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NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND INSURGENCY IN
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IN THE less developed nations guerrilla insurgency is an ubiquitous indicator of the lack of political stability. Several theories have been proposed to explain high incidence of insurgency within the Third World. A common theory which links insurgency with economic underdevelopment and traditional social structure coupled with a "conspiratorial trigger" fails to explain those nations experiencing insurgency which are relatively more developed than their insurgency-free neighbors. Lucian Pye has suggested an alternative theory: insurgency as a consequence of the lack of national integration. We have tried to test this theory in a case study of one nation, Venezuela, which has experienced considerable guerrilla activity in the 1960's.

Venezuela seems well-suited for such an investigation because it ranks higher on most indicators of socioeconomic development than other nations within the Third World and has been experiencing one of the highest rates of urbanization, considered by some to be the most significant measure of national integration. Socioeconomic integration in Venezuela is a recent phenomenon and largely due to the discovery, exploration, and expanded production of oil. Following the discovery of oil during the 1920's and 1930's, large population migrations began to result in the emergence of a maldistribution in literacy, income, and urbanization characteristics. However, as the oil industry has matured, economic growth has spread to other sectors of the economy with a resulting decrease in inequality in terms of urbanization and literacy on a state-by-state basis.

The picture with regard to political integration is not nearly so optimistic. Kalman Silvert places Venezuela in the next to last group on his four-part scale of integration along with Bolivia, Colombia, Panama, and Peru. This group is characterized by "super-ordinate groups split by value disagreement concerning the desirability of national values and integration, again in coexistence with large groups alienated for class and ethnic reasons."¹

Guerrilla activity has occurred in six states of Venezuela, mostly in the extreme mountainous areas: Anzoátegui, Falcon, Lara, Portuguesa, Tachira, and Trujillo. Except for Tachira, these states are on the perimeter of the core area which, by and large, includes the most significant urban areas and economic productivity in Venezuela.

Our method ranked each state in terms of various indicators of national integration (literacy, urbanization, internal migration, and voting) on a ten-part scale. The rankings were then compared with the states that have had serious guerrilla activity.

Literacy has increased dramatically in Venezuela as a natural result of urbanization and deliberate government effort to eradicate illiteracy. In 1961, literacy of

¹ Kalman H. Silvert, "The Hemispheric Perspective," in John Plank, ed., *Cuba and the U.S.* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1967), p. 134.

those over 15 years of age in the Federal District was 87.2 percent while the state of Cojedes was lowest with a literacy rate of only 38.8 percent.

Of the six states afflicted with guerrilla activity, four were around the median level of 4: Anzoátegui, Falcon, Lara, and Tachira. The other two were at the low end of the scale: Portuguesa and Trujillo. By themselves, the statistics are not necessarily indicative of anything. It is significant, however, that the six are in the lower half of the distribution and *not* in the upper half. Perhaps a more significant aspect is to consider the rate of change between literacy levels of 1941 and 1961 which would show the rate of assimilation (see Table 1).

TABLE 1
CHANGE IN LITERACY 1941-1961

<i>State</i>	<i>Actual Change</i>	<i>Ranking</i>	<i>% Change (1941=100)</i>	<i>Ranking</i>
Anzoátegui	31.4	10	179.8	8
Miranda	25.3	8	194.9	10
Aragua	22.6	7	156.8	6
<i>Falcon</i>	22.0	7	161.9	7
<i>Lara</i>	21.4	6	171.8	8
Carabobo	20.5	6	130.2	3
Guarico	20.5	6	171.0	7
Cojedes	19.0	5	196.0	10
<i>Portuguesa</i>	18.9	5	190.0	9
Yaracuy	18.6	5	126.7	3
Barinas	16.6	4	161.5	6
Bolivar	14.3	3	126.9	3
Nueva Esparta	13.6	3	132.6	4
Sucre	13.3	3	137.4	4
<i>Trujillo</i>	13.1	3	145.6	5
Monagas	12.6	3	130.7	3
<i>Tachira</i>	12.3	3	127.2	3
Apure	11.8	2	136.0	4
Merida	11.7	2	135.7	4
Zulia	9.4	1	116.7	2
Federal District	8.4	1	110.7	1

