


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COMMUNALISM, WEALTH AND INCOME
IN
AFRO-ASIA

by

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PREFACE

This study had the aid of several assistants in getting data: Anwar Ikbal, Jan van Lohuizen, Tuan A. Nguyen, and Neal Tannahill. The organization, analysis, and resultant gaps and problems were mine. Considerable thanks also go to Rita Marsales, Josephine Monaghan, and Lois Thomas for translating my writing and typing the manuscript.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

This monograph was initiated as a "State of the Art" paper designed to provide a broad descriptive analysis of the present state of knowledge of the role of communalism in the distribution of income, policies which intentionally or inadvertently affect economic inequalities along communal lines, and the outcome of such policies within lesser developed states (LDCs).¹ Communal groups are defined as those elements of a population that can be identified by language, religion, race, ethnicity or regional cultural patterns. This paper has thus focused upon four interrelated areas of description and analysis: 1) the nature of the interaction of communalism and economic theory; 2) the types, availability, and reliability of literature and data on the distribution of wealth and income among communal entities; 3) types of government policies that may produce, maintain or diminish economic inequality among communal groups; and 4) the influence of communal factors on the acceptance or rejection of state efforts. The first two issues will be discussed briefly in this introduction.

¹It was decided to concentrate this particular analysis to Afro-Asia where cultural heterogeneity has been more commonplace and communalism has usually been of a different character than that found in Latin America. We also determined to exclude six Afro-Asian states, the Soviet Union as a primarily European state, Japan and the two Koreas due to their high levels of homogeneity, and the Union of South Africa and Rhodesia where differences between the races is so obvious as to make further research unnecessary. Latin America will be covered in future work.

It can be argued that until recently both the distribution of wealth and income and communalism have received minimal attention from economists dealing with LDCs. Yet, programs designed to distribute wealth and income in these areas have become issues of increasing concern to academics and practitioners alike. The earlier concentration on aggregate growth which permeated economic planning within developing polities in the first decades after World War II has been challenged as questions of equity have arisen. Rather than only reaching for higher GNPs, an increasing number of planners and politicians are looking to how income can be distributed more equitably among their citizens while still maintaining respectable growth rates. While Western socialist writing, including that of Marx, Bernstein, and the Fabians have long emphasized equity questions, postwar economists analyzing LDCs have tended to focus their interests more on growth. In part this latter view has resulted from: 1) the belief that the issues of growth and equity were separable; 2) a consensus that the basic problem for LDCs was growth, which would ultimately aid the poorer sections of the populace; and 3) a view that while the early stages of development might lead to inequities, "since the rich save a higher proportion of their incomes than the poor, higher degrees of inequality would generate a higher savings rate, and hence a higher rate of output of growth, ultimately helping the whole society."¹

¹R. Soligo and F. von der Mehden, eds., "Issues in Income Distribution," Rice University Studies, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Fall, 1975), p. 103.

Communal issues have been heavily researched by anthropologists, sociologists, and (to a lesser extent) political scientists. However, communal variables have been ignored almost totally by economists and even by many development-oriented planners. Yet, the relative success of policies to provide greater growth and equity is in part dependent upon a recognition of all the variables that can affect programs and projects. Aggregate analysis, treating the polity as homogeneous, may neglect important communally-based differences such as culture-bound attitudes toward savings, education, occupations, etc. As well, the planner may not realize that a general policy may penalize or advantage a particular community, leading to possible heightened communal tension. The degree to which this issue can be politically sensitive may cause further obfuscation as policy makers are not willing even to analyze communal problems attendant to particular projects. (In Zaire, Uganda, and India the census has actually suppressed ethnic-religious data reporting.)

If communalism has historically been neglected by many economists and planners, there is one conceptual question it raises that will not go away--the relationship of communalism to class. This is a vital issue to Marxist writers who have always appeared uncomfortable with ethnic and religious loyalties that crossed class lines, considering them manifestations of "false consciousness." The Soviet Union and China have recognized the political advantages of providing at least symbolic autonomy to cultural groups, and there has been considerable Soviet writing on "the nationality question."¹ More recently racial

¹See E. Goldhagen, ed., Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger, 1968); R. Conquest, ed., Soviet Nationalities

exploitation has been considered an important aspect of the "colonial model," although ethnic variations have been less clearly analyzed by Moscow and Peking.¹

For theorists outside the communist countries, efforts to integrate cultural pluralism and class have produced considerable variation in thinking. There are those who sharply divide the state among classes which are differentiated horizontally and communal groups which are differentiated vertically. The former is an acquired status in which behavior and attitude attributes such as occupation, income, and education are the essentials, while the latter is a birth-ascribed system.² Differences in mobility within the two systems can raise important conceptual and practical problems for the planner. It is argued that a class-differentiated system provides at least limited economic and social mobility between classes which communal birth-ascribed systems prescribe such movement. For example, M. Zacheriah's study of caste and education in India questioned whether a lack of response to government provided opportunities among members of scheduled castes was related to poverty

Policy in Practice (New York: Praeger, 1967); and F. Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).

¹John Grove has commented that "The shift from a class to a racial perspective focused on the spatial orientation of the ghetto as a colony rather than looking at it as a means of production. This distinction certainly helps clarify types of oppression but does not elucidate the dynamics of socioeconomic inequality, nor have there been any systematic attempts to compare colonial models in different societies." See Ethnic and Racial, Socio-Economic Inequality: Some Cross-national Evidence (Denver: University of Denver, 1976), 6.

²See T. Shibutani and K. Kwan, Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach (New York: MacMillan, 1965); and G. D. Berreman, "Race, Caste, and Other Invidious Distinctions," Race, XIII (1972), 385-414. We are purposely not reviewing the extensive social stratification literature at this time.

or caste.¹ The former factor might ultimately be more amenable to change than the more classical communal pattern.

This issue is further complicated by writers who argue either that poverty produces a communal culture of its own or who state that ethnicity in particular is simply a function of a general system of social stratification. The latter claim that it is the unequal distribution of power and status that produces ethnic conflict. This whole discussion leads to debates as to the origins of divisions, class or ethnicity which are not pertinent to our present analysis. What is important is that perceptions of a common class and communal identity do exist among many religious, ethnic, racial, and linguistic groups; and that this can heighten tension. The author of this paper has asserted that,

among causal situations, one of the most volatile would appear to be the perception of a communal group that it is being economically or socially subjugated by another primordially based class. The word "perceived" is emphasized because it is the contention here that there need be no objective economic or social difference so long as the politically active element of the lower class perceives, or chooses to perceive, that it is being kept in an inferior position. In either case, whether subjective or objective, when class inequality is paralleled by communal separation, the end result tends to be a situation of heightened tensions. When a catalytic event such as a coup, a foreign intervention, the assassination of a communal leader, or the achievement of independence is interjected, this combination of antagonisms has led to some of the most bloody instances of postwar internal violence.

¹M. Zacheriah, "Positive Discrimination in Education: A Review of the Problem," Comparative Education, XVI (February, 1972), 16-29.

"Class" as discussed here is not considered in its Marxian connotation. In communal-class divisions, often the rhetoric and perceptions of the group that considers itself subjugated join together elements that traditional Marxist theory would term mutually antagonistic. This uniting of disparate economic classes against a common foe has been recognized by nationalist writers who have commented upon the different class balance established by imperialism. For example, the interwar Indonesian Islamic nationalist, Harsono Tjokroaminoto, once argued with indigenous Communists that the clash with the Dutch government was class war--the Dutch, Christian capitalists against the Indonesian, Moslem downtrodden native. Although Communists rejected this formulation, we must remark that communal conflict has allowed competing economic "classes," in the traditional sense, to overlook differences within the group.¹

We may also find that in many plural societies objective economic differences exist between communal groups that tend to reinforce communal patterns. As we shall show throughout this monograph, a combination of differential impact of colonial rule combined with similarly uneven development after independence has led to basic variations in class related attributes among communal groups. These attributes include occupation, education, income, and general standard of living. These socioeconomic divisions may act upon groups so that several of the aforementioned communal factors reinforce one another; i.e., where language, religion, ethnicity, and cultural values are all part of the integral whole of

¹F. R. von der Mehden, Comparative Political Violence (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 56-57.

the group. For example, interviews in Java found that villagers could not differentiate between being Javanese or Sudanese and being a Moslem.¹ Many Japanese considered accepting Christianity treason to the country as early as the initial period of missionary activity and as late as the interwar years. Indians in East Africa are identified by clothing, language, religion, and racial background. Varieties of cultural pluralism have been discussed elsewhere, but suffice to state here that we are more likely to see a plural society where both economic and communal cleavages reinforce one another as ethnic, religious, linguistic, and/or regional loyalties are maintained by economic and social inequalities common to the group.

A final point to be made in this short discussion of communalism is that perceptions of a group's communal identity may change over time as nationalization of the society proceeds. As awareness of other communities develops and the state encourages assimilation or discriminates against communal elements in the polity, the communal identity of the group may change in terms of assimilation, hardened self-consciousness, or an enlarged communal identity. Crawford Young has diagrammed one pattern of activation of cultural contact, conflict and expanded identity for the Mongo tribe of Zaire, showing growing circles of role identity.²

¹See N. Adriani, Verzameldi Geschriflon, Vol. 1 (Haarlem: Bohn, 1932), and W. Freytag, Spiritual Revolution in the West (London: Lutterworth, 1940).

²C. Anderson, F. von der Mehden, and C. Young, Issues of Political Development (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 13-110.




FIGURE 1

II

The relationship of communalism to income and wealth can be considered under three broad rubrics: (1) communalism as a causative factor of group inequality, 2) the impact of exogenous variables on communal economic inequity, and 3) the influence of these inequities on other processes in the body politic.

Communalism as a cause of income and wealth disparities is the most difficult of the three areas to analyze. Three major influences have been forwarded. As will be discussed in detail in the conclusion to this paper, one line of reasoning is that cultural norms of ascriptive groups may form barriers to the economic advancement of particular communities. Examples of such constraints would be support of traditionally-oriented religious education that does not prepare the student in modern commercial and technical skills, savings and later

expenditures for ceremonial activities, and the rejection of new tools or agricultural processes because of religious taboos. As we shall see, there is considerable debate regarding the reasons for differences in economic achievement among various communities in the Third World as particular groups have displayed comparatively greater success in the commercial field.

The second manner in which communalism has an impact upon economic differentials centers on discrimination based upon ascriptive variations. Many of the discriminatory policies of governments described in this study have their roots in group antagonisms, whether they be Malay versus Chinese in Malaysia, Moslem versus Hindu in India, Hutu against Tutsi in Rwanda, or Moro-Christian conflict in the Philippines. Group identity and rivalry may have other determinants and may be sustained for political and economic reasons, but historically based antagonisms founded upon ascriptive differences provide much of the emotional foundation to discriminating practices.

The final means by which communalism effects inequities concerns a different conceptual problem. The question is, do variations in the communal composition of the state lead to alternate policies? It can be argued that in highly heterogenous countries there should be less discrimination on ascriptive lines while in systems with a single dominant community plus one or more minorities the government may attempt to employ its power on the side of the majority. There are difficulties in making any generalizable assertions based on the evidence at hand as states with similar patterns of communal composition have displayed disparate policies. Of perhaps greater importance, reasons for the dominance of one group or another appears to relate to various

historic, geographic and social factors to a greater extent than to demographic patterns. One generalization that does tend to hold, however, is that when a small nonindigenous minority controls economic power during the colonial period (Arabs in Zanzabar, Indians in East Africa, Chinese in Southeast Asia) it is likely to be the target of discriminatory legislation after independence.

This paper is primarily concerned with the second broad rubric, i.e., the impact of exogenous variables on differentials in wealth and income among communal groups. The effect of government policies is given particular stress. This concentration can be subdivided into three areas, an analysis of national goals, the impact of government programs on particular groups, and, finally, the effect of policies on the total economy.

We may initially establish four basic orientations held by governments regarding communal equity and growth. These broad policies may change over time, existing as the position of any one political group in power, or the government may have different orientations toward one group as against others. They may be current firm policies as against long-term goals and, finally, there may be varying levels of similarity between goals and actual practice.

Egalitarianism: Most LDCs propound a fundamental goal of equity and development for all indigenous communities within the society. Government policies are described as unbiased as to religion, language, race or region, although particular projects may unavoidably advantage or disadvantage one group or another. This does not preclude inequality as a result of historically or geographically based inequities in

infrastructure, funding, education, etc., nor are covert policies nonexistent that might penalize or aid special groups. One aspect of this policy might be a rigorous stance of neutralism in the face of heterogeneity as has been the case of Zambia, Mali, and Senegal.

"Affirmative action" or compensatory: These policies also have as their long-range goal equality and growth within the political and economic structure. The basic expectation would be similar to that expressed by the Malaysian government, a prominent proponent of compensatory policies, "to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty for all Malaysians, irrespective of race" and to restructure society "to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eradicate the identification of races with economic function."¹ However, "affirmative action" policies are predicated on the belief that elements of the polity are specially disadvantaged and incapable of competing equally with other communities with sufficient rapidity unless granted more than equal aid. "Affirmative action" policies have included quotas in educational, governmental and industrial organizations, additional expenditures for programs directed toward the disadvantaged and the lowering of standards for education and employment. African examples of "affirmative action" policies might include Tanzanian efforts to direct social infrastructure investment away from the relatively prosperous Meru-Kilimanjaro region to the center and south, Nigeria's Universal Primary Education program to aid the north, and Zaire's university quota system to advantage less developed areas rather than the Kongo-Luba.

¹Malaysia, Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1971), 1.

A central issue related to this policy alternative revolves around possible impacts upon other groups within the society. While this will be discussed in a later chapter, it can be argued that equity programs of this type can only be developed peacefully without disadvantaging others in an "expanding pie" economy. That is, economies where special programs are established must be increasing sufficiently to allow growth for all groups within the system, as well as the disadvantaged if communal tensions are not to reach untenable heights.

Negative policy: Throughout Southeast Asia, East Africa and parts of West Africa "foreign" communal groups have been the targets of governments seeking to limit their power in the economy. These have been nonindigenous Asians, particularly Chinese and Indians but including Vietnamese, Europeans, and Levantines. While usually composing only a small percentage of the population they have been under attack since the colonial era for their economic control of local commerce, support of colonial governments and alleged corruption of local officials. Perceived by the populace as a foreign element unfairly dominating the economic lives of the indigenous populace, these groups have been targets of pogroms for decades.¹ Governments have made citizenship difficult for them and then used their foreign status to limit their role in jobs, professions, education, and ownership of land and wealth. Political leaders have not considered it inconsistent to support egalitarian programs for the indigenous population and limitation of opportunities for the "foreigners" although there have been

¹See F. R. von der Mehden, "Pariah Communities and Violence." in Vigilante Politics, ed. by H. J. Rosenbaum and P. C. Sederberg (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976), 218-33.

examples in which the former have also been targets of discriminatory laws and regulations.

Lack of policy: Finally, there is a small minority of LDCs that do not have an important problem of cultural pluralism and thus do not maintain economic policies designed to affect communal differences within the polity. Given the high degree of heterogeneity within the developing world this pattern is rare indeed.

Within these broad goals there has developed a variety of programs which would appear to impact upon differentials in wealth and income among communal groups. Broad policies and specific programs may be designed to attain equality for, inhibit or advantage particular communal elements. It is necessary to analyze each policy in detail to assess its particular influence. This study concentrates upon six policy areas that appear to be particularly pertinent to an understanding of the relationship of communalism and economic inequities.

Education: It has been hypothesized that education is one important variable influencing income levels in both developing and developed states, and those government programs that open or close educational opportunities are highly relevant to our analysis. Four subsets of policies appear important factors in determining access to education:

a) Expenditures available to differing groups, and private costs paid by the individual student determine the availability of educational facilities and the ability of the student to use them. Past differentials in public and private spending during the colonial period are also important in understanding the present educational infrastructure. Communal

groups in more inaccessible and, thus, less Western influenced areas have usually been the most penalized.

b) Quotas have been employed by LDC governments both to limit the enrollment of "undesirable" groups such as the Chinese and Indians and to give special help to disadvantaged elements in the society.

c) Considerable variation often exists in terms of the quantity and quality of facilities and instruction based upon area of residence. Those residing in urban areas and missionary centers have been more likely to find quality education available often up through the tertiary level, while the rural populace have usually only had access to inferior quality schooling in early primary grades. Educational opportunities for communal groups may thus vary depending upon geographic residence.

d) The ability of students to compete equally in education is in part determined by their capacity to operate in the national language. Thus, language policies may offset opportunities dependent upon whether the lingua franca is that of your own or another indigenous group, the former colonial tongue, or an artificial language.

Confiscation and residence restrictions: The most publicized forms of discriminatory policies have been designed largely to penalize foreigners and nonindigenous commercially powerful groups. Indians, Chinese, Europeans, and others have seen their property seized and/or place of residence circumscribed. Examples of this on a large scale have taken the form of anti-imperialist crusades in East Africa, Southeast Asia, and some revolutionary governments (where foreign property

was expropriated). As well, there have been instances of communal conflict resulting in the confiscation of the property of the loser, and South Africa has long regulated residence of its "native" population.

Language: Language policies of governments can advantage those groups most proficient in the chosen national language. While this factor is also discussed under education, linguistic regulations have an impact upon entrance into the civil service, opportunities to compete in national commerce, and the ability to be involved equitably in the state's political, social and economic life in general.

Quotas: Similarly, access to jobs and educational opportunities can be regulated by official and unofficial quota systems. Governments seeking to enforce a compensatory policy may reserve positions in education, the civil service, military, industry, etc. for disadvantaged groups, while "undesirables" and particularly foreigners may have opportunities limited. While confiscation, residence, language and quota policies are important and will be discussed in Chapter III, they are too politically sensitive to be subjects of field research.

Taxation, pricing, subsidies, and licensing: Taxation and licensing can have obvious implications for the distribution of income. Licensing of businesses, and import-export firms in particular, has been used to regulate the economic control of foreign and nonindigenous Asian and Middle Eastern communities in LDCs. However, efforts to limit licenses to indigenous populations have often been hindered by clandestine partnerships or ownership of restricted licenses by those previously denied. The impact of taxation and subsidy policies is far more complex and

provides difficult conceptual problems. There are obvious examples of the taxation of urban firms largely owned by members of the non-indigenous population, sumptuary taxes that are paid by particular groups, and income taxes that affect wealthier communities. However, of importance as well are indirect taxes on primary product exports which may disadvantage groups producing these items. Communal groups producing agricultural products, in particular, may feel penalized if their income derived from these taxes is not returned to them in an equitable fashion. Analysis of such taxes shows that not only are such levies likely to be an additional income tax on producers, but the revenue derived tends to be spent on urban populations. Finally, the maintenance of low agricultural food prices to keep urban political stability can have important communal implications. We will be addressing direct and indirect taxes as well as subsidies in detail in Chapter IV.

Regional investment and planning: The placement of investments, improvements and other government projects in particular regions may impact differentially upon communal groups when this is done on a demographic basis. Numerous examples are available where regional interest groups have sought to influence the placement of programs in areas which they dominate. As well, governments may formulate projects without consideration of possible communal tensions. Chapter V will analyze types of regional investment discrepancies; the generation of demands for regional equity and the means by which regional infrastructures can be analyzed.

The third area of analysis related to the impact of government policies is not discussed in detail in this paper, although we intend it to be a focus of future research. This aspect of the problem centers on the effect on the national economy of particular programs that are intended to influence levels of equity among communal groups. There are several interesting avenues of research here. What is the economic effect of restricting or rejecting successful entrepreneurial communities such as the Chinese, Indians, or Levantines? (See pp. 108-118 for a discussion of this issue in Uganda.) Do quota systems retard immediate economic growth and what are their long term implications? (See pp. 108-118.) In situations of spatial distortion where isolated communities have poorer educational, governmental and communications services what is the cost to the total economy to upgrade these programs--is some sort of policy of triage more economically desirable for the population as a whole? Basically, can a state afford a program of communal equity and if so what are the costs?

Finally, there is the impact of government policies and communal inequities on other aspects of the polity. Certainly communally-based tension arising out of economic inequities remains a major problem for Afro-Asian countries seeking to establish national unity and political stability. Religious, ethnic, linguistic and regional divisiveness have led to the fall of governments, riots, civil war, the division of countries and considerable individual hardship. A study made by the author in 1973 showed that communally-related (described as primordial) violence occurred in almost every state in Afro-Asia in the postwar, postindependence years.¹

¹F. R. von der Mehden, Comparative Political Violence (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 8 and 17.

TABLE 1: Postwar or Post-Independence
Primordial Violence

<u>Africa</u>	<u>Asia</u>	<u>Europe</u> *	<u>Latin America</u>	<u>Middle East & North America</u>
Congo (B)	Cambodia	United Kingdom	Brazil	Iran
Congo (K)	Laos	Italy	Guyana	Israel
Nigeria	Thailand	Spain		Sudan
Rwanda	Burma	Belgium		Lebanon
Burundi	Singapore	United States		Iraq
Tanzania	Malaysia	Canada		Egypt
Kenya	Indonesia			Afghanistan
Ethiopia	India			Turkey
Uganda	China (C)			Yemen
S. Africa	Ceylon			
Zambia	Philippines			
Dahomey	Vietnam			
Ghana	China (T)			
Chad	Pakistan			
Liberia				
Ivory Coast				
Equatorial Guinea				
Gabon				
Malagasy				
Niger				
Somalia				
Mauritania				

*Includes the U. S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The following charts reflect all events for which there was sufficient information to justify inclusion within the particular category.

TABLE 2: Percentages of Types of Violence in
Postwar, Post-Independence Nations*

<u>Region</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Primordial</u>	<u>Separatist</u>	<u>Revolutionary</u>	<u>Coup</u>	<u>Student/ electoral</u>
Africa	35	63%	25%	8%	71%	54%
Asia	19	74%	46%	63%	42%	74%
Latin America	23	8%	4%	25%	52%	73%
Middle East & North Africa	16	56%	25%	56%	75%	62%
Europe	30	27%	13%	14%	3%	33%

*This and Table 1 were compiled from African Research Bulletin, Asian Recorder, Middle East Record, Facts on File, Encyclopedia Americana, and individual country studies.

Much of this tension has related to the perception within groups of a common communal and class base noted earlier in this chapter. As well, government programs designed to alleviate inequities or policies consciously or unconsciously causing economic differentials have led to friction between ascriptive groups.

Prior to launching into an analysis of the impact of government it is necessary to develop in some detail the data base with which we are working, as it provides severe limitations on what will follow. Two projects are now being developed by PDS to expand and substantiate that base.

III

The usual "State of the Art" paper is a review of the literature covering the intended area of analysis, in this case the impact of and response to government policies that impact upon income and growth among communal groups in Afro-Asia. Regretably, little descriptive or analytic literature covering the fundamental areas of consideration exists in this field. Available literature (as distinct from data which will be discussed next) can be divided into three discreet types covering communalism, income distribution and growth, and government policies, with little overlap between the categories. It is impossible to review the sizable article and book material dealing with racial, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and regional groups. These are primarily anthropological or sociological in approach although studies by political scientists, historians, and more rarely economists can be found.

Examples of this type used in this study are W. Bell and W. Freeman's Ethnicity and Nation-Building; J. Caldwell's collection on Population Growth and Socio-Economic Change in West Africa; C. Enloe's Ethnic Conflict and Political Development; N. Glazer and D. Moynihan's Ethnicity; P. Kunstader's Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities and Nations; J. Schroch's Minority Groups in Thailand; C. Young's Politics of Cultural Pluralism; and a number of other works covering particular countries, groups or regions, and general issues involving communalism.¹ Of special interest has been literature related to nonindigenous minorities such as A. Bharati's The Asians in East Africa; D. and Y. Ghai's Portrait of a Minority: Asians in East Africa; M. Morris's The Indians in Uganda; V. Purcell's The Chinese in Southeast Asia; K. J. Ratnam's Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya; G. Skinner's Chinese Society in Thailand; and M. Somers's Peranakan Chinese in Indonesia. These works provide illustrative evidence regarding government programs, the response to opportunities by various groups, and some data on economic levels, but there is comparatively little quantitative material on any of these issues.

Analytic and descriptive studies of income distribution in developing states has been of a recent and limited nature when compared to those on industrial economies. The most useful general sources have resulted from work by the World Employment Program

¹ Full bibliographic information on books and articles considered in this section are to be found in the bibliography at the end of this monograph.

of the International Labor Organization. The Program's papers have covered both country analyses and conceptual problems. Other than these, there have been rare case studies such as those by Snodgrass and Linn on Malaysia, and G. Abeysekera on Sri Lanka. With the exception of extremely rare works such as C. Elliott's Patterns of Poverty in the Third World, and Malaysian studies these analyses have not combined systematic quantitative data on income with communal considerations.

Finally, there is considerable material dealing with government activities in education, taxation, language, investments, etc. from which one can extrapolate relationships with communal groups. Examples of this type of literature employed here are illustrated by J. Bertrand's analysis of taxation in Thailand; P. Foster and R. Clignet's studies of education in West Africa; and A. Yoingco and R. Trinidad's review of Asian fiscal systems. The central problem facing the analyst of the issues under consideration in this monograph is the paucity of descriptive or conceptual material that draws together the three elements of communalism, income, and policy.

Similar problems exist with regard to raw data that can be used to develop our own analysis, and it is important that the reader understand its limitations in this analysis in terms of both availability and reliability. In the best of all possible worlds we desired evidence from five areas:

Demographic--statistical breakdowns of communal differences within polities, providing patterns of religion, ethnicity, race, and religion as well as regional and rural/urban dimensions.

Income and wealth--distribution of income and wealth, primarily among households, between and within rural and urban, and regions, and particularly along defined communal lines.

Amenities--distribution of types of household amenities, housing, and other capital items along the aforementioned lines.

Programs--descriptions and distribution of government programs and projects that would affect income differentials of communal groups.

Outcomes and outputs--levels of outcomes such as health, education, occupation, etc. and of the outputs that helped generate them such as numbers of doctors, teachers, bureaucrats, infrastructure, etc. defined along communal lines.

A complete data set would allow a correlation of demographic factors, income distribution and government programs. These would enable us to describe differences in income and wealth among communal groups and to analyze the relation of these variations to various economic and social variables. While these data, combined with studies by anthropologists and sociologists, would be required for a complete, in-depth analysis, it has been necessary to develop the initial "state of the art" overview from more limited sources. What do we have beyond case studies or anecdotal evidence to support our analysis?

Household budget and other surveys

National and/or regional household budget surveys have been developed in most LDCs in the postindependence years and have been a major source of income distribution data. However, these and

other surveys must usually be treated with considerable caution due to a number of problems attendant to them. These include:

1. The size of the sample has often been too small for sufficient stratification according to income or communal variables. An International Labor Office study of thirty-six household budget groups completed in 1960-1970 included eight with samples of less than 400.¹ Another reference to national income surveys in India noted that data in surveys did not allow breakdowns by region.²

2. Reporting errors have been perennial problems for surveys, and rural-agricultural efforts in particular have been plagued with difficulties. For example, a 1968 national demographic survey in the Philippines suffered from having interviewers filling out questionnaires themselves³; agricultural surveys in Thailand were often done by individuals knowing little of agriculture⁴; a 1967-68 survey in Sudan had a high degree of nonresponse and understating of income as substantiated by the fact that 83 percent of the respondents reported expenditures higher than income.⁵ The

¹"An Annotated Bibliography: Sources of Data on Household Budgets, Manpower and Population," International Labour Review, Vol. 108, No. 2-3 (August-September, 1973), pp. 247-262.

²M. Farbman, "A Methodology for Estimating Statewise Size Distribution of Income in Rural India," WEPR Working Papers (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 1974), 33.

³J. Encarnacion, "Income Distribution in the Philippines: the Employed and Self-Employed," WEPR Working Papers (Geneva: ILO, 1974).

⁴The author found surveyers asking farmers their agricultural production and being given inaccurate figures either by design or ignorance.

⁵W. van Ginneken, "The Regional and Rural-Urban Income Distribution in the Sudan," WEPR Working Papers (Geneva: ILO, 1975).

problems of defining income and unemployment in rural areas have persisted and open comparative data validity questions at every turn.

3. Surveys are often not for the entire nation, making cross-communal group comparisons difficult. Almost half of the 36 household surveys reviewed by the ILO were limited in terms of area or group, and two were only for the capital city. Obviously, there are possibilities for extrapolating from extant data if the problems are fully recognized. However, it would appear that the further from the political and economic center of the polity the less likely the data will be complete.

4. Statistical offices in LDCs are often in danger of politicization as efforts are made to either withhold or change undesirable information. Examples of such efforts in various types of surveys include the absence of a Lebanese census since the 1930s due to the possible impact of new data showing a changed Christian-Moslem balance, the end of regular economic reports from the People's Republic of China after the failure of the "Great Leap Forward," the "statistical elimination" of tribes in the Indian census in order to display greater unity and a questionable Nigerian census that resulted in violence.

Census and population surveys

These surveys often contain the same difficulties as socio-economic studies related to income. The number of "horror stories" that can be provided are proverbial, and it is a major task to

attest to the reliability of any one set of data without a specialist's expertise. We can describe the number and general character of such surveys and whether they include variables we consider important--such as ethnicity, religion, income, employment, education, and occupation. This can be done without attesting initially as to reliability. An ILO review of 67 population censuses carried out from 1960 to 1970 showed that only 60 percent reported any communal variables and only 25 percent noted income.¹ Unfortunately, only eight censuses provided data on both income and either religion or ethnicity, three of which were island colonies: Netherlands Antilles (religion), Guam (ethnicity), Jamaica (religion and ethnicity), Malawi (ethnicity), Mexico (religion), Peru (religion), Rhodesia (ethnicity and religion), and American Samoa (ethnicity). Note that religion is not an important distinguishing variable in Mexico or Peru, leaving only three independent states with useful correlations.

Population Censuses 1960-1970						
<u>Total reported</u>	<u>Religion</u>	<u>Ethnic group</u>	<u>Educa- tion</u>	<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Income</u>	<u>Unemploy- ment</u>
67	36	25	63	61	17	46

If we attempt to correlate communal and income variables from these censuses with variables from the 36 household income surveys, we find that only two censuses included income and were among the household surveys, and 23 of the household surveys did not have a

¹ILO, "An Annotated Bibliography," op. cit.

country census with a communal variable; 11 had religion and 9 had ethnicity. We should also note that in several cases where correlations are theoretically possible, the samples were probably too small to be meaningful. While neither of the ILO censuses of

Countries with Both Household Budget
and Communal Census Data

(+ available - not reported)

Country	Household Budget Surveys				Censuses				
	Income	Education	Occupation	Covers all population	Religion	Ethnicity	Education	Occupation	Employment
Cameroon*	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Chile	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+
Dahomey	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-
Fiji	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	-
Gabon	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-
Ghana*	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Jordan	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+
Kenya*	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-
Malawi*	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-
Pakistan*	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sudan*	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+
Surinam*	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+
Vietnam	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+

* PDS has other data.

surveys pretended to be completely exhaustive over time and country, they give us a good idea of the general availability of data upon which we can make empirically based statements.

To summarize, even taking into account problems with the reliability of data, we find only a small minority of countries with sufficient statistics. Efforts to correlate communal data with income from censuses yield only 8 states out of 67 and many of these were not typical of pluralist polities of Afro-Asia. Even considering the 13 states with data on income from the household budget surveys and communal information from censuses, there are gaps in coverage. This chart does not include census and household budget surveys done in the past five years, and two states not listed (Malaysia and Sri Lanka) have data that are both of high quality.

Income tax

A third area of information can be gained from income tax reports. Such data are often not readily available, in such a form as to be highly time consuming to study, insufficiently disaggregated or categorized or derived from under or improper reporting. Income taxes may be collected from those at an income level too high for useful disaggregation of poorer groups. As well, as Gamini Abeysekera found in his study of Sri Lanka, there are often difficulties in the internal comparability of data from different agencies.¹ This becomes even more complex as cross-national analyses are attempted.

¹G. Abeysekera, "The Distribution of Income in Sri Lanka, 1953-1973: Its Structure, Trends and Interpretation," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1975.


Given the paucity of data available that correlate communalism and income distribution, we have sought other means of gathering the necessary empirical underpinnings to future research. Two areas of analysis in particular offer interesting possibilities, rural/urban and regional comparisons. Each can be of importance both intrinsically and as they relate to communal issues. Rural/urban and regional cleavages have long interested economists, political scientists and anthropologists, with income discrepancies being only one area of analysis. But further, there are cases where these variations may co-vary with communal divisions. To elucidate:

Rural/urban: We start with a base of considerable previous work on rural/urban divisions. For example, of the 36 household budget surveys previously noted, 15 provided data of some sort on this dimension, which could be correlated with other socioeconomic variables.¹ There have also been other useful studies as those on Africa by J. Lecaillon and D. Germides; Astra Mecsook's work on Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia; van Ginneken's studies of Mexico and the Sudan; A. O. Phillips and O. Teriba's analysis of Nigeria; and Indira Rajamaran's review of data on the Indian subcontinent.² However, care must be taken in analyzing rural/urban differences, and we should initially note two conceptual difficulties. Lecaillon, Germides, and others have argued that the rural/urban dichotomy is fallacious as there exist traditional sections in urban areas and vice versa. Migration may not only be to urban areas. Lecaillon

¹ ILO, "An Annotated Bibliography," op. cit.

² These citations are listed in the Bibliography.

and Germides summarize possible movement and activities as follows:¹



Secondly, we began our research hypothesizing that there are possibilities of looking at rural/urban dichotomies as another means of obtaining communal data, given the paucity of other material. It was initially hoped that we would find communal boundaries coinciding with urban centers. For example, it could be argued that in Africa particular tribal groups have dominated certain urban centers such as the Merinas in Malagasy, Bamiléké in Douala and Youndé of the Cameroon, and the Mbundu of Luanda of Angola. However, it would appear that this type of analysis may tell us more about incomes of rural communities

¹J. Lecaillon and D. Germides, "Part des Salaries dans le Revenu National et Developpement Economique," WERP Working Papers (Geneva: ILO, 1974).

than urban centers since cities appear less homogeneous today. That is, internal and external migration has developed a more polyglot urban population, and it is a rare city with a single communal group that would allow us to use rural/urban data. Beyond this, in the African case there appears to be considerable fluidity over time in terms of the definition of the communal unit of analysis.

Regional: Another means of attacking this problem is to look for covariance between provincial or district boundaries and communal groups.¹ If data are available on these administrative units then communally-oriented conclusions can be drawn. We cannot expect that an entire nation will have this covariance, but individual areas may. For example, the following map of the Ivory Coast shows an overall convergence of tribal and administrative divisions.² It should then be possible to correlate economic and social variables with these areas. However, this covariance is more often negated by the heterogeneity of LDC provinces and districts as illustrated by the map of Liberia.³ As well, reliable income and other data are not always available for these units and is more likely to be poorer in quantity and quality for outlying regions.

V

Given these problems, we have sought a variety of means by which data correlating income, opportunity, and communal data can be

¹For an interesting discussion of the problems and possibilities in regional income analysis in data-poor areas, see W. Isard, Methods of Regional Analysis: An Introduction to Regional Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960), 100-107.

²John C. Caldwell, ed., Population Growth and Socio-Economic Change in West Africa (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 662.

³Ibid., 533.

