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Phillips Foster

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PREFACE

Original material included in this paper is the result of two field trips to Algeria, both sponsored by the Agricultural Development Council. Herbert Steiner and I spent four man months in Algeria in late 1963 and early 1964. Our studies on that trip concentrated on one farm which had been recently socialized, and resulted in a bulletin on The Structure of Algerian Socialized Agriculture.¹ I returned to Algeria in the Spring of 1966 and had a chance to briefly re-visit the farm which Steiner and I had intensively studied in 1964. Most of my time on the second trip, however, was spent gathering material for a bulletin on Research on Agricultural Development in North Africa.² Literature searches relevant to these studies were made in Algeria, Paris, and Washington, D. C.

Time limitations and budgeting limitations have precluded such an exhaustive literature search for this paper. I am indebted to Paul Mallary and Dennis Wood who made a quick literature search in an attempt to bring the bibliography on Algerian Socialized Agriculture up-to-date and thus helped me to answer some of the questions in the AID Country Paper Outline which I was unable to answer from previous experience or research.

On occasion, in this paper, I have made reference to a case study farm, Benkheira Abdellah, located in the northeast corner of the department of Al Asnam, about 80 kilometers west of Algiers on the Mediterranean coast, near the city of Cherchell. The case study technique provides the opportunity to probe in depth

¹Phillips Foster and Herbert Steiner, The Structure of Algerian Socialized Agriculture, Md. Ag. Expt. Sta. Misc., Pub. No. 527, July, 1964.

²Phillips Foster, Research on Agricultural Development in North Africa, The Agricultural Development Council, 630 Fifth Ave., N.Y., N.Y., 10020, 1967.

the organization and operation of a real production unit. At the same time, it provides useful data for discussing the relation between the production unit, the National Office for Agrarian Reform, and the related socialized cooperatives. Although no case study will ever represent the whole, I should point out that we selected this particular farm for intensive study because it seemed to be the least typical farm we could find in the Cherchell region--a region which seemed as representative as any of Algerian socialized agriculture.

This paper attempts to outline the story of Algerian land reform--the antecedents to the revolution which led to reform, the reform process, and the results of the reform. From time to time in the discussion of the post-revolutionary situation in Algerian socialized agriculture I have made reference to materials gathered during our intensive field work in 1964. I hope this adds color and depth to the analysis. There have certainly been changes since the time of our field work, but the main outlines of Algerian agriculture have not changed all that much and I think the field illustrations are still useful in understanding the present character of the Algerian system.

I have followed the AID Country Paper Outline religiously, when possible. On occasion I have embellished the outline where the subject matter of Algeria seemed to call for it, and have collapsed or revised sections of the outline or left out a subhead or so when it did not seem to be appropriate to the Algerian material. For the benefit of those reading and comparing a series of AID Country Papers in the 1970 Spring Review of Land Reform, I have included the letters and numbers of the AID recommended outline in parentheses both in the table of contents and next to the appropriate subheads sprinkled throughout the paper.

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I. SUMMARY

Prior to the arrival of the European farmers (colons), who were largely of French extraction, the agriculture of North Africa was characterized by three traditional systems of agricultural resource organization: (1) individually controlled small-holdings, sometimes very small, (2) land controlled by a tribe and parcelled out periodically by the tribal chief, and (3) large estates worked by sharecroppers.

The European farmers brought with them a dramatic and sudden emphasis on commercial agriculture. The new commercial agriculture, with the help of the new political and military power which backed it up, became so successful that during the 1950's in Algeria, the European farmers who represented 2 percent of the entire rural population held a third of all of the cultivated land and produced 60 percent of the total crop by value.¹ While development of commercial agriculture was taking place, the traditional agriculture of the non-European community remained very much the same as it was before the arrival of the Europeans. Thus, a dual economy developed in North African agriculture.

Following independence, the European agricultural entrepreneurs experienced varying degrees of disillusionment and fear, and in all three countries of North Africa there have been exoduses of these people. The exodus was most pronounced in Algeria where a European farmer would be a considerable novelty today.

¹Charles F. Gallagher, The United States and North Africa, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, p. 27.

Nationalization of the modern, commercial farms in Algeria took place in 1963. Responsibility for the management of these farms had already been placed jointly with the National Office for Agrarian Reform and a set of "self-management" committees, made up of workers on the farms. The basis for the transfer of ownership and management was provided by the revolutionary government through a set of decrees it issued in March, 1963. This legislation is known, appropriately, as the "Decrees of March."

The agriculture of Algeria today is characterized by relatively productive, socialized commercial production units which employ a small fraction of the nation's labor force,¹ but which probably account for most of the marketed agricultural product by value,² and by relatively unproductive traditional (peasant) farmers who have not been socialized, who produce little for the commercial market, and who make up the lion's share of the agricultural labor force.

¹The socialized sector employs about 200,000 permanent workers.

²The socialized sector produces only 40 percent of the total agricultural product of Algeria by value, but since the traditional sector is so largely subsistence in nature, the socialized sector markets the majority of the agricultural product.

II. PRE-REFORM PERIOD

(A) Introduction: Economic and Political Background

The best agricultural land in Algeria is devoted to a series of modern, commercial farms. These farms were nationalized in October of 1963, more than a year after Algeria received its independence.

The nationalized farms occupy about 2.8 million of the 10 million hectares devoted to agriculture in Algeria.¹ The areas of heaviest concentration of socialized agriculture are shown in Figure 1. These areas may be divided into four regions: the littoral, the sahel, the interior valleys, and the high plains. The agricultural product mix varies by region. Winter vegetables dominate the littoral; wine and oranges dominate the sahel and the interior valleys; wheat is practically the sole commercial crop of the high plains.

The influence of climate on location

Algerian agriculture is almost wholly restricted to the area north of the Sahara where there is enough rainfall, but even in the northern region, the precipitation is not always dependable. The climate here is Mediterranean with most of the rainfall concentrated in the winter months. It is further distinguished by the great irregularity in rainfall because it lies in a 'zone

¹ Robert Aron and others, Les origines de la guerre d'Algérie (Paris: Fayard, 1962) pp. 211-212.




Figure 1.--Areas of greatest concentration of socialized agriculture in Algeria

of struggle¹ between the warm dry air of the Sahara, and the cooler more moist air of the north.

The influence of physiography on location

Littoral.--The littoral is the narrow coastal strip of level or almost level alluvial land between the mountains and the sea. The frost-free temperate climate of the littoral makes it ideal for such out-of-season vegetables as winter potatoes and early spring tomatoes. The frost-free season extends the full 365 days of the year, and where irrigation is available it is possible to produce a crop even during the dry summer months.

Sahel.--The sahel includes the slopes and top of a low ridge lying next to the littoral and just a little further inland. For example, west of the city of Algiers the sahel extends parallel to the coast for over 50 miles and separates the littoral from the inland plain called the Mitidja. There is also another sahel in the Department of Oran. The chief commercial crops of the sahel are wine and citrus, but wheat and some of the hardier vegetables such as onions are often grown here in winter.

Interior valleys.--The interior valleys such as the Mitidja and the valley of the Chelif, are the region of the large estates. The great stretches of level, fertile, tillable land in the interior valley, are suited for many crops, but commercially, wine and citrus fruits are the most important.

High plains.--South of the complex mountain system known as the Tellian Atlas and north of the Saharan Atlas is a plateau where wheat is grown as a monoculture. This includes the area around Tiaret, Setif, Constantine, and

¹ Marcel Larnaude, Algérie (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1950) p. 19.

and Guelma. The amount and distribution of rainfall are the limiting factors. Wheat can be raised where there is an annual rainfall of greater than 350 millimeters, but if the rain does not come at the right times the crop can be a failure. Frosts are possible here as early as October and as late as May. Late frosts or long periods without rain can be very damaging to yields.¹

(B) Land Tenure Structure

(1) Characteristics before the French conquest

Arabs and Berbers.--The pre-French land tenure pattern was heavily influenced by the diverse cultural elements which made up the pre-French cultural pattern. Algeria at that time was checkered with a series of tribal groups of two basic types, Arab and Berber.

When the French began their conquest of Algeria in 1830 they found a diversified and complicated tenure system ranging all the way from private land holdings to communal tribal properties. This tenure pattern was related to the pre-French cultural pattern and could be divided into three main categories, arch land, melk land, and large estates Azel , (Figure 2).

Arch land.--In those areas which had been most influenced by the influx of the Bedouin Arabs the people lived in tents and engaged in an extensive nomadic agriculture based chiefly on livestock supplemented by a primitive grain culture. Extended families were grouped together into factions or clans all of whose members claimed descent from a single patronymic ancestor.

¹Larnaude, pp. 22, 44-45.




Figure 2. Location of arch, melk, and azel land in Algeria in 1830

Source: Adapted from Yves Lacoste, Andre Nouschi and Andre Prenant, L'Algérie, passée et présente (Paris: Editions Sociales, no date).

Each clan was led by a sheik. A group of these clans were united into a tribe under the leadership of the sheik of one of the leading clans. Each tribe controlled a certain land area, but the boundaries of these areas were in a constant state of flux, depending on the fortunes and powers of the tribes.¹

The grazing and cultivated land which belonged to the tribes was referred to as arch land. Usually in the fall of the year the sheik of each clan allotted tillable plots which were to be planted to wheat and barley to each family. A family with many sons received a much larger plot than a family with a smaller male work force. If the head of the household died and the widow had no sons old enough to plow, the land was taken away. The arch land belonged to the tribe collectively, but only those who could work it had the right to use it. They could only benefit from the use of it as long as they worked it, but everything they produced on it was theirs.²

That part of the arch land which was not cultivated was pastured collectively by the whole tribe. The livestock was branded with the mark of the family, and usually the animals of each clan were pastured together. The members of the tribe moved several times each year as required by the condition of the pastures. The livestock provided the main subsistence of each family. This system provided a satisfactory standard of living for the limited population without wearing out the soil. Approximately two-thirds of the Algerian peasants were living on arch land at the time of the French conquest.^{3,4,5}

¹Pierre Bourdieu, The Algerians, Trans. by Alan C. M. Ross, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962) p. 83.

²Andre Nouschi, Enquete sur le niveau de vie des populations rurales Constantinoises de la conquete jusqu'en 1919 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961) pp. 85-89.

³Larnaude, pp. 79-80.

⁴Bourdieu, p. 83.

⁵Nouschi, pp. 54-61.

Melk Land.--In the mountain areas of the Aures, of Kabylie, and a few other isolated spots, Berbers practiced a form of sedentary agriculture. These were the regions of the olive and the fig, with the land divided into small individually-fenced plots and a tenure system called melk. The melk form of land tenure has often been defined as a system of private property in the western sense of the word, but this is not entirely true, because in order to sell an individual plot permission of every member of the extended family was required. Even if this permission was forthcoming it could be revoked at any time within a year if only one member changed his mind. Inheritance was by all the children, so that the ownership of melk land became extensively fragmented after generations of being divided and sub-divided. It was not unusual for six individuals to own one olive tree or for one peasant to own a piece of land as small as a piece of paper, but this fragmentation of ownership did not prevent exploitation in reasonably sized fields. Individuals who owned squares too small to work separately often joined their squares together in a larger plot which could be farmed as one unit. This device was similar to the modern corporation where the ownership of one enterprise may be divided into thousands of shares, except that in the case of melk land the shares represented specific plots.

Since there was great shame attached to selling melk land which had been in the family for generations and since plots were so frequently held by several people, land sales under the melk system were virtually unknown. Only if a man had cleared land himself and developed its productivity from nothing was he allowed to sell it without legal restrictions or the social pressures mentioned. In all other cases, melk land was considered the heritage of the family and the clan, though privately held by the individuals.¹

¹ Andre Nouschi, pp. 89-93.

