

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
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BIBLIOGRAPHIC INPUT SHEET

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Batch 67

1. SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION	A. PRIMARY	TEMPORARY
	B. SECONDARY	

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Migration, integration of migrants, and the problem of squatter settlements in Seoul, Korea

3. AUTHOR(S)
Nelson, Joan

4. DOCUMENT DATE 1972	5. NUMBER OF PAGES 61p.	6. ARC NUMBER ARC
--------------------------	----------------------------	----------------------

7. REFERENCE ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Harvard

8. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES (Sponsoring Organization, Publishers, Availability)

9. ABSTRACT
(SOCIAL SCIENCES R&D--MIGRATION)

10. CONTROL NUMBER PN-AAE-203	11. PRICE OF DOCUMENT
12. DESCRIPTORS	13. PROJECT NUMBER
	14. CONTRACT NUMBER CSD-2502 Res.
	15. TYPE OF DOCUMENT

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MIGRATION, INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS, AND THE
PROBLEM OF SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS IN SEOUL, KOREA

Report on a Field Study for the Smithsonian Institution

Joan M. Nelson
Harvard Center for International Affairs
and
Woodrow Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution

July, 1972

3 page Summary statement
attached at back.

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**MIGRATION, INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS, AND THE
PROBLEM OF SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS IN SEOUL, KOREA**

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Preface and Acknowledgements

During a three-week stay in Seoul, from April 2 to April 21, 1972, I gathered as much information as I could regarding migration, economic and social integration of low-income migrants, and squatter settlements in Seoul. More precisely, I concentrated on two sets of questions:

1. Broadly speaking, has the economy of Seoul succeeded in absorbing most of the massive influx of migrants in the past decade? What have been the major sources of employment and income for those with little education and few or no skills? What has been the impact of the slower rate of over-all economic growth since 1969? Have economic changes and other policies reduced the rate of in-migration? Induced some return migration? What seem to be the long-run prospects for economic integration of this generation of urban poor, and their children?
2. What policies and programs are now in force, or are planned for the near future, to address the problem of squatting? How will these policies affect different categories of low-income people? In what ways might policies regarding squatting indirectly affect the broader process of economic and social integration of the urban poor in Seoul?

I discussed these questions with a number of scholars at four universities, and with a smaller number of officials of the city government. All those with whom I talked are listed in Attachment I. The report would have been much improved if time had permitted fuller consultation with officials in the city and national government. In particular, I regret not drawing on the resources of the Social Affairs Department of the City of Seoul, and on the Ministries of Construction and of Health and Social Welfare in the National Government.

All those with whom I discussed these problems were more than generous with their time and patience. Many gave me helpful materials, or shared with me the results of not-yet-published research. I would like to extend thanks to them all. I owe a special debt of gratitude to certain scholars who have studied these problems in depth for some time. This report relies heavily on their information and insights. Professor Sohn Jung-mok, Director of Planning and Coordination, City of Seoul, has studied these problems for many years and bears special responsibility in his present post. Dean Ro Chung-Hyun, Director of the Institute of Urban Studies and Development at Yonsei University, and Gregory Pai and Mr. Youn Hong-Tae of the Institute staff shared with me the results of several years of extensive and detailed analyses, surveys, and field work in low-income and squatter communities in Seoul. Professors Lim Hee-sop (Sociology Department, Korea

University) and Lee Hyo-jae (Sociology Department, Ehwa University) gave me information drawn from their surveys in low-income neighborhoods. Anthropologist Vincent Brandt, who has done substantial anthropological work in rural areas, lived in one squatter settlement in Seoul, and guided participant observers in several others, found time for a long discussion despite a hectic travel schedule.

Glenn Paige, Herb Barringer, and Bill Henthorn of the University of Hawaii were most helpful in preliminary conversations, both with substance and with suggestions as to Korean scholars who were working on related topics. Finally, thanks are due to T. J. Pak, who made appointments, acted as interpreter when necessary, and generally smoothed the way, and to Dr. Newman Hall and the USAID mission for their logistic support.

While I could not have prepared this report without the help of these and others listed in Attachment 1, I am entirely responsible for all interpretations (and misinterpretations) of fact and judgment in this report.

MIGRATION, INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS, AND THE PROBLEM OF SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS IN SEOUL, KOREA

I. Factual Findings

A. Trends in the volume of migration into Seoul

Migration into Seoul is by far the largest component of the city's extremely rapid growth since the early 1950s. Some feeling for the future volume of migration therefore is a crucial piece of information for planning the expansion of the city's physical infrastructure and services. To the extent that officials and planners can anticipate shifts in the composition of migration with respect to age and sex, education and prior urban experience, planning can be adjusted more precisely to probable future requirements.

The Korean censuses of 1960 and 1966 did not include questions regarding place of origin. Therefore data on migration must be calculated indirectly from the census data, or must be based on sample surveys.

Professor Yu Eui-young has analyzed the census data for 1960 and 1966, in order to measure the relative importance of annexation, natural increase, and in-migration as components of Seoul's growth. The expansion of the city limits in 1963 incorporated areas with a population of approximately 155,000. The remainder of the city's population increase between 1960 and 1966 must be accounted for by migration and natural increase. Yu estimates the volume of net in-migration by comparing the number of men and women in each age bracket actually counted in the 1966 census, with the number which would be expected in each category on the basis of the 1960 census results adjusted for (age and sex-specific) survival ratios. The difference between the actual and expected numbers in each age and sex category is taken as net migration. Yu estimates the rate of natural increase as a residual, by subtracting the growth accounted for by annexation and migration from total growth. His results are summarized in the first two columns of Table 1. The calculations imply a rate of natural increase of 2.77%, slightly below the national rate of 2.90% during this period. (Yu, p. 16).

No comparable analysis is available for the four years between the census of 1966 and 1970. However, no additional territory was annexed during those years, and all growth therefore was due to natural increases plus migration. Estimate A, shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1, computes the contribution of each, using the assumption that the rate of natural increase was the same during this period as in the early 1960s. Estimate B (columns 5 and 6) uses the more realistic assumption that the rate of natural increase

dropped substantially, due in part to the spread of family planning. The rate of natural increase used in Estimate B is 1.8%, and is drawn from a study of fertility and migration in Seoul in 1968 by Professor Yoon Jong-joo. Yoon's data are based on a stratified random sample survey of more than 3000 Seoul households with a total population of 16,327 persons. His conclusion regarding natural increase, however, sounds surprisingly low.

Estimate A implies that average annual migration into Seoul during the late 1960s reached a level of 315,000. Estimate B suggests a yearly level closer to 356,000. The actual figure is probably somewhere between these two estimates. In any event, the inflow by 1969 and 1970 clearly averaged close to 1000 daily!

Table 1
Components of Seoul's Growth During the 1960s

Increase due to:	1960-1966 ^{1/}		1966-1970			
	Number (000's)	% of Total Change	Estimate A ^{2/}		Estimate B ^{3/}	
Number (000's)			% of Total Change	Number (000's)	% of Total Change	Number (000's)
annexation	155	11	0	--	0	--
natural growth	421	31	444	26	280	16
net in-migration	784	58	1259	74	1423	84
Total	1360	100	1703	100	1703	100

^{1/} Data for 1960-1966 drawn from Yu, Eui-Young, Components of Population Growth in Seoul, 1960-1966. (Forthcoming, 1972, Seoul National University, The Population and Development Studies Center.) Implied annual rate of natural increase is 2.77%.

^{2/} Estimate A is based on an assumed annual rate of natural increase of 2.8%, compounded over 4 years.

^{3/} Estimate B is based on an assumed annual rate of natural increase of 1.8%, compounded over 4 years.

No data are available for the eighteen months since the census of October 1970. However, several informants agreed that the rate of in-migration probably has slowed substantially, and may have begun to decline even before autumn 1970. Several factors support this appraisal.

First, the over-all rate of economic growth, while still rapid, has fallen off since the spectacular gains of the late 1960s. The more moderate pace of expansion is partly a result of adjustment problems created by earlier growth, and partly a reflection of global economic trends. Many firms are emphasizing efficiency where earlier they sought expansion. Therefore they are hiring fewer workers or even discharging some of their labor force. Construction in Seoul, which boomed in the mid-1960s and provided employment for many un-skilled and semi-skilled workers, has been sharply curtailed in the past two years. Reduced construction in part results from slowed industrial and commercial expansion. Moreover, in order to curb run-away real estate speculation in the city, the government in 1969 imposed a heavy tax on profits from the sale of land. This measure immediately and sharply reduced new construction, and therefore the demand for construction workers.

A second factor contributing to reduced in-migration is a strict prohibition on construction of new squatter huts. While such construction is by definition illegal, and the city government periodically cleared many squatter settlements during the 1950s and 1960s, in 1969 a new system of enforcement was put into effect. The system is described later in this report. At this point it is necessary to note only that the more consistent and vigorous enforcement of the prohibition against new squatter construction has, by all accounts, been highly successful. Newly arrived migrants can no longer assume that they will be able to construct makeshift, but free, shelter. It is reasonable to believe that word of this filters back to rural areas, and helps to discourage those potential migrants who have neither friends nor relatives with whom to stay nor money to rent housing.

Meanwhile, employment and wage prospects in the rural areas have improved. The massive exodus of the 1960s is making itself felt in a shortage of agricultural labor in many areas, especially during the peak cultivation seasons. Agricultural price changes have reinforced the effect of the population shift. The real price of rice dropped steadily and substantially between 1963 and 1968. Starting in 1969, however, the government began to support domestic rice prices through a combined program of purchasing a small part of the domestic crop, and managing the prices of increasingly large imported supplies. The real price of rice received by farmers rose roughly 30% (from 26 won per 80-

pound bag to 34 won, expressed in constant 1965 won) between 1968 and 1971. The price of barley, also an important cash crop, has risen since 1969. (Bob Morrow, Rural Development Division, USAID). The combined effect of better prices for farmers and a reduced rural labor force has substantially increased agricultural wages during peak seasons. I was told that wages for rural construction projects have also risen, and are now comparable to those for urban construction jobs.

To summarize, poorer prospects of employment in Seoul, the crack-down on new squatter construction, and improved conditions in rural areas almost certainly have reduced the volume of migration into Seoul in the past couple of years. In addition to discouraging some potential migrants from making the move, the change in employment opportunities may even be inducing a modest amount of return migration, perhaps particularly among young male migrants with few skills. This group is both particularly hard-hit by the urban economic slowdown, and particularly able to take advantage of improved rural prospects. (Brandt.)

However, the slowdown in migration to Seoul may be only a temporary respite. Some of the factors contributing to the slow-down are likely to change in the near or medium-term future. For example, the high tax on land transfers which curtailed construction activity during the past two years has recently been eased for purchasers planning to build middle-income homes. (Ro.) More generally, some of the domestic adjustment problems and international economic forces which currently hamper Korea's industrial growth are likely to taper off during the next few years, although rates of growth will not regain the frenetic pace of the late 1960s. (Adelman.) Over the next decade agricultural machinery may displace a good deal of farm labor. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry currently has a team of consultants examining prospects for farm mechanization. If Japan's experience is any guide, the use of small tractors can spread extremely rapidly. (Ralph Watkins.) In short, recent improvements in rural employment prospects relative to urban opportunities may not continue, and are likely to be partially reversed during the next decade.

Moreover, non-economic motives are important in prompting migration, and are likely to grow stronger in the future. Several surveys of migrants in Seoul indicate that although economic factors are most frequently mentioned as the primary cause of migration, non-economic factors are not far behind. Sociology Professor Yoon Jong-joo surveyed 2226 migrants, and found that 45% of his respondents cited actual or potential jobs as their major reason for moving;

10% sought education, and 25% were motivated by a more general desire for a better life or "longing for Seoul." 16% came in order to marry, or to join family members already in Seoul. Professor Lee Man-gap interviewed 404 migrants and asked which of twenty-three possible reasons for deciding to move to Seoul had influenced them strongly, moderately, slightly or not at all. Each factor was then scored according to the number of times it was mentioned, weighted by its degree of influence. Those factors which are clearly economic scored 1309 points; those clearly related to education or to social or cultural advantages of the city over the countryside scored 979 points. (Derived from Lee Man-gap, "Pushing or Pulling," pp. 9-10.)

