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SOCIALIZATION TO NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION

AMONG TURKISH PEASANTS*

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Introduction

"An Impressive Body of Ignorance..."

A story is told about a professor of anatomy at the Johns Hopkins University Medical School early in this century who regularly delivered the following lecture in one session of his course:

Today, gentlemen, we come to the spleen. The spleen is one of the most important organs of the human body. Unfortunately, we know next to nothing scientifically about the structure and functioning of the spleen. So much for the spleen, gentlemen.

At least until very recently, candor would have compelled many empirically oriented social scientists to make a similar declaration when dealing with the topic of nationalism. They would agree with Doob's contention that "nationalism is unquestionably one of the most important problems, if not the most important one, of this century." ¹ They would perhaps concur with Hess and Torney in maintaining that "the emotional attachment of an individual to his country and its leaders is one of the most profound, powerful, and complex ties in human experience." ² But they would also accept Rupert Emerson's judgment that "what we do not know (about nationalism) or have taken for granted without adequate evidence adds up to an impressive body of ignorance and uncertainty which is all the more dismaying because of the frequent failure to face up to the limitations of our knowledge. It is a far more complex and elusive matter than it is usually given credit for being." ³

¹ Leonard W. Doob, Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p.1.

² Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Basic Attitudes and Values Toward Government and Citizenship During the Elementary School Years, Part I (Cooperative Research Project No. 1078, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare; Chicago: University of Chicago, 1965), p. 1.

³ Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 89.

The significance of feelings of national identification is currently most apparent in the emerging nations. "Nation-building," to use the fad-phase of the day, is generally seen as being dependent upon a widely shared sense of national membership. Verba puts the case well when he argues that "unless those individuals who are physically and legally members of a political system (that is, who live within its boundaries and are subject to its laws) are also psychologically members of that system (that is, feel themselves to be members) orderly patterns of change are unlikely. It is the sense of identity with the nation that legitimizes the activities of national elites and makes it possible for them to mobilize the commitment and support of their followers." ⁴

More specifically, we are concerned with the interaction of values, power, and perceptions of political systems. If the values and cognitions of people in most developing societies had not changed, it would seem that their traditional political systems -- their ancient patterns of power -- might still be viable. However, confronted with external challenges (and it makes little difference for many purposes whether these be regarded as imperialism, colonialism, communism, foreign aid, or international exchange), the aspirations and perceptions held by strategic groups have changed in virtually all traditional societies. Moreover, they have changed in regular ways. Most of the new goals keenly desired by important sectors of these now "transitional" societies are goals that require for their realization the eventual coordination of the preponderance of the society. Industrialization, modern mass media, "social justice," military power, widespread education, increased international prestige -- all these goals have societal rather than merely individual implication. They necessarily involve strategies regularly to concert the behaviors of large masses of people -- without grievous social costs, if possible.

⁴Sidney Verba, "Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Studies in Political Development 5; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 529.

A sense of personal identification with a political unit called the nation and a sense of mutual involvement with other members of that nation presumably make an individual more willing to link his behavior with others designated as compatriots, to accept the authority of persons designated as national leaders, and to make sacrifices for supra-personal national goals. The more a person identifies with the nation, the more he tends to feel that what benefits the nation benefits him and what harms the nation harms him. Such feelings appear to stimulate many kinds of behavior that are difficult to evoke in individuals lacking national identification -- behaviors ranging from obeying laws, saluting the flag and taking the trouble to vote in elections, through paying taxes in money and goods, to willingness to risk death in armed combat.

The Pathology of Nationalism

At the same time, we must not overlook the Janus-face of nationalism. Our deep concern with strengthening the new and underdeveloped nations of the world should not lead us to forget that it was only yesterday when narrow European nationalisms were regarded by many as the scourge of the world. If political independence, modernization and development are the presumed blessings of nationalism, then war, hatred and regimentation may be its curse. There would seem to be an unmistakable pathology of nationalism which matches jingoism, xenophobia, chauvinism, rigidity and authoritarianism against sacrifice, obligation, coordination, flexibility and achievement. Which face of nationalism is most likely to appear under various circumstances has yet to be ascertained by social scientists. Nor have we determined how essential feelings of national identification really are for political stability, social and economic development, and personal satisfaction.⁵ Indeed,

⁵Obviously, the significance of national identification in a given political system depends fundamentally on the distribution of other values and identifications among the actors in that system and on the prevailing patterns of power, communication, status, etc. As David Wilson has remarked, "...it does not seem necessary that even today a state be based on a nation or held together by nationalism in order to be significantly autonomous." Other combinations of motives,

it may turn out that any general answer to such queries is impossible; the substantive content and trappings of various nationalisms may be all important. One conception of the nation may lead to irredentism and costly war while another leads to newfound unity. One conception may threaten domestic minorities while another subsumes them under a broader identity. One nationalism may pose false and irrelevant problems which waste the nation's talent and equanimity while another nationalism may focus on critical issues long ignored.

Finally, I should note that we currently know relatively little about the processes that lead a person to national identification, for better or for worse, and about the attitudinal and behavioral changes that may regularly attend such identification. Are some types of individuals more likely than others to identify with the nation? What experiences, if any, promote national allegiance? Does national identification seem to be more associated with willingness to sacrifice for national goals or with demands for governmental assistance? Does nationalism have the same cognitive meaning for a peasant who is enlarging his horizons of social identification as for a person who is merely changing from one particular unit of identification to another at the same level? Is national identification a stage in a relatively continuous process of ever-expanding allegiances, or does it develop before many logically intermediate loyalties exist? Does the development of a new and more inclusive allegiance stretch the mind and make it easier for subsequent expansions of allegiance to occur, or is allegiance a zero-sum phenomenon in which a new allegiance tends to detract from the old so that the convert becomes more rigid in his new identity than he was before? These are but a few of the many questions regarding national identification that must be answered before we can claim to have any reasonably profound understanding of the personal and political significance of nationalism.

social structure and external forces might accomplish the same result. But the probabilities of maintaining such a political organization for an appreciable time in the absence of nationalistic sentiments legitimizing relative concentration of authority seem low. See David A. Wilson, "Nation-Building and Revolutionary War," in Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz (eds.), Nation Building (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), p. 85.

