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# 11

## **Contemporary Mexico: A Structural Analysis of Urban Caciquismo**

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This chapter seeks to analyze a particular type of political leadership frequently encountered in urban squatter settlements in Mexico and other Latin American countries, with a view toward illustrating the importance of local-level leadership to an understanding of how political attitudes are formed in Latin American urban environments. The data on which this analysis is based were gathered as part of a larger study of political implications of rapid urbanization in Latin America, both in terms of individual attitude formation among rural-to-urban migrants and of governmental responses to the urbanization process at the level of the urban political system.<sup>1</sup> The theoretical perspective adopted for this study directs special attention to a variety of structural and situational variables relating to the low-income settlement zones in which most migrants to the city reside and which might be expected to impinge significantly upon processes of "political learning" at the level of the individual. It was in this particular context that intensive research on patterns of local-level political leadership was undertaken.<sup>2</sup>

Leadership represents one of several types of linkages between community-level and individual-level phenomena which may be of particular importance in explaining the impact of certain types of urban dwelling environments on patterns of political attitudes and behavior in such areas. Most research on political leadership in Latin America to date has been confined to studies of a small number of elites or individual leaders operating at the national level.<sup>3</sup> In recent years there has been greater attention to the study of local power distributions in Latin American cities, taking the form of attempts to apply the various techniques of leadership identification developed in research on community power structures in the United States.<sup>4</sup> Only rarely has there been any attention to leadership phenomena at the neighborhood or subcommunity level.

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One study has analyzed the distribution of community power within a specific squatter settlement;<sup>5</sup> others have compared leaders and followers in such areas in terms of basic value orientations, participant orientations, and demographic characteristics.<sup>6</sup> These studies have given little or no attention to the *structural* aspects of leadership—the nature of leader-follower relationships, relationships between leaders and supralocal political actors, bases of leadership influence, and so forth—which are most relevant to an assessment of effects of leadership behavior upon individual attitude formation.<sup>7</sup>

Yet anyone who does extended fieldwork in squatter settlements or related types of low-income settlement zones in a Latin American city cannot fail to be impressed by the importance of leadership differences in accounting for variations in the “developmental trajectories” of such settlements. There appear to be strong relationships between leadership performance and differences in the outcomes of demand-making experiences, the length of time needed to accomplish certain developmental objectives, the quality of relationships maintained between a settlement and political and governmental agencies, and the level of internal organization within a settlement over time.<sup>8</sup> It is evident that leadership is one of the most important factors affecting the capacity of such settlements to alter their economic, social, and political environments; and there is also reason to believe that it may be an important source of variance in individual attitudinal and behavioral patterns in such areas.

It is possible to undertake a comparative study of leadership patterns across a number of low-income settlement zones within a given city, due to the relatively high degree of internal differentiation into urban subcommunities which is characteristic of large cities in most Latin American countries. Indeed, the most accurate sociological conception of the modern Latin American city seems to be that of an agglomeration of such metropolitan subunits. These settlement zones—particularly those formed by means of illegal land invasions—tend to possess in abundance “the common values, mutual duties, obligations, responsibilities, and benefits normally associated with a ‘community.’”<sup>9</sup> Thus we may study a low-income residential zone not merely as a fragment of the larger urban society and polity, but as an ecologically and sociologically distinct urban subcommunity, which constitutes a meaningful and highly salient reference group to most of its inhabitants. Each settlement has its own set of developmental needs and problems to be dealt with and its own history of relationships with supralocal political actors and institutions.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, it is in the context of the interaction of these settlements with political and governmental agencies that most of the political learning experience of their inhabitants is obtained.<sup>11</sup> Thus there is little question that the low-income settlement zone in most Latin American cities constitutes a meaningful social context for the study of patterns of political leadership and their attitudinal and behavioral consequences.

In the larger study from which the present analysis results, data were

gathered in six of the numerous low-income settlement zones, or *colonias proletarias*, on the periphery of the Mexico City metropolitan area. It is these peripheral zones which have served as the primary receiving areas for migrants from the countryside over the past two decades. Three of the settlement zones included in my study were squatter settlements formed by means of illegal occupation of privately or publicly owned land; another originated as a low-income subdivision (*fraccionamiento*) laid out by a commercial land developer; another was created by the government as a public housing project; and another area included in the study might best be categorized as a new resettlement area—basically a government squatter settlement—formed as a consequence of mass evictions of low-income families from central-city slum zones eradicated by the city government.<sup>12</sup> Given my interest in making comparisons across a number of significantly different types of urban dwelling environments, the settlement zones chosen for inclusion in the study were selected for the maximum range of variation in such theoretically relevant variables as access to basic urban services (“level of urbanization,” in the Latin American use of the term) and type of origin (i.e., the form of occupation or creation of the settlement zone, whether by illegal land invasion, commercial subdivision, or governmental initiative). These two variables in particular tend to be good predictors, in the Mexican context, of the relative richness of the set of politically relevant learning experiences to which the average resident of a low-income settlement zone has been exposed. They also appear to be somewhat predictive of the types of political leadership likely to emerge in such settings.

The particular pattern of leadership described below was encountered in three of the six areas studied in Mexico City (all squatter settlements), either at the time of the study or at some point in their previous history. A variant of this pattern was also observed in the large public housing project included in the study. The low-income subdivision or *fraccionamiento* which was studied has not exhibited this pattern of leadership, nor has the government resettlement zone. Close observance of several other settlements bordering those included in the study, as well as extensive documentary research and visits to many more *colonias proletarias* throughout the Mexico City metropolitan area led me to the conclusion that the leadership pattern described here is one of those prevalent in Mexican low-income urban environments.<sup>13</sup>

#### CACIQUISMO AS A PATTERN OF LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

In Spanish-speaking countries the term *cacique* is often applied to any individual who is thought to exert an excessive influence on local politics. However, the *cacique* can be defined with greater precision as “a strong and autocratic leader in local and/or regional politics whose characteristically informal, personalistic, and often arbitrary rule is buttressed by a core of relatives, ‘fighters,’ and de-

pendents, and is marked by the diagnostic threat and practice of violence."<sup>14</sup> Moreover, the existence of a cacicazgo (i.e., a concrete instance of caciquismo) has always implied "strong individual power over a territorial group held together by some socioeconomic or cultural system" and a certain degree of "detachment or freedom from the normative, formal, and duly instituted system of government."<sup>15</sup> The cacique is recognized by both community residents and supralocal authorities as being the most powerful person in the local political arena and public officials deal with him to the exclusion of other potential leaders in all community matters. He also possesses *de facto* authority to make decisions binding upon the community under his control, as well as informal police powers and powers of taxation. Thus in some respects the cacicazgo represents a sort of informal government-within-a-government, controlled by a single dominant individual who is not formally accountable either to those residing in the community under his control or to external political and governmental authorities.