Non-economic motivations then, are already an important cause of migration. Moreover, they are likely to become increasingly important. Anthropologist Vincent Brandt points out that

"... With the exception of ... drought [in 1968 and 1969] in the Cholla provinces, poverty in rural areas is certainly no worse today in absolute terms than in the past. In fact, there has probably been steady if slight improvement during the last ten years or so ... It is not so much that rural existence is intolerable or impossible in terms of traditional standards, as that expectations in the countryside have changed ... Young people from all economic levels share a desire to escape from the stifling aspects of small rural communities. They long to get out from under parental authority, tight social censure, and nearly complete economic dependence. Radio broadcasts from Seoul, the return visits of those who have already left the village, military service, and increased opportunities for travel all carry the same message to country youth: an alternative now exists to the constant pressures for conformity and subordination of egoistic drives to group interests."

Among the migrants, Brandt notes, are many sons and daughters of middle-level and well-to-do farmers. While these new urbanites may visit their home villages more or less often, they are "irrevocably committed to life in the city." (Brandt, "Seoul Slums and the Rural Migrant," Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, Seminar on Tradition and Change, Sept. 1969; pages 8-9.)

The balance of economic and non-economic motives may affect migrants from other cities in ways which differ from rural out-migrants. Many

migrants into Seoul already come from other cities or towns. In Yoon's survey, slightly more than 30% of those respondents who were not natives of Seoul had been born in other towns or cities. Lee Man-gap's smaller survey found that 43% of in-migrant respondents had been born in other urban centers. Lee also asked respondents to give their place of residence just before moving to Seoul; 57% had come from towns or cities rather than rural areas. Finally, data from the Seoul Statistical Yearbook, based on a survey of migrants arriving in Seoul during the first half of 1970, indicate that just over half of the recent arrivals listed their former residence as another city (shi) or town (eup). (1971 Yearbook, Table 26, pp. 52-53.)

While figures from these several sources differ substantially (in part reflecting different time periods covered), it is clear that the proportion of Seoul's in-migrants who come from other urban centers rather than directly from the countryside is already large. Moreover, the proportion is likely to grow as the population of Korea becomes more urbanized, following the pattern already clearly evident in many Latin American countries, Turkey, and other substantially urbanized developing nations. Inter-city migrants are likely to be less strongly motivated than rural out-migrants by desire to escape from social and cultural constraints. They move to Seoul not so much to escape such limitations as to optimize their prospects, that is, to seek the best possible educational and job opportunities. If Seoul's advantages over other urban centers were reduced over the next few decades, in-migration from such centers should diminish correspondingly.

B. Social Adjustment, Employment, and Economic Integration of Migrants and the Urban Poor in Seoul

Simply to state that migrants flooded into Seoul during the 1960s, and that the flow continues heavy though perhaps somewhat abated, tells us very little. How have the migrants fared?

In other developing countries, rapid cityward migration is often regarded as posing serious problems of social and cultural adjustment. To the extent that newcomers to the city are accustomed to long-established and tradition-sanctioned patterns of rural life, they may find it hard to adjust to the hurried pace, impersonal atmosphere, and competitive structure of the city. Personal psychological disorientation, familial discord and disruption, drunkenness, crime, and other social ills are often assumed (though less frequently shown) to result. Moreover, in those countries with a variety of languages, religions, races, or regional traditions, migrants to the cities may face formidable obstacles of language, culture, and racial, regional, or religious bias.

Migration into Seoul (and, I suspect, into other Korean cities) poses few such problems. Korea is culturally and linguistically homogeneous. Although Koreans notice regional differences and many prefer to live near or associate with people from their home region, migrants into Seoul from other parts of the nation do not have to learn a different language or become familiar with a strange culture. Moreover, the Korean War and the spread of elementary and secondary education and mass media into rural areas have probably disrupted traditional social structure and undermined the hold of traditional mores in many parts of rural Korea. Many of the supportive and reassuring aspects of traditional rural life have been ideals rather than actualities for those many migrants who were children or unborn at the time of the Korean War. Therefore they may find urban life less of a contrast than would their parents or grandparents. More important in terms of preparation for life in Seoul, most migrants are comparatively well-educated, and many have previous urban experience. The fact that many migrants into Seoul come from other cities and towns has already been noted. In general, migrants have less schooling than the average for their sex and age categories for the population of the city as a whole. But few have so little education as to be severely handicapped in adjusting socially and culturally to the city environment. Yoon's survey found fewer than 3% of the male migrants under the age of 45 had no schooling at all. 49% had at least some high-school education. A surprising 21% had some college education, or were college graduates. Female mi-

grants were substantially less well-educated. 16% of those between the ages of 20 and 45 had no formal education. Nonetheless, in comparison to the migrants into the major cities of most other developing nations, Seoul's migrants, like the Korean population as a whole, are well-educated.

Moreover, while I did not examine the question systematically, there is little evidence of social maladjustment of migrant groups. Crimes of violence are rare. City statistics show between 460 and 560 violent crimes each year from 1965 to 1970, a remarkably low total for a city of Seoul's size. Seoul (Statistical Yearbook, 1971, Table 236, p. 240.) Few shops protect their show windows at night with the bars, grills, or sliding metal doors which are omnipresent in Latin American cities. While many factors, including efficient law enforcement, the midnight curfew, and national cultural values undoubtedly share credit for this record, the point remains that crime and violence rates offer little evidence of widespread social maladjustment. Several informants who had conducted extensive survey research and/or community organization work in low-income neighborhoods asserted that they saw relatively little social or familial disruption and disorganization. On the contrary, they stressed the prevalence in the neighborhoods with which they were familiar of a sense of dignity, discipline, willingness to work hard, and hope for the future.

To state that there is little evidence of serious social maladjustment on the part of in-migrants is not to imply that their reception is smooth and easy. Newcomers, especially from rural areas, undoubtedly are exploited by unscrupulous employers, landlords, and the like. I heard several stories of employers who hired youngsters from the countryside, let them work for two or three months, then dismissed them without paying the wages they were owed. (Wright, Casey.) Some migrants find employment through jobbers who then claim a large share of their wages for a year or more, and back up their claim with force. (Herb Barringer.) Such problems, while serious for the individuals, fall short of what might be regarded as severe problems of social adjustment for migrants as a category.

Elsewhere in the developing world cityward migration often causes serious problems of economic integration, regardless of the ease or difficulty of migrants' social and cultural adjustment. More precisely put, the influx swells the urban labor force much more rapidly than economic growth creates new jobs, particularly at the un- and semi-skilled levels appropriate for less educated migrants from rural areas. As a result, the proportion of the city's population which is un- or under-employed and abysmally poor grows steadily. Moreover, the poor have little prospect of breaking out of their situation.

In general, and until the recent slow-down in economic growth, this has not been the case in Seoul. During the late 1960s, Korea's industrial production was growing at rates of 20.6% per year; exports were increasing at an incredible 42.6% annually. (Five Year Economic Development Plan, 1971, pages 8, 134). Between 1965 and 1970 employment in manufacturing increased more than 50%, from 800,000 to 1,261,000 workers (in a national labor force of just over 10 million). (Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1971, Table 116, pp. 232-3). Much of this expansion was concentrated in and near Seoul. Moreover, reconstruction, industrial expansion, and population growth all fed tremendous activity in public and private construction, a heavy employer of un- and semi-skilled labor.

Within this dynamic economic context, additions to Seoul's labor force were readily absorbed. In 1970, a third of all workers in manufacturing were located in Seoul City (Yearbook of Mining and Manufacturing, 1970, Table II-1, p. 201), and manufacturing establishments employed roughly a quarter of the city's labor force (Seoul Statistical Yearbook, 1971, Table 23, pp. 48-9). Demand for construction workers was so strong during the late 1960s that some firms recruited in the rural areas--a situation which would be unbelievable in most South Asian, African, or Latin American cities.

Moreover, the strong demand for labor coupled with productivity increases permitted substantial increases in real wages, for all categories of labor in manufacturing and mining. For the nation as a whole, workers' wages increased from mid-1967 to mid-1970 at an annual rate of roughly 38%, far in advance of the increase in urban consumer price indices for those years. Workers at the low end of the wage scale, especially women workers, did less well than the labor force in general. But even their wages rose substantially, in real as well as monetary terms. (KIDRI, Report on Wage Survey, 1970, pp. 128, 125.) Wages in Seoul increased somewhat less rapidly than for the nation as a whole. Table 2 (next page) gives some data on wage trends during this period in selected low-wage branches of manufacturing in Seoul. (Unfortunately, data on wages in lowpaid branches of service occupations were not available in comparable form for the two years.) Female workers in textile and food industries--large, relatively low-paid categories--gained an average of roughly 12 1/2% annually in real wages.

Table 2

Wage Trends for Production Workers in Selected Industries, Seoul, Korea, 1967-1970

Type of worker ^{2/}	Average monthly earnings (in won)		%rise in money wages	%rise in real wages	%rise in real wages, annual average
	June 1967	June 1970			
Foods, beverages, and tobacco					
Male	9,964	25,100	251.9	83.4	22.5
Female	4,724	10,000	211.6	43.1	12.7
Textiles, shoes, and clothing					
Male	10,712	23,200	216.5	48.0	14.0
Female	5,155	10,800	209.5	41.0	12.2
Metal Products and machinery					
Male	8,670	20,200	232.9	64.4	17.9
Female ^{3/}	3,800	10,000	263.1	94.6	24.9

Sources:

- a) 1967 wages: Bank of Korea, Report on Wage Survey (1967), Table II, p. 473ff.
- b) 1970 wages: KIDRI, Report on Wage Survey (1970) plus additional data kindly provided by KIDRI on selected categories of workers in Seoul for which published data were not available.
- c) Price change data: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Year Book, 1971, Table 161, Seoul Consumer Price Index, p. 335.

Notes:

- 1/ Industries selected are those employing large numbers of semi-skilled workers.
- 2/ In order to construct comparable categories of workers for both 1967 and 1970, the categories used in Table II of the 1967 Bank of Korea survey were combined into broader industrial categories for which 1970 KIDRI data were available. For example, male production workers in food processing industries were combined with male production workers in beverage industries. The wages for the combined category are a weighted average of the wages for the more detailed categories, using 1967 number of workers in each of the latter as weights.
- 3/ Data shown are for female metal products workers only. Apparently there were no female machinery production workers included in the survey.

As one would expect, migrants as well as natives of Seoul have benefited from the strong labor market since the mid-1960s. Fragmentary evidence suggests that migrants in general have not had great difficulty in finding jobs. Lee Man-gap's survey found that more than a quarter of those questioned had arrived in Seoul with a job already assured; 37.4% arriving without a job found employment within a matter of weeks, and roughly 12% took up to six months to locate a position. (Lee Man-gap, "The Facts Behind Seoul's Exploding Population".) In general, more migrants than natives of the same age and sex are economically active. (Yoon, Jong-Joo, (1970), pp. 85-6 and 134.)

Migrants are more heavily concentrated in certain low-level occupational categories than the city's labor force as a whole. But this reflects their age, sex, and educational characteristics. Migrants are, on average, slightly less well-educated than those born in the city. Disproportionate numbers are young, and among those between the ages of 15 and 25, a heavy majority are women. The young in general, and young women in particular, tend to cluster in ill-paid and insecure types of work, regardless of whether they are migrant or native.