National Identification Among the Turkish Peasantry

I shall attempt to provide some introductory analyses relevant to a number of these questions. The data were gathered through a survey of a national sample of the Turkish peasantry conducted in the summer of 1962 under the auspices of the Government of Turkey and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Interviews were conducted with a probabilistically selected regular sample of nearly 6,500 Turks aged sixteen or over and resident in legally defined villages (under 2,000 in size). Specially trained teams of Turkish interviewers visited approximately 460 villages spread across all of Turkey's sixty-seven provinces. In addition to the regular interviews in every village with randomly selected respondents, both male and female, interviews were also conducted with the village headman, village religious leader, and each of their wives.⁶

The data introduced here have some special merits and demerits as vehicles for improving our understanding of socialization to national identification. The defects are essentially two. First, socialization processes are probably best studied through longitudinal surveys, panel studies and trend analyses that are not possible with data obtained at a single point in time. I shall have to rely mainly upon the analysis of matched subgroups of different types, on the correlation of salient variables, and on retrospective reports. Second, the survey was not focused primarily upon national identification. Much more depth and detail in the elaboration of the content of such identification would have been possible with more questions devoted to that topic. On the other hand, cognizant of the quite limited amount of time available with each respondent (about ninety minutes), additional

⁶A fuller description of the project is found in Frederick W. Frey, "Surveying Peasant Attitudes in Turkey," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 27, (Fall, 1963), pp. 335-355. Neither the U.S. Agency for International Development nor the Government of Turkey is responsible for the opinions herein expressed. The interpretations are solely those of the author. I am grateful to the Computation Center at M.I.T., Allan Kessler and William Selles for help in processing the data.

questions on national identification would have meant fewer questions on other topics. One of the virtues of the data is that, assuming that we can obtain a valid basic placement of respondents in terms of the degree of their national identification, we can then explore the attitudinal, behavioral and social concomitants of national identification more fully than would be possible in a narrowly focussed survey.

The Turkish peasantry would seem to be a particularly useful group to juxtapose against the other groups whose socialization to national identification is also currently being examined by social scientists. Turkey has had a particularly prominent and successful nationalist movement which has long since become established among the elite members of the society. She is currently in the throes of trying to engage the peasant majority of the nation in more extensive and continuous social, political and economic participation. Since roughly three quarters of her population is agricultural and resident in scattered village communities, she can be considered grossly representative of many other developing nations.

There is little need to stress the significance of the peasantry for developmental processes. There are more and more indications, even ignoring the Chinese model of peasant-based revolutions, that the final hurdle in national modernization is the transformation of the rural sector of the society. The bulk of the population in most developing societies resides in villages and is engaged in agriculture. Agriculture is a major contributor to the national product of the developing society, ordinarily such a large contributor that it is difficult to contemplate markedly increased general investment levels without some increase in agricultural productivity. Moreover, there are numerous critical side-effects arising from these basic relationships. For example, a stagnant or sluggish agricultural sector does not provide sufficient attractions to slow the rush to the cities, where urban slums and unemployment may create dire problems for the already

beleaguered government. Effective industrialization tends to produce increased demand for agricultural products, and instability may be engendered by conspicuous failure to meet this demand. The agricultural problems of the U.S.S.R. would seem to bear testimony to these relationships. And, if population increases are not to consume all the hard-won economic gains of the developing society, it would seem that the peasantry must be reached with some effective techniques of birth control. These examples could be multiplied many times over, but they all point to the basic conclusion that the ultimate problem for most developing societies may be incorporating the peasantry into national life. Identification with the nation seems to be a first step in this process.

Finally, I should like to emphasize that political socialization does not stop at age twenty-one, eighteen, or wherever one chooses to designate the end of adolescence and commencement of adulthood. The empirical literature on socialization to national identification in industrial societies has so far focused largely on rather young children -- wisely so, since it is clear that this is the group in which national allegiance is being formed.⁷ By the end of their elementary years it would seem that most citizens of the major Western democracies have strongly developed feelings of national identification. But in developing societies the situation is quite different. Adults as well as children are frequently called upon to undergo the process of national identification. It is quite interesting to ascertain whether there are similarities between these processes, regardless of whether the subjects are adults or children and regardless of their residence in urbanized developed societies or in rural transitional societies. Cross-cultural comparative research enables us to gain a deeper understanding of these processes by permitting a much greater range along the critical variables.

⁷See, e.g., Hess and Torney, op. cit.; Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); Gustave Jahoda, "The Development of Children's Ideas about Country and Nationality," British Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol. 33 (1963), pp. 47-60 and 143-153; Eugene A. Weinstein, "Development of the Concept of Flag and Sense of National Identity," Child Development, Vol. 28 (1957), pp. 167-174; Eugene L. Horowitz, "Some Aspects of the Development of Patriotism in Children," Sociometry, Vol. 3 (1941), pp. 329-341; and Edwin D. Lawson, "Development of Patriotism in Children - A Second Look," Journal of Psychology, Vol. 55 (1963), pp. 279-286.

Data and Discussion

Are Peasants Different?

It might be assumed that national allegiance is such a potent orientation that all persons in a society would manifest it about equally. This seems to be a not inaccurate description of the United States and several other Western nations. National allegiance is inculcated in virtually all citizens at a very early age. However, in newer nations with less intricate and complete communication systems and educational institutions there might well be less uniformity in the distribution of nationalistic orientations. It is useful to gain a gross perspective on the distribution of feelings of national identification among peasants and other groups in Turkish society.

The survey of Turkish villagers described above, which constitutes the prime source of data, was restricted to the rural sector and consequently provides no direct basis for comparing peasant Turks with others. However, comparative insights can be obtained from a few other sources. In 1963 a survey dealing primarily with matters of population control was conducted in strata representative of the village, town, city and metropolitan populations of Turkey. This survey covered married female respondents of child-bearing age together with their husbands, so the defined population is not identical to the village survey of 1962 which included all adult villagers aged sixteen or over. Nevertheless, comparisons of village, town, city and metropolitan Turks within the defined population are interesting.⁸

⁸The population control survey of 1963 is described in Bernard Beyelson, "Turkey: National Survey on Population," Studies in Family Planning, No. 5 (December, 1964), pp. 1-5, and J. Mayone Stycos, "The Potential Role of Turkish Village Opinion Leaders in a Program of Family Planning," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 29 (1965), pp. 120-130. I am grateful to Dr. George W. Angell, Jr., Field Director of the 1963 study, for making these data available to me, and to Dr. Leslie Roos for sharing the results of his own special processing of them.

In the population control survey only one question particularly relates to feelings of national identification. It asks the respondent to designate the two persons, living or dead, whom the respondent most admires. Many writers have observed that feelings of national identification depend fundamentally upon effective symbolization of the very abstract entity that is the nation. Furthermore, among the most telling national symbols seem to be the personal -- that is, individuals who represent in manifold ways the presumed spirit of the nation -- a Garibaldi, Washington, Lincoln, Bolivar, Gandhi, or Lenin. Thurman Arnold (and probably many other people) once said, "Let me designate the heroes of a nation and I care not who writes its constitution." In their study of American elementary school children, Hess and Torney comment that "it appears from our data that complex social systems are initially conceptualized as persons to whom the child can relate. It is through attachments to these persons that the individual becomes related to the system."⁹ This tendency seems particularly pronounced in Turkey where the charismatic figure of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is said to epitomize Turkish nationalism in most of its aspects. Hence, it is instructive to examine our data to ascertain what percentage of the sample of Turkish married couples in villages, towns, cities and metropolitan areas (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir) designated Ataturk and other types of individuals as a first or second choice for the person most admired. These data are presented in Table 1.

