a Title IX oriented program of legal assistance for a specific country would be a survey of the country's laws, legal institutions and procedures, undertaken preferably by American experts who have been active in the campaign to make our own legal structure more responsive to the poor or in the civil rights field. Among the subjects which any such survey should scrutinize with particular care are the following:

#### 1. Criminal Law:

Means for acquainting persons with their legal rights;

Procedures for arrest, interrogation, bail and parole;

Conduct of trials, including nature and quality of the fact-

finder and law applier, availability of free legal

counsel, rules of evidence, transcripts, method of appeal;

Available sanctions against police for unjust arrest, torture, perjury, etc.;

Substantive criminal law, with particular relevance to penalization of labor and political organizational activities, imprisonment for debt, penalization of rights of free speech, press, etc.

## 2. Civil Law:

Means for acquainting persons with their legal rights;

Availability of free legal counsel;

Nature and quality of fact-finders and law-appliers;

Means for allocating and extent of court costs other than counsel fees;

Speed of legal process;

Means for enforcing judgments;

Means for enforcing or restraining administrative actions, including right to judicial review;

Means for enforcing claims against the government;

Content of civil law, with particular reference to rights of lessees and borrowers against landlords and lenders.

Whether A.I.D. can do more than catalog the sins of the system is problematical. Many of the inequities in a legal system are not inadvertent; rather they reflect the active or passive preferences of

those who exercise political power. But, since people tend to be far more aware of the content of law than of the institutions and procedures through which it is enforced, law may lag behind shifts in the political balance of power. In such cases, A.I.D. should be able to develop programs of reform with the full cooperation of the host government. And undoubtedly there will be a considerable range of cases where either the threat to vested interests will not be immediately perceived or where the political establishment, for a variety of reasons including conscience and enlightened perceptions of long-run self-interest, will be sympathetic to some reforms.

If our own experience is any guide, two significant kinds of reform will frequently enjoy a considerable degree of receptivity, if the United States will pay the bill: Changes in the curriculum and research interests and capabilities of the local law schools, and the support of free legal services for the poor. The two are, of course, intimately related, in that free legal service programs are necessarily promised on the existence of a group of competent lawyers interested in the legal problems of the poor.

VI. Conclusions About the Feasibility of Carrying Out Title IX Programs in a Given Country.

It can be seen from this analysis that there are probably only a limited number of countries where commitment to political change is so great and lack of sensitivity to U.S. participation in that process so slight that a direct and fully cooperative attack on the problem can be mounted. In such cases, Title IX programs should be given high priority.

Equally there appear to be a few cases where the possibility of dealing with Title IX problems is, under present conditions, very limited--either because of the rigid status quo attitudes of the regime or because of the threat to other U.S. interests involved in encouraging or pressing a regime to adopt socio-political change it does not want. In such cases, thought should be given, if there are not other overriding U.S. interests, to cutting off economic assistance altogether.

The main conclusion of this analysis, however, is that the bulk of countries in which U.S. economic programs are being conducted lie in a middle range--there are factors which may limit the prospects for Title IX strategy, but there are also conditions which give scope to Title IX efforts and justify the expenditure of energy required to determine precisely where and how Title IX objectives might be melded with other U.S. objectives. Thus, in most cases, the kind of strategy concepts outlined in connection with countries only partially interested in political change and/or more or less sensitive to U.S. involvement in the process can be combined with the kind of strategies involved in countries considered receptive to Title IX changes.

The principal aspects of a country to be evaluated in the course of the analysis are these:

1. Attitudes of host government toward Title IX programs:
  - (a) commitment to political development
  - (b) sensitivity to U.S. involvement
2. Concentration of decision-making power.
3. Centralization of government.
4. Attitudes of government elite concerning the importance of economic development.
5. Dependency on the United States.
6. Capability of leadership.
7. Extent to which government is limited either in scope of its functions or magnitude of its operations.
8. Bureaucratic efficiency.
9. Adequacy of communication infrastructure.
10. Legitimacy of leadership.
11. Extent of economic development and social change in process in the country.
12. Legitimacy of governmental institutions.
13. Problems of national unity; possibility of fragmentation.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### IMPLEMENTING TITLE IX: A.I.D. INSTRUMENTS

Referring to foreign aid as a series of "instruments" vaguely implies that its programs are levers of change. The ambitious have seen in them a gigantic carpenter's chest of tools for moving recalcitrant governments and rebuilding decaying social orders. Reality is not so simple. It is true that every activity of an A.I.D. mission is instrumental to some purpose, and it may also be true that the United States has nothing to lose anywhere by using its programs to improve popular participation and governmental response capabilities. But this proposition does not offer much guidance for program design when these objectives conflict with other U.S. interests or those of the host government.

Any effort to describe aid instruments in terms of Title IX objectives will seem unreal if it ignores the fact that most instruments serve several purposes. There are probably no pure Title IX instruments. Even a program designed to increase popular participation may be seized by a despotic clique or used to deceive those it was intended to benefit. It may be equally true that all aid activities can be used in such a way as to enhance Title IX prospects.

This possibility serves as the starting point for the present analysis. Presumably a program officer should review the potential

Title IX contributions of U.S. aid to government capacity to sustain itself through the use of its modernizing programs, while increasing its responsiveness to popular needs. Such a review would have to consider what each project added to the government's efforts. These efforts would logically include the following stages, each of which would be eligible for assistance under Title IX:

Analysis of country needs in each sector in which aid is offered.

Where the government's planning seems deficient because it does not reach the silent portions of the population, the American contribution can make an important additive contribution ("substitutions for participation"). Where the planning is defective because it does not provide adequate means of responding to changing public demand, the United States can help strengthen the government's capacity to do so ("anticipatory institutionalization").

Project design within externally supported programs. Where the ministerial activities show concern only for economics or professional (e.g., agriculture, public health, education, etc.) standards, the U.S. increment can be to support projects that may be in themselves "marginal" to macro-economic purposes, but potentially useful in terms of reaching segments of the population not touched by other national programs ("responses to unarticulated demands").

Resource mobilization for the execution of developmental programs.

Where the government's financial resources come from taxes on the poor, and its administrative personnel come from the families of the rich, the United States can offer advice and funds to bring about a better balance. Where developmental projects are placed in the hands of groups

likely to be unresponsive to popular demands (the army? a guardian bureaucracy? corrupt privateers?), the United States can take steps to reduce its dependence upon such resources ("equalizing the burdens and privileges").

Generation of public support for developmental programs. Where a government feels compelled to carry out unpopular programs for national development purposes, the United States can help find substitutes for a coercive posture toward the citizens involved. American aid can not only provide communications support to agencies so engaged, but it can also experiment with ways of inviting client groups to participate in making the relevant decisions involved ("forestalling hostility and apathy").

Efficient and effective administration. Where governments feel compelled to substitute welfare standards for those generally accepted by American public administrators, the aid input is usually "organization and methods" advice. Title IX also suggests that American help might generate other means of providing for the school-leavers, the urban underemployed, and others now placed on governmental payrolls for want of an alternative livelihood. Efficiency and honesty in government management are not problems of public administration alone. Social and economic activities have to be considered outside the immediate bureaucracy before conventional Western principles of administration can be applied. ("Administrative social substructure").

In analyzing A.I.D. instruments of change, our approach is to examine aid activities at various immediate points of contact in host

countries. We begin by considering U.S. assistance to central government agencies, including both their "developmental" and their "support" functions, with special reference to means of using modernizing programs to foster popular participation. (Part I) Continuing the discussion of U.S. support to institutions, we then consider those activities that seek to promote local government and public and private associations. (Part II) The third contact point we consider is economic policy, taken on both national and local levels. (Part III) We then turn to aid to non-governmental organizations on the national level, including political parties. (Part IV) Finally, we consider transnational activities. (Part V)

## I. U.S. ACTIVITIES IN DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

### Development Ministries and Agencies

Development Administration is here defined to mean the introduction of technology and the spreading of its fruits among citizens through government action. In agriculture, public health, education, and industry, for example, governments work through their ministries and a variety of private organizations to this end. When technical assistants offer program advice to ministries so engaged, they usually perform as development administration advisors even though they consider themselves agriculturalists, public health specialists, educators, engineers, and the like. Two years ago, recognizing the intimate relationships between one group of technologies and their administration, the Philippine government organized a task force to modernize the agricultural sector, recruiting about half of its members from technical specialties and the other half from the ranks of administrative specialists. The Denizli project in Turkey, which began its operations in 1963, also works with a mixture of technicians and administrative specialists in a regional modernization program. American aid missions have only begun to recognize the potential advantages of using public administration specialists as staff advisors in technical programs.

Development ministries engage in three forms of program activity in enlisting the support of the citizens they regard as client groups. Each of these activities can be conceived in terms of participation and response, for Title IX purposes:

(a) They enforce laws and regulations in order to distribute the benefits of their services fairly. In this process, the dimensions of participation are latent but potentially important. The Irrigation Department of the Government of Pakistan, for example, has to regulate the distribution of irrigation waters through rules and watering schedules. But enforcement is accomplished through peasant groups who assist in applying the regulations for distributing canal waters to members of the water distribution system. In most countries the appearance of hoof-and-mouth disease in animals usually requires the health officials to assume summary police powers in the condemnation of diseased animals. Usually the government asks the more articulate farmers to explain to their neighbors the necessity for the radical policy.

Similar examples in other fields suggest an important, though scarcely obvious, role for American technical advisors. Technicians must be concerned not only with professional standards but also with the political consequences of governmental efforts to regulate the activities of private citizens in the interests of national development.

(b) They may stimulate supporting and multiplying activities from private groups. Sometimes capital projects such as roads and dams may be used to encourage and stimulate other investments (feeder roads, tertiary irrigation systems). In other cases certain government functions may be carried out by private groups organized by government initiative. In Turkey, for example, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry has assisted, through direct financial support, in organizing

Chambers of Commerce, Unions of Chambers, the Turkish Management Association and the Turkish Municipal Association. The Department of Labor has also given financial support to labor unions. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce has given financial support to the Confederation of Employers to develop collective bargaining skills.

American project aid to these ministries should systematically seek to add such participation increments where they have been overlooked by the host government.

(c) They develop a variety of means for responding to the citizen demands articulated as a result of their activities, and for correcting imbalances and excesses in the private sector. Even the coolest bureaucratic responses to citizen desires tend to warm up when the citizens become numerous and well organized.

In such cases, higher officials can often be induced to make use of citizen councils and advisory groups to find ways of reacting responsibly to such demands. The Turkish municipal councils mentioned above serve such purposes. When client groups are transformed into pressure groups, of course, public concern over excessive devotion to their interests may require corrective action. At this point the clash of private interests and public interest reaches the heart of the political process, usually extending beyond the appropriate concerns of foreign aid.

#### The Support Agencies

Most American professional public administration advice is addressed to "auxiliary" or "support" ministries and agencies, including

finance and the budget, planning, civil service, administrative management, and public safety, whose activities make possible the "developmental" role of government. The presumption is, of course, that increasing the efficiency of these staff agencies contributes to the political capabilities of the government. This presumption is questionable in some situations. Certainly no developmental program can be effectively carried out in the absence of the required logistical base of financial and manpower resources. But there is considerable evidence that strengthening the auxiliary agencies in government may disturb the balance of political forces and actually reduce the opportunities for popular participation and the need for governmental response. At a minimum, American public administration advisors have an obligation to consider whether their activities will have such effects.

Two courses of action in response to such findings are possible: to aid other sources of political power in order to keep the bureaucracy responsive, and to refrain from further assistance that might strengthen the capabilities of the civil service. The first course is obviously preferable, where it is possible.

Aid to legislative bodies, especially in their fact-finding and investigative functions, is an example of corrective action that has been only rarely undertaken. Other ways of offsetting bureaucratic domination include support to the judiciary and legal professional groups, training political party leaders, attempting to broaden the recruitment base of the civil service, assisting in the establishment of quasi-public corporations, and promoting press associations and other devices for advancing free inquiry and public information.

### Decentralization

Decentralization offers a convenient slogan for critics of national power, but it is also an inescapable aspect of participation. The language of Title IX implies that efforts should be made to decentralize decision-making and the carrying out of programs. The assumption is that decentralization has uniform and predictable effects toward increased participation. The general truth of the assumption obfuscates a number of difficulties encountered with various kinds of governments and with the remnants of widely differing local government frameworks when they are used for localized development efforts.

The desire for increased participation must be weighed against the problems of overloading poorly staffed and inadequately trained ministries. At the local level there are problems of overwhelming local leadership and creating local requirements that stifle local initiative as much as they offer new opportunities. The land reform program in Vietnam posed goals that clearly exceeded ministerial capabilities in 1955-61. In Pakistan, Village A.I.D. and more recently Basic Democracies placed so many tasks on village leadership that effective execution of any single task was difficult, and bureaucratic control may even have increased under the guise of decentralization. Hence, the decentralization process requires a continually changing balance between ministerial readiness and local capabilities.

The mere existence of legal sub-divisions in a state, e.g., municipalities, provinces, parishes, is insufficient reason to assume developmental viability of the local unit. For example, projects in public works and agriculture assume not only a degree of logistical

competence on the part of the central government, but also suggest in many cases that the legally defined local unit is unwieldy or inappropriate. An overenthusiastic ministry may create local units designed to its needs and limited by its present capacity, while other branches of government establish entirely different geographical and ethnic boundaries, sometimes in competition with other ministries. Moreover, different priorities for the development of local government units are often established by different ministries. It is not uncommon for ministries of education to focus on intermediate urban centers while ministries of agriculture press for improved agricultural education in more remote locations. To the extent that decentralization is the product of ministerial competition and uncoordinated extension of governmental services to local units, the likelihood of confusing and inhibiting local participation is enhanced or, at least, the cumulative emergence of viable local units is made more difficult.

A decision to decentralize administration in national ministries requires an affirmative answer to most of the following questions:

1. Does the process of decentralization strengthen local units in a form that is compatible with longer-term goals of national and local government?

Yugoslavia is a good example of a country with a well conceived and ambitious program of decentralization that had the purpose of subduing ethnic, religious and regional rivalries while also feeding into a national development effort. Started in 1951, the decentralization process was phased into the establishment of increasingly effective local institutions, both urban and rural. The process was not completed

until 1963, when autonomous rural and urban communes were legally established in the new Yugoslav constitution. Less well conceived and fragmented examples include the effort to reform land tax collection in Vietnam or the local associations to collect irrigation revenues in the Philippines.

2. Does the proposed change actually increase the capabilities of local government and encourage local participation?

Nearly every government in the Third World is skilled in creating a façade of decentralization and, under pressure of aid givers, is prepared to endorse projects which it knows vastly exceed the existing capacity of local units. In fact, such programs can serve the interests of a government that wishes to increase central control. For example, in Korea in the late 50's, locally elected councils became the vehicle for Syngman Rhee's dominant Liberal Party to extend its power. In the absence of competing parties or developed local interests, the councils never promoted any meaningful form of political participation, nor did they contribute to economic development.

3. Do the local subdivisions promise to increase local skills in the administration of assistance and a readiness to assume more functions as initial successes are achieved?

Decentralization on a "one shot" basis does not necessarily put into action a process of dispersion of powers and functions that will stimulate local activity and affect overall productivity. Some efforts at decentralization are wholly cynical. For example, Obote of Uganda first used constitutional promises of decentralization to

gain Buganda as an ally against the Democratic Party in order to come to power. Once in power, Obote felt insecure and threatened by Buganda, finally demolishing the relationship when he felt himself strong enough to do so. A more rewarding effort was the Barrio Charter Law of 1959 in the Philippines. The parties certainly saw the barrio scheme as a new vehicle for political privilege and patronage, but the program was accomplished by effective efforts to strengthen local government. Though the barrios feel the vicissitudes of party politics and must still deal with heavy-handed ministries, the new program reached all parts of the country, was attached to an existing infrastructure of local government, and was accompanied by a massive effort to train elected barrio council members. Over 200,000 barrio leaders have had short training sessions. While the scheme has been increasingly politicized, it has firmly established the local unit in relation to national politics and given it an identity within the political system that will not be easily undone by central government. The barrios can make demands on government and are recognized as a meaningful unit for political action.

4. Does the program to decentralize envisage a continuing build-up of local activity and authority that will neither stifle local action in early phases nor inhibit local initiative after early successes?

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of decentralization is the need to reassess continually the progress and expansion of localized activities. In some instances, such as Pakistan's Basic Democracies, so many functions may be imposed on a fragile and only partially understood

local framework, that the local leadership is confused and even more dependent on administrative control and direction than under the earlier more arbitrary and less ambitious local programs.

## II. U.S. ACTIVITIES TO PROMOTE LOCALLY ORGANIZED INSTITUTIONS

### Rationale and Instruments

Several A.I.D. instruments are designed primarily to increase local participation and the demand for participation--participation in the decision-making and implementation of development, particularly, but at least indirectly also in the benefits. These instruments include community development programs, cooperatives (for production, marketing, electrification, etc.), credit unions, and private local associations (e.g., 4-H clubs). A.I.D. has also sought to promote participation through improving the effectiveness and responsiveness of local units of government. These instruments create "demand" for participation, while those in Section 1--to follow the economic analogy--address themselves to the "supply," i.e. to the provision of institutions and opportunities for participation. (This is not a hard and fast distinction, because locally organized institutions like coops also supply some of the means for participation.) Understanding the nature of that demand, and its likely repercussions upon the political and administrative systems of the country, will help in making these instruments more effective, particularly as they move from simple demands (e.g., a well, a school) to more complex ones (e.g., control of a share of tax resources).

Most of A.I.D.'s experience with these instruments has been in rural areas. Yet the pace of urbanization in countries of Latin America and elsewhere suggests that their adaptation for the urban

areas needs to be explored, or alternative means of participation for the urban population need to be found. In the rural areas also, new instruments may be needed where coops, credit unions or community development programs--as we know them--do not fit the local situation. It is perhaps most of all in the interaction of the locally organized institutions and the modernizing (or alternatively, regressive) activities of the government that more understanding and more work is needed.

#### Local Participation Instruments and the Political-Administrative Structure

Localized assistance cannot be fully assessed without some framework for judging conflict and opportunity in the political system. In some countries one finds only a single fragile political hierarchy which is barely able to sustain the government's legitimacy. Localized demands can quickly become a major threat and any power base outside government is tempted to topple the entire regime. Indonesia existed on this basis for many years and Sukarno's failure was in many respects his inability to create new hierarchies in the society relevant to national goals.