Tribal and Administrative Divisions
in the Ivory Coast and Liberia




FIGURE 32.3. Ethnic Distribution
in the Ivory Coast




FIGURE 25.2. Tribes of Liberia

retrieved. The best of all possible worlds are the compilations of the type found in Malaysia. Not only are statistics there generally quite reliable, but both income and a series of other extremely useful economic and social variables are reported along communal lines. Thus, we can find data supporting the contention that foreigners, Chinese, and/or the urban population have consistently higher levels of income, household amenities, and ownership in the corporate sectors of agriculture and industry (Appendix 1). However, such quality and quantity of data are rare in Afro-Asian countries, and we must be satisfied with statistics and other evidence which are more limited in reliability and/or the variables reported. These include:

1. Partial data on communal lines: A number of countries do collect useful statistics along linguistic, religious, racial or ethnic lines, but the variables covered are not as extensive as in the Malaysian case. A preliminary assessment of a large number of Afro-Asian censuses showed that they usually reported communal breakdowns in terms of education, occupation, and employment--but not on income. Three examples of this type of data are provided in Appendix 2. The Ghanaian government has reported its statistics in both numbers and graphs. For illustrative purposes we have provided examples of its graphs. These data on education and income show the very low levels of modern schooling among tribes such as the Hawa, Tem, and Songhai; the almost total lack of secondary and university training among these tribes, and women in most other tribes; and the heavy concentration of professional, managerial and clerical personnel among the Akan

and Ga-Andangbe. This can be used in our analysis of opportunities and occupation status.

Cyprus and Fiji are two well-known examples of communally divided societies, and census data from both show sharp economic and social differentials, although in neither case is there adequate income data reported in the pattern desired. Among other variables, the Fiji material shows the dominance of Indians and Europeans among professional and official workers, the high percentage of Fijians in agriculture and comparatively low levels of Indian educational achievement. [See Appendix III.] The Cyprus data shows the advantages Greeks held over Turks in occupation and the lower levels of education combined with higher unemployment, a seeming inconsistency we will consider in general in later chapters. [See Appendix IV.] The Indian and Ugandan data give the ethnic distribution of members of the civil service. [See Appendix V.]

2. Nonindigenous groups: An important issue in our analysis has been the role of foreign communities within LDCs and comparative data on these communities and indigenous populations is essential. Usually material on noncitizens is more available than for the nonindigenous Asians and Middle Easterners who may have lived in an area for generations. Kenya does offer an example of complete data comparing Asians, Europeans, Africans, and others both across and within communal lines. Statistics such as those provided in Appendix VI show the dominance of Europeans and Asians in high level occupations, earnings, and education. However, most of our evidence regarding these groups has been illustrative without a reliable national statistical base.

3. Administrative division/communal extrapolation: Finally, where useful statistics are not available directly by community, it is necessary to extrapolate the data from administrative divisions where these districts, states, or provinces may co-vary with communal patterns. We are in the process of analyzing several LDCs using this type of correlation. In the case of Thailand we have used data covering health, education, and government expenditures on several levels:

- a) The Bangkok-Thonburi metropolitan region against other regions and provinces,
- b) Provinces in the North-Northeast that have perceived themselves as Thai but communally different compared with other provinces,
- c) Sections of provinces with large non-Thai minorities with other parts of the same province.

The striking point in this data is that communal variations are not great, but differences between the Bangkok region and other parts of the kingdom are significant. [See Appendix 7.]¹ Yet, even these data can be misleading since numbers of students, teachers or schools, for example, do not tell us anything about quality of education. This factor is drawn out by analyzing the percentage of teachers with bachelor's degrees presented in the Appendix. Of course, in a largely homogenous population such as Thailand's this type of analysis provides us with comparatively little communal comparison. Similar studies using communal distribution by region have been pursued in other polities and will be employed in later chapters.

¹There is some question about the existence of communal differences in Thailand aside from Malays in the South, Khmers in the

These data are not provided with any lengthy analysis but simply to display the types available and their limitations. Generally there is little reliable direct evidence on communal income differentiations. Using statistics such as these we can often say something about the education and health infrastructure and levels of schooling of different groups as partial evidence of opportunities available. Government intentions can be derived to a degree from expenditures and infrastructures. Information related to income can be developed from data on occupation levels and types, unemployment and, infrequently, actual income statistics. At times these data must be extrapolated from regional statistics, and there are always problems with reliability and comparability. As this project continues, we will be assessing this material with greater care and intensity.

A project developed by Kim Hill and the author has a panel of county experts to report on the reliability and availability of various types of data originating in tropical Africa.

In the following chapters on government impact we have relied only in part upon correlational analysis because of problems of paucity and reliability of data. To a great extent illustrative evidence has contributed most effectively to our analysis. One obvious difficulty is that a search for disparities relevant to communalism can provide the reader with a distorted view of the centrality of that variable as an explanation of income and wealth inequalities. An effort is made to

East, Chinese in the cities and hill tribes. The real question is if the 1/3 of the population that lives in the Northeast can be called a separate ethnic group.

put communalism in proper perspective, but it should be understood that at this time we are examining only this one factor. Thus, while we recognize the conceptual difficulties in employing such data we consider it the most useful foundation of research given the present state of the art.

CHAPTER II

Education, Communalism and Wealth

I

A basic assumption of this section is that formal education is one important road to higher paying occupations and entrance into the modern sectors of the economy. Studies in the United States and Western Europe have underlined the correlation between years of schooling and income and more recently similar analyses have been employed in the developing world.¹ Other studies have shown the relationship of education to income in the Third World.²

¹See C. A. Anderson, "Economic Development and Post-Primary Education," in Post-Primary Education and Economic Development, ed. by D. Piper and T. Cole (Durham: Duke University Press, 1964), 3-26; F. Harbison, Human Resources as the Wealth of Nations (New York: Oxford, 1973); Charles Elliott, Patterns of Poverty in the Third World (New York: Praeger, 1975); F. Harbison and C. Myers, eds., Manpower and Education (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965). At the same time others have noted the dangers of overeducation impacting upon jobs. See E. Edwards and M. Todaro, "Education and Employment in Developing Nations," in E. Edwards, ed., Employment in Developing Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 313-29; and R. Boudon, Education, Opportunity and Social Equality (New York: Wiley, 1974).

²See T. P. Schultz, "Returns to Education in Bogota, Colombia," AID, RM-4645-RC1AID, 1968; G. Sahota, "The Distribution of Tax Burden among Different Education Classes in Brazil," Economic Development and Cultural Change, XIX (April, 1971), 438-60; G. Psacharopoulos, "Schooling, Experience and Earnings," Journal of Development Economics, IV (March, 1977), 39-48; O. D. Hoem, "Educational Returns and Educational Reform in Ethiopia," Eastern Africa Economic Review, VI (December, 1974), 18-34; F. Harbison, "The Education-Income Connection" (1975), Mimeo.; R. Boudon, Education, Opportunity and Social Equality (New York: Wiley, 1974); and M. Carney, "Rates of Return to Schooling in Latin America," Journal of Human Resources, III (Summer, 1967), 359-74; and K. Hinchliffe, "Education, Individual Earnings and Earnings Distribution," Journal of Development Studies, XI (January, 1975), 149-61.

While recognizing that this is both a complex and somewhat controversial issue, we can briefly describe this interaction in LDCs under 1) correlations of income and educational levels, 2) the relation of education to occupation, and 3) the impact of technological development.

1. Correlations of education and income: There have been various studies displaying correlations between higher levels of educational attainment and increased yearly or lifetime income in both Afro-Asia and Latin America. Tables 1, 2, and 3 are examples of income increments attributed to income in Malaysia, Mexico, and India. Simple correlations of this type must be handled with care, particularly within the context of communal divisions in which ascriptive characteristics may disadvantage groups otherwise equally educated. For example, in Guyana, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka educated minorities have been limited in both teaching and civil service opportunities.¹ As well, such correlations may hide variations in quality and type of education which also may be tied to communal patterns.

2. Education and occupation: The outside observer might expect that occupation and income would be related, given the necessity of extensive schooling for most higher income jobs, but of equal or greater importance is the factor of widespread illiteracy. At the top of the scale professors, civil service positions and technical fields require strong credentials. (Table 4 shows educational requirements for the civil service in Kenya.) At the same time perhaps the more pertinent correlations have been at the level of simple literacy. In an environment including 80 percent adult illiteracy in the newly independent

¹See M. Bacchus, Education and Socio-Cultural Integration in a Plural Society (Montreal: McGill University, 1970).

TABLE 1: Median Income Estimates (\$M)
West Malaysia, 1967-68

	Gross Cash income	Gross increment	Net income	N increment
Unschoolled	516	...	321	...
Primary	1,969	1,453	753	432
Forms I-II	3,663	1,694	1,308	555
Forms III-IV	5,828	2,165	2,002	694
Sixth Form	8,434	2,606	2,880	878
University	15,211	6,777	4,338	1,458
Teacher Training	7,354	-1,080*	3,106	226

*As compared with the sixth form.

SOURCE: O. D. Hoerr, "Education, Income, and Equity in Malaysia," Economic and Cultural Exchange, XXI, 2 (January, 1973), p. 256.

TABLE 2: Age, Schooling, and Mean Monthly income,
Urban Males, Mexico, 1963, Father's Occupation,
Industry, City of Occupation,
and Attendance Constant

Age	Years of Schooling						
	1	4	6	8	11	13	14
10	180	160					
13	202	218	257				
15-16	424	343	376	551			
18	590	511	571	625	745	813	
22	723	689	776	868	966	1,154	1,981
27	775	764	916	1,159	1,554	1,959	3,273
32	794	873	1,184	1,498	1,836	2,601	4,744
39	868	989	1,300	1,799	2,204	3,208	5,469
49	940	1,088	1,502	2,375	3,028	3,914	6,298
58	918	1,052	1,918	2,716	3,419	5,670	7,440

SOURCE: Carney, op. cit., p. 363.

TABLE 3: India: Average Annual Income of Males
By Level of Education and Age, 1961
(in Rupees)

Age	Illiterates	Literates ^a	Primary	Metric	Bachelor's degree	Engineering degree
17	355	359	410			
22	475	645	824	1453		
27	782	900	1390	1987	2803	4346
32	850	1203	1500	2565	4049	5806
40	1200	1750	1850	2977	4757	8856
50	744	1133	1466	3170	5386	12564
60	650	800	964	2069	2154	15192

^aWithout formal education.

SOURCE: Nalla Gounden, "Education and Economic Development," (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Kurukshetra University, India, November, 1965).

TABLE 4: Starting Public Service Salaries,
Excluding Housing and Before Taxes, for
Persons with Different Educational
Qualifications, 1966 and 1971

<u>Educational Qualification</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1971</u>
University	£ 804	1,212
SI	582	702
PI	348	447
Form VI	348	384
Form IV	268	276

SOURCE: Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1971); Gary S. Fields, "Private Returns and Social Equity in the Financing of Higher Education," p. 189 in Education, Society and Development, New Perspectives from Kenya, ed. by David Court and D. Naram P. Ghai (Nairobi: Oxford, 1974).

states, the literate worker was more likely to obtain the higher paid skilled jobs. As well, the father's occupation can relate to income and education as seen in Table 5 and 6. These data appear to re-inforce F. Harbison's comments about LDCs when he stated that, "Without any question, formal education is an avenue through which some members of low income groups gain access to the higher income occupations." [Harbison, 1975].

TABLE 5: Distribution of Occupational Levels by Educational Qualifications among Heads of Households of Youths Born in 1956 and 1960 Who Are Members of the Labor Force in 1970^a

Educational qualification	Sample number	Occupational Level			
		Skilled (%)	Semi-Skilled (%)	Slight Skill (%)	Unskilled (%)
No formal education	4,689	7.0	9.9	57.2	25.8
Some primary	7,314	12.4	21.1	45.4	21.2
Completed primary	3,743	17.9	23.1	40.6	18.4
Lower Secondary Form I or III	793	36.4	28.5	26.8	8.3
Form IV or V	731	63.2	30.5	5.0	1.3
Form VI or more pre-university	204	91.0	8.2	0.7	0.1
TOTAL	17,474	15.8	19.0	44.9	20.4

^a/ Murod Bin Mohd. Noor, Laporan (Kuala Lumpur: Kementerian Prelajaran, 1973), p. 10.

TABLE 6: The Relationship between the Educational and Occupational Characteristics of the Fathers of Sampled Students

Paternal Occupation	Paternal Education							Total
	No Formal Education	Primary School 1 to 6	Middle School I to IV	Secondary School I to VI or Teacher Training College	University or Equivalent	Commercial and Technical Schools	Don't Know and No Answer	
Professional, Higher Technical, and Administrative Workers	2.2 (3)	1.5 (2)	12.7 (17)	35.8 (48)	37.3 (50)	6.0 (8)	4.5 (6)	100.0 (134)
Clerical Workers	0.8 (2)	1.6 (4)	48.8 (124)	41.7 (106)	—	1.2 (3)	5.9 (15)	100.0 (254)
Private Traders and Businessmen	22.2 (22)	9.1 (9)	38.4 (38)	18.2 (18)	—	3.0 (3)	9.1 (9)	100.0 (99)
Skilled Workers and Artisans	21.4 (25)	12.8 (15)	41.9 (49)	12.8 (15)	—	6.8 (8)	4.3 (5)	100.0 (117)
Semiskilled and Unskilled Workers	50.0 (7)	—	42.9 (6)	—	—	—	7.1 (1)	100.0 (14)
Farmers and Fishermen	64.6 (202)	16.6 (52)	13.7 (43)	1.6 (5)	—	—	3.5 (11)	100.0 (313)
Other (including Police and Uniformed Services)	14.3 (1)	—	71.4 (5)	—	—	—	14.3 (1)	100.0 (7)
Don't Know and No Answer	16.0 (4)	—	20.0 (5)	24.0 (6)	4.0 (1)	—	36.0 (9)	100.0 (25)
Total	— (266)	— (32)	— (287)	— (198)	— (51)	— (22)	— (57)	

SOURCE: P. Foster, Education and Social Change in Ghana (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 256.

3. Education and Technology: As technology has become more prized in modernizing societies, Western education and particularly advanced scientific training has become more desirable. Thus, traditional religious education as provided in many rural areas may not be relevant to those seeking positions requiring different background and the illiterate is effectively shut out of those more lucrative fields. As we shall see, a concomitant factor may be the need of European languages to compete for better commercial and technical opportunities. These "modern" languages have rarely been taught in traditional primarily

rural religious schools where Arabic, Pali, and other non-European tongues are used. Thus, the type of education afforded children in different areas can disadvantage them in terms of job opportunities.

We are not considering the economic impact of educational policies on the economic growth of the entire polity. Discussion in this area ranges from arguments as to whether elite education or literacy lead to higher national incomes, to analysis as to whether economic development calls for limited expenditures on formal education as against other policy alternatives.¹ At the same time, there is little doubt that there is a statistical correlation between countries with high education attainments and economic growth. For example, A. Peaslee's cross-national study showed that no country had achieved significant economic growth until it gained a ten percent primary school enrollment.² While these issues will be considered at a later date, present analysis is limited to problems of access to extant educational opportunities for communal groups.

We seek to assess government educational policies that tend to limit economic opportunities in developing countries under four rubrics: 1) quotas in secondary and tertiary education and restrictions on professional training, 2) language regulations, 3) areal differentiation in programs, and 4) differential expenditures.

¹For one interesting discussion see B. Sanyal, "Higher Education and Labor Market Needs in Developing Countries," Paris, International Institute for Development Planning, 1976. (Mimeographed.)

²A. Peaslee, "Primary School Enrollments and Economic Growth," Comparative Education, XI (February, 1967), 57-67.

II

In analyzing the impact of educational policies, careful attention must be given to longitudinal data. In particular, traditional religious-cultural patterns and colonial educational practices have been highly relevant to an understanding of current disparities. Traditional factors remain powerful limiting forces, more in terms of the employment of educational opportunities rather than equal access, although they are relevant in the latter as well. Three examples should suffice to draw out the implications of these cultural elements although this is a rich area for future research. Religious training was long a vital core to the development and maintenance of Islam and Buddhism.¹ Buddhist monastery schools provided primarily religious training taught by rote, based on Pali, and focused on religious texts while Moslem children followed a similar rote-oriented system employing Arabic and the Koran and Hadith. Both were for males only. This education was in contrast to Western state and missionary schools which taught courses more relevant to the modern industrial and commercial world. Thus, religious training provided a comparative disadvantage to its product in the colonial and postcolonial eras. With reference to Hindu versus Christian education in India one observer commented that "The

¹For discussions of this type of traditional education see F. von der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963); A. R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947); and M. Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) among others.

background of the mission schools and the emphasis on education in the Christian home gave [the Christians] an important headstart."¹ Given the concentration of Western educational facilities in urban and other less traditional areas, access to opportunities afforded by them was limited to groups living in these centers of learning.

Traditional sex roles, often tied to religious concepts, have also inhibited females from obtaining the education necessary for economic advancement in the modern sector. Even today the very basic criteria of literacy finds considerable variation between the sexes in the LDCs of Afro-Asia. Female illiteracy in these countries averages well over 80 percent. While there were major changes in attitudes toward female education in these areas during the latter years of colonialism, progress was very slow against the traditional reaction to modern training for women. Thus, even in the more Westernized areas of southern Nigeria in 1947, less than one-fifth of those in primary schools were girls and less than 750 were attending secondary school.² In addition, females have often been relegated to courses emphasizing homemaking, teacher training, and other specialties limiting access to the administrative/commercial sector. This pattern is accentuated by the higher dropout rate of females as the class proceeds up the educational ladder. For example, even in Thailand where women have enjoyed greater

¹R. Hardgrave, The Nadars of Tamilnad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 182.

²For an analysis of colonial problems with female education, see African Education (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 107-115.

opportunities, the percentage of females in attendance drops from 48 percent in secondary to 26.4 percent at the university level.¹

As a final example, we may turn to traditional attitudes among farmers to extensive educational opportunities for their children. As we shall note below, the fact of comparatively low education in rural as against urban areas is well documented. As well, numerous village studies in LDCs have commented upon the peasants' reluctance to allow their children to attend primary and postprimary schools. In part, this has been due to the need for labor in the fields combined with questions about the relevance of continued education for an agricultural community. These questions involve distrust of secular-oriented and nonvocational education and a paucity of opportunities to find local employment for those with an education. Examples of this reaction can be found throughout Afro-Asia. Manning Nash noted that in Kelantan, Malaysia, Malay adults feared that education would alienate their children from family, Islamic purity and Malay culture.² Similar tendencies regarding rural Malays have been observed by Brien Parkinson,³ and T. Silcock.⁴ Lauriston Sharp found upland tribes

¹Joint Thai-U.S. Task Force, Preliminary Assessment of Education and Human Resources in Thailand, Vol. I (Bangkok, 1963), 197.

²M. Nash, "Ethnicity, Centrality and Education in Pasir Mas, Kelantan," Comparative Education, XVI (February, 1972), 6-7.

³B. Parkinson, "Non-Economic Factors in the Economic Retardation of the Rural Malays," Modern Asian Studies, 1 (1967).

⁴C. Hirschman quotes, but does not agree with Silcock's statement that "Most Malays were peasants and fishermen. Their environments were not conducive to education and their culture did not induce them to want it." Hirschman notes urban Malays did well. (C. Hirschman, "Educational Patterns in Colonial Malaya," Comparative Education, XVI [October, 1972], 486-502.)

in northern Thailand reluctant to accept Thai education.¹ Khmers in Northeast Thailand reportedly have negative attitudes toward education for a variety of reasons including: 1) a lack of schools, 2) low socio-economic status of much of the population, 3) questions about the usefulness of education in an agricultural society, and 4) a desire to maintain traditional language, customs and religious beliefs.² The Conference on African Education at Cambridge in 1952 carefully discussed the problems of getting children into school and then keeping them, including the difficulty surrounding local leaders who saw little value in education.³

To a considerable degree internal maldistribution of educational opportunities also has its roots in colonial attitudes, policies and practices within an environment of unequal modernization. Prior to discussing the elements of modernization and particular policies affecting inequality, we should note that while considerable variation existed in programs they were not so different in results. There were obvious major differences in overall programs⁴ The Portuguese stressed the "Assimilado" but made little effort at mass education, resulting in

¹L. Sharp, "Cultural Confrontations in Northern Thailand," Asia, 30 (Summer, 1973), 14-42.

²U.S. Army, Ethnographic Study Series: Minority Groups in Thailand (Washington: Department of the Army, 1970), 260.

³African Education, op. cit.

⁴See J. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice (Cambridge: University Press, 1948), 123-30, 371-407; Piper and Cole, op. cit., and V. Thompson and R. Adloff, French West Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956), 516-56.

99 percent illiteracy of its African population as late as 1950.¹ The Belgians provided the highest level of literacy of any colonial power but severely limited post-primary education and emphasized "utilitarian" training. The British displayed a variety of programs in different colonies, relied heavily on missionary education in their African colonies and produced a relatively larger educated elite. The French emphasized assimilation through learning the language and culture of the metropolitan power but extended this to a comparatively small portion of their colonial population.² The Dutch laid little stress on education although a small minority achieved advanced training.

What all of the European powers had in common was a set of policies which resulted in a minority of their charges receiving even a minimum of formal education and only a minute number obtaining post-primary training. Literacy at the time of independence averaged less than 20 percent and post-primary schooling less than one percent. Of particular importance to this study, those who were educated tended to be concentrated geographically in urban settings and other regions impacted by modernization.

These dismal statistics resulted from a variety of factors: relatively short periods of European penetration in some cases, a lack of emphasis on mass education, attitudes towards indigenous peoples, the unequal impact of modernization and conscious policies of colonial administration. While we will be concentrating upon the last two

¹J. Duffy, Portuguese Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 313-17).

²E. J. Berg, "Education and Manpower in Senegal, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast," in Harbison and Meyers, op. cit., 232-67, and D. Scanlon, Traditions of African Education (New York: Teachers College, 1954), page 118.

elements, these must be considered against the background of the attitudes of colonial administrators. Views of their charges were in part responsible for the paucity of educational opportunities in general and inequities within the colony's population. To many Europeans formal education of the "natives" was considered unnecessary or undesirable on the basis that they were uneducable, happy in their primitive state, did not need a formal education for their jobs, etc. Thus, a District Commissioner from Kenya argued that, "...for some years to come he [the African] must be regarded as a child and, as such, not allowed to decide what is best for himself.... It is our duty to educate the native whatever his inclinations may be."¹ As to the type of education, a report from pre-war Kenya stated it should be designed to keep the Kenyan on the farm² and even a postwar report stated that:

Illiterates with the right attitude to manual employment are preferable to products of the schools who are not readily disposed to enter manual employment.

Teachers do not have the convictions, the knowledge or the training in order to inculcate the right attitudes to agricultural and pastoral and other manual activities.

The boy who passed through primary school, as we recommend it should be, and did not go to intermediate school, should have retained his rural attitudes as well as having received an education in literacy which will be capable of further development through welfare projects.³

¹Quoted in J. R. Sheffield, Education in Kenya: An Historical Study (New York: Teachers' College, 1973), 18.

²Sheffield, Education in the Republic of Kenya (Washington: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1971), 11.

³Quoted in S. Weeks, Divergence in Educational Development: The Case of Kenya and Uganda (New York: Teachers' College, 1967), 6.

The Portuguese were even more forceful in their view that the African was meant only for work, one commenting that "It is necessary to inspire in the Black the idea of work and of abandoning his laziness and his depravity if we want to exercise a colonizing action to protect him."¹

If these views helped influence educational policies toward the general population, prejudices against particular groups within the polity gave credence to programs disadvantaging those considered less capable of educating than others. Administrators came to believe that groups such as Malays, Moros, southern Sudanese, Amer-Indians, Dyaks, etc. were less capable of absorbing formal education or "happier" in their ignorance. For example, peasant Malays and Dyaks in colonial Malaya and Sarawak were to be educated, if at all, only to be better farmers and fishermen and one administrator argued that "the longer he [the Sea Dyak] is kept away from the influences of civilization the better it will be for him, for the good cannot be introduced without the bad."²

The expansion of European colonialism brought with it economic and social modernization and concomitant demands for education to gain the advantages of this "progress." With the imposition of colonial control came commercial agriculture, exploitation of natural resources, the opening of trading posts, a proliferation of missionary activities and the development of an infrastructure that included administration, roads, health and education. Obviously, this process was uneven in its

¹Duffy, op. cit., 318.

²J. Gullick, Malaya (New York: Praeger, 1967), 202-63; N. Ryan, The Making of Modern Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967), 167-68.

development in terms of period, geographic area and colonial system, producing modernization of varying intensity through the developing world.

It was just this unevenness of penetration that influenced variations in educational opportunities as particular groups within the colony were impacted by modernization more than others. These people might have lived near colonial administrative or trading towns, along lines of transport near roads, rivers, ports or railroads, in regions of commercial agriculture or mining or in missionary centers. Urbanized populations as such were thus not the only ones influenced by modernization and, in fact, some towns such as Kano, Luang Prabang or Fez retained their traditional patterns throughout the colonial years.

To understand the relation of colonialism, modernization, education and spatial distortion, it is necessary to consider a number of interacting variables. First, as P. Foster, R. Clignet and others have noted, the colonial infrastructure provided an environment conducive to demands and opportunities for education.¹ The new system needed individuals who were skilled in reading and writing in Western languages and capable of working with a modern context. Conscious programs of colonial governments often established schools intended to train indigenous cadres for administrative service; yet, the employment opportunities generally available resulting from modernization were probably more important in creating demands for jobs.² As well, the

¹R. Clignet and P. Foster, The Fortunate Few: A Study of Secondary School Students in the Ivory Coast (Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1966); and P. Foster, Education and Social Change in Ghana (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

²J. Cameron, The Development of Education in East Africa (New York: Teachers College, 1970), 26.

new situation challenged other elements in the colony to look to the education. Nationalists saw danger in European control and began to develop indigenous schools employing modern methods.¹ Non-literates of groups different from those first educated sought similar training in order to compete on an equal footing. However, these opportunities for employment developed primarily in those modernized regions previously mentioned and more rural, traditional and isolated communities were disadvantaged.

There were varying reactions among indigenous groups to these new patterns ranging from rejection, through apathy, to acceptance, and even demands.² In some cases precolonial factors such as trade interests, support of education or an educated bureaucratic elite made the new opportunities highly attractive. For example, the Buganda already had writing skills and an esteemed educated bureaucracy prior to the arrival of the European, and the missionaries found "a great desire among the younger chiefs and the King's servants to learn to read and write."³ In other cases traditional forces inhibited the acceptance of education.⁴

¹J. Anderson, "Self-Help and Independency: The Political Implications of African Education in Kenya," African Affairs, LXX (January, 1971), 9-22.

²B. Yates, "African Reactions to Education in the Congolese Case," Comparative Education, XV (June, 1971), 158-71; and T. Ranger, "Education in East and Central Africa," Past and Present, XXXII (December, 1975), 57-85.

³Ranger, ibid., 59.

⁴Y. Martin, "Sociologie de l'enseignement en Afrique noire," Cahiers internationaux de sociologie, LIII (1972), pp. 337-62; and "Inegalites regionales--inegalities sociales: l'enseignement secondaire au Cameroun septentrional," Revue française de sociologie, XVI (1975), pp. 317-34.

Secondly, the colonial regime provided unequal opportunities to obtain the necessary education. State supported institutions of high caliber were developed primarily in urban areas where they catered to European children and were available on a limited basis to the indigenous population. The decision as to where to place missionary schools was often more complex. At times the local leader defined the area of operation (in East Africa missionaries were forbidden to leave Kampala by Mustese I, giving the advantage to the Buganda in the area).¹ Colonial regimes limited church groups from areas that might be politically difficult. The missionaries themselves sought people interested in education, vulnerable to proselytizing or easier to reach.² The important point here is that European supported education was restricted by edict or situation to particular areas and the groups within these regions were advantaged over others in the colony.

One other area of modernization needs to be noted. Education was normally not free in colonial Afro-Asia and those living in areas in the money economy could obtain the funds necessary to gain a formal education. A cash income was a prerequisite and those in traditional rural economies were again disadvantaged.³

Aside from the general impact of modernization, specific policies of colonial governments affected educational inequality within areas under their control. While there were a wide variety of policies

¹A. Richards, The Multicultural States of East Africa (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1969), 44-46.

²D. Abernathy, The Political Dilemma of Popular Education (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 35-64.

³M. Kilson, Political Change in West African State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 6.

implemented, we can focus only briefly on a few of the most saliant:

1) Decisions to remain out of regions: In a number of cases colonial administrators decided not to expand into or to actually prohibit Western education to particular areas. For example, Northern Nigeria was "off-limits" to missionary education and students from that region were discouraged from going elsewhere for education. As a result, as of 1947 only 2.5 percent of those attaining a secondary education were from the North and only one university graduate was from the region--and he was a converted Christian.¹ A similar policy was followed by the British in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast.² As well, precolonial rulers or traditional leaders under indirect rule often restricted missionary and other Western education, as seen in actions by the Buganda King and Emirs of Northern Nigeria. A different type of limitation was practiced by the French in Algeria where compulsory education was only for those within three kilometers of "native schools."³

Reasons for these decisions varied. Often it was felt that it was more desirable to maintain traditional patterns rather than raising conflictual situations by challenging them. This was true in parts of Nigeria, Indonesia, the Philippines and Gold Coast. In other cases it

¹See G. Williams, "Education and Government in Northern Nigeria," Presence Africaine, 87 (1973), 156-77; Z. Lewis, Society, Schools and Progress in Nigeria (London: Pergamon, 1965); W. Schwarz, Nigeria (London: Pall Mall, 1968), 47-49; and R. Sklar and C. Whitaker, "The Federal Republic of Nigeria," in Regionalism in Eight African States, ed. by G. Carter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), 24-26.

²R. Thomas, "Education in Northern Ghana, 1906-1940: A Study in Colonial Paradox," International Journal of African Historical Studies, VII (1975), 425-67.

³A. Heggory, "Education in French Algeria: An Essay on

was the consideration that people were too isolated, less capable of teaching or did not need an education given their means of livelihood. Whatever the reason, these decisions effectively disadvantaged groups during and after the colonial era.

2) General development programs: Educational policies were only part of the generally uneven developmental policies of colonial governments. While usually not systematically planned, health, transportation, housing, electrification and other programs developed an urban bias which, in turn made for demands for opportunities for education. As for the urban dweller's rural counterpart, C.E.R. Burroughs put it rather succinctly when he noted that in Venezuela the lack of services, medical, social, and supply meant a reluctance to return to the village of those few who could break out of traditional patterns.¹

3) Aid to Europeans and Asians: A basic policy of colonial governments was the establishment of schooling for European children. As early as the eighteenth century French West Indian schools were almost exclusively European and this was followed throughout most of Afro-Asia. Expenditures were heavily weighted in favor of these schools in most colonies. For examples, as late as 1959-60 only £2,600,000 were provided 9,000,000 Africans while £430,000 were allocated 100,000 Europeans and Asians.² Finally, the best schools were

Cultural Conflict," Comparative Education, XVII (June, 1975), 180-97.

¹J. Burroughs, Education in Venezuela (Hamden, Connecticut: Anchor, 1974), 8.

²J. Cameron, "Integration of Education in Tanganyika," Comparative Education Review, XI (February, 1967), 45.

primarily for these children due to a combination of circumstances including the urban setting of the European population, an emphasis on metropolitan languages, costs which could not be met by the local population and outright segregation. The results of this can be seen in the Tables 7 and 8. The first shows the Netherlands Indies with the typical pattern of European-Asian domination of the best schools while the second table compares two school systems in what is now Zambia.

It should be noted that European schools ultimately did provide the foundation for elite schooling of others, first foreigners and sons of the local aristocracy and then children of the local urban population. In that sense they aided in forming the growing gap between urban and rural.

4) Urban-centered education: Educational opportunities were primarily developed in the colonial capital cities and other market centers and among groups believed "particularly responsive or particularly useful and/or important to the colonial administrators."¹ Thus, in West Africa Western education was concentrated along the more commercially developed coast. In Asia, the port cities and commercial towns received the greatest benefits, and on both continents rural areas were rarely, if ever, those advantaged by secondary or tertiary educational efforts. On the one hand, this pattern tended to reinforce the dominance of the urban elite (along with traditional leaders of importance who sent their sons abroad). It also had its impact upon access to education in communal terms. In colonies with

¹Charles Elliott, Patterns of Poverty in the Third World (New York: Praeger, 1975), 229.

TABLE 7: Official School Enrollments, 1940

Type of School	Numbers of Students			Percent of Age Group*		
	Euro-peans	Indo-nesians	Other Asians	Euro-peans	Indo-nesians	Other Asians
Dutch-language elementary	41,814	88,233	24,845	99.0*	0.5	13.0
Vernacular-lang. primary	1	2,178,732	17,588	0.0	19.2	10.0
Vernacular-lang. upper-elementary		398	1	0.0	0.003	0.0
Dutch-language general secondary	9,013	10,021	3,928	50.0	0.1	3.4
Dutch-language vocational	3,776	5,990	1,822	20.6	0.05	1.5
Vernacular-lang. vocational	176	26,532	147	0.9	0.3	0.1
University	245	637	364	1.1	0.009	0.3
Total attendance	55,025	2,310,533	49,695			

These percents represent an estimate of the proportion of children or youth of each ethnic group who actually were in school. For example, the 99+ under the European column for Dutch-language elementary school means that an estimated 99+ percent of all European children of elementary school age, 5-12, were actually in this type of school. Likewise, the 0.009 in the Indonesian column for the university means that an estimated 9 thousandths of one percent of all Indonesians of typical university age were actually enrolled.

SOURCE: R. M. Thomas, "Who Shall be Educated?--The Indonesian Case," in The Social Sciences and the Comparative Study of Educational Systems, ed. by J. Foster (Scranton: International Textbooks, 1970), p. 304.

TABLE 8: Comparison of Federal and African Systems of Education in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Circa 1962

Features	Federal Schools	African Schools
Race	Mainly European and Asian	African
Compulsory education	All children aged 7-15	7 years (in designated urban areas only); 4 yrs. elsewhere, where schools were available.
Enrollment ratios	Very high	Very low, particularly so for girls.
Access to higher education	No restrictions between stages other than those of merit, determined by exam.	Bottlenecks in provision of places at all grade levels.
Wastage	Little wastage, mobility high through the system	Extremely high rate of dropouts--higher for girls than for boys.
Pupil-teacher ratio	1 to 29	1 to 51 (some teachers worked double sessions with smaller numbers in a group. 40 considered a "model" class).
Annual expenditure per pupil	£90 (primary + secy.) per pupil for 20,942 pupils.	£12 per pupil for 334,050 pupils.
Language of instruction	One language of instruction--English	Two, often three, languages of instruction, early primary--mother tongue. Middle primary on--l of 4 official vernaculars + English increasingly introduced.

SOURCE: Maureen Webster, Federal and African Systems of Education in Northern Rhodesia (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 62 pages, Mimeographed).

geographically-based communal groups the pattern of urban-based post-primary education severely restricted the more isolated populations and aided those near and in the cities. Thus, educational opportunities were more available to the urbanized Chinese and Indian elites of Southeast Asia, the Kikuyu of Kenya, Buganda in Uganda, Ibo and Yoruba of Nigeria, and Chewa of Zambia. For example, in Ghana following annexation of the coastal area in 1948 nearly all education was near the European centers to the disadvantage of the Ashanti and Northern Territories. This pattern continued to advantage the coast, and by 1948 18 percent of the population of Accra had completed at least six years of schooling which percentage for the Ashanti was only 3.9 percent and Northern Territories but 0.2 percent.¹ As well, colonial administrators seeking employees who were considered either "safe" politically or proficient technically, turned to particular groups with Western training. The French looked to those assimilated into French culture and who were thus in all probability educated within and around the capital cities. In Burma and the former Netherlands East Indies colonial administrations sought to employ Christians, who often came from particular converted rural ethnic groups but were educated in urban centers. In Malaysia the British used the urban-based Chinese in commercial and technical activities because they were considered more proficient and hard working.