Several basic patterns are etched quite clearly in these data. First, there is an appreciably greater tendency in the metropolitan areas than in the villages to name Ataturk as the person most admired. This pattern is accompanied by a reduction in the tendency to name a religious or familial personage as the individual most admired, a finding that lends initial credence to the hypothesis

⁹Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 91.

Table 1

Person Most Admired, by Sex and Community of Residence^a

<u>Person Admired</u>	<u>Husbands</u>				<u>Wives</u>			
	<u>Vill.</u>	<u>Town</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Metro.</u>	<u>Vill.</u>	<u>Town</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Metro.</u>
Ataturk	36%	51%	49%	57%	17%	22%	30%	36%
Political & Military	35	45	23	33	12	18	25	22
Religious	27	27	18	10	19	15	11	3
Family and Friends	67	53	64	53	100	99	86	93
Other (including Don't Know)	36	24	36	48	52	47	47	48
"N"	(1120)	(327)	(264)	(316)	(1120)	(327)	(264)	(316)

^a Percentages are the sum of the first and second choice percentage figures. Thus the columns should total 200% except for rounding variations. The number of husbands and wives has been made equal through random rejection procedures although in the original samples a few married persons entered singly.

that these may be competitive rather than complementary loyalties in contemporary Turkey.¹⁰ The particular significance of Ataturk as a nationalistic symbol in Turkey is possibly reflected in the fact that the incidence of selection of other political and military figures does not vary according to place of residence in the marked fashion of the Ataturk variation.

The table also portrays quite vividly the relationship between national identification and sex, with family circumstances essentially controlled. Village and town males are about twice as likely as their wives to focus upon Ataturk as an object of personal admiration. This difference between the sexes remains prominent

¹⁰ This inference is far from automatic since, with the answers to only five exclusive alternatives percentaged, a rise in any one has to be attended by a drop in some of the others. The point is that this drop occurs disproportionately in the religious and familial categories, not, for instance, in the percentage of replies referring to other political, military, or governmental figures.

among the city and metropolitan samples but at a reduced level. Close inspection of the table will suggest that there is a clear and plausible association between increasingly urban residence and reduced attitudinal differences between the sexes. It seems from these and many other data that one aspect of "development" or "modernization" is a striking lowering of many pronounced sex-role differences that typify traditional ways of life.

Put very simply, Table 1 suggests that urban residence and being male are both associated with a heightened sense of national identification. Another survey offers us the possibility of a second look at these phenomena. In 1959 the author and his colleagues carried out a national sample survey of the basic value systems of students in Turkey's lycee (high school) level schools.¹¹ This 1959 lycee survey included two questions related to national identification that were also inserted into the 1962 study of Turkish villagers. One of these questions was, "What two persons in all the world, living or dead, do you most admire?" The other question asked the respondents to indicate what they considered to be the two outstanding characteristics of Turks as people. The latter question refers to another basic aspect of national identification, viz., the perception of other members of the same nation who have distinctive and shared characteristics. Weinstein, for example, in his sample from the midwestern United States, notes the development of the child's sense of national identity as it passes, at about age nine, from a vague notion of national ownership of the country to a sense of similarity and mutual involvement with other members of that country. "National identity is not merely a matter of possession any longer. It now involves an identification with a group and the goals of that group."¹² Similarly,

¹¹ This study, still unpublished, was conducted by Frederick W. Frey, George W. Angell, Jr., and Abdurrahman S. Sanay, with the cooperation of the Test and Research Bureau of the Turkish Ministry of Education.

¹² Weinstein, loc. cit., p. 172.

Hess and Torney speak of the development of a sense of "we" and "ours" as opposed to "they" and "theirs" as essential to the process of national identification.¹³ This question was intended to tap just such an aspect of the identification process. A comparison of the replies to both these questions given by the lycee students and the village respondents who were in the 16-19 year old age group, with sex and literacy controlled, is furnished in Table 2.

Table 2

Persons Most Admired by Turkish Lycee-Level Students
and Village Youth (Aged 16-19) ^a

<u>Persons Admired</u>	<u>Males</u>			<u>Females</u>		
	<u>Lycee Students</u>	<u>Village Literates</u>	<u>Village Illits.</u>	<u>Lycee Students</u>	<u>Village Literates</u>	<u>Village Illits.</u>
Ataturk	80%	58%	23%	71%	50%	11%
Political	28	58	42	17	52	26
Military	12	8	4	6	3	--
Religious	7	16	7	3	4	4
Family and Friends	21	34	48	42	64	82
Other	32	2	2	38	--	3
Don't Know	20	24	74	23	27	74
"N"	(1370)	(211)	(57)	(477)	(86)	(181)

^aAll percentages are for first and second choices combined.

The differences in national orientation between the groups of young people displayed in Table 2 are even more striking than those previously presented. The lycee-level students are markedly more inclined than the village youth to nominate Ataturk as a person most admired. However, as I shall emphasize later, the literate villagers resemble the lycee students in this respect much more than the literate villagers resemble the illiterate villagers, re-

¹³Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 81.

ardless of sex. This pattern suggests that differences in national identification may be more associated with discrepancies in education and communication than with urban versus rural residence per se.

Other aspects of the patterning of responses reveal the underlying cognitive aspects of the identification process. Note that the peasant youths are more likely to award admiration to family and friends. They seem to have a more parochial cast of characters from which to draw. They are also less able to designate someone whom they admire. These cognitive limitations (i.e., restricted reference and inability to designate) are particularly pronounced among the illiterates and most common among the female respondents.

Table 3

Perceived Main Characteristics of Turks as People, Students and Villagers (16-19)^a

<u>Main Characteristics of Turks as People</u>	<u>Males</u>			<u>Females</u>		
	<u>Lycee Students</u>	<u>Village Literates</u>	<u>Village Illits.</u>	<u>Lycee Students</u>	<u>Village Literates</u>	<u>Village Illits.</u>
Intellectual	4%	6%	4%	4%	13%	16%
Strength and Heroism	68	30	7	62	29	6
Nationalism	28	16	4	24	9	2
Hospitality	15	7	6	21	4	2
Morals and Ethics	19	21	16	20	31	30
Religion	7	32	16	5	34	17
Other	19	26	9	16	28	20
Don't Know and Refusal	40	62	138	48	52	107
"N"	(1370)	(211)	(57)	(477)	(86)	(181)

^aAll percentages are for first and second choices combined.

