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Vazguez,M.C.; Dobyns,H.F.

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THE TRANSFORMATION OF MANORS INTO PRODUCERS' COOPERATIVES

by

Mario C. Vazquez

and

Henry F. Dobyns

Comparative Studies of Cultural Change

Department of Anthropology

Cornell University

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PREFACE

This report has been prepared in English for the Comparative Studies of Cultural Change in the Department of Anthropology of Cornell University. This long-term social science effort is currently financed in large part under Contract AID/csd-296 between Cornell University and the Agency for International Development research division.

Within the Comparative Studies of Cultural Change, this report results from the Cornell Peru Project which has been supported by grants to Cornell University from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The present English analysis amplifies earlier Spanish position papers prepared by the authors upon two occasions between 1960 and 1963 at the request of officials of the Peruvian government -- the university's partner in the Project. Those briefer statements lacked the comparative citations included in the present analysis, but contained the same core ideas succinctly stated.

The purpose of this paper is to outline the results of the "Vicos Experiment" as a model for the transformation of Andean manors with serfdom and servitude into producers' cooperatives. Social and economic reasons abound for terminating the surviving manorial system in the Andes. Latifundium has been a major calamity that has befallen Latin America, and it continues to constitute a serious obstacle to rational organization of the economies of several Indo-American nations[1/] because of ethnic group involvement on different sides of the power equation expressed in control of land resources.

It strikes us as useful to the reader, moreover, to differentiate between the Vicos model and the structure of the kolkhoz and the kibbutz, collective farming communities in Russia and Israel, respectively.

The Cornell Peru Project has spent twelve years of research on the process of peacefully transforming a traditional manor with serfdom and servitude in the Andean mountains of Peru into a self-governing agricultural community employing modern agricultural production practices. We offer the present summary of principles confirmed by the Vicos experiment, which can be used to carry out programs fundamentally changing the socio-economic structure of the Andean region without recourse to violence.[2/] The Vicos experiment directly contradicts those theories which maintain that Latin American experience proves that violent revolution is the <u>only</u> method for doing away with latifundium,[3/] or that devising a "collective system" is essential to enjoy the benefits of contemporary science.[4/]

Plural societies which remain relatively unintegrated with each other constitute the Peruvian nation.[5/] Both Peruvians and foreigners have said that the manor system with serfdom and peonage is one of the principle obstacles to basic changes in the socio-economic structure of the country.[6/] By the same token, the integration of peasants in the modern society of the country will hardly be possible so long as they are not provided with economic and social security gained by technological and legal control over land and other natural resources which they have occupied and worked from time immemorial. Thus it seems urgent to change the tenancy system of manors organized along medieval lines, with patronal social structure, as well as to change their exploitative technology for the benefit of the peasantry and the national economy. Transferring legal title to lands they farm to their actual cultivators obviates the necessity for direct action by the tenant population.

Such is one clear alternative already taken more than once. Tenants of coffee estates in Cundinamarca in Colombia took them over in 1934-1936, and have since operated them cooperatively with Communist aid and direction.[7/] Serfs forced the issue of agrarian reform during both the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and the Bolivian Revolution of 1952.

The legal transfer of the lands or other goods of manors, by expropriation, sale, or other form of cession, ought to favor the entire group of resident peasants organized into a single unit including the poor families which constitute the majority of the population -- if tenancy reform is to benefit the entire body politic. This does not come to pass by parceling out land and selling it directly and individually to solvent

peasants, whether by state action or by private initiative such as was proposed in Peru in 1960.[8/] This system benefits only the proprietor of the manor being divided up, while it tends to impoverish the peasants because in their zeal for acquiring land they are likely to sell their few belongings (animals, tools, etc.) or to go into debt. As a result, when they become proprietors, they are likely to lack the capital means necessary to exploit their sometimes already mortgaged lands. After some years, they will encounter once again the manorial pretensions of more powerful individuals such as rich farmers or tradesmen-farmers monopolozing the plots. This has already occurred in Peru when Indians on the island of Taquile in Lake Titicaca purchased lands they formerly cultivated as serfs.[9/] It has occurred on a large scale in Mexico.[10/] It happened to tenants-cum-owners in Japan following its U. S. occupation tenancy reform because this did not affect landlord holdings of forest and grassland necessary to successful rice paddy cultivation.[11/] It began to occur in Bolivia only six years after the revolution when the "new rich" peasants began to accumulate "more and more land in their hands for capitalistic purposes." Sometimes they purchased it from the refugee former landlords.[12/]

In recommending the transfer of manor titles to the serfs who occupy them, we do not propose the total distribution of the cultivable land in individual parcels, recognizing that economizing scarce agricultural resources requires the maintenance or even the creation of production units of efficient size. It would be preferable to avoid the fragmentation of land holdings that is already very general in the so-called Indigenous Communities in Peru, where it is asserted to have des-

troyed "the spirit of mutual assistance" among family members.[13] In a survey conducted by the Commission on Agrarian and Housing Reform[14] in 1958 in 684 communities, 94.5% replied that their irrigated agricultural lands were distributed among their members, and 78.6% reported the same situation for dry-farming land. Fragmentation is also blighting the manors that are purchased or leased directly by their peasants, as has occurred in the manors of Pumpac, Catay, Uchusquillo, Huaypan and others in Ancash Department.[15]

The same fragmentation occurred in revolutionary Bolivia, where the greater part of the former manor lands were parceled out among rebel serfs without any planning, and the peasants continue to live in a subsistence economy,[16] although they are vain because they managed to become land owners. This situation has caused a decline in production for the national cash market, although part of the apparent diminution in foodstuffs offered on the urban market represents production that is now absorbed by the peasantry which is better fed than in pre-revolutionary days. These changes are explicitly recognized by the revolutionary government itself in its current rural development scheme.[17]

A comparable fragmentation of land holdings followed the Mexican Revolution. The division of ejido lands created a minifundium so severe as to make the application of modern technology virtually impossible, so that tenancy reform failed to lift the new landowners out of their historic poverty.[18]