The cacique gains power primarily through self-imposition, with the acquiescence (and occasionally the active support) of a majority of community residents. Since the cacique holds no elective post and is not dependent on supralocal officials for appointment to an authority role, he may remain in power until he voluntarily renounces his leadership role or is removed by force. As Friedrich has pointed out, the fact that the cacique's rule is temporally unrestricted is one of the most important distinguishing characteristics of his status in Mexican politics.<sup>16</sup> In the Mexican system, local caciques are virtually the only officially recognized political leaders whose tenure is not necessarily affected by the sexennial, constitutionally-mandated changes of the national administration or the triennial replacement of municipal governments.<sup>17</sup>

The cacique is a truly indigenous leader who emerges from the same community over which he exerts his influence and whose followership is confined to the residents of that locality. Moreover, his political activity is oriented primarily to local issues and concerns. Thus the cacique must be distinguished from local leaders who are simply "imposed" on a community by supralocal forces. Similarly, he must be contrasted with local agents or representatives of the government, political parties, labor unions, or other organizations of the dominant political system whose activity is oriented in some degree toward the local community but whose primary concerns are clearly supralocal in nature and scope.<sup>18</sup>

Typically the cacique's relationship to his followers tends to have a far more utilitarian, rationalistic, instrumental character than that of other types of local leaders, whose power is often based at least in part on personal charisma or ties of affect, deference, or personal loyalty. The strength of the relationship is more dependent upon a continued flow of material benefits to the community and individual residents within it than on affective bonds. It approximates in certain respects a patron-client relationship; yet as we shall see, the cacique does

not operate exclusively with personally controlled local resources (as does the patron in a true clientage relationship); and the mutual rights and obligations and the types of interaction involved are usually significantly different as well.<sup>19</sup> Since the leader-follower relationship in a *cacicazgo* is predominantly instrumental in character, the legitimacy of the cacique must be regarded as tentative.<sup>20</sup> It may be undermined by particularly flagrant indiscretions and abuses of authority and above all by failure to meet certain standards of leadership performance over a period of time. Thus the cacique must strive continually to legitimize his rule through a variety of means. At any given point, this process of legitimation may be incomplete and subject to reversal.<sup>21</sup>

The cacique may be heartily disliked and distrusted by many of his followers, who correctly suspect him of utilizing his leadership position to advance his personal interests at the expense of the community. For like the old-style *caudillos* whose code of behavior he frequently emulates, the cacique's primary aim is to increase his personal wealth.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, the barely concealed economic motivation of some caciques in assuming their position and maintaining themselves in power often leads to charges of fraudulent collection and handling of community funds on the part of dissident residents. The cacique loses few opportunities to enrich himself and his closest followers; and, despite the poverty of most of its inhabitants, the urban squatter settlement usually offers a rich harvest of such opportunities.<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, as long as it appears that the concrete material interests of the settlement are also being advanced as a result of his leadership, the cacique's exploitative behavior will be overlooked by most of his followers.

In Mexico as in much of Latin America as a whole, *caciquismo* has been an historically ubiquitous phenomenon, and it is still an important, if largely covert, feature of the political culture in rural areas. During the past thirty years in much of Latin America, as large numbers of *caudillos* and caciques in the countryside have either disappeared or have lost their influence in state and national politics,<sup>24</sup> there has been an increasing tendency to refer to *caciquismo* as essentially a phenomenon confined to the more backward rural areas, where it is closely tied to the isolation and strong tradition of local political control by a single family or extended family often characteristic of the rural closed community. For example, Pablo González Casanova has pointed to the persistence of *caciquismo* mainly in "the small communities of the more backward areas" of Mexico and notes that even there "the process of dissolution of *caciquismo* is visible."<sup>25</sup> Similarly, Padgett has observed that "the more remote the rural area and the farther it is from ready accessibility to a large city, the easier it is for the cacique to establish and maintain himself in power" and implies that the reduction in the number of old-style caciques remaining in power in Mexico today can be attributed largely to the "growing urban character of the country."<sup>26</sup>

Yet my own observations in Mexico City as well as those of investigations in other Latin American cities suggest that this interpretation is basically mis-

leading, in the sense that while agrarian caciquismo may indeed be on the decline in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America, there are highly significant and probably widespread manifestations of this phenomenon in *urban* contexts. Thus it appears that urbanism per se is not incompatible with the emergence of caciquismo as a pattern of political leadership among low-income populations. Ray, for example, indicates that many low-income barrios of Venezuelan cities are dominated by caciques who "represent the supreme, and almost absolute, authority in their barrios. They sanction, regulate, or prohibit all group activities and exercise a strong influence over any decisions that might affect their communities."<sup>27</sup> Toness (1967) has also documented the behavior of an urban cacique in his study of power relations in a Nicaraguan slum.<sup>28</sup> The same basic pattern may be identified in urban contexts elsewhere in the Latin American region as increased attention is directed to leadership phenomena in low-income settlement zones.

#### BASES OF LEADERSHIP INFLUENCE

What factors help to explain the influence exerted by the urban cacique over the affairs of the community which he rules? What is it which induces others in such a community to follow his leadership? To answer questions such as these we must examine the set of resources which the cacique brings to his leadership status, and which serve to consolidate and legitimize his rule.

Some of these resources take the form of personal skills or aptitudes which are perceived as equipping the cacique for his leadership role. For example, the cacique's skill at organizing and unifying the community is highly valued by its residents, who firmly believe that a high degree of unity and organization improves the settlement's position in negotiating with government authorities for urban services, legalization of land tenure arrangements in the settlement, and other types of benefits. Thus to the extent that the cacique can represent himself as effective in maintaining a high degree of unity and organization within the area under his control, he gains in influence and legitimacy. Moreover, the capacity to mobilize and organize people, both for internally oriented purposes and for participation in political activity outside the settlement, helps to impress external political actors and to enhance the cacique's bargaining position in dealing with them. A well-developed capacity for effective self-expression is another useful skill which the cacique usually brings to his leadership role. Since he is entrusted with the task of seeking external assistance in the development of the settlement, the ability to articulate with eloquence and conviction the needs and aspirations of the residents is regarded as very important in dealing with public officials as well as mass media representatives who may be willing to publicize the settlement's needs and petitions for assistance.

Patronage resources also help the cacique to consolidate his grip on the settlement. Like his agrarian counterpart, he enlists the services of several close aides who assist in mobilizing and organizing settlement residents, collecting money from them, and enforcing the cacique's will. In return, these individuals receive a share of the economic rewards flowing from the *cacicazgo*. The cacique usually adds to his *comitiva* (or retinue of closest subordinates) a number of individuals serving as nominal representatives of the city government or official party in the settlement, whose appointments he has engineered through contacts with higher levels of authority. The members of this group may also be installed by the cacique in leadership positions in the settlement's improvement association (*junta de mejoras*) or community council (*mesa directiva*). The cacique's followers are often bound to him not only through patronage rewards but ties of fictive kinship (*compadrazgo*) as well, which strengthens their personal loyalty and responsiveness to his commands. They form a highly cohesive "political family" which supports, protects, and insulates the *cacique* against harassment by dissatisfied residents or predatory aliens.<sup>29</sup>