Similar comments are occasioned by Table 3 which depicts the responses to the question, "What are the two main characteristics of Turks as people?" A considerable degree of consensus is found in the answers of the lycee-level students. Roughly three of every

five students pictured Turks as being distinctive in terms of strength, willpower and heroism. The most common reply within this category was heroism (kahramanlık), and even superficial contact with Turkish culture points up the near ubiquity of this self-conception among educated Turks. Among the village respondents, however, such consensus is lacking. A large portion of these young people, particularly the illiterates, seemed to be unable to conceive of distinctive traits of Turks. And those who were able to venture a reply perceived outstanding Turkish qualities to lie more often in the moral and religious realms than in a domain related to heroism or nationalism. The response profile for the literates once again resembles that of the lycee students more than does the illiterate profile, probably suggesting the direction in which village orientations will move as the rural sector of the society becomes increasingly literate. In several respects, both Table 2 and Table 3 point to national identification as a process of stretching the mind and of abstraction for peasant youth in Turkey, just as it is for the elementary school children who have been studied in industrial societies. All in all, the answer as to whether Turkish peasants are different from their urban compatriots in their tendencies toward national identification would have to be clearly affirmative. The problem now becomes that of comprehending the reasons for demonstrably lower levels of national identification among the rural portions of Turkish society.

Variations in National Identification Within the Peasantry

Thus far, we have observed that village Turks display a lower incidence of nationalistic sentiments than their countrymen resident in towns, cities and metropolitan areas, and that village youths seem to be notably less oriented toward the nation than the largely urban young people attending public lycee-level schools in Turkey. Although less domestic variation in national identification might be found in many industrial societies, it is hardly startling that peasants should have this characteristic. A similar relationship is probably to be found in most emerging nations. Fundamental elite-

mass differences are a hallmark of the developing society.

The paramount task at present is to gain insight into why the village sector of Turkish society manifests less national identification than other sectors. Can one leap to the convenient conclusion that there is something about agriculture as an occupation or about rural residence that produces such attitudinal differences? Or must we probe more deeply in order to discover the environmental and personal factors promoting nationalism?

These questions can be partially answered by exploiting the fact that peasants are not all alike, even though the peasantry as a whole differs significantly in many respects from the remainder of Turkish society. Rural Turkey is no monolith, and it is not the case that to know one peasant or one village is to know them all. Most germane to the present investigation is the fact that Turkish peasants vary markedly in their expression of feelings of national identification. Such differences have already been depicted in preceding tables in terms of sex and literacy. A broader panorama of the degrees of national identification expressed by different types of peasant respondents is offered in Table 4. Two of the three items presented there have been previously described: naming the two people, living or dead, most admired, and stating the two main characteristics of the Turks as people. The third item included in Table 4 was a question asking, "Of the following different kinds of loyalties, which would you say is the most important to teach a child -- loyalty to the nation, to the province, to the village, or to the family?" Since, in pre-testing, many respondents insisted on saying, "all of them," we created a separate category for that response as well.¹⁴ To sim-

¹⁴ Most writers on nationalism have included as part of national identification "...a willingness to grant their community (the nation) a primary and terminal loyalty." Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), p.3.

Obviously, the question excludes other possibly prominent loyalties, perhaps most conspicuously that to religion or the church and that to the occupation or profession. The former was excluded because of fears of sensitivity and the latter because of the relative occupational homogeneity of the population. It should also be noted that the most important loyalty to teach children may be different from the loyalty regarded as generally most important, although my judgment is that there would be virtually no difference in this case. The question seemed to

Table 4

Replies to Three National Identification Items by Selected Respondent Types^a

<u>Respondent Type</u>	<u>Preferred Loyalty</u>				<u>Person Most Admired</u>				<u>Turk Charac-</u> <u>teristics</u>
	<u>"N"</u>	<u>Nation</u>	<u>Family</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Ata-turk</u>	<u>Reli-gion</u>	<u>Family</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
Total Sample	(6436)	47%	34%	21%	32%	15%	50%	51%	80%
Males	(3010)	59%	31%	18%	47%	20%	32%	30%	70%
Females	(3311)	37	36	24	19	10	66	70	90
Age 16-19	(635)	46%	36%	17%	36%	11%	55%	48%	77%
20-29	(1587)	49	36	14	34	14	53	46	73
40-49	(831)	51	32	18	37	17	45	52	70
60-69	(510)	45	31	27	27	18	46	60	89
Village size:									
1-99	(302)	41%	35%	32%	29%	22%	52%	60%	77%
200-399	(1223)	47	34	20	31	14	44	56	79
400-599	(1284)	47	32	19	32	14	53	50	79
600-999	(1662)	48	34	18	31	15	53	51	78
1000-1999	(1556)	49	33	15	39	14	45	47	69
Urban Proximity ^b :									
20-49 km.	(698)	51%	33%	17%	29%	15%	45%	63%	89%
50-99 km.	(1555)	49	36	16	36	14	46	50	79
100- - km.	(3740)	48	33	21	32	17	54	48	75
Region:									
North Central	(930)	45%	33%	32%	33%	12%	45%	59%	92%
Aegean	(928)	58	36	9	42	11	57	34	90
Marmara	(534)	53	37	9	40	15	61	39	75
Mediterranean	(659)	51	33	23	33	9	14	78	98
Northeastern	(484)	55	34	3	28	20	74	20	21
Southeastern	(617)	43	27	57	18	42	50	49	82
Black Sea	(1128)	44	35	12	27	12	72	42	61
East Central	(623)	38	34	19	33	14	24	83	119
South Central	(529)	46	33	9	39	12	37	53	65
Male Literates	(1465)	62%	35%	7%	59%	20%	27%	19%	49%
Male Illiterates	(1227)	55	27	28	35	21	37	45	88
Female Literates	(304)	47	40	9	43	4	56	33	48
Female Illiterates	(2836)	36	35	26	16	11	66	74	90
Headman (<u>Muhtar</u>)	(424)	70%	33%	14%	65%	22%	20%	17%	41%
Religious Leader (<u>Imam</u>)	(335)	63	36	8	52	47	26	20	42

^aAll percentages refer to combined first and second choices that total 200%.

^bThe cell of respondents living in villages within twenty kilometers of the nearest city over 50,000 in population was too small for detailed analysis.

plify an extensive table, only the most relevant reply categories have been included.

The data of Table 4 provide only an initial exploration of the terrain and, although they are often highly suggestive, they are too gross to warrant detailed discussion here. Like most rough maps, they are useful only to tell us where it would seem fruitful to reconnoiter in depth. For instance, the data do not show very striking discrepancies in national identification according to village size or the proximity of the village to the nearest city with a population over fifty thousand. Some variations in the expected directions do occur, but they are slight compared with the range of variation in terms of other variables presented in the table. On the whole, the same can be said of age differences.