In general, then, the massive migration into Seoul has not posed serious problems of economic absorption. Even during the boom period of the late 1960s, however, certain categories of job-seekers, both migrants and those born in Seoul, undoubtedly had trouble finding steady work at adequate pay. The extent of under- and unemployment is hard to gauge. Unemployment statistics are seldom useful for this purpose. In the cities of developing countries, poor people who lose their regular jobs pick up odd jobs, turn to sidewalk vending, collect and sort waste materials for resale, go to "work" in a relative's service or small-scale manufacturing establishment, and otherwise eke out an income. Only a small proportion of such people would report themselves as unemployed on an employment survey.

The Seoul Statistical Yearbook includes data on unemployed persons, but does not spell out how the data were obtained. Time and language problems barred a serious attempt to assess their reliability. The data given, for 1970, show 193, 116 unemployed persons. If we define the total labor force as including employed workers plus the recorded unemployed, then open unemployment represented 13.3% of the labor force. The City statistics indicate that the openly unemployed are disproportionately young, and include a high proportion of relatively well-educated persons. 29% of the unemployed were 14 to 24 years of age, (Among the employed, only 14% fell in this age bracket.) 40% of the unemployed males were high-school graduates. These data strongly suggest that in Seoul, as elsewhere, open unemployment is greatest among first-time job seekers. Moreover, many of the openly unemployed are not unskilled workers unable to find work of any kind, but moderately educated young men holding out for jobs which they regard as appropriate and promising. Nonetheless, the Seoul City statistics also indicate substantial recorded unemployment among older persons, particularly males.

Underemployment is even more difficult to gauge (and much harder to define) than open unemployment. Clearly, however, many of Seoul's employed workers hold insecure and poorly paid jobs. Some data are available on the numbers and characteristics of workers in three of the largest categories of low-wage work: common laborers employed on a daily basis, small-scale vendors, and domestic servants.

* / Similar findings have been made regarding the composition of open unemployment in Bogotá (Colombia) and in other cities of the developing world. The most comprehensive review on this topic is David Turnham, The Employment Problem in Less Developed Countries: A Review of Evidence, Development Centre, OECD, Paris, 1971. See P. 54 especially.

In 1970 the City of Seoul recorded close to 86,000 common laborers employed on a daily basis. Many of the 200,000-plus workers classified as "self-employed sales" workers are stationary or perambulating venders. A few venders have sizeable stocks and earn a reasonably secure and adequate livelihood. Most do not. City statistics include domestic servants in the broader category of "service workers", which combines a range of occupations from unskilled to highly professional. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that a high proportion of the 82,000 young women between the ages of 14 and 24 recorded as employed in services are in fact domestic servants. Others probably collect fares on buses or work as waitresses. For most, the hours are long, the work is hard, the wages are abysmal, and the jobs are dead-end. Combining these three categories (and using an arbitrary three-quarters of all self-employed sales persons as a estimate of the number of venders), then ill-paid workers with little prospect of advancement constituted just about one quarter of Seoul's employe labor in 1970. (Seoul Statistical Yearbook, 1971, Table 22, pp. 46-47).

The economic and social significance of these categories--that is, the degree to which they constitute serious problems of welfare--varies substantially. Few of the young women employed as domestic servants, bus girls, waitresses, and the like are trying to support a family. Nor do they plan to stay in the labor market very long. Most will drop out of the labor market when they marry and have children. In Yoon's survey, a quarter of all women between the ages of 30 and 55 were economically active (Yoon, p. 86). While more productive and better-paid jobs would be more satisfying for the women themselves and would contribute more to the economy, the significance of their low-level jobs in terms of their own and others' welfare is much less than if they were heads of households permanently in the labor market.

Vending is often assumed to be a residual occupation, the last resort of those who cannot find alternative employment. But this assumption may be misleading. At least some venders regard their work as a potential stepping stone into small-scale commerce. Surveys have found that many low-income people dream of starting a small business of their own, despite the fact that failure rates among such enterprises must be very high. Nor is this desire entirely irrational. For people with little education and few skills, particularly those beyond their early twenties and therefore unlikely to gain a skill through training or apprenticeship, even a stable manual job offers little prospect of long-run advancement. For many women venders, vending is simply a part-time occupation to supplement the head of household's wages. Those who walk about with a pan or basket of vegetables or fish may also get some enjoyment out of being away from house and children for a time, and chatting with friends and strangers. In short, while many of those working as self-employed sales persons may have reluctantly resorted to such work, for many others it is either a readily available part-time occupation or a putative spring board into retail business.

The most clear-cut, low-level occupation for which data are available are ordinary laborers. The great majority of these (93%) are male, and most of those over the age of 25 must be assumed to be heads of households. Therefore it is interesting to note that there is a strong and consistent relationship between age and the proportion of laborers in the labor force. Laborers account for 10.3% of Seoul's male labor force as a whole. But among young workers--those between 20 and 29--only 6.5% are laborers. Among these in their thirties, roughly 10.5% are laborers and the proportion rises steadily to 15.7% of workers between the ages of 55 and 59. The strong relationship is more surprising in view of the fact that employers might be expected to prefer to hire younger men for hard physical work. The statistics strongly suggest the long-run up-grading of Seoul's labor force, and the ability of the economy to absorb better-trained workers.

However, both the recent recession and longer-run prospects suggest that un- and under-employment are now and may remain more serious problems than they were during the latter half of the 1960s. The recent recession has undoubtedly increased the number of openly unemployed, and swelled the ranks of laborers, venders, and others scratching out a marginal living. I am not aware of published data more recent than 1970, which is too early to suggest the full effects of recent trends. However, unless changes between 1969 and 1970 are due to shifting statistical definitions or other data problems, it is suggestive that the number of laborers employed on a day-to-day basis jumped from roughly 52,000 in 1969 to 86,000 in 1970, while the number of those employed on regular or temporary bases dropped substantially. Craftsmen and production workers employed as "family workers" quintupled, and those employed on a temporary or daily basis grew substantially while the number regularly employed dropped by 25%. Similarly, regularly employed male sales workers fell dramatically from 34,000 to slightly over 9,000, while self-and family-employed sales workers jumped substantially. (Seoul Statistical Year book, 1971, Tab 22, pp. 46-7). While contrasts in the rates of recorded unemployment are not very revealing for the reasons discussed earlier, observers in low-income neighborhoods estimate that as much as a quarter of heads of households have been unemployed recently. (Brandt, Ann Casey.)

While some of the transitory causes for the economic slow-down may be expected to ease off in the next few years, longer-run problems remain. There is a disposition among many planning and economic officials in the Korean Government to move fairly rapidly in the direction of more sophisticated industrial development, calling for more capital-intensive patterns of production and for a higher ratio of professional and skilled technical workers in the labor force. (Irma Adelman.) I have no judgment on the over-all advantages and drawbacks of such a development strategy. Clearly, however, it would create conditions less favorable for the absorption of un- and semi-skilled labor than during the late 1960s.

Until now, the Economic Planning Board has given little direct attention to expansion of employment in urban areas and at various skill levels. The summary report on the Third Five Year Plan (1971-1976) touches on employment in only the most brief and general terms. This probably reflects the assumption that if rapid growth is sustained, employment will take care of itself. This view has been well-founded thus far, but a slower rate of over-all growth plus a rapid shift toward more sophisticated technology would call for more explicit attention to problems

of low-level labor. The Korean Development Institute has recently launched an ambitious analysis of trends in income distribution. This project may help provide benchmarks against which to monitor trends in employment and income distribution, in order to determine whether more explicit and vigorous employment policies are needed.

Meanwhile, Seoul must continue to cope with widespread poverty and its concomitants, including problems of health and welfare, slums, and squatter settlements. Among these problems, I focussed particularly on squatter settlements. This focus seemed most likely to complement, and avoid duplication of, the work of other participants in the Smithsonian study. It also seemed appropriate because squatter settlements should be viewed not merely as problems of housing and city planning, but as an integral aspect of the economic integration of the urban poor. This viewpoint is explored in Section C below.

C. The Problem of Squatter Settlements

1. Extent and Nature of the Problem

The current official estimate of the number of squatter dwellings in Seoul City is 168,000. This figure dates from mid-1970 or earlier. At that time it represented roughly 28% of approximately 597,000 housing units in the city (preliminary data from the 1970 census).

The estimate probably includes several categories of illegal housing:

a. Houses built on land to which the builder lacked title. In most cases the land is public property;

b. Houses built on land legally purchased or otherwise legally acquired, but violating the building code. Included in this category are probably many delapidated buildings, plus some older units which are in fair repair but were built when standards of sanitation, light, size, fire protection, and the like were less stringent;

c. Houses which conform to the code and are built on land legally purchased or otherwise acquired, but which are not yet registered, hence technically illegal. Much of this housing is in new areas of the city opened up since the mid-1950s. In these areas plots were surveyed, roads laid out, and water and sewer mains installed, but many houses are not yet registered.

These categories clearly pose quite different legal and administrative problems. Only the first category, where title is lacking, is normally called "squatter housing" elsewhere in the world. The discussion below focusses on this category.

Since the official estimate of 168,000 "squatter" units probably includes substantial numbers of units which violate the building code and/or are unregistered but do hold title, the figure overstates the number of squatter units strictly defined. The Institute of Urban Development and Studies at Yonsei University is currently attempting to sort out the several types of illegal housing, to identify sub-categories of squatter housing more narrowly defined, and to explore policies appropriate to each category. They estimate that the number of illegal units is substantially larger than the official city estimate, but believe that the number of these units which are squatter housing (e.g., lack land title) is smaller - perhaps in the neighborhood of 120,000. For the purposes of this report, it is sufficient to state that at least 20% and perhaps more of all the housing units in the city as of 1970 were squatter units in the sense of lacking title to the land.

How many people does this represent? The Economic Planning Board surveyed several hundred households in 1970, to gather data on family income and expenditures. It found that the average wage-earner's household included 5.24 members, slightly above the average of 5.04 for the city's population as a whole. (EPB Survey of Family Income and Expenditure; EPB Preliminary Count of Population and Housing Census.) If we multiply the Yonsei estimate of 120,000 squatter units by 5.24, then roughly 630,000 persons are living in the squatter settlements. But this is almost certainly too low an estimate. The Economic Planning Board survey excluded households in squatter areas. (Eui-young Yu and Hyun-ho Seok, Adequacy and Problems of Korean Government Statistics, Vol. 1, p. 97.) The average size of squatter households may well be higher, particularly if we take into account the fact that most single wage-earners do not live in squatter settlements. The substantial number of single young men and women living in rented rooms elsewhere in the city presumably pulled down the figure for average size of household covered by the EPB survey.

Moreover, for the city as a whole, the number of households is much greater than the number of housing units. According to the preliminary returns from the 1970 census, Seoul's total population as of October 1970 was 5.536 million; the number of households was 1.097 million; and the number of occupied housing units was .586 million. Renters are probably a smaller proportion of squatter settlement residents than of the city population as a whole, because most squatter housing units are so small.

The Yonsei Institute survey of squatter settlements found that the average unit houses 2.3 families. Multiplied by the Economic Planning Board figure of 5.24 persons per family, this suggests an average of 12.1 persons per unit. Assuming, then, that each squatter unit houses between 10 and 12 persons, we arrive at an estimate of 1,200,000 to 1,452,000 persons living in the squatter settlements. This represents 22 to 26% of Seoul's population as of October 1970.

The extent of squatting in Seoul, then, is substantial, though perhaps less than in many major cities of the developing nations. What are the characteristics of the settlements?

Almost all the houses in the squatter settlement are single-story. Most have one or two rooms plus a cooking lean-to built against one exterior wall. Houses built to be rented by the room, such as Latin American conventillos, row shelters common in Indian bustees, or the four-room units often built in African housing estates, are almost unknown. However, many households rent all or part of a room to unrelated individuals or families, and many houses are rented as a whole by the builder-owner or a later purchaser who subsequently moved away. The quality of the houses varies greatly. Many are rudimentary shacks of scrap materials. Many others are two- or three-room, solidly constructed cement-block buildings with roofing of asbestos tile or even of the red clay tile used on most of Seoul's smaller legal buildings.