A similar fragmentation of cultivable lands took place on the Chinese mainland when each peasant laborer or tenant was given a small plot as his personal property, redeeming a Communist pledge. This land redistribution did not work out because the plots were so

small that they could not be farmed efficiently. The party solution was collectivization.[19] The communes sought to apply labor on a large scale so it could be deployed by central direction in a more rational and effective manner.[20]

In Egypt, a great increase in "dwarf" holdings of less than an acre has been a striking trend. These tiny holdings rose from 943,000 in number in 1913 to 2,058,000 in 1957 covering 827,000 feddans.[21] Three-fourths of the landowners can not live off their farm produce, so must rent additional land or hire out as laborers part of the year.[22] The agrarian reform initiated in 1952 has apparently not halted this trend toward fragmentation, although 431,000 feddan of expropriated lands had been distributed to 163,000 families by late 1960.[23]

The problem of fragmentation of agricultural land holdings seems to be, indeed, an obstacle to modernizing agricultural practices in any contemporary peasant economy. It was explicitly recognized and occasioned many polemics during the Italian land reform initiated in 1950.[24]

Prior to land reform on the island of Taiwan, in 1948, only fifteen per cent of the farm families cultivated the area -- three hectares -- required for a "comfortable living" by then-current local standards, compared to forty-six per cent tilling less than one hectare and twenty-six per cent less than half a hectare.[25] Later redistribution, rent reduction and rise in tenant income improved the situation, yet Taiwan still has too many people on too little land.[26]

The island of Cyprus provides another illustration. "It is evident and generally agreed that much of the malaise of the rural areas" there stems from minifundium.[27]

Just as new minifundium is to be avoided, one should not attempt to re-establish the traditional practically self-sufficient "indigenous community" in Peru. This is, with few exceptions, a negative type of organization for national development in terms of social integration and economic diversification.[28/] In the majority of the contemporary indigenous communities, a small but powerful and educated sector of the populace boasting professional men in its families manages to obtain greater material benefits, to exploit the best and largest pastures and cultivable fields of the community. This same group which dominates the local majority with threats and by means of its ties of real and artificial kinship, with apparent support from its fellow inhabitants, naturally seeks to maintain the present state of organization and administration, systematically opposing the introduction of fundamental changes in the community for fear of losing its privileged position. This occurs in the majority of the forty-four Indigenous Communities in Bolognesi Province in Ancash Department that are officially recognized by the national government.

The Vicos experience is showing that it is possible to create out of manors with peonage a new type of community or peasant association, which we refer to here as the "Vicos model," where the use of the land base does not benefit only a single individual or a faction, but the entire community and each one of its members, as well as the region and the country.

The "Vicos model" has as its ultimate objective establishing an economically viable and socially rewarding modern rural community. It constitutes in its present stage, however, a socio-economic transition model for a backward population on the way toward mod-

ern producers' cooperative organization. In commercial terms, Vicos has at the present time the characteristics of an informal corporation or joint stock company in which the household heads are shareholders and proprietors of Vicos as a production enterprise. Vicos may be conceived as currently in a preliminary stage of organization preceeding modern cooperative operation, and necessarily so. For it does not seem possible that these or other Andean Indians who have lived since birth as serfs under the psychologically degrading manorial system -- and those of Vicos were counted among the most backward serfs in Peru when the Cornell Peru Project began -- would be able to organize themselves according to the principles of the modern cooperative movement without a preparatory period of education in cooperative principles and some adaptation of modern cooperativism to the culture and mentality of the new peasantry.

This is to say that the cooperative movement which originated within modern Western Civilization, and in an urban context at that,[29/] must be in some measure indigenized within the Andean cultural context. Any such task clearly ought to be carried out on an experimental basis the first time it is attempted in any given cultural area that does not fully participate in modern industrial civilization. Such has been the process underway at Vicos since its ex-serfs assumed the direction of their own affairs in 1957 after five years of preparation guided by personnel of the Cornell Peru Project.

The Vicos experiment involves two types of transculturation in this regard. On the one hand, new peasants not long liberated from serfdom of medieval type if not severity have been learning numerous technologi-

cal and social traits of modern Western Civilization. To facilitate this educative process, certain institutions of the modern world such as the public school could be set up in toto in Vicos, gaining a gradual acceptance involving eventual internalization of the values of formal education,[30/] in large part because they can be manned by non-Vicos personnel. On the other hand, certain other institutions of equal importance in equiping the new peasantry of Vicos to survive the economic competition of the contemporary world market economy could not be established immediately in their entirety because they must by their very nature be manned by Vicos personnel, and this is not yet prepared at all uniformly. Such is the case with the producers' cooperative ideal. The present Vicos "community farm enterprise" constitutes a frankly transitional social structure adapting the cooperative structure within Western Civilization to the present level of cultural sophistication of Indian peasants in the Andes. Full comprehension of cooperative principles and complete structuring of the community farm enterprise as a legally recognized organization operated in accordance with those principles remains a goal during this transitional period.

This situation reflects the conclusion of personnel of the Cornell Peru Project, based upon analysis of manor serfs and free cultivators, that the traditional modes of cooperation between rural cultivators in the Andes differ markedly in nature from the behavior demanded by the guiding principles of the contemporary cooperative movement. In this view, there is no functional equivalence between the traditional "cooperation" encountered among Andean Indians, whether bound to manors or cultivating freeholds, and the modern cooperative

movement, despite the repeated assertion or assumption of such equivalence by Andean intellectuals,[31] who often conceive of the native community assumed to be the ancient ayllu (clan) in organization, as a forerunner of the modern cooperative or the kolkhoz[32] or kibbutz.[33]