Azel land.--The Turkish governors who had a limited political control of the Algerian Tell at the time of the French conquest personally owned some of the best land in Algeria. This land was in the form of large estates, (Azal) either worked by neighboring tribes who furnished obligatory labor in place of payment of taxes, or it was sharecropped by tenants under the moslem khammes system. Under this system the landowner supplied the seed, tools and animals of **traction** while the tenants did all the work in **return** for one-fifth of the crop. Khammes was more of a social institution than an economic one. The man-to-man relationship of landlords and tenant was strictly delineated by unwritten laws enforced by social pressures. If there was a crop failure the landlord had to carry the tenant through the difficult times; at the time of Moslem festival Aid Seghir the tenant was to receive a slaughtered lamb or sheep. As long as the tenant and his family satisfactorily carried on the farming operations their position on the farm was permanent and could be passed on from generation to generation. Besides the large properties of the Turkish governors there were other large estates owned by wealthy men who also exploited them on the khammes system.¹

(2) Changes with and after the French land grab

Between 1830 and 1871 the French Government expropriated much land which had belonged to the natives and offered it to French colonists. First to change ownership were the private estates of the Turkish governors; then came the lands of the religious foundations which had been set up by Moslems for charitable purposes. The takeover of these lands was simple, but it required a little longer to devise schemes for sequestration of the arch land. One

¹ Ibid., p. 79.

scheme was called cantonnement. Since the native agriculture was so extensive, it was argued that a tribe could be restricted to part of its former land and it would still be able to support itself by using more intensive methods. The land that was not considered necessary to the tribe was taken away and given to French colonists.

During the 1860's a number of spectacular forest fires destroyed thousands of hectares of forest which had been given to private concessionaires. The fires were blamed on the tribes who pastured their animals in these forests. Partly as punishment, and partly as a precaution, all trespassing in these forests was forbidden. This caused great hardship on those tribes which had been dependent on forest land for subsistence. The last big land grab was the one in 1871 when several hundred thousand hectares were taken away from the tribes in the Kabyle and in the department of Constantine as punishment for rebellion.¹

In general the French landowners preferred a system of hired labor instead of khammes mainly because they could control the workers more rigorously in switching over to European methods of agriculture than would have been possible with share-croppers who had a little more of the decision-making function. This change from share-cropping to hired labor continued all during the French occupation, so that by 1954 khammes had virtually disappeared. The peasant's new position as a rural proletarian was now less secure than it had been under the feudal khammes system.

The melk lands, however, remained largely in native hands because they were marginal mountainsides not suitable for commercial agriculture. The French did not want them. The tenure system for these lands today is essentially the same as it was when the French came to Algeria.

¹Ibid., pp. 380-447

Emperor Napoleon-the-Third of France was sympathetic towards the Arabs and wanted to help them modernize their culture, but in trying to help them he inadvertently struck one of the hardest blows against them. This was the Senatus-consulte of 1863 which forced the native Arabs to settle in villages under a system of individual private property. This destroyed the power of the tribal chieftains because the villages were not organized on a tribal basis. In 1870 when the Third Empire fell, the new republican government took control of Algerian affairs north of the Sahara from the military and gave it to the colonists. From this time on, the colonists managed northern Algeria in their own selfish interest. They had important connections in Paris, both in the French Assembly and in the business world and when it came to Algerian policy, they usually had their way.^{1,2}

Phylloxera and immigration.--Immigration was encouraged, and at times it was heavy, especially at the end of the nineteenth century when the phylloxera blight hit the vineyards of France. Thousands of wine-growers migrated to Algeria where they planted new vineyards unaffected by the blight. Immigrants came from France, Spain and Italy, but the population of European descent never reached more than ten percent of the total because the native Moslem population of Algeria expanded so rapidly that immigration was completely overshadowed.

The colonists acquire most of the best land.--French settlement policy had been to encourage small peasant holdings by the European immigrants, but this policy was never very successful. Only a minority of the immigrants stayed on the land.³ The good land became concentrated into large estates.

¹Ibid., pp. 380-447

²Charles Gallagher, The United States and North Africa, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963) pp. 62-67.

³Larnaude, pp. 120-122.

(C) Land Resource Information

(1) Land availability

By independence, Algeria's 10 million hectares of tillable land was divided between 22 thousand French holdings, which comprised 2.7 million hectares of the very best land in the country and 630 thousand peasants whose little farms comprised 7.3 million hectares of infertile, remote, rather badly eroded land. There were a few large farms held by Algerians.

The peasants and their families, most of whom have holdings of less than 10 hectares had, on the average, less than two hectares per capita. In any one crop year, half of that land was likely to be fallow. The French holdings averaged 125 hectares in size. Nevertheless, when the French families involved, plus the 375 thousand workers associated with their farms, plus the workers' families, are credited to the French holdings, the average land per person works out to have been about 2 hectares in the French sector.¹ The difference in productivity per worker in the two sectors is attributable to the vast differences in the quality of the land involved and in the management skills and capital applied to the land.

The 2.8 million acres of land nationalized after the revolution represents about a third of the farm land in Algeria. The land which was destined for reform had essentially one characteristic--it was owned by the European colonists. Only a small minority of the land which was destined for reform was owned by native Algerians.

¹Keith B. Griffin, "Algerian Agriculture in Transition," Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 27, No. 4, November 1965, pp. 232-235.

(2) Classification

Algerian soil and water resources have been intensively surveyed. Physiographic maps with a contour interval of 20 meters, as well as detailed aerial photographs are available at the Institut Géographique National in Paris. From these and other sources, there is a basis for assessing the relative agricultural value of different plots, although this was not necessary in the Algerian land reform.

(3) Identification and titling

Cadastral information was of high quality and readily available during French rule. I imagine it is still of high quality, but I'm not so sure it would be readily available except to people with proper clearance at this time. I am not familiar with the titling procedure. The historical and legal basis for property claims were discussed briefly earlier in this paper.

(D) Rural Production and Productivity

Probably 60 percent of the Algerian population depends directly on agriculture for a living. During some years in the 1960's, agricultural products have amounted to more than 75 percent of total Algerian exports by value. Since virtually all agricultural exports in the past have come from the large commercial farms, the continued productivity and efficiency of these farms will be important to Algeria in the future.

The overwhelming majority of people who make their living in agriculture in Algeria are peasant farmers or nomadic herders. As subsistence farmers and herders they are of low productivity, (with a per capita income of some \$60) not well integrated into the market economy, and diversified enough to survive on the land. The commercial farms (the present socialized sector) are well integrated

into the market economy and specialized as outlined in the introduction. Compared to the subsistence sector, the commercial farms are highly productive.

Despite the substantial labor resource devoted to agriculture, undernourishment is common. Average daily calorie consumption is slightly under 2,000 in rural areas, higher in the cities, but with both groups deficient in animal proteins.¹

(E) Rural Population, Employment and Underemployment

Gallagher cites natality range in Algeria as from 40-50/1,000.² With death rates well below 20 per thousand, this suggests population growth rates approaching 3 percent per year.

Griffin estimates that 58 percent of the theoretically available man years of labor in Algeria are unoccupied. He estimates the labor force in traditional agriculture as 2.1 million persons, of whose man years, 75 percent are unoccupied. He estimates the labor force in the socialized sector as 375 thousand persons, of whose man years, 60 percent are unemployed.³ Griffin states that in spite of "staggering" unemployment in the traditional sector, "Unfortunately, very little can be done immediately to transform the traditional sector. The socialist sector ... must receive first priority."⁴

¹Gallagher, p. 144.

²Ibid.

³Griffin, "Algerian Agriculture in Transition," op. cit., p. 242. Although these estimates are higher than the official estimates, both sets of estimates on unemployment suggest that absorption of additional labor into the agricultural sector in Algeria is not going to be easy.

⁴K.B. Griffin, Algerian Agriculture During the First Two Years of Transition Towards Socialism, Algiers: U.S. Agency for International Development, June, 1964, pp. 6, 19.

While Griffin's statement could be brushed off with the comment that it simply represents the world-wide tendency among agricultural economists to be more concerned about the welfare of farms than about the welfare of farm people, they still represent accurately the ubiquitous North African attitude that the best path for agricultural development is through the socialist sector. This attitude results in a wholesale neglect of programs for peasant farmers and peasant farms which lie without the socialist framework.

(F) Income Distribution

Gallagher reports the 1960 per capita income in Algeria at \$200. From casual observation of presence of wrist watches, transistor radios, etc., workers on the commercial farms appear much better off than workers in the subsistence sector. Using data from the Statistical Service of the Ministry of Agriculture for 1964 and combining this with some of Griffin's data, it would appear that per capita income in the traditional sector is over \$60 and in socialized agriculture about \$125. Data gathered in 1964 on our case study farm near Cherchell will illustrate small variability of wages among people in the socialized sector and the nearby town, all of whose wages are higher than the equivalent returns to labor on most of the nearby subsistence of farms:

The members of the farm Benkheira Abdellah were paid according to the type of work they did. For ordinary unskilled labor the rate of pay was 6.42 new francs per day of which .15 francs was deducted for social security.¹ This pay category seemed to cover most of the jobs done on the farm. Tractor drivers and overseers received 8.00 new francs per day. The president was paid 10 new

¹The dinar became Algeria's monetary unit in April, 1964. It is at par with the new franc.

francs per day. This particular farm had its own mechanic who received 15 new francs per day. This relatively high wage was paid the mechanic only because he could make even more in a similar job in the city.

The adult seasonal workers were all paid the same 6.42 new francs per day which the regular members drew, a wage. On Benkheira Abdellah, teenage boys were also employed as seasonal workers at a wage of only 6.25 new francs per day.

For those fortunate enough to get it, virtually any type of off-farm work paid a higher wage than farm work. Both of the farm residents who worked for the highway department received 12 new francs per day. In the town, few people were willing to work for less than 20 new francs per day. Several people in the vicinity who were unemployed were heard to say that they would never work for the farm management committee because the wages were too low.

All farm members interviewed in a random sample of 14 families on this farm reported vegetable gardens. These (illegal) gardens are an additional source of income for the farm residents. All 14 families also reported keeping chickens, and many reported other livestock such as sheep, goats, and cows. A few were farming small plots of wheat and barley on isolated hillside plots of their socialized farm, another widespread, but supposedly illegal practice.

In spite of the differences in income distribution, the society on this farm was surprisingly egalitarian. Almost every house had either two or three rooms, most of the gardens were the same size, every family had at least two chickens. The only wealth which was restricted to a few was the larger livestock, but no family had more than a modest number of cows, goats or sheep. Incomes were not far apart. The president received only about a dollar a day more than the teenage seasonal worker. The bonus in February, 1964 was distributed equally to all members.

In 1963, members of farms in the socialized sector throughout Algeria received a fixed bonus of 230 or 110 new francs, depending on a rough estimation of whether or not their farm was profitable.¹

(G) Supplementary Services and Supplies

(1) Information

Before 1943, the French had developed a series of biologically-oriented experiment stations in various parts of the country, associated with various agencies. In 1943 at Maison Carrée, a research institute was organized, primarily for crop research, under the general direction of what was the equivalent of a ministry of agriculture. In 1953, the Paris Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique took over the management of the Algerian experiment stations and the research institute and began to carry on some agricultural economics and rural sociology work at the research institute under a Laboratoire des Recherches Economiques et Sociologiques located on the campus of l'Ecole Nationale d'Agriculture d'Alger in Maison Carrée.²

In addition to the above institutions, namely the Ministry of Agriculture, FAO, a number of consulting firms, etc. carry out research in agriculture.

The tradition of separating extension services from regulation and control activities has not developed in Algeria as it has, for instance, in the United States. Extension type activities have long been in existence, both

¹Griffin, "Algerian Agriculture in Transition," op. cit., p. 242.

²Conversation with Mr. Bermarr, Head of the Centre National de la Recherche Agronomique at El Harrach, March, 1966.

before and after land reform, but they have been tied closely with regulatory offices and thus have slightly different orientation than most Americans are used to. Their services have been oriented almost exclusively towards commercial agriculture. The formal organization conducting most extension work before the struggle for independence is discussed below, (section II-H).