In contrast to the relatively exiguous variations found according to village size, urban proximity and respondent age, vivid regional differences do appear and both sex and literacy seem quite strongly associated with orientations toward the nation. In general, the regional variations reveal that the more modern coastal and western areas of Turkey exhibit greater national identification than the more traditional interior and eastern regions. The main exception to this pattern is the Northeastern Region. Other notable facets of these data are the heightened religiosity of the inhabitants of the Southeastern Region together with the lower saliency of Ataturk in that same area, and the rather high incidence of "don't know" responses in the East Central Region, another less-developed area in many respects.

A glance at that portion of the table where data for sex and literacy together are presented yields an initial opportunity to compare the relative influence of these two critical factors. Sex seems slightly more significant than literacy with regard to awarding priority in loyalty to the nation, whereas literacy appears to outweigh sex with regard to expressing admiration for Ataturk and

"take" better (be more comprehensible and have more impact) in the present form. Finally, some respondents had difficulty with the very concept of "loyalty," so that this item may be less discriminating than one should like.

being able to furnish some idea as to main characteristics of Turks as people.

Finally, the data permit us to compare two strategic elite roles in village life -- the headman and the religious leader -- with other types of villagers. Although only two thirds of the headmen were literate, we see that they display a somewhat greater tendency than the male literates to give loyalty to the nation, to admire Ataturk and to offer some idea of the main characteristics of Turks. On the other hand, the religious leaders, of whom nine tenths were literate, do not differ appreciably from the male literates in loyalty preferences and tend to admire Ataturk less and religious figures more, although they too have a superior ability to indicate some main characteristics of Turks as people. All told, these data hint at the relevance of socio-political role for adult tendencies toward national identification. As one might expect, an official position seems to enhance the propensity toward national identification. Even though these are local elites, they are the main link between the village and the official super-structure.

Mass Media Exposure and National Identification

From Gabriel Tarde, a writer who influenced Ziya Gökalp and other early Turkish nationalists, to modern social scientists such as Karl Deutsch, many writers have described an important role for the mass media in inculcating sentiments of nationalism.¹⁵ Two of our three basic items tapping national identification (person most admired and preferred loyalty) have been subjected to a detailed analysis in terms of their associations with exposure to the three major mass media of Turkey -- cinema, radio and newspaper. This analysis essentially involved dichotomizing the degrees of exposure to each medium and then creating an eightfold typology of all possible exposure patterns over the three media, ranging from highly exposed to all three media to poorly exposed to all three. Thus,

¹⁵On Tarde, see, e.g., Niyazi Berkes (ed.), Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 71. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York: The Technology Press and John Wiley & Sons, 1953).

exposure to any two of the three media could be held roughly constant and only exposure to the third medium varied. Moreover, in this analysis sex, literacy and language (Turkish speakers only were considered) were also controlled. A significant positive association (using the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test) was found between stressing loyalty to the nation and radio exposure ($p < .001$) and also between the same attitude and cinema exposure ($p < .05$), but no significant association was found with newspaper exposure. For the item inquiring about the person most admired, it was found that radio exposure was positively associated with admiration for Ataturk ($p < .05$) as was cinema exposure ($p < .01$), but that again there was no significant association between this response and newspaper exposure. Exposure to all three of these media was individually and significantly associated with a reduced tendency to answer "don't know" to both items.

It must be emphasized that these associations with media exposure hold after controls for sex, literacy, language, and exposure to the other two of the three media were introduced. It would seem that differential exposure to the radio and cinema in rural Turkey relate to sentiments of national identification at a level beyond that predicted by their association with literacy and sex alone. Conversely, we found that the association between being male and stressing loyalty to the nation or admiration for Ataturk persisted even after controls for literacy, media exposure and language were introduced, and that literacy also remained significantly associated with admiration for Ataturk after such controls, but that its association with a preference for national loyalty disappeared. Such findings bear upon the critical question for rural development of whether literacy has any psychic impact upon people that is not fully attributable to its association with increased mass media exposure. These and other data indicate that the answer to this question is definitely yes, in many but not all attitudinal areas. The task for the social scientist concerned with development is to

chart the areas of impact and those of no impact.

Formal Education and National Identification

An analysis roughly similar to that just described was also made to ascertain the relationship between exposure to the formal school system (i.e., having attended school) and national orientations. With sex, literacy and language again controlled, a modest but consistent residual relationship between formal education and heightened tendencies to prefer national loyalty and to admire Ataturk were found. The school in rural Turkey seems to play a pronounced role in increasing national identification. Its major influence would seem to come through teaching literacy; but it appears also to inculcate nationalistic sentiments (if I may be permitted a technically undemonstrated causal inference) beyond the level to be expected from literacy alone. In fact, our analyses have indicated that this is one of the very few areas in which the village schools have a clear impact above that associated with literacy. The data for the two items discussed are presented in Table 5. It should be pointed out that there was no significant relationship between exposure to formal schooling, given the designated controls, and ability to state two main characteristics of Turks as people.

Age, Role and National Identification

Age, sex and literacy are very closely related to each other in village Turkey -- so much so that it is dangerous to analyze one of the three variables without controlling for the other two. Males and young people tend to be appreciably more literate than females and older people. All of our data have been inspected utilizing simultaneous controls for sex, literacy and four age groupings. Such procedures indicate that, in general, age is not importantly related to nationalistic sentiments. Sex and literacy are much more strongly associated than age with nationalistic responses to the three items we have been examining. Having made this general comment, I should report that a few minor patterns did

Table 5

Formal Schooling and National Identification, Controlling for Sex, Literacy and Language

	<u>Admire Ataturk</u>	<u>Prefer Loyalty to the Nation</u>
Male Literates:		
No education (373)	41%	35%
3 years or less (269)	44	39
More than 3 years (776)	51	41
Male Illiterates: ^a		
No education (1106)	31%	39%
3 years or less (127)	33	46
Female Literates: ^a		
3 years or less (95)	27%	23%
More than 3 years (224)	40	34
Female Illiterates:		
No education (2310)	12%	22%
3 years or less (276)	22	23
More than 3 years (44)	27	30

^aThe cells for the male illiterates with more than three years of schooling and the female literates with no education have been dropped because they were too small for reliable analysis (20 to 26 respondents, respectively).

emerge in these voluminous data. One can usually perceive a small but consistent tendency for nationalism to increase with age as one moves from the 16-19 year old group, through the 20-29 year old group to the 30-49 year old contingent. Then, however, there is usually a decline in nationalism among the peasants aged fifty or over, although that group is still ordinarily slightly more nationalistic than the youngest group of respondents.