In line with these aforementioned interests, colonial governments generally provided larger budgets for urban and commercially-oriented

¹Encyclopedia of Education, Vol. 4 (New York: Macmillan), page 131.

regions. Again, given geographically based communities within colonies, this led to differentiated communal access. There were numerous examples of this pattern. In Nigeria the number of primary grade students in government schools in the south in 1937 was 12,183, while the equally populous north had only 9,130. Secondary education figures were 608 and 65, respectively.¹ In the Gold Coast (Ghana) in 1950 government grants were £700,000 for the Ashanti and colony, and only £30,000 for the northern territories with over 20 percent of the population of the colony.² In Malaya expenditures on education in 1955 went to states with the highest Chinese and urban populations (over 60 percent of the educational funds although they had but 45 percent of the total population).³

Integrally related to these factors was the type of education provided in these primardial schools. In French schools in Africa primary education was in French, as the colonial administration sought to advance assimilation with the metropolitan culture.⁴ This was

¹African Education, op. cit., 47-48.

²Ibid., 52.

³Federation of Malaya, Annual Report, 1955 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1956), 245.

⁴For a discussion of education in European colonies, see Piper and Cole, Post-Primary Education and Development, op. cit.; and V. Thompson and R. Adloff, French West Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956), 516-56; J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), 123-30, 371-407.

reinforced through selective entrance into secondary schooling and the greatly limited university and professional school admittance system. In the words of one observer, the result was that

So successful was the French program of education assimilation that the African it produced often felt much closer culturally and spiritually to the French colonial administrator than he did to his own people. A member of this educated elite felt that his place was not in a bush village, but in the administration of the territorial capital.¹

Thus, within various colonial systems a new communal group was formed, composed of individuals educated by and often culturally sympathetic to the dominant metropolitan culture. This was the base to the economic elite of the postindependence era.

The impact of European educational policies on income distribution among groups within their colonies was two-fold:

1. An elite was entrenched who was European educated in language and training so as to compete more effectively in the modern world than those coming from the traditional patterns. Positions were available to the former in administration, commerce, and (later) politics.²

2. Urban populations were more likely to receive superior educational opportunities in secondary and tertiary education than their rural counterparts. Those benefiting were more often than not either foreign communal groups or of a different ethnic-linguistic composition than the rest of the population.

¹Piper and Cole, Post-Primary Education, 183.

²For example, Christian Karens, who composed 22 percent of the University of Rangoon prior to the war, had but 2 percent of Burma's population. They reached high posts in British colonial government. G. Theodorson, "Minority Peoples in the Union of Burma," Journal of Southeast Asian History, V (March, 1964), 1-16.

III

We now turn to the relation of educational policy to income patterns in the contemporary era of politically independent LDCs. In our analysis we will consider the four aforementioned areas of expenditures, quotas, language, and areal differentiation. An effort will be made to provide examples of policies noted, but in most cases there are insufficient data to present universal material from throughout even Afro-Asia.

Quotas and restrictions

We can find numerous examples of the use of quotas or other restrictions affecting particular communal groups. Such policies can be considered under two general rubrics, restrictions on schools stressing particular cultures and languages, and quotas on students in various levels of education. These programs, as with other educational policies noted here, have been formulated with "positive" and "negative" goals in mind. In the former cases, the design has been to unify the nation by providing a common cultural and linguistic heritage. In achieving this goal it has been considered necessary to eliminate patterns of loyalty considered parochial or foreign. This stress on unity has been a principal factor in internal political tension as local elites in rural areas and foreign commercial elements in urban centers have felt increasingly threatened. Other "positive" goals have been of an "affirmative action" nature; i.e., policies established to allow disadvantaged groups to "catch up" with other communities. "Negative" goals have been to discriminate

against or otherwise penalize groups perceived to be foreign, overly aggressive, or of opposing political factions.

Regulations formulated to restrict particular types of communal schools have been aimed particularly at institutions considered foreign by the indigenous elite; i.e., Chinese schools in Southeast Asia, Indian schools in East Africa, and some expatriate-oriented European educational institutions. Examples abound in which schools have been closed, language teaching restricted, communalism nationalized, and "alien" cultures curtailed. In Indonesia all Chinese schools in rural areas were closed after the abortive coup in 1965.¹ Later all use of Chinese as a mode of teaching was forbidden. In Malaysia Chinese education has come under increasing attack from Malay nationalists who have vigorously pursued a Malay national language policy. In Thailand Chinese education is being phased out, primary schools having been reduced from 500 to 167, and a maximum of ten hours of Chinese over four years established. In the Philippines a proposal was made at the 1971 Constitutional Convention to outlaw all "alien" schools, an effort directed against some 152 Chinese schools in the country. As early as 1935 Hebrew schools were prohibited in Iraq.

Schools designed for expatriates have found it increasingly difficult to operate in the LDCs. Regulations have been promulgated

¹For information on policies toward Chinese in Southeast Asia, see D. W. Chang, "Current Status of Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia," Asian Survey, XIII, No. 6 (June, 1973), 587-608; Asian Research Bulletin, I, No. 4 (September, 1971), 302, and No. 6 (November, 1971), 464; J. van der Kroef, "Nanyang University and the Dilemma of Overseas Education," China Quarterly, 20 (October-December, 1964), 96-127; K. Watson, op. cit., 77-87; D. Murray, "Chinese Education in South-East Asia," China Quarterly, 20 (October-December, 1964), 67-95; K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965); and L. Suryadinata, "Indonesian Policies toward the Chinese Minority under the New Order," Asian Survey, XVI (August, 1976), 770-87.

to include indigenous language instruction, restrict attendance to foreign students, enforce annual licensing procedures and generally either to isolate the institution from the indigenous community and/or nationalize its curriculum--if such schools are allowed to exist at all.

Fundamentally, these restrictions can have three influences upon access to educational opportunities in LDCs. Where alien schools are restricted or eliminated, local Chinese or Indian students who are not citizens may be totally deprived of an education in-country. Unable to attend their own schools, they may be ineligible to enter government owned institutions because of their citizenship. This has recently been the fate of many Indian children in East Africa. It thus may only be the well-to-do who are able to send their children abroad for education. Secondly, by restricting "expatriate" schools to foreigners there is the possibility of limiting educational opportunities to local students. However, since tuition is usually high at these institutions, it does not seriously affect the poorer population. An advantage to breaking up these cultural schools is that it may help to crumble the linguistic-cultural economic power structure of these "alien" communities. Particularly where the alien language is the dialect of commerce, the continuation of these schools helps to maintain a closed linguistic-economic community.¹

A different set of regulations has been designed to establish quotas in educational opportunities. These have been of two types:

¹The author found this espoused as a reason given by Chinese merchants in Malaysia to hire only their own; i.e., only Chinese could do business in the commercial community.

1) restrictions upon members of certain designated groups in order to keep their numbers in institutions of learning limited, and 2) "affirmative action" programs promulgated to aid "disadvantaged" elements of the society. In the United States we have experienced both types, previous quotas on those of Jewish origin in professional schools and current efforts to increase minority attendance of institutions of higher learning.

Restrictions upon communal groups other than aliens are often difficult to prove. In the cases of foreigners such as Chinese, Indians, Levantine and migratory labor, data are available. Foreign schools have been closed or restricted, particularly regarding instruction in non-indigenous languages. As well, there are rare examples where specific quotas or restrictions have been formulated for communal groups. In pre-war years Jews in Iraq reportedly were under quota systems for secondary and higher education.¹ However, a more common practice has been support to communal groups favored by the elite controlling the educational system. When a political leader, minister of education, or school administrator takes over, members of his or her religious, linguistic, or tribal group may find it easier to get scholarships, entrance into institutions of higher education, teaching positions, etc. On the other hand, communal groups in opposition may find access to educational facilities closed or severely restricted. Such discrimination may, of course, be rationalized on the basis of equity considerations. One example of restrictions on "indigenous" populations has been in postwar Sri Lanka where

¹H. Cohen, The Jews of the Middle East, 1860-1972 (New York: Wiley, 1973), 27.

Tamils have been less than proportionately placed in government positions, education, and other areas. By 1960, in Sri Lanka's three universities Tamils had only a small number of the 800 students in teacher training and found it difficult to obtain teaching positions once graduated. (Tamils were approximately one-fourth the population.) As well, there have been charges of systematic and planned discrimination against Tamil schools.¹ The situation is more complex than the figures show, however, since rural "estate Tamils" have been more discriminated against while other urbanized Tamils have received better treatment.

"Affirmative action" programs have been rather rare, at least in terms of systematic policies. The two paramount examples have been India and Malaysia. In the former case, "untouchables" or Harijans and specified tribes can obtain scholarships, entrance into boarding schools, reserved places in schools and easier matriculation requirements.² However, these efforts have not been totally successful due to high dropout rates, geographic isolation, insufficient information and private discrimination, all of which have inhibited attempts to fill quotas. In Malaysia special efforts have been made to aid Malays and other indigenous peoples (in contrast to Chinese and Indians). As in India, discrimination in education is constitutionally forbidden, but this means discrimination against individuals

¹See C. L. Sharma, "Ethnicity, Communal Relations, and Education in Sri Lanka," Greensboro, University of North Carolina, undated, pp. 24-25. (Mimeographed.) Also, H. Oliver, Economic Opinion and Public Policy in Ceylon (Durham: Duke University, 1957), 33.

²For India see J. Arles, "The Economic and Social Promotion of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes in India," International Labour Review, 103 (January, 1971), 29-64; L. Durkheim, "Scheduled Caste Policy in India: History, Problems, Prospects," Asian Survey, VII

based upon race, religion, descent or place of birth. Since the Chinese have generally lived in urban areas with better schools, it has been considered necessary to increase the number of both Malay students and faculty at various levels. Special efforts have thus been implemented to increase the number of Malay teachers and students at the university level, the new national university is almost entirely Malay in its student body (in part because classes are all taught in Malay), and vocational training has been aimed at aiding Malays.

Considerable further research and analysis is necessary to judge the total impact of such "affirmative action" programs on income. Cultural and spatial factors appear to remain quite important in Malaysia. Malay students still do more poorly in science fields and are underrepresented in science and engineering at the university level. Chinese with primary and secondary education still obtain more middle and high level positions than Indians and Malays,¹ and Chinese control of guilds and associations aids them in achieving higher income occupations. M. Zacheriah has underlined a basic conceptual difficulty in this area in his analysis of what he has called "Positive Discrimination" in India. In this study he asked the question as to whether it has been poverty or caste holding back the Scheduled Castes.² As we have noted in the Introduction, this raises

(September, 1967), 626-36; S. Anant, "Caste Hindu Attitudes: the Harijans' Perception," Asian Survey, XI (March, 1971), 271-78.

¹A. Wilson, "Education, Mobility, and Expectations of Youths in Malaysia," Berkeley, School of Education, University of California, p. 14. (Mimeographed.)

²M. Zacheriah, "Positive Discrimination in Education for India's Scheduled Castes: A Review of the Problem, 1950-1970,"

fundamental conceptual problems in terms of whether we are dealing with a relatively closed system; i.e., caste or one easier to penetrate; i.e., poverty. J. Olson has asked the question in a different fashion, asserting that Kikuyu dominance in education relates to opportunity not tribalism.¹

Language policies

We have already noted efforts to restrict "foreign" education; i.e., Chinese, Indian, and expatriate schools. Here we are analyzing language policies related to the formulation of lingua francas that may restrict access in the educational realm. In developing societies the generally desirable goal of establishing a single national language may be harmful to particular communal groups. If the language of one of the indigenous linguistic elements of the polity is chosen as the lingua franca, the members of that group will have an advantage in competing for jobs and education where the national tongue is required. In Malaysia the language issue has been of considerable importance. The National Language Bill of 1957 had made English and Malay compulsory at the primary and secondary level, and later Malay was phased into the educational system grade by grade up to the university matriculation exams. Examinations to upper level institutions could be taken only in English or Malay. Malay was the indigenous language of approximately one-half of the population while the largest minority, the Chinese, with 37 percent of the populace was more fluent

Comparative Education, XVI (February, 1972), 28-29.

¹J. Olson, "Secondary Schools and Elites in Kenya: A Comparative Study of Students in 1961 and 1968," Comparative Education XVI (February, 1972), 44-53.

in either Chinese or English. The result was that in 1973 some Chinese students passed all their exams but Malay and were eligible for Commonwealth universities, but could not attend local institutions of higher education. Meanwhile in Sarawak, in East Malaysia, the placing of intensive English in Chinese schools was explained on the basis that it would allow Chinese students to get better jobs. Chinese in both areas fear that they will be penalized in both jobs and education in competition with Malays.¹

A similar problem is found elsewhere. In Sri Lanka the 1956 Language Act proclaimed Sinhalese as the national language and in 1964 a complete changeover was attempted to the detriment of the Tamil minority that found Sinhalese civil servants dominating.² The Indian government decision to make Hindi the official language triggered riots and other strong reactions from both those with another indigenous tongue and the English educated elite that felt their employment threatened.³

Chapter III will analyze the language issue more fully. Suffice to state at this point, the employment of a local language as the lingua franca is perceived by varying groups as disadvantageous.

While indigenous minorities may see dangers in the majority language

¹For a discussion of the language question in Malaysia, see M. Roff, "The Politics of Language in Malaya," Asian Survey, VII, No. 5 (May, 1967), 316-28; L. Comber, "Chinese Education--Perennial Malayan Problem," Asian Survey, I, No. 8 (October, 1961), 30-35; and F. Kee and E. Hong, Education in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books, 1971).

²R. Kearny, "Sinhalese Nationalism and Social Conflict in Ceylon," Pacific Affairs, XXXVII, No. 2 (Summer, 1974), 125-36.

³For example, Tamils were particularly disturbed. See R. L. Hardgrove, Jr., "The Riots in Tamilnad: Problems and Prospects of India's Language Crisis," Asian Survey, V, No. 8 (August, 1965), 399-407.

being chosen, individuals speaking the lingua franca may feel that their inability to employ a major European tongue will injure their opportunities. As one anthropologist reported, Malay villagers complained that, "Well, we are not educated in English; that is why we are poor."¹

If the former colonial language is maintained as the lingua franca, as has happened in much of tropical Africa, egalitarianism also suffers. The same educated elite, combined with those living in more modern sectors where the European language is the mode of commerce, will be better able to compete for positions than rural populations reared in local dialects. The fact is that modern commerce, science, intellectual exchange and technology are carried out in Dutch, English, French, and other European languages--not local dialects. Without education in Western languages the deprived may find upward mobility markedly inhibited. Student learning was further complicated by dual language requirements in some African states. For example, in the Cameroons the dual colonial background has led to the establishment of two European languages, English and French. The Ministry of Education has stated that English is to be taught in all schools above the primary level in East Cameroon and French in the West Cameroon. This is within a country with approximately 100 local languages. In Ghana, English is the medium of instruction at the secondary level; yet local languages (Ewe, Fante, Ga, and Twi) are widely used at the primary level. Students with these vernacular tongues must take entrance examinations to the Middle School that stresses English.²

¹A. Malaud Yusuf, op. cit., 37.

²Encyclopedia of Education, I, 588; IV, 132.

In Morocco there has been a mixture of French and Arabic with a move toward Arabizing all education. Arabic was the language of primary schools after 1914, while French was taught as a second language in secondary schools, and there was a mixture at most universities. In Nigeria the first two or three years are usually in the vernacular with English replacing the various local tongues at later grades. Thus in most cases the African elite must at least be bilingual, i.e. capable of speaking in indigenous tongue plus the lingua franca. We have seen a number of cases where traditional or national universities have maintained the indigenous language (Malaysia, Morocco) while others have used European languages. This can affect the extent of modernization of the students, since the former may preclude expatriate teachers and hinder students in areas requiring fluency in Western language.

A third and quite rare alternative has been to develop a new language not drawn from either the colonial power or one of the indigenous groups. This was accomplished in preindependence years by Indonesian nationalists who turned market Malay into a relatively sophisticated and highly eclectic modern language. Today a special institution sanctions new words to meet modern needs, and a high percentage of Indonesians are bilingual, speaking both their own dialect and Indonesian.¹ However, even here there may be some comparative advantage as more isolated or traditional peoples have been less proficient in the national language. For example, on the island of Java most people speak indigenous languages in day-to-day

¹T. Alisjabana, "The Indonesian Language--By-Product of Nationalism," Pacific Affairs (December, 1949).

transactions, and Indonesian is a second language. Javanese is spoken in the home by 80 percent of the Indonesians in the cities of Yogyakarta and Surabaya, while the percentage of those speaking Sundanese in homes of Bandung is 94 percent. Villagers may be particularly disadvantaged, and studies on Java show that a minority of village household heads are fluent in the national language.¹ In sum, variations in fluency in the national language(s) can inhibit students throughout their entire educational career and later make it difficult in obtaining jobs requiring such ability. Occupational limitations have been noticeable most particularly in government jobs and those demanding technological and other modern skills.

Spatial access or distortion

The issue of access to education based upon geographic setting is of central importance in considering obstacles to the attainment of higher kinds of schooling in the developing world. By spatial access is meant the ability to obtain equal education based upon the location of the student and/or his family. The relationship of spatial access to income is based upon three propositions:

- 1) The aforementioned correlations of education to income;
- 2) That a considerable disparity exists in both quality and quantity of schooling among regions, particularly between rural and urban areas;

¹P. Weldon, "Indonesian and Chinese Status Differences in Urban Java," Working Paper No. 7, Department of Sociology, University of Singapore. (Mimeographed.)

3) Where communal groups in plural societies are dispersed geographically, there exist instances where access to education up through the university is limited for particular communities.

There is extensive evidence to support the second proposition regarding disparities of educational opportunities between rural and urban populations. F. Harbison summed up evidence on several states, noting:

In Colombia, for example, which is one of the more advanced of the less-developed countries, nearly 10 percent of the rural schools offer no more than the first two grades of primary school; only six percent have facilities to offer the four-year primary sequence. In Kenya about 80-85 percent of the relevant age children in the more advanced Central Province attend primary school; but in several other districts and provinces, the rate may be as low as 35 percent. In Mexico the percent of population which has completed four years of schooling is strikingly higher in the Federal District (Mexico City)--60.6--than in the rural states such as, for example, Chiapas (11.9), Guerrero (9.8), and Oaxaca (11.4).¹

Charles Elliott has plotted out primary and secondary enrollment ratios in rural areas as percentages of enrollment ratios in capital cities of African states.² (See Tables 9 and 10.) Other studies in Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Turkey, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and Latin America bear out this spatial distortion between rural and urban education. A few glimpses into this data should suffice to make the point. In pre-1970 Cambodia, the capital, Phnom Penh, with only 10 percent of the country's population had

¹Harbison, The Education-Income Connection, 4-5.

²Elliott, op. cit., 231, 235.

TABLE 9: Secondary Education Enrolment Ratios
in Rural Areas as Percentages of
Enrolment Ratios in the Capital

Country	Year	Top Rural			Bottom Rural		
		Male	Both Sexes	Female	Male	Both Sexes	Female
Kenya	1970		35.2			21.4	
Tanzania	1969	92.9	64.8	28.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
Uganda	1968		43.0			2.6	
Zambia	1969		82.4			41.2	
Cameroon ^{a/}	1965		128.0			7.0	
Ivory Coast ^{b/}	1968		--			17.3	

^aUsing Centre-South with Yaounde as reference.

^bComparing the Northern Region with the whole of the Southern Region, including Abidjan.

SOURCE: Annual reports of ministries of education.

TABLE 10: Primary Education Enrolment Ratios
in Rural Areas as Percentages of
Enrolment Ratios in the Capital

Country	Year	Top Rural			Bottom Rural		
		Male	Both Sexes	Female	Male	Both Sexes	Female
Kenya	1970		162.7			13.6	
Tanzania	1969	159.5	161.0	162.9	41.9	40.8	20.7
Uganda	1968		89.1			22.0	
Zambia	1969		106.3			68.8	
Ghana	1970		98.1			23.7	
Cameroon	1971-72 ^{a/}					24.5	12.3
Ivory Coast	1969		116.7	77.8		28.8	13.4
Upper Volta	1971	51.0	41.6	37.7	5.7	3.7	2.8
Tunisia	1969-70	208.0		104.4	80.0		13.8
Sri Lanka ^{b/}	1972		104.1			50.5	

^aUsing Centre-South with Yaounde as reference.

^bAll grades of education.

SOURCES: Annual reports of ministries of education.

almost all the select institutions of higher education.¹ In Bolivia figures show not only high discrepancies in terms of school attendance, but in qualified teachers. Urban schools had 93 percent qualified, and rural 39 percent; urban teachers were required to have 15 years of schooling, and rural 10.² In Dahomey 30-63 percent of the children in the south were receiving formal instruction in the 1960s and 11-13 percent in the north.³ In colonial Sierra Leone the more developed districts had a 55 percent school attendance while the less modern protectorate figure was only 4 percent.⁴ Finally, in Ghana the capital of Accra with 51.6 percent of the population in 1954 had 73.3 percent of school enrollments while one rural district with 2 percent of the population had only .4 percent of enrollment.⁵

The significance of this data becomes clearer when we note that the normal pattern is for the rural population to have access to only two to four years of primary education, hardly sufficient for functional literacy. In many cases there are no schools at all in villages. For example, in the 1960s Turkey had one-third of its villages without schools. Thus, the majority of rural youths in most Afro-Asian countries cannot expect to receive training for occupations beyond the semi-skilled. Underscoring this disadvantage

¹Encyclopaedia of Education, I, 584.

²Ibid., 476.

³V. Thompson, "Dahomey," in Five African States, ed. by G. Carter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), 205.

⁴M. Kilson, "Sierra Leone," in Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, ed. by J. Coleman and C. Rosberg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), 101.

⁵Foster, op. cit., 119.

of rural youth is the elite school mechanism through which access to the best universities is predicated upon graduation from "prestige" secondary schools which are to be found primarily in the large urban centers.

These problems can be illustrated from studies in Thailand and Malaysia. In the Thai case, the vast majority of students left by the end of the fourth year of school.¹ In 1961, 75 percent of those leaving school through the 18th grade had done so by the end of four years; and by that year there were less than half the children attending that started the first year. By the 1970s the majority of students had completed four years, but postprimary education remained for a small minority. However, the problem of spatial distortion is emphasized by the quantity and, particularly, the quality of teaching outside the urban areas. In order to enter one of the country's better institutions of higher learning it is helpful to obtain a secondary education from a good secondary school in the Bangkok or Chiangmai regions. Yet most rural areas only go the fourth year--with district towns having further primary education and provincial towns comparatively low quality secondary schools. Thus, unless a rural family has money to send its child to a boarding school or relatives in a provincial town or city, there is no access to higher institutions. Only 5 percent of Northeast Thailand's population received four years education and 31 percent received no formal education in 1961. The results appear at the college graduate level.

¹This data has been drawn from various AID studies done in Thailand during the 1960s.

Thus, the Northeast with one-third of the nation's population had but 14 percent of university graduates in 1961, and Bangkok with approximately 10 percent of the population had 47 percent. When the government decided to put a university in the Northeast to cater to students there, a majority of those able to matriculate were from the urban centers and not the region. It was ultimately necessary to protect slots for local students through a quota system, guaranteeing positions for Northeasterners. Part of the problem was educational basics. In terms of one simple literacy test, slightly over half (56 percent) of those examined in the northeastern villages had functional literacy. The further the area was from educational centers and the more distinct the people were from the core Thai culture, the less literate they were. In Sisaket where the largest Khmer speaking population lives, 78 percent of the people in the early 1960s were either illiterate or could not comprehend the lowest level Thai.¹

Even greater problems face the "Thai Moslems," in the southern part of the country. Not only is there a serious language problem among the Malay speakers, but often parents do not accept either a secularist education or one taught by non-Moslems. This has meant very few Moslems go beyond primary education and are thus shut out from promotion in the military and civil service.²

¹USOM, Comprehension in the Rural Northeast Thailand: Summary Highlights of the Study (Bangkok: USOM, 1964), 26.

²See S. Alpern, "The Thai Muslims," Asian Affairs, 1 (March-April, 1974), 246-54; and A. Suhrke, "Loyalists and Separatists: The Muslims in Southern Thailand," Asian Survey, XVII (March, 1977), 237-50.

In Malaysia distinct variations in school attendance, dropout, and test scores also exist between rural and urban populations.¹ While 47 percent of urban 15+ youths were enrolled in school in the early 1970s, only 28 percent of rural youths were enrolled. Among Malays the respective percentages were 63 and 28, and Chinese 42 and 31 percent. Even Malaysia, with one of the highest percentages of its budget given to education in the world, shows high levels of attrition throughout the school system.

In sum, there is considerable evidence showing limitations in access to education from simple literacy to the university, based upon the geographic location of the student. Most of what has been analyzed has been the rural-urban gap. We now turn to the third proposition of this section, that spatial distortion can also account for variations in access among communal groups. The basic assumption here is that communal groups may find themselves either in rural areas without adequate educational facilities or from urban or missionary centers which have been favored by schools superior in quantity and quality.

We can note three communal groups that have been favored due to spatial access:

1. "Foreigners"--As we have noted, the colonial period allowed Chinese, Indians, and Europeans living in urban and commercial centers the opportunity to take advantage of the better educational opportunities of these areas. The various advantages of urban schooling mentioned previously accrued to at least some members of these communities. For example, in colonial Malaya the great majority of Malays were rural, and

¹This data has been drawn from Noor, op. cit.

there were no Malay secondary schools until 1963, while at the same time there existed 60 government assisted or partially assisted secondary schools, plus private institutions.¹ In 1961 only 21 percent of university students were Malays. (It is now about 52 percent of those taking degree courses, and 85 percent of primary technical courses.)

2. Missionary centers: In both Africa and Asia there have been missionary centers outside urban areas where superior education has been provided, thus educating the particular communal group residing in the area. Examples have been the Minahasa and Ambonese regions of Indonesia, and Christian missionary centers in Burma.

3. Communal-urban: We have numerous examples of indigenous communal groups residing in and about urban areas or centered in regions of European commercial activities and thus having heavy access to superior education. In Kenya the Kikuyu have taken advantage of this geographic factor, and one study showed that in 1962 56 percent of the Kikuyu primary school-age group had attained some schooling as compared with 38 percent of the Luo, 34 percent of the Luhyu, and 21 percent of the Kamba.² Makerere College enrollments show the tribal dominance factor in East Africa with the Kikuyu percentage of Kenyan enrollment 44.5 percent in 1953, and Ganda as a percentage of Ugandan reduced from 78 percent in 1922, but still 50 percent in 1953.³ In Sierra Leone it has been the Creole population

¹Education in Malaysia, 10-13.

²Noted in C. Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 202 fn.

³Noted in Elliott, op. cit., 253.

around Freetown that has benefited from good educational institutions. The Sudan is an excellent example of differences according to region with the Arab Moslem north far more advanced in educational terms than the African Christian and tribal religious south, due to a combination of spatial access and government policy. The following table shows one result.

TABLE 11: Students in Post-Primary Schools,
Sudan 1960*

<u>Type of School</u>	<u>North</u>	<u>South</u>
Intermediate (Boys)	180	17
Intermediate (Girls)	55	1
Technical Intermediate (Boys)	14	3
Secondary (Boys)	49	2
Secondary (Girls)	14	-
Commercial Secondaries	2	1
Technical Secondaries	3	-
Universities	4	-

* From Sudan Almanac 1960, quoted in J. Oduho and W. Deng, The Problem of the Southern Sudan (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 45. For other data on the Sudan, see D. McClintock, "The Southern Sudan Problem: Evolution of an Arab-African Confrontation," Middle East Journal, XXIV (Autumn, 1970), 466-78.

Two other studies have attempted to break down educational attainment by tribe. E. Soja has estimated primary and secondary educational levels plus literacy in Kenya.¹ A most interesting analysis was made by Clignet and P. Foster in 1963 when they interviewed a sample of

¹E. Soja, The Geography of Modernization in Kenya (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968), 63. See Table 7.

TABLE 12: Ethnic Breakdown of African Educational Achievement in Kenya

Tribe	Primary Education %	Tribe	Minimal Literacy %	Tribe	Post-Secondary Ed. Number
Kikuyu	56.0	Kikuyu	51.2	Kikuyu	645
Nandi	50.8	Kisii	40.5	Kisii	332
Taita	44.8	Luhyu	38.5	Luhyu	329
Embu	41.0	Kipsigis	36.2	Kamba	214
Luo	37.7	Embu	34.7	Luo	205
Kipsigis	36.2	Luo	33.0	Meru	154
Kisii	34.0	Taita	33.0	Nandi	144
Luhya	34.0	Nandi	31.8	Tugen-Njembs	119
Meru	32.0	Meru	28.3	Kipsigis	111
Elgeyo- Marakwet	24.1	Kamba	28.3	Mijikenda	110
Kamba	20.5	Tugen-Njembs	21.8	Embu	61
Tugen-Njembs	17.7	Eleyo-Marakwet	21.8	Eleyo-Marakwet	44
Pokot	15.2	Mijikenda	15.5	Taita	26
Mijikenda	14.9	Pokot	9.1	Masai	24
Masai	13.0	Masai	7.7	Pokot	11

80 percent of the post-primary students in the Ivory Coast.¹ Using a selectivity index which assessed ratios between a group's representation in the sample and its appropriate representation in the total population, they found considerable variation among tribal groups. As well, Moslems with one-third the population had but 15.4 percent of the students.² The data also showed our previous emphasis upon urban,

¹R. Clignet and P. Foster, The Fortunate Few: A Study of Secondary Schools and Students in the Ivory Coast (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

²Ibid., 59. See Table 8.

TABLE 13: Distribution of Major Ethnic Groupings in Ivory Coast Secondary Schools Compared with Their Distribution in the Population (Percentages)

ETHNIC GROUP *	PERCENTAGE OF † IVORY COAST		SELECTIVITY INDEX	PERCENTAGE OF † IVORY COAST		TOTAL	SELECTIVITY INDEX
	POPULATION (1958)	MALE STUDENTS		POPULATION (1958)	FEMALE STUDENTS		
Agni	5.6	15.9	2.8	21.5	3.8	16.5	2.9
Lagoon cluster	7.3	18.4	2.5	16.0	2.2	18.1	2.5
Baoulé	19.0	16.7	0.9	14.8	0.8	16.5	0.9
Kru	18.3	19.9	1.1	18.1	1.0	19.7	1.1
Mandefou	11.2	8.9	0.8	3.4	0.3	8.3	0.7
Malinke	15.2	9.5	0.6	8.9	0.6	9.5	0.6
Senoufo-Lobi	19.0	6.4	0.3	5.5	0.3	5.3	0.3
Other Africans	3.8	4.3	1.1	11.8	3.1	5.1	1.3
Europeans and others	0.6	0.0	..	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	..	100.0	..	100.0	..
		(1,837)		(237)		(2,074)	

* Ethnic groups comprise the following subclusters: Agni—Agni, Nzima, Ehotilé, Abouré, Abroun, Mbatto, Apollo; Lagoon cluster—Adleskrou, Alladien, Attié, Abidji, Avikam, Ebrilé; Baoulé—Baoulé, Kru—Abbé, Bélé, Dida, Godié, Guéré, Noyo, Nlaboua, Kru, Mandefou—Dan, Gagou, Gouro, Webo, Yacouba; Malinke—Malinke, Senoufo-Lobi—Kulango, Lobi, Senoufo, Taguana; Other Africans—mostly from Dahomey, Senegal, Mali, and Upper Volta; Europeans and others—includes Lebanese, West Indians, etc.

† These figures have been computed from Ivory Coast, Ministère du Plan, *Inventaire économique de la Côte d'Ivoire, 1947-1956* (Abidjan, 1958), p. 26, and from unpublished census materials of the Direction de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, Côte d'Ivoire, collected in 1959. Although these figures can be considered as only approximations, there is a high degree of correspondence between the two sources regarding the size of the major ethnic groups.

modern sector and colonial influences. The degree of a farmer's involvement in the exchange sector had a significant impact on access to secondary education.¹ The authors further commented that it was within the urban centers "that schooling is first looked upon as providing high returns in terms of status, income and power."²

The newly independent states were thus faced with spatial distortion in terms of both those educated and the infrastructure capable of providing opportunities for all their people. Almost every new elite has publicly subscribed to universal education, developing literacy campaigns, expanding school opportunities into rural regions and building educational institutions at all levels. However, in spite of good intentions and a general raising of standards, spatial distortion still exists in a manner largely continuing the advantageous position of previous centers of modernization. The reasons for the continuance of the colonial pattern are briefly as follows:

(1) Power of the colonial structure: The spatial distortions of the colonial period have been extremely difficult to overcome quickly and most Afro-Asian states have been independent less than a generation. Better schools, high demands for education and employment opportunities have remained in the modernized centers. On the other hand, efforts to get better teachers to rural areas, keep the educated there to train others, develop qualified students to compete for university positions, etc. have all met with considerable difficulty. The situation in being has meant that equalizing expenditures throughout the nation will not

¹Ibid., 65.

²Ibid., 56.

lead to equal education. Thus, PDS studies of the relationship of expenditures to output and outcome have shown that equal financial support cannot overcome past inequities, i.e., levels of expenditures have little correlation among administrative units in terms of literacy, school leavers, etc.¹ This leads to the second point.

(2) High levels of necessary expenditures: A key factor in the slow development of rural areas has been the high costs of providing quality education to relatively isolated and often underpopulated regions. The lack of transportation, poor or costly boarding schools, need to build entirely new plants, lack of experienced teachers and slow systemic development have all compounded one another in discouraging educational expansion. For example, the high cost of upgrading rural teachers has been studied in a number of LDC which have low levels of income. Even relatively well-off Kenya found the yearly cost of upgrading teachers to be over a million pounds a year. This led one observer to comment:

It is difficult to avoid the pessimistic conclusion that the mounting cost of teachers as well as capital equipment will not permit large-scale improvement in the quality of primary education over the next five years, even with present fee structure and normal increase in enrollment. Were universal primary education to become a reality, there would undoubtedly be a decline in quality because additional untrained teachers would have to be employed, or costs would rise substantially if more holders of higher qualifications (such as School Certificate) became available for training as teachers.²

(3) The ousting of Europeans and non-indigenous Asians: Voluntary or forced repatriation of Europeans and other "foreigners" has at the

¹Kim Q. Hill, "Distributional and Impact Analysis of Public Policy: A Two Nation Study of Education and Health Policy" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Rice University, 1974).

²G. Cowan, The Cost of Learning: The Politics of Primary Education in Kenya (New York: Teachers College, 1970), 29.

least hurt educational quality. While these expulsions from urban areas probably temporarily partially narrowed the gap between rural and urban, these people also provided major contributions in teaching. Missionaries have slowly been ousted from rural areas lowering the quality and quantity of teachers in these regions. Where European languages have survived as the official or commercial form of communication the expulsion of Europeans lowered the quality of education, particularly in more isolated rural areas and smaller towns.

(4) Prejudicial decisions: While there have been prominent programs of "affirmative action" in LDCs designed to help previously disadvantaged groups (Malaysia and India the most obvious), there have also been cases where populations have been singled out to limit opportunities. Prejudicial policies have been directed more at "foreign" communities than indigenous groups, but we have examples of the latter in Sri Lanka, Uganda and Sudan, among others.