(2, 3) Credit and supplies

The material on credit and supplies is integrated with section "H" on Peasant Associations and Power.

(4) Infrastructure

Pre-independence Algeria was blessed with a good infrastructure in terms of transportation facilities, irrigation, telephones, electricity, etc. This was especially the case with reference to commercial agriculture. Figure 3 shows the articulations between our case study socialized farm and the national highway system. Substantial blocks of this 1,244 hectare farm have been shaped for gravity irrigation, (marked by the diagonal lines on our map).

Griffin suggests that there may be 250 thousand hectares of land equipped or partially equipped for irrigation, but that little more than half this amount is actually irrigated. Most of the irrigated land is in the socialized sector. Eight major irrigation works provide water for one third of the total irrigated land, while the rest of the irrigation water comes from 200 small irrigation facilities.¹

(5) Crop procurement and marketing


Some remarks on crop procurement and marketing are found in the following section.

¹Griffin, "Algerian Agriculture in Transition," op. cit., p. 238.

 Irrigated land

FARM BENKHEIRA ABDELLAH

KEY

- | | |
|---|---|
| Farm boundary  | Foot path  |
| Main road, paved or gravelled  | River or stream  |
| Farm lane  | Moslem cemetery  |
| Field boundary  | Beach  |

METERS
0 200 400 600




Figure 3.--The irrigated land of Benkheira Abdellah

(H) Antecedents to Associations and the Power Structure
in Socialized Agriculture

Wine production and marketing cooperatives

For many decades wine has been the leading agricultural product of Algeria, and cooperative wineries in Algeria have a history going back before World War I. The smaller producers, who could not afford to build their own private wineries and who were at a great disadvantage when they sold their grapes to the land owners with their own private facilities, formed cooperatives. Each member bought a share or shares in the enterprise. A building was constructed in a centrally located spot, equipment was installed, and a wine specialist and necessary auxiliary help were hired. In the Cherchell arrondissement where our case study farm was located, there were several of these cooperative wineries servicing the many small farms. Our farm was large enough to have its own winemaking and wine storage facilities.

Algerian Provident Society

During the latter part of the colonial era, machinery cooperatives and other types of agricultural supply and marketing cooperatives had developed in some sections of Algeria. In the Cherchell area, however, these functions were performed by a quasi-governmental cooperative called The Algerian Provident Society, (Société Algérienne de Prévoyance--SAP). This cooperative was derived from an earlier one formed in 1893 as the Indigenous Provident Society, (Société Indigène de Prévoyance--SIP) to help the native sharecroppers and peasants on the non-French land by means of loans for planting, harvesting, debt consolidation, and disaster. In 1937 a section was added to SIP solely to buy the principal cereals from the producers and move them to the channels

of consumption. From 1942 to 1947 SIP was charged with the distribution of the prime necessities rationed because of the war.¹

In 1952 the name of SIP was changed to Algerian Provident Society (SAP) and the functions of the organization were expanded to cover all agriculture, both Moslem and French. SAP became a cooperative for doing custom work with machinery, for buying and selling cereals, for doing extension work, and for supplying credit. By 1956 the SAP of the Cherchell arrondissement had eight tractors available for custom work, a repair shop, a large garage, and all the other subsidiary equipment necessary for providing machine service. In the last years before independence the services of SAP were still further extended, making SAP the most important service institution for the agriculture of the Cherchell area.²

The Society for Rural Development

The Society for Rural Development or Secteurs d'Amelioration Rural, (SAR) was set up in early 1946 to attempt to help the peasants of the traditional subsistence agriculture to increase their production enough to satisfy their needs and have some extra produce to sell on the market. The peasants were grouped into production cooperatives, each with a technical advisor who lived with them and helped them in their day-to-day farming operations. There were two different kinds of cooperative units. One was a cooperative settlement where the peasants put their properties at the disposition of the SAR and worked on them individually; the other was a collective where all worked together. In either case the cooperative was run as one unit with complete financial autonomy

¹ Anonymous, Monographie sur Cherchell, unpublished typewritten report (Orleansville: Prefecture, 1960), p. 72.

² Ibid, p. 73.

and one cropping plan. The members of these SAR cooperatives meeting in general assembly, elected a management committee composed of a president and four members who set up the work schedule and introduced the cooperators to modern agricultural methods. A technical counselor appointed by the government made certain that the cropping plan, worked out by the management committee and approved by the general assembly of the cooperators, was carried out.

A contract was drawn up between the president of the management committee and the cooperator. In the case of the cooperative settlement the contract required the cooperator to follow the cropping plan and methods recommended and to work the number of days necessary for efficient production. He also was required to make the harvest according to instructions. The SAR for its part of the contract was required to put at the disposition of the cooperator all that was necessary to help him both technically and morally. The Native Provident Society (SIP) was the bank which provided short-term loans for buying livestock and machinery and long-term loans for improvements to the farm property. This system, set up in 1946, was very much like some of the structure of the socialized agriculture specified seventeen years later in the Decrees of March, 1963.

By the end of 1948, 103 SAR units had been set up with a total membership of 75,000 families. This relatively small beginning seemed promising; production had doubled in the areas affected. But with the departure of Chataigneau from the governor-generalship in Algiers, the political climate changed. SAR lost its autonomy, and in 1956, the budget was reduced to less than half what it had been in 1948.¹

¹ Jean Guillot, "L'Amelioration du niveau de vie des populations rurales en Algerie" Tiers Monde (Special number entitled Problèmes de L'Algérie indépendante, Francois Perroux, ed.), Presses Universitaires de France, 1963, pp. 26-34.

III. LAND REFORM PROGRAM

Land Reform and the Origins of Self-Management

Algerian nationalism and revolution

Today's Algerian land reform is a phenomenon of the nationalist revolution. The need for land reform, however, was one of the underlying causes of the revolution in the first place.

Algerian nationalism developed only after decades of French occupation, and even then it developed gradually. For many years after the revolt of 1870, there was virtually no resistance by the Moslems to French rule and to the exploitation by the immigrant minority. During the First World War many natives fought in the French army and as a result they were given some of the rights of French citizenship. Between the World Wars the Moslems began to press for more rights. At first they worked towards a goal of assimilation into a larger French community, but over the years they became disillusioned at the French reluctance to share equally either political or economic control. In November, 1954 the Algerian revolution began, which after a long struggle, ended with complete independence in July, 1962.¹

¹Gallagher, pp. 92-98.

Assembly at Tripoli

In June, 1962, just before independence, leaders in the Algerian independence movement held a convention in Tripoli to lay down the guide lines for the Algerian economy after the French bowed out. The meeting known as Assembly at Tripoli (Assises de Tripoli) decided on a socialist agriculture and nationalization of the land belonging to the French.^{1,2}

The Yugoslav model

After the Nazi defeat and as the communist government was formed in Yugoslavia there was less centralization of bureaucratic power than in the Soviet Union. Management of the collective farms and other state enterprises was left at a local level and came to be known as self-management. This idea appealed to the Algerians, because an ideology of the Algerian revolution was the edification of the peasant, a case of the meek inheriting the earth. With self-management the peasants were to control the farms with a minimum of interference or direction by the government.³

Flight of the French landowners

In June, July and August of 1962 virtually all the French farmers of Algeria abandoned their farms and fled to France. The government was unprepared to cope with the resulting chaos. Many of the French had sabotaged tractors and

¹Gallagher, pp. 136-137.

²Conversation with Kemal Bereksi, March, 1964.

³"La Yugoslavie", Le Peuple, (March 4, 1964), p. 7.

other machinery before they left, but damage was also done by Algerians who seized some of the abandoned properties. Some tractors were sold for scrap; crops were sold, and the money was spent without providing for payment of the farm expenses.¹

The Algerian Government invited the departed French owners back to their farms to be "reintegrated into the farming operations" if they were willing to share the administration and management with their employees. None accepted this invitation.

Emergency measures of late 1962

The military government issued a decree which set up an agency called "National Bureau for Protection and Management of Vacant Properties." This was an emergency measure to prevent further loss and destruction of property on the abandoned farms. In October, another decree prohibited all transactions pertaining to abandoned properties and made illegal retroactively all transactions which had taken place since the beginning of the year. Some of the owners who had fled to France had rented or sold their properties to Algerians in what the government called "an attempt to take advantage of the situation and to cheat the workers out of their rights." According to the law, fraud occurred in each case where a sale or rental of the property had taken place with the express purpose of preventing the workers from taking over the management of the farm.²

¹René Dumont, Des conditions de la réussite de la réforme agraire en Algérie" Tiers Monde (Special number entitled Problemes de L'Algerie independente, Francois Perroux, ed.) , Presses Universitaires de France, 1963, pp. 79-81.

²Le Peuple, "L'Autogestion avant les decrets de mars", Le Peuple (March 20, 1964), p. 3.

The formation of management committees

In the summer of 1962 thousands of peasants found themselves without work because their employers had fled the country and abandoned their farms. The workers on these farms "spontaneously" took over the management of the farms and continued operations cooperatively. They were given help in organizing by the Algerian Labor Union (UGTA) or by the National Army of Liberation (ALN). In those areas where the ALN had been strong, the peasants had acquired political experience in this organization so that setting up a management structure for the farm was more easily accomplished.¹ The Algerian Government also seems to have had a hand in this. For example, Mr. Charfa, a director in the hierarchy of socialized agriculture in Cherchell traveled around from farm to farm, helping the peasants set up self-management committees.

On October 6, 1962 the National Bureau for Protection and Management of Vacant Properties issued a circular spelling out the conditions under which the French owners could return to their vacant properties. The owner was required to be willing to share the management with the management committee. But this "management committee" did not legally exist at the time. The decree of October 22, 1962 legalized the management committees and required that every farm with 10 or more workers form a management committee of at least 3 workers.

Recommendations of René Dumont

In December, 1962 the Algerian Government called on the French agronomist René Dumont, together with two other agricultural specialists, to make a study of Algerian agriculture and recommend specific measures for handling the emergency created by the sudden departure of the French farmers. After

¹Jean-Francois Kahn, "L'Expérience de l'autogestion dans les campagnes algériennes", Le Monde (December '0, 1963), p. 1.

eight months of study, Dumont presented a detailed list of recommendations, both long term and short term.

For the long term he suggested a reorganization of the product mix on the northern fringes of Algeria, replacing the wine by table grapes, grape juice, raisins and oranges. For the high plains he suggested a greater emphasis on a livestock economy based on forage crops grown in rotation with wheat, instead of the present monoculture of wheat interspersed only by fallow every other year.

Dumont considered the rapid reestablishment of governmental authority the most important single factor in the short term solution of the agricultural problem.

He thought that responsibility for the day-to-day on-the-farm decisions should be placed in one person, but that the masses of farm workers should also be able to express their opinions. To administer the farms abandoned by the French, Dumont recommended a semi-autonomous organization within the Ministry of Agriculture, to be called The National Office of Agrarian Reform or Office National de la Reforme Agraire, (ONRA). This was to have a nationwide structure from the headquarters in Algiers down to the arrondissement level, with two branches, one technical, the other financial.¹

(A) Legislation--The Decrees of March, 1963²

A number of emergency decrees had attempted to bring order to the rapidly deteriorating situation. The culmination of these decrees was a series issued in March, 1963, known as the Decrees of March. These decrees established

¹René Dumont, "Des conditions de la réussite de la réforme agraire en Algérie," Tiers Monde, (Special number entitled Problèmes de L'Algérie indépendante, Francois Perroux, ed.), Presses Universitaires de France, 1963, pp. 79-81.

²For the full text of the decrees see Appendix.

"self-management" as the only legal system of control of abandoned properties. The "self-management" concept combined elements of local cooperation with strong direction from central government.

Decrees of March 18.--Decree 63-88 of March 18 provided for the regulation of vacant properties. Article 1 of this decree as officially translated follows.