The cacique relies to some extent on coercive resources to compel financial cooperation and general obedience among his followers. He generally has exclusive control over the actions of the city police stationed in the settlement and makes effective use of this police power to coerce and intimidate dissidents and potential rivals. And like his agrarian counterpart, the urban cacique is also characteristically accompanied by one or more armed supporters used both as personal bodyguards and for "enforcement" purposes within the settlement. In the areas included in my study, overt coercion occasionally took the form of breaking up meetings of suspected opposition groups or inciting mobs to expel recalcitrant individuals from the settlement by demolishing their houses. Yet one does not observe the kind of consistent and highly visible application of physical force, including extensive small-arms violence and politically motivated homicide, which apparently constitute an integral component of community life in agrarian *cacicazgos*.<sup>30</sup> One possible explanation for the lesser reliance of the urban cacique on physical force lies in the fact that he is under relatively greater scrutiny by higher political and governmental authorities. A more convincing explanation, however, is provided by the greater diversity of coercive tactics available to the urban cacique which may be liberally employed to intimidate and enforce "discipline" while avoiding the political costs generally associated with the application of physical force. Most of these alternative forms of pressure are economic in nature. For example, the cacique may possess nearly absolute control over the allocation of land within a settlement, initially through the illicit sale of credentials or permits to occupy land in the area and later during the process of "*lotificación*" (subdivision of the land occupied by the settlement into individual parcels) which follows official recognition or legalization of the settlement. This control over land distribution en-

ables the cacique to build a followership composed of families personally indebted to him for access to the settlement and the landownership opportunities which such access entails. Moreover, it can be employed in coercive fashion, for the land which is bestowed can also be taken away. The mere suggestion that one's plot of land in a squatter settlement may be "reallocated" to some other settlement resident, or even an alien to the settlement, is usually sufficient to compel obedience. In such a situation the deprived party has no redress before higher levels of authority, for he has been occupying the land illegally and lacks an officially recognized land title.<sup>31</sup>

Still other types of resources important to the influence of a cacique are external to his personal power domain and not subject to his direct control. Included in this category are the cacique's contacts with supralocal political and governmental officials, university professionals such as lawyers, doctors, architects, and engineers, and other high-status individuals possessing skills or resources relevant to the satisfaction of local needs. Such contacts are highly valued by residents of low-income settlement zones and are perceived as enabling the cacique to deal effectively with external actors and secure benefits for the community which would be beyond the reach of someone lacking such regularized channels of access to higher levels of authority.<sup>32</sup> Thus the cacique will strive continually to impress his followers with the range and importance of the contacts he has succeeded in establishing, depicting himself as enjoying the exclusive support and recognition of various high-ranking officials in the city and even federal governments and stressing the usefulness of such contacts in his negotiations on behalf of the settlement.

In a broader sense, the cacique's relationships with external political actors are extremely important to understanding the influence he exerts within the settlement. "Derivative power" flowing from sources outside the cacique's domain can be used effectively within the settlement to maintain control and discourage serious challenges to his authority.<sup>33</sup> Thus the cacique will attempt to extend his contacts with politicians and bureaucrats as widely as possible within the government-official party apparatus, thereby increasing the number of potential sources of derived power to which he has access.<sup>34</sup> He must strive also to demonstrate to his followers as often and as conspicuously as possible—preferably by congratulatory messages and even personal visits to the settlement by high-ranking officials—that he does in fact enjoy their favor. The cacique's dependence on external support may prove costly, however, in the event that such support is withdrawn. To actually fall into disgrace with supralocal officials, and to have this loss of support or recognition become widely known among residents of the settlement, may have highly damaging effects upon the cacique's influence. In fact, the most effective tactic of dissatisfied elements within a settlement seeking to depose a given cacique is to work diligently at discrediting him in the eyes of outside authorities and, if successful, to inform as

many settlement residents as possible of the cacique's loss of official support. Once it becomes widely known that the cacique has fallen into official disfavor, residents may consider his usefulness to the settlement to be at an end and may be highly receptive to opposition efforts aimed at displacing him.

Although initially the cacique is simply self-appointed to his leadership role, it is achievement-oriented criteria which usually determine whether he is able to consolidate and legitimize his rule. Demonstrated performance in securing tangible benefits for the settlement is particularly important in this respect.<sup>35</sup> The low-income settlement zones of a large city, and especially the more recently formed squatter settlements, must confront a number of key developmental problems and needs which must be met if the settlement is to survive as a community and develop into a dwelling environment that satisfies most of the needs of its inhabitants for security of land tenure, basic urban services, schools, markets, recreational facilities, paved streets, and a wide variety of other improvements. Moreover, in Mexico, in contrast to some other Latin American countries where at least semi-routinized and rationalistic planning criteria are applied in processing demands of urban squatters for developmental assistance, land titles and other types of benefits are usually allocated to specific settlements on a highly particularistic and often nonrational basis.<sup>36</sup> Under these circumstances, the sheer persistence and negotiating skill of an individual leader in pressing his demands for legalization and urbanization of the settlement he represents can often have great impact on the allocation of resources to such an area. In the eyes of most of his followers, the urban cacique's effectiveness as a leader is measured primarily by his success in maintaining a constant flow of concrete, material benefits to the settlement as a whole as well as to individual residents.<sup>37</sup>

It is for this reason that the cacique must actively seek to be identified personally with any and all public works, services, and other improvements introduced into the area under his control—whether or not he himself was actually responsible in some way for securing these benefits. In many instances the cacique may claim full credit for an improvement for which he was in no way responsible and may actually have opposed covertly in his dealings with political and governmental agencies. In certain highly salient issues, such as the acquisition or legalization of land titles within the settlement, the cacique may be confronted with a painful dilemma: settlement residents expect him to make a certain amount of progress toward resolving such a problem over time; yet because the very legalization of land tenure arrangements by governmental action may sharply diminish his own opportunities for extracting personal economic gain through control of land use within the settlement, the cacique may indulge in a considerable amount of footdragging in his actual efforts to secure official action to deal with the problem. In this and other key areas, it is often in the interests of a cacique to act against the interest of his followers. Accordingly,

he may choose to press for short-term ameliorative action by the government rather than seek permanent, comprehensive solutions to the settlement's developmental problems. He may even carry out elaborate deceptions of his followers regarding the progress of his negotiations for governmental action on these basic problems. In the long run, however, the cacique must clearly produce results on such salient concerns as reducing insecurity of land tenure within the settlement. If he fails to do so, he will find it increasingly difficult to maintain the allegiance of his followers and forestall potential challenges to his leadership.<sup>38</sup>

Finally, the overall style of political leadership exhibited by a cacique is of relevance to an understanding of his influence within the community. Here we are referring to the manner in which the cacique makes his influence felt among the settlement residents, as well as to his operational code of behavior with respect to the handling of internal conflict and dissent, involving residents in the community decision-making process, and simply relating to other residents of the settlement on a person-to-person basis. Like that of his agrarian counterpart, the leadership style of the urban cacique could be characterized as highly personalistic, pragmatic, informal, and autocratic. However, his manner of dealing with settlement residents either individually or collectively need not be overtly abrasive or domineering. He prefers to assert his influence in subtle ways, relying upon the threat posed by the negative sanctions at his disposal to compel obedience and resorting to strong-arm tactics only against the most uncooperative and openly rebellious residents of the community.<sup>39</sup>