The states we are concerned with show a significantly higher rate of assimilation than the national average of all states which has a ranking of approximately 5. This, however, could conceivably be due to the fact that these states start from a generally lower base than the others. In some ways, the results do indicate such a correlation, but it must be pointed out that Anzoátegui which has the highest literacy rate of the six states also has shown the greatest increase in literacy for the last 20 years. The data for Tachira seem to support the initial conclusion, since literacy was at a mid-level position while the rate of change was somewhat lower than the average. The general conclusion comparing literacy levels are not significantly lower in all the states except Trujillo and Portuguesa, while the rate of assimilation is significantly higher, allowing for difference in base in those states we are concerned with, except for Trujillo.

A second most important indicator is *urbanization*. Urbanization implies social mobilization. As noted before, urbanization has been rapid in Venezuela. In 1961, the range of urbanized population among the various states was 24.8 to 80.2 percent although most were between 30 and 76 percent. Except for the states of Anzoátegui and Lara, the areas of insurgency are less urbanized than the national average, indicating a lesser degree of social mobilization than other areas. Again we must consider the rate of urbanization as an indicator of the rate of social mobilization.

As shown by the data on raw change, there was minimal range in terms of changes in patterns of urbanization. Three of the six states, Anzoátegui, Falcon, and Portuguesa were above the median while the other three were below. The percentage change in urbanization produces similarly inconclusive statistics, Portuguesa and Anzoátegui being significantly above the national average while the remainder are closer to or below the national average. The urbanization-literacy lag is an indicator that combines the two previously used ones, offering a good measure of the mobilized but unassimilated population in each state. As Lerner and others have pointed out, there is a significant time interval before those migrating into the city become literate. This lag can be easily measured statistically in Venezuela. A difference in lag would possibly indicate differing propensities to become literate or differing needs to become literate. If the literacy lag is high it would probably indicate that socioeconomic standards were not appreciably higher in the urban areas and would point to a pattern of incomplete integration. It would also indicate a high degree of instability because the socially mobilized then are assumed to have been denied full participation within the politi-

TABLE 2
RATE OF URBANIZATION

State	Actual Change (1936-1961)	Ranking	% Change (1936=100)	Ranking
Miranda	35.3	10	512	6
Aragua	22.6	5	180	2
Carabobo	22.5	5	158	1
Falcon	22.0	5	276	2
Anzoátegui	21.4	5	512	6
Guarico	20.5	4	260	3
Cojedes	19.0	4	234	2
Portuguesa	18.9	4	768	10
Yaracuy	18.6	4	282	3
Barinas	16.6	3	479	6
Bolivar	14.3	2	168	1
Lara	14.0	2	294	3
Nueva Esparta	13.6	2	128	1
Sucre	13.3	2	193	2
Trujillo	13.1	2	199	2
Monagas	12.6	1	128	1
Tachira	12.3	1	240	2
Apure	11.8	1	180	2
Merida	11.7	1	317	3
Zulia	11.4	1	137	1

TABLE 3
URBANIZATION-LITERACY LAG

State	LITERACY		URBANIZATION		Δ Literacy Δ Urbanization
	1941	1961	1941	1961	
Apure	32.8	44.5	16.9	24.8	.96
Carabobo	47.5	68.0	47.0	71.3	.94
Cojedes	19.8	38.8	15.5	34.2	.89
Aragua	46.7	69.3	45.8	80.2	.85
Zulia	57.0	68.4	51.3	76.8	.80
Nueva Esparta	42.6	56.2	28.0	47.2	.79
Sucre	36.5	49.8	23.2	40.6	.78
Guarico	28.9	49.4	20.0	47.3	.73
Lara	30.1	51.5	21.8	55.5	.68
Anzoátegui	39.3	60.7	29.0	67.5	.66
Bolívar	53.2	67.5	32.4	62.7	.64
Yaracuy	26.7	45.3	18.6	50.7	.64
Monagas	42.0	54.6	23.1	45.6	.64
Falcon	33.3	55.3	17.0	45.2	.62
Tachira	45.3	57.6	22.4	45.7	.62
Merida	32.8	44.5	12.5	28.2	.58
Miranda	37.2	72.5	18.1	70.6	.50
Portuguesa	21.0	39.9	11.3	43.2	.50
Trujillo	28.7	41.6	9.5	31.0	.45
Barinas	27.0	43.6	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