In the next stage a dual hierarchy emerges, most often around a differentiation between political or policy-making figures and the administrative machinery. Most developing countries have reached this stage, but where they have not there is a need to encourage the pristine form of political differentiation that provides alternative channels to power and permits some forms of competition for power.

Quite possibly a symbiotic relationship may emerge at this point--for example, in Pakistan between military and civil service, or in India between Congress Party elite and civil service--that makes further sharing of power difficult and restricts the opportunities for localized activities to relate to the power structure. The dual hierarchy is essential to creating a degree of specialization in national government, but it can become an obstacle to localized growth when the duality is easily merged back into a single hierarchy.

In more advanced stages of development, where institutionalization has defined the political and administrative framework of government, the possibility arises of encouraging task-oriented or competing hierarchies. Such hierarchies provide reinforcement for a government and increase specialization in the political process, as well as in other economic and social endeavors. Several countries where A.I.D. has been judged successful, such as Korea, Taiwan, and Tunisia, have entered into a stage of development where such specialization is being accepted and promoted and where therefore projects which promote participation are more readily acceptable and the dispersion of power is less often viewed with suspicion.

Any given form of localized assistance must be evaluated and implemented in the light of a political estimate something like the above. The various A.I.D. instruments normally used in this area, e.g. community development and coops, create different kinds of demands that have different kinds of effects on the power structure. Simple demands, such as for a new bridge or well, create demands upon the existing hierarchy but do not essentially change it. More complex demands,

however, such as a share of control over resources going into projects, or even more advanced, a measure of autonomous control over tax sources, do in fact begin to create differentiation and specialization in the hierarchies.

Almost all of these instruments, when initiated by A.I.D., have the implied goal of moving from single to complex tasks, from refining the single hierarchical structure (where it exists) to one more diverse. One case mentioned earlier is community development in the Philippines. There the barrios have moved from single demands upon the central government to a degree of genuine autonomy and have developed linkages into the political and administrative structure at several levels.

Yet we know that in practice A.I.D. efforts in this area are often frustrated. Sometimes this is because of cultural factors, e.g. the lack of receptivity to the idea of a cooperative for profit in rural Indonesia. But often it is because the demands of these institutions meet resistance on the part of the existing power structure. In Thailand, community development programs were first absorbed by the Ministry of Interior (the single hierarchy) and later overrun by counter-insurgency programs which substituted largesse for local control, and central administration for local participation. Such examples point up the fact that efforts to promote local participation can be expected to meet some resistance from the existing power structure. By posing a "threat" to it, they may actually bring about a regression in differentiation and less, not broadened sources

of power. Failure to anticipate that resistance often leads to institutions whose original purposes have been diverted or distorted or simply stalled.

On the other hand, when the local institutions fail to generate demands upon the system which it might accept, the potential for differentiation is lost and the dynamism in the system atrophies. This also is evident in some A.I.D. programs. Coops which continue to demand large government subsidies when they might develop private credit resources perpetuate the narrowness of the system. Community development programs which never go beyond a steady demand for physical structures paid for largely by central government (or U.S.) funds do little to broaden the power base or develop differentiation of function. Government in turn is not stimulated to give more free rein and authority to private institutions or to modify its pattern of control.


A.I.D. programs in this area, therefore, should proceed from an analysis of the power structure, the points of resistance to greater differentiation of the structure, the nature of demands that can be put upon the system and the ways in which the resistance may be overcome. In general, A.I.D. must be aware of the linkages of these institutions into the political process. A.I.D. tries to maintain these programs free from "political" involvement by insisting on at most a link into the bureaucracy. Yet if the real objective is to provide more access for citizens to the political process, then linkage to party politics, national associations and other nonadministrative sources of power may represent success for these institutions.

The following charts, one for community development, one for



**NEW A.I.D. DANCE:  
"THE TITLE NINE CRUNCH"**

**LL "SWING YOUR PARTNER, SWING YOUR MATE" LL  
LL EVERYONE PARTICIPATE" LL**





coops, show some of the linkages which these institutions can have into the power structure through the way they operate. They provide the beginnings of a check list which can be used to measure the degree of differentiation represented by the demands of these instruments and to suggest "next steps" with these instruments which can be taken to help move the power structure toward being more diverse and permitting of more access to power and participation.

#### Local Participation and Development Priorities

Participation is both a means and an end. It is a means to greater control over one's environment and to improvements in one's living conditions. It is an end in that it provides the dignity and psychic satisfaction of having a share in the control of one's environment and the structure of power. But we must be careful to distinguish between the form and the substance of participation. Where the most critical issues are national, not local--e.g., land reform, allocation of national resources--small amounts of local participation may not provide meaningful participation either as a means or an end. It can be looked upon by the power structure as a means of diverting popular pressures into low priority areas. Or local participation and even autonomy may simply be insufficient to affect national issues. The Philippines may be a classic case in this regard. The community development program has provided the barrio many linkages into the power structure and has likely prevented a greater distance being created between the ruling classes and the bulk of the population.

Evolving Political Linkage of Community  
Development with Hierarchical Structures

<u>Types of Demands</u>	<u>Hierarchical Structures</u>		
	Simple	Dual	Competing
<b>Financing of Activities</b>	Direct Subsidy	Direct Loan	Financing Powers of its own
<b>Management</b>	Government Personnel	Special Service	Autonomous Educational Process
<b>Leadership and Control</b>	Appointed Village Committees	Local Leadership Training	Regional or Provincial Representation
<b>Program Selection</b>	Pre-Selected Village Needs	Bargaining to Identify Needs	Self-defined Needs
<b>Link with Government</b>	No Link, or Direct Link to Power Structure	Access to Political and Administrative Systems, in Local Units	Access to Political and Administrative Systems, in Higher Units
<b>Expertise</b>	Government Technical Assistance	Choice of Public or Private Technology	Find Own Technical Inputs

CHART II

Agricultural Production Coops

<u>Types of Demands</u>	<u>Hierarchical Structures</u>		
	Single	Dual	Competing
Management	Govt. Aptd. Director	Jointly Aptd. Director	Director Elected from Members
Financial Control	Profits and Reserves under Govt. Control	Profits and Reserves under Joint Control	Self-regulated Financial Management
Leadership and Policy Control	Members Virtually Paid Laborers	Members' Voice in Management Defined	Management Fully under Membership Control
Operations	Coop Proceedings and Minutes Filed with Govt.	Govt. Access to Inspect and Review Proceedings	Records under Legal Protection
Expertise	Govt. Determines Technical and Service Inputs	Coop Bargains for Tech. and Service Inputs	Inputs Fully Independent from Govt.
Functional Autonomy	All Farm Prices Set by Govt.	Coop Chooses Between Private and Govt. Price	Self-regulating Price Structure
Functional Autonomy	Crops Determined by Govt.	Crops Partially Selected by Coop	Production Wholly Self-managed
Functional Autonomy	No Coop Control over Technical and Extension Agents	Coop Voice in Evaluation of Technical Advisors	Hire and Fire Technical Advisors

Still it has not been able to bring about a shift of national resources into the lagging agricultural sector, exert much influence on the major question of land reform, or to check the growing inequality in distribution of income.

A related problem arises when the demands for participation are created but there is no direction of these demands and of local participation toward programs which really achieve development, i.e., a real degree of new control over the environment. Programs which simply emphasize filling immediate "felt needs" over long periods of time are subject to this criticism. They place heavy and often excessive demands upon the central government, or in many cases upon the United States. In Laos, for example, community development efforts have gone on for years in the absence of any national development effort. This has resulted in a continuing drain on U.S. resources to provide the cement, bridges, pumps and other materials for the local projects without lasting changes being accomplished in the villages themselves. This type of participation without development may create more rather than less frustration in the long run.

Cooperatives and credit unions, though geared more to concrete changes in the income and development patterns of the membership, have similar effects. Cooperatives may lobby for subsidies and market protection that deter rather than add to national development opportunities. Rural electrification coops may draw off scarce managerial and financial resources from higher priority production needs.

The point of this discussion is that local participation projects which are unrelated to changes in national policy or national development

efforts may produce a politically as well as economically meaningless form of participation. They may divert the population, the host government, and the Mission from higher priority concerns which will later overshadow the degree of participation achieved. These instruments therefore are most effective when they are introduced in relation to a fairly clear set of national priorities and developmental efforts. In that way they add to national development. The link in each country depends on the nature of the situation. In Nepal, they may serve as a prelude to development, laying the base for a more effective participation in development at a later time. In other countries, they may become a useful adjunct to centrally directed developmental efforts. In Korea, for example, community development villages were found to be more receptive to change and were able and willing to take more advantage of the technical and capital inputs coming from the central government. But it was the central government, after many years of neglect, which finally made available these technical inputs for the villages to put to work.

In sum, instruments promoting locally organized institutions are important facets of the development process, both political and economic. But they are not the whole process. They can make demands upon the system, but if those demands do not lead to real improvement in the memberships' long term prospects, they may not produce satisfaction. They can develop links between national government and the outlying population. But if the national government uses these links as a diversion from attention to critical national weaknesses or inequities,

then they become a substitute for change instead of an instrument for it. A.I.D. missions have the task of analyzing country situations, pinpointing the obstacles to development, the role that locally organized institutions can play to overcome these obstacles, and the other nationally focused efforts that are needed to make any local programs really meaningful and effective. To proceed with the instruments for local participation without making those determinations is to run the risk of overstaging their significance (e.g., measuring progress by the number of local council meetings, or the number of wells constructed) or, perhaps worse, underutilizing their potential to affect the other facets of development, e.g., placing a higher priority on meeting a steady stream of unrelated material demands than on using these instruments to achieve, say, a greater allocation of investment resources and new economic opportunities to the rural sector, to lobby for better technical services, or to develop a tenant farmer voice in national affairs.

#### Local Governmental Units as a Focus for Expanding Participation

A.I.D. has paid little attention to local units of government. This is not hard to understand. Most development policies and programs proceed from central government ministries. Many countries being assisted, moreover, have serious problems of national integration which improved central government effectiveness could help to overcome. Assistance to local government units could be a gigantic task in terms of human and perhaps capital resources: it would seem more feasible

to develop in-country competence for improving local government by concentrating on the competence of central government ministries and the development of in-country education and training institutions, both of which would spread out in their effects to the local level. We know, for example, that recent crash efforts in Thailand to upgrade provincial governments have involved very sizeable capital and technical inputs that would likely be unavailable where security considerations are not present.

Yet the contrast between A.I.D. efforts at community organization--community development, coops, etc.--and the limited attention to local units of government is harder to explain. It would seem that, apart from the traditional emphasis on decentralization in A.I.D. philosophy, local units of government have not been considered prime targets for increasing participation. Two considerations should alter this opinion: the rapid urbanization process which makes urban units of government key elements in providing for participation in all three senses of the word, and the important relationship between community participation projects and political-administrative structures discussed earlier.

One difficult question is what units of government should be supported for what purpose. Is a village a viable unit for agricultural development emphasis, tax resource control, education? There are obvious conflicts between desiring to promote the most locally oriented base of participation, e.g., in community development programs, and the need to develop viable administrative and developmental units. A.I.D. program instruments are actually helpful in this regard. For they are usually geared to functional considerations and can help

develop analysis of local government needs on some kind of objective criteria. Thus perhaps the most effective A.I.D. instruments for assisting local governmental units are the economic planning and policy advisory programs, development loans, and P.L. 480, rather than the supplying of public administration advisors to each local unit of government or developing capital projects "on the local level." A.I.D. efforts would thus include encouraging national planning units to involve local government officials in the planning process, urging that sectoral plans and projects involve a high degree of decentralized administration, adjusting service on national tax policy and administration, building managerial concepts of decentralized authority into developmental programs in agriculture, industry, etc.

For example, in Korea, in implementing the Second Five Year Plan, regional planning and analysis was encouraged for answering questions of siting, priorities, inter-industry effects, etc. This brought local government units, urban planning bodies and other elements of the society into direct contact with national planning whereas before local and national planning had been largely unrelated. One result was to sensitize the national planning body to local considerations; another was to raise the perspectives of local officials.

Development loans and P.L. 480 programs are other instruments which can be used to help develop administrative and financial capability. Waterworks, sewage and similar municipal projects can be used to help develop municipal taxing and administrative powers.

In encouraging decentralized administration of its programs, A.I.D. faces a difficult operational problem. Local units of government

are often less efficient, sometimes more corrupt, usually less scrupulous in keeping records than national ministries. A.I.D. can ill afford gross misuses of resources. Therefore, to "put its money where its mouth is," i.e., to support decentralization of authority in its own projects, may require a higher degree of risk--one which may be justified by the importance of the goal, but which A.I.D. cannot undertake lightly. On the other hand, program loans in place of project loans, P.L. 480 Title II with sales proceeds used for development in place of Food-for-Work, and other means are available whereby A.I.D. can consciously take the required "centralization" out of its own programs.

There is a distinction of course between devolution of authority to a legal personality and decentralization of function from the center. A.I.D.'s role has been limited in the former case, because the decision to establish locally elected bodies in place of appointed local officials, or even how to organize administrative units of the country, is one related to highly sensitive, internal political considerations on which A.I.D.'s advice is rarely invited. The instruments mentioned in the previous paragraph would apply to both situations. But they could have different effects. Improving the effectiveness and responsiveness of decentralized units of the central government apparatus may improve participation in several ways but may also reinforce the single hierarchy, a degree of paternalism, and the resistance to local autonomy. This may not be a bad objective, since it could be one form of participation with which both rulers and ruled are comfortable, i.e., within a fairly paternalistic, centralized system of government. We should not think, however, that this leads

automatically to autonomy.

The kind of assistance to be given to local units of government thus depends on the nature of local participation which is being encouraged or is desired. Where A.I.D. or the host country is assisting in community action programs, assistance to local government might be phased in to help overcome resistance to demands created by local community projects. There is danger that A.I.D. might assist in domination of the community programs by the local government apparatus. But with some care exercised, A.I.D. can assist in creating a more dynamic situation between community demands and governmental response, at the local as well as the national level. For example, a careful review of tax resources and budget requirements in a province may lead to recommendations for more autonomous control of certain tax resources for the provincial governor, assignment of certain goals to the private sector (commercial credit and investment powers to the coops) and new and different tax sources for the national government, i.e., encouragement of greater specialization and differentiation of function in ways that help overcome resistance to new forms of local participation.

#### Urban Areas: Special Considerations

A.I.D. has recently issued guidelines calling attention to the need to develop instruments for helping countries meet the problems that arise with urbanization. These guidelines, however, refer primarily to technical assistance in housing finance and urban planning;

and in some cases investment guarantees and loans for housing. They have been related only indirectly to the issue of participation. Obviously, such programs can be shaped to improve participation, e.g., savings and loan associations and housing cooperatives enlarge opportunities for citizens to engage in housing decisions, urban planning can be carried out in a manner that will solicit views and actions by private groups, etc.

Less consideration has been given, however, to developing community action programs within cities. Such programs are not directly transferable from the rural areas to cities for a number of reasons. The appropriate units of organization are more difficult to determine (e.g., what is comparable to the village in community development: a district, a ward, a block?). P.L. 480 Food for Work programs are less relevant, for cities are in the monetized sector of the economy and likelihood of diversion is thus greatly increased. Surplus property, on the other hand, is probably more relevant and immediately useful in urban programs and easier to check on.

Perhaps most important in the Title IX context is that the considerations discussed earlier--the relationship of such activities to the political-administrative structure--apply with even greater force. The cities have a higher level of education, more mass media, and greater interaction between government and any "local" project--that is, any action program on housing, sewage, schools, health or other things meaningful for urban citizens will touch almost immediately with government offices and programs related to those areas (which is

not necessarily so in building a well or community center in a village). For these reasons, cities are often more politically volatile, and, consequently, citizen organization and action within a city is likely to have very early repercussions upon the system. We know, for example, from the experience of O.E.O. programs in American cities that the reaction of city administrations to such programs has been often adverse or at least sticky. The urge to "control" such projects on the part of the existing elite in other countries will be no less prevalent. Finally, urban political activity is often deemed more risky to the national political structure than rural activity; large-scale urban unrest can sharply divide the political structure, create instability and perhaps touch off revolt.

While these considerations add to the sensitivity and risks of such instruments, they also add to their potential. Because they are deemed so politically important, they lend themselves to involving activists in constructive vehicles for change (as in the Dominican Republic). They can become the vehicle for constructive political action for private associations (e.g., labor unions involved in housing). In other words, whereas community development work in villages may be a long, slow process of awakening people to a sense of initiative and control over their environment, the populations of cities may be more amenable to such involvement, more capable of quick action, and more able to translate the effects into new forms of political participation.

In developing greater use of these instruments, another

consideration is important. Recent events have made the United States more aware of its own urban problems. One reaction might be to withdraw from offering assistance to other countries in an area in which the United States must do so much rethinking. But a more dynamic and useful response would be to embark upon assistance programs in the context of a more equal interchange of U.S. and host country ideas on how to solve urban problems. For example, there might well be seminars bringing together community development leaders in the American ghettos with counterparts in other countries, or city administrators or urban scholars with their counterparts. Already the "reverse Peace Corps" idea has been introduced into U.S. cities. It is rare that the United States can, in the aid program, undertake efforts on the basis of a mutual search for solutions to common problems. The opportunity--fraught with problems and sensitivities at first glance--should not be quickly rejected. A frank recognition of our own problems will only raise our prestige abroad, the use of people involved in our own urban development will only enhance our (and other peoples') understanding of urban problems, and our ability to transmit, and receive, skills will likely be enhanced rather than diminished.

In terms of aid to decentralized units of government, the cities may provide a natural and viable unit on which to concentrate attention. Our own experience has taught us that cities in time demand a measure of community participation and control, and a degree of autonomy to adjust to the problems of change. They are large enough and economically integrated enough to justify degrees of financial autonomy. In Turkey,

the municipal governments comprise one of the key areas in which government and citizen interaction takes place, and in many ways a more fruitful vehicle for encouraging flexibility and responsiveness on the part of the central government than programs of assistance directed to the center. Cities are, finally, sufficiently limited to avoid scattering of A.I.D. efforts in local government. The cities, in sum, may be the best place to develop coordinated programs of community action and local government effectiveness leading to a more diversified and satisfying power structure.