One cannot dismiss entirely the possibility that "natural cooperativism" or the "spirit of cooperation," or the "collectivist spirit," or "peruvian cooperativism" etc., can favor the introduction of the modern cooperative movement in rural Andean communities. At the same time, our observations lead us to share in the conclusions of the Mexican anthropologist Julio de la Fuente.[34] Discussing whether "one can take advantage of the spirit of cooperation of the Indians in order to implant among them modern cooperativism," he affirmed that "there are no points of contact and a considerable difference and even antagonism...so that both systems are mutually exclusive." In this respect, although it may seem unnecessary, we think it useful to indicate that the modern cooperative movement operates through capitalistic institutions with a philosophy, principles, objectives and goals which require formal organization of administration, written rules, compliance with national laws, an ample monetary base, and modern methods of production, distribution, and accountancy. That is, a modern cooperative constitutes a complex system of mechanisms and aims distinct from the traditional system of Indian "cooperation." The latter is sustained by ties of kinship and for individual purposes, and as De la Fuente said, is a sign "of a strong group cohesion" that is fostered through competition and rivalry among local groups. The function of the trait complex of Indian cooperation differs, in other words, from the function of the trait complex constituting the coopera-

tive movement in Western Civilization.[35]

Those who optimistically assume that traditional Indian forms of "cooperation" can be directly converted into the modern cooperative movement may be taken in to a considerable extent by confusing semantic labels with social structural reality. For Indian "cooperation" is what Sanders[36] labels quite correctly "mutual aid" in discussing the agricultural cooperative movement in Greece. He notes that logic would lead one to believe that people aiding one another as much as Greek villagers do should readily organize modern cooperatives. Sanders counters logic with realistic social science analysis, however, pointing out that the transition from "informal mutual aid" to the "organized cooperative" is a difficult one. Persons lending mutual aid can see the results of their work immediately. The goals of cooperatives are, on the other hand, distant in place and in time from peasant perception. The mutual aider can hold those whom he helps responsible for returning his aid in equivalent form at his need. A marketing cooperative member must, in contrast, await the accrual of benefits beyond his personal control. "The cooperative organization presupposes an integrated system whose progress will be regulated by the experimental method," in the words of one Peruvian intellectual. "It also presupposes 'cooperative education' that begins in the school and is intensified in technical institutes," For not only does the producer require orientation and preparation, so also does the consumer.[37] An Ecuadorian also has emphasized that the cooperative movement "is an ideal system that requires an integrated educative process that benefits families and the group," and advocated teaching its principles before distributing lands in an agrarian

reform.[38] Less reliant upon formal education, the Vicos model provides simultaneous formal education, cooperative education and tenancy reform.

It should be emphasized that American Indian "cooperation" consists of exchanges of assistance based upon a principle of reciprocity in kind or labor between competitive individuals that is absent from the modern cooperative movement which depends upon behaviors based on an internalized ethic of group cohesiveness subordinating individual interests. Indian mutual aid consists of "practices...without any defined plan, without a philosophy, and without organization," in the hyperbole of a Scandanavian observer[39] from the area where modern cooperatives have perhaps won widest acceptance. Indian mutual aid does take the forms of working for someone who is thereby obligated to reciprocate with "an identical service under similar circumstances" and working in exchange for food and drink.[40] That is to say that no equality of function exists between the native and the modern institutions. Yet such would be a basic prerequisite for easy transformation of the one into the other to occur as a natural consequence of contact between members of the two types of institution. Although their outward forms -- people working in groups toward common ends -- appear to be very much alike, the meanings of these forms to their participants differ markedly between Indian mutual aid and the cooperative movement, as they have different purposes and rationales inhibiting the coalescence of institutions.[41]

Happily for the prospects of Peruvian agrarian reform, this difference was perceived by the Commission on Agrarian and Housing Reform which asserted in its exposition that "the evolution of the community toward cooperativism requires...a special promotion for the

creation of new ties and the renovation of traditional norms of mutual aid, because these correspond to social and cultural systems whose nature differs from that required by cooperative organization."[42/]

The fact that there is no essential similarity between Indian "cooperation" which really should be labeled correctly as "mutual aid," and the modern cooperative movement is amply confirmed, in our opinion, by the failures of modern producers' cooperatives in both Mexico and Bolivia despite the fact that these two countries have gone through their respective social revolutions.

In the Mexican case, according to one of the most distinguished economists of that country, the cooperatives failed "because of the low cultural level of the members of ejidos and on occasion also that of the improvised propagandists themselves."[43/]

In Bolivia, more than 200 cooperatives organized by state agencies have failed because, according to spokesmen for the revolutionary government, an important effort was not made to "promote cooperative labor."[44/] According to a moderate critic of the Bolivian Revolution,[45/] they failed fundamentally because "such a form of organization collides with the psychology of the ex-serf, who vehemently covets his liberty after so many centuries of oppression," and because the government sought to "impose compulsorily" the cooperative movement. In this respect, Bjornberg[46/] has said of the Bolivian case that "the cooperative movement cannot be introduced suddenly by governmental decisions or laws" because it is a "popular movement" which requires time to develop.

It is true that cooperatives appear to have enjoyed success in Egypt during the agrarian reform carried out since 1952. There were 3,100 agricultural credit

cooperatives with 674,000 members by 1960 and 3,788 in 1961, "which means that practically every village has a cooperative."[47] Aside from the advantage of credit unions in helping peasants escape money-lenders, the Egyptian agrarian reform law required beneficiaries of land redistribution to join cooperatives and government-appointed supervisors manage each 1,000 feddan bloc of redistributed land.[48] Since fertilizers and other agricultural necessities have been distributed through the credit cooperatives which are also the avenue of access to machinery pools, such government measures leave the organizations as "cooperative in little more than name" since they are in fact controlled by government officials.[49]

Italian agrarian reform law also requires each peasant receiving land to join a local cooperative.[50] Local cooperatives have marketing, consumers' and agricultural machinery pooling functions.[51] The local cooperatives are grouped in associations, and the association secretary is an Ente (the rural regional agrarian reform agency) functionary. The Ente also reserves the right to appoint a representative to the council of each local cooperative, although its members are otherwise reportedly elected democratically.[52]

It follows that the genuine entry of Andean Indian groups into the modern cooperative movement requires a preparatory process such as is now being carried out in Vicos, where several previous steps and processes of organization have been worked out along the route toward the final goal of a modern producers' cooperative free from governmental control or intervention.

