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PARTIES AND LEGISLATURES

Some Definitional Exercises

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## 1. INTRODUCTION: THE EXAMPLE OF "DEMOCRACY"

Anthony Judge, in his paper for the COCTA panel at this Congress, reports that a meeting of experts was once convened by UNESCO to examine the meanings associated with the term, "democracy." The report of the meeting stated that at least thirty different meanings were in current use. Subsequently the report of this meeting was not published because of its political implications. (Judge, 73, p. 53) Clearly, when authors in different cultures and contexts use the word "democracy," they are likely to be misunderstood by their readers. Obviously much of the dialogue about "democracy," therefore, entails people talking past each other, not really communicating.

1.1 Disentangling Concepts from Words. The UNESCO exercise raised problems at two levels, and they could not be resolved because the two levels--concepts and words--were inextricably intertwined. One of COCTA's objectives is to make solutions possible by disentangling these levels.

The first level simply involves the recognition of all the concepts that scholars or decision-makers find useful in their thinking, theorizing, or analysis. The UNESCO group, in forthright fashion, discovered that there were thirty concepts, all different from each other, but all relating in some way to a general conception of democracy.

A second problem arose out of the scarcity of words for use in referring to relevant concepts. Unfortunately there was one word, "democracy," which everyone wanted to monopolize for his (or her) cherished concept. If it were to be agreed that Smith could appropriate the term "democracy" to stand for a concept he wished to use, then Jones or Miller could not use the same word for the different concepts they wished to employ. Since there is a general resistance to neologisms, and strongly favorable emotional overtones accompany the word "democracy," it is understandable that every protagonist wanted to appropriate the treasured word, and no one would give ground. Thus the battle to monopolize a word subverted the scholarly effort to sort out some diverse meanings that experts had found useful and important.

1.2 Numbering Concepts. A simple expedient could have been used to cut this Gordian knot. Let us suppose that a series of numbers, from 1 to 30, had been used to identify each concept. Then users could have been asked to specify every time they wanted to use the word democracy which of these concepts they had in mind. They could have done so by adding the appropriate number: thus "democracy(14)" would be easily distinguished from the concept "democracy(23)," etc. Everyone in the know would understand that the word "democracy" without a number after it was a vague conception, that the author either intended to confuse and obscure rather than to clarify, or else that he was uninformed and needed to be taught the abc's of conceptual clarity when using such a heavily loaded word.

1.3 Scientific Usage. To a considerable degree scholars in the physical and life sciences have resolved these problems by designing and accepting technical nomenclature for the concepts important to their work. The Linear system of Latin terms for flora and fauna brought order to what had become a highly chaotic system of every day or colloquial expressions for familiar plants and animals.

Similarly the chemists, once they had identified the basic elements, each of which could be positively identified, agreed on a set of terms, like oxygen,

hydrogen, carbon, to refer to them. They could then also use these terms as building blocks to designate  $H_2O$ ,  $CO_2$ , etc. with absolute clarity. As writers in the natural sciences refer to any of the basic constituents or constructs of their fields, they can use technical and exact terminology easily understood by readers who are trained in their own fields of knowledge.

1.4 Chaos in the Social Sciences. By contrast, in the social sciences there is minimal agreement among specialists about the exact meanings to be applied to the basic terms they employ. So confusing is this situation that conscientious scholars necessarily spend a good part of their time carefully defining and re-defining the key words which they use. There are no standard reference works to which they can turn for authoritative--and generally accepted--definitions, with the result that much social science writing is repetitive, controversial, and non-cumulative. In this paper I shall illustrate the situation and try to show how a solution can be found by using the principles espoused in the COCTA working papers. For this purpose I shall examine a few concepts related to the notion of democracy, but easier to handle because they are more concrete. These concepts are suggested by the words "party" and "legislature." The word party will be given a dictionary treatment, a reconstruction from the literature, whereas the word legislature will be handled deductively, an effort in construction.

## 2. PARTIES: A RECONSTRUCTION

To save time I shall not make an independent search of the literature, but will rely on a study made by COCTA chairman, Giovanni Sartori, for his new book on political parties. First, however, let us note that Webster's Third New International Dictionary offers fourteen different definitions (or concepts) for the word party. These include such diverse meanings as a division or portion of a whole, a person or group involved in contention with others, a body of partisans or adherents, a particular person, a social gathering for purposes of entertainment, a group of animals, and an act of sexual intercourse. The word party is also defined several ways by the dictionary in the sense of a political party.

- 2.1 A Catalog of Meanings. Here I shall use the word party only in this sense. Turning then to Sartori's study, we find the following among a dozen meanings offered on the basis of quotations from the works of political scientists:
- #1. "An organized attempt to get power." E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942), 35-37.
  - #2. "Social organizations that attempt to influence (1) the selection and tenure of the personnel of government by putting forward candidates for public office, and (2) the policies of government according to some general principles or proclivities upon which most of their members agree . . ." Bernard Hennesy, "On the Study of Party Organizations" in William J. Crotty, ed., Approaches to the Study of Party Organization (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), 1.
  - #3. "Almost anything that is called a party in any Western democratic nation . . ." Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Praeger, 1967).
  - #4. "Any group seeking votes under a recognizable label." Leon D. Epstein. ibid. 11.
  - #5. "A formally organized group that performs the functions of educating the public . . . that recruits and promotes individuals for public office, and that provides a comprehensive linkage function between the public and governmental decision-makers. It is distinguished from other groups by its dedication to influencing policy making on a broad scale, preferably by controlling government and by its acceptance of institutionalized rules of electoral conduct--more specifically, capturing public office through peaceful means." William J. Crotty, "Political Parties Research," in Michael Haas and Henry S. Kariel, eds. Approaches to the Study of Political Science (Scranton: Chandler, 1970), 294.
  - #6. "A group formulating comprehensive issues and submitting candidates in elections." Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), 169.
  - #7. "Any organization which nominates candidates for election to an elected assembly," Fred W. Riggs, Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1970), 580.
  - #8. "Organizations that pursue the goal of placing their avowed representatives in government positions." Kenneth Janda, A Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1970), 83.
  - #9. "Any political group identified by an official label which presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or nonfree), incumbents for public office." Giovanni Sartori, MS on political parties, p. 3.2-10.

2.2 Analysis of Components. Remembering, now, that our purpose is to identify a list of differing concepts, and not to determine which, if any, of these concepts should properly be termed a "party," let us proceed by analyzing the defining criteria and arranging them in systematic order. Scrutiny of the definitions offered above will show, I think, that three kinds of criteria are mentioned. They relate to actors, actions, and consequences. The actor is typically some kind of collectivity. The actions indicate a regular pattern of behavior, i.e. a structure. The consequences are the system-relevant results of action, and hence the functions performed. These criteria can be separated, and a definition may include all three types or only two, but normally--not always--they provide some specification of the actor.