Are considered as Vacant Properties the following enterprises and establishments of industrial, commercial, craft, financial, mining, agricultural or sylvicultural nature:

- (a) Those which, at the date of publication of the present decree, have been certified as vacant or which stand idle or fail to function normally without good cause;
- (b) Those which, subsequent to the date of publication of the present decree, fall idle or fail to function normally without good cause.

This decree set the stage for the transfer from private to public ownership of virtually all major productive properties including both grande domains and the main marketing institutions serving them.

Decree 63-90 of March 18 set up the National Office of Agrarian Reform (ONRA) as suggested by Dumont.

Decree of March 22.--The decree of March 22, 1963 described in detail the organization by which each farm would be managed. Responsibility for the day-to-day decisions was given to a president who was indirectly chosen by the general assembly of the workers through the intermediate devices of the council of workers and the management committee. The general assembly was to approve the annual program of production and the division of work set up by the management committee. Thus, the workers could at least express an opinion on the management of the enterprise and get the feeling of partnership and the sense of belonging.

Decree of March 28.--The decree of March 28, 1963 determined the rules of income distribution for the enterprises of the socialist sector. This established the concept of profit sharing as a further incentive to the workers. Provisions were made for profits to be shared by the government and workers, but no definite statement was made as to what the respective shares were to be. The profits kept by the government were to be used for replacing old capital, for new investments, and for the establishment of a national fund for employing unemployed people in public works projects.

Nationalization

On October 2, 1963 the abandoned farms were officially nationalized. Theoretically the families who worked the land were supposed to control it and the other factors of production. Bachir Boumaza (Minister of Economics) is quoted in the Alger républicain of March 3, 1964 as saying, "Socialism is the return of the means of production into the hands of the workers."

It was originally assumed that agrarian reform would apply only to the large farms, but at the time of independence most of the thousands of French farmers with properties smaller than 100 hectares also abandoned their farms. These small farms were nationalized along with the large ones. Since they seemed too small for efficient exploitation under socialist self-management, the government regrouped many of these into larger collectives. Thus, there are two basic patterns in socialized Algerian agriculture, the grand domaine and the collective. The grand domaine was a large farm before independence and was managed as a unit at that time. The collective is a consolidation of small farms into one large unit after nationalization. (For example, a socialized farm near Cherchell, now known as Cherchell East, was formerly 42 small farms.) The grand domaine, however, is the predominant type in Algeria's socialized agriculture.

(B) Institutional Arrangements

The lines of authority in Algerian socialist agriculture run directly from the president of Algeria to each farm. Thus it is possible for people on many levels--from the Ministry of Agriculture to the assembly of workers--to have a part in the decision-making process. A block diagram showing the structure as it related to our case study farm in 1964 appears in Figure 4.

Ministry of Agriculture--The Ministry of Agriculture, headed by a cabinet-level minister, decides on overall agricultural policy, and its technical staff originates the national agricultural plan.

National Office of Agrarian Reform (ONRA)--The National Office of Agrarian Reform was set up as a semi-autonomous agency within the Ministry of Agriculture. It was charged with organizing the management of the farms abandoned by the French.

At the head of the National Office of Agrarian Reform is the Secretary General who follows the directives laid down by the Ministry of Agriculture, but who is free to make his own decisions within the framework of overall government policy. The Secretary General's Office draws on technical advice from the staff groups in the Ministry of Agriculture and from its own staff offices. The general secretariat is charged with the realization of the government's program of agrarian reform.

Departmental Office of ONRA--In each of the departments (states) of Algeria there is a commissioner of the National Office of Agrarian Reform who administers at the departmental level and reports to the Secretary General in Algiers. This departmental commissioner has an important part of the




Figure 4 -- The formal power structure in Algerian socialized agriculture as it relates to Farm Bankheira Abdellah

decision-making power. A circular letter (dated October 29, 1963 and signed by the commissioner at Al Asnam) reads as follows: "It is formally prohibited to change the cropping plan which has been set up in cooperation with the technical services of the department without a written order signed by the commissioner." This letter also indicates that there are technicians on the staff of the commissioner who take part in management decisions.

The commissioners in both the departments of Algiers and Al Asnam are burdened with a large part of the decision-making and executive work in the organization below them. The same may be the case in other departments. At the time of a visit to the Maison Carré office the commissioner for the department of Algiers was immersed in all the details of reactivating a chick hatchery which had been abandoned by its owner. At the same time a steady stream of people with problems from the farms was flowing through his office. Many decisions which could have been made at lower levels were passed up to the departmental office.

At the Arrondissement level.--The National Office of Agrarian Reform has two parallel organizations at the arrondissement (county) level. One is in charge of technical matters, and the other has a business function.

The technical branch at the arrondissement level is presided over by the delegate of the National Office of Agrarian Reform. This office is analogous to a county agent's office in the United States, except that the delegate is an agricultural specialist whose power goes far beyond that of merely providing technical advice. Every morning various presidents and directors of farms in the arrondissement assemble around the delegate's desk to present their technical problems and receive recommendations and orders. There is a tendency for the people from the farms in the immediate vicinity of town to come to the office much more frequently than those from the far ends of the arrondissement.

The delegate at ChercHELL had drawn up a five year plan for agricultural development in the arrondissement. This plan was within the structure of the national plan but provided evidence that a share of local decision-making belonged to the delegate. His office was housed in a former store on the main street and was very simply furnished with only a desk, a table, a couple of chairs, a typewriter, some shelves for filing, and an old automobile seat.

The business branch of the ONRA at the arrondissement level is called the Cooperative Center for Agrarian Reform (CCRA). CCRA was derived from the Algerian Provident Society, (SAP) one of the most important institutions in preindependence Algerian agriculture. When incorporated into the National Office of Agrarian Reform, SAP kept most of its old functions except that it no longer serviced the peasant farmers through its extension and credit personnel, who were transferred en mass to become "directors" in the socialized sector. This action, in one blow, completely destroyed the extension service.¹ In addition, CCRA became the bank for the socialist agricultural sector and maintains a repair service and replacement parts depot.

When a farm of the socialist sector sells some of its products, the cash received is deposited with Cooperative Center for Agrarian Reform. As expenses have to be paid, checks are written against the farm's account with CCRA. Since labor is the largest single expense item in Algerian socialist agriculture, one of the most important functions of CCRA is to audit the fortnightly payroll as it is handed in by the farm directors. The payroll check is then made out and is cashed at the post office by the president and director of the farm. The workers are paid in currency.

¹Griffin, "Algerian Agriculture in Transition," op. cit., p. 235.

The Cooperative Center for Agrarian Reform has inherited all the resources of the old Algerian Provident Society (SAP):¹ its suite of offices, its large garage and shop fully equipped for repair jobs, its inventory of farm machinery, its warehouse, and its trucks for hauling wheat and fertilizer. Under the French as a quasi-governmental cooperative, SAP provided purchasing, marketing, and credit services to the commercial sector of Algerian agriculture and was supposed to introduce modern methods to the traditional subsistence sector. Now it has been converted to an even more important position in the development of the new socialist sector.

The director of the Cooperative Center for Agrarian Reform at Cherchell shares the administration of the program in the arrondissement with the delegate of the National Office of Agrarian reform. The director's authority is in business and financial decision-making while the delegate concerns himself with the technical problems.

Decision-makers on the farm.--Each farm in the socialist sector has a director who is appointed by the National Office of Agrarian Reform and paid by it to represent its interests on the farm. The director is a transmitter of orders and a record keeper who relays information from the farm to the government and vice versa. The director is an ex officio member of the management committee with the right to vote , but his is his only official title to a share in the decision-making.²

According to the Decrees of March, the president is not much more than a figurehead who presides at meetings and who countersigns

¹Except that half of SAP's personnel which fled to France in 1962.

²See Appendix, Decree No. 63-95, March 22, 1963, Sub-section IV, the Director.

documents and represents the enterprise in external relations,¹ but at Benkheira Abdellah he makes most of the day-to-day decisions in cooperation with the local ONRA delegate and the CCRA director.

The Decrees of March give virtually all the decision making on the farm to the five-member management committee. Such functions of management as drawing up the annual program of equipment, production, and marketing are specifically assigned to the management committee, as is the organization of the work schedule and solving production problems.² Actually all these decisions are made by the president of Benkheira after consultation with the local ONRA officials. From October, 1963 to the end of February, 1964 only two meetings of the management committee had been recorded. On the other farms in the arrondissement the president had also taken over most of the decision-making power assigned to the management committee by decree.

The most important function of the worker's council is its choice of the management committee. Other decisions made by the workers' council are the purchase and sale of equipment, medium and long term loans, and the admission or expulsion of members of the farm.³ During the time of the field study the council did not meet, nor was there any evidence that it had ever met.

Except for its right to elect the council (and through it the management committee) the general assembly of workers has no decision-making power. It can approve or adopt the programs drawn up by the management committee, but this is a mere rubber stamping of the decisions made by others.⁴

¹See Appendix, Decree No. 63-95, March 22, 1963, Article 19.

²See Appendix, Decree No. 63-95, March 22, 1963, Sub-section III: The Management Committee.

³See Appendix, Decree No. 63-95, March 22, 1963, Sub-section II: The Worker's Council.

⁴See Appendix, Decree No. 63-95, March 22, 1963, Sub-section I: The General Assembly of Workers.

The planners and the officials who decide agricultural policy on the national level in Algeria also have authority to determine the program for each individual farm. Their objectives are as follows:

A just distribution of income and wealth.--A major goal of Algerian national policy-makers is equality of income and wealth distribution. Dissatisfaction with the great inequality of income and wealth was one of the root causes of the revolution. "It was the people who by their sacrifices and by their heroism drove out the foreign exploiter. It is the people who today demand punishment of the war profiteers and a more just distribution of the nation's wealth."¹

Socializing the land.--Closely related to the goal of equality of income distribution is that of socializing the land resource. President Ben Bella, speaking before the National Constituent Assembly on December 12, 1962 said:

To carve up the land and satisfy the petty bourgeois desire for private property is to refuse the modernization of our agriculture, to relegate thousands to famine, and deny to the country the possibilities of rapid and orderly reconstruction. The Algerian people were wise enough to guess the real intentions disguised under this phoney Agrarian Reform. They know that the land of Algeria is the indivisible property of all the inhabitants of the country, and that the only solution capable of giving each his bread tomorrow is to be found in work collectively organized and executed.²

Increased agricultural production.--Another goal of the government is increasing total production from the whole country, considering labor as

¹Ministry of Information, p. 39.

²Ibid., p. 29.

a free good. Labor is the only factor of production which is in virtually unlimited supply. Over two million men are underemployed in the subsistence sector of the rural economy.

Employing the greatest number of people.--Another goal of the planners is to employ the greatest number of people. The avowed purpose of the national fund for balanced employment is "to avoid that certain agricultural self-management concerns employ a few permanent workers when there are a large number of seasonal and unemployed workers in the vicinity," and to further "the absorption by the agricultural concerns of the greatest number of agricultural workers."¹

Creating capital.--The planners need capital for economic development. Profits generated by socialized agriculture are potentially one of the largest single sources of capital for Algerian economic development. It is the role of socialized agriculture to create these profits so necessary for capital formation.

Fully utilizing existing capital.--Since capital is a relatively scarce input in Algeria, a major goal is to conserve the capital in existence.

Encouraging decision-making at the farm level.--Ben Bella said on March 29, 1963, "There are two possible solutions open to us: Should management be entrusted to the State or to the workers? In fact there can be no hesitation. The principle of self-management calls for direct participation by the people in the economic management of the country."²

¹Ibid., p. 73.

²Ibid., p. 35.

