

**Participation, Planning, and Administrative
Development in Urban Development Programs**



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Preface

The goal of involving people in planning and development from the decision making stage, through implementation, and to sharing in the resulting benefits, has been contained in U.S. domestic and foreign aid legislation for many years. Expressed in cultural (the "other" American, poor majority), economic (employment generation and income distribution), political (civic participation and maximum feasible participation), and social (structural poverty and equity) terms in various policies and programs, the concept of participation has been as elusive of precise definition as it has been of consistent and effective implementation. Earlier efforts, under such rubrics as extension services, community action and community development programs, and adult education, and usually containing a large element of "participation," were abandoned in favor of other approaches. However, the problem has persisted -- namely, how to achieve the effective involvement of those impacted by development efforts.

Nowhere has the problem been more complex than in the urban areas in developing countries. Underdeveloped by definition, these economies have not been able to deal effectively with the unprecedented rates of urbanization and the resulting range of enormous demands on admittedly limited resources. In these urban areas one is acutely aware of the nexus of issues concerned with administration, planning, and participation in development programs.

The authors of this monograph focus on the nature of these issues and their interrelatedness in urban development and planning. They describe how the various theories and concepts have converged, separated, and been intermingled over time. The authors consider also the kind of evaluative process which can improve urban development program design and implementation generally and especially participation at the interface of the local-level administrator and the citizen participant.

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INTRODUCTION

The last decade has witnessed profound changes in our thinking about that nexus of issues which swim around participation, planning, and development. Each of these large concepts represents a stream of intellectual thought interacting with accumulated experience. All three streams converge at different points during which their similar concerns mingle and wash against one another. And then for awhile they go their separate ways, changed from their earlier paths, and not quite the same as they once were. One knows that they will again converge at some future point, but meanwhile there is a period of picking up their own tributaries.

Our purpose here will be to summarize briefly just how each of these streams has changed, converged, contributed to one another, and gone on its way. Each is concerned with defining the meaning of development and growth, juxtaposing it with decay, and sorting out values about the best ways to maximize that development and its distribution.

Much of the postwar period, for our purposes, may be roughly divided into four phases. The first phase can be characterized as dominated by the economists whose

conception of development was limited to increasing Gross National Product which was said to measure growth.

Alternative models were debated over how best to push rates of growth to better plateaus, and the consensus was that inequalities in income were necessary to do this. Political scientists at this point talked about political modernization as a counterpart to enhance the economists' vision with little preoccupation about participation as part of modernization. Planners, too, worked at comprehensive master plans to maximize the controls needed to reach the benchmark of rapidly growing GNP.

Phase II can be characterized as the beginnings of doubt, and a reaction against the idealism of the first phase. Experience had been harsh, and growth was not only slow in coming but often brought trouble in its wake. Economists persisted, but political scientists talked about dangers--dangers of instability, riots, civil tensions--indeed, of political decay. Political scientists began to consider participation as pivotal, albeit some were opposed to mobilization which was called participation. Planners began to worry about new ways to improve the cognitive limits of centralized planning.

Phase III was a fertile period of critiques from the left and from the right among economists and political scientists and planners. The left in all three groups repudiated earlier definitions of development. Rapidly

growing GNP was no longer enshrined as the sine qua non of development. Those on the left saw participation as essential; those on the right saw it as dangerous. Each group was more concerned about distribution. On the right were advocates of no-growth as well, for different reasons from those on the left, but with very similar policy positions.

We are going to posit that there is yet a Phase IV, which reflects an approaching synthesis--a point where the streams converge for awhile--and where there are issues intermingling in new ways.

This monograph will, therefore, set out to do three things. In this first part we shall summarize the arguments concerning citizen participation and its relationship to economic and political development. Only part of these theories were concerned with urban development, however, and we will focus primarily on urban development and planning. In Part II we will address the administrative problems encountered in urban development. Much of the time we will draw upon both experience in cities in the United States and in the third world. In Part III, we will summarize experimental urban development schemes tried in third world countries. And then finally we will address the issue of evaluation--how and what we should do in an evaluative process so that we can learn from the experience accumulated.

PART I

PARTICIPATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Strategies to involve citizens in local planning efforts have been manifold in their design, and varied in their success in the past decade. The same patterns and problems reappear whether one is looking at metropolitan New York or downtown Nairobi. The experimentation with alternative forms of citizen participatory arrangements has been greatest recently in the United States. They have given rise to arguments both about the proclivities of the poor to participate as well as about the costs and benefits of that participation. These very same issues surface in the voluminous literature on development of third world countries. Just as participation of residents of inner cities was seen by some as costly in time, and not especially beneficial in impact on total urban development, observers of the third world pointed to the limitations, self-imposed as well as systemic, of lower income groups participating in development planning. (cf. Banfield and Wilson, 1963; Huntington, 1968; Moynihan, 1969).

Participation is viewed from three different perspectives, corresponding to three different theories about what it is thought to accomplish. In the first view, participation is evaluated as a part of the political system, and particularly in terms of the system's need to maintain its

legitimacy over time. The question then becomes how much participation is possible given the complexity of a social system and the proclivities of the citizens. For some, the answer has been that most people are only moderately inclined to participate fully, and that as long as the government functions effectively and fairly, they are more or less willing to participate in a low keyed, routine way. Further, these theorists argue, the system can only absorb a moderate amount of participation, and conversely that such a moderate amount is necessary for the system to retain its legitimacy and incorporate incremental change. (cf., for example, Almond, 1965; Pye, 1966; Verba, 1963; Weiner, 1967). In this view, participation is defined as giving the leadership signals of what people want, and to enhance their sense of involvement and support of the regime. In order to perform this function, such participation is usually planned, or structured from above.

The second view of participation argues that the above perspective, however well it reads as theory, in fact means that only some will participate, and they will either willfully or inadvertantly skew policies to their own interests. This argument goes that unless non-participants are brought into the system, their interests will not be taken into account. (Schattschneider, 1960; Edelman, 1971; Lowi, 1969). Participation in this case becomes important to represent certain interests, or to implement certain policies. A useful definition of participation from this

view might well be the activities of individuals and groups undertaken to influence the allocation of resources, benefits, or values.

The third approach is in practice allied to the view of participation as interest representation, but its goal is quite different. It focuses on participation as crucial for the development of the individual. Proponents often couch their arguments in the context of a concern with our vast bureaucratic and technological structures which dwarf the individual, and lead to anomie and alienation. (Pranger, 1968). Unless a person has some decisive say in how one's life is determined, one becomes apathetic and growth as a creative individual is stunted. Implicit in both these last two approaches is the idea that non-participation is not an expression of inadequacies in the person, rather it results from inadequacies in one's environment. In current jargon, the political system in this case is the independent variable determining the nature of participation. Many of those who view participation as a form of power or influence, argue that the prevailing system shuts some groups out, while those who view it as a means for individual growth tend to focus on large institutions and the prevailing culture for stifling participation.

For our purposes, we will define citizen participation in urban development and planning as those legal activities

which might be undertaken to influence the allocation of resources, values, benefits and development. Ideally it will encompass aspects of all three views of participation. Hopefully it would allow for incremental change, and would retain popular support for such activities as authentic channels. The activities and influence need to reflect the actual interests and needs of the people. Finally the activities should have sufficient structure so that they are sensitive to the potential of those involved to develop to their fullest potential.

Planning and Development

In the early concern with development, many assumed that the problem was primarily one solvable by expertise. As two noted economists pointed out, "most economists assume that the problems of economic development are solved by expertise. Their theories assume that the question of the good society--the kind of society towards which development is presumably leading--is already answered." (Wilber and Weaver, 1974: 1). If and when planners also make that assumption, then participation as discussed above is merely eliminated. It is when one confronts the issue of what is the good society, what and for whom is development to be sought, that the nexus of participation and planning is problematical. Planning and development are inextricably interwoven since planning is undertaken in order to maximize

development. The problem is what is meant by development. Development for whom? Development for what?

When laissez faire is the operable value system, the assumption is that planning is not necessary since the maximization process will be the natural result of the unfettered competition in the market place. Planning theory, therefore, dates from those times and places where societies decided that some form of intervention--planning--was necessary.

Frequently the call for planning comes from the group in a polity which perceives itself hurt, or about to be hurt, by patterns of economic growth in the country. Intervention is then solicited as necessary, while those who are not adversely affected will point to all the pitfalls in the planning efforts to date. For this reason, in the United States one heard calls for planning during the Depression, the Wars, or in cities which either wanted more growth, or wanted to prevent growth. Inner cities in the 1960's were asked to plan precisely because no growth appeared to be occurring; planning was to be undertaken as part of urban renewal. More recently, suburban counties have undertaken planning because groups feel threatened by the pattern of growth. Nationally the added dimension of energy scarcities and of new awareness of international interdependence has elicited a new concern with planning. International interdependence has exacerbated tensions within our society.

In part, this tension springs from the real apprehension that the "expanding pie" may not continue to expand at the same rate; and, if not, little will be left to "trickle down." Some would argue that the "trickling down" never did work very well anyway. Regardless of one's position in that argument, a positively shrinking pie means nothing is available to "trickle down." We, as a country, are unaccustomed to exogenous constraints on national development. Those in the third world which have always had to deal with exogenous constraints may well appear bemused and unsympathetic as we squirm within our newly imposed harness.

Phase I: Participation and Political Development in the War Years

The first discussions on the requisites of economic development in the postwar years paid little attention to what relationships political institutions and practices could or should play in regard to economic development. The crux of the argument was whether political development is enhanced when economic development is pursued, whether political stability must precede development, or whether they might, in fact, be more independent than suspected. (Almond and Coleman, 1960). This debate soon tangled, however, with yet another theme, and failed to connect with some central issues. Those who tended to connect economic and political development drew on a distinction

between traditional society and community, and modern rational, legalistic society--a dichotomy originally posed by such theorists as Henry Maine, Tonnies, and Max Weber. (Maine, 1861; Tonnies, 1463, Weber, 1943). Most often developmental theorists misconstrued this dichotomy, and reading little history, assumed an automatic movement from the traditional society based on status, to modern society based on contract relationships. (Rostow, 1952 and 1971). By assuming a unilinear path, and a predetermined end, these theorists failed to deal with changes actually taking place, or to appreciate the complexity of the intricate interdependence of economic and political development.

Phase II; Doubts about Development; Misgivings about Participation

In 1961, Karl Deutsch pointed to the implicit dangers to political systems caused by social mobilization which in turn had been generated and stimulated by economic change. Economic development, he wrote, creates changing social, and hence political relationships; old patterns erode and people become available for new patterns. (Deutsch, 1961: 493-511). While Deutsch himself remained optimistic about what those new patterns might be, others were far less sanguine. They picked up on his work and said that this mobilization might create ever increasing demands on newly formed political institutions which might buckle under the strain. Research began in earnest on

praetorianism; no longer was it to be assumed that coup d'etat was a Latin American phenomena.)

