

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523
BIBLIOGRAPHIC INPUT SHEET

FOR AID USE ONLY

Batch 69

1. SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION	A. PRIMARY Development and economics	DA00-0000-G530
	B. SECONDARY General--Peru	

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
 The emerging policy sciences of development, the Vicos case

3. AUTHOR(S)
 Lasswell, H.D.

4. DOCUMENT DATE 1964	5. NUMBER OF PAGES 6p.	6. ARC NUMBER ARC
--------------------------	---------------------------	----------------------

7. REFERENCE ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
 Cornell

8. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES (*Sponsoring Organization, Publishers, Availability*)
 (In Am. behavioral scientist, v.8, no.7, p.28-33)

9. ABSTRACT

10. CONTROL NUMBER PN-AAE-530	11. PRICE OF DOCUMENT
12. DESCRIPTORS Development Foreign aid Technical assistance Case studies	13. PROJECT NUMBER
	14. CONTRACT NUMBER CSD-296 Res.
	15. TYPE OF DOCUMENT

The Emerging Policy Sciences of Development: The Vicos Case

Harold D. Lasswell



Edward M. Kennedy expresses the respect of the U.S. government for the accomplishments of the people of Vicos.

THE POLICY SCIENCES of any civilization or of any historical period mobilize intellectual resources to meet the challenge of the great and continuing problems of the age. A relatively distinctive body of specialists—the policy scientists—appear in the intellectual community. Their complex functions are often dimly perceived at first, even by the individuals who engage in them.

In our day, the policy-science orientation is emerging in response to great and continuing problems. National and world insecurity, for instance, is such a challenge. National defense in a chronically divided world draws on the patriotism and competence of scientists from every field of knowledge. Whatever their original specialty, some individuals are gradually transformed into policy scientists.

The process of adaptation to the insecurity problem typically began in a crisis such as World War II. As a result of their interdependent relationship to the national community as a whole, scientists and scholars were brought into the war effort. Formerly it was assumed that once a war was over nearly everybody went home to his laboratory, field station, or library, and reverted to the spectator role in public affairs. But today the problem of insecurity does not go away when fighting is suspended. A long-known though often disregarded fact of life remains, and in the era of nuclear weaponry it takes on ominous significance. This fact of life is the expectation of violence, the expectation that whether one likes it or not, large-scale violence is probable. No all-inclusive system of world public order can be relied on to keep the peace.

In this context individual scientists begin to act as intermediaries between their colleagues—most of whom continue to do science as usual—and the authorized decision-makers of the nation states and the transnational organizations. Some advise on defense problems; some

try to understand the whole context of factors that must be understood and controlled if world insecurity is to be overcome by agreement. They advise on arms limitation and reduction, sometimes attempting to relate this issue to other major matters, such as development.

Development problems are also great and continuing challenges in our time. They are variously called challenges of modernization, of growth, of development; or, more generally, of the accelerating diffusion of a universalizing civilization based on science and technology. The demand on the part of new and reviving nations and peoples to transcend their traditional culture is itself characteristic of our universalizing civilization. The demand is particularized in the search for formal recognition and incorporation into the governmental and legal institutions of world politics. Beyond this, the aim is to obtain non-humiliating support in learning how to breathe effective power into the forms of a nation state.

Specialists from all fields of knowledge have been involved in activities that relate to giving or receiving assistance for purposes of development. Some specialists, like their counterparts in the quest for security, have achieved a policy-science orientation. We shall use the Vicos case to analyze this orientation. In Vicos the initiator was an anthropologist. But among social and behavioral scientists the economists have been particularly involved, since problems of development are often phrased as "economic." Political scientists, sociologists, legal scholars, social psychologists and other social and behavioral specialists have also been implicated. Some social biologists, demographers, and public health professionals have long been actively engaged in modernization programs. Soils chemists, engineers, and mineralogists are among those with a particularly long record.