2.3 Types of Actor. Three types of actor are mentioned:

- (1) An organization,
- (2) A group, or
- (3) "Anything."

Without going into the definition of organizations as distinguished from groups, we may note that a temporary hand of bridge players is a group, whereas an organization is a group that has additional characteristics, such as membership, legal recognition, and continuity over time. "Anything" could, of course, be an elephant or a bus, but in this context presumably refers to one or more persons. A single individual can, in some jurisdictions, nominate himself for elections.

These categories can be hierarchically arranged in the sense that every organization is a kind of group, and every group is a kind of "anything." Note that specification of the actor affects the concept defined. If the broader term "group" is used, for example, then a committee or ad hoc set of individuals carrying out the specified activities would be a party as well as any more formally organized group undertaking the same types of action.

2.4 Types of Action. Turning next to the types of action, we can classify them under five headings, as follows:

- (1) It calls itself:
  - a) a "party," or
  - b) has some recognized label.
- (2) It seeks
  - a) power, or
  - b) attempts to place its representatives in positions of power.
- (3) It formulates issues, advocates policies, platforms, programs, ideologies.
- (4) It accepts rules and seeks office through peaceful means.
- (5) It participates in elections by:
  - a) seeking votes, or
  - b) nominating candidates.

The concepts given above differ among themselves in their selection of items from the foregoing list. Although we may assume a high degree of overlapping, such that any organization which calls itself a party will probably seek power, formulate issues, accept rules, and participate in elections, it is also possible to find groups that do some but not all of these things. Accordingly it is important in any theoretical context to decide which defining criteria are required in order to identify the entities about which generalizations are to be made, thereby making it possible to hypothesize about the other activities--not just that they normally occur but also to indicate conditions under which they may, exceptionally, not occur.

2.5 Consequences (Functions). Before illustrating these possibilities, let us look at the functions (consequences) that have been enumerated as defining properties of political parties. They include:

- (1) educating the public,
- (2) linking the public with governmental decision-makers,
- (3) controlling the government, and
- (4) placing incumbents in public office.

2.6 Domain. In addition to specification of actors, actions, and consequences, definitions may indicate the domain of the definition, which is to say the places, times, or institutional settings in which they occur. Definition #3 above, for example, limits the definition to "anything" that calls itself a party and is found in a "Western democratic nation." If the definition is intended to be exclusive in the sense that anything that does not meet the criteria put forward is not to be recognized as a member of the set, then any organization calling itself a "party" that happens to be found in a non-Western democracy, or a Western non-democracy--e.g. the German Nazi Party, or the Indian Congress Party--would not be included in the roster of parties delineated by this definition.

Although the definitions do not so specify, it may be inferred from context that most of them do not intend such a limitation and are supposed to apply to any country, democratic or non-democratic, Western or non-Western.

There are other limitations in domain, however:

1) Scale: national and sub-national. Parties may operate at sub-national as well as national levels. The definitions clearly all apply to national governments and their political processes, but it is not clear whether they also apply to provinces, states, cities, counties, etc. some of which also have relatively autonomous governments.

2) Jurisdiction: governmental and non-governmental. Many organizations that are non-governmental--churches, trade-unions, professional societies, corporations--have decision-making bodies and elect office-holders. They may contain groups that seek power and nominate candidates for election to the councils, boards, assemblies, etc. of these non-governmental organizations. While the definitions all clearly include groups engaging in such activities within government, and some specify a quest for public office, it is not clear if any of them also include groups seeking office within non-governmental organizations. However, without a specific limitation to public jurisdictions, the definitions could include power-seeking groups within non-governmental organizations as well as in governments.

3) Temporal: contemporary and non-contemporary. The election of officers to governmental positions is a relatively recent phenomenon, but the organization of power and the establishment of governments is quite ancient. Accordingly, unless time-span is specified by a definition, those which refer to efforts to gain power and to accepting rules for seeking office, can apply to Imperial Rome or Imperial China as well as to contemporary Canada, India, Lebanon, or Italy. Most of the authors probably had contemporary politics in mind when they wrote their definitions, but a strict construction would often include power-seeking groups in non-contemporary governments.

4) Offices: assembly and non-assembly. In most governments elections are only held for seats in legislative bodies or elective councils, but in some the chief executive and other public offices are also filled by election. It is doubtful if any governments have elections for non-assembly offices that do not also have elections to assemblies. By non-specification, the concept may include

elections for any type of position and this may add to the simplicity of the definition, but for some purposes it may be useful to have a concept explicitly limited to organizations that put forward candidates for assembly seats.

2.7 A Tabulation. Let us now have a look at the various definitions presented above in relation to the criteria used, as follows:

Table 1: Parties

	<u>Actor</u>	<u>Actions</u>	<u>Consequences</u>	<u>Domain</u>
1. Schattschneider	1(?)	2a	--	--
2. Hennesy	1	2b,3*	--	governments
3. Epstein (a)	3	1a	--	Western democracies
4. Epstein (b)	2	1b,5a	--	--
5. Crotty	1 or 2?	2,3,4	1,2,3	governments
6. Lasswell & Kaplan	2	3,5b	--	--
7. Riggs	1	5b	--	elected assemblies
8. Janda	1	2b	--	governments
9. Sartori	2	1,5b	4	governments

\*subject to agreement of members

2.8 Analysis. A look at the foregoing tabulation shows that among the authors cited there is no consensus on the meanings for which the word "party" is used in political science. Each definition puts forward a different combination of characteristics. If every possible combination of criteria were used, the number of conceivable concepts for which the word "party" might be used staggers the imagination. Fortunately, we do not have to deal with all possible combinations but only with those that actual writers have used, among which we have selected only nine out of what could undoubtedly be a much larger list.

Reviewing this tabulation, and looking at the actor column first, we see that Epstein (a) is willing to admit to his first concept "almost anything" which presumably would exclude non-human entities, but could include any person, group, or organization that called itself a party. Most of the authors, however, specified either a group or an organization; Crotty perhaps had an intermediate category in mind when he wrote "formally organized group." Something like the "Committee to Re-elect the President" would fit under this rubric. Schattschneider's term, an "organized attempt," may imply an organization, but I suppose an unorganized group could also mount an "organized attempt" in the sense of systematic or sustained efforts. Among the clear cases, Hennesy, Riggs and Janda specify organizations as actors, and Epstein (b), Sartori, and Lasswell and Kaplan are willing to include groups, which may not be organized, as well as organizations.

