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9. ABSTRACT

The socioeconomic aspects of land reform in East and Southeast Asia are examined. Two periods of land reform have occurred. The first, following World War II, saw sweeping land reform programs in the East Asian countries of China, Japan, Taiwan, North Korea, and South Korea. The second period has occurred since the mid-1950s in the eight countries of island and mainland Southeast Asia. The Philippines and South Vietnam have had a voluminous history of land reform legislation. North Vietnam has followed the model of agrarian revolution in mainland China. Burma has carried out its own program of land redistribution. Malaysia and Indonesia, though not engaged in wide-scale reform, have acknowledged their land problems in areas of high population density. Thailand has begun to acknowledge its problems. Cambodia and Laos are evidently adopting at least the broad outlines of the Communist pattern of land reform. Land reform programs in East and Southeast Asia today, despite the diversity in historical and cultural settings, are intimately linked. They confront the twofold issues of equity and productivity. The working models for land reform--exemplified by Japan and Taiwan on one hand and mainland China on the other--have exerted influence on the pattern of land reforms in neighboring countries. This discussion of land reform efforts in the various countries deals with socioeconomic repercussions on various social classes, political objectives of the elite, government implementation efforts and modifications to models for agrarian reform.

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LAND REFORM PROGRAMS IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH

by
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by

Antonio J. Ledesma**

*This paper derives from the author's work as an annotator for the forthcoming bibliography on land tenure and agrarian reform in Asia which is being produced by the staff of the Land Tenure Center Library under the direction of Librarian Teresa Anderson.

**A Ph.D. in Development Studies candidate currently doing dissertation field research in the Philippines.

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
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INTRODUCTION

"Search for the root cause and it will be found in the land." (Lin 1966) Perhaps in no other part of the modern world has the land problem been so closely associated with the development or underdevelopment[1] of sovereign nations than in East and Southeast Asia. Nowhere else too has there been such a spectrum of land reform programs based on a variety of national goals, means, and competing ideologies.[2]

In general, two periods of land reform programs corresponding to the two Asian regions under study can be outlined. The first period, taking place immediately at the end of the Second World War, witnessed sweeping land reform programs in the East Asian countries of China, Japan, Taiwan, North and South Korea. In addition to affecting some of the most ancient civilizations in Asia, land reform in these countries took place in the Asian areas of high population density where the land problem was most acute.

The second period of land reform activities has taken place in the countries of Southeast Asia since the mid-1950s, when land reform in East Asia had already been substantially completed. Among the eight countries of island and mainland Southeast Asia, there has been more diversity in the initiation, formulation, and implementation of land reform programs--a reflection perhaps of the region's own complexity, situated at the crossroads of the Indian and Chinese civilizations, and colonized at various times over the last four centuries by competing Western powers (the Portuguese and Spaniards, followed by the Dutch, British, French, and Americans), and more recently by the Japanese during World War II. (Steinberg 1971)[3]

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1. "Underdevelopment" in the current literature has three connotations: (1) in the neutral sense, meaning "less developed countries" (LDCs); (2) among dependency theorists, meaning literally under-developed--i.e., under the domination of the developed countries, and (3) more dynamically, meaning under-developing--i.e., the "development of underdevelopment."

2. "Land reform" has been defined in multifarious ways. As used throughout this study, it means land tenure reform and refers primarily to land redistribution.

3. Though extremely important for a proper appreciation of various land reform programs, the historical background for each country's unique experience in the evolution of its land problem has not been attempted. Emphasis has rather been laid on drawing the broad outlines for a comparative study of contemporary land reform programs in the region.

For the more interested reader, the standard history books for each country should be consulted as well as more specialized inquiries into the history of land tenure problems such as: Gourou (1955) for Vietnam, Cady (1958) for Burma; Dore (1959) for Japan, McLennan (1973) for the Philippines; Jacoby (1961) for Southeast Asia; etc.

The Philippines and South Vietnam have had a voluminous history of land reform legislation, accompanied by substantial attempts by the government to implement reforms. Two major efforts in the mid-1950s and late 1960s have characterized these two countries' history of land reform. North Vietnam, following the model of agrarian revolution in mainland China, has initiated a radical land reform program earlier than any other country in the region. Burma in the contemporary world, following the "Burmese road to socialism," has carried out its own pattern of land nationalization and redistribution. Malaysia and Indonesia, though not engaged in wide-scale redistribution of land, have acknowledged their land problems in areas of high population density and in the foreign-owned plantation sector of their agricultural economies. Land settlement has been the preferred policy for these two countries, as well as for Thailand which has only begun to acknowledge the spread of tenancy relations in its Central Plain. The two remaining countries of Cambodia and Laos, former provinces of French Indochina, are probably the least developed countries in the region--and also the least studied in terms of land tenure problems. Recent political events in 1975 have further shrouded the mystery regarding these two countries' development, but should indicate that Cambodia and Laos will henceforth be adopting at least the broad outlines of the Communist pattern of land reform.

Rural Southeast Asia in the late 1960s and early 1970s, like East Asia in the earlier decades, has begun to feel the increasing pressures of population growth with its consequent repercussions on land tenure problems. Coupled with population growth, however, has been the advent of the seed-water-fertilizer revolution, dubbed the Green Revolution, since the late 1960s which has dramatically increased the food-production potentials of the region. (Joint FAO 1969:4)

Land reform programs in East and Southeast Asia today, despite the diversity in historical and cultural backgrounds, are therefore intimately linked and confront basically the same twofold issues of equity and productivity. (Ruttan 1964) The working models for land reform--exemplified by Japan and Taiwan on the one hand and mainland China on the other--have exerted a profound influence on the pattern of land reform in neighboring countries. And as the countries with earlier experience in land reform implementation have begun to confront second-generation problems (usually productivity questions) brought about by the reforms, the later countries have tried to cope with their first-generation land problems (usually equity questions) while seeking for longer term solutions that would not incur similar future problems.

It is in this light that our comparative survey of the socio-economic and political dimensions of land reform programs in various Asian countries will be undertaken--keeping in mind the uniqueness of each nation's experience, yet trying to note some underlying similarities and historical links.

Table 1 presents a simplified chart of land reform programs in East and Southeast Asia after the Second World War, evaluated by the writer according to the scope and degree of implementation.[4]

Table 1. Scope and Degree of Implementation of Land Reform Programs in East and Southeast Asia

Land Redistribution Completed:		
Communist	Non-Communist	Socialist
China (1950-52)	Japan (1947-49)	Burma ?
North Korea (1946-48)	South Korea (1950-)	
North Vietnam (1954-56)	Taiwan (1953-)	
Partial Reforms Consisting Primarily In:		
Land Redistribution	Land Settlement	Minimal Efforts
South Vietnam (1957-)	Philippines (1954-57)	Cambodia
(1970-75)	Malaysia	Laos
Philippines (1963-date)	Indonesia	
Indonesia (1962-65)	Thailand	

I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC REPERCUSSIONS OF LAND REFORM ON VARIOUS SOCIAL CLASSES

Because land reform is such a complex process, it is difficult to isolate its various social, economic, and political dimensions. In this

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4. The present study has evolved from a year's work by the writer (from mid-1975 to mid-1976) as research assistant annotating the current holdings of the Land Tenure Center collection on agrarian reform and land tenure in East and Southeast Asia. When not found in the LTC collection, individual items can usually be located in one of the libraries of the University of Wisconsin-Madison campus, particularly the Memorial Library.

Although this is not intended as a complete review of the literature, an effort has been made to include the principal studies or to cite representative works of major writers on land tenure and agrarian reform in the region.

The writer especially acknowledges the support provided by his major adviser, Professor William C. Thiesenhusen, and LTC librarians, Teresa Anderson, Charlotte Lott, and Patricia Frye, in completing a sizable portion of the annotations. In collaboration with several other annotators, the LTC library staff plans to publish in due time this annotated regional bibliography on land tenure and agrarian reform in Asia, in the same manner that they have already done so for the holdings on Latin America and Africa.

section, we shall deal primarily with the socio-economic aspects of land reform in East and Southeast Asia. Six indicators have been selected to provide some guidelines for a comparative study. These are:

1) Tenure change--in terms of either tenancy regulation or tenancy abolition;

2) Landlord compensation and retention limits--including questions of land valuation, the legal formula for compensation, and tenants' amortization payments;

3) Distribution of income and wealth--pertaining to consumption, savings, and capital formation; (cf. Dorner 1964)

4) Production and productivity--per unit area and per worker, investments for production and technological innovations; (cf. Dorner and Kanel 1971)

5) Employment creation--in terms of on-farm work and the creation of rural-based industries; (cf. Thiesenhusen 1971)

6) Structural changes--i.e., the effects of land reform on other sectors of the economy, particularly industry, and on the formation of new social classes.

In examining several or all of these socio-economic indicators for each country, we shall try to follow the chronological order of modern-day land reform programs, as they occurred first in East Asia, then in Southeast Asia.

Japan: Ironically, Japan, which set off the whole chain of events leading to major land reform programs throughout Asia in the aftermath of the Second World War, is credited today as having undertaken one of the most effective post-war land reform programs. Actually, Dore (1965) distinguishes two stages of land reform in Japan based on two types of landlords--the first attaining power through military conquest or by infeudation, and the second by economic means within an established political order. The Meiji Restoration in the 1870s dispossessed the Type I landlords, the daimyo, leaving the field clear for the Type II landlords, the smaller village landlords who remained the dominant influence in the countryside until Japan's Stage II land reform in 1947-49.

By 1950, a total of 1,742,000 hectares, comprising one-third of the total area of Japan's cultivated land, had been purchased and transferred to tenants, including owner-tenant cultivators. As a tenure class, owner-operators increased from 31 percent of total farm households in 1945 to 70 percent in 1950, reaching up to 80 percent in 1965. (Ogura 1967:224-27) Several factors have been cited for this rapid change of tenure: (1) ceiling prices of land had been officially fixed since the war, so that by the end of 3 1/2 years of severe inflation in 1945-49, the real price of the land was only 6 percent of the annual yield in 1950; this made it unnecessary for small farmers to make long-term installment payments over 24 years; (2) while not abolishing tenancy altogether, land reform placed severe restrictions against tenant eviction, and money rents were fixed so

that by 1965, the controlled rent represented less than 3 percent of the estimated average yield converted to money.[5] (Ogura 1967)

Clearly then, the direct results of land reform were on land tenure change and a concomitant distribution of agricultural income, due to the real reduction of land rent and purchase price for the land. "As far as the influence on the development of Japanese agriculture after the reform is concerned," remarks Ouchi (1966:132), "it is this fact, the fact that the reform was carried out in a manner which was virtually a form of expropriation, which was of greatest significance, rather than the mere fact of the vast scale of the reform" (emphasis added).

The economic impact of land reform on consumption, savings, investment, and productivity has also been well documented. Kawano (1965), for instance, concludes for the 1951-54 period in Japan's agricultural sector:

> The economic significance of the Land Reform in Japan lies, for one thing, in the fact that it raised both the average consumption level and the average propensity to consume of farmers, resulting in a big expansion of the domestic consumption market, and for another, that by converting tenanted land to owner-cultivated land it expedited long-term investment in agriculture, and thus combined with technological progress brought about positive effects in increasing agricultural productivity. It seems to us, however, that in the period under review, the Land Reform cannot necessarily be said to have raised agricultural productivity explicitly.

A decade after land reform, however, Japanese scholars and other observers have noted second-generation problems, arising particularly since the stage of high economic growth in the aftermath of the Korean War. Undersized holdings and small-scale farm management have created a gap between the agricultural and industrial sectors in terms of productivity and income.[6] A significant increase in part-time farming has been noted, indicating on the one hand the need of most farm households to supplement their incomes from non-farm sources, and on the other hand the lack of full employment opportunities on small farms.

In terms of the impact of these structural changes on small farmers, Uehara (1964) has investigated the uneven differentiation of the peasantry by 1960 along two lines--the semi-proletarianization of the bottom peasants who remain resident part-time farmers; and the increasing difficulty for the top and middle strata of the peasantry to develop as rich peasants. He expects an increase in the ranks of the "half-proletarian poor peasantry" who already constitute from 72 percent to 82 percent of all peasants in the districts of Tohoku and Kinki.