Open conflict with recalcitrant individuals as well as direct confrontations with opposition groups within the settlement are avoided if at all possible. To allow such confrontations to develop would detract from the cacique's image as an essential unifier and harmonizer in the community, both in the eyes of his followers and of external authorities. The same rule applies in presiding over meetings of the settlement's improvement association or other types of public assemblages. Open cleavages are not allowed to emerge in public; formal votes on community issues are hardly ever taken, "consensual" decision making being the accepted practice. Thus in a well-functioning urban cacicazgo, the overt political factionalism and vicious feuding characteristic of many rural communities in Mexico, as well as some low-income settlement zones in urban areas, are seldom in evidence.<sup>40</sup> Public meetings in the settlement are handled (or more precisely, orchestrated) by the cacique in such a manner as to give the illusion of meaningful rank-and-file participation, making it appear that the cacique's role is confined to one of providing needed information or "orientation." In reality, of course, the cacique makes all important decisions affecting the settlement according to his own judgment, with no more than ritualistic consultation with settlement residents. He demonstrates a certain degree of sensitivity to public opinion, but only in the sense of forestalling potential coups and avoiding overt group conflicts within the settlement.<sup>41</sup>

### LEADERSHIP ROLES

The kinds of roles performed by the cacique within the political and social life of the community and in its relationships with the external environment relate closely to the various bases of leadership influence discussed above. The cacicazgo gains in legitimacy to the extent that the cacique's followers perceive him as fulfilling widely shared expectations associated with the performance of these leadership roles. Two of the most important roles performed by the cacique exclusively within the context of settlement life are those of formal organization leader and informal opinion leader. In his role as formal organization leader, the cacique usually heads the settlement's improvement association (*junta de mejoras*) and may customarily identify himself to outsiders as president of this body. Depending on how seriously he regards the junta as a community institution and not just as an instrument of personal rule, the cacique may have an important and positive impact on the vitality of such an organization over time.<sup>42</sup> As formal organization leader, the cacique has wide authority to establish priorities for settlement development. In a very real sense he is responsible for defining the settlement's developmental objectives and ordering them into an agenda for negotiation with external authorities. The cacique's performance of this leadership role also helps to legitimize his virtually complete control over the allocation of benefits secured from external political and governmental sources within the settlement.

In his role as an informal opinion leader, the cacique may have a highly significant impact on the process of political learning among the residents of a settlement. Through frequent public meetings and other types of group activity designed to structure and organize the participation of his followers in politically relevant activities, the cacique contributes to increased perceptions of the relevance of politics and political involvement to the satisfaction of individual and community needs among his followers. The cacique's opinion leadership may also have significant consequences for the development and internalization of community norms, value orientations, and traditions. For example, he may seek to create a sense of group solidarity and unanimity by fostering collective perceptions of "external threat" to the settlement's survival and developmental chances.<sup>43</sup> Such tactics have the effect of enhancing the cacique's reputation as a unifier and harmonizer of interests while also strengthening his image as the settlement's foremost protector and defender against powerful forces bent on its destruction. Of equal importance is the cacique's role in shaping his followers' images of the dominant political system. Through his overblown descriptions of personal relationships with external political actors and overly generous accounts of his negotiations with such actors to secure community and individual benefits, he may create highly unrealistic perceptions of the accessibility of top elites to vertical communication within the political system and of governmental willingness to produce satisfying outputs. The cacique may also find it expedient to

cultivate a collective sense of dependence upon the government—and indirectly, upon himself—for help in the creation of an adequate dwelling environment. This requires him to work at undermining public confidence in the efficacy and desirability of self-help efforts in the development of the settlement.

In the role of “political broker” or “middleman,” the cacique mediates in a number of ways between his followers and higher levels of authority.<sup>44</sup> He represents the settlement under his control before supralocal officials and is primarily responsible for articulating the demands and grievances of his followers to such officials. In doing so he serves to bridge the gap between settlement residents—many of them of recent rural origin and having little or no detailed knowledge of the organization and functioning of the urban political system—and the political and juridical institutions of the larger society.<sup>45</sup> He also transmits the political information that flows out of the official party-government apparatus, being primarily responsible for informing settlement residents of government programs or actions which affect them individually and collectively. In sum, a cacique performing the role of political broker or middleman “stands guard over the crucial junctures or synapses of relationships which connect the local system to the larger whole.”<sup>46</sup> It is important that this kind of brokerage activity be viewed not only in terms of facilitating contacts between part and whole, but of “limiting the access of local persons to the larger society” as well:

Mediators “guard” these functions, i.e., they have near exclusivity in performing them. Exclusivity means that if the link is to be made at all between the two systems with respect to [a] particular function, it must be made through the mediators. . . . To the extent that alternative links become available, so that the mediators lose their exclusive control of the junctures, they cease to be mediators.<sup>47</sup>

The cacique therefore seeks to monopolize all links between the settlement under his control and political and bureaucratic structures in the external environment. He will take pains to portray himself as the only officially recognized intermediary between settlement residents and these structures, the only person who is in a position to work productively with the authorities for the betterment of the settlement. And he will actively strive to *minimize* the contact of individual residents with outside political and governmental agencies, except insofar as it is mediated by his own actions as broker. The cacique is thus able to increase the residents’ sense of dependence on him for the performance of this function.

#### THE CACIQUE’S RELATIONS WITH EXTERNAL POLITICAL ACTORS

The cacique is usually linked as a client to one or more patrons in the government-official party apparatus, usually upper-echelon functionaries in the various offices of the city government or official party having nominal responsibility for

dealing with the problems of low-income sections of the city. The friendship and good will of these persons are cultivated assiduously by the cacique through a variety of means.<sup>48</sup> Like all such clientage arrangements, the relationships between the cacique and his external patrons are based on the "reciprocal exchange of mutually valued goods and services."<sup>49</sup> As well as granting him a large measure of autonomy in the running of local affairs and the allocation of government benefits within his community, the cacique's patrons represent a source of derivative power which, as indicated above, may have an extremely important bearing upon his overall influence in the settlement. The cacique also relies upon his patrons to expedite administrative actions favorable to the settlement and maintain an acceptable flow of material benefits to the area.

In return, the cacique can be counted upon to mobilize large numbers of people within the area under his control to attend political rallies; public appearances of the president of the republic, and other high-ranking officials; ground breaking or inauguration ceremonies for innumerable public works; and supportive activities relevant to the patron's own political advancement in many different parts of the city. The cacique is also expected to maintain "control" of his settlement—to keep order, avoid scandals and public demonstrations embarrassing to the government, and head off any other types of occurrences which tend to disrupt social tranquility and undermine confidence in the regime. He also has obligations to "orient" his followers politically (i.e., propagandize on behalf of the regime and strengthen local identification with it) and to organize the participation of his followers in elections, voter registration campaigns, and other forms of political activity. Finally, the cacique is expected to assist the regime in minimizing demands from his followers for expensive urban improvements and services which tend to "load" the political system beyond its responsive capabilities. He must therefore try to persuade them to be content—at least temporarily—with what may amount to token material satisfactions while the basic problems of infrastructural development in the settlement go unattended. Flagrant violation of any of these basic terms of the informal contract between the cacique and his patron may be punished by a public withdrawal of the patron's support and recognition, with all the negative consequences which that may entail.<sup>50</sup>