Much squatter housing -- perhaps as much as 30% of all squatter units -- is scattered throughout the city singly or in small clusters. But the bulk of squatter housing is concentrated in settlements ranging in size from a few hundred to thousands of units.

Most larger and more visible settlements are of two types: those strung out on flat terrain along the banks of tributaries to the Han and the Chung-gye-chun canal; and those clinging to the sides of the steep, bare, rocky hills scattered throughout the city. The stream-side settlements generally are delapidated single or double lines of shanties, although they

may include a few well-built houses. The hillside settlements vary. New areas, often located at the tops of the mountains, look raw and poor. Older settlements are predominantly small cement-block houses, often with red tile roofs and sometimes gaily painted. Those households with a bit more space and money prefer to enclose the house and tiny patio with a high wall. One very extensive area (Oksudong) reminded me of a pleasant Italian hillside town, with red tile roofs no two of which are at the same level, neatly enclosed patios with plantings appearing over the wall-tops, narrow curving pedestrian lanes, paved and with stairways up the steepest slopes, and broader main streets, paved and bus-serviced much though not all of the way up the mountain side. Many, perhaps most of the houses in this area were originally squatter units, but have since been legalized by purchase of land title from the government. But many fairly recent units on the upper slopes are not yet well-developed, and also lack title.

Virtually all settlements have water taps and electric lines. Most have regular arrangements for garbage collection. Some of the older, larger, and better developed areas have paved main roads and bus service. In most, however, roads are unpaved and too narrow to admit motor vehicles. Therefore, fire protection is a serious problem, particularly in settlements where many of the houses have wood-and-tar paper or canvas roofs. Virtually no houses have indoor plumbing. In well-developed areas each house has its own latrine; in many settlements several households or a small segment of the settlement share a latrine.

Different types of settlements almost certainly serve different social and economic functions. One major purpose of the Yonsei Institute study is to delineate, on an empirical basis, the characteristics and functions of different types of settlements and their residents. Even without the conclusions of that study, however, it is possible to distinguish two broad types of settlements, which may be labelled "transitional" and "incipient residential". (These categories are similar to Turner's "bridgehead" and "consolidation" types, but differ with respect to their relationship to recently arrived migrants.)

Most of the residents of "transitional" settlements, which include many of the linear streamside clusters, are striving to enter or to re-enter the mainstream of the city's economy. Some are recently arrived migrants. Some may be young couples, recently married (or living together in what would elsewhere be called common law marriage) who had previously lived as single persons in rented rooms or quarters provided by employers.

Some may recently have lost a job or suffered the failure of a small business. All have moved into the settlement to stretch their reduced income. Many of these settlements are characterized by large numbers of small commercial establishments. The space between the high-water mark and the edge of the streams is often cluttered with salvaged scraps being sorted for resale and a variety of other re-processing industries (for example, unravelling flour sacks and making the thread into cord or ropes). Many of the people in these settlements would like to move out, if they could find secure and adequate wage employment or could make a go at a small shop. Turnover, therefore, is high. However, this does not mean that the settlements would gradually and naturally empty out, if they were simply left alone for some years. Their population is continually replenished, from new migrants and from various categories of people already in the city. High turnover does mean, however, that much of the housing in these areas is comparatively poorly developed.

In contrast, most of the residents of incipient residential areas do plan to stay where they are. Many of the mountainside settlements probably are of this general type. While some of the residents in such settlements might prefer in principle to live elsewhere, they are doubtful that they will be able to afford to do so. Living in the squatter settlements permits them to stretch meager and/or insecure incomes to cover other needs -- for example, providing operating capital for vending or a small business (otherwise available only by borrowing at high interest), or putting several children through middle school or if possible high-school. (Lim Kee-sop, unpublished survey results.) While elementary school is free in principle, even elementary school children are expected to bring in periodic "school support fees" which are used to supplement teachers' salaries. Middle and high schools charge entrance, tuition, and a variety of other fees which total to roughly 55-60,000 won per year, or the equivalent of two-and-a-half or three months' wages for an average semi-skilled worker in manufacturing. In other words, many squatters prefer to invest part of their meager incomes in their children's educations or in small enterprises, rather than consuming more in higher-quality housing.

However, in incipient residential settlements squatters do hope to gradually improve their houses. One informed observer of the squatter settlements estimated that materials for a 12-pyong house of cement blocks with a "slate" or pressed asbestos-sheet roof costs roughly 100,000 to 200,000 won. By way of comparison, in the citizens' apartments built by the city as low-cost housing (discussed below) key money

is usually 900,000 won or more; people move in with a down-payment of about 30% or 250,000 to 300,000 won. The least expensive rented room requires a downpayment of roughly 50,000 won; a larger room or one more centrally located costs much more. (Pai, Youn; confirmed in part by Lim, Casey, Brandt.) Therefore, self-built squatter housing offers more and better housing than an equivalent amount of money can purchase otherwise, with the added advantage that the expenditure can be made gradually, as funds are available to purchase more cement blocks or better roofing, rather than having to borrow a large amount for a down-payment at high interest rates. The rate at which such houses are improved, of course, varies according to the builders' incomes. In a comparatively high-income area such as Oksudong, houses which Yonsei Institute staff recalled as being mere shacks in 1971 were well-constructed cement structures with tile roofs and enclosed patios when we returned to the area in April 1972.

Squatting in Seoul, then is not only extensive but also quite varied in nature. In what senses is it a problem, for the government or for the public or sections thereof?

Squatting on private land obviously violates the right of the owner to the use of his own property. However, most squatting in Seoul (as in most other cities in developing nations) is on public land. In principle this poses similar legal problems to squatting on private land. In practice, the legal problem of squatting on public land can be solved by legalizing whole settlements or individual houses, with or without payment by the squatters. The more fundamental problems posed by squatting on public land are not legal, but lie in the realm of conflicting public interests.

Squatting impedes the orderly and planned development of city in several ways. Some settlements lie in the path of roads or other infrastructure. For example, much of the strip settlement on the banks of the Chung-gye-chun Canal had to be destroyed and its residents relocated when the canal was covered over and an expressway was built on top of it. Many more settlements are built on land which, though undeveloped at the time the squatters settled, is designated in city plans as public park. This applies particularly to the mountainside settlements. These settlements pose additional problems for provision of services. Constructing roads (or anything else) on the steep slopes requires expensive retaining walls. Even where roads wide enough to admit vehicles have been built, busses,

fire engines, and garbage trucks have difficulty on the sharp grades. Perhaps most important, the city water system uses low-pressure pipes; pumping water to the higher altitudes strains the system.

Both city and national officials also view the squatter settlements as unsightly and embarrassing, perhaps particularly vis-a-vis foreign visitors. The hillside settlements are clearly visible from almost all parts of the city except some upper-income residential areas and the heart of the downtown business district where tall buildings cut off the view. The more squalid streamside settlements cannot be seen from a distance, but are obvious from several major thoroughfares. As in other developing nations, officials not infrequently have described the settlements as a blight or cancer.

However, both official and public attitudes toward the squatters have probably changed over time. One scholar offered an impressionistic account based in part on an early (1963) survey of attitudes towards squatting, and in part on an analysis of newspapers' handling of the issue. He traced a shift from early concern over law and order, to later concern over aesthetics, to the more recent focus on (assumed) links between widespread squatting and rapid in-migration. (Kwon Tai-joon) The senior planning official in City Hall confirmed that one major reason for the recent crackdown on new squatter construction was desire to discourage the very poor from moving to Seoul. (Prof. Sohn, Jung-mok.) Despite the prevailing view among officials and middle- and upper-class groups that squatting is a public problem, there may be less of a tendency to look down on squatters socially than is the case in many other countries.

2. Past Efforts to Cope With Squatting

Concern over squatting led to sporadic attempts throughout the 1960s to discourage new squatting and to eradicate some of the more squalid areas. Such efforts usually led to protests by the squatters and to criticism of the government in the press, among intellectual and university circles, and in opposition political circles. If the government wished to clear out squatter areas, it was argued, it should make some provision for the displaced households.

This thumbnail history provides a general background to the major policy experiments of 1969 and 1970. During this period, a number of squatter settlements were eradicated; a large number of low-cost apartment buildings were constructed to house some of the displaced families, and many other squatters were encouraged to move some 28 kilometers southeast of Seoul to the new satellite city of Kwanj Ju. The city's experience with each line of action is briefly reviewed below.

Plans for the large-scale construction of low-cost "citizens' apartments" to rehouse squatters had been under consideration for some years, probably since 1966. (Kwon; Korea Times of 8/2/70 and 9/3/70). Construction actually began in 1968 and the bulk of the building was carried out during 1969. In all, 403 buildings with approximately 16,000 apartment units were completed. Due to various problems, including extensive sub-contracting, inadequate supervision, and what is generally conceded to have been large-scale graft, many of the buildings were shoddily constructed. Many were built on the sides or tops of the hills where the cleared squatter settlements had been located; the four and five-story buildings were supported on the downhill side only by thin and inadequately moored pillars. On April 8, 1970, one building collapsed, killing 33 and injuring close to 40 persons. The construction of additional apartments was cancelled, and construction funds diverted to the reinforcing of already-completed buildings. Inquiries led to the prosecution of a number of officials and contractors. Mayor Kim resigned under heavy criticism, and was replaced by Mayor Yang, who continues to hold the office.

While the collapse of one building was the most dramatic and tragic event associated with the citizens' apartments, problems with the apartments had begun before the tragedy and continue to the present. Complaints of rapid deterioration and unsafe conditions have been continuous. (See, for example, the articles in the Korea Times, March 5 and 27, 1971, regarding fresh evidence of cracked walls and other major deterioration.) Moreover, the city government has found that apartment residents are demanding. They are often better organized than most squatter communities (discussions with Yonsei staff), and press the government for repairs and improvements. A survey organized by the city government itself in July 1970 concluded that the apartments tend to concentrate people from particular income groups, thereby encouraging organization of pressure groups. (Korea Times, August 2, 1970.) I was told that the apartment residents voted overwhelmingly for the opposition party in the 1970 elections.

As a measure to relocate squatters, the apartments were also largely unsuccessful. Only the household which claimed primary responsibility for a squatter hut (that is, claimed to have built the hut, or to have purchased it from the original builder) was eligible for relocation in the apartments. Those who rented all or part of a room -- a substantial fraction of all those displaced -- received no assistance at all. Most of those who were assigned apartments found that they could not afford them. The apartment interiors were not finished by the government. Those moving in were expected to put up partition walls within the apartments, to lay flues and flooring for ondol floors, install sinks, and so forth. The costs of finishing the apartments were substantial. Moreover, many families were unable to maintain payments on the apartments, despite subsidized rates and other government concessions (for example, residents were exempted from paying house taxes for two years after moving in). (Korea Times, March 27, 1971). Many families rented part of their space to others. Most of the former squatters eventually moved out. Those who bought their rights to the apartments were usually somewhat better off, and could be described as lower middle class. While a few buildings may have as much as 75 or 80% of their original residents, an unofficial but informed estimate places the ratio of original residents in all the 403 citizens' apartments at roughly 25% of the total population of the buildings. (Brandt .)