### 2.9 Actions as Criteria.

1) Looking now at the actions, we find that Epstein (a) has a concept of anything that calls itself a "party" and Epstein (b) any group with a recognizable label. A pig farmer in Scaucus announced his candidacy for the president and

proclaimed a name which included the word "party"--I regret I cannot recall it. He would fit under the Epstein (a) concept; the Committee to Re-Elect the President would fit Epstein (b).

2) The concepts proposed by Schattschneider, Hennesy, Crotty, and Janda all include the quest for power and/or placing representatives in positions of power, as criteria, but Schattschneider and Janda give this type of action as a sole requirement. Their concepts would therefore include all military juntas and cabals that sought power in addition to organizations nominating candidates for election. These two concepts are similar with the important difference that Janda specifies "placing avowed representatives in government positions," whereas Schattschneider simply requires an effort to "get power." Since one can "get power" by influencing or bribing officials, or becoming the boss of a political machine, so the Schattschneider's definition is broader than Janda's.

3) No one uses the third set of activities as an exclusive basis for defining parties, but Hennesy, Crotty, and Lasswell and Kaplan (L&K) use it in conjunction with other criteria. Thus Hennesy specifies not only the quest for public office, but also the effort to shape policies. He adds the qualification that this effort must be based on principles accepted by most of the party's members. It might be difficult to determine whether this condition had been met and, I suspect, it is not actually met in many organizations that call themselves parties and put up candidates for public office. Thus the Hennesy concept is quite restrictive. It would apply most easily to ideological organizations, like the Communist Party, whose members must, in principle, accept the party's positions as a precondition for membership, but would probably exclude the major American political parties.

L&K specify that parties must both submit candidates and formulate comprehensive issues. This rules out organizations that, while submitting candidates at elections, do not formulate comprehensive issues. Crotty, in addition to several other requirements, expects that all parties will try to "influence policy on a broad scale." It may be suspected that neither the Democratic nor Republican Parties in the United States would qualify under this definition, though it would undoubtedly include the Conservative and Labor Parties in the United Kingdom.

4) Turning to category 4, the acceptance of rules and reliance on peaceful means, we find that only the Crotty definition includes this specification. This has the effect of ruling out organizations that may engage in violent or direct action to secure their goals, even though they may also nominate candidates for elections. The Congress party of India has clearly done both, especially prior to independence, as have many other nationalist political organizations in the new states. They could not be included in Crotty's concept.

5) Category 5 calls for participation in an electoral process, a condition included in the concepts defined by Epstein (b), L&K, Riggs, and Sartori. However, a distinction may be made between seeking votes, and nominating candidates. The former (5a) used by Epstein (b), could include campaigns to win a public referendum on constitutional or legal issues, and also efforts by a caucus or coalition in parliament to affect the outcome of a vote on legislation. Thus this concept (5a) is much broader than the latter (5b), and includes many political groups that would never call themselves "parties."

L&K, Riggs, and Sartori's concepts all agree in specifying that a group or organization must nominate candidates for election. However, L&K would exclude groups that, though nominating candidates, fail to formulate comprehensive issues; Riggs specifies that the election must involve seats in an assembly; and Sartori adds the qualification that the group must be capable of winning. Then

he excludes groups which, while nominating candidates, regularly fail to secure their election. The Riggs concept requires that the election be for seats in an assembly. This would not exclude organizations that also nominated candidates for other kinds of positions, e.g. the office of president. However, if the organization did not nominate candidates for an assembly (legislature, parliament, council, etc.) it would not be included in this concept.

2.10 Consequences as Criteria. The Sartori specification includes a consequence of activity, namely success in winning elections. The only other definition that includes functions is that offered by Crotty. He specifies that in order to be considered a party an "organized group" must educate the public, link the public with decision-makers, and control the government. I suspect that most organizations that call themselves "parties" could not meet these criteria, and hence would be excluded from Crotty's concept. Possibly only a handful of organizations in the world could satisfy the criteria set forth in Crotty's definition.

2.11 Domain Specifications. As to specification of domain, we have already noted that Epstein (a) limits his concept to anyone in a Western democracy. Hennesy, Crotty, Janda, and Sartori limit their concepts to entities seeking power or office in government, and others--Schattschneider, Epstein (b), L&K, and Riggs--do not specify this limitation. Epstein (b), L&K, Riggs and Sartori, by specifying elections, imply contemporary societies. Only Riggs mentions the quest for assembly seats as a defining criterion.

2.12 Enumeration Possibilities. Having now shown that the nine definitions offered differ from each other not only in literary form but also substantively, we can justify the assertion that they refer to nine different concepts. If we were to make a comprehensive list of all entities in the world that satisfy the specifications of each definition, we would come out with nine different lists. No doubt some entities--the British Labor Party, for example--would be found on everyone's list. However, it is easy to see that some lists would contain a great many names not found on other lists. Major clans in Imperial China and military juntas in Latin America would be found on Schattschneider's and Janda's list; the Communist Party in India could not be found on the Epstein (a) list, but the Committee to Re-Elect the President would be found on the Epstein (b) list; most organizations that call themselves "parties" could not be admitted to Crotty's list; and weak minority "parties" would be found on the Riggs list but not on Sartori's list.

2.13 Re-assessment. No doubt some of the authors of these concepts would themselves discard their definitions in favor of others after giving the matter further thought. However, it is quite conceivable that at least half a dozen different overlapping concepts relating to parties are needed in political science. It is premature and dysfunctional to expect, at this stage, that the word "party" can be authoritatively allocated to one of these concepts as its recognized label, leaving the other concepts to hunt for neologisms or phrases in order to secure recognition. The COCIA approach is to give each concept in this list a serial number. Since many different concepts can have the same tags, they might all be called "party," quotation marks being used to show that the usage has not yet been standardized. By attaching numbers, however, it would already be possible to indicate clearly which of these concepts an author has in mind.

Only later, after the modeling stage in which the relationship to each other of key concepts required for the study of parties had been completed, would an effort be made to arrive at some consensus among users on the most appropriate allocation of available words as standard technical labels for the concepts which had proven generally useful in scientific or scholarly work.


### 3. LEGISLATURES AS OBJECTS: A CONSTRUCTION

Let us turn, now, to a similar enquiry into the concepts relevant for the study of legislatures. The Riggs definition, parties(7) above, refers to a type of organization that nominates candidates for seats in an elected assembly. Clearly there is an organic connection between this concept and elected assemblies. We shall not, here, look for a set of concepts that are clustered together because they have all been given the same label. That, essentially, is a reconstruction from the literature. It was used above to bring together a set of definitions that might be included in a political science dictionary, following the word "party."

Our effort in the second half of this paper will be to effect a construction, to bring together deductively a number of definitions of concepts that have some theoretical relevance to each other. We can do this by exploring, for example, a set of concepts which link parties(7) with the idea of an elected assembly. Let us begin by trying to create a conceptual framework.