### III. U.S. INFLUENCE ON ECONOMIC POLICY AND PLANNING

Some of A.I.D.'s most effective work in recent years has been done in countries where it was influential in making economic policy and in planning. The key to this success has been sufficient A.I.D. resources, and host country agreement on what should be done. Instruments in this area include technical assistance--in such areas as planning, taxation, monetary and fiscal policy, development of financial institutions, pricing policies, and the use of credit, savings, and investment policies--and capital assistance for sector development, balance of payments support, and the development of banking institutions. These instruments are geared to promoting economic growth and to assisting in institutional development.

In a disturbing number of cases, however, rapid growth has not increased participation enough to overcome the sense of alienation of large parts of the population from the established political structure. However, as we saw in Chapter One, economic growth and development can enhance participation and broaden the base of political participation. Economic development is also the field in which the United States normally has the most entree. This means that economic instruments may be the most important ones available for achieving Title IX objectives in host countries.

To assess the use of these instruments, and to resolve some of the potential conflicts between better economic policies and wider participation we need to look at countries in terms of their development position (degree of economic "modernization"), their degree of participation and their capacity to govern. In some countries,

e.g., India, the accent on participation may be already so great that concentrated economic development efforts--whatever promotes growth most effectively--may be the most important contribution the United States can make, for growth in these cases is likely to be distributed widely and involve considerable participation. In other countries, economic programs may be meeting the requirements of the country in macro-economic terms, e.g., Brazil in stabilizing prices and supporting the modernizing sectors, but with little or no promotion of participation in any of the three senses of the word. In these cases economic instruments need to stress in their approach and implementation the broadening of participation. There may be other cases where the capacity to govern has priority over further development efforts or increased opportunities for popular participation, e.g., the Congo.

Looking at the specific instruments, we can see that programs in the various areas of specialized economic concern can be directed so as to maximize participation, sometimes in the short run and very often in the long run if this dimension is built into these instruments at an early stage.

### Economic Planning

In the small number of countries where the United States is providing substantial aid, U.S. advice on economic policy and planning is often crucial. There are a number of other countries in which U.S. advice is also sought, both on the techniques of planning and the content, though our small resource input often means that a number of

favored policy courses are foreclosed as unfeasible. That U.S. advice is sought and taken into consideration does not, of course, always mean that it is followed, since planning decisions must inevitably be political. But the fact that we are heard at the very least means that many ideas are introduced into the planning process that would otherwise have been lost and that our preferences may affect the final decisions. The planning process, into which our concerns are introduced, can thus be the arena in which Title IX considerations are first raised with a host country.

Equally important, the planning process provides an opportunity to agree on a strategy for development, with all that this implies for goals, priorities, and choice among alternative courses. Such a strategy offers an opportunity to consider the wide range of objectives that exist in the real world, to weigh explicitly the by-product effects of, for example, alternative growth policies on the subsistence sector, and to try to make an optimum choice.

It is important to recognize that planning itself has a Title IX aspect. In many countries plans for monetary and fiscal policy are made at the top and simply announced. While many of the issues involve technical economics, simply promulgation misses an opportunity to carry on a public discussion of objectives and alternative methods. Where planning concerns the expenditure of public funds and the preparation of projects, the planning process can be broadened to include meaningful participation by operating as well as planning officials and local as well as central government people. This is the way the Northeast Development Plan in Thailand is to be carried out. The planning

assistance we provide should include people who understand social sectors as well as macro-economists. By engaging local institutions in the planning process through designing projects in the locality and discussions of sector priorities the planning process will increase participation while making the plans more realistic and relevant to people's requirements.

Politicians have frequently failed to recognize the vote appeal of local participation in project design. The elaborate Red Book procedure used in Malaysia is at once good administration, sound participation, and practical politics.

#### Tax, Fiscal, and Monetary Policies

Together, tax, fiscal, and monetary policies constitute the major influence on growth. A combination of policies determines whether growth is fast or slow, and a bad mix can result in no growth at all. But if growth benefits only those who already receive a disproportionate share of the national income, continued growth is doubtful in cases where the modern sector is small and national stability and integration is subject to challenge. Hence in the underdeveloped countries, which commonly have a large traditional agriculture sector, growth policies will need to consider not only the rate of development, but also the speed with which the subsistence economy is being reduced as its members are first drawn into the market economy, either as wage earners or small proprietors, and secondly given opportunities to participate in the growing fruits of

development through investment of their savings and improvement of their skills.

Economists often argue about rates of growth that seem too high, bringing damaging inflation. The argument usually fails to take account of who is hurt by the inflation, and who by a lower rate of growth. No general rule can be adduced to answer these questions, so that they must be examined in the light of each country situation. But some experience (Vietnam) suggests that a higher rate of growth than is normally thought acceptable in light of the resulting inflation is the only way that the subsistence sector can be affected in a short time. At the same time, the urban poor seem generally to have been able to keep up with the cost of living, though not without complaining.

The foreign exchange restraint and the difficulty of adjusting exchange rates are constraints on achieving higher rates of growth in many countries. The former could be handled, if larger amounts of foreign aid were available. The latter, however, remains a creature of national political forces, although a restatement of development theory which took account of these considerations might improve the climate for more frequent devaluation or the adoption of free floating systems.

The components of monetary and fiscal policy are themselves powerful instruments, affecting both the rate of growth and the distribution of the benefits. Tax policy is perhaps the most obvious. In terms of growth, we need to be concerned about taxes for their incentive effect. For equity purposes the tax structure should not operate to prevent any groups from participating in the fruits of growth. The tax structure, however, is often subverted by administrative shortcomings

which permit the wealthy to escape the impact of an ostensibly progressive structure. It is obvious that both administrative and structural improvements are hard to make where the wealthy have high political influence. Experience shows, however, that host governments are frequently more receptive to advice on administration and that improved administration mitigates some of the worst aspects of tax inequality. As to tax policy, perhaps the best that can be done is to encourage host governments to tax the growth increments progressively to be certain that income distribution is not worsened. In some cases, a policy which encourages private savings and investment in place of taxation and public investment may have a less adverse impact on income distribution.

Unprogressive tax policies have their analog in unprogressive expenditure of the proceeds. Efforts to change expenditure patterns run into the same political problems where there are vested interests, so that improving the pattern can frequently only be done at the margin when government revenues are rising. Another compromise is to offset the regressiveness of the tax system with progressive expenditure patterns.

Analytically, tax and spending structures raise messy issues on which it is difficult to speak unequivocally unless there are more data than is commonly the case in the developing countries. Further, simple arguments which set the wealthy off against the poor or the urban dweller off against his rural cousin fail to take account of the fact that the group's membership is often shifting. Thus a policy which

benefits the urban dweller may also encourage urban migration helping those farmers who move, but not those who remain. In a growing economy, this may well be the optimum policy at least for a time. Too much attention to the progression issue may divert attention from the use of fiscal policy or from taxes and spending policies as direct incentives to those groups in society which most need to be reached and brought into the growth process.

Monetary policy is handmaiden to fiscal policy. But it also determines what sector receives the flow of private savings. As with other policy dimensions, vested interests resist change in the credit system; but A.I.D. has frequent opportunities to make its influence felt. This has sometimes misfired when, for example, it resulted in an agricultural credit bank which made money available at less than market rates but was unable to supply the total demand. The loanable funds must then be rationed and too often go to the already wealthy or to the politically favored or to those willing to pay something extra under the table. For those in the subsistence sector, pricing policy is increasingly recognized as a more powerful instrument to encourage market production and costly technological change. With sufficient profits, many farmers are induced to save or are able to pay the high rates charged by money lenders.

Removing constraints on the capital market will in many cases raise interest rates charged by institutional lenders, but at the same time it should lower the rates charged elsewhere through the impact of competition. While it is an open question in most cases

whether higher rates will increase savings where inflation makes the real return negative, a positive real rate should have a substantial effect. While such a reform is unlikely to help the subsistence farmer, it can be a major assist to the small farmer or urban dweller who is at the lower end of the income scale but still producing for sale.

Price controls are frequently used for social purposes in underdeveloped countries. Generally, experience with them has been dismal. The administrative apparatus has been incapable of enforcing them, more than sporadically. Too frequently they have benefited already favored groups, such as manufacturers dependent on imported raw materials. Even if enforced, they are of little or no benefit to those in the subsistence sector. Though ineffective, price controls are important politically in many countries. United States advice has generally gone unheeded as the case has been weak. However, where they can be shown to impede production of a major feed grain, for example, U.S. advice can make a strong case for exemption from control or increasing the control price.

#### Sector Decisions

Sectoral decisions may be made in the context of whatever overall planning is done, but in its absence, the choices will need to be illuminated by a sense of national priorities and strategies. Thus, the Third World generally needs to put a high priority on agriculture, because this is often the sector where most growth can be got for a given investment, because of the world food problem, and because it

contains the subsistence sector which needs to be reduced to develop a national political life.

Equally troublesome in somewhat more developed economies is the large number of people at the bottom of the income scale, who are monetized but whose energies must be tapped and whose sense of participation needs to expand if they are to be firmly integrated into the national life. While many of these will remain in the rural sector, where they can be reached by agricultural policies, the urban areas also contain large and growing numbers of the potentially alienated. Programs to reach them have frequently missed the point and concentrated instead on the physical aspects of urban life, a focus which dooms the proposals because of high costs and which moreover fails to solve the core problems of un- and underemployment. A high and sustained level of economic activity and the teaching of work skills should have higher priority.

Among specific instruments A.I.D. has available to affect sector decisions are sector loans. They may permit government policy makers to examine programs and policies which can achieve meaningful progress in that sector rather than be splintered into individual projects which bear little or no relation to each other. Capital loans, for sectoral or other purposes, also can provide a means to cover local currency costs and thus to provide incentives that bypass budget restrictions. However, since covering local costs under development loans relieves the recipient government of covering them from tax revenue, the tax structure should be examined in each case to see whose tax burden is therefore less, i.e., what are the social and

political effects. Sector loans or grants could also be used to reinforce decentralization where appropriate by providing direct support to local government entities.

In the industrial and agricultural sectors, higher priority should be given to employment through the use of less capital intensive investment. Subsidies could well be given to encourage investment in rural or poorer areas, although this must be handled very carefully to avoid considerable uneconomic investment. This is an area where imaginative research would be helpful. This could include an examination of criteria for making such decisions and the best means of influencing or subsidizing such decisions, e.g., special development loan terms, grant subsidies, etc., which could be added to A.I.D.'s present criteria for grant vs. loan financing and the determination of loan terms to particular countries.

WHAT ARE  
THE ADVANTAGES  
OF ACTION AS  
OPPOSED TO  
INACTION?

IF SO, WHAT  
SHOULD OR  
SHOULD NOT,  
NOT BE DONE  
FIRST?



FIRST, LET  
US REFLECT FOR  
A MOMENT ON  
THE NATIONAL  
INTEREST -



OBYIOUSLY,

A LOW  
POSTURE  
IS CALLED  
FOR.





#### IV. U.S. SUPPORT TO HOST COUNTRY VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS

##### Instruments and Rationale

Components of the private sector in underdeveloped countries have become the direct beneficiaries of American aid. Commercial activities constitute the largest part of the development-oriented private sector, and substantial attention is devoted to them in national economic policy planning and administration (See Part III). Non-commercial voluntary associations perform such a large variety of economic, social, and political functions that they deserve particular attention from the aid mission. Political parties, discussed below, are a special case among voluntary associations.

There is a growing consciousness of the role of voluntary associations in influencing the attitudes of citizens toward change, in articulating the non-commercial interests of private groups, and in bringing large segments of the hitherto inactive population into active political participation. They provide in some cases the link between locally organized participation, discussed earlier, and the national arena. In order to assist these groups in these tasks, A.I.D. missions are increasingly providing participant training and travel for leaders; offering technical advice to new or modernizing associations; and supplying funds to them directly or indirectly to support selected activities.

The assumptions underlying American support to voluntary associations may not apply with equal relevance to all countries.

receiving American aid. In order to test the relevance of proposed support to voluntary professional and special group activities, American technicians should investigate these assumptions in each case.

#### Problems of Identifying Existing Groups for Title IX Support

In most countries, some voluntary associations already exist. Their original purposes may not be to serve developmental goals at all, much less to promote increased political participation. But whenever modernizing leaders begin to rise to positions of eminence in these organizations their Title IX potential rises also. And as the organizations begin to enlarge their membership to include new elements of the population, the objectives of participation are already being served. But these assumptions need to be checked: the "modernizing" characteristics of the actual and prospective leadership of existing organizations need to be identified, along with changes in their membership characteristics.

The social role performed by existing organizations also needs to be assessed in relation to that of other organizations, new and potential. In some situations, two or three competing organizations may appeal to the same membership, and Americans may find themselves in the middle of a struggle for power if the mission "chooses up sides" prematurely. Such a situation actually developed in Vietnam when farmers' associations sponsored by the trade union confederation began to compete successfully against those sponsored by the ministry of agriculture, to which the United States had already committed its support.

The leadership of traditional voluntary associations may coincide largely with that of existing elite structures in the government itself, in which case American support might tend to confirm an exclusive role for preferred individuals and thus to discourage participation instead of fostering it. This is especially true of voluntary associations originally created as "client groups" and "information channels" of various ministries.

Support to voluntary associations is not likely to achieve much in the way of political participation if the government seems reluctant to tolerate or encourage activities outside official channels. In Taiwan prior to the activation of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, for example, farmers' associations were used by the government as a means of implementing productivity goals and augmenting the activities of the Ministry of Agriculture. And some West African countries have seen the introduction of press associations which were later subjected to severe government control as a means of indirect censorship.

#### Problems in Developing New Groups

It may become necessary to create new associations, perhaps because the existing functional equivalents are dominated by government elites or are unreceptive to changes in leadership or membership, or perhaps because there are no functional equivalents at all. Sometimes a new organization may be necessary because the old one has become a closed society: in Vietnam, for example, a fishing cooperative

established in Kamau Peninsula served as a vehicle for further exploitation by the processors of the fishermen whom the cooperative was intended to benefit. Again, in Korea, the trade union leadership is still largely selected by the government or through the government party and becomes in part a means of preventing genuine labor-stimulated trade union activity.

The establishment of new associations accomplishes little if the organization is unable to survive. In Southeast Asia, technicians have reported instances where organizations were created in order to please the American advisor, and then became moribund upon his departure. In Korea, the Asia Foundation funded various academic groups, most of which fell apart once the initial funding was exhausted because of lack of interest and sufficiently broad membership. Again, in Ethiopia three separate groups of paramedical workers were hostile to each others' activities. Any effort to organize them into a single association would have been resisted by all groups and suggestions to create such an organization were accordingly discarded.

If the institution is unable to preserve its independence, its influence may be counterproductive. In rural Korea, for example, there are numerous supposedly private citizen organizations promoted in fact by the government, but instead of increasing participation, they decrease it by creating diversionary formal structures with little functional utility.

The proposed organization ought to be conceived in local, rather than American terms. In former British colonies, lawyers may have to be organized separately as solicitors and barristers because common

membership in a lawyers' association would be incompatible. Similarly, American-supported efforts to organize teachers in former French colonies produce resistance because of differences between French and American pedagogical practice.

New groups are likely to be subjects of suspicion if they appear to be alien to local tradition or dominated by foreign purposes. In Taiwan, for example, an organization of budget specialists returning from American participant training experience was ignored because it was considered a tool of American policy. Eventually it was able to establish independent bases for sustaining its activities, but the venture required great patience on the part of Americans concerned about the impact of the original effort.

#### Relationship to Other Aid Programs

Aid support for some voluntary associations may flow naturally from the economic developmental emphasis in the host country. For example, in pursuing industrialization, the involvement of chambers of commerce, private investment development corporations, business associations (e.g., metalworking industries association) and labor unions in the various phases of industrial development may represent a valuable addition to the industrialization objective while promoting new private institutions of a wider long range significance. (It is worth noting that while some of the above have been part of A.I.D.'s industrial programs, A.I.D. almost never works with labor unions in this context, e.g., in promoting industrial safety, especially in

countries where industrialization is just beginning to be significant.) Similarly, programs in law can proceed from the need to upgrade the legal profession's ability to deal with foreign trade and investment problems, the growing legal requirements of a market economy, etc.

The advantage of this approach is that by relating to the economic development objectives of the program (for which there is presumably mutual agreement with the host country), the usefulness of such associations can be demonstrated and the sensitivity of the host government to private associations can be lessened. A second advantage is that at least one function is quickly identified toward which the group can be directed. This gives it status and meaning in the society. A third advantage is that the staff capabilities within A.I.D. for developing such organizations is likely greater than those unrelated to development (that is, there is more A.I.D. staff knowledge of the role of private commercial organizations or commercial law than of legal aid or civil liberties groups). Finally, where private associations are weak, such direct connection with the economic development process may give them relatively uncontroversial experience and prestige upon which they can later expand into social and political roles.

The disadvantages of this approach are, first, that it may inhibit A.I.D. from dealing with any organizations not economic development-related, even though analysis may suggest that other groups are important to Title IX objectives. Second, the chances of government domination may be increased if such organizations proceed

directly from government-to-government A.I.D. projects. This problem may be also aggravated if they need special government favors to organize and serve their developmental function (e.g., a private investment corporation needing to get through government regulations, etc.). Finally, such groups may appear as "selected" U.S. instruments to receive American largesse and special advantages from the aid program, creating resentment against them and the United States.

A.I.D. may also support voluntary organizations which have no relation to on-going economic programs. These may include special projects for law, academic associations, labor union organizations, etc.

**Advantages are:**

(1) Unlimited selection of target groups, i.e., they can be selected for assistance in light of Title IX objectives even when they do not relate to on-going economic development programs.

(2) They will not be tied into unnatural frameworks imposed by the first type of programs (e.g., forming academic associations which only research economic development problems, trade unions which are urged to identify with immediate government, or private, industrialization plans).

**Disadvantages are:**

(1) Increased likelihood of host country sensitivity and suspicion of U.S. motives.

(2) Follow-up A.I.D. support may be limited and thus they might be left hanging and frustrated, e.g., lawyers may be trained by A.I.D. in constitutional and civil law but be able to receive no direct A.I.D. support in their efforts to exert influence in these fields

afterwards.

