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Summarizes a test of a judgmental measurement strategy proposed as a partial solution to some problems of cross-national data. Existing cross-national data are considered somewhat limited in their scope and often uncertain in their reliability. It has been suggested that these data might be supplemented by having a sample of African area experts code 39 African nations on several scales tapping attributes central to comparative political analysis and especially relevant to democratic theory. Expert agreement was good on highly familiar items such as regime type and role of the military. However, on more abstract scales and for more "exotic" nations, both dissensus and nonresponse increased considerably. There are several specific theory and measurement problems which must be confronted to adapt the judgmental measurement approach satisfactorily. The major difficulty is that of nonresponse. Another problem area is the specification of individual scales and the meaning of individual scale positions. At the same time, even in this preliminary test, the results allow a useful general characterization of regime types, role of the military, democratic development, corruption, and other political traits in Africa.

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Area Experts' Images of African Nations:
A Test of a Reputational Measurement Approach

by

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Abstract

Area Experts' Images of African Nations:
A Test of a Reputational Measurement Approach

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Fred R. von der Mehden
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This paper presents a test of a judgmental measurement strategy which has been proposed as a partial solution to some problems of cross-national data. It has been suggested that existing cross-national data, which are somewhat limited in their scope and often uncertain in their reliability, might be supplemented by having area experts code nations onto new scales. We test this approach by having a sample of African area experts code 39 African nations on several scales tapping attributes central to comparative political analysis and especially relevant to democratic theory. The results indicate that expert agreement is rather good on highly familiar items such as regime type and role of the military. On more abstract scales and for more "exotic" nations, however, both dissensus and nonresponse increase considerably. Our findings indicate several specific theory and measurement problems which must be confronted to adapt satisfactorily the judgmental measurement approach. At the same time, even in this preliminary test, the results allow a useful general characterization of regime types, role of the military, democratic development, corruption, and other political traits in Africa.

Area Experts' Images of African Nations:
A Test of a Reputational Measurement Approach

It is well recognized that there are a number of shortcomings in the data readily available for aggregate cross-national research. The major difficulties are probably the simple absence of many desirable variables and the uncertain reliability of many extant ones. What is especially unfortunate is that these problems are most severe for many concepts central to social and political theory construction. Thus, it is often on the most important concepts that data are most sparse or suspect.

One partial solution proposed to help rectify these problems is the use of area-experts or other "expert" judges to generate new cross-national indices. DeGrazia,¹ Hudson,² and Mueller,³ among others have argued for the use of area specialists to assist in the collection and evaluation of cross-national data.

Beyond mere suggestions for this strategy, there now exist a variety of efforts which actually employ expert judges to generate new

¹Alfred DeGrazia, "What Indicates What?" American Behavioral Scientist, VIII (December, 1964), 29-41.

²Michael C. Hudson, "Data Problems in Quantitative Comparative Analysis," Comparative Politics, 5 (July, 1973), 611-630.

³John E. Mueller, Approaches to Measurement in International Relations (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969).

cross-national variables. An early effort was that of Nixon¹ who utilized five-judge panels of press experts to rate 117 polities on a freedom of the press scale. This index, along with some other original ones such as for "Electoral Irregularity," was incorporated in the second edition of the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.²

Two other major efforts in this category are Banks and Textor's Cross-Polity Survey³ and Fitzgibbon⁴ and Johnson's⁵ quinquennial survey of Latin American area experts. Both of these should be seen as pioneering efforts. Unfortunately, both suffer some serious deficiencies, as well. With the Cross-Polity Survey the set of expert judges was not

¹Raymond B. Nixon, "Factors Related to Freedom in National Press Systems," Journalism Quarterly, 37 (Winter, 1960), 13-28; and "Freedom in the World's Press: A Fresh Appraisal with New Data," Journalism Quarterly, 42 (Winter, 1965), 3-14, 118-119.

²Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972). Several other cross-national data handbooks also include simple judgmental scales for some political characteristics of nations (See Arthur S. Banks, Cross-Polity Time-Series Data [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971]; Donald G. Morrison et al., Black Africa [New York: The Free Press, 1972]; and Rudolph Rummel, The Dimensions of Nations [Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972]).

³Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1963).

⁴Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Measurement of Latin American Political Phenomena," American Political Science Review, XLV (December, 1951), 517-23; "A Statistical Evaluation of Latin American Democracy," Western Political Quarterly, IX (September, 1956), 607-19; "Measuring Democratic Change in Latin America," Journal of Politics, 29 (February, 1967), 129-66; and R.H. Fitzgibbon and Kenneth F. Johnson, "Measurement of Latin American Political Change," American Political Science Review, LV (September, 1961), 515-26.

⁵Kenneth F. Johnson, "Scholarly Images of Latin American Political Democracy in 1975," Latin American Research Review, XI (1976), 129-140.

identified nor was the manner of their selection. While the Fitzgibbon-Johnson project is exemplary in that regard, it shares with the Banks and Textor compendium difficulties in the manner in which variables were articulated. The Banks-Textor scales were theoretically relevant but operationally obscure. In our judgment the Fitzgibbon-Johnson ones cover many attributes better measured by aggregate data and fall short in the area of strictly political concepts. Another problem shared by both these projects has been a failure to present evidence on the extent of expert agreement in the results.¹ One's faith in the quality of such data must be qualified until such evidence is presented.

There have also been several less extensive efforts to employ expert judges for cross-national measurement. Mueller² reviews most of these in detail. Likewise, a large number of studies exist where a single scholar has, out of necessity, generated de novo a judgmental scale of some attribute necessary for his analysis--such as for extent of democratization, role of the military, level of bureaucratic corruption, and so on.³

Clearly, the use of "expert" judgmental measurement in one form or another is extremely common in comparative research. Present usages are not adequate, however, to indicate the reliability of this approach nor

¹Fitzgibbon and Johnson do report some data on the dispersion of responses in their surveys up through 1960. That information is insufficient, however, for assessing the satisfactoriness of their data for measurement purposes.

