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9. ABSTRACT
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Since the guiding concepts of aid programs seldom concern the impact on bureaucracies in the recipient countries, this article directs attention to the theory of bureaucracy as reflected in U.S. aid to Asian Countries in the past two decades. Discusses the constraints on the roles played by bureaucracies in receiving countries; influences of the donor and receiving bureaucracies on each other; and basic problems of development planning, policy advising, and limitations stemming from the realities of political leadership in the recipient countries. It also covers the concept of community development, programs designed to provide technical assistance in public administration, and the sector approach to development administration. An assessment of past problems identifies some reasonably constant factors: The recipient bureaucracy is assigned an extremely important role in the development process, and the aid relationship tends to strengthen its power. Aid programs have sought to reduce bureaucratic obstacles to development by providing incentives and trying to build development institutions. The aid program has tended to support capable individuals, stressing leadership capacity rather than bureaucratic function. It has pursued goals of democratic behavior and popular participation, but has restricted itself to the use of example and exhortation. However, notable changes have occurred in two decades. Technical assistance in public administration has shifted from trying to improve the bureaucracy in general to a focus on the management requirements of programs to solve specific development problems. Aid managers have learned to be more flexible in capitalizing on possibilities inherent in existing institutions, rather than seeking to change them.

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THE BUREAUCRAT AS THE MANAGER OF DEVELOPMENT

Curtis Farrar

(Prepared for delivery at the 87th meeting of
the American Historical Association, New Orleans,
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INTRODUCTION

My assignment is to try to identify the theory of the bureaucracy reflected in United States aid to the countries of Asia in the past two decades.¹ This is not an easy subject to get at. There is no authoritative statement of the theory of the foreign aid program; there has instead been a continuing and still incomplete argument on what aid is all about. Moreover the guiding concepts of the aid program, as put forward and modified from time to time, rarely address directly the question of the impact on bureaucracies in the recipient countries.

If we turn from theory to practice, and try to look at what actually happened, we find that there is no comprehensive body of data from which to discover what the program managers think they have been doing to the recipient bureaucracies, or what they have in fact done. If we could confine attention to the part of the program labelled "public administration" this would be relatively easy, because the objectives for the bureaucracy are reasonably clear for these projects and have been exhaustively commented upon. But this is a very small part of the total of foreign aid, and by no means the most important in its impact on Asian bureaucracy.

In the absence of both a complete body of data and an explicit theory of foreign aid on which to base this paper, my choice of evidence to consider is highly intuitive and personal, and my conclusions are necessarily subject to challenge by counter example.

1. Acknowledgment: I am grateful to Idris Rossell for having suggested that I write this paper. My colleagues at A.I.D. James M. Blume, James J. Dalton, Kenneth L. Kornher, and Alfred D. White helped with frank criticism, as did Jack Koteen who also provided encouragement. Edna A. Falbo and Dimitra Crassas

This paper concentrates on economic aid intended for development purposes, generally omitting reference to aid intended to strengthen the security of the recipient. This means omitting assistance given the three countries of Indochina and Thailand since the early 1960's, the relatively minor counterinsurgency programs elsewhere in Asia, and the grant transfers of capital to a number of Asian states -- Korea, Pakistan, Taiwan for example -- which began in the mid-fifties and trailed off in the early sixties. (Toward the end these funds were used very effectively for developmental purposes, in a manner quite similar to development loans.) This limitation seems clearly in accord with the focus of the panel.

A less defensible and more personal omission is my failure to address substantively and directly the question of political development, or euphemistically, popular participation. I do not deny the importance of this subject: a significant aid relationship cannot but have an impact on political as well as social and economic change in the recipient country. My experience does not offer me, however, any trace of a systematic relationship between the attitude and behavior of foreign aid agencies and what happens to the politics of the recipient. The foreign aid manager needs to be very sensitive to the political implications of any proposed action. He has little choice, however, short of recommending withdrawal, but to accept and work within the recipient's sense of justice, priorities and political direction. He can hope to carry democratic values with him by example and discussion, and occasionally

he can choose a project or an approach to a project partly on criteria related to degree of participation, but that is about the limit of what he can do.²

². For an informed argument supporting this view see Joan M. Nelson, Aid, Influence, and Foreign Policy, New York, Macmillan, 1968, p. 139.

I. THE GIVING AND THE RECEIVING BUREAUCRACIES

A bilateral aid program is by definition a group of bureaucrats from two countries endeavoring to find ways in which the financial and technical resources of the donor can be used to develop the economy of the recipient. These bureaucrats often have many reasons to disagree, and they have cross-cultural problems in dealing with each other. They are aware of the political implications of the proposals they consider, and the need to find political support for the ones they chose, which is most often important in the recipient country. But often they also find common ground: they know, as specialists, what should be done about a problem if only the politicians of one nationality or both would let them do it.

This is not merely a case of administrators making political issues into bureaucratic ones, as Karl Mannheim has suggested they often do.³ It is an inevitable result of the circumstances in which aid activities are carried on.