Samuel Huntington took this view one step further in arguing that economic development if unaccompanied by political institutionalization would lead to 'political decay.' (Huntington, 1965). His argument was most fully expounded in his Political Order in Changing Society wherein he elaborated on his hypothesis that the central problem was the lag in the development of political institutions capable of coping with economic and social change. (Huntington, 1968). Political institutions, he claimed, are essential to absorb increased participation. If participation was not absorbed, it resulted in instability. (Huntington, 1968: 266). He proposed the political party as the ideal institution for channeling increased participation; others used much the same argument in defense of the need for military government. While his logic appeared ineluctable, the behavioralists called for some empirical analysis. An example of a case study generated out of an examination of the Huntington hypothesis was that on Venezuela written by Powell. (Powell, 1971). In the Venezuelan case, "the mobilization of the peasantry took place within an institutional framework--the peasant union movement--and the struggle for the interests of the peasant masses took place within a newly created context of political struggle, the multiparty system and the electoral process." (Powell, 1971: 213-214).

Huntington's argument reflected the classical conservative preoccupation with political stability and order. His concern with these issues in the third world was paralleled in the United States by Daniel Moynihan's concern for order in American cities. While praetorianism flourished abroad riots were rentng the cities in the United States asunder. Economists were arguing that redistributing income might slow down growth while their compatriots, the political scientists, were saying that redistributing political power might lead to political instability. A scholar from abroad observing the United States pointed to the erosion of the democratic ideal in American political science.¹ (Cruise O'Brien, 1972).

Phase III: Revisionist Theory on Participation and Development

Critics of the Huntingtonian hypotheses abounded, although more on the left than on the right. The criticism from the left coincided with the argument that the United States' domination of Latin America was as responsible for the lack of development in that region as any other factor. The point was argued that regions, which because of trade and investment patterns, were made dependent upon others were stifled in their own growth; hence these writers came to be called dependency theorists. Others also raised real doubts about the earlier prescriptions on how to arrive at economic development; reservations were expressed about

the assumptions that income distribution could be, or should be, highly unequal. A new look was taken at the meaning of development.² (Seers, 1969; Haq, 1971; Wilber and Weaver, 1974). New thoughts on the meaning of development were also put forward by Paulo Friere and Ivan Illich who stressed the devastating cultural repercussions of western economic domination. (Friere, 1972; Illich, 1971). Writing in a slightly different vein, Denis Goulet pointed to the expensive trade offs for those confronted with the choices posed by growth and/or development, as The Cruel Choice. (Goulet, 1971). These choices only appear emotionally, psychologically and culturally less expensive and traumatic when viewed from the cushioned secure berths of the middle class in the Western world.

Few political scientists followed who stressed the cultural impact of Western economic domination. Only Riggs had pointed out, and that had been earlier (Riggs, 1964) that there was a complex and different perspective of those caught up in the throes of undifferentiated traditional societies. A few pointed to the preoccupation with political order as misplaced, and that some instability was the more natural accompaniment to any sort of development. That instability may well be an inevitable aspect of any change which is truly 'development.' "It should be remembered that instability may have positive as well as negative consequences. It provides opportunity for flexibility and

experimentation in political structures and processes that would be much more difficult in a highly stabilized, tightly hierarchical system." (PADCO, HUD document, 1971: 11). The central issue was how to learn to cope with the conflict, not eliminate it. Political order, after all, can mean merely an extension of the status quo, and not development at all.

Two other developments within political science fostered alternative criticisms of the Huntingtonian hypotheses. The first came from the empirical theorists (Bienen, 1974; Brass, 1969); the second, from those who were applying economic models of rational man to political behavior. (Downs, 1957; Olsen, 1965).

An empirical study of India found, for example, that increased rates of participation were not associated with a decline in institutionalization. (Brass, 1969). And in Kenya, Bienen found that "the model that has been put forward of increased participation from below leading to a rise in effective demands which in turn places stress on weak institutions needs revision. Political participation takes place in different contexts, national and local, and it has different forms and meanings for different groups. Political participation may not stress national institutions if major arenas of politics are local ones." (Bienen, 1974: 195; cf also Hebsur, doctoral dissertation, 1975).

The generally accepted wisdom that political participation leads to political instability was also seriously challenged by economic/rational political scientists. The application of economic theory to political behavior tells us that participation is properly viewed as an investment by the citizen, and, like other investments, will depend upon the expected rate of return. The logic then of participation leads one to ask what sorts of benefits will induce various citizen groups to participate in collective action in order to secure common goals. Primarily they will do so when the perceived benefits are real and immediate unless they value longer range goals which are more diffuse and dispersed. In many respects this sort of argument again makes the political system the independent variable and rather than arguing that public attitudes create conditions for democratic development (Almond and Verba, 1963) it would argue that the system sets the environment within which people rationally respond.

Phase IV: The Approaching Convergence

Our multiple streams of thought about planning and development, and their interrelationship, appear to be reaching a new convergence point. The political as well as economic implications of the tradeoffs between distribution and growth have been widely discussed. (Chenery, Ahluwalia, Bell, et al, 1974; Adelman and Morris, 1967;

Wilber, 1969). Much of the old accepted wisdom is being questioned. For example, the old wisdom argued that inequalities were unfortunate, but probably necessary to have increased growth; those policies also further abetted inequality. But many of the so-called developed countries have also come to taste the bitterness of growth for its own sake. Growth alone showed little concern for the quality of life. Suburbanites came to appreciate what traditional people meant in their adage that growth is not the same thing as development.

While not all the elements of the newer thinking about development are yet clear, the approaching convergence appears to center around aspects of the following ideas:

- 1) That concerns with equity must be paid more heed. For political scientists and administrators this concern means a policy analysis which looks at the quality of life with some indicators about that quality and social justice; and a political analysis more interested in the effects of participation on the distribution of benefits. For economists, it means a repudiation of fast growth models which exacerbate inequalities, and more attention to labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive projects. For planners, it means more emphasis on smaller scale, self-help projects and more action planning.

- 2) That concerns with participation must not be disregarded. For economists and planners this means less acceptance of claims of "expertise," less readiness to accept "professionals" calling all the shots. For political scientists and administrators, it means more interest in the effect of multiple access points on decision making, more ways to maximize participatory schemes, and concerns about avoiding cumulative cleavages for ethnic groups. (Pratt, 1971: 522; Brass, 1969; Rawls, 1971, Wirsing, 1974; Enloe, 1973).
- 3) That decentralization appears more desirable than ever before. We shall return below to the many issues wrapped around this concept. Suffice it to note that economists are talking more than ever before about decentralized models; administrators have created an ideology out of decentralization (Ostrom, 1973); and planners will have to devise their plans to enhance dispersed growth. For urban planning, this means a dramatic shift against the large urban agglomerations whose costs are perceived as "staggering." (Ayres, 1975: 520).

Many scholars and practitioners are calling for a new conception of development policy that draws upon these elements. (cf. for example Ayres, 1975). Over two years ago Robert McNamara called for a shift in World Bank lending

policy with a greater concern for the bottom twenty-five percent of a country's population. Development assistance has been reevaluated with these newer sorts of convergence points implicitly as well as explicitly discussed. (Owens and Shaw, 1974). While this newer convergence has not yet been subjected to its own critical review, it does portend of changing directions in development politics and planning.

Rural to Urban Migration: Migrant Political Behavior

Urbanization is an integral part of modernization and development. Disputes there can be over whether that urbanization is good or bad, but there can be no dispute over the fact that it is happening and that any industrialization appears to increase the rate of urbanization. Arguments then proceed to develop over the implications of these rapidly increasing urban populations and what they might portend for political development. For some, the major worry is about the dominance of the urban elites over the rural peasantry; for others, the plight of the urban unemployed is the major grievance with urbanization. Attention swiftly turns to speculation about the likely political behavior of these newly arrived urbanites. Some quickly hypothesized violence and instability would be caused by these migrants, although there is little, if any, evidence to confirm this argument. Others have made facile

assumptions that migrants would experience stressful degrees of anomie or become available for participation in activities that were either radical or destabilizing. Recently, surveys in eight countries and within squatter communities in eight respective cities adds to the mounting evidence that these hypotheses are wide of the mark. (Intermet, IDRC, 1973).

In some respects the reaction to migrants is in part a reaction to the scale and rate of the migration in some parts of the world. In some instances, the rates are dramatic enough to give one pause, while they frighten local city councilors. Some cities in West Africa are growing at about 9 percent a year, while their birth rates are a modest 2.5 percent a year. (Gutheim and Bryant, 1974: 1-3). Squatter settlements are accounting for ever-increasing percentages of total urban populations. (Intermet, IDRC: 131-132). Obviously not all migrants are squatters, nor are all squatters recent arrivals to the city. Moreover, migrant political participation often is heavily affected by the fact that new arrivals have many other needs with which they are concerned before they can consider political participation. Just what sorts of difference urban residence makes for participation is not an easily resolved issue for political science research. At least one study has found no significant increase in participation as a result of urban residence. (Nie, Powell and Prewitt, 1972).

Turning her focus directly to the proclivities of the migrants for contributing to political instability, Joan Nelson (1969) culled through innumerable case studies and first hand research to point out that there is no body of evidence to prove that migrants are likely participants in urban instability. On the contrary, she found every indication that this is precisely the group most concerned to keep out of sight, and out of trouble. The daily struggle with subsistence consumed more energy and time as well as will than most migrants could spare. Cornelius, in recent research, discovered after surveying Latin American urban residents that migrants were not interested in larger political questions, but were concerned about land tenure, housing and education. (Cornelius, 1975: 1129-1130). In addition, he found that once some security in these areas was achieved, demands dropped off significantly (Cornelius, 1975: 1144).

United States Urban Experience with Citizen Participation

During the last two decades, the United States has also been preoccupied with its own urban poor. No small part of the nation's attention, especially in the 1960's, was with its own citizens and their role in urban development. To the extent that racial issues pervaded the developmental issues there were interesting linkages to the international developmental debate as well as some striking similarities.

(Sharkansky, 1975). Many of the issues were the same; in many respects the inner cities were islands of underdevelopment within a prosperous industrialized society. One could read many of the books mentioned in the discussion above and insert U. S. cities for third world countries in order to see the comparabilities. The differences are obvious, but sometimes the similarities are more instructive for those who would toil with the developmental dilemmas. Conservatives as well as radicals saw the similarities. Huntington's concern with order and stability, and governmental muscle to keep that order, was echoed by Banfield and Wilson writing City Politics, and Moynihan in Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding.

There were three new federal programs in the decade of the 1950's and 1960's which promoted citizen participation in urban development and planning processes. The first was the Housing Act of 1954 mandating cities as a condition of federal funding to involve citizens in urban renewal. The second was the antipoverty program initiated by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 with its mandate for the "maximum feasible participation of the poor" in the development, coordination and administration of the program. That mandate was dropped in 1967, at the urging of big city mayors when Congress amended the Economic Opportunity Act with the Green amendment. Under this amendment a local government either could become the

Community Action Agency or could designate an organization to fill the role. (Zimmerman, 1972: 7). The third major federal program promoting participation was the Model Cities Program authorized by the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966. From all of the experience under this legislation we can begin to make some generalizations about two different facets of the participatory experiments. The first set of generalizations concerns the circumstances within which citizens will utilize their opportunities for participation. The second group of generalizations concerns the impact of participation on planning effectiveness.