It should be emphasized that the relationships maintained by the cacique with external political actors cannot be interpreted as purely dependency relationships resulting from the familiar Mexican pattern of "coöptation and control" from above.<sup>51</sup> Genuine reciprocity is involved. The cacique does not function simply as an appendage of the government-party apparatus, although he performs useful services for the regime and cooperates with his official patrons to the greatest extent possible. He retains considerable freedom of action in managing the internal affairs of the settlement under his control, and it is clear that his position is not entirely dependent upon derivative power from external sources. The best evidence of this relative autonomy is provided by those

caciques who have succeeded in remaining in power after one or more complete turnovers in role incumbents at higher levels of authority have occurred, effectively cutting off, at least for a time, their sources of external support.<sup>52</sup>

#### ORIGINS AND DURABILITY OF URBAN CACIQUISMO

What factors help to explain the emergence and persistence of caciquismo as a pattern of local leadership in the urban setting? One investigator has argued that in the Venezuelan context "what determines a *barrio's* choice of leadership is the economic, social, and political character, as it had developed in the post-war period, of the city in which the *barrio* is located" and goes on to assert that caciques are more likely to emerge in those cities "which have remained relatively unaffected by the forces of modernization" and whose occupational structure lacks a strong, modern, industrial sector.<sup>53</sup> But the diversity of leadership patterns observed *within* many large cities in Latin America—including Mexico City—suggests that the most important variables in this regard may be those relating to the character of the urban settlement zone itself.<sup>54</sup> For example, in Mexico the settlement which has originated through illegal land invasion (either organized or accretive) appears to be a social context particularly conducive to the emergence of caciquismo. Caciques have also emerged frequently in the numerous illegal subdivisions or *fraccionamientos clandestinos* formed on the periphery of the city by land speculators lacking government authorization to subdivide and often clear title to the land as well. Both types of settlements typically suffer from extreme service deprivation and insecurity of land tenure and often become the object of negative sanctions by the government or private landowners. The emergence of caciquismo as a pattern of local leadership in such areas may be related both to the illegality of their origins and the magnitude of the developmental needs and problems which they must confront. Since prior to granting official recognition to such a settlement the government assumes no responsibility for its administration, it provides greater latitude for individual strong men to assume control and deal with their followers in an arbitrary and autocratic manner. The absence of a governmental "presence" combines with the severity of problems confronting such settlements to create a situation in which people may feel a greater need to enter into a dependency relationship with a cacique.

If this is true, we may expect that, as a settlement's basic needs for urban services and security of land tenure are satisfied, the cacique presiding over it will find it increasingly difficult to maintain his position.<sup>55</sup> Official recognition and subdivision of the land into individual parcels may be especially damaging to the cacique's influence in the settlement, for it simultaneously deprives him of important coercive resources (i.e., those deriving from control over the allocation of land within the settlement) and satisfies the single most deeply felt need

of his followers. This helps to explain the cacique's previously mentioned tendency toward footdragging in negotiations with external authorities, lest he succeed too quickly in abolishing his usefulness to others.

The size of a settlement may also be of considerable importance in predicting the emergence and durability of urban caciquismo. In the first place, it is much easier for a prospective cacique to establish and demonstrate to external authorities his personal control over a relatively small area than one many times larger. He is also more likely to be successful in his efforts to mobilize and organize the population in a small settlement.<sup>56</sup> Moreover, as Leeds and other investigators have observed, settlement size tends to be positively correlated with internal social differentiation. "The larger the squatterment, the more diversified [will be] the types of social groups, aggregates, and associations, and the more of them absolutely and relatively."<sup>57</sup> As a settlement matures and its population increases, it becomes increasingly heterogeneous in terms of group structure as well as socioeconomic characteristics of the population. As this transformation occurs it becomes increasingly difficult for the cacique to maintain control and impede the emergence of organized opposition to his rule.

The emergence of caciquismo as a pattern of political leadership in certain social contexts may also be related to the demographic composition of the population in terms of rural-urban origins. Since a majority of the people in most squatter settlements are of rural origin, it might be suggested that the leadership phenomena observed in these areas represent another manifestation of what has been referred to as "residual ruralism"—i.e., the "transference from the rural areas of institutions, values, and behavior patterns and their persistence or adaptation to the specific requirements of the urban setting."<sup>58</sup> Thus we might hypothesize that there has been some degree of transference of leadership-role expectations from life in the rural community to that of the urban squatter settlement.<sup>59</sup> We might also posit a relationship between urban caciquismo and several types of value orientations frequently attributed to peasants as well as rural migrants to the city, including a strong predisposition toward authoritarianism and a propensity to enter into paternalistic dependency relationships.<sup>60</sup> This raises other interesting questions about the long-term persistence of caciquismo as a pattern of local leadership in a given settlement. For example, is the stability of a *cacicazgo* threatened by long-term changes in the distribution of these "supportive" value orientations among the population of the settlement as the first generation of migrants undergoes urban acculturation and the second generation—with no rural socialization experience—comes to maturity?

Still another type of threat to the durability of urban caciquismo arises as the squatter settlement evolves over time, developing a more complex set of social, economic, and political relationships to its external environment and becoming more closely intergrated ecologically into the structure of the city in which it is located. The total and closed dominion which the cacique exercises over his territory may thus be undermined. Moreover, the influence of the

cacique in his key role as intermediary between his followers and the institutions and structures of the external environment may be weakened substantially through such evolutionary change. As urban assimilation proceeds and individual residents become more familiar with the contours of larger urban society and polity, an increasing amount of direct, *non-mediated* participation will occur.

Finally, the cacique may be faced with increasing competition from other types of brokers and middlemen encroaching upon his domain from both within and outside the settlement.<sup>61</sup> Eventually he may be displaced in the cacical role by one of these newly emerged competitors; or more likely, the *cacicazgo* may simply dissolve, giving way to some form of imposed leadership, a set of competing factions with no clearly dominant individual leader, or perhaps no discernible leadership structure at all. Thus it might be most accurate to conceive of urban *caciquismo* as a transitory phenomenon restricted to a particular phase in the evolution of a low-income settlement zone and the urban assimilation of its population.