²Mueller, op. cit., pp. 249-252.

³For example, concern with the extent of military influence in public affairs has led to several different efforts to index that involvement. On this issue, see the measurement operations of R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan, "A Comparative Analysis of the Political and Economic Performance of Military and Civilian Regimes: A Cross-National Aggregate Study," Comparative Politics, 8 (October, 1975), 1-30; Kim Q. Hill, "Military Role vs. Military Rule: A Research Note on Allocations to Military

the extent of its utility in supplementing customary aggregate data. Furthermore, if it is to be extensively useful, we require more systematic guidelines for its application.

The present paper reports on a project designed to test the efficacy of this "expert" judges measurement strategy. For this project a sample of political scientist Africa-area experts was generated and surveyed. The survey instrument asked these respondents to code 39 African nations as of mid-year 1977 on a set of scales tapping several attributes central to comparative politics and particularly relevant to democratic theory. The results of this project have important implications both for cross-national measurement in general and for the use of this "reputational" technique specifically. Furthermore, the results provide an overall characterization of certain aspects of contemporary African politics and allow some discrimination among nations on several theoretically interesting traits.

Data Collection Procedures

We have discussed at length elsewhere¹ the general rationale for the use of expert judges in comparative politics and possible difficulties in Activities," Comparative Politics (forthcoming); Robert D. Putnam, "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics," World Politics, XX (October, 1967), 83-110; Lee Sigelman, "Military Intervention: A Methodological Note," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 2 (Fall, 1974), 275-282; and R. Neal Tannahill, "Military Intervention in Search of a Dependent Variable," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 3 (Fall, 1975), 219-228.

¹Kim Q. Hill and Fred R. von der Mehden, "Data Reliability in Cross-National Research: A Test Employing Black Africa Country Experts," paper delivered at the Western Political Science Association annual meeting, Los Angeles, California, March, 1978.

such applications. The major problems are those of sample selection, willingness of the respondents to participate in such an exercise, and the extent of both knowledge and consensus of the sample on the matters about which they are questioned. We will consider these problems briefly in reverse order.

A well-known characteristic of comparative political scholarship is the rough division between area or nation experts and broad comparativists.¹ The differences between these two groups probably arise for several reasons--from their formative scholarly training to personal research preferences. Unfortunately, some practitioners of both schools denigrate the value of work by the other school. This attitude can result in indifference at best, and hostility, at worst. One implication of this schism for our project is that some area experts may see it as unimportant and, therefore, unworthy of their participation. A second difficulty may arise because many "Africa experts" may perceive themselves as specific-nation experts, with little particular confidence to scale a large number of African nations on several variables. The extent to which either of these difficulties arises will, of course, limit the feasibility of this proposed measurement method. The likelihood of these problems should forewarn us that not all area experts are actually suitable respondents for this task, either. Some may lack either the willingness or the ability to be suitable judges.

Fortunately, the matter of choosing a sample of area experts is at least more straightforward than is anticipating their likely response to

¹ Lucian W. Pye, Political Science and Area Studies: Rivals or Partners? (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975).

this project. To collect a pool of Africa experts we initially drew upon published scholarship in African studies. Three university libraries were searched for books published on the politics of single African nations or for multinational studies which indicated detailed knowledge of African nations or subregions. The resulting list of scholars was supplemented with additional names taken from a search of articles on African politics in four African studies journals in 1972-76.¹ This final list was supplemented with additional names provided by two African area experts asked to evaluate our list. The final list included 54 scholars.

The survey instrument requested respondents to code 39 nations on one nominal and six ordinal scales chosen by their relevance to some particular theoretical issue in comparative politics. Each scale was presented with a short paragraph describing the underlying concept, and each scale point carried a specific description. The scales ranged from some highly specific ones drawn directly from African politics literature to some addressing more abstract and broadly comparative concepts. One may view the questionnaire as posing a rather difficult exercise for the respondents, given the large number of nations and the range of scales.

The survey instrument was administered by mail in the following sequence. A lead letter introduced the project and its intent; the questionnaire followed in a few days with a cover letter and return envelope; and a follow-up mailing of another letter and questionnaire was ultimately sent to tardy respondents.

¹Those journals were the Journal of Modern African Studies, the Journal of African Studies, the African Studies Review, and African Social Research.

For an investigation of this type, an important aspect of the results is the response rate. In our survey 26 of the scholars in the sample of 54 returned a completed questionnaire. Two other respondents' questionnaires were returned to us blank because of changes of institutional address, and eleven others returned the instrument blank indicating their desire not to participate (in accordance with our request). Our positive response rate was then 50 percent of those scholars whose addresses were correct (as far as we know). While this return falls below the rules-of-thumb for adequacy of mail questionnaire response suggested in the survey research literature,¹ there are some peculiarities about this project which qualify the meaning of this response.

First, we do not have a random sample of Africanists to begin with, and we would have difficulty defining--much less identifying specifically--the universe of such experts. Given this situation, our "sampling" must be seen as relatively informal. Therefore, we are not attempting to infer characteristics of the universe of all African experts from this particular sample. Because of the schism in comparative politics discussed earlier in this paper, we did not anticipate that all the scholars in our sample would be sympathetic to this enterprise. Because some Africanists surely view themselves as country or subregion specialists, not all of our original sample may have felt competent to execute the task we requested.

The preferred way of viewing our respondents would seem to be as a set of 26 Africanists of relatively high academic reputation who feel competent to judge the placement of a large number of African nations on

¹Earl R. Babbie, Survey Research Methods (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1973).

several disparate scales. Our analysis is then, just as it should be in the first place, an examination of the character of such collective judgment.