This paper is too brief to describe these factors in detail, but we can state that, in spite of major efforts to expand education in LDCs, spatial distortion still exists, with varying success in closing the gaps among indigenous peoples.

As Charles Elliott quite properly notes, no universal statement can be made regarding the future of communal domination, and government policies differ markedly from one country to another. In the Malaysian case, efforts to increase Malay participation will mean higher rural enrollment while in Sri Lanka political factors may weigh against major shifts of this nature.

While some groups may be advantaged by spatial distortion, obviously others will be injured. This is particularly true of

communal groups living in sparsely populated regions where communications and economic factors will militate against equal education. Rare is the country like contemporary Malaysia where over half the children are within 2 miles and 95 percent are within 10 miles of a secondary school.¹ In most Afro-Asian polities there exist variations among communal groups in access to quality schools or scarcely schools of any sort. Whether they are the Taurigs of the Sahal, Moros of the Philippines, Chins of Burma, Nagas of India or Kurds of the Middle East, specific communal groups are victims of spatial distortion.

Differential expenditures: We have noted that there was often considerable disparity in expenditures on education provided different communal groups during the colonial era. In part, this was due to the successive inclusion of areas into the respective colony over time. For example, African coastal regions were usually those originally colonized and, therefore, open to the first missionary and public education. In Ghana, almost all the 12,000 students in government assisted schools in 1900 were from the coast.² Another factor was the desire to limit missionary educational activities in particular areas due to fears of religious frictions. Thus, missionary education, a major vehicle of Western learning, was largely absent from Moslem regions in black Africa. In addition, the poor communications systems of many colonies led to a differentiated educational infrastructure with urban and other commercial centers receiving higher governmental expenditures.

¹Noor, op. cit., 60.

²Encyclopedia of Education, IV, 131.

The postindependence period has seen the vast majority of newly independent states seeking the twin goals of universal, free primary education and equalization of educational expenditures throughout the polity. Research under the Program of Development Studies has shown examples where the equalization of expenditures has been achieved, at least on the provincial level. Even where this has not been attained, there has been a tremendous increase in total funds spent on education in both the rural and urban areas at all levels. Table 9 shows changing expenditures in a single decade in selected Afro-Asian states.

However, egalitarianism in funding does not necessarily lead to equal access to education. Hill's research shows that in the Turkish and Malaysian cases, where spending was basically equal on the provincial level, services provided students in different areas varied, outcomes in terms of levels of enrollment were not correlated with expenditures.¹ This result was not surprising given problems of language, culture, previous colonial policies and spatial distortions noted previously in this paper. Colonial governments spent unequal proportions of their budgets on different parts of their colonies which over time led to basic variations in educational infrastructure between rural and urban areas. When combined with a selective placement of missionary schools, particular communal groups were advantaged,

¹Hill, op. cit. We should note that in Malaysia Malays receive more scholarship aid than Indians and Chinese. For federal scholarships and bursaries the ratio has been 3 Malays to 2 in the arts, and 2 to 1 in science and technical areas. L. Ann, "Fiscal Policy and Political Transition: The Case of Malaya, 1940-1960," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, V (March, 1974), 111.

TABLE 12: Public and Private
Recurring Expenditure
Per Pupil by Level
(in U. S. \$)

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>% increase 1960-69</u>
<u>Less Developed</u>				
Algeria				
1	44	59	60	36
2	--	257	214	[-17]
3	952	1243	1309	38
Botswana				
1	15	22	25	67
2	406	336	258	-36
3	--	--	--	
C.A.R.				
1	19	24	29	53
2	204	338	163	-20
Dahomey				
1	45	53	51	13
2	119	147	318	167
3	450	714	952	112
Ethiopia				
1	18	20	21	17
2	103	84	69	-33
3	1823	1046	1944	7
Ghana				
1	14	21	22	57
2	202	262	268	32
3	3103	3361	3424	10
Hong Kong				
1	49	66	70	43
2	110	158	156	42
3	1075	1198	1162	8
India				
1	6	7	8	33
2	10	15	14	40
3	164	219	252	54
Korea				
1	10	13	23	130
2	25	29	24	-4
3	22	30	268	1118
Tunisia				
1	33	29	30	-9
2	188	149	162	-14
3	738	469	533	-28

and contemporary equal expenditures are insufficient to rectify these accumulated inequities. Nor could equal funding alleviate differences in language capabilities, traditional attitudes toward education and a multitude of other problems of unequal development in plural societies. We have not been able to cover all of these elements here (future research will analyze the expenditure issue more fully), but two areas of analysis more clearly related to expenditures should be commented upon: costs due to difficulties in providing equal infrastructure to areas with dispersed populations, and covert costs. Both of these issues have been given considerable attention by education economists and will be touched upon only as they relate to communalism.

Cost factors such as the aforementioned are important today in maintaining older disparities among regions inhabited by communal groups that are poorer or more widely dispersed. Studies show that fixed per pupil costs decline with increased school size up to particular limits.¹ Governments obviously face greatly increased per pupil costs in less populated areas if they expect to provide similar quality education. The need to establish more schools, compensatory funds and/or an extended transportation or boarding system adds to costs where a critical mass of students is not present.

Charges for education, overt and covert, have obvious implications for poorer communal groups attempting to employ education as a means of upward mobility. The argument is that formal costs for attending school or fees related to matriculation, books, boarding, etc., when combined with foregone income which children may have earned instead of gaining

¹Noor, op. cit., 62.

an education, are all obstacles to poorer families considering an education for their children. Elliott notes that overt fees for a secondary education in Uganda are 40 percent of the minimum wage in Kampala with equivalent figures for other areas (Cameroons, approximately 22 percent, and for the Philippines about 12 percent). The impact upon lower incomes is shown by data from Sri Lanka where "For every Rs. 20 increase in his weekly wage, the chances of a child attending school increased by 1 percent for the youngest to 3 percent for the 12-14 age group."¹ Given lower incomes for many poorer rural groups, we can expect fees to be an even greater burden on them.

Finally, we must note that the rural-urban disparities in educational expenditures that remain do affect particular communal groups. The following conclusions from a recent report on education in Malaysia illustrate the results of many of the problems mentioned in previous pages:

Over three-fourths of Malaysian children enrol in a vernacular primary school. 83 percent of Malays, 75 percent of Chinese and 51 percent of Indians enrol in vernacular primary schools.

Most of the children of the poor attend vernacular schools. The well-to-do of each community, particularly in urban areas, are more likely to send their children to English medium schools.

Larger educational investments are made in English medium than vernacular media primary schools. On the average, as contrasted with all three vernacular media primary schools, English medium schools:

(a) are larger; (b) have more of every type of educational facility, e.g. libraries, audio-visual equipment,

¹Elliott, op. cit., 236-37.

craft rooms; (c) have more qualified and younger teachers who have higher morale; and (d) make higher non-teaching expenditures per pupil per year--three times as high as Malay and Tamil media schools.¹

Concluding remarks

This chapter has noted briefly the basic factors which appear to impose obstacles to access to education including language policies, quotas, spatial distortion, and expenditures. It would be remiss on our part to end without noting several caveats to the foregoing analysis.

1. This study is only a review of the major elements of the problems related to education and communalism. Future analysis is intended to study these issues in greater detail and to include in it empirical research on selected LDCs.

2. It is in no way the intention of this study to assert that education alone is an obstacle to higher incomes for communal groups. Other sections herein analyze government policies such as taxation, confiscation, language, and job opportunities. As well, we recognize the saliance of particular cultural forces. Nor is this paper centered upon basic issues related to the correlation of education to economic development. We recognize the vitality of arguments that universal primary education or a concentration upon quality higher education may not be the most desirable policies an LDC can follow if economic development is the primary goal.

¹Noor, op. cit., 70-71.

Finally, we wish to reiterate the complex nature of interactions among education, ethnicity, and environment. We will be analyzing the factors responsible for educational achievement among communal groups in more detail in the conclusion to this paper. However, we should note that considerable divergence exists in terms of causal relationship between ethnicity and educational attainment. Jean-Yves Martin and Philip Foster offer the dichotomy of views. Martin in his analysis of Cameroon cogently argues that ethnicity explains much in terms of education and that one must study the particular tribe to understand reactions to the penetration of modernization and the European.¹ He argues that the analyst must look at precolonial history and the structure of traditional societies. On the other hand, in his study of Ghana, Foster states that present inequalities cannot be attributed to ethnic factors per se, but to a great extent from the differential impact of European rule.² The extension of education and the exchange economy are described as mutually reinforcing. It would appear that the answer lies somewhere in between and that cultural factors can provide temporary barriers to the acceptance of new ideas or ease the process of receptivity (see the conclusion to this paper).

3. There remains a dearth of reliable empirical data (a forthcoming paper will assess some of these data problems) upon which we can base our analysis. While we recognize this problem, available material provides ample evidence to support the general conclusions presented in this paper.

¹Martin, op. cit., 337-62; 317-34.

²P. Foster, Education and Social Change in Ghana (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

CHAPTER III

Confiscation, Residence, Quotas and Language

Communal identity often raises issues of a sensitive political nature to both LDCs and donor nations. Questions involving confiscation of property, restrictions of residence, perceived favoritism in allocating jobs, and the establishment of an official language usually cannot, and perhaps should not, be the targets of policy changes urged by outside governments and must be treated carefully in any analysis. This chapter seeks to highlight these policy areas since they are a part of the general issue of the distribution of income and opportunities. We do not intend that they be central parts of this or future research, and PDS does not consider it desirable to develop these points in future field work. Finally, as we shall regularly note, descriptions of inequitable policies are not meant to be criticisms of actions unique to LDCs. Any even superficial perusal of programs implemented by Western states in the past century would elicit numerous illustrations of a similar nature. However, such policies do affect shares in the total economic pie and opportunities available to members of ascriptive groups to compete equally for economic development.

Four at times interlocking areas of policy will be commented upon in the chapter:

1. Restrictions on residence
2. Confiscation of wealth
3. Quotas on jobs

4. Language regulations

All of these actions can and have been employed to restrict opportunities of particular groups to compete for better positions, retain wealth or be more mobile within the society. At the same time, each can and has been used to heighten opportunities for disadvantaged elements within the system and to create greater equity where it is considered a desired goal.

Finally, it is necessary to discriminate between restrictions directed against citizens and aliens. The latter have seen their rights and activities more limited than have citizens by government regulation in most countries. For example, in Texas alien children may have to pay tuition in public schools and the United States may restrict length of stay and occupation. Afro-Asian laws in this area differ from those in most industrialized societies in two basic respects: 1) they are often directed toward specific communal groups, and 2) they have tended to be more restrictive. In the first instance, Southeast Asian and East African regulations have targeted non-indigenous Asians, i.e., Indians and Chinese primarily, while other African laws have wavered between treating all Africans as brothers and limiting activities of citizens of neighboring countries. As will be noted below, a wide variety of laws have been developed against aliens in fields of jobs, residence and political-economic activities.

The problem of the noncitizen has been compounded by major obstacles put in the path of foreigners wanting citizenship in states desirous of restricting nonindigenous Asians. These include "grandfather clauses," i.e., a requirement that grandparents be parents to citizens, high fees and various bureaucratic regulations. For example,

in Indonesia it is necessary to file a total of 14 documents, pay \$75-250 to be naturalized and even that citizenship may be revoked for not fulfilling all requirements.¹ In Ceylon long residence is required and administrative proceedings prevent most Indians from becoming citizens. In the Philippines there remains considerable red tape and expense even after the recent easing of restrictions.² Thai law is based upon jus soli with a high application fee, minimum income and a great deal of paper work.³ In Uganda General Amin's government deprived many Asians of citizenship on technicalities.⁴

I. Confiscation and Residence Limitations

The most obvious policies employed by governments that affect income and wealth of communal groups center upon efforts to confiscate property or limit residence. While confiscation has at least apparent short-term income related results, residence regulations also have an impact. Restricting groups to urban centers, particular parts of cities, or other limited areas prevent individuals from economic contacts and opportunities available to other elements of the polity.

¹L. Suryadinata, "Indonesian Policies toward the Chinese Minority under the New Order," Asian Survey, XVI, 8 (August, 1976), 783-84.

²Far Eastern Economic Review, No. 88 (May 6, 1976), 40. In 1974 all former foreign nationals who had received citizenship after July 4, 1976 had to register. Ibid. (May 6, 1974).

³Ibid., No. 82 (October 24, 1973), 16-17.

⁴Kenyan law allows the government to deprive a naturalized citizen of citizenship on various grounds including having "shown himself by act or speech to be disloyal or disaffected toward Kenya." Rothchild, D., Citizenship and National Integration: "The Non-African Crisis in Kenya," Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, Vol. I, No. 3 (1969-70), p. 23.

Historically, both policies have been used against religious, racial, and other communal groups in both the West and Afro-Asia. During the past century Jews have been forced to live in ghettos and have been driven from rural areas and small towns in eastern Europe: blacks in the United States have faced residence restrictions; and extra-legal limitations have been enforced along religious lines in northern Ireland. In Afro-Asia various groups have been so regulated. Dutch traders in pre-Meiji Japan were kept to the island of Deshima, and Europeans in China were limited to factory areas. Indigenous populations such as the Harijans of India were forced to live in particular sections so as not to contaminate others, and various religious and ethnic groups in Afro-Asia have been regulated by custom and government orders.

Nor has confiscation of the wealth of particular communal elements been unique to contemporary Afro-Asia. Again, Jews were objects of confiscatory laws in pre-twentieth-century eastern Europe, and later under Nazi rule. In the United States the American Indian has been the most notorious case as lands were taken illegally or under spurious treaties. Examples in precolonial Afro-Asia abound as communal conflict led to confiscation, destruction of property, and even slavery. Prior to World War II some of the most obvious Asian cases related to commercially dominant groups such as the Greeks in Turkey and Chinese in Southeast Asia, although in both cases they were objects of popular reactions as much as official programs.

More recent history has seen confiscation of property and restrictions on residence directed toward three types of communal

- groups: 1) Non-indigenous commercial communities such as the Chinese and Indians
- 2) European entrepreneurs
- 3) Indigenous populations in conflict with the government

Numerous reports have appeared in the press during the postwar years describing attacks upon the non-indigenous commercial communities.¹ Suffice to state here, these nonindigenous Asian and Middle Eastern communities in Africa and Southeast Asia have tended to dominate much of the commercial life of the polities in which they live. Most notably they have been Chinese, Indians, and Vietnamese in Southeast Asia and Indians, Arabs, and Levantines in Africa. Local populations have called for their regulation as a result of the interaction of unpopular roles played by these groups with often partially true perceptions of these roles. The former have included a) economic middlemen and entrepreneurs engaged in commercial activities that impinge directly on the indigenous populace (moneylender, rice miller, store owner, etc.); b) supporter of the colonial regimes (usually on an effort to continue in business and defend their economic interests); and c) political middlemen in the postindependence years. These alleged roles have been combined with perceptions of such groups as a) composing an ethnic group that is also the major economic power in the polity, and b) having personality attributes making them inferior or superior to the

¹See F. R. von der Mehden, "Pariah Communities and Violence," in Vigilante Politics, edited by H. J. Rosenbaum and P. C. Sederberg. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976), 218-33.

dominant culture.¹ These factors have all led to popular support for government policies to confiscate the wealth or regulate the residence of pariahs.

Limitations on the residence of nonindigenous Asians have been common in Southeast Asia and parts of Africa.² Practices have fallen into two categories, ousting the offending community from the country and limiting it to particular sections of the polity. It should also be noted that regulations can also be divided between those directed at foreigners (although really targeting Asians and other nonindigenous commercial groups) and orders pertaining to a communal group regardless of citizenship. The most publicized examples of mass deportation from countries have related to Uganda and Burma, both directed against Indians (and Pakistanis). President I. Amin's program was based upon nationalist desires to have the economy controlled by locals and to "cleanse" the polity of a group considered undesirable on the basis of foreign loyalties and habits. Initially noncitizens were the objects of deportation orders and later almost all of the Pariah community was urged to leave. Ultimately approximately 87,000 Indians, Pakistanis, British, and Ugandan citizens of subcontinent ancestry left the country.

¹For example, an Indonesian Presidential Instruction read, "Chinese religion, beliefs, and customs (in Indonesia) originated in their native land and their various manifestations may generate unnatural influence on the psychology, mentality, and morality of Indonesian citizens and therefore impede natural propensity." Suryadinata, *op. cit.*, 780.

²Even in 17th century Yemen Jews were forced to live on the outskirts of towns in special areas. S. Sharot, "Minority Situation and Religious Acculturation: A Comparative Analysis of Jewish Communities," Comparative Studies in Society and History, XVI (June, 1974), 329-54.

No detailed study has been made to analyze the income ramifications of expulsion for all this group given their wide dispersion.¹

In the Burmese case actions against the Indian community followed a military coup in 1962 which resulted in programs nationalizing the means of production under the rubric of the "Burmese Way to Socialism."² Indians were particularly subject to attack due to their past domination of the economy of lower Burma, wide retention of Indian and British citizenship, charges of corruption and their postwar role in the private economy. Firms that were nationalized could only have Burmese citizen workers and this combined with a dim future for private enterprise and government pressure led to the exodus of over 170,000 Indians and Pakistanis. As in the case of Uganda, members of the Asian community found it difficult to retain property upon emigration.

There have been numerous other examples of expulsion in Afro-Asia. In Black Africa between 1969 and 1976, Goans were forced out of Malawi, Tanzanians from Kenya, Ghanians from Sierra Leone and Liberia, Nigerians from Ghana, Mozambians from Tanzania and Zambia, etc.³ At the same time it should be pointed out that large numbers

¹For a detailed view of the role of Asians in East Africa, see D. Ghai and Y. Ghai, eds., Portrait of a Minority, Asians in East Africa (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970), and H. S. Morris, The Indians of Uganda (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

²For an analysis of the Burmese Way to Socialism, see F. R. von der Mehden, "The Burmese Way to Socialism," Asia Survey, Vol. III, No. 5 (March, 1963), pp. 129-35.

³A. Gupta, "Ugandan Asians, Britain, India and the Commonwealth," African Affairs, LXXIII (July, 1974), 312-24, for various periods.

of noncitizens reside in various African states including perhaps a million Angolians in Zaire, also Rwandans in Uganda, Guineans in Kenya, and Voltaires in the Ivory Coast.

One other type of expulsion from the national polity should be mentioned--that related to a military/political rather than primarily economic/political rationale. In these cases communities were excluded because they were considered undesirable due to either their alleged military danger to the system or they were classed as political "pariahs." It should be noted that in almost every case although the rationale was not economic, there were also basic economic reasons for the evacuation. Examples of such expulsion were West Pakistanis from Bangladesh and Vietnamese from Thailand. With rare exceptions these groups were considered foreigners in spite of the fact that in some cases individual families had lived in the country for generations.¹

A second general type of residence restriction relates to policies that seek to either limit groups to particular geographic areas within the state and/or relocate them domestically. Both limitation and relocation patterns have been rationalized on the basis of economic, political and security factors, usually interacting one upon the other. Economically, it has been argued that nonindigenous groups in particular have dominated the economy of rural areas or small towns and that in order to provide greater opportunities to nationals the offending

¹For example, many Vietnamese in Thailand had lived in Northern Thailand since the nineteenth century, see P. A. Poole, The Vietnamese in Thailand, A Historical Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), and his "The Vietnamese in Cambodia and Thailand: Their Role in Interstate Relations," Asia Survey, XIV (April, 1974), 325-37.

elements must be relocated. Thus, in Indonesia Chinese have been denied access to the countryside and towns where they had finally been permitted to reside by Dutch administrators in the beginning of the century. The colonial decision developed economic nationalist reactions among Javanese merchants who feared competition.¹ In Kenya, business licenses have been employed to keep Asians from rural areas where Africans would meet competition.² In Tanzania nationalization laws were used to force noncitizens from rural areas while in Zambia expatriate owners of small businesses were told to go into joint ownership with Zambian citizens unless they confined their activities to major towns.³ In Iraq, Jews have been forbidden to immigrate.⁴

Political factors also have been responsible for restrictions. In Southeast Asia regulations regarding land ownership have been developed both to control Chinese and Indian economic domination and oppose local nationalism. For example, in Sarawak laws were consciously unfavorable to Chinese who (with one-third the population)

¹Fred R. von der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), 33-46; and D. Chang, "Current Status of Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia," Asian Survey, XIII (June, 1973), 588.

²Ghai and Ghai, op. cit., 122-24. An effort by the Nairobi city council to force non-Africans to vacate their market stalls was termed illegal by the courts. Rothchild, op. cit., 17-18.

³J. Scarrett and J. Hatter, "Racial and Ethnic Conflicts in Zambia," Graduate School of International Studies, Vol. II, No. 2 (1970-71), 22-23.

⁴Economist, 230 (February 1, 1969), 20-21.

own only three percent of the land.¹ Security matters long have been a principal reason for limitation and relocation. A prime example of this type of policy was formulated by the United States during World War II when Japanese Americans were forcibly relocated from the West Coast. Other twentieth century cases include the British relocation of Boer families, German concentration camps and forced labor during World War II, French activities in North Africa and the movement of approximately one million rural dwellers (86 percent Chinese) during the Malayan "Emergency."² It should be noted that often the security rationale has its economic counterpart. For example, the expulsion of Japanese from the West Coast allegedly was supported by local business and agricultural interests, to eliminate successful Japanese competition.³

Confiscatory policies have been formulated primarily in connection with nationalization and war or insurrection, although personal veniality has not been absent. The communal groups most affected by nationalization have been nonindigenous Asians or foreigners who have often owned or managed the type of economic activities most likely to be taken over (firms handling natural resources, banking, trade and refining of agricultural products). The very fact that nonnationals

¹J. van der Kroef, "Chinese Minority Aspirations and Problems in Sarawak," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXIX, No.s 1 & 2 (Spring-Summer, 1966), 74.

²Kernial Singh Sandhu, "The Saga of the 'Squatter' in Malaysia," Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. I (March, 1964), 143-78.

³For a critical analysis of the "pressure group" theory at the Japanese evacuation, see J. ten Brook, et al., Prejudice, War and the Constitution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), 185-98.

dominate these vulnerable areas makes nationalization a politically desirable act--it does not endanger indigenous support and builds on a foundation of economic nationalism. An example of confiscatory policies directed at "foreign elements" was the 1963 Burmese "Enterprise Nationalization Law." The former was used to nationalize all major firms in an economy largely controlled by non-Burmese.¹ In the process the Indians lost through receiving payment in long-term bonds, being declared "economic saboteurs" and penalized through confiscation and the loss of jobs in the new government enterprises when they were not citizens. Nationalization programs in Zambia and East Africa had a varying impact on Asians dependent upon ease of citizenship and inter-marriage, while those in Algeria affected the French population.²

Confiscation related to war and insurrection has a long and "honorable" history, being a traditional means of spoils going to the victor. This pattern of activity has not been absent from Afro-Asia as civil strife in Rwanda, Zanzibar, Bangladesh, and Israel have resulted in defeated communal groups losing property. An additional victim in Afro-Asia has been the nonindigenous Asians who suffered when antagonists have used periods of instability to launch pogroms. The rationale for these actions has been accusations of support of one of the partisans, and the hope of eliminating debts. The latter element

¹R. A. Holmes, "Burmese Domestic Policy: The Politics of Burmanization," Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 3 (March, 1967), 190-91.

²For example, in Uganda legislation forced those involved in processing and marketing cotton and coffee (mostly Asians) to sell out to cooperatives and laws covering similar areas with the same targets in mind were carried out in Tanzania. Ghai, op. cit., 118-22.

of veniality has been a probable consideration where individuals have used their power or knowledge of the law to cheat the less advantaged. American treatment of the Indian has its alleged modern counterpart in the Vietnamese "stealing" of Montagnard lands, and Christian use of corruption, political power, and better knowledge of the laws to take land away from Moslems in the Philippines.¹

Hill tribes and other isolated groups have long been objects of encroachment by dominant cultures with the resultant losses of land by the former. Hill people in northern Thailand held uncertain citizenship and thus had difficulty holding title to their land.² In Vietnam hill groups lost their land to Catholics forced out of the north in 1954. In India efforts to resettle tribes to valley areas have met with strong resistance and have not been entirely successful.³

While there are obvious losses in wealth and opportunities to form restrictions on residence and confiscation to communal groups and particularly to nonindigenous elements, these policies open several intriguing questions. Of course, there is a well-known argument that

¹These indictments appear in L. P. Jackson, "The Vietnamese Revolution and the Montagnards," Asian Survey, Vol. IX, No. 5 (May, 1969), p. 326 ; and H. Luther, "Background to the Muslim Successionists Movement in the Philippines," Asian Research Bulletin, Vol. III, No. 10 (March, 1974), 2519-22.

²J. Race, "The War in Northern Thailand," Modern Asian Studies, VIII (January, 1974), 85-112.

³For example, see L. P. Vidyarthi, "The Future of Traditional 'Primitive' Societies: A Case Study of an Indian Shifting Cultivation Society," The Eastern Anthropologist, No. 28 (October-December, 1975), p. 324.

groups that go through such difficulties are more likely to advance at a later date, although the positions posited by Everett Hagan and others related to more traditional societies. More interesting is the impact of residence and confiscatory policies not on the victim but on those supposedly not affected. What are the income and opportunity ramifications for the groups that are not expropriated or left after the expulsion of others? This is a complex problem to analyze, since it is difficult to keep other factors equal. These activities often happen during periods of fast and at times violent transition such as war, insurrection and revolutionary programs which cloud explanations of cause and effect. For example, the Burmese expulsion of the Indians and nationalization of their property in Burma was implemented during a period of fundamental economic and political change. Thus, although the years following promulgation of this policy saw a gradual erosion of the entire economy, probably combined with greater equity between rural and urban areas, this was also a time of revolutionary change under an ideologically-oriented military regime. These patterns of decline and equity cannot simply be laid to the treatment of the non-indigenous Asian community. Similarly, the expulsion of Vietnamese from Thailand, Laos, and the Khmer Republic were under wartime conditions.

The cases of Uganda and Zambia may be somewhat different as local citizens were given the opportunity of taking over Asian owned enterprises in a more open market economy, or at least not one in which state ownership or war were involved. The situation in Uganda is comparatively well-known.¹ In 1972 noncitizens were given three

¹Material on Uganda is drawn from Jack Parsons, "Africanizing Trade in Uganda: The Final Solution," Africa Today, Vol. XX,

months to leave the country, and this forced withdrawal was basically accomplished by November of that year. The precipitousness of the action made for considerable confusion and economic difficulty which might not have occurred under more evenly paced programs. However, it is possible to assess some of the positive and negative aspects of the situation in terms of distribution and income. On the positive side for the indigenous population, other than the emotional gains from Africanization and advantages to new owners, three points can be made.

1. The loss of the Asian community should ultimately aid the balance of payments since those evacuated tended to buy heavily in imported goods (automobiles, electrical appliances, luxury items, etc.) and there were large transfers of payment through remittances and travel.

2. Much of the trade was inter-Asian, and the loss of the entire community would thus not hurt the economy as a whole.

3. Much of the Ugandan population is rural and would be only tangentially affected.

On the negative side, other points can be listed:

1. There was a heavy loss of income (perhaps 38.6 percent) from income, excise, corporate, import and sales taxes.

2. There were basic problems of distributing, importing, and wholesaling goods. This could be only short term.

No. 1 (Winter, 1973), 59-72; and J. Rollow, "Uganda's Amin's Economic Revolution," Africa Today, Vol. XX, 36-38, 42.

3. There were difficulties in replacing supervisory and managerial personnel and in many cases African civil servants were transferred into areas in which they had little or no background.

4. Savings from the balance of payments appear to have gone into nondevelopment-oriented expenditures such as military supplies.

5. Shops and other businesses went disproportionately to members of General Amin's own ethnic group on the West Nile and Moslems, although not to the extent previously thought.

In addition, F. J. Ravenhill has noted three other factors:

1. It removed the bulk of Uganda's middle class. This including a large number of professionals essential for Uganda's development program: doctors, lawyers, teachers, and a number of senior civil servants. This problem has been exacerbated by the reduction in the number of British expatriates serving in Uganda and by the "disappearances" which directly, through murders, and indirectly, by encouraging other professionals to flee the country, have robbed Uganda of many of its most able citizens.
2. It led to the fragmentation of some of Uganda's most efficient industries, such as the Madvani group of companies, which was the largest industrial enterprise in East Africa. Many companies have failed to reopen under African management; it will be a considerable time before a class of indigenous industrial entrepreneurs develops.
3. It resulted in a reduction of employment opportunities. Not only did a large number of Asian enterprises close completely, but one of the largest sectors of employment for African girls--domestic employment--suffered a considerable contraction. It is estimated that 150,000 jobs have been lost.¹

Even in Zambia where Africanization has been less precipitous, there is pessimism as to the egalitarian nature of the programs.

A. A. Beveridge, in reviewing the "reforms" there considers that

¹F. J. Ravenhill, "Military Rule in Uganda: The Politics of Survival," African Studies Reviewed, XVII (April, 1974), 245.

those gaining have been civil servants, politicians, lawyers, and managers rather than the government or the people. His view of such programs in general was that "Usually some such sacrifices of development must be made for increased indigenization, while successful indigenous development will usually be to the detriment of equality among the indigenous population."¹

II. Quotas

Quotas as a means of aiding or inhibiting particular communal groups are neither new nor of limited scope. We have noted their use in the United States in the chapter on education. Colonial governments provided designated seats in legislative councils and positions in the civil service on a quota basis. Basically, quotas have been rationalized as necessary either to limit the participation of groups that would otherwise receive more than the government desires in terms of jobs, wealth, education or other opportunities or to provide participation to groups that could otherwise not compete equally without state assistance. The relation of quotas to income and opportunities is obvious. They can be employed either to limit or increase the essential ingredients for better income in terms of jobs, capital, political power, or education. There are six principal areas in which quotas have been assigned:

¹A. A. Beveridge, "Economic Independence, Indigenization, and the African Businessman: Some Effects of Zambia's Economic Returns," African Studies Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (April, 1975), 1-7.

1. Education
2. Civil Service
3. Commercial and professional positions
4. Ownership and investment opportunities
5. Political positions
6. Military and Police

Education: This has been discussed separately in the chapter on education and will not be re-analyzed here.

Civil Service: LDC governments have found it desirable to formulate quota systems in their civil service. These may be informal, as in parts of Africa where some sort of rough tribal equivalency has at times been attempted without any legal sanctions. There may be a detailed public program to provide proportional representation to minorities as announced by the North Vietnamese authorities.¹ In the cases of India, Taiwan, and Malaysia "affirmative action" regulations have been institutionalized to aid disadvantaged elements of the society.² In the first, the scheduled castes have received slots at various levels of the administration on the basis that previous treatment deserved compensatory action.³ A quota of a different type was given to the Telenganas when they were brought into the state of Andhra

¹George Kahin, "Minorities in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," Asian Survey, Vol. XII, No. 7 (July, 1972), 580-86.

²In Taiwan aborigines are allowed to take special civil service examinations and may enter all levels of education with lower standards. See Area Handbook for the Republic of China (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), 47.

³Lelah Dushkin, "Scheduled Caste Policy in India: History, Problems, and Prospects," Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 9 (September, 1967), 626-35.

Pradesh.¹ Fearing that their minority status would limit job opportunities, they obtained a "Gentlemen's Agreement" guaranteeing a certain percentage of jobs. Later events proved the agreement to be insufficient. In various African countries "Africanization" policies have led to restrictions on Asians and Europeans.

Malaysia has implemented the most systematic quota program related to civil service positions, with Malays dominating administrative posts and the technical services held by various communities but primarily filled by better trained Indians and Chinese. This has been accomplished through recruiting ratios of 4 Malays to 1 non-Malay in the Civil Service administrative posts, and 3 to 1 in External Affairs, Judicial and Legal Services. There has been a paucity of Malays in technical areas although efforts have been made to bring more into these posts, in part through scholarship quotas aiding Malays by a 3 to 2 ratio in the Arts, and 2 to 1 in science and technical fields.²

Commercial jobs and professions: Governments have made efforts to control entrance into jobs in the private sector through two broad policies. First, there have been laws to restrict activities of foreign workers through the use of work permits, immigration regulations, limitations on certain occupations, wage differentials and controls on

¹H. Gray, "The Demand for a Separate Telengana State in India," Asian Survey, Vol. 86, No. 5 (May, 1971), 463-74.

²Lee Soon Ann, "Fiscal Policy and Political Transition: The Case of Malay, 1940-1960," Journal of Southeast Asia Studies, Vol. V, No. 1 (March, 1974), 102-14; R. O. Tilman, "Public Service Commissions in the Federation of Malay," The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XX, No. 2 (February, 1961), 181-96.

business activities. In Southeast Asia a large number of occupations have been denied aliens (read Chinese and Indians). For example, Thailand lists the following 39 activities that have been restricted with varying stress.¹

Occupations Restricted to Thai Nationals

calculation	research planning testing
systemization	controlling or supervising of construction and civil engineering work
designing of buildings or other architectural structures including: consultations, estimations, construction supervision according to construction plans	legal or law-suit services
accounting supervision and auditing services	secretarial or clerical work
vending	brokerage or agency work
animal breeding	auctioneering
fishing (except specialized work and farm supervision)	haircutting
making silk products by hand	hairdressing and beautician service
Thai alphabet type-setting	tourist guides and tour organization
driving of motorized and non-motorized vehicles (except piloting int'l aircraft)	farming
hat making	forestry
production of paper and cloth umbrellas	nialloware making
knife making	silk reeling and spinning by hand
gold and silversmiths (or working with precious metals)	hand-weaving
Thai doll making	dress making
mat weaving (or making utensils of reed, rattan, kenaf-straw or bamboo pulp)	lacquerware making
	Buddha-image casting or making
	making "sa" paper by hand
	cigarette making by hand
	mattress or padded blanket making
	shoemaking
	wood carving
	lapidary or diamond and gem polishing
	pottery production
	Thai musical instrument making
	masonry
	alms bowl making
	bronze-ware making
	labour
	shop assistants
	carpentry (or other construction)

¹Asian Research Bulletin, Vol. VII, No. 2 (April, 1973),

Other examples abound. In Burma the 1962 military coup and installation of a socialist government brought the nationalization of all industries with a resulting discrimination against Indians in employment, type of business, licenses, loans, etc. Foreigners were forbidden to own land, send money abroad and participate in certain occupations.¹ Most African states have listed occupations for citizens only. The extent to which these restrictions are enforced may vary according to the economic situation and nationalist tensions. For example, in Nigeria, 22 categories of rather simple occupations are forbidden foreigners while 33 other categories are closed to foreigners if small enterprises and call for 40 percent Nigerian participation if large.²

A second pattern has been to limit nationals, although much "anti-foreign" legislation has actually been directed against Chinese and Indian citizens. This has been accomplished informally throughout Afro-Asia as communal groups aid "their own," thereby helping the more affluent maintain better opportunities for their people. Thus, tribal

¹R. A. Holmes, "Burmese Domestic Policy: The Politics of Burmanization," Asian Survey, VII (March, 1967), 188-97. In the Philippines the Retail Trade Act of 1954 provided that: a) All present alien proprietors may retain ownership; b) business cannot be passed on to alien heirs and must be liquidated within six months after death; c) no new retail establishment licenses to aliens; d) violations of economic regulations mean immediate revocation of alien licenses; e) corporations were allowed ten years to liquidate unless they were 100 percent Filipino owned. See S. Eitzen, "Two Minorities: The Jews of Poland and the Chinese of the Philippines," in D. Gelfand and R. Lee, Ethnic Conflicts and Power: A Cross-National Perspective (New York: Wiley, 1973), 143.