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5. In 1967, however, this rose to 10 percent of the average yield. (Ogura 1967)

6. Cf. Tohata 1963; Ouchi 1966; Kajita 1965; Dore 1963.

South Korea: In terms of tenure change, South Korea's land reform can compare favorably with those of Japan or Taiwan. Owner-operators constituted 14 percent of all farm households in 1945, 17 percent in 1947, and 70 percent by 1965. (Pak 1968:102) However, aggregate figures alone may not reveal other relevant data. For instance, the area actually redistributed by the reform constituted only 56 percent (470,000 chongbo; 1 chongbo equals about 1 hectare) of the tenant farmland area, with the other 44 percent being sold earlier in the intervening four years prior to the promulgation of the Farmland Reform Law in 1949. (Pak 1968:103)

The fact that most tenant or former tenant farmers are still poor has been ascribed to several reasons: (1) the inability of many tenants to pay for their lands due to the short repayment period of five years, the high monetary interest rate of 24 percent per annum, and the stipulation of repayment in kind; (Pak 1967:103) (2) an indirect effect of accelerating the trend to small farms--i.e., the average size for all farms fell from 1.62 chongbo in the late 1930s to 0.8 chongbo in 1960, (Pak 1966:220; and Morrow and Sherper 1970:44) and (3) the government's neglect of the agricultural sector, following a dualistic model of development that is biased toward an export-oriented industrialization program. (Reed 1975)

The extreme fragmentation of landholdings and continued pressures on the land (due partly to the influx of war-time refugees from the north), coupled with the official abolition of tenancy, have led to disguised forms of tenancy arrangements which have become all the more difficult to control. A widespread form of disguised tenancy, called Ko-ji, has become prevalent particularly in the densely populated rice-growing regions of the southwest. Under this system of semi-permanent contract farming, a laborer and his family agree to a given set of farm tasks, receiving from the landowner payment in kind, usually rice, prior to the crop season. (Morrow and Sherper 1970:43; Reed 1975:20-21)

Compounding the problems of dwarf farms for many and landlessness for a growing number has been the small farmers' limited access to credit, to new types of farm technology including high-yielding varieties, and to extension assistance. (Morrow and White 1972) South Korea thus represents an instance where drastic tenure changes were made in favor of the small farmers but were not integrated within a wider scheme of government support services for rural development.[7] The political actuations of the South Korean elite in the 1950s as well as today likewise indicate that the Korean farmers have been made passive objects, not subjects, of reform. The socio-economic repercussions have therefore remained ambiguous and, on the whole, may even have become more pernicious to the small farmers if only because official statistics do not reveal the extent of the problem.

Taiwan: Like Korea, Taiwan was a colony of Japan for several decades before the war. Innovative agricultural technology and an economic

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7. This is similar to what occurred in the Bolivian land reform of 1952 when widespread land redistribution took place, but the peasants' welfare did not improve due to lack of infrastructure support.

infrastructure under the colonial regime had made the island a highly productive agricultural region even if most of the surplus was earmarked for the mother country. (Myers and Ching 1964) The retrocession of the island with this infrastructure to China after the war, the arrival of a new elite, the Kuomintang leaders, from the mainland without landed interests to protect on the island, and the offer of U.S. support in the ideological battle against the giant across the strait constituted unique preconditions for the success of the land reform program that followed.

Three general features can be cited. First, there was a logical three-stage progression, starting with the 37.5 percent farm rent reduction in 1949, followed by the sale of public lands, and culminating in the Land-to-the-Tiller Act of 1953 which set a maximum retention limit of 3 hectares of paddy land and 6 hectares of dry land. (Shen, S.K. 1967) The first step enabled tenant farmers to increase their incomes, making it relatively easier for them to eventually pay the amortization payments during the final stage of land redistribution. Likewise, the interim sale of public lands lessened the population pressure on tenanted lands, preventing the miniscule fragmentation of what would eventually be converted into owner-operated lands.

A second salient feature of the reform was the manner of landlord compensation which was pegged to commodity prices instead of fixed money prices, thus providing a partial hedge against inflation. Moreover, the formula for compensation provided a built-in mechanism for ex-landlord capital to be channeled to industries. Comparing the relative merits of landlord compensation in Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, Steele (1964) has pointed out the following features:

In Taiwan, compensation took the form of 70 percent in commodity bonds in terms of rice or sweet potatoes, and 30 percent in stocks of government enterprises. Although the prices of rice and potatoes increased at about the same rate as the wholesale price index, the price of the stocks dropped considerably. In Japan, landowners received only a fraction of the original value of their lands since no protection was provided against the severe inflation of 1945-51. Finally, in Korea, compensation was in commodity bonds payable in cash at the current official price. It is not known, however, how much lower the official price was in relation to the market price, and whether or not it followed the general rise in the price level.

A third characteristic of the Taiwanese reform has been its integrated model for rural reconstruction where land tenure reform was a necessary but not the only element in the total uplift of the small farmers' welfare. Several studies have given high scores for Taiwan's reform experience in reference to the socio-economic indicators we have earlier indicated--i.e., income distribution, productivity, employment creation, and structural changes. (cf. Koo, A. 1968; Shen, T.H. 1967)[8]

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8. In a study of land reform programs in Taiwan, Japan, and mainland China, Chao (1972) concludes that there was a decline in the productivity of aggregate input immediately after the changes in land tenure. However,

Another group of studies has examined the repercussions of land reform on rural social leadership in village Taiwan. Noting the initial social disorganization undergone by many villages during the post-reform period, Gallin (1963 and 1964) has noted the withdrawal of many landlords from their traditional leadership roles and a trend toward equalization of social status in the villages. Disagreeing with Gallin's findings that land reform caused a "leadership vacuum" in rural Taiwan, Pasternak (1968) nonetheless agrees that new kinds of leaders are emerging with a diffusion of influence and power in the Hakka village that he observed. (cf. Bessac 1965)

China: Land reform on the mainland of China is better understood within the larger context of the agrarian revolution that was foreseen, fomented, and brought to fruition by the Chinese Communist party (CPP) during a tumultuous period that reaches back from the early 1920s to the present day. Mao's forecast in 1927 was but an apocalyptic prelude to what would constitute by far the world's greatest rural movement, involving a farming population of half a billion:

> In a very short time, in China's central, southern and northern provinces, several hundred million peasants will rise like a mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to hold it back. . . . There are three alternatives. To march at their head and lead them? To trail behind them, gesticulating and criticizing? Or to stand in their way and oppose them? (Selected Readings 1971:24)

In retrospect, the CPP's Agrarian Reform Law that was promulgated in June 1950 and officially concluded in October 1952 represented merely the extension to the rest of the country of a process that had already begun in the liberated areas of Northern China during the period 1945-49. Earlier than this; throughout the late 1920s and 1930s, during the Kiangsi and Yenan periods, the Communist leadership under Mao and rival factions had experimented with various agrarian strategies to mobilize party, army, and peasants together. (Yeh 1970, Hsiao, T.L. 1969) It is with this background in mind that Wong (1973) observes: "The Chinese land reform was very original: it was not derived from the past experience of any other country but evolved through the Chinese Communist Party's own trial-and-error method during its struggle for power."

If the period of massive land redistribution in 1950-52 was not the beginning of the agrarian revolution, neither was it the end. Two further stages establishing cooperatives (1953-57) and finally communes (1958-61) would complete the institutional transformation of the Chinese countryside. Within the space of a decade, China underwent three massive reorganizations

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in the long run, tenure change induced farmers to marshal more inputs for production, and increased the consumption of the rural population---which might retard the commercialization of farm products, but would also expand the home market for industrial goods.

in the countryside unparalleled by any other period in more than five thousand years of its continuous civilization. In assessing, therefore, the socio-economic repercussions of China's land reform program in 1950-52, one has to recognize the specific objectives of the reform itself, which were more socio-political than economic. Three distinctive features can be pointed out:

First, the differentiation of rural classes was entrusted to the peasants themselves. Five categories were generally adopted: landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, and agricultural laborers. In marked contrast to the practice of land reform in other countries, the Chinese revolutionary leaders recognized the crucial importance of distinguishing among peasant sub-classes in the continuous task of discerning potential friends and foes during a period of revolution, external aggression by Japan, and civil war. (cf. Shillinglaw 1974) Nonetheless, the specific criteria for class analysis based on such factors as landownership, labor exploitation, personal cultivation, and political activities continued to defy uniform application. (cf. Hsiao, T.L. 1969) Still it was the Party's conviction that tenure status, being chiefly a matter of socio-economic relations within a village, could be more accurately defined by the peasants themselves. In this manner, it fell upon the peasants, aided by the cadres, to decide whose property was to be expropriated and who were to be the beneficiaries of the reform. A classic account of the process of transformation in a peasant village in revolutionary China is Hinton's Fanshen (1966).[9]

A second striking feature of the reform was its lack of strict egalitarianism. On the contrary, only a partial reshuffle of agricultural resources was actually carried out--involving the transfer of only the landed properties of the landlords to the poor peasants and agricultural workers. (Wong 1974:18-19) To several observers, the CPP's Agrarian Reform Law of 1950 represented the policy of "making both ends equal without touching the middle." The slogan used was: "Rely upon the hired farmers and poor farmers; protect the middle farmers; neutralize the rich farmers; watch the landlords." (Gen 1951) In sharp contrast to the Russian revolution, the outcome of the Chinese Revolution depended in many ways upon the protagonists' policy toward the middle peasants who as an ill-defined group were "too large to be liquidated as a class, too sensitive to incentives to be bullied, and too economically important to be dispensed with." (Gray 1964) In a similar vein, commenting on one of the early Communist attempts to carry out a land revolution in Kiangsi during the early 1930s, Elvin (1970) notes:

> Land reform in the Kiangsi Soviet area was thus not the abolition of a manorial or 'feudal' order. It was the economic and sometimes physical destruction of the class of better-off smallholders, many of whom were also engaged in trade or money-lending, to the benefit of the less well-off smallholders

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9. Also see Myrdal 1965.

and hired labourers, while those in an intermediate position (the 'middle peasants') were largely left alone.

This same policy was to be re-affirmed by the Communist leaders during the land reform phase two decades later in the early 1950s. Reporting on the whole course of the reform, a high official of the CPP claims that 47 million hectares of land changed hands from the landlord class to some 300 million peasants. (Teng 1954) However, despite its absolute size, the expropriated area is calculated to be only about 43 percent of the known total cultivated land in China at the time. (Wong 1974:18)

A third feature of China's land reform stage was the very process itself--characterized by pragmatism, avoiding "the grotesqueness of land reform in a court room" (Wong 1974:22) and the sequencing of land reform as a necessary first step to confirm the principle of peasant ownership and with it peasant power. As the first step, land reform in terms of radical land redistribution was also meant to demonstrate eventually before peasant owners the uneconomic limitations of very smallholdings, and the need for establishing mutual-aid teams, leading to cooperatives and ultimately, people's communes.[10] (Liao 1963)

More than a quarter of a century after the start of China's agrarian revolution, the Chinese pattern for rural development has become clearer, characterized by a social revolution followed by a technological revolution. (Fei 1974) The stage of land reform belonged to the first period of institutional or social transformation. From this has followed the more recent socio-economic advances in food production, increased peasant welfare, and profound structural changes within the commune system that has made the Chinese model an object of heightened interest among Western and Asian scholars.[11]

North Vietnam: Agrarian revolution in North Vietnam has followed the general outline of the Chinese example with the notable exception that advanced cooperatives have been the final stage instead of the more complex system of communes. As in China, the issue of land reform was used by North Vietnamese leaders to transform an anti-colonialist struggle into a peasant-based Communist regime. (Hoang 1964) White (1970) more accurately talks of the country's "two land reforms" since independence--the first one replacing the "feudal" system of landlord control with private peasant landownership; and the second one abolishing "capitalist" private landownership and instituting collective ownership of land by the cooperatives.

The various steps in the land reform process have been pointed out--the Land Rent Reduction Campaign in 1953-54, followed by the Land Reform

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10. Some observers have commented that the land reform stage would have taken more time had it not been for the outbreak of the Korean War which forced China to hasten the process toward socialized agriculture in the face of an external threat.

11. Cf. Thomas 1956; Ishikawa 1968; Stavis 1974.

Campaign Proper in 1954-56. This second phase touched off some peasant revolts due to excesses committed by political cadres, forcing the Party to undertake a "rectification of errors." (Hoang 1964) An enlightening document from the state-supported National Farmers' Liaison Committee (1954) enunciates the major guidelines for the land reform program. It is intended to wipe out the feudal system, encourage greater productivity, and is vital for the war resistance. The three methods to be employed by the government are: confiscation, requisition, and forced sale. Land distribution will be based on the need of the people, the farming situation prior to the reform, the number of family members, productivity of the area, and village population.

Again as with the Chinese example in initiating land redistribution only to be followed by collectivization, divergent interpretations have been forwarded by observers. Representative of the critical view are Larsen (1965) and Gittinger (1970) who maintain that collectivization of agriculture has failed to attain its goals and that resort to repressive programs is not a requisite to significant agricultural production increases. More sympathetic views are expressed by Shabad (1958) who describes the economic rehabilitation of North Vietnam three years after the Geneva agreements of 1954. By the end of 1956, a land reform program had transformed agricultural tenure into three kinds of farms: small owner-operated, experimental cooperative, and state. Toward the end of the 1960s, Van Dyke (1972) can point out the development and consolidation of cooperatives, which according to the North Vietnamese press, cover from 91 to 97 percent of all farmers.