3.1 Groups and Organizations. In discussing parties we saw that the actors could be classified as any entities, groups, and organizations, each a sub-set of the preceding category. Groups are entities consisting of human beings engaged in some kind of patterned interaction. Organizations are groups with acknowledged membership criteria. We can descend this ladder of abstraction by adding further criteria. Note that in this process we do not enumerate criteria, as on a string of beads, but arrange them hierarchically with cut-off points, such that each mode can, if desired, be identified by number or given a name. We have already started this process, as follows:

Figure 1: Organizations



3.2 Decision-making. Some writers would add the capacity to make decisions on behalf of the collectivity as a necessary criterion for the definition of organizations. Whether or not it is included in the definition, clearly many organizations do in fact make decisions, but by different means. Some, for example, are essentially hierarchic and others basically polyarchic. In the former, the right to make decisions is vested at the top in a chief executive, who may delegate authority to subordinates. They, in turn, may further delegate authority to their subordinates. Organizations constituted in this fashion are often known as "bureaucracies."

By contrast, an organization is polyarchic if its members all have an equal right to vote in the making of authoritative decisions. Of course, one must add immediately that, in practice, influence is never equally divided among members of polyarchic organizations--and similarly subordinates in hierarchies often exercise influence based on considerations other than delegated authority. Moreover, there are complex organizations in which the hierarchic and polyarchic principles of decision making are intermingled--a university being one of the

most conspicuous and confusingly mixed examples. Are decisions in an academic department made by the chairman or by a faculty vote? Sometimes there are rules to indicate when decisions can be made by the chairman and when by a vote, but often the boundary is unclear and protracted disputes accompany the effort to determine continuously changing ground-rules.

Despite such caveats, we can classify organizations broadly into two types, those that are predominantly polyarchic, and those that are predominantly hierarchic. This gives us two concepts that are sub-types of organizations, to be added to the ladder in Figure 1.

3.3 Size. Now, considering only the predominantly polyarchic organizations, let us distinguish by size between those that can assemble and vote in a single room, hall or meeting place and those that cannot. A national constituency that votes in governmental elections and plebiscites or referenda may be considered to be a polyarchic organization, but definitely cannot meet and vote in a single place. On the other hand, a legislature or parliament, even the largest, can meet in a single hall. No generally used word is available to make this distinction, but we may provisionally use the word "camera," meaning a room, for this purpose. Any polyarchic organization capable of meeting in a single room or in camera will, then, be called a cameral polyarchic organization. Legislatures are cameral polyarchic organizations. This criterion may well be built into the definition of legislatures. However, temporarily leaving aside the concept of a "legislature," let us define the word "assembly" as an organization that is cameral and polyarchic, i.e. capable of assembling. This enables us, at least in this context, to simplify references to the concept of a "cameral polyarchic organization."

Having looked at definitions of parties, we may also observe that most of them identify organizations which are polyarchic but not cameral. Without making it a point of definition we can assert the proposition that parties (in most definitions given above) are non-cameral polyarchic organizations. Formal or authoritative decisions can be taken by a vote of members, but all the members cannot assemble for the voting. This should be considered a statement capable of empirical verification--not true by definition.

3.4 Selection. Since we have defined organizations as membership groups, we can go on to ask how one becomes a member. Clearly different principles of selection can be used. Thus they may be appointed, elected, or inherit membership, or they may join voluntarily on the payment of prescribed fees, or by meeting other criteria or tests. In the case of assemblies, it is useful to determine whether members hold their seats by election or by other means.

If assemblies act on behalf of a larger constituency, then it is particularly important to know how they acquire the authority to act for others. Here our analysis returns to one of the concepts of democracy that was surely discussed at the meeting of UNESCO experts. If a whole society conceives of itself as a polyarchic organization in which all members (citizens) have the right to be considered in the making of public decisions, then the principle of voting may be emphasized.

Since, in practice, everyone cannot be consulted on every issue, some may be elected to act on behalf of their constituents, and if assemblies are elected, they may also make decisions by voting. This theoretical consideration gives us a reason to make the election or non-election of assembly seats a criterion of classification. Since it is possible to have a mixed assembly, one may be

considered elective if at least half its seats are filled by election. On this basis we can classify assemblies as elective or non-elective.

It is apparent that in many but not all contemporary polities elected assemblies play an important political role. One of the significant empirical questions to which we can address ourselves is the analysis of variables which affect the kind of role such assemblies can and do play--but we must resist the temptation to discuss such issues while we continue the task of conceptual construction.


3.5 Scope of Domain. We have already seen that domain is a significant criterion in the definition of parties. It is no less important here, and we may therefore add another classificatory element based on the type of domain served by any elected assembly. Since it acts for a larger polyarchic organization of which it is a component--otherwise its seats could not be filled by election--we need to identify the constituency of any elected assembly if we are to understand its behavior and functions. A distinction can be made here between constituencies that include all the residents--or all the adults, or all the male adults, or all the tax payers--of a domain and those that include only some selective fraction of the population based on occupation, belief, or other self-selecting criteria. We may refer to the former basis of membership as territorial, and hence to any elected assembly whose constituency embraces, in principle, the total population resident in a domain as a territorial elected assembly. Generally speaking elected assemblies which serve non-territorial constituencies are organs of private organizations, whereas those which are territorial serve governments.

3.6 Scale of Domain. Considering the category of territorial elected assemblies we observe that some serve entities which are classified as sovereign or nation states, whereas others serve entities that are classified as sub-national (For present purposes let us ignore assemblies which serve supra-national or international organizations.). Using this criterion, we can distinguish between national territorial elected assemblies, and sub-national territorial elected assemblies.

3.7 Duration. Let us note, finally, that some elected assemblies meet regularly and others meet only once or twice. Let us stipulate that a meeting which occurs on one day is a sitting, but a meeting which consists of many sittings extending over a period of a year, or from the time when an assembly is elected until it is dissolved or replaced after new elections, may be called a session.

In these terms, observe that a constitutional convention often takes the form of a national territorial elected assembly that holds only one session, although that session may extend over a long period of time. By contrast, if an assembly holds more than two sessions, or clearly expects to hold periodic sessions over an indefinite period of time, then it is a standing, not a temporary, assembly. This distinction enables us to classify elected assemblies into those that are standing and those that are temporary.

3.8 A Ladder of Abstraction. We have now constructed a hierarchy of concepts, each succeeding level involving dichotomous distinctions based on some variable or organizational property. A complete tree for this ladder of abstraction would generate a large number of concepts. For most of them, clearly, no convenient term or expression is available, but all could be characterized by lengthy phrases, repeating each of the classificatory elements. Omitting unnecessary items, and building on the tree in Figure 1, here is a revised and extended hierarchy of concepts.