TABLE 4
INTER-STATE MIGRATION (OUT)

State of Birth	% Living in Other States	Ranking
Nueva Esparta	37.2	10
Miranda	31.3	8
Yaracuy	30.8	8
Trujillo	29.0	8
Sucre	26.3	7
Cojedes	26.2	7
Falcon	26.1	7
Merida	23.2	6
Monagas	23.1	6
Lara	22.6	6
Aragua	22.2	6
Tachira	22.0	5
Apure	21.1	5
Guarico	19.8	5
Carabobo	19.2	5
Bolívar	17.8	4
Anzoátegui	16.8	4
Barinas	15.2	3
Portuguesa	12.9	3
Zulia	7.0	1

cal system. Only two of the six states have lags close to the national average, Anzoátegui and Lara. As can be seen all the states do have a lag. The other four states have significantly greater lags, 1.0 being unity.

Another measure of integration is *migration* from one state to another. Despite the existence of geographic barriers, Venezuela has not suffered from the traditional curse, regionalism, such as is characteristic of its neighbor, Colombia. In part, this is due to the phenomenon of substantial migration from the interior to Caracas and to the oil producing areas and migration *away* from the economically depressed eastern coastal region and from the Andean region.

In addition to being an indicator of general integration, out-migration is also a negative indicator of the relative perceived desirability of the state. Furthermore, rapid migration out of the state leaves a residue of less integrated people with close regional ties who are unaware of the perceived undesirability of their environment or are unable to consider moving. Thus, out-migration has both positive and negative implications for integration of the specific state in question and for the entire nation. As far as this indicator is concerned, the results show a wide variance although Trujillo has an exceptionally high degree of out-migration.

Corresponding data on in-migration would indicate the existence of positive integration and the perceived desirability of the state. A figure is included in Table 5 for the Federal District to indicate the source of its growth. As can be seen, two of the six states, Anzoátegui and Portuguesa, have had considerable in-migration while the other four states are below average, Trujillo and Lara being considerably below average. The plus and minus signs indicate whether net migra-

TABLE 5
INTER-STATE MIGRATION (IN)

State	% Living in State Born Elsewhere	Ranking +/-
Federal District	54.3	10 +
Miranda	46.8	10 +
Aragua	37.3	8 +
Portuguesa	37.3	8 +
Barinas	31.7	7 +
Carabobo	31.7	7 +
Anzoátegui	27.2	6 +
Monagas	27.2	6 +
Guarico	26.7	6 +
Zulia	26.4	6 +
Bolívar	24.3	5 +
Falcon	21.5	4 -
Yaracuy	19.6	4 -
Cojedes	19.2	4 -
Tachira	16.8	3 -
Apure	14.4	3 -
Merida	12.2	2 -
Lara	11.7	2 -
Trujillo	7.0	1 -
Nueva Esparta	6.8	1 -

tion into and out of each state is positive or negative. As expected, Portuguesa and Anzoátegui, which have had considerable in-migration have also made a net gain while the other four states have suffered net losses in population relative to the total population. This has been due primarily to out-migration. Thus, those states inflicted with insurgency are generally less integrated as far as migration statistics are concerned, except for the two important cases of Trujillo and Lara.

Voting is also a measure of integration, primarily political rather than social or cultural integration. The first indicator in this section is simply an indicator of participation based on percentage voting of those registered and percentage of those registered.

For this analysis the national election of 1963 has been used. The 1958 elections enjoyed a high turnout since this was the first election following the overthrow of Perez Jiménez. The 1963 election was contested by three major groups, *Acción Democrática* (AD), the Christian Democratic party (COPEI) and the *Unión Republicana Democrática* (URD). At the time the election was being held, Larrazabel was provisional president and very popular in the Caracas area. He was running under the URD program which the Venezuelan Communist party (PCV) was supporting. Unfortunately no data on registration is available for this election which presented a variety of candidates and roused all segments of Venezuelan society.

The 1963 election was run under greatly changed circumstances. Schism had occurred within the AD, resulting in the expulsion of Marxist-leaning activists and the formation of a new group, AD-OP which participated in the national elections.