Political levels in the United States government have played a relatively small role in development aid decisions. One notable exception was President Johnson's assertion of personal control over wheat shipments to India in 1965-7.⁴ One might also cite President Kennedy's interest in the Alliance for Progress. Decisions with major foreign policy implications and the annual determination of

3. Quoted in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York, Macmillan and Free Press, 1968, Vol.II, p.214.

4. Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-69, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971, pp. 221-31.

budget levels are perforce made by the White House, and from time to time a few members of the Congress have found the aid program of importance positively or negatively. The State Department exercises its kibitzing rights largely on narrow grounds of direct U.S. foreign interests. This leaves most questions, some of which are of great policy and political import to the recipient, to be handled by the professionals of the aid agency, who tend to look at things from an economic or programmatic point of view.⁵

In the developing nations of Asia, at the outset of the aid program, the civil service was usually the strongest government institution to be found, indeed the strongest non-military institution of any kind. In former colonies, the bureaucracy was identified with the colonial power, and had no claim after independence to political leadership. It generally embodied concepts of seniority, rigid procedures, and privilege; its own view of its role was to maintain law and order and concern itself with welfare only in emergencies. These were not characteristics particularly suited to the encouragement of rapid development. Poor countries that had never been colonies were rather worse off, for their bureaucracies tended to be less efficient at keeping the peace, but no more oriented toward development.⁶

Yet in the absence of other institutions -- public or private --

5. Nelson, Influence, p. 140.

6. Albert Waterston, Development Planning: Lessons of Experience, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1965, p.251.

equipped to take the leadership role, there was simply no choice but to rely on the local bureaucracy. Lack of such institutions is one of the hallmarks of underdevelopment, and the process of building them is a long term objective of the aid program.⁷

The American aid program has a number of effective activities where the relationship does not run from our government to the recipient government, but goes instead through a private or voluntary agency. The largest programs have been in food and nutrition, and more recently in family planning. But these private agencies are invariably limited by the capacity of their local counterparts and the restrictions on access for the foreign agency itself. Moreover, substantial and sustained success always requires the endorsement and effective support of the local government.⁸

Similarly, the efforts of the aid program to build development institutions, whether those institutions are a formal part of the bureaucracy or not, require support from the host country government to succeed. In fact, it happens very often that the leadership of a non-government or private institution marked for development is entrusted to an outstanding active or retired civil servant.

7. On the need to rely on the bureaucracy, see ibid; Herbert Feis, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy, New York, St. Martins Press, 1964, pp. 145-6; Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations, New York, Pantheon, 1968, Vol.II, p.901ff.

8. This point is amplified in Jerome T. French, Review of the Role of LDC Institutions and Joint Organizations as Program Intermediaries for Increasing Local Action Capability: Findings and Implications, Washington, D. C., Agency for International Development, Technical Assistance Bureau, 1971, p.18.

Whatever their preferences, the developing country and the foreign donor alike have no choice but to turn to the bureaucracy for leadership if they wish to mount a development program. This remains true even where the system is stiffened by making soldiers into bureaucrats. Lacking sophistication on the complex issues of development, the political leadership must rely heavily on the top officials for both initiation and evaluation of policies, thus obscuring the traditional distinction between policy and administration. The workings of the aid program serve to draw the administrator even more deeply into questions of policy.

All elements of the American aid program in Asia, therefore, involve cooperation between the aid agency and the bureaucrats of the aid-receiving countries, and constitute a means by which the one bureaucracy influences the other. The following examples illustrate the range of that influence:

1. The self-help conditions attached to agreements to supply surplus agricultural products under Public Law 480 oblige the recipient government to undertake both policy and implementing steps to improve agricultural production. They are often, but by no means always pro-forma.

2. The aid program has commissioned numerous sector or problem studies that provide a framework for large action programs, such as the Revelle study of waterlogging and salinity in West Pakistan; and the transportation and power sector studies performed in a number of countries. Explicit or implied recommendations for administrative reform are often included.

3. The aid agency occasionally became involved in projects that were technically deficient or placed excessive financial or administrative demands on the host country, but were so politically sensitive or costly that they could not be written off. The Helmand Valley in Afghanistan, now at last becoming modestly successful, is an example. The long struggle to put such a project on the track leads to multiple interactions with the agencies responsible for its management, and those making policies that affect it.

4. The process of testing the feasibility of, and then planning for implementation of, capital projects, whether for highways, irrigation, farm credit or industrial investment, invariably involves some attention -- not always enough -- to administrative feasibility, technical assistance requirements for management improvement, or needed reorganization. Sometimes the capital assistance for such projects is conditioned on achievement of specified targets or administrative efficiency.

5. Programs concerned with specific fields -- health for example -- often have major implications for the parts of the bureaucracy involved. The campaigns to contain or eradicate malaria, in which A.I.D. provided DDT, equipment and technical advice, were basically problems in organizing large number of relatively low paid workers to perform systematic spraying operations reliably. The \$20 million grant to India for family planning, made in 1970 as part of a multilateral effort, was intended primarily to encourage better management of the vast nationwide program to which the Indian Government was committed. Some of the

objectives were: improved training programs, regular civil service status for family planning personnel, better feedback of evaluation results, more flexible financial relationships between the central government and the states, greater use of voluntary agencies, and better arrangements to maintain and use motor vehicles.

If one could make a comprehensive survey of the administrative or bureaucratic aspects of these and comparable programs it would undoubtedly show increased attention over time by the U. S. aid manager to both the policy and detail of administration, as experience demonstrated the difficulties of implementing assistance programs.

To be complete, a survey of this experience would have to take into account not only the intended results of the aid programs, but also the unintended ones. Merrill Goodall reports on the tendency of competitive aid programming among donors in Nepal to fragment still further the already divided nature of Nepalese administration.⁹

It would also have to take into account the impact on the actions of senior Asian bureaucrats of the existence of large resources available fully or partially outside their own budgetary process. In the case of the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction in Taiwan, the extrabudgetary nature of the program and its independence of both donor and recipient bureaucracies is given as one of the principal

9. Merrill R. Goodall, "Administrative Change in Nepal," in Ralph Braibanti (ed), Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Tradition, Durham, Duke University Press, 1966, p.633ff.

reasons for its evident success.¹⁰ On the other hand, use of freely available local currencies in a number of Asian countries produced results that ranged from excellent to superfluous, and I suspect in some cases worked against the growth of a responsible process of budget and financial control.

An aspect of the aid relationship even more difficult to evaluate is the intimate and continuous discussion of key development issues between the A.I.D. mission director and his principal lieutenants on the one hand, and the department secretaries or advisors of the host government on the other. I expect that the burden of the talk on the American side in many cases was how to get a particular job done, or a bottleneck broken, even at some risk to accepted principles of organization and management.