(D) Program Implementation and Enforcement

(1) Redistribution of land ownership

The sole criterion for nationalization of land was abandonment. Practically all those who abandoned land were European colonists, although a few wealthy Algerians abandoned their farms also. As mentioned earlier, small plots which were abandoned were consolidated into "commercially viable" units approaching 1,000 hectares in size. After consolidation of the smaller vacant properties, the 3,000 resulting self-managed units averaged a little less than 1,000 hectares in size.¹ The new proprietors were usually former straw bosses and farm hands, although in a few cases, the leadership included a man who came down out of the hills with a loaded tommy-gun and asked to join the farm.

(2) Changes in the tenancy systems

By and large, land reform was a traumatic experience only for those who fled from Algeria. The workers left behind on the farms found things very much the same as they had in the days of the French owner. They worried that they might have to give up their "private plots" of barley and wheat and vegetables. And they were worried that their salary was sometimes late in arriving. When the salary payments got more than a few weeks behind, the workers complained that they "didn't understand" socialism.

(3) Colonization

Colonization of virgin lands was not part of this program.

(4) Consolidation and enclosure

As discussed earlier, consolidation of the smaller farms took place during nationalization of the vacant lands.

(5) Classification, identification and titling

No soil survey or cadastral work was necessary for the implementation of this program. As mentioned earlier, Algeria already had a strong cadastral program, and it was merely necessary to nationalize the abandoned lands.

¹Griffin, "Algerian Agriculture in Transition," op. cit. p. 234.

(E) Financial Aspects Related to Expropriation

We corresponded with the owner of the case farm who indicated that he was hoping to be compensated for his property, but that he was unclear as to what proportion of its value to expect or when to expect it. At the time of our field work, the question of compensation did not seem to be much on people's minds.

A recent inquiry discloses that this issue still has not been settled partly because it involves a large amount of money which should be paid in foreign exchange and, partly because the settlement of this issue would "create a precedent for seized properties of other countries." Probably the issue will never be settled.

In that the land is government owned now, there is no problem of peasant or worker repayment for the land. However, according to Decree Number 63-98 issued on the 28th of March, 1963 the annual revenues generated by a self-managed enterprise are to be divided into two categories: one payable to the national community and one due to the workers of the particular enterprise. It is not stated specifically what relative percentages are to go to each, but conversations with farm presidents suggested that this might be 50-50. The government's share of the annual revenues constitutes a kind of return to ownership.

Of the payments which go to the government, some may be used for the redemption of financial liabilities incurred by the enterprise. The major part of the government's share is to be used in an investment fund and in a national fund for balanced employment.

(F) Supplementary Measures

This section will examine briefly the main supplementary measures for servicing the socialized farms in Cherchell as they existed in 1964.

Cooperative Center for Agrarian Reform

Farm machinery.--After reform, the farm machinery inventory which belonged to the SAP mentioned earlier became the property of the Cooperative Center for Agrarian Reform (CCRA). The machinery is now available to both the socialist and the private sectors at fixed rates. The larger socialized farms have their own tractors and associate machinery, but many depend completely on the CCRA because they have no machinery at all. Even those farms with equipment of their own, such as Benkheira Abdellah, don't have all that is necessary. CCRA will come to do the work for which the farm is not equipped, particularly combining the wheat and barley and baling straw.

Cooperative Center for Agrarian Reform also has a stock of replacement parts, but in early 1964 this service seemed inadequate, and many of the broken parts had to be repaired in the shop because new ones were not available. Replacement parts were not of the biggest problems in late 1963 and early 1964, especially since there was such a large variety of makes.

Seeds, fertilizers, and chemicals.--CCRA has continued the function of supplying cereal seed. It inherited this operation from its predecessor SAP. For similar reasons fertilizer and chemicals were also distributed by CCRA. It had the trucks and the personnel for this job.

Marketing of wheat and barley.--The prices of wheat and barley are set by the government just as they were in the past under the French. The Algerian

Provident Society (SAP) purchased the wheat and barley from the farms in pre-independence days. Now the Cooperative Center for Agrarian Reform (CCRA) has inherited this function from the SAP.

Cooperative for Supply and Marketing, Cherchell, (CAFC)

In late 1963 the Supply and Marketing Cooperative was organized in Cherchell to sell the fruits and vegetables of the socialist sector. The peasants of the private sector may also send their produce here if they wish. This cooperative also sells vegetable seed to the socialized farms. In early 1964 the cooperative occupied a small store fronting on a street near the market square at Cherchell. There was a simple office behind the display area. The produce was brought here for the local buyers to see. What was not sold in Cherchell was shipped to Algiers. The cooperative owned one medium-sized stake body truck for picking up produce at the farms.

Wine

In the Cherchell arrondissement the non-socialized cooperative wineries were still being used for making and selling the wine of the area. This was because there were not enough winemakers. As a result, operations had to be concentrated in particularly well-equipped wineries. These private wine cooperatives were in early 1964 on the verge of being taken over by the government for probable integration into the CCRA structure. By 1965 ONRA was marketing almost the entire Algerian wine crop.

Nationalization of the wine production and marketing cooperatives is particularly significant to Algerian socialist agriculture, since Algeria produces more tons of grapes annually than of any other agricultural commodity.

Private suppliers and purchasers

Gasoline, oil, and other petroleum products were being purchased from one of the large oil companies in early 1964. At that time there were still some private channels open for the purchase of seed, fertilizer, and chemicals. A price list circulated by a private firm in Blida offered a complete line of supplies including fertilizer, seed, chemicals, livestock feed specialties, and baby chicks. In Algiers there was a store offering this line of products on one of the main avenues.

Fruits and vegetables were marketed through private dealers and commission men before independence, and in Cherchell in early 1964 three private commission houses still operated. Even the socialized farms sometimes did business with private dealers. Several times the president at Benkheira Abdellah received bids from private dealers. The late crop of oranges in the spring of 1964 was sold in this way and not through the cooperative. In view of apparent ONRA policy, it was questionable whether these private dealers would be allowed to compete with the cooperative for long.

(G) Mobilization of the WorkersThe formal power structure on one farm

The method of mobilizing the workers in Algerian socialized agriculture is illustrated by our case farm and diagrammed in Figure 5. Within the framework of the structure set up by the Decrees of March, the roles ultimately played by individuals within the system are often influenced by the relative strengths of the personality, education, and experience of the people involved.




Figure 5 .--The formal power structure on Benkheira Abdellah

Non-member resident families.--We will consider the non-member resident families of the farm Benkheira Abdellah in two groups: (1) squatter families, and (2) seasonal worker families.

Squatter families.--There are some 90 families living on the farm whose heads either work off the farm or do not work at all. Those who work for the highway department are financially better off than the members because they get 12 francs for an eight hour day, as contrasted with 6.42 francs for a member, and yet they live on the farm rent free. The two squatters who answered our questionnaire both stated that they worked for the highway department. One of these had a half acre garden from which he got a substantial percentage of his family's sustenance. The other had a small garden, but he also had seven goats which he pastured on farm property. The farm takes in a large slice of the lower western slope of Chenoua Mountain. On this slope are scattered many huts inhabited by squatters living on the farm and either eking out an existence on their "private" plots and supplementing their income with off-the-farm work or depending almost wholly on off-farm work.

Seasonal worker families.--Some 45 seasonal workers work on the farm only during peak labor requirement periods. The rest of the time they either must work off the farm or must depend on their gardens or on the little plots of grain some of them cultivate on the "non-tillable" land of the farm. The chances that these people will some day find steady work on the farm are remote. Yet they may be better off living on the farm than they would be in some urban slum.

General assembly of workers.--All the regular workers on the farm are members of the general assembly which is supposed to meet every three months. To receive a membership card a worker must have worked on the farm at least six months. This provision virtually restricts membership to those who worked on the farm before nationalization, except for veterans of the resistance and victims of the repression who are given special privileged

status. Membership also entails other qualifications as to age, physical condition, and citizenship. It is analogous to being accepted into a union where the membership is restricted. Compared to the great mass of peasants in Algeria the regular members of the farm are a relatively small, privileged group. But the privilege requires that the members exhibit the ability to work regularly on a time schedule, an attribute that is by no means universal in Algeria.

Workers' council.--The general assembly of workers chooses the council. This intermediate organization was created to prevent the management committee from becoming bureaucratic and being cut off from its base, the general assembly. The council has the right to expel members of the farm and to take in new members. The right to expel may be reversed on appeal to the general assembly. If the council should fail in its duties in admitting new members, this right strangely enough is given to the director. (Under the self-management concepts this right logically belongs to the council). The council also decides on the buying and selling of equipment and on intermediate and long term loans. There was no indication of any activity by the council on this particular farm. It seemed to exist only on paper.

Farm management committee.--The management committee is chosen by the council of workers from among its own members. In turn the management committee elects one of its members president of the farm. The Decrees of March give most of the functions of management to the management committee, but on this particular farm during the first few months of 1964, the largest part of the management function had been usurped by the president.

President.--The president of the farm management committee is the head of the farm. He gives the orders and makes the day-to-day decisions. He lives in the house where the French owner lived in former times, but his authority is far from that of an owner, since he has to share responsibility for decision-making with the government. Moreover much of his power is really vested in the management committee of which he is only the head.

Director.--The director or "chargé de gestion" had the responsibility of representing the government on the farm. He is both a record keeper and a transmitter of information. He sends the facts and figures about the farm operations to the ONRA office in Cherchell, and similarly in the opposite direction channels the governmental directives and technical information from ONRA in Cherchell to the president and the farm management committee. On this particular farm he is often by-passed when the president confers directly with the ONRA delegate or with the director of CCRA in Cherchell.¹ The relative strength of president and director in the power structure is a function of their respective personalities, education and experience. The director is an ex-officio member of the farm management committee. He is hired by the government.

Leadership above the farm level

At first, positions of leadership in ONRA tended to go to those who had a good record of fighting or suffering during the revolution. Later on professional competency and political capacity became increasingly important.

¹ On another farm the director who represents the government makes all the management decisions which on Benkheira Abdellah are handled by the president. This is an example of flexibility of the system in adjusting to the relative strengths of the personalities involved.

(H) The Politics of Implementation

Land reform Algerian style was looked on with favor by a wide spectrum of the Algerian populace, not only because it seemed a logical way to cope with the exodus of the European owner-managers, but because it appealed to the Algerian's sense of social justice. The rightness and importance of doing social justice was so all-prevasive in Algerian society after the long struggle for independence, that occasionally Christian churches which decades ago had been converted from Mosques were re-converted to mosques to round out the accomplishment of social justice.

Local jockeying for power within the system began to be evident soon after socialization became formalized and national program objectives were consequently sometimes subverted. The program objectives were listed under III, C as: (1) A just distribution of income and wealth, (2) Socializing the land, (3) Increasing agricultural production, (4) Employing the greatest number of people, (5) Creating capital, (5) Fully utilizing existing capital, and (6) Encouraging decision-making at the farm level. In practice, objectives at the farm level often turned out to be rather different from the above national program objectives. The experience on the case study farm is illustrative. For instance, individuals within the system tend to think of job security as an important objective.

Job security

All the agrarian reform officials from the departmental commissioner down to the farm director are concerned with their job security and their chances for advancement in the hierarchy. These positions have an unusual

importance in the Algerian value system because they represent an achievement which most young men rate highly as a criterion of success.

The farm president is a slightly different position because he is not appointed, but chosen by a group. This means that he has to please this group, so he may feel less secure in his position than the appointed officials. With a new election he could drop back to ordinary membership on the management committee, or even further.

Maximum farm profits

From the departmental level down to the farms themselves another important goal is profit maximization. The departmental commissioner is interested in the success of the nationalized farms in his department because this reflects his own accomplishments. If most of the farms in his department show a profit he is more likely to advance to a higher position. For similar reasons the local agrarian reform officials want the farms to maximize profits. Profit maximization is the most obvious way to judge their effectiveness.

The farm president and management committee want to maximize profits on their farm and to keep these profits on the farm either as bonuses for themselves and the farm members, or as working capital for the farm enterprise.