The Contextual and Problem-Oriented Approach

As we see in the Vicos project, involvement with a major problem of public policy can lead to an inclusive orientation toward the context of past, present, and prospective features of the situation. In an important sense, the training of modern anthropologists is contextual. This owes much to the functionalist approach in which the late Radcliffe-Brown and Bronislaw Malinowski were leaders. The approach emphasized that no trait of culture could be understood until its interrelation with other traits had been uncovered by sampling the life situations of the people exposed to the culture as a whole. However, emphasis was *not* laid on the scientific advantage of enlarging the conception of context to include future events, or of modifying the future according to deliberate programs.

When Vicos was first examined, the available models of society and the social process were not sufficiently operationalized to permit realistic predictions to be made, and it was becoming apparent that established methods were poorly adapted to the task of improving the models. The contextual viewpoint, though approved in principle, was largely ignored in research practice. Investigators continued to study particular patterns of culture; yet no one took responsibility for fitting results together and subjecting partial generalizations to the test of prediction. Arrangements were not made to observe the emerging future for scientific purposes, and to make certain that after periods of active manipulation theoretical models were carefully revised.

Once it is perceived that an orderly strategy of action is a path to knowledge, the question is: What innovations shall the scientist initiate? The policy orientation is helpful in clarifying the issue. Considered in context it is evident that the consequences of any attempted innovation may ramify widely; and that, given the current state of ignorance, repercussions may include unforeseen deprivations of life and of other important values. Shall a scientist, in the name of science, close his eyes to these considerations? Or shall he identify himself with an inclusive social goal and guide his interventions accordingly?

The policy orientation chosen by Holmberg and his associates—which gained clarity through experience—was in all essential features present from the beginning. The aim was to lead a traditional community toward modernization; more specifically, to set in motion a process of community-wide decision that would survive the withdrawal of control by Cornell University personnel, and go ahead with realistic, modernizing policies. Effective control and formal authority were to pass from the Cornell *patron* to the local body politic. This was a program of power sharing, of devolution; it was a program of affirmative leadership. It sought to encourage community perspectives favorable to modernization, and to increase the likelihood of success by providing relevant enlightenment, skill, and other value assets.

For the anthropologists involved, the dominant value at stake was the advancement of knowledge. It was also

recognized that the distinctive values sought in the scientific role could be achieved while taking other values into account. As the overriding goal the project leaders postulated the realization of human dignity (rather than indignity). Applied to a traditional society this meant acknowledging an obligation to the community, an obligation to prepare it to make informed decisions in future years about the policies to be adopted in coping with the unavoidable impact of the universalizing civilization on the conditions of life.

The choice of goal was not arbitrarily made. On the contrary, it was the result of a self-disciplined procedure of reflection and study. The costs, benefits, and risks of alternative objectives (and strategies) were brought to the focus of attention. Hence the choice was made by a procedure, a succession of steps, that allowed plural possibilities to become integrated in the act of scrutiny.

It is not to be assumed that all members of the free professions—where free professions are permitted—will agree about overriding goals. It is conceivable, though unlikely, that some nuclear physicists who become policy scientists of security will commit themselves to perpetual insecurity and intermittent war. It is also conceivable, though unlikely, that a sophisticated science of counter-modernization could arise in the same way that some human biologists, who are usually predisposed to the conservation of human life, become specialists on death, and prepare for biological warfare. More immediately, individual scientists of modernization may become identified with coercive ideologies, and oppose improving the lot of underdeveloped peoples until, goaded by desperation, these peoples attach themselves to totalitarian programs. Holmberg and his associates were committed to the use of persuasion and improvement; they did not resort to strategies of provocative desperation. And their *distinctive* goal remained the advancement of knowledge.

The policy-science orientation brings the context into view as a problem. Hence five intellectual tasks become explicitly relevant: the clarification of goal; the description of trend; the analysis of conditions; the projection of future developments; the invention, evaluation, and selection of policy alternatives. When formalized, these questions lead to complementary models for the guidance of inquiry. There are "preference models" (postulating general goals for the transformers of society); "historical models" (displaying the sequence of movement toward or away from goals); "analytic models" (identifying the factors in development and the patterns of inter-determination among the components of the changing system); "projective models" (giving estimates of the probable sequence of future events in the absence of further policy intervention); "action models" (exhibiting the strategies, and the net results of policy options). Before a generalized preference model can be applied, it is necessary to obtain information about trends, conditions and projections; and to select goal maximizing (optimalizing) options in the light of changing information.