(3) Skills in A.I.D. for such groups may be limited, including the availability of training programs in the United States, e.g., where A.I.D. would wish to strengthen the ability of local representatives (elected councilmen, legislators, etc.), there may be no program in the United States or elsewhere that could provide them relevant experience.

#### Training of Leaders

Should the leadership of such associations be trained in-country or in the United States, or in third countries? The normal response to assisting voluntary associations is to provide leaders with training and observation trips abroad. This may be useful if the leadership does not perceive its function very usefully, or lacks organizational ability or professional skills, or lacks prestige in the country. It can be quite counter-productive, however, in that it may give the leadership irrelevant and perhaps distorted views of its function, e.g., in a country where trade union activity is closely controlled and must pick its way carefully to avoid being stopped or taken over, six months training with the AFL-CIO in the United States may be quite irrelevant and perhaps harmful; or it may give the leadership exaggerated prestige which cuts it off from the rank and file, e.g., where student leaders are sent off for training or observation tours which detach them from the students and student concerns and make them part of the "establishment," as perhaps is being done in Indonesia today.

In-country training facilities, using indigenous trainees and designed to capitalize on local knowledge and ability, may be more effective in some cases. This would involve giving financial and perhaps technical support to such facilities. The returns, in persons reached, would likely be greater. All the problems of identification and selection apply here. Yet developing on-going and potentially growing indigenous training institutions for these associations (labor unions, legislative assistants, local councilmen, etc.) may be more valuable in strengthening their growth and viability than the one-shot or hit-and-miss training abroad of particular leaders. Obviously, balance of payments problems apply here, as with sending people to third countries. But balance of payments considerations should not be the excuse for establishing a poor training program in the United States when in-country concentration is what is needed.

Should training be functional (i.e., related to the profession) or organizational (how to recruit members, establish dues-paying systems, etc.)? Most of A.I.D. leadership training is in the former category when in many cases the latter may be more relevant. The main obstacle to private peasant organization, for example, may be organizational skills. This was certainly one of the problems of professional academic associations in Korea (habitually insolvent). Engaging in this training obviously puts A.I.D. foursquare in the position of promoting organizational activity, while professional up-grading is a more subtle approach. But where private association strengthening is the goal, the U.S. should be prepared to transfer the necessary skills.

Should A.I.D. concentrate on training existing leaders or potential future leaders? This can be answered in regard to the analysis of the role that the present leadership is playing and in regard to the time perspective of A.I.D. objectives. If the present leadership is playing, or is amenable to playing, a vigorous role in expanding public participation, then strengthening that leadership may be the most useful approach. Often, however, we accept the present leadership for training because it is there, it has Government backing, and we have no means to select others. The alternative of reaching beneath the top to train sub-leadership and potential leaders seems relevant when the basic outlook and function of the group needs to be changed, e.g., in Korea, academic associations were dominated by colonially trained and politically sanctioned professors who did not support empirical or other modern research. New younger professors needed to be trained, given support for research and eventually help in organizing new professional associations.

On the other hand, A.I.D. efforts to select potential leaders are usually hit-and-miss. When aid funds are relatively large and the number of trainees great (Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Turkey in the 1950's) or where the number of college or high school graduates is small and hence leadership more easily identifiable (the Congo), the odds for success are better. But where aid funds are limited, and the selection process wide open, the selection of potential leaders (as in our youth programs) may be simply wild shots in the dark. Concentrated efforts on specific organizations (e.g., labor unions) and on the people already in their hierarchical ladder may be the

most useful long-range approach.

What should be the nature of post-training support? Often people are trained professionally but are "dropped" afterward by A.I.D. and the United States. Obviously, direct, continuing support to individuals can be expensive, dangerous and self-defeating. On the other hand academics who never again get to share their experience with contemporaries in other countries, or peasant group leaders who have no access to P.L. 480 programs, may be ineffective in applying their training in their home countries. It may be better to encourage private professional associations in the United States to provide continuing support to these leaders after A.I.D. training ends, e.g., universities who have A.I.D. contracts should agree to maintain personnel, research and other support to host country institutions and individuals. A.I.D. should also gear some of its own programs to private group participation, e.g., involving unions in productivity and industrial safety programs, peasant unions in P.L. 480 Food-for-Work programs, veterans' organizations and civil servants' pension funds in home savings-and-loan associations, etc.

#### Types of Financial Support

What are the risks of U.S. financial support for the United States and the recipient? Obviously the United States could be criticized for giving outright financial support to special interest groups. The groups too could be criticized as U.S. "puppets." There is also the risk of involving the United States in a long-range commitment to

the organization. Some of these problems can be avoided by careful selection of the types of financial support given and by the provisions for self-help.

Self-help--how much and what kinds? One can kill an organization by asking it to contribute in money or facilities more than its members can afford. Yet planning for increasing self-sufficiency is one way to test membership interest and commitment. These can be dues-paying arrangements, matching contributions (from Government, outside foundations), contributions of time and skills (e.g., lawyers donating skills to legal aid or urban community action groups, etc.). There should be more attention to endowment practices also (as with JCRR in Taiwan) to develop independence and long-run financial stability for such organizations. One example of multiple funding and self-help is in Turkey. The Turkish Management Association, a completely private voluntary association consisting of large and small industry representatives, businessmen and entrepreneurs, was established in the early 1960's to provide management consultants and management research and training to its membership. In an effort to strengthen the Association's capacity to serve its members both the Ford Foundation and A.I.D. provided technical assistance and local currency support. The Association presently covers in excess of 60 per cent of its budgetary requirements through its members' own resources, but it was recognized that it would not be able to service its membership without some form of donor assistance through 1972. Under the phase-out plan, the United Nations Special Fund will provide one and one-half million

dollars of technical assistance in the form of management consultants through 1972, the Ford Foundation will provide annual budget support to the Association through 1972 and A.I.D. will phase out its technical assistance and local currency support in FY 1969.

Direct or indirect financing? A.I.D. support can take many different forms. Direct support to organizations can be given through endowment, subsidization of operating expenses, payment of salaries, etc. Indirect financing may be more effective and involve less commitment. Research grants, for example, can be given to promising indigenous academic associations and professional groups. Almost none of A.I.D.'s research funds are now so used. Project involvement (unions and industry associations in vocational education programs, private development associations in administering community action programs, etc.) should be stimulated with contracts given to private organizations to carry out functions now done almost exclusively with American contractors or host Government institutions. Obviously, careful selection of contractors, provisions of technical assistance, etc. will be necessary. But these are precautions, not precluding obstacles.

Finally, A.I.D. use of non-A.I.D. organizations in the United States to support these groups should be carefully evaluated. (See Chapter Five.)

#### Problems of Continuity

Aid programs relating to private associations suffer more than others from lack of continuity. Because they are often linked to an

individual's skills (one extension advisor is interested in 4-H but his successor is not, one education advisor has a feel for the use of academic associations but his successor has none), ideas come and go with the change in personnel and program emphasis. One important answer to this is careful selection and concentration. Rather than hitting at private organizations qua private organizations, the Mission should select those one, or two, or three, which are potentially important, which A.I.D. is able to assist or help gain assistance for, for which long-range planning of objectives and effects can be done, and for which continuity can be built into the program. These then should be pursued with the necessary staff and financial provisions to the exclusion if necessary of others to which the Mission could give only lip-service or transient support.

A second means of overcoming this problem is to build into every such activity the means for indigenous follow-up. If legislative assistants are to be trained in the United States over three years, a condition should be established that an indigenous training program for legislative assistants be established to which the A.I.D.-financed trainees can devote their skills afterwards.

A third approach is to emphasize the development of private U.S. support for such groups--through an institutional commitment (university to university, labor union affiliations abroad, etc.), recognition of mutual interest (exchanges between community development efforts in the United States and abroad) and private foundation support.

Political Party Promotion: A Special Case

We were asked to consider ways whereby the growth of popularly based and representative political parties might be assisted in accordance with Title IX. The assumption evidently is that A.I.D. should seek to promote consensus politics within a pluralist, constitutionally democratic framework, and that specific attention to political parties is an appropriate means to this end. A further assumption seems to be that the political experience of the United States is relevant to the situations in which the underdeveloped countries find themselves and that therefore we have something valuable to teach or to give them in this highly sensitive area.

We can accept the assumptions, but we must qualify the conclusions to take account of cases. Political parties must obviously be approached much more delicately than other voluntary associations.

We believe, for example, that the political experience of the United States is much more relevant to the developmental challenge of Latin America than it is to that facing most of the societies of Africa and Asia; and even with respect to Latin America, great caution and modesty is called for. The free and responsible play of party politics, moreover, presupposes an undergirding of national consensus, a consensus that is not yet to be found in most underdeveloped countries. This consensus is commonly expressed in the form of a complex structure of interest groups and voluntary associations, which articulate many issues on which the political party system operates. Without such a social substructure promotion of parties may prove ineffective.

As a general principle, support of one party in a competitive system might serve only to destroy it in the eyes of its national constituency. The single-party system or the one-party-dominant system may be an instrument for the building of consensus, although it need not be. What does seem to be clear is that competing political parties in national societies that are only fragilely integrated are more likely than not to be divisive agents, particularistic, factionalist, personalist. Responsible populist party politics in certain regions emerges very slowly. And it is emerging perhaps less in consequence of the activities of the parties themselves than in consequence of the working of other forces--economic and social--to which parties find it expedient as well as possible and desirable to respond.

Is it possible to approach some aspects of political parties as "technical" matters? Is it possible, that is, to provide training to party leaders and activists, irrespective of their party labels and specific programmatic thrusts, in such fields as party organization, financing, recruitment and advancement? Attempts to do this in the past, as, for example, at the San Jose, Costa Rica, school, have not been notably successful. In the first place, it is very difficult to keep the program "technical" to the exclusion of ideological and other more narrowly partisan concerns. (The San Jose School has been overtly committed to the interests of the so-called Aprista parties of Latin America.) Secondly, there is an awkward choice between opting for a neutral site for the school (with the inevitable consequence that much of the curriculum appears abstract and sterile to party activists from other countries) and locating schools in host countries for the purpose

of training host country party workers (which immediately gets the schools embroiled in domestic political rivalries.) Third, there is the difficulty of recruiting suitable persons for the carrying out of these training activities. It is a real question whether United States party workers have derived from their own experience information and lessons that can be made relevant to the situations confronting party workers in other countries; it is also questionable whether it is appropriate for U.S. nationals to teach this range of materials. Moreover, resource persons from the countries themselves are very scarce and, where they are to be found, are almost certainly committed to the fortunes of their own parties, not to facilitating the work of other, competing parties.

It need not be assumed, of course, that the responsibility for assisting the emergence of strong, responsible parties is one that falls most properly to the United States. Both the Social Democratic and the Christian Democratic parties of Western Europe are involved in programs of training and research in the developing world (cf. the work of the Ebert and Adenauer Foundations based in West Germany), and it is possible that their political experience is more relevant to that of the Third World than is our own. Moreover, their presence in the developing countries is less visible, less a cause for concern, than presumably is ours. Also, there are within the Third World some party systems that may profitably be examined by party leaders from other underdeveloped countries. For example, Mexico has evolved an effective, quite responsive and responsible party apparatus that has

been, one surmises, too little appreciated and examined by other Latin Americans. For the kinds of "technical" party matters that here concern us, Mexico probably has much to teach. It would be worth exploring whether A.I.D. could facilitate some party training of non-Mexicans in Mexico.

We reach the conclusion that direct A.I.D. involvement in matters pertaining to political parties must be approached with great caution and only after profound and comprehensive analyses of country situations. Indirect activity--i.e., support of non-governmental initiatives--in support of party development is subject to similar caveats. (Non-governmental instruments are discussed in Chapter Five.)

Both are probably limited to these situations:

1. In competitive party systems

(a) Technical advice direct from U.S. to foreign parties,

(b) Assistance from European democratic parties.

2. In single or dominant-party systems

(a) Assistance to subsidiary interest groups which promote participation,

(b) Training or visits of party leaders and staff,

e.g., to Mexico.

3. In both systems

(a) Grants to recognized leaders who are also party officials to visit the United States under State/USIS exchange programs.

A more hopeful, certainly less risky, line of approach lies in the field of civic education. For many years, for example, the Overseas

Education Fund of the League of Women Voters has been engaged in trying to help the women of Latin America acquire the skills, attitudes, and values that are appropriate to responsible and effective political behavior. The Fund's program is not in any sense partisan, although implicit in it is a set of political values that are manifestly incompatible with much actual political practice in most of the countries in which the Fund operates. Similarly, the International Development Foundation is conducting programs among peasant groups in several Latin American societies. Such programs are carried out of course with the full knowledge and consent of the host governments and are not seen by the governments as threatening. These programs are small, but their long-range implications for the political systems are profound. One may properly ask whether their scope could be significantly expanded without arousing fears and suspicions on the parts of the government and other elite elements.

**V. TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVITY**

At the core of Title IX, as conceived by its Congressional sponsors and as understood by many A.I.D. personnel in Washington and the field, is a deep concern for the quality of human life in the developing countries. While the thrust of the Title is downward, toward the grassroots, it can be, and probably should be interpreted as well in the other direction, toward the transcending of parochial nationalisms and confining state boundaries. It is true that A.I.D. programs take as their targets individual states; what is urged here is that A.I.D., without sacrifice of country programs, devote research attention and perhaps some resources of other kinds to transnational prospects and possibilities.

We make this recommendation because it is distressingly evident that many of today's nation-states are simply too small, too poor, and too poorly endowed to meet the social and economic requirements their populations are placing upon them--their prospects for substantial development as independent entities are at best very dim. Moreover, during the years ahead additional states will be seen to lack sufficient capacity as emerging demands reveal traditional forms of political, economic, and social--and international--organization as increasingly inadequate. It would seem prudent to begin now to prepare for an international dispensation that transcends conventional notions of state autonomy and sovereignty in the political as well as the economic and cultural spheres.

In the economic and cultural spheres state frontiers are being breached today in ways inconceivable a few years ago. We see not only

the classic dependence of states upon world market forces over which they have no control; we see also the rise of the international corporation whose allegiance and responsibility are owed to no single state. We see the pervasive influence over much of the Third World of the mass media of the United States. We see the international movement of persons, for employment, for education, for recreation, on a vast scale. We see the spread of international ideologies, no respecters of boundaries. The sovereign state remains, however, as the ultimate community with which a man can legitimately identify himself, while the ostensible grounds for that legitimate identification are being rapidly eroded.

In addition to relevant research (e.g., imaginative exploration of the possibilities for the mini-states of the Caribbean, a matter that is already being intensively explored in the United States under private auspices), A.I.D. might consider promoting the development of transnational parties, embracing a number of states within a geographic region--for, as we are discovering, some movement toward political integration must accompany advances toward economic integration if the latter is to succeed. A.I.D.--or another agency of the United States government--might try to help give substantive significance to various regional interparliamentary unions. A.I.D. could do more to promote regional professional associations. It could assist chapters of the Society for International Development in the underdeveloped countries.

We do not suggest that these possibilities should occupy a high priority among A.I.D.'s many concerns. It is suggested only that,

in the absence of increased efforts to crack through the shell of state sovereignty at the political level, many of A.I.D.'s laudable single-country efforts are likely foredoomed.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### IMPLEMENTING TITLE IX: NON-A.I.D. INSTRUMENTS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE

Although Title IX is an instruction to A.I.D., the agency cannot be expected to implement it alone. A.I.D.'s efforts have to be meshed with those of other elements of the U.S. Government, if not to ensure full compatibility of purpose and program in Title IX terms, then at least to minimize incompatibilities.

Moreover, the United States is a society which prides itself on the diversity and strength of its private institutions and activities. Indeed it is this feature, above almost all others, that in our national self-evaluation accounts for our success. And Title IX as a conscious policy thrust stems from the belief that the pluralism we enjoy at home will prove helpful to the developing societies of the world. It is natural, therefore, that the United States private sector, in its many overseas manifestations, should be fully and constructively involved in pursuit of Title IX objectives.

Operationally, the very pluralism we prize raises difficult problems of planning and coordination. Not only is there a plethora of non-A.I.D. official agencies and private groups already engaged abroad in activities of Title IX relevance, but these agencies and groups are often enough working for different purposes and with disparate strategies. The prospects for significant direction or coordination of--or, in many instances, even positive influence upon--

such multiple activities are not bright.

These difficulties should be recognized, but not allowed to overwhelm us. In the first place, it is probably correct to assume that the general programs of most U.S. agencies overseas, whether public or private, are consistent with Title IX purposes or at least are not jarringly inconsonant with them. Second, coordination and direction are not always desirable. Some non-governmental organizations, among them some with great potential for Title IX, depend for their effectiveness abroad upon maximum independence from the U.S. Government. Finally, "coordination and direction" imply concerted activity in pursuit of understood and agreed-upon goals. Can it be said that the state of our knowledge and the extent of our agreement about the nature of socio-political change are such that we could, even if it were otherwise feasible, move forcefully and confidently to ensure coherence among the activities of the many non-A.I.D. agencies that are working in ways relevant to Title IX? Flexibility, innovative capacity, acceptance of the lessons of experience, multiple initiatives: these are called for.

Two broad categories of agencies concern us in this chapter:

(1) U.S. Government resources, including the special case of multi-lateral agencies, and (2) Private sector resources. With respect to each of these we have tried to indicate not only constructive possibilities but also actual or potential problems.

**Part I: Government Agencies**

Agencies of the U.S. Government other than A.I.D. must be utilized in Title IX implementation for at least three reasons. First, they dispose of substantial resources for application abroad which can supplement and reinforce those available to A.I.D. Second, some agencies enjoy special, if not exclusive, access to counterpart groups within foreign societies. Finally, if they operate abroad independently of Title IX policies, these U.S. official agencies will undoubtedly be producing unintended political effects in the host countries, in the same way that A.I.D. economic development programs have in the past. If their operations are contrary to Title IX principles, they can obviously cancel out what A.I.D. is trying to accomplish.

What are these agencies? First and foremost is the State Department. Given State's predominant role both in Washington and in the field, it is clear that only close and willing cooperation between State and A.I.D. can make possible the implementation of Title IX. If State's attitude toward Title IX goals is hostile, or even just indifferent, prospects are dim. (In Chapter Seven, Part I, we discuss organizational changes that would lead to closer coordination between the two agencies.) The same is true, in lesser degree, of the other major agencies that operate abroad.