Maximum individual income

Maximizing profit is only a secondary goal for farm members; maximizing their own incomes is their primary goal. For the peasant the idea of a bonus based on farm profit is complex and difficult to understand. There are other more obvious paths to greater income and besides the farm is so big it is hard for him to see how he alone can influence its profits. One path to

higher income for the member is to raise livestock privately and have a garden. This is completely within the control of the individual peasant and is for him a much more direct means. Another is to put the children to work for the farm.

On Benkheira Abdellah teenage boys (who are not members but who live on the farm) do much of the heavy labor at a lower salary than that of seasonal and regular workers. Apparently the president and the management committee want to keep these wages "at home."

Still another path to maximizing individual income of farm members is to reduce the number of members on the farm and thus share the same pie with fewer people. This device seems also to be in use on Benkheira Abdellah.

Farm appearance

A readily noticeable goal of the farm presidents and directors is to have neat appearing fields on their farm as compared to other farms and to have the satisfaction of being the first in the area to finish plowing, pruning, or seeding.

IV. EFFECTS OF LAND REFORM

Algerian land reform has done little for the peasant who was not tied into the system of commercial agriculture before reform. Rather, he may be even more neglected than he was during the heyday of the Society for Rural Development (SAR) after 1946. Interest had so centered on socialized agriculture that the peasant farmer majority is relatively neglected in government programs. Furthermore the tendency of present members of socialized units to limit membership may restrict access of the peasant farmer to the commercial sector as a common laborer.

(A) On Land Tenure Structure

The main changes in tenure structure as the result of Algerian land reform were the transfer of ownership to government and the consolidation of the smaller farms, (say those under a few hundred hectares) into units considered large enough, (usually at least a few hundred hectares in size). The reform didn't stimulate spontaneous changes in tenure in other sectors of the economy.

(B) On Production and Productivity

Agricultural production in the socialized sector does not appear to be increasing. In fact, in some products the socialized farms are having real difficulty holding production to former levels. Citrus fruit and vegetable

production have held up much better than wine. Those crops which require less technical knowledge to produce are less of a problem than wine which requires complicated procedures. Except for wine the decline in production has been moderate to non-existent.

Table I gives production figures for all of Algeria for selected crops. Since most of the production of the listed crops comes from the commercial sector before, during, and after nationalization. While these production figures don't make Algerian socialized agriculture look any more productive than the previous system, it should be noted that the socialization program helped to avoid a production disaster on these farms after the skilled European managers left, and from this point of view, it has been a success.

(C) On Rural Employment and Underemployment

On our case study farm as members dropped out they were not replaced because it was to the advantage of the members to limit membership so that there would be fewer workers to share the profits. On another farm the director said that the same work could be done with fewer men. The president on still another farm rationalized his idea of restricting membership differently. He said, "the seasonal workers don't want to become members. They are happier taking life easy on their little plots." As long as these farms are run on the basis of profit maximization there is little chance that they will provide employment for many more workers than at present.

There is little reason to feel that land reform in this case will either slow population growth rates or retard rural-urban migration rates.

TABLE I
 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN ALGERIA, 1959 TO 1968

Year	Event	Production in 1,000 metric tons				Index of crop production, 1957-59 average equals 100
		Wheat	Grapes	Citrus	Tomatoes	
1959	War	1,105	2,386	315	138	103
1960	War	1,497	2,035	347	154	110
1961	War	659	2,200	395	60	80
1962	Independence, Colons flee	1,495	2,300	420	110	104
1963	Nationalization of vacant properties	1,590	2,178	398	108	107
1964		1,162	2,206	464	113	95
1965		1,305	1,800	402	85	92
1966		630	1,700	401	82	69
1967		1,270	1,700	400	86	88
1968		1,500	1,600	380	103	92

Source: Indices of Agricultural Production, 1959-1968, Africa and the Near East, ERS Foreign 265, U.S.D.A., June, 1969, p. 9.

(D) On Income Distribution

Except for the former European colonists, those directly affected by land reform seem to have about the same sort of life they had before the reform took place. I know of no evidence to suggest that the worker in socialized agriculture today is much better off or much worse off than he was before reform took place. He may have more pride as a part owner of the land, but our interviewing disclosed that the workers had only the dimmest conception of their "participation" in land ownership on the socialized farm.

(E) On Services, Supplies, and Monopsony

One observer of Algerian agriculture reports that as of 1965 ONRA was marketing almost the entire Algerian wine crop. In 1965 ONRA and related marketing facilities, such as the nationalized transportation network were also marketing virtually all the cereals, olives, and dates, whether raised on socialized or private farms. A dual marketing system still exists for fresh fruits and vegetables in Algeria, with the 68 ONRA-related "Cooperatives d'Ecoulement" accounting for 30 percent of the fruits and vegetables marketed with the rest being sold through the municipal markets. About half of the fresh produce moves through open air markets with competing stalls.¹

The large and apparently increasing proportion of the crops of the socialized sector which move through the socialized marketing system suggests increasing progress toward a monopsony situation confronting the producers on the self-managed farms. It may be the most efficient system conceivable. But monopsony has its drawbacks.

¹ Conversation with Dr. Frank Moore, Ford Foundation.

(F) On Worker Participation in Decisions

One of the more cherished goals of the socialist planners is to encourage decision-making at the farm level. The degree of attainment of this goal varies from farm to farm, depending directly on the education, experience and personality of the chief decision-maker on each farm. It will require a long period of education and training before extensive decision-making will take place on all farms, but since we observed a very high order of decision-making taking place on one farm, it should be possible eventually on the others. On our case study farm more of the decision-making was done off-the-farm than was the case with other farms in the region.

(G) On Character of Rural Society

I don't think that Algerian agrarian reform can be credited with substantially changing the character of rural society.

V. CRITIQUE AND EVALUATION

The Problem of Inconsistent Goals

One of the most serious problems of the Algerian system of socialized agriculture is the problem of inconsistent goals. There are two important goal conflicts inherent in the system.

- A. The national goal of "employing the greatest number of people" conflicts with the local goals of "maximum farm profits" and "maximum individual income."
- B. The national goal of "increasing agricultural production" may conflict with the local goal of "maximum farm profits."

For discussion purposes, they will be identified as "goal conflict A" and "goal conflict B."

Goal conflict A

While national policy is to employ as many workers as possible, local administrators are more interested in increasing farm profits, and individual farm members are more interested in maximizing their own income.

Because of the high rate of unemployment in Algeria the national officials view labor as a virtually free input. Bachir Boumaza, the Minister

of Economics, speaking before the National Assembly on December 29, 1963 said:

Let us use our underemployed workers to create new agricultural capital in the depressed areas.... This will only be effective if we take massive action.... This will only be possible if the work projects do not cost too much.... Our effort will only be successful if we use little equipment on our work projects and we give the workers only food and lodging without wages.¹

The national officials want to use unemployed labor at as low a wage as possible so as to accumulate capital for economic development. They also feel that employing the unemployed is desirable for social and political reasons.

The local administrators on the other hand clearly would prefer to maximize profits even at the expense of limiting the number of workers hired. A circular letter from the local ONRA delegate at Cherchell stated, "The employment of seasonal labor must be solely according to the needs of the enterprise and the importance and urgency of the work."² The statement, "Do not hire labor unless it is absolutely necessary," was on the report of the management committee meeting at Benkheira Abdellah on September 3, 1963.³

The individual farm members are primarily interested in maximizing their own incomes. Insofar as these incomes are dependent on farm profits, this goal of the members is consistent with farm profit maximization, but the income maximization goal of the members on Benkheira Abdellah was also expressed in part by a tendency to reduce the membership of the farm. Through such a technique the profit bonus of the farm can be divided among fewer members, thus raising the bonus per member. But reducing the number of workers on the farm is in direct conflict with the national goal of employing the greatest number of people.

¹Bachir Boumaza, Alger republicain (December 31, 1963) p. 2.

²Unpublished letter from Hakem to the farm directors, (Cherchell: March 10, 1964).

³Typewritten report in farm office.

Figure 6 demonstrates how the national goal of "employing the greatest number of people" conflicts with the local goals of "maximum farm profits" and "maximum individual income".

Goal conflict B

At first glance goal conflict B (the national goal of increasing agricultural production versus the local goal of maximum farm profits) is not as obvious as goal conflict A.

The casual observer might feel that increasing agricultural production is a goal consistent with maximum farm profits. Such is not necessarily the case. In order to maximize profits, production should be increased to the point where an added unit of input just pays for itself. After this point each added unit of input costs more than the output that it produces. Maximizing production is then inconsistent with maximizing profits. If the Algerian government urges increased production up to the point of maximum profits, but no further, then local administrators will feel no conflict. But if the government pushes for production increases beyond this point (as it will if it is serious about the maximum production goal) there will be important internal stresses within socialized agriculture as a result of the conflict, see Figure 7.

The significance of the goal conflicts

These major goal conflicts existing between the national and local level could have serious undesirable affects: (1) they could interfere with effective communication between individuals at the local and the national level, (2) they could generate antagonisms between individuals at the local and




Figure 6.--Goal conflict A

The national goal of "employing the greatest number of people" conflicts with the local goals of "maximum farm profits" and "maximum individual income". The vertical scale represents wage rates and the horizontal scale, amount of employment. The line DD suggests the schedule of demand for labor by the farm Benkheira Abdellah. (It slopes downward because the marginal productivity of labor decreases as more is hired.) If all the workers on the farm and in the immediate vicinity who were willing to work for the fixed wage rate (6.42 per day) were hired, the number represented by OE would be hired and their wage would be OW. The line OL represents the number of people who are actually working on the farm at present. In this case the average wage rate OP is higher than OW because a bonus is now shared by the smaller number of workers.




Figure 7.--Goal conflict B

The national goal of increasing agricultural production conflicts with the local goal of maximum farm profits. This diagram illustrates the case of a hypothetical farm producing tomatoes on a hectare of land. The vertical scale on the diagram represents prices of tomatoes in cents per kilo, the horizontal scale, the quantity of tomatoes (in thousands of kilos) produced per hectare. The curved line MC is the schedule of costs for producing additional kilos. As production is increased on a fixed amount of land the cost of producing an additional unit of output first decreases, then gradually rises, and finally rises very rapidly. The straight line MR is a schedule of market prices received per additional kilo produced. This remains fixed, because the quantity of tomatoes produced on the hectare of land is not large enough to affect the market price. At a yield of 25,000 kilos on this hypothetical farm the cost of producing the last kilo is \$0.02. This is exactly the market price. It does not pay to produce more tomatoes than this.

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(3) they could hinder the planning process because of the failure of people at opposite ends of the power structure to have common objectives.

Doctrinaire Socialism

The Decrees of March are strongly influenced by a doctrinaire socialism which sometimes introduces non-rational choice criteria. Making changes on the basis of mere conformance to doctrine is not rational, whether then doctrine be socialism or capitalism.

Recommendations

In retrospect, the Algerian system of socialized agriculture seems, in general, to have been a fairly logical way of handling the sudden loss of management capacity which was vested in the European colonists. It is not without its problems, however, as noted above. A list of recommendation designed to improve the overall productivity of the socialized sector in agriculture is given below.