Before we examine the results on the various scales, a few words about our presentation are necessary. We present in the individual tables for each scale the number and percentage of positive responses for each nation on each scale position and then the number of total respondents who did not reply or who checked "don't know" for a given nation. This is the most parsimonious format wherein we can indicate both the proportion of total respondents who felt able to code a given nation and, of those who coded each nation, the proportions who chose various alternatives. We present the complete distributions of responses rather than just descriptive statistics because we wish to allow other scholars to make a complete assessment of the results themselves.

The Aggregate Results

Our first question sought views as to regime type. We adapted the set of regime categories developed by Crawford Young¹ telling the specialists to "indicate which category is most applicable to each nation, keeping in mind that the categories represent ideal-types which individual nations may only approximate." The responses to this question are reported in Table 1. For those nations where at least a majority of the positive responses agreed upon a single coding, the results were:

¹ Crawford Young, "Political Systems Development," in James N. Paden and Edward W. Soja (eds.), The African Experience (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 452-472.

TABLE 1: Political Regime Type

	ALGERIA	BOTSWANA	BURUNDI	CAMEROON	C.A.E.	CHAD	CONGO-E	DANOMBY	EGYPT	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	KENYA	LESOTHO	LIBERIA	MALAGASY REP.	MALAWI	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONROCCO	NIGER	NIGERIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRA LEONE	SOMALI	SOUTH AFRICA	SUDAN	SWAZILAND	TANZANIA	TOGO	TUNISIA	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	ZAMBIA	ZAMBIA	
No party, traditional system ^a		13 3			4 1											23 5						40 8			5 1														
One party system ^a	36 8		11 2	91 20	8 2	9 2	10 2	5 1	57 13		71 15	4 1	4 1	100 24	96 22	72 18	32 7	73 16	15 3	91 21		95 19	5 1	5 1	15 3	29 7	18 4	17 4											
One party dominant, semi-competitive ^a		57 13		5 1					13 1			44 10		4 1	28 7	18 4	23 5					35 7			67 16	68 15													
Competitive party system ^a		30 7									48 11											5 1																	
Military regime ^a	35 12		84 16		71 17	87 20	81 17	90 18	17 4	88 22	19 4	4 1	96 25					80 16	4 1	96 23			85 21	100 26	80 16		5 1	78 18		77 17				87 20		80 17	81 17	64 16	
Unclassified ^a	9 2		5 1	5 1	17 4	4 1	10 2	5 1	13 3	12 3	4 2				27 6	5 1	5 1	4 1	4 1		5 1	15 3			4 1	5 1	4 1	4 1	33 8	18 4	8 2	9 2	4 1	16 4	10 2	16 4			
Don't know; undecided ^b	4 3	7 4	4 2	3 5	6 3	3 1	5 3	6 3	3 1	5 3	3 0	0 2	2 3	3 1	4 4	4 4	6 6	3 3		6 6	6 4	6 4	4 4	0 6	2 2	4 4	3 3	2 4	4 4	0 0	3 3	3 3	1 1	5 5	1 1	2 2			
Variation ratio	.45	.43	.16	.09	.29	.14	.19	.10	.43	.12	.29	.52	.04	.00	.04	.24	.68	.27	.20	.09	.04	.05	.60	.04	.00	.20	.13	.32	.22	.54	.24	.32	.15	.13	.26	.20	.19	.16	.08

^a Cell entries are for the percentage and number of positive responses, respectively.

^b Cell entries are for the number of responses.

TABLE 2: Military Influence on Civilian Politics

	ALGERIA	BOTSWANA	BURUNDI	CAMEROON	C.A.E.	CHAD	CONGO-E	DANOMBY	EGYPT	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	KENYA	LESOTHO	LIBERIA	MALAGASY REP.	MALAWI	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONROCCO	NIGER	NIGERIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRA LEONE	SOMALI	SOUTH AFRICA	SUDAN	SWAZILAND	TANZANIA	TOGO	TUNISIA	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	ZAMBIA	ZAMBIA
No military involvement in civilian politics ^a		95 19	5 1	22 4	6 1	10 2	5 1				28 5	15 18	9 2	29 5	47 9	57 12	82 14	59 10	6 1	67 12	4 1	31 5	10 2			48 10	6 1	4 1	15 3	5 1	72 13	57 13	9 2	20 4	5 1		4 1	35 7
The military is a "significant" interest group, among others, influencing civilian policy making. ^a		5 1	5 1	67 12					8 2	4 1	39 7	8 2		53 9	47 9	29 6	6 1	24 4	6 1	17 3	4 1	50 8	40 8	9 2	6 1	33 7	39 7	9 2	50 10	10 2	6 1	35 8	14 3	45 9		10 2	8 2	50 10
The military has no open, formal role in political decision-making, but significant direct behind the scenes military influence operates at a level more important than "normal" interest group influence (in terms of a liberal democratic model).	2 5		5 1	6 1	6 1		5 1	6 1	54 13	11 2			12 2	5 1	10 2	6 1	6 1		11 2		13 2	40 8		4 1		10 2	50 9		20 4	5 1		4 1	15 3		5 1	16 4	10 2	
The military participates openly and formally in civilian policy making through a joint civilian-military regime. ^a	56 11		20 4		6 1	15 3	17 7	33 6	25 6	17 4	6 1		16 8	6 1	5 1	6 1	6 1	33 6		25 6		5 1	17 4	26 6	17 3		6 1	30 7	45 9	6 1	4 1	18 4	5 1	9 2	9 2	6 1	40 8	5 1
The military dominates civilian policy making through a formal military-run regime. ^a	24 5		65 13	6 1	83 15	15 10	53 10	61 11	13 3	79 19	17 3	17 4	55 12				6 1	36 6	6 1	67 16	6 1	5 1	74 17	70 16	78 14	10 2	57 13	15 3	35 7	17 3		59 13	15 3	19 4	57 12	32 8		
Don't know, undecided ^b	4 6	6 8	8 8	8 8	6 6	7 7	8 8	2 2	2 2	8 8	2 4	4 4	9 9	7 7	5 5	9 9	9 9	3 3	8 8	2 2	10 10	6 6	3 3	3 3	8 8	5 5	8 8	3 3	6 6	6 6	8 8	3 3	4 4	6 6	4 4	5 5	1 1	5 5
Deviate range	2.0	0	2.5	1.0	2.0	1.5	2.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	4.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	4.0	3.0	4.0	1.0	3.0	4.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	2.0

^a As in Table 1.