In striving toward this goal, after legally replacing the traditional manor owner, individual or institutional, with the community of cultivators organized as a production enterprise, it is considered

necessary to maintain the status quo with respect to the tenancy and usufruct of the expropriated or purchased lands, as has been done in the Vicos case. That is, the family subsistence plots held by the peasants by usufruct should be maintained unchanged, and the fields exploited by the manor owner should be turned into communal property managed by the community without any division into smaller cultivation units. Such procedure presupposes that commercially farmed fields had been of economically productive size under the antecedent manorial system.

The preceeding scheme is based upon the following considerations.

Peru needs more productive rural enterprises than it now possesses. The necessity for importing foodstuffs attests to this need. The economically and socially unproductive Andean manor ought to be converted into a modern production enterprise, agricultural, pastoral or mixed, in accordance with the characteristics of each locale, organized along cooperative lines with technical assistance and adequate credit provided either by state or private institutions. Efficient production by rational techniques aided by credit requires a certain minimal sized farm unit, a factor being belatedly recognized by the theoreticians of the Mexican agrarian reform, who in contrast to earlier concentration on estate division, recently have come to advocate re-grouping overly small private or ejidal holdings into units of adequate size to utilize year-round all the farmer's labor, and thus intensify agricultural production.[53/] This goal of efficient production by labor intensification is feasible in view of the fact that the type of organization proposed already functions successfully at Vicos. This already-tested organization possesses numerous advantages.

In the first place, the traditional manor organization favors its gradual conversion into a cooperative system, inasmuch as the serf is accustomed to working under direction and does not resist orders issued by the cooperative leadership, in which each new peasant may take part in his turn. This new opportunity that the liberated serf finds within the cooperative's leadership allows him to achieve prestige and a new social status within the local and regional social structure, and helps to insure against his turning upon management by including him in it.

In the second place, cooperative production facilitates financial and commercial transactions by consolidating operations on an economically viable scale and providing security in the form of cooperatively held land and institutional capital.[54/]

Thirdly, cooperative organization permits successful exploitation of the land base using modern systems and techniques of agricultural and pastoral production on a large scale. Advantages of modernization of production technology include (a) Increasing the agricultural and pastoral products sold on the regional and national markets. This directly benefits the urban consumer by holding down consumer prices while the rapid process of urban growth tends to drive food prices up as long as agricultural production does not expand to keep pace. (b) The formation of capital is favored in rural populations which traditionally have not created capital nor made important investments in the national economy, following the sequence of obtaining funds with which to purchase the estate, and later acquiring capital with which to promote the development of the community according to the needs felt by the people without having to rely upon governmental capitalization. (c) Cash income is provided for the peasants in the

form of daily wages or dividends after the cost of the estate has been paid, and the most important investments in community development made. (d) Dividends are provided in kind to erase any dietary deficiency of family subsistence agriculture. In the Vicos case, cereal grains grown by the community farm enterprise are sold at symbolic prices, as low as one-fifth that of the same grain in the regional market, to the members of the community. Each worker in the community farm enterprise is entitled to purchase a share of the community cereal grain crop equal to that of every other worker at the same price. Here is, in other words, a beginning translation from the reciprocity principle of Indian mutual aid into the egalitarian norms of a cooperative. (e) Obtaining communal funds for social purposes such as maintaining health services and providing scholarships for secondary school or college students is facilitated. (f) Outmigration due to economic pressures is limited, [55/] diminishing the number of persons of rural origin with little or no capacity for urban life or industrial employment burdening the cities.[56/]

It is urgent to legalize the system of mixed tenancy with co-existing individually held and community-held property. It is public knowledge that it is impossible to provide an adequate land base to all the Andean peasantry in the form of family farms, owing to the scarcity of cultivable lands in the mountains,[57/] quite apart from the fact that there are not enough technical specialists such as engineers, topographers and so on in Peru to carry out so idealistic a distribution of land, were it available. Lack of technical personnel was a key problem in land reform programs in Colombia.[58/] Serious difficulty was created in Mexico's agrarian reform when the number of applicants for land

increased because several years elapsed between formal transfer and actual subdivision[59/] which depended on technician availability. A similar time-lag in final land distribution occurred in Bolivia. By mid-1956, only 109 of the 17,775 landholdings possibly subject to agrarian reform according to the 1950 census had been carried completely through to final presidential approval.[60/] Even the Russians admitted encountering difficulties in creating their collective-farm system for "lack of experience and skill in managing a large scale economy."[61/] Yet plans of the Prado government in Peru for agrarian reform have been criticized on putatively "technical" grounds for failing to establish priorities for aerial photogrammatic, tenency, agricultural economic, sociometric and natural resource studies,[62/] all of which would require technicians the country currently lacks or does not have in numbers sufficient to carry through a rapid program.

In addition to the preceeding considerations, the system of mixed tenancy corresponds to social and economic reality in the Andes. Whatever the romantic or critical images of them, in fact the majority of the rural communities in Peru have both types of property -- private or individual and community.[63/] Communally held lands are typically vacant areas or pastures, whether they belong to the community, municipality or parish or to the national government itself, exploited sometimes by communal labor, sometimes by individual usufruct, sometimes by individual rentors. Pastures grazed by the livestock belonging to serfs also characterize many Andean manors.

Consequently the system of mixed tenancy is a traditional pattern in the rural communities of Peru, and it behooves the government to legalize this land use pattern. Besides the considerations expressed in

the section above, such legalization offers several advantages.

First of all, former serfs are converted into owners of their family subsistence plots and also into coproprietors of community property without suffering drastic changes in their socio-cultural structure which might create adverse psychological reactions to change, and without the necessity for making monetary contributions apart from putting their labor into the community production enteprise. At the same time, they receive technical assistance and farm credit through the community so as to improve their cultivation or pasturing of their individual holdings.