Assessing the precise socio-economic consequences of land reform in North Vietnam is made difficult by the paucity of reliable sources. However, two salient features should be kept in mind: (1) as in China, the land redistribution phase was meant to be but a brief prelude toward collective cooperativization and was intended to spark off the social transformation that was deemed necessary before any technological transformation could take place; and (2) more so than in China, North Vietnam's agricultural production was carried out over the past 30 years under war-time conditions which required more regimentation and less margin for experimentations. (cf. Van Dyke 1972) The fact that North Vietnam has been able to adapt the cooperative as a rural social structure according to its own people's needs and quite distinct from either the Soviet collectives or the Chinese communes bears testimony to the imagination of its leaders:

> The cooperative has some of the characteristics of the traditional Vietnamese commune. The cooperative provides basic social security, making sure that everyone in the village has food and housing, even though it may be at a very low standard of living. Inequality of wealth is minimized, and thus the major cause of agrarian unrest is removed. (White 1970: 64)

<u>South Vietnam</u>: In contrast to North Vietnam's two-stage blueprint for a total transformation of the countryside, South Vietnam's attempts at land reform (first in 1956 under President Diem, and finally in 1970 under President Thieu) were characterized by half-hearted efforts in the beginning

when there was still time, and frantic distribution of land titles toward the end when it was too late to stem the Communist tide. Whether or not Thieu's Land-to-the-Tiller (LTTT) program would have worked had it not been overrun by the victory of the north, or whether political events took the shape they did because of the failure of land reform in the first place is now a moot question. The fact is South Vietnam lost the war, and it was principally a peasant war. (cf. Wolf 1969)

The land question was recognized early enough by Diem when Ordinance No. 57 was promulgated in 1956 to initiate land reform involving approximately 320,000 cultivators and a rice area of 760,000 hectares. (Gittinger 1957) However, legislative compromises (e.g., the landlords' retention limit was set at 100 hectares) and delays in implementation virtually negated any socio-economic impact that could be hoped for from the program. It was even stressed by field researchers that the Diem government lost much of its political credibility in the eyes of the peasants by taking back the land previously distributed to them by the Viet Minh forces prior to the partitioning of Vietnam in 1954. (cf. Sansom 1970)

Evaluating the consequences of the Diem reform program in a village in the Mekong Delta, Hendry (1960) observed that only about one-quarter of the village households benefited directly from the reform, and that there were no significant changes in the size of farming units, agricultural methods, nor productivity. Due to the absence of sharecropping, farm tenancy may not have been as onerous as in other areas, but neither were there any indications of productivity increases.[12]

The second land reform program under Thieu had as its objectives: (1) the distribution of the remaining lands acquired by the government in the 1950s, (2) the LTTT program which will transfer free of charge all privately tenanted and communally owned ricelands to actual tillers, and (3) a Montagnard land tenure project which issues titles to lands farmed by the highland tribal peoples. (Salter 1970) On the third anniversary of the signing of the LTTT law, the government claimed that 1,003,353 hectares of land had been distributed to 858,821 former tenant farmers. (U.S. AID 1973) Earlier surveys among military personnel indicated that a majority of the soldiers completely approved of the LTTT program. (Russel 1971; Newberry 1971; Bush and Newberry 1971) In at least one military region, however, more than half of the soldiers had failed to apply for or declare their land. (Messegee 1971)

Other studies on small landlords revealed what was perhaps the principal obstacle to the LTTT program: although absentee landlord power had been greatly reduced, resident landlord influence was still strong. (Callison 1973)[13] Investigating the lack of LTTT implementation in the crowded coastal plain of Central Vietnam, in contrast to the delta region, Bush

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12. For a more comprehensive study of the impact of Diem's land reform program, see Stanford Research Institute 1968.

13. Cf. Bush 1970; Eney and Bush 1971.

(1973) noted that 30 percent of all tenants, sharecroppers, or squatters on privately owned land had not been affected. In addition to the expected reasons--such as inability to apply, fear of landlords, ignorance, and moral taboos--Bush concludes: "The unwillingness of small landlords to transfer land and accept compensation is the barrier to distribution."

If small landlords were adversely affected by the projected reforms, other groups were being bypassed. Thus, for instance, commenting on Diem's partial land reform program, Hendry (1964) showed how land redistribution was far from being egalitarian, and noted dissatisfaction among landless laborers and tenants who did not benefit from the redistribution and who still comprise a majority of the village population. A later study on the LTTT program likewise indicated grievances from the 10-15 percent of landless and tenants farming on worship land because they were not included as beneficiaries of the program. (Bush, et al. 1972)

When the LTTT program was thus abruptly ended by the military denouement of April 1975, two principal questions remained unresolved by the Thieu regime: (1) How overcome the opposition of small landlords who saw themselves as being adversely affected by the reform program? and (2) How include marginal groups in rural society--such as the landless agricultural workers, tenants on exempt lands, or cultural minorities on the highlands--as beneficiaries of a land reform program? The same questions are still being asked in the Philippine setting today.

Philippines: With the ending of South Vietnam's final effort at land reform, the Philippines remain as the only nation in Southeast Asia with an ongoing agrarian reform program. Certain parallels, however, with South Vietnam's reform experience should not be lost sight of. As with the Diem reform in 1956, the Philippines' initial attempt at land reform in 1954 under President Magsaysay failed to be implemented, principally due to landlord obstruction in Congress. (cf. Starner 1961; Tai 1974.Chap. 6) In 1963, the Agricultural Land Reform Code was passed under President Macapagal. This too, however, resulted in minimal implementation and had to be amended in 1971. The current agrarian reform program is a continuation basically of the 1963 and 1971 measures, although much more emphasis has been given to its implementation ever since the imposition of martial law in 1972 and President Marcos' declaration that the agrarian reform program would be "the cornerstone of the New Society." (cf. Estrella 1974)

Since then, three interrelated programs have been introduced by presidential decrees: (1) Operation Land Transfer, which like South Vietnam's LTTT program stresses the land-to-the-tiller principle and has been designed to distribute certificates of land transfer to all eligible tenant farmers on rice and corn lands; (2) the Samahang Nayon (Barrio Association) program, which organizes potential reform beneficiaries in the barrios into pre-cooperatives, eventually leading toward an integrated network of area-wide cooperatives servicing the various needs of its members; and (3) the Masagana-99 program, designed to increase rice productivity by providing for the credit and input requirements of small farmers in relation to the green revolution.

Tenure change, structural reorganization, and productivity increases have therefore been fully articulated as specific goals within an integrated agrarian reform program. Recent empirical findings, however, have begun to show discrepancies between program designs and actual accomplishments.

(1) Tenure change: From the original one million tenants to be benefited by the program, approximately 700,000 tenants are actually not eligible for land transfer if agrarian reform stops at the 24-hectare limit. If implementation is pushed down, as at present, to the 7-hectare retention limit for landlords, still 57 percent of all tenants would not be covered. (Harkin 1976:8) This means that more than half of all rice and corn share tenants can only shift into permanent leasehold status (i.e., with a fixed rental of 25 percent of the average yield of the previous three normal years). In effect tenancy would not be abolished, at best it would be regulated for the majority of rice and corn tenants.

(2) Landlord compensation and retention limits: Government policy in recent years has shifted back and forth between 7 and 24 hectares for the retention limit for landlords. Likewise the compensation formula has been made more attractive for landlords, particularly the small landlords of 7 to 24 hectares, by increasing the cash payment from 10 percent to 20 percent. Amortizing peasant owners are given 15 years to pay by yearly installments for the assessed value of the land. Considering the various options in terms of cash and bonds offered as compensation, Harkin (1976) has calculated that the landlord would be able to receive an effective rate of compensation of 92 percent, while the tenant would be paying 68 percent of the agricultural value of the land, the difference being made up by a subsidy from the Land Bank--ultimately, from the general public. Indeed because of these modifications, big landlords would be better off being compensated for their lands than medium and small landlords who would not be compensated at all under a permanent leasehold arrangement with their tenants! (cf. Harkin 1976)

(3) Distribution of income and wealth: Reform beneficiaries are still saddled by a number of financial obligations: (a) amortization payments over 15 years or permanent fixed rentals, (b) repayment for the Masagana-99 loans; and (c) three automatic contributions under the Samahang Nayon program for the membership fee, the barrio guarantee fund, and the barrio savings fund. Despite the replacement of usurious credit rates by government legalized rates, the probable lightening of the lessee's fixed cash rental with continued inflationary trends, and the long-term goal of building up a cooperative system for small farmers, it is extremely doubtful whether peasant farmers can fulfill all these financial obligations all at once, much less perceive the long-range advantages in store for them.[14] Thus, the tenant is still asked to pay substantially for the promised land and

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14. If the agrarian reform experience of Peru is similar to that of the Philippines, it is also likely that Filipino peasant farmers still look with distrust at the central government and regard the reform as simply a period for getting as much as possible out of government services without

for the government's service infrastructure. On the other hand, as has been noted earlier, it is more likely that any redistribution of income takes place not from landlords to tenants, but rather from the general public (including tenants) to big landlords and small landlords of 7 to 24 hectares who are almost fully compensated for any lands they may lose!

(4) Productivity, labor absorption, and structural changes: Although several studies have indicated modest production increases in reform areas, (Sandoval and Gaon 1972; Takahashi 1970) by and large share tenants, lessees, and amortizing owners have not shown significant differences in productivity. In a socioeconomic survey conducted from 1970-73 in the pilot province of Nueva Ecija, a multidisciplinary group of social scientists derived as some of their main conclusions that: tenure change *per se* does not raise productivity; and amortizers exhibit unsatisfactory performance in fulfilling financial obligations. (Mangahas, *et al*. 1974)

If tenure change does provide incentives for increased production, as with the Bulacan lessees observed by Takahashi (1972), it also means that lessee farmers are becoming full-time farmers and utilizing more family labor instead of hired help on a cash basis or payment in kind.[15] A probable outcome would be the growing displacement of landless rural workers who used to help tenants in their work, but have not been included in the list of reform beneficiaries. There are no exact figures for this group of landless workers. But in aggregate terms for the entire country, it has been estimated from the 1959 census data that of 5.4 million people engaged in "agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing," only 2.2 million are classified as "farmers" who either own land they till or are tenants on others' lands. (Kerkvliet 1974) Thus, among the remaining 3.2 million people--a figure that has grown considerably since 1959--it is not improbable that a sizable and growing number actually belong to this lower class of landless peasantry. This class could further be subdivided into: (a) a rural proletariat--those who work as agricultural wage-earners in large plantations, exempt from the present land reform program; and (b) what may be termed as a "lumpen-peasantry"--those who have the right neither to own the land, to till the land as tenants, nor to earn a living wage in agricultural plantation economies, but must somehow live off the land.

Thus, seen from the bottom end of Philippine agrarian society, the truly marginal groups are still left outside the effective scope of the land reform program, and Griffin's observation is corroborated: "those in the lowest deciles of the income distribution . . . are unlikely to improve their relative share--or to increase their political influence." (1974:201-02) From the other end, the big landlords of 50 hectares or more are no longer found in rice and corn lands, but rather in plantation lands

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paying the costs. (Seminar talk on "Agrarian Reform in Peru" by Luis Deustua, 17 September 1976, Land Tenure Center)

15. In Takahashi's analysis, hiring wage laborers and being hired in turn was a disguised way for sharecroppers to increase their net incomes, at the expense of landlords.

exempted from land reform and devoted to the more lucrative export crops. Redistribution of income will not affect those in the highest deciles. The shock troops therefore in any projected redistribution of income and wealth will be small landlords pitted against middle peasants!

From an overall point of view, the socio-economic consequences of agrarian reform in the Philippines have been ambivalent at best, and oftentimes self-contradictory--i.e., beneficial to those who were to be expropriated, and prejudicial to those who were to be the beneficiaries. Despite its already limited scope to tenanted rice and corn lands, the effective applicability of the program has further been curtailed by fluctuating retention limits, and various compensation formulas favoring landlords. For most share tenants, the final objective has been shifted to rent reduction under permanent leasehold--only the first step in the land reform programs of other Asian countries.

Other Countries: In dealing with their land problems, the remaining countries of Southeast Asia have relied more on attempts to regulate tenancy or to start resettlement schemes rather than redistribute the ownership of land. Indonesia witnessed a brief period of land reform in 1962-65, but since then attention has shifted to the colonization of its Outer Islands. (Tjondronegoro 1972) Along with Indonesia, land issues in Malaysia and Thailand have focused more on fragmented smallholdings, land settlement schemes, and plantation economies, instead of tenancy relations. (See Part IV infra. for a brief treatment)

Although Burma's version of a non-Communist type of socialism is probably unique among the countries of the region, an attempt to discuss the socio-economic consequences of its nationalization of agricultural lands has not been made for lack of available data. Likewise, the countries of Cambodia and Laos present a lacuna in our information on land tenure problems.

Concluding Remarks: Some generalizations that may be drawn from this brief survey are:

(1) Marginal groups--i.e., those at the very bottom of the social pyramid--have to be identified and included in any reform program. Otherwise, the conditions of the very poor will only be aggravated, and it is likely that the beneficiaries of today will become tomorrow's problems. (cf. Harkin 1976)

(2) The immediate impact of land reform in the short run lies more in resolving the equity issue. Beneficial socio-economic consequences are more likely to be appreciated only in the intermediate run. In the long run, land reform programs have to be fully integrated with national economic planning. It is not an accident that Japan and Taiwan, the only non-Communist countries considered to have successful land reforms, have also had vigorous industrialization programs.