The activities of the other foreign affairs agencies abroad should be advised of the purposes of Title IX. Basic to the formulation of Title IX programs in any particular country is a thorough understanding of that country. Within the U.S. Government, the

gathering and interpretation of knowledge essential to such understanding is primarily the task of the U.S. intelligence agencies, principally State, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. The information-gathering process needs to be geared to Title IX goals.

In a second category of official agencies potentially concerned with Title IX are those which carry on continuing programs overseas. Among them are the Peace Corps, the U.S. Information Agency and the Department of Defense. All have personnel in frequent contact with foreign government officials and with private citizens. The Peace Corps and D.O.D. are specifically charged with advising and aiding foreign nationals in their respective fields. Particularly the Peace Corps, through the pervasiveness of its activities and their relevance to the creation of institutions of popular participation, can have powerful impact. U.S. military officers can also have significant influence through the attitudes they reflect in dealing with counterparts who are members of key power groups in their own societies. U.S.I.A. distributes information through various media and makes cultural presentations on the United States. Each of these agencies can help or hinder the Title IX effort by the compatibility or incompatibility of their programs.

Lastly, there is a much larger group of official agencies which is less deeply involved and on a more selective basis. These include the departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Health-Education-Welfare, and Housing-Urban Affairs, as well as the Library of Congress and the

Treasury Department. They may or may not be permanently represented abroad; in any case, they have regular or intermittent contacts with foreign counterparts, provide technicians to work with A.I.D. or in other overseas programs and, generally, have assets of expertise to contribute to development. In due course, the Office of Economic Opportunity and related domestic agencies may be adding to and drawing upon our overseas capabilities and experience.

Non-federal units of government, or quasi-official organizations attached to them, have long maintained counterpart relationships abroad. They include the People-to-People Program established more than a decade ago, the Partners of the Alliance (in Latin America) and various sister city and even school-to-school projects. The force and nature of their impact needs to be investigated in relation to Title IX. Coordination with them is probably unnecessary, but exchange of information with U.S. missions is desirable as a way of minimizing conflicts or duplication and of revealing possible areas for more deliberate and fruitful cooperation.

#### Department of Defense

The Department of Defense is a major element in most country missions. The military assistance program, U.S. participation in regional security organizations and the D.O.D. research program--all should be implemented in such a manner as to support Title IX goals, or at the very least, avoid conflicting with such goals.

The following are some of the activities and goals which are

or could be pursued by D.O.D. in support of Title IX objectives:

Civic action projects by foreign military organizations which not only build physical infrastructure and improve the military's popular image, but also increase popular participation, strengthen local institutions, open up isolated rural areas, increase local manpower skills and reduce unemployment.

Literacy and vocational training programs for conscripts, helping to modernize a significant population group.

Promoting among foreign military leadership the idea that security is dependent upon economic, social, and political, as well as military, modernization, with all that these imply in terms of civic rights and freedoms.

Promotion among military leaders, especially in those countries where they play a dominant or significant role in government policy, of the management techniques required adequately to relate military factors to other fields of activity.

Creation or strengthening, in the implementation of social science research programs, of indigenous research capabilities.

#### U.S. Information Agency

The U.S.I.A., with American and local personnel at 106 embassies throughout the world, now supports Title IX policy, although its mode of doing so--through portraying the U.S. as a model presumably to be emulated--is not for all audiences the most persuasive one conceivable.

Several types of U.S.I.A. activities and resources could directly support Title IX objectives. The educational exchange program, which is administered by U.S.I.S. in the field for the Department of State, is one of the most important means to assist in developing democratically-oriented future leadership. The U.S.I.S.

cultural presentation program overseas could also more directly support Title IX themes. The main obstacle will undoubtedly be the costs involved in shifting from largely elite to mass audiences.

In presenting current news regarding the U.S. and other countries through all media, the U.S.I.A. should use those "pegs" to impart Title IX values--popular participation, institutional development and distributive justice.

Thus, in addition to being a publicist of change, U.S.I.A. should more fully become an agent of change. This could take the form of assisting foreign countries in the improvement of popular communications. Working with A.I.D. and possibly private commercial or educational organizations, U.S.I.A. could provide media expertise and management direction to improve public and private channels of communication between the country's leadership and the people. In such operations, the idea of communication upward should be stressed.

#### The Peace Corps

The central idea and the manner in which the Peace Corps conducts its work can be directly supportive of Title IX participatory objectives and institutions. Peace Corps activities which are particularly important in support of Title IX goals include the following areas:

Peace Corps projects designed deliberately to support local institutions so that those organizations may be strengthened.

PCV training in the techniques of community development and institution building, as well as in effective techniques of cross-cultural communication.

Following their PC service, former PCV's may be good recruits for A.I.D. Title IX activities. Also, former PCV's can be effective hosts for visiting foreigners under participant training, educational exchange or leadership grants coming from countries where those volunteers have served.

### Multilateral Organizations

Multilateral official organizations that receive support from the U.S. Government are a special case. The prospect of using such organizations for Title IX programs does not seem bright at this time--although we believe it important to stimulate discussion of Title IX goals in international settings.

Concern for self-help in strictly economic assistance programs has grown among multilateral organizations, but none of them has shown great interest in extending its operations to Title IX purposes. In part, at least, this is because organizations dependent on a number of governments must be particularly careful not to risk offending any of their supporters. They cannot take many chances.

We would not propose to ask multilateral official agencies to promote popular participation in the Third World, for practical reasons. One other reason is that the United States' own ability to continue foreign assistance would be impaired if it were to put into international channels the most attractive activities and keep on a bilateral basis only the least popular, most directly self-serving programs. In the longer run, however, the promotion of

popular participation could become a broader international goal.

International discussion of Title IX goals, on the other hand, would have immediate value. If people in other countries take up the theme of popular participation as part of a broadened view of the nature of development, then the ideas embodied in Title IX are less likely to appear to emanate from the United States and its government. Other nations would then be less suspicious of Title IX, and the chances of its implementation would be correspondingly increased. To that end, we believe agencies of the U.S. Government should take every opportunity to inject Title IX themes into international dialogues. The effort should not be restricted to official multilateral agencies. Foreign chapters of the Society for International Development, for example, provide opportunities for such dialogues.

## Part II. Non-Governmental Resources

### Types of Organizations

A.I.D. has a long history of using non-governmental organizations (NGO's) and private resource persons overseas. Most of these organizations and persons have been engaged, of course, for quite specific assignments, some of them highly relevant to Title IX.

But the U.S. private presence abroad includes many more resources of actual or potential Title IX pertinence than those under the direct control of A.I.D. The challenging question, to which we cannot pretend to have found an answer, is how most effectively to enlist the cooperation and assistance of these additional resources in pursuit of Title IX purposes. Other questions are, how can A.I.D. keep itself adequately informed of the activities of the multitude of private sector organizations and enterprises abroad in order to profit from their experience? How can A.I.D. facilitate the flow among those agencies themselves of Title IX-relevant information? The problems posed by the latter two questions are much less severe than those posed by the first, and steps have already been taken by A.I.D., in the Title IX office and elsewhere, to try to meet them.

Most private sector U.S. activities of Title IX concern in the Third World are not going to be carried out under the oversight or in the hire of A.I.D. Even if A.I.D. were in a position to offer private sector organizations major support, many of them would be reluctant

to accept it. Working with the government is not easy. Accumulated restrictions, requirements, and uncertainties in the foreign aid legislation and regulations discourage some private organizations from becoming involved in any way. Others hesitate to do so because of differences with official foreign policy. And the U.S. private business sector abroad, while it may be susceptible to suasion by A.I.D. in support of Title IX goals, seldom would feel itself under any major constraint to respond to A.I.D.'s suggestions. Finally, purely private endeavors overseas should be encouraged, and care has to be exercised not to "take them over" and destroy their distinctive character.

Accepting that it is unlikely, and in some ways undesirable, to secure significantly greater coordinative power over the activities of the private sector, A.I.D. will still find it useful to explore that sector's possible contribution to Title IX implementation. The non-governmental activities that are of interest to A.I.D. are carried out under four kinds of U.S. auspices: (1) U.S. commercial, manufacturing, and other business enterprises; (2) U.S. universities and research institutions; (3) foundations; and (4) philanthropic and religious organizations.

Business Enterprises. In pursuit of Title IX objectives, it is appropriate to encourage U.S. private business enterprises abroad to:

Seek ways whereby employees can be brought to feel they have a significant stake in the enterprise;

Encourage management to devote more of its attention and talents to the solution of community problems.

U.S. businesses are in a good position to encourage and assist in the development of local small businesses, some of which could serve as sources of supply (Sears in Latin America carries out such a policy). The availability of risk capital is frequently the missing ingredient in the creation of small business and in some countries U.S. business can help finance the establishment of small business investment companies (cf. the experience of CREOLE in Venezuela).

In the field of technical assistance, A.I.D. should continue and expand the use of incentive grants to provide partial funding for private technical assistance programs. The potentials of this "piggy-backing" grant (or contract) to support private technical assistance can be useful in building up the institutional structures inevitably associated with major private investment projects. The objective of strengthening the private institutional fabric of a society is better served by such private-sector-to-private-sector arrangements than through the conventional government-to-government pipeline.

An example of what can be done is provided by the International Executive Service Corps. This organization, established by U.S. business with A.I.D.'s help, is providing business know-how to developing countries by drawing on a roster of 4,000 U.S. business volunteers. Some 400 projects in 38 countries have been completed in its first three years. Similarly, Volunteers for International Technical Assistance (VITA), Inc. draws on the contributed talents of 4,500 specialists from 800 corporations and 200 universities in

technical problem-solving through a person-to-person mail inquiry and counseling service. A.I.D. should ensure that these volunteers are aware of Title IX considerations in the conduct of their work.

Recently there has been an increase in the involvement of businesses in urban and related problems in the U.S., either through government contracts, enlightened self-interest or a public service desire. A.I.D. should investigate such programs for applicability to similar problems in the Third World and then should attempt to apply some of the pertinent experience using this business talent.

A.I.D. through the Private Resources Development Service should provide information and suggestions to U.S. businesses on how operations overseas could assist in the pursuit of Title IX goals. Examples of U.S. organizations which might be used for the purpose are the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Council for Latin America, Partners for the Alliance, and the American Institute for Free Labor Development.

In addition to the opportunities for constructive use of U.S. business organizations in pursuit of non-profit purposes abroad, there exists the problem of how U.S. business conducts itself in its activities for profit. In part, it is more historical and symbolic than actual, for many U.S. investors and traders have adopted highly enlightened practices of ownership, management and labor-social relations overseas. Nevertheless, the U.S. should do all possible to ensure that U.S. business subsidiaries and affiliates conduct their business activities so as to support the goals of Title IX. The subject should

be discussed in general terms with main offices in the U.S., but the main effort must be made in each country, using the special entree that exists for Ambassadors and Commercial Attaches usually via a local chapter of the American Chamber of Commerce.

Some firms, however, are growing beyond the exclusive influence of the U.S. Government. Examples multiply of firms which, though of U.S. origin and perhaps dominant ownership, are in fact internationalized in respect to large shares of their stock holdings, management, personnel and operations. These firms may be beyond the influence or decisive control of the U.S., or any other of the firms' parent Governments, on critical issues of financial gain. Control then rests largely with the nation in which investments or operations are located, the governments of which are seldom in strong positions to act forcefully. Their common presupposition is that the U.S. Government will side with the foreign firm in traditional protective action.

In the new circumstances which surround such cases, the U.S. Government needs to study the problems of its relationship to the interests and conduct abroad of wholly or partly-owned U.S. firms. The subject goes far beyond the concerns of A.I.D. alone and should have the attention of the State and Commerce Departments.

Universities and Research Institutions. The training and research functions of American university personnel working abroad are well appreciated by A.I.D., which over the years has contracted with a number of them for these purposes (as has State through Fulbright and other exchange programs). Universities offer special advantages as instruments of Title IX. Their personnel are better

equipped than others for the kind of basic, social science research required if the host-country and A.I.D. are to plan constructively for Title IX. They can incorporate into their teaching materials concepts, methodological instruction, and information of Title IX usefulness. Most important, they are in effective working touch with students, who in most developing countries almost by definition will assume leadership roles. This is a group to which, as we are aware, direct U.S. Government access is not easily achieved.

It is an elementary counsel of prudence that if A.I.D. is concerned to see American university personnel perform most effectively in pursuit of Title IX objectives, it should recruit that personnel carefully and then should dissociate itself as completely as possible from the professors it has engaged (or at least should permit the professors to dissociate themselves). Allowing the foreign university to contract with professors directly would help ensure such a separation from the U.S. Government.

The main argument for dissociation of professors is to increase their credibility with students. Students do not like to be manipulated, and in the Third World least of all do they relish being manipulated by anyone they take to be an agent of the United States Government. Correspondingly, many capable American social scientists are reluctant to work abroad if they are made to feel that they would be "instruments" in the implementation of a "country program."

In recent years A.I.D. has assisted in the broadening of university curricula in the developing countries through promoting "general studies" courses and the like. It might be well for A.I.D.,

in consultation with scholars in the United States and host-countries, to consider how best also to introduce relevant social science skills into the curricula of professional faculties and schools. In Latin American countries, for instance, where university graduates constitute a restricted elite, political leadership is recruited from the ranks of lawyers, doctors, and engineers of classical training, few of whom have received more than a smattering of systematic social science instruction. They are consequently less well prepared to confront and deal with the socio-political problems of their countries.

Foundations. It is regrettable that the great U.S. foundations (Ford, Rockefeller) are reducing their involvement in the Third World (in deference to the ever-more-evident demands of our domestic problems) at a time when U.S. governmental support of foreign assistance is in decline. With their impressive financial resources and their relative freedom from the constraints upon U.S. government agencies, they are in a position to promote Title IX activities in significant ways.

Communication channels between these two giants and A.I.D./ Washington are open and informal. All that can be urged is that those channels be employed for more frequent consultation in respect of Title IX, in the interests of informal cooperation and coordination, exchange of experience and information, and innovative program possibilities.

The substantial number of smaller, special-interest foundations that work abroad needs to be examined by A.I.D. for the relevance of their experience to Title IX. Some of these foundations are

specifically oriented toward Title IX objectives (e.g., the Pan American Development Foundation, the International Development Foundation) and are already well known to A.I.D., indeed receiving Agency support. But the operations of others are scarcely known. One suspects that many of these foundations are little more than significant sums of money looking for significant purposes. Title IX activity, which might be suggested by A.I.D., could provide that purpose.

Philanthropic and Religious Organizations. The list of philanthropic organizations that direct their activities overseas is long. Most of them are single-purpose, targeted on a specific group or problem. Some of them are large (e.g., Foster Parents), others operate small budgets. They should be encouraged to respond to the broader challenges of the environments within which they work. A.I.D. missions in the field might want to explore with organization field directors what could be done by them; and A.I.D./Washington may wish to increase its communication with their home offices. The Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid Agencies has not till now proved a particularly effective vehicle.

A number of these organizations are directly involved in Title IX work, many of them backed by religious denominations. The American Friends Service Committee, the Brethren Service Committee, the Unitarian Service Committee and a number of others, Protestant and Catholic, lay and clerical, are among them. In the abstract it is in A.I.D.'s interest to cooperate with--and, to the extent possible, support--the work of these agencies. Since they are "service" organizations, overhead costs are usually very low. Their personnel

are usually committed, prepared to endure hardship and energetic--for they are staffed by what is in large part self-recruitment. Most important, in field situations they are in daily and significant touch with precisely those elements of host-country populations with which U.S. mission personnel least frequently come in contact: the urban poor, the peasants, the forgotten of the earth.

In operational terms, however, problems often arise. The philanthropic or religiously motivated worker may want to avoid a close relationship with the U.S. government both because he fears for the loss of his independence, and consequent loss of effective access to those groups with which he is working, and because he may be in disagreement with the role the United States is playing in the host-country and the world. The U.S. Government officer, on the other hand, may find fault with the other man's professional training, narrow identification with a single element in the society, lack of appreciation of the complexity of issues and power structures, and laxness in setting up performance criteria. There is also the danger of A.I.D. identification with specific missionary goals.

Title IX may serve to lower the communications barrier between these two groups. Performance criteria for Title IX activities, for instance, must be substantially different from those for other operations: time spans of evaluation must be lengthened, "hard" results cannot be expected. Title IX demands that attention be paid to the man, the person, to his welfare and dignity, wherever in the society he may be found. A.I.D. activities of course will continue to be oriented toward nation-wide development, but the Title IX

injunction recalls us to an awareness that underlying all our statistics there are whole persons whose wholeness we are not to lose sight of.

The religiously or philanthropically motivated worker, in his usual manifestation, sees very little but whole persons, and therefrom stems his frequent inability to view problems and priorities as government officers are obliged to do. In the light of Title IX the nature of what this kind of person is trying to accomplish may be more fully appreciated.

This brief consideration of the Title IX role of the religiously-motivated worker leads to a related set of matters having to do with religion and the churches.

Throughout the Third World religion remains a vital force, significantly informing man's values and behavior. Its importance as a facilitating agent or as a hindrance to the kinds of participation called for by Title IX should not be minimized. The questions to be raised here are two: Can the process of social, cultural, and psychological dislocation associated with modernization be made less painful by providing ways whereby men may understand and interpret this process in terms of their established religious beliefs? If so, is there a role here for United States churchmen?

The first question is one for intensive research of the kind that has been pursued by Robert N. Bellah, Clifford Geertz, and others, although enough is known to permit the conclusion that most established religions can provide a framework of belief within which rapid change can be accepted. Islam and Buddhism, for example, are capable, upon interpretation, of accommodating rapid, planned change.

And Christianity with its strong emphasis upon process and God-in-history is readily interpreted as change-oriented, as the pronouncements of John XXIII show.

The second question must receive a guarded answer. Traditionally most U.S. churchmen overseas have been missionaries primarily committed to inculcation of Christian belief; and in much of the world the legacy of the missionaries makes cooperation difficult today between Christians and non-Christians or between Protestants and Catholics. But the ecumenical spirit is spreading rapidly among present-day United States churchmen, along with an increasing preoccupation with problems of social and cultural change derived from a reassessment of the nature of Christian responsibility. By inclination more and more of them are advocates of initiatives fully consonant with Title IX, and they are establishing effective working relationships with their host-country counterparts, particularly in predominantly Roman Catholic countries. The churchmen therefore are a significant resource for Title IX purposes.