Circumstances Which Encourage Participation:

Human Scale:

Participation is far more likely to occur in small groups. Mancur Olson tells us that the only time when people will work together for common benefits is with small groups of people, where their participation makes a difference, or where they receive some specific benefit they would only get by participating. (Olson, 1965). Behavioral ecologists add that small groups allow participants to have significant experiences, and a sense of contributing. (Chickering, 1971). Others come to the same conclusion from a cybernetic model, on the grounds that only in a small group can each individual process the

amount of information which is generated. (McEwan, 1971).

In Bowling Green, Kentucky, a small group of citizens and the Model Cities staff and the mayor met over lunch to discuss the issues surrounding the program. Here the citizens had an ongoing role that allowed them to have an impact on all facets of the administration of the program. Meeting with the mayor and his staff directly and informally maximized their participation in the planning process of their community. The manageable size of the group directly involved affected not only their participation but their attitudes about their role.

Community Experiences:

Related to the issue of the size of the group, many studies also show that participation is fostered in natural communities, rather than in large pluralistic or urban centers. Verba and Nie find that communal activists are more apt to be found in rural and suburban areas than in urban ones and also that participation declines as communities grow and lose their identity or boundaries. (Verba and Nie, 1972: 242-243). And Alford and Scoble find that because of its bureaucratization, "the city as a whole ceases to become a meaningful unit for organizing civic loyalties and actions." (Alford and Scoble, 1969). The type of neighborhood one is from is a major determinant of participation, and involvement in an urban area is less

rational than it is elsewhere. (Orbell and Uno, 1972: 484).

These same authors continue, however, that decentralization is not an answer since the neighborhood is not a viable community in urban centers. Transportation and communication patterns obliterate all such boundaries. (Orbell and Uno, 1972). Others contend that decentralization will stimulate a neighborhood community and that the poor in fact often have a sense of community which can be developed and may well be conducive to positive change. (Keller, 1968: 51)

In the suburban county of Fairfax, Virginia, many grass roots organizations or civic associations founded in the subdivisions developed over the past twenty years. Dedicated to the improvement and preservation of their own natural communities, these organizations also buttressed local planning districts which had local master plans. The problem was that planning district boundaries did not coincide with other functional boundaries, e.g., transportation networks. With rapid suburban growth came the demand for some kind of comprehensive county-wide planning.

Bureaucratic innovations

If people are to become involved in the planning process, there will have to be some variation in the traditional hierarchical bureaucratic model. Harlan Cleveland describes the hoped for model of such organizations

as "systems-interlaced webs of tension in which control is loose, power is diffused and centers of decision are plural. The bigger the problems to be tackled, the more real power is diffused and the larger the numbers of persons who can exercise it." (Cleveland, 1973: 9). Decentralization, as we shall see in our later discussion, becomes important in proportion to the load of services being handled. (Kochen, 1969: 748). The result may well be bureaucracies composed of smaller ad hoc or functional groupings, with what Cleveland calls "horizontal" relationships. The literature on organizational development also prescribes that participation is enhanced as organizations become more flexible, and somewhat more temporary. (Bennie and Slater). Future change-oriented organizations are described as "adaptive, rapidly changing temporary systems. . .of diverse specialists linked together by coordinating and task-evaluating specialists in an organic flux." (Bennis and Slater, 1968: 73-76).

The initial model cities process in New York City found significant amounts of decision making power delegated to neighborhood agencies in the hope that they would act as a broker between the diverse communities in the program and the highly centralized service delivery agencies of the general purpose government. These agencies were able to work with the local community groups to articulate their plans, but proved to be unable to implement those plans because of their inability to work at the interface with

the other bureaucracies. Hence yet another new organization was created at the cabinet level by the mayor so that inter-agency disputes could be negotiated. In the process, the neighborhood agencies lost some influence to the central model cities office. Eventually the central office created a 'mirror' bureaucracy matching one to one their subunits with other city agencies. This process had the effect of slowing the whole decision making process down to a near halt, and the endless quarrel of centralization-decentralization-centralization came full circle. Any organization at the front end of interacting with diverse and conflicting citizen groups and interacting with old line inter-agency fights will have to learn to live with constant organizational change as a modus operandi.

Specific goals

The planning process must have some policy specific goals which people want. Organizational goals must also include some specific member goals. As Anderson writes, "the idea of fostering member motivation by a heavy emphasis on increased participation in the decision making development process is an over-utilized, over-generalized approach that often fails. Participation to be of value must be at a level which picks up issues of genuine concern to the participant." (Anderson, 1973: 55). Those concerns must be more specific than a general policy such as "urban renewal;" they must include some concrete gains to the

participants in terms of their specific and immediate needs. (Bryant and White, 1975).

In the Baltimore and New York model cities programs the members of the community strongly wanted more jobs for the community people as a result of these programs. They lobbied strongly for and won the veto power over the job selection process. The result of this veto power was that the communities goal of gaining more employment was integrated with the bureaucratic goal of comprehensive planning and hence the program was viewed as useful to the participating community.

Immediate successes

Alinsky underscores the need for some immediate successes to retain peoples' motivations in participation. It was for this reason that he always began his organizing efforts with a small issue which could be easily resolved and the resolution of which would be highly visible. (Alinsky, 1971). Such positive experiences change the actors' personal feelings of efficacy. (Mazzietti, 1974). Similarly persistent defeat of a community's apparently small requests implants cynicism and bitterness about the openness of the political and administrative process (Parenti, 1973). An example of success was the Bowling Green, Kentucky, model city program's response to a community request to cover an open sewer in a park in the model cities' area. Even though the project would use up one

fourth of the annual program budget, it was decided to go ahead with the project precisely because it was the kind of project most wanted by the community and most visible. The psychological and political gains outweighed the costs, the sewer was covered, and new grass was sprouting within the year.

Group identity

A sense of group consciousness can motivate individuals to undertake involvement. (Enloe, 1974). Verba and Nie found that blacks were more apt to participate than non-blacks, controlling for socio-economic status, and they suggest that their racial identity was a strong impetus. (Verba and Nie, 1973). This was very true, for example, in the case of the Nashville, Tennessee, model cities program. However, there the alleged representative citizen participants were the well-educated upper middle income black citizens.

Conflict

Conflict may serve to heighten group consciousness. Wilson documents what Marx predicted; poorer communities are more apt to become active when they are, or perceive themselves to be, threatened. (Wilson, 1968: 245). Lewis Coser suggests that conflict is instrumental in promoting group unity, and in enhancing ego identify. (Coser, 1964: 73).

Participation and Effectiveness

Many of the controversies about citizen participation have latent within them a concern similar to the concern we saw reflected in the early debates over the contribution of politics to economic development. The argument is whether, how much, or to what extent participation will be counterproductive to the overall effectiveness of the plan itself, and even to what the participants want to accomplish.

Planners themselves, as we shall see below, are rethinking much of what used to pass for the current wisdom on this issue. (The current wisdom centered on the idea that people did not know their best interests and that expertise was essential.) Many planners are now talking about participation not because it is a 'good idea,' but because it is the single most effective way of discerning what a community wants, and what will be implementable in that community. The prominent development planner, Albert Waterston, has recently argued that the only way to reach the rural poor is to involve those rural poor in the development process. (Waterston, 1974: 22).

But even this position does not in every instance go to the heart of the dilemma. If the planner is concerned with equity, or redistribution, there are inevitable conflicts over the tradeoffs that such redistribution implies. Who gets how much influence in determining those tradeoffs?

And, to a central concern, how can support for generally needed public goods be mobilized?

It is not useful to talk of the older, and probably bankrupt concept of the 'public interest;' rather, one can usefully construct an argument around the economists' concept, 'public goods.' These are goods which, once they are produced, are generally available. Their production is problematical, however, precisely because no one is motivated to pay for these goods, or work for them, especially if they can "free ride" on other payments. The problem for planners is how to know which public goods are most wanted (e.g., schools, roadways, water lines), and how to gather support for them. This is particularly difficult to do if some, short range, specific goods have to be postponed until the "public goods" are underway. If equity is a priority, and the urban poor are also participants, there may well be occasions when their participation will be more preoccupied with specific self-interests and less committed to undertaking those activities which will generate greater supplies of "public goods." (For example, squatters may want the specific benefit of tin roofing before the generalized public good of a sewer ditch.)

One study of three community action programs notes that citizen involvement often led to specific gains to the participants at the cost of broader, or public interest goods. (Peterson, 1970: 449). The reverse impact can also

happen. If the lower income groups are not organized or well represented, the development effort may result in benefits for the wealthy participants and not the poor. This impact often happens when, for a series of reasons, a system decided to decentralize without adequate grass roots organizing efforts. As Waterston points out, "studies of the green revolution, for example, suggest that programs which concentrate on the adoption of improved techniques. . . have tended to benefit the middle income and rich farmers rather than the poor. In fact, productivity increases concentrated on the larger farms can undermine the position of small farmers. . ." (Waterston, 1974: 23).

Many of the West African mobilization party efforts were devoted to mobilization precisely in order to harness the poor to the development effort; often they argued that participation in the party was the best way to get popular participation in planning. (Zolberg, 1966). Whether or not this procedure did, or could, work is an empirical question beyond the purview of this monograph. Evaluations of mobilization parties differ in their perspective and findings on this issue. But there is a question which should be addressed since it invariably surfaces in any discussion of participation: at what point can participation by the urban poor amount to a mobilization of vetoes over the urban development process. This point is often overdrawn by Banfield and Wilson as they discussed the private regarding nature of low income groups. (Banfield

and Wilson, 1963). It is also the commonly accepted wisdom of those men on horseback who thereupon decided in favor of military governments to quell the quarreling and get on with growth.

As we have already noted, Alinsky pointed out also that lower income groups have to have some immediate and specific benefits if they are to make the investment in participation. The skillful planner therefore has to construct the process with enough benefits for participants at various stages of growth. Vague unspecified calls for the 'public interest' will neither carry the program with any group nor generate any more excitement than a local civic club's agenda. But does that argument mean that those goods which might be termed 'public goods' have little chance of gathering public support? Unfortunately it probably does--at every level of governance and with every class of people. Nations do little because it is in the 'international interest,' and people within nations do little for 'the public interest.' They do a lot for issues which they like to denote as being in the 'public interest,' but that is a different statement from our earlier one. Does that mean that those resource allocations to things which might be termed "public goods" have no future in planning? To make that argument would be to make a mockery of planning; a community decides to undertake planning precisely at that moment when collective needs

are not being met by the market place. The rationale for interfering with the market place usually begins with a litany about its failures. But planning requires collective action; sometimes it uses varying degrees of collective coercion. Incentives are preferred to punishments just as persuasion is to be preferred to coercion, and in both cases the preferences run that way because legitimacy affects effectiveness. There are varieties of ways to achieve collective action. Responding to the innate force of self interest as a motive can be one of the ways to attract groups to the collective endeavor. But there is no escaping the grim fact that if the tradeoffs are severe, little growth has been occurring, and the time horizon shows little prospect soon for growth, then participants perceive that their participation investment will be heavy with no great payoff soon. In those circumstances the ratio of persuasion to coercion can, and frequently does, change. (Hinton, 1966).