Values and Institutions

An intellectual consequence of the contextual orientation is to underline the importance of drawing a conceptual distinction between values and institutions. Among social scientists the economists are most experienced in handling these categories; hence when problems of development gained importance, economists were relatively well equipped to participate. As a rule they were unacquainted with the institutional details of tribal societies, of reviving ancient civilizations, or of non-industrial nations. But the conception of wealth-shaping and sharing (of economic value and valuation) provided an abstract model of what to look for. However novel the institutional practices of a specific society might be, a search instrument was available with which to scan patterns, and to identify production, distribution, investment and consumption phases of the value process.

The categories of value and institution were helpful in stating theories of economic growth. Growth was conceptualized as a sequence of levels or stages, a mode of analysis that made it possible to think of development as progress toward a self-sustaining process of value accumulation. Some institutional assumptions were included in the model, since it was taken for granted that rapid value accumulation presupposes such important institutional changes as the introduction of technologies for assembling and processing the factors of production that rely on non-personal sources of energy (like electricity). It was recognized that the choice of growth (in preference to non-growth) depends on changes of value demand and expectation that presently become stabilized as institutions. Economic institutions are patterns of practice relatively specialized to the shaping and sharing of wealth. Each practice is a relatively stable pattern of subjective events (perspectives) and of operations (behaviors). Conceived in the aggregate, the perspectives are the economic "myth" of society; the operations are the economic "technique" of managing men and resources in the value process.

Faced with the policy task of relating a single value-institution model to the social context, some economists of development began to be more explicit about the surrounding cultural situation. Thus W. W. Rostow introduced various "propensities": to develop fundamental science (physical and social); to apply science to economic ends; to accept innovation; to seek material advances; to consume; to have children.

The challenge of development caught political scientists in the midst of clarifying the distinction between the power value and the institutions of government, law, and politics. One result has been to accelerate the explicit use of these distinctions, and to identify the significant interconnections with the inclusive social context. Sociologists, like anthropologists, include general theorists of society and social process. However, the specialists on particular value-institution sectors (like the family or skill groups) tend to divide into social psychologists or social psychiatrists, who study perspectives; and structural social scientists who investigate operational technique. Specialists on the small community—often rural sociologists

—are trained to a configurative approach, and frequently contribute policy-oriented persons to the tasks of development.

Though some demographers, social biologists, and public health professionals have been involved in projects of modernization for years, they have not invariably considered health and safety in the context of all values. It is relatively rare to find a chemist, physicist or geologist who sees his activities in an explicitly social frame of reference. However, individual soils chemists, civil and electrical engineers, and mineralogists, for example, perform some of the roles of a policy scientist, such as suggesting knowledgeable personnel to advise, teach, or execute. They do not, however, usually add much to the principal intellectual task of the policy scientists, the understanding of the process of decision.

From an early date the Vicos Project offered data gathering facilities to any qualified scientist, and attempted to fit every new fragment to the contextual map. Improved knowledge of the dynamics of decision depended mainly on policy-oriented social and behavioral scientists.

Value Shaping and Sharing (a Generalized Model)

The question arises whether the Vicos case, which we are using to identify the characteristics of the emerging policy sciences of development, is significant for science or policy at the national level. We consider this question under three headings: 1) a theoretical model of value shaping and sharing that gained clarity at Vicos; 2) a strategy of knowledge (prototyping) that became more explicit in the Vicos Project; 3) a strategy of induced initiative in the acceleration of development.

The generalized model outlined here can be applied to a small social context like Vicos, to a national context like Peru, or to a transnational configuration (regional or universal). It begins by conceiving any social process, whatever the scale, as "man seeking to maximize value outcomes through institutions utilizing resources." During any period the flow of interaction is characterized as value *shaping* and *sharing*. Hence it is possible to summarize the aggregate result in terms of *gross value outcome* and of *net*; and therefore to arrive at a figure for *net value* accumulation (or disaccumulation). The pattern of aggregate *value participation* can be described as general or narrow. This mode of analysis can be applied to any social process. The model is contextualized in terms of eight possible value shaping and sharing sectors, with their specialized institutions.