## CHAPTER 11

1. Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., "Political Behavior in Urban Mexico: The Politics of Migrant Assimilation in Low-Income Urban Environments," Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University (Stanford, 1972). Related research is reported in Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr. in "Urbanization as an Agent in Latin American Political Instability: The Case of Mexico," *American Political Science Review* 63, no. 3 (1969), pp. 833-57 and Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., "The Political Sociology of Cityward Migration in Latin America: Toward Empirical Theory" in *Latin American Urban Research* by Francine F. Rabinovitz and Felicity M. Trueblood, eds. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publication, 1971), 1:95-147. Field work was conducted in Mexico City from January to December 1970 and during a brief return visit in June 1971. The research has been supported by grants provided through the Foreign Area Fellowship Program of the Social Science Research Council and American Council of Learned Societies, the National Science Foundation (grant GS-2738), and the Center for Research in International Studies of Stanford University.
2. Data were gathered by a combination of field methods, including a sample survey, documentary research, use of key informants, semi-structured depth interviewing of local leaders, participant observation, and the gathering of intensive life histories. The present analysis is based primarily on ethnographic data gathered through the participant-observation technique.
3. See Frank Bonilla, *The Failure of Elites* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1970); Richard Bourne, *Political Leaders of Latin America* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969); Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari, *Elites in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Peter H. Smith, "Elite Mobility and Political Change in Mexico, 1900-1970" (Dept. of History, University of Wisconsin, research in progress); William A. Welsh, "Methodological Problems in the Study of Political Leadership in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review* 5, no. 3 (1970), pp. 3-33; and William A. Welsh, "Toward Effective Typology Construction in the Study of Latin American Political Leadership," *Comparative Politics* 3, no. 2 (1971), pp. 271-80.
4. See Delbert C. Miller, *International Community Power Structures* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970) and Francine F. Rabinovitz, "Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing?—A Review of Community Power Research in Latin America," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 3 (1968), pp. 111-22.
5. A. Eugene Havens and William L. Flinn, "The Power Structure in a Shantytown" in *Internal Colonialism and Structural Change in Colombia*, A. Eugene Havens and W. L. Flinn, eds. (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 93-107.
6. Herbert D. Friedman, "Squatter Assimilation in Buenos Aires, Argentine," Ph.D. dissertation, M.I.T. (Cambridge, 1968); James W. McKenney, "Voluntary Associations and Political Integration: An Exploratory Study of the Role of Voluntary Association Membership in the Political Socialization of Urban Lower Class Residents of Santiago, Chile, and Lima, Peru," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon (Eugene, 1969); and Raymond B. Pratt, "Organizational Participation, Politicization, and Development: A Study of Political Consequences of Participation in Community Associations in Four Lower Class Urban Settlements in Chile and Peru," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon (Eugene, 1968).
7. Exceptions to this pattern are the papers by Kaufman and other participants in the Conference on Urban Poverty Leadership Styles in the Americas, held at the University of Pennsylvania in 1968. See Clifford Kaufman, "Urban Poverty Leadership and Political Change in the Americas," unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, 1970. Several dissertations have focused on voluntary associations (particularly local improvement associations) in low-income urban settlement zones in Latin America. See Thomas M. Lutz, "Self-Help Neighborhood Organizations, Political Socialization, and the Developing Political Orientations of Urban Squatters in Latin America: Contrasting Patterns from Case Studies in Panama City, Guayaquil, and Lima," Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University (Washington, D.C., 1970); Friedman, *op. cit.*; Pratt, *op. cit.*; Raymond B. Pratt, "Community Political Organizations and Lower Class Politicization in Two Latin American Cities," *Journal of Developing Areas* 5 (July 1971), pp. 523-42; and McKenney, *op. cit.* Unfortunately these studies devote virtually no attention to leadership structure in such organizations, focusing instead upon the personal attributes of members

and non-members, the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of participation in such organizations, and related topics. The same limitation applies to broader studies of sociopolitical organization among the urban poor in Latin American countries; see, for example, Bryan Roberts, "Politics in a Neighborhood of Guatemala City," *Sociology* 2, no. 2 (1968), pp. 185-204; Bryan Roberts, "Urban Poverty and Political Behavior in Guatemala," *Human Organization* 29, no. 1 (1970), pp. 20-28; and Bryan Roberts, "The Social Organization of Low-Income Families" in *Masses in Latin America*, Irving L. Horowitz, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

8. Lutz, for example, reports that in both Lima and Panama City he was "struck by the impact that good leadership seemed to make in the development of squatter settlements and organizations." See Lutz, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

9. Rabinovitz, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

10. Cf. Anthony Leeds, "The Significant Variables Determining the Character of Squatter Settlements," *América latina* 12, no. 3 (1969), pp. 78-79; Douglas Butterworth, "Squatter Settlements in the City of Oaxaca: the Structure of Diversity," unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Modernization and Urbanization Problems in Latin America, University of Illinois, 1971.

11. Cf. Roberts, "Urban poverty," pp. 22-23.

12. Cf. Alejandro Portes, "The Urban Slum in Chile: Types and Correlates," *Land Economics* 47, no. 3 (August 1971), pp. 246-47.

13. For descriptions of alternative leadership patterns, see Susan Eckstein, "The Poverty of Revolution," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University (New York, 1972); Butterworth, *op. cit.*; Donald W. Foster, "Tequio in Urban Mexico: A Case from Oaxaca City," unpublished paper presented to the Session on Latin American Studies, Central States Anthropological Society Meetings, Detroit, May 1971; and Antonio Ugalde, *Power and Conflict in a Mexican Community: A Study of Political Integration* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970), pp. 143-46.

14. Paul Friedrich, "The Legitimacy of a Cacique," in *Local-Level Politics: Social and Cultural Perspectives*, Marc J. Swartz, ed. (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), p. 247.

15. Friedrich, *op. cit.*, p. 247. As the cacique of one of the settlements included in my study was fond of putting it, "Aqui no hay más ley que yo." Friedrich's pioneering ethnographic work on Mexican caciquismo is reported most fully in a doctoral dissertation, "Cacique: The Recent History and Present Structure of Politics in a Tarascan Village," Yale University, (New Haven, 1957) and in a recent monograph, *Agrarian Revolt in a Mexican Village* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970). For additional discussions of caciquismo as an historical phenomenon in Mexico, see Victor Alba, *The Mexicans: The Making of a Nation* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 44, 52, 166-67 and Robert E. Scott, *Mexican Government in Transition*, 2nd ed., (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), pp. 102-04.

16. Friedrich, "The Legitimacy of a Cacique," pp. 258-59.

17. In one of the squatter settlements included in my study, a single cacique had held power continuously for over a decade; in another the cacicazgo established upon invasion of the settlement site endured for nearly fifteen years.

18. As we shall note below, however, the cacique's actions are influenced to some extent by supralocal political actors. Thus, in terms of Kaufman's typology of urban leadership patterns, the cacique must be regarded as a hybrid type combining certain attributes of both "indigenous" and "imposed" leaders as defined there. See Kaufman, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

19. For detailed explications of the patron-client relationship and how it may be distinguished from other types of leader-follower relationships, including the cacical pattern, see Sydel F. Silverman, "Patronage and Community-Nation Relationships in Central Italy," *Ethnology* 4, no. 2 (1965), pp. 172-89; Eric R. Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies" in *The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies*, Michael Banton, ed. (New York: Praeger, 1966); Alex Weingrod, "Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 10, no. 4 (1968), pp. 377-400; John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," *American Political Science Review* 64, no. 2 (1970), pp. 411-25; and James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *American Political Science Review* 66, no. 1 (March 1972), pp. 91-113.

20. In speaking of legitimacy in this context we are referring to the degree to which the

residents of a settlement believe that a cacique's rule—that is, his behavior and the rules of the game to which he adheres in performing his leadership role—is “right” or “appropriate,” as measured by the extent of support which the average resident accords the cacique through a variety of means. Thus we may speak of a settlement resident having essentially supportive or nonsupportive legitimacy orientations toward the cacicazgo.

21. Friedrich has argued convincingly that the legitimacy of a cacique should be viewed “as a matter of process and ‘flux’ rather than a static, fixed attribute of his leadership status.” See Friedrich, “The Legitimacy of a Cacique,” p. 244.

22. Undoubtedly there are certain psychological satisfactions which accrue from exercising a leadership role in a social setting like the squatter settlement; but it is clear that the cacique's primary motives for acquiring and retaining power are economic in nature. Cf. Odin A. Toness, Jr., “Power Relations of a Central American Slum,” M.A. thesis, University of Texas (Austin, 1967), p. 38.