(3) Paradoxically, complex tenure systems may require simple, uniform, and universal solutions. There is almost general consensus among observers that it is easier to abolish tenancy entirely rather than regulate its

various forms. (cf. Warriner 1969; Dore 1963) Likewise, landlordism, whether big or small, runs at cross purposes with the land-to-the-tiller principle. Unless severe restrictions are clearly made, partial solutions to the land problem have a way of being dissipated in the end.

II. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF ELITES AND RESULTS OF LAND REFORM

A. Political Objectives of Elites

> "Land reform cannot be effectively implemented in the absence of political will, leadership and drive at all levels, to enforce it." (Joint FAO/ECAFE/ILO Seminar 1969)

> "There is no country in Asia, however underdeveloped, which does not know how to write a reform law, or what its implications might be. They have written them, and many have not been carried out--precisely because the political decision-makers understood their implications and their inevitable repercussions. . . . The content and implementation of agrarian reform are a reflection of a particular political balance of forces in a country." (Ladejinsky 1964)

> "Whoever wins the support of the peasants will win China; whoever solves the land question will win the peasants." (Mao in Yenan, 1936)

Land reform programs are only as good as the elites who implement them; elites are only in power so long as they retain some social bases for their regimes. If elites are primarily beholden to the landlord class, then land reform becomes a dress rehearsal. If elites look to the peasants as their main base for power, land reform becomes an agrarian revolution. If elites stay in the middle, trying to reconcile the interests of both landlords and peasants, land reform becomes a balancing act that may never quite satisfy either landlords or peasants.

Although the political reality is much more complex than these generalizations, the experience of land reform programs in the Asian countries under study bears out the convergent observations of such disparate participants as Ladejinsky, U.N. agencies, and Mao.[16]

It is therefore important to draw some classification of the elites in various countries. Using Tai's categories with some modifications (1974: 91), we have the following groupings (Table 2):

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16. Also cf. Moore's more subtle treatment of the historical relationships between landlords and peasants in the rise of modern isms--democracy, fascism, communism. (1966)

Table 2. Types of Political Elite during Land Reforms in East and Southeast Asia

Elites Separated from Landed Class		Elites Cooperative with Landed Class	
Revolutionary	Non-Indigenous	Dominant	Controlled
China	Taiwan *	Philippines (1972)	Philippines (1954)
N. Korea		S. Vietnam (1970) +	S. Vietnam (1956)
N. Vietnam	Japan **	S. Korea	Thailand
			Cambodia
Burma?			Laos +
		Malaysia?	
		Indonesia?	

* The Kuomintang came from the mainland.
** The decisive elite at the time of land reform were the American occupation forces.
\+ Prior to the political events of 1975.

Depending on the type of political elite, land reform programs at various times and places have stressed one or a combination of several of the following political objectives: (1) legitimacy, (2) counter-insurgency and maintaining the status quo, and (3) democracy--either in the Western sense or in the Communist sense. Usually, legitimacy and counter-insurgency are immediate, short-term goals of land reform, while the ideal of democracy constitutes a long-term, if undefinable, objective.[17]

(1) Legitimacy: During or after a political upheaval, the issue of legitimacy becomes a matter of survival for the new elites that have gained power. It is not surprising therefore that after the dislocations of World War II, land reform programs were inaugurated by both Communist and non-Communist countries. In predominantly agricultural countries, characterized by population pressures and concentration of landownership, no other program perhaps can claim more popular support and lay a stake to political legitimacy than land reform.

Thus, in China, land reform provided the Communists an instrument to weld together the interests of the peasants, the army, and the party. (Yeh 1971) Recovering from initial failures, the Communist party under Mao arrived at the "grand strategy of agrarian-based, protracted armed conflict, of which the doctrine of land reform was an integral part." (Yeh 1970) It was perhaps a pointless question among Western writers of the 1930s and 1940s to debate whether the Chinese Communists were really first and foremost "agrarian reformers" or "communist revolutionaries." (Shewmaker 1968)

17. Cf. Tai 1974 and Tuma 1965 for their discussion of the political objectives of land reform programs in different parts of the world.

From hindsight we now know that they were both: agrarian reform provided the basis of legitimacy for the Communist-inspired revolution.

Similarly, Viet Cong support from the rural areas of South Vietnam rested upon a sustained appeal to peasant discontent with land tenure conditions: "We gave you the land; give us your sons." (In Hess 1969) The history of other peasant wars in Asia, led by counter-elites vying for political power, has been focused on the land problem--and the legitimacy, or justice, of land reform.[18]

In non-Communist countries, sweeping land tenure reforms were carried out in Taiwan and Japan immediately after World War II--partly as a claim to legitimacy of the new post-war elites, and partly as counter-insurgency against the threat of Communism from without or, more imminently, from within. Indeed, it was because of the Kuomintang's failure to solve the crucial problem of land tenure relations that they had lost the "mandate of heaven" to rule the mainland. (Chan 1965) More recently, in the Philippines, President Marcos has pointed to agrarian reform as the sole justification for the continuation of his regime under martial law: "The land reform program is the only gauge for the success or failure of the New Society. If land reform fails, there is no New Society." (In SEADAG 1975)

(2) Counter-Insurgency: In many respects, therefore, counter-insurgency is the other side of the issue of legitimacy. To provide stronger claims to legitimacy is to deny the legitimacy of insurgents or revolutionaries. But to utilize land reform primarily for the short-term objective of counter-insurgency may not serve to confirm the long-term legitimacy of the ruling elite. The classic example has been South Vietnam's Land-to-the-Tiller program in the early 1970s--so meticulously prepared in advance with socio-economic surveys and technical assistance, so much more "biased" toward the tenants (in contrast to Diem's earlier reform), yet also so patently designed with the primary goal of counter-insurgency that many intended beneficiaries remained suspicious and did not bother to accept their titles. (Bush 1973)

"Land reform, in the perspective of the past 25 years," states a report of the Stanford Research Institute (1968), "has been a paramount issue in Vietnam." It was perhaps with this realization that an office memorandum considered land reform as "the easiest of all pacification programs to put into effect administratively." ("Proposal . . ." n.d.) A U.S. adviser put it more bluntly. Urging a land reform program that would immediately confer land titles for free to virtually all peasant tillers, while compensating landlords with a guarantee from the United States, estimated at $900 million, Prosterman (1967) observed: "If the land reform shortens the war even by two weeks, it will pay for itself."

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18. See for instance the anonymous article, "The Peasant War in the Philippines" 1946, which interprets Philippine social history in terms of class struggle between landlords and their foreign allies on the one hand and the peasant masses on the other. For Indonesia, cf. Van der Kroef 1963.

A diametrically opposite view has been suggested by a controversial study made by Mitchell (1967). Applying linear regression analyses to describe the association between greater government control and greater inequality in land tenure variables, he concludes:

> From the point of view of government control, the ideal province in South Vietnam would be one in which few peasants operate their own land, the distribution of land holdings is unequal, no land redistribution has taken place, large French landholdings existed in the past, population density is high, and the terrain is such that mobility or accessibility is low.[19]

Though not indicative of official U.S. views nor those of the South Vietnamese government, the study indicates how land reform itself may be seen by some as merely a tactical weapon to be used or conveniently shelved in the fight against insurgency or revolution.

Like Thieu's LTTT program, Marcos' Operation Land Transfer for Filipino tenant farmers has been criticized as simply a stratagem to gain legitimacy for his martial-law government and to deny a mass base for Maoist insurgents. Kerkvliet claims for instance that "the purpose of land reform is to protect the regime from rural unrest rather than to bring substantial reforms for the good of the peasantry." (1974:2)[20]

The recourse to land reform simply as a means to stay in power and as a measure of counter-insurgency has been recognized by most political leaders. Their short-term effects may be realizable as with the initial successes of Thieu's LTTT program and with the first years of Marcos' New Society. However, in the long run, the root causes of the land problem still have to be confronted, and it is within this time frame that land reform cannot be used only or even primarily as counter-insurgency.

(3) Democracy: The long-run objectives for land reform programs have invariably been couched with the ideals of democracy--e.g., "land-to-the-tiller" (Magsaysay in 1954; Chen Cheng in 1953; Thieu in 1970), "emancipation of the peasants" (Macapagal in 1963, Marcos in 1972); "people's communes" (Mao's China); "wars of national liberation" (Ho's Vietnam); Sun Yat-sen's Minsen (People's Livelihood) Principle; etc.

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19. A pointed rebuttal of Mitchell's celebrated study has been made among others by Paige 1970. Reversing Mitchell's conclusion, Paige contends: "The delta, a region of commercial rice production, large rice estates, extensive tenancy, and inequitable holdings, is the most prone to revolutionary social movements, both political and religious." The author adds, "the fundamental explanatory principle is market penetration rather than inequity or estate size."

20. For an elaboration of the radical critique of anti-Communist land reform programs, see Olson 1974 and McCoy 1971.

Because democratic ideals are so universal, and have been appealed to by elites all across the political spectrum, the objective of democracy in land reform has defied definition--conveniently vague for politicians to make unrealizable promises, yet attractive enough to gain support from peasants and intellectuals alike. At the risk of over-simplification, two general interpretations of democracy in land reform processes are compared in Table 3, reflecting the divergent land reform experiences of Communist and non-Communist regimes. (cf. Tuma 1965:224-25; Warriner 1969:57-76; Klein 1958)

Although no country quite corresponds to only one of these views of the democratic ideal, several examples can be noted--Japan and Taiwan as approximating the non-Communist view of democracy, China and North Vietnam the Communist interpretation of people's democratic republics.[21]

Categorization aside, it is part of history's paradoxes that thoroughgoing land reform programs, despite their ideal of democracy, have invariably been implemented with un-democratic means. Communist countries have usually been severely criticized for this failure. On the other hand, non-Communist countries have not been exemplars either of democratic methods in land reform. In the cases of Japan and South Korea, the decisive role of U.S. occupation forces as an outside force has been well-documented. Taiwan's land reform was likewise initiated and implemented by the Kuomintang leaders who had come from the mainland and had no landed interests to protect on the island. In none of these three cases was there a genuine democratic process in the Western liberal sense--e.g., of counting electoral votes, peasants being represented in a multi-party system, and legislating reforms by majority rule.

In his extensive study of the political process of land reform in eight representative countries throughout the world, Tai is led to conclude that it is much easier for a non-competitive political system than for a competitive one to effect meaningful tenurial reform:

> To the developing countries in need of reform it is evident that in those countries where a multiparty or biparty system reigns, the prospect for prompt, effective, and drastic land reform is generally not bright. In countries where political power is concentrated in one political party or a small group of leaders, and where the elites earnestly seek to broaden their rural base, the possibility of a relatively successful reform is great. (1974:473)

Ladejinksy, who was probably the most effective proponent for the democratic ideal of land reform in the post-war era in Asia, nonetheless emphasizes: "If the peasantry is to get what is promised, peaceful and democratically managed reforms are not going to fill the bill. Government coercion, whether practiced or clearly threatened, is virtually unavoidable."

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21. For the philosophical principles behind Taiwan's land reform, see Tseng 1968.

Table 3. Democracy as the Goal of Land Reform, in East and Southeast Asian Countries

	Non-Communist View	Communist View
Assumptions regarding land problem	Market imperfections in the factors of agric. production --land, labor, capital, entrepreneurship	Class struggle between landlords and peasants
Attitude toward property	Wider distribution of private landownership	Private ownership of the means of production, i.e., land, to be abolished
Process of land redistribution	According to legal norms; enforced by courts and police power of state	Means for peasants to exercise power over landlords
Duration of land distribution	Final stage, supported by infrastructure of services --credit, etc.	Transitional stage, prior to collectivization (cooperatives and/or communes)
Landlord compensation	"Fair compensation" based on land value or some other norm	None; all land and farm equipment to be expropriated
Tenure reform beneficiaries	Sharecroppers become lessees or owner-tillers; but landless agricultural workers not benefited	Poor and hired peasants allotted land, middle and rich peasants not touched
Farm operation	Family farms; increase scale of production with HYVs and more inputs, and service cooperatives	Collectivized agriculture: production teams, brigades, people's communes, large-scale farming
Ultimate vision	To form a strong rural middle class participating in parliamentary democracy	To create an egalitarian rural society, principles of the mass line and democratic centralism
Some recurrent problems	1) re-concentration of landownership 2) how to increase scale and size of farm operation 3) government cooptation of peasant groups--toward fascism	1) problem of incentives 2) how to provide specialized training without return of "capitalist tendencies" 3) control by a central government and the party--toward totalitarianism of the left

(1964) The conclusions of Tai and Ladejinsky merely reiterate a truism in politics: that no class legislates itself out of existence. What is perhaps more pertinent to ask is whether non-competitive elites, once in power on the basis of land reform promises, would actually be willing to share the decision-making process with intended reform beneficiaries. Implicit in this perspective is the long-term view of democracy.

Thus, short-term goals for land reform--in terms of establishing legitimacy or conducting counter-insurgency--may be temporarily effective. But the longer-term goal of attaining democracy--not only in terms of protecting individual human rights, but also of achieving basic social freedoms from hunger, widespread poverty, and dependence on other countries--has proved to be more elusive and constitutes the focus for the continuing debate over the precise nature and orientation of land reform.