Figure 2: Legislatures

3.9 Definitions and Terms. This tree enables us to explain several problems that arise in dealing with terminology for concepts. Using all the relevant variables--which have been assigned labels in the right hand column--we might refer to the concept no. 13 as a "standing national territorial elected cameral polyarchic organized group." Political parties might typically be, no. 6, "non-cameral polyarchic organized groups," a municipal council would be, no. 12, a kind of "sub-national territorial elected cameral polyarchic organized group," and a trade-union's governing council, no. 10, an example of a "non-territorial elected cameral polyarchic organized group."

Unfortunately such phrases are not only tongue-twisters but would be harder to remember than neologisms. Consequently, if any of these concepts are to be frequently used we will either have to remember the numbers assigned to them or accept neologisms--unless, of course, we are willing to assign a standard word to them as the authoritative meaning for that word. However, if we do this we must remember that we cannot then claim the same word to be used authoritatively as a standard label for a different concept. If, for example, we use the word "legislature" to stand for concept 5 or 13, we cannot then claim it for concepts which include, in addition to these structural criteria for actors, a range of additional properties or functions.

3.10 Selectivity. Fortunately we do not need to use all the concepts identified by a ladder of abstraction, such as that visualized in Figure 2. If we consider the requirements of particular clienteles, such as the professional groups who, we anticipate, would be engaged in COCTA modeling exercises, then only a few of the concepts in the ladder will probably be required for each group. Political scientists, for example, will be likely to require concepts 5, 7, 9, and 11 to 14. By contrast, sociologists may be more interested in 1, 2, 3, 8, and 10, while specialists in business administration might focus their attention on concepts 3 and 10. Economists and psychologists may have no use for any of these concepts.

3.11 The Numbering of Concepts. Each group of specialists will, naturally, need a convenient and easily remembered term to refer to the concepts it uses most often. If the same word is required by several groups for different concepts, we can easily understand that conflicts will arise between them. This is predictably what happened when the UNESCO experts tried to agree on how to use the word democracy. But with the COCTA method, no such clash of interests is necessary. First of all, each concept used by anyone will be added to a numbered inventory, simply using serial numbers for purposes of identification. To illustrate, the concepts in Figure 2 could be listed as follows:

- 1) a human collectivity (a group)
- 2) a collectivity with membership (an organization)
- 3) an organization in which decisions are made hierarchically
- 4) an organization in which decisions are made polyarchically
- 5) #4 capable of acting in camera (an assembly)
- 6) #4, not capable of acting in camera (e.g., a party)
- 7) #5, more than half of whose members are elected
- 8) #5, less than half of whose members are elected
- 9) #7, whose constituency is territorial
- 10) #7, whose constituency is not territorial
- 11) #9 whose domain is national
- 12) #9 whose domain is sub-national
- 13) #11 whose duration is standing (legislature)
- 14) #11, whose duration is temporary (convention)

If we review the words that have closely related and overlapping meanings in this context, such as legislature, convention, assembly, parliament, council, diet, soviet, we will easily see that most of them have additional meanings which make them poor fits for any of the concepts from 6 to 14. At the first stage of a COCTA exercise, however, we do not need to link such words with our concepts. We start just by numbering them, and leave the terminological problem for a later stage, to be tackled only after a modeling exercise in which the relationships between concepts had been handled by specialists in each group of social scientists who choose to work on the problem.

Meanwhile we can very simply refer to our concepts by number. Thus concept 13 refers to a "standing national territorial elected assembly." For convenience, or as an alternative, we might use an acronym, e.g. SNTEA, to refer to concept 13. Another temporary expedient would be to take a word like "legislature" which has a range of associated meanings--comparable to the range linked with the word "party" as discussed above--and use it for mnemonic purposes only, employing the form "legislature(13)" to bring SNTEA to mind.

3.12 Extension vs. Intension. The tree in Figure 2 may be used to illustrate Sartori's discussion of the ladder of abstraction. It will be recalled that he points to the inverse relation between denotation (extension) and connotation (intension), which is to say that the higher one goes on the ladder (tree), the more objects but the fewer properties--to use Teune's meta-conceptual vocabulary --and the lower one goes on the tree, the fewer the objects but the greater the number of properties.

If one takes the list of variables in the right hand column of Figure 2 as properties (connotation, intension), then one can easily see that, for example, there are surely not more than a couple of hundred legislatures(13) in the world today, but each one can, by definition, be ascribed a set of seven properties: membership, mode of decision-making, size, selection procedure, scope and scale of domain, and duration. By contrast, moving up the ladder, there are probably

thousands of elected assemblies(5) which possess, by definition, properties relating to membership, mode of decision-making, size, and selection procedure. However, we do know nothing about their scope and scale of domain and their duration, though it would be possible to make empirical propositions about these characteristics.

We could, for example, speculate about how many elected assemblies are territorial in domain, and how many are non-territorial. If we were then to make a random sample of the world's elected assemblies, we could demonstrate empirically what the ratio is, and either corroborate or correct our preliminary guess. Such a proposition would add to our store of verifiable knowledge whereas, of course, the definition of any of the concepts in our ladder of abstraction adds nothing to our knowledge, but merely demarcates a boundary in such a way as to enable us to determine what belongs inside and what falls outside the boundary.

3.13 Object Concepts. It may be objected that all the criteria used in defining this ladder of abstraction are static if not sterile, that they are unlikely to contribute to theory or even to prove interesting. Whether or not this objection is valid, I would say, cannot be determined at this stage. We first need to pursue our analysis further by identifying some more properties or characteristics and inquiring into the kinds of theory that might subsequently emerge. In this connection note that, to use Teune's terminology, items in the tree are all object concepts. However, the criteria listed in Figure 2 are all property concepts. They enter intrinsically into the definition of objects. Moreover, although each of these criteria can be partitioned on a multi-valued scale, they can also be dichotomized by using a threshold or dividing line. If we had dichotomized these scales at different points, we would, of course, have arrived at a different set of concepts on the tree. To illustrate, suppose we were to dichotomize the scale of domain between local government and trans-locality government. If our interest were in elected assemblies at the village, district, and county levels only, we might have done this, thereby generating a category of local territorial elected assemblies, a concept that does not appear on the tree in Figure 2. I mention this point only to emphasize what should be obvious, namely that this particular selection of concepts is arbitrary and can readily be modified to create--bring into view--a host of additional concepts. It could well be that the theoretical purposes of any particular author would not be served by any of these concepts but, if so, he could easily generate additional concepts to meet his needs.