10. E. G. Alderfer, The Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, Washington, D. C., Agency for International Development, Technical Assistance Bureau, July 1971, describes the characteristics of the JCRR and gives a bibliography. See also Max F. Millikan and David Hapgood, No Easy Harvest: The Dilemma of Agriculture in Underdeveloped Countries, Boston, Little Brown, 1967, pp. 116-8.

II. DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND POLICY ADVICE

Given the impossibility of covering all American aid to Asia systematically, I have selected a number of aspects that I hope will provide a balanced view. The first of these is the relationship between the American aid program and the Asian governments concerning general development policy. After the end of the second World War, and with the advent of independence, many countries in Asia adopted national planning before any significant aid factor was present. Among them were India, Pakistan, Iran and the Philippines. Some began their planning at the inception of the Colombo Plan in 1950, but others -- Waterston cites Afghanistan, Korea and Taiwan -- started national planning exercises largely to meet the requirements of aid donors.¹¹

American aid managers welcomed planning from the start, but integration of national planning and U. S. economic assistance programs occurred only with the substantial unification of responsibility for these programs under the Agency for International Development in 1961.

Periodically, A.I.D. did its own critical analysis of the plan of each major recipient and the annual programs developed under it. In its own country program, A.I.D. would decide what policy changes should be encouraged, the amounts and types of assistance that should be offered, the self-help conditions that should apply to parts of the program, and special steps needed to coordinate U. S. assistance efforts with other donors. Typically the A.I.D. country program would be much clearer on the overall economic situation, the total levels of assistance recommended, and desirable changes in macro-economic and broad sector policies,

11. Waterston, Development Planning, pp. 32-6.

than it would be on specific capital or technical assistance activities, or issues of program management and implementation.

One of the perceptions that grew out of the macro-economic analysis of the development process was how small a share of total investment was actually provided by development assistance, and how large a share was generated within the aided economy itself. It was clearly much more important to encourage adoption of good economic policies and good overall priorities than to make marginal improvements on the use of particular aid funds.¹² As a result of this conclusion A.I.D. development loans (and in some cases grant assistance intended mainly to support security and stability) were used to reward good performance, or conditioned on policy changes or achievement of specified targets by the recipient governments. Funds for capital projects were not very useful for this kind of bargaining: often there was a need to negotiate difficult conditions specific to the project; and once a project passed a certain point, it could be very wasteful to delay it because of failure to meet a condition extraneous to the project itself. The monies used, therefore, were generally those intended for program lending, to provide general imports needed by the economy but for which the recipient country did not have sufficient foreign exchange. The policies which A.I.D. sought to influence and

12. The official rationale for this position is contained in Hollis B. Chenery and Alan M. Strout, Foreign Assistance and Economic Development, (A.I.D. Discussion Paper Number 7, Revised), Washington, D. C., Agency for International Development, 1965, particularly Chapter III. See also Nelson, Influence, pp. 52-3.

the targets it hoped to achieve included exchange rate adjustments, control over budget deficits, reduction in the rate of inflation, liberalization of import controls, improved export performance, reduction in subsidies for capital goods, incentive prices for agricultural products, and many others.

In the 1970's A.I.D. is doing much less reviewing of national plans, and much less bargaining for policy changes. Neither planning nor policies have become less important, but the United States has made a purposeful transfer of the responsibility for oversight of both functions to multilateral agencies, notably the World Bank, in the hope that aided nations will be less sensitive to advice and criticism from this source.

Basing aid programs on national plans, and conditioning aid on policy changes, both impose a high responsibility on a small group of civil servants near the top of the recipient government. (In fact, our aid program has imposed on recipients some criteria we do not apply to our own internal processes of government.) The planners had to become highly skilled not only at technical economic analysis, but at "the art of the possible," that is at melding economic judgments with political judgments. One can express the planning role in terms of a more or less conventional division between policy and administrative responsibilities. Thus Waterston:

By requiring political leaders to give explicit consideration to the difficult choices imposed on them by the desire to develop, the planner will be educating them to the need to think in the specific and selective terms essential to the achievement of plan objectives. ¹³

There have been instances, however, where the ascendancy of new political leadership committed to development and anxious for foreign aid support has brought considerable real authority into the hands of top level bureaucrats. The political leaders have chosen a few highly effective administrators, usually trained in economics or management in the United States or Europe, and given them substantial responsibility. These bureaucrats remain subject to political guidance and vulnerable to failure, as they have no political base of their own. But while their political support lasts, they have wide flexibility to direct economic policy and initiate programs. Asian officials of this sort are able to communicate with aid program managers on the basis of easy equality and shared outlook. The effective working relationship that exists in such circumstances has produced large and often successful programs.

Many discussions of aid and recipient economic policy are informal and frequently private. The same subjects are raised in a more formal setting at the meetings of international consortia of the countries and multilateral institutions giving aid to a particular country. The influence of consortium meetings should not be exaggerated, but when substantial programs are involved, the sessions can be critical for both donors and recipients. The cast at a consortium session is largely made up of officials. Perhaps the head of the aided country's delegation will be of cabinet rank, but if so he often turns out to be a civil servant -- or perhaps a general -- elevated to political functions, rather than a person with independent

political strength. The discussion is in the language of the development economist and the programmer, and it is not unusual for there to be clear technical agreement on proposed actions combined with a mutual wringing of hands that the needed political will is somehow lacking.

It is natural that the civil servants participating in these technical agreements on major policy questions should be used by the aid donor as a channel for reaching the decision levels of the recipient government, first as a transmission belt for information, and then as a focus for the bargaining power of development loans. On occasion the tactics of giving and withholding assistance would have the explicit, though of course not expressed, purpose of strengthening the position of a particular individual or group within the councils of the recipient government.