Mitigate the major goal conflicts

Reduce reliance on non-rational choice criteria and strive to increase
reliance on rational choice criteria

Re-examine and improve the management structure

Arrange for decision-making at the lowest possible level

Teach people how to make decisions for themselves

Provide in-service training for the farm executives

Educate workers at the meetings of the general assembly

Aim the youth program toward decision-making

Recognize and take advantage of peasants' desire to have
private livestock and gardens

Encourage budgeting

Reward better record keeping

Set up a suggestion system

Work with women

 On household management

 On family planning

Provide lower-level managers with a torrent of management information

 Radio reports

 Reference book of agriculture

 Periodicals

Develop a work incentive system

 Relate the bonus to farm profits

 Specify percentage of profits going to government and going
 to workers

 Provide extra bonus to workers who excel

 Make individuals responsible for their own equipment

Develop further the supply and marketing system

APPENDIX

THE DECREE OF MARCH

DECREE NO. 63-88 of 18th March, 1963 providing for the regulation of vacant properties

The Head of State, President of the Ministerial Council,

Taking into account the Ordinance 62-020 of 24th August, 1962, concerning the protection and management of Vacant Properties,

Taking into account Decree 62-02 of 22nd October, 1962, instituting Management on vacant agricultural enterprises,

Taking into account the Decree 62-38 of 23rd November, 1962, instituting Management Committees on vacant industrial, craft and mining enterprises,

After hearing the Council of Ministers,

D E C R E E S

Section I: ENTERPRISES, ESTABLISHMENTS AND UNDERTAKINGS WHETHER CONCERNED IN INDUSTRY, COMMERCE, CRAFTS, FINANCE, MINING, AGRICULTURE, OR FORESTRY

Article Premier.--Are considered as Vacant Properties the following enterprises and establishments of industrial, commercial, craft, financial, mining, agricultural or sylvicultural nature:

(a) Those which, at the date of publication of the present decree, have been certified as vacant or which stand idle or fail to function normally without good cause;

(b) Those which, subsequent to the data of publication of the present decree, fall idle or fail to function normally without good cause.

Article 2.--The vacant properties cited in Article 1, clause (a) are automatically subject to the present decree.

The vacant properties cited in Article 1, clause (b) become subject to the present decree on the decision of the competent administrative authority, as determined in Article 6.

Article 3.--The legally recognized causes for non-functioning are:

- (a) The legal or conventional period of paid holidays;
- (b) Customary seasonal close-down;

(c) The physical incapacity of the director of the undertaking by reason of death or illness duly certified, on condition that work is not interrupted for more than one month.

Article 4.--The enterprises, establishments and undertakings cited in Article 1 have corporate civil status before the law or, where not expressly registered, acquire it at the publication of the present decree. In either case, however, those employing fewer than 10 paid workers will receive the said legal status by Prefectoral Order.

Article 5.--Corporate bodies, as defined in Article 4, should be entered in the Commercial Register within the two months following the publication of the present decree, or of the vacancy-order as the case may be. After specifying the nature of their activities, they should add the formula: Corporate body under the Decree of 18th March, 1963.

Article 6.--The vacancy of any property, as defined in Article 1, clause b), must be confirmed by prefectoral order. The above-mentioned orders must be published in the Official Journal within 15 days of the decision.

Article 7.--In the two months following the publication of the Vacancy Order in the Official Journal, the head of the enterprise in question may contest the validity or factual basis of the Vacancy Decision by summoning the Algerian State, in the person of the Prefect responsible for the decision, before the Appealcourt judge within whose jurisdiction the Prefecture lies. The Vacancy Order becomes absolute in the case where the Appealperiod expires without its being contested or where the appeal has been dismissed.

Article 8.--As from the publication of the present decree, the enterprises, establishments, and undertaking defined in Article 1, clause (a), may be re-organized, regrouped or divided according to conditions to be defined in Application Orders.

Those covered by Article 1, clause (b), can be thus modified as soon as the Vacancy Decision becomes final.

Enterprises, establishments and undertakings thus created are subject to the provisions of Article 4 and 5.

Article 9.--Enterprises, establishments and undertakings that have functioned normally under an agent appointed by the head enterprise and able to prove adequate technical and administrative competence, are not considered vacant.

But in every such case the appointment of that agent must definitely ante-date 1st June, 1962, if it is a question of renewal of a previous appointment.

In default of any one of these conditions, the enterprises, establishments and undertakings concerned may be declared vacant properties.

Section II: PREMISES, BUILDINGS OR PORTIONS OF BUILDINGS

Article 10.-- Vacant properties are considered to be those premises, buildings or portions of buildings subject to declarations of vacancy prior to the publication of the present decree.

Article 11.--May be declared Vacant Properties:

(a) Premises, buildings or portions of buildings the titular occupants of which have not exercised their right to occupation during a period of two consecutive months at any time since 1st June, 1962.

(b) Buildings or portions of buildings, the proprietors of which have ceased to fulfill their obligations or ceased to avail themselves of their rights to proprietorship during a period of more than two consecutive months at any time since 1st June, 1962.

The provisions of Articles 6 and 8 apply to premises, buildings or portions of buildings that may, subsequently to the publication of the present decree, become subject to Vacancy Decisions.

Section III: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 12.--No process or action may be undertaken against properties declared vacant on the grounds of liabilities prior to the date when the decision of vacancy came into force, the settlement of these liabilities being subject to subsequent texts.

Article 13.--Any person who knowingly seizes or occupies vacant properties, or who appropriates or disposes of materials in use, without the authorization of competent authorities will be liable to the penalty of imprisonment for one to five years and a fine not exceeding 100,000 N. F., or one or other of these.

After discovery of the offense and until the relevant circumstances are definitely established, the administration may have recourse to any seizure of goods belonging to the suspect that it may judge useful for security; the suspect deposits in court a sum equal to the damage, as estimated by the administration.

Article 14.--Vacant properties as defined in the present text are placed under the administrative supervision of the Presidency of the Council.

Article 15.--The present decree supercedes and annuls all contrary provisions.

Article 16.--The ministers of Justice, the Interior, Finance, Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Commerce, Industrialization and Power are charged--each in what concerns him--with the application of the present decree, which will be published in the Official Journal of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria.

Algiers, 18th March, 1963

(Official Journal of 22nd March, 1963)

Ahmed BEN BELLA

DECREE NO. 63-95 of 22nd March, 1963 providing for the organization and management of industrial, mining and craft enterprises, as for vacant agricultural concerns

The Head of State, President of the Council of Ministers,

Taking into account the Ordinance 62-020 of 24th August concerning the protection and management of vacant properties.

Taking into account the Decree 62-02 of 22nd October, 1962, instituting Management Committees in vacant agricultural enterprises.

Taking into account the Decree 62-38 of 23rd November, 1962, instituting Management Committees on vacant industrial, craft and mining enterprises.

Taking into account the Decree 63-135 of 31st December, 1962, providing for the creation of a corps of Management Inspectors attached to the national office for the protection and management of vacant properties.

Taking into account the Decree 63-36 of 18th January, 1963, favouring the renewal and maintenance of activity in vacant industrial, mining and craft enterprises.

Taking into account the Decree 63-88 of 18th March, 1963, providing for the regulation of vacant properties.

After hearing the Council of Ministers,

D E C R E E S

Section I: ON THE ORGANIZATION OF SELF-MANAGEMENT

Article 1.--Vacant industrial and mining enterprises, as in the case of agricultural concerns, manage their own activities by the agency of the following organisms:

- (a) the Worker's General Assembly
- (b) the Worker's Council (1)
- (c) the Management Committee
- (d) the Director

However, on the decision of the President of the Council (of Ministers) certain enterprises or undertakings of national importance may be integrated into the public sector and managed public or semi-public bodies, or by national associations.

Sub-Section I: THE WORKER'S GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Article 2.--The Worker's General Assembly is composed of the regular workers of an enterprise or undertaking chosen in conformity with the criteria defined in Articles 3, 4 and 5.

The number of its members is fixed annually according to the degree of development and the expansion of the enterprise or undertaking.

Plan for the development and expansion of each enterprise conform to the national development plan.

Article 3.--To qualify as member of the General Assembly, the worker must fulfill the following conditions, he must:

- be of Algerian nationality,
- be at least 18 years old,
- never have been deprived of civil rights,
- perform a useful function of which he is physically capable,
- have no major resource other than the product of his work on the enterprise or undertaking concerned,
- be a regular worker on that enterprise or undertaking,
- have been present without interruption for at least six months.

However regular workers who have left the enterprise for reasons arising from the liberation struggle are exempt from that last condition.

Article 4.--Seasonal workers may neither be members of the General Assembly nor enjoy the rights and prerogatives connected with that function .

Article 5.--The Director, on the advice of the competent services and of the Communal Council of the Animation of Self-management:

- draws up the list of members of the Worker's General Assembly and provides them with membership-cards,
- determines each year the optimum number of regular workers technically necessary for the accomplishment of the economic program of the enterprise or undertaking.

Article 6.--Each member of the Worker's General Assembly has the right to one vote only. He may not be represented by proxy.

Voting must be by secret ballot. Two-thirds of the members must be present for the deliberations of the Worker's General Assembly to be valid.

Decisions are made by a simple majority of members present.

Article 7.--No worker eligible for participation in the deliberations of the Worker's General Assembly may be excluded except for a serious offence.

Proof in such a case lies with the Workers' Council, or with the General Assembly if none exists.

Article 8.--The Workers' General Assembly must be called by the Workers' Council or by the management committee at least

once every three months. It may be convened extraordinarily on the initiative of one-third of its members. In enterprises or undertakings employing less than 30 workers, the Workers' General Assembly replaces the Council.

Article 9.--The Workers' General Assembly:

- Adopts the development plan for the enterprise or undertaking within the framework of the national plan, similarly the annual equipment, production and marketing programs;
- approves the arrangements made concerning work-organization and the definition and distribution of functions and responsibilities;
- approves the final accounts;
- elects, in the appropriate cases, the Workers' Council.

Sub-Section II: THE WORKERS' COUNCIL

Article 10.--The Workers' Council chosen from among the members of the General Assembly of the enterprise or undertaking is composed of, at most, 100 members and, at least, one member for every 15 workers, the minimum being in no case less than three.

Article 11.--At least 2/3 of the members of the Workers' Council must be directly engaged in the production work of the enterprise or undertaking concerned.

Voting conditions are the same as those laid down in Article 6 for the Workers' General Assembly.

Article 12.--The members of the Workers' Council are elected for three years and may be re-elected in annual 1/3-elections (1/3 of members coming up for election every year).

Article 13.--The Workers' Council meets at least once monthly on the decision of the management committee. It may however hold extraordinary meetings on the request of 1/3 of its members.

Article 14.--The Workers' Council :

- approves the internal regulation of the enterprise or undertaking,
- decides on the buying and selling of equipment within the frame of the annual equipment program approved by the General Assembly, on condition that the initial capital value is never reduced.
- decides on long and medium term loans in the framework of the development plan approved by the General Assembly,
- decides on the exclusion of members with the reserve of right to appeal before the General Assembly,
- decides on the admission of new regular workers within the limits laid down in Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the present decree. Should the Council fail in its duties, the director may assume its functions. In the admission of new workers, war veterans and victims of the repression should have priority,
- examines the final accounts before their presentation to the General Assembly,
- elect and check on the Management Committee.

Sub-Section III: THE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

Article 15.--The management committee comprises 3 to 11 members elected by the Workers' Council and of these, 2/3 must be directly engaged in production.

The management committee designates one of its members each year as president.

Elections take place at the end of each year on the system of 1/3 renewal as in the case of the Workers' Council (4).

Article 16.--The Management Committee assumes the functions of management of the enterprise or undertaking and, in particular:

- draws up the development plan for the enterprise or undertaking within the frame of the national plan and, similarly, the annual equipment, production and marketing programs,
- regulates the organization of the work, and the distribution of functions and responsibilities,
- draws up the final accounts,
- prepares the ground for the decisions of the Workers' Council,
- fixes short-term loans within the frame of the annual equipment, production and marketing programs,
- arranges the buying of necessary provisions such as raw materials, seeds, etc., on the basis of the annual production program,
- decides on the means of marketing produce and services,
- handles production problems including the recruitment of seasonal workers,

Article 17.--The management committee meets at least once every month and as often as the interest of the enterprise requires, at the call of its president.

It may admit to its meetings, on a consultative basis, members of the Workers' Council or General Assembly ready to elaborate propositions and suggestions concerning the running of the enterprise, previously submitted to the management committee.

Article 18.--In order for the deliberations of the management committee to be valid, 2/3 of its members, including the Director, must be present.