^b As in Table 1.

No Party, traditional system	1
One party system	11
One party dominant	2
Competitive party system	0
Military regime	19

This overall pattern accords with customary views of regime types in Africa, i.e., a basic lack of political competition with the norm being military and one party systems. In 1969 von der Mehden placed 26 African states in the noncompetitive or single party categories.¹ Gavin Kennedy named 19 African states as countries with military governments in 1970.²

On the matter of consensus among the experts, the results were generally encouraging. For 27 nations more than 70 percent of the positive responses (that is, excluding "don't know" and "no answer" responses) were in agreement on a single categorization. For another seven nations at least a majority were in agreement. The average variation ratio (a measure of dispersion for nominal scales) was $v = 0.23$, indicating an average of 23 percent nonmodal responses. While there was some variation in the numbers of "don't know" and "no answers" by nation, those numbers were usually not striking (averaging only 3 nonresponders per nation), especially given the generally high levels of agreement among positive replies.

¹Fred R. von der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969).

²Gavin Kennedy, The Military in the Third World (New York: Scribner's, 1974).

There are several nations, nonetheless, where especially wide variation is evident. Algeria, Egypt, Lesotho, Morocco, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zaire are notable in this regard. Also, Gambia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone show significant splits in the responses between two possible party system categorizations. Some of these troublesome countries no doubt reflect substantively difficult cases where the reality may simply not fit any of the conceptualizations very well. In a sense, this is more a failure of theory than of the area experts. On the other hand, the knowledge of even area specialists regarding some countries on the continent could be relatively low.

We were also interested in one other element of regime type--the extent of military influence in the civilian government. As noted above, about half the states under consideration were classified as having a military regime by a majority of our panel. In this second question, however, we sought to delineate more carefully the exact type of military involvement. The results on this scale are displayed in Table 2.

Based on at least majority consensus positive codings, the largest numbers of nations fell in the "formal military regime" category (16) and the "no involvement" category (8). Three of the countries (Algeria, Sudan, Zaire) coded in Table 1 as military regimes did not receive a majority of codings in the highest category in Table 2; yet, they did receive large majorities in the two highest military scale positions taken together.

In terms of variation among respondents, for only 11 nations was there at least 70 percent agreement among positive replies. All these 11 were either "no involvement" or formal military regimes, suggesting that they may be especially notable for being at the extremes of the scale.

For another 21 nations, however, at least a majority of positive replies were in agreement. Also, 27 states were coded in 4 of the 5 categories by at least one respondent. This indicates that on an individual scholar basis there can be exceptional variation in replies. Yet, for most of these countries the majority of responses were split between two contiguous categories. Once, again, this may indicate as much a problem of theory and measurement as of respondent knowledge. The countries with especially disparate codings (as determined by the decile range of responses) were Gambia, Ghana, South Africa, Swaziland, and Tunisia.

More troubling is the number of nonresponders. There is wide variation here, but on average about six respondents (roughly a quarter of the sample) failed to code each nation. This is about twice the average nonresponse rate of the regime types question.

Several other questions in our survey were oriented toward specific elements of polyarchy or Western democracy. Based upon Dahl's interest in the role of opposition we framed the following preface to a question on political opposition:

According to Robert Dahl and others,¹ the allowing of freely organized political competition is an important component of democracy or polyarchy. We wish to assess the opportunities for political opposition in national level politics in our set of African nations. Oppositional opportunities would be indicated by freedom of group opposition, the right of oppositional leaders to compete for public support, free and fair elections, freedom of expression, and so on.

The codings on our "extent of political opposition" question are reported in Table 3. The responses on this scale reinforce the picture

¹Robert Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

TABLE 3: Extent of Political Opposition

	ALGERIA	BOTSWANA	BURUNDI	CAMEROON	C.A.E.	CHAD	CONGO-B	GAHNEY	EGYPT	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GAMBIA	GHANA	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	KENYA	LESOTHO	LIBERIA	MALAGASY REP	MALAWI	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER	NIGERIA	RUANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRA LEONE	SONALI	SOUTH AFRICA	SUDAN	SWAZILAND	TANZANIA	TOGO	TUNISIA	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	ZAIRE	ZAMBIA	
No organized oppositional activities are allowed. ^a	50 10	6 1	80 16	25 5	86 19	71 15	70 14	70 14	5 1	91 20	47 8		27 6	71 15	27 6	9 2	47 8	16 3	56 9	72 11	53 10	33 5	17 3	67 12	23 5	78 14		11 2	48 10	16 3	60 8	39 7	18 4	72 11	16 2	100 23	41 7	61 14	19 4	
Opportunities for opposition activities and criticism of the regime are allowed but only within narrow limits. ^a	45 9	6 1	20 4	50 10	14 3	29 6	30 6	20 4	61 12	9 2	47 8	26 5	46 10	19 4	64 14	20 16	35 6	58 11	31 5	28 5	42 8	67 10	67 12	28 5	46 10	22 4	46 10	53 10	29 6	68 13	50 10	39 7	50 11	28 5	43 6		53 9	39 9	43 9	
Opposition activities are freely allowed except for the systematic exclusion of certain groups in the society who do not form a majority of the citizenry.	5 1	11 2		15 3				10 2	16 3		6 1		9 2	10 2	5 1	17 4	6 1	11 2	13 2		5 1		6 1	6 1	14 1		9 2	21 4	14 3	11 2	5 1	11 2				14 2				14 3
Opportunities for opposition activities are generally freely allowed but there is occasional official retribution against regime opponents.		28 5		10 2					16 3			16 3	14 4		5 1	4 1	12 2	11 2					11 2				41 9	16 3	10 2	5 1	5 1	11 2		23 5		22 4				24 5
Oppositional activities are freely allowed except for relatively rare occasions of official sanctioning or limitation.		50 9										58 11	5 1					5 1									5 1												5 1	
Don't know; undecided. ^b	6	6	6	6	4	5	6	6	7	4	9	7	4	5	4	3	9	7	10	8	7	11	8		4	8	4	7	5	7	6	8	4	8	12	1	9	1	5	
Decile range	1.0	3.0	1.0	2.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.5	2.0	0	1.0	3.0	3.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	1.0	3.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	1.5	3.0	3.0	1.0	1.0	0	1.0	1.0	3.0	