Planning theory

John Friedman writes, "A useful way to look at planning is to consider it as an activity centrally concerned with the linkage between knowledge and organized action." A less abstract definition given by the Kenyan nationalist, Tom Mboya, carried much the same integral meaning: "Planning is a comprehensive exercise designed to find the best way in which the nation's limited resources--land, skilled manpower, capital, and

foreign exchange--can be used to promote the objectives of every individual. . .and every agency of government both central and local." (Mboya, 1965: 4). While currently it appears that one talks about either regional, or rural, or urban, planning these modifying terms do not change many of the underlying assumptions. But those who work as planners do point to the many ways in which planning approaches have changed, in part because of experiences in the past decade.

With the growing disenchantment among urban planners in the West with their apparent minimal successes in urban development, new thinking and new approaches began to be discussed in planning literature. The day of the large-scale, all-encompassing Master Plan appeared to have passed, and few express much regret at its passing. The monumental concrete, larger-than-life sort of public work project also appeared to have been something less than successful--from Pruitt-Igoe in Missouri to the high-rise hotels on Jerusalem's skyline. There appeared to be an increasing feeling that large-scale building and massive redevelopment often extracted a payment not worth the price in terms of the quality of urban life.

The major criticisms came from three different schools of thought: 1) a humanistic redefinition of organizations, 2) related theories of organizational development, and 3)

a cybernetic model of decision making. The humanistic model developed as a reaction to the rationalistic-scientific models of the previous era. Critics in this school "rejected the cognitive limits of a central intelligence and its inherent incapacity to gain a comprehensive overview of large, complex, and rapidly changing social systems." (Friedman and Barclay, 1974: 7). These critics understood planning as a form of social learning that occurred in loosely linked network structures consisting of small, temporary, non-hierarchical, and task-oriented working groups. They emphasized technical exchange as the basic means of exchange between technical experts and clients. In this process, scientific and technical knowledge was seen to fuse with the personal knowledge of client actors in a process of mutual learning." (Friedman and Hudson, 1974: 7) Warren Bennis makes clear that this development is desirable from a normative point of view, and that it is also imperative if organizations are going to cope with increased complexity and demand for services. (Bennis and Slater, 1968).

It is worth noting how much overlap there is between Friedman's description of the direction in which organizations need to develop if they are to adapt, and the need to develop opportunities and incentives for people to participate. As discussed in the above section, the same need for some decentralization, and for flexibility enters

into both developments. This approach also would stress the goal of participation as a means to encourage human development, as well as to accomplish some specific policy goals.

The second body of criticisms of centralized planning came from the related field of organizational development. Organizational development is an approach grounded in the idea that organizations exist to serve human needs and to expand the possibilities of human development. To do so it has developed various strategies of intervention, or planned change, to facilitate development. Periodically such change requires concentrated planning. As Chris Argyris puts it, "Passing a law on participation does not assure its effective implementation. Experience suggests that it takes a minimum of three years to develop an effective team among managers. The time involved to create cohesive citizen groups would be longer. If some planners or governmental bureaucrats are now beginning to wonder about the value of citizen participation, one can say that results were predictable. Human involvement cannot be bought and plugged in easily. That is encouraging; otherwise man could be easily manipulated." (Argyris, 1970: 5).

OD models are closer to the rational models of planning than either the humanists or the cybernetic model. This follows of necessity since they intervene to bring about certain desired changes. However, the models are also

developed to engage participants in a process of mutual goal setting, and of responding to each other's needs, and thus integrate the rationalistic models of goal setting, with the cybernetic models of learning and feedback.

In a review of the OD field, W. Warner Burke has tried to define this area of planning theory; "In brief, if an intervening activity in an organization (a) responds to a felt need for change on the part of the 'client,' (b) involves the client in the activity of planning and implementing a change event, and (c) leads to a normative change in the organization's culture, then it is an organization development scheme." (Burke, W. W., 1972: 6). Organization development literature has both implicit and explicit norms of what a healthy organization would look like. Operationally, a healthy organization would include some of the following characteristics: "1. Objectives are widely shared by the members. . .2. People feel free to signal their awareness of difficulties because they expect the problems to be dealt with. . .3. Problem-solving is highly pragmatic. . . The boss is frequently challenged. A great deal of non conforming behavior is tolerated. . . .5. There is a noticeable sense of team play in planning, in performance, and in discipline. . .6. The judgement of people lower down in the organization is respected. . . .7. The range of problems tackled includes personal needs and human relationships. . . ." (Fordyce and Veil, 1971: 11-12).

There is clearly considerable overlap between these norms, and the requisites for motivating participation discussed above.

Organizational development theory is useful for integrating planning and participation, however, it is not as readily useful for citizen groups who are trying to force their way into the planning process. As Burke notes, "Organizational development does not deal with power dynamics very effectively. In fact, it seldom deals with power at all. Since OD practitioners seek outcomes such as collaboration, high interpersonal trust, openness, honesty, decentralization of decision making, and a sharing of authority, the technology for coping with the realities of power is very limited." (Burke, 1972: 6). By the same token it is highly useful where planners are committed to a collaborative style, and are seeking methods and experiences from which they might learn. Nor, as Bennis says, is OD very useful in situations where the basic values or purposes of an organization need to be challenged. (Bennis and Slater, 1968). Its utility is in increasing the skills and insights of those committed to engaging in a mutual planning process. It was noted above that the goal of participation must be placed in the context of the need for retaining the capacity to be effective. It is in the context of reconciling these two demands that OD is most useful.

Cybernetic studies of decision making have had quite an impact also on planning theories. Taking up the classic

work of March and Simon, Steinbruner further develops our understanding of decision making while criticising the inadequacies of a rational model to describe accurately and explain decision processes. (Steinbruner, 1974; see also Alison, 1971).

Steinbruner's effort is to find a way to conceptualize the processes which go into any decision or planning of a complex nature. His cybernetic theory's thesis is that planning is a system of feedback from cues in the immediate environment, can handle situations fraught with uncertainty, and involving vast amounts of information. Planners who go into an encounter with rationally conceived goals in mind, and who then seek to enlist citizens in attaining them, would seem destined to end up by coopting citizens, and by underscoring their sense of powerlessness. A model of the planning process which perceives planning as an effort to respond to the expressed needs and interests of those affected, and to engage in a mutual learning process, however, seems much more adequate to the task. In Steinbruner's words, "the major focus is on processes which remove or avoid uncertainty, thus reducing the burdens of processing information, and which divide problems into segments, thus avoiding conflict within the organization." (Steinbruner, 1974: 78).

Instead of focusing on outcomes, cybernetic models focus on the learning that takes place in the system, or the changes in behavior that takes place in the system, or the changes in behavior that result. This focus on behavior changes would fit into the emphasis in the humanistic model on individual development. As planners and citizens engage in the process of planning the development of an urban area, they both feed information into the process, respond to the goals and interests of each other, and change their own behavior in response.

Organizational development is consistent with a cybernetic model in that it stresses the need for each party to be aware of the needs and interests of the other. As Jay Hall puts it, this "condition of awareness becomes the major objective of the learning experience. . ." (Hall, 1972: 49) As such it seems eminently useful for planning and participation efforts where bureaucrats and citizens may enter the process with very different experiences, perceptions, and needs. Hall also notes one of the major findings of OD theory and learning theory--that "involvement per se is not enough to insure either the new awareness or the degree of commitment necessary for sustained change. . . The need for information concerning the efficacy of one's practices, the utility of one's approaches, or the significance of one's attitudes, has been evident since the early work in learning theory of E. L. Thorndike." (Hall, 1972: 59).

As stressed above in the discussion of participation, merely setting participatory schemes of planning into operation, will not be sufficient. Just as the very act of getting people to participate needs to be thought through, and incentives built in, so does the interaction during the planning process itself.

PART II

ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT

In the first part of this monograph, we addressed the issue of the relationship of participation to political and economic development. Throughout many of those discussions, one issue was frequently assumed; whatever else might be prerequisite for economic development, administrative capacity was surely essential for development. As Waterston said, "There are differences among experts about whether administrative improvement must precede, follow or accompany development, but there is general agreement that reform takes a long time to achieve. . . .Until administrative improvements are clearly foreseeable, planners must prepare plans which take account of administrative capacity."

(PADCO, 1971, p. 41).

Just how to proceed with efforts for development of that needed administrative capacity was not easy, or clearly defined. And some people were quick to point out that the possible overemphasis on developing administrative capacity, could result in so enhancing bureaucratic power that political institutions would have significant handicaps in endeavoring to hold it accountable. Foremost among those who held this view was Fred Riggs (1964) who pointed to

the implicit dangers of any headlong rush to build administrative strength. Such administrative strength could be dysfunctional for political development. The solution was to maintain consciously a balance between administrative and political structures.

Yet given all the arguments, just how to achieve administrative capacity and, as a next step, integrate it with political institutions which enhance representativeness was nowhere made clear. The intractability of poverty in many countries was matched by the infertility of social science in most countries to address the issue of administrative development. Everyone knew it was essential; no one was sure how or what was to be done about it. No pretense can be made here to have more of a vantage point on this issue than those who have already labored in these vineyards. We will summarize some of the existing wisdom, and focus more explicitly on one issue within the larger complex of issues--the special problems confronted by the lower level urban official on the front line whose job it is to elicit, respond to, and possibly to enhance, innovative schemes involving urban citizens in development projects.

Impediments to Administrative Development

One of the major impediments to administrative development involved the degree of influence local governments have over their own development in the first place. In

many developing countries the national government not only has most of the planning staff at its disposal, it has most, if not all, of the planning power. The result is that little if any, authority or power resides in local governments. One observer of urban administration in Latin America, says that "the root causes of many day-to-day problems to be faced by urban administrators may not be within their immediate control at all, but rather stem from inadequate or incomplete national policy and legislation." (PADCO, 1971: 2). For many purposes urban development is conceived of as a central government function with key decisions made at the center and mandated to local units. In part, this happens when most of the skilled administrators are also to be found at the center. Long ago a scholar wrote of the extremely resourceful top executives "yet after all the elaborate and skillful preparations for action have been made, all too frequently nothing happens. The machinery is primed and loaded, and misfires. Between organization and impact, administrator and clientele a tremendous gap still exists." (Anderson, 1969: 148). He goes on to explain that the administrative culture, in some cases, fails to reward, prepare, or recognize the people who are ultimately responsible for action or policy implementation. . . .One can examine the flow of policy from top to bottom of a hierarchy being progressively refined and delimited, only to stop dead at

this last synapse of implementation." (Anderson, 1967: 148).

Compounding the problem of lack of authority is the multitude of agencies impacting upon urban development. There is a vast difference between the administration that is officially recognized as urban administration and the much wider range of administrative action that has a bearing on urban development. While there usually is only one central agency or ministry officially recognized as "urban" in its mandate, hundreds of agencies in fact are involved in investment and activities which significantly influence urban growth patterns. Ironically enough, often those denoted as "urban" ministries in their mandate have actually less influence on urban development than these other agency decisions do. Some aspects of this issue will be considered at greater length below when we discuss alternative models of centralization and decentralization.