3.14 Keeping the Lid On. Needless to say, and as a warning note, it is not proposed that COCTA should try to inventory all possible concepts relevant for the social sciences--that would indeed be a Herculean and impossible task. COCTA's goal is much more modest--merely to inventory all the concepts that working scholars have found useful for their theoretical and empirical work. That, in itself, is a vast undertaking which no one has yet undertaken to perform, and it needs to be performed soon if we are to escape from Sartori's new Tower of Babel.

#### 4. PROPERTIES OF LEGISLATURES: SOME RELATIONSHIPS

At this point, let us move, however superficially, into a further exploration of properties attributable to legislatures(13). As we do so, and thereby become even more concrete (connotative), we will also begin to see more theoretical relevance in our concepts.

4.1 A Set of Properties. Mr. Allen Temple, in a study of standing sub-national territorial elected assemblies (concept 11) in the U.S. (i.e. American state legislatures) has drawn up a list of 78 variables (properties) applicable to all of them. He relied on many different sources in the extant literature on legislatures, but many of the variables were also created by Temple from coded responses to questionnaires distributed to leaders in all 50 U.S. state legislatures. A few of the variables, however, apply to the states and their governments and were included because of their relation to legislative behavior.

Merely for illustrative purposes some of these variables are listed below. Although they apply specifically to American state legislatures, with relatively minor changes they could be made to apply also to legislatures(13). With rare exceptions there is no single word that can be used to characterize each of these variables, so phrases are used. However, for convenience in handling by computer, Temple has coined short code expressions (neologisms) for each variable, and they are given in parenthesis after each statement. Temple's manuscript gives documentation for the sources from which many of the variables were taken, but these are omitted from this paper to save space.

##### SAMPLE VARIABLES APPLICABLE TO AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATURES

- 1) Bills introduced: the number of bill introductions, less resolutions, for regular and extra sessions in 1968 and 1969 (BILLIN)
- 2) Calendar days in Session per Biennium: the calendar days each legislature was in session in 1968 and 1969 (CALDAY)
- 3) Index of Centralization in Decision-Making: a centralization index for legislatures ranging from 0 to 1 (DMCENT)
- 4) F.A.I.I.R. Overall Rank: a composite rank for each legislature based on how it measured up to minimal standards of legislative capability in five major categories of Functionality, Accountability, Information handling capacity, Independence, and Representativeness (FAIIR)
- 5) Grumm's Professionalism Index: using 1963-65 data Grumm developed an index based on (1) the total length of legislative sessions at that time, (2) legislative expenses, (3) legislative services (such as a legislative reference bureau), and (4) the compensation of legislators (GRUMMS)
- 6) Independence: combines a legislature's control over its own activities, its independence of the executive branch, its review and oversight powers, control of lobbyists and safeguards against conflicts of interest (INDEP)
- 7) Size of Legislature: the total authorized membership of both houses (LEGSIZ)
- 8) Legislative Innovation Score: a crude outline of the pattern of diffusion of 88 new programs or policies among American states, created by Jack L. Walker (LINOVA)
- 9) State Mean of Overall Direct Communications: state average of overall communications directly to and from the governor as perceived by all the legislative leaders responding in each state (MODCS)
- 10) Mean Rivalry: state average of rivalry or support for the governor as given by all the leaders of the majority and minority in both houses as perceived by the respondents (MRIVAL)

11) Partisan Conflict: a scale designed to measure conflict between parties within the legislature, not in the elections (PCNFCT)

4.2 Coding and Applications. Each of these variables was operationally defined in such a manner that exact arithmetic scores or codes could be assigned to each American legislature or each variable. In a modeling exercise a set of variables such as this could be attributed to entities in any object concept. In this particular case they apply to a sub-set of legislatures (11), i.e. to American state legislatures. Obviously they could not all be applied to every legislature (11), but with appropriate modifications, similar properties could no doubt be assigned to them, and also to all legislatures (13).

4.3 Concept Matrices. We have seen above how a sequence of dichotomized variables (properties) can be used to generate a hierarchy of concepts (ladder of abstraction). This is actually a special case of a more general procedure which typically involves overlapping criteria, and hence necessitates the use of multi-dimensional matrices. From them, of course, many new concepts can also be generated. Let us use some of Temple's variables to illustrate this point. Suppose that we were interested in the relationship between professionalism (variable 5) and independence (variable 6). We might start with a simple three-by-three matrix, hypothesizing that the more independent the legislature (11), the more professional it would be. Having coded every case on these variables, we could partition them on each scale into three segments and fill in the cells. Each variable might be divided into high, medium, and low or, on a nine-point scale, partitioned at 3 and 6. The results would tell us whether in fact these two variables were directly correlated, or perhaps inversely or randomly related to each other.

The matrix would also automatically generate a set of nine concepts, as illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3: PI Matrix

		Professionalism Index		
		HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW
Degree of Independence	HIGH	1.PH/IH	2.PM/IH	3.PL/IH
	MEDIUM	4.PH/IM	5.PM/IM	6.PL/IM
	LOW	7.PH/IL	8.PM/IL	9.PL/IL

Using initials, i.e. PH for "professionalism high," IM for "independence medium," etc. we have given symbols to each of the numbered cells. All of these concepts can be operationalized against the empirical data on 50 American state legislatures. Some of them may also turn out to be extremely useful concepts. If so, Temple will want to refer to them frequently, and others reading his work may also wish to continue the dialogue by investigating these characteristics in sub-national legislatures outside the United States.

If this happens, a terminological problem will immediately arise. He might call the whole set a PI matrix, and refer to cell 6, or concept "PLIM," or try to find some word or phrase that would suggest a system low in professionalism but intermediate in independence. It is not difficult for an individual author to handle such problems in his own idiosyncratic fashion, but it is difficult for his personal conceptual and terminological choices to gain admission and currency in the scholarly world. While Temple is working out his regression coefficients and private nomenclature, another scholar is doing very similar work on Indian provincial legislatures, but comes up with a completely different --and rival--model. Instead of being cumulative and comparative, the Tower of Babel adds another floor.

The COCTA proposal will provide a general clearing-house through which all such innovative scholars can register the new concepts they have found useful for research, and they will thereby enter the main stream of social science. Subsequently, after the modeling stage, through the terminological stage, appropriate and standardized ways of referring to the more useful concepts will be devised.

4.4 Operationalism and Theory. In reviewing Temple's list of operational definitions for legislative properties, one is struck by the importance of Hempel's observation, underlined by Sartori in his COCTA paper (1973, p. 33) namely, "the discovery of concepts of theoretical import . . . cannot be replaced by . . . the operationalist or empiricist requirement of empirical import alone." (C. G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 60, 47)

Teune arrived at a similar conclusion, stated in his COCTA paper (1973, p. 12) "Operational definitions put a premium on precision at the cost of theoretical significance." Reflecting on theories of legislative behavior one is struck by the limited interest struck in the mind of the reader by the variables put forward in Temple's catalog. Yet, no doubt, a careful analysis of this data will enable us to move ahead by a solid, though small, step in our understanding of legislatures.