It is difficult, however, to coordinate the efforts of the churchmen with those of the United States Government, in part because of the churchman's conception of his proper role in the world, in part because many churchmen, including some of those most active and influential in international matters, are bitterly opposed to United States foreign policy. What is required, if the human and other resources of the churchmen are to be used most effectively in Title IX ways, is systematic effort to open good channels of communication

between the United States Government and the churches, both in Washington and in the field. Major first steps in this direction have already been taken by the Latin American bureau.

If the churchmen can be assured of compatibility of purpose between their activities and those of the United States Government, if some mechanism for coordination of efforts can be devised, and if the churchmen can be held to suitable performance criteria, then it would seem appropriate to provide churches and church-related groups with direct financial and technical support for specific endeavors.

#### Some Special Problems

Private Organizations in Non-Concentration Countries. In that significant group of nations in which the U.S. presence is slight, A.I.D. programs will probably have only a minimal impact on socio-political modernization. What the U.S. Government cannot do directly in such a country can perhaps be accomplished--in part at least--by the NGO's. Private organizations, whether business or philanthropic, operate in countries for reasons often quite different from those of the U.S. Government. It might be, therefore, that for humanitarian, cultural, or professional reasons NGO's would maintain active operations in countries where the U.S. Government does not have a major presence.

Here enlightened Title IX policy would see the U.S. encourage and assist the NGO's to operate meaningful programs of pluralistic democratic development. How can A.I.D. help the NGO's under such circumstances? The answer would depend, of course, on the nature of

the country and the attitude of its government. In countries ripe for pluralistic development but where political animosities block greater direct U.S. participation (e.g., Arab states), the U.S. might make available to NGO's information on opportunities for their activities. It could assist monetarily by way of a grant or transportation subsidies if commodities are involved. In politically cool areas, A.I.D. should consider encouraging the use of third country NGO's which might be more immediately acceptable politically and yet would still achieve Title IX purposes. Perhaps A.I.D. financing could be made available through the medium of a world-wide contract or grant, making U.S. involvement appear minimal. Multilateral support for U.S. or third country NGO's might also be a workable method. In countries where the U.S. presence is limited due to the lack of economic potential or the minimum nature of U.S. interests (e.g., most of Africa) the U.S. could benefit from NGO operations, and could in turn assist the NGO's by working with the host-government to ease their entry, providing information on local opportunities and in general using its good offices. In this way the NGO could become an American-sponsored and locally-recognized substitute for a U.S. public foreign aid program and could help directly in advancing Title IX goals.

Funding. Of considerable significance to the way in which the U.S. can use NGO's in advancing Title IX activities is the method whereby they are financed. When financed directly by A.I.D. contract, the NGO's activities are locally viewed as a U.S. Government program.

If, however, the circumstances are such that the complete control of the NGO's activities offered by the contract is of less significance than the appearance of less U.S. official involvement in the NGO's in-country activities, a grant may be more appropriate. Under this mechanism the funding for generally agreed-upon purposes is given to the NGO in advance. The NGO is then usually free to begin operations after direct NGO-host country agreement, where necessary, and can operate with greater flexibility. Another significant question is that of administrative procedures and oversight. To the extent that the formalities involved in fiscal accounting and end-use audits normal for A.I.D. contract administration can be eased and made more flexible (which can be done without excessive loss of program control), the NGO's will be more ready to participate in U.S.-supported programs.

This is a factor which both A.I.D. and the relevant Congressional committees must consider, for much of A.I.D. detailed accounting procedures have resulted from Congressional criticism of alleged loose fiscal accounting to A.I.D. contractors. If the grant device is to prove its effectiveness, it should be accompanied by a reasonable understanding by A.I.D., the Congress and the NGO's as to what is proper fiscal procedure combining optimum amounts of flexibility with the basic minimum of accountability.

Closely related to the question of NGO funding is that posed by the so-called "CIA orphans." It is certainly in the interests of the U.S. that the very desirable work of some of these organizations continue. Much of their work is directly related to the purposes of

Title IX. A.I.D. could through grant financing continue the work of many of these organizations directly involved with Title IX whenever (and this is true in many cases) the direct U.S. funding relationship would not embarrass or be repugnant to the host government. In those cases where direct funding is inexpedient, A.I.D. could encourage private foundation funding.

Another type of funding for NGO activities involves direct profit-making ventures. Both private capital investments and A.I.D.-financed capital development projects can have valuable Title IX side effects. Private or public capital projects can be planned in such ways that their completion will leave behind significant contributions to local social infrastructure. Road building or power project camp sites could be turned into technical schools. Enterprises can be designed to promote local government as well as trade unions. Maximum use of local entrepreneurs in such projects could result in new business groupings and a new impetus for social pluralization. Such projects could be fashioned to increase not only technical skills, but also the socio-political skills sought by Title IX. This so-called "piggy-back" use of capital projects for Title IX purposes must not be overlooked.

Phase Out. The problem of when and how NGO activity should be curtailed or terminated must also be considered. It can be hypothesized that NGO termination could occur under two different sets of circumstances. The first and more desirable situation is where the local country activity fostered by the American NGO has reached that stage

of fruition where it can and should proceed alone. Certainly a continuing consultative relationship is not bad, but it must contribute to the self-sustaining nature of the local NGO. It is most unlikely that there would be any U.S. Government involvement at this stage, but if such should be required, it would probably consist of gentle and helpful counsel for the displaced NGO.

A more troublesome scenario is where a change in government or some local indiscretion has resulted in a public or private climate inhospitable to the continued activity of an NGO. The last decade has seen this situation develop all too often (e.g., Sukarno's Indonesia, Cambodia, Cuba). Under such circumstances the role of the U.S. Mission is to assist the NGO to maintain its place where for Title IX or for other purposes this is considered to be in the U.S. interests. If the disfavor incurred by the NGO is the result of its own indiscretions, however, the U.S. Mission should urge it to put its house in order, as rapidly as possible and if it does, intercede with the host-government on its behalf. If it refuses, the U.S. would have little alternative to letting it be displaced despite whatever support its constituents might marshal for it in the U.S.

A variation of this same problem might occur when upon a change of local regime the NGO becomes increasingly persona grata but the new regime turns away from Title IX objectives toward a more authoritarian, non-participatory society. Here the U.S. would have to make a judgment as to whether the continued presence of the NGO would tend to advance meaningful Title IX or humanitarian goals. If not, it might then be

proper for the U.S. to encourage the NGO's departure by whatever means might be both available and suitable. But the U.S. might also choose to disassociate itself from the regime by withdrawing or sharply curtailing its presence, including aid, but might seek to maintain NGO activities as a connection with the national Title IX allies who some day might change the country's direction.

## CHAPTER SIX

### ASSESSING TITLE IX PROGRAMS

#### Why We Need Indicators

If Title IX is to be vigorously pursued by A.I.D., in the same sense that economic development is rigorously pursued--a long run, year-in, year-out concern of every Mission--then we need a factual base and a theoretical base relating to socio-political change, of the sort that we know is indispensable in contriving programs for economic development. Without this factual and theoretical base one may very well do more harm than good, or, in acting blindly, spoil the chances for Title IX success at a later point when we know more. We need Title IX data series and sharpened Title IX concepts and theoretical insights.\*

However, a set of all-purpose, all-country indicators of Title IX conditions and change may be impossible to contrive because we are dealing with such a large group of countries (which, because of their heterogeneity, defy neat inter-country contrasts) and because there are so few established theoretical insights into sequential change of societies and polities. Nor are all assessment indicators to be regarded as of equal importance in all countries. We do not have in our conceptual armory a typology of underdeveloped nations which would enable us to specify which Title IX indicators are most important

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\*In Chapter Seven, Part II, we discuss the research needs of Title IX.

in which type of nation. The creation of such an analytical typology should be a matter for Title IX research.

Title IX indicators serve two purposes: initial diagnosis of the Title IX condition of a country so as to help decide whether Title IX programs should be pursued in that country and, within a country, to identify priority areas for program and project selection; and assessment of the results of such specific A.I.D. programs, once initiated, as well as changes in the overall Title IX condition of a country, whether or not these changes are related to A.I.D. activities. Both diagnosis and assessment require a mixed bag of indicators and guideline criteria--qualitative and quantitative, rural and urban, macro and micro, economic, social and political. We need organized data series in order to choose projects and then assess their consequences. Inevitably (as in economic development), we need not one but a set of indicators, a composite or "profile." No single number or data series is sufficient.

There are both macro and micro dimensions to Title IX implementation and therefore to assessment indicators. Title IX objectives are fulfilled by increased national participation as well as by the sorts of increased micro-participation emphasized in the Title IX legislation and documents.

In broad terms, national participation is furthered by a decrease in dualism; when more people within the nation speak the same language; when more regions have access to roads, electricity, newspapers, and governmental services (education, health, courts, agricultural

extension); when regional, rural-urban, and ethnic group differences in income diminish; when all regions and ethnic (or other) groupings can effectively register their national political preferences and determine or meaningfully influence central government personnel, and policy. Responsiveness of central government to regional and ethnic group preferences is a macro question.

Increased national participation means (1) increased mutual dependence (economically, politically, and culturally) among sub-groups within the nation; (2) an increased flow of material and cultural transactions among local groups and between local and central groups; (3) enlarged mutual identification with persons, institutions, symbols, and values external to the local community.

For Title IX purposes, then, we need one set of indicators of the extent of national participation which tell us the scope and variety of the participation of regional and local groups in the economic and socio-political life of the nation.

We mean by micro-development an increase in the extent of participation in modernizing local organizations: political institutions, such as local parties and local government; economic institutions, such as cooperatives, trade unions, and community development and other extension agencies; voluntary associations of a social or cultural sort. So we need a second set of indicators which tell us the extent and variety of individual participation in grass-roots organizations.

A third set of indicators would attempt to portray the depth and variety of social, political, and economic malaise (conflict,

instability). The point here is to identify acute problem areas (analogous, perhaps, to balance of payments problems) to which Title IX programs might be addressed. These indicators almost certainly would have to be qualitative, although quantitative information such as the frequency of strikes, group violence, or hostile political demonstrations would be relevant. We would also want some qualitative assessment of the extent of institutionalized repression, that is, the extent to which malaise is not allowed to be expressed overtly.

Finally, Title IX indicators could serve as shorthand expressions of desirable goals in the dialogue with host country governments. These indicators can be thought of as equivalents to "growth in GNP," and "a healthy balance of payments surplus," to indicate progressive changes of sorts worth pursuing by deliberate efforts, just as economic growth is worth pursuing.

It is useful to compile statistics on facilities which may be regarded as preconditions and instruments for increasing participation, such as the number of newspapers, the frequency of elections in a stated time period, miles of improved highway, literacy and education, and land tenure patterns. Such statistics should be supplemented by qualitative analysis of their relevance for participation.

The kind of qualitative information required is suggested by the following "impressionistic" questions, which we discussed at length in chapter three in considering whether Title IX programs are feasible in a given country:

Is the regime notoriously repressive or corrupt?

In the foreseeable future, is the regime interested in promoting participation to the maximum extent consistent with local conditions and is it interested in establishing the institutional framework needed for effective participation?

Is the regime, with assistance, capable of following through on its interest in promoting participation and establishing the needed institutional framework?

#### The Indicators

We have listed below some significant indicators that might be used to evaluate progress toward Title IX objectives in a country. These indicators fall into two categories. One category deals with national participation and integration, and overall socio-political structure. These give a picture of the preconditions for effective participation in decision-making and in carrying out development activities. The second category deals with participation in the benefits of economic activity.

These are macro-indicators. They deal with entire countries. In some cases, differences and fissions within a country will make countrywide answers impossible. In these cases, it will be appropriate to apply them to specific regions and sectors and communities within the country. These same indicators can be adapted for the analysis of micro-participation at the local level.

These indicators may be used both to show an existing situation

and to show change.

Qualitative appraisal of performance is also necessary since increases in each indicator do not necessarily show improvement in the amount or quality of participation, or the basis for participation, or in development. For example, there may be cooperative or savings and loan societies for individuals who do not have the experience or training, the trust in each other, or the view of the future needed to make the society function well. If that is the case, the society may well serve perverse purposes, and an increase in such cooperatives should not be considered a sign of progress. Each indicator must therefore be examined and explained critically if the analysis is to be useful.

#### A. National Integration and Socio-Political Structure

##### 1. National Integration

- (1) Percentage of the population over which the writ of the national government runs.
- (2) Degree of acceptance of the national governmental administration as legitimate.
- (3) Ethnic, religious, tribal and other socio-cultural barriers to mobility.
- (4) Presence or absence of fragmentation (division of the country into hostile camps).
- (5) Presence or absence of communal warfare, violence, or other indications of tensions.
- (6) Extent of common religion and language.

- (7) Presence and location of air, road, rail and water transportation facilities.
- (8) Presence of communication facilities: mail, telecommunication.
- (9) Presence of mass communications media: radio, newspapers, movies, television.
- (10) Extent of participation in market economy. (This indicator may relate as much, if not more, to socio-political structure and participation in benefits.)

## 2. Socio-Political Structure

In a wholly traditional society, political, economic, and military power are fused in a single hierarchy with one-way transmission of policy from the small elite at the top downward to the rest of the society. The process of modernization may be viewed as displacing this single hierarchy with a network of governmental and private organizations, creating channels through which the preferences and needs of rank and file persons and groups are effectively transmitted upwards. One group of indicators should measure progress toward such a pluralistic society.

- (1) Extent of task-oriented, competing organizations.  
(Presence and effective functioning of cooperatives, labor unions, professional associations, and other economic interest groups.)
- (2) Concentration or diversity in the ethnic or regional or class origins of governmental employees.

- (3) Standards for recruitment and promotion in government service.
- (4) Extent of civic education.
- (5) Basis of local government. (Direction from above the community or from within. Power of tribal, caste, economic status groups. Extent to which leadership is selected from ascriptive groups.)
- (6) Participation in elections. (Extent to which there is a choice of candidates in elections. Eligibility of participation as candidate, as voter. Percentage of population eligible. This indicator should be applied to the various levels of public government and to voluntary associations and pressure groups.)
- (7) Participation in development schemes. (Extent and nature. Is there merely receipt of resources from the center, controlled by the center? Some contribution and control by the locality? Transfer of resources from the center to control of the locality, for specific purposes? Local control of generalized resources?)
- (9) Freedom of press; political opposition; extent of civil liberties.

**B. Participation in Benefits of Economic Activity**

- (1) Distribution of land ownership among agriculturists.  
(Consideration will have to be given to the nature of ownership, its attributes and uses.)

- (2) Distribution of income and other forms of wealth.
- (3) Magnitude of unemployment.
- (4) Availability of credit.
- (5) Possession of education, including:

Literacy

School enrollment: urban/rural

Percentage of adults with primary, secondary, technical, and higher education: same for younger adults

Content of educational curriculum: traditional (e.g., Koranic schools) or modern

Difficulties in the Use of Indicators

Title IX implementation often means undoing what exists. We usually perceive Title IX projects as creating new institutions where they do not exist and changing the way present institutions work. However, in countries ruled by repressive and anti-democratic regimes, the difficulties lie in undoing existing practices. But the process of undoing what exists will not necessarily show up in our indicators.

There are few theoretical insights into the processes of social and political development. It may be wrong to assume that Title IX projects, even if eventually successful in enlisting wider participation, will necessarily have predictable and measurable effects on the political and social processes of the country. We do not know how long these processes take. It may be that some Title IX projects during the first 10 or 15 years of their life only create a sort of

latent preparation, without discernible change in the macro-structure of the society that can be captured by indicators. Their effectiveness may not be apparent for a generation or more.

Perhaps the model we should have in mind is the one that characterizes the socio-economic changes underway in the U.S., and also in the Czechoslovak reforms: a period of slow change, which, when some critical threshold is reached, induces sharp, dramatic transformation, accompanied (nota bene) by crises and instability. Surely in tracing the present (1966-1968) upheavals in U.S. life, one would go back to the massive Black migration out of the South during World War II, when Watts and the South side of Chicago grew to their present size; also, the fact of prosperity in the postwar years, and the Supreme Court desegregation decision of 1954. Progress in participation of Blacks in U.S. seemed very slow between 1944 and 1965, and then sharp changes became evident. So too, perhaps in tracing back the changes leading to the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia. Research should be initiated to develop devices to measure the undercurrents of change.

It may very well be, therefore, that Title IX success is frequently accompanied by social strife and spasms of instability. The work of Adelman and Morris\* suggests that social tension is more acute in their intermediate group of countries, those which have already achieved the basic social conditions for economic development. Title IX progress may not be an upward tilted plane--continual and

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\*Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, Society, Politics and Economic Development (Johns Hopkins Press, 1967).

discernible progress--but rather a horizontal line which abruptly turns upward (or temporarily downward). We need, therefore, a good deal of research before we can have confidence in the efficacy and the required time span of Title IX programs, and our indicators of their consequences.

The Cost-Benefit Caution must be remembered. The foregoing indicators do not constitute a recommendation to A.I.D. practitioners to launch an exhaustive datagathering or encyclopedic analytic effort. Our purpose is to suggest the kinds of phenomena about which information would be required. The precise set of indicators will not only depend upon the Title IX situation in each country but will also reflect judgments made on the benefits to be derived, their importance to understanding and prescription, and the costs of obtaining the information. In many situations, theoretically desirable information would be extremely costly and time-consuming to collect and, often, the benefits would be minimal.



## CHAPTER SEVEN

### ORGANIZATION, RESEARCH, RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

To improve the effectiveness of A.I.D. in conducting programs consonant with Title IX, changes in organization, research methods and recruitment and training will be required.

We believe the changes we recommend may result in more rapid achievement of Title IX objectives than would suggestions for a more sweeping restructuring of the Agency and the foreign affairs establishment. While there may be other reasons to consider fundamental reorganization, we do not believe that Title IX either demands or is sufficient cause for such drastic change. Indeed, one proposed change--the parceling out of foreign assistance among several agencies--would clearly impede the implementation of Title IX, for the coordinated country planning that is needed would be difficult if not impossible under those circumstances. We have, therefore, sought to make the recommendations contained herein both relevant to Title IX performance and susceptible of implementation without basic restructuring of the foreign affairs establishment.