^aAs in Table 1.

^bAs in Table 1.

TABLE 4: The Extent of Individual Civil Liberties

	ALGERIA	BOTSWANA	BURUNDI	CAMEROON	C.A.E.	CHAD	CONGO-B	GAHNEY	EGYPT	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GAMBIA	GHANA	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	KENYA	LESOTHO	LIBERIA	MALAGASY REP	MALAWI	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER	NIGERIA	RUANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRA LEONE	SONALI	SOUTH AFRICA	SUDAN	SWAZILAND	TANZANIA	TOGO	TUNISIA	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	ZAIRE	ZAMBIA
The full range of Western democratic civil rights is present and effectively protected by law.	5 1	40 8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	40 8	5 1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9 2	0	5 1	0	0	5 1	0	6 1	4 1	0	0	0	5 1	0	5 1
There are at least occasional governmental acts of infringement upon some Western democratic civil liberties.	5 1	35 7	0	40 8				24 5	0	22 4	15 3	32 7	0	18 4	44 10	28 6	42 8	0	0	5 1	18 3	18 3	5 1	35 8	6 1	46 10	42 8	42 8	10 2	0	14 3	22 5	19 4	11 2	42 8	0	21 4	4 1	4 1
There is regular infringement of at least some forms of Western democratic civil rights. ^a	24 15	20 4	70 4	35 7	18 4	18 4	18 4	15 3	61 12	10 2	56 10	20 4	50 11	33 7	43 9	48 11	50 9	42 8	56 9	47 9	58 11	53 9	65 11	42 8	48 11	39 7	36 8	42 8	38 8	50 11	52 11	50 9	48 11	53 10	47 9	9 2	37 7	50 12	38 8
Civil rights are virtually nonexistent in terms of any systematic guarantees of individual freedoms.	16 3	5 1	80 16	25 5	82 18	82 18	62 13	65 13	11 2	90 18	22 4	5 1	15 3	67 14	19 4	9 2	22 4	16 3	44 9	53 10	37 7	29 5	18 3	53 10	9 2	56 10	14 3	15 3	52 11	46 10	33 7	22 4	9 2	37 7	11 2	91 21	37 7	46 11	14 3
Don't know; undecided. ^b	1	4	6	6	5	4	5	6	7	6	8	6	4	5	5	3	8	7	10	7	9	9	9	7	1	8	4	7	5	4	5	8	3	7	7	3	7	2	5
Decile range	2.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	0.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	0	2.0	1.0	2.0	

^aAs in Table 1.

^bAs in Table 1.

of Africa as an area allowing comparatively little open political opposition. At least a majority of respondents agreed upon the coding of 30 nations. Only two of these, Botswana and Gambia, were placed in categories indicating extensive oppositional freedom. All of the remainder fell into the two most restrictive categories.

In terms of coding agreement, for 12 nations 70 percent or more of the positive replies agreed on a single code. Another 18 nations received at least 50 percent agreement. For most of the countries, the consensus is in a sense actually quite high, because the vast majority of positive responses tend to cluster into two contiguous categories. For example, the results for many nations are split between "no opposition allowed" and "opposition allowed only within narrow limits." The distinction between these two possibilities can certainly be rather fine in practice, and one should expect to find well reasoned judgmental variation between the two for many nations.

Once again, however, there were some peculiar outliers and variations in some individual scholars' answers. Liberia, Botswana, and Ghana had responses in each category and 14 states had 4 categories checked by at least one specialist. Several cases were particularly strange. As examples, Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia were coded by the majority as allowing few oppositional opportunities, if any (the first two scale positions), but several scholars coded each of these nations in the "only occasional retribution against regime opponents" category, as well. Botswana, Gambia, Liberia, Senegal, and Tunisia also showed wide disparities.

Regarding the nonresponse problem, the oppositions scale fares about the same as the military involvement index (about 6 nonresponders per

nation on average). Once again, however, the tendency for the positive replies to cluster around one or two contiguous scale positions allows more confidence in inferences from the results than would otherwise be the case.

Another scale relating to democratic practices is that reported in Table 4 on individual civil liberties. There is only moderate consensus in the results here, but the overall characterization is one of very limited civil rights. For only six nations was there as much as 70 percent consensus in the positive responses (Algeria, Burundi, the Central African Empire, Chad, Ethiopia, and Uganda) and all save one of these fell in the scale position for the most restricted civil liberties. For another 20 nations at least half the positive responses were in agreement and all these nations fell into the two categories with the most restricted civil liberties. Only in Botswana and Gambia did any appreciable number of respondents say a full range of democratic rights existed. Again, some notable individual variation was evident, and for six countries (Botswana, Gambia, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, and Upper Volta) all four categories were checked by at least one scholar. The numbers of nonresponses on this scale were on average identical to those on the role of the military scale.