A third problem is perhaps the most common and pervasive of all. Formal structures and procedures often have little to do with the ways in which policies are actually administered. This gap is wide in all countries and may well vary dramatically within any particular country depending upon the functional area concerned. Calling the phenomenon "formalism," Fred Riggs went on to explain some of its root causes as well as implications for policy. (Riggs, 1964). He pointed to psychological and political

reasons for its existence. The colonial inheritance left a residue of procedures and mores to be followed. There were psychological reasons why some administrators felt unwilling to abandon these, even though the mores and the patina of some procedures were perceived, rightly, as foreign and without substantial roots. To the extent that naive idealism of many interested in development in the 1960's fostered policies which would transplant certain institutions--for example, a rigorous merit system--onto political cultures which had little receptive soil to nurture them, the transplants abetted formalism. More unfortunate than the impact of this formalism on the administration was its near devastation of those institutions which might have helped accountability. Political parties are a useful device for whistle-blowing or overseeing administrative implementation. But for parties to develop spoils are required, at least in the first instance. Enhancing meritocracy cut away at one of the sources of potential party growth and hence restricted parties which might not only watch implementation, but mobilize citizen participation.

In some cases the political environment generally may not be conducive to effective urban administration. In many of the cities in developing countries there are not the wide array of interest groups which one finds in American cities. Moreover, elites within these cities

may well not be committed to, or interested in, urban development. They need not consider the likely impact of interest groups since there are so few, if any. And these elites have a comfortable berth in the existing distribution of influence, resources, and income--all of which they might perceive as threatened by change. If one is working within a country with a large primate city, very often these same elites are interacting daily with central government officials and the cumulative impact of their mutually supportive system is to close out urban development that is either decentralizing, or redistributive within that primate city.

Centralization Versus Decentralization in Planning

This issue is by far the most intractably complex, and the most frequently obfuscated, of any of the planning issues. As if thinking about how simultaneously to maximize equity and efficiency with participation in planning is not enough, one must add the cross cutting issue of decentralization. Let us begin with a controversial statement; if one wants to maximize equity above all, decentralization may not be the best administrative route to take. It will not be the best if--and it's a crucial qualification!--locally entrenched elites are more ready to claim policy outputs than the lower income groups. (Elites may so claim policy outputs by virtue of their

greater organization and control of local decision making.) If, on the other hand, lower income groups have some channels of influence, and are at least minimally organized enough to bargain with local elites, decentralization may do that which it usually promises to do--maximize participation, and hence, hopefully equity. The issue then becomes one of considering how to structure the administrative situation so that, over time, the local urban poor can develop channels of influence.

There are really two concepts which are frequently discussed as if they were one in debates concerning decentralization. There is both decentralization and deconcentration with the latter connoting an administrative arrangement by which the center manages to penetrate the periphery by delegating work to be done at the local level. Decentralization, on the other hand, usually connotes a system in which locally based power is exercised over issues and policies which the center does not totally control. As one insightful commentator said, "It is unfortunate that efforts to adopt the French distinction between decentralization and deconcentration have gone unheeded. Decentralization involves the transfer of powers from a central government to specialized territorial or functional units. . . . Deconcentration, by contrast, entails the dispersal of facilities or functions from the central government to subunits in an effort to improve the effectiveness and/or

efficiency of delivery systems. Little or no delegation of substantial decision making power occurs and the relationships within the organization remain strongly hierarchical. The concern is really to devise a more complex network of delivery stations." (Kasperson and Breithart, 1974).

While the differences between decentralization (involving power) and deconcentration (involving program execution) appear great at first glance, the problem is more intractable. It is useful, however, to conceptualize these two aspects as extreme points on a continuum. Yet as one moves from some aspects of program delivery, the cumulative impact of implementation decisions begins to take on some influence. The old, and false, dichotomy between decision making and decision execution is at the heart of the issue. For example, while devising ways to make decisions about program implementation, one is shaping that program. Nevertheless, even while remembering that this continuum has shaded middle points, the two extremes we know to exist empirically. The appointed mayor of a French administrative district represents deconcentration; the elected mayor of Chicago exercises power which is decentralization. Like the common cold, decentralization defies definition, but we know it when we have it.

Arguments in favor of decentralization are often given along the following lines: that decentralization will foster greater participation. . . . That those closer to the local urban poor (or rural poor) are better able to identify needs. . . . that only by the development of access points to decision making can those otherwise excluded groups make their priorities known. . . . further, that while the decision making process is slower, it is also simultaneously more firmly based having aggregated local desires and priorities in the process.

Arguments in favor of centralization are, on the other hand, also well known. And note, since they do not in every case counter those given for decentralization that is precisely why the argument is so complex. It is also why the argument then turns to issues of what functional areas can be done at which level of governance, and whether, or when, does geographical deconcentration lead to geographical cum power decentralization. The arguments in favor of centralization are based on economies of scale, in the first instance. If one wishes to maximize a fast rate of growth, central control over key sectors appears to be a most direct route. (Bell, 1974). Military governments the world over have grasped this point and operationalized it. Moreover, since one cannot always prove that decentralization maximizes redistribution, military governments of the left, as well as the right, take the

route of centralization. Often in developing countries one can make the argument that the central government also has so much more of the managerial skill, which is limited in any case, and more ability to solve internecine intergovernmental battles, that centralization is more viable, effective, and development oriented.

Interestingly enough, even in those countries most disposed to discuss decentralization, the impetus for the programs is usually mandated by the center. In the United States, all the legislation creating the Community Action, Model Cities, and Urban Renewal Programs came from the center. Neighborhood councils have been instituted in over some 140 cities with 25,000 people or more. The approach of neighborhood councils has been especially popular in larger cities. One critic of the councils noted, "characteristically the councils have been selected by neighborhood constituencies, review city program plans, channel citizen complaints to appropriate agencies, and act as citizen advocates. It is revealing that such councils rarely have any important discretionary or decisional powers, budgetary review rights, ability to hire professional staff, or approval powers over new plans. . . .These are important indices which differentiate deconcentration from decentralization. . . ." (Kasperson and Breithart, 1974: 30).

The United States was not alone in experimenting with deconcentration (even while they called it decentralization). Around the globe the decades of the 1960's and 1970's witnessed African nations experimenting with local government reform, or federalism, Chinese concerned with devolution to villages in the cultural revolution, Yugoslavs trying ambitious schemes of local self government, and the English sweepingly reorganizing local government. And, of course, this was the period of the New Town--tried in many countries as an effort to counter the weight of primate cities from London to Brasilia.

In comparing the United States to other countries, it must be remembered that federalism is a form of decentralization. While primarily a geographical arrangement, it is also a theory about dividing power. And it is a theory which cannot be planted on foreign soil (e.g., the East African Federation), but has real strength when rooted in deeply held power distributions which will suffer no tinkering or intrusion (for example, the Nigerian federal constitution). Many of the developing countries discussed in this monograph do not have even this degree of decentralization. A federal system can serve as yet another roadblock if one is concerned with redistribution or equity for the poor. One need only recall the original reasons that civil rights groups turned to Washington rather than Albany, or Austin for recourse. The point is

that while some think that a multiplicity of access points makes the way easier for the poor, they can also mean multiple tripping points for mounting roadblocks. (Segal, 1972). The English approach to local government is interesting in this regard, and relevant since so many third world countries inherited a local government system designed originally on English principles. Far more than the French, or the Portuguese, the English feel strongly about local government as an essential training ground for future leaders, and providing socialization experience for citizenship. (Hicks, 1961). Much of India's panchayati raj experimentation stems directly from the English preoccupation with decentralization found as much among the Labour and earlier Fabian Socialists as it is among Conservatives. It is interesting that the English reorganization of local government probably means, ironically enough, that the center has undertaken just those reforms necessary to ensure more effective local government in the future. They were able to reorganize and reform local government far more than the United States can in a federal system.

Yet having mentioned panchayati raj, it should be said that some observers of community development in India have argued that decentralization did set back opportunities for lower income groups. Their point was that "although it is commonly held that a strong measure of decentralization

of decision making and political power is a necessary condition for a reduction in inequality, this is so only if the underprivileged are already organized to take advantage of the opportunities thus offered. If they are not, decentralization may actually worsen the position by giving dominant groups an occasion to capture institutions and lines of access which will then be placed to subvert to their own advantage many kinds of intervention from above. A well documented example of exactly this process is provided by the failure of the Community Development Program in India which was undertaken without any prior attempt to change the preexisting social structures at the local level." (Chenery, Ahewualia, Bell, et al., 1974: 66).

Being concerned with the development of intermediate-sized cities, is, in part, also a concern with decentralization. Given the urbanization rates discussed earlier, primate cities cannot absorb the expected future waves of migrants. While few intermediate-sized cities have yet all the authority, or all the skilled manager/planners that they need, the only place to begin is with programs directed at improving their urban goal setting and development process. While this process at first may meet more of the criteria of deconcentration than it does of decentralization, future development could change the position of these intermediate-sized cities on the continuum.

There are indices alluded to earlier which are useful in discerning movement from being a delivery station to being a source of real decision making. Those indices come from the input that the intermediate-sized city local planning unit has in budgetary decisions affecting local growth and distribution, the kind of staff they can hire, the sorts of approval leverage they can bring to bear. And it is the case that the local urban poor in an intermediate-sized city will never be able to begin their process of organizing and accumulating the sort of experience needed to influence their own futures without at least a minimal deconcentration of urban planning efforts in the first instance.

The Lower Level Administrator: On the Front Line in the Conflict

The developmental tasks require above all that the administrator at the cutting edge between the clientele and the bureaucratic hierarchy be able to carry multiple and conflicting strains and yet simultaneously deliver-- be the realissateur, the one who gets the program implemented. The problems confronted by this individual are a major concern, because of the very pivotal nature of this function. We need to know more about these people, and under what circumstances they can or will succeed.

There are, if one is to make a first cut at the problem, two dimensions that are worth examining. The first dimension

concerns the pressures confronted by the lower level administrator. Caught between time constraints and demands from superiors, there are all too few payoffs for him to respond to demands from below. There are culture shocks for that individual interfacing with some communities. While he might favor participation as a way of maximizing information, hence avoiding some sorts of error, there are other times when the energy and time consumed by hearing out varying group demands will not be perceived as worth the benefit of improved feedback. Optimizing, or setting and trying to meet major goals reinforces his need to be perceived by himself and peers as professional but interacting with the community means more the order of the day.

The second dimension concerns the implementation problems when one undertakes interactive planning rather than the more traditional master plan approach. The line between implementation and policy making grows dim, and citizens begin to intrude into decision making arenas previously the private domain of our front line administrator. Choosing the developer in an urban renewal area, or refusing to accept that a decision called for special expertise, the citizens then put our administrator in the most problematical box. Dismayed by superiors as well as criticized by citizens (whom he may feel are inferior given his perceptions) he works alone on an island,

or refuses to produce because that is less controversial than production.