In short, the citizens' apartments have been unsuccessful as a means of rehousing squatters, and have been a continuing source of administrative difficulty and political embarrassment for the city government. This experience is not unique to Seoul. In only a few cities have low-cost apartment projects been constructed on a scale similar to Seoul's. Hongkong, Singapore, and the superbloques of Caracas come immediately to mind. Elsewhere smaller programs have been undertaken. (Large-scale projects designed for slightly higher income brackets -- for example, Bogota's Ciudad Kennedy -- are more numerous.) Singapore's program has, by all accounts, been highly successful. But with a per capita income of \$200, Singapore cannot meaningfully be compared to Seoul. Even working class households in Singapore can afford housing well beyond the means of those in the lower 30% of Seoul's income distribution. Caracas' experience with the superbloques -- deterioration, administrative difficulties, political problems -- is in many respects very close to that in Seoul, although as far as I am aware there have not been serious structural problems with the buildings. In the many less ambitious projects, former squatters resettled in apartment units have often been unable to afford even subsidized payments for rent or long-term purchase, or have been able to do so only by sacrificing other items of

expenditure which may objectively be more important -- for example, food, or children's school fees. In general, ex-squatters have been gradually replaced in such apartment complexes by somewhat more comfortable households. Elsewhere, projects originally intended as "low-cost" turn out to attract lower-middle income households from the beginning.

At roughly the same time that the citizens' apartments were being built, the government bought eleven and a half million square meters of land in a rural area about 28 miles south-east of Seoul, to be developed as the first of a series of satellite cities. Richard Coughlin's report describes and assesses the history of Kwang Ju in some detail. For my purposes I need merely summarize the basic points in his account. One of the major purposes of the settlement was to relocate squatters from Seoul itself. With the promise of low-cost land as inducement, large numbers of families, including many displaced by the construction of the citizens' apartments, did move out to the site. Planning during the first phase was inadequate, and the settlers found no water or sewerage facilities, no financial or material assistance for building houses, and worst of all, no employment. Bus service into Seoul was at first both infrequent and slow. Urban facilities and bus service were greatly improved during the second phase of development, dating from the appointment of Mayor Yang. Employment opportunities were eventually generated through attracting a few small industries to locate in Kwang Ju plus jobs created through public and private construction activity. But by this time the great bulk of the original settlers had sold their land and moved back to Seoul. As Coughlin points out, most of those moving back doubled up with friends and relatives in the remaining squatter areas, increasing the crowding in the settlements. (Coughlin, p. 19). Many of those who replaced the original settlers were several rungs higher on the socio-economic ladder, and could be described as middle class. (Coughlin, 21.) Kwang Ju now seems likely to become a thriving satellite community, and is in that sense a success. As a strategy for relocating squatters out of Seoul, however, it is clearly a failure.

As a result of its experience with the citizens' apartments and Kwang Ju, the City Government seems to have set aside both of these approaches to the problem of Seoul's squatter settlements. Large new apartment complexes are planned, but for middle- and upper-income families. Additional satellites may be undertaken later, but they are to be built around existing settlements as nuclei, and, I gathered, will be regarded as a means for decentralizing population in the Seoul Metropolitan Area rather than primarily as a strategy for relocating squatters. (Sohn.)

3. Current Policies Toward Squatter Settlements

Current policy regarding the squatter settlements is three-fold. New squatting is to be vigorously prevented. Some existing squatter areas which meet certain criteria will be upgraded and legalized. Most will be gradually removed, and their residents resettled in newly opened areas on the fringes of the city (but within its present boundaries, that is, peripheral but not satellite settlements). These three programs are described below, and evaluated in Part II of this report.

The energetic and systematic prevention of new squatter construction dates from mid-1970. Local officials and police officers are held responsible for new shacks discovered in their jurisdictions. At the precinct level, more than five new shanties are grounds for disciplinary action. Ward officials are punished if more than fifty new shacks appear in their area. In addition, in some areas the city government threatens to demolish the ten existing squatter shacks nearest to any new shanty. (Korea Time, July 7, 1970.) The appearance of new shacks is monitored by helicopter. (Dean Ro and Gregory Pai.) I was told that the system has proved highly effective in halting further squatter construction. Since new legal housing has continued to be built at a rapid pace, the proportion of squatter to total housing units in the city must have declined since 1970.

The problem remains of what to do about the 120,000 to 168,000 squatters units which were built before the crackdown and still remain. A minority of squatter areas are to be legalized. The criteria for and process of legalization are such that squatters displaced from legalized settlements will outnumber those receiving title and secure tenure. The displaced households, plus all of those living in settlements to be eradicated, are to be resettled somewhere within the city limits. Both legalization and eradication are to be carried out gradually. Most settlements therefore will continue as they are for the near and perhaps the medium-term future.

In order to be eligible for legalization, a settlement must have a minimum of 30 houses. It must be located on land which is available for residential use, that is, which is not reserved for military or other overriding public purposes. (I was not able to determine whether settlements on land originally intended as public park would be eligible.) The site must not exceed an altitude of 100 meters above sea level. Roads and other infrastructure necessary to develop the area must not interfere with the city's development plans. According to an unofficial but informed estimate, perhaps 30% of existing settlements meet these criteria. (Sohn.)

Legalization will involve a number of steps. While many of the details remain to be worked out, the general outlines of the process are clear.

An eligible community must first improve its roads to a minimum width, and construct storm drainage. The residents and the city government are expected to co-operate on these measures. After being informed about the criteria and procedures for legalization through the normal administrative hierarchy and the press, eligible settlements will be encouraged to meet and decide whether they want to work toward legalization. Those choosing to go ahead will request assistance in estimating costs and drawing up plans for the necessary public works. The city will cover, on average, 35% of the total costs of roads, paving, storm drainage, and retaining walls. (If a road, bridge, or other facility serves not only the squatter area but the general public as well, the city may finance a larger share of the costs.) The City contribution will largely take the form of materials. The settlement will pro-rate the remaining estimated costs by household, and decide whether or not it wishes to go ahead. Households may contribute their share of costs in cash or labor. Responsibility for construction will be given to private firms under the supervision of the district (ku) office. Contracts will be let through competitive bidding. (Lee, Young-sik). This community improvement stage of the legalization process ties in closely with the New Community movement being promoted throughout both rural and urban Korea, with the strong endorsement of President Park.

Later stages of the process focus on upgrading the quality of individual lots and houses. Before a settlement can be legalized, each lot must be at least 27 pyongs in size (almost 90 square meters, at 3.3 square meters per pyong). Each house must have floor space of at least 12 pyongs (40 square meters). The house must not occupy more than 60% of the lot. (Sohn.)

These criteria will obviously present grave problems for the squatters. Most lots in squatter areas are less than half the required 27 pyong. I was told that city data based on aerial mapping estimates average lot size in different sections of the city as 13.5 to 20 pyong. (Lee, Young-sik). However, this information may reflect a problem of translation, since the same official stated in an article appearing in Greater Seoul Magazine (Vol. 10, January 1971, p. 8) that out of close to 174,000 squatter lots, 98% were less than 11 pyongs in size. (Source cited by Pai.) This estimate is much closer to what my own observations and that of persons with extensive experience in the squatter areas would regard as accurate.

Most houses are also substantially less than 12 pyong in size. Many might be enlarged, but for the additional requirement that no house should take up more than 60% of the lot on which it stands. The binding constraint, therefore, is lot size rather than house size.

Some few squatters might be able to enlarge their lots, by extending their retaining walls and/or digging back deeper into the mountain slopes. Many of the mountainside lots, however, are on slopes so steep that the costs of expanding in this manner are extremely high, even if it were technically feasible without encroaching on neighbors' lots. On flat land, even this technical possibility does not exist.

One means by which squatters might be able to satisfy the requirements for minimum lot and house size, without violating the additional requirement that the house should not take up more than 60% of the lot on which it stands, would be for two or more squatters to combine their lots and to build and share a new house (or expand the best of the existing ones). Alternatively, some squatters would sell their lots to their neighbors and move out. In any case, a general re-allocation of lots would be necessary both to provide space for necessary community facilities, and to meet the minimum lot size requirements.

Having re-allocated their lots and built the community facilities, most of the community residents who remained in the settlement would have to improve their existing houses or build new ones. A fortunate few might have solidly-built houses, of minimum size or larger, which could remain on their expanded lots purchased from neighbors or extended by building retaining walls. But those whose houses are in the path of community facilities, or who must combine with neighbors to put together a lot of the required size, will have to obtain permits and build new houses. The City Government will simplify and expedite the granting of permits. It will not provide any credit for construction of new houses. (Sohn.)

Once the necessary community facilities have been built and requirements regarding lot and house size are satisfied, the residents (or those remaining in the settlement) may purchase their land from the city. The value of the land will have been appraised before redevelopment, and those seeking title presumably will be charged a price reflecting the pre-development value.

II. Evaluation and Recommendations Specific to Seoul

A. Policy Towards Squatter Settlements

Several important aspects of the Seoul City Government's current three-pronged policy on squatter settlements are realistic and sensible. Particularly realistic is the recognition that efforts to eliminate the settlements in the near future, before incomes of the urban poor have risen enough to permit them to afford better housing, would be unsuccessful, and would cause severe hardship among a large part of the city's population. Willingness to legalize certain of the squatter settlements also represents a substantial concession in principle on the government's part. (In practice, the City has sold land to individual squatters, thus converting them into legal land-owners, in some areas in the past. I have no information on how extensive this practice has been, how prices have been determined, nor what criteria have been used in deciding whether or not particular pieces of city land could be sold.)

However, two of the criteria affecting whether a settlement is eligible to be legalized seem unnecessarily rigid, and sharply limit the scope of possible legalization. Moreover, even in those settlements which are eligible under present criteria, the process of legalization is so complex, lengthy, and costly, and the additional criteria which must be met to complete the process are so demanding that a high proportion of the squatters will be forced to leave their homes. These points are discussed in turn below.

1. Eligibility for legalization.

The decision by the Government of the City of Seoul to legalize some of the squatter settlements grew out of the recognition that eradication without relocation is inhumane and politically risky, while relocation to apartments or out-lying settlements is expensive and likely to be unsuccessful. Some clear and strong conclusions follow from this recognition. Given the (perhaps unfortunate) fact that the settlements exist, the best general solution for the government and for the squatters themselves is to legalize the settlements. Only where a settlement blocks construction of important public facilities, interferes with urgent public uses of the land (for example, defense), or poses an irreparable threat to the health of its residents and the city population, are the human and monetary costs of eradication and resettlement justified. Legalization should not be viewed as an extraordinary concession to be granted only to the select few who can meet strict criteria. Instead, legalization should be regarded as a realistic approach to existing problems for which other policies

have proved ineffective. But legalization is not merely a policy designed to make the best of a bad situation. The development of many of the older hillside settlements in Seoul, as well as experience in other nations (for example, Lima, Peru) indicates that many settlements develop over time into quite acceptable working class residential areas, if their residents are reasonably certain that their investment will not be threatened by eradication or other government actions. In short, officials should not ask, "Is this settlement high-quality enough to merit legalization?" but rather "Are there urgent, compelling, and permanent public reasons why this settlement should not be legalized?"

From this perspective, two of the criteria for eligibility are unnecessarily restrictive.

(a) The requirement that squatter houses must be in clusters of thirty or more in order to be eligible for legalization automatically rules out a high proportion of the city's squatters. The Yonsei Institute estimates that 30% of the squatter units are scattered through the city singly or in small clusters. It is not clear why these units should be ineligible for legalization. The smaller groups may not be able to undertake the elaborate process of legalization outlined in the preceding section. However, I recommend below that this procedure be simplified. Most small clusters of houses or even single units would be able to meet simplified criteria, including cooperation in construction of adequate storm drainage and road access. They could also be required to correct unsanitary conditions or remove fire hazards posing a threat to their neighbors as well as themselves. In some cases this might prove impossible, because of limited space or other technical difficulties, or because the squatters themselves are unwilling or unable to bear a share of the costs. But these instances should be determined case-by-case, rather than ruling out in advance many of the squatter units in the city.