²L. Rood "Nationalization and Indigenization in Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, XIV (1976), 437.

groups with an urban base may be able to employ their roles in labor unions, political parties, business or particular professions to support fellow tribal members coming into the city. These are not quotas as such and may or may not be sanctioned by government, but such patterns are vitally important in explaining communal income differences.

Rarer has been the situation where government officially sanctions quotas on nationals. An example of communal/state interaction can be found in "nativist" sentiments in Bombay, India. Local residents (those living in Bombay at least 10 or 15 years or unofficially speaking the local language) receive preference in housing, government jobs and education.¹ Again, Malaysia is almost unique for its systematic programming for national quotas. For several years it has sought to implement rules to forward employment in the modern sector that would reflect communal percentages in the country. In the process a relatively flexible policy has been followed to establish a 40 percent Malay quota at all levels of industry.² It has been argued that this is the only way to bring Malays into the modern sector where more opportunities are available to raise the income of the disadvantaged, primarily Malay, rural population.

Investment quotas: India and Malaysia both exemplify countries that have sought to formulate investment policies which would set aside land or investment opportunities to disadvantaged groups. The Indian government has allowed Harijans special funds for rural industries and

¹M. E. Katzenstein, "Origins of Nativism: The Emergence of Shiv Sena in Bombay," Asian Survey, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (April, 1973) 386-99.

²Fred R. von der Mehden, "Communalism, Industrial Policy and Income Distribution in Malaysia," Asia Survey, Vol. XV, No. 3 (March, 1975), 247-61.

preferential treatment in land distribution.¹ The Malaysian government has a long term program establishing goals of ownership in the modern sector.² By 1990 it seeks 30 percent Malay ownership, 40 percent non-Malay indigenous, and 30 percent foreign. Percentages in 1970 were 1 percent, 22.5 percent, and 66.5 percent respectively, but no group is expected to diminish its actual investment due to continued national growth. Since there is insufficient capital in the Malay community, the government has sought to help Malays with preferential treatment in contracts, training, funding, and management. Beyond this the government has found it necessary to define state ownership as Malay in order to achieve the desired goal. A different pattern can be seen in Africa where government aid has gone to indigenous enterprises which received special benefits in terms of credit facilities and technical assistance.³

Political positions: Recruitment into and retention of political positions are important elements in gaining and maintaining higher incomes and opportunities, particularly if these posts are ones of real political power. Again, we must distinguish between informal and formal arrangements. Most plural societies have informal patterns of representation whereby communal groups urge that their representatives be given actual or symbolic positions of power. Even the United States Supreme Court has unwritten rules that call for the inclusion of Jewish, Catholic, and

¹J. L. Arles, "The Economic and Social Promotion of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes in India," International Labour Review, XXXVIII (January, 1971), 29-64.

²Fred von der Mehden, "Communalism," op. cit. This is a far more complex issue than can be discussed here.

³See, for example, L. Grayson, "The Promotion of Indigenous Private Enterprises in Ghana," Journal of African and Asian Studies, IX (January and April, 1974), 17-28.

now Black members. Symbolic minority membership in less sensitive cabinet, party, and administrative posts are normal means of appeasing these demands for representation.

An example of changes in the communal composition of cities can be seen in recent Ugandan history. The Obote government was one in which the military was northern dominated and Bagandan officers were discriminated against, although they were reported better educated and trained. Officers from the Acholi and Lango tribes were relied upon. After Amin's coup, Bagandans were still discriminated against and many of their leaders disappeared. The bulk of the new officers were from the West Nile and 40 percent Moslem and Amin relies heavily on his own Kakwa tribe. Officers received priority consideration over the homes of former Asian residents.¹

Formal quotas are a rare phenomenon and are usually found where severely divided polities have used them as a means of political compromise. The prime example of this type of arrangement is Lebanon where the President has been a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister Sunnite Moslem, the Cabinet from various sects and Parliament included 30 seats reserved for Maronites, 11 Greek Orthodox, 1 Armenian Catholic, and 1 Protestant.²

¹F. J. Ravenhill, op. cit., 240-43, and J. O'Brien, "General Amin and the Ugandan Asians," Round Table, LXII (January, 1972), 103.

²For a discussion of Lebanese politics see M. Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon: The Challenge of a Fragmented Culture (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967). In Ceylon, Tamil leaders attempted to get one-half the legislative seats at the time of independence, in order to protect Tamil jobs in the civil service. H. Olive, Opinion and Policy in Ceylon (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1957), 32.

Military and police: Formal and informal quotas have also appeared in the military and police forces. Again, informal patterns of representation may be quotas in actuality. We have many cases in which dominant communal groups have sought to maintain control over instruments of force, particularly in situations of possible conflict. Thus, in Taiwan 82 percent of all senior posts related to national security are held by mainland Chinese;¹ in Trinidad and Guyana armies and police forces recruit almost exclusively from the African communities which are less dominant but more politically powerful; and in Malaysia senior police and army posts are primarily Malay.² Obviously, such positions of power allow these groups to reinforce other special privileges.

However, as in the civil service, the numerical superiority of one community may only reflect historic colonial patterns, particularly in the first years of independence. The colonial rulers may have selected one element or another of the society because of education, political trustworthiness or perceptions as to fighting character. Thus, the British in Burma chose hill tribes, in Malaya, Malays, in Kenya, non-Kikuyu, and in Nigeria, Southerners, while Dutch looked to Ambonese in the East Indies and Belgians to the Tutsi in central Africa. Often the ties of these groups to the metropolitan powers meant suspicion and ultimate exclusion from high military posts once colonial rule was ended.

¹Hung-mao Tien, "Taiwan in Transition: Prospects for Socio-Political Change," China Quarterly, 64 (December, 1975), 627.

²For a good comparative study see C. Enloe, "Ethnicity and Militarization: Factors Shaping the Roles of Police in Third World Countries," Studies in Comparative International Development, XI (Fall, 1976), 25-38.

There can be little doubt that in numerous cases quotas have afforded disadvantaged groups opportunities they would not have available in open competition. As well, restrictions on other groups have inhibited them from obtaining equity. However, quotas promulgated to aid the disadvantaged in LDCs have been beset by numerous problems. Experience has shown that the targets of these programs have found it difficult to avail themselves of the opportunities afforded them. For example, Harijans in India have failed to meet job quotas at higher levels due to poor education and took up only 42-43 percent of the money allocated to them for investment projects by the third Five Year Plan.¹ As we have seen, Malays had insufficient capital to achieve their goal of ownership in the modern sector and too little education to fill technical posts in the civil service.

Secondly, it has been argued that in the Malaysia case where we have seen a highly organized quota system, the program has made the governmental organization less effective.¹ If so, this would inhibit state efforts to improve the economic position of the poor. L. P. Arles also argued that the whole quota system in jobs, land and education in Malaysia has produced deleterious effects on Malay income since it has drawn Malays away from more profitable entrepreneurial activities, now in the hands of Chinese, Indians and foreigners.² This may be true, but built-in Chinese and foreign organization and financial advantages would probably inhibit Malay progress in the economy at any rate. Such

¹M. Seals, Review of "Administration and Development in Malaysia, Institution Building and Reform in a Plural Society," by M. J. Esmon, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. IV, No. 2 (March, 1973), 143-45.

²L. P. Arles, "Ethnic and Socio-Economic Patterns in Malaysia," International Labour Review, Vol. CIV, No. 6 (December, 1971), 537-58.

informal pressures are relevant to other societies where the political and economic power of dominant groups have been employed to circumvent laws. Thus, part of the reason for the inability of Harijans to take advantage of opportunities may very well be fear of other castes. In sum, quotas have problems in implementation, but even when successful may have long-range deleterious effects on the economic life of both the country and disadvantaged group. Obviously these are emotionally charged questions that need greater analysis.

III. Language

The relationship of language to poverty has received considerable emphasis recently in the United States as the result of debates over bilingual education and the testing of the black poor. The encompassing nature of recent work tackling this issue can be assessed by simple reviewing the table of contents of a book such as Language and Poverty edited by Frederick Williams.¹ These writers have tended to view the language issue as primarily an educational question and studies have tended to be centered on American problems. At the same time, they have opened important conceptual areas which are relevant to the developing world. For example, a vital differentiation we are considering between the impact of government programs and the reaction of communal groups is succinctly highlighted by Williams regarding language:

... Are we talking about groups of individuals whose backgrounds, attitudes, and general capabilities have failed to equip them adequately for a life of opportunities or are we talking about minority cultures of a country where the attitudes of the majority have inhibited the participation of the minorities in these opportunities? The first version yields the definition of a disadvantaged culture, and the second, of a culture at a disadvantage. As we interpret evidence for purposes of assessing these alternatives, and as we may find ourselves faced with an interpretative blend of their extremes, we must cope theoretically and practically with what they imply about the nature of poverty in the United States. Moreover, we must consider what they imply about the ways in which we have chosen to fight poverty. Nowhere is this challenge more evident than in the contrasts between the deficit and the different positions taken on the language of the poverty child.²

¹Frederick Williams, ed., Language and Poverty, Perspectives on a Theme (Chicago: Markham, 1970).

²Ibid., p. 3.

While educators and policy makers have been wrestling with these problems, demographers, anthropologists, sociologists, and linguists have also been attempting to sort out language variations. There now exists considerable literature on language questions in LDCs although rarely have political scientists or economists given them much attention outside of studies of India and Malaysia. This section will attempt briefly to put together the contributions of the various disciplines as they relate to the distribution of income and opportunities.

To set the stage for our discussion it is useful to note the extent of homogeneity or heterogeneity of language within each national polity. This can be seen in Table I.¹

As can be noted from the list of languages, there is considerable diversity in terms of homogeneity. Beyond these figures other classifications are possible. Dankwart Rustow divides these linguistic constellations into six categories:²

1. A distinct language predominant throughout the country (Japan, Korea)
2. A single language predominant in several neighboring countries (Latin America, Arab countries)
3. A variety of closely related languages, one of which serves as an official language (Philippines, Tanzania)
4. A variety of unrelated languages of which only one has a substantial literary tradition (Morocco, Peru)
5. A variety of unrelated languages without a literary tradition (Tropical Africa)

¹Dankwart Rustow, "Language, Modernization and Nationhood-- An Attempt at Typology," in Language Problems of Developing Nations, ed. by J. Fishman, C. Ferguson, and J. Gupta, (New York: John Wiley, 1968), 95-96.

²Ibid., 97-104.

TABLE 1: Linguistic Unity and
Diversity of Countries

Country and source	Mother Tongue of largest group	Per Cent of population	Mother Tongue of second largest group	Per Cent of population
<u>East and South Asia</u>				
Korea (C)	Korean	100		
Maldiv Islands (C)	Sinhalese	100		
Japan (C)	Japanese	99	Korean	1
Bhutan (C)	Bhutanese-Bhotia	98		
Thailand (A) ^b	Thai-Lao	91	(Chinese)	4
Hong Kong (E)	Cantonese	88		
Vietnam (N & S) (C)	Vietnamese	85	Thai-Lao	4
Cambodia (C)	Cambodian-Khmer	84	Vietnamese	7
China (Mainland) (C,D)	Mandarin	81	Wu	8
Mongolia (C)	Mongolian-Khalkha	78	(Oirat)	8
Taiwan (A)	Fukienese-Taiwanese	78	Mandarin	18
Singapore (B)	(Chinese)	75	Indonesian-Malay	14
Burma (C)	Burmese	71	(Karen)	9
Laos (C)	Thai-Lao	69	Mon	11
Ceylon (B) ^o	Sinhalese	67	Tamil	29
Pakistan (A)	Bengali	56	Punjabi	30
Nepal (C,F)	Nepali	49	Hindi-Urdu	28
Indonesia (C)	Javanese	45	Sundanese	15
Malaysia (A)	Indonesian-Malay	43	(Chinese)	36
India (B)	Hindi-Urdu, Punjabi	42	Telugu	9
Philippines (A)	Cebuno-Visayan	24	Tagalog	21
<u>Oceania</u>				
Australia (C)	English	91	Italian	1
New Zealand (C)	English	91	Maori	7
New Guinea (C)	(Papuan)	69	(Melanesian)	30
<u>Middle East and Northern Africa</u>				
United Arab Repub- lic (C)	Arabic	98	Nubian	1
Jordan (C)	Arabic	98	Circassian	1
Yemen (C)	Arabic	98	(African Languages)	1
Saudi Arabia (C)	Arabic	96	(African Languages)	1
Somalia (C)	Somali	95	Arabic	2
Tunisia (C)	Arabic	93	French	2
Lebanon (C)	Arabic	92	Armenian	5
Turkey (A)	Turkish	90	Kurdish	7
Muscat & Oman (C)	Arabic	89	Baluchi	4
Libya (C)	Arabic	88	(Berber)	6
Algeria (D) ^o	Arabic	87	(Berber)	12
Syria (C)	Arabic	87	Kurdish	6
Kuwait (C)	Arabic	85	Persian-Tajik	9
Mauritania (C)	Arabic	82	Fulani	12

TABLE 1--continued

Country and source	Mother Tongue of largest group	Per Cent of population	Mother Tongue of second largest group	Per Cent of population
Iraq (A)	Arabic	79	Kurdish	16
Cyprus (A)	Greek	77	Turkish	18
Iran (D)	Persian-Tajik	69	Azerbaijani	12
Israel (A)	Hebrew	66	Arabic	16
Morocco (C)	Arabic	65	Tamazight and Shilha (Berber)	12 each
Afghanistan (C)	Pashto	53	Persian-Tajik	31
Ethiopia (C)	Amharic	49	Galla	23
Sudan (C)	Arabic	48	Dinka (Nilotic)	12
<u>Tropical and Southern Africa</u>				
Lesotho (C)	Sotho	99	Zulu-Xhosa	1
Madagascar (C)	Malagasy	97	French	2
Rwanda (E)	Rwanda	90		
Botswana (C)	Tswana	69	Shona	9
Rhodesia (C)	Shona	65	Zulu-Xhosa	15
Dahomey (C)	Ewe-Fon	58	Gurma-Somba	13
Upper Volta (C)	Mossi	54	Lobi, Bobo, Dogon	13
Sierra Leone (C)	Temne, Bulom, Limba	52	Mende	34
Mozambique (C)	Makua	51	Tsonga	24
Congo (Brazzaville)(C)	Kongo	50	Teke	25
Gen. African Repub.(C)	Banda	47	Gbaya	27
Gambia (C)	Malinke-Bambara-Dyula	46	Fulani	19
Ghana (A)	(Akan)	44	Mossi, Dagomba	16
Niger (C)	Hausa	43	Songhai	18
Senegal(C)	Wolof	42	Fulani	24
Togo (C)	Ewe-Fon	41	Tem-Kabre	22
Mali (C)	Malinke-Bambara-Dyula	40	Fulani and Senufo	14 each
South Africa (C)	Zulu-Xhosa	40	Afrikaans	21
Guinea (C)	Fulani	39	Malinke-Bambara-Dyula	26
Angola (C)	Umbundu	36	Kimbundu	24
Malawi (D)	Nyanja	36	Nguru and Yao	14 each
Chad (C)	Arabic	33	(Bongo-Bagirmi)	25
Zambia (C)	Bemba	33	Tonga	15
Gabon (C)	Kele, Njabi	31	Fang	30
Liberia (D)	Kru-Bassa	30	Kpelle	25
Kenya (C) ^d	Kikuyu	29	Lubya	19
Burundi (E)	Rundi	28	Swahili	17
Uganda (D)	Ganda	28	Yoro, Nyankore, Hororo	17
Ivory Coast (C)	Anyi-Baule	24	Bete	18
Nigeria (C)	Hausa	21	Ibo	18
Cameroon (C)	Fang	19	Bamileke	18
Congo (Kinshasa)(C) ^d	Rwanda	17	Luba Lulua	17
Tanzania (C) ^d	Nyamwezi-Sukuma	17	Hehe	7

SOURCE: J. A. Fishman, C. A. Ferguson, and J. D. Gupta, eds., Language Problems of Developing Nations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), pp. 95 and 96.

6. A variety of unrelated languages, each with its own literary tradition (Sri Lanka)

While we shall present a different categorization below, it can be argued that, in an aggregate sense, linguistic heterogeneity positively correlates with low income levels (the case of Switzerland shows that this is only a tendency). Banks and Textor found that homogeneous systems tended to have at least "medium" per capita GNPs (\$300.00 per year) while heterogeneous polities tended to be "low" or "very low." Russett and Akers show high correlations between linguistic homogeneity and 1) government revenues as a percentage of GNP, 2) per capita GNP in 1957 United States dollars, and 3) wage and salary earners as a percentage of the working age population.¹ Reasons for this would appear to be primarily related to the fact that linguistic heterogeneity is positively correlated with high levels of sectionalism and the presence of major nonassimilated minorities, both characteristic of newly independent Afro-Asian states. The economic correlations may thus be unrelated to actual causative factors and, in fact, are poor explanatory models.

As can be seen in the chapter on education, we believe that a more useful categorization for our purposes is one formulated on the ability of groups within the polity to cope with the official language. This capability affords individuals within the group a competitive edge in jobs and education in particular. Our own categories are similar to those of Rustow, but with greater consideration of the official role of the language.

¹Joshua Fishman, "Some Contrasts between Linguistically Homogeneous and Linguistically Heterogeneous Polities," in Fishman et al., op. cit., 61-67.

TABLE 2: Arrangement of Polities by Linguistic Homogeneity-Heterogeneity and Per Capita Gross National Product^{a/}

Gross National Product	Linguistic Factor	
	Homogeneous	Heterogenous
Very High Medium	Australia, France, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Austria, Denmark, E. Germany, German F.R., Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Greece, Hungary, Jamaica, Japan, Lebanon, Poland, Uruguay.	Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Israel, USSR, Bulgaria, Rumania, Spain, Trinidad, Cyprus, Malaya, S. Africa, Yugoslavia.
Number	27	15
Low, Very Low	Albania, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Burundi, Haiti, Jordan, Korea N., Korean Rep., Libya, Malagasy, Rwanda, Somalia, Yemen.	Panama, Syria, Turkey, Algeria, Ecuador, Guatemala, Iraq, Peru, Philippines, N. Vietnam, Republic of Vietnam, Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Bra.), Congo (Leo.), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ivory Coast, Laos, Mali, Liberia, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanganyika, Togo, Uganda, Upper Volta.
Number	25	47

^aTable 2 indicates the position of 114 polities with respect to the cross-tabulations of per capita gross national product (dichotomized) and linguistic homogeneity (dichotomized), based upon the indices of Banks and Textor.

SOURCE: Joshua A. Fishman, C. A. Ferguson, and J. D. Gupta, eds., Language Problems of Developing Nations (New York: Wiley, 1968), p. 62.

1. A distinct language used by almost all the populace that is also the official language (Korea, Syria)
2. A distinct language used by the majority which is the official language with one or more other linguistic groups (Malaysia, Burma)
3. A variety of closely related languages in which one is the official language but where no group holds a majority (Philippines)
4. A variety of unrelated languages of which one is the official language (India)
5. A variety of related or unrelated languages in which the official language is artificial or imported (European language states of Africa--see map.

In the first case language policy does not disadvantage any one group, but in each of the others one community or another is aided or inhibited by its ability to employ the official language (see the chapter on education, pp. 37-92). If one group is better able to use this lingua franca it will obviously be able to compete more effectively activities such as education and civil service examinations that demand such capabilities. For example, in the Sudan Arabic is the official language but 98.9 percent of the country's Arabic speakers are from the North and Southerners rarely speak it.¹ While this would appear simple

¹J. Sommer, "The Sudan: A Geographical Investigation of the Historical and Social Roots of Political Dissension," (Ph.D. thesis, Boston University, 1968, p. 107). In Mauritania a 1966 effort to force the teaching of Arabic led to a walkout of negroes from schools. See A. Gerteing, Mauritania (New York: Praeger, 1967), 151-52.

at first glance, the situation is far more complex. First, even when an indigenous language may be promulgated as the official standard, a European tongue may still be the language of upward mobility and status. Three examples from Africa illustrate this: Charles Gallagher wrote of North Africa in the middle 1960s when he commented:

It can be stated flatly that in Morocco and Tunisia today the non-French-speaking candidate has no chance at getting a good government job and advancing himself in any ministry except Justice, Religious Affairs, or in specialized functions in the Interior (police work) or education.¹

He further notes that posts in key ministries and important commercial and industrial jobs were virtually closed to the monolingual Arabophone. D. J. Parkin noted that in Nairobi, Kenya, both Swahili and English are lingua francas, but the latter is consistently used at levels of clerical and above occupational grades.² With regard to local perceptions of the status of a European language Carol Scotton's survey of Kampala, Uganda, found that English was valued because of its high economic status and "If one speaks English well, he is educated and has a good job."³


Beyond these factors, we find that certain languages are those of commerce, even if they are not officially recognized. Thus, in South-east Asia Tagalog, Thai, Indonesia or Malay may be the official language, but European languages or Chinese are the means of commercial transactions. Finally, we should note that just because a community speaks

¹Charles Gallagher, "North African Problems and Prospects: Language and Identity," in J. Fishman et al., op. cit., 143.

²D.J. Parkin, "Nairobi: Problems and Methods," in Language in Kenya, ed. by W. H. Whitely (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1974), 143.


³Carol Scotton, Choosing a Lingua Franca in an African Capital (Edmonton: Linguistic Research, Inc., 1972), 82.

AREAS OF EUROPEAN LANGUAGE INFLUENCE



-  FRENCH
-  ENGLISH
-  PORTUGUESE
-  ITALIAN
-  SPANISH

OFFICIAL LANGUAGES OF AFRICA



ARABIC SPEAKING AFRICA



-  COUNTRIES WITH OFFICIAL AFRICAN LANGUAGES OF A NATION-WIDE SCOPE.
-  COUNTRIES WITH A POTENTIAL AFRICAN LANGUAGE (NOTED IN PARENTHESES).

the indigenous official language it does not mean that the group is of the highest economic level. Cultural factors, past disadvantages, geographic placement and other elements may inhibit the group's economic role. While Malay is the national language of Malaysia, the largely rural Malays are lower in about every economic category from the Chinese. India, with its 1,652 "mother tongues," established Hindi as the official language in the constitution. Yet native Hindi speakers have lower literacy rates than non-Hindi states, have a comparatively lower urban population, rank among the lowest in per capita income, and using a composite development scale are near the bottom of Indian states.¹

We have seen that quotas, residence restrictions, confiscation, and linguistic policies have been two-edged swords, both aiding and inhibiting communities within a single polity. The problems are far more complex than can be analyzed by simply singling out the obvious losses and gains of particular groups. Confiscation and limitations on residence does clearly discernable and immediate economic damage to groups such as the non-indigenous Asians who are forced out of particular countries or regions. However, the impact on those remaining is less clear and even the long-term effects on those made to leave are open to question. Quotas have been established by governments to help disadvantaged groups in education, jobs, business and government; but we have found that they do not always take advantage of opportunities afforded them and the short and long-term ramifications of these programs on the whole economy has

¹J. D. Gupta, Language Conflict and National Development (Berkeley: University of California, 1970), 33-68.

not been investigated adequately. Language policies appear to have unfavorable implications in terms of jobs and education for those less able to cope with the official language, but those who can may find their common betterment blocked by the existence of other tongues of commerce and status.

CHAPTER IV

Taxation, Pricing, Subsidies and Licensing

In analyzing the effects of taxation, pricing, subsidies and licensing on income differentials among communal groups, it is important to recognize the different patterns of interaction. Subsidies, pricing and licensing are more closely related to previously discussed policies. Licenses can be and have been used to aid or inhibit particular groups in a manner similar to quotas and, as we shall see, have been employed to control residence. Subsidies and pricing have been conscious government policies intended to aid targeted areas of the polity. For example, low rice prices have been maintained to gain the support of urban populations. Taxation, on the other hand, is less a question of a decision to create greater equity through programmatic policies and more related to regulation or the transfer of wealth. Unlike education, quotas, investments or language policies which may be developed to aid or impede group income and opportunities, taxes are infrequently directed toward a particular communal element and primarily formulated to collect income for government operation or to regulate designated activities (customs, luxury, and gambling taxes). In this chapter we will analyze the income/communal attributes of five broad areas:

1. Indirect taxes, primarily on primary agriculture products
2. Direct taxes consciously aimed at communal groups
3. Direct taxes, neutrally designed but with communal implications.

4. Subsidies and pricing
5. Licenses

We should also note that there exist severe data problems regarding issues such as taxation. While material often exists in a bulk nature, very little of it has been refined in a manner which is useful for our analysis. For example, much of the International Labour Office work on taxation and income distribution assesses the impact of taxation and expenditures along income, class and rural/urban lines. Even such excellent treasures of communally classified data as the Malaysian materials do not discuss sources of revenue by community. We will be concentrating upon only a few of the wide variety of taxes levied within the LDCs, noting in particular those systems that we believe do impact differentially upon communal groups. One of the most obvious examples of such a tax relates to taxation of primary products for the foreign and domestic market.

Indirect taxes

In analyzing the relation of indirect taxes on primary products it is conceptually useful to divide these levies along two lines, natural resources and agriculture. The former may vary from other primary products in terms of both public and private ownership. While natural resources such as minerals may be found in one region, it can be argued that they are national treasures and that taxes derived from income from mining, refining, and selling them should revert to the national coffers. Thus, the oil of southern Nigeria, copper of Katanga, tin of Bangka, and Billeton, and gems of eastern

Burma are not the wealth of the region alone; and tax revenue supposedly should be distributed equitably among all regions and communities within the polity.¹ Questions involving local versus national ownership of natural resources and the issue of which should receive the revenue from their exploitation are obviously highly debatable both in the United States and abroad. The problem becomes further complicated in many developing countries where the ownership of companies that control the development and sale of these products is usually in the hands of absentee owners in the urban centers, foreigners, or held by the government itself. Thus, taxation on these properties and activities may not directly impact upon the producing region but upon other communal groups living elsewhere. This pattern is the norm for oil, copper, iron, coal, bauxite, and most other minerals.

Quite different is the taxation of agricultural products due for sale outside the producing areas. Here again, it may be desirable to separate plantation agriculture from small-holder operations. The former, similar to mining, is likely to be held by urban-based absentee owners or foreigners. Examples of this pattern of ownership are numerous. In West Malaysia, ownership of limited companies in agriculture, forestry and fisheries in 1970 was held primarily by foreigners (75.3%) and Chinese and Indians (23.7%), while the majority Malays had but 1%.² This is in spite of the fact that two-thirds

¹In Nigeria the revenue from oil and other minerals has been divided on the basis of 50% to the region in which it was found, 20% to the Federal Government, and 30% to a distributive pool. A. Adedeji, Nigerian Federal Finance (New York: Africana, 1969), p. 131.

²Malaysia, Mid-Term Review, 1973.

of rural Malaysians are Malay. Another way of stating the issue is to compare ownership in the corporate and agricultural sectors, where Malay ownership in the former was only .03 percent in 1970.

As well, taxation of smallholders has been less of an ideological question than policies directed toward plantation agriculture. The latter has been characterized by Afro-Asian politicians as exploitive and thus proper targets of high taxes, or regulation and even nationalization. Taxation of smallholders normally has raised different issues centering upon equity, its impact on modernization and the protection of producers against world market fluctuations.

Our principal concern in this area of analysis, indirect taxation in agriculture, opens to scrutiny several of the issues noted in the introduction to this chapter. These levies relate primarily to taxes on the export of agricultural commodities and the cesses of marketing boards originally established to protect producers from market fluctuations. Export taxes have been a major issue in terms of equity. Their economic advantages (all of which are debatable) are usually defined along the following lines:¹

1. They are an efficient and relatively easy means of collecting taxes, particularly in developing nations with limited bureaucratic infrastructures that may not be capable of controlling nonpayment of other taxes.

¹T. Bertrand, "Rural Taxation in Thailand," Pacific Affairs, XLII (Spring, 1969), 178-88; B. Renaud and P. Suphaphiphat, "The Effect of the Rice Export Tax on the Domestic Rice Price Level in Thailand," Malayan Economic Review, XVI (April, 1971), 84-107; A. H. Tan, "The Incidence of Export Taxes on Small Producers," Malayan Economic Review, XII (April, 1967), 90-98.

2. They can be used to stabilize prices by maintaining particular price levels and using surpluses to subsidize volatile export commodities in periods of declining prices.

3. They can be employed to collect windfall profits in periods of unusually high commodity prices.

4. By keeping prices low they enable the country to compete more effectively on the world market. This can be done in conjunction with marketing boards.

5. By taxing certain crops the government can force agricultural diversification--a particularly important goal in one-way economies.

The political advantages have been dual. Often the producers may not be aware of the extent of the burden or they may believe that the incidence is on foreign consumers or unpopular local producers. However, as F. Jackson has warned, in order that this tax be politically acceptable, the producers of the taxed commodity should not comprise a politically significant element of the population.¹

The impact of these taxes on equity can be seen in three broad areas:

1. Taxes as an added income tax on producers,
2. Expenditures of tax revenue on nonproducers,
3. Differential impact on communal groups.

Economists have argued that export taxes and pricing through marketing boards can be a means of "forced savings" in times of an export boom and subsidies in periods of decline, but that in practice

¹Frank Jackson, "Political Aspects of Export Taxation," Public Finance, XII (1957), 291-96.

they tend to be a tax on producers.¹ Due to slow growth of markets and poor terms of trade, it is unlikely that these taxes will be passed on to the foreign consumer (we will look at the impact of food pricing on local conditions later in this paper). The amounts collected by governments or their marketing boards varies, of course, dependent upon world prices, pricing policies, etc., but a few examples may illustrate the amounts available and losses to producers. In Uganda, marketing boards were formed in the 1940s to protect producers of cotton and coffee by buying at prices set to form reserves against world market fluctuations.² In the early years the Coffee Marketing board and Lint Marketing Board built a considerable surplus although there were later losses. From 1945 to 1960 £50,700,000 was withheld and coffee producers received only 73 percent of their net revenues and cotton farmers 62 percent. In Upper Volta by the end of 1967-68 the assets of the Price Stabilization Fund were about FAF 180,000,000.³ In Ghana, the Cocoa Board showed surpluses of over £20,000,000 in 1946 and £87,000,000 from 1947-48 to 1960-61.⁴ In Burma, by the end of 1966 the government was paying £11 a ton for rice and exporting it at £35 a ton.⁵ In Burundi

¹L. H. Samuels, "Monetary and Fiscal Policy in Relation to African Development," Taxation for African Economic Development, ed by M. Taylor (New York: Africana, 1970), 60-63.

²P. Marlin, ed., Financial Aspects of Development in East Africa (Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1970), 82-88.

³IMF, "Upper Volta," Surveys of African Economics, III (1970), 696.

⁴W. Birmingham, I. Newstadt, and E. Dmaboc, eds., A Study of Contemporary Ghana (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), 366-71.

⁵F. S. Dennison, Burma (New York: Praeger, 1970), 184-88.

the Cash Crop Office (OCIBU) controls coffee marketing through which producers in 1965-68 averaged about 66 percent of actual earnings. In 1972 this dropped to 53.4 percent.¹ Finally, in Rwanda coffee growers obtained an average of 60 percent of earnings from 1966 to 1971, and the Cash Crop Office (OCIR) had RF 79,800,000 and the Stabilization Fund 220,200,000 as of 1970.²

Thus, as P. Marlin has commented, "It can be assumed, therefore, that the incidence of the export taxation falls upon East Africa itself and that the producers of the respective products finally have to pay the burden. Consequently, such taxes on production to be paid by the producer, by their economic nature are nothing less than direct income taxation assessed on the rough basis of the gross sales of export products."³ Of course, there can be variations in policies and goals and thus how the tax impacts upon producers. For example, in Tanzania and Kenya export taxes (primarily on coffee and sisal) have been to catch windfall profits while in Uganda similar levies on coffee and cotton have been a revenue device which has hurt farmers.

The second issue related to how these funds are used. They can be employed for the producers alone, either as a reserve to protect them from the world price fluctuations or in the form of expenditures for

¹IMF, "Burundi," Surveys of African Economics, V (1973), 234-35.

²IMF, "Rwanda," Surveys of African Economics, V (1973), 363-66.

³For a detailed analysis of export taxes see R. Goode, G. Lent, and P. Ohja, "The Role of Export Taxes in Developing Countries," IMF Staff Papers, XIII (November, 1966), 453-503. They argue that the incidence is more likely to be on the producer if the tax is imposed by a single country and even where the country accounts for a large proportion of the world market the shift of incidence to foreign consumers is likely to be short term. In Burma E. Ayal has stated that rice marketing board activities were tantamount to a net tax on producers, and since at

agricultural research or benefits to the local community. On the other hand, revenue may be diverted to general funds or development programs. Uganda's expending of approximately 50 percent of the aforementioned surplus on development programs has been only one of many such cases. (See Table 1.) In much of the Nigeria regional marketing boards large surpluses went into general development funds. In the former Eastern and Western States the boards were described as unquestionably formed to generate income rather than protect producers.¹ Rwanda's assets from surplus have been a major source of financing the development budget since 1967. In Gambia and Ghana, although a considerable amount of the surplus went into agricultural research, there was also extensive use of these funds for regular government expenditures and national development projects. This has tended to be a general pattern where marketing boards have operated--hidden taxation on producers, an accumulation of large surpluses which in time become attractive to national planners in need of capital for modernization. These expenditures are only in part employed in the rural sector and in effect we see a transfer of capital to satisfy urban needs. When taxes impact differentially on communal groups, the issue touches upon the principal concern of this study.

Indirect taxes on agricultural products primarily influence income differentials among communal groups where particular crops are grown by one or another community. Basically, this means that where X export crop is grown by Y group we may find that the income derived from taxing X may

stages the elasticity of supply is smaller than the elasticity of demand a substantial part of this "tax" is shifted backward. "The Impact of Export Taxes on the Domestic Economy of Underdeveloped Countries," Journal of Development Studies, 1 (July, 1965), 330-62.

¹G. Helleiner, "The Fiscal Role of the Marketing Boards in Nigerian Economic Development, 1947-61," in Taylor, op. cit., 414-48.

TABLE 1: Distribution of Export Revenue
from Coffee and Cotton in Uganda
1945-1960

	<u>Cotton</u>		<u>Coffee</u>		<u>Coffee and Cotton</u>	
	Million £	%	Million £	%	Million £	%
1. Payment to growers	135.3	100	96.6	100	231.9	100
2. Contribution to development funds	24.2	17.9	0.6	24.8	24.8	10.7
3. Export funds						
a. For development budget	12.3	9.1	7.0	7.2	19.3	8.3
b. For current bud- get increase in price	31.2	23.1	17.7	18.3	48.9	21.1
4. Ass't funds	13.9	10.3	8.9	9.2	22.8	9.8
5. Depreciation (net)	2.0	1.5	1.1	1.2	3.2	1.4
TOTAL	83.7	61.9	35.3	36.5	119.0	51.3

be spent inequitably on communal groups A, B, and C. What particularly aggravates these agricultural groups is that they feel that other communities are receiving the revenue from these taxes while they are being deprived of needed development funds. More often than not, it is an issue of rural communal groups supporting urban populations.