In the second place, the economic security of the new peasants is reinforced not only by their personal possessions, but also by the community's property, which is obtained by capitalizing the wages not paid for community production works. Thus community property can be used to help out the coproprietors in situations of emergency or of catastrophe, avoiding the quandry caused by tenancy reform in Mexico where the distribution of large estate lands was not accompanied by creation of a substitute institution able to satisfy peasant needs.[64/]

Thirdly, group unity is reinforced by avoiding conflicts between peasants over tenancy and usufruct rights to lands originally exploited by manor owners. It is further bolstered by resisting better the aggression of rapacious elements, be they local individuals, outsiders, or even the overly authoritarian intervention of state agencies which tend to ignore local community desires.

A fourth advantage is that community organization requires a limited number of technical specialists to guide and control its community development programs,

compared to the number of such specialists needed to carry the same technical message to an equal number of peasants subsistence farming family plots who are not organized into a production enterprise. As already noted, technical specialists are scarce in Peru as they tend to be in any developing nation, and their services are, therefore, relatively expensive. Organization of a community production enterprise also insures that those in charge of lending technical assistance to the community will have direct contact with the peasantry. This is not always easily achieved in a nation where considerable cultural barriers exist between the small educated elite and the illiterate agricultural and pastoral masses.

The community cooperative or production association functions as an agency of change and socio-economic development, inculcating in the peasantry positive traits of modern Western Civilization. It plays a very important role in this respect. The basic structure of cooperative organization permits programming and executing integrated plans for social improvement. The cooperative or community farm enterprise may be used as an agency for introducing innovations and changes, related not only to agricultural and pastoral production, but also to other aspects of human well-being.

Secondly, the psychological requirements for efficient learning of new agricultural technology are met by the community production enterprise. The areas -- fields or pastures or orchards -- of the community worked commercially by cooperative labor serve not only as demonstration fields but also as training grounds where the peasants acquire direct experience in the innovations introduced into the community and later observe their results. Having seen the production gains achieved by technological changes, the peasants who

have learned the techniques involved by working in the community farm enterprise can and do put them into practice on their own individual plots or with their own individual flocks or herds.

Thirdly, the producers' cooperative or community production enterprise constitutes an effective sized organization to bring ex-serfs into integral and mutually beneficial relationship with modern society, which is characterized by its large-scale institutions. Community scale work facilitates the task of modernization confronting government agencies and organizations for several reasons. (a) Community works expose the entire population to the government program, avoiding the tedious and costly necessity for establishing relationships with each family. (b) In the process of converting the antiquated manorial system into something more productive for expanding urban food requirements, community exploitation of former manor lands avoids conflicts between the new peasants and technicians over the just division of commercial lands, such as inevitably occur in land distribution programs. (c) In this same process, community exploitation of former manor commercially exploited lands avoids conversion of commercially productive lands into subsistence plots to the detriment of the urban consumer. That this is a real danger in tenancy reform has been demonstrated by Bolivian and perhaps Egyptian experience since 1952. (d) Community production avoids the deterioration in land quality and diminishing production brought about by continued land fragmentation caused by the legal principle of equal individual inheritance.

In the fourth place, the association or cooperative is a dynamic element of social and cultural integration within the community as it is also a dynamic structure for integrating the rural population with modern nat-

ional life. It fosters local responsibility for public works the developing nation may not be able to provide such as local farm-market road maintenance.[65]

A fifth dimension of the community converted into a center of modern production is that it acts as an agent for diffusing new skills to neighboring communities and areas.[66]

In addition to the advantages already cited, the cooperative system or community production enterprise permits putting into practice the democratic principle of respecting the will of the people by electing its own local leaders. It allows the rural population to make local corporate decisions as to the objectives and goals of the community as a producing enterprise for the benefit of the majority of its members.[67]

Having sketched in some of the principal characteristics of the "Vicos model," we now wish to indicate some of the basic differences between its structure and that of the Russian kolkhoz and the Israeli kibbutzim. For it is perhaps as important to understand what the Vicos model is not as what it is in order to utilize it optimally.

Vicos is, to repeat, a form of community farm enterprise or incipient modern producers' cooperative. The kolkhoz and kibbutzim are forms of collective farm. The peasants of the kolkhoz type farm were forced in 1928 to 1934[68] to renounce their lands and their draft animals and agricultural equipment[69] so as to amalgamate the small peasant farms into large scale socialist collective farms capable of using tractors and other modern machines.[70] In the kolkhoz, every household is allotted a half-hectare plot of land for personal use. There a truck garden or orchard can be cultivated for the personal use of the household. In addition, each farmer owns his home, small implements, animal

sheds and a fixed number of cattle (one cow, two sows with litters, ten sheep and goats plus poultry) in the artel type collective.[71]

The members of the kibbutz have renounced all their individual property.[72]

In the Vicos model, on the other hand, the ultimate goal is to establish a capitalistic farm enterprise upon a cooperative basis. The new peasants have not nor are they likely to renounce their customary rights to individual property including their subsistence plots and their houses which they have occupied from time immemorial. By the same token, they will continue to be absolute masters of their animals and tools. Under Peruvian national law, legal title to the land -- both communal and individually held and exploited areas -- is held by the group and not by the state as in Russia or by a foundation as in Israel.

In the local system of customary law, community property in Vicos consists of the upland natural pastures, the public services such as teachers' quarters (provided outside teachers free of charge), clinic building, warehousing, meeting halls, and approximately fifteen per cent of the land cultivated under irrigation. Approximately eighty-five per cent of the cultivated lands are held individually by the new peasants under the system of customary usufruct rights and farmed today with technical assistance and credit provided by the community farm enterprise.

The fifteen per cent of the cultivable land under irrigation defined as community property by local custom is presently worked by collective labor provided on an egalitarian basis and presently non-commutable.[73]

The ideological motivation of participants in any form of cooperative endeavor tends to be the key factor in determining success or failure of the enterprise.

The motivation of the Vicos resident is very different from that of the kolkhoz or kibbutz member.