The final political attribute relevant to democratic practices in our survey concerned opportunities for public participation in politics. We asked the panel to code nations on a scale assessing the extent to which opportunities for participation are open to the mass of citizens. Table 5 presents the results.

TABLE 5: Opportunities for Public Participation in the Political Process

	ALGERIA	BOTSWANA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	C.A.E.	CHAD	COMOROS	COTE D'IVOIRE	EGYPT	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GAMBIA	GHANA	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	KENYA	LESOTHO	LIBERIA	MALAWI REP.	MALAWI	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER	NIGERIA	RHANDIA	SENEGAL	SIERRA LEONE	SOMALI	SOUTH AFRICA	SUDAN	SWAZILAND	TANZANIA	TOGO	TUNISIA	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	ZAIRE	ZAMBIA		
All legitimate political participation is limited to a very narrow elite.	11	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Effective participation is elite dominated and the public is allowed "symbolic" opportunities for participation.	12	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Meaningful participation is generally openly allowed except for the systematic exclusion of certain groups in the society who do not form a majority of the citizenry.		1																																							
Meaningful participation is generally openly allowed but with some major qualifications on its extensiveness (as significant restrictive voting or office-holding requirements).		10																																							
Meaningful participation is effectively open to all citizens except for minimal requirements of age, residence, etc.	11	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Don't know; undecided ^b																																									
Decile range	4.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	

^aAs in Table 1.
^bAs in Table 1.

TABLE 6: The Incidence of National Level Administrative Corruption

	ALGERIA	BOTSWANA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	C.A.E.	CHAD	COMOROS	COTE D'IVOIRE	EGYPT	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GAMBIA	GHANA	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	KENYA	LESOTHO	LIBERIA	MALAWI REP.	MALAWI	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER	NIGERIA	RHANDIA	SENEGAL	SIERRA LEONE	SOMALI	SOUTH AFRICA	SUDAN	SWAZILAND	TANZANIA	TOGO	TUNISIA	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	ZAIRE	ZAMBIA
The vast majority of national administrative officials are noncorrupt in terms of Western distinctions between public and private regarding activities.	0	56	0	14	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	52	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	63	0	14	17	0	0	0	9	0	0	6
A majority of national administrative officials are noncorrupt, but a significant minority of officials engages in at least some form of behavior proscribed by Western legal standards of administration.	7	4	15	36	14	8	17	25	43	13	50	20	33	4	50	55	62	41	37	33	46	50	23	40	26	42	67	60	54	31	62	50	72	42	42	6	36	5	83
A majority of national officials do engage in some forms of corrupt behavior by Western legal standards, but there is a significant minority of noncorrupt officials.	17	1	55	43	15	30	55	74	44	33	29	20	53	32	46	30	4	24	44	2	46	42	23	40	42	25	17	27	23	6	31	21	11	42	42	35	46	20	17
Among national administrative officials it is almost universal to engage in practices defined as corrupt by Western legal standards.	1	1	1	1	10	1	1	17	14	15	21	1	11	13	11	15	1	24	22	20	4	14	20	32	13	1	13	1	0	8	14	0	17	8	59	9	75	0	
Don't know; undecided. ^b	14	10	13	12	12	14	14	14	12	14	11	11	10	10	4	6	14	9	17	11	15	14	13	16	7	14	11	13	10	13	12	8	14	14	9	15	6	8	
Decile range	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0

^aAs in Table 1.
^bAs in Table 1.

Overall the same pattern of nondemocratic practices appeared here as in earlier tables. For 36 countries at least a majority of positive responses were in agreement on a single coding. Only two of these nations-- Botswana and Gambia--were coded as allowing the most open participation possibility. All the remainder fell into the two most restrictive categories.

In terms of country specific agreement, 12 nations reached the 70 percent level for positive replies, and another 24 had at least 50 percent. These results compare closely with those for the military and oppositions scales. As with the groupwide consensus levels, similar degrees of individual-level variation were also evident in the participation results. Nineteen states were coded in at least 4 categories and 6 had all possible categories checked. In terms of nonresponse rates, the results here were about identical to those for the immediately preceding ones--about six nonresponders per nation on average.

Finally, we were intrigued with two other issues, corruption and income distribution, because of their intrinsic interest, their relation to other work by the authors, and their possible relationship to democratic practices. Corruption has been described by many as endemic to the developing world and inimical to the democratic process. We noted in remarks to our specialists that:

Much has been written about corruption in developing nations--about its various forms, its roots in traditional practices, its changes within "modern" administrative organizations, and its presumed effects on the society. Yet, the problem of measuring either the extent of corruption or its impact remains a difficult one. Incidence, scope, and consequences could all be assessed separately--and each of these separately for administrative, legislative, and electoral systems. We have focused on the incidence of corruption in administrative systems for two reasons. It can be expressed as a scaled index in relatively unambiguous terms--an

important qualification for good measurement. And, second, it is one aspect of corruption about which area experts might have a more accurate sense of the situation.

Table 6 displays the results on our corruption scale for national administrative officials. For individual nations only 4 countries show 70 percent or better consensus on a single category--Tanzania and Zambia with only a "significant minority" of corrupt officials and the Central African Empire and Zaire with near universal corruption. For some 22 other nations at least a majority of positive responses agree on a single category. Only three of these--Botswana, Gambia, and South Africa--are placed in the "majority noncorrupt" category.

One must view the results in Table 6 with caution, however, since large proportions of the sample did not respond positively regarding most of the nations. The nonrespondents frequently reach half of the sample. Likewise, the degree of individual-level variation was similar here (13 countries had responses in all 4 categories, 36 had responses in 3 of the 4). Nonetheless, the overall characterization tends toward the high or universal corruption scale positions. For 25 countries more than half the positive responses were for one of the two highest corruption categories. Two nations (Gambia and Botswana) scoring low on corruption were considered among the most democratic on other questions. Also, regimes considered high in military involvement generally scored worse on the corruption index. This finding casts doubt on the traditional military self-perception as the "purifiers" who will cleanse the body politic of corrupt civilian politicians.