TABLE 6
VOTER PARTICIPATION

<i>State</i>	<i>% Registered</i>	<i>% Voting</i>	<i>Ranking</i>
Nueva Esparta	49	96	10
Anzoátegui	40	91	7.5
Cojedes	36	91	7.5
Falcon	43	90	7
Sucre	42	89	6.5
Aragua	43	88	6
Carabobo	43	88	6
Guarico	40	88	6
Miranda	41	88	6
Bolivar	43	87	5.5
Merida	46	87	5.5
Monagas	42	87	5.5
Yaracuy	44	87	5.5
Federal District	39	86	5
Barinas	39	86	5
Tachira	35	86	5
Trujillo	44	85	4.5
Portuguesa	41	84	4
Zulia	39	84	4
Lara	44	82	3
Apure	37	78	1

Thus, as the novelty of the 1958 election contributed to voter turnout, the importance of the 1963 election also did so.

The lack of any data on total population of voting age precludes the use of these data in any significant way since range of percentage is so limited. The range of percentage of voting of those registered is also limited but the differences are significant. Except for Anzoátegui and Falcon, the percentages for the states we are concerned with are lower generally than the rest of the country, indicating some regional differences in civic participation. It must be kept in mind that the act of registration itself signifies political participation and significant numbers may be precluded from participating through denial of registration. However, the data provided in Russett *et al.*, *World Handbook of Social Indicators*, indicate voting participation is high in Venezuela compared with the rest of Latin America, implying that the registration process is not a significant enough discriminator.

Analysis of the vote indicates that the AD's strongest support is outside the Federal District in the rural areas — a positive indicator of integration in that the AD is a nationalistic party, not trying to cultivate a following on any type of regional or sector base. The six states with the exception of Tachira voted significantly higher for AD. Tachira is an unusual case. For 100 years, the vast majority of members of the political elite including caudillos and army officers had come from this state. Under the political reforms, the locus of power gradually shifted from Tachira to the Federal District and the adjoining state of Miranda. Consequently, the general opposition to the AD is somewhat logical and expected.

TABLE 7
COMMUNIST VOTE IN 1958

State	% Communist Vote	Ranking
Federal District	7.4	10
Aragua	4.4	6
Lara	3.5	5
Zulia	3.5	5
Anzoátegui	3.4	5
Miranda	3.2	5
Portuguesa	3.1	4
Falcon	2.8	4
Yaracuy	2.8	4
Monagas	2.6	4
Carabobo	2.5	4
Bolívar	2.2	3
Sucre	1.9	3
Guarico	1.7	2
Barinas	1.3	2
Nueva Esparta	1.1	2
Apure	1.0	2
Trujillo	1.0	2
Cojedes9	1
Tachira6	1
Merida5	1

The presidential election of 1963 indicates a general shift away from AD. However, the shift away was greater in the six states in comparison with the rest of Venezuela. This certainly does not mean a process of disintegration within the country but does indicate the possibility of a base of support for the rebels in these areas.

Another indicator within the voting analysis would be the percentage of radical vote within each state. The Communist party was allowed to participate in the 1958 election and supported the candidacy of Larrazabal. The actual procedures of voting permitted the tabulation of the Communist vote.

Except for the states of Tachira and Trujillo, the Communist vote was above average for the six states, implying a somewhat bifurcated public sentiment toward the incumbent government. In 1963, the Communist party was outlawed precisely for its support of the insurgency activities. A measure of the radical support is the vote for the coalition of which AD-OP, the breakaway group, was a prominent member.

As can be seen from Table 8, the vote for AD-OP was centered around the Federal District and the adjoining states. The insurgency states' radical vote was generally below the national average. Thus, voting patterns do not have significance for the question of national integration. Although there is a regional voting pattern, often a negative indicator of national integration, this pattern does not correspond to any pattern of insurgency. Voting seems to have little relevance to the problem of pluralism and regionalism in the Venezuelan case.