Writing about this dilemma in Latin America, Anderson spoke to the first dimension of our problem. "The problem is," he said, "one of finding those individuals who can bridge the basic cleavage of a dual society. For the upwardly mobile member of the modern society, to leap the chasm. . .is unthinkable. . .His sights are set on a position with dignidad, on fuller involvement in the urbane and Western milieu." (Anderson, 1968: 148). There is indeed a sort of culture shock implicit in the encounter of the front line administrator and the clientele group. The extent of this "culture shock" syndrome depends, however, on the extent of dualism in the country concerned. Observers of front line administrators in India noted less, and probably precisely because there is less dualism in India. Yet even within the inner cities of the United States, those on the front line in urban renewal participatory efforts felt a sort of culture shock. In a perceptive case study of one experimental urban effort, Segal pointed to the conflicts confronted by the lower level official. Officials caught up in the resulting tensions had to "reexamine their own work habits, separating what was required by law from what was simply convenient and familiar." (Segal, 1972: 24). Recent work in organizational development theory on encouraging creativity in administrators seems most applicable here. (Burke, 1971).

Just as Segal points out that few city administrators were openly or directly opposed to the general principle of citizen participation, it was the case that their process usually rested on two unstated, and faulty, assumptions. The first assumption was that citizens would defer to professional judgment when there was a conflict between them and city officials and that the term "citizen" applied to a select group of people who were both moderate in ideology and in their styles of expression. Both assumptions were false.

The assumption, frequently made by the administrator, that the citizen will defer to professional or technical expert opinion when there is a conflict goes to the heart of the developmental dilemma and especially its second dimension--the implementation stage of development projects. Criteria for discriminating between technical aspects of issues and the more political aspects of issues are not available. Furthermore, altogether too many technical issues have very real political implications. In the United States, often the core issue which administrators claimed as 'out of bounds' for the citizen group in urban renewal programs was the selection of the contractor to do the actual work. Given the perceived need within the community for greater employment opportunities, the cordoning off of this issue as 'technical' was felt to be obstructive. Similarly, the administrator keenly felt the need to get on

with the actual implementation of the project and that meant speedy contracting procedures. In third world countries the issues multiply; 'technical' decisions, for example, about which languages to use for radio broadcasts have profound implications for local groups, especially when language reflects ethnic divisions. Is that decision 'technical' or 'political?! Advocate planners were frequently hired by citizen groups (sometimes with governmental assistance) in order to push back the boundaries of those arenas roped off by bureaucrats as 'technical only.' Often the assistance of the professionally trained advocate planner greatly increased the group's sense of efficacy even more than his presence increased their actual influence. From the administrator's point of view, however, a case could be made that whittling away the technical arena carried costs in terms of greatly increased time in implementation. And, they could add, drawing out the process could abet frustration and result ultimately in dwindling community interest.

The lower level bureaucrat has to be the bridge between the community and its preferences and the translation of those preferences into technically feasible alternatives. In some communities in the United States the local government stressed community organization skills at the expense of technical expertise and the program implementation suffered. Other communities stressed the conversion of

the traditional planner and they then suffered from a series of confrontations and misunderstandings at the early planning stage. Few were those communities which could hit upon the appropriate balance, and bridge the gap between clientele's perceived needs and lower level administrator's, and the administrator who could communicate between the planning staff and the community.

PART III

SOME INNOVATIVE APPROACHES AND EVALUATION

Many third world countries have already experimented with a wide range of approaches to urban growth problems. Since the growth itself was occurring at nothing less than dramatic rates, governments frequently had to respond with little time for elaborate preplanning preparations. Experimentation was often the order of the day. Most experimentation was directed towards meeting the very real needs of the migrant as well as the older urbanite--needs such as housing, or transportation--with little experimentation directed towards improving participation in the decision making process. Very frequently it was also the case that little time or resources were directed towards evaluation. In this section we shall summarize a few selected approaches to urban development and then secondly we will discuss the elements that should go into a useful evaluative process when one is working with experimental programs.

Sites and Services

Many urban development projects in the 1960's, especially those which attracted international assistance,

were focused on housing needs and policies. The most innovative of these projects were 'site and service' programs, i.e., programs which allocated land sites on which squatters could have some sort of tenure with provisional planning for services either begun with the program, or added at some later date. Random or illegal squatting often means a land use pattern that defies adding adequate services because of density and pattern of settlement. Some of the best thinking and research with these sorts of schemes followed on the path breaking work of Charles Abrams, John Turner and William Mangin. Charles Abrams entitled his 1966 monograph, Squatter Settlements: The Problem and the Opportunity. His argument was that a better understanding was needed of the process through which squatter settlements had "unslumming" functions. He further argued, as have those who followed his lead, that self-help housing projects and self-help sites and services, are functional in many respects, not the least of which is their impact upon the settler's sense of efficacy. It is an argument generically related to that of Jane Jacobs in The Death and Life of the Great American City. Jacobs was deeply critical of the wholesale slum removal policies of urban planners for, she argued, there were, and are, self-help networks at work informally in these communities which functioned to allow some to

improve their situations over time. Just as Jacobs' critique of urban planning sent reverberations through schools of planning, so too did Abrams work significantly affect those concerned with third world urban programs.

By the early 1970's, some thirteen nations were already including sites and services programs in their national development plans. (Nelson, 1972). Some of the most innovative experimentation has taken place in Colombia, the Philippines, Tanzania, Jamaica, Senegal, and Zambia. The United Nations, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and U.S. AID have all been active in funding a range of site and service programs. The IBRD is increasingly interested in this approach and will be more heavily involved in developing and monitoring such projects in the future. (Gutheim and Bryant, 1974), (IBRD, 1975).

Sites and service projects are controversial, even given the large amount of experimentation that has been done with them in many different countries. They are controversial in terms of the conflicting issues discussed in the first part of this monograph; in terms of participation, distribution of benefits, and the unintended consequences of their planning. Some argue that they do not house the truly very poor; some say they encourage migration and hence abet overly rapid urbanization; some say they merely legalize squatting; and some argue that they only manage to keep the poor locked into their poverty.

Those who have worked with the schemes argue, on the other hand, that this approach is the most rational, feasible, and humane alternative cities can make to the influx of migrants; that migration happens for a variety of reasons and rarely, if ever, in response to housing; that this form of housing allows more self expression than a 'cinder block' mass housing approach. It is not our purpose here to delineate these arguments but rather to summarize those schemes which have been more effective in terms of their contribution to urban development.

Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru have all had pilot projects with substantial government commitment and support for community development over the past decade. Since 1962, Venezuela has had a Foundation for Community Development and Municipal Improvement to assist housing and community projects. The Venezuelan National Plan regularly incorporates a chapter on community development objectives. One of the early plans states the objectives of community development as channeling the latent social energy in communities and integrating these communities into national life.

Peru had a three-year project approved by the United Nations Special Fund in 1968 to assist them in establishing a long-term housing policy with particular emphasis on low-income housing. One part of this scheme was the planning and programming of sites and services for the settlement of migrant and squatter families with low incomes. The

scale of the project was not very large, however, for it only provided for some two hundred dwellings and buildings for community facilities. Both Mali and Zambia experimented with rural self-help projects as early as 1961; Zambia is now experimenting with urban self-help projects as well. All these experiments appear to point to responses that can be made to urban growth that are both more humane and more feasible than the older, ruthless bulldozing of settlements, regulation and efforts at eradication.

Zambia provides us with the most interesting case study of a truly innovative approach to urban development in the program currently in progress in Lusaka in cooperation with the American Friends Service Committee, Lusaka City Council, UNICEF, and the IBRD. (A.F.S.C. Report, 1975). Some twenty-five percent of the Zambian population live in urban areas; the Second Five Year National Development Plan prepared in 1971 states that yearly urban population increase in the last of the 60's was 7.6 percent for males and 10.1 percent for females even though the national population growth rate for the same period was 2.7 percent. As a result, Lusaka which had a population of 55,000 in 1954, and 258,000 in 1969, had a population of 381,000 in 1973. Of those 381,000, some 150,000 people were squatters living in substandard housing. In response to this pressing need, the government, with help from the World Bank, undertook a large scale site and service program. The site and

service program in this instance was carefully linked to community self help development and as such could well serve as a model for other countries confronting similar urban growth problems. The project, costing approximately \$40 million for a three year period is financed by the government of Zambia, assisted by a loan for \$20 million from the World Bank. It is designed to provide water standpipes for each twenty-five families, new primary schools, security lighting, markets, clinics, and community centers. All of these facilities, as well as the housing, are to be built by the various groups of families utilizing their own labor as part of their equity. The training and skills this self-help requires in community development are considerable, but the results are equally compelling. As one report summarizes, not only do the homebuilders benefit in gaining solidly built homes and facilities, but in the process of doing so they acquire a wide range of skills of future use to them. "Not only did families learn to overcome a reluctance to work with strangers, but they also learned how to make choices for themselves by using new organizational methods. For example, the idea of family budgeting, of sharing costs and of paying off loans on a regular schedule were unfamiliar to most families before they joined a brickmaking group. Moreover, resident families learned the benefits of acting

in concert when presenting a case to officialdom and some of the means of exercising their rights as Zambian citizens. Accordingly, many residents have become vigorous participants in public forums and new organizations." (A.F.S.C. Report, 1975: 51)

In many respects the Zambian program is similar to the earlier program in Manila in the Philippines. From both these cases we can learn that it is important to conceive of a self help strategy as part of a more extensive community development effort with far more control and participation in the hands of the residents themselves. Focusing on housing alone--even self help housing--without community facilities and community organizing is not sufficient. The Barrio Magsaysay Pilot Project in the Philippines was begun in 1966 as an on-site program which built upon the obvious community spirit and desire for community-wide development. The Magsaysay scheme was based on a project conducted by the Delhi project with its greater emphasis on economic betterment.

Integral to the Magsaysay program was the idea that whatever changes occurred in the community would have to be generated by the residents themselves. Barrio Magsaysay was already organized into natural communities and contained many small scale voluntary associations. (Some of this associational activity had happened earlier when residents unified in order to counter the external threat

of eviction. The squatment is on public lands.) The main thrust of participation in this instance was to build upon these existing associational groups.

The core of the program included social integration of communities on a neighborhood basis through self-help programs as well as the development of a sense of civic pride by stimulating imaginative, small-scale, immediate civic improvements. There was emphasis also on decentralization with people's development councils through which local municipal services would be administered and controlled. The general thrust throughout was on programs for economic and political development by building on local initiatives and local resources.

An important aspect of this scheme to be remembered is that from its inception, the Barrio Magsaysay project benefitted from interagency cooperation and coordination. (Laquian, 1971). It was realized that there were too many needed resources and skills to be centralized in one administrative unit. Involved agencies were both at the center--the Presidential Assistant on Community Development (PACD), and local--the Manila City Government, and private--Operations Brotherhood International, and external--the Asia Foundation. Yet as Laquian has also written, outside the Barrio Magsaysay project the other Philippines cities responses to squatters were not very different from those in other countries. More recently the Philippines government

has, however, in its Four Year Development Plan, (1974-1977) devoted considerable attention to a decentralized approach to urban development.

Laquian, an unusual academic analyst of squatters since he grew up within a barrio himself, provided in his survey of Philippines squatter settlements an interesting range of governmental responses to squatters. The city of Baguio set aside (in 1967) some 19 hectares of public land near the city center for allocation to squatters. A "squatters committee" was established to control and supervise the awarding of lots. The national government provides an annual subsidy to the city government to help in the provision of services in the community. The Davao Development Foundation offers job training and placement centers for squatters. In Iligan the squatters organized a "home defenders association" in order to ward off threats of eviction and the government eventually subdivided and distributed lands to the squatters.