While this process of aid negotiations influences the role of the Asian bureaucrats because of its mode of operation, it also has been substantively concerned with the function of the bureaucracy in two ways:

1. Implementing many of the policy changes sought depends on the effectiveness of the government apparatus in carrying them out. Increased tax collection, incentives to private enterprise, or improved maintenance of law and order can be achieved only if the bureaucracy is capable of doing the job. The process therefore directs attention repeatedly to the weaknesses of the bureaucracy as a limitation on the effectiveness of development programs.

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2. The policy questions at issue often involve the role the bureaucracy should try to play in the economy. As a group the Asian governments tend to use exhortation and regulation to achieve economic purposes. While exhortation rarely works at all, regulation places added burdens on an already overextended bureaucracy, and creates new bottlenecks and new dangers of corruption. Asian bureaucrats also generally mistrust the private sector and tend to call on government agencies to do what business can perform much better. A.I.D. influence has consistently been used to promote the employment of incentives and market forces as opposed to regulation and exhortation and to encourage use of the private sector. This is part of the rationale for urging adoption of realistic exchange rates, and opposing the expansion of state trading operations. A.I.D. has encouraged the use of high interest rates to promote savings, with subsidized loans restricted to narrow and easily controlled purposes. In several countries, provision of funds for fertilizer imports was managed so as to encourage handing the distribution of fertilizer over to the private sector. The concept is to structure economic incentives to make maximum use of the private sector, in order to free the bureaucracy for tasks that it cannot share.¹⁵

It should be noted that A.I.D. has not always been able to practice what it preaches. Requirements that goods be bought from the United States, that American small business be given an advantage in competing

15. Waterston, Development Planning, pp.341-2 gives a good summary of the case for using economic incentives.

for aid-financed orders, that the American merchant marine carry a large share of aid goods, and in general the need to demonstrate to the Congress in detail how aid funds have been used, all forced the Agency to require recipients to impose degrees of control at variance with the liberal economic policies A.I.D. was urging on them and to expand the role of the bureaucracy in ways known to reduce economic efficiency.

The aid relationship at the top also tends to strengthen the generalist in Asian bureaucracy. It is quite usual in the Asian aid programs, particularly in ex-British colonies, to find A.I.D. officers complaining about the know-it-all attitudes of the senior civil servants, the difficulty of getting adequate hearing at policy levels for technical conclusions, and the need to promote functional specialists into the highest ranks of the civil service. Yet the focus of attention on policy questions reinforces the position of the generalist, who has no commitment to a particular field of endeavor. One of the principles of planning, of course, is the choice of alternatives on the basis of highest return; a comparable principle of aid-giving is "concentration," the idea of using aid resources on a few high priority areas where they can make a difference, rather than scattering them across a wide number of fields. Since the specialists tend to see their own fields as having high priority, the implementation of a policy of concentration naturally favors the generalist in both the aid agency and the recipient government. This paragon presumably

approaches the tangled web of development interrelationships with objectivity and the capacity for judging priorities free from preconceptions.¹⁶

Of course, the problem of the generalist not being able to deal adequately with policies arising from technical considerations remains. It can be argued that the single greatest lack of talent in both aid-giving agencies and aid-receiving governments has been the absence of functional specialists who can handle broad policy analysis within their own field, and relate their field continuously to general policy considerations. This has been a problem over the entire period of American aid to Asia, and it has become even more serious today with the increasing emphasis on sector programs.

16. Nelson, Influence, p.51.

III. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND ITS SUCCESSORS

Whereas the aid program's concern for planning and economic policy intersected the Asian bureaucracy at its center, community development operated, with considerable pride, from the bottom up. A start was made by India, 1952, and the concept spread to most of the aid-receiving nations in Asia, with Pakistan and the Philippines undertaking two of the more substantial efforts. In general the American advisors were sociologists and social workers, rather than either economists or specialists in administration.

The concept of community development was to organize and motivate the villagers to improve their lot, using essentially their own resources and known technology. Additional funds made available through the community development agency itself were limited, and intended only for demonstration or educational use. There was no limit on the type of project that might be started: education, agricultural production, better nutrition practices, health services, recreation facilities were all acceptable, provided only that the villagers chose them, and were willing to work on them. A main principle of operation was the setting up of both formal and informal village organizations.

The government employees whose job it was to initiate these activities were to be quite different from the traditional bureaucrats.

Thus in Pakistan:

The Village...Worker is unique among all government employees; he is not an "officer". Rather he is a "worker" -- a servant of the people. He has no regulatory or enforcement powers over the villagers and cannot so much as command lodging for himself. His approach is one of persuasion in both planning and action rather than the time-honored method of coercion,

however gently applied...He is an educator, organizer and planner, friend, philosopher and guide to the villagers...much of his time is spent in applying human relations skills in program planning and execution through organizations which he fosters...¹⁷

The village worker was trained in the fundamentals of agriculture, health, irrigation, and other specialized skills. It was intended that he would call on the specialists from the technical departments when he judged they were needed, and would thus multiply their effectiveness by channeling their work to the right places. He would also help the villagers take advantage of the resources available to them under the programs of other departments.

The community development movement hoped that the village workers would inspire the villagers by the example of their behavior, and that the whole outlook of the bureaucracy would be changed. The five year plan for Village Agricultural and Industrial Development (Village AID) in Pakistan, listed six objectives for the rural development effort, the last of which was "to give a welfare bias to the entire administrative structure of the Government."¹⁸ The obstacles to success perceived by the advisors to the program, in Pakistan at least, were very largely problems within the bureau-

17. James W. Green, "Rural Community Development in Pakistan: The Village AID Program," Community Development Review, No. 6, September 1957, pp. 51-2. I have chosen examples mostly from Pakistan partly because of personal familiarity with the program, and partly because of the extent of U.S. official aid involvement. For the story of an early, trailbreaking community development project in India, see Albert Meyer, et al., Pilot Project India: The story of Rural Development at Etawah, Uttar Pradesh, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1958.