B. Results vis-à-vis Professed Intentions

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that one reason why results of land reform differ from professed intentions is simply that political rhetoric tends to exceed realizable expectations. Asian leaders in the post-World War II era have become so adept at the symbolic uses of land reform that today no public leader would dare come out on record as being against land reform.[22] Indeed, sincere proponents for land reform may even go along with land reform schemes that have no realistic expectations of fulfillment, if only to keep the issue alive and to raise the peasants' own expectations: "The mere writing and passing of reform laws is a good thing, even if they are deficient and their execution is obstructed. Their very existence is a promise to the tenants and a threat to the landlord." (Ladejinsky 1964) In the Philippine experience, this seems to have been the case with Magsaysay's 1954 land reform bill and Macapagal's 1963 land reform code. (Starner 1961; Manglapus 1967)

A second reason for the lack of congruence between intentions and results of land reform is the lack of peasant participation--either in terms of articulating their demands or in ensuring the implementation of the reform once it has been legislated. Although they stand to benefit from any redistribution of land or rights to land, peasants are usually too unorganized and inarticulate to be initiators of reforms, much less active agents in its successful completion. Tai (1974) suggests that in the majority of countries he has examined, peasants have not actually played a major role in land reform planning and implementation. The crucial relationship to examine then is the link between the elite and the landed class.

The third and principal reason for the gap between intentions and results in land reform is thus landlord opposition. This may take various

22. An instance of this were the Congressional debates prior to the passage of the Philippines' Agricultural Land Reform Code in 1963. See Manglapus 1967.

forms: (a) dilution of the meaning of land reform during the period of initiation; (b) compromises during the period of formulation; (c) obstruction during the period of implementation; and (d) reversal after the reform has been completed. (cf. Tuma 1965)

(a) Dilution: Land reform in its popular usage has usually meant some form of land redistribution. In actual practice, however, it is not uncommon for so-called land reform programs in various countries to consist of measures other than land redistribution--i.e., land resettlement schemes (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines); schemes for cooperative farming (Malaysia, Thailand); community development programs (Philippines, Indonesia, Laos); package programs extending the Green Revolution (Philippines, Thailand); and tenancy regulation which has been legislated by practically every country in the region. The arguments forwarded for all these other measures are cogent enough. The principal flaw, however, is that they do not strike the heart of the matter--the concentration of landownership in the hands of a few big landlords or many small landlords, accompanied in either case by the attendant social evils of widespread tenancy, debt peonage, and perennial rural poverty. As complementary measures for land redistribution, these other programs may be indispensable; as substitutes, however, for land redistribution, they simply dilute the meaning of land reform. It is in this light that the broadened term of "agrarian reform" has been criticized by some as a means of delaying the implementation of what should be "land reform" in the restricted sense. (Rocamora and Panganiban 1975:108)

(b) Compromises: Legislative delays and compromises have been favorite methods for landlord opposition. In Japan, the "first reform plan" which essentially reflected the views of the conservative ruling class had to be overruled by the second reform plan which was closer to the interests of the peasants and supported by U.S. occupation authorities. (Ushiomi and Watanabe 1959) In South Korea, in spite of political rhetoric, little was done to carry out the Allies' program of land reform. Some former Japanese holdings were redistributed in 1948 and a few landlords parceled out their holdings to relatives in response to pre-election demands, but President Rhee's government largely protected the interests of the elites. (Mitchell 1949)

Similar compromises have been noted by observers during the period of land reform legislation in South Vietnam and the Philippines in the mid-1950s. Some indicators of landlord dominance in legislation have been: the relatively high retention ceiling (100 hectares for South Vietnam in 1956; 75 hectares for the Philippines in 1963); the deletion of an entire chapter on agricultural land taxation (the Philippines in 1963); exemption of particular lands devoted to plantation economies and export crops (South Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines), and formulas for compensation highly favorable to ex-landlords (South Vietnam in 1970; the Philippines in 1974). In all these instances, and many hidden others, the "I-am-for-land-reform-but!" proponents of land reform have become its most effective opponents--by presiding over its legislative abortion. (cf. Manglapus 1967; Tai 1974)

(c) Obstruction: The period of implementation of land reform has perhaps become the most fertile field for landlord obstructionism. Particular

provisions of the law have been challenged and brought to court, tenants have been harassed and evicted, oftentimes on the basis of the law itself which allows for self-cultivation; land valuation committees have been stalemated by the absence of landlord representatives; government officials and local judges have been identified with the landlord class, etc. (cf. Diokno 1967; Luedtke 1971; Dore 1959)

Perhaps not all failures in implementation should be ascribed to the obstructionist designs of landlords. The absence of land records and cadastral surveys, lack of government personnel, the failure of infrastructure services for credit, marketing, etc., have oftentimes been cited as additional reasons for poor implementation. (Joint FAO 1969) It has even been suggested that landlords themselves be included as active cooperators in the smoother implementation of the reform program--e.g., by continuing to provide credit to their former tenants. (Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch 1972) However, as with substitute measures for land redistribution, this technocratic approach to the implementation of land reform may simply gloss over the underlying reality: that landlords as a class stand to be adversely affected by any thoroughgoing land reform program. And, as such, opposition on their part is to be expected. The process of land reform does not have to create irreconcilable class enemies; but neither has the history of successful land reforms shown that landlords would graciously accept the rationale of land reform.

(d) Reversal: A final and more insidious form of landlord reaction to land reform is the reversal of reform objectives several years or even a generation after the reform has been accomplished. South Korea's attempts to consolidate very small farms into medium-size farms after the initial reform have been viewed with apprehension by some because of the likely reemergence of landlordism. (Morrow and Sherper 1970:44, Pak 1968) Already, the disguised forms of tenancy prevalent in the densely populated rice-growing areas today have indicated a de facto reversal of reform goals.

Japan and Taiwan have also moved in the direction of making land reform ceilings and the rules for land transfers more flexible--allowing for bigger-scale farming, but also the possibility of absentee landlordism once again. (Ogura 1967) In the early 1960s, the belated compensation of ex-landlords as legislated by the Japanese Diet has also been viewed by some as a reneging on the original rationale of land reform. (Tuma 1965)

In the Philippines, perhaps the most significant reversal today has been the acceptance of permanent leasehold for the majority of tenants as the maximum goal of agrarian reform, instead of the much-publicized objective in 1972 to distribute certificates of land transfer to all tenants. Even land resettlement projects, originally designed to clear pioneer lands for family-sized farms, have resulted after a generation or two as areas of widespread tenancy and abandoned farms. (Fernandez 1972)

C. Feasibility of Land Reform

Landlord opposition as well as the emergence of a new form of landlordism have reduced or even nullified the projected impact of land reforms

in various countries. From past experience, we can therefore try to draw together three general conclusions with regard to the feasibility of new or continuing reforms.

(1) Elites do make the critical decisions whether land reform is to be substantially implemented or not. However, elites themselves are constrained by the social bases of their power. Elites closely linked to the landed class are no more than the executive arm of this semi-feudal oligarchy and will not carry out substantial reforms. On the other hand, elites that are dominant or independent of the landed class are more likely to push through effective reforms.

In addition to the examples of Japan and Taiwan--whose elites were prodded on by U.S. backing and the Communist threat--it is instructive to examine the thoroughness of land reform or more profoundly, agrarian revolution, carried out by the Communist regimes in China, North Vietnam, and North Korea. Tenancy has not only been abolished, but rather landlords as a class have been abolished. If there have been defects in implementation, they have been on the side of excesses against the landlords. In this regard, White's observation is to the point: "Land reform is a law plus the political power balance: if the landlords have the power they can distort the law in their favor; if the poor peasants are given power they can distort the law in their own favor." (1970:63)

(2) Land reform programs initiated primarily for the short-term objectives of counter-insurgency and establishing the legitimacy of a new or failing regime are likely to have limited success at the beginning, with a tendency of petering out with the passage of time. Despite initial reports of widespread acceptance, South Vietnam's LTTT program was already showing signs of slowing down even before the final political upheaval in 1975. Likewise, the Philippines' agrarian reform program today has shifted emphasis from Operation Land Transfer to other related programs such as the Samahang Nayon and Masagana-99 programs.

(3) In the Asian context, the most stubborn opponents of land reform have been the medium- and small-landlord class. Although tenure status with regard to farm size is an extremely relative term, peasant perceptions of who is a big, medium, or small landlord have ordinarily been adequate for delineating social relationships within a rural community. It is in this area that several reform programs have floundered and been stalemated --for lack of appreciation of the extent and political significance of the small-landlord class. "Land reform's most effective opponents," stresses a rural development seminar group, "are the small landlords, not the large." (SEADAG 1975:15)

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF LAND REFORM: GOVERNMENT, CADRES, PEASANTS

For the most part, implementation of land reform programs has become the crux of the problem today in many Asian countries. Simply to have land

reform in the legislative books has become almost fashionable, but the question of implementation remains a critical issue. (Joint FAO 1969) In general, there have been three groups of actors who have been charged with the implementation of land reform programs on the Asian stage: government agencies, political cadres, and peasant groups. Although their functions may oftentimes overlap, the roles of these three implementing groups have been quite distinct.

A. Government Agencies (Taiwan and the Philippines)

Because land reform is a public policy, government agencies have ordinarily been entrusted with its administration. Nonetheless, there is a wide variety in the administrative structures of each government set-up. Malaysia for instance has achieved notable recognition for "one of the most successful programs of rural infrastructure construction and land development to be found in Southeast Asia"--the work of its Ministry of Rural Development in land development, irrigation, road-building, schools, and adult education. Much of the work has been accomplished directly by the Federal Land Development Authority (FLDA) which has concentrated on the opening of new lands. (Ness 1967a and b)[23]

With less notice, Thailand has had its own Land Development Department which oversees the research work on land problems and the beginnings of colonization schemes in the Northeast and other parts of the country. (Chuchart 1971) In both Thailand and Malaysia, however, land reform proper in the sense of land redistribution has not been attempted. In other Asian countries, the beginnings of land reform activities are oftentimes entrusted to a Ministry or Department of Agriculture. As the implementation stage is reached, a separate office or department is created. In the Philippines, an entire Department of Agrarian Reform has been established since 1971, taking over the previous functions of the Land Authority. South Vietnam too has had its Directorate General of Land Affairs under the Ministry of Land Reform, Agriculture and Fishery Development to supervise the implementation of the LTTT program.

Perhaps the most interesting and successful of these government bodies is Taiwan's Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) which has been instrumental in backstopping the implementation of the land reform program on the island. The JCRR has been described by one of its original five commissioners as "a bilateral organization operating on a semi-autonomous basis, . . . the first of its kind to prove the feasibility and effectiveness of binational technical cooperation." (Shen, T.H. 1970, cf. Koo, A. 1970 and Klatt 1972) Essentially, the JCRR was able to channel American financial and technical aid for Taiwan's land reform program on a more technological level without being confronted with political considerations at every turn from either the American or the Chinese side. In

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23. Degani (1964), however, questions the overall utility of the FLDA because of its heavy toll on limited resources. See also Hill's reply

addition to the work of the JCRR, Taiwan has also had a functional blending of governmental centralization with delegation of responsibility to the local levels which ensured the step-by-step implementation of the land reform program. (Shen, S.K. 1967) Furthermore, like Japan, its former colonial master, Taiwan had available cadastral records, a classification of land according to 26 grades, and a farmer population that had already been accustomed to technological innovations with the steady introduction of new crop varieties.

In contrast to Taiwan's experience, Philippine government efforts to implement land reform have been plagued by problems of bureaucracy, not to mention the constraints imposed by ambivalent political objectives discussed earlier. Some of the recurrent problems that have been pointed out by middle-level officers themselves of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) are: overlapping of government agencies, inadequate funding, low salaries for fieldworkers and lack of training; little research and evaluation; and delays in court proceedings. (Panganiban 1972; Madronio 1974; De los Reyes 1972) Even in the pilot province of Nueva Ecija, the concept of an integrated development program where all government and other supporting agencies are coordinated under a single head has had only limited success. (Rusch 1975; De los Reyes 1972)

"The idea behind the integrated approach to agrarian reform was good," remark Rocamora and Panganiban (1975:108). "In practice, however, it provided a government whose commitment to land reform was lagging an excuse to delay its implementation." At present, land reform activities have indeed been centralized under the Department of Agrarian Reform. However, other reform-related activities have been entrusted to other departments--the Samahang Nayon program under the Bureau of Cooperatives of the Department of Local Government and Community Development (DLGCD), and the Masagana-99 rice-production program under the Department of Agriculture. The outcome at times has been inter-departmental rivalry--e.g., the DAR being eager to distribute certificates of land transfer to as many tenants as possible, while the DLGCD has stressed training and membership of tenants in barrio associations before they can be eligible for these certificates. In effect, therefore, three departments of government are engaged in various aspects of the broadened concept of agrarian reform--all together extending to small farmers a promised package of equity, productivity, and the cooperative spirit.