(b) The requirement that settlements must not lie more than 100 meters above sea level in order to be eligible for legalization seems quite unrealistic. I do not have data on the point, but casual inspection suggests that many of the hillside settlements are above the 100 meter line. In general these settlements are better constructed, represent more investment, and are more likely to improve over time than the low-lying streamside settlements. (Low-lying settlements across the Han River in the industrial area of Yong-Dung-Po may be an exception. I did not have an opportunity to visit this area, which includes many squatters.)

It is my strong impression that not only most of the better-developed squatter settlements, but also a great deal of legal housing lies above the 100-meter level. Therefore, I suspect that the 100-meter limit will not be strictly enforced. Even if it is not strictly enforced, however, it may discourage the upgrading of many of the most promising squatter settlements.

To the best of my knowledge, the main reason for the 100 meter limit is the problem of water pressure. Pumping water to the tops of the high hills strains the already-leaky pipes. However, Dr. Perry L. McCarty, Professor of Environmental Engineering at Stanford and also a consultant on the Smithsonian study, informs me that it may be possible to construct water storage tanks so located as to serve some of the high-lying settlements by taking advantage of, rather than combatting, gravity. This technical possibility should most certainly be explored. A more expensive and long-run approach would be replacement of part of the existing water system. This would not be warranted solely in order to permit continued existence of neighborhoods located on the higher hills. But the low-pressure pipes also create other, more serious problems. Dr. William Hall's report states that leakage of approximately 40% permits sewerage to contaminate the water supply. In the long run, therefore, both health and housing considerations might justify the overhaul of part of the water system.

2. The process of legalization

The procedures for legalizing eligible settlements should be designed with several considerations in mind:

- i. Preservation or creation of minimum environmental standards for the neighborhood as a whole and for near-by areas, including provision for sanitation, storm drainage, and fire control.
- ii. Realistic costs to the city.
- iii. Administrative simplicity.
- iv. Realistic costs to the squatters, e. g., costs which the great majority can reasonably be expected to afford, and which most are likely to be willing to bear in return for legal title.

The following paragraphs argue that the City Government's current requirements regarding lot and house size go well beyond the standards necessary for environmental quality, while imposing unrealistic costs and disincentives

on the squatters and a heavy administrative burden on the city government.

It is difficult to understand the reasoning behind the requirement that every lot in a legalized settlement be at least 27 pyong in size. As noted earlier, most squatter lots are a third to a half this size. Most legal lots in conventional working class areas where single-family housing prevails are undoubtedly much smaller than 27 pyongs. Lots of this size are found mostly in upper-middle income neighborhoods. In the past, displaced squatters have been relocated on lots as small as 8 pyong. (Lim Hee-sop, unpublished survey data.)

The City Government seems to rely fairly heavily on the option of two or more families sharing a house. There is nothing wrong in principle with this solution, but very few families have chosen it freely (except in the sense of renting a room from owners or quasi-owners). This suggests that many Korean families have a preference for single-family housing. The preference may be based on the legal and personal problems of joint ownership, or on desire for privacy, or both. It is not obvious what compelling public interests are served by pressing for larger lots and houses sheltering two or three families instead of two smaller houses on the same land area, in the face of private preferences to the contrary. The technical alternatives of multi-story construction utilizes space more efficiently, but also substantially increases construction costs. Moreover, multi-story construction requires much more skill, making it difficult for families with low incomes but willingness to work hard to build their own houses.

Thus far I have argued that the minimum lot and house size standards set by the City Government are unreasonably high in view of prevailing standards in working class neighborhoods in Seoul. Any substantial regulation of lot and house size also greatly increases the cost of legalization for the squatters. In order to meet such requirements, the squatters must tear down their existing houses, thereby losing several years' investment, and must rebuild new houses, without any assistance in the form of low-cost credit. These costs, added to their contributions for necessary neighborhood infrastructure (storm drains, road-widening, etc.) and the cost of purchasing the land from the government, may well mean that most squatters cannot afford the process even if their settlements are eligible.

Dr. Sohn of the Seoul City Government estimated that households earning 20,000 won per month should be able to afford the process. In a different

interview, he stated that roughly 80% of the families in settlements eligible for legalization would be able to bear the expenses. The implication is that about 80% of squatter households, at least in eligible settlements (which may be better off than average) earn at least 20,000 won per month. Yonsei Institute researchers believe, on the basis of not-yet-processed survey data, that average income for squatter households ranges from 15,000 to 25,000 won per month. Roughly a fifth of the households in their sample have monthly incomes below 10,000 won. Another, smaller survey conducted in 1970 (?) found that 63% of the 450 respondents reported their family incomes as less than 20,000 won. (Lim Hee-Sop, unpublished survey data.) Incomes are undoubtedly somewhat higher in mid-1972, as a result of inflation and development, but it seems likely that substantially more than a fifth of all squatter households earn less than 20,000 won monthly. *

I would have liked to learn more about the basis on which capacity to pay was calculated. Yonsei Institute staff indicated that many City and National government planners use a rule of thumb of 20% of income available for housing expenditures. (Pai.) EPB family income and expenditure data show that the average wage-earning household (which earned close to 28,000 won per month, and excluded squatters) spent only about 16% of its income on housing in 1970. (op cit., p. 59). While detailed data by income bracket is not available for Seoul separately, EPB data for households in all cities shows that families earning between 12,000 and 20,000 won per month in 1970 spent less than 6% of their monthly income on housing. (ibid, p. 64.) Even allowing for the fact that the average household spends much more on housing in Seoul than in all cities in Korea taken jointly (compare pages 59 and 64 in the EPB survey), the 20% rule-of-thumb still may exceed what most low-income families can afford to spend on housing and related costs (e.g., contributions to community improvements) without cutting into the budget for food and other necessities.

* The estimates of Pai and Toun of the Yonsei Institute, and the survey findings of Lim Hee-Sop and his associates (Professors Lee Hae-young and Lee Hong-koo of Seoul National University) are roughly consistent with income and wage data for 1970 reported by the Economic Planning Board and the Korean Industrial Development Research Institute. The EPB 1970 Report on the Family Income and Expenditure Survey found that average income for wage-earning households in Seoul was 27,720 won per month. (p. 59). The survey specifically excluded squatter households, which could be expected to have incomes well below the average. These data should, of course, be adjusted upward for 1972 equivalents.

In order to gauge ability to pay, information is needed not only on what most squatters can afford to spend on housing each month, but also on how much the process of legalization would cost. Any such estimate would be extremely difficult to develop, since costs will vary with the assessed value of the land in different settlements, the amount and technical difficulty of infrastructure required, the proportion of infrastructure costs the government is willing to finance, and (for individual squatters) lot size and the extent of expansion or new construction necessary for their houses to meet city requirements. Moreover, the burden is reduced if payments are stretched out over a number of years.

Nonetheless, several conclusions seem clear. Few squatters can afford to spend more on housing and related expenses than they do already. A substantial fraction -- surely more than a fifth -- earn less than the minimum income the city government believes will support the costs of legalization. Therefore any requirements which add to the cost of the legalization process are justified only if they are truly necessary. Current requirements for minimum lot and house size cannot be so justified.

Thus far I have argued that the current requirements regarding lot and house size are unnecessary for environmental quality, and increase the costs borne by the squatters. The requirements may also discourage the community agreement and co-operation necessary for improvement of neighborhood facilities and infrastructure. The 27-pyong requirement will force out of the settlements all families which cannot afford to buy out their neighbors and rebuild their house, or are unwilling to double up with their neighbors and accept the loss of privacy and the complications of sharing a house. These effects must be obvious to the squatters themselves. Therefore the requirements create a division of interests between the most wealthy squatters and their less-well-off neighbors. It is hard to imagine a majority of neighborhood residents voluntarily co-operating with such a process. In other words, the minimum house and lot size criteria may well sabotage the earlier phases of legalization by deterring co-operation on improved community facilities. Far from promoting an up-graded community, the requirements may impede the modest community improvements which are truly necessary.

A fourth and final criticism of the attempt to regulate lot and house size is the administrative burden such regulation entails. The city government is already hard-pressed to cope with the many problems caused by

Seoul's rapid growth. It seems unwise to take on a substantial additional burden of inspection and regulation. If such regulation is in fact only occasionally enforced, the effect is to create the impression of an arbitrary and unpredictable government.

I would strongly urge the Government of the City of Seoul to reconsider its requirements for minimum lot and house size. Instead, I would urge that the Government pursue vigorously its plans to work in co-operation with squatter neighborhoods to correct the most important community deficiencies of sanitation, drainage, and access. Once a neighborhood has completed these improvements, every household in the settlement (with the exception of those renting space from others) should be eligible to purchase from the city, on easy terms, the lot on which its house stands. Some of the squatters will not be able or willing to purchase title. No serious public problem is created by their continuing to live as squatters, once the community facilities have been up-graded. However, if the government wants to exert some pressure towards legalization, it could declare a generous time limit--perhaps twenty years--at the end of which a household would have to begin paying for its land or sell to others willing to do so.

For many squatters, the prospect of clear title will encourage energetic efforts to improve the quality of their houses. In the long run, as productivity and incomes rise, many ex-squatters may decide to move elsewhere. Some will sell to their neighbors, who may then end up with larger lots and houses, moving toward the higher-quality housing which the City Government would like to see. Where location, terrain, and zoning regulations permit, some lots may be sold to persons planning to establish stores or productive enterprises. In short, legalization will encourage squatters to invest in their houses, and will also leave land use to market forces within the guidance provided by zoning regulations .

Any exchange of former squatter land could, of course, be subject to such taxes as the government felt appropriate to impose. In particular, where legalization greatly increases the value of the land, resulting in windfall profits to the seller, the government may want to recoup these profits through taxation. While tax evasion is admittedly a problem, enforcing sales taxes should not create a more severe administrative burden than enforcing lot and house size regulations on tens of thousands of squatter units.

3. Relocation of displaced squatters.

If the above recommendations were adopted, far fewer squatters would be displaced than under current plans. A substantially higher proportion of all

squatter units would be eligible for legalization. And fewer households would be forced out of their communities by the process of legalization itself.

However, there would still remain some settlements which must be eradicated, and some squatters from eligible settlements unable or unwilling to bear the costs of legalization. The City Government has plans to offer displaced squatters improved lots in newly opened outlying districts of the city at subsidized prices. This approach will meet the needs of some, but far from all, dislocated squatters. Some young couples with no or few children may not want to invest at this point in their lives in a lot and construction of a house. Persons with steady jobs near their present houses may be reluctant to move to a distant section from which they must commute two or more hours daily. Laborers without steady jobs may want to remain near areas offering a flow of short-term jobs. Venders and small entrepreneurs may want to remain near their established suppliers and customers. In all of these cases it makes more sense for the household to rent a room than to settle on a distant lot.

Such households will probably do as the ex-squatters relocated to Kwang-Ju, the citizen's apartments, and newly -opened outlying areas of the city did: they will sell the rights to their lots and use the proceeds for alternative arrangements better fitted to their circumstances. Most will use the money for the chonsei (lump-sum rental) payment required by most landlords for a rented room.



There are both advantages and drawbacks to offering a single form of assistance to displaced squatters, even though the government knows that many will probably sell their lots and convert their rights into a different and preferred form of assistance.

From the point of view of the displaced squatters, those who would prefer to rent a room rather than use their lot may be happy with the arrangement if the price for which they sell their new lots is higher than the subsidized price they must pay the government. In this case, resources over and above what the government has provided are being transferred to some of the former squatters from private buyers of their lots. The squatters gain; the private buyers presumably gain because they are willing to pay the (higher) price to get the lot; and the government does not lose anything except the subsidy it had already committed to the displaced squatters. However, if the squatters find they can sell only at a reduced price (perhaps because the second-generation buyers believe the government will insist on their paying for the lots on harder terms or over a shorter period, as was attempted at Kwang Ju), then those ex-squatters who prefer to rent a room rather than to build a house on the outskirts of the city will receive, in effect, less assistance than the government was willing to give them.