Our last question related to the posture recently taken, if any, by governments to alter the existing income of the country in the direction of greater equality. It has been argued by some that economic equality

is necessary prior to the promulgation of political equality while others have considered economic issues more important than traditional Western democratic values. Table 7 presents our results on "government policy toward income distribution."

Perhaps not surprisingly, given the specificity of this scale, the numbers of nonresponders are quite high, although they are on average a bit lower than those for the corruption scale. For the entire table the extent of dissensus in positive replies is also rather high with an average decile range of 2.6 (indicating that the middle 80 percent of replies on each country range across almost 3 scale positions on average) far and away the highest for any of the tables. Consequently, we must interpret these results especially cautiously. Based on instances where a majority of positive responses were in agreement, 17 nations were coded as making no significant efforts toward income distribution and only 5 (Ethiopia, Guinea, Somali, Tanzania, and Zambia) were coded as seeking greater equality through either a mixed economy or a socialist system (the two highest codes). The more democratic states (as determined from previous tables) tended to be less involved in regularized efforts at income distribution, while those most active were divided between military (Algeria, Ethiopia, Somali) and one party (Egypt, Guinea, Tanzania, Zambia) systems.

Among the positive replies, the extent of group-level agreement on this scale was moderate. Ten nations were coded in the same category by 70 percent of these respondents and another 15 by at least a majority. The vast majority of all these 25 nations fell at one or the other extreme of the scale--suggesting once again that extreme cases are probably more notable even to the experts.

Regional Results

The employment of the collective judgment technique is particularly difficult in tropical Africa due to both its heterogeneity and patterns of training of "experts." Latin America has developed, with the exception of Brazil, only one predominant colonial heritage, language and basic culture. Africa, on the other hand, has been divided among many colonial systems, dozens of local and five European languages, and most nations have thus exhibited a highly fragmented cultural pattern. In Africa as a whole there were 3 Belgian, 14 British, 18 French, 1 Spanish, 3 Italian, and 4 Portuguese colonies, plus 2 independent polities (we considered only 39). This profusion of political entities generates considerably greater demands on the Africanist attempting to remain up to date on the entire continent or even tropical Africa alone.

A second debilitating factor inhibiting collective judgment is the background of the "experts." Historically, specialists tended to be tied to a particular colony or colonial system and many were civil servants or missionaries. Few "experts" have the language capability to work across several former colonial systems and the relatively recent nature of sophisticated political science research in the area has precluded in-depth work by individual "experts" in a large number of countries. All of this would lead to an expectation of limited knowledge across many states. On several states such as South Africa, Guinea, Tanzania, Egypt or Algeria ideological preferences may affect individual answers. Also, changing patterns of institutions make categorization difficult. On the one hand, recent coups or party variations may not be noted by all respondents. On the other, the reorientation of military regimes into

party states (at least in name) further complicated decisions of our experts.

It may thus be desirable to alter the expert sampling procedure by taking a particular region or set of countries previously under one colonial regime and seeking experts only on those states. This should reduce the "Don't Knows" and no answers and provide greater homogeneity of answers. However, even here caution is advised.

We sought to test the higher reliability of regional expertise by selecting from the aggregate sample 6 specialists on English-speaking southern African and 8 on Francophone West-Central Africa. We then examined their responses regarding nations only in their respective areas. The numbers of respondents were rather small for making fine comparisons but they were sufficient to answer the three central questions regarding the regional technique.

1. Did it lessen Don't Knows?
2. Did it limit heterogeneity?
3. Were there different patterns in substantive answers from those of the aggregate sample?

There is no question that the percentage of Don't Knows was smaller than with the general survey, particularly in the questions dealing with regime type, civil liberties, and role of opposition. However, there were cases of undesirably high nonresponse especially from the English-African sample. On both the corruption and income distribution scales the average Don't Know responses were approximately 25 percent of the subsample. Still, narrowing the sample to regional specialists does limit our nonresponse rate considerably.

Regarding heterogeneity of responses, overall there was a significant drop in individual outliers. Table 8 gives the number of countries per question that had 3 or more answers checked in the general survey and in the regional subsets.

It should be noted that the numbers in the first column are for 25 respondents while those in the second are only for 14, but the use of regional experts has limited the variation in responses among the specialists.

Finally, while the small number of specialists from regions must be handled cautiously in comparing their responses to the general survey, the general pattern between the two is quite similar. Given the higher response rate and the greater homogeneity, we did receive larger percentages in our positive answers. However, with very few exceptions, no major change in pattern was noted.

Conclusions

We began this project as a methodological exercise to examine the efficacy of an "expert judges" approach for generating cross-national variables. The exercise resulted in some interesting substantive results, as well, and we wish to review both those aspects of the work.

How one judges the satisfactoriness of the nation-codings on specific scales by our respondents depends on how stringent are his criteria of necessary consensus. Without data on the extent of expert agreement in other similar studies, we have no standard by which to compare the heterogeneity of answers here.

The criterion of 70 percent agreement used in our discussion would seem to constitute a fairly stringent criterion for acceptable consensus--

especially when many scale positions are substantively similar as was often the case. By this criterion only on the regime type variable did our respondents perform well collectively. Some might be satisfied with simple majority consensus--when the number of "Don't know" replies is itself low. By this standard our results obviously appear more favorable--with satisfactory codings for roughly 30 of the 39 nations on all but the corruption and income distribution scales (where nonresponse is the major difficulty). If the expert judges method were to be developed more extensively in subsequent research, we would argue, however, for the 70 percent consensus standard.