This pattern can be illustrated by numerous cases. In pre-1965 Indonesian revolts resulted in part from local dissatisfaction with the fact that the outer islands were producing taxable revenue while Java was expending it. Meanwhile, as D. H. Penny noted, "The farmers have received little in return: the roads and railways have deteriorated (they are being rehabilitated slowly now), and the delivery capacity of the irrigation systems has declined. Government services

to farmers have not been commensurate with the (total) taxes they have paid."¹ In East Africa ownership of sisal-cotton land and trade was largely in the hands of Asians and Europeans who were thus most affected by export taxes.² In these and similar cases we find the general impact of these indirect agricultural taxes to fall upon one community or set of groups as against others. A different pattern can be illustrated by the case of the Malaysian rubber industry. There we find that funds for replanting made available from export taxes went disproportionately to larger plantations and thus these taxes were "very regressive to the small-holders."³ It so happens that in Malaysia large plantations have primarily been owned by Europeans while small-holders have largely been Malays. An area of further investigation would fruitfully be in this area of the distribution of export tax revenues, for as A. H. H. Tan notes, the regressive nature of this tax must be balanced with gains from research and rural development rising out of revenues. We should also note that in the East African case the aforementioned rural-urban dichotomy was less clear as large-scale agriculture was in the hands of urban-based non-Africans. As well, while it may not be difficult devising means of assessing the amount of export taxes paid by a region, problems arise when attempting to provide accurate government expenditures on any given area. While we

¹D. H. Penny, "Indonesia," Agricultural Development in Asia, ed. by R. T. Shand (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 268-71.

²See A. Bharati, The Asians in East Africa (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1972), 104-12.

³Tan, op. cit., 97.

can define expenditures on roads, personnel, health centers, etc., how do we consider defense and other central government costs?

Direct taxes consciously aimed at communal groups or neutrally designed

It is not always easy to prove that a particular communal group has been the target of government tax policies. We can show that income or excise taxes can advantage one group as against another, or that head taxes impact more upon poor communities than rich. If we find a communal group with a higher percentage in upper income brackets than others, then a decision to use income taxes or excise taxes on luxury goods will impact disproportionately on that community. In the colonial Netherlands Indies the Dutch and nonindigenous Asians paid almost all of this type of tax while the indigenous population was basically unaffected. Colonial governments often exempted the indigenous population or kept taxable income at a high enough level to restrict income taxes to the foreign sector. For example, in Uganda Africans were exempt from income tax up to 1961 and non-Africans were subject to the regional income tax to the same date.¹ The following chart shows why. In Malaysia progressive income taxes hit commercial and industrial sectors dominated by the Chinese. In Uganda it has been argued that the expulsion of the Asian community by Idi Amin cost the government approximately 38 percent in revenue primarily in income, corporation, excise, and import taxes.² In Southeast Asia

¹J. Due, Taxation and Economic Development in Tropical Africa (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963), 34.

²P. Beaulieu, "Singapore: A Case Study of Communalism and Economic Development (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Seattle, University of Washington, 1975), 243-44.

middle and large-scale entrepreneurial activities have traditionally been in the hands of nonindigenous Asian communities and foreigners who have populated cities such as Bangkok, Penang, Ipoh, and Kuala Lumpur. Taxes on the modern sector have been paid primarily by these groups. Thus, in 1964, Malays paid only 6.4 percent of all personal income taxes, Chinese 51.6 percent, Indians 11 percent, and non-residents 31 percent.¹ Data on Kenya in 1962 shows both where the income tax burden falls as well as the disparities within communities.²

TABLE 2: Index of Income Per Head of
Working Population by Racial Groups
1930-1939^a

(Indonesian income = 1)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Europeans</u>	<u>Foreign Asiatics</u>	<u>Indonesians</u>
1930	47	5	1
1939	61	8	1

^aD. H. Penny, op. cit.

It is, of course, possible that this discrimination is planned. For example, in 1961 Iraqis in the agricultural sector were exempt from income taxes as part of a conscious government policy to aid large landowners while the 81.6 percent of self-employed taxpayers in the three largest cities (with 40.7 percent of the population) paid 93.3 percent of the income tax.³

¹Jack Parson, "Africanizing Trade in Uganda: The Final Solution," Africa Today, 20 (Winter, 1977), 59-72.

²D. and Y. Ghai, Portrait of a Minority: Asians in East Africa (Nairobi: Oxford, 1970), 109.

³A. Alnasawi, Financing Economic Development in Iraq

TABLE 3: Kenya--Percentage of Taxpayers
in Each Income Group by Race: 1962

Income group	Africans	Arabs & Somalis	Asians	Europeans
Under £120	91.4	86.0	11.0	1.5
£200-399	4.7	7.2	4.3	3.2
£160-199	1.7	1.9	3.3	0.6
£120-159	1.7	2.0	13.0	2.5
£400 and over	0.5	2.0	68.4	92.2

There are, of course, taxes explicitly and publicly designed to impact upon foreigners and other nonindigenous populations. These include payment of higher individual or corporate income taxes, higher payments for licenses and other means of making the noncitizen pay more than the indigenous population.¹ The Thai Revenue Code of 1939 established a tax on the commercial class designed to impact on aliens.² In (then) Nyasaland, Europeans paid a higher poll tax.³ In Indonesia the government formulated a special head tax for foreigners in 1957.⁴ In 1974 foreign workers were told to pay a "contribution

¹For a review of varying Asian policies in the 1960s, see A. Yoingco and R. Trinidad, Fiscal Systems and Practices in Asian Countries (New York: Praeger, 1968). For Africa, see J. F. Due, op. cit.

²G. W. Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 263.

³Due, op. cit., 34 and 64.

⁴G. W. Skinner, "The Chinese Minority," Indonesia, ed. by R. McVey (New Haven: Yale, 1963), p. 114; and D. Willmott, The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), 74.

fee" of U.S. \$100 per month and companies the same unless they trained Indonesians.¹ On the other hand, special tax incentives are often provided to attract outside investment. Under acts such as the "promoted industries" of Thailand, "new, necessary, and basic" industries of the Philippines and other such schemes, foreign enterprises receive personal and corporate tax holidays of one type or another. Foreign residents also have often received special tax privileges. In South Vietnam they received higher family allowances than citizens. In Sri Lanka foreign scientists were exempt from income tax if they were employed by a company wholly financed by the government, and in India foreign technicians were exempt.²

While there is little doubt that communal factors have gone into decisions to employ one type of direct tax as against another, it is difficult to prove actual bias. Most systems have graduated incomes taxes and levies on luxury items, and if richer communal groups must pay more it is argued that this is more than balanced by their wealth. As well, sumptuary taxes are a normal method of obtaining revenue. However, these levies can consciously or unconsciously impact upon particular communities. Income taxes, and levies on luxuries have targeted urban nonindigenous populations. At the same time cultural habits may make one community more vulnerable to certain types of taxes. In Moslem dominated countries a tax on alcohol will be paid primarily by unbelievers.³ In Kenya the high value placed on cattle

¹Asia Research Bulletin, III (May, 1974), 2754.

²Yongco and Trinidad, op. cit., 213.

³This may be true of indirect taxes and tariffs as well. In Nigeria the revenue from taxes on motor spirits, diesel oil, wine,

has led to relatively higher per capita taxes among pastoral peoples in the Narok, Kajiado, and West Pokot districts.¹ In colonial India the income tax system reportedly hurt the Hindu Joint Family (an extended family including several adult males) since the graduated nature of the levy meant a higher tax burden. In independent India, the HUF has been characterized as a tax haven for Hindu families falling under the system.² Revolts in Chad and Mali were in part due to efforts to collect livestock taxes which largely fell on Moslems.³ There are also cases in which particular communal groups or their institutions have been exempted from taxation. This is not unusual in the West where, for example, in the United States religious institutions are largely freed from taxation. In Ethiopia the Coptic Church is exempt from land taxes, but not other religions.⁴ In India, disadvantaged groups have been aided through the tax system and any income of a member of a scheduled tribe residing in certain designated

potable spirits, and beer were distributed throughout the country with a high proportion going to Northern Nigeria, a Moslem area, with comparatively little transport. See Taylor, op. cit., 259.

¹E. Soja, The Geography of Modernization in Kenya (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968), 120.

²For discussions of the HUF, see D. T. Lakdawala, Justice in Taxation in India (Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1946), 59-60; I. and K. Gulati, The Undivided Hindu Family (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962); and J. Cutt, Taxation and Economic Development in India (New York: Praeger, 1969).

³V. DuBois, "The Struggle for Stability in the Republic of Mali," West Africa Series, VII (December, 1964), 6.

⁴P. Schwab, "The Tax System of Ethiopia," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, XXIX (January, 1970), 77-88.

areas is exempted from taxes.¹ However, we should emphasize that the imposition of/exemption from taxes based upon conscious ascriptive determinants is rare and not of major economic importance in Afro-Asia.

In reviewing the overall impact of various types of taxes further case study analysis is necessary. For example, it is necessary to analyze the comparative advantages or disadvantages to different communities paying indirect export taxes as against income, luxury, and import taxes and combinations thereof. We do have a great deal of evidence showing that while urban populations tend to pay higher income taxes, when other levies are included the burden tends to shift to the agricultural sector. Care must be taken not to generalize, but examples of discriminatory systems are not difficult to discover. E. T. Matthews found that agricultural income tax formed but 0.13 percent of the national revenue and even less for many states. However, by combining central excise duties, the general sales tax and import duties, etc. it was estimated that 64.3 percent of the total revenue came from the rural sector.² D. Usher compared the tax burden in Thailand between farmers paying the rice premium (see below) and rubber export taxes, and nonfarmers paying income and property taxes. He concluded that "over two-thirds of the total burden of tax falls on the farmer even though the farmer owns only half of the money national income. The net effect of the

¹Harvard Law School International Program in Taxation, World Tax Series: Taxation in India (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), 150.

²See E. T. Matthew, Agricultural Taxation and Economic Development in India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1968), 30-75.

tax system is like a 22 percent tax on farm income and a 10 percent tax on nonfarm income."¹

Unfortunately for our study almost all analysis of tax incidence and burdens is defined along class or income lines. Discussions as to the relatively progressiveness or regressiveness of particular direct or indirect taxes do not consider the vertical divisions within the system.² Extrapolation of the data to assess the communal impact of such taxes must be extremely crude, except where income variations are of the size shown in the distribution of income between Europeans and Africans or Indonesians in colonial Kenya and the East Indies.

Subsidies and pricing

Subsidies have obviously been around for decades in the developed world and have been formulated to assist a wide variety of interests. Agriculture, industry, cities, railroads, the poor, all have benefitted from government largesse in the United States. Subsidies perform much the same functions in the LDCs although they have not usually been of the variety or sophistication of those in the West. In neither case have the policies normally been employed to aid particular communal groups, although in both we can find programs with such goals or which

¹D. Usher, "The Economics of the Rice Premium (Preliminary)" (Mimeo, undated), p. 14, quoted in T. Bertrand, op. cit., p. 185.

²This is the manner of analysis carried out in the generally excellent paper turned out by the ILO's Income Distribution and Employment Programme.

unconsciously achieve similar results. In the United States and some LDCs subsidies have been provided disadvantaged communal elements. For example, there is the aforementioned help to Harijans in India and Malays in Malaysia. In the latter, projects such as the Federal Land Development scheme are to help the poor but have really been directed toward subsidizing Malays. Subsidies to particular agricultural or other economic interests have also aided those communal groups producing them. For example, the rice subsidy in Sri Lanka primarily aided Sinhalese who are the primary rice producers and the government marketing system helped to eliminate the Indian middlemen.¹

An interesting area of analysis and speculation is opened by the subsidies question. Much of this centers upon "neutral" policies intended to aid agriculture or certain industries and their unintended implications to communal income differentiation. For example, subsidies for agricultural modernization through new seeds, fertilizer, and mechanization can initially affect those areas with the infrastructure already in place. This was one of the warnings with regard to unforeseen ramifications of the "Green Revolution."² Thus, groups residing near the capital or in more developed regions may be advantaged.

The differential impact of pricing policies in agriculture has been an object of political and academic discussion and dispute.

¹See D. Snodgrass, Ceylon: An Export Economy in Transition (Homewood: Irwin, 1966), p. 194; and G. Abeysekera, "The Distribution of Income in Sri Lanka, 1953-1963; Its Structure, Trends and Interpretation," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1975), p. 310.

²SEADAG, Agricultural Revolution in Southeast Asia: Consequences for Development, II (New York: SEADAG, 1970).

Debates have taken place regarding both whether pricing policies should be formulated and what impact they actually have. Agricultural pricing usually has three goals, the attainment of self-sufficiency or an export surplus, an investment surplus to be employed in national development, and to hold back the cost of living, primarily in urban sectors.¹

The most discussed pricing issues have revolved around food grains--the maintenance of artificially low purchases of domestic agricultural products to satisfy food needs of the urban populace.² This pricing can be combined with or separate from subsidies on the same items. Arguments over this type of policy center on disagreements over whether the prices paid to farmers are too low, or whether it is politically more desirable to satisfy rural or urban constituents. Where priced foods are produced by particular communal groups this can have ramifications related to our general interests; but usually it is a rural-urban question. Examples of this rural subsidization of urban areas through low pricing of foodstuffs are Egypt and Thailand where forced procurement at below market prices of grains is a severe limitation on farm income. In the Egyptian case farmers were required to deliver food and cotton products at prices much lower than could be obtained in the free market or face severe fines (see Table 4).³ According to estimates

¹See F. Maimbi and J. Fry, "An Investigation into the Change in the Terms of Trade between the Rural and Urban Sectors of Zambia," African Social Research, XII (December, 1971), 96.

²We are not discussing price controls here although they have been directed specifically at nonindigenous Asian businessmen in East Africa and Southeast Asia.

³M. Abdel-Fadil, Development, Income Distribution and Social Change in Rural Egypt, 1952-1970 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 88-106.

by M. Abdel-Fadil by manipulation of agricultural prices and export duties the state treasury took in 330,000,000 during 1965-70. This was the equivalent of a 10-11 percent tax on agricultural income and 16.4 percent of government revenues for that period.

TABLE 4: Government-Procurement Prices
Egypt as Compared with Free Market
Prices 1967-68

<u>Crop</u>	<u>Average Prices for compulsory purchases (E.L.)*</u>	<u>Average Prices for free retention (L.E.)</u>	<u>Prices differentiated (2)/(1) %</u>
Wheat (per arдах)	4	5.1	127
Rice (per arдах)	20	40.0	200
Onions (per ton)	11	16.5	150

* Average prices

The Thai Rice Premium has been a classic case of urban centered pricing policies.¹ As early as 1856 King Mongkut proclaimed that:

Those lazy people who do not grow their own paddy and have to purchase from others would ever want prices to be low. Now if rice farmers receive a low price for their rice which is not worth the labour they put in, they would be discouraged and leave farming for other activities. This is why the king has kindly permitted rice exports so as to benefit the people.²

¹This discussion is taken from T. Bertrand, op. cit., pp. 178-88; B. Renaud and P. Suphaphiphat, op. cit., 84-107; P. Bowring and R. Nations, "Kukrit's Fight for Farmers," Far Eastern Economic Review (January 30, 1976), 34-39; R. Bird, Taxing Agricultural Land in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 46-47; W. Baldwin, "The Thai Rice Trade as a Vertical Market Network: Structures, Performance and Policy Implications," Economic Development and Cultural Change, XXII (January, 1974), 179-97; Pracheen Chem Chai, "Thailand's Industrial Development: Rationale, Strategy, and Prospects," in Studies in Contemporary Thailand (Canberra: Australian National University, 1973), 67-88.

²Quoted in Bowring and Nation, op. cit., p. 34.

In more recent years the Royal Thai Government (RTG) has employed a variety of tax programs to maintain artificially low rice prices. At one time this practice was based upon revenue creating goals, but the percentage of Thai revenue resulting from this levy fell from 20 percent in the 1950s to 2 percent in 1970. More important considerations would appear to have been related to maintaining Thai rice at a competitive price internationally and warding off possible urban dissatisfaction and combating inflation. Perhaps accidentally it has also become a major means of financing industrial development and modernization. To accomplish these ends the RTG has used a complex set of policies including multiple exchange rates (1947 to 1954), the forced selling of rice to the government at fixed prices and an export tax fixed on each ton of rice dependent upon quality and variety. The Thai government used the rice it bought to sell cheaply through special shops in urban areas where the poor (and rich) could purchase this staple commodity. It has been estimate that these actions brought the price of rice down one-third to urban dwellers and cost the farmer 20 percent of his income as he had to sell at 30-50 percent of the world price. As well, the sale of cheap rice by the RTG provided a competitive tool to keep domestic prices low. Trent Bertrand has argued persuasively that this artificially low price has led to slow agricultural modernization because the tax burden increases with the amount produced and thus there is no incentive to add fertilizer, labor, pesticides, and mechanization.¹

The political-communal aspects of Thai rice policies can be seen by noting two facts. First, the majority of the population of Bangkok-

¹T. Bertrand, op. cit., 180-82.

Thonburi that benefits from these practices is Chinese or Sino Thai, while farmers are Thai. Secondly, governments have been extremely reluctant to change policies to increase the income of the majority rural farmer out of fear of antagonizing the urban population that is perceived as more politically dangerous to regime stability.¹

Agricultural price policies do not always act as a disadvantage to the producer. We have noted consumer-oriented programs. However, pricing has also been used to maintain high prices on food products to aid farmers such as is the Malaysian case or food consumed may not be locally grown. Price supports can be developed to protect new products or those vulnerable to fluctuations in market value. In the past, colonial governments provided long-term incentives to expand European agriculture. As well, while state-owned marketing boards might maintain lower prices, they also provide services in research and organized buying and selling of products. As we have seen, while (supposedly) the surplus obtained from such transactions are to be returned to the agricultural sector, this is often questionable.²

Licenses

Licenses have long been used as a bureaucratic and political means of aiding friends and debilitating enemies. The necessity of obtaining official permission to start and maintain a business, import or export goods, operate vehicles and equipment, enter a profession, sell and buy particular goods, etc. opens a multitude of possibilities for the legal

¹For a good analysis of a recent attempt to change rice policies and its political ramifications, see Bowring and Nations, op. cit.

²For a good initial discussion of agricultural pricing in Africa, see S. M. Makings, Agricultural Problems of Developing Countries in Africa (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1967), 101-31.

or illegal control of groups within the polity. Several points need clarification prior to categorizing types of licenses employed in LDCs. First, most of these levies that have inequitable goals have been directed against aliens, rather than the indigenous population. The restriction of foreign activity in the domestic economy has been a central theme of Afro-Asian nationalists, and licenses have been the most ubiquitous tool for controlling resident noncitizens. This is not to state that locals have not faced discrimination, but this type of policy has been either more circumspect or directed toward nonindigenous citizens. Thus, Kenyan politicians argued that Black Africans should have first priority in licenses, non-African citizens second, and aliens the remainder.¹ During the debate on the 1967 Trade Licensing Act one legislator remarked that "just now the public of Kenya is quite impatient with the rate of Africanization in this country...what we want... is that business in Kenya should be Africanized today, so that all black citizens of Kenya get first priority."²

A second, related comment is that licensing has led to considerable public discussion of communal issues, particularly with regard to aliens, but also in terms of "affirmative action" programs in countries such as Kenya, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka. At the same time, the alien nature of much of the business of East Africa and Southeast Asia has made possible attacks on foreigners without appearing "racist." Like taxes on luxury items, it is possible to legislate in general terms but restrict foreigners. As a Bharati noted, "This is well-known to the finance ministries

¹Kenya, National Assembly Debates, XIII, Part I (1967), 7614-18.

²Ibid., 1803.

and their adjunct offices in the East African countries...the Africans do not have to enact any discriminatory legislation, since all restrictive action in the process of issuance automatically "discriminates" against the Asian who alone needs the licenses."¹

Finally, we are using the term "license" broadly, referring to a variety of practices that have the same effect. Thus, work permits are a form of license that have been employed effectively to limit the economic activity of foreigners. Examples abound, such as Thai restrictions on Japanese during anti-Japanese boycotts in 1973² and East African rules that allow the issuance of work permits to aliens only if qualified Africans are not available.³

Employment of licenses to advantage or disadvantage communal elements fall into three major categories:

1. Business licenses: Licenses have been employed to keep or put business in the hands of indigenous entrepreneurs rather than nonindigenous aliens or foreigners, but dominant political elements have also used them to aid their own people. It would be interesting to study shifts of licenses in areas such as Uganda and Nigeria as communal power elites changed. As for the control of foreigners, import and export licenses became one of the first areas usually reserved for locals although various others have been used to restrict or regulate the activities of "outsiders." Examples of this type of license control are numerous. In East Africa,

¹Bharati, op. cit., 112-13.

²Asia Research Bulletin, III (April, 1974), 2670.

³L. Suryadinata, "Indonesian Policies toward the Chinese Minority under the New Order," Asian Survey, XVI (August, 1976), 770-84.

aside from the aforementioned use of work permits, Kenya restricted the business activities of more than 3,000 Asian traders in the first year of the Trade Licensing Act.¹ Throughout Southeast Asia licenses have been used to restrict alien (primarily Chinese and Indian) economic practices.² Indonesia and Burma employed them to keep aliens from import-export and manufacturing enterprises. As early as the 1930s Thailand formulated a host of laws using tax policies against alien Chinese. These included restrictions on fishing and taxi driving, and increased fees for shops normally owned by aliens. In the postwar period Chinese found it impossible to get licenses in a wide variety of areas including retailers of wine, meat, sugar, and tobacco. In Sri Lanka similar restrictions have been put on Indians including fishing and taxi franchises.

2. Professional licenses: License quotas have been formulated to limit the number of foreign and nonindigenous Asian groups in certain key professions, although as can be seen in the chapter discussing quotas, the list can be quite long. This pattern may be combined with quotas in the schools which are also intended to restrict numbers in professions.

3. Licenses to restrict movement: In some cases licenses have been developed as a tool to limit to certain geographic areas the business activities of nonindigenous Asians, foreigners, and indigenous groups politically oppressed. The aforementioned Kenya Trade Licensing Act

¹D. and Y. Ghai, op. cit., 122-26.

²For discussions of Southeast Asian practice, see G. Skinner, "The Chinese Minority," op. cit., 97-117; and his Chinese Society in Thailand, op. cit., 263, 354, 374; V. Thompson and R. Adloff, Minority Problems in Southeast Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), 219-21; V. Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 156-69. In Thailand there was even a tax on the amount of space on signboards not in Thai. (Signs with over one-half non-Thai were charged ten times the amount of all-Thai counterparts.)

excludes noncitizens from areas outside the major shopping centers except on a one-year license for limited goods.¹ Similar programs were formulated in Zambia.²

The problem with using licensing systems to create greater equity is the degree to which they are vulnerable to abuse. While they can be used to develop opportunities for the disadvantaged and to break the domination of foreigners and others over sections of the economy, the changes wrought are often symbolic. Considerable evidence is available on the existence of "front" firms or "Ali Baba" businesses as they are called in Malaysia and Indonesia. The all-too-frequent pattern starts when licenses are primarily restricted to the indigenous population: the licensee is unable or unwilling to operate the firm in an efficient and profitable manner, and it is ultimately sold to a foreigner or local Chinese or Indian who keeps the original owner as a "front." This is illegal, but both buyer and seller profit. Examples of such activities were Indian control of the importation and sale of alcoholic beverages in pre-1962 Burma, and surreptitious passage of import licenses from Indonesians and Filipinos to Chinese. The result of these licensing patterns has probably been increased prices to the general public, less efficiency in business, and hidden costs due to corruption.

This discussion has only touched upon the highlights of a highly complex subject. We haven't mentioned or simply noted several important

¹D. and Y. Ghai, op. cit., 123.

²J. Scarritt and J. Hatter, Racial and Ethnic Conflict in Zambia, Graduate School of International Studies, Vol. 2 (Denver: University of Denver, 1970-71), 22-24; and A. Beveridge, "Economic Independence, Indigenization, and the African Businessman: Some Effects of Zambia's Economic Reforms," African Studies Review, XVII (December, 1974), 477-98.

areas of analysis such as land taxes, poll taxes, African personal taxes, and internal marketing taxes. In part, these have not been discussed because they have only tangential effects upon communal equity.

CHAPTER V

Regional Capital Investments

This chapter is, at this point, only a preliminary statement on the impact of regionally-oriented capital investments/expenditures on the distribution of income and opportunities among communal groups. Several points of clarification must be made prior to launching into this type of analysis. First, we are concerned with government supported projects including those developed by quasi-governmental organizations. While we recognize the importance of private investment in regional growth, the subject at hand is already rather large. Secondly, it is desirable to separate capital expenditures from recurrent ones. As Richard Szal has noted in his study of regional distribution in Botswana:¹

Capital expenditures are quite different from recurrent ones in the sense that rates of return and of depreciation must be estimated in order to distribute what is more akin to a benefit than an expenditure for any given year. Recurrent expenditures, on the other hand, are more a type of consumption expenditure in the sense that money is expended and utilized in a given year. Basically, it is the difference between stock and flow.

Among recurrent expenditures Szal differentiates between non-subsidized and subsidized government programs. The former include areas of agriculture, housing and food such as agricultural marketing, livestock development, animal production, cooperative development,

¹Richard Szal, "The Regional Distribution of Government Expenditures in Botswana," W.E.P.R. Paper, No. 36 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1975), p. 7.

land utilization, administration of rural and urban housing and loan programs. Subsidized activities included education, community development, provision of water, animal health, agricultural extension and health. While most agriculturally-dominated polities would include most of these, there would be variations in type and mix. We are looking at capital investment in terms of infrastructure in place rather than simply recent capital expenditures.

Third, in most cases we find it necessary to compare capital investments on a regional rather than a communal basis. There are simply insufficient data to correlate government projects with particular communities in any other manner, with rare exceptions. Normally capital expenditures are formulated for geographically circumscribed regions and at times it is possible to use administrative units that correspond to communal variables. We recognize that this has all the methodological problems noted in Chapter I in terms of communal heterogeneity within districts, states, and provinces and poor demographic data. Beyond this, some polities do not report adequately regional expenditures and investments.

We also must take into account the obvious fact that some capital expenditures and infrastructure within a region may affect other areas as well. We can compute benefits with regard to locally targeted expenditures and in place infrastructure regarding farm to market roads, schools, treatment plants, irrigation laterals, etc. The assessment of benefits can be far more difficult when we think in terms of major government expenditures and infrastructure on national highways, railroads, universities, port facilities or hydro-electric dams. These

investments may be used by other than locals, as communications may be used to pass through the region, universities may have a national student body, and the water and power from the dam may be consumed by other areas some distance away. In fact, an all too familiar pattern in dam building has been the forced expulsion of local residents from water catchment basins.

Fifth, it is necessary to note the capital city complex that is normally established around the colonial and later independent center of political power. Governments need to expend large expenditures upon buildings, equipment and communication infrastructure in these urban areas. This will usually skew the expenditure/capital investment data in favor of communal groups living in and about the capital. This is well documented throughout Afro-Asia. (See Table 1.)

Sixth, we realize that regional inequalities may originally be based upon proximity to resources, or sources of power, areas suitable for particular crops, nearness to rivers, ports, mountain passes and other natural advantages. As W. Baer has noted, these inequalities become perpetuated as development proceeds and they become centers for modernization.¹

Finally, planners must often decide between some degree of regional equality and the needs of national growth. General development objectives may run counter to a more equitable spatial allocation. The early tendency of Afro-Asian states was to maximize growth rather than distribution and new projects were generally placed near ports, railway lines,

¹W. Baer, "Regional Inequality and Economic Growth in Brazil," Economic Development and Cultural Change, XII (April, 1964), 268-85.

and other older commercial and population concentrations.¹ Even when planners decided to expand into less developed areas, they found it difficult to overcome such barriers as political pressure from commercial centers, a lack of skilled personnel, unwillingness of the private sector to invest and a dispersion of population and resources.² The private sector has been reluctant to move out of the old colonial export enclaves as banks, trading firms, and manufacturers were unfamiliar with problems and prospects in these new areas.³

All of the aforementioned problems make our effort complex. In this introduction to the issues surrounding regional investment we will concentrate on three areas of concern, employing one major illustration in each case: 1) the types of discrepancies in regional investment that can exist, using Sudan as our worst example; 2) the generation of communal demands from a region looking at Northeast Thailand; and 3) the means by which we can assess more accurately the differences in regional capital investments, employing the tools formulated by Malaysia.

Regional discrepancies in capital investments may vary in terms of the type of project or program. We can generally categorize these under the following five headings:

1. Education and health: education and health facilities primarily as they relate to schools, books, equipment, hospitals, health centers,

¹For the Nigerian example of the pattern see L. Schätzl, Industrialization in Nigeria: A Spatial Analysis (Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1973). Excellent maps.

²A good case study of this issue is W. Ndongko, Planning for Economic Development in a Federal State (Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1975).

³This pattern is discussed in Kenya by A. Seidman, Comparative Strategies in East Africa (Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, 1972).

beds, etc. For example, we have previously noted variations in terms of schools between the Moslem north and more Christian coast of West Africa and most of Afro-Asia displays maldistribution of secondary and tertiary institutions between rural and urban areas. Data later in this chapter will note differences in doctors and beds in Ghana.

2. Industry: The perpetuation of a concentration of industry in the old colonial commercial centers has brought demands from previously neglected regions for government action to redress these imbalances. As we have noted, governments were initially slow in moving out of traditional growth centers, but political expediency often made such policies inexpedient. In the cases of India and Malaysia demands for change had a communal background and both governments have sought to formulate incentives to attract industry to new areas. In the Philippines, Manila has traditionally been the center of industrialization and public expenditures on projects (see Table 1), and the government actually put a ban on new plants within 50 kilometers of the capital, with the exception of export industries.¹

3. Communications: Obvious discrepancies exist in communications infrastructure in terms of quantity and quality of road, railroad, port and air facilities. As has been argued in Thailand, without such an infrastructure it was impossible to provide other projects and services or to market goods and obtain materials necessary for agricultural modernization.

¹World Bank, The Philippines: Priorities and Projects for Development (1976), 238. This was part of an extensive plan that included fiscal inventories, experimental projects and other promotional activities.

TABLE 1: Regional Allocations of Public Investment Expenditures Per Capita on Projects During FY73-FY77
(In pesos per capita at current prices)

<u>Region</u>	<u>Ongoing projects (December 1974)</u>	<u>Projects to Be implemented in FY 74</u>	<u>Projects to Be implemented after FY 74</u>
Metropolitan			
Manila	754	24	167
Ilocos	174	85	145
Cagayan Valley	138	85	972
Central Luzon	375	93	107
Southern Luzon ^a	83	58	367
Bicol	146	27	282
Western Visayas	74	27	196
Central Visayas	54	31	162
Eastern Visayas	131	30	173
Western Mindanao	69	55	179
Northern Mindanao	215	99	442
Southern Mindanao	225	62	227
Philippines	243	55	255

^aExcluding Metropolitan Manila.

SOURCE: NEDA, "Regional Distribution of Public Investment" (n.p., 1975; processed).

4. Capital projects: Variations are observable regarding large capital projects such as dams, irrigation projects, bridges, etc. We have noted that dams or bridges may not be of benefit to those in the immediate vicinity as the dams may provide electricity to people some distance away and may even displace the local populace. However, such projects are also of symbolic importance to regional groups who see in them outward manifestations of modernization and government interest.

5. Development packages: Finally, there are differences in development packages of more or less integrated government projects which are centered upon one region or another according to national priorities. Thus, we have seen localized projects in Northeast Thailand, Mindanao,

and among Montagnards in Vietnam to meet communal unrest. In Kenya the planners decided to invest development capital in "growth centers" where there was a high potential for growth. It was hoped that the effects of this policy would ultimately spread to the surrounding countryside.¹

As we have seen in previous chapters, these discrepancies can be the result of historic practices, the differential impact of colonialism, and discriminatory government programs. Variations in postindependence priorities may follow changes in the communal political balance due to the attainment of power by a different party or military elite, expanded participation of groups in the decision-making system, or fears of political instability derived from unmet demands.² Sudan offers an interesting, if perhaps extreme, example of wide discrepancies in capital investments and efforts to ameliorate these conditions both relating to most of these factors.

Sudan has historically been a country divided by religious ethnicity, culture, and geography. The dominant North, composing approximately 70 percent of the population, is primarily Sunni Moslem, Arab, and more influenced by the outside world, while the South is generally made up of those following the Christian and tribal religions and Black. Under the former Anglo-Egyptian Condominium the South was largely neglected and the colonial impact was felt mainly in the North.

¹See G. Gaile, "Processes Affecting the Spatial Pattern of Rural-Urban Development in Kenya," African Studies Review, XIX (December, 1976), 1-16.

²For a discussion of some of these issues related to participation, see S. Huntington and J. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976).

The year prior to independence in 1956, Southerners precipitated an abortive revolt. Postindependence policies, particularly after the 1958 military coup, were oriented toward a conscious growth-pole strategy which left non-Northern regions in a backward economic-social condition.¹ One observer has charged that "Regional imbalance may have been a deliberate aspect of economic policy designed to assure continued favor of essential labor from the impoverished regions to the central schemes."² In part, this policy also sought command goals as northern decision-makers attempted forced Arabization and Islamization. Resultant conflict led to major destruction in the South and charges of genocide.

If we assess regional capital investment differentials along the aforementioned categories, we find the following:

1. Education: The number of schools built and maintained prior to and after independence has reflected priorities advantaging the North. In the last years of the Condominium the South remained comparatively neglected (see Table 2), and almost a decade after independence major differentials continued (see Table 3). This inequality in infrastructure was reflected in numbers of students in academies that opened opportunities in the police and civil service, scholarships abroad, and civil service positions.

¹D. Roden, "Peace Brings Sudan New Hopes and Massive Problems," Africa Report, SVII (June, 1972), 512.

²See D. McClintock, "The Southern Sudan Problem: Evolution of an Arab-African Confrontation," Middle East Journal, XXIV (Autumn, 1970), 466-78; and M. Beshir, The Southern Sudan (New York: Praeger, 1968), 81-82.

TABLE 2: New Schools Opened in the South 1951-6^a

	1951-2	%	1952-3	%	1953-4	%	1954-5	%	1955-6	%
Total number of New Sub-grade schools opened	49	100	17	100	26	100	114	100	44	100
Share of Northern Provinces	40	83	6	35	8	31	39	34	44	100
Share of Southern Provinces	9	17	11	65	18	69	75	66	-	-
Total number of Elementary Schools	65	100	47	100	83	100	69	100	93	100
Share of Northern Provinces	61	94	40	85	72	87	41	59	93	100
Share of Southern Provinces	4	6	7	15	11	13	28	41	-	-
Total number of New Intermediate Schools	2	100	4	100	10	100	17	100	4	100
Share of Northern Provinces	1	50	4	100	10	100	16	94	1	25
Share of Southern Provinces	1	50	-	-	-	-	1	6	3	75
Total number of New Secondary Schools	2	100	2	100	3	100	5	100	8	100
Share of Northern Prov.	2	100	2	100	3	100	5	100	7	87
Share of Southern Prov.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	13

^aMohamed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan (New York: Praeger, 1968), 75. Also see O. Albino, The Sudan: A Southern View (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 100-06; and G. McLean, "Sudan: Land without Bootstraps," Africa Report, SVII (November-December, 1972), 12-16.

TABLE 3: Schools in Sudan 1965^a

	<u>North</u>	<u>South</u>
Secondary	88	7
Intermediate	175	26

^aG. Shepherd, "National Integration and the Southern Sudan," Journal of Modern African Studies, IV (1966), 199.