From the point of view of the Government, the most obvious advantage of a single form of assistance is administrative simplicity. The Government administers only one program for displaced squatters, and lets those dissatisfied with this form of assistance make their own arrangements to convert it into forms more suitable to their individual circumstances. However, offering assistance only in the form of subsidized lots may be more expensive for the government than would be a more flexible range of assistance designed to offer displaced squatters a choice of programs suited to different kinds of needs and circumstances. Those ex-squatters who prefer to rent a room in the vicinity of their former neighborhood basically need assistance with the chonsei payment. If the price for which the government can obtain land and provide water and drainage facilities is a good deal higher than the price which they can realistically ask the squatters to pay in view of their limited incomes -- in other words, if the subsidy involved in providing lots to ex-squatters is large -- then it might be cheaper to offer those squatters who preferred to rent rooms a loan program which would reduce the cost to them of making the necessary chonsei payment. Since low-income households cannot easily save enough for the very substantial lump-sum expenditure required, normally their only course is to borrow money at very high interest rates. A government credit program could ease this problem. It would work as follows: ex-squatters who did not want to build on an outlying lot could receive, instead, a form entitling them to apply for a low-interest loan to cover a chonsei payment.

The size of the loan might be fixed, or adjustable depending of the size of the ex-squatter's family, or on his income. The lending agency would provide the chonsei payment to the landlord or his agent. The ex-squatter would be responsible for repaying the lending agency, in fixed monthly installments covering principal and a low rate of interest. Since the interest rate would be below the market rate for loans of this kind, a subsidy would be involved, but the amount might well be less than that required to provide cheap lots with water and drainage facilities. If an ex-squatter defaulted on his payments, the lending agency would recover the chonsei deposit from the landlord, who would evict the tenant. Although such a program would require careful design, it seems likely that the administrative difficulties involved would not be greater than those of collecting payments on lots from former squatters relocated in fringe areas of the city.

Whether or not this specific suggestion makes sense, the broader point remains. A great many households will be displaced from eradicated settlements, perhaps as many as 80,000 or more. Clearly not all of these households will wish to settle in fringe areas of the city, nor will it be in their own interests or the interests of the city to encourage them to do so. If the only form of assistance offered is subsidized lots, many of the displaced households will sell their lots. The City Government should consider whether it would be in its own and/or the displaced squatters' interests to provide some choice of alternative forms of assistance.

One further point regarding displaced households should be made. In the late 1960s, when settlements were eradicated and squatters were relocated in the Citizens' Apartments or in Kwang Ju, the status of those who had been renting a shack, or a room or part of a room in another squatter's house, was quite unclear. I have been told that many of these people received no assistance whatsoever. Partly as a result of this, coupled with the crackdown on new squatting, a large number of households -- the Yonsei Institute estimates as many as 40,000 -- currently have no regular residence whatsoever. Some build shacks and live in them until they are knocked down by the police; some double up with friends or relatives for as long as they are tolerated. Many of these households presumably earn no regular income; assisting them probably requires a straight welfare expenditure. Some, however, might earn a regular but small income. These families and others like them who may be displaced in the future from settlements being eradicated, form an additional category of households which might be substantially assisted by a government credit program designed to help them convert the lump-sum chonsei payment into small monthly installments.

B. Development of Institutional Capacity to Analyze Problems of Squatters and Design Appropriate Policies.

The Yonsei Institute of Urban Studies and Development has been conducting excellent work in collection and analysis of data designed to improve understanding of squatters' problems and to help the City and national governments design appropriate policies. If AID decides to support a diversified program to alleviate problems of Seoul's rapid growth, some support for the continued work of the Institute might be one appropriate component of such a program.

The Urban Planning Department of the Graduate School of Public Administration at Seoul National University also has many staff members interested in problems of urban development, in close contact with the relevant City and national government agencies. With one or two outstanding exceptions, however, there is virtually no interest in this department in problems of squatter settlements and more generally the urban environment as it affects low-income people. Since a large part of Seoul's population is and will remain poor for some decades to come, the department might be encouraged to broaden its interests to encompass not only urban design and engineering in the conventional architectural and planning senses, but also the design of gradually improved environments for her low-income groups. In order to do this, the Department might have to broaden its curriculum (or co-operate with other departments) to include analysis of legal, social, and economic problems which it now ignores.

Both the Yonsei Institute and the Planning Department at SNU (broadened along the lines suggested) might be encouraged to offer workshops on problems of squatters and low-income neighborhoods for city and national officials. These should be designed for exchange of information and ideas, not as short courses, since the problems are not the kind on which academic staff can offer well-tested theory and methodology.

C. Research on Migration

Turning from the problem of squatters to trends in migration: it is probably impossible to predict the volume of migration into Seoul during the next decade or two. However, carefully designed research can greatly improve understanding of the most important factors affecting migration. Such research could also point to policies which might be most effective in reducing in-migration, if the government believes this is desirable.

Two examples of research focussed so as to produce results relevant to policy are outlined below.

1. A two- or three-stage study of the impact of farm mechanization on demand for agricultural labor, and more broadly on demand for rural labor. As a first step, such a study would identify the areas of the country where small tractors and other farm machinery have begun to be used. What economic and social features seem to be characteristic of such areas? Having determined what kinds of rural situations seem most likely to mechanize fairly rapidly, several test areas should be selected which exhibit these characteristics, and are small enough to monitor thoroughly. In each area, baseline data should be gathered on the extent and nature of farm mechanization, the economic and social characteristics of farmers using small tractors, and their reasons for adopting such equipment. These data constitute the independent variables. Data should also be gathered on variables assumed to be influenced by mechanization, e.g., the structure of employment, wage levels, family incomes, and the volume and pattern of out-migration at the time of the initial baseline study. The same independent and dependent factors should then be examined two years later, and perhaps again after four years, to assess the effects of mechanization. A research project along these lines would contribute not only to understanding of rural-to-urban migration trends and therefore the realism of city planning efforts, but also to knowledge of rural economic and social change and therefore to capacity to plan for healthy rural development.

2. A purposive survey of migrants already in the city, designed to explore differences in motivations and in adjustment among different categories of migrants. Such a survey would not be designed so as to sample a representative cross-section of all migrants, as have several previous surveys. Rather, it would select particular types of migrants, in order to conduct a detailed and statistically significant analysis of their motivations, controlling for various background factors which might be partly responsible

for observed differences among groups. Possible categories of migrants should include young single men and women, young heads of households migrating with their nuclear families (or moving in advance but planning to bring their families to join them in a short time), and older heads of households (say, over 35 years of age at the time of migration). Within each category, the sample should include some migrants with high school education or more, and others with no more than elementary education. Each category should also include migrants from rural, town (eup) and city (shi) origins. The survey should include not only questions regarding why the migrants decided to move, but also the conditions (if any) under which they might have been willing not to move (or to move someplace other than Seoul).

As I indicated earlier, I am not at all certain that "too many" migrants are coming to Seoul. Nor am I convinced that it is desirable or possible to reduce the volume of migration for the nation as a whole, or to divert it from Seoul to other places. However, a purposive survey of the type described would provide a much fuller understanding of why different types of migrants come to Seoul, and how they fare after arrival. This in turn would permit an informed judgment on whether it would be either desirable or feasible to try to reduce or divert the flow of some types of migrants.

A third more general suggestion for research grows out of general knowledge of trends in thinking about urbanization, rather than from specific field work in Korea. Both in Korea and elsewhere there is growing interest in the possibility of encouraging less concentrated patterns of urbanization, by promoting the growth of smaller cities and thereby -- it is hoped -- diverting the migration from the largest centers like Seoul and Pusan. Interest in this idea and, in some cases, policy intended to implement it has far outrun solid information on whether the idea is either feasible or desirable.

A great many assumptions lie behind the idea. For example, it is assumed that it is cheaper to provide urban facilities and services for additional population in small cities than in large ones. It is assumed that problems of unemployment may be less acute in smaller cities. It is assumed that problems of social adjustment and, perhaps, of political unrest will be less acute in smaller cities. But in no country of which I am aware have any of these assumptions been systematically tested, with the partial exception of the first. (There are some inconclusive studies which try to relate incremental costs of various types of facilities and services to city size. The studies find that some facilities and services are cheaper in smaller cities, but others are more expensive.)

Before the Korean government (presumably the national government, on an issue of this scope) becomes committed to a policy of promoting the growth

of smaller cities, the possible costs and benefits of such a program should be carefully examined. One aspect bearing particularly close examination is the assumption that more rapid growth of other cities might divert some migrants from Seoul. It is equally plausible that more rapid economic expansion and improved urban facilities in smaller cities would simply attract more migrants from surrounding areas into these centers, without diminishing the flow into Seoul.

III. Broader Principles Growing Out of the Seoul Case Study

1. Richard Coughlin's report states clearly and emphatically his concern that planning concepts emphasizing architectural design, engineering standards, and somewhat rigid land-use planning may be applied uncritically in the future development of Seoul, although these concepts are increasingly regarded as inadequate in Europe and the United States. I share his concern. The danger exists not only in Seoul but in most developing countries. The immediate risk is greater in Seoul precisely because the city and national governments are energetic, well-organized, and staffed with well-trained people many of whom received their professional educations abroad, and because the economy is dynamic enough to support ambitious public and private development and redevelopment schemes.

2. In the United States during the 1950s, these planning concepts bore particularly heavily on the urban poor. In many cities large areas were cleared and redeveloped, replacing low-income housing with housing and facilities designed for the upper middle class. The dislocated low-income families were mostly left to find such housing as was available and within their means in other neighborhoods.

In developing countries, attitudes toward the squatter settlements are analagous to the sense of distaste, embarrassment, or shame felt by many American urbanites toward slum areas. Indeed, the feelings may be stronger in developing countries, because the squatter settlements are larger and ^{more} visible, are illegal, and are constant reminders of the gap between international (ideal) standards and the country's current state of development.

3. Therefore, foreign advisors on environmental improvement bear a special responsibility to make sure their recommendations do not imply, and cannot be construed to imply, endorsement of programs and policies which improve the "environment" at the expense of the poorest and politically least influential groups.

4. With respect to squatter settlements specifically, advisors could play a constructive role encouraging officials, scholars, journalists and others with whom they may have contact to regard the settlements as a natural response to rapid urban growth and the difficulties of providing conventional housing which can be afforded by working class people at early and intermediate stages of development. Many of the squatters are law-abiding, hard-working, and socially stable people who are willing to invest their scant leisure time and scantier savings in construction of a home, as rapidly as their circumstances permit. Others live in squatter settlements in order to save money for goals they regard as more important than clean plaster walls or individually-piped water -- often schooling for their children, or investment in a small business.

Therefore, schemes which provide higher-quality housing at the cost of spending a higher proportion of family income on housing, or on terms which require fixed periodic payments rather than sporadic investment which can be adjusted to unsteady income flows and competing expenditures (such as school fees, medicine, etc.), may actually reduce welfare and impede the process of economic integration into the city. The evidence of this is the tendency, in most cases where squatters have been moved into low-cost apartments, to default on payments and/or sell and move out.

In other words, from the viewpoint of the squatters, so-called "decent" housing is only one of their needs, It is not so important that all other needs should be sacrificed to it. From the viewpoint of the development of the city as a whole, the problem of squatter settlements must be regarded not only as a problem of city planning, land use, and low-cost housing, but also as an important aspect of the process of economic integration.

5. Squatting clearly does pose problems for orderly urban development, and squatting on private land infringes the owners' rights. Officials should be encouraged to consider how to ease and eventually solve these problems, without feeling undue embarrassment, concern, or indignation over the phenomenon of squatting in and of itself. This calls for systematic and dispassionate analysis of the varieties of settlements, the characteristics of the residents in different types of settlements, the economic and social functions served by the settlements for their residents and possibly for other parts of the urban society, and the design of policies based on this information. The work undertaken by the Yonsei Institute of Urban Studies and Development is a good example of the kind of detailed analysis required.