The members of the kolkhoz and of the kibbutz have ideological commitments to group endeavour. It is not too much to claim that they are motivated by an ideological mystique. In the case of the kolkhoz, although its members do not necessarily all belong to the Communist Party, they are subjected to state indoctrination promoting Party ideals of collective farming and high agricultural production. In the course of promoting large-scale collective farms, the Soviet government "trains numerous specialists and organizers of large-scale agricultural production."[74] Kolkhoz leaders receive rigid plans from central agricultural authorities every year[75] and then attempt to comply with them. The kolkhoz have been controlled by a "Council for Collective Farm Activity," an institution paactically an agency of the Party and Soviet Government. "They use the Council as their watchdog for seeing that the measures approved by them for strengthening the collective farms and increasing the well-being of their members, are strictly enforced."[76] Following the second World War, Communist Party organizations began to multiply in every kolkhoz so by 1949, no kolkhoz in some regions, at least, lacked a Party organization. Only party members or candidates were appointed kolkhoz chairmen.[77]

The case of the ideological motivation of members of the kibbutzim is quite clear. They recognize themselves the explicit religious, nationalistic and socialistic principles of the kibbutz movement.[78] As Spiro[79] observed, the kibbutz is a means to national as well as personal liberation. In kibbutz culture, socialism and zionism represent the opposing universalistic and parti-

cularistic principles, respectively. Spiro[80] affirmed that the kibbutzim are political communities that also have religious characteristics.

In contrast, the peasants of Vicos are not united nor motivated by ideological beliefs extolling group life. They are strongly individualistic. Nor have they been organized within the alignments of the principles of any political party nor any religious denomination. They are united by their traditional customs, sense of identification with the Vicos habitat and their relatives and kinsmen there, as well as common dress. Currently, they are united also by their common desire to convert themselves into owners of their lands, which they are in the process of purchasing, and thus liberate themselves completely from the manorial system. They are united to some extent by the experience of working toward common objectives in community labor parties.

The Vicos model has for Peru additional advantages of being a locally-arrived at Andean model worked out in large measure by the ex-serfs become new peasants themselves. In applying social science theory that participation of people in planning and execution of programs directly enhances the chances of program success,[81] the Cornell Peru Project has distinguished itself from the typical administrative agency by its abstenance from decision-making and encouragement of Peruvian government agencies to likewise abstain from making decisions for the new peasants of Vicos.

This contrasts starkly with the collective farms which have been organized along standard lines laid down by state agencies or organizations such as the Jewish National Fund which possess many attributes of states. The kolkhoz have been "imposed from above"[82]

by the Soviet state and operate as units in a planned economy with nationalized transport and production directed by a single party.[83/] The organization and the plans of the kibbutzim were elaborated in the context of youthful revolt against parental authority in Jewish ghettos or shtetl in urban Europe and settled by pioneers whose previous acquaintance with rural environments was typically limited to youth movement hikes through the European countryside.[84/] As a result, "the movement" remains a paramount influence on the kibbutzim today.

The Vicos model has not been worked out by any bureaucratic organization, except to the extent that Peruvian government bureaus in the national capital have sought to reconcile the forms worked out at Vicos with the national legal system. It originated through the initiative of the ex-serfs themselves, aided by patient advice from scientists of the Cornell Peru Project and education provided by the government of Peru.

The Vicos model is not a new type of collective enterprise, nor is it an utopian community in any sense. It is, rather, a completely realistic social structure worked out in the Andes themselves through several years of experimentation and readjustment, during which social scientists acted as "participant-intervenors"[85/] advising the new peasants as well as the governmental agencies providing technical assistance and credit. The social scientists know how to channel the initiative and the frequently very small scale and limited objectives and social aspirations of the Vicosinos. Like the rest of Andean serfdom, the Vicosinos wished to convert themselves into proprietors of the lands that they and their ancestors have cultivated from time immemorial, and to become free men.

They have, nonetheless, harmonized their individual aspirations and efforts with their group aspirations and efforts to obtain freedom and individual and communal well-being. In the course of achieving their initially quite limited goals, the Vicosinos have learned that the world they inhabit is considerably wider than the geographic boundaries of Vicos and the Marcara River Valley where it is located and have come to desire to participate actively in Peruvian national affairs.

Vicos differs from collective farms in the organization of labor and the degree of individual freedom afforded by its social structure. Working on the collective farm is a full-time occupation for all members, especially in the kolkhoz, where there is "instituted rigid control of each member's output," and the income of the farmer is proportional to the number of his work-day units. The work-day unit "is the equivalent of the average amount of work that can be performed by a collective farmer in one working day, as fixed by the standard quota set for each type of work."[86/] The average in 1939 was 228 days of work per person between the ages of sixteen and sixty for men and women. According to a special survey of spring work in 170 kolkhozes in 1940, the average gross length of the working day from departure to the field was 11.9 hours in operations involving the use of animal power, and 10.8 hours in operations performed by hand. The mean working time was 6.8 and 6.7 hours.[87/] The minimum number of work days in 1940 was 219.8 for men and 123.2 for women.[88/] The average number of workdays was 252 in 1940, and 351 in 1944[89/] under wartime conditions. Under post-war conditions in 1947-1949, men earned an average of 250 to 300 labor days, women from 150 to 180, and youths from fifty to sixty. Families averaged 500

work-days per year.[90] "Daily work quotas" for collective farm labor are fixed in general meeting of the membership,[91] and during "any spare time" collective farmers "may attend to the private plot of land attached to their homestead."[92]

Collective farm work is performed in a psychological climate encouraging labor. "Labour is surrounded here by honour " comments a professor in the Moscow Economic Institute. He points to a linkage between perception of working for self and society and the multiplication of "the forces of the worker, his readiness to give more and better quality products."[93]

Among members of kibbutzim, there exists "almost fanatic devotion to labor" in which all the adult members of the settlement take part.[94] This is relieved only by an annual vacation, and even then some individuals choose to work outside the kibbutz to earn money.[95] The kibbutz work day is eight to nine hours long, as a rule.[96]

In Vicos, in contrast to the kolkhoz and kibbutz year-round collective labor requirement, only one member of each land-holding family is obligated to work in the community farm enterprise. This family representative currently puts in from sixty to seventy-five days per year on community enterprise tasks. He works seasonally when agricultural requirements demand, according to work assignments made by the elective community council. The community farm enterprise work day usually lasts from about eight a.m. to four p.m., or from seven a.m. to one p.m. during the rainy season, plus up to an hour's travel each way for those living farthest away from the area being worked if heavy implements such as plows are carried. The work day is broken up, however, by a couple of "coca breaks" lasting

from fifteen to forty-five minutes, when workers sit down to masticate coca leaves with lime and to gossip, and a lunch hour, so the effective work-time is only five to six hours.