Decisions are made by simple majority of those present. Where the votes are evenly divided, the President has the deciding voice.

Article 19.--The president of the management-committee:

- presides and directs the debates of the Management Committee, the Workers' Council and General Assembly,
- countersigns the minutes of meetings of the Management Committee, the Workers' Council and General Assembly,
- countersigns documents involving financial commitments and payments,
- convenes, on the decision of the Management Committee, meetings of the Workers' Council and General Assembly,
- represents the enterprise or undertaking in external relations and before the law, after authorization by the Management Committee.

Sub-Section IV: THE DIRECTOR

Article 20.--The Director:

- represents the State in the enterprise or undertaking,
- assures the legality of the economic and financial operations of the enterprise or undertaking; in particular,
- he opposes any management--or development--plans that do not conform to the national plan,
- vetos any measure that fails to observe the conditions of Articles 3, 4 and 5.
- opposes any reduction in the capital value of the means of production of the enterprise or undertaking (6),
- assumes, under the President's authority (7), the daily running of the enterprise or undertaking, applying the decisions of the Management Committee and Workers' Council, in conformity with the laws and regulations,
- signs documents involving financial commitments and payment-orders,
- holds funds in cash for current expenses,
- checks the final accounts,
- draws up and keeps inventories of movable and immovable materials, and, likewise keeps the accounts of the enterprise or undertaking according to the rules and procedures layed down by the supervisory body,
- assumes the secretariat of the Management Committee, of the Workers' Council and General Assembly, keeps the minutes and sends copies to the supervisory body.

Article 21.--The Director is automatically a member of the Management Committee with the right to vote. He may not be President. The Management Committee may call on him to present reports to the Workers' Council and General Assembly.

Article 22.--The Director, who must possess the personal and professional qualifications required by his work, is nominated and dismissed by the supervisory body on the agreement of the Communal Council for the Animation of Self-management (8).

He may only be dismissed from his post as Director for a serious offense or for obvious incompetence, or if the Communal Council for the animation of Self-management withdraws its recognition.

Section II: ORGANISMS FOR THE ANIMATION OF SELF-MANAGEMENT

Article 23.--In each Commune is set up a Communal Council for the Animation of Self-management, composed of the presidents of the Management Committees, and the respective representatives of the Party, the U.G.T.A., the A.N.P. and the Communal administrative authorities.

Where appropriate an Intercommunal Council may be created in place of several Communal Councils; but it may not take the place of more than five such councils.

A representative of the supervisory body may take part in all its meetings.

Article 24.--The Communal Council for the Animation of Self-management:

- assists in the creation and organization of management bodies in enterprises or undertakings,
- interests the workers in the problems of Self-management,
- co-ordinates the activities of enterprises and undertakings in the Commune that are under Self-management,
- calls on the technical and financial assistance of the supervisory body in matters of management and control,
- gives or with-holds its agreement on the Director designated by the supervisory body in conformity with Article 22 of the present decree.

Article 25.--The Communal Council for the Animation of Self-management elects its president from among the presidents of the enterprises and undertakings under Self-management. It meets on the initiative of its president at least once every three months.

Article 26.--Neither the Members of Workers' Council and Management Committees of enterprises and undertakings, nor the members of the Communal Councils for the Animation of Self-management may receive any special payment for the tasks involved in membership, since the time devoted to the deliberations and working of these bodies will be considered part of normal working hours and remunerated at normal rates (9).

Article 27.--Members of the above-mentioned bodies only exercise the functions entailed by their membership during the meetings of the bodies of which they are members, and they may not take advantage of those functions outside the meeting of those bodies except with the express authorization of the body concerned.

Article 28.--Any person who knowingly hinders the functioning of a Management Committee will be liable to the penalty of one to five years imprisonment and a fine of between 1,000 N.F. and 10,000 N.F., or to one or other of the two.

Article 29.--The provisions of the present decree come into force on its publication and must be executed in full within a year's delay.

Article 30.--The present decree on the organization of Self-management of enterprises and undertakings annuls all earlier contrary provisions.

Article 31.--The manner and means of application of the present decree will be defined by presidential circulars.

Article 32.--The Ministers of Justice, the Interior, National Defense, Finance, Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Industrialization and Power, and Labor and Social Affairs are charged, each in what concerns it with the execution of the present decree, which will be published in the Official Journal of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria.

Algiers, 22nd March, 1963.

Almed BEN BELLA

DECREE NO. 63-98 of 28th March, 1963 regulating the distribution of revenues in enterprises and undertakings under self-management

The Head of State and President of the Council of Ministers,

Taking into account the Decree No. 62-165 providing for the institution of a corps of management-inspectors attached to the National Office for the Protection and Management of Vacant Properties,

Taking into account the Decree No. 63-88 of 18th of March, 1963 providing for the regulation of vacant properties,

Taking into account the Decree No. 63-95 of 22nd March, 1963, providing for the organization and management of industrial, mining and craft enterprises as for the vacant agricultural undertakings,

After hearing the Council of Ministers,

D E C R E E S

Article 1.--The annual revenue of each undertaking or enterprise under Self-management is equal to the annual production of that enterprise (i.e. the total output for the year in products and services), minus running-costs other than labor-cost.

The methods of calculating and evaluating this revenue will be fixed by further regulations.

Article 2.--The annual revenue thus determined is divided in two principal categories:

- levies payable to the national community,
- revenue due to the workers on the undertaking or enterprise under Self-management.

Article 3.--Payments due to the national community comprise levies for:

- the redemption of financial liabilities incurred by the undertaking or enterprise under Self-management. The total and the employment of this levy are subject to official regulations. The enterprise may, however, be partly or totally absolved from this levy by the supervisory authority if internal or external economic circumstances render this necessary (10).
- the national investment fund (11).
- the national fund for balanced employment (12).

The nature of these funds will be defined by subsequent texts which must provide for the participation of workers in their management.

In making these levies, account will be taken of the practical possibilities of contribution by the enterprise on the basis of normal production.

The totals and payment systems for these levies, as for the working of the National Investment Fund and the National Fund for Balanced Employment, will be fixed by official regulations.

Article 4.--The revenues due to the workers on the undertaking or enterprise include:

(a) The payment of occasional workers on the enterprise under Self-management, in particular, the wages and advantages offered to these workers in conformity with social legislation.

(b) The basic wages of the regular workers fixed by the supervisory authority according to functions and based on the norms of minimum productivity.

(c) Production-bonus payments attributed to regular workers according to individual and team out-put. These bonus-payments are fixed by the Management Committee and must be approved by the supervision authority. They are given periodically, in so far as the workers' output exceeds the minima laid down in clause (b) above.

Basic wages and production bonuses are payed in cash or in kind (in the form of goods produced by the enterprise or undertaking, the values of which are calculated on the basis of market prices). The forms of such payments are fixed by the Management Committee with the agreement of the Director.

These basic wages and production bonuses are counted in finance and before the law as salaries.

(d) A remainder to be shared. The Workers' Council or, if necessary, the General Assembly decides on how it should be divided.

It may decide to deduct from this remainder further sums attributed to:

--the Investment fund of the enterprise or undertaking in question,

--the Social Fund of the enterprise or undertaking (towards housing, equipment for education, leisure activities, health, mutual insurance schemes, participation in communal, union or co-operative funds, etc.),

--any reserve fund or provision it may judge necessary.

The surplus balance is shared out at the end of the financial year between all the members of the Workers' General Assembly in proportion to their respective basic wages plus production bonuses as laid down for the members of that assembly.

The Workers' General Assembly may however, at the suggestion of the Management Committee, take a levy on this balance surplus before distribution for the Director and members of the Management Committee to constitute a bonus for good management.

If the funds of the enterprise or undertaking under Self-management are running low, the Director may decide that the sum payable to the members of the Workers' General Assembly shall be paid into the general account of the enterprise until such period as the state of the general funds permits a final payment. This payment must never involve an aggravation of debts owed to third parties by the enterprise under self management.

Article 5.--If the annual revenue of the undertaking or enterprise under Self-management is not sufficient to enable it to fulfil its obligations towards its workers and the national community, as defined in Articles 3 and 4 above, the Management Committee should, on the suggestion of the Director, take the measures necessary to right the situation. These measures are submitted to the Workers' Council and to the General Assembly.

Article 6.--Besides the legal accounting forms, the Director must, to satisfy this present decree, keep check on the following business documents for which he is responsible:

- an annual program or campaign for production and marketing,
- an annual account of running-expenses and a forecast budget,
- an investment program,
- a table of basic wages and bonuses attributed to each function.

Article 7.--The annual accounts should include, besides the balance sheet, the accounts necessary to the application of Articles 1, 2, and 3 above.

Article 8.--The annual revenue of undertaking and enterprises under Self-management is liable to tax on industrial, commercial or agricultural profits, as may be appropriate, in conformity with the legislation governing co-operatives. However the following sums are considered as deductible expenses:

- levies for the national community listed in Article 3 above,
- basic wages and production bonuses to regular workers,
- wages payed to occasional workers, and advantages offered them in accordance with social legislation.

Article 9.--A member of the Workers' General Assembly who, for whatever reason, leaves the enterprise or undertaking, has no right to advantages afforded by the investment fund, social fund, sinking fund or by any of the reserves or provisions of that enterprise.

Unless he has been dismissed for a serious offense, he may participate, on the basis of length of service, in the share-out of net revenue.

Article 10.--The ministers of Justice, the Interior, National Defense, Finance, Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Commerce, Industry and Power, and Labor and Social Affairs are charged, each in what concerns him, with the application of the present decree which will be published in the Official Journal of the Democratic and Popular Algerian Republic.

Algiers, 28th March, 1963.

Ahmed BEN BELLA

DECREE NO. 63-90 of 18th March, 1963 providing for the creation of a
National Office for Agrarian Reform

The Head of State, President of the Council of Ministers,

--Taking into account the Decree No. 62-02 of 22nd October, 1962 instituting management committees on vacant agricultural enterprises;

--Taking into account the Decree No. 63-89 of 18th March, 1963 providing for the organization of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian reform;

On the basis of the report of the Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform.

After hearing the Council of Ministers

D E C R E E S

Article 1.--A National Office for Agrarian Reform is set up as a public body endowed with financial autonomy and legal status.

Article 2.--The general purpose of the National Office for Agrarian Reform is the realization of the government's program for Agrarian Reform.

Article 3.--The National Office for Agrarian Reform is charged with organizing the management of farms abandoned by their owners.

Article 4.--The resources of the fund for acquisition of property and rural undertakings are transferred to the National office for Agrarian Reform which will decide on the means of exploiting the lands it inherits from that organization.

Article 5.--The conditions of application of the present decree will be fixed by further decrees issued on the advice of the Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform.

Article 6.--The Minister of Agriculture and Land Reform and the Minister of Finance are charged, each in that which concerns him, with the execution of the present decree which will be published in the Official Journal of the Democratic and Popular Algerian Republic.

Algiers 18th March, 1963.

Ahmed BEN BELLA

DECREE NO. 63-100 of 4th April, 1963

The Head of the State, President of the Council of Ministers,

Taking into account the Decree No. 62-561 of 21st September, 1962 providing for the creation of a National Bureau for the Protection and Management of Biens Vacants.

D E C R E E S

Article 1.--The National Bureau for the Protection and Management of Biens Vacants will henceforward be entitled: The National Bureau for Animation of the Socialist Sector. It remains attached to the Presidency du Conseil.

Article 2.--The National Bureau for Animation of the Socialist Sector retains the functions defined in the above-mentioned Decree No. 62-561 of 21st of September, 1962.

It has also the functions of orientation, animation, coordination and supervision of the Socialist Sector of the Algerian Economy in the framework of Development Plans and Programs.

Article 3.--The present Decree will be published in the Official Journal of the Democratic and Popular Algerian Republic.

Algiers, 6th April, 1963.

Ahmed BEN BELLA

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