The inclusive model:

Value Shaping and Sharing		
Initial	Gross value outcome	Net value accumulation
base values	less	(initial base values
	value inputs	less depreciation
	equal	plus net income
	net value outcome	less value enjoyment)
		and
		value participation
		(general, narrow)

(Values: power, enlightenment; wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect, rectitude.)

biguities remain. Hence an aim of any prototypical study is to devise a better strategic program.

The interplay between prototyping and other methods for the advancement of knowledge is complex. The Vicos prototype depended in part on transferring instruments and techniques from experimental situations to the field (e.g., psychological tests, blood typing). In turn, Vicos stimulated further experimentation. (One example is the search for simplified ways of studying "self-other" perceptions.)

It is understandable that prototypes stimulate programs of field study whose design is fully experimental (with "manipulated" and "control" groups). No scientific observer can fail to recognize that much is to be learned by adapting the strategy employed at Vicos to other communities. What would be the result in villages with less equal access to power, wealth, and other values? Or with most adults employed in distant jobs? Or with a different distribution of personality patterns?

Although the Vicos Project has inspired other programs, it may not be possible in every case to adhere to a strict experimental design or even to explore new prototypes. Political considerations may gain the upper hand and interfere with the advancement of knowledge. (However, official interventions will undoubtedly continue to be influenced by the Vicos prototype.)

A National Strategy of Induced Initiative

The policy sciences of development with which we are most concerned seek to devise strategies of accelerated growth that rely on minimum use of coercion. In many countries an important element in the national elite is committed to the goal of transforming a traditional society. They are, however, fully aware of elite elements who are firmly committed to the established order, and who oppose innovations that threaten to weaken their ascendancy. In desperation the modernizers are sometimes disposed to adopt coercive strategies for seizing power, liquidating reactionary elements, and mobilizing the manpower required for accelerated change. The Vicos Project supports the view that strategies of desperation are not always necessary to get things moving, even in a state whose territory includes folk societies that have never been assimilated to the nation or to the science and technology of today.

The Vicos Project can be characterized, in fact, as a strategy of induced initiative, hence of minimum resort to coercion. It points the way to programs of national or transnational development by consent of the developing peoples. It is directly appropriate to the task of activating suppressed peasant societies.

The national structure of Peru is an uneasy coalition of traditional landlords with emerging professional, commercial, industrial and labor groups. Any attempt to transform the estate system at one blow would require a stern revolutionary coup, and any such transformation would probably perpetuate a crisis of agricultural production (as in the U.S.S.R. and Soviet China).

The Vicos prototype provides a body of knowledge of great importance to enlightened national and transnational policy. In many traditional societies the human potential of the suppressed peasantry has never been directly demonstrated on a community-wide scale. Even relatively modern city dwellers who belong to commercial, industrial, and professional classes carry with them the image of the "childlike" peasant in need of a guardian elite. The image is cracked but unbroken by news of foreign countries, or by individual "exceptions." The latter are usually accounted for by alleged infusions of superior blood. Even the suppressed population is resentfully acquiescent in the face of overwhelming evidence of their low value position. Vicos was a prototypical situation that helped to bring conviction to the more modern elements of national society that the peasants were victims, not of bad blood, but of social deprivation, and that, properly encouraged, peasants could become a great national resource at all levels of creativity.

The scientists who took the initiative at Vicos needed no new information to confirm the deprivational interpretation. Their concern was on a more sophisticated level, namely, the devising of strategies whereby the consequences of past deprivation could be overcome among the suppressed peasantry, and overcome at the least human cost to all concerned. More particularly the challenge was to improve strategies of induced innovation.