6. In all cities where there is widespread squatting, some settlements will have to be eradicated because they block the development of needed infrastructure, are inherently unsafe, (located, for example, in river beds subject to flooding, on hillsides subject to landslides, or next to sewerage disposal areas) or represent a blatantly irrational or uneconomic use of particular land sites. Since squatter settlements usually house a variety of people in different stages in their life cycle, different income levels, and different employment situations, there is no reason to believe that a single relocation program will be appropriate to their varied needs. One realistic approach is to design several different options which would meet a variety of circumstances. Alternatively, if a single form of assistance is offered, governments should recognize and accept the fact that some of the relocated squatters will devise ways to convert this form of assistance into alternative forms which they prefer.

7. The work of John Turner and others during the past decade has led an increasing number of specialists in developed and modernizing nations who are concerned with problems of urban development to recognize the functions of squatting, and to accept the goal of legalization for at least some settlements. The case of Seoul suggests a problem growing out of this step forward: the tendency to try to take back with the left hand what the right hand has just given away. In other words, having reluctantly conceded the inevitability, perhaps the limited desirability, of legalizing some areas, officials concerned with maintaining "adequate standards" may insist on unrealistic requirements for legalization. Such requirements are likely to sabotage much of the original rationale for legalization: If only the richest of the squatters can afford to stay the course, and the remainder are forced out, why embark on the trip at all? Unrealistic standards have two additional drawbacks. They obscure and divert attention from analysis of the problems which really do require governmental action. In the case of Seoul, the unrealistic 100-meter requirement diverts attention from consideration of

how to cope with the serious problem of low-pressure pipes. Secondly, unrealistic regulations offer new opportunities for corruption, in societies where corruption is already widespread,

8. Concern over migration into the cities of the developing countries is partly analagous to concern over squatting. Migration, even more clearly than squatting, is an inevitable concomitant of economic and social development. Furthermore, like squatting, migration usually increases the welfare of the people concerned and facilitates their entrance into more modern and productive economic and social levels of society. In both cases, what is important is to identify as precisely as possible in what sense and to what degree the processes are "problems". In the case of migration, the goal should be to try to link identified "problems" as closely as possible to particular types of migration or migrants, as a first step toward devising means to ease or solve the problems. As long as the "problem" is equated with a broad and varied process, neither research nor policies are likely to be effective.

ATTACHMENT I: SOURCES

I. Books, articles, studies

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Brandt, Vincent. Anthropologist.

Han, Bae Ho, Department of Political Science and Asiatic Research Center, Korea University

Hong, Sung-chick, Department of Sociology and Asiatic Research Center, Korea University

Kwon, Tai-Joon, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, GSPA, Seoul National University

Lee, Hae-young, Department of Sociology and Director, Population and Development Studies Center, Seoul National University

Lee, Hong-koo, Department of Political Science and Population and Development Studies Center, Seoul National University

Lee, Hyo-jae, Department of Sociology, Ehwa University

Lee, Man-Gap, Department of Sociology, Seoul National University

Lee, Young-sik, Chief, Housing Control Division, Seoul City Government

Lim, Hee-sop, Department of Sociology and Asiatic Research Center, Korea University

Pai, Gregory, Institute of Urban Studies and Development, Yonsei University

Ro, Chung-Nyün, Director, Institute of Urban Studies and Development, Yonsei University

Sohn, Yung-mok, Coordinator of Planning, Seoul City Government

Yoon, Jong-joo, Department of Sociology, Seoul Women's College

Youn, Hong-taek, Institute of Urban Studies and Development, Yonsei University

IV. Conversations useful in providing information on specific points or directing me to additional sources

Adelman, Irma, Development Research Center, World Bank

Casey, Ann, Principal of a nursery school serving both wealthy Korean children and scholarship students from a squatter area near the school. Miss Casey was thoroughly acquainted with the parents of her students and with other residents of the settlement.

Choe, Sang Chul, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, GSPA, Seoul National University

Henthorn, William, Korean Studies Center, University of Hawaii

Hunter, Dallas, Division of Public Administration, USAID/Seoul

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Kim, Jun-yop, Director, Asiatic Research Center, Korea University

Kim, Woon-Tai, Dean, Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University

Morrow, Robert, Division of Rural Development, USAID/Seoul

Paige, Glenn, Social Science Research Institute, University of Hawaii

Sedjo, Robert, Economics Division, USAID/Seoul

Watkins, Ralph, Director, ECOTECH advisory group to the Korean Ministry of Agriculture (working on prospects for mechanization of agriculture)

Wright, Edward, Director, Fulbright House

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Summary

Migration, Integration of Migrants, and the Problem of Squatter Settlements in Seoul, Korea

by Joan Marie Nelson

The author focussed on the relationship of economics and migration in Seoul, and on present and planned policies and programs for squatters. After setting forth findings, an evaluation of measures aimed at squatters is made, and, finally, general principles emerge from the case study.

Between 1960 and 1970, contribution of in-migration accounted for increasing amounts of Seoul's total population, approaching an average rate of 1000 persons per day, corresponding to over 80% of the growth. Since 1970, the rate has apparently slowed because of slackening construction and worker demand, strict prohibitions on new squatter housing, and better jobs and wages in rural areas. But in-migrants also have non-economic motives-especially better education - and many come from other urban centers. Seoul's migrants are well educated compared to other developing nations, although not as educated as Seoul residents.

The nation's extraordinary industrial growth rate during 1960-70 (Approx. 20%/year) absorbed the flow of migrants, and wages increased during 1967-70 by 38% per year. Until the recent recession, unemployment or under-employment were not problems. A trend to capital intensive production and slower economic growth could generate unemployment. National planners may need to give this problem more explicit attention in the future.

There are an estimated 168,000 squatter dwellings in Seoul, or 28% of the 597,000 housing units (1970 census). Roughly 120,000 were estimated to lack land title, while others are illegal because of faulty construction or are not registered. 30% of the squatter houses are scattered singly or in small clusters throughout the city, and the remainder are concentrated either at river edge locations or on the steep, rocky hills in the city. The hill settlements are usually in better condition and more stable than the river edge shanties. Most squatting is on public land, including planned sites for roads and parks.

Past attempts to cope with squatters have been unsuccessful. 16,000 low-cost apartment units were built, but very poorly: one building collapsed and others are deteriorating. Occupants became politically active and voted with the opposition party in 1970. Costs of finishing the units (born by the relocated squatter) were high, and many of the former squatters moved out. As a strategy for relocating squatters out of Seoul, Kwang-ju was also a failure. There were insufficient jobs, public transportation to Seoul was initially entirely inadequate and water and sewers were not hooked up. The result was that many former squatters returned to Seoul.

Current policy toward squatter settlements has three prongs:

(i.) New squatter construction is prohibited, and the prohibition is vigorously and successfully enforced. (ii.) Some squatter settlements will be legalized. Under current criteria, roughly 30% of the existing squatter housing is eligible for legalization. Eligible communities will first improve their storm drainage and widen their roads, with some assistance from the City government. They must then reallocate and consolidate lots so as to satisfy City requirements of minimum lot size. The City requires lots roughly two to three times larger than the average in existing settlements. Therefore more than half the residents will have to sell out, or double up with neighbors. Existing houses will also have to be remodeled or replaced to conform to City requirements. Having met these conditions, each resident will be permitted to purchase the land on which his house stands from the government. (iii.) Squatter settlements not eligible for legalization will eventually be eradicated and their residents relocated. The city plans to move as gradually as possibly on eradication.

The report recommends certain changes in the legalization scheme.

(i.) Small clusters of squatter dwellings are ineligible for legalization under present criteria. At least 30% of squatter housing is ruled out by this criterion. If legalization is the best realistic policy (though perhaps not an ideal solution) then small clusters of squatter housing, or even individual units, should be eligible unless there are strong reasons to the contrary. (ii.) Settlements located on hills over 100 meters above sea level are not eligible under current criteria. This excludes many of the most promising squatter areas. The major reason for the regulation is the difficulty of pumping water to the higher settlements. Alternative solutions to this problem are recommended.

The report also recommends streamlining the legalization process by abandoning the effort to control lot and house size. Unlike the requirements for storm drainage and road access, these controls are not necessary for minimum community environmental standards. They add substantially to the costs of legalization borne by the squatters, and will therefore increase the proportion who will not be able to afford legalization even if their communities are eligible. (The City estimates that 20% will be unable to afford the process, but other data suggests that a much higher proportion will be forced out.) Insistence on high minimum lot and house sizes will also sabotage community cooperation necessary to carry out needed community improvements, and will create a division of interests between wealthier and poorer squatters. Finally, the planned regulations impose a heavy enforcement burden on the already overloaded city government.

If these recommendations were adopted, legalization would require only two steps: construction of necessary community improvements, and individual purchase of land from the government.

With respect to squatters displaced from eradicated settlements, and those from communities eligible for legalization who cannot or do not wish to purchase title, the report recommends provision of alternative forms of assistance in addition to removal to a lot in the outlying sections of the city. Some squatters might prefer a low-cost loan to finance the chonsei payment for rented quarters. Such loans might be less costly to the city than providing all displaced squatters with lots.

Recommendations are also made regarding development of institutional capacity to analyze problems of squatting and to design appropriate policies.

Two research projects are suggested to improve information on migration into Seoul. The first concerns the effects upon migration of farm mechanization, which can be expected to spread rapidly in the next decade. The second study would use a purposive sample, rather than a stratified random sample, to study the motivations and experience of specific categories of migrants into the city. The categories would be selected because they pose policy problems, and would not be a representative cross-section of the migrant population as a whole. More research on the costs and benefits of encouraging the growth of medium-sized cities is also urged, before any decisions are made to embark on such a policy.

Broad principles emerging from the study are as follows:

1. Desire for modernization, orderly growth, and high aesthetic standards may lead to over-emphasis on architectural design, engineering standards, and rigid land use planning. Urban redevelopment programs in the United States during the 1950s, undertaken in the name of more attractive and healthful cities, dislocated large numbers of low-income families without providing realistic alternatives for their accommodation. Some attitudes in Seoul are similar enough to those in the United States in the 1950s to cause concern that serious American mistakes may be repeated in Korea. Other developing nations may have similar tendencies.
2. Desire to maintain high standards should not be used to justify unrealistically rigid standards for legalizing squatter settlements. Unrealistic criteria not only sabotage legalization programs, but also divert attention from more realistic problems, and may unintentionally encourage corruption and evasion of the laws.

3. The problem of squatter settlements should not be regarded solely as a problem of city planning and low-cost housing. Squatting--e.g., rent-free housing--is an important element in the economic and social integration of low-income people into the city. Many squatter families will be worse off, not better off, if they are provided better housing so located as to jeopardize their ability to earn a living, or at rents which must be paid regularly and constitute a substantial proportion of their income. In other words, relocation schemes are costly to the squatters as well as to the city. Programs can be designed which will alleviate some of the specific problems caused by squatting, such as risk of fire or important health hazards, without extensive eradication and relocation. Where relocation is necessary to free land for urgent public uses, relocation provisions should be flexible, to meet varying life circumstances of different households. Legalization schemes should concentrate on upgrading community facilities and environment, and should not attempt to regulate individual lots and houses. In newly forming settlements, however, regulations on lot size (density) are desirable, if administrative mechanisms are capable of enforcing such regulations.

4. Both migration and squatting are simple labels for complex phenomena. Some aspects of squatting, and some aspects of migration, do cause problems which government must address. But much migration, and some squatting, is on balance desirable in terms of developmental goals. The first step toward realistic policy is to identify as precisely as possible the aspects or categories of migration and squatting which pose serious problems. Appropriate policies can then be designed to address these narrower, more manageable problems.