This does not mean that the Andean peasant is slothful. On the contrary, the "masses of hard-working peasants" constitute the major hope for Andean development.[97] The people of Vicos share an ethic of labor strongly resembling that of kibbutzim members. They, too, believe that physical labor"dignifies the individual" and that "laziness is worthy only of condemnation." To call a Vicos resident lazy is an insult. Since he considers physical labor"to be the only true work" the Vicos Indian "considers himself superior to mestizos and white men" who know only how to give orders.[97] The burden of community farming bears lightly on each Vicos farm family. Each family representative meeting the obligation of community labor may spend the remaining days of the year as he wishes, whether in agricultural pursuits on his individual properties, herding his animals, travelling, attending festivals, or otherwise. The other members of the family bear no responsibility to work for the community production enterprise, so that all of their time is free to work their family plots, follow occupational specialties, trade, etc. Thus the allotment of labor to land resources in Vicos differs markedly from that in the kolkhoz or kibbutz, achieving the social goals of pooling labor and land at a much lower labor cost.

The individual mode of life in Vicos also contrasts with the collective way of life on collective farms. This collective living is especially marked on kibbutzim where the family almost does not exist as a basic unit of social organization.[99] In the kib-

butz Spiro[100] studied, the group is assigned primacy. The individual who seeks privacy arouses anxiety among his fellows. A cooperative way of life is explicitly sought and extolled. On the other hand, in Vicos the family and the lineages constitute one of the most important forms of social structure, as in most other Andean rural communities.[101]

In terms of the developmental potentials of the Andean area, it is important to recognize that the Vicos model relies for success upon changing the agricultural technology of small-scale farmers, and not upon the mechanization that has played an important part in the production success of collective farms.[102] Among the kolkhoz, according to one member, "mechanization is a most important factor in increasing the yield in our collective farm."[103] Soviet writers boast, as a matter of fact, of replacing manual and horse-drawn implements with machines, of increasing 34,900 tractors in agriculture in 1929 to 276,400 in 1934 to 640,000 in 1940 to 1,500,000 in 1955.[104] Whatever production success the kolkhoz has enjoyed has been compounded from collective farming on a large scale "given an adequate material and technical base."[105] The production results of land redistribution remain unclear. An apparent overall increase in production in Egypt[106] can probably be attributed in part to mechanization,[107] inasmuch as reliable observers report that output has been "drastically" reduced on some expropriated estates, "especially fruit orchards,"[108] where mechanization would be difficult.

While the kibbutz moral imperatives stress hard physical labor, and the kibbutz population is a relatively highly educated one capable of efficient application of scientific principles of farming, machinery

has aided the kibbutzim to produce. A kibbutz with a population of 500 can own ten tractors, three combines and three trucks.[109]

On the other hand, large scale mechanization would be perhaps impossible and certainly inadvisable on the slopes which make up most Vicos farm lands. Economic success has been achieved there almost entirely thanks to human efforts, by teaching ex-serfs new agricultural technology that can be employed without using machines other than hand-powered back-pack sprayers to apply insecticides, and trucks to haul produce to market. The over 2,100 inhabitants of Vicos collectively own one heavy-duty truck purchased in 1962 as their principal venture into mechanization. It is both a source of community pride, and a guarantee of having transport available when market prices are up during the Vicos harvest season.

The capacity for rural capital accumulation without extensive mechanization is not to be underrated in the extremely uneven terrain making up the inhabited portions of the central Andean mountains away from the Altiplano.

With respect to farm mechanization, moreover, it should be pointed out that this process was carried out in Russia largely for the purpose of releasing rural manpower needed for industrialization, urban construction works and the armed forces.[110] This government policy left many collective farms almost without able-bodied men so that women carried the main burden of work.[111] In the Peruvian case, unskilled rural manpower is not a necessity at the present time. On the contrary, its over-abundance constitutes a problem because skilled labor remains in short supply.[112] The problem is most acute in the larger Peruvian cities

owing to massive migration of often illiterate or minimally literate peasants. That is to say that one of the immediate problems that many Peruvians are interested in solving is how to limit and slow the rate of rural-to-urban migration. This has been achieved in the Vicos experiment. Not only has out-migration been limited, but Vicos actually attracts back former migrants who are returning in significant numbers to live there.[113/]

This achievement of the transitional institutional model of community-scale farming combined with technologically rationalized individual farming, gains time for the formal educational process carried on in the national school system to be able to prepare individuals from Vicos to succeed if they migrate to the city. For the schools teach rural natives the cultural traits and specific knowledge required for social and economic success in the urban environment. Available survey data on socio-economic characteristics of migrants into the Lima metropolitan area certainly indicate that social and economic achievement depends upon cultural background. Urban migrants to the metropolitan area generally succeed, whereas rural migrants achieve much less.[114/]

The Vicos social and cultural transition model has been shaped to fit current social and cultural as well as economic conditions in its national and regional context. As an institution forged at the meeting point between three cultural traditions -- local Indian, national Peruvian with hispanic antecedents, and U. S. scientific -- the Vicos model appears to be unusually free of elements forced by a dominant group. From these circumstances spring its wider applicability to Andean situations.