23. In the three squatter settlements included in my study, caciques had been deeply involved in a variety of illicit money-making activities, including trafficking in lots or permits to occupy land within the settlement, fraudulent collection of money for personal use (in the form of special assessments or “cooperaciones,” ostensibly to defray costs incurred in negotiating with the authorities for urban services or improvements), commercial exploitation of publicly owned mineral resources within the settlement, and the charging of special fees for access to basic urban services such as electricity. To the economic returns from activities such as these, the cacique may add the income derived from property owned within the settlement, often including small businesses, houses, and land.

24. The term *caudillo* is usually applied to political strongmen who made their influence felt on the regional or national level. As Wolf and Hansen have pointed out, there is much in the code of caudillo behavior—particularly its emphasis on personalized loyalties, frequent recourse to violence, and an arbitrary, autocratic style of governance—which is also characteristic of many local caciques. See Eric R. Wolf and Edward C. Hansen “Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 9 (1967), pp. 168-79.

25. Pablo González Casanova, *Democracy in Mexico* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 33; cf. Jacques Lambert, *Latin America: Social Structures and Political Institutions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 154.

26. L. Vincent Padgett, *The Mexican Political System* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p. 83.

27. Talton Ray, *The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 59.

28. Toness, op. cit.

29. Cf. Paul Friedrich, “A Mexican Cacicazgo,” *Ethnology* 4, no. 2 (1965), pp. 192-96; Havens and Flinn, op. cit., pp. 101-03.

30. Friedrich, “A Mexican Cacicazgo,” pp. 205-06; Friedrich, “The Legitimacy of a Cacique,” p. 265; and Lesley Byrd Simpson, *Many Mexicos*, 4th ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 341-42.

31. Ray has also observed that the cacique “maintains strict control over the distribution of [land] parcels. This enables him to establish his reputation as *él que manda* (the one who runs the show) and gives him the opportunity to bestow favors which, in turn, will give him much bargaining power in later dealings with the residents.” See Ray, op. cit., p. 59. As a squatter settlement matures and virtually all land within it becomes occupied, the cacique may engage in a certain amount of illegal reallocation of parcels of land from the original occupants to more recent arrivals, particularly relatives and close subordinates of the cacique himself. Some plots may be reallocated several times, and families refusing to submit willingly to displacement may be relocated on the least desirable land in the settlement or simply be expelled from the settlement by force.

32. Cf. Lisa R. Peattie, *The View from the Barrio* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968), pp. 88-89.

33. The concept of “derivative power” employed here is elaborated in Richard N. Adams, *The Second Sowing: Power and Secondary Development in Latin America* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1967), p. 40, 250 ff. The dependence of local leadership in urban low-income contexts on such power has been noted by observers in several

Latin American countries: See Denton R. Vaughan, "Links Between Peripheral Lower Income Residential Areas and Political Parties in a Latin American City," unpublished paper, Dept. of Anthropology, University of Texas, Austin, 1968; Toness, *op. cit.*, pp. 59, 68-70; and Ray, *op. cit.*, pp. 56, 61-62. It has also been characteristic of some types of agrarian caciques in Mexico. See Friedrich, "A Mexican Cacicazgo," pp. 199, 203; Friedrich, "The Legitimacy of a Cacique," pp. 262-63; and Alba, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

34. Cf. Toness, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-70.

35. This assessment is strongly supported by preliminary results from the sample survey conducted as part of my Mexico City research. Respondents were first asked to identify "the three persons who have the most influence in this settlement . . . that is, the persons who are most successful in getting their own way and getting things done." In the two settlements dominated by caciques at the time of the survey, virtually all respondents who were able to identify one or more settlement influentials mentioned the ruling cacique and his closest subordinates. When asked why these people had the most influence in the settlement, a majority mentioned past or ongoing service to the settlement, as measured by success in securing urban services and improvements, in negotiating with the authorities for legalization of land tenure arrangements, obtaining benefits and doing personal favors for individual residents, and other types of service-oriented activities.

36. This pattern seems to contrast markedly with those observed in Peru and other countries whose urban planning practices are more highly developed and oriented toward facilitating the integration of squatter settlement zones into existing urban structures. On the case of Lima, Peru, see Allan G. Austin and Sherman Lewis, *Urban Government for Metropolitan Lima* (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 77, 142-49 and Henry Dietz, "Assimilation and Politicization of Urban Squatter Migrants in Lima, Peru," Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, in progress. In their study of politics in the city of Jalapa, Mexico, Fagen and Tuohy note that government and official party functionaries with formal responsibilities for the problems of colonias proletarias in the city are subjected to a continuous drumbeat of highly particularistic, unaggregated demands from residents of such areas. "The confusion and inaction occasioned by this fragmented competition for attention and resources are complicated by the absence of developmental planning of the sort that might provide criteria for bringing together and judging conflicting claims on scarce resources. . . . There are no formally established guidelines by which needs are evaluated." See Richard R. Fagen and William S. Tuohy, *Order without Progress: The Governance of a Mexican Community* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), Chap. 3. Much the same situation prevails in Mexico City, where "the idea of comprehensive physical planning, even as an eventual goal, was dropped shortly after the second world war" and never revived. See Robert Fried, "Mexico City" in *Great Cities of the World*, William A. Robson and D. E. Regan, eds. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972), 2:680. This is clearly reflected in the highly erratic, idiosyncratic handling of the problems of low-income settlement zones within the metropolitan area. Official behavior toward such areas may fluctuate sharply from overt hostility to benevolent permissiveness with top-level changes in city government personnel. Persistent refusals to legalize specific colonias on technical grounds (e.g., topography or subsoil conditions would make the introduction of basic services impossible or prohibitively costly) may give way virtually overnight to full legalization and large-scale urbanization efforts by the government. Each settlement tends to have a distinctive pattern of interaction with political and governmental agencies which cannot be explained adequately except by reference to differences in local leadership performance.

37. Assistance provided on an individual basis may include recommendations to prospective employers and government functionaries; small business permits, licenses, and other types of legal documents; help in enrolling children in overcrowded public schools or in securing medical treatment or legal advice; and so on. To the extent that the legitimacy of the urban cacicazgo derives from the dispensation of such concrete, particular, short-term material benefits and acts of assistance to settlement residents, it bears some resemblance to the old style ward machines of the northern U.S. cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus the cacical pattern of leadership tends to complement the overall "machine politics" approach of the Mexican official party-government apparatus toward the political integration of low-income populations in urban areas. See Cornelius, "Political

Behavior in Urban Mexico"; Martin C. Needler, *Politics and Society in Mexico* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1971), p. 86; Fagen and Tuohy, op. cit., Chap. 2; Ugalde, op. cit., p. 148.

38. Similarly, Ray notes that in the modern urban-industrial environments of Caracas and other rapidly growing Venezuelan cities, "the traditional authoritarian rule of the cacique is an anachronism. In order to maintain any degree of support within a community, a leader must produce; if he does not, his neighbors ignore his supposed authority." Ray, op. cit., p. 70.

39. Cf. Ray, op. cit., p. 61.

40. Cf. Henry Torres-Trueba, "Factionalism in a Mexican Municipio," *Sociologus* [Berlin] n.s. 19, no. 2 (1969), pp. 134-52; Friedrich, "A Mexican Cacicazgo"; and Butterworth, op. cit., pp. 16-18.