2. Industry: Manufacturing has been left largely to private capital and has been almost entirely continued to the three northern towns of Wad Medani, Port Sudan, and Atbara. When funds were available they were expanded in the Arab regions.¹

3. Communication infrastructure: Although the Nile and a north-south railroad provides contact between the two regions, roads in the South have been characterized as the worst in the country.

4. Large capital projects and development schemes: The Ten Year Plan of Economic and Social Development (1961-71) was concentrated in the North, 75 percent of agricultural expenditures were there, 77 percent of all government spending went to the Gezira District near Khartoum and most of the international loans, including those from China and to the North.²

¹P. Abbas, "Growth of Political Consciousness in Northern Sudan," Africa Today, XX (Summer, 1973), 29-43. This is a sharp indictment of Sudanese government policy by an opponent of the regime who was sentenced to death in absentia.

²This data is drawn from Roden, op. cit., 14-72; D. Roden, "Regional Inequality and Rebellion in the Sudan," Geographical Review, LXIV (October, 1974), 498-516; and P. McLoughlin, "Economic Development and the Heritage of Slavery in the Sudan Republic," Africa, XXXII (1912), 355-91.

The result of this neglect was that the largely pastoral south remained an economic backwater. As of the late 1960s, the Southern percentage of national output was 10.9 percent. Industry was almost all related to local, not national, needs; and per capita income was less than half that of the north.¹

In 1972 a new regime called for a program of equalization in an effort to end the long communal conflict. There was a long way to go from the per capita gap that existed at the time of independence-- S£71 in Gezira as against \$£25 for the rest of the republic.² Other states in Afro-Asia have displayed similar discrepancies, although rarely with the conscious effort at systematic communal discrimination.

We can analyze these systematically; that is, the total pattern of inequality as reviewed for Sudan or with regard to a particular segment of a state's infrastructure. For example, Ghana shows considerable maldistribution in doctors and beds between the capital and Accra and among regions, a pattern illustrative of most rural-urban situations. Pakistan was one of the most noted examples of maldistribution of capital expenditures prior to the formation of Bangladesh.³ There was a concentration of government and foreign aid in West Pakistan with East Pakistan's share rising from only 20 percent in 1950-55 to 36 percent in 1965-70.

¹See J. Sommer, "The Sudan: A Geographical Investigation of the Historical and Social Costs of Political Dissension" (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1968), 102-37.

²Roden, "Regional Inequality...", 508. For a good recent analysis of Sudan's regional problems, see the three-part study by J. Waterbury, "The Sudan in Quest of a Surplus," RUFS North Africa Series, XXI, 8, 9, 10.

³See M. Rahman, "East Pakistan: The Costs of Estrangement," South Asian Review, III (April, 1970), 235-40; and R. Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (New York: Praeger, 1975).

From 1947 to 1956, 78 percent of national resources came from the West which in turn received 94.9 percent of expenditures. One observer noted that in the first Five Year Plan per capita investments in West Pakistan were 205 rupees while they were 80 rupees in East Pakistan.

TABLE 4: Distribution of Medical Facilities
Ghana^a

	No. of doctors	Per 100,000 pop.	No. of beds/cots	Per 1000 pop.
Greater Accra	229	29.5	2230	2.87
Eastern	47	3.3	1402	.98
Volta	24	2.3	1201	1.16
Central	24	2.4	656	.65
Western	57	6.6	994	1.15
Ashanti	73	4.3	1502	.80
Brong Ahafo	20	2.1	449	.48
Northern	21	4.5	443	.94
Upper	12	1.3	751	.80
Ghana	507	5.5	9628	1.05

^aDrawn from M. Sharpston, "Uneven Geographical Distribution of Medical Care: A Ghanaian Case Study," Journal of Development Studies, VIII (January, 1972), 206-07.

Regional projects are those key political demands of geographically-based communal groups. In the United States ghetto Blacks and Indians have demanded high priority consideration of programs and projects that would aid them. Similarly, local political forces in LDCs seek government largesse for their particular group. Where administrative units encompass communal populations they can be the spokesmen for these requests, particularly where there exists a degree of bureaucratic or political autonomy. Even in centralized systems such as exist in much of Africa-Asia such requests may be generated through representatives, local interest groups, or demonstrations of dissatisfaction, peaceful or violent.

Northeast Thailand is an example of a region with communal characteristics different from the dominant culture, for although both consider themselves Buddhist and Thai there exists a common perception of cultural and historic variation between the Northeast and Bangkok and the Central Plains, it can also be argued that the area represents a general pattern of neglect rather than conscious discrimination. Differences in levels of investment reflect the faster development of areas near the capital and on earlier modernization and communications infrastructure. This has led to a spatial distortion factor similar to that described in the chapter on education--those communal groups more isolated from centers of modernization are generalized in terms of government support. There is little doubt that Northeast Thailand has been comparatively poorer than most of the Kingdom. In 1953 the average annual farm income for the region was 954 baht, while it was 2,888 baht in the Central Plains.¹ In 1962 per capita income in the former was \$45 as against \$100 for the rest of the country.² By the late 1960s the Northeast Province of Nakhon Phanom, not the area's poorest, had 1,200 persons to a water well, one doctor to 32,000 people, and only .29 percent of villages with electricity. Both in terms of wealth and government supported infrastructure the region suffered a comparative advantage.

¹C. Keyes, Isan: Regionalism in Northeastern Thailand, Data Paper No. 65 (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Programs, Cornell University, 1967), 37.

²M. Long, "Economic Development in Northeast Thailand: Problems and Prospects," Asian Survey, VI (July, 1966), 355.

Demands for change were generated by four elements which can be found in varying influence in other LDCs: local politicians, the bureaucracy, threats of disruption, and foreign aid. Throughout the postwar regimes of Phibun, Sarit, and Thanom requests were made for an end to the neglect. For example, in 1958, MPs from the Northeast presented an "ultimatum" demanding capital investment programs including:

1. An urgent short-term project for improving conditions in the northeast should be started in order to relieve suffering and hunger there as soon as possible.
2. The government should also draw up a longer term project "like the Yanhee Hydro Electric Project, through foreign loans as in the central and southern projects."
3. The government should establish heavy industries in the northeast "which has plenty of raw materials."
4. The government should increase educational facilities in the northeast.¹

Partially in answer to these requests a program was instituted in 1961 calling for projects:

1. To improve water control and supply
2. To improve means of transport and supply.
3. To assist villages in increasing production and marketing.
4. To provide power for regional industrial development and (later) rural electrification.
5. To encourage private industrial and commercial development in the region.

¹Quoted in Keyes, op. cit., 55.

6. To promote community development, educational facilities, and public health programs at the local level.¹

However, ultimately demands generated by these discrepancies were partially met due to the influence not of local politicians but from a bureaucracy encouraged by fears of political unrest and supported by a foreign aid program oriented toward counter-insurgency. Thus, the decade after 1965 (coinciding with increased U. S. and Thai involvement with the war in Indo-China) saw a massive increase in capital investment in the Northeast. This was centered upon road building with hopefully integrated programs providing agricultural educational, administrative and other government projects and services.² We see then in this example a fairly typical case of response to demands resulting from central government fears of instability and insecurity. Similar patterns can be seen in Northeastern Brazil, Mindanao, in the Philippines, the southern Sudan, and ghettos in the United States. Variations may exist in terms of the degree of regional pressure, the type of interaction between state and regions and other political administrative factors.

Finally, it appears useful to establish a means by which we can assess the availability of infrastructure to differing communities. While recurrent expenditures or present capital expenditures may tell us something of current support to a region, an analysis of these combined with existing infrastructure is a more reliable basis for

¹Ibid., 56.

²D. Wit, Thailand: Another Vietnam? (New York: Scribners, 1964).

comparison of opportunities available. This type of study is obviously important beyond our consideration of communalism. This will allow a comparison of differentiated opportunities across administrative units of varying character.

Systematic analysis of infrastructure down to the lowest administrative level was initially developed under the "Red Book" plan in what is now West Malaysia.¹ Derived from wartime experience during the ten year "Emergency" following the 1948 communist rebellion, the plan made use of the guerilla war's extensive reporting system. Starting at the local level, each village prepared a Buku Merah Kampong (Village Red Book) categorizing its projects and needs. These were passed up through the district and state to the capital. At each level an operations room plotted out projects, needs and priorities; maps were used with symbols to show various activities and projects with the old "War Room" of the "Emergency," a national operations center for the country. The 12 sections covered for the "Red Book" concept were:

1. Basic District Map (giving physical essentials and administrative boundaries)
2. Land Map (showing agriculture, mining, irrigation and other land uses)
3. Road Map (existing roads, needed improvements and road standards)

¹Fred R. von der Mehden, "Malaysia's Rural Development Program," Prepared for USOM and Royal Thai government, 1966. (Mimeographed.)

4. Rural Water Supplies
5. Minor Irrigation Works
6. River Clearing Proposals
7. Schools, Health Centers and Playing Fields
8. Rural Processing and Marketing (dealers, mills and processing)
9. Rural Industries
10. Cooperative Development
11. Telecommunications Facilities
12. Rural Electricity Supplies

Data in this degree of detail is normally not available on other states, but there do exist some states with material that is more general (and perhaps less reliable). Countries around major river projects have been objects of intensive scrutiny and data such as that collected by the United Nations Mekong research teams is useful for sections of the countries considered.

In future research PDS would like to consider tackling this problem along two lines:

1. Available data: PDS seeks to employ extant data here and in the metropolitan countries to map out variations in infrastructure within selected polities. These states must incorporate two factors: 1) administrative units that correspond to communal elements at least in some sections of the country, and 2) comparatively recent data on expenditures and infrastructure. We will be looking at Malaysia in our initial analysis.

2. Field Research: A possible means of developing data on communal differentiations in income and opportunities is to map out

infrastructure and expenditure data in selected administrative units. This was accomplished in Thailand in the mid-1960s and was found useful by the Thai government and USOM in planning programs. Local research personnel could be employed in such a study, which would help in answering three basic questions to our analysis: a) why are there differentials in regional infrastructure; b) do such differences affect opportunities of groups; and c) what impact do variations in opportunities have on income? This research would not have to emphasize communal problems, but would concentrate on regional variations in growth and equity. In sum, this brief analysis of regional capital expenditures is not meant to cover the problems and research possibilities available in this area and PDS will give priority to issues related to this chapter as this project develops.

CONCLUSION

I

In this final chapter an effort is made to assess and summarize three issues related to communalism and economic equity, the impact of communalism on wealth and income, the influence of state policies on ascriptive groups and possible alternatives to present inequities. Thus, initially we are returning to points raised in the introductory chapter, i.e., communalism as a dependent and independent variable. The two questions to which we seek tentative answers are: to what extent do communal norms influence economic differentials, and, secondly, how important are the government programs, mentioned heretofore, in causing economic inequities? Put in a different way, the first query is "why have certain communal groups tended to take advantage of opportunities to achieve economic development more than have others? These questions have been asked and answers attempted in other ways in different contexts. Peter Marris and Clifford Geertz each queried as to why entrepreneurship flourishes in some societies and not in others.¹ David McClelland has looked for achievement oriented societies in an effort to explain economic growth and decline.²

¹Peter Marris, "The Social Barriers of African Entrepreneurship," Journal of Development Studies, V (October, 1968), 29-38; and C. Geertz, "Social Change and Economic Development in Two Indonesian Towns," in On the Theory of Social Change, ed. by E. Hagen (Homewood: Dorsey, 1962), 385-407.

²D. McClelland, The Achieving Society (New York: Free Press, 1961). McClelland discusses various approaches to this problem noting conflicting views and a general absence of empirical data.

Sociologists have attempted to assess variations in the basic characteristics that differ between traditional and industrial societies, and historians have long sought to explain the rise and fall of provinces, states, empires, and dynasties. Thus, this is obviously too large a question to be covered fully at this time. However, the "response factor" in terms of varying reactions of communal groups to economic development opportunities needs at least some consideration. In our assessment it appears obvious that we cannot discuss cultural forces in a vacuum, and that they interact with patterns of modernization and historic government policies.

Two views have been forwarded regarding the relevance of cultural factors in aiding or inhibiting economic achievement. The first explanation is based upon the argument that variations in the reactions of groups in accepting economic opportunities is simply or primarily an issue of the availability of those opportunities. That is, it asserts that, given the past differential impact of modernization under colonial rule combined with later inequitable government policies and practices, certain groups have been disproportionately advantaged while others have remained isolated and/or neglected. Differentials cannot be explained through the cultural traits of communities, but only by propinquity to modern opportunities and practices. Thus, we have the advanced development of the Creoles as against the tribes of the Protectorate in Sierra Leone,¹ the privileged status of

¹J. Cartwright, Politics in Sierra Leone, 1947-67 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press).

the Amero-Liberians of Liberia,¹ the decisive advantage provided the Balubas of the Congo when the railroad was built,² and numerous other examples of groups residing near ports, railroads, capital cities, or in the case of Liberia or Sierra Leone having more direct contact with the West.

Two further points need to be made in our examination of this argument. It was not simply the presence of the European that led to greater modernization of groups with whom they had contact. Tribes along the rivers and capital areas of Africa may have long acted as traditional trading intermediaries and were thus "ready" to accept what the West brought, as were the Bakongo of Zaire.³ Secondly, once in a position to take advantage of Western language, education and economic techniques these groups were able to achieve a degree of political and commercial dominance within the colonial regime. Ultimately, they often found themselves in positions of power in the early years of independence at which time they could advantage themselves and their own group. Obvious examples of such initial dominance were the Ibo of Nigeria, Northern Tutsi of Burundi, and Arabs of the Sudan. Studies such as those of Christopher Clapham on Ethiopia,⁴ Rene Lemarchand⁵ on Rwanda and Burundi, or a variety of analyses on

¹M. Lowenkopf, Politics in Liberia (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1976).

²C. Young, Politics in the Congo (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

³Ibid., 256.

⁴C. Clapham, Haile-Selassie's Government (London: Longmans, 1969).

⁵R. Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (New York: Praeger, 1970).


Uganda and Kenya show the high percentage of members of the modernized tribes in positions of power within their governments. While these roles often changed over time, early policies reflected past patterns of inequity.

This question of the relationship of contact with modernization to acceptance of new opportunities has been discussed at greatest length in the area of comparative education. Writers such as P. Foster, R. Clignet, B. Yates, R. Hopkins, and J. Tyler basically have stated that even among traditionally oriented communal groups who at first rejected Western educational opportunities, the continued presence of the dominant modern colonial system led to acceptance and even demands for that education and what it could bring. Thus, Yates' study of the Congo found that there were three stages of relationship of a group to missionary schools, indifference often including hostility, curiosity and, finally, acceptance.¹ Tyler noted that while chiefs and elders in East Africa saw education as a danger to their authority, "once it was recognized that schooling provided avenues to the achievement of such status within the mission organization (statuses, moreover, which might confer a degree of power and prestige within tribal society), recruits to the schools became more plentiful."² Hopkins commented that in Sub-Saharan Africa the Christian mission acted as an intermediary between traditional value orientations and the acceptance of

¹B. Yates, "African Reactions to Education in the Congolese Case," Comparative Education, XV (June, 1971), 158-71.

²J. W. Tyler, "Education and National Identity," in Transition in East Africa, ed. by P. H. Gulliver (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 149-52.

modernization, breaking down adherence to the traditional order and exposing the African to some aspects of the modern world."



Foster and Clignet have made the most cogent case for the relationship of contact with the modern sector to educational acceptance and progress.¹ In their study of the Ivory Coast they found education correlated with urbanization (when the town was modern, not traditional as in Northern Nigeria) and "It was within these towns that schooling is first looked upon as providing high returns in terms of status, income and power."²

Foster, in his analysis of education in Ghana argues that,

...apparent ethnic inequalities stem largely from differential internal rates of social and economic change in Ghana and are not attributable to the operation of the ethnic factors per se. These inequalities can partially trace their origin to the differential pattern of European contact as between the coast and interior which we have been previously at such pains to describe. The educational advantages which particular ethnic groups have historically enjoyed tend to persist, though in an edified form, and the data would suggest that those advantages will continue to persist and to reflect a pattern of uneven socioeconomic development within Ghana.³

¹R. Hopkins, "Christianity and Sociopolitical Change in Sub-Sahara Africa," in Governing in Black Africa, ed. by M. Dora and N. Schultz (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 45-46.

²See R. Clignet and P. Foster, The Fortunate Few: A Study of Secondary Schools and Students in the Ivory Coast (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern, 1966); and P. Foster, Education and Social Change in Ghana (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

³Foster, op. cit., 251.

He finds differences in educational acceptance and achievement to be related to rural-urban variations, mission access, poverty and opportunity costs in rural areas. He asserts that the three most important factors relevant to differential demands for Western education in the then Gold Coast were the

1) establishment of effective European overrule which created an administrative structure within which posts were available to the educated Africans and which gave opportunities for the latter to displace traditional rulers,

2) creation of opportunities within an occupational structure dominated by European commercial enterprises, particularly in the coastal area,

3) enlargement of the exchange sector through the development of cash-crop economics within the rural areas which introduced increasing fluidity within traditional structures themselves.¹

The second set of possibilities, while usually not totally denying the impact of contact with modernization as an explanatory variable, emphasizes the importance of communal cultural traits. These may relate to more generalizable factors such as patterns of hierarchy and mobility or attitudes toward wealth and religion. Or these may pertain to particular ethnocentric traits such as the structure of the Malay language (it has been argued that it is less amenable to scientific conceptualization than Chinese) or the matrilineal system of the entrepreneurial oriented Minangkabau of Sumatra (wags say this is their reason for men

¹Foster, op. cit., 128.

migrating to other parts of Indonesia where they have done well financially). Obviously, considerable care must be taken in discussing this type of position. We are all familiar with critics who have at one time or another termed Irish, East Europeans, Mexicans, Blacks, Indians, and others as "lazy" or "dull-witted," etc. Similar data-free assessments have been employed to characterize the Karens of Burma, Southern Sudanese, Northern Nigerians, Thai-Lao, and Malay Moslems of Thailand, Malays in Malaysia, etc.¹ These assertions have even been given religious connotations as the Eta, or outcastes of Japan, and "untouchables" of India have seen themselves labeled as "impure" and somewhat sub-human.² We are, of course, interested in more carefully formulated arguments, although, as D. Moynihan discovered, even these can bring heavy criticism. One reason for this criticism is the often impressionistic nature of the scholarship.

Given the scope of research and discussion related to this issue, we will attempt only to highlight two arenas of analysis which are of greatest interest in explaining variations in economic achievement of communal groups: generalizable studies of entrepreneurship and studies of particular communities.

¹In a few instances surveys have substantiated these attitudes, not the empirical bases for the charges. For example, Ladd Thomas found most levels of the Thai administrative elite characterizing Thai Muslims as less hardworking and less intelligent than Buddhists. Ladd Thomas, "Bureaucratic Attitudes and Behavior as Obstacles to Political Integration of Thai Muslims," Southeast Asia, III (Winter, 1974), 545-66.

²Traditional Japanese folklore considered Eta physically inferior due to animal as against human attributes, alleging that they had deformed internal organs, including dog bones, etc. G. De Vos and H. Wagatsuma, Japan's Invisible Race: Caste in Culture and Personality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 11.

The question of what factors make for higher levels of entrepreneurship in one communal group as against another has intrigued observers of both industrialized societies and LDCs. In East Africa and Southeast Asia a common subject of conversation in university halls and coffee shops is why overseas Chinese and Indians do better economically than do the indigenous population, with answers ranging from a capacity for hard work to conspiracy theories. More generalizable answers would appear to follow Geertz's points regarding Chinese in Southeast Asia that entrepreneurs would 1) be from a closed and homogeneous society, 2) have many trading contacts with the outside world, 3) have an uncertain status in the national society, but 4) feel themselves superior to the majority of the people, 5) have talents dependent upon the manipulation of social relations and structures rather than technological knowledge, and 6) be able to function as intermediaries between tradition and modernity.¹ The final argument is that the Chinese were from a self-selected group of achievers who differed from those remaining at home.

R. C. Thurpwald has a somewhat different set of reasons for Indian achievement in East Africa, arguing for: 1) the simplicity of their life, 2) their generally excellent family life, 3) the saving of money for remittance to lenders, 4) reciprocal aid among families, 5) the settlement of Indians along main lines of modern traffic (whereas Arabs stayed on old caravan routes) and 6) education in English in the European manner.²

¹Geertz, op. cit., 385-407.

²Quoted in Y. Ghai, "Ethnicity and Group Relations," in Two Studies on Ethnic Group Relations in Africa (Paris: UNESCO, 1974), 152.

However, it was Hagen and McClelland that popularized the question of the factors which have produced entrepreneurship, although they were but the most recent of scholars to be interested in it since Max Weber. It is not our intention to present an extended interpretation of either writer; it has been done elsewhere by others. Yet each does formulate hypotheses that are quite different from the aforementioned modernization theorists. While Hagen is an economist and McClelland a psychologist, both look not to the impact of economic change on the individual or group, but to changes within the individual that have led to economic growth. McClelland forcefully argues that entrepreneurship does not follow economic development, but that achievement is the causative factor.

The obvious question then is: what causes entrepreneurship in the individual and group? Hagen came forward with the now much criticized explanation of entrepreneurship in traditional societies based upon the idea of "withdrawal of status respect," by which the creative individual is a deviant personality drawn from a group which has been rejected. This social group perceives itself as one denied the respect it feels it deserves. While his examples are drawn largely from non-Afro-Asian cases, they are generalizable, as when he sums up his position by stating that the lack of status respect leads to a situation where,

there gradually emerges a group of individuals, creative, alienated from traditional values, driven by a gnawing, burning drive themselves (to themselves, as well as to their fellows) seeking for an area in which to do so, preferably an area in which they can gain power and preferably also one in which in some symbolic way they can vent their rage at the elites who have caused their troubles.¹

¹E. Hagen, "Personality and Entrepreneurship," in Political Development and Social Change, ed. by J. Finkle and R. Gable (New York: Wiley, 1968), 138. For a critical evaluation of Hagen, see

On his part McClelland sees the achieving society derived from the presence of a critical number of achieving individuals.¹ These people attain that ability to develop through parental training and early socialization. For example, he finds the group's achievement motivation related to the type of stories and games used by the children.

Several others have argued that receptivity to change tends to be based upon whether status is grounded upon achievement or ascription.² Those societies where achievement was prized (Baganda, Yoruba, Ibo) were more likely to accept Western education and adjust to the new colonial environment, while those who found the new ways in conflict with a more rigid ascriptive system (Hausa, Masai) were less amenable to changing traditional patterns. H. Dieter Seibel has expanded upon this by offering five hypotheses relating receptivity to change.³

H.1: There is a relationship between certain structural features and receptivity to change.

H.2: There is a relationship between structural complexity and receptivity to change.

A. Hirschman, "Comments on 'Framework for Analyzing Economic and Social Change,'" in Development of the Emerging Countries: An Agenda for Research (Washington: Brookings, 1962).

¹McClelland, op. cit.

²See J. W. Tyler, "Education and National Identity," in P. H. Gulliver, Tradition and Transition in East Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); 147-74; and H. Dieter Seibel, "Systems of Status and Receptivity to Modernization," in V. Damachi and H. O. Seibel, eds., Social Change and Economic Development in Nigeria (New York: Praeger, 1973), 51-77.

³Ibid., 52.

H. 3: There is a relationship between the system of stratification and receptivity to change.

H. 4: There is a relationship between the amount of mobility and receptivity to change.

H. 5: There is a relationship between the system of status allocation and receptivity to change.

While these authors are far more complex than presented here, it is often difficult for the observer of Afro-Asian societies to relate their hypotheses to particular active economic communal groups. Thus, another way of understanding this problem might be to review various ideas as to why a specific group has attained its reputation as entrepreneurial. In Afro-Asia one people who have been so perceived have been the Ibo of Nigeria. Obviously, the Ibo would fit the modernization model given their nearness to the coast and early Western penetration. However, many observers have looked to explanations within the Ibo tribal culture. One writer, Robert Levine, has paralleled Hagen's hypothesis in noting that resentment at being despised as a backward people and discriminated against in towns dominated by others has led to a tremendous Ibo determination to get ahead, to be more modern and to succeed in every field, individually and as a group.¹ More often answers have been found

¹R. Levine, "Dreams and Deeds: Achievement Motivation in Nigeria," in Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Modernization, ed. by R. Nelson and H. Wolpe (East Lansing: Michigan State Press, 1971), 202. Peter Marris has observed that many Kikuyu businessmen in Kenya may have developed the determination to do well through "brutal" treatment in concentration camps during the Mau Mau period. Op. cit., 32. E. Isichei has argued that the Ibo were manipulators who saw the acquiring of European skills as a means of enhancing their position. The Ibo People and the European (New York: St. Martins, 1973), 176-69.

in a variety of alleged Ibo cultural traits, including social mobility, competition in all areas, a preoccupation with material concerns, stress on achievement status, latitude to youth, emphasis on individual initiative, willingness to imitate and strong tribal nationalism.¹

Population to land factors have also been debated with proponents arguing that acute land shortages in Ibo territories have led to efforts by young men to find nonagricultural jobs.² One difficulty with some of these explanations rests on the question of cause and effect; i.e., whether modernization produced the traits or if the culture allowed its people to take better advantage of opportunities.

We might briefly observe the other side of this question--have particular groups been less successful in economic growth and entrepreneurial activity due to cultural traits? A variety of general answers have been proposed including the African family system as a drain on incipient entrepreneurs who must support kin,³ Theravada Buddhist emphasis on non-material goals and villager propensity for savings for marriage,

¹See J. Coleman, "The Ibo and Yoruba Strands in Nigerian Nationalism," in Nelson and Wolpe, op. cit., 70-73; and D. and R. Smock, Cultural and Political Aspects of Rural Transformation: A Case Study of Eastern Nigeria (New York: Praeger, 1972), 295. Crawford Young comments that the factor of social mobility was also important for the Baluba of Zaire although the dislocation from the slave trade that was present at the time of European penetration was the major if not the factor. Young, op. cit., 258-59.

²A. Wallace, Culture and Personality (New York: Random House, 1962).

³This situation was particularly true of some Neolithic tribes. See A. O'Connor, An Economic Geography of East Africa (New York: Praeger, 1966), 25.

feasts, religion, and other nondevelopmental demands. One such group that has been described as less able to compete in the economic sphere than others in their polity have been the Malays in Malaysia. There has been considerable debate in Malaysia as to whether this "backwardness" has been due to cultural traits or lack of opportunity, with the Malay-dominated government presently arguing the latter. Brien Parkinson has written the most persuasively on the cultural forces that have hindered Malay economic growth and entrepreneurship, although he recognizes other factors.¹ He states that the Malays differ from the more entrepreneurial Chinese in large part due to historical, cultural, and religious factors that have led them to value security and tradition. Parkinson points to various examples of resistance to change, a reaction that has been reinforced by past experiences with authority, the role of Islam, patterns of child rearing and the rural environment. Perhaps most importantly he notes a trait which the author of the paper observed in Burma, the value the rural Malay gives his traditional way of life and his resistance to change if it means basic restructuring of that pattern, even if it were to lead to a higher income. He states:

Modern psychologists and sociologists maintain that a strong motivating force in the lives of most of us is the desire to succeed. This desire to succeed is no more absent from rural Malay society than it is in any other but to the Malay success means something different from what it does, for example, to the Malaysian Chinese. The Chinese seem to

¹See B. Parkinson, "Non-Economic Factors in the Economic Retardation of the Rural Malays," Moslem Asian Studies, 1 (1967), 31-46; the critical rejoinder by W. W. Wilder, "Islam, Other Factors and Malay Backwardness: Comments on an Argument," Modern Asian Studies, 2 (1968), 155-64; and Parkinson's rejoinder to Wilder, "The Economic Retardation of the Malays--A Rejoinder," Modern Asian Studies, 3 (1968), 267-72.

regard success as being the improvement of their economic position even if this requires some fundamental change or innovation. The Malays seem to regard success as doing what their forebears have approved and practised, but doing it as well as they can. Wealth and economic advancement are desired by the Malays, but not at the expense of renouncing utterly the traditions and traditional occupations of their forefathers to which they have grown accustomed, and which offer them a level of satisfaction greater than that offered by the mere pursuit of economic advancement and wealth.

The economists's maximizing postulates can be interpreted in a similar way. The Chinese and the Malays, because they possess different cultures, attitudes, values and motivations, maximize different things. Neither one is necessarily superior to the other, it is simply that the maximizing postulates of the Chinese are more likely to lead to economic development in the Western sense than are the maximizing postulates of the Malays.¹

A number of other authors have reasoned that Malay backwardness has arisen out of different cultural traits.² H. S. Alias has asserted that Malay belief in animistic and demonic forces has made it difficult to master their environment and cope with the scientific method. M. Swift states that after receiving a setback the Malay tends to give up and become fatalistic. Islamic tenets of traditional Malays is said to hinder commercial enterprises.

We must hasten to add that not all observers support this line of argument. Charles Hirschman argues that at the time of independence differences in education between Malays and the more entrepreneurial Chinese could be explained almost entirely in terms of access.³ Ungku Aziz has stated that British policy tended to hold back Malay commercial

¹ Parkinson, "Non-Economic...", op. cit., 42-43.

² This is drawn from D. Linn, Economic Growth and Development in West Malaysia, 1947-1970 (London: Oxford, 1973).

³ C. Hirschman, "Educational Policies in Colonial Malaysia," unpublished.

advancement.¹ Others have commented upon colonial paternalism and/or neglect as important explanatory elements.

Few, if any, of those writers who have asked us to recognize the importance of cultural traits would argue that these are immutable communal barriers to change. They accept the fact that intensive, long-range influences from the modern sector can eventually overcome most of these obstacles or that the physical environment can play a role.² It would appear that the pattern of response within communal groups depends upon the interaction of two variables--the process of modernization, and the cultural conditions within the particular community. In the first instance, the length and depth of penetration of the Western presence is an obvious measure of change. The economic, educational and administrative infrastructure, cash economy, job opportunities, and clash of cultures are only part of the multitude of influences that impinge upon the traditional societies with which they came into contact. In that sense, the proponents of modernization as a change factor are undeniably correct.

Environmental and policy influences originating from outside the community come into contact with groups which respond differently with regard to acceptance of external norms and behavior, depending upon cultural-historic factors within the affected group. The communal entity may react in terms of varying forms of refusal or rejection of change

¹Linn, op. cit.

²For example, although the economic backwardness of the Luo of Kenya is in part due to a strong attachment to traditional norms and clan relationship, poor land and the presence of the tsetse fly were also factors. S. M. Meck, Problems and Prospects of Social Services in Kenya (Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1971), 27-28.

(preferring to maintain traditional patterns), adaptation (attempting to combine modern attitudes and behavior with traditional dynamics), or adherence to the new culture in a rapid acceptance of external influences.¹ These varying responses may relate to economic patterns or changes taking place within the community during the period of European penetration such as the role of the group as a precolonial trader, or insecurity due to migration or slave trade. Important among other communities may be internal cultural traits such as the role of competition, hierarchy and youth, social mobility, the status of commercial occupations, religious limitations on behavior and attitudes, etc. These may aid or retard the groups' willingness to react positively toward external influences. However, as Parkinson and others have noted, this does not mean there exists a lack of achievement motivation within the community that is slow to change; it may reflect support for different basic goals. In sum, the particular communal culture will guide the process of change and cause differentiations in the acceptance and achievement in the now more Western oriented system.²

II

We can now turn more specifically to weighing the relative importance of government policies on income and wealth differentials among communal groups. The past four chapters have commented upon both historic

¹These categories are developed with regard to education by Jean Yves Martin. See his "Sociologie de l'enseignement en Afrique Noire," Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, LIII (1972), 337-62; and "Inegalites regionales y inegalites Sociales: l'enseignement Secondaire au Cameroun Septentrional," Revue Francaise de Sociologie, XVI (1975), 217-34.

²For an extended example of this pattern in Kenya, see E. Soja, The Geography of Modernization in Kenya (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968), 65, 101-07.

factors and recent government actions which have often reinforced previous discrepancies. In the first instance, we have noted the practices and policies of colonial administrations and the few continuously independent Afro-Asian states. These appeared to produce spatial distortions leading to economic variances between communal groups residing near or migrating to capital cities, ports, mission areas, and other centers of modernization and those living in the more remote and neglected hinterlands. Thus, there have been differentials in educational opportunities, communications infrastructure, the availability of Western health programs, and other essential foundations for economic and social development. We have seen this pattern among the Hausu-Fulani and other inland tribes of West Africa, the hill tribes of Southeast Asia, the Kurds of the Middle East, and innumerable other relatively isolated communities.

These historic differentials were often compounded by later policies of the leaders of the newly independent states. Past chapters have alluded to confiscation of property, language quotas, variations in educational opportunities, tax, pricing and subsidy programs, and disparities in regional investments. It has also been noted that these actions have generally developed along three broad lines:

- 1) Efforts to deny equal opportunities to groups that have been considered already overly advantaged, foreign to the society and/or opponents to the regime in power. These policies have included confiscation of wealth; the employment of taxes, licenses and other regulations to restrict residence, occupation and business activities; and limitations on educational opportunities.

2) Special programs to help historically disadvantaged communal groups through preferential educational quotas, jobs, and subsidies. These were not formulated with the expectation that they would be injurious to other groups but were developed as a means of speeding equality.

3) A variety of policies and practices which have not been established with communally-oriented goals in mind, but which ultimately impact differentially among groups with the polity. For example, we have reviewed various tax policies which were promulgated with non-communal economic goals but which disadvantaged particular groups.

Now the question is can we define which of the programs and policies previously discussed have been most influential in causing economic inequities? The first reaction may be that there are insufficient systematically organized data to make precise assessments. While accepting the paucity of empirical evidence, we can sum up our conclusions as follows:

A. The colonial experience appears to have been the most important force in establishing economic inequities among communal groups. This influence was derived from both conscious policy and the process of modernization. Conscious government decisions led to inequities through:

1. Neglect of particular groups in terms of education, modern commercial activities and administration. Thus, primarily for political reasons, the British allowed the northern territories of their colonies of Nigeria and the Gold Coast to remain traditional.

2. Support of particular groups who were considered politically "safe" or more amenable to Westernization. Colonial governments especially advantaged these indigenous communities in terms of education and public service jobs.
3. The importation of nonindigenous Asians and Middle Easterners. The formation of communities of Chinese, Indians or Levantines in urban areas and along major trade routes developed an economic elite that dominated the commerce of East Africa and Southeast Asia.
4. Support for urban and commercial centers. By concentrating expenditure and governmental infrastructure in commercially-oriented areas the colonial government advantaged those groups residing nearby.

More important than conscious colonial policies was the differential impact of modernization. The European powers expanded their rule over conquered territories over extended periods of time leading to variations in quantity and quality in the modern infrastructure. As well, colonial occupation was relatively short for much of Afro-Asia and even when it was lengthy it was often contained in commercial centers. This variation in impact meant that groups were comparatively disadvantaged in terms of lack of access to education and a modern economic environment, often ignorant of the lingua franca of the elite and maintained under a traditional rule suspicious of Western norms and practices. Most of these former colonies have been independent less than two decades (three decades for most of Asia and the Middle East) and the differentials created or retained by colonial rule have been difficult to overcome.