In shaping these proposals we have been mindful of the new wording contained in the 1968 amendments to Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act, especially the following relating to research and training:

"In particular, emphasis should be given to research designed to increase understanding of the ways in which development assistance can support democratic social and political trends in recipient countries."

and that

"In order to carry out the purposes of this title, the agency primarily responsible for administering Part I of this Act shall develop systematic programs of in-service training to familiarize its personnel with the objectives of this title and to increase their knowledge of the political and social aspects of development."

(Section 281 FAA of  
1961 as amended 1968)

Suggestions contained under the Research (Part II) and Recruitment and Training (Part III) sections provide assistance to the Agency in framing operational responses to these legislative directives. Yet beyond formal research and training activities we believed that there is much which can be done to make the Agency more aware of and responsive to the demands stemming from Title IX.

The place to begin--the point of entry--is at the top. The posture of the executive leadership is of the utmost importance in setting the pattern for any organization. If the leadership understands and takes an active interest in Title IX, the informal agency communication network--the space age 'bush telegraph'--will soon "fan the word out" to the most remote missions. If executive understanding and interest is minimal, that word too will soon be transmitted.

Not only must senior A.I.D. executives recognize the broad implications of Title IX and make the social and political aspects of each foreign assistance decision as much a part of their mental check list as are economic criteria; but it is also imperative that the executive leadership in the Department of State understand and support A.I.D.'s role in responding to Title IX. For unless top leadership in State appreciates the nature of Title IX and the potential

it represents for making more effective use of foreign assistance to achieve broad foreign policy goals, A.I.D. alone cannot hope to be effective in this area.

This need for full understanding and support is of greatest importance in the field, for the Ambassador presides over the Country Team, prepares the Performance Evaluation for USAID mission leadership and in a number of other key ways has the ability to shape and control the thrust of the USAID country program. Therefore, the Ambassador and his senior staff must be fully involved at all stages in the planning and implementation of Title IX activities.

Beyond the informal network of communication and the impact of executive attitudes which set the style and informal priorities within the system, there are a number of bureaucratic pressure points at which the Agency can be geared up to understand and be responsive to Title IX. These points include manifestations of executive commitment to Title IX objectives in the form of revised program guidelines to the field missions. Such guidelines should stress the importance of providing analysis of the social and political context and implications of each program and each project activity. These might be framed in the form of specific questions to be considered by each mission in program formulation. (See Chapter Four) The importance of cranking Title IX criteria into the program guidelines cannot be over-stressed. Unless the guidelines require careful analytical focus on Title IX questions, mission leadership is not likely to pay serious heed to the goals with which the legislation is concerned. Missions have shown themselves to be, on the whole, less responsive to 'fad' cables and airgrams of

special pleading than to program guidelines.

Another pressure point within the bureaucratic sub-culture is the personnel evaluation system. Inclusion of questions in the Performance Evaluation Report designed to assess the qualifications and performance of the employee in areas related to Title IX would have the double effect of requiring both the employee and his supervisor to focus upon social and political issues involved in his duties. If evaluation (i.e., promotion) panels were enjoined to give special emphasis to an employee's performance in Title IX endeavors, the effect would be to raise the priority of social and political analysis throughout the system. So also in establishing criteria for recruitment and training, for research, and evaluation, for Congressional presentations and in other critical bureaucratic areas where the real priorities of the Agency are spelled out.

Finally, in the matter of interagency coordination, we have suggested ways in which the Agency could make more effective use of the skills available within the Foreign Service by assignment of FSO's to liaison positions within both the field missions and A.I.D./W. If A.I.D. is to become an increasingly effective instrument of foreign policy, personnel exchanges between the Agency and State must be encouraged. This should be much more of a two-way process than has been the case in the past. Although we have not formally recommended it, it is possible in time that A.I.D. officers with Title IX experience could be assigned to Embassy Political Sections. Such exchange of personnel can be carried out under existing regulations, if there is executive will and determination.

## I. ORGANIZATION

Implementing Title IX does not, in our opinion, require any drastic reorganization of foreign assistance. It does require a much closer coordination between A.I.D. and the State Department, because the subject matter of Title IX brings A.I.D. much more than before into State's area of political analysis. We also recommend some organizational changes in A.I.D./Washington designed to help the implementation of Title IX.

It is of course true that the A.I.D. programming system will have to be revised to include Title IX analysis, criteria and indicators. This requires, rather than structural change, a major information effort on the part of A.I.D.'s leadership.

In general, Title IX programming must be initiated in the country missions, and centralized direction from Washington must be avoided. The reason is that, as we have pointed out earlier in this report, programs must be designed on the basis of extensive knowledge of the given country, and ideas generated in one country can rarely if ever be transferred intact to another nation.

### A.I.D.-State Coordination

#### Overseas

Coordination is a much-abused word, but it describes a need which exists, quite aside from Title IX, for a closer connection between U.S. Embassies and A.I.D. The need arises out of problems of sharing information within complex organizations. Title IX concepts call for

greater involvement of the Ambassador and his staff in A.I.D. programs. The operations of an A.I.D. mission present numerous opportunities from State's viewpoint.

First, A.I.D. officials and technicians in direct contact with host country nationals and officials acquire a great deal of information and insights into the local environment. This is not now systematically fed back to the Embassy for its analytical value. There is a tendency for divergent estimates of the situation in the host country to develop in different parts of the U.S. mission, and even within technical sectors or other strata of the A.I.D. Mission.

Second, inputs of State political analyses to the operating levels of A.I.D. and other agencies are difficult to achieve, and probably have not been adequate in the past. Primary reliance is placed on staff meetings for conveying the views of the analytical sectors of the Embassy to the operating missions. Besides being oral, and therefore superficial and subject to error in transmission to and through subordinate echelons, these communications are primarily on questions which the originator regards as important. They may respond also to the needs of senior A.I.D. staff, but they do not necessarily meet the needs for political guidance of the working level technician.

Third, regardless of the care exercised in planning, programming and negotiating with host governments, political problems do arise throughout the life of an A.I.D. project or agreement. Often these are either dealt with as if they were technical problems, or ignored as "extraneous" until they reach crisis stage and must be referred to the

Country Team level. It is undoubtedly true that many such crises could be dealt with at an earlier, more manageable stage if they were promptly detected and analyzed in the light of overall political conditions.

Heavy reliance is now placed on coordination at the executive level, partly because it has turned mainly, if not exclusively, on the primacy of the Ambassador over the several "independent" agencies operating abroad. This was a necessary first principle, but inadequate by itself. The remaining problem is that of coordinating at the working level all the business which cannot possibly deserve the time of the Ambassador or his immediate deputies.

The companion and loose doctrine of the Country Team does little to remedy the situation. In large missions, where the real problems of command and control exist, none of the principal representatives of U.S. agencies can personally carry out the detailed coordination required. Thus, the top executives who have the broad overview needed to coordinate interagency operations generally lack the time; those who have the time and detailed knowledge lack the breadth of information or outlook.

These gaps need to be closed by devising some kind of interconnection at the working level, between the Political Section and, especially, the larger A.I.D. missions. The problem might be resolved in a number of ways. Within the present operating concepts, it is probably best met by assigning one or more State officers to new positions within A.I.D. Missions above a given size. The second major organizational alternative is for A.I.D. to recruit and hire or train its own Title IX political development officers and assign them to A.I.D. Missions to carry out the

analytical function central to Title IX planning.

The problems of duplication of effort and competition in A.I.D. having its own political planning officer are obvious. The current and probably continuing financial and employment cutback of foreign aid programs also argues against A.I.D. mounting a campaign to recruit for new positions on a world wide basis. Possible retraining of qualified A.I.D. employees for Title IX analytical positions may be the only feasible alternatives to utilizing State officers for this function. At any rate A.I.D. has been given the Title IX job and if State cannot provide the needed resources, then A.I.D. must do so, either by recruitment of new personnel or by retraining current personnel.

In Washington the increased emphasis on Title IX will require less innovation in Washington operations than in the field. The principles of interagency coordination are well-established and the machinery exists even if it is used somewhat haphazardly.

Undoubtedly State will require, as a counterpart to A.I.D. bureau-level offices responsible for Title IX and related activities, a central point of functional specialization to whom each regional assistant secretary can look for information and advice across the board. This relates most closely to the planning-programming function abroad, and may enter also at the stage of regional evaluation of Title IX effects. Each regional bureau in State has a regional planning officer who would be the logical person to fill this role. He is a link for planning purposes not only between his assistant secretary and the Country Directors and Officers, but also between these bureau levels and their

counterparts in A.I.D. and the State Policy Planning Council and especially its regional specialist member.

At higher levels, the Country Director reports to his Assistant Secretary who can, if necessary, make Title IX activities the subject of Inter-Departmental Regional Group (IRG) or Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) consideration. The purpose of careful organization at the country level, however, should be to minimize the need for such appeals to higher authorities.

#### A.I.D.-State: Political Analysis

The most important benefit of better A.I.D.-State coordination would be in the realm of political analysis. Today State is exclusively responsible for such analyses. However, political analysis is vital to Title IX, and A.I.D.'s needs for Title IX programming are not always met by State's present product.

Normal political reporting tends to focus on a fairly short time span and to look for indicators of changes in the host country environment mainly for their significance in international affairs, and especially in our bilateral relations with the country. This results in a concentration on the current activities of political parties and of explicitly political leadership. Other forces are analyzed, but mainly for their effects on these aspects.

Title IX programs will require a more comprehensive and longer term analysis of the implications of deeper involvement in individual country situations (along the lines of the indicators discussed in

Chapter 6). This will entail analysis in depth of local government and local organizations and their relationships to the central government and of possible economic, political and social consequences of Title IX programs. It will include attention to institutional trends without a priori limitations as to immediacy.

The political analytical function abroad is currently the responsibility of the political section of the Embassy and is performed by State officers. Its product has been serving the needs of many agencies but it is of principal interest to State.

To analyze the probable political effects of efforts to attain Title IX goals is obviously a State Department function. In small country teams the political officer will be concerned with this function. In large teams, as noted earlier, delegation of an FSO to work within the A.I.D. mission may be desirable. The functions of obtaining the most effective Title IX content of an economic aid program and of its execution are operating functions. They must be performed by the members of the A.I.D. mission. In each larger mission, there should be a Title IX officer in whom responsibility for the function is vested. There is no conflict between these functions. Obviously, close coordination is needed.

In Washington, analysis is the responsibility of the Bureau of Intelligence & Research (INR) within State and of the entire intelligence community for the Government generally. In respect to Title IX, however, this element of State provides a resource that is mainly of a country background sort. To provide operations-oriented analysis of the type called for by Title IX, INR would have to, as would the Embassy

Political Section overseas, change both the nature and depth of its analysis. INR and the other intelligence communities should be informed of the Congressional mandate placed on A.I.D. for this Title IX political analysis.

The advantages of this type of solution are twofold: (1) building on this existing foundation by additions or redirection of State-A.I.D. analytic staff and resources enhances Title IX coordination in the U.S. community rather than creating competitive forces, and (2) there should be an immediate gain in quality flowing from this combination of closely relating tasks with a minimum additional staffing cost.

#### Modification of Existing A.I.D. Organization for Title IX.

To implement Title IX effectively in A.I.D./Washington few basic organizational changes are necessary. What is needed in A.I.D. is a thorough understanding throughout the structure of A.I.D.'s role in responding to Title IX.

The few organizational changes recommended in Washington are discussed below at three hierarchical levels: central staff, regional bureaus and country desks.

#### Central Staff--Policy Planning and Coordinating.

The Policy and Planning Coordinating Staff, Title IX Division, should be responsible to the A.I.D./Administrator for central Title IX policy formulation and coordination. This function includes the drafting, clearing and issuing of agency-wide Title IX policy documents;

the review of Title IX implementation on a country-by-country basis for the Administrator; helping to design and operate agency-wide Title IX training programs and conferences in coordination with the A.I.D. personnel office; coordinating agency-wide Title IX research policy and programs and responding to Congressional Title IX requirements.

While this office would remain small, it must have sufficient highly qualified staff to accomplish all of these functions and also maintain close liaison with appropriate offices in A.I.D. and State on Title IX matters. Probably at least seven professional positions plus supporting clerical staff would be the minimum needed: 4 professional analysts (one assigned to monitor each Bureau plus Vietnam), 2 professionals responsible for world-wide Title IX training programs and reporting requirements, and one to monitor research policy and operations.

#### Regional Bureaus.

The second level of Title IX activities would be centered in the regional bureau under the authority of the Regional Administrator, preferably within the regional Office of Development Planning. This office would insure that program planning within the region includes Title IX considerations. It will work closely with the Bureau country desk officers in this respect and participate in the country analysis of proposed and on-going projects. An important part of this function will be educating the country desk officers on the potential role of Title IX in their countries. Another basic function of this office will be that



### EDITING



"IT WAS THE UNANIMOUS VIEW OF THE ACADEMIC PARTICIPANTS ATTENDING THE MIT ENDICOTT HOUSE CONFERENCE, THAT MEASURES TO INDUCE BROADER PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS SHOULD BE INSTIGATED IN ALL INSTITUTIONS EXCEPT UNIVERSITIES."  
EXCERPT FROM FINAL REPORT



of Title IX coordination and liaison. It will serve as the regional focal point for implementing Title IX policy emanating from the PPC Title IX office and be responsible for helping prepare Congressional responses on regional Title IX questions. It will also coordinate regional Title IX activities with the State Regional Planning Officer, with State INR and with DOD (ISA), CIA and other appropriate government agencies at the bureau level.

In addition to reviewing country programming plans for Title IX potential, the regional planning office will have an important responsibility in suggesting, encouraging, coordinating, monitoring, evaluating and disseminating research related to Title IX activities. Here again liaison with the desks (both State and A.I.D.), INR, the Foreign Area Research Council, DOD and other agencies will be important. In regions having a development advisory group (e.g., SEADAG in East Asia), it should maintain liaison and help coordinate its activities. In regions not now having such advisory groups, their establishment should be considered. (The Title IX function in regional bureaus of A.I.D. may on occasion be performed by officers detailed from State).

As an alternative, the Latin America model may be used. The Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress has assumed a deep interest in the development of Title IX concepts and operational guidelines. The Chief of the Planning Division was initially designated to supervise the Bureaus' responsibilities for Title IX. Since Latin America's commitments through the Social Progress Trust Fund and the Alliance are greater than the obligations imposed by Title IX alone, it was deemed necessary to establish a full-time position in the Office of Institutional

Development to take care of these concerns.

The arrangement was sufficiently productive to cause the Bureau to elevate the responsibility to the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Social and Civic Affairs. The Office of Institutional Development, which includes all technical services backstopping functions in agriculture, health, education, public administration, etc., has been assigned to this official to carry out his duties. The role of this office encompasses more than just Title IX, but it was set up as a result of Title IX to implement the amendment as a coherent integrated part of the development process. Title IX has been given greater visibility, an enhanced operational scope and significance for the Bureau as a whole.

#### The Country Desks.

The third level is that of the country desk officer. It is at this level that Title IX must become operational on the Washington end. To achieve this effectively desk officers must not only be aware of Title IX and its meaning but must be able and willing to implement it where appropriate. This will require a much wider spread of Title IX knowledge and initiative throughout the Agency than exists at present. The country desk officer in responding to field proposals, analyzing programs and evaluating results must put Title IX into effect. Coordination for this purpose should be maintained with the A.I.D. regional planning offices, the State Country Directors, and appropriate country level officials in DOD, CIA, AND USIA. It is the desk officer's responsibility to work Title IX into the country-level, multi-agency planning mechanisms.

## II. RESEARCH

Research is a vital tool in the implementing of Title IX. This is especially true because we know so little about the processes of political and social development.

In this section we first take up a series of questions concerning research administration: A.I.D.-university relations, out-of-house research, host country researchers, and risks and problems in research management. Finally, we discuss the topics to which Title IX research could most usefully be directed.

### A.I.D.-University Relations

The skepticism expressed in university circles about working with A.I.D. bears examination. If Title IX is to be launched successfully, it is important that some specific component of the agency be given overall responsibility for examining its relations with students, faculty and university administration. The foregoing is not meant as a blanket indictment, but only to underscore the extent to which other agencies have identifiable, central elements to which universities can take their problems, can seek assistance of many kinds, and can be guided into areas of activity responding to a variety of needs of the government agencies. Although many of the suggestions below cannot be implemented under existing levels of support, A.I.D. could do much more to make its current efforts intelligible and persuasive and could begin in modest ways to design better ways to utilize university resources.

Because of the close scrutiny of A.I.D. operations, A.I.D. has

the general reputation of being a difficult agency with which to enter into contracts. Contracts with universities are drafted and cleared by a large number of offices within A.I.D., sometimes originating with field offices, sometimes with regional bureaus and sometimes with functional bureaus. It is not uncommon to find several parts of one university working in the same geographical region or on interlocking problems without the faculty involved knowing this; whether or not the agency knows it is another question. In some instances, A.I.D. has caused a variety of petty, but extremely frustrating conditions for university administrators. Most often, these harassments seem to be the result of lower level administrators in the agency. A.I.D. should introduce a good deal more flexibility and efficiency into its administration of university contracts.

A.I.D. also has the reputation of relying heavily for advice on the relatively small number of universities that have organized special offices to manage their contract relations, and, therefore, of relying on a small number of interested professors in institutions where relations can be more easily managed. A.I.D. has tended to look to applied social scientists, no doubt for good reasons, but in doing so may have lost the opportunity to bring basic research fully into the service of field operations and, conversely, to have data relevant to working problems fed back into more theoretical and conceptual research in universities.

In the case of institution-building contracts, A.I.D. should realize that it is becoming increasingly difficult for universities to free their best faculty for prolonged residence abroad, and that

universities often fail to provide the continuity of either teaching or research interest abroad that is necessary to begin a self-sustaining activity in the host country. The net result, too simply stated, is that the best professors often prefer support from other government sources rather than A.I.D.

Title IX suggests that A.I.D. in the long run might well appeal successfully to the "new" generation of students once it can expand into broader aspects of socio-political change. On the whole, A.I.D. does not have the reputation on campuses of vigorous recruiting which other agencies, notably the State Department, have cultivated. If Title IX is implemented, there will be numerous opportunities for injecting into A.I.D. activities social science skills and continuing research interests that might provide A.I.D. with a distinct advantage in attracting some of the best university products.