41. Ray, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

42. The relationships between leadership preferences and the frequency and quality of organizational participation within low-income urban settlement zones, as well as the impact of changes in leadership on the survival and effectiveness of such formal voluntary organizations as the local improvement association, are important questions which have not been adequately investigated in the Latin American context. Cf. Ray, op. cit., p. 46, 54, 61.

43. For example, land tenure is, in most squatter settlements, the fundamental value to be protected. The cacique in such an area may seek to exploit the insecurity of existing tenure arrangements by exaggerating the danger to continued occupancy of the land (stemming from potential negative sanctions by the legal landowners, whose property was invaded to form the settlement, or the government) long past the point at which such sanctions are likely to be invoked.

44. The concept of political brokerage has been developed principally by anthropologists concerned with relationships between the nation and the traditional rural community. See Eric R. Wolf, "Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society: Mexico" in *Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America*, Dwight B. Heath and Richard N. Adams, eds. (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 85-101; Silverman, op. cit.; M. Kenny, "Patterns of Patronage in Spain," *Anthropological Quarterly* 33 (1960), pp. 14-23; and Brian J. Betley, "Otomi Juez: An Analysis of a Political Middleman," *Human Organization* 30, no. 1 (1971), pp. 57-63. More recently it has been employed in the context of linkages between traditional and modern sectors within the urban setting. See William J. Hanna and Judith L. Hanna, "The Integrative Role of Urban Africa's Middleplaces and Middlemen," *Civilisations* 17, no. 1-2 (1967), pp. 12-29; William J. Hanna and Judith L. Hanna, "Polyethnicity and Political Integration in Umuahia and Mbale" in *Comparative Urban Research*, Robert T. Daland, ed. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1969), pp. 162-202; William J. Hanna and Judith L. Hanna, "Influence and Influentials in Two Urban-Centered African Communities," *Comparative Politics* 2, no. 1 (1969), pp. 17-40; William J. Hanna and Judith L. Hanna, *Urban Dynamics in Black Africa: A Guide to Research and Theory* (Chicago: Aldine, 1971); Norman R. Kurtz, "Gatekeepers in the Process of Acculturation," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado (Boulder, 1966); and Ugalde, op. cit., pp. 173-75. Numerous investigators have characterized local leaders in Latin American squatter settlements as political middlemen, brokering the relations of such parties in the urban electoral arena. See François Bourricaud, *Power and Society in Contemporary Peru* (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 83; Jorge Giusti, "Organizational Characteristics of the Latin American Urban Marginal Settler," *International Journal of Politics* 1, no. 1 (1971), p. 83; Elizabeth Leeds, "Games Favelas Play" (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, San Diego, November 1970), pp. 3-5; Anthony Leeds and Elizabeth Leeds, "Brazil and the Myth of Urban Rurality: Urban Experience, Work, and Values in the 'Squatments' of Rio de Janeiro and Lima" in *City and Country in the Third World: Issues in the Modernization of Latin America*, Arthur J. Field, ed. (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1970); Juarez Rubens Brandão Lopes, "Some Basic Developments in Brazilian Politics and Society," in Richard R. Fagen and Wayne A. Cornelius Jr., eds., *Political Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 164-65; José Arthur Rios, "El pueblo y el político," *Política* [Caracas] 6 (1960), pp. 20-29; Toness, op. cit., pp. 58-59; and Vaughan, op. cit.

45. Cf. Friedrich, "The Legitimacy of a Cacique," p. 247.

46. Wolf, "Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society," p. 97.
47. Silverman, *op. cit.*, p. 173, 188; cf. Kenny, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.
48. These officials are, in turn, linked through informal clientage relationships to politicians and bureaucrats at higher levels of authority. This pattern has been referred to as an "extended patron-client relationship" or "clientele system." See Powell, *op. cit.*; Thomas Nowak and Kay Snyder, "Urbanization and Clientelist Systems in the Philippines," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* 14, no. 3, pp. 259-75. Other investigators have demonstrated that the Mexican political system can be usefully conceived in terms of tiers of patron-client linkages operative at all levels of the system. See William S. Tuohy, "Centralism and Political Elite Behavior in Mexico" (unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Administering Revolutionary Change in Latin America, Austin, April 1970); Fagen and Tuohy, *op. cit.*, Chap. 2.
49. Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 412.
50. This occurred in the case of one settlement included in my study, in which a scandal over the cacique's trafficking in land within the settlement erupted with such vehemence and city-wide publicity that it eventually implicated the cacique's patron himself as being an active party to, and direct beneficiary of, his client's illegal transactions in real estate.
51. See Bo Anderson and James D. Cockcroft, "Control and Coöptation in Mexican Politics," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 7, no. 1 (1966), pp. 16-22; Fagen and Tuohy, *op. cit.*, Chap. 2.
52. Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
54. Cf. Anthony Leeds, "The Significant Variables," pp. 72-80.
55. For highly suggestive analyses of the relationship between satisfaction of basic needs and modification of local leader-follower relations, in both rural and urban contexts, see Silverman, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-84 ff.; González Casanova, *op. cit.*, p. 35; James C. Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change," *American Political Science Review* 63, no. 4 (1969), pp. 1155-57; and Wolf, "Aspects of Group Relations," p. 98.
56. Lutz, *op. cit.*, p. 118.
57. Anthony Leeds, "The Significant Variables," p. 78.
58. Gino Germani, "The City as an Integrating Mechanism: The Concept of Social Integration" in Glenn H. Beyer, ed., *The Urban Explosion in Latin America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 179; cf. Cornelius, "The Political Sociology of Cityward Migration," pp. 111-12.
59. Cooper has investigated the relationship between leadership role expectations and degree of orientation to urban-industrial life, in the context of work situations studied in a rural village, a medium-sized town, and a large city in Mexico. He found that as one moves from the traditional rural community along a continuum toward the modern urban-industrial environment of Mexico City, attitudes toward what constitutes "good" and "bad" leadership exhibit considerable change. See Kenneth Cooper, "Leadership Role Expectations in Mexican Rural and Urban Environments," Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, (Stanford, 1959).
60. On authoritarian tendencies, see Erich Fromm and Michael Maccoby, *Social Character in a Mexican Village: A Sociopschoanalytic Study* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 80-82; Robert E. Scott, "Mexico: The Established Revolution" in *Political Culture and Political Development*, Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 353-54; and Needler, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-88. For discussions of migrant predispositions toward dependency relationships, see Giusti, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-83; Alistair Hennessy, "Latin America" in *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*, Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, eds. (New York and London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 30-33; Leeds and Leeds, *op. cit.*; Andrew Pearse, "Some Characteristics of Urbanization in the City of Rio de Janeiro" in *Urbanization in Latin America*, Philip M. Hauser, ed. (New York: International Documents Service, 1961), pp. 200-05; Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 60; and Lloyd H. Rogler, "To Be or Not To Be Political: A Dilemma of Puerto Rican Migrant Associations" in *Behavior in New Environments: Adaptation of Migrant Populations*, Eugene B. Brody, ed. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970), p. 431.
61. Cf. Silverman, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-88; James Scott, "Corruption," p. 1150; and James Scott, "Patron-Client Politics," pp. 21-22.