Our results also indicate some good reasons why nation coding exercises like this should rely on group expertise rather than the more typical single scholar codings. Some of the individual responses were wildly deviant from the modal codings and some nations showed extensive variation on particular scales. When individual scholars create judgmental scales de novo, their critics may have little opportunity to gauge the credibility of the coder or the results. Group methods help minimize the possibility of deviant results and help expose areas where no consensus exists even for the group. If judgment methods are to be pursued, however, the results of our analysis suggest some specific problems which constrain their feasibility and which should be addressed in future studies.

The major difficulty is certainly that of nonresponse. The problem was most severe with the more "exotic" nations and concepts, but it was great enough to be of some concern for most of the scales. The best route for solving this problem may be the use of subregion experts, as

demonstrated above. Yet, even this approach will create some additional problems of administrative inconvenience and of uncertainty regarding subgroup biases in interpreting individual scales. Yet, for Africa, this approach would have another important benefit. The task of judging 39 culturally and historically divergent nations is certainly a highly demanding one--probably more so than for any other traditional area studies "region." The use of subregional panels would greatly diminish this difficulty.

Another problem area for measurement efforts of this type is the specification of individual scales and the meaning of individual scale positions. Surely, some could argue with the rationales behind the details of some of our scales. Clearly, as well, determining the appropriateness of contiguous scale positions for given nations is responsible for some of the heterogeneity in our results. For assessing the overall record of African polities on a given attribute, like the role of the military, this does not cause serious problems. But if our primary goal is creating new indices (by assigning each nation to a specific scale position), it is more severe and must be considered seriously in future research. Some balance must be struck between the fineness of preferred and of possible measurement.

Finally, our analysis has also generated some substantive findings which are worthy of consideration. On the matter of regime types and levels of polyarchic development our results mirror previous generalizations about the African continent. The generally low levels of party competition, meaningful opposition, and individual civil rights as well as generally high levels of corruption have been reported in the press

and in studies by single country experts. We have gone further than previous generalizations, however, by providing nation-specific codings for a very recent time period on these issues. These codings allow some discrimination among countries in terms of their relative positions on the given scales. Furthermore, countries at the extremes of especially high or low democratic performance, for example, are clearly identified in our results. There is, then, a good deal of substantive information on current political variations in Africa in our respondents' aggregated codings.

Our study has explored the current limits of systematic theory much as we have explored the current limits of African politics. For example, some of our concepts and scales were both familiar to and salient for our respondents. Others were more unusual and coalesced less well with their own principal concerns. Thus, we may have at times been urging our respondents to judge nations on attributes of little interest to them, that is, ones outside their own principal theoretical purview. We also noted several instances when our sample was widely split in coding a nation on even some of the better known variables. This problem may reflect one of several causes. In rare instances the selection of a category may have resulted from the ideological predisposition of a respondent (this was probably the cause of some dissensus on South Africa, for example). Second, the aforementioned heterogeneity of the African continent made heavy demands on the knowledge of respondents. Finally, there is the possibility that our conceptualizations are not always so precise that informed observers can agree. These problems of ideological

bias, respondent knowledge, and the "limits of theory" would seem to constitute major concerns for any effort at comparative measurement which would employ this reputational approach.

TABLE 8: Heterogeneity of Codings^a

<u>Question</u>	<u>Aggregate results</u>	<u>Regional results</u>
Regime Type	18	6
Military Involvement	22	9
Opposition	12	5
Participation	14	7
Civil Liberties	17	11
Corruption	22	8
Income Distribution	35	12

^aThe figures in the table are the numbers of countries for a given scale where the responses fell into three or more of the possible reply categories.

68. "Income Redistribution and Its Effects on Factor and Import Demand in Taiwan: A Simulation Approach" (1975), 33 pp..... Yhi-Min Ho
69. "The International Tin Agreement: A Reassessment" (1975), 19 pp.,
.....Gordon W. Smith and George R. Schink
70. "Ethnography of Migration: Breaking out of the Bipolar Myth" (1976),
15 pp..... Douglas Uzzell
71. "Education, Communalism and Income Distribution" (1976), 33 pp.....
..... Fred R. von der Mehden
72. "From Play Lexicons to Disengagement Spheres in Peru's Urbanization"
(1976), 21 pp..... Douglas Uzzell
73. "Savings Behavior of Poor and Rich in Taiwan: 1964, 1966, 1968, and
1970" (1976), 30 pp..... Marian Krzyzaniak
74. "Communalism and the Gains from Development: The Case of Nigeria"
(1976), 55 pp..... Gaston V. Rimlinger
75. "The Relevance of the New View of the Incidence of the Property Tax in
Developing Countries" (1976), 38 pp..... Charles E. McLure, Jr.
76. "Price Policy and Agricultural Development in Ecuador" (1976),
34 pp..... Wayne R. Thirsk
77. "The Incidence of Jamaican Taxes, 1971-72" (1976), 37 pp.....
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45 pp..... Gordon W. Smith
81. "An Analysis of the Saving Behavior of a Group of Colombian Artisan
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82. "U.S. Commodity Policy and the Tin Agreement" (1977), 31 pp.....
..... Gordon W. Smith
83. "Data Reliability in Cross-National Research: A Test Employing Black
Africa Country Experts"(1978), 23 pp, K.Q. Hill and F.R. von der Mehden
84. "Urban Building and Income Distribution in Colombia: Some Relevant
Aspects" (1978), 40 pp.....R. Albert Berry and Ronald Soligo
85. "Structural Change, Employment and Income Distribution: The Case of
Korea 1960-1970" (1978)..... Daemo Kim
86. "Area Experts' Images of African Nations: A Test of a Reputational
Measurement Approach" (1978), 29 pp., K.Q. Hill and F.R. von der Mehden

NOTE: Discussion Papers are available upon request to individual scholars and researchers and libraries of educational institutions.