My impression -- and it must remain only that because of insufficient data for a further test -- is that two counteracting forces are at work to blunt the relationship between age and national identification. The data suggest that playing a rela-

tively active role in the political power structure of the community is positively associated with nationalism, especially for males. The ability of a villager to play this role depends significantly upon his age. Having what the villagers regard as mature years, (let us say, roughly, being over thirty) is a necessary although far from sufficient claim for community influence. The 16-19 year olds, and even most of the 20-29 year olds, have not yet moved into positions of political and social leadership in their villages and do not yet have the role pressures that bear on village leaders to have attitudes on political matters. The same is true for village women, especially the illiterate majority, and the relationship between age and national identification is weaker among this group. Hence, my contention is that young people do tend to be more prone to national identification, for many reasons too involved to delineate here, but that these tendencies are damped by their lesser role-responsibility for political leadership in the village. If one could control for such role differences, the relationship between age and national identification should increase in strength.¹⁶

Some confirmatory (but far from clinching) evidence for this argument is at hand in cross-tabulations between items dealing with sense of local and national efficacy felt by the respondents and their nomination of Ataturk as the person most admired. The villagers were asked what they could do about an unjust action contemplated by local and national authorities. Any answer presenting some positive reaction, i.e., other than "I could do nothing" and "I don't know" was classified as efficacious. Our hypothesis is that

¹⁶In two states in India, Elder found that age was rather strongly related to national identification. He even suggests that the quality of nationalism depended on generational (pre-independence vs. post-independence) orientations. Our data from Turkey reveal no such generational cleavage among Turkish peasants, although my impression is that it does exist among the elite. Otherwise, Elder's Indian findings strongly resemble those described for Turkey. See, Joseph W. Elder, "National Loyalties in a Newly Independent Nation," in David Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 77-92, and "Socialization to National Identification: Indian Students," Paper presented at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, N.Y., September 6-10, 1966.

the more efficacious individuals, who are assumed to be those more likely to exercise leadership roles, will prove to be more nationalistic (i.e., designate Ataturk as the person most admired), after sex and literacy are controlled. These data are exhibited in Table 6.

Table 6

Political Efficacy by Selection of Ataturk as the Person Most Admired^a

<u>Sense of Efficacy</u>	<u>Males</u>		<u>Females</u>	
	<u>Literates</u>	<u>Illiterates</u>	<u>Literates</u>	<u>Illiterates</u>
Some <u>local</u> efficacy	50%	33%	39%	16%
No <u>local</u> efficacy	33	26	28	10
Some <u>national</u> efficacy	56%	35%	43%	17%
No <u>national</u> efficacy	44	30	33	12

^aThe number of respondents on whom each of the cell percentages is based as follows:

1173	889	253	1471
245	364	92	1159
343	261	105	644
1075	992	240	1986

Secondly, our findings related to age and national identification seem impressionistically and intriguingly to resemble the findings made regarding American school children. Hess and Torney found that I.Q. essentially acted to accelerate the political socialization of their respondents.¹⁷ We have no similar I.Q. measures for the Turkish peasantry, but one can argue that literacy is something of an analogue in the sense that it is clearly associated with augmented cognitive flexibility, empathic capacity, knowledge, and

¹⁷Op. cit., Chapter V.

so on. Our data indicate that literacy is markedly associated with heightened politicization (including national identification). Unfortunately for our immediate purposes, literacy also confers prestige and influence in the village community. The point of these perhaps cryptic remarks is that one of the most distinct age-related differences among our respondents was that between the 16-19 year old males who were literate and the same age group among the male illiterates. The latter group clearly had not yet assumed adult status in many respects, while the equally youthful male literates much more resembled their adult counterparts. In short, literacy seems to expedite the assumption of adult positions, both psychologically and in terms of status and influence. This is true for national identification as well as for other aspects of politicization.

It may be useful to summarize the findings to this point regarding social background and environmental factors, on the one hand, and tendencies toward national identification, on the other. I shall do this by presenting the appropriate variables one at a time, giving the gross hypothesis related to that variable in parentheses, followed by the findings.

Age: (Age will be negatively associated with nationalism.) Quite weak relationship in the opposite direction -- nationalism increases rather than decreases with age, except that there is a drop in nationalism in the oldest age group.

Sex: (Males will be more nationalistic than females.) Definitely confirmed. Such a finding is particularly interesting when compared with the consistent findings of Hess and Torney, Jahoda, and Weinstein of no significant differences in national identification among male and female school children in the United States and Britain, although the items used in the different instruments are not identical and boys in most countries do show more tendency than girls to admire political figures.¹⁸

Literacy: (Literates will be more nationalistic than illiterates.) Definitely confirmed.

Education: (Education will be positively related to national identification.) If literacy is not controlled -- and inducing literacy is one of the prime tasks of the school -- the hypothesis is strongly

¹⁸Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 308; Jahoda, loc. cit., p. 48; Weinstein, loc. cit., p. 170.

confirmed. Moreover, with literacy controlled, exposure to the formal educational system is still rather weakly associated with heightened national identification for at least two of our three indicators.

Mass Media Exposure: (Mass Media exposure will be positively related to national identification.) Definitely confirmed, even when sex and literacy are controlled. If particular media are inspected, cinema exposure seems to be most strongly linked with national identification, then radio and then newspaper exposure.

Geographic Mobility (Travel): (Mobility will be positively associated with national identification.) When sex and literacy are controlled, there is a clear but weak confirmation of the hypothesis. But when mass media exposure is also controlled, very little of that association remains.

Land Ownership: (Peasants who own their own land will be more nationalistic than others.) Not confirmed. No significant relationship in either direction when sex and literacy are controlled.

Economic Status: (Increased economic well-being will be positively associated with national identification.) Not confirmed. No significant relationship when sex and literacy are controlled.

Linguistic Minority: (Members of linguistic minorities will exhibit less national identification than others.) Generally confirmed, although the difference was notably less than my subjective expectation.

Village Isolation: (Residents of physically more isolated villages will be less nationalistic than others.) A very weak relationship in the anticipated direction was found. The physical isolation of the villages, in the sense of travel time by the usual means of transportation from the nearest city, regularly travelled road, county seat, etc., seems not to be importantly related to national identification.

Village Mass Media Access: (Residents of villages with better mass media access will be more nationalistic.) Hypothesis confirmed, although personal factors clearly intervene between access to the media, use of the media, and national identification.

Village Development: (Residents in the better developed villages -- in the sense of having better media access, more facilities, and more services -- will be more nationalistic.) Weakly confirmed, after sex and literacy are controlled, as was done with all village indices.

Attitudinal Concomitants of National Identification

Approximately twenty-five attitudinal indices have been developed for the analysis of the peasant data, and validated largely through inter-item correlations. These indices deal with such orientations as willingness to accept communal responsibility for dealing with outstanding problems, tolerance of mildly deviant behavior, religious strictness, political empathy, personal political efficacy, feelings of communal efficacy regarding the ability of the respondent's village to handle its problems, levels of educational and occupational aspiration, knowledge of Turkey's major political parties, general optimism or pessimism, mistrust of external agencies and actors, desire for political participation, and so on. There is insufficient space to present data on all these indices as they impinge on national identification. Instead, the highlights of the most interesting relationships will be discussed.