18. Quoted in Green, "Community Development in Pakistan," p. 46. for a less simple but favorable view of the potential impact of community development on the bureaucracy see Lucian W. Pye, "The Social and Political Implications of Community Development," Community Development Review, No 4, December 1960, pp. 11-21.

cracy, and with the other departments. Successive heads of the Village AID program, some of them members of the Civil Service of Pakistan, openly attacked that elite service and its attitudes and privileges. The Academy for Rural Development at Peshawar was organized specifically to change the outlook of the Pakistan bureaucracy by training courses and publications.

Community development, at least in Asia, seems to be one of those activities that sometimes work on a pilot scale, but cannot be expanded to a large area, at least not fast enough to meet the political imperatives of the developing nations. Wherever the programs are active (some still continue, but without further US support) there are always worthwhile organizational or physical accomplishments to observe, but no self generating momentum seems ever to have been achieved. It would be unfair to blame all the problems of community development programs on the failure of the bureaucrats in the traditional arms of government to cooperate fully. Certainly one deficiency has been the lack of resources sufficient to generate economic growth in the villages. This could have been only partly overcome if the functional departments had been willing to accept the priorities generated through the community development program. An equally serious problem concerns the technology offered for the solution of village problems, particularly problems of agricultural production. It often is not good enough to

19. Green, "Community Development in Pakistan," p. 60ff; Jack D. Mezirow, Dynamics of Community Development, New York, Scarecrow Press, 1963, Chapter VI.

repay the cost and risk of adopting it from the point of view of the villager. The economics of community development have been focussed too narrowly on the village, not giving enough weight to linkages to the national economy. Finally, and perhaps most important, there have never been enough village workers, or leaders of village workers, with the skill and the personal drive to make the system work in spite of the odds against it, as the leaders of the pilot projects were often able to do.

There are a number of later programs which benefitted from the experience of community development, and continued some of its essential spirit. Perhaps the best known is the Academy for Rural Development at Comilla, in what is now Bangladesh.

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Like its sister institution at Peshawar, the Academy was intended to train bureaucrats, and it did run a large training program. It started, however, with the assumption that the best means to achieve rural development were not known, and could be discovered only by working with and observing the natural unit of social organization, the village. (The Village AID program had tried to group villages into large units.) The staff of the Academy, in a more clearly paternal role than the Village AID workers, tried to discover the villager's needs and promote the selection of programs to deal with them, usually in a cooperative framework. The resulting programs were contin-

20. The most complete work on Comilla is Arthur F. Raper, et. al., Rural Development in Action: The Comprehensive Experiment at Comilla, East Pakistan, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1970. See also E. G. Alderfer, The Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, Comilla, East Pakistan, Agency for International Development, Technical Assistance Bureau, June 1971; and Millikan and Hapgood, No Easy Harvest, pp.109-112.

uously evaluated and adjusted, with the intention of applying them more broadly once they were fully tested and understood.

In place of the outside government employee working in the village, the Academy selected leaders from within the village who were trained, at a place within walking distance from their homes, in the techniques and attitudes to be diffused in the village. The training was given continuously, so that problems of implementation could be discussed with the teachers.

The Academy also worked with a restructured system of local government under President Ayub's Basic Democracy program, whereas the earlier rural development effort had taken village government essentially as it was.

The question always asked about the Comilla Academy is whether its success was due to the personality of its director, Akhtar Hameed Khan, or to its concept of operation. There is no completely satisfying answer. Individual programs tried at the Academy were spread to the entire province: rural public works is the best example. On the other hand, the basic approach was never really tried in a broad area. Instead the East Pakistan government adopted single purpose campaigns, easier to mount and promising quicker increases in production, such as the installation of low level pumps, and dissemination of IR 20, a new rice variety apparently suited to the conditions of the area. Perhaps the question will never be answered, since Akhtar Hameed is no longer associated with the Academy, and the long run intentions of the Bangladesh Government are not clear.

Akhtar Hameed was influential enough with the Pakistan Government and with foreign donors, to get the outside financial resources needed to support his experimental programs, and to secure the cooperation of the functional departments, though sometimes not without a fight. Other descendants of the community development program, which we can call integrated rural development, have tackled the problem of coordination directly by attempting to unify control over both capital and specialized personnel and moving that control at least partially away from the national government and closer to the village. Programs of this nature have had A.I.D. support in the Philippines, Thailand, and the three Indochina countries. In all but the first case, the primary objective is that of strengthening the influence of legitimate authority in the face of subversive attack. The broad purpose regional development program in the Helmand Valley in Afghanistan has gradually taken on some of the characteristics of integrated rural development. In these programs substantial capital resources, usually emanating at the start from the foreign donor, are passed through the national government to the provincial or district government. Typically the first grant is for construction equipment, and the initial activity consists of building roads and other public works. Among the goals are the creation of a planning and project design capacity at the province level, decentralization of authority to the provincial government, creation of mechanisms to coordinate the work of national departments of agriculture, health, education, etc., and

an increased responsiveness to village needs of government officers working in the province. Typically again, decentralization proceeds painfully slowly, in the view of the American advisors, and initiatives from the provincial level seem to depend on unusual personal qualities in the chief administrator of the province. In Thailand in the mid-1960's, one of the national government agencies with which the new Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) program had to contend was, ironically, the continuing Community Development effort. On the other hand, ARD found support from a training program for provincial and local officials which had also had significant American technical assistance.