B. Political Cadres (The Vietnamese and Chinese Experience)

Generally, land reform programs that have been designed from the top down have relied on government bureaucracies for their execution. On the other hand, land reform programs that have been based more on peasant aspirations--i.e., from the bottom up--have been carried through by political cadres. Perhaps the most striking and recent contrast between the two approaches has been exemplified by the conflicting strategies for rural development adopted by the warring sides in Vietnam. (Asian Survey 1970)

Several studies have pointed out the marked contrast between the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) and the Viet Cong/National Liberation Front

(VC/NLF) in their approaches to the land problem--e.g., the effective VC ceiling of 5 hectares compared to the GVN's retention limit of 100 hectares (later reduced to 15 has. in the LTTT program); the VC's flexibility versus the GVN's slowness in distributing government-held land (Bredo 1970), the GVN's preference for legalistic solutions and the American preference for technological ones vis-à-vis the VC's direct impact on institutional change (Montgomery 1968); in short, the classic theme of David versus Goliath, with a lumbering bureaucracy pitted against the more agile political cadres of the NLF. Referring to the NLF's indoctrinational approach among peasants, Pike (1966) observes that "cadres were instructed to turn every issue into land terms." Similarly, in examining "the economics of insurgency," Sansom (1970) points out the fatal flaw of U.S. policy regarding the land question: "The Americans offered the peasant a constitution; the Viet Cong offered him his land and with it the right to survive."

In the literature on land reform in Communist countries, the role of political cadres has been stressed instead of any particular government agency. To be sure, stricter supervision by the party and a central government are evident, resulting in the swiftness of reform implementation, but also in occasional sudden shifts in agrarian policies that have taken place in China and North Vietnam. (cf. Honey 1960) An exceptional report that gives us an inside view of the role of political cadres in China, even prior to the formalized Agrarian Reform Law of 1950, is Hinton's day-by-day description of the transformation of Long Bow village during the process of land reform in Northern China. (1966)

Some of the notable characteristics of the cadres were: (1) they were volunteer workers, oftentimes only high school or college students; (2) many were also of peasant stock, local cadres, who helped in the execution of the reform either in their own villages or in another county (hsien), (3) they were all political cadres--i.e., highly politicized about the aims of the agrarian revolution they were participating in; (4) they were highly motivated to suffer deprivations with the peasants and to live, eat, and work with the peasants; and (5) they were charged with a minimum of legal instructions but were periodically engaged in long sessions of criticism and self-criticism, sometimes in confrontation with the village people themselves (what Hinton [1966] has graphically described as "passing the gate").

An historical instance of the crucial role of cadres in China's implementation of land reform was the sending of political cadres from the north to the southern province of Kwangtung. At a critical moment during the outbreak of the Korean War, when the land reform policy in the south took on a more radical turn, it was necessary for northern cadres to reinforce and take the place of their southern comrades to fully enforce land reform. The fact that political ideology was able to prevail over inherent regional rivalry speaks well of the cadres' political commitment to the specific task of nation-building they were engaged in. (Vogel 1969a and b) Less well-studied though perhaps equally vital has been the instrumental role of political cadres in North Vietnam's land reform program. In a letter written in 1956, Ho Chi Minh congratulates the peasants and cadres on the successful completion of land reform in the north. (Fall 1967)

C. Peasant Groups and Peasant Unrest

Peasants and cadres in the Asian Communist approach are thus inextricably linked in the implementation of land reform. If cadres provide the intermediary roles between a centralized government and millions of peasants, it is nonetheless the peasants themselves who constitute what Mao has called the "motive forces" for agrarian revolution.[24] In this light we shall now have to examine the crucial role of peasant groups, first in non-Communist countries, then in the entire Asian region as viewed from different perspectives on peasant unrest.

(1) Non-Communist Countries: Japan and Taiwan, considered by many to have effectively implemented land reform programs in the early 1950s, ascribe no small degree of their success to the participatory role given to potential reform beneficiaries in the very process of land reform. Chiefly, this meant institutionalizing the participation of peasant small farmers in the carrying out of land reform on the local level.

In Japan, the role of local Land Commissions has been amply documented. Composed of five tenants, three landlords, and two owner-cultivators elected by their respective groups, together with three "learned and experienced persons," the commissions were entrusted with a major share in implementing the land reform--i.e., the actual purchase and sale of land on the local level. Broad powers were exercised by these commissions--in drafting the suitability of the land; in establishing the eligibility of purchasers; in deciding unusual cases; in appraising cases of exemptions, etc. By relying on local people themselves to determine local conditions, the government was able to transfer 30-40 million plots of land in the space of three years. Approximately 150,000 commissioners, half of whom were tenants, were involved in this unique leadership experience. (Millikan and Hapgood 1967:104-05; Smith 1971?:47-50) A field observer has described the educational function of the whole reform effort thus:

> The method by which the land reform programme was carried out constitutes an important adult educational programme, perhaps one of the most significant adult educational efforts ever launched. The purchases and resales of the land were made by village commissions--nearly 10,600 generally independent and highly responsible groups of 10 members each. Half of the members of each commission were farm tenants. (Raper 1951:12, in Huizer 1971:24)

A similar scheme, creating Farmland Committees, was promulgated in South Korea under Presidential Decree No. 275 in 1950. However, in actual practice the committees did not function due to the exigencies of the Korean War. (Morrow and Sherper 1970:24)

Taiwan has had three principal rural organizations connected with land reform and rural development--the multipurpose Farmers' Associations for

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24. "Motive forces" here mean the principal agents of revolution.

the procurement of agricultural inputs and extension services; the Irrigation Associations for water management, and the Farm Tenancy Committees. The first two organizations are of long standing, established during the Japanese period, and reorganized by the Kuomintang government to remove the traditional domination of landlords. (Tai 1974:397-402)

The Farm Tenancy Committees were more directly related to the land reform program, starting with the rent-reduction phase. These committees closely resembled the Japanese Land Commissions upon recommendation of Ladejinsky who had visited Taiwan in 1949 at the invitation of the JCRR. (Tai 1974:400) Comprising eleven members, the committee included the chief of the land affairs section of the local government and the chairman of the local farmers' association, five tenant farmers, two landlords, and two owner-farmers. Among the committee's major functions were to supervise the rent-reduction program, set up criteria for the total annual harvest of main crops, and arbitrate disputes between tenant farmers and landlords. (Shen, S.K. 1967:388) Tai summarizes the role and impact of these Farm Tenancy Committees:

> As an indicator of the extensiveness of the committees' activities, from 1952 to 1956 (when tenant-landlord conflicts were most intense and frequent), the committees settled a total of 62,645 disputes. By providing the reform beneficiaries with important roles in the process of implementation, these committees have been most effective in dispelling peasant indifference and in curbing the landlords' evasive and resistant tactics. By assuring the tenants and owner-farmers a privileged position vis-à-vis the landlords, these committees have also "raised the social status of the cultivators." (1974:401-02)

The Taiwanese and Japanese success in incorporating the active participation of tenant beneficiaries in land reform implementation has been held up for other non-Communist Asian countries to emulate because of its emphasis on reconciling class interests rather than in heightening class conflicts. Almost no violence occurred during the Japanese land reform, Huizer observes. (1971:26) Likewise, the reform in Taiwan has been described as adopting "equitable, rational, peaceful, and gradually progressive" methods, in implicit contrast to the Communist manner of agrarian revolution. (Shen, S.K. 1967:423)

However, efforts to adopt this proportionate-representation model in establishing implementing bodies on the local level have not succeeded in several countries of Southeast Asia. For a time, in the Philippines, Barrio Committees on Land Production (BCLP) were established composed of a proportionate number of tenants, landlords, and owner-cultivators. As in Japan and Taiwan, these committees were asked to determine the valuation of the land upon which the amount of amortization payments would be based. However, later government-policy changes have modified this practice because of the inability of the committees to convene in the first place or to arrive at uniform valuation estimates within the same locality. As modified, the BCLPs are still functioning, but it is still too early to make a judgment on their overall contribution to the land reform process.

During the preparatory stage for South Vietnam's LTTT program, recommendations were also made to entrust land tenure adjudication and administration to re-activated village councils. This theory of devolution, forwarded by Montgomery (1968), would have aimed at a resolution of the foremost problem that plagued the South Vietnamese government up to the very end, which was how "to convert peasant indifference into commitment."

(2) Views on the Peasantry: How then explain the continued indifference of many peasants to established governments and their commitment to "other" causes? Among the various views on peasants and peasant unrest in Asia, seven distinct though oftentimes overlapping categories may be briefly discussed by citing representative authors:

a) Traditional Society and Rural Poverty: A rapidly increasing population and an underdeveloped economy utilizing primitive methods of agriculture have been the principal causes for the economic stagnation of many Asian countries. In this view, the basic problem "is not simply unequal distribution, but poverty, and a value system not well adapted to the requirements of modern technological change." (Firth 1950; cf. Nash 1965) Describing pre-revolutionary China, Buck (1930 and 1937) and Tawney (1932) have both stressed the parameters of the existing rural framework such as low productivity and the extreme fragmentation of farms, as well as tenure problems. Similarly, referring primarily to the densely populated island of Java, Geertz (1963) has proposed his theory of "agricultural involution." In this view of peasant society, modernization, particularly in terms of industrialization, becomes the recommended solution to rural Asia's problems. A concomitant phenomenon in this process is the "revolution of rising expectations." (cf. Froehlich 1961)

b) Defense of the Little Tradition: In a suggestive historical reinterpretation of peasant unrest in modern colonial Southeast Asia, Benda (1965) contrasts the urban-based Great Tradition from the Little Tradition of the rural areas. Distinguishing peasant from nationalist movements in terms of locale and social, ideological, and organizational distance, he observes that peasant movements "were reactions to social malaise, as often as not backward-looking, and whose goal usually was the recreation of an imaginary state of primordial past tranquillity." Examining earlier peasant revolts in Central Java, Lower Burma, North Annam, and Central Luzon, Benda concludes that specific causes of unrest were complex, but may be traced ultimately to the peasantry's "revolution of rising irritation" against outside interference.

Along the same lines, Sturtevant (1969) notes common traits among several Philippine peasant sects: their mystical and chiliastic elements; their tendency toward anarchism; and aspects of hypernationalism. Questioning the primacy of economic causes such as tenancy problems for rural discord, Sturtevant maintains that these movements arise rather as highly creative "revitalization" attempts to cope with cultural alienation in the conflict between modernization and the Little Tradition. (cf. Wolf 1966)

c) Colonialism, Nationalism, and Communism: A pioneering and sympathetic study by Jacoby (1961) of agrarian unrest in Southeast Asia stresses among other points the intrinsic relationship between peasant unrest and

nationalist movements, and maintains that the economic dependence forged under Western colonial rule is still of crucial importance in understanding the present tenurial systems. Other writers, starting with an historical survey, point out several maladjustments brought about by the "laissez-faire revolution" of Western capitalism in the Asian region: agrarian indebtedness, concentration of landownership, and tenancy problems. (Dandekar n.d.; cf. Allen 1938, Douglas 1972)

The radical critique of peasant problems presents a more pointed attack against the continued influence of Western colonial powers, from the plantation economies of the pre-war era to the present-day penetration of Asian economies by multi-national corporations. (cf. Feder 1975) Thus, for instance, the head of the Philippine Communist party characterizes Philippine society as "semi-colonial and semi-feudal," afflicted by the three basic problems of "U.S. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism." (Guerrero 1971; cf. "Peasant War . . ." 1946)

d) Land Tenure Problems: Most authors explaining the causes of rural unrest have pointed to land tenure problems as the principal factor. Representative of this general agreement is Klatt's article (1972) which surveys half-hearted attempts at land reform in Asia. Describing acute disparities existing in the rural areas of Asia, Klatt notes that those affected adversely are the small owners, tenants, and, particularly, the growing number of landless agricultural workers. Historical studies of the origins of land problems have also delineated the tightening bonds between landlords and peasants, and the rise of debt peonage and widespread tenancy. (cf. McLennan 1973; Hayden 1942; Pelzer 1945; Gourou 1955) Still other writers such as Sansom (1970) have taken issue with the "revisionist" attack on the accepted doctrine of insurgent movements--i.e., the revisionist's claim that peasant unrest is not caused primarily by land tenure problems. Examples of this revisionist viewpoint are Mitchell's socio-econometric studies on the main causes of agrarian unrest in South Vietnam and the Philippines. (1968 and 1969) A final indicator of the causal nature of land tenure problems with regard to peasant unrest is the growth of peasant organizations themselves and their persistent demands for land reform. (Huizer 1971 and 1972; Richardson 1972)

Related to tenure problems is the whole area of studies on patron-client relationships between landlords and tenants. Re-examining historical periods of peasant unrest in pre-war Southeast Asia, Scott (1974) provides a penetrating analysis of the precise moments of rebellion whenever the peasants' right to survive is being threatened.