4.5 Institutionalization as a Variable. By contrast, there are other variables of much greater theoretical interest which cannot, as yet, be precisely quantified or measured. Consider, for example, the term "institutionalization," which has been much debated, especially since Samuel Huntington's provocative essay, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics (vol. 17, April 1965, pp. 393-405). By linking the term institutionalization with the words "modernization" and "development," Huntington seemed to have given this much tormented field a new framework, a promising approach.

An effort was made to apply the notion to legislative studies at a conference hosted by Duke University which led to the publication of Legislatures in Comparative Perspective (New York: McKay, 1973). Allan Kornberg, editor of the volume, notes in his introductory essay that the authors were requested to be comparative in method and also to focus their analyses on the conference theme,

"Institutionalization." The limited success of this undertaking may be judged by the editor's further comment, "The failure to focus analyses on institutionalization may well be a function of the lack of scholarly agreement on even a nominal definition of that concept, or on the concept of development, for which, in some respects, institutionalization is both a surrogate and an analogue." (pp. 1-2)

It might be interesting at this point to illustrate both the theoretical interest and the conceptual confusion generated by the introduction of the term, "institutionalization" into the literature on development by making a survey of the definitions used by Huntington and his successors, thereby not only testing Kornberg's surmise, but also clarifying a range of differing--and perhaps all useful--concepts to which this single word has been attached. Having already carried out such an exercise on the word "party," it is perhaps unnecessary to take the time and trouble to do it again here.

Note in passing that the term has something in common with the idea of "standing" used above in the definition of legislatures (13). Possibly the criteria for an institutionalized legislature might simply be placed at a higher point on the scale of duration. Thus if a standing assembly must have held at least three sessions, we might assume that a legislature which has held, let us say, ten sessions, can be assumed to be "institutionalized." However, to set such an operational criterion is almost immediately to trivialize the concept, which has also taken on a host of associated functional and behavioral connotations.

4.6 Some Definitions. The salient concepts which have been termed "institutionalization" are conveniently summarized by Richard Sisson. ("Comparative Legislative Institutionalization: A Theoretical Exploration," in Kornberg, op. cit., 17-38) He notes that a number of earlier writers had expressed themselves on the subject--including Fustel de Coulanges, Sir Henry Maine, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber. However, contemporary formulations, to which Sisson refers, were given by Samuel Huntington, Shmuel Eisenstadt, and Nelson Polsby.

1) Huntington defined institutionalization as "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. Levels of institutionalization, for Huntington, are measured by degrees of adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. (Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1969. pp. 12, 18, 20, 22)

2) Eisenstadt defines institutionalization as "the organization of a societally prescribed system of differentiated behavior oriented to the solution of certain problems innerent in a major area of social life." It depends on the "extent to which any given system of social stratification and organization is capable of continuous expansion and differentiation, so as to minimize the monopolistic, freezing and ascriptive tendencies of holders of power, wealth, and prestige." (Eisenstadt, "Institutionalization and Change," American Sociological Review, vol. 29, April 1964, p. 235; and his "Modernization: Growth and Diversity," India Quarterly, vol. 20, Jan.-March 1964, p. 37)

3) Polsby offers a set of measures of institutionalization in relation to the U.S. House of Representatives, which includes: 1. institutional autonomy defined in terms of ease of identification of members, difficulty of entry, and internal recruitment of leadership; 2. complex internal organization defined in terms of role specificity and widely shared performance expectations, regularized recruitment to roles, and regularized patterns of movement

from role to role; and 3. universalistic criteria applied in the conduct of internal business and impersonal codes that supplant personal preferences as prescriptions for behavior. (Polsby, "Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, vol. 62, March 1968, pp. 144-68)

4) As for Sisson himself, he defines institutionalization as "the existence and persistence of valued rules, procedures, and patterns of behavior which enable the accommodation of new configurations of political claimants and/or demands within a given organization." (Sisson, op. cit., p. 24) In order to measure degrees of legislative institutionalization, Sisson offers three sets of criteria: structural, cultural, and the character of elite and public obligation and compliance. Each of these, in turn, is analyzed into a subset. Structural indices, for example, are broken into a four-cell matrix bounded by structural attributes: autonomy and complexity; and by external/internal aspects. Each cell, in turn, contains two or three sub-headings.

Similarly, cultural indices of institutionalization are divided into four components, bounded by institutional behavior and institutional goals in one dimension, and by external/internal on the other. Finally, structures of compliance and support for public institutions are analyzed in terms of a nine-cell matrix bounded horizontally by three levels of compliance (high, medium, and low) and vertically by three levels of support (also high, medium and low). (Ibid., pp. 24-35)

4.7 Some Reactions. It is evident that the definitional elements in these conceptions of institutionalization are extraordinarily complex. It would require an elaborate analysis--a complete paper in itself--to subject them to the kind of systematic ordering of elements that was provided above for the diverse definitions of political parties. It should be clear, however, that not only are these definitions of institutionalization all conceived on the grand theoretical scale but they involve combining a large number of definitional components. Moreover, except perhaps for Polsby's conception--and he does not really offer a formal definition but puts forward a list of measures--the constructs are not only different from each other, but are extremely difficult to operationalize.

1) Other authors in the book pay marginal attention to institutionalization. Kornberg himself neither offers a definition in his introductory analysis nor in his own contribution to the volume. Relying on Huntington, he refers to institutionalization as the appearance of "stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior." (Allan Kornberg, Harold D. Clarke, and George L. Watson, "Toward a Model of Parliamentary Recruitment in Canada," in Kornberg, op. cit., p. 250) The authors accept as a premise the proposition that the processes of recruitment of legislators in Canada and other Western democracies are already well institutionalized. They proceed from this premise to examine in some detail how recruitment to the Canadian Parliament occurs.

2) C. L. Kim, also starting from Huntington's definition, proceeds immediately to focus on legislative role analysis, as developed by Wahlke and others. He considers this "an extremely useful concept for investigating the process of institutionalization of legislative bodies." His chapter consists, then, of an elaborate analysis of their own roles as perceived by Japanese prefectural assemblymen.