One significant point about these latter examples is that they continue the concept implicit in the community development program that:

...the encounter between farmer and bureaucrat is a crucial point in the process of development. If that encounter does not appear fruitful to the farmer, then the most attractive of package programs will remain on the shelf, unsold.²¹

The quotation is from a report on a six weeks meeting of experts from all applicable disciplines on the question of what to do about agriculture in the poor countries, organized by the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the summer of 1964. The pessimistic tone of the document is reflected in its title, No Easy Harvest; it is of particular interest because it represents a clear expression of the expert consensus on this crucial development problem just before the Green Revolution unexpectedly

21. Millikan and Hapgood, No Easy Harvest, p. 78. See Chapter VI generally.

changed the gloomy outlook. In general, the MIT group found that agricultural progress was heavily location-specific, and that for each location it was necessary to organize a comprehensive systems approach through which each relevant factor was controlled or influenced. A **crucial** role was assigned to the bureaucracy, not only to design a package of innovations that would meet the local requirements, but to sell that package. Organizational structure could be adjusted to the circumstances, but large numbers of technically competent government workers dedicated to promoting development were essential.

Fortunately for the cause of development, the pessimism turned out to be unjustified; moreover, and also fortunately, the encounter between the farmer and the bureaucrat appears not be too crucial at all. It pales in significance alongside the encounter between the farmer and the market, and the nature of the technology available to the farmer through either governmental or private channels.

22

22. See Section V below.

A mission sent to any of the poor Asian countries in the early 1950's to establish a program of economic assistance would obviously have included among its findings the observation that governmental inefficiency was an important obstacle to development. So it was a natural to call in an expert in public administration. The result was a program intended to improve the efficiency of administration across the board. Commitments for technical assistance in public administration in Asia from the mid-fifties through the late sixties ran something less than 10% of total commitments for technical assistance, or around \$6 million a year. The program consisted largely of:

1. training in the United States and third countries, in administrative skills and techniques.
2. establishment or improvement of training institutions in the host country, such as special government schools, universities, departments, or institutions combining business and government management courses.

23. Edward W. Weidner, Technical Assistance in Public Administration Overseas: The Case for Development Administration, Chicago, Public Administration Service, 1964, p. 199. For brief summaries of the deficiencies in developing countries' bureaucracies see Montgomery, John D. "A Royal Invitation: Variations on Three Classic Themes," in Montgomery and William J. Siffin (eds), Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change, New York, McGraw Hill, 1966, p.262; and Waterston, Development Planning, p.252ff.

24. The figures are estimated from reports prepared by the Statistics and Reports Division, Agency for International Development. Descriptions of the technical assistance program in public administration may be found in Weidner, Technical Assistance, and in David S. Brown, "Strategies and Tactics of Public Administration Technical Assistance, 1945-63," in Montgomery and Siffin (eds), Approaches to Development.

3. groups of advisors to help with financial management, budgeting, accounting, tax collection, statistics, and personnel practices.

In approaching the government apparatus as a whole, it was generally the policy of the aid agency to avoid sensitive issues such as the structure of the civil service, the attitude of bureaucrats toward the public, and the policy role of the bureaucrats. But those who carried out the projects were in no doubt that they were trying to teach democratic behavior by example in the classroom and elsewhere, and that their trainees were going to have to "serve as the architects of their new societies" and had to be prepared to handle issues of broad policy significance.

25

This phase of U.S. foreign assistance has been extensively and critically analyzed by numerous experts whose broad conclusions I will summarize here:

26

1. The program focussed on how to improve administration in general, rather than how to achieve development goals through better administration.

25. Mary E. Robinson, Education for Social Change: Establishing Institutes of Public and Business Administration Abroad, Washington, D.C., Brookings, 1961, pp.13-14. See also Ralph Braibanti, "Transnational Inducement of Administrative Reform: A Survey of Scope and Critique of Issues," in Montgomery and Siffin (eds), Approaches to Development, p.152.

26. See for example, Weidner, Technical Assistance; Brown, "Strategies and Tactics;" Braibanti, "Transnational Inducement;" and Milton J. Esman and John D. Montgomery, Systems Approaches to Technical Cooperation: The Role of Development Administration, Washington, D.C., Governmental Affairs Institute, 1969 (reprinted in Public Administration Review, September-October 1969).

2. In dealing almost exclusively with administrative skills, it applied the efficiency-oriented concepts of American public administration as developed in the 1930's, while ignoring more recent insights such as the behavioral approach, and the use of modern analytical methods from economics and engineering.

3. Although both the policy guidance and the individual advisors spoke fervently about the need to adapt American experience to local circumstances, virtually identical projects were replicated in country after country implying a belief that the administrative techniques involved were in fact universal and could be applied anywhere.
27

4. The aid program failed to integrate the work of its public administration specialists with, for example, its programs in developing planning, or community development, where substantive issues of administration were involved. One consequence was to lose sight in the technical assistance program of the policy making, political role that the Asian bureaucrat is often called upon to play, and that our own programs encouraged him to play.

27. Weidner, Technical Assistance, pp.164-5. For a statement that combines a ringing statement of the importance of adaptation and cultural relevance with a long list of nonetheless essential American style reforms, see Henry Reining, "Organization of the Civil Service for Social and Economic Development," in Martin Kriesberg (ed), Public Administration in Developing Countries, Washington, D.C., Brookings, 1965, pp.103-13.

Looking back, one can see that these programs produced a number of important accomplishments. For example, a national training policy for civil servants was adopted in Pakistan, and the institutions to implement it are still active and vigorous. Bangkok has a Budget Bureau technically similar to that in Washington, although it fits into the power structure in a Thai rather than American fashion. Where there was political backing for better revenue collection, as in Korea, tax receipts climbed very satisfactorily. Perhaps most important, large numbers of trainees returned from study abroad in public administration, and added significantly to the supply of sophisticated native experts on subjects related to development: while general educational levels have not changed much in Asia in the last two decades, the level of training of top professionals has changed enormously as a result of aid and self-financed training programs.