e) The Green Revolution and Technological Change: The seed-fertilizer revolution introduced in the late 1960s has created another destabilizing dimension in the Asian countryside--but this time fraught with hopes of self-sufficiency in food by most if not all agricultural countries in the region. Cautious voices, however, have also been raised warning against the deeper social cleavages that may arise. Reflecting the optimistic view of induced institutional change as a result of technological innovations have been the writings of Hayami and Ruttan (1971). On the other side, Griffin (1974) has argued forcefully that the Green Revolution has failed to raise

the Asian region's agricultural production in aggregate terms, and has only widened the gap between the better-off farmers and the small farmers:

> The reason lies not so much in inadequate technology as in inappropriate institutions and poor policy. The explanation for the latter, in turn, lies not in the ignorance of those who govern but in the powerlessness of most of those who are governed. (1974:255)

f) Peasant Differentiation into Sub-Classes: A cumulative result of the intermingling processes of the Green Revolution, tenure changes, and modernization in general has been the more pronounced stratification of peasants into sub-classes. The Maoist analysis of rural classes in China had long ago indicated this more pragmatic and sophisticated understanding of various social groupings with divergent interests within the peasantry itself. More recently, several empirical findings by Japanese researchers on the village level have reinforced the crucial importance of distinguishing among peasant sub-classes--e.g., Takahashi in Bulacan (1969); Umehara in Nueva Ecija (1969 and 1974); and Yano in northeastern Thailand (1968). (cf. Griffin 1974:252f.) Of special importance today is the plight of the landless agricultural laborers who may be pushed farther onto the margins of society by the very processes that were supposed to improve rural conditions.

g) The Vanishing Peasant: A final role of peasant groups may be to slowly fade away from the stage of main actors in Asia. Already, the post-reform period in Japan has witnessed the decline of farmers' unions, with the more prosperous owner-operators and former landlords constituting a conservative wing in party politics. (Cole 1956) Similarly, in Taiwan, farmers' associations have long been coopted within a centralized government network of agricultural services for the rural areas. This is the non-Communist end of the land reform spectrum. On the other extreme, peasants have been radically re-organized into collective groupings--in producers' cooperatives or the multi-faceted communes. On either end of the spectrum, peasants have had to forfeit several or all of their distinguishing characteristics--e.g., of being independent producers on individual plots, tied to subsistence or traditional ways of farming, and utilizing mostly family labor. (Shanin 1971:14-15) In its stead, a more contemporary picture of the small farmer has begun to emerge--one who is perhaps half-proletarianized by engaging in off-farm work; perhaps more entrepreneurial in increasing the scale of farm business; certainly more dependent on off-farm inputs, as well as on cooperative or collective forms of organization; and less likely to be left alone in subsistence farming that is isolated from markets and the urban areas.

Tai has pointed out the inverse relationship of land and politics: if land reform hastens the process of economic modernization in the developing countries, it reduces the relative economic as well as political importance of agriculture. (1974:478-79) If the prognosis is correct, then the peasant too becomes a new socio-economic agent--as small-business farmer, semi-proletariat, or commune member--and loses the specific political pressures of an independent peasant class. It is thus part of the irony of history that peasant groups remain recognizably peasant only when land reform--or

agrarian revolution--has not yet been carried out. East Asia has passed this stage. With the exception of Indochina, the current theatre of peasant groups extends to the rest of Southeast Asia.

IV. MODELS FOR AGRARIAN REFORM AND MODIFICATIONS

Depending on the political ideologies of the governing elites, the paradigms for land reform have taken on different and at times diametrically opposite directions in various countries. The pre-reform situation, the historical period, and the several stages of implementation are significant points to consider in any general comparison of land reform models in different countries.

At one end of the spectrum, following the capitalist strategy for development, based on the concepts of private property and free enterprise, the owner-cultivatorship of the family farm has been upheld as the model for land reform in Asian countries influenced by U.S. policy in the post-war period.

> The basic tenure pattern which has been woven into the experience of Western man is essentially that which was proposed by classical liberalism, and whose economic functioning was formulated in neoclassical economics. This remains true despite all the problems of surplus production, price support programs, and all the rest. This is the basic pattern which was adopted in Japan after World War II. The agricultural economy is based upon private ownership of land, individual entrepreneurship geared partially into a market economy, with credit facilities, appropriate education, market information, and so on. (Parsons 1961:286)

On the other end of the spectrum, following the socialist path to development, Communist countries such as China, North Korea, a reunited Vietnam--and, conceivably today, also Cambodia and Laos--have all stressed collectivized agriculture and the merits of the cooperative and/or the commune.[25]

Grouping the various countries according to the type of post-reform model ultimately introduced (distributive or collective), and according to the extent of implementation (full or partial), we have the following general scheme in Table 4:

25. As with the term "land reform," the term "cooperative" takes on a different meaning when applied to either a socialist or a capitalist economy. Cooperatives in Communist economies also have political functions.

Table 4. Implementation and Orientation of Land Reform Programs in East and Southeast Asia

	Full Implementation	Partial Implementation
Collective Land Reform	China North Korea North Vietnam Burma?	(after 1975) South Vietnam? Cambodia Laos?
Distributive Land Reform	Japan Taiwan South Korea	Philippines Indonesia Malaysia Thailand

It is well to keep in mind that this table is merely a static approximation of the dynamic processes still going on in different countries. With the passing of the "Cold War" phase, and the varied experiences of land reform implementation in China as well as in Taiwan and Japan, several other countries have introduced modified elements of both the distributive and the collective types of land reform. Similarly, the older reform countries themselves have begun to move into the "post-post-reform stage" where original paradigms have been recast to adapt to changing circumstances. It is in this light that we shall try to examine more closely: (a) the model of the family farm; (b) smallholdings, plantation economies, and land settlement schemes; (c) the collective pattern; and (d) the Philippine case as an example of the eclectic approach.

(a) The Family Farm (Japan, Taiwan, South Korea):

Among the non-Communist countries advocating land reforms, the family farm has stood out as the ultimate model for realizing socio-economic goals and political objectives of legitimacy, stability, and democracy. The post-war reforms in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, influenced heavily by American advisers, have followed this model. (McCoy 1971) Indeed, since the land had already been fragmented for cultivation by individual farm families, land reform simply meant the transfer of ownership from landlord to actual tiller of the soil, without rearranging the scale of farm management. "Japanese land reform," comments Smith (1971?:50-51), "did very little to restructure actual farm size. The reform was simply an adjustment of title, and the tillers remained the same." Other writers, however, have

calculated that farm size may actually have diminished on the average due to the increase of the rural population from returning soldiers and refugees.[26]

In many respects, as discussed earlier, the small family farm in Japan and Taiwan proved to be highly successful--in terms of increased productivity per unit area, in raising farm-family incomes, in increased investments and technological innovations, in giving farmers a stake in the land and more participation in their local governments. However, it is well to keep in mind that Japanese and Taiwanese farmers were only regaining productivity performances of pre-war levels, that the necessary infrastructure of roads and communications was basically left intact in the two areas, and that the peasant farmers themselves had long been experienced in farm management skills. Dorner comments thus:

> It is especially difficult to visualize a repeat of the Japanese experience. The post-World War II land reforms in that country occurred in an economy, though shattered by war, that was already highly industrialized. The U.S. occupation force provided the required authority to impose the reform. Japan had a long history of technological development, especially in rice farming, and an entrepreneurial farming class even among its tenants. It had excellent land records and most of the other strategic elements . . . . (1976:13)

The other strategic elements--such as credit, marketing, and extension services--were made accessible to small farmers through institutionalized service cooperatives that were part and parcel of the reform. (cf. Cruz 1971) It is for this same reason that the South Korean experience, though patterned after the Japanese model, did not fare as well--for lack of government auxiliary services, the short five-year span allotted for compensation payments, and the outbreak of the Korean War which prevented local farmers' associations or cooperatives from evolving properly.

The family farm therefore is only part of the post-reform model in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. What is perhaps more significant is the network of services channeled by the government through institutionalized farmers' cooperatives for the <u>system</u> of family farms to function well. Hsieh (1966) notes:

> Taiwan's agricultural development experience, for 15 years, indicates that, under rational land tenure arrangements, a small family-farm system <u>supported</u> by modern agricultural technological improvement, effective extension education services, and efficient farmers' cooperative organizations

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26. This does not take into consideration, however, the number of war casualties--in Japan, and during the Korean War. It was probably only Taiwan that experienced a net increase of the population, with the "migration" of over a million Kuomintang soldiers and officials.

manages to survive in the world competition of agricultural production (emphasis added).

Moreover, because of the restrictions on the maximum size of landownership and on the transferability of reform lands, the result of land reform in these countries, as in Japan in particular, has not been to establish a "free and independent owner farmer system" but, as Ogura prefers to call it, a "cultivator proprietorship system under the paternalism of the state." (1967:231)[27]

In the post-reform years, although the trend toward tenancy has effectively been reversed, other second-generation problems have arisen, due on the one hand to the growing income lag between the agricultural sector and the industrial sector, and, on the other hand, to the limited size of agricultural holdings. "Small-scale farming and fragmentary holding of arable land have resulted in a bottleneck to the further development of the Japanese economy," Ouchi (1966) has observed. Because of the deteriorating terms of trade between agriculture and industry, 80 percent of the heads of farm households have taken up side-jobs in industry, supplying cheap labor and indicating the need to supplement farm incomes with off-farm employment. (Tokiwa 1968; Hoshi 1972) The principal remedy suggested for Japan has been to consolidate and enlarge farming units by modifying the earlier land reform restrictions on farm size. (Nakae 1968; Ogura 1967)

Taiwan has witnessed similar problems of size limitation. In addition to the three steps of land reform, a program of land consolidation, known as the fourth step of land reform, has been carried out. (Chang 1965) In a resolution, entitled "Outline for Current Rural Economic Reconstruction," the Kuomintang's Central Committee has laid the groundwork to enlarge farms for mechanization and modern management while retaining the private ownership system. As distinguished from the earlier land consolidation program started in 1961, the new proposal would eliminate existing footpaths serving as boundaries and combine small private farms into larger production units adapted to mechanization. Farmers in these schemes would share crops and cash income in accordance with the land, cash, and labor supplied. (Lee 1970)

In the case of South Korea, more acute problems concerning dwarf farms have been reported, since the average unit area of a tenant farm is only 2.7 tanbo (0.27 hectare). (Pak 1967:113-15) Due to land reform and the influx of North Korean refugees, a shrinking scale of farm management has occurred resulting in a decline of the farm economy. "Poor tenant farmers," comments Pak (1967), "become no more than poor landed farmers." Conducting empirical tests on a fragmented farming system, another researcher claims that "the farmers have exhausted the profitable production possibilities of the state of arts at their disposal and little economic surplus can be created." (Oh 1967)

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27. Harkin (1976) suggests a similar process taking place in the Philippines as a result of the devolution of the concept of private property by means of agrarian reform restrictions.

Because of the acute shortage of land, disguised forms of tenancy contracts, mostly verbal, have been uncovered. And yet, the proposed alternative of enlarging farms, particularly the contemplated legislation to allow the re-emergence of absentee landlordism under the principle of "owner manager" or "entrepreneur owner" in defiance of the "tiller-owner" principle may merely complete the full cycle from reform to the pre-reform situation --an instance of the reversal of land reform policies a generation after the initial reform. (Pak 1967:115-16)

(b) Smallholdings, Plantations, and Land Settlement Schemes (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand):

The phenomenon of fragmented smallholdings has posed a specially sensitive problem in Muslim countries like Malaysia and Indonesia where the Islamic law of inheritance specifies how property must be divided according to rules of consanguinity and sex. (Ho 1970) Earlier provisions prohibiting further subdivision below a minimum limit have been disregarded. Likewise, attempts at land consolidation have been effectively stalemated. As a result, multiple ownership and a high turn-over of owners have complicated the land tenure system. (Mahmud n.d.; Wilson 1955) "Freehold ownership as a method of land tenure in a Muslim South-East Asian country," Wilson concludes, "is, of itself, no guarantee of a 'healthy system of peasant proprietors.'" (1954)

In addition to the problem of smallholdings, both Malaysia and Indonesia have also had a significant agricultural sub-sector devoted to plantation economies, oftentimes enclave economies run by foreign companies for the export market.[28] Although rubber has been considered an ideal peasant smallholder crop, McHale (1965) notes that the Malayan rubber industry from the beginning under colonial government was almost exclusively "European in orientation and plantation in form." A comparison with Indonesia's rubber industry has also been made along with the effects of plantation agriculture in widening the gap in production techniques between the modern plantation and peasant agricultural sectors. (Thee 1969)

The Malayan reform of plantation economies through subdivision during the period 1951-60 has, however, been severely criticized by Aziz (1962-63) who terms subdivision an "anti-development" process, while also exposing the practice of pseudo-subdivision. "The myth of peasant proprietorship," he continues, "has turned out to be a reality of increasing proprietorship by capitalists, white-collar workers and 'blue-trouser' workers." (cf. Quirin 1964; Aziz 1966)

In a different study comparing capital-intensive sugar plantations in Java with the labor-intensive forms of economic organization in the pre-capitalistic stage, Geertz (1956) notes the anti-developmental effects of the plantation companies on the agrarian economy. He suggests a division

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28. The Philippines also has a growing number of plantation economies devoted to export crops, particularly on the islands of Mindanao, Negros, and Panay situated below the typhoon belt.

of labor between peasant organizations and plantation companies in the distinct stages of cultivation, processing, and marketing to arrive at "a non-exploitative integration between an advanced technology and Javanese primary production in agriculture."