3) John Grumm, in an essay applying economic models to the study of legislative systems, uses a modernization scale to compare American state legislatures with each other. The scale includes several items in the list compiled

by Temple: biennial compensation of legislators; expenditures for legislative staff and services; number of bills introduced during a session; length of regular plus extra sessions in calendar days; and a legislative services score. (John Grumm, "The Legislative System as an Economic Model," Kornberg, op. cit., p. 244)

Kornberg suggests that one may assume a "strong correlation between legislative modernization and legislative institutionalization," and consequently that Grumm's modernization measure can be regarded as "at least an indirect measure of institutionalization." (Ibid., p. 10)

4.8 Other Legislative Properties. There are, of course, other properties of legislatures that may be thought to have general theoretical interest in addition to institutionalization. Sisson suggests several such variables when he writes:

. . . the role of legislative institutions in the political system subsumes the question of power wielded in the making of law, as well as the mobilization of support for the regime . . . and the symbolic and ceremonial functions . . .

(Sisson, op. cit., p. 25)

In my own contribution to the Kornberg volume I presupposed the existence of a set of institutionalized legislatures(13), and speculated about some structural characteristics that might be associated with the effective exercise of legislative power. (Riggs, "Legislative Structures: Some Thoughts on Elected National Assemblies," in Kornberg, op. cit., pp. 39-93) It may be assumed that a positive correlation can be found between the power exercised by legislatures and their degree of institutionalization, and also with legislative modernization and institutionalization. However, in order to demonstrate the validity or falsity of such propositions, it would be necessary to establish clearly just which of the many concepts associated with such words as "power," "modernization," and "institutionalization" one was using.

## 5. IN CONCLUSION: ON FILLING GAPS

In order to illustrate some modes of concept clarification and analysis this paper has wandered somewhat erratically over the terrain of democracy, political parties, and legislatures. In conclusion it might be useful to try to fill in some gaps by showing how these terms can be related concretely to each other, and in so doing revealing an important terminological gap.

5.1 On Democracy. Surely one of the meanings attributed to the word "democracy" involves a system of government in which the preferences of the governed are systematically taken into account in public decision-making. Such a regime will not rely on intuition or private influence or the benevolence of the ruler to make good its fundamental premise but must surely institutionalize some mechanisms for translating the preferences of the governed into public policy. Since the computer revolution, we may speculate about new technologies for doing this, but the historically established method surely involves voting, both directly on issues, and indirectly on candidates to take responsibility for making decisions on behalf of their constituencies.

However, it has never been possible to carry out much of the work of government on the basis of voting. As modern governments have become increasingly complex, they have come to rely more and more on complex bureaucratic organizations, operating hierarchically more than polyarchically, to carry out the fantastically interdependent procedures of governance--the administrative functions. Bureaucracies serve as the primary instruments of implementation, but unavoidably bureaucrats themselves have their own interests and they find themselves well placed to exercise growing power. Moreover, they know well that the preferences of the citizen public are meaningless unless implemented. Thus the processes of administration are crucial for the success of democracy--and this gives the bureaucrats tremendous levers of power. They necessarily become, in any democracy, part of the political system--they share in the making of public policy.

5.2 The Electoral System. To counteract and control the exercise of bureaucratic power and to give direction to the democratic policy-making process many governments have institutionalized complex voting or electoral systems, procedures for counting heads and aggregating preferences. Central to the electoral system are a set of procedures and norms with implementing machinery for making counts, for refining issues, for policing the polls, for protecting the voter's freedom of action and understanding of the issues. I shall not discuss the concepts and variations in electoral systems, but point out simply that their effectiveness has always required a focal institution, namely an elected assembly. Although a chief executive may be directly elected, I doubt that such elections can be open or recurrent without the presence of an effective (power-holding) elective assembly. We have many test cases where elections have been foiled by military junta's seizing power in the face of pliant legislatures.

An electoral system also requires a procedure for nominating candidates, especially to the assembly. While individuals and informal or temporary groups may perform this function, in the more stable and well institutionalized systems (whatever definition is used) political parties have emerged with the nomination of candidates as one of their key functions.

5.3 The Constitutive System. A composite structure of institutions and activities has emerged in modern governments oriented to an electoral system. It would be misleading to refer to this complex structure as the "political system" since it is only part of any government's political system, something that includes also, as noted above, bureaucrats and bureaucracies, the office of chief executive, courts of law, and autonomous organizations outside of government.

This composite structure is a modern phenomenon: it arose concurrently with the elaboration of electoral systems, the emergence of elective assemblies, and the rise of political parties. We have, clearly, a need for a comprehensive structural (object) concept which includes as components one or more elected assemblies, an electoral system, and a nominating system. The nominating system in most instances is a party system which, in turn, contains one or more parties. In previous works I have referred to this composite structure (assemblies, elections, parties) as a "constitutive system." No one has so far offered a preferable term or shown that it is not an important concept, but since we have not yet gone through the COCTA exercise, I do not claim authority for the term. But the concept is, I believe, important.

5.4 An Institutional Context for Parties and Assemblies. One of the reasons why I think the constitutive system is a basic concept is because it provides a fundamental context for the understanding of elected assemblies, and also for explaining party systems. Elected assemblies can best be understood by their relation, not to governments as a whole, but to the constitutive systems in which they are embedded. Above all, the survival of an open competitive party system depends on the political potency of the elected assembly. The protection of political competition may well be the crucial function of legislatures. If the party system is dominated by a single party, that party will also dominate the elected assembly.

There are three main procedures for authoritatively electing a head of government. The office will be filled by a decision made within the dominant party if the constitutive system is powerful and the elected assembly is weak. If the constitutive system is powerful and the assembly is strong, there are two other procedures: either the assembly itself makes the decision, or the assembly protects the electoral system so that the decision can be made by the voting public.

5.5 The Rationale. The argument for these conclusions has been developed at some length elsewhere. (Riggs, Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1971) I do not put them forward here to persuade others of their validity. Rather, they are advanced as part of a concluding statement to bring into focus the relation between the concepts of democracy, of parties, and of legislatures that have been discussed in this paper.

But far more importantly, they are put forward to underline the need for a mechanism which will enter new concepts systematically into the social science domain, will provide for their consideration in theoretical and modeling exercises and finally, if they have proven their value, it will assure the adoption of appropriate terminology to facilitate communication among those interested in using the concept. My own experience has shown over and over again that when a scholar on his own responsibility seeks to introduce a new concept into current debate, he has to make a hard choice between coining a neologism or assigning a new meaning to an old term. In

the former case he is likely to be ignored because of a widespread aversion for neologisms, and in the latter case he will generally be misunderstood because readers will continue to attach old meanings to familiar words rather than accept new conceptual contents.

5.6 The Urgency. This paper ends with a plea. It is hoped that the construction and reconstruction of concepts relating to parties and legislatures that has been offered above will convince doubting auditors or readers of the urgent need to move ahead with the COCTA program. It offers an economical, substantively promising, and politically practicable solution to one of the greatest obstacles now blocking the progress of the social sciences.