The Vicos Project is a demonstration of power devolution accomplished with minimum coercion. The scientist-*patron* shared and ultimately turned over his lawful power to the community. It was never necessary to use the potential instruments of coercion at his disposal. Thanks, however, to his initial ascendancy the *patron* was able to shepherd the local decision makers away from policies that would have had dangerous results. For instance, his influence was used to prevent a few heads of the largest and best-off families from breaking up the public lands into small private units. Instead, the community was able to control enough capital to improve production in the common sector and to launch new enterprises which could supplement and strengthen the assets available to individuals and families engaged in private enterprises of their own.

No matter how ambitious the goals of development may be, changes are usually a step-by-step process. The overall problem of a strategy of induced innovation is to persuade specific persons at particular places and times that they will be better off by adopting new rather than repeating old social practices. Thus the aim is to change perspectives and operations, and eventually to consolidate the perspectives and operations conforming to the innovation sought.

The strategy calls for several choices to be made by the innovators: 1) What *practices* shall be introduced? 2) What role shall the innovators play as *value sources* in the community? 3) What role shall they play as *models* of proper practice? 4) What *participants* in the community structure shall be chosen to expedite innovation? 5) What *timing* shall be adopted for all acts of strategy?

For fuller exposition of the model, reference is made to the author's discussion of "The Policy Sciences of Development" in *World Politics* (January, 1965). A few comments are offered here to suggest how this model relates to Vicos. A power outcome is defined upon the act of giving or receiving (or withholding, rejecting) support in a decision (e.g., an election; in general, in community commitments sustained by severe sanctions, actual or potential). Political growth at Vicos was understood to be *movement toward a stable decision process in which participation was widely shared, and in which the institutional practices involved characteristically led to realistic results*. The main problem of the Vicos Project was to consolidate effective support for a decision process in harmony with these specifications.

The Project was not unconcerned with growth in terms of all other values and institutions at Vicos. However, these were viewed chiefly as factors affecting the power process. If a realistic decision capability could be attained, other changes could be left to the Vicosinos after the withdrawal of the Cornell personnel.

The Strategy of Prototyping

A policy-oriented approach is open to all the methods that have been invented to observe and process data. It also calls for somewhat distinctive ways of exploring a social context. The Vicos Project is of general interest in this connection, since it represents a somewhat distinctive methodology that is transferable to many other communities. The reference is to prototyping, whose characteristics can be clarified in terms of Vicos.

Prototyping is an active method of "manipulation." Hence it has more in common with *experimentation* or *intervention* than with the study of historical records or the making of spectator notes on activities that the scientist does not influence.

Prototyping is distinguishable from experimentation in several ways. A prototype studies an institutional practice as a total pattern. Thus the strategies of power devolution employed at Vicos are available for diffusion elsewhere. Experiments, on the other hand, are typically concerned with factors that are deliberately isolated, for purposes of study, from one or more institutional practices. For example, symbols of self-identification ("Vico:" equivalents) are part of several patterns; and it is possible to design experiments to discover the factors that condition the occurrence of such symbols. Small group experiences can be arranged in which individuals identified with "Vicos" are in the minority or majority. Does the intensity of identification with Vicos remain the same? Or is a larger identity adopted? At what rate?

Prototyping is distinguished from intervention by the fact that scientists control prototypes and politicians control interventions. In the perspective of Peruvian politics the Vicos Project did not begin as an intervention. It was launched quietly out of the glare of intense partisan controversy. Since the main goal was recognized to be the advancement of knowledge, scientists were left in charge.

Presumably this is unusual among programs of development, since scientists are kept in advisory or spectator roles.

Experiments or interventions can usually be divided into rather clear-cut stages that separate the preparatory activities involved in "introducing" an innovation from the "results." The results or responses usually begin at the moment when the experimenter or the intervener changes the environment of the subjects. In prototyping, however, it is often difficult to distinguish between preparations and results. Hence it is problematic when a change is "introduced." The point is important because it is not helpful to learn that a project has failed because the scientific staff didn't believe in the possibility of successful innovation anyhow; or that the staff contained too many misfits, persons whose character traits would not permit them to play the roles assigned. Or further, that the project was never supported by enough significant figures in the community to get off the ground. Since institutional practices are patterns of *both* perspectives and operations, a practice must be acceptable to effective decision makers before it can be said to be introduced.