NOTES

1. Kantor 1961:12.
2. The conclusion of an eminent Peruvian politician states succinctly the rationale for pacific agrarian reform. Bustamante (1960:57) urged upon the landed elite the idea that "it is better to yield up magnanimously upon the altar of prudent evolution a portion of the positions acquired than to lose them all in an uncontrolled explosion of violence." Palerm (1962:7) considers Italian land reform a success precisely because it has been carried out in a "democratic, orderly and peaceful manner, without violence or upsets."
3. Flores 1962:278.
4. Patron 1956:301.
5. Holmberg 1960:67; Patch 1959:17; Haya 1961:27,152-153; Bustamante 1960:54; Ford 1955:73.
6. Holmberg 1960:73-74; Ford 1955:123; Diez Canseco 1961:39; Bustamante 1960:55; Cossio 1946:220; Cornejo 1959:99,109; Castro 1936:7; Mariategui 1928:34,42-43.
7. Hirschman 1963:107.
8. Comision para la Reforma Agraria y la Vivienda 1960:152-155.
9. Matos 1957:254.
10. Silva 1959:455,573.
11. Smith 1956:43,45.
12. Antezana 1958.
13. Metraux 1959:233.
14. Comision para la Reforma Agraria y la Vivienda 1960:88.
15. Vazquez 1961:53.
16. Carranza 1961:105.
17. Junta Nacional de Planeamiento 1961:147-148.
18. Silva 1959:572.

19. Hughes 1961:12.
20. Chung-kuo 1959:5.
21. Issawi 1963:156.
22. Ibid., p. 157.
23. Ibid., p. 160.
24. Palermo 1962:48,99-101.
25. Moody 1955:136.
26. Ibid., p. 166.
27. Christodoulou 1959:80.
28. Kubler 1946:409; Patch 1959:17; Faron 1960:439. Patron (1956:298) asserted that the "poorly paid labour" of community adult males "is responsible for the very existence of Coastal agriculture" and the mining industry.
29. Sanders (1962:197) emphasized this point in discussing the difficulty of Greek peasants joining the cooperative movement.
30. Holmberg and Dobyns 1962:109.
31. In Bolivia, Moller 1960:33 and Villalpando 1960: 24-26. In Ecuador, Peñaherrera y Costales 1957:312 and Murgueytio 1961:98. In Peru, Belaunde 1959:39-44; Matos 1961:8; Maita 1963:89; Cornejo 1959:170-174.
32. Metraux 1959:229.
33. Diez Canseco 1961:102.
34. 1947:749-765.
35. This terminology is from Linton (1936:404-405).
36. 1962:197.
37. Haya 1961:110.
38. Murgueytio 1961:219.
39. Bjornberg 1959:9.
40. Metraux 1959:239-240.
41. Again, the concepts are from Linton (1936:405).
42. Comision para la Reforma Agraria y la Vivienda 1960:88.
43. Silva 1959:312.
44. Junta Nacional de Planeamiento 1961:148.

45. Urquidi 1962:14.
46. 1959:8.
47. Issawi 1963:164.
48. Ibid., p. 165.
49. Ibid., p. 166.
50. Palerm 1962:28.
51. Ibid., p. 29.
52. Ibid., p. 25, 30.
53. Flores 1962:397-398; Silva 1959:572.
54. "It is much easier and more convenient for the state and credit banks to arrive at an understanding with thirty families grouped and organized in a cooperative than 200 or 300 individuals" (Murgueytio 1961: 218).
55. Vazquez 1963:97-102.
56. Stycos and Richards 1963.
57. Coverdale & Colpitts 1961:37-38.
58. Hirschman 1963:122,127-128.
59. Mendieta 1959:196.
60. Alexander 1958:69-70.
61. Moiseyev 1956:342.
62. Diez Canseco 1961:37.
63. Dobyns 1964:120; Andrews 1963:282,284,295; Adams 1953:238; Allred et al 1959:65-68; Alencastre 1960:7-8; Alers 1960:53; Boluarte 1961:277-283; Castro 1946:491; Cotler 1961:127; Doughty 1963:240-241; Guillen 1961: 71-78; Llosa 1962:38; Matos 1951:11; 1953:185-188; Patch 1959:15; Sabogal 1961:42-43; Snyder 1960:405; Soler & Basto 1953:237; Tschopik 1947:33,44,48,52,54.
64. Mendieta 1959:197.
65. Palerm (1962:30) noted that Italian land reform cooperatives build and maintain roads, aqueducts and other public works.

66. Dobyns, Monge & Vazquez 1962.
67. Holmberg, Dobyns & Vazquez 1961:45.
68. Mosely 1957:55-5..
69. Klimenko 1943:10.
70. Borin 1943:25.
71. Moiseyev 1956:338.
72. Wesson 1963:22; Spiro 1963:19-20.
73. By way of comparison with the accidental proportion of community-worked land to individually worked land in the Vicos model, one highly idealized Ecuadorian scheme for thirty families cooperatively farming 300 hectares allots six hectares to school and experiment station, 144 to collective fields, and divides the other 150 hectares into thirty five-hectare family parcels with houses occupying part of this area (Murgueytio 1961:215).
74. Moiseyev 1956:337.
75. Dinerstein & Goure 1955:72.
76. Barou 1950:79.
77. Belov 1955:48; Cheema 1955:123.
78. Unna 1957:27.
79. 1963:32.
80. 1963:168-200.
81. Dobyns 1951:31; Erasmus 1961:54-55.
82. Mosely 1958:49.
83. Barou 1950:70.
84. Spiro 1963:38-55.
85. Holmberg 1955.
86. Klimenko 1943:9.
87. Jasny 1949:392.
88. Ibid., p. 397.
89. Barou 1950:77.
90. Belov 1955:178.
91. Moiseyev 1956:340.

92. Barou 1950:69.
93. Pashkov 1956:218.
94. Wesson 1963:24 and Hartog 1950:95; Spiro 1963:12-19.
95. Spiro 1963:22.
96. Fishman 1957:10.
97. Holmberg 1960:78.
98. Vazquez 1955:26.
99. Hartog 1950:95; Wesson 1963:25; Spiro 1963:110.
100. 1963:30-32.
101. Vazquez 1964.
102. Barou 1950:71.
103. Klimenko 1943:11.
104. Moiseyev 1956:336.
105. Ibid., p. 337.
106. Issawi 1963:163.
107. Ibid., p. 166.
108. Ibid., p. 163.
109. Spiro 1963:72.
110. Mosely 1957:50,58.
111. Belov 1955:107.
112. Herman 1963:23.
113. Vazquez 1963:97-102.
114. Stycos & Richards 1963:41.

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