One of the chief findings is the conspicuous relationship between indices that tap cognitive flexibility and measures of national identification. By cognitive flexibility I refer to a presumably general ability to restructure one's cognitive patterns, either through adding new perceptions or recasting existing linkages. This relationship between cognitive flexibility and national identification should not be surprising, for although strong national identification sometimes seems to be associated with rigidity and parochialism in industrial societies, its psychic significance for peasants seems rather different. For them national identification ordinarily constitutes an expansion of their horizons, a learning of a more abstract identity -- perhaps the first extra-village allegiance of any major consequence. The relative readiness for this broader identification and the ease with which it is made seem to depend to no small degree on the level of cognitive flexibility of the individual. Hence we find that national identification, after sex and literacy are controlled, is associated with greater empathy, propensity to innovate, aspiration levels, and

knowledge. It is associated with reduced external mistrust and religious strictness (among males).

In this connection, an additional point must be made. As will be shown in more detail in a moment, one of the indices most strongly associated with the national identification items was an index of political party knowledge. This strong relationship symbolizes the manifold indications in our data that national identification is merely one aspect of a broader process that we have labelled "politicization." However, our data show very few signs of any increased propensity to make demands upon government or even of any increased desire for greater political participation associated with heightened national identification. Doob makes the distinction between "patriotism" and "nationalism," with the former essentially representing commitment to the nation and the latter representing demands for political action flowing from that commitment. Although Turkish peasants are clearly beginning to increase their demands on Turkish government, our data indicate very little association if any between sentiments of national identification and the presence of those demands. Once again, those in the early stages of national identification in industrial societies, the school children, seem to become oriented to participation in and a demand for a beneficial return from the formal political system only late in the politicization process and well after basic national identification has been established. Child or adult, West or East, the phasing of the national identification process seems similar.

The data do not permit a good test of whether national identification is associated with an increased willingness to make sacrifices for perceived national goals. One presumably relevant index assesses willingness to have one's village assume responsibility at least jointly with government for meeting outstanding village problems, rather than foisting such problems entirely upon government. No clear association between national identifi-

cation and communal responsibility so defined was found. Similarly, another index was designed to measure communal cooperativeness, or willingness to contribute personally to village improvement projects and the like. No relationship at all was found between national identification and this measure. Finally, we also found no association between preferring national loyalty and expressed willingness to accept recommendations from a governmental specialist, after sex, literacy and language were controlled. This expressed willingness ran very high in the sample (80-90%). However, a more thorough analysis with more pertinent items would be necessary to be very confident of understanding these relationships. I might add that we also have found very little evidence that national identification is associated with a tendency to look outside the village for various kinds of leadership. Literacy and mass media exposure do seem to be associated with such a tendency; but when these factors are controlled there is no residual association with national identification.

Ordering the Association Between Selected Factors and National Identification

The analyses presented thus far have indicated significant but not over-powering associations between a number of different background and attitudinal factors, on the one hand, and national identification, on the other. Fuller understanding of the processes leading to national identification requires that we secure some notion of the relative potency of each of these influential factors and obtain measures of the strength of their association with national identification. There are many ways of going about such an analysis, all of which have merits and flaws. If one is willing to assume that nominal or, at best, ordinal data are actually interval data, or to dichotomize all items, one can employ standard correlational and regression techniques. We have not felt content to rest our analyses upon such assumptions, and so we have cast about for other approaches to this problem. One of the most promising new tacks for

social science data analysis would seem to be based upon reduction of uncertainty principles that have emerged from mathematical information theory. Essentially, these techniques involve quantifying the amount of predictive uncertainty regarding some dependent variable (in this case, national identification), and ascertaining how much that uncertainty is reduced by knowledge of designated independent variables. Obviously, the stronger the correlation between the two variables, the greater the reduction of uncertainty, with complete reduction of uncertainty if the two variables are perfectly associated. The two great merits of such an approach are that it assumes only nominal rather than interval data and that it has a very clear intuitive meaning. Applied to national identification, the approach involves measuring how much error there would be in the prediction of the national identification of each of our respondents if we knew only the overall sample distribution (the marginals) as opposed to how much error there would be if we also knew, let us say, the respondent's literacy, education, age, or awareness of political parties.¹⁹

Such an analysis has been performed for each of the three items we have been using to tap national identification: person most admired, preferred loyalty, and a sense of some main characteristics of Turks as people. Table 7 portrays the ranking of eleven independent variables in terms of the relative amount of zero order uncertainty reduction in the designated dependent variable associated with each independent variable. In this fashion, the best predictor (uncertainty reducer) for preferred loyalty was cinema exposure, followed by sex, and so on. The final column gives a composite average ranking of the independent variables across all three items.

We see from this table that, on the whole, the best of these predictors of national identification is another psychological factor -- political party knowledge. As I have already indicated, national identification seems to be part of a more comprehensive

¹⁹A very useful introduction to these approaches is found in Fred Attneave, Applications of Information Theory to Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1959). I am indebted to Carl Hensler for calling this technique to my attention and for preparing, with William Selles, a computer program for its use.

Table 7

Rank Orderings of Selected Variables According to Their Reduction of Predictive Uncertainty for Each of Three National Identification Items

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Preferred Loyalty</u>	<u>Person Admired</u>	<u>Characteristics of Turks</u>	<u>Composite Composite</u>
Political Party Knowledge	3.5	1	1	1
Cinema Exposure	1	2	4	2
Literacy	3.5	4	2	3
Sex	2	3	10	4
Radio Exposure	5	6	6	5
Newspaper Exposure	6	7	5	6
Education	7	5	7	7.5
Aspiration Level	8	8	3	7.5
External Mistrust	9.5	9	8	9
Language	9.5	10	11	10
Age	11	11	9	11

Preferred Loyalty	--	11	9.5	
Person Admired	3	--	1	
Characteristics of Turks	8	5	--	

process of politicization. (Incidentally, the psychological indices selected for inclusion among the eleven independent variables were those which previous analysis indicated were probably most strongly related to national identification.)

The next best predictors of national identification are three background factors: cinema exposure, literacy and sex. It is interesting that sex is relatively good as a predictor of preferred loyalty and person most admired, but that it is not nearly so effective as a predictor of the peasant's ability to name two main characteristics of his compatriots.