The criteria of "introduction" must not be so strict that only successful results are possible, thus giving the innovators a built-in alibi that anything short of success means that, "like Christianity, the proposal has never been tried." When we stipulate that an innovation must be acceptable to effective decision makers (beyond the project staff), unanimous optimism is not implied. It is enough if an effective majority of leaders is willing to participate in a change, and believes that some advantages at least may not unreasonably be expected. From an early date Holmberg was able to elicit among the elders of Vicos an attitude of cautious willingness to enlarge the scope of their responsibilities.

Prototyping brings the scientific observer explicitly into the context of interaction. As the strategy of prototyping is refined, I predict that self-observation will be emphasized further. More is required than for a field investigator to take note of what he and others said and did, or even to describe in his diary his fluctuating moods and images about the undertaking. Investigators can profitably be encouraged to adapt free association technique to the task of bringing covert as well as overt moods and images into the record. As a result the scientist will undoubtedly modify himself in the process, seeking to acquire more effective strategy for dealing with himself and others. Group self-observation (only incidentally for therapeutic purposes) is also indicated. Prototyping is part of the insight revolution that has been accelerated in our civilization by the techniques of free association (individual, group) for examining subjective events. Cultivation of the self calls ultimately for a continual strategy in which objectives and performance are subject to planned innovation, followed by appraisal and further innovation.

Prototyping is not identical with most of what is usually meant by the term "pilot study." Usually a pilot study is planned in detail. A creative feature of prototyping is that, although objectives are relatively explicit, many am-

I shall refer briefly to some of the timing tactics at Vicos. Recognizing the suspicion with which strangers, especially authoritative strangers, were regarded, it was decided to *begin with immediate indulgences*. We note also that some tactics were *continuously employed* during the entire period; others were *discontinuous*. The principal figures, for example, continuously acted by *models* of the new forms of social practice, introducing egalitarian modes of exchanging *respect* and of acting responsibly (*rectitude*). *Wealth* and *skill* values were connected in a series of campaigns to supplement everyday activities. This was also true of *well-being* and the specific skills closely connected with this value. The *patron* was a major source of increasing *power* indulgence (rather than deprivation) as the program of devolution was carried out.

A key timing decision was to concentrate on winning over the elders, rather than to assist the younger men to gain immediate power. All Project members were explicitly involved as *enlightenment* and *skill* sources throughout their stay at Vicos; and implicitly they served as sources of other values and of new modes of conduct.

Programs of the Vicos type can be duplicated and adapted to the circumstances found in many underdeveloped nations. If such programs are perceived as successful, the news travels in all directions and stimulates diffusion. This happened along the Andes among Indian communities as the news of the Vicos Project spread. The idea of acting as a whole community and of obtaining disinterested advice was an idea that could be understood. It fit the predispositions of a traditional culture whose balance between private family channels and community-

wide channels had been maintained. It survived during the Spanish and early national period because an outside *patron* could step in to obtain most of the advantages of cultivating community land with community labor. The strategy at Vicos was to share the *patron's* power with the community while helping to consolidate a set of institutions that would maintain the pluralistic framework of society while acquiring more of the universalizing civilization of science and technology.

The emerging policy sciences of development provide another example of how the intellectual resources of civilization can be adapted to the great and continuing problems of any historical epoch. In our time the twin challenges of world wide insecurity and underdevelopment are evolving specialized intellectuals whose task is twofold: to improve knowledge of the decision process itself; to improve the mobilization of knowledge for the pressing issues of public policy. The policy science orientation is problem-oriented: It calls for the clarification of goal values, the description of trend, the analysis of conditions, the projection of futures, the invention and evaluation of policy programs. The policy science approach is contextual: It examines the interplay of value and institution, and the several phases of policy; it makes use of all techniques of data gathering and processing, and adapts various methods—such as prototyping—to its needs; it contributes to the strategies available to the achieving of such overriding goals as the realization of human dignity—such as, for instance, the strategy of induced initiative. The policy sciences use policy for knowledge, and knowledge for policy.