But not everything looks so bright. Some of the new administrative systems, even quite routine ones, were formally accepted but did not have the anticipated results; they were frustrated by values and modes of behavior embedded in the cultures of the Asian countries. As for the application of merit principles to promotions, reductions in corruption, greater delegation of authority to permit faster action,²⁹ nothing much happened at all. Major administrative reforms did not

28. Braibanti, "Transnational Inducement," p.160.

29. For examples and discussion see Braibanti, op.cit., pp.163-8, and Esman and Montgomery, Systems Approaches, p.4.

follow from the insertion of revolutionary ideas in technical guise. Even where reforms were recommended directly by advisors, or by influential local leaders, there was little action.

In some countries, important changes in bureaucratic structure and behavior did take place, but these seemed to be associated not with the ideas of the public administration specialists, but either with political reforms imposed on the administrative structure, or with programs to achieve particular economic purposes.

Beginning in the early 1960's, a number of students of the development process, dissatisfied with the role that public administration as a discipline was playing in the aid program, began to propose a new approach, which they called "development administration." This has grown, rather slowly, into a doctrine of management for development purposes, which will be discussed in the following section.

30. Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and the Judiciary in Pakistan," in Joseph LaPalombara (ed), Bureaucracy and Political Development, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963, especially p.373; and Albert Gorvine, "Administrative Reform: Function of Political and Economic Change," in Guthrie S. Birkhead (ed), Administrative Problems in Pakistan, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1966, pp.185-211.

31. Ibid.

V. NEW TECHNICAL ANSWERS, DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
AND THE SECTOR APPROACH

It is immediately clear from the experience of Pakistan under Ayub, the Philippines under Magsaysay and Marcos, Korea under Park, and Indonesia under Suharto -- to mention just a few -- that strong political leadership and policies favorable to development can produce a greatly improved performance by the bureaucracy, at least for a while. There is not much the managers of an aid program can do about this except to prepare themselves for the day when such an opportunity presents itself.

The Green Revolution suggest another way in which it may be possible to create a set of circumstances in which development momentum is generated with better bureaucratic performance as one aspect. The Green Revolution is the name given to the unexpectedly rapid adoption by the farmers of Asia, particularly in Turkey, Pakistan, India, Vietnam and the Philippines, of the new high yielding varieties of wheat and rice developed in Mexico and the Philippines in the mid 1960's. An extensive study in the spring of 1969 under A.I.D. auspices, involving many outside experts and considering experience worldwide, not just in Asia, came to the conclusion that the package of technology itself provided the impetus. The combination of seed, fertilizer and cultural practices provided such a high return to the individual farmer and the economy -- roughly a doubling of income and a larger increase in output -- that it offered substantial incentives

32. Agency for International Development, Spring Review of the New Cereal Varieties: Implications for A.I.D., Washington, D.C., 1969; Edward B. Rice, Spring Review of the New Cereal Varieties: A Perspective, Washington, D.C., Agency for International Development, 1969.

to the farmer and also to governments to take extraordinary action to secure its rapid introduction. The result in each country was an intensive, goal-oriented effort by the bureaucracy with full political backing from the government. In some cases advanced management technologies, PERT and such, were used. In others, not. It is not clear that the use of such technologies made any difference. It is clear that political backing was essential to break bottlenecks, to cross lines between existing government agencies, to mix public and private organizations and capacities as needed to get the job done.

The institutions normally associated with agricultural progress -- cooperatives, rural credit institutions, extension services, and so forth -- were used where they existed, but their presence and effectiveness did not seem to be particularly important; the campaigns succeeded with or without them. But as soon as the increased production itself took hold, the existing institutions began to change and flourish, and new ones to develop, energized by the new wealth and the need to deal with its consequences.

A conclusion, which has been taken very much to heart by A.I.D. and other aid agencies, public as well as private, is to devote more attention to finding new technology, or new ways of adapting existing technology, to the high priority problems of the developing countries. 33

33. For an assessment of the requirements for new technology in various fields and suggested programs, see Rutherford M. Poats, Technology for Developing Nations: New Directions for Technical Assistance, Washington, D. C., Brookings, 1972.

This suggests a task for Asian bureaucracy in helping to identify the problems to be tackled, to initiate and guide the search for technical answers, and to design programs to implement the technology when it becomes available. The crop campaigns of the Green Revolution reduced enthusiasm for bureaucrats in the role of persuading individual farmers to adopt innovations, and in the role of delivering inputs and services themselves. The same campaigns and subsequent experience have reinforced the importance of the policy-making bureaucrat ensuring that price relationships enhance production incentives, and that vital inputs are available when needed. These **lessons** contributed to the refinement of the ideas of "development administration" as the concept has matured over the past ten years.

The arena for development administration is a major system of action, not the whole of the bureaucratic structure. Such a system can be functionally or geographically defined, or both: export promotion, rice production, dry land farming and reducing the birth rate are all examples. The concern is the management aspects of the entire problem, as a factor co-equal with the resource requirements, the technical knowledge, and the economic policy aspects. Using the

34. The present view of development administration is laid out in Esman and Montgomery, Systems Approaches. See also William J. Siffin, "Development Administration in the Programme of the United States Agency for International Development," International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. XXXVII - 1971, No. 3, pp. 250-3 and George F. Gant, "A Note on Applications of Development Administration," Public Policy, Vol. XV - 1966, pp. 199-211.

techniques of systems analysis, the management expert would ensure the coordination of all essential factors into a single delivery system which will bring the new technology and the related inputs to the ultimate user.

Note the stress on essential factors. No Easy Harvest also talked of a system, but seemed to be saying that almost every relevant factor was an important system element. A useful distinction for agriculture has been suggested by Arthur Mosher: the essentials for agricultural development are markets, technology, availability of supplies and equipment, production incentives, and transportation. Accelerators, which are desirable because they speed things up but are not essential, are relevant education, credit, group action by farmers, improving the land and agricultural planning.