Land settlement schemes in frontier regions have been a third area of concern for the governments of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. Usually the establishment of new agricultural settlements has been premised on the model of family farms. However, variations have arisen. In North Borneo, for instance, Lee (1965) has contrasted the Chinese land-settlement schemes, where each house is set amidst its own agricultural land, with the village pattern of indigenous settlements. He likewise notes a new form of "tertiary land tenure" whereby a group of people, voluntarily or by order of the government, exercises land rights in common.

In Thailand, land settlement schemes and a reorganization of existing land tenure patterns have been attempted through various kinds of land cooperatives. Arguing that the Japanese and Taiwanese models are not applicable to Thailand because of differences in the pre-reform situations, Seetisarn (n.d.) favors "a system approach which will nurture and utilize cooperative efforts of the farmers." He recommends small family farms, supported by land cooperatives, to be established first in irrigated areas, then expanded into rain-fed areas. However, typical problems of implementation have been encountered--such as lack of cooperation among farmer workers and lack of qualified personnel. (Thailand. Dept. of Land Cooperatives 1969)

Thailand has not seen fit to legislate a land reform program, but has rather re-emphasized its agricultural policy based on individual farm ownership. (Sitton 1962) Like many of its non-Communist neighbors, the diagnosis for its land problems strikes the same chords--lack of security of tenure, diminishing farm sizes, depressed farm incomes, etc. (Grace 1974) In the same manner, the recommended remedy has a familiar ring--tenancy regulation, creating service cooperatives, changing farmers' attitudes from subsistence farming to commercialized production, and the like. (Johnson 1969; Ng 1970)

In the absence of a full-scale land reform program, each of the three countries--Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand--has tried to deal separately with its various tenure systems. It is clear, however, that with growing populations and diminishing land frontiers, some of the options have gradually been curtailed. In this situation, government policy with regard to models for reform has to be more clearly defined to avoid a Malthusian situation of what has been called "static expansion." (Boeke, in Penny 1966)

(c) Collectives: The Communist Pattern

Instead of being the final stage, land reform in the sense of land redistribution was only the beginning of the agrarian revolution in China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Indeed, for Asian Communists, as with Marxist-Leninists elsewhere, the final solution of the land problem was not to be in terms of individual peasant ownership of family farms. Unlike the Soviet pattern, however, China's road to collectivized agriculture followed

several progressive stages over more than a decade--from privately held farms, through mutual-aid teams, to cooperatives, and finally to the people's communes.

The complete story itself of this massive institutional transformation of half a billion peasants has not yet been fully told. Suffice it to note that these changes were not carefully designed by a monolithic Communist hierarchy, as manifested by recurrent disputes among China's leaders, notably between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi in the early years, and the ever-present "two-way struggle between socialism and capitalism" in China's rural areas. (Chao 1970; Su 1968) "Socialistic transformation," however, has always been viewed as a prerequisite to "technological transformation," in a similar manner that several non-Communist countries have viewed tenure reform as a pre-condition to production increases. (cf. Schran 1969) "Humanitarian considerations aside," Fei (1974) remarks, "the willingness and capability for large-scale experiment may, in the long run, turn out to be a major asset of the Communist system."

The period of land redistribution into private peasant plots did not last more than two years (1950-52). It was seen however as a necessary first step for the agrarian revolution--politically, for the peasants to exercise their power over the landlords; and economically, for the same peasants-turned-owner-farmers to realize the limits of traditional agriculture on small individual plots. (Agriculture in New China 1953) Starting from this situation, it was considered a logical step for the small peasant farmers to move further on to the next rung, the Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives (APC). And by 1958, practically all of the 120 million peasant households had been communized. "Instead of 740,000 APC's with an average of about 160 households," Chao reports, "there are now about 24,000 people's communes, averaging over 5,000 households each." (1960)

The present three-tier system of decision-making at the level of the commune, the brigade, and the local production team has been the result of large-scale experiments that resulted in the Great Leap Forward in 1958, followed by three years of disasters (1959-61), and subsequent periods of reassessments. (Burki 1971) Thus the communes as they continue to develop today are the result of Chinese pragmatism as well as a long-term commitment to the socialist paradigm of collectivized agriculture.

Some notable features of the communes have been: (1) the organizational balance arrived at based on "democratic centralism" (Chao 1960); (2) the achievement of economies of scale, while allowing for the continuation of small private plots (Walker 1965; Burki 1969; Dutt 1963); (3) the integration of simultaneous objectives such as: to develop agriculture, to build local industry, and to advance education and culture (Greene 1960);[29] and (4) the breakthrough toward the Chinese equivalent of a green revolution by the late 1960s (Stavis 1974).

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29. Likewise, Hautfenne (1972) states that the commune in its present form has economic, administrative, military, medical, and socio-cultural functions.

Several criticisms have been leveled at the communes--e.g., the undesirable features of a "command economy" (Jo 1967); totalitarian centralism (Klein 1960; Lethbridge 1963); and distrust of what have been labeled by Communist leaders as "revisionist policies" (Yeh 1969). Considering China's past, however, particularly the recurrence of floods and famines, and her suppliant posture before other powers in pre-revolutionary days, one would find it hard to disagree with Stavis' conclusion (1974):

> Compared with other countries in Asia, China's experiences in transforming agriculture can be considered successful. Food production has risen slightly more rapidly than in the rest of East, Southeast and South Asia. On an overall average basis, China's agriculture is the most advanced in Asia, after that of Japan and Taiwan; and China's high and stable yield areas are comparable to the best areas in Japan and Taiwan. In terms of future prospects, China's difficulties are certainly no greater than those of other countries.

Implicit in this judgment is an evaluation of the system of people's communes, which "still holds the key to Communist China's future." (Snow 1961)

Following the Chinese pattern, North Korea has also carried out in successive stages the reorganization of the peasantry with a sweeping land reform program in 1946, the cooperativization movement in 1953-54 after the Korean War, and culminating with the enlargement of the cooperatives in 1958 after the commune movement in China. (Lee, C.S. 1963) A Communist writer provides a different categorization of the various phases in North Korea's agricultural transformation--the stages of "anti-imperialism, anti-feudalism, a democratic revolution and socialistic revolution." (Ko 1966)

Reviewing North Vietnam's land reform process from 1945 to the present, Tran (1972) discusses its development strategy of balanced economic growth in agriculture and industry through the use of intermediate techniques and a network of regional production areas. Patterned after the Chinese experience, the first reforms involved rent reduction followed by a radical redistribution of land in 1953 that left the peasants with average holdings of one-tenth of a hectare. The second stage of collectivization involved a progression from mutual-help teams to the semi-socialist type of cooperative to socialist-type cooperatives. No general attempt has been made however to adopt the Chinese model of people's communes. "By the end of the first five-year plan (1961-65)," he concludes, "agriculture in North Vietnam had been basically socialized, while in the course of less than a generation the peasantry had undergone sweeping changes."[30]

(d) <u>The Philippine Case: Paradigm Lost?</u>

In 1963, the Philippine land reform program was legislated "to abolish share tenancy" and to establish "owner-operated family-size farms as the

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30. For criticisms of the North Vietnamese experience, see Teodoru 1973, and Hoang 1964. For a more balanced view, see Jacoby 1961.

foundation of Philippine agriculture." (Republic Act 3844, Sec. 2) Tenure change was to be carried out in two stages: (1) from share tenancy to leasehold, and (2) from leasehold to owner-cultivatorship of family-size farms. In 1971, when the Code was amended, the focus had shifted to "cooperative-cultivatorship among those who live and work on the land as tillers" and "a cooperative system of production, processing, marketing, distribution, credit, and services." (R.A. 6389, Sec. 2) In 1972, one month after the declaration of martial law Presidential Decree No. 27 proclaimed that all tenants, whether sharecropper or lessee, were "deemed owners" of the land they till.

For the first time, the size of family farms was calculated as 3 hectares of irrigated land or 5 hectares of unirrigated land. Likewise, the maximum retention limit for landowners on the basis of personal cultivation was set at 7 hectares. The most far-reaching provision however has been the requirement for the tenant-farmer to become "a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative" before he can be eligible to receive the title to his land. In subsequent decrees and letters of instruction, this requirement has been interpreted to mean that a tenant can only receive a Certificate of Land Transfer, which makes him the amortizing owner of his land over the next 15 years, on condition that he joins the government-sponsored Samahang Nayon (Barrio Association). Henceforth, tenure shift would no longer be accomplished on an individual basis but on the barrio level. Likewise, an institutionalized form of peasant cooperation has become an integral part of the agrarian reform program.

In the immediate period following P.D. 27, however, land transfer proceedings affected only landlords owning 24 hectares or more. Later on, Operation Land Transfer was indeed extended down to the 7-hectare level, but by this time with a significant concession to small landowners of 7 hectares or less: they may retain ownership of their land (even without personal cultivation). If there are tenants on the land, they shall not be evicted, but shall continue working the land under permanent leasehold arrangements. DAR Secretary Estrella summarizes the resulting situation:

> By the exclusion of the 7 hectares and below, the new coverage of the land transfer program stands as follows: land area--759,015 hectares; tenant-farmers--393,778; and landowners--39,550. The 7 hectares and below category comprises 663,973 hectares or 46.6 percent; 521,136 tenant-farmers or 56.9 percent; and 371,129 landowners or 90.3 percent. This latter category is to be covered by leasehold operations. (1975:2)

Finally, in another policy decision, which has been seen by some observers as working at cross purposes with the original intention of land reform, the government has encouraged large-scale rice farming by private corporations (Government Order No. 47). As of 1975, 129 G.O. 47 operations were listed, but only 3 of these involved contracts with family farmers. (Harkin 1976:28)

Thus, the post-reform picture that emerges, granting full implementation for the sake of discussion, takes on the following configurati ns:

(1) Only a maximum number of 43 percent of all tenant farmers on rice and corn lands can become amortizing owners. These will not however be allotted the 3 hectares of irrigated land or 5 hectares of unirrigated land, but will retain the present actual size of their landholding. As of September 1975, it was reported that 25 percent of all tenants had received Certificates of Land Transfer. (Estrella 1975)

(2) The other 57 percent of all tenants will remain as permanent lessees on small landlord-owned lands of 7 hectares or less.

(3) Average holdings of both amortizing owners and permanent lessees have been calculated at 1.55 hectares in 1975, and are expected to decline further to 1.2 hectares by 1990. (Harkin 1976:24-25)

(4) A system of service cooperatives initiated by the Samahang Nayon program will supply the various needs of all small farmers. As of February 1976, it was reported that 14,397 SNs had been registered or 90 percent of the program target of 16,000 barrios. (DLGCD 1976)

(5) Various forms of cooperative farming--such as compact farms, the moshav-type operations, or under the SN program--have been introduced on an experimental basis.

(6) Corporate rice farming will most likely continue, with reported significant increases in production, but with questionable repercussions on tenants or settlers who may be displaced from their lands or from work.

(7) Land reform has been restricted to tenanted rice and corn lands. Lands devoted to agricultural export crops such as coconut, sugar, pineapple, bananas, etc., have all been exempted. The extent of illegal conversion of rice or corn lands to these other crop lands has not been well documented.

In many respects, therefore, Philippine policy-makers have followed the eclectic approach in searching for working solutions to the land problem--publicizing some, discarding none (except the socialist model). Small farmers on rice and corn lands continue to exist alongside big landlords on exempt land or corporate rice farms. Leasehold tenancy becomes a permanent complement to small landlordism. And cooperatives have been introduced on a pilot farm-operation basis as well as institutionalized within land tenure reform. In following the incremental approach, ad hoc problems may have been solved, but underlying contradictions have been glossed over. The most obvious one should be spelled out: that the original paradigm of "owner-operated family-size farms" will not materialize for the majority of Filipino peasant farmers today.[31]

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31. As with the Philippine experience, South Vietnam's Land-to-the-Tiller program failed to attain its original objectives. The linkages between the two countries' experiences are instructive. Originally influenced by the Philippine example in land reform legislation in 1954 and

Thus, the search for lasting models continues. On the one hand, much of the current literature on agricultural development has focused on the small farmer and his specific problems. (cf. Adams and Coward 1972) On the other hand, a growing body of studies has emerged discussing the merits and demerits of group farming. (cf. ADC/RTN/LTC Group Farming Conference 1975)

As more clearly perceived, land reform in terms of land redistribution can no longer be seen as a once-and-for-all phenomenon. Modern-day problems have become much more complex than even just three decades ago. And as populations grow, and the land frontier diminishes, and the clamor for food, security, and equity continues, the nations of Asia have begun to reassess their current strategies for rural--and national--development. Land reform remains a burning issue, but inherent in this sense of urgency is the related question of a restructuring of social institutions--or "man reform."

1963, South Vietnam's LTTT program became in turn the precursor of the "New Society's" Operation Land Transfer.

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