TABLE 8
VOTE FOR AD-OP COALITION (1963)

<i>State</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Ranking</i>
Aragua	22.9	10
Federal District	22.2	10
Carabobo	22.2	10
Yaracuy	19.0	8
Miranda	18.5	8
Zulia	15.8	7
Bolivar	9.9	5
Anzoátegui	8.9	4
Lara	7.0	4
Cojedes	6.4	3
Monagas	5.5	3
Guarico	5.3	3
Apure	4.9	3
Portuguesa	4.6	3
Barinas	3.7	2
Falcon	3.4	2
Sucre	2.8	2
Trujillo	2.5	2
Merida	2.3	2
Tachira	2.0	1
Nueva Esparta8	1

SUMMARY FINDINGS

The data (see Table 9) indicate that these six states can be classified in three separate categories. The first pair, Anzoátegui and Portuguesa, show indications of rapid integration with their relatively high rates of change in urbanization and literacy. Rapid integration generally results in tremendous social pressures, and in the short-run, relatively acute and magnified inequalities. The situation may be similar to that of the nation as a whole: strong currents of integrative activity within a core area activated by certain economic and geographical advantages and

TABLE 9
NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN VENEZUELA

	Literacy (1961)	Literacy Δ	Urbanization (1961)	Urbanization Δ
Range	39.9-87.2	110.0-196.0	24.8-80.2	128-768
Rank Average of all States	4	5	5	3
Anzoátegui	5	8	8	6
Falcon	4	7	4	3
Lara	3	8	6	3
Portuguesa	1	9	4	10
Tachira	3	3	4	2
Trujillo	1	5	2	2
	Out-migration	In-migration	Voting participation	
Range	7.0-37.2	7.0-54.3	78-96	
Rank Average	6	4	5.5	
Anzoátegui	4	5	7.5	
Falcon	7	4	7	
Lara	6	2	6	
Portuguesa	3	7	4	
Tachira	5	3	5	
Trujillo	8	1	4.5	

resulting in the already modern core area's encirclement by isolated, unintegrated areas. This occurs as people and capital migrate to more modern urban areas offering greater opportunities. Within the states, there are rapid population dislocations resulting in extensive urbanization and the emergence of oases of modernity within a desert of traditionalism and isolation. The perceived differences in economic situations cause even greater social tensions among the unintegrated rural populace.

The second pair of states, Tachira and Trujillo, are characterized by relative stagnation. They are among the least integrated states in Venezuela. Being rather mountainous, and having few natural advantages and resources, they have not been absorbed into the slowly expanding perimeter of the core area. The mountainous terrain offers suitable cover to guerrillas although it does not provide for food which has occasionally forced the guerrilla bands down into more populated areas where they are vulnerable. The fact that Tachira, a nineteenth-century power and home of many generals, has been usurped of its influence in national politics indicates a propitious climate for revolutionary movements. Although the

rebels are inspired by the Cuban example, this has not limited recruitment to leftist elements alone, but has attracted many from the disenchanting right.

The case of the states of Lara and Falcon seems to indicate the strategic elements involved in guerrilla warfare. The deserted coast of Falcon is a suitable area to bring supplies in from outside the country. Although the level of urbanization is only average, the population is concentrated in a few coastal cities leaving large areas absolutely uninhabited. Lara borders this state and has much the same topology. A spillover effect is evident, although the state by itself would be suitable for such activity.

A final analysis must focus on the obvious failures of the guerrilla movement to make any headway. If lack of complete integration, or the pressure of rapid integration has a positive effect upon insurgency, less measurable factors such as ideology, sense of nationalism, etc., have had a negative effect upon the movement. Furthermore, with the systematic implementation and expansion of the agrarian reform movement, recent reformist-oriented governments have gained a great deal of support among the peasants.

The data indicate a definite relationship between lack of integration and insurgency but also indicate that there are other variables to be considered, including strategic and socioeconomic factors only peripherally related to the problem of national integration. An excellent area for further study might be the spatial distribution of population which would require data on rural density and its impact and land pressure upon arable land according to relative fertility. Another area of study might be the effect of urban unrest upon rural unrest. In some respects this appears very important in the Venezuelan case because the rural guerrillas are of urban origin and educational background and nurtured in the battles of urban insurgency. This very fact calls into question theories aimed at explaining the rural unrest on the basis of considering rural conditions only and ignoring the effect of urban areas.