B. The vast majority of elites in the now independent Third World profess and attempt to practice philosophies upholding equality of all groups within their boundaries. We do have glaring cases of discriminatory practices against particular communities resulting in the maintenance or creation of economic inequities. Examples of alleged injustice noted in this monograph include policies against the southern Sudanese, Kurds in the Middle East, Indians in East Africa, Chinese in Southeast Asia and Hutu in Rwanda. We have also observed examples of "affirmative action" programs to aid previously disadvantaged groups such as the Malays and Harijans. In these cases the evidence remains out as to the ultimate success of the policies in raising economic levels.

Most government actions resulting in communal inequities do not appear to be derived from conscious efforts to discriminate against particular communities. Where injustices occur they are more the offshoot of neutrally conceived decisions with regard to communal factors. Many of these ultimately discriminatory policies are the product of an urban bias and neglect of the rural sector, thus disadvantaging communities living in the countryside. World Bank and United Nations studies have discussed a variety of actions of Third World governments which have been weighted toward the city.¹ Some of these include:

1. Establishing pricing machinery on food to aid urban populations to the detriment of producers.

¹See World Bank, Kenya: Into the Second Decade (1975); World Bank, The Philippines: Priorities and Prospects for Development (1976); and Nancy Baster, Distribution of Income and Economic Growth: Concept Issues (Geneva: UN Institute for Social Development, 1970); United Nations, Income Distribution in Latin America (1971).

2. Attracting trained personnel to the city and not pressing educated people into rural areas.

3. Centering industrialization programs in already modernized urban regions.

4. Concentrating foreign loans and projects in the same areas.

We must hasten to add that such programs were more common in the first year of independence and planners have more recently recognized the need for rural development. However, when added to colonial policies these earlier actions have put rural areas at a severe disadvantage.

We have also noted a number of other policies of independent states that have led to inequities. It would appear that three of the most salient have been:

1. Language policies which disadvantage those less capable of speaking the official language.

2. Taxation programs, especially those related to export crops. The employment of marketing boards and other means of "protection" of export crop prices have not only been an income tax on producers but the surplus has gone to urban dwellers.

3. Education policies which maintain imbalances derived from the colonial period have been more the product of acts of omission.

At this point we must again emphasize that many of the communal inequities we have been discussing are really historic rural-urban or modern-traditional imbalances that have been compounded by ascriptive attitudes and practices. A central problem of most LDCs throughout the world has been inequities in economic, social, and administrative infrastructure and resultant wealth and income between rural and urban areas.

This pattern has been too widely documented to go into detail here.¹ However, it is important to note how by adding the communal component we can observe other issues not readily apparent by studying the rural-urban dichotomy alone. These include:

1. In political terms an aggrieved communal group is more likely to organize to seek redress than the disparate rural masses.

2. We have seen that particular ascriptive groups may retain cultural norms which form at least temporary barriers to the acceptance of modern ideas and practices.

3. Communal divisions can inhibit cooperation both between rural and urban populations and within the rural sector.

4. Vertical divisions along ascriptive lines may be harder to surmount than horizontal class patterns and make upward mobility for the individual more difficult.

Many of the issues raised in these two sections deserve more empirical research, particularly if we are to make more precise statements as to relationship. At this point we have only attempted to raise these issues as points of concern.

III

Our final concluding remarks are intended to summarize briefly various means governments have employed to ameliorate economic differences among communal groups in Afro-Asia. Policies have ranged from broad

¹For example, see Le Repartition des Revenues dans les Pays du Tiers Monde (Paris: Editions Cujas, 1968), Richard Ward, Development Issues for the 1970s (New York: Dunellen, 1973), and P. M. Sundrum, "Aspects of Economic Inequality in Developing Countries," Bangladesh Economic Review, 11 (January, 1974), 445-68.

programs to eliminate nonindigenous Asians or stress "affirmative action to activities concentrating on particular sectors or administrative changes. Prior to analyzing these efforts, it is important to understand that formerly neglected groups have also become more involved in the national economy through the gradual evolution of economic and political development. This development has brought increased socio-economic mobility within the community's geographic base which, when compounded by greater migration to urban areas, has cracked some of the traditional barriers to change.

Political development in terms of increased popular participation (not necessarily Western democracy) has grown as nationalist elites have attempted to establish national unity. To achieve this goal of unity, governments have formulated a political agenda intended to socialize the population through education, the manipulation of symbols, the opening of communications to the hinterland and other means of disseminating the religion of nationalism.¹ With this increased participation or, at least, communication has come an assault on the

¹Numerous examples are available of government programs to gain assimilation of communal groups either through voluntary action or force. For example, in Thailand from 1938 to 1944 there were efforts to assimilate Thai Moslems, pressing them to wear Thai clothes, adopt Thai names, minimize Islamic power, etc. More recently roads, education and services have been pushed. See L. Thomas, op. cit., 545-68. Similar programs were started in assimilating hill tribes in Burma. In the Middle East, Turkish, Iraqi policies toward the Kurds have historically swung between efforts at assimilation through attraction and repression. See I. Naamani, "The Kurdish Drive for Self Determination," Middle East Journal, XX (Summer, 1966); and L. Wenner, "Arab-Kurdish Rivalries in Iraq," Middle East Journal, XVII (Winter-Spring, 1963), 68-82.

vertical barriers to mobility supported by traditional political peace and values. Nationalist traders such as Kwami Nkrumah and Sukarno launched political attacks on local elites who were considered spokesmen for regional loyalties. Elections, whether competitive or not, led to voting for offices beyond the community.

Care must be taken in developing hypotheses that argue a direct causal relationship between increased political participation and economic equality. Adelman and Morris argue that there is "some evidence that greater political participation tends to lead to a more egalitarian distribution of the national product,"¹ and S. Huntington and J. Nelson comment that "More generally, widespread political participation generally means more widespread access to political power, and those who gain access to power will insist that government act to broaden their share in the economic benefits of society."² However, in line with Kuznets' hypothesis regarding economic growth and equity, these authors believe that early stages of political participation act negatively in terms of national economic equity--in part due to the concentration of power in the new middle class and landowners. It is only later, when the peasantry and working class participate, that the poor are able to make direct demands on the system. However, we can also argue that the first effects of economic and political development can aid neglected communal groups to gain greater equity than is true of the general polity. Even when growth is primarily oriented toward capital

¹"Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations," Part I, Final Report, Grant AID/csd-2236 (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1971), 7.

²S. Huntington and J. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 73.

city complexes, the increased mobility afforded by an expanded physical and communications infrastructure tends to break down the traditional barriers. Thus, rural Thais in Northeast Thailand migrate to or are more aware of Bangkok; Moslems distant from the coast of West Africa come into greater contact with Lagos, Accra, and Ibadan; and the spatial distortion of the colonial period becomes somewhat mitigated.

If these are among the side effects of the general forces of modernization, what are some of the more specific solutions employed by governments to hasten the process of communal equity? Two broad policies we have previously discussed have centered upon the elimination of the richer entrepreneurial groups and so-called "affirmative action" alternatives. A solution which has normally appeared repugnant to Western observers but has been proposed by various nationalist politicians in LDCs has been simply to drive out the dominant economic elements. We have noted this effort in Uganda, Zanzibar, Burma, Turkey, and rural areas of Africa and Indonesia. Nonindigenous Asians have usually been the targets of such policies although similar programs have appeared directed toward indigenous groups.

This paper has analyzed the economic difficulties that can face those remaining after the expulsion. It would appear on balance that abrupt action can have at least short-term disruptive effects on the local economy and that political factors may lead to an exchange of foreign businessmen or other "undesirables" for another set of politically supported entrepreneurs with less experience and capital. However, we have little systematic evidence over time on the economic impact on the indigenous economy of the expulsion of these communal groups.

A second broad-gauge policy reviewed in this monograph has been special aid to previously disadvantaged elements of the society or what we have come to know as "affirmative action" in the United States. Our most obvious examples of this orientation in LDCs have been Malaysia and India, and we have discussed a variety of policies that fall under such a program including:

1. Educational efforts establishing quotas for students, scholarships, and faculty.

2. Occupational programs giving quotas in profession, jobs in industry, civil service, the military and other government positions, as well as aid in training for, and maintaining these occupations.

3. Economic activities providing subsidies, special help in management of businesses, preferences in government contracts, loans, taxes, land, housing, agricultural tools and supplies, etc.

To be successful, affirmative action goals usually necessitate four interlocking political, economic, and attitudinal factors:

1. A recognition on the part of decision-makers that a populace has been inordinately disadvantaged for reasons not of the group's own making. Thus, in the United States Blacks suffered from slavery and discrimination; in India "untouchables" were victims of the caste system; while in Malaysia Malays were largely outside the direct impact of a colonial system that advantaged other communities. Beyond this attitudinal factor, there must be a willingness to develop policies which may limit the dominant economic group through quotas and other aids to those needing special support.

2. Unless the disadvantaged population is comparatively small or programs of relief of a limited nature, it is probably a political

necessity to have a growing economy. Without this expansion, political tension can develop as other communities perceive the situation as a "zero-sum game" in which aid to the disadvantaged means losses to themselves. This perception will probably arise among poorer elements of the dominant economic group at any rate, but general growth can partially ameliorate political difficulties.

3. Care must be taken to assess the functioning of the economic and administrative system, particularly in LDCs with fragile economies or understaffed administrations. We have noted charges that quota systems and other preferential treatment have weakened development programs or adversely influenced investors in Malaysia. Again, little empirical analysis is available as to the long-term effects on the economy of such programs and, meanwhile, rumor and conjecture are likely to be the basis of judgment.

4. Finally, we have noted that cultural factors have allegedly slowed full implementation of these policies in Malaysia and India. It may be that changes in basic communal traits are necessary before complete success is possible--in the words of a former Malaysian Prime Minister, the "Protestant work ethic" must be implanted. Aside from being a difficult and long-term goal to achieve, this "Skinner-like" restructuring of value systems smacks of ethnocentrism of an extreme order. However, without changes in cultural patterns some groups may be slower in using opportunities than others.

There are, of course, policies developed to create greater communal equity that claim to be more limited than expulsion or "affirmative action." It is possible to adjust the administrative structure or concentrate upon particular problems. In the first instance, regional

administrative units have been established to give actual or symbolic autonomy to communal groups. In China the perception of local autonomy was fostered by developing minority areas, although in actuality power remained largely centralized. In the Cameroons federalism was partially credited for providing greater resources in scope, cost, and quality to the West Cameroons.¹ Finally, in Nigeria the reorganization of the country into nineteen regions was accomplished in part to meet minority problems and charges of neglect and discrimination. As G. Rimlinger noted in a PDS Discussion Paper:

According to a government white paper, the creation of new states was widely looked upon around the country as a "booty-sharing exercise." It has to be kept in mind that about three-fourths of state revenues come from federal allocations, and that the federal government controls most of the country's oil revenue. Understandably, minority groups wanted to have states of their own, claiming to be discriminated against by majority ethnic groups in existing states.²

His study shows that equality was increased both in terms of perception and actual improvement of circumstances.

There are also a variety of programs that can be and have been promulgated to meet the specific needs of disadvantaged communal groups. These policies include expansion of education, the development of transportation and communications infrastructures, financial reforms, etc. Each raises basic questions in terms of overall needs and priorities which we have not discussed in this paper. For example, programs directed

¹W. Johnson, The Cameroon Federation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 319-20.

²Gaston Rimlinger, "Communalism and the Gains from Development: The Case of Nigeria," Discussion Paper No.74, Program of Development Studies, Rice University, Houston, Texas, 1976. For earlier policies, see A. Adedeji, Nigerian Federal Finance (New York: Africana, 1969), and K. J. Binns, Report of the Fiscal Review Commission (Lagos: Government Printing, 1965).

toward neglected communal groups in less populated or remote areas may be prohibitively high with regard to both finances and trained personnel. Or national economic goals may necessitate concentrating in already developed regions with a policy of delayed support for other areas. It is the intention of the PDS to concentrate a major part of its future work on the impact of these and other sectoral programs; assessing them in the context of national and local goals of growth and equity. The dimensions of this area of analysis only underline the wide ranging ramifications of the whole question of communalism, wealth and income in LDCs.

APPENDIX I

Malaysia¹

¹Derived from: Malaysia, Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan: 1971-1975 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1973).

TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY INCOME¹, PENINSULAR
MALAYSIA, 1970

Income range (per month)	Urban households as % of total households				Rural households as % of total households				Total				Total
	Malay	Chinese	Indian	Other	Malay	Chinese	Indian	Other	Malay	Chinese	Indian	Other	
\$ 1- 99	4.4	4.3	1.2	0.1	80.1	5.3	3.7	0.9	84.5	9.6	4.9	1.0	100
\$ 100- 199	7.3	12.0	4.4	0.1	53.5	12.9	9.6	0.2	60.8	24.9	14.0	0.3	100
\$ 200- 399	10.2	21.8	14.2	0.1	30.1	24.2	9.3	0.1	40.3	46.0	13.5	0.2	100
\$ 400- 699	11.6	30.6	6.6	0.5	20.0	25.1	5.5	0.1	31.6	55.7	12.1	0.6	100
\$ 700-1,499	11.7	42.2	9.2	2.0	11.5	19.1	3.3	0.9	23.2	61.4	12.5	2.9	100
\$1,500-2,999	8.5	48.5	10.7	6.6	5.5	13.6	2.9	3.7	14.0	62.1	13.6	10.3	100
\$3,000 and above	6.8	42.7	16.0	13.3	5.3	9.3	1.3	5.3	12.1	52.0	17.3	18.6	100
As a % of total households	7.9	16.1	4.0	0.3	48.8	15.2	7.2	0.5	56.7	31.3	11.2	0.8	100
Mean household income (\$ per month)	328.1	464.3	441.5	1,491.7	154.5	332.6	237.2	563.4	178.7	387.4	310.4	950.5	268.7
Median household income (\$ per month)	227.3	289.9	241.9	1,139.5	111.7	254.4	220.3	87.9	122.3	271.1	195.5	324.2	168.6

¹ Income includes cash income, imputed income for earnings in kind plus transfer receipts.

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD AMENITIES, BY STRATA,
PENINSULAR MALAYSIA, 1970

<i>Strata</i>	<i>Average number of persons per dwelling</i>	<i>% of households with piped water</i>	<i>% of households with adequate toilet facilities</i>	<i>% of households with electricity</i>
Metropolitan	7.48	89.6	95.1	85.6
Urban large	6.96	71.4	84.6	79.6
Urban small	6.77	61.5	83.4	68.1
Rural	5.49	32.3	59.7	24.6
Total	6.06	47.5	69.8	43.7

APPENDIX II

Ghana¹

¹Derived from B. Gil, et al., Ghana, 1960 Population Census of Ghana (Accra: Government of Ghana, 1964).

TABLE 3

OWNERSHIP OF ASSETS IN MODERN AGRICULTURE AND
INDUSTRY, PENINSULAR MALAYSIA, 1970


Ownership	Modern agriculture ¹ (planted acreage)				Industry ² (fixed assets)			
	Corporate sector		Non-corporate sector		Corporate sector		Non-corporate sector	
	(000 acres)	(%)	(000 acres)	(%)	\$ (million)	(%)	\$ (million)	(%)
Malaysians	515.0	29.2	697.6	94.1	559.7	42.8	167.2	97.6
Malay	5.0	0.3	349.3	47.1	11.2	0.9	3.9	2.3
Chinese	457.0	25.9	243.3	32.8	342.3	26.2	158.0	92.2
Indian	4.9	0.3	74.8	10.1	1.5	0.1	3.9	2.3
Other	48.1	2.7	13.2	1.8	187.2	14.3	1.4	0.8
Government ³	—	—	17.0	2.3	17.5	1.3	—	—
Non-Malaysians	1,249.6	70.8	44.0	5.9	747.3	57.2	4.1	2.4
Total	1,764.6	100.0	741.6	100.0	1,307.0	100.0	171.3	100.0
% of total		70.4		29.6		87.4		12.6

¹ Modern agriculture covers estate acreage under rubber, oil palm, coconut and tea. FELDA is included in this category—under the non-corporate sector. Ownership is in terms of total planted acreage.

² The industry sector covers manufacturing, construction and mining. Ownership is in terms of fixed assets. Total excludes unallocatable assets amounting to \$25.2 million.


³ Government ownership of 17,000 acres in modern agriculture is included in the non-corporate sector, while its ownership of \$17.5 million of fixed assets in industry is included in the corporate sector.

Chart 4.1.1 - MAJOR TRIBES RANKED BY SIZE OF POPULATION (in thousands)



DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS


Chart 4.7.1 - MAJOR TRIBES BY AGE AND SEX,
RANKED BY TOTAL (past and present) SCHOOL ATTENDANCE (In percent)



* Age 20 - 24 omitted because not essential for comparison purposes. ** Females not shown because total number is less than 100.

DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS

(Chart 4.7.3A) PAST SCHOOL ATTENDANTS (aged 6 and over) AMONG MAJOR TRIBES BY SEX AND TYPE OF SCHOOL ATTENDED (in percent)




Distribution not shown because total number is less than 1,000

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100%

DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS

Chart 4.9 2/3 - OCCUPATIONS OF MAJOR TRIBES BY SEX



* Distribution not shown because total number is less than 1,000

APPENDIX III

Fiji¹

¹Derived from: Fiji, Report on the Census of the Population, 1966 (Suva: Legislative Council Paper no. 9, Government Press, 1968).

TABLE A
Proportion (per 1,000) of adult males in each component population who were engaged in each major group of industries

Industry Group	Chinese & Part-Chinese	European	Fijian	Indian	Part-European	Rs
Agricultural & Pastoral	100	52	612	458	194	
Other Primary	17	35	39	16	79	
Secondary	144	103	33	86	192	
Construction	28	24	44	69	95	
Commerce	359	154	20	81	69	
Transport & Communications	30	112	22	44	53	
Other Service	15	18	29	7	42	
Entertainment & Personal Service	75	40	14	23	12	
Administration & Government	14	67	27	16	28	
Professional & Allied Workers	21	246	39	30	28	
Miscellaneous	7	58	7	17	8	
Engaged in Industry	809	909	885	846	799	
Unemployed	33	5	31	48	71	
Economically Active	842	914	916	893	870	

TABLE D

Proportions per 1,000 males and females in selected ranges of age in each component population who attended school for at least six years:

	Chinese & Pt-Chinese	European	Fijian	Indian	Part- European	Rotuman	Other Pacific Islanders	All Com- ponents
MALES								
10-19	970	992	876	753	926	946	778	813
20-29	859	987	841	670	882	907	791	757
30-39	756	1,000	800	471	841	818	664	648
40-49	671	983	692	309	758	815	632	526
50 & over	438	969	479	156	609	776	476	368
all ages	690	985	750	527	813	863	689	648
FEMALES								
10-19	959	980	863	578	914	932	776	711
20-29	867	994	810	421	896	896	707	615
30-39	664	992	697	203	818	807	544	473
40-49	445	987	507	88	656	732	491	338
50 & over	252	972	305	33	463	539	387	246
all ages	705	985	660	331	776	796	603	514

Proportions per 1,000 males and females in selected ranges of age in each component population who attended school less than four years:

	Chinese & Pt-Chinese	Fijian	Indian	Part- European	Rotuman	Other Pacific Islanders	All Com- ponents
MALES							
10-19	7	43	136	28	19	81	91
20-29	47	48	187	49	24	95	119
30-39	136	57	351	74	57	162	198
40-49	203	123	521	122	52	154	304
50 & over	393	307	737	242	131	362	472
all ages	195	108	331	97	50	158	215
FEMALES							
10-19	24	48	279	40	26	83	173
20-29	76	60	421	48	40	117	244
30-39	203	101	671	82	55	188	367
40-49	430	251	839	208	105	269	506
50 & over	626	474	944	374	278	387	609
all ages	215	170	546	132	94	192	344

<u>Fiji</u>			
<u>Component population</u>	<u>Total males</u>	<u>Professional & allied workers</u>	<u>Percent age</u>
Chinese and part-Chinese	2,910	37	1.27
European	3,427	532	15.52
Fijian	102,479	2,189	2.13
Indian	122,632	1,900	1.54
Part-European	4,951	74	1.49
Rotuman	2,939	110	3.74
Other Pacific Islanders	3,207	176	5.16
All others	<u>202</u>		

SOURCE: Fiji, Report on the Census of the Population, 1966; F.H.A.G. Zwart (Census Commissioner); Council Paper no. 9, 1968.

APPENDIX IV

Cyprus¹

¹Derived from: Cyprus, Registration of the Population, 1956 (Nicosia: Government Printing Office), and Cyprus, Census of Population and Agriculture, 1960, Vol. III, Demographic Characteristics (Nicosia: Government Printing Office, 1963).

Cyprus

A) <u>Literacy</u>	<u>Greeks</u>	<u>Turks</u>
Read and write	69.0	61.3
Read only	1.1	0.6
Illiterate	29.8	37.9
Not stated	0.1	0.2
B) Never attended school:		
(% of group's male population)	21.45	31.67
Elementary school:		
(% of group's male population)	57.82	47.29
Secondary & technical schools:		
(% of group's male population)	18.51	18.68
University	0.98	1.01

SOURCE: Republic of Cyprus, Census of Population and Agriculture, Vol. III, Demographic Characteristics, 1960.

Unemployment by Race

	<u>Males</u>	<u>Total male population</u>	<u>Percent- age</u>
Greeks	35,993	217,030	16-58
Turks	6,611	51,469	12-84
Others	294	13,484	2.1

SOURCE: Republic of Cyprus, Census of Population Agriculture, Vol. V, Employment and Education, 1960.

Number of Persons Aged 12 and Over
by Occupational Group and Community

<u>Occupational groups</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Greeks</u>	<u>% to total</u>	<u>Turks</u>	<u>% to total</u>
All occupations	360,260	286,791	79.60	61,055	16.94
Professional, technical & related occupations	11,724	8,893	75.85	1,501	12.80
Managerial & admin. occupations, clerical & related occupations	14,748	11,697	79.31	1,565	10.60

SOURCES: Registration of the Population, 1956; Nicosia: St Section, Financial Secretary's Office.

APPENDIX V

Civil Service in Uganda¹ and India²

¹Uganda by Nelson Kasfir in The Politics of Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Africa, ed. by V. Olorunsole (Garden City: Anchor, 1972), 127.

²India from Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 116.

Distribution of Selected Government Jobs
in Madras, 1912

	% of total male popula tion	% of appointments
Deputy Collectors		
Brahmans	3.2	55
Non-Brahman Hindus	85.6	21.5
Muslims	6.6	10.5
Indian Christians	2.7	5
Europeans and Eurasians	.1	8
Sub-judges		
Brahmans		83.3
Non-Brahman Hindus		16.7
All Others		nil
District Munsifs		
Brahmans		72.6
Non-Brahman Hindus		19.5
Muslims		1.6
Indian Christians		3.9
Europeans and Eurasians		2.4

Source: Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, vol. XXI (*Reports from Commissioners, etc.*, vol. XI), "Royal Commission on the Public Services," Appendix vol. II. Minutes of Evidence relating to the Indian and Provincial Services taken in Madras from the 8th to the 17th of January, 1913," Cd. 7293, 1914, pp. 103-4, cited in Eugene F. Irschick, *Politics and Social Conflict in South India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 14.

Uganda

Ethnic Composition of the Higher Civil Service

1959 Popu- lation %	Ethnic Group	September 1959 % (N)	December 1961 % (N)	July 1963 % (N)	August 1965 % (N)	March 1967 % (N)
16.3	Baganda	40.7(11)	46.9(23)	38.1(51)	37.3(57)	35.6(105)
8.1	Iteso	3.7(1)	2.0(1)	5.2(7)	4.7(11)	8.1(24)
8.1	Banyankole	0.0(0)	4.1(2)	7.5(10)	6.9(16)	6.8(20)
7.8	Basoga	7.4(2)	4.1(2)	9.0(12)	6.0(14)	3.4(10)
7.1	Bakiga/ Bahororo	3.7(1)	10.2(5)	6.0(8)	5.2(12)	4.7(14)
5.9	Banyarwanda	11.1(3)	4.1(2)	3.7(5)	4.7(11)	4.4(13)
5.6	Langi	3.7(1)	2.0(1)	1.5(2)	3.0(7)	4.1(12)
5.1	Bagisu	0.0(0)	4.1(2)	4.5(6)	3.0(7)	2.7(8)
4.4	Acholi	7.4(2)	4.1(2)	6.7(9)	7.3(17)	4.4(13)
3.7	Lugbara	0.0(0)	2.0(1)	1.5(2)	1.3(3)	1.4(4)
3.2	Batoro	7.4(2)	6.1(3)	3.0(4)	3.4(8)	7.1(21)
2.9	Banyoro	7.4(2)	6.1(3)	5.2(7)	6.0(14)	5.1(15)
2.0	Karamojong	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.7(1)	0.9(2)	0.7(2)
1.9	Alur	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.7(1)	0.9(2)	0.7(2)
1.7	Bagwere	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.4(1)	0.3(1)
1.7	Bakonjo	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.4(1)	0.3(1)
1.6	Japadhola (Badama)	0.0(0)	2.0(1)	2.2(3)	0.9(2)	4.1(12)
1.4	Banyole	3.7(1)	0.0(0)	0.7(1)	1.7(4)	1.4(4)
1.2	Madi	3.7(1)	2.0(1)	1.5(2)	0.9(2)	0.3(1)
1.0	Kumam	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.9(2)	0.7(2)
0.7	Samia	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.7(1)	3.0(7)	2.4(6)
0.6	Kakwa	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.7(1)	0.9(2)	1.4(4)
0.6	Sebei	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.3(1)
0.4	Jonam	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.7(1)	0.4(1)	0.0(0)
7.0	Other ^b	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.0(0)
100.0	TOTAL	99.9(27)	99.8(49)	99.8(134)	100.1(233)	100.4(295)
		Δ = 46.2	Δ = 41.1	Δ = 29.0	Δ = 30.0	Δ = 30.2
1959 Popu- lation %	Language Groups	September 1959 % (N)	December 1961 % (N)	July 1963 % (N)	August 1965 % (N)	March 1967 % (N)
65.7	Bantu	81.5(22)	85.7(42)	78.4(105)	78.1(182)	73.9(218)
14.5	Nilotic	11.1(3)	8.2(4)	11.9(16)	12.4(29)	13.2(39)
12.7	Nilco-Hamitic	3.7(1)	2.0(1)	6.7(9)	7.3(17)	11.2(33)
5.0	Sudanic	3.7(1)	4.1(2)	2.9(4)	2.1(5)	1.7(5)
2.1	Other	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.0(0)
100.0	TOTAL	100.0(27)	100.0(49)	99.9(134)	99.9(235)	100.0(295)
		Δ = 15.8	Δ = 20.0	Δ = 12.3	Δ = 12.5	Δ = 8.2

APPENDIX VI

Kenya¹

¹Derived from: Kenya, Employment and Earnings in the Modern Sector, 1971 (Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1973), and Kenya, Employment and Earnings, 1963-1967 (Nairobi: Statistics Division, 1971).

DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT BY RACE, SEX AND INCOME GROUPS, 1971

Table 23

	AFRICANS		ASIANS		EUROPEANS		TOTAL
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
shs.							
Under 100	91,944	29,190	232	119	485	122	122,032
100 - 149	71,577	3,173	31	6	1	5	74,793
150 - 199	64,340	6,854	186	46	7	-	71,433
200 - 299	79,514	6,473	217	115	19	9	86,347
300 - 399	62,037	6,260	472	194	18	28	69,009
400 - 599	56,112	8,612	1,284	547	53	93	66,601
600 - 999	31,236	3,859	2,942	1,309	295	357	39,998
1000 - 1499	14,151	2,394	4,105	1,443	380	672	23,145
1500 - 1999	7,837	711	3,432	1,049	833	892	14,754
2000 - 2999	4,360	265	4,592	538	1,677	739	12,171
3000 and Over	2,541	25	1,444	65	4,758	215	9,048
TOTAL	485,649	67,756	18,837	5,431	8,526	3,132	589,331

* Excluding casual employees and unpaid directors.

Percentage Distribution of African Population*
and Asian Population
by Education Group

Kenya Education	Education Group				
	0 or not stated	1-4	5-8	9-12	13 and over
African population (aged 15 years and over)	60.78	18.98	17.83	2.21	0.18
Kenya Asian population (aged 10 years and over)	21.38	12.87	30.82	30.68	4.24

* Excluding northern province.

APPENDIX VII

Thailand¹

¹Derived from: Somluckrat Wattanovitukul, "Effects of Income Equalization on Overall Economic Growth of Thailand," M.A. Thesis, Thammasat University; United Nations, Atlas of Physical, Economic and Social Resource of the Lower Mekong Basin, 1968; Preliminary Assessment of Education and Human Resources in Thailand, Vol. I & II (Bangkok: Joint Thai-USOM Human Resources Study, 1963); Thailand, Changwat-Amphoe Directory (Bangkok: National Statistical Office); Thailand, Amphoe-Tambon Statistical Director of 14 ARO Changwats (Bangkok: National Statistical Office, 1967).

VOCATIONAL EDUCATION - TABLE 26.

Comparison of Magnitude, Vocational Education, Between the Central Area and the Balance of the Kingdom, 1962, by Type of School, by Numbers of Schools, Teachers and Students

SCHOOL YEAR VOCATIONAL SCHOOL TYPE 1962	SCHOOLS					STUDENTS					TEACHERS				
	TOTAL	Central		Outlying		TOTAL	Central		Outlying		TOTAL	Central		Outlying	
		No.	%	No.	%		No.	%	No.	%		No.	%	No.	%
Technical Institute	5	2	40.0	3	60.0	6578	5091	77.4	1487	22.6	528	307	58.1	221	41.9
Thewes Teacher Training	1	1	100.0			277	277	100.0	-	-	31	31	100.0	-	-
Boys' Trade	73	4	6.8	68	93.2	12120	592	4.9	11527	95.1	1533	89	5.8	1444	94.2
Girls' Trade	73	5	6.8	68	93.2	10513	2432	23.1	8081	76.9	1167	262	22.4	905	77.6
Special	8	3	37.5	5	62.5	1603	1273	70.9	330	29.1	170	115	67.7	55	32.3
Agricultural	21	-	-	21	100.0	2908	-	-	2908	100.0	388	-	-	388	100.0
Industrial and Business	13	10	76.9	3	23.1	10534	9424	89.5	1110	10.5	854	775	90.7	79	9.3
Short-Course	5	4	80.0	1	20.0	3613	2393	66.2	1220	33.8	160	140	87.5	20	12.5
ALL SCHOOLS	198	29	14.6	169	85.4	48140	21476	44.6	26664	55.4	4831	1719	35.6	3112	64.4

Population (1960)

Whole Kingdom

Number

26,257,916

%

100.0

Central

1,703,346


6.5

Outlying

24,554,570

93.5

TEACHING FORCE - CHART 10. Distribution of Bachelor's Degree Graduates by Educational Regions of Thailand - (Total - 2282 Graduates)



	Bangkok Thonburi	Northeast Changwats					Central Plains				Northern Changwats		
		Thai-Lao		Cambodian			Lopburi	Phra Nakhon Si Ayutthya	Sing- buri	Ang- thong	Minorities		Thai Rural-Based
		Sakon Nakhon	Nakhon Phanom	Ubon	Surin	Sisaket					Nan	Nakhon Sawan	Suk- hothai
+ Total population	2,136,435	426,755	436,482	1,130,712	581,732	601,356	335,661	478,783	154,509	197,805	240,471	647,602	315,948
/ Schools (per 1,000)	521 (0.24)	524 (1.22)	526 (1.20)	1,350 (1.19)	677 (1.16)	688 (1.14)	340 (1.01)	444 (0.92)	153 (0.99)	226 (1.14)	297 (1.23)	566 (0.87)	311 (0.98)
/ Students (% total population)	239,055 (11.18)	66,895 (15.67)	68,318 (15.65)	163,393 (14.45)	96,422 (16.57)	99,387 (16.52)	56,786 (16.91)	64,250 (14.46)	22,080 (14.29)	29,423 (14.87)	39,715 (16.09)	100,087 (15.45)	58,445 (18.49)
/ Teachers (% total population)	8,500 (0.54)	1,807 (0.42)	1,899 (0.43)	4,827 (0.42)	2,577 (0.44)	2,607 (0.43)	1,581 (0.47)	2,300 (0.48)	789 (0.51)	1,009 (0.50)	1,018 (0.42)	2,490 (0.38)	1,495 (0.47)
* Hospital beds (Government) (per 1,000)	11,045 (5.16)	150 (0.35)	88 (0.20)	300 (0.26)	174 (0.29)	117 (0.19)	145 (0.43)	75 (0.15)	142 (0.91)	120 (0.60)	50 (0.20)	135 (0.20)	136 (0.43)

Data: UN Atlas (+) p. 88, (/) p. 111, (*) p. 119, 120.

	Educa- tional region 1	ER 6	ER 7	ER 8	ER 9	ER 10	ER 11	Total (excl. ER 2,3,4)	Total 12 ER's	Note
Distribution of Bachelor Degree (% total 12 ER's)	1,081 (47.37)	127 (5.57)	123 (5.39)	111 (4.86)	80 (3.51)	127 (5.57)	122 (5.35)		2,282	Data: Preliminary Assessment of Education and Human Resources in Thailand, V. I & II, p. 304.
Vocational-Tech. education										
Pupils (% total ER's excl. ER's 2,3,4)	24,188 (61.82)	1,965 (5.02)	1,622 (4.17)	2,671 (6.82)	1,803 (4.60)	1,202 (3.07)	2,277 (5.82)	39,122		
Teachers (% total ER's excl. 2,3,4)	2,110 (44.94)	389 (8.28)	327 (6.96)	400 (8.51)	221 (4.70)	240 (5.11)	420 (8.94)	4,695		
Schools (5 total ER's excl. 2,3,4)	43 (25.59)	19 (11.30)	18 (10.71)	16 (9.52)	14 (8.33)	11 (6.54)	16 (9.52)	168		
Students (% total ER's excl. 2,3,4)	9,681 (49.62)	1,503 (7.70)	1,621 (8.30)	935 (4.79)	668 (3.42)	1,974 (10.11)	881 (4.51)	19,508		
Teachers (% total ER's)	781	125	110	71	56	135	79	1,519		

Secondary education	Northeast						Central				Northern		
	Bangkok Thonburi	Thai-Lao		Cambodian			Lopburi	Phra Nakhon Si Ayutthya	Sing- buri	Ang- thong	Minorities	Thai Rural-Based	
		Sakon Nakhon	Nakhon Phanom	Ubon	Surin	Sisaket					Nan	Nakhon Sawan	Suk- hothai
Schools (per 1,000)	69 (3.22)	3 (0.007)	7 (0.01)	8 (0.007)	4 (0.006)	6 (0.009)	7 (0.02)	16 (0.03)	6 (0.03)	6 (0.03)	5 (0.02)	6 (0.009)	8 (0.02)
Students (% total population)	48,295 (2.26)	1,180 (0.27)	1,631 (0.37)	2,172 (0.19)	1,499 (0.25)	1,534 (0.25)	2,818 (0.83)	3,210 (0.67)	1,180 (0.76)	1,471 (0.74)	961 (0.39)	1,405 (0.21)	2,000 (0.63)
Teachers (% total population)	2,753 (0.12)	62 (0.01)	109	120 (0.01)	89 (0.01)	85 (0.01)	161 (0.04)	164 (0.03)	76 (0.04)	87 (0.04)	54 (0.02)	71 (0.01)	113 (0.03)
	ER 1	ER 9	ER 10		ER 11		ER 6				ER 8	ER 7	

Data: UN Atlas of Physical, Economic and Social Resources of the Lower Mekong Basin, p. 111.

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