#### Out-of-House Research

The advantages to A.I.D./State of Out-of-House research are several.

Many Title IX programs imply a depth of understanding of the processes of socio-political change in the Third World which require the application of more sophisticated developmental theories than are normally available in-house. Title IX programs also require deeper knowledge of particular country situations than is likely to be available in-house, except among those relatively unrewarded individuals who

stick to one country for a long time, either in the INR side of State or in certain technical assistance fields. Such country specialization is more likely to be found among academic country specialists than in most operationally oriented contract research organizations, but even here, too, country specialization is considered less important now than a decade ago. Accordingly, country specialists are rare.

Academic and other out-of-house researchers are often more able to work in easy collaboration with local academic and research institutions than mission personnel since locals may be reluctant to work directly with the U.S. Government. Outside researchers are therefore more promising if one objective is to improve indigenous capability, though no doubt some direct contracting can also serve this purpose.

Finally, the more research is done through academic institutions, the more attuned will they, and ultimately the public, be to development problems and the goals of Title IX. The question, of course, is: How can A.I.D./State ensure that out-of-house researchers will focus on questions germane to Title IX?

The answer to this question depends upon A.I.D./State having capable staff able to identify and define questions the answers to which are researchable and will be relevant, upon the care with which questions are defined in advance in consultation with researchers, and, lastly, upon the ingenuity of A.I.D./State staff in spotting those interests of academic or other researchers which are of potential value.

Making research results useful to A.I.D./State operators and policy makers may be a problem. Since the results of out-of-house

research will not always be in a form to be readily absorbed by the bureaucracy, A.I.D./State should have a qualified staff of operation-minded social scientists as "translators" or two-way communicators, analogous to some of DOD's intermediary staffs. This staff could also "translate" into operational terms abstruse research originating elsewhere.

In addition, there are the familiar issues of:

-Organizing to jointly shape and select among research proposals.

Alert staff with authority to encourage early-stage proposals and joint inside-outside professional advisory panels to review and select among nearly completed proposals are necessary. The latter should meet frequently enough to minimize delays at the last stage. (Four times a year is not enough.)

-Supervising projects along the way. This requires a nice balance to be sure the researchers are still on target, yet leaving them enough authority to change specific questions, staffing and even methodology if they deem this necessary for optimal results.

-Relations with Embassies and A.I.D. Missions. These present special problems if some of the research is to be overseas. The U.S. Government has a stake in making it possible for American researchers to work abroad without becoming too closely identified with USG activities. Hence, Embassies and Missions and A.I.D./State are well advised to avoid restricting researchers too much, or taking responsibility for the results of research by giving too much specific guidance.

-Publications. Since the time of qualified scholars is scarce

and publication is important to academic satisfaction and reputation, publishing must be allowed. In some cases, a classified version might be submitted and a sanitized version issued later. But this should be the exception.

There should also be assured means for reporting of results back to collaborators in the host country. Host governments and associates are less likely to feel they are being exploited by U.S. researchers, and it is one way of developing a professional association, itself a Title IX objective.

#### Host-Country Researchers

In a number of Third World countries in which the United States has a Title IX interest, social science research capability is substantial or is increasing rapidly. Host-country nationals are now producing studies of Title IX relevance. The capability of A.I.D. and, more broadly, the United States Government effectively to use these researchers and their research products, however, is quite inadequate. We suggest that A.I.D. deliberately and forcefully encourage research in the Title IX area by host-country nationals. The reasons are, several:

Research done by host-country nationals can supplement the research available from U.S. sources, and, perhaps more important, provide alternative assessments of country situations--for the perspective of a host-country national frequently leads him to evaluations that differ from those of U.S. researchers. The national

has an awareness of cultural nuance and national ambience that the U.S. researcher only rarely possesses. Also it is undoubtedly true that the host-country researcher can gain some kinds of access and gather some kinds of information that Americans cannot.

Research conducted by host-country nationals provides information to the host-country government and other elements of the society that might not otherwise reach them. The results of much research conducted by Americans are carried back to the United States and written up to meet the requirements of the American academic community; research done by host-country nationals is often better received in the host-country than is the work done by Americans.

Title IX research will be a continuing requirement in the developing countries even after A.I.D. has phased out its operations within them. A.I.D., therefore, should help to develop their research skills through support of both research institutions and promising researchers.

In the preceding paragraphs we have assumed that host-country researchers can be engaged by A.I.D.--or other U.S. Government agencies--for Title IX studies. This assumption we believe is valid for many societies in the Third World. We recognize, however, that it is far from being universally valid, and we would advise great sensitivity on A.I.D.'s part in approaching potential host-country researchers.

In the first place, some regimes are opposed to the participatory thrust of Title IX and would be little disposed to tolerate A.I.D.

sponsorship of research that could be interpreted as reflecting adversely on the performance of those regimes.

Beyond that, it is necessary to keep in mind the risks to his own reputation a host-country researcher may run through accepting an association with the United States Government. Anyone who accepts A.I.D. support must expect to be attacked by some elements in his society. He must weigh the costs of such attacks against the support he may receive from others of his peers as well as the intrinsic benefits he sees for himself and his society in the proposed research.

We think naturally of trained social scientists when we think of persons who should do Title IX research. It may be useful, however, to consider other kinds of people. An additional payoff may result if A.I.D. turns to those who are most likely to play active political roles in their societies. Lawyers, for instance, make up a group that in most societies has a strong political interest. A.I.D. could look to this group for a Title IX contribution, making efforts to involve in research lawyers who are about to be graduated or who have been very recently graduated. Indeed, Title IX research might well be made an integral part of law school curricula where conditions permit.

It might also be useful to think of encouraging representatives of other, less-favored groups--recent urban migrants, labor, peasants--to begin to do some of their own research, to ask their own questions, acquire their own range of skills and knowledge. There is a direct Title IX benefit from this in the form of giving such representatives confidence in their ability to examine and interpret their social and

political environments--an important civic skill. There will frequently be a further payoff in information.

### Risks and Problems

The principal risk that is run by U.S. involvement in research abroad, whether done by Americans or host-country nationals, is that the research done will not be seen to be in the interests of the host-country. One device that has been found successful in countering this risk is to ensure that all products of the research be prepared and published in two versions, one written by host-country nationals and published with the needs and priorities of the host-country in view, the other published in the United States for the use of U.S. nationals. The data used are the same in both cases; the costs of publication for both are assumed by the funding agency.

It cannot be urged too strongly that basic research of the kind recommended here be unclassified. Not only does the (often unnecessary) classification of research lend an arcane, conspiratorial cast to research activity, thereby increasing host-country suspicions and fears; also, the results of Title IX research should be disseminated as widely as possible in the host-country in the hope, if not always the realistic expectation, that they will lead to constructive Title IX responses on the part of host-country governments and people.

Although current U.S. balance of payments difficulties impose serious limitations on the amounts of dollars A.I.D. can devote to research activities abroad, there is adequate statutory authority to

permit the use of host-country researchers for Title IX purposes. Moreover, our foundations and other private sector organizations working overseas can be encouraged to promote host-country investigations of the kinds indicated. Finally, every effort should be made to involve host-countries themselves, in their public and private components, in the funding of Title IX research. Where counterpart funds are available, they can be used. Joint financing on a matching-fund basis can also be promoted.

#### Topics of Research

There is no shortage of subjects for Title IX research. In an area so broad and ill-defined, an area moreover of which our understanding is limited at best, the goal is to use scarce research resources to best effect.

One approach to defining research priorities could start from the indicators suggested in Chapter 6. Another might seek to identify essential broad areas where our knowledge is scant. We know very little, for example, about contrived social change. We know little about rates of change: how many years should we expect to wait before Title IX programs have discernable effects, and how many years before such programs become self-sustaining? We particularly need to know more about sequential change. When, say, a rural community development project is initiated, we assume that it will have an impact beyond the immediate project area, but we do not know how and when this effect occurs.

Research for Title IX, like the programs with which it deals, must be viewed in lengthened time perspective. Just as a Title IX project may take years to show results, so research may also take years to complete.

What follows is a list of possible Title IX research topics, a list intended to be illustrative rather than inclusive or definitive:

1. Compare the performance in selected countries of local governmental units before and after they have acquired significant taxing authority. (This would demonstrate to ourselves and host governments the utility or liabilities of devolving taxing authority to local bodies.)

2. What have been the effects on rural political tensions of rapid agricultural innovation? (This would help us and host governments to know more precisely the political and social consequences of such innovations, consequences with which the governments may have to deal.)

3. What have been the political and economic consequences of expanding participatory processes (however defined) in major urban centers and towns? (Title IX assumes that good results flow from increasing participation. But we have little idea of the gains and costs in specific country contexts in terms of economic growth, public order, group frictions, rising demands, new political organizations, etc. This is a problem fundamental to all Title IX activities.)

4. Examine in a number of countries popular and elite conceptions of governmental legitimacy, in order better to understand what steps

governments might take to win and maintain popular and elite approval. (Governments considered legitimate by their peoples are presumably better able to innovate and promote participation than those that are not. And Title IX presumes that if governments introduce Title IX activities, they will gain legitimacy. But in different cultures governments acquire legitimacy in different ways, some by the mystery of rule, others by panoply or possession of the palace, others by their ability to demonstrate control and order, others by the services they perform and the constitutionality of their coming to power.)

5. What changes in class and other stratifications have occurred in selected countries during the past decade? Which groups have risen and which have declined? What economic, social, and political innovations have favored and impeded these changes? How have U.S. activities (State, A.I.D., USIA, the military, U.S. business) affected these changes? (Title IX instructs us to work for increased participation in the interests of forwarding democratic changes. Answers to the above questions would identify changes already taking place and assess how U.S. activities affect these changes, thereby increasing A.I.D./State understanding of the scope of U.S. influence.)

6. In selected countries, how adequate are information flows, both to the government and to the citizenry? Is the government communicating as effectively and honestly as it might with its public? If not, how if at all might it be assisted to perform this function better? Are the media providing the people with adequate, objective and comprehensive information about matters of national and local concern? Title IX assumes that a society cannot be a wholesomely

participant one in the absence of an informed, responsible public. Officers in A.I.D./State will find it useful to know what factors and forces impede the dissemination of information in order that they may advise and program for improved performance.)

7. In given country situations what have been the political and social costs of inflation? Of stabilization programs? (Title IX obliges A.I.D. to pay much more systematic attention to the non-economic consequences of all its programs and projects. This study, which would be of use to other agencies as well as A.I.D., should provide vital information on a particularly difficult issue. Also it should show us whether cross-country generalizations about this question are valid. Do societies differ markedly in their political and cultural capacity to live with inflation? with austerity?)

8. How effectively are locally initiated and organized projects incorporated into the broader institutions and processes of politics and government? (A.I.D. recognizes that community development programs cannot achieve more than very limited success in political environments that are indifferent or hostile to them. This study, conducted in specific countries, would provide needed information about the adequacy and shortcomings of linkage mechanisms between local efforts and other hierarchically superior power elements.)

### III. RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

#### Recruitment

If Title IX alters the goals of the aid agency, it necessarily also alters the agency's personnel requirements. On the purely professional level, the change is obvious: the agency will need more people grounded or experienced in the social and behavioral sciences.

In a less obvious sense, the agency may have to place greater stress on the personal traits that go into what we think of as "overseasmanship." We all know that some Americans find it easier than others to work in other cultures. This ability becomes more important under Title IX. An economist or a natural scientist or technician may be able to function effectively overseas with little sympathy or understanding for the local culture. This is because he is dealing with transferrable technology whose implementation requires little cross-cultural dealing.

But Title IX projects by their nature require the practitioner to develop a deep understanding of, and ability to function within, the specific culture of the country in which he is working. A.I.D. may, therefore, find it advisable to give greater importance in its recruiting standards to such qualities as: understanding the 'social infrastructure' of technology, a desire to learn the local language and understand the local culture, a facility in cross-cultural communication.

The task is to use the best techniques available to identify such people, recruit them, provide them with orientation to equip them to move into a new cultural situation, and finally, to assign them to meaningful positions. With this formula, A.I.D. will evolve a professional cadre of dedicated and skillful operators who will tackle assignments and stay with them through the necessary work-spans. It should be noted that the agency has never lacked for dedicated personnel. It has had problems in providing sufficient training to equip them to work more effectively in given assignments.

Private industry, the churches and some other nations have identified one prime method of ensuring good results from their overseas representatives, long tenure at post. Title IX suggests longevity at post beyond the normal period of two two-year tours. The argument runs strongly in favor of recruiting individuals for specific tasks in one country for the regular two-tour period and then returning them to it for an additional two-tour period after a tour in Washington or another post. This allows for readier acquisition of genuine facility in the local language, thorough orientation in the host culture and a sense of purpose and identity which is difficult to achieve when rotation to a new post and a new task is anticipated.

Perhaps new positions will be established with special personnel review panels. An examination of personnel files may reveal qualified staff now on the job in other positions. More importantly, the present personnel evaluation reporting system should have added to it a specific item or section to provide an evaluation of each employee's role in

facilitating participation in his area of responsibility or project. How does he perform as an advocate of Title IX? The simple inclusion of this evaluative category in the personnel system will ensure an early and interested effort to begin to understand and apply Title IX objectives by the ratee as well as the rater.

Inter-agency exchanges between A.I.D. and State are not uncommon and should be encouraged to help in the location of personnel sensitized to Title IX goals. Foreign Service officers will profit from the professional expansion the exchange brings and A.I.D. will ultimately profit as these officers acquire posts of increasing responsibility. The FSO's should bring political analytical skills to the new task. Cultural Affairs officers and other USIA personnel are additional sources of interchange possibilities.

Obviously the prime resource is the large number of A.I.D. personnel presently operating overseas and in Washington who have grown up with the program. To the extent that these people have shown ability and commitment, they deserve training to better equip them to continue. Some will select themselves out when they are brought to realize the complexity and duration of the task they are engaged in. Others will certainly profit and assist in the extension and betterment of the art of development.

### Training

Successful training requires a multi-level approach. The minds of the personnel in the Agency must be 'engaged' with the Title IX

concept. This runs from the Administrator to the technicians in the field. Assuming that an accelerated process of identification and selection of new recruits is being undertaken, the next job is to train all personnel, new as well as those who have been on the job.

The Training Office of A.I.D. is now engaged in a modest though extensive program including orientation training, mid-career programs and senior programs. Other continuing management-type programs are underway primarily for the Washington complement but available for overseas staff on home leave. Some of this training is carried on in A.I.D. and other programs are under contract with universities. A new program was initiated last year by carrying the training to the field in the first of a series of inter-disciplinary seminars for senior staff held in Mexico. Its success for Latin America A.I.D. officers has resulted in its world-wide extension this year. Traveling seminars for all personnel would appear to be an excellent means of speeding up the development of our developmental personnel around the world and are recommended as initial expedients to facilitate staff "tool-up" for Title IX.

A.I.D. staff members who deal with Title IX should be able to tolerate ambiguity and not need to find authoritative answers to tension-creating problems. This is because there is far less certainty in this area than in that of economic growth. They should appreciate that because each society is a social-political-economic-personality system, which changes progressively, and with whose state at any given period any innovation must be consistent, therefore

almost no American method (technical, political, or other) fits well without adaptation. Hence, for the most effective service these staff members must themselves be imaginative and innovative; they cannot merely transmit American methods. The perception by any individual that this is true is of course closely associated with his tolerance of ambiguity and his freedom from the need to rely on dogmatic solutions.

It is uncertain whether "sensitivity" or "T-group" training will help promote such attitudes. A.I.D. should get an evaluation of the evidence concerning such training from a dispassionate committee of social scientists, not from an exponent of the method. In a condition of uncertainty about the effects, such training (say a two-week course) should be a part of the training of a new A.I.D. staff, since there is no evidence to suggest deleterious effects, and the possible positive effects are important.

Behavior in administering economic assistance can be altered favorably to some degree by specific training in the problems to be encountered. New recruits should not merely be given an orientation to cultural differences and inter-cultural contacts. They should be given specific training in the cultural as well as the technical problems of their job. There should be emphasis on clusters of case studies of the process by which an effective overall development program was worked out in a developing country; that by which a successful community development program was conceived, planned in general, worked out in detail, and executed; and so on. If the process is narrated by someone who is familiar with the sequence of

communications among individuals that went on--the exploration of the idea, contact between planners and operating agencies, formation of task forces, discussions by chiefs with Indians of problems and needed adaptations, obtaining of responses from consumers, and the progressive and repeated reformulation and improvement that will result from this network of communication--then the study of the case is likely to be far more effective than discussions in general terms. Structured groups of case studies will be valuable training tools for development processes when they become available.

Both sensitivity training and refresher training by discussion of specific successes (as above) will be useful for mid-career staff members also. In general, refresher training should be regarded as normal procedure for all Agency members.

The Foreign Service Institute is by statute the common training facility for all agencies, except for training that is unique to the needs of one agency. Title IX training should not be unique to A.I.D. Title IX requirements are also the training needs of State generalists, as well as some elements of USIA, DOD and Peace Corps training. The tendency in most agencies is to set up special courses each time a new idea arises. We urge consultation with the Foreign Service Institute toward the development of new programs involving Title IX curricula. There will be a large overlap of subject matter in Title IX and there should be positive benefits derived from training in an inter-agency setting reminiscent of the Country Team or the Washington committee. Prime emphasis should be put on the need for

cooperation among agencies in meeting Title IX training needs.

The Senior and Mid-Career Inter-departmental Seminars should be converted from their counter-insurgency roles to courses on Title IX and development. These are extremely valuable training opportunities which should be used to their fullest capacity.

The techniques of simulation and gaming would be useful in training senior personnel in the application of Title IX objectives. Brookings Institution has developed skills in this area and it is suggested that a series of one-week programs be given for senior Washington and field personnel.

A new training suggestion is to take a selection of 5 to 10 technicians and programmers eligible for training and run them as a simulated Country Team through a nine-month program dealing with (1) leading issues of economic development, (2) elements of project design, implementation and management, (3) latest techniques of U.S. management, systems design, etc. and (4) identification of social and political factors in development. The program could be conducted at one site or moved from campus to campus to accommodate the team's schedule to the best available talent for the unit under discussion. It would be a seminar operation with the end-product a country team paper on a selected country. The country focus would facilitate an in-depth use of the conceptual tools being acquired.