While many discussants assume that squatters are antipathetic towards participatory approaches, Laquian provides us with evidence to the contrary. (Laquian, 1972).³ He documents that community organization found throughout squatter communities in the Philippines is the organic outgrowth of traditional motives and patterns of behavior in rural life. Rural Filipino values, he asserts, place a great deal of importance on community

cooperativeness. Interviewing squatters in all the cities mentioned above, he found that respondents valued cooperativeness, and appeared to find it in their neighbors. The percentages of affirmatives on a question asking whether neighbors joined together for joint action ran from 70 percent in Davao to 89 percent in Manila. Mutual assistance, apparently, is a way of life in these communities. He also found (probably as a result of this mutual assistance) that there were many community organizations. The lack of urban services in the barrios was usually overcome by communal efforts among the squatters themselves. "In almost all communities, associations and organizations were in existence, though many of these have been organized and mobilized for very specific purposes (to celebrate the fiesta, provide fire protection, hold a social event). The number of associations mentioned in the various communities included four in Baguio, seven in Cebu, seven in Davao, three in Iligan, more than ten in Iloilo, and four in Manila." (Laquian, 1972: 65). In many cases, these organizational capabilities have been harnessed through the Barrio Councils--the lowest tier of local government. These councils elect their own officers and administer their own services. It is through these councils that squatters usually participate in policy making and administrative decision making.

Very similar sorts of organizational capabilities and attitudes conducive to community participation and self-help were documented in a study done by Marc Howard Ross of squatters in Mathare Valley, Nairobi, Kenya. "The most striking aspect about Mathare 2, however, is neither the marginal existence attributable to economic conditions nor the inadequate physical conditions. . . what is so striking about the community is that it is highly organized and politically integrated. . ." (Ross, 1973: 299). He goes on to relate that the squatters, through self-help, have organized, built, and maintain several nursery schools, community work projects, and a community social hall in the center of the village. This social hall is the only building in the village with electricity (they also use electricity for their electric guitar for Saturday night dances). They built the hall themselves and the little electric generator they bought from the proceeds of selling locally made beer. He adds, "unlike virtually all other neighborhoods in Nairobi, there is a relatively well developed sense of community and a series of affective local political and social institutions in the community which provide for the peaceful resolutions of local problems." (Ross, 1973: 299). His actual data on participation in community affairs bears out this conclusion; e.g., some 88 percent had turned out to vote in a village election.

Colin Rosser (1970) in his report on the process of creating a municipal plan for Calcutta while he was with the CMPO, wrote that the planning should include a strong commitment to involving the many varied local voluntary organizations in the process of consultation as well as implementation. He thereupon devised a scheme to illustrate how this might be done which, while it was not at that time utilized by the CMPO, has influenced others to think about such a model. He argued, ahead of his time, for substantial local and neighborhood involvement to enhance the effectiveness of the urban planning process.

Tanzania also offers some usefulness as a case study. Unlike other of the countries we have looked at, Tanzania emphasizes self reliance and does not, therefore, solicit heavily for foreign assistance in urban development. (The Tanzanians have, however, utilized some World Bank loans.)

Since the Arusha Declaration of February, 1967, Tanzania has initiated many experimental housing, site and service projects, as well as ujamaa villages. In fact they tried sites and services in the villages before they tried them in Dar es Salaam.

The Tanzanian housing projects usually consist of a building lot serviced with roads, water, electricity, and, in some cases, sewers. Of course, in Tanzania, as administrators have learned other places, the size of the service component of a project cuts down on the total number of

people who can be so housed. If a country is anxious to serve large numbers, therefore, they would be well advised to keep services at the rudimentary stage. In Tanzania, the building materials loans are available from the Tanzanian Housing Bank which in turn has received assistance from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). Families build their own homes on the lots usually using rammed earth with thatch or sheet metal roofs.

The program is administered by the Site and Services Division of the Housing Branch of the Ministry of Land, Housing and Urban Development. This Ministry is responsible for coordinating urban planning and municipal services throughout Tanzania. Dar es Salaam is planned in a series of satellite communities of 200,000 population. The 1967 master plan also provides for a large measure of self containment in a hierarchy of communities that go from the Ministry at the Center to the smallest cell of six or seven families who elect a leader or head man. At the lowest level a small piece of community held land is provided as a general purpose open space. The next larger unit is the ward, comprised of about 100 families, with a larger open space used as the community decides. The neighborhood of 700 to 800 houses is the largest unit in the sites and services plan. A variety of participatory

arrangements have been instituted of which the urban planning committee is the most important for the sites and services program.

The national site and services program has had some assistance from two architect planners from Yugoslavia and Finland who were provided by UN technical assistance programs. Through their efforts housing and community development standards have been formulated with physical and social planning carried on simultaneously. At the project sites building technicians are available who can advise of construction problems, and community organization workers are available to assist with organizational problems. As in some other homesteading plans, houses do have to conform to some standards and specified amounts of work must be done. Sites usually include room for a family garden as a significant contribution to the food supply.

Tanzania's housing philosophy reflects the self reliance of the Arusha Declaration. From the fundamental reform brought about with nationalization of the land, to the integration of housing management and the party structure, the objectives of Nyerere's distinctive brand of socialism are reflected. (cf. Ingle, 1972). There are many, however, who are concerned that some lower level officials have not been as persuasive but rather more coercive in administering the development of ujamaa

villages; but as yet we know far too little about the extent and effectiveness of Tanzania's considerable experimentation to know whether some of the allegations of coercion are true or only ideologically inspired. In the area of sites and services the experimentation is most interesting and useful.

While this summary is all too brief considering the range of countries which have tried various innovative urban development schemes, the larger problem is that there has been very little done by way of a cross-national comparative assessment of this accumulated experience. Until such work is undertaken there can be little in the way of cumulative learning. Considering the scale and rate of the shelter problem, and the rate of growth of the cities, the need for such learning is real. A step in this direction requires that we think more about evaluation of existing projects and their planning processes. One hopes for insights that may be useful in evaluating particular projects, but beyond that, ones that will allow us to build information blocks for looking at the broader range of experience acquired to date in urban development schemes.

Evaluation of Innovative Urban Development Schemes

Even while it is understandable that the extreme pressures for action within many countries meant that little time, energy, or other resources could be devoted

to evaluation of the many different sorts of urban development projects, it is nevertheless regrettable that that should be the case. In the United States, evaluation was talked about often in the 1960's but, because of a variety of administrative and political considerations, was rarely done. It is only recently in the post PPBS world that attention is being paid to attempts at serious evaluation.

Evaluation of international development projects, given the sensitivity of the international negotiations leading to those projects, only further abets the sensitivities evoked when evaluation is discussed. Evaluation is a provocative term, implying, as it does, judgements about the impact of a project relative to its cost, and judgements about the measurement of goals. This is difficult to do domestically; it is exponentially more difficult with an international program. It is interesting, then, to note that one of the most useful guides to evaluation is found in paper from the Development Economics Department of the World Bank. (Clignet and Long, 1975).

It is important initially to distinguish between monitoring and evaluation. By monitoring, we mean a process of recording and analyzing information about project performance for feedback into that project's further implementation. By evaluation, we mean analysis of the goals, objectives,

and impact of a project; an analysis of the effects of the project on the target population both during and after project execution. While these two processes may interact, it is important to understand conceptually the difference between the two. This latter sort of evaluation requires a rigorous research design, including careful comparison of the target population with a control group so that one can discern the difference that the project has made. In order to be valid, the evaluation team has to follow rigorous research requirements addressing problems of internal validity, construct validity, and external validity. (Clignet and Long, 1975: 2).

There can be a middle ground between these two processes of monitoring and rigorous evaluation research. That middle ground, which we will elect to call interactive evaluation, has some distinct advantages in programs that cannot afford to mount the more elaborate evaluation team in combination with a monitoring team. Interactive evaluation, as we shall describe it here, means having a team undertake ongoing evaluation with periodic interaction with both the executing agency and the parent funding agency. Such interactive evaluation can be a useful management tool for identifying and responding to unintended consequences of the program before those consequences have had the opportunity to multiply throughout the program. On the other

hand, while interactive evaluation still means the team must carefully construct their criteria, indicators, and requisite control group, precisely because they are interacting with implementation there will be greater chance that their design will not meet the most rigorous standards of internal validity. (Their intervention might account for changes which are not accounted for in their model.) Nevertheless, what the team must struggle to do is to identify the conditions under which a specific part of the program exerts the anticipated influence on the economic and social behavior of the target population.

Some General Considerations

Evaluating a program initiated by the foreign assistance agency of a developed country, agreed to by both countries at the national government level, implemented at the local or urban level, and involving local participation by the affected population, is inevitably fraught with the problems of multiple goals and expectations. The problems caused by multiple and unspecified goals is repeatedly discussed in United States domestic programs by evaluators; the issue only becomes more complex when an international program is involved.

Most of our following discussion lays out the skeletal framework for interactive evaluation. It is useful to conceive of this sort of evaluation as divided into three

different sorts of questions. First one begins with laying out the large goals of the program and the smaller level objectives leading up to those goals. In this respect, it should be remembered that, "evaluation must be seen as intrinsic to the planning process itself. Decisions made during the design phase of program development are crucial factors in determining the potential worth of any evaluative effort for the manner in which a program was formulated may be particularly important content area, deserving the attention of the evaluator." (Van Maanen, 1973: 11).

The second set of questions is an evaluation of the participatory and equity aspects of the program. This area should involve the creation of three sets of indicators to show the "objective change" in the circumstances of the participants, or clients; the participant's perception of the change that has taken place, perceived benefits, fulfilled expectations; and finally the effectiveness of the local administration in dealing with the demands of participation.

The third set of questions to be examined should be directed to the implementation and general political environment of the program or project. Here we need to develop ways to examine the intergovernmental administrative coordination, the advantages of decentralization versus centralization, and the national government's political will to delegate control over certain functions.

In all three question areas two different perspectives need to be discussed: the perspective of the client/consumer on whom the project or program has impacted, as well as the perspective of the program's administration and its implementors. Those impacted by a program need to have their special vantage points put forward, while those implementing the program also have their perspective and opinions about the direction and utility of the program, especially in light of its cost. In short, there are two perspectives--from the bottom looking up, and from the top looking down.

The Evaluation Process

In one discussion of the process of program evaluation, Van Maanen (1973) develops the idea of evaluation cycles. He points to two cycles of planning. One involves implementing, assessing and deciding, intersected at the assessment point with the other cycle of comparing, and measuring. He stresses that these cycles must be conceived of as ongoing over the lifetime of the program or project under consideration. (Van Maanen, 1973: 15). The 'meat' of the evaluation process, its key operational elements are assessing, specifying, measuring, and comparing. Having pointed to these essential phases in what must be a repeating cycle, it then becomes important to devise creatively measurements so that one can begin

to address the question of what happened as a result of the program or project. Controlling for exogenous factors or for any other factors which intervened becomes a part of the problem of the research design for the evaluator.