While the uncertainty reduction associated with nearly all the independent variables is statistically significant ($p < .05$), and while the percentage differences revealed when these relationships are expressed as cross-tabulations are quite respectable (always more

than ten percentage points), the percentage reduction in uncertainty associated with any single independent variable is not large. The best predictors for preferred-loyalty, person-admired, and main-characteristics-of-Turks reduced uncertainty 2%, 5% and 6%, respectively. If we proceed by selecting the best predictor, partialling out its effects, selecting the next best predictor, and so on, and ascertain the cumulative reduction in uncertainty thereby produced, we find that the best eight independent variables reduce the uncertainty for the same three items 12%, 17% and 17%.²⁰

One should also observe that the rank orderings produced by the three national identification items are very similar (the Coefficient of Concordance, W , is 0.77). Within this general similarity, the ranking for person-most-admired is closest to the overall ranking, suggesting that perhaps this item tapped a more central psychological element in the orientation toward national identification than the others. Another indication pointing in the same direction is provided at the bottom of Table 7, below the dotted line. There we have presented the rank positions of each of the three national identification items in an expanded set of thirteen variables including the eleven above and the appropriate two of the three identification items. In other words, the first column entries in this part of the table indicate that, if the person-most-admired and main-characteristics-of-Turks are thrown in with the other independent variables as potential predictors of preferred loyalty, person-admired is the third best predictor and characteristics-of-Turks is eighth. Inspection of this portion of the table reveals that person-admired is most strongly related to the other two national identification items, being the best predictor of awareness of the main characteristics of Turks and the third best predictor of preferred loyalty. Preferred-loyalty would place second among this triumvirate, and the characteristics-of-Turks

²⁰The last percentage reduction in uncertainty refers to only seven predictors. As successive predictors are used, the degrees of freedom expand rapidly, so that statistical significance is usually reduced and then lost. We have used as many successive predictors as possible (that is, eight, eight, and seven, respectively) until the significance level for the next predictor's reduction of uncertainty fell below $p < .05$.

item third. It is important to note that such a finding is again redolent of the conclusions coming from recent research on the political socialization of Western school children which show that initial relationships to the political system are highly personalized. Individual symbols seem to be the keystone around which a more profound and sophisticated national identification is constructed.

A National Index

Cross-tabulations indicated that a moderate but nonetheless clear association did exist between all three of the items we have employed to assess national identification. As was just demonstrated, the reduction of uncertainty analysis also pointed toward the same conclusion. Hence, it seemed at least tentatively worthwhile to combine the three items into an index of nationalism in an attempt to separate a sub-group of more thoroughly nationalistic respondents whose characteristics could be examined. At the same time, the modest nature of the inter-correlations between the three items should lead us to use this index with caution and should impress upon us the seemingly inchoate character of these sentiments.

Using this index, we distinguished a group of peasants who gave nationalistic responses to all three component items, and we ascertained how this group compared with the remainder of the sample along the dimensions provided by the forty indices devised for the general analysis of the survey data. The results were essentially the same as those previously reported for the individual items. The nationalists, after controls for sex and literacy were introduced, differed significantly from the residual group in displaying more political empathy, less religious strictness (especially males), greater mass media exposure (which may account for some of the other associations), stronger tendency to use government agricultural services (male farmers only), slightly more social wants (roads, schools, etc.), higher levels of occupational and educational aspiration, less mistrust of external actors and agencies, increased

use of social services (telephone, school, etc.), markedly higher knowledge of political parties, greater religious knowledge, greater general knowledge, and more frequent feelings of personal political efficacy. All these differences held for each of the four sex-literacy groups (except use of agricultural services, which applied to males only), and the percentage differences between the nationalists and others within such groups usually ran at about the ten percent level -- clear and significant, but not striking.

A reduction of uncertainty analysis was also performed, with the nationalism index, dichotomized as indicated above, as the dependent variable. Basically the same independent variables were employed as previously and the resulting rank ordering of these variables was as follows: Political Party Knowledge, Literacy, Cinema Exposure, Education, Sex, Newspaper Exposure, Radio Exposure, Aspiration Level, External Mistrust, Military Service, and Age. The uncertainty reduction associated with the single best predictor, Political Party Knowledge, was eight percent. Nine of these items, used successively and independently, reduced the total uncertainty twenty-two percent.

Conclusion

The general picture of national identification among the Turkish peasantry perceived through these data can be described as follows. As a group, peasants appear to be less oriented toward the nation than are more urbanized Turks. Particularly conspicuous differences in this respect were found between the potentially elite urban young people attending public lycee-level schools and village young people of approximately the same age. This difference in national orientation may contribute to the markedly different response tendencies that elite and mass elements display in Turkey. Political integration is difficult when appeals in terms of nationalism have such differential impact among major sectors of the population.

Recognizing these general differences between peasants and non-peasants, further significant variations in the intensity of national identification were also found within the peasant sector.

Many of these differences were related to social background characteristics. Mass media exposure, literacy and sex were among the factors most closely associated with national identification. Sex-role differences were extremely pronounced in the villages studied, and the political dimension constituted an important distinguishing component of the male role. One can locate "political man" among the Turkish peasantry, but "political woman" is not yet visible.

The appreciably stronger relationship between national identification and media exposure, literacy, education, and similar variables, in contrast to economic and environmental variables, seems to illuminate the critical cognitive aspects of the process of national identification. Need fulfillment and emotional urges alone will probably be inadequate to explain this process. For peasants, national identification involves a stretching of the mind, looking toward broader horizons than those previously known. Those peasants with more cognitive flexibility, probably acquired through greater exposure to change via the mass media, attending school, becoming literate, and travelling away from home, seem to make the transition to national identification more readily, over and above the thrust provided by specific communications directed at them by these institutions.

The relatively strong association between the peasant's knowledge of political parties and his national identification is another manifestation of the cognitive side of the identification process. National identification in rural Turkey seems to be part of a broader process of politicization that includes gaining knowledge of and identifying with other political agencies as well as the nation. Actually, one can contend that, for political development to proceed at all smoothly, certain patterns of institutional identification may have to prevail, and that a timed sequence of identifications becomes important. Where intermediate agencies such as political parties, interest groups, district and provincial representatives of the central government, and the like are important

to the orderly functioning of the political system, some knowledge of and identification with these agencies would seem needed. However, our data also suggest that for many peasants, identification moves from largely familial and village authorities to national figures and institutions without attendant awareness of and moderate attachment to the agencies that are supposed to mediate between the local and national levels. The more cognitively flexible villagers make such bridging identifications more readily than other villagers. In fact, cognitive flexibility seems to make better sense of most of our data, political or economic, than virtually any other organizing psychological rubric.

Finally, attention was drawn to parallels between findings regarding the socialization to national identification among Western school children and among Turkish peasants. Although the data from the pertinent studies do not permit close comparability, common features (such as the tendency to personalize the political system, the tendency for affect often to precede an ability explicitly to justify that affect, and the tendency for cognitive flexibility as measured by I.Q. or literacy to accelerate the politicization process), seem to indicate important uniformities of process. If a handy label helps, it might be said that we are referring to the psychology of inexperience. People who are moving into a new, more diverse and more extensive world, where broader identifications are required, may well proceed by similar psychic paths regardless of culture, age or status.