The delivery system will rely on organizations and institutions judged likely to work best, whether they are government or non-government. Moreover, the predisposition will be to use the forms and methods already available in the host society, rather than to import structural types and procedures. Esman and Montgomery point out that the comparative study of public administration has served to break down preconceptions about bureaucratic methods, and to illustrate that there are often numerous alternative ways of using public and private agencies and resources to secure public objectives. There

35. Arthur T. Mosher, Getting Agriculture Moving: Essentials for Development and Modernization, New York, Praeger, 1966.

36. Esman and Montgomery, Systems Approaches, p.15. See also Waterston, Development Planning, p. 283; Weidner, Technical Assistance, pp. 179-85, 205ff; and LaPalombara, Bureaucracy and Political Development, p.14.

is always a problem, of course, in carrying out this declared intention, as it is difficult for an advisor to distinguish clearly between his own cultural preconceptions and his judgment of what is needed for program effectiveness.

Development administration will not hesitate to use behavioral analysis of organizational structures when it may help, nor to consider the most advanced and sophisticated techniques of analysis and information control when these fit the situation. (The management of a steel mill in Turkey should be able to benefit no less from a computer model relating company finances to technical and investment choices than the management of any other modern steel mill.) Moreover, experimental testing of programs in actual operation is encouraged. Such social experimentation is already quite widespread both in the United States and in Asia, although the methodology of proceeding from experiment to full fledged program is still somewhat uncertain.

It has often been said that the constraint on development progress³⁷ is lack of management capability rather than of economic resources. This is a form of expression that makes an economist cringe slightly, so let me amend it to read that the development returns to improved management in the developing countries of Asia can be very large indeed. The development administration concept is that foreign assistance should

37. For example in Waterston, Development Planning, p. 289 and Donald C. Stone, "Government Machinery Necessary for Development" in Kriesberg (ed), Public Administration in Developing Countries, p.53.

not attempt to improve the quality of management across the board in government, or in the economy generally, but should attempt to meet the management requirements of achieving particular development goals. This approach coincides closely with the experience of aid program management, which has for a long period been looking -- though perhaps not hard or deeply enough -- at the total requirements needed to make a particular project or activity succeed, as illustrated by some of the examples given in Section I.

38

The approach also has the great operational advantage of desensitizing to some degree efforts by foreigners to change ingrained ways of doing things. It is much easier to propose a wrenching shift in practices that is clearly related to a specific, high priority purpose, than it is to propose the same shift on the grounds of improving general efficiency of administration.

The concepts of development administration as outlined here also match well with the sector approach to foreign assistance, which is becoming increasingly important in the programs of A.I.D. The sector approach seeks to combine the flexibility of resource use and the policy influence of program aid, with the functional focus and specificity of capital projects and technical assistance. A sector loan is made in support of a developing country government program in a single area of the economy which can be viewed operationally as relatively separable from the economy as a whole. The loan may finance technical assistance,

38. Another example is the "nuclei approach" to administrative reform described in Waterston, Development Planning, pp. 285-7.

specific capital projects, or general budgetary or import requirements for the sector: thus a food grain production loan might provide funds to import fertilizer for distribution through commercial channels, capital for needed irrigation works, and technical assistance for agricultural research and the organization of rural credit institutions, which, together with the other parts of the host government's program are judged sufficient inputs for a significant advance in food grain production.

Since the concept of a sector and the span of a system of action are very much the same -- allowing for sub-sectors and sub-systems in both cases -- it is clear that the concepts of development administration fit neatly into the sector approach to foreign assistance.

The general application of the principles of development administration as described above will mark a complete turnaround in assistance concerned with the bureaucracy directly. In fact, however, these principles represent a codification and elaboration of the approach to the bureaucracy that has been implicit for some time in the program of American economic assistance. Working in this fashion, the management specialist should be able to make a significantly greater contribution to the progress of development than has been possible in the past.

SUMMARY

One can identify two sets of themes on the role of the bureaucracy running through the American economic aid program to Asia. The first set have remained reasonably constant:

1. The bureaucracy is assigned an extremely important role in the development process, second only to the political leadership which is much more difficult for the aid program to influence. The private sector is also given high priority, but must be approached through the bureaucracy.

2. The working of the aid relationship tends to strengthen the power of the bureaucracy in the aided countries, particularly at the top, and to encourage greater policy initiative and decision-making by civil servants.

3. Seeking to reduce bureaucratic obstacles to development, aid influence has attempted to limit the regulatory and service-providing functions of the bureaucracy, and to replace these functions by the use of incentives and private agencies. In trying to build development institutions, the focus is on autonomy, effectiveness, and linkages to the power structure, not on the specific placement in the bureaucratic system.

4. In its concern for accomplishment, the aid program has tended to support capable individuals, stressing leadership capacity rather than bureaucratic function. It has taken both sides in the specialist-generalist controversy, depending on the particular circumstances.

5. The program has pursued goals of democratic behavior, the philosophy of servant not master, and broadened popular participation

in development institutions, but restricted itself to the use of example and exhortation in pursuing these goals.

A second set of themes do show change over the period:

1. Technical assistance in public administration has shifted from trying to improve the bureaucracy in general by better staff services, organization, and administrative technique, to a focus on the management requirements of programs to solve specific development problems.
2. Aid managers have learned to be more flexible in capitalizing on possibilities inherent in existing institutions, within and without the bureaucracy, rather than seeking to change them to fit other models.
3. Greater prominence has been given to full scale social experiments, quite different from the pilot projects of the early aid programs, and to encouraging an experimental outlook among bureaucrats and political leaders.
4. The great apprehension shown earlier about the relationship between the outer edges of the bureaucracy and individual citizens has eased, in favor of greater attention to the substantive content of the choices and incentives available to the individual through government agencies or otherwise.