We talked above about the crucial first step of identifying goals, and the intended consequences of the program. (Later, unintended consequences will make their appearance and then the evaluator may decide that they are such as to deserve evaluative attention as well in the next run through the cycle.) Evaluations based on the wrong goals, or too limited perceptions of the intended goals, however, can have consequences for the usefulness of the evaluation and also hinder an administrator in carrying out the full intent of the program or policy. Ex-post facto evaluations suffer from having arrived too late to clarify, or make explicit, the programs goals. In choosing to have an interactive evaluation process, one is giving the researcher an opportunity to increase the validity of his work as well as the flexibility to adjust any subsequent changes in focus. Often overlooked is the fact that the evaluator involved in interactive evaluation is also thereby made more accountable. Observing the impact of criticisms and/or suggestions sensitizes the evaluator to the dynamics of involvement in a process.

Given explicit goals, the evaluator as well as the policy maker and administrator develops a complete

description of existing conditions. This step is often referred to as the pretest period in the process. This pretest step sets the baseline by which future change is to be judged. The movement from the "as is" (existing conditions) to the "should be" (goals) requires a series of hypotheses relating the variables involved. (cf. Freeman and Sherwood, 1970). Each hypothesis will relate a part of the problem to a part of the solution. An impact statement, if it is to be complete, would also require a prediction as to the extent of change to be expected. The identification of target populations will flow from the relationships that are developed in the hypotheses. The effects on these target populations measured with multiple indicators will indicate how close we have come to the expected change.

These preliminary steps bring us to the point of administration and program implementation. Differences in interpretation and the qualitative differences in administration can change the program dramatically. If these differences occur, they may contravene the goals initially articulated and doom the program to failure, before it has had a fair trial. The effects of administration, favorable or unfavorable, clearly fall on the target populations. Weak, or ineffective administration as well as maladministration can skew indicators, prejudice

future adjustments, and alienate those it was meant to assist. The evaluator must follow the program at this stage very closely if he is ever to assure the users of his work as well as himself that his indicators are reliable and conclusions accurate. An ex-post evaluation simply cannot capture the full meaning of administrative problems in a program, while an interactive evaluation process can identify troublesome administration problems in a program.

The final check of the indicators (the post-test step) should be made at a point in time which will allow for a fair test of the program. A land use planning process, for example, requires an extensive period of time while a discrete site and services program will require considerably less time for a check on indicators. The evaluation process is a series of adjustments between the ideal research design the evaluator would prefer and the administrator's preference for implementable rather than ideal goals. This tension will be present throughout the process. It is possible to find a middle ground in which a usable evaluation may emerge both for the evaluator and the administrative-political actors. Whenever possible it is of great experimental value to include a pretest and post-test of a comparable group to those involved in the program. Ideally this group should not participate in, or have much interaction with the project

for the point in having such a control group is to help in answering the question of whether the change observed would have occurred without the intervention of the program under examination.

Developing Evaluative Indicators

The tension between the evaluator and the administrator is paralleled in the search on the operational level for indicators. While these indicators must be project sensitive, they should be useful for other projects of a similar sort. Evaluation that addresses no more than a program's relative success or failure under narrow and specific conditions, and does so using indicators which are not transportable, is failing in its main mission. If we cannot learn from an evaluation some generalizable criteria for similar programs elsewhere we will have misused considerable energy and effort. Indicators are the medium through which we translate goals into criteria for measuring the effects of a project on social change.

For indicators to fulfill their intended purpose they should be focused. But if too specific, they can miss the essential. For example, in the United States domestic policy we have discovered the limits of measuring housing shortage by counting the presence or absence of indoor plumbing. The use of multiple indicators better captures the interaction of physical, psychological, political and administrative qualities which determine

a program's level of achievement. In short, indicators must be focused and yet comprehensive to be useful.

Given the three areas for evaluation set out earlier, we may at this point indicate the kinds of questions from which indicators can be developed.

I. General Evaluation of the Extent to which Goals have been achieved.

- a) Has the project met the goals as specified initially?
- b) Has the project met the expectations of those involved? Expectations of those administering the program? Of those impacted by the program?
- c) In the case of a land use planning process, has the project been able to develop a process which is meeting the needs of all involved groups?
- d) Could comparable alternative processes have achieved the same goals with less cost?
- e) Is the project meeting the expectations of other affected tiers of government?
- f) Do involved groups wish to continue with the present program as implemented, or are they demanding a change in the plan or project?

II. Evaluating Participatory and Equity Aspects

a) Equity

- 1) What has been the pattern of distribution of benefits as a result of the project?
- 2) What is the extent of the coverage of the program to the intended population?
- 3) What is each group's perception of the achieved benefits?

b) Participation

- 1) Have the participants been effective in achieving their own goals?
- 2) What is their perception of the change that has taken place? Perception of those administering the program? Perception of change for those impacted by the program?
- 3) Have lower level officials a feeling of improved efficacy?
- 4) Have local citizens (voluntary organizations, informal groups) feelings of improved efficacy?
- 5) Are the participants planning to continue involvement? If not, why not?

III. Administration and Political-Governmental Environment

- a) How have center-periphery relationships affected the program?

- b) To what extent has some degree of decentralization resulted? Is this decentralization with some local control over decisionmaking, or deconcentration with local service delivery?
- c) How have goals been shifted by the exigencies of administration? At what level of governance?
- d) How have intergovernmental relationships affected the program or project?
- e) How supportive has the existing governmental/political environment been for the program?

The questions above are only a rough estimation of those one might consider for use in developing adequate indicators. The three sets of questions overlap. An overall conclusion on the project is dependent on the judgment of the evaluator as he examines each of the indicators results. The summarizing process is also subject to the political environment within which the evaluator, or evaluation team is working.

Too often evaluation is conceived as an ex post examination of a project. A report is written long

after much of the project has been implemented; the evaluator feels no real involvement with the project as it developed. The report then sits uselessly in someone's file cabinet. This sort of evaluation process makes little contribution to the effectiveness of the program in question. Often small changes in the course of a program could have prevented unnecessary problems and have kept the program in line with the goals originally charted.

Interactive evaluation--evaluation that is incremental and on-going with the whole administration of a program--is more contributive to a program's growth and development. But this sort of evaluative process is not without its own special requirements. First such evaluators have to be more open and trained for constructive assessment rather than the critical blast which is more typical. The evaluator at each step of the process will have to follow closely the perceived needs and values of those who designed the program initially. It is essential that the evaluator understand and have rapport with the officials concerned with the evaluation.

Evaluation research is a combination of many different sorts of research. Set in an action setting, the evaluator must be as observant and emphathetic as an anthropologist, as analytical as the economist, and as systematic as the social scientist. And of course it helps if our evaluator

combines a bit of Charlie Chan's sleuthing with Charlie Chaplin's humor in his carpet bag of skills. Most certainly the difficulties of finding the right combinations of skills in one skull explain why most often an evaluation team is the better approach.

Evaluation will always face challenges by political leaders, administrators, and participants. Such challenges can only be met by the skills of the evaluator, or evaluation team in maintaining the usefulness as well as the accuracy of the evaluation. There may be those who for their own purposes feel uncomfortable with assessing performance. Hopefully our Chan/Chaplin evaluator is also a most sensitive and skillful diplomat.

CONCLUDING NOTE

There is no way to summarize all, or even much of our foregoing discussion. There are, on the other hand, some major points we should like to make in closing. Much of the evidence for their support has gone before and will not, therefore, be repeated.

Urbanization is continuing at significant rates, and in some instances, at dramatic rates, in much of the third and fourth world. Even those countries with meaningful rural development programs will experience rapid growth of their cities in the decade ahead. Responses to this growth and the potential for participation of the urban poor in the planning undertaken in response to that growth has been the focus of this study. Along with this fact, we should also remember that income disparities between developed and developing worlds are increasing; by the year 2000, Kahn and Weiner (1965) estimate that the per capita GNP of North America will be nine times greater than the per capita GNP of Latin America. Furthermore, the income disparities within nations will increase, in many instances. The middle classes in Rio, Montevideo, Lagos and Nairobi will be setting their tastes and living standards after those set in Paris, London, and Washington, D.C. While such was the case in the periods discussed in this monograph, it will affect and involve ever increasing numbers while

exacerbating inequities within and among nations. The role of all urban citizens in urban development planning will be ^acrucial issue; for the urban poor, it will be a central issue. In summary:

1. The trade-offs between equity and growth have been debated in the past, but will be increasingly central in the future. The era of growth alone is past and few political systems will be able to argue for a "growth at all costs" strategy. Distributional issues, and issues about the quality and direction of growth will be increasingly heard with the debate turning to ways in which equity can be maximized.
2. Many different groups within urban populations will demand to be participants in this debate over distribution. Whether or not the urban poor will be among those groups depends upon the many variables discussed within the body of this study. It is usually the case that if the urban poor are not represented during the process of resource allocation, they do not receive their fair share.
3. If the urban poor are to participate in resource allocation in developing cities, there will have to be effective channels through which they might be heard. Community development programs which build upon self-help and mutual self-help networks appear to be most successful in providing methods as well as skills for participation. Accumulated experience to date points up the need for small groups in order to maximize collective action. Nor do all decentralized models in fact maximize local participation of the urban poor; in some instances, decentralization may find the urban poor more squarely under the thumb of the local "powerfuls." In such cases, decentralization may run counter to achieving greater equity.
4. If a government is seriously interested in developmental urban programs, the supports and training for the lower level administrator, upon

whom so much of the interface between government and squatter comes to rest, must be substantially improved. The pivotal importance of administrative skill at these lower levels must be acknowledged and provided for in budgets and programs.

5. More careful evaluation of urban development schemes needs to be undertaken so that learning from these experiences can be more cumulative. The old process of one time, post hoc evaluation is insufficient and a model of interactive evaluation as proposed can be adopted, and built into programs from their beginning. More attention in that evaluation needs to be paid to measuring the impact of alternative participatory arrangements in the development of the planning process and its implementation.

It was from within the context of a concern for our urban future that we began this monograph and from which we shall also conclude it. The arguments concerning distribution and growth will be at the heart of the intellectual and policy conflicts in our increasingly interdependent world. One cannot escape the debate, nor the tension that underpins it. Our very interdependence will mean that the ramifications of that debate within one part of the world will ripple through other parts at some distance. We can only hope that those committed to more effective and participatory urban development will be able to meet some part of this challenge.

NOTES

- 1) Donal Cruise O'Brien's (professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London) incisive essay also points to the impact of U.S. changing directions in foreign policy upon our thinking about development and change. Written during the Vietnam era, this point was not often enough addressed in the literature that purported to be concerned with political development.
- 2) We are indebted throughout much of our discussion in this section to the survey of economic development theory in the paper given by Professors Wilbur and Weaver at the Third World Consultation of the Ecumenical Institute, World Council of Churches in Geneva in April, 1974.
3. The International Association for Metropolitan Research and Development (Intermet) and the International Development Research Center (IDRC) sponsored an extensive set of surveys in eight different countries on rural to urban migration. The study was begun in 1969 and had its final conference in Istanbul, Turkey in 1973. Those interested in research in this area should be well advised to follow closely the analysis